

JPRS-UMA-87-028

13 MAY 1987

# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No 12, DECEMBER 1986

19990428 088

SPECIAL NOTICE INSIDE

Reproduced From  
Best Available Copy

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A**  
Approved for Public Release  
Distribution Unlimited

**FBIS**

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

SPECIAL NOTICE

Effective 1 June 1987 JPRS reports will have a new cover design and color, and some reports will have a different title and format. Some of the color changes may be implemented earlier if existing supplies of stock are depleted.

The new cover colors will be as follows:

CHINA.....aqua  
EAST EUROPE.....gold  
SOVIET UNION.....salmon  
EAST ASIA.....yellow  
NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA...blue  
LATIN AMERICA.....pink  
WEST EUROPE.....ivory  
AFRICA (SUB-SAHARA).....tan  
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY.....gray  
WORLDWIDES.....pewter

The changes that are of interest to readers of this report are as follows:

USSR reports will become SOVIET UNION reports.

The USSR REPORT: NATIONAL ECONOMY will be titled SOVIET UNION/ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (UEA).

The USSR REPORT: POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS will be titled SOVIET UNION/POLITICAL AFFAIRS (UPA).

The following Soviet journals will be added to those which are already issued in separate series:

EKO: ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION (UEO)  
THE WORKING CLASS & THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (UWC)  
PEOPLES OF ASIA & AFRICA (UAA)  
MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL (UMJ)  
FOREIGN MILITARY REVIEW (UFM)  
AVIATION & COSMONAUTICS (UAC)  
SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES (USS)

If any subscription changes are desired, U.S. Government subscribers should notify their distribution contact point. Nongovernment subscribers should contact the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161.

#### NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

#### PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

13 MAY 1987

USSR REPORT  
MILITARY AFFAIRS

MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No 12, December 1986

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL.

CONTENTS

DECISIONS OF THE 27TH CPSU CONGRESS IN LIFE

Patriotic and International Indoctrination of the Soviet Military (pp 3-10)  
(Editorial) (not translated)

SOVIET MILITARY ART

1941 Battle of Moscow Recounted (pp 11-21) . . . . . 1  
(N.G. Andronikov)

Achieving Success With Overall Enemy Superiority in Forces (pp 22-29) . . . . . 15  
(B.I. Nevzorov)

PARTY POLITICAL WORK

Features of Party Political Work in Battle of Moscow (pp 30-35) . . . . . 25  
(N.A. Maltsev)

UNKNOWN PAGES OF HISTORY

Archival Documents on Actions of soviet Troops at Moscow (pp 36-38) . . . . . 33  
(V.V. Tarakanov)

MILITARY LEADERS AND CHIEFS

MSU G.K. Zhukov: A Glorious General of the Great Patriotic War (pp 39-52) . . . . . 38  
(A.M. Mayorov)

|   |    |
|---|----|
| MSU K.K. Rokossovskiy (pp 53-58)<br>(D.D. Lelyushenko) . . . . .  | 53 |
| MASTERY AND HEROISM   |    |
| Sergeant's Heroism in DRA Discussed (pp 59-60)<br>(B.Ye. Pestov) . . . . .  | 60 |
| SCIENTIFIC PAPERS AND INFORMATION   |    |
| The Southern Boundary Lines and Their Role in the Defense of the Russian<br>State in the 16th-17th Centuries (pp 61-67)<br>(V.V. Kargalov) (not translated) |    |
| MILITARY HISTORY DATES  |    |
| A Famous Hero of the Civil War (pp 68-70)<br>(V.T. Roshchupkin) (not translated)  |    |
| Mar Engr Troops M.P. Vorobyev (pp 71-73)<br>(S.Kh. Aganov) (not translated)   |    |
| 30th Anniversary of Cuban Armed Forces Noted (pp 73-78)<br>(I.D. Statsenko, A.F. Shcheglov) . . . . .   | 63 |
| 45 Years of Yugoslav People's Army Celebrated (pp 79-84)<br>(N.I. Andreyev) . . . . .   | 72 |
| DIALOGUE WITH READERS   |    |
| A Review of Editor's Mail (pp 85-87)<br>(Unattributed) (not translated)   |    |
| FROM READER CONFERENCES   |    |
| In the Far Eastern Military District (pp 85-90)<br>(N.T. Aksenov) (not translated)  |    |
| INDEX OF ARTICLES FOR 1986 (pp 91-96)<br>(Unattributed) . . . . .   | 81 |

10272  
CSO: 1801/97

## 1941 BATTLE OF MOSCOW RECOUNTED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 86 (signed to press 18 Nov 86) pp 11-21

[Article by Col (Ret) N.G. Andronikov, winner of the USSR State Prize and candidate of military sciences: "The Dawn of a Great Victory (On the 45th Anniversary of the Defeat of the Nazi Troops at Moscow)"; published under the rubric "Soviet Military Art"]

[Text] The Battle of Moscow holds a special place among the major battles of the Great Patriotic War. Precisely here, at the approaches to the capital of the Soviet Union, the Nazi aggressors who had conquered virtually all of Europe suffered their first major defeat. The enemy plan for a "blitzkrieg" was once and for all thwarted. The defeat of the Wehrmacht's main shock forces marked the beginning to a fundamental change in the fate of the war. The dawn of our Great Victory had broken.

The Battle of Moscow lasted more than 6 months (30 September 1941 -- 20 April 1942). On both sides it involved enormous forces: more than 3 million men, over 22,000 guns and mortars, up to 3,000 tanks and over 2,000 aircraft. It developed in an area around 1,000 km long and was marked by exceptional intensity and fierceness.(1)

In the course of the stubborn defensive engagements on the far and near approaches to Moscow, the Soviet troops ground down and bled white the advancing Nazi hordes, they gained time for concentrating major reserves and created conditions which would favor the going over to a counteroffensive.

The counteroffensive was prepared and commenced in a tense situation, when the situation around Moscow had not yet stabilized and the Nazi Command was continuing its desperate attempts to take the Soviet capital.

The enemy which had suffered significant losses in the previous engagements before Moscow still remained a mighty force. By the beginning of December 1941, Army Group Center numbered 1,708,000 men (along with the air forces which were supporting the army group), around 13,500 guns and mortars, 1,170 tanks and 615 aircraft. Our troops consisting of the Kalinin, Western and the right wing of the Southwestern Fronts had around 1.1 million men, 7,700 guns and mortars, 774 tanks (including 222 medium and heavy) and 1,000 aircraft.(2)

Consequently, the enemy had maintained superiority over the Soviet troops in personnel, tanks and artillery and only for the number of airplanes did the Soviet grouping surpass the enemy by 1.6-fold.

In taking the decision to go over to a counteroffensive, our Supreme High Command considered above all that in moving close to Moscow, the enemy had created an extremely dangerous situation. The elimination of the threat to the capital was the prime political, economic and strategic task and a vital necessity to our state.

At the same time, in thoroughly analyzing the situation which had arisen on the front, Hq SHC [Headquarters Supreme High Command] was more and more convinced that, regardless of numerical superiority, the enemy's offensive capabilities were exhausted. This was particularly apparent at the end of November and the beginning of December 1941, when the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts in a series of strong counterstrikes forced the formations of Army Group Center to go over to the defensive and to retreat on a number of sectors. Soviet aviation had won operational air supremacy and this created better conditions for regrouping and concentrating the large reserves of our troops. At the same time, the offensive operations organized and conducted by Hq SHC in November-December on the flanks of the Soviet-German Front (at Tikhvin and Rostov), tied down the enemy forces and deprived it of the opportunity to shift reinforcements to Moscow. Under these conditions it was important not to miss a good moment for going over to a decisive counteroffensive, when the enemy would no longer be capable of advancing and had still not been able to dig in on the captured lines and regroup its forces for a strong defense.

In taking advantage of the dispersion of Army Group Center along the extensive front, Hq SHC concentrated our assault groupings and the main mass of combat equipment on its flanks. In truth, the shortage of men and weapons did not make it possible to establish a numerical superiority over the enemy on the axes of the main thrusts. However, this, to a certain degree, was made up for by the surprise start of the counteroffensive which was achieved primarily due to the fact that Hq SHC showed high art in the covert concentration of the strategic reserves as well as in the skillful choice of the time for going over without a pause from the defensive to the offensive.(3) Surprise was also aided by the fact that the Nazi Command, in underestimating our forces, as before was convinced of the Soviet Army's inability to initiate extensive offensive actions.

The counteroffensive was planned as a strategic offensive operation by a group of fronts and carried out in cooperation with the Air Forces and air defense forces. It involved the Kalinin and Western Fronts and the right wing of the Southwestern Front as well as aviation from the Moscow Defensive Zone, the VI Air Defense Fighter Corps, two air groups from the RVGK [Supreme High Command Reserve] and the long-range bomber aviation. The troops were given decisive aims: to defeat the enemy assault groupings, to eliminate the threat to Moscow and the Moscow Industrial Area, to seize the strategic initiative and create good conditions for a further offensive.

The overall plan for the counteroffensive was by simultaneous strikes by the armies of the Western Front in cooperation with the left wing of the Kalinin Front and the right wing of the Southwestern Front, to defeat the most dangerous enemy groupings advancing against Moscow from the north and from the south, to push the enemy troops back from the capital and subsequently to launch a strike against the entire Army Group Center.

The main role was assigned to the Western Front under the command of Army Gen G.K. Zhukov. Its troops, by a thrust against Klin, Solnechnogorsk and Istra, were to defeat the main enemy grouping on the right wing and by a thrust against Uzlovaya and Bogoroditsk in the flank and rear of Guderian's panzer army, to crush the enemy on the left wing of the front.

The troops of the Kalinin Front under the command of Col Gen I.S. Konev had the mission of attacking on the Turginovo axis, coming out in the rear of the Klin enemy grouping and together with troops on the right wing of the Western Front to destroy this grouping. Then they were to defeat the enemy Kalinin grouping and continue the offensive to Rzhev.

The Southwestern Front under the command of MSU S.K. Timoshenko with its right wing was to defeat the Yelets enemy grouping and, in advancing on the Orel axis, to assist the troops on the left wing of the Western Front.

A crucial role in the counteroffensive was assigned to the partisans in Kalinin, Tula, Smolensk and Orel Oblasts and in Belorussia. They, by fighting actively in the enemy rear, were to provide help to our troops in successfully carrying out the tasks confronting them.

For achieving the strategic aim and for carrying out the operation's missions, the most effective method of defeating the enemy was determined and this was the launching of concentrated thrusts against the flanks of both individual enemy groupings as well as the entire Army Group Center. The launching of flank attacks against the enemy required on the part of the advancing troops great intensity and skillful fluid and decisive actions under severe winter conditions.

A difficult problem was the preparation of the strategic reserves and the establishing of the assault groupings. This task was carried out in the course of the defensive engagements, when forces were needed to check the enemy advance. But the situation on the front demanded a rapid going over to the counteroffensive and the Soviet Command firmly carried out the adopted decision. Arriving in the capital in a growing flow were trains carrying troops, combat equipment, weapons, ammunition, winter clothing and food from the Urals, Siberia and Central Asia. Around Moscow, in addition to the 1st Assault Army, the 10th and 20th Armies which had previously been moved up here, by the beginning of December, formations of the 26th and 61st Armies were being concentrated behind the flanks of the Western Front. The constituted 24th Army and the arriving units of the 60th Army were incorporated as part of the Moscow Defensive Zone. Simultaneously, measures were taken to strengthen the fronts on the western sector with artillery, drafts of recruits and new troop formations.

The entire country participated in preparing for the counteroffensive. With the active support and help of the local party organizations and soviet bodies in all republics, krays and oblasts, the organizing the equipping of reserve formations were commenced. The party and Komsomol organizations of Moscow and Moscow Oblast by the end of 1941 had sent to the front some 114,000 communists and over 300,000 Komsomol members.(4) In Moscow, upon orders of Hq SHC, rocket launcher battalions and regiments were organized. At many Moscow plants, military equipment was repaired and small arms and mortar weapons and ammunition were produced. The entire nation collected warm clothing for the front. This helped improve the equipping of the Soviet soldiers in the winter of 1941-1942. The nationwide aid to the front further raised the morale of the defenders of Moscow and strengthened their confidence in the success of the forthcoming counteroffensive.

During the period of preparing for the offensive actions, enormous work in strengthening the combat spirit of the men was carried out by the command, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations of the units and formations. It was essential to quickly bring about a psychological shift in the awareness of the men and commanders who for long months had conducted stubborn defensive operations and to instill in them the confidence that the Nazi Army could not only be halted but also defeated. Special attention was paid to work with new recruits who had arrived in the operational army but had not yet participated in battle. It was explained to them that on the fields around Moscow a historic task would be carried out, a start would be made to the defeat of the Nazi invaders and to the liberation of the motherland.

Party political work was based on the party slogan "The Defeat of the Enemy Should Start at Moscow!" PRAVDA, in appealing to the defenders of the capital, on 27 November 1941 wrote: "A stronger blow and the overwhelmed enemy will not last! It has already been ground down in the previous fighting. It is tired. The time has come when it is possible to halt the enemy in order to shatter it."

In the troops there was stronger propaganda of the revolutionary and combat traditions of the Soviet people, the heroic past of the nation and its outstanding military leaders. The mass heroism of Soviet soldiers in the fighting around Moscow and on other sectors of the front was widely popularized. The bestial essence of Naziism was exposed, and the atrocities, depredations and violence of the Nazis on occupied Soviet land were described. Great work was carried out to strengthen the party organizations of the units and subunits which were on the forward edge. The political directorate of the Western Front, for example, sent around 2,200 communists from the rear subunits as political fighters for them.(5) The influx of soldiers into the party and Komsomol increased. All of this had a positive effect on increasing troop combat morale. Precisely the high political and morale state of the Soviet military was a basic advantage over the enemy.

The first days of December 1941 for the Soviet people became joyous days of a historic turn in the course of the Battle of Moscow. The reserve armies which had reached Moscow as well as the defending troops launched counterstrikes against the enemy and these began to develop into a counteroffensive. During the morning of 5 December, the troops of the Kalinin Front attacked the enemy



The Soviet troop counteroffensive caused confusion in the Nazi Command. The commanders of the 3d and 4th Panzer Groups and the 2d Panzer Army reported that the Soviet Army thrusts were growing stronger. For this reason, on 8 December 1941, Hitler was forced to sign Directive No. 39 on the going over of the German Armed Forces to the defensive along the entire Eastern Front. Army Group Center was given the mission of holding at any price the areas of important operational and military-economic significance.

The most stubborn fighting occurred to the northwest and south of Moscow, where the enemy panzer and motorized formations resisted stubbornly. During the first 5 or 6 days the advancing troops fought for the strongpoints and centers of resistance which the Nazis had been able to establish in the towns and villages. The rate of advance of many formations was initially low as there were not enough tanks and artillery and the deep snow cover impeded the maneuvering of infantry off the roads. In addition, our troops still did not have experience in conducting offensive operations.

Nevertheless, the Soviet troop counteroffensive continued to develop. The 29th and 31st Armies of the Kalinin Front (commanders, Maj Gens V.I. Shevtsov and V.A. Yushkevich) cut virtually all the lines of communications of the Nazi troops holding Kalinin. The real threat of encirclement forced the enemy on 16 December to abandon the city, forsaking virtually all the combat equipment. During the third 10 days of December, having increased the effort by committing the 39th Army to battle (commander, Lt Gen I.I. Maslennikov) and assigned from RVGK, the troops of the front continued the offensive and by 7 January 1942, had reached a line of Rzhev, Zubtsov, Lotoshino. Conditions had been created for a deeper envelopment of the entire enemy grouping operating on the Moscow sector.

On the right wing of the Western Front, the 30th Army and the 1st Assault Army (commanders, Maj Gen D.D. Lelyushenko and Lt Gen V.I. Kuznetsov) sealed off the Klin enemy grouping and by 15 December had completed its defeat, liberating Klin. On the following day, troops from the armies went over to pursuing the retreating enemy. Earlier, on 12 December, the 20th Army by a surprise attack had captured Solnechnogorsk.

In the fighting in the village of Varaksino (to the north of Klin), a feat was carried out by the company political instructor of the 280th Rifle Regiment of the 185th Rifle Division from the 30th Army, N.P. Bacharov. Having taken over for the wounded company commander, he led the men into the attack. The enemy could not withstand the rapid thrust and began to hurriedly retreat. The company soldiers broke into an enemy artillery position, captured 2 guns and opened fire from them, destroying up to a company of Nazis. The enemy abandoned on the battlefield 11 machine guns, many submachine guns and several motor vehicles.(6) The courageous political instructor was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Having abandoned positions on the Leningrad Highway, the enemy endeavored to utilize natural barriers for the defensive such as the Istra River and the Istra Reservoir. The Nazis blew up the dam, many sectors of the river's western bank were mined and a strong defensive system was organized. The

attempts of the 16th Army to cross the Istra and breach the enemy defenses with frontal attacks on 12-13 December were ineffective. Upon the decision of the army commander, Lt Gen K.K. Rokossovskiy, the Istra position was outflanked to the north and south by two mobile groups: of Gen F.T. Remizov (the 145th Tank Brigade, 44th Cavalry Division and 17th Rifle Brigade) and Gen M.Ye. Katukov (1st Guards Tank Brigade, 17th Tank Brigade, 40th Rifle Brigade and 89th Separate Tank Battalion).(7) In using the success of the mobile groups, the main forces of the 16th Army, advancing from the front, on 15 December crossed the Istra River on a number of sectors and forced the Nazi troops to retreat to the west.

In pursuing the retreating units of the 3d and 4th Enemy Panzer Groups, the armies on the right wing of the Western Front on 18 December took Teryayeva Sloboda and on 20 December liberated Volokolamsk. Upon reaching the line of the Lama and Ruza Rivers, our troops encountered stubborn enemy resistance on the previously prepared defensive position. All attempts by the 1st Assault Army, the 20th and 16th Armies to breach the enemy defenses without a pause were unsuccessful. At the end of December, the Soviet troop offensive was halted and they received the task of beginning preparations to break through the fortified line.

To the south of Moscow, the offensive was being successfully continued by the left wing of the Western Front, in attacking the flanks and center of the 2d German Panzer Army. Formations of the 10th Army (commander, Lt Gen F.I. Golikov) and the I Guards Cavalry Corps (commander, Maj Gen P.A. Belov) on 11 December captured Stalinogorsk (Novomoskovsk), while the 50th Army (commander, Lt Gen I.V. Boldin) breached the enemy defenses to the south of Tula. Conditions were created for encircling the enemy grouping. At this time, formations of the 49th Army (commander, Lt Gen I.G. Zakharkin) crushed the enemy to the northwest of Tula, having captured the important points of Aleksin and Tarusa.

The main forces of the 2d Panzer Army which had threatened Moscow from the south had been dealt a major defeat. A wide breach had formed in the defenses of the right flank of Army Group Center on a front from Tarusa to Plavsk. In this situation, the command of the group endeavored to pull its right-flank grouping from under attack and organize a defensive on the Oka, planning at any price to check the further advance of the Soviet troops and await the arrival of reserves. The Soviet Command, having guessed the enemy's intentions, demanded that the armies on the left wing of the Western Front immediately pursue the enemy so as to prevent it from digging in on the intermediate lines.

Formations of the 50th Army were advancing successfully. By decisive assaults, they had shattered the enemy rear guard and had quickly advanced to the Oka. For capturing a major road junctions, Kaluga, the army command had established a mobile group headed by Gen V.S. Popov (two regiments of the 154th Rifle Division, the 112th Tank Division, the 31st Cavalry Division, the Tula Worker Regiment, the 131st Separate Tank Brigade and the 21st Guards Mortar [Rocket Launcher] Battalion).(8) This group, in advancing off the roads, in 3 days covered a distance of around 100 km and in the morning of 21 December, covertly approached Kaluga, broke into the city by surprise and

initiated street fighting. The enemy moved up new units to the city and cut the group off from the army main forces. Until 25 December, units from the group fought stubbornly in the city, tying down significant Nazi forces. With the approach of formations from the 49th and 50th Armies to Kaluga, the defeat of the enemy grouping was completed. The city was liberated on 30 December. After Kaluga, the 10th Army and the I Cavalry Corps liberated Belev, Meshchovsk, Mosalsk.

By 7-8 January 1942, troops from the left wing of the Western Front had crossed the Oka on a broad sector. In a month of fighting they had advanced 220-250 km, they had enveloped Army Group Center from the south and were continuing offensive operations.

The troops on the right wing of the Southwestern Front achieved significant successes in the counteroffensive. In continuing the commenced offensive, formations of the 3d and 13th Armies (commanders, Maj Gens Ya.G. Kreyzer and A.M. Gorodnyanskiy) and the front operations group of Gen F.Ya. Kostenko by mid-December had advanced 80-100 km and had defeated the main forces of the 2d German Army, having surrounded and destroyed over two enemy divisions. They had liberated extensive territory and the cities of Yelets and Yefremov. By their actions the troops of the front had tied down a portion of the forces of the 2d Panzer Army and thereby provided substantial aid to the troops on the left wing of the Western Front. Having completed the defeat of the enemy in the Yelets Salient, the 3d, 13th and 61st (commander, Lt Gen M.M. Popov) Armies were incorporated in the newly established (as of 24 December) Bryansk Front under the command of Col Gen Ya.T. Cherevichenko, and continued the offensive on the Orel axis. By the beginning of January 1942, the troops of this front had reached a line of Belev, Mtsensk, Novosil, to the northwest of Livna, where they encountered fierce enemy resistance and were forced to break off further advance.

In mid-December, favorable conditions arose in the center of the Western Front for the going over of the 5th, 33d, 43d and 49th Armies to active operations and for defeating the opposing formations of the 4th German Army. The enemy put up stubborn resistance but nevertheless the 33d Army (commander, Lt Gen M.G. Yefremov) on 26 December liberated Naro-Fominsk and on 4 January, Borovsk, while the 43d Army (commander, Maj Gen K.D. Golubev) on 2 January captured Maloyaroslavets. Regardless of the slow advance, the armies tied down the opposing enemy and prevented it from maneuvering troops toward the flanks.

In the fighting for Naro-Fominsk, a significant feat was carried out by the tank troops of the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division. A crew of a KV tank under the command of Lt G.G. Khetagurov was sent out on reconnaissance. In breaking into the city rapidly, the tank troops spread panic among the Nazis. As a result of the fighting, they established the enemy fire plan, they destroyed the enemy staff building as well as several guns, six machine gun nests and scores of Nazis. The reconnaissance data gained by the bold crew provided great help to the command in organizing the offensive against the town. (9)

Thus, by the end of 7 January 1942, the armies of the Kalinin and Western Fronts and the right wing of the Southwestern (from 24 December, the Bryansk) Front defeated the assault formations of Army Group Center which were located on the near approaches to Moscow and had thrown the enemy back some 150-250 km. The threat to the capital of our motherland was eliminated. In the course of the counteroffensive, over 11,000 population points were liberated and great damage caused to the enemy troops. The major victory won in the counteroffensive at Moscow created conditions for the Soviet Army to go over to a general offensive at the beginning of January 1942 on the main strategic axes. The main thrust was launched on the western axis.

According to the plan of the offensive, by pincer strikes by the armies on the right wing of the Kalinin Front from the area to the northwest of Rzhev toward Sychevka, Vyazma and the troops on the left wing of the Western Front from the Kaluga area on the Yukhnov, Vyazma axis, with a simultaneous offensive by the remaining armies of the Western Front against Sychevka and Gzhatsk, the main forces of Army Group Center were to be surrounded, split up and destroyed in the area of Rzhev, Vyazma, Yukhnov, Gzhatsk. For a deeper envelopment of the Soviet grouping from the north, troops from the left wing of the Northwestern Front (commander, Lt Gen P.A. Kurochkin) were to launch a thrust from the Ostashkov on the Toropets, Velizh, Rudnya axis. The Bryansk Front was given the mission of covering the troops of the Western Front from the south and by active operations on the Bryansk and Orel axes to tie down the Nazi forces which were located there.

The Soviet troop offensive developed without an operational pause after the December operations with a relative balance of forces with the enemy in terms of personnel and artillery and the enemy's double superiority in tanks.

On 8 January, the assault grouping of the Kalinin Front broke through the enemy defenses to the west of Rzhev and began advancing successfully to the south toward Sychevka. On the following day, the 3d and 4th Assault Armies (commanders, Lt Gen M.A. Purkayev and Col Gen A.I. Yeremenko) of the Southwestern Front went over to the offensive. Subsequently, transferred to the Kalinin Front, they energetically continued the offensive deep in the enemy rear and in the first days of February were approaching Velikiye Luki and Demidov while one rifle division had broken into Vitebsk. Over the 25 days of the offensive, these armies pushed the enemy back almost 250 km and liberated over a thousand population points, including the towns of Andreapol, Toropets and others. At the start of February, Army Group Center had been deeply enveloped from the northwest by the Soviet troops. A serious threat hung over its lines of communications.

The armies on the left wing of the Western Front in attacking Vyazma from the southeast were also advancing successfully. The 10th Army by 10 January had reached the approaches to the towns of Kirov, Lyudinovo, Zhizdra. The 33d, 43d, 49th and 50th Armies were advancing steadily, outflanking to the north and south the strong enemy grouping operating in the Yukhnov area. However, in the second half of January, enemy resistance on this sector increased sharply. The advance of the 50th Army slowed down. The zone of advance of the 10th Army was widely extended and its left-flank formations were unable to repel the counterstrike from the Zhizdra area and launched by an enemy

motorized corps. The corps succeeded in relieving the grouping surrounded in Sukhinichi. The 16th Army which had been shifted to this sector of the front began to pursue the Nazi units retreating from Sukhinichi but encountered the deliberate enemy defenses. By the start of February, the offensive of the formations of the 10th and 16th Army and the 61st Army which had been shifted from the Bryansk Front had been virtually broken off.

Intense fighting occurred in the Yukhnov area where the 50th, 49th and 43d Armies tied down a large Nazi troop grouping. This made it possible for the 33d Army and the I Guards Cavalry Corps to break through into the enemy rear to the north and south of Yukhnov and, in continuing the offensive, on 1-2 February, unexpectedly for the Nazis, to come out on the approaches to Vyazma.

For assisting the advancing troops of the Western and Kalinin Fronts in encircling and defeating the Vyazma-Rzhev-Yukhnov enemy grouping, upon the decision of Hq SHC, in the second half of January and in February 1942, an airborne operation was conducted in the course of which units of the IV Airborne Corps (the 8th, 9th, 201st and 214th Airborne Brigades and the 250th Rifle Regiment) were landed in the enemy rear in areas to the south and southwest of Vyazma. The operation had been prepared in a limited time and was carried out under exceptionally difficult conditions (active enemy air resistance, a shortage of transport aircraft, severe frosts and a deep snow cover). All of this, along with a lack of experience in organizing the landing and in the command of the landing units, reduced the results of the operation and its aims were not fully achieved. However, the operations of the landing troops in the enemy rear did play a positive role in the defeat of the Germans at Moscow. Together with the I Guards Cavalry Corps and the partisans, the landing troops succeeded in capturing a large area to the south of Vyazma and holding it until 25 May, having tied down up to five enemy divisions. (10)

Simultaneously with the launching of pincer strikes against Army Group Center, the Soviet Command attempted to split the surrounded enemy with the forces of the right wing of the Western Front, having created for this an assault grouping consisting of the 20th Army, a portion of the forces of the 1st Assault Army and the II Guards Cavalry Corps. On 10 January, this troop grouping attacked from the area of Volokolamsk toward Shakovskaya and over 2 days of fighting breached the Nazi defenses on the Lama River. In exploiting the achieved success, the adjacent 16th and 5th (commander, Lt Gen L.A. Govorov) Armies went over to the offensive. Up to the end of January, our troops liberated Lotoshino, Shakhovskaya, Mozhaysk, but, reaching a line of Pogoreloye Gorodishche, Shanskiy Zavod, encountered organized resistance by units of the enemy 4th and 3d Panzer Armies which had been pulled back here and this could not be broken without a pause.

At the beginning of February, Hq SHC demanded that the Western and Kalinin Fronts quickly complete the encirclement and destruction of Army Group Center. However, the fighting assumed a protracted nature. The fatigue of the troops with the continuous 2 months of the offensive was strongly felt. Because of the over-extension of the supply lines, there were interruptions in the supply of ammunition, fuel and food. The remoteness of the main airfields and a

shortage of field landing strips worsened the operating conditions of the frontal aviation, particularly the fighters, and complicated the maneuvering of the air forces. As a result, the operational air supremacy previously won by Soviet aviation on the western sector began to be gradually lost.

At this time, the Nazi Command shifted reserve units from Western Europe into the area of Army Group Center and increased the activeness of its troops. By carrying out a series of counterstrikes, the enemy succeeded in cutting off from the main forces the troops of the 33d Army and the I Guards Cavalry Corps which were heavily engaged at Vyazma.

The situation of the Soviet troops on the western sector deteriorated. Weakened by extended fighting, they lost their offensive capability and were unable to completely carry out the set tasks. In line with this, on 20 April, Hq SHC adopted the decision to break off offensive actions on the western sector and to go over to the defensive on the occupied lines.

In the course of the general offensive, the Soviet Army dealt the enemy a major defeat. Over 16 divisions were put out of action.(11) The losses for Army Group Center from 1 January through 31 March 1942 were over 334,000 men killed, wounded and captured.(12) Only the shifting of over 12 divisions from Western Europe saved it from complete defeat.

In the course of the Battle of Moscow, the Soviet Armed Forces won a victory of world historical importance. Completely liberated from the Nazi occupiers were Moscow and Tula Oblasts as well as many rayons of Kalinin, Smolensk, Orel and Kursk Oblasts. The successes achieved fundamentally altered the situation on the entire Soviet-German Front. Having seized the strategic initiative on the crucial sector and in causing severe losses to the enemy, the Soviet troops created prerequisites for launching new thrusts against the enemy.

The victory of the Soviet Army at Moscow meant the final collapse of Hitler's blitzkrieg strategy. On the fields around Moscow, the myth of the invincibility of the Wehrmacht was dispelled. Contrary to the plans of the Nazi leaders, Germany was confronted with the inevitability of an extended war against the USSR.

The defeat of the Nazi troops at Moscow was of enormous international significance. The entire world was convinced of the increased combat capability of the Soviet Army which could deal a crushing defeat to the main Wehrmacht assault grouping, having forced the enemy to go over to the strategic defensive along the entire Soviet-German Front. The successes of the Soviet Army played a significant role in strengthening the anti-Hitler coalition. The news of the defeat of the Nazi troops inspired the Resistance fighters and all patriots on Nazi-occupied lands and intensified their struggle against Naziism.

Many bourgeois politicians, historians and writers in every possible way endeavored to play down the importance of the victory of the Soviet people in the Battle of Moscow. They asserted that the main reasons for the defeat of the German armies were bad weather conditions and the great numerical superiority of the Soviet Army. However, the facts refute these fabrications.

As is known, the bad weather had an equal impact on the combat operations of both belligerents. As for the balance of forces, in all stages of the battle, the overall superiority, with the exception of aviation, remained on the side of the Nazi Army. The import of the victory of the Soviet troops was precisely that the success under exceptionally difficult conditions was achieved not by numbers but by skill. This was proof of the high level of art of the Soviet Command.

The victory of the Soviet Army at Moscow was achieved primarily by the strength of our social and state system. The crucial factor in the success of the Soviet troops was the inspiring and organizing role of the Communist Party which surmounted enormous difficulties and was able to prepare the people and the army for carrying out such a crucial military-political task. The unstinting labor of the Soviet people was an important condition in this great victory. The rear workers under the severe wartime conditions indefatigably forged weapons for the army. The Soviet partisans made a major contribution to the defeat of the enemy at Moscow. In relying upon the support of the population in temporarily Nazi-occupied territory, they fought the occupiers in cooperation with the regular troops and caused tangible losses to the enemy.

The crucial factors which ensured the success of the offensive operations were the increasing art of the military leaders, the intense work of the political bodies and party organizations and the heroic actions of the Soviet soldiers. The high morale of the soldiers and commanders, their ardent Soviet patriotism, hate for the enemy and feeling of personal responsibility for the fate of the capital and the beloved motherland helped them surmount all difficulties and achieve victory.

This victory showed that Soviet military art had withstood the testing of war and had taken a decisive step forward. The Moscow counteroffensive was the first strategic offensive operation in the Great Patriotic War carried out by the group of fronts on the basis of a single plan and with a decisive goal. During the preparatory period Hq SHC was able to preserve the strategic reserves and covertly concentrate them at the requisite moment on the crucial sectors. The time for going over to the counteroffensive was correctly chosen when the German Command had exhausted its reserves and the enemy assault groupings forced to go over to the defensive had not yet been able to dig in on the captured lines.

The first experience of organizing and conducting offensive operations was not devoid of shortcomings and oversights. The command of the fronts and armies did not always correctly employ the reserves made available to them. Certain commanders, with the lack of a sufficient number of troops, endeavored to organize an offensive on several sectors, thereby dissipating the forces and often assigned small groups of tanks to the rifle units and subunits.

In generalizing the experience of the counteroffensive, Hq SHC in the directive of 10 January 1942 pointed out that the slow pace of breaking through the enemy tactical defensive zone was to be explained not only by the shortage of men and weapons but also by the scattering of actions over individual sectors and by the employment of artillery solely for preparatory

fire. It demanded the abandoning of the even distribution of divisions along the entire front and the establishing of powerful assault groups on the main sectors with the actions of these groups being supported by an artillery offensive. The combat experience gained at Moscow pointed to the necessity of establishing large tank formations for continuing the offensive to a great depth and at a rapid pace.

We remember 1941 and turn to the events of 45 years ago in order to prevent a repetition of the past and so that the collapse of Nazi blitzkrieg strategy be a lesson for all who are hatching plans for a new war.

In the situation of the unprecedented arms race initiated by the imperialists, with their desire to achieve military superiority, to foster political tension and with outright claims to intervention into the affairs of other countries and peoples, the peace-loving forces have an exceptionally great responsibility for thwarting the adventuristic plans of the reaction, of preventing a new world war and maintaining peace.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 4, 1975, pp 92-93.
2. Ibid., pp 283-284.
3. The idea of a counteroffensive at Moscow, as was pointed out by MSU A.M. Vasilevskiy, arose at Hq SHC at the beginning of November but the decision to carry it out was adopted at the end of November (see: A.M. Vasilevskiy, "Delo vsey zhizni" [A Cause of One's Entire Life], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1976, p 161).
4. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 4, p 283.
5. Ibid., p 286.
6. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 33, inv. 793756, file 6, sheet 342.
7. "Sovetskiye tankovyye voyska 1941-1945" [Soviet Tank Troops 1941-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1973, p 49.
8. Ibid., p 50.
9. D.Z. Muriyev, "Proval operatsii 'Tayfun'" [Collapse of Operation "Typhoon"], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1972, pp 252-253.
10. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 2, 1976, pp 445-446.
11. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 4, p 312.

12. Klaus Reinhardt, "Povorot pod Moskvoy. Krakh gitlerovskoy strategii zimoy 1941/42 goda" [The Turning Point at Moscow. Collapse of Hitler's Strategy in the Winter of 1941/42], translated from the German, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1980, p 381.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1986.

10272

CSO: 1801/97

## ACHIEVING SUCCESS WITH OVERALL ENEMY SUPERIORITY IN FORCES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 86 (signed to press 18 Nov 86) pp 22-29

[Article by Col B.I. Nevzorov, candidate of historical sciences, docent; the article was written from the experience of the 10th Army in the Moscow counteroffensive]

[Text] At the end of November and the beginning of December 1941, the last attempts by the enemy to break through to Moscow were checked. Our troops, in being frequently in a critical situation, held out. The enemy had been bled white.

Nevertheless, the Nazi grouping at Moscow still represented a powerful force, surpassing the Soviet troops in personnel by 1.5-fold, by 1.4-fold in artillery and 1.6-fold in tanks. It was inferior to us only in aviation by some 1.6-fold.(1) In having superiority in men and weapons and in underestimating the capabilities of the Soviet Army which, in the opinion of the German Command, was incapable of moving major reserves to the front, the Nazi Command assumed that the Russians could not "begin a major counteroffensive at the present."(2)

In such a situation, the going over of the three fronts to a counteroffensive was a complete surprise for the enemy and as a result of this the enemy groupings fighting to the north and south of the city were defeated and pushed back from Moscow some 100-250 km. This created conditions for the Soviet Army to go over to a general offensive.

The achieved results were an indicator of the high art of the Soviet Command which was capable of carrying out a series of problems in the preparation and conduct of an offensive under difficult conditions. How this was actually carried out can be seen from the example of the 10th Army (commander, Lt Gen F.I. Golikov) advancing on the left wing of the Western Front.(3)

Here formations of the enemy 2d Panzer Army were engaged. Its troops, in being extended along a front of 350 km stretching as an arch from Tula to Mordves, Serebryanyye Prudy, Mikhaylov, Chernava, by 6 September had maintained overall numerical superiority over the Soviet troops by 1.5-fold in artillery and by almost 3-fold in tanks.(4) However, the main enemy grouping


(up to 75 percent of the 2d Panzer Army) was tied down by active operations of the 50th Army at Tula and by the I Guards Cavalry Corps at Mordves. For this reason, from the end of November, the 29th and 10th Motorized Divisions which had been operating here as well as a portion of the forces of the 18th Panzer Division went over to the defensive.(5) In the areas of Venev and Stalinogorsk (Novomoskovsk), an army reserve (25th Motorized Division and 112th Infantry Division) had been concentrated.

The enemy had readied for the defensive a main zone and a series of lines in the operational depth and as a rule these ran along the banks of the Pronya, Don, Upa and Plava Rivers and areas of terrain suited for the defensive. The main zone included a system of individual strongpoints and centers of resistance adapted for all-round defense. These were set up in population points and at road junctions. The intervals between them and the approaches to the forward edge were covered by fire and man-made (mixed minefield) obstacles. The lines in the operational depth were prepared for a stubborn defense, however they were not occupied by the troops. For example, along the western bank of the Don they had built trenches, permanent emplacements, firing points in stone buildings and wire obstacles. The banks in places had been scarped and iced. Among the weak points of the defensive one must put the lack of a continuous front, the incomplete preparation of the defenses, the low operational troop density (one division per 23 km of front) and their poor preparation for fighting under winter conditions.

The formations of the 10th Army from 24 November through 5 December were regrouped from the assembly area to the area of Ryazan. Their effective strength by the start of the operation had risen to 98 percent in terms of personnel and 78 percent for artillery. An exception was only the 41st and 75th Cavalry Divisions and the 239th Rifle Division which were at 50 percent of their strength.(6)

In the morning of 5 December, the army staff received a directive from the front's military council which ordered the troops on the morning of 6 December to go over to the offensive from the line of Zaraysk, Zakharovo Vtoroye, Pronsk, Mamonovo, launching the main thrust on the axis of Mikhaylov, Stalinogorsk. Auxiliary thrusts were to be made as follows: by one division from the Zaraysk area against Serebryanyye Prudy; by the forces of at least a formation from the Mamonovo area against Yepifan. In cooperation with the 50th Army and the I Guards Cavalry Corps, the troops of the enemy 2d Panzer Army were to be defeated and by the end of 10 December, the area of Stalinogorsk, Uzlovaya, Yepifan was to be taken.(7) Thus, the army was to advance in an area over 100 km wide to a depth of up to 60 km at a rate of 12 km a day.

In accord with the task received, the commander of the 10th Army planned the operation (see the diagram). According to the plan, the main thrust in an area of 38 km was to be launched by the strongest divisions (330th, 328th, 324th and 323d Rifle Divisions) while auxiliary thrusts would be made by the 322d Rifle Division (on the right flank in an area of 14 km) and by the 326th Rifle Division and the 41st Cavalry Division (on the left, in a zone of 48 km).(8)



Plan of Operation and Course of Fighting of 10th Army in Counteroffensive at Moscow. 6-20 December 1941

The divisions advancing on the axis of the main thrust were given zones from 5 to 9 km wide. On the auxiliary axes, where the zones were wider, the commander demanded that the division commanders not spread the forces over the entire zone, but rather concentrate these on a selected sector. In the remaining zone of advance there were to be only flank security detachments. Tasks were set for the formations to a depth of 4-9 km. This was caused by the difficult conditions of the very snowy winter and the low maneuvering capabilities of the divisions.

The battle orders of the formations were formed up in two echelons with the assigning of artillery infantry support groups consisting of one battalion for each first-echelon regiment.

With the moving up of the units to the forward edge of the enemy defenses, there was to be brief artillery softening up for the attack in the form of a 10-15-minute intense shelling of the main enemy installations. No artillery support for the assault was planned but could be carried out if called for by the unit commanders. The numerical strength of the artillery made it possible to establish an average density along the entire zone of 9.2 guns and mortars per kilometer of front and on the main sector from 31 to 39. (9)

The army aviation during the night of 6 December was ordered to make bomb strikes against the enemy in the areas of Poyarkovo (12 km to the east of Mikhaylov) and Mikhaylov, and at dawn of 6 December, to conduct reconnaissance on the roads on the axes of Zaraysk, Serebryanyye Prudy, Venev and Zakharovo Vtoroye, Mikhaylov, Stalinogorsk. (10)

In preparing for the operation important significance was given to the organizing of troop command, since the army had 11 divisions spread out along a broad zone. The army command post was located in Shilovo (115 km to the southeast of Mikhaylov), and the auxiliary control post in Starozhilovo (20-75 km from the first-echelon formations). The army staff was subsequently shifted here. Such a distance of the control posts from the troops could not provide dependable command in the course of the operation. This shortcoming was eliminated by establishing operational groups for the command of several divisions on the individual axes. In the army they organized two groups: one under the command of Lt Gen V.A. Mishulin and the other under Lt Gen K.S. Kalganov.

In the rifle divisions which were in concentration areas, command posts were organized and with the start of the offensive these were to move up behind the battle formations of the units. Observation posts were not organized prior to the start of combat operations. Communications in the army with the formations was organized by radio nets while wire communications was by individual links and signals centers (for the divisions of the center and left flank). Only radio communications was planned for the group of Lt Gen V.A. Mishulin. There were also plans to employ mobile means of communications (particularly the mounted liaison officers and PO-2 aircraft).

Around 14 hours were assigned for preparing the formations for battle and 3 of these hours was in daylight. But a large portion of the divisions was en route to the start-line which was some 110-115 km from the unloading zones.

They moved up at a rapid march covering some 45-50 km a day and only in darkness for the interests of secrecy. It was hard going due to the deep snow cover and the snowstorms. (11)

At 0400 hours on 6 December, the 10th Army began its offensive. At mid-day four first-echelon divisions initiated battle with the battle outposts and drove the enemy from the strongpoints. The right-flank division during the day advanced 25 km and the left-flank ones some 12-14 km. The offensive was continued at night. As a result, by morning of the following day, Mikhaylov, Goldino, Gryaznoye, Katino and other population points had been liberated. Having broken through the tactical defensive zone of the Nazis, the army formations began to continue the offensive in the operational depth.

The enemy, in taking cover behind strong rear guards and using the population points and the line of the Pronya River for its defense, resisted stubbornly.

Under these conditions the army commander demanded that nighttime operations be more widely employed. For conducting these special detachments were organized in each battalion, regiment and division from the bold, physically strong soldiers and commanders. These detachments were given the mission, in breaking through into the enemy rear, to destroy the personnel and combat equipment. Such actions played an important role in wearing down the enemy. The extensive employment of outflanking of the enemy strongpoints also contributed to the successful advance of the troops. For example, the 328th Rifle Division, having attacked the enemy strongpoint in Gremyachiy several times, had been unsuccessful. Then, with the onset of darkness having outflanked it to the north and south, the division launched an attack and as a result of this the Nazis fled in panic, abandoning their combat equipment, supplies and heavy weapons.

On 9 December, by the end of the day, having crossed the enemy defenses along the Pronya River, the 10th Army had fought its way to a depth of 35 km. The Nazi Command, in order to prevent the Soviet troops from coming out in the rear of its main grouping and surrounding it, committed units of the 112th Infantry Division to battle and these together with the retreating 25th and 10th Motorized Divisions, deployed along the line of the Stalinogorsk Reservoir and the Don.

In the aim of outflanking the strongest point in the enemy defenses, Lt Gen F.I. Golikov decided to tie down the enemy troops located here by employing a portion of the forces from the front while the main forces would regroup to the south for attacking Yepifan. For this the latter were withdrawn from combat, they made a regrouping over a distance from 25 to 50 km, and in heavy fighting crossed the Don and reached the line of Stalinogorsk, Yepifan.

On 13 December, the army received a new task: in cooperation with the I Guards Cavalry Corps to destroy the enemy in the area of Uzlovaya, Bogoroditsk, Plavsk, and by 16 December at the end of the day to reach the line of Zhitovo Station, Plavsk. The main thrust was to be launched by the left flank on the axis of Bogoroditsk, Plavsk. (12)

The army commander decided to carry out the set task with the forces of the grouping which had been formed by that time: in the first echelon, four rifle divisions (328th, 324th, 323d and 326th Rifle Divisions), in the second, two rifle divisions and one cavalry division (322d and 330th Rifle Divisions and 41st Cavalry Division); in the reserve, as at the start of the operation, four divisions (239th and 325th Rifle Divisions and 57th and 75th Cavalry Divisions).

On the morning of 14 December, the army formations resumed the offensive, pursuing the ragged enemy divisions. The Nazis, deprived of the line along the Don, hurriedly prepared a defense along the line of Dedilovo, Bogoroditsk, Malevka. In order to prevent the retreating units to occupy it, the army commander ordered the formations to pick up the rate of pursuit. This task as a whole was successfully carried out. Thus, the 328th Rifle Division, in using the success of the I Guards Cavalry Corps, pursued the enemy at a pace of up to 15 km a day and by 20 December had reached the Plava River to the south of Krapivna. Here upon the decision of the front's commander, it was incorporated as part of the corps.

The 322d Rifle Division which was committed to battle from the second echelon in the area of the 324th Division (withdrawn into the reserve), by the end of 20 December had also reached the line of the Plava River. The 322d and 326th Rifle Divisions advancing on the left flank of the army by the end of 19 December had reached the near approaches to Plavsk, a major road and rail junction. In the aim of rapidly capturing it, the army commander established a mobile group consisting of the 41st, 57th and 75th Cavalry Divisions under the command of Lt Gen V.A. Mishulin. The group was committed to battle on 17 December. However, it was unable to get around the infantry, as the offensive had been developing slowly due to the difficult road conditions. For this reason, the task of capturing Plavsk was to be carried out by the forces of the 326th and 323d Rifle Divisions and the 41st Cavalry Division. In the evening of 19 December, under the cover of darkness, their units broke into the town. The Nazis resisted desperately, repeatedly going over to counterattacks. As a result, fierce street fighting broke out and this frequently reached the point of hand-to-hand clashes. However, a portion of the Soviet troops began to come out in the rear of the enemy grouping and the enemy, fearing encirclement, abandoned the town.

The reaching of the line of the Plava River by the 10th Army and the capture of Plavsk aided the 50th Army in defeating the enemy in the area of Tula and Shchekino, having created good conditions for the continuation of the offensive by the left wing of the Western Front on the Kaluga axis.

From the viewpoint of military art, the offensive operation of the 10th Army is instructive in the prompt and skillful employment by the Soviet Command of the favorably developing situation for defeating the large enemy grouping. Regardless of the fact that the enemy possessed a general superiority in men and weapons and had an absolute supremacy in mobile troops, having fallen into the operational trap, it was split into significantly smaller forces. The 10th Army caused a major defeat to six of its divisions and in 15 days pushed their remnants back 130 km, having liberated hundreds of population points. The average daily rate of advance (around 9 km a day) under the conditions of

the snowy severe winter, the acute shortage of transport and the complete lack of tanks, must be considered rather high.

The main thrust was launched against the weak point in the enemy operational configuration, in the flank and rear of the main grouping of the 2d Panzer Army. Here they considered the location of the concentration area of our troops and the possibility of their rapidly reaching a line the capture of which would disrupt the operational stability of the enemy. The most battleworthy and strongest divisions were assigned to fight on the axis of the main thrust. The concentration of 8 out of the 11 divisions (73 percent) made it possible to alter the balance of forces in favor of the 10th Army by 2.5-fold in terms of personnel and 1.5-fold for artillery. (13)

The operation was prepared in an extremely short time. Under these conditions an important role was played by the early organization of the assault grouping, the preliminary guidance by Army Gen G.K. Zhukov for the army commander at the front's command post, the adopting of the plan using a map without preliminary reconnaissance in the field, the elaboration of only the essential planning documents and the effective issuing of the tasks to the formation commanders.

The organizing of the army offensive with the moving up of the troops from in depth, directly from the concentration area, ensured secrecy of action. However, with such a method of going over to the offensive, the time for the immediate preparation of the operation was shortened. Under these conditions, the army command, in not planning for the formations to take up the forming-up place in immediate contact with the enemy, in the concentration area established a troop grouping conforming to the operation's overall plan. This provided surprise for the attack, making it possible to stun the enemy, to use its unpreparedness to repel the offensive, to cause the enemy great losses and create favorable conditions for the subsequent development of the operation. On this issue the West German historian K. Reinhardt has written: "The formations of the 10th Army...attacked the unprotected eastern flank of Guderian's panzer army...having caused panic in the German troops." (14) Surprise was achieved by the following: by the covert concentration of troops in areas which were 25-30 km from the front line; by the moving of them only at night and in bad weather; by banning the use of radios during the period of the approach and while in the concentration areas.

The conduct of the operation was characterized by diverse methods of fighting. Extensively practiced were outflankings (the 330th and 328th Rifle Divisions in crossing the defensive line, respectively, along the Don and Upa and so forth) and envelopments (322d Rifle Division in the area of Serebryanyye Prudy, the 323d and 326th Rifle Divisions and the 41st Cavalry Division in the Plavsk area). A major effect was provided by: the actions of the forward detachments of the divisions assigned to pursue the retreating enemy (in the 328th, 324th and 323d Rifle Divisions); by the conduct of the offensive along the axes around-the-clock, with the periodic replacement of the first echelon formations (for example, after the capture of Bogoroditsk the 324th Rifle Division was withdrawn into the second echelon and its place taken by the 322d Rifle Division which previously had been in the reserve).

The extensive employment of nighttime operations ensured surprise of the assault, the covert execution of a maneuver, regrouping and movements, the reduction of losses in our troops, and the possibility of employing close combat infantry weapons and making a bayonet attack against the enemy. For this purpose even during daylight they studied the enemy strongpoints, designated the landmarks, directions and objectives of the assault and designated common liaison signals and lines of attack. With the onset of darkness the troops carried out an outflanking or enveloping maneuver, they reached the start lines and then upon the established signal simultaneously attacked the enemy garrisons. Precisely as a result of the night operations the army's troops captured such major enemy centers of resistance as Mikhaylov, Serebryanyye Prudy, Yepifan, Bogoroditsk, Plavsk and others, and in addition broke through all the enemy defensive lines in the operational depth running along the western banks of the Pronya, Don, Upa and Plava Rivers.

Troop command and control were provided by various methods, for leadership of two or three formations on separate axes, operational groups were established; in losing contact over the equipment for reporting on the state of one's troops and the enemy troops, representatives from the divisions were summoned to the army staff; in the aim of becoming familiar with the situation on the spot and for adjusting the tasks, the army commander and his deputies visited the troops. Proof of the flexibility of command was: the skillful shifting of efforts from the center to the left flank, the outflanking of the strongest point in the enemy defenses along the line of the Don; the change in the army's operational configuration in the course of the operation, when a second echelon and mobile group were organized in addition to the first echelon and the reserve. The increased depth of the operational configuration and the shortening of the width of the zone of advance (from 100 km at the start of the operation to 25 km at its end) made it possible to maintain supremacy over the enemy (in personnel and artillery), to build up the effort of the troops in depth and increase the rate of advance from 7.5 to 11 km a day (it averaged around 9 km a day).

The course of the operation was largely influenced by the careful preparation of the troops for fighting under the conditions of a severe snowy winter. Thus, the personnel was well supplied with warm clothing; the weapons and combat equipment were converted to winter lubrication, they were painted white and delivered on ski and sled equipment. In the course of the operation, great attention was given to protecting wounded from frostbite and to their prompt evacuation. For this purpose, all medical transport was supplied with warm articles (fleece coats, felt boots, blankets and fur-lined bags), warming stations were organized along the evacuation routes for the wounded and the stretcher carriers had travois.

At the same time, it should be pointed out that, regardless of the importance of the achieved results, the army troops did not succeed in cutting off the escape routes and surround the enemy grouping. The reasons for this were that a large portion of the command and rank and file did not have combat experience and the subunits were not sufficiently unified and trained; tanks were lacking; there were not enough antitank weapons; the maneuvering capabilities of the formations were very poor due to the acute shortage of transport and the abundance of snow on the roads.

The experience gained by the army was considered in the subsequent operations of the Great Patriotic War as well as the particular features of preparing and conducting the offensive such as the skillful choice of the axis of the main and other thrusts, the massing of men and weapons on these sectors, the rapid preparation of the operation, the going over to the offensive with the incomplete concentration of the troops, with the moving of them up from in depth, directly from the concentration areas, surprise of the attacks, an offensive along axes, the wide employment of outflankings, envelopments and nighttime operations, and the flexibility of troop command have fully maintained their validity under present-day conditions.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 4, 1975, p 284.
2. Klaus Reinhardt, "Povorot pod Moskvoy. Krakh gitlerovskoy strategii zimoy 1941/42 goda" [Turning Point at Moscow. Collapse of Hitler's Strategy in the Winter of 1941/42], translated from the German, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1980, p 241.
3. The 10th Army was constituted in November 1941 in the Volga Military District with seven rifle divisions (322d, 323d, 324th, 325th, 326th, 328th and 330th) and two cavalry divisions (57th and 75th). With the concentrating of the army in the Ryazan area, it was also to receive the 239th Rifle Division, the 41st Cavalry Division and the 28th Mixed Air Division.
4. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 8, 1980, p 132.
5. By 30 November, the advance of the units of the 2d Panzer Army on the northeastern, eastern and southeastern axes had been halted and they had begun to go over to the defensive. Only on the left flank during the period from 2 through 5 December did the enemy unsuccessfully endeavor to capture Tula.
6. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 353, inv. 3, file 2, sheets 8, 365.
7. Ibid., inv. 1, file 1, sheet 451.
8. Ibid., file 2, sheet 210.
9. Ibid., sheets 8-10, 365-367.
10. The 28th Mixed Air Division had 29 aircraft (5 YaK-1, 9 R-5 and 15 PO-2). On 12 December, the division was transferred to the front Air Forces.
11. F.I. Golikov, "V Moskovskoy bitva" [In the Battle of Moscow], Moscow, Nauka, 1967, p 49.

12. TsAMO, folio 208, inv. 4857, file 80, sheet 7.
13. Ibid., folio 353, inv. 3, file 2, sheets 8-13.
14. Klaus Reinhardt, op. cit., p 249.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1986.

10272

CSO: 1801/97

## FEATURES OF PARTY POLITICAL WORK IN BATTLE OF MOSCOW

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 86 (signed to press 18 Nov 86) pp 30-35

[Article by Col N.A. Maltsev, doctor of historical sciences, professor, published under the rubric: "Party Political Work"]

[Text] The Communist Party was the inspirer and organizer of the victory at Moscow, as in all the battles and operations of the Great Patriotic War. In following Lenin's legacy that political work must be carried out purposefully, actively and continuously, the party saw to it that this was done considering the specifically existing situation on the front. The political work was aimed at strengthening discipline and order, rallying the men around the party and indoctrinating them as true fighters to achieve victory over the enemy.

During the Battle of Moscow, the Communist Party in the aim of strengthening its influence in the masses, for mobilizing the men to an unstinting struggle against the enemy and for increasing the battleworthiness of the units and subunits, constantly strengthened the party organizations in the operational army. In fighting on the most difficult sectors and carrying out the most responsible missions, the communists by their personal example inspired the men to a heroic fight against the enemy. The significant losses among the communists led to a weakening of the party organizations. Just over the 6 months of the war, over 500,000 party members and candidate members were put out of commission.(1) Of enormous significance for strengthening the party organizations were the decrees of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee of 19 August 1941 "On the Procedure for Admitting to the Party Red Armymen and Red Army Leadership Who Distinguish Themselves in Battle" and of 9 December 1941 "On Admitting As Candidate Members of the VKP(b) Those Who Distinguish Themselves in Fighting Against the German Invaders." These helped to quickly increase the party ranks. Leading soldiers became communists when in battle they proved their dedication to the Communist Party and the socialist motherland. The decisions of the VKP(b) Central Committee on admitting soldiers who distinguished themselves in fighting to the party were based upon Lenin's admonishment on the need to trust "a party member who came to us at a difficult moment."(2) During the second half of 1941, 137,000 soldiers were admitted as candidate party members, that is, 4-fold more than in the first half of the year.(3) Here on the Western Front 2,238 men were admitted to the party in July and 4,850 in

August.(4) While in October there were around 33,500 communists here, in November the figure was already 51,500.(5) The rapid growth of the ranks of army communists made it possible to establish fighting party organizations in the units and in a majority of the subunits of the operational army and this helped to strengthen party influence on the personnel and increase the battleworthiness of the units and subunits. In being in the thick of the men and in being in a predominant majority rank and file, they served as an example of valor and discipline and were the vanguard in fighting.

Of important significance was the Decree of the Komsomol Central Committee of 25 December 1941 on the procedure for admission to the Komsomol in the units of the operational army. In accord with this the questions of admission to the Komsomol were to be settled at sessions of the presidium of the company Komsomol organization, in bypassing the meeting, with the subsequent approval of the decision by the bureau of the primary Komsomol organization. By January 1942, the Armed Forces numbered around 2 million Komsomol members.(6)

During the period of the Battle of Moscow, the Communist Party gave enormous importance to the ideological and political indoctrination of the Soviet soldiers. In order to withstand the fierce pressure of the Nazis, to halt the enemy and then defeat it, unshakable morale, ideological strength, high moral-combat and psychological qualities of the Soviet military and iron discipline were essential. It was all the more necessary to overcome the negative aspects apparent in a portion of the soldiers and commanders at the very outset of the war. Under these conditions it was very important that the men not lose the prospect of the struggle behind the temporary setbacks and that their confidence in the inevitable defeat of the enemy was not shaken.

The basic efforts of party political work in the Battle of Moscow were aimed at explaining to the personnel the military-political situation and developing in them high moral-political and psychological qualities. Everything necessary was done to mobilize the men to steadfastly repel the offensive of the superior enemy forces and stubbornly hold the defensive lines, to increase discipline and vigilance in every possible way, to develop initiative and combat activeness of the personnel, and to aid the commanders in readying the personnel to go over to a decisive offensive in the aim of the complete defeat of the enemy.

The particular features of party political work in the Battle of Moscow were determined primarily by the fact that this was organized and carried out under conditions when the fate of the capital of our motherland was being determined and a difficult situation had developed on the other sectors of the Soviet-German Front. Here it was considered that very little time had been allocated for preparing for the counteroffensive and the reinforcements arriving for the troops did not have sufficient combat experience. In a short period of time it was essential to train the men and to inspire them to successfully carry out the set missions under the difficult conditions of the harsh winter and deep snow cover. All of this influenced the planning, the content and the forms of party political work.

In accord with the commander's plan, the political bodies of the formations and the unit political workers elaborated work plans which outlined specific

measures to support the preparation and conduct of the forthcoming hostilities. Many divisional political sections and unit political workers compiled special plans, as follows: for the period of the troop regrouping; for preparing and conducting the counterattack; for the landing of an assault force; for the preparing of the party and Komsomol organizers of the companies and battalions and their assignment to the units and subunits in the course of combat. They prepared reference materials on the political and morale state of our troops and the morale of the enemy troops and so forth. This provided an opportunity to effectively organize party political work, to more closely coordinate it with the tasks which the troops were to carry out and provide most effective aid for the commanders.

The VKP(b) Central Committee gave great importance to strengthening discipline in the troops. Even in August 1941, Hq SHC in its order demanded that the commanders and political workers strengthen the indoctrinational work with the personnel and more decisively combat negative phenomena. The order of Headquarters was permeated with a concern for strengthening the authority of the commanders as the organizers and leaders of combat and commended strong-willed and exacting commanders and political workers.

The political directorates of the fronts, the commanders and political bodies of the formations outlined and implemented a series of measures of an organizational and agitation-propaganda nature. The political workers of the formations and the units as well as many staff officers, in working in the subunits, familiarized the men with the demands of Hq SHC on disciplinary questions. In the units meetings, talks and reports were held and instructions, pamphlets and appeals of the military councils to the fronts were issued. Extensive work was done directly in the troops and at the firing positions.

We would particularly like to emphasize the role of the Moscow City Party Committee [GMK] headed by the secretary of the Central Committee and the GMK of the VKP(b) A.S. Shcherbakov and the capital's communists. Upon the initiative of the Moscow party organization, in July 1941, 12 people's militia divisions were organized with a total number of around 120,000 men.(7)

Prominent party and state leaders, in particular M.I. Kalinin who visited a number of units defending the capital spoke to the personnel. The Political Directorate of the Western Front played a major role in establishing political work in the troops and in raising their battleworthiness. After the death of the Div. Commissar D.A. Lestev, the directorate was headed by V.Ye. Makarov who previously worked as the secretary of the VKP(b) GMK. The Moscow party organization during those days sent a new group of the party aktiv to do political work in the troops.(8)

During this period virtually all the formations and units were visited by delegations of workers from Moscow and the oblast, other republics and oblasts of the nation. The delegates brought a large amount of gifts, letters from the worker and kolkhoz collectives to the front, they described the unstinting work of the Soviet people in the rear and urged the defenders of the capital to bend every effort to defeat the enemy. In turn, the soldiers and

commanders reported on their combat deeds and vowed to intensify the blows against the enemy.

Frequently, the delegation members talked with the men directly at forward positions. Thus, having visited the 22d Tank Brigade, representatives from the Moscow Komsomol in small groups spent time at the forward positions of all battalions.(9)

Such meetings and talks inspired the men and the commanders to defeat the enemy, they demonstrated the unity of the army and the army and the people and instilled confidence in the invincibility of the Soviet system.

In indoctrinational work extensive use was made of letters from worker collectives as well as letters received from relatives and close friends. Troops of the 30th Army passed around an appeal from the workers and employees of the Moscow Motor Vehicle Plant. Men of the 5th Rifle Division sent the Muscovites a reply in which they promised to hit the enemy even more strongly, to fight for the motherland and for the Soviet people boldly and wholeheartedly and to defend each inch of the homeland.(10)

The frontline soldiers received profoundly patriotic letters from their fathers, mothers and wives. A soldier from the 144th Rifle Division, Romanov, received the words from his wife: "Strike the fascists, do not leave a single one alive. Destroy these butchers for the blood of the mothers, sisters and children. Again I beg: destroy them unmercifully."(11) Such letters were read in the political information sessions and were quoted by commanders, political workers and agitators in talks with the men.

In party political work great attention was given to readying the men of newly arrived formations and units and the new recruits for fighting. For example, in the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, a meeting was held for the political workers on the indoctrination of young soldiers before the arrival of recruits. The new men were greeted very warmly and positioned in the rear of the division. Officers from the staff and the political session spoke with each of them. This made it possible to better know the new arrivals and correctly assign them to the subunits. The new men heard reports on the combat traditions of the Soviet Army, the campaign record and heroes of the division and they met with veterans of the Civil War as well as soldiers who had distinguished themselves in recent fighting.

In considering that the combat was to be carried out under severe winter conditions, the commanders and political workers acquainted the men with measures to prevent frostbite. The medical personnel of the units was widely involved in this work.

In describing party political work during the period of the Battle of Moscow, the Commander of the Western Front, MSU G.K. Zhukov, wrote: "The front's political directorate and all the political workers did the maximum possible to increase the battleworthiness of the units and formations and to ignite in the hearts of the soldiers and officers a hate for the Nazi occupiers and a belief in our victory."(12)

The Communist Party took all the necessary measures to further mobilize the people and the army personnel to defeat the enemy.

On 27 November, PRAVDA in an editorial entitled "The Defeat of the Enemy Should Commence at Moscow!" wrote: "A stronger blow and the shattered enemy will not endure!... The moment has come when it can be stopped and crushed.... Having destroyed the enemy at Moscow, we will begin to destroy it on all captured territory."(13) This demand of the party lay at the basis of the work done by the commanders, political bodies and party organizations to develop an offensive drive and combat activeness of the personnel in order to ensure the fulfillment of the command's order to defeat the enemy. Everything necessary was done to bring about a psychological change in the awareness of the men who for many long months had been on the defensive to the slogans: "Stand to the death!" and "Not a single step back!" and to instill in them a belief that the Nazi invaders could be not only halted but also defeated in decisive offensive battles.

In carrying out this task an important role was played by the extensive use of materials on the successes achieved by our troops. The announcement of the Sovinformburo [Soviet Information Bureau] on the liberation of Rostov-na-Donu on 29 October further increased the combat morale of Moscow's defenders. At meetings conducted in the units, the speakers congratulated the soldiers of the Southern Front and promised to strengthen the blows against the enemy.

With the going over to the counteroffensive at Moscow, this work was significantly intensified in the troops. The commanders and political bodies of the Western, Southwestern and Kalinin Fronts, in explaining the appeals of the military councils and the battle orders of the command, drew attention to the fact that the general political aims of the offensive should be perfectly clear to all the fighters. They pointed out that there would be a fight not merely for a geographic point but also for the restoring of Soviet power in it, for liberating thousands of Soviet citizens from Nazi captivity and for capturing a line which would open up an opportunity for launching new strikes against the enemy.

The subjects of the talks, lectures and reports and the speeches of agitators became more specific and diverse. For example, in the units of the 11th Guards Rifle Division talks were held and reports given on the subjects: "The Communist Party -- The Organizers of the Defeat of the Nazi Barbarians," "The Defeat of the Nazi Hordes Has Commenced," "Surround and Destroy the Enemy," "Vulnerable Points on Enemy Tanks"(14) and others.

From the first days of the Moscow counteroffensive, various forms of propaganda of skillful offensive actions were employed. Thus, in the 1287th Rifle Regiment (33d Army), as a rule, the results of battle were summed up, the outstanding soldiers and commanders were listed in the orders and the essence of their accomplishments stated. This same regiment kept an album where they entered the names of the unit's best soldiers and if possible included photographs of the men with a description of their feats.(15) In the 681st Rifle Regiment (49th Army) for popularizing the experience of the outstanding soldiers they published a bulletin BOYEVOY DEN POLKA [The

Regiment's Combat Day]. The bulletin was distributed to the battalions where the agitators read it to the soldiers. (16)

In the course of the counteroffensive, the political bodies and party organizations for developing offensive drive extensively used such means of ideological and political influence on the soldiers as the press, movies, radio and so forth. Here particular attention was paid to indoctrinating hate for the enemy in the personnel. The note of the USSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs "On the Flagrant Atrocities of German Authorities Against Soviet Prisoners of War" and the announcements on the crimes of the Nazi troops in Kiev and Rostov as published in the newspapers served as material for carrying out extensive agitation work among the soldiers. In talks with them the commanders and political workers used numerous instances of bloody crimes by the Nazis on the territory of Kalinin, Moscow, Tula and Orel Oblasts.

Pamphlets and other printed materials were put out on the occasion of the presentation of guards colors to the formations and units and the decorating of outstanding soldiers, commanders and political workers. Thus, the Political Section of the 5th Guards Rifle Division of the 49th Army published a pamphlet which urged them to follow the example of the decorated soldiers and demonstrate examples of valor and military skill in the forthcoming fighting. (17)

The personal example of the commanders, political workers, all the communists and Komsomol members had an enormous, truly inestimable influence on the men. By their bold, skillful and decisive actions they clearly showed how the order of a chief and a combat task must be carried out. Their personal example along with their inspiring word and challenge and their aid to a comrade had a strong effect on the awareness of the soldiers and increased their combat spirit and offensive drive. When the subunits of the 142d Rifle Regiment after heavy fighting for the village of Aleksino, slowed down its rate of advance, the regiment's commander, Maj Mikhyev, and the military commissar, Sr Political Instructor Potapov, visited the 1st and 2d Battalions, explained the situation to the men and inspired them to surmount the difficulties. The commanders and political instructors of the companies by their personal example of intrepidity led the subunits into a rapid assault. (18)

At the most critical moments of combat, the communists carried out immortal feats for the sake of victory over the enemy. This was the case on 6 December 1941, on the first day of the counteroffensive by our troops on the Klin axis. The fire of an enemy machine gun from a camouflaged pillbox blocked the path for the subunit from the 1309th Rifle Regiment which was attacking the outskirts of the village of Ryabinka. The communist, Sgt V.V. Vasilkovskiy, volunteered to destroy the firing position. He crawled through the deep snow and threw grenades against the pillbox but soon thereafter the machine gun resumed firing and halted the subunit's advance. Vasilkovskiy had no more grenades. Then the communist rushed the pillbox and blocked the firing slit with his body. At the price of his own life he ensured the subunit's successful execution of the battle task. (19)

Like the communists, the Komsomol soldiers, disdaining death, carried out heroic feats around Moscow. On the approaches to the Soviet capital, Komsomol pilots destroyed 600 Nazi aircraft, about one-half of all the enemy aircraft downed here. Of the 23 air rammings around Moscow, 15 were carried out by Komsomol members. (20)

The great and intense activities carried out in the troops by the military councils, the commanders and political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations during the period of the defensive battles around Moscow, the counteroffensive and the subsequent general winter offensive were one of the crucial factors ensuring a crushing defeat for the enemy at the walls of the Soviet capital. Significant experience in party political work was gained both in the defensive and major offensive operations and this was widely employed and improved upon in the subsequent engagements of the Soviet Army against the Nazi invaders.

This experience also is pertinent today. It teaches the commanders and political workers a creative approach to organizing and conducting party political work with a limited time for preparing for offensive actions and the ability to mobilize the personnel to successfully carry out the set tasks in conducting hostilities against a strong, technically equipped enemy under difficult natural and climatic conditions. A profound study and employment of this experience considering present-day demands are an important condition for further increasing the effectiveness of party political work in the troops.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. See: "Velikaya Pobeda sovetskogo naroda 1941-1945" [The Great Victory of the Soviet People of 1941-1945], Moscow, Nauka, 1976, p 152.
2. V.I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 39, p 361.
3. "Velikaya Pobeda sovetskogo...", pp 153-154.
4. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 208, inv. 2848, file 2, sheets 37, 44.
5. "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945 gg." [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 2, 1963, p 256.
6. "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna 1939-1945" [World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 4, 1975, p 369.
7. "Istoriya KPSS" [History of the CPSU], Moscow, Politizdat, Vol 5, Book 1, 1970, p 182.
8. "Ocherki istorii Moskovskoy organizatsii KPSS" [Essays From the History of the Moscow CPSU Organization], Book 2, November 1917-1945, Moscow, Moskovskiy Rabochiy, 1983, p 642.
9. TsAMO, folio 326, inv. 5064, file 5, sheet 385.

10. Ibid., sheet 386.
11. Ibid.
12. "Bitva za Moskvu" [The Battle of Moscow], Moscow, Moskovskiy Rabochiy, 1966, p 66.
13. PRAVDA, 27 November 1941.
14. TsAMO, folio 208, inv. 2614, file 2, sheet 145.
15. Ibid., folio 32, inv. 15798, file 78, sheets 78, 80, 87.
16. Ibid., file 15, sheet 90.
17. Ibid., folio 208, inv. 2433, file 8, sheet 194.
18. Ibid., folio 213, inv. 2016, file 25, sheet 204.
19. Ibid., folio 32, inv. 15798, file 15, sheet 90.
20. "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna 1941-1945. Entsiklopediya" [The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. An Encyclopedia], Moscow, Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1985, p 187.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1986.

10272

CSO: 1801/97

## ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS ON ACTIONS OF SOVIET TROOPS AT MOSCOW

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 86 (signed to press 18 Nov 86) pp 36-38

[Archival materials prepared by Lt Col (Ret) V.V. Tarakanov and published under the rubric: "Unknown Pages of History"]

[Text] The published documents are stored in the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

They disclose the particular features of the preparation and conduct of combat operations, that is: the tenacity of the command and troops in carrying out the set tasks, the improvement in the tactics of fighting for strongpoints, centers of resistance and capturing lines of communications deep in the Nazi troop defenses.

The experience gained in the course of the Battle of Moscow was widely employed in organizing and conducting other offensive operations by the Soviet troops in the course of the Great Patriotic War.

### Order to the Troops of the Western Front of 8 December 1941 on Employing Curtains of Fire in the System of Defenses

1. In combating the German invaders, significant combat benefit has come from the fire obstacles, fields of Molotov cocktails and static flamethrowers.

The fire obstacle set afire on 3 December 1941 on the front of the 5th Army burned for 4 hours and the height of the flames reached 2-3 and in places 4-5 m. The enemy tanks were forced to change their combat course and move along the defensive front, exposing their most vulnerable (side) part to antitank fire and as a result of this up to 20 enemy tanks were destroyed by the artillery and antitank rifles, Molotov cocktails and flamethrowers in front of the obstacle.

2. Obstacles built from bottles with burning liquid [Molotov cocktails] checked the movement of the enemy tanks and a portion of them were set afire on these fields. A total of 15 bottle fields on the front of the 5th Army were built with a total expenditure of up to 70,000 bottles.

3. In the Akulovo area static flamethrowers were used with great combat effect and these destroyed 4 tanks and up to a company of submachine gunners. The fire of the static flamethrowers not only repelled the enemy assault but the latter fled in panic, abandoning weapons, supplies and many charred corpses on the battlefield.

All these examples show that with the tactically skillfully placement of fire obstacles, bottle fields and flamethrowers, the latter are a powerful and effective means for destroying enemy personnel and equipment.

I order:

1. The commanders of the troop formations and units in the system of organizing the defense are to widely employ fire obstacles in the form of barriers and bottle fields.

2. For building the fire obstacles local materials are to be employed such as straw, brush, firewood, peat, structures and so forth. The obstacles should run across the main likely tank approaches and block the entrances and exits from population points.

3. The front of a fire obstacle should be at least 1 km long and the flanks of the obstacle should rest on natural obstacles. The obstacle should be set afire according to the signal of the combined-arms commander by specially assigned teams.

4. The bottle fields should be organized in the general system of antitank engineer obstacles.

The dimensions of the field: depth 15-20 m, along the front 500-900 m and the bottles should be placed in a checkerboard pattern. It is also possible to create bottle fields combined with mine fields.

5. The chief of the front's Rear Directorate is to provide the troops with the necessary amount of fuel (oil, kerosene, gasoline).

6. The chief of the front's Chemical Warfare Service is to draw up and issue to the troops instructions on building fire obstacles and bottle fields.

7. The order is to be transmitted by telegraph.

Commander  
of Western Front,  
Army Gen Zhukov

Military Council Member  
of Western Front,  
Bulganin

Chief of Staff  
of Western Front,  
Brig. Cmdr. Golushkevich

Battle Order of Military Council of Western Front  
of 9 December 1941  
on Tasks of Front's Troops With the Retreat of the Enemy

To All Armies and the Belov Group(1)  
Copy to Comrade Shaposhnikov(2)

1. The enemy under the blows of the Western Front on its flanks has begun to hurriedly retreat. In places the enemy is abandoning transport, equipment and weapons.

The enemy, in pulling its flanks back, is evidently endeavoring to straighten out its front, to bring it in order, to resupply and prepare for a new operation.

2. The main task of the Western Front is to destroy as quickly as possible the enemy flank groupings, to capture the enemy equipment, transport, weapons and, in pushing forward rapidly around the enemy flank groupings, to once and for all surround and destroy the enemy armies opposing our Western Front.

3. The experience of the offensive and pursuit of the enemy indicates that some of our units are fighting completely incorrectly and instead of a rapid advance forward by outflanking the enemy rear guards, are conducting a frontal extended fight against the enemy.

Instead of outflanking and encircling the enemy, they are pushing the enemy back from the front by a frontal offensive and instead of infiltrating between the enemy fortifications, they mark time in front of these fortifications, complaining of difficulties of fighting and heavy losses.

All these negative methods of fighting play into the enemy's hands, giving him an opportunity with small losses to retreat in a planned manner to new lines, to order himself and reorganize resistance to our troops.

In order:

1. The categorical banning of frontal combat against enemy cover units, the banning of frontal combat against fortified positions, the leaving of small screens and their rapid outflanking, coming out as deep as possible on the enemy escape route.

2. To constitute from the army several assault groups consisting of tanks, submachine gunners and cavalry and under the leadership of brave commanders, to throw these into the enemy rear for destroying fuel and artillery traction.

3. To wear down the enemy day and night. In the event of the overfatigue of the units, to assign pursuit detachments.

4. The actions of our troops are to be supported by antitank defenses, by reconnaissance and a permanent security, bearing in mind that the enemy, upon retreating, will seek out instances to counterattack our units.

5. Immediately report on what you have done.

Zhukov

Bulganin

Sokolovskiy

FOOTNOTES

1. Commander of the I Guards Cavalry Corps, Major General.
2. Marshal Soviet Union and Chief of the General Staff.

Battle Order of Western Front Staff  
of 28 December 1941  
on Troop Tactics Under Winter Conditions

To All Army Commanders  
Copy to Chief of General Staff

In line with the arriving cold season and heavy shows, the Nazis are grouped chiefly in population points and along roads.

The Nazis still have not received their warm uniforms and for this reason they are forced to warm themselves in population points.

The Military Council orders:

As of the current night, to begin extensive surprise nighttime actions.

Ambushes of small hunter detachments are to be sent in the evening along the roads deep in the enemy positions. All nighttime assaults on population points are to be prepared for in daylight. The troops are also to move up in daylight to the forming-up place for the assault.

Wider use is to be made of guides and submachine gunners.

General task: by our actions to keep the Nazis constantly in the frost.

Execution to be reported on 29 December 1941.

Sokolovskiy

From the Commander of the 16th Army, Lt Gen K.K. Rokossovskiy,  
to the Commander of the II Guards Cavalry Corps, Maj Gen L.M. Dovator,  
on Attacking Peshki

Comrade Dovator!

All Europe is watching you. There is an opportunity to excel.

I am hoping that you by a decisive rapid counterstrike with tanks against Peshki will restore the position.

On the remaining sector of the front defend yourself.

Rokossovskiy

Resolution: "Europe is not Europe and the Germans recognize that Moscow will not be taken. Dovator."

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1986.

10272

CSO: 1801/97

MSU G.K. ZHUKOV: A GLORIOUS GENERAL OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 86 (signed to press 18 Nov 86) pp 39-52

[Article by Army Gen A.M. Mayorov: the article was written on the occasion of the 90th birthday of MSU G.K. Zhukov and published under the rubric "Military Leaders and Chiefs"]

[Text] Among the famous military leaders who made a significant contribution to the development of military art during the years of the Great Patriotic War, one of the first places is rightly held by MSU Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov.(1) The imprint of his personality and generalship talent can be seen in the course and outcome of the major strategic operations of the Soviet Armed Forces. During the war years the Communist Party sent G.K. Zhukov to the most crucial sectors of the fight against the Nazi invaders and everywhere he showed unbending will, courage and the ability to mobilize the men to carry out the most complex tasks.

Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov traveled the path from ordinary soldier to marshal. He served in the Old Russian Army. He volunteered for the Red Army and participated in the Civil War. During the interwar years, he commanded subunits, units and formations and held leading positions in the military districts and the central administration.

Zhukov's involvement in the fighting in Mongolia in 1939 played a definite role in his further development as a major military leader. Under the command of G.K. Zhukov, Soviet and Mongolian troops along the eastern frontiers of Mongolia, on the Khalkhin-Gol River, dealt a crushing defeat to a crack grouping of the Japanese Imperial Army which was endeavoring to seize a portion of Mongolian territory. For working out the plan and for successfully conducting this operation, G.K. Zhukov was one of the first among the higher command personnel of the Red Army in the prewar period to receive the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

After this, G.K. Zhukov was entrusted with leading the troops on one of the most important strategic sectors: he was appointed the commander of the Kiev Special Military District.

The commander of the district had to carefully follow the intrigues of the probable enemy and prepare the units and formations to rebuff the enemy. First of all, it was essential to analyze the methods employed by the Nazi Army in initiating and conducting a war and to study the strong and weak points of the Wehrmacht. G.K. Zhukov did study all the available materials and the reports of commanders from formations stationed in the border areas. He was able to gain exhaustive answers to questions of interest to him concerning the state of the Armed Forces of Nazi Germany from Lt Gen M.A. Purkayev who was appointed his chief of staff and who had just returned from Berlin, where he had been the Soviet military attache.

In December 1940, a decision was taken to hold a meeting of the superior command personnel of the Red Army and then the largest operational-strategic game during all the prewar years at the General Staff. G.K. Zhukov was assigned to speak at the conference giving the report "The Nature of a Modern Offensive Operation" and in the game to command the "blues" which designated the advancing side. By this time he had become an army general.

The aim of the planned operational-strategic game was to test the capability of the Red Army to repel the looming Nazi aggression. At present it is known that precisely in December 1940, Hitler approved the plan for an attack on the USSR as later set out in his Directive No. 21, the notorious Barbarossa Plan. Even then, everyone realized that the coming game would be not so much of theoretical significance as profoundly practical importance. The Politburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee followed the course of the game.

In the plan for the "offensive" worked out by Army Gen G.K. Zhukov, consideration was given to all the components in the military potential of Nazi Germany and the experience gained by the Wehrmacht in conducting a "blitzkrieg" in the West. It must be said that the "reds" or the defending side which represented our Armed Forces in the course of the game had to work hard to stop the drive of the "blues"....

In referring to the results of the meeting and the results of the game, the VKP(b) Central Committee decided to carry out certain changes in the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense. Army Gen G.K. Zhukov was appointed to the position of chief of the General Staff. And although he did not spend much time in this position (just several months) he fully felt all the great responsibility and the state importance of the activities of the main command body of the Soviet Army which he headed.

Under the leadership of the USSR people's commissar of defense, the chief of the General Staff worked intensely to carry out party policy in the area of military organizational development and the strengthening of the state's defense capability. Important measures of an organizational and mobilizational nature were carried out, inspections were made on the state of troop combat readiness in the districts, and new, modern types of military equipment were introduced. Progressive methods of troop instruction were also introduced. All of this was carried out under the conditions of the growing threat of war which with every passing month became more and more obvious....

With the start of the Great Patriotic War, the range of duties of the chief of the General Staff grew broader. Army Gen G.K. Zhukov was included as a member of the Headquarters of the High Command (which was subsequently transformed into Hq SHC). Upon orders from Headquarters he immediately had to travel to the Southwestern Front in order to provide help to the command in mobilizing the existing forces to repel the enemy offensive. At the end of July, he was appointed commander of the Reserve Front established in the rear of the Western Front and which at Smolensk was to fight against the superior forces of the Nazi Army Group Center.

Having assumed command, G.K. Zhukov began to seek out opportunities to turn the Reserve Front into an actively fighting operational-strategic field force and to employ its men and weapons for attacking the enemy. The ever-deteriorating situation on the Moscow sector required this. Here the Nazi troops had succeeded in pushing into the defenses of the armies of the Western Front in the Yelnya area, thereby creating a convenient staging area for a further offensive against the Soviet capital. Army Gen G.K. Zhukov proposed that the Yelnya Salient be eliminated, employing the favorable configuration for us of the Soviet-German Front on this sector. Headquarters supported him.

In August-September 1941, troops of the Reserve Front under the command of Army Gen G.K. Zhukov launched a powerful thrust against the enemy grouping at Yelnya. The combat on this axis was the first offensive operation of such scale by the Soviet Army since the start of the war. The loss of the Yelnya Salient seriously disrupted the initial plans of the Nazi Command to capture Moscow. At the same time, the Yelnya Operation taught the Soviet troops a great deal. It showed that the enemy could be beaten if one acted skillfully and decisively. This is precisely how the troops of the Reserve Front fought and it is no accident that the Soviet Guard, the 1st Guards Rifle Divisions in our Army, was born in the fighting for Yelnya. "The Yelnya Operation," recalled G.K. Zhukov subsequently, "was my first independent operation and the first testing of my personal operational-strategic abilities in a major war against Nazi Germany."(2)

The generalship talent of G.K. Zhukov in the course of the Great Patriotic War grew and developed. His methods of troop leadership were improved, and the methods employed by him in resolving strategic and operational problems became evermore effective. Georgiy Konstantinovich, as always during his service in the army, studied constantly, from operation to operation, from engagement to engagement, gaining priceless practical experience. He scrupulously and self-critically analyzed and generalized this experience, isolating in it all that was new and promising and decisively rejecting all that was obsolete and had not withstood the testing of time and repudiating routine and the blind imitating of foreign models.

In September, when a critical situation had developed around Leningrad, G.K. Zhukov was appointed commander of the Leningrad Front. By this time, the enemy had succeeded not only in closing the ring of blockade around the city but also had reached the near approaches to it. In the developing situation, the Leningrad Front could count only on its own internal resources, since it was virtually impossible to shift reserves and combat equipment from unoccupied Soviet land under the given conditions. The aim of the defensive

operation was to tie down the main forces of the Nazi Army Group North by active operations and to thwart the Nazi plan of capturing the city.

Due to the energetic and efficient measures adopted by G.K. Zhukov as well as to the complete aid to Leningrad and its defenders from the VKP(b) Central Committee, the State Defense Committee [GKO], the Soviet government and Hq SHC, to the active mobilizing activities of the Leningrad party organization, to the high patriotism of all Leningraders and to the heroism of the men of the front and the sailors of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, the situation was stabilized. Several decisive counterstrikes on different axes, the maximum employment of ship and coastal artillery of the fleet, the use of antiaircraft weapons to fight against Nazi tanks and, most importantly, firm troop command -- all of this provided an opportunity to drive off the fierce enemy attacks and force it to go over to the defensive.

But while the threat hanging over Leningrad was to some degree lifted, the situation on the Moscow sector had become even more dangerous. In considering the enormous political and military-strategic importance of Moscow, the Nazi Command had linked to its capture the realization of the entire blitzkrieg plan against the USSR. Being unable to achieve this goal during the first months in the war, at the end of September and in October 1941, it undertook a major offensive operation under the code name of "Typhoon" to capture the Soviet capital. For this purpose enormous forces, including a larger portion of the Wehrmacht panzer divisions, were concentrated in the Army Group Center fighting on the Moscow axis. From the air, the Nazi troops were supported by the Luftwaffe's 2d Air Fleet which included over one-half of all the Nazi aviation on the Soviet-German Front.

The enemy planned by powerful thrusts to defeat the defending troops of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk Fronts and in two stages carry out a double outflanking of the Soviet capital. Initially the plan was to surround and destroy the Soviet Army Units at Vyazma and Bryansk and then by deep outflanking movements of the armored groups on the Kalinin and Klin axes in the north and Tula and Kashira in the south to close the "pincers" around Moscow in the Noginsk area. During the first stage the enemy succeeded in surrounding a portion of the forces of the Western and Reserve Fronts near Vyazma, and the Bryansk Front at Bryansk. The enemy mobile groups broke through the Soviet troop defenses on the flanks of these fronts and pushed to the east, around Moscow.

For stabilizing the situation on the Moscow sector, urgent and decisive measures were required. First of all, it was essential to strengthen troop leadership. In the developing situation, command had to be brought together in one hand as the presence of the headquarters of the two fronts -- Western and Reserve -- actually in the same defensive area merely complicated things and introduced confusion. The choice of the general for the position of commander was important. Only a person with a broad operational-strategic viewpoint, who had a sound knowledge of both the strong and weak points of the enemy and its favorite procedures and who possessed firm willpower and decisiveness, could handle such a task. The GKO and Hq SHC decided to entrust it to Army Gen G.K. Zhukov. He was called back from Leningrad.

Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov was assigned a strategic task that was more important than any other, that is, to halt the Nazi offensive against Moscow and to deal the enemy such a blow that any threat to our capital in the future would be eliminated. It was not merely a question of pushing the enemy back to the west, but rather to abort the entire plan of the Nazi Command for winning a major victory in the "blitzkrieg" against the Soviet Union. First of all, it was essential to halt the enemy's further advance to Moscow and to make the defenses on the approaches to it insurmountable.

The Reserve Front was abolished by a decision of Headquarters and all the troops on the Moscow sector were combined in the Western Front with Army Gen G.K. Zhukov assuming its command. The Mozhaysk defensive line which blocked the direct and shortest route to the capital became the basic line for deploying the front's forces.

The front's commander, like everywhere that he had directed military operations, under these complex conditions endeavored to ensure firm and continuous troop command and control. Thus, when the situation on the right wing of the Western Front had become seriously difficult with the enemy mobile groups launching an attack against it, it was essential to strengthen troop leadership on the given sector and the deputy commander of the front, Lt Gen I.S. Konev, began to command the armies on the right wing of the front. But this measure did not eliminate all of the difficulties, since communication of the right-flank armies with the front's staff remained difficult. Then, upon the proposal of G.K. Zhukov, Hq SHC formed a new front, the Kalinin Front, on this sector.

G.K. Zhukov gave particular attention to strengthening air defenses of the front's troops and to reinforcing their air support. While still chief of the General Staff, he had personally directed the measures to establish a dependable air defense for Moscow. Under his direct leadership, in July a command-staff game of the air defense zone had been conducted to repel a massed enemy air raid against the capital.(3) For the leadership of the air defense troops covering Moscow, this game became a dress rehearsal for repelling the actual Nazi bomber raids.

We would particularly like to mention the role of aviation in the Battle of Moscow. In the hands of the Nazi generals, aviation was the most important means for carrying out the "blitzkrieg" strategy. This had been the case in all the campaigns in the West and at the moment of the treacherous attack on the USSR. At Moscow, the Luftwaffe Command had endeavored to actively support the ground troops from the air and at the same time to make massed raids against the capital. The Supreme High Command had adopted measures to strengthen the air defenses of Moscow. All the enemy raids were repelled with great losses for it. Nazi aviation had suffered particularly tangible losses in October. The air enemy which threatened Moscow had been so weakened that it was possible to reassign a portion of the air defense fighter aviation to directly support the Western Front and cover the defensive lines occupied by them. In November, for the first time since the start of the war, our aviation seized operational supremacy on a major sector of the Soviet-German Front, the Moscow strategic sector.

As a result of the energetic measures adopted by the command of the Western Front (military council member of the front, Lt Gen N.A. Bulganin, chief of staff Lt Gen V.D. Sokolovskiy), the advance of the Nazi troops had begun to slow down by the end of November. Our units which had been encircled continued to fight heroically in the rear of Army Group Center. They diverted to themselves over 20 Nazi divisions and this prevented the Nazi Command from exploiting its success at the center of the Western Front. The enemy panzer wedges pushing toward Moscow from the north and south began to lose their strike force. The enemy was suffering heavy losses everywhere and there was no way to replace them as the Wehrmacht Command lacked operational reserves on the Soviet-German Front.

A thorough analysis of the information received from all types of intelligence concerning the state of the opposing Nazi troops with each passing day persuaded Army Gen G.K. Zhukov that, in planning the operation to capture Moscow, the Nazi Command had made a serious mistake in calculating the men and weapons. It had overestimated the offensive potential of its troops and had clearly underestimated the ability of the Soviet Army to resist. Such a carefully planned operation as Typhoon, having gradually lost the initially set pace, petered out. Conditions were coming into being favoring a decisive counterstrike against the enemy. The commander of the Western Front, in proceeding from the proposals worked out by the staff and approved by the military council, submitted his plan for further actions to Hq SHC. There, in turn, the idea developed of going over to a counteroffensive, and not a partial limited one to the area of the Western Front, but rather a strategic counteroffensive involving the forces of several fronts.

The General Staff, having reviewed the proposals of the command of the Western Front, worked out a detailed plan for the counteroffensive. In addition to the Western Front it was to involve the Kalinin Front and the right wing of the Southwestern Front (by this time the headquarters of the Bryansk Front had been deconstituted). Naturally, the Western Front was to play the main role in the forthcoming strategic operation and it was to be reinforced by several newly constituted armies from the Headquarters Reserve. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin approved this plan and the necessary directives were issued to the appropriate fronts.

A particular feature of the counteroffensive being planned, and this was considered by G.K. Zhukov, was that the enemy had maintained its superiority in forces, that is, in personnel, tanks and artillery. Under these conditions, it was essential to find the most vulnerable places in the enemy troop grouping and establish superiority in our favor on such sectors, as well as ensure the necessary surprise and speed of advance. Since the counteroffensive was to begin virtually without any operational pause, its success depended largely upon the organizational abilities of the commander and upon the capacity to accurately determine the moment when the enemy had finally run out of steam but had not yet gone over to the defensive and had not been able to dig in firmly on the occupied lines.

In carrying out the instructions of Headquarters, Army Gen G.K. Zhukov promptly issued an order to the front's armies on going over to the counteroffensive. At the same time, the troops of the Kalinin Front and the

right wing of the Southwestern Front were to go over to a counteroffensive. The fighting developed under difficult winter conditions when snow and frosts seriously complicated the employment of all branches of troops. Commencing on 5 December (on 6 December on certain sectors), the counteroffensive nevertheless developed successfully, having immediately assumed enormous scope and engulfing a vast territory from Kalinin Oblast in the north to Kaluga Oblast in the south.

Although the first results of the advance of the Soviet troops caused justifiable optimism, the commander of the Western Front, Army Gen G.K. Zhukov, placed great demands on the army commanders and all the troop leadership, in seeking the observance of the set rate of advance, the effective employment of the existing combat equipment, particularly the artillery, and executing bold maneuvers in pursuing the retreating enemy. For example, here is how Col Gen L.M. Sandalov recalled this and who during those days led the actions of the staff of the just organized 20th Army on the Solnechnogorsk axis: "By the end of the day (10 December--Editors) the optimistic mood of the army command had been cooled by the front's commander, Army Gen G.K. Zhukov. In talking with me by phone, he pointed to the unacceptably slow rate of advance of the army and said that our troops were advancing only along the roads behind the retreating enemy troops, they were not coming out in the flanks and rear of the enemy columns and were not endeavoring to surround the enemy."(4)

Army Gen G.K. Zhukov applied the same measure of exactingness to the actions of the other armies of the front in the developing counteroffensive. By his will and energy he endeavored to maintain a high offensive drive in the troops and a determination to completely carry out the task of defeating the Nazi troops at Moscow. Here an important role was played by the party political work conducted in the troops. As G.K. Zhukov himself has written about this: "...An enormous advantage of ours was the high morale of the Soviet troops and which gave rise to their energy. This was the result of great party political work carried out by the commanders and political workers on the eve of the counteroffensive in all elements of the front organism -- from the front staff down to the companies and platoons. As a result of it our troops were confident of their forces and of the possibility of defeating the enemy at Moscow."(5)

The Battle of Moscow in which the decisive role was played by the Western Front headed by Army Gen G.K. Zhukov ended with a major defeat for the Nazi Army. Some 38 enemy divisions were destroyed. The Wehrmacht panzer formations suffered particularly heavy losses. In the course of the offensive the Soviet troops of the three fronts liberated over 11,000 population points from the invaders and pushed the Nazi hordes some 100-250 km back from Moscow. The immediate threat to the capital and to the entire Moscow Industrial Region was lifted.(6)

The most important thing was that the defeat of the Nazi Wehrmacht at Moscow, along with the victories of the Soviet Army at Rostov and Tikhvin, meant the collapse of the entire adventurist strategy of a "blitzkrieg" and the failure of Hitler's plan to crush the Soviet Union in the course of a single brief military campaign.

"When I am asked," said G.K. Zhukov subsequently, "what I remember most in the last war, I always reply: the Battle of Moscow. A quarter of a century has passed but these historic events and engagements still remain in my memory. Under the harsh, often catastrophically complex and difficult conditions, our troops were tempered, matured and gained experience, and having obtained in their hands the minimally necessary amount of equipment, turned from a retreating, defending force into a powerful offensive force."(7) Proof of such growth in the offensive capabilities of the Soviet Army was the Rzhev-Sychevska Offensive Operation carried out in the summer of 1942, that is, still in the period of the strategic defensive of our Armed Forces, on the boundary of the Western and Kalinin Fronts.

The offensive operation conducted by the forces of the two fronts was led by the Commander-in-Chief of the western sector, Army Gen G.K. Zhukov. He was appointed to this post at the beginning of 1942, while remaining simultaneously the commander of the Western Front. The offensive involved several armies of the Western and Kalinin Fronts. Although this operation was of a particular nature, its influence on the general course of military operations on the Soviet-German Front was significant. Due to it the plans of the Nazi Command to shift several tank and infantry divisions from Army Group Center to the south, where the enemy was developing an offensive on the Voronezh and Stalingrad axes, were thwarted. They remained tied down to the Rzhev staging area held with great difficulty by the Nazi troops.

On 26 August 1942, G.K. Zhukov was appointed USSR First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and the Deputy Commander-in-Chief. At the same time Headquarters sent him as its representative to the south to Stalingrad, where the Soviet troops were engaged in stubborn defensive battles against superior enemy forces. Together with the Chief of the General Staff, A.M. Vasilevskiy, he coordinated the actions of our troops on this sector. At the same time both military leaders were constantly searching for the ways to check the enemy offensive. The first signs of the plan for a counteroffensive at Stalingrad were reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

As is known, in the Battle of Stalingrad, the Soviet Army carried out all that it had been unable to achieve completely at Moscow due to the lack then of the necessary men and weapons. At the walls of the hero city on the Volga, a Nazi troop grouping some 330,000 men strong was surrounded and eliminated. The experience gained in this enriched Soviet military art and armed our generals, including G.K. Zhukov, with a knowledge of the most effective methods for conducting highly fluid and deep offensive operations which had become possible due to the fact that the Soviet rear was providing the front with everything necessary in the requisite amount: tanks, artillery, aircraft and ammunition.

Together with the other military leaders who participated in the preparation and execution of the Stalingrad counteroffensive, G.K. Zhukov was awarded the just struck military order bearing the name of Suvorov. He was awarded the Order of Suvorov 1st Degree marked with the number 1. The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet awarded Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union.

The second period of the Great Patriotic War further broadened the sphere of generalship activities of G.K. Zhukov. Linked to his name are the major operations of the Soviet Army conducted on various fronts. The breakthrough of the Leningrad blockade in the course of the Iskra Operation of the Leningrad and Volkov Fronts, the defeat of the Nazi troops on the Upper Don, the liberation of the Northern Caucasus, the historic Battle of Kursk, the engagements on the Left- and Right-Bank Ukraine, including the preparations of the Korsun-Shevchenkivskiy Operation -- everywhere he, as the representative of Hq SHC, provided strategic leadership and coordination over the actions of the Soviet fronts.

At the beginning of 1944, MSU G.K. Zhukov headed the First Ukrainian Front, having replaced the mortally wounded Army Gen N.F. Vatutin. The troops of the front (Military Council Member, Maj Gen V.K. Kraynyukov and Chief of Staff, Lt Gen A.N. Bogolyubov) had liberated virtually all the Western Ukraine and had reached the Carpathian foothills. In the course of the offensive operations, a significant enemy grouping had been surrounded and destroyed. For their successful execution, G.K. Zhukov was the first of the Soviet generals to receive the higher military Order Victory.

Being the deputy supreme commander-in-chief, MSU G.K. Zhukov participated in reviewing proposals submitted by the General Staff and presented by the command of the fronts on conducting the various operations and for further improving the organizational structure of the Soviet Armed Forces. Here each time he submitted his own considerations and voiced to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief his viewpoint on the overall assessment of the situation developing on the Soviet-German Front. I.V. Stalin was always interested in his opinion on the possible development of events on a specific strategic sector and on the prospects for the next campaign. The forecasts of G.K. Zhukov, in being based upon a profound knowledge of the enemy and the state of our own troops, as a rule, were correct.

G.K. Zhukov endeavored to embody the set strategic plans in specific operational and tactical decisions and he recommended to the troops the most rational ways for carrying out the tasks assigned to them on the offensive or defensive. He had a good knowledge and, in his own words, loved tactics. The marshal employed his knowledge and rich practical experience in this area while visiting the troops in order to help the commanders achieve the set goal with the least losses by the skillful maneuvering and effective employment of the available men and weapons. In speaking after the war, in 1946, at a military theoretical conference devoted to an analysis of the Vistula-Oder Operation, MSU G.K. Zhukov emphasized that one of the main demands on the commanders in preparing offensive operations was the achieving of operational and tactical surprise and this was provided chiefly by two elements: by confusing the enemy on one's true intentions and by speed of action. Speed of action is the main and decisive means against all enemy measures, including against its regroupings. It is essential to act, said G.K. Zhukov, so quickly that the enemy is always late everywhere, it is essential to catch the enemy unaware and thereby put it in a difficult situation. (8)

MSU G.K. Zhukov personally, in disregarding safety, conducted reconnaissance on the forward edge and inspected the troops for the forthcoming offensive and their supply with everything necessary for carrying out the set task. This was the style of his organizational activities where the greatest exactingness that admitted no compromises was combined with a paternal concern for the men, their everyday routine and morale. Here one cannot help but recall the words of the outstanding Soviet military leader, MSU A.M. Vasilevskiy, who knew him more intimately than anyone else, when he wrote: "Zhukov did not appear as a general standing above the mass of soldiers. In preparing the operations, he maintained closest contact not only with the commanders of the field forces and formations, but also with the officers of the units and subunits, particularly those which were to fight on the main sector. This gave him an opportunity to know profoundly the mood of subordinates, to control their actions and direct the efforts of the men toward victory." (9)

After the devastating defeats in the campaigns of 1943-1944, the Nazi Command by every means endeavored, in following the example of 1914-1918, to switch to positional warfare. It planned not to allow the Soviet Army to reach the frontiers of Germany itself and to gain time for concluding a separate peace with the West at the appropriate moment. These perfidious plan had to be thwarted and the offensive continued on the major strategic axes with the main one leading to the central areas of the Nazi Reich, to Berlin. On this path lay the Polish lands which had been occupied by the Nazi invaders and had for 5 years languished in Nazi captivity. The Soviet Army was confronted with the noble international task of liberating fraternal Poland.

In anticipating the coming great engagements, Hq SHC in every possible way strengthened the First Belorussian and First Ukrainian Fronts which were fighting here. It was decided that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, without Headquarters representatives, himself would directly conduct the concluding operations of these fronts. MSU G.K. Zhukov (Military Council Member of Front, Lt Gen K.F. Telegin and Chief of Staff Col Gen M.S. Malinin) was appointed the commander of the First Belorussian Front and this front was given the crucial role in defeating the opposing Nazi troops and in the subsequent capture of Berlin.

The Vistula-Oder Strategic Offensive Operation involving the First Belorussian and First Ukrainian Fronts had to be carried out first. Here the Warsaw-Poznan Operation which was conducted within the larger operation by the First Belorussian Front which held the Central, leading position in the system of the planned offensive was to be the most important component of the entire Vistula-Oder Operation.

The Vistula-Oder Operation of the First Belorussian and First Ukrainian Fronts was not only one of the largest offensive operations of the Soviet Army during the years of the Great Patriotic War. In the full sense of the word, it became classic for our military art.

The activities of MSU G.K. Zhukov in the post of the commander of the front were marked by boldness and breadth of operational concept and by the ability to foresee the development of the operation and to seek out new, unexpected methods of action for the enemy in the ongoing offensive. Unflinching will,

the greatest exactingness on all executors and the capacity to organize clear cooperation in all elements of the complex troop organism of the front field force were particularly apparent here.

In the course of the Vistula-Oder Operation, the commander of the First Belorussian Front adopted a bold plan -- and this was supported by headquarters -- of continuing the offensive in the aim of capturing the Oder Defensive Line before the enemy attempted to occupy it with large forces. At the same time, he did not give in to the temptation of conducting the offensive farther, in advancing to Berlin, the way to which would be seemingly open. MSU G.K. Zhukov showed reasonable caution, without leaving the Nazi Command any chances for organizing counterstrikes against the front's flanks and having also established strong preconditions for conducting a decisive offensive operation subsequently.

G.K. Zhukov was awarded a second Order of Victory for high generalship art in leading the troops of the First Belorussian Front in the Vistula-Oder Operation.

On 17 February 1945, in remaining commander of the front, MSU G.K. Zhukov, by a decree of the GKO, was approved as deputy chairman of Hq SHC. (10)

Next came the final, Berlin Operation which was the largest in terms of the scope of combat and in terms of the achieved final results.

It was quite natural that the party and government assigned the preparation and conduct of this operation, the storming and taking of the capital of the Nazi Reich to MSU G.K. Zhukov, as the most experienced Soviet military leader the generalship talent of whom by this time has reached its greatest flourishing. Symbolically, precisely Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov who had headed the heroic defense of Moscow had the fortune of directing the Soviet troops storming Berlin.

The plan of the operation was worked out with great carefulness and considering all the political and military factors as well as the experience of the previous years of the war. It was the result of the collective creativity of Headquarters, the General Staff, the commanders, the military councils and staffs of the fronts which were to participate in the Berlin Operation. It was finally approved at the beginning of 1945 at an enlarged session of Hq SHC with the participation of the members of the Politburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee, the members of the GKO as well as the commanders of the First Belorussian and First Ukrainian Fronts (the commander of the Second Ukrainian Front was summoned to Headquarters several days later).

The aim of the operation was to rapidly defeat the Wehrmacht troops covering the Berlin axis, to Berlin and, reaching the Elbe River, to link up with the troops of the Western Allies. In this manner Nazi Germany was doomed to a final defeat and deprived of any opportunity to put up further organized resistance.

As was subsequently recalled by MSU G.K. Zhukov, the task then set for him was unlike any other which he had been involved in previously. "In reflecting on

the forthcoming operation," he wrote, "I repeatedly returned to the great Battle of Moscow, when the strong enemy hordes, having been concentrated on the approaches to the capital, launched powerful strikes against the defending Soviet troops."(11)

As in the Battle of Moscow, G.K. Zhukov gave great attention in preparing for the Berlin Operation to mobilizing all the men to carry out the task confronting them. Simultaneously with diverse operational-tactical and material preparations for the operation, the military councils of the front and the armies, the political bodies and party organizations conducted great party political work. Party and Komsomol meetings were held in the units and formations. "In mid-April I happened to attend one of the party meetings of the 416th Rifle Division of the 5th Assault Army," recalled G.K. Zhukov. "All the speakers said that each communist in the forthcoming operation, particularly in the storming of Berlin, should lead his soldiers by personal example."(12)

On 15 April 1945, MSU G.K. Zhukov signed the appeal of the Military Council of the First Belorussian Front and which contained an appeal to all soldiers and commanders to honorably carry out their duty to the motherland and to finally defeat the hated enemy.

The offensive commenced on 16 April 1945. Much has already been written about its course and the tactical innovations employed by the Soviet troops in breaking through the enemy defenses and there is no need to repeat all these details here. It must merely be said that from the very outset of the operation the commander of the First Belorussian Front encountered significant difficulties. In order to surmount them, it was essential to strain all his forces, will power and reason and show all his generalship art in order that the set rate of advance did not falter.

The second enemy defensive line running along the Seelow Hills almost became a stumbling block. It was not possible to breach it without a pause, as had been planned. The Nazi Command had planned that here the Soviet troops would be tied down in extended fighting and during this time it would be able to remove the divisions covering the line along the Elbe River from their positions, having thrown open the gates to Berlin to the Americans, and then turn the divisions to the east against the advancing Soviet Army.

G.K. Zhukov anticipated this enemy trick. Incidentally, in the Battle of Moscow, the Nazi troops, regardless of all attempts, did not succeed in cutting off the Western Front from the reserves being moved up from the rear. In the Battle of Berlin the situation was quite different. Due to the clear cooperation of the three fronts, the efforts of which were directly personally by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I.V. Stalin, the enemy groupings which threatened the flanks of the First Belorussian Front were defeated by the troops of the First Ukrainian and Second Belorussian Fronts, while the Nazi divisions which had left their positions on the Elbe were destroyed on the way to Berlin.

Upon the orders of MSU G.K. Zhukov, the artillery and aviation unleashed an attack of unprecedented force against the Nazi fortifications on the Seelow

Hills. The commander of the front also committed two tank armies to battle ahead of time. The enemy defenses collapsed and the Soviet troops rushed toward Berlin.

It took several days to capture the city which had been turned by the Nazis into a true fortress. By 20 April, Soviet artillery had opened fire against the center of Berlin. On 25 April, our troops had arrived at the Elbe and there linked up with the forward units of the American Army. On 2 May, after fierce fighting, the remnants of the Berlin Garrison surrendered. Soviet soldiers had raised the Victory Banner on the roof of the stormed Reichstag.

In the course of the Berlin Operation, the largest enemy grouping in the entire war was surrounded and captured. Here the Soviet troops defeated 70 infantry divisions, 12 tank divisions and 11 motorized divisions and a large portion of the enemy aviation. Around 480,000 enemy soldiers and officers were taken prisoner, while up to 11,000 guns and mortars, over 1,500 tanks and assault guns as well as 4,500 aircraft were captured.(13)

During the night of 9 May 1945, MSU G.K. Zhukov, on behalf of our motherland together with representatives of the command of the U.S., English and French Armies, accepted the unconditional surrender of the leadership of the Nazi Wehrmacht. The war in Europe was over. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany had ended with a world historical victory.

Along with the other Soviet generals who during the harsh war years led the troops over the difficult frontline roads to victory, Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov also merited national recognition. Over the war years he himself had not only finally developed as an outstanding military leader of the Soviet school but had also helped many other well-known military leaders in their development. MSU I.S. Konev recalled after the war: "We all learned from Zhukov. In the cohort of our generals he will always be the first. Zhukov was the brightest military talent, a commander of profound strategic thinking born for great military deeds...."(14)

Like the other Soviet military leaders, G.K. Zhukov embodied the finest traits of our generals who had emerged from the masses of people due to the Great October Socialist Revolution, fostered by the party, indoctrinated by it in a spirit of high ideological loyalty, dedication and self-sacrifice in serving their motherland and capable under the most difficult conditions of successfully carrying out the assignments of the Communist Party and Soviet government.

In the postwar period, in holding various high posts in the Armed Forces, including being USSR minister of defense, G.K. Zhukov did a great deal to strengthen the military might and combat readiness of the Army and Navy and to equip them with the most modern weapons and technology. Without reservation he passed on his knowledge and experience gained in the Great Patriotic War as a general to the Soviet Armed Forces. And the motherland had high praise for his contribution to strengthening the defense capability of the Soviet state and for the personal courage and heroism shown in the battles against the enemies of the fatherland. G.K. Zhukov was awarded the highest decorations of our land. He received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union four times.

"Now in the waning of his days, Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov, in replying to anniversary congratulations, said:

'Our state has raised me high and here it has been correctly said that few have received such high titles as I, having become Marshal of the Soviet Union and Hero four times. But I have considered and do consider the highest title to be the title of a Bolshevik communist for more than a half century. I owe all my accomplishments and achievements primarily to our party which has carefully fostered me, promoted me to command positions and has taught me strictly and impartially that I can move forwards and upwards....'"(15)

MSU G.K. Zhukov left an invaluable heritage to the Soviet military personnel. His contribution to the development of Soviet military science and military art is presently an important means in the hands of our officers and generals for constantly increasing the combat might and readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov was born on 19 November (1 December) 1896 in the village of Strelkovka, now Zhukovskiy Rayon of Kaluga Oblast. Marshal of the Soviet Union (1943) and four times Hero of the Soviet Union. He was a member of the CPSU since 1919 and joined the Soviet Army in 1918. From January through 30 July 1941, he was the chief of the General Staff and USSR Deputy People's Commissar of Defense. From 23 July 1941, he was a member of Hq SHC and from August 1942, the USSR 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief. He commanded the Reserve, Leningrad, Western, First Ukrainian and First Belorussian Fronts.

After the war, he was the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Troop Group in Germany and the head of the Soviet Military Administration (July 1945-March 1946), the commander-in-chief of the Ground Troops and deputy minister of the Armed Forces (March-July 1946). In 1946-1953, he was the commander of the Odessa and Urals Military Districts. From March 1953, he was the USSR 1st Deputy Minister of Defense and from February 1955 through October 1957, the USSR Minister of Defense.

A member of the CPSU Central Committee (1953-1957) and a candidate and member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee (1956-1957). Deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet 1st-4th Sittings. Died on 18 June 1974 in Moscow.

2. G.K. Zhukov, "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" [Remembrances and Reflections], Moscow, Izd-vo APN, Vol 1, 1978, p 329.
3. D.A. Zhuravlev, "Ognevoy shchit Moskvy" [The Fiery Shield of Moscow], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1972, pp 41-42.

4. L.M. Sandalov, "Na moskovskom napravlenii" [On the Moscow Sector], Moscow, Nauka, 1970, p 259.
5. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1966, p 72.
6. "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuz 1941-1945. Kratkaya istoriya" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945. Concise History], Moscow, Voenizdat, 3d Revised Edition, 1984, p 123.
7. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1966, p 85.
8. See: VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 11, 1966, p 40.
9. A.M. Vasilevskiy, "Delo vsey zhizni" [A Cause of One's Entire Life], Moscow, Voenizdat, 5th Edition, 1984, p 487.
10. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 February 1985.
11. G.K. Zhukov, "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya," Vol 2, p 85.
12. Ibid., p 292.
13. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 10, 1979, p 344.
14. Quoted in: IZVESTIYA, 6 January 1985.
15. I.Kh. Bagramyan, "Velikogo naroda synovya" [Sons of the Great People], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, p 9.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1986.

10272

CSO: 1801/97

MARSHAL SOVIET UNION K.K. ROKOSSOVSKIY

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 86 (signed to press 18 Nov 86) pp 53-58

[Article by Army Gen D.D. Lelyushenko, twice Hero of the Soviet Union; the article was written on the occasion of the 90th birthday of K.K. Rokossovskiy]

[Text] The military service of K.K. Rokossovskiy(1) started in August 1914, when he was inducted into the Tsarist Army and assigned to the 5th Kargopol Dragoon Regiment. He participated in the fighting of World War I and received a junior officer rank.

With the victory of October, Konstantin Konstantinovich without hesitating came to the defense of Soviet power. Initially, he fought in the ranks of the Red Guards and later in Red Army units. In the battles of the Civil War, he proved himself to be a brave, able, decisive and enterprising commander. He was awarded two Orders of the Red Banner for military feats.

After the Civil War, in commanding units and formations, K.K. Rokossovskiy improved his military skill and devoted much attention to the training and indoctrination of subordinates. He received the Order of Lenin for successes achieved in the combat training of the 15th Separate Kuban Cavalry Division which had been assigned to him.

The talent of K.K. Rokossovskiy as a general was most apparent in the years of the Great Patriotic War. On 22 June 1941, the IX Mechanized Corps under the command of K.K. Rokossovskiy was alerted early in the morning. After a difficult 200-km march, the corps divisions without a pause entered battle against superior Nazi forces in the Lutsk area and caused them significant harm. Several days later, together with the XIX Mechanized Corps, the IX Corps launched a counterstrike against the troops of the enemy 1st Panzer Group at Dubno and then conducted heavy defensive battles on the Novograd-Volynskiy axis. Neither the enormous enemy superiority in motorized infantry and tanks nor its extensive use of aviation could break the resistance of the corps. K.K. Rokossovskiy opposed the enemy's strikes with a skillful defense, bold counterattacks and daring maneuvers.

The days of the first fighting and the border engagements were the most difficult for our troops. They had to hold out against a well conceived,

carefully planned and prepared treacherous strike by the Nazi hordes. And I well remember the difficulties which corps commander Rokossovskiy encountered at the outset of the war, as I myself was in a similar difficult and at times critical situation in commanding the XXI Mechanized Corps as in June-July 1941 I was driving off the attacks of the superior forces of Manstein's LVI Motorized Corps which was pushing toward Leningrad.

In July 1941, when a difficult situation developed at Smolensk, Hq SHC ordered K.K. Rokossovskiy to take command of one of the army groups of the Western Front in the Yartsevo area. But first this group had to be organized from scattered retreating subunits and units as well as from troops being sent to the front. Maj Gen Rokossovskiy successfully carried out the set task, being able in a short period of time to organize a stable defense on the Yartsevo sector. Subsequently, the group headed by him, having received reinforcements, launched a counterstrike against the enemy and forced it to go over to the defensive on this sector. In the fighting at Smolensk, the determination and decisiveness of K.K. Rokossovskiy were apparent as well as his ability in a difficult situation to unite and organize the men and lead them against the enemy.

Soon thereafter, Rokossovskiy was appointed commander of the 16th Army. Under his leadership, the army fought heroically in the Battle of Moscow, in initially conducting stubborn defensive battles around Vyazma and on the Volokolamsk sector and then fighting successfully in the counteroffensive.

The feats of the 16th Army which was defending the Volokolamsk sector are widely known. I would merely like to emphasize that this army during the difficult October days of 1941 was the dependable righthand neighbor of the 5th Army which I commanded. Later, in November-December, when I happened to head the 30th Army, the 16th Army was fighting on the left. We repeatedly met with Konstantin Konstantinovich and jointly analyzed the situation which was exceptionally tense, particularly in the fighting for Klin and Solnechnogorsk, when the troops of the German 3d and 4th Panzer groups were pushing with superior forces toward Moscow. It must be said that in the most difficult situations K.K. Rokossovskiy did not lose his spirits, he remained very collected and cool headed and skillfully and firmly led the subordinate troops. The men, commanders and political workers were infected with his calmness and acted confidently. In the Battle of Moscow, he demonstrated his excellent commander qualities. In the fighting on the Volokolamsk sector, he proved himself to be an able organizer of a deep, active antitank defense. And when the troops of the 16th Army went over to the counteroffensive, he took an original decision of establishing two mobile groups for outflanking the Istra Reservoir to the north and south. The outflanking actions by these groups combined with a frontal thrust of the main forces accelerated the liberation of the town of Istra and ensured the breaching of a strongly fortified line and the defeat of a major enemy grouping.

As is known, the Soviet Army defeated the Nazi hordes at Moscow and pushed them back hundreds of kilometers from our motherland's capital. Moscow and Tula oblasts as well as many rayons in Kalinin, Smolensk, Ryazan and Orel Oblasts were completely cleared of the enemy. This was the dawn of our

victory and the start of a fundamental change in the Great Patriotic War. K.K. Rokossovskiy made a worthy contribution to the attaining of victory.

The generalship gifts of K.K. Rokossovskiy were properly praised by the party and government. In July 1942, he (now as a lieutenant general) was appointed commander of the Bryansk Front and up to the end of the Great Patriotic War commanded fronts fighting, as a rule, on the main axes: the Don Front in the Stalingrad Battle, the Central Front in the Kursk Battle and the Battle of the Dnieper, the First Belorussian Front in the Belorussian Operation and the Second Belorussian Front in the East Prussian, East Pomeranian and Berlin Operations. And always the troops under his command crushed the enemy and moved forward unchecked.

In commanding the Don Front, K.K. Rokossovskiy made a major contribution to achieving victory in the historic Stalingrad Battle. The active offensive operations of the front forced the enemy to shift significant forces to the north and thereby weaken the pressure on Stalingrad. During the counteroffensive, the front together with the Southwestern and Stalingrad Fronts, participated in breaching the enemy defenses and in encircling the enemy grouping of 330,000 men in the interfluve of the Don and Volga, and then carried out the operation of eliminating the Nazi troops caught in the ring.

I also happened to participate in the Stalingrad Battle, in commanding the 1st and then the 3d Guards Armies of the Southwestern Front. And I know what effort was required from the commanders, the political workers, the staffs and all the personnel in order, without having an overall superiority over the enemy in men and weapons, to defeat the enemy not by numbers but by ability. In this battle, Konstantin Konstantinovich proved himself to be a good organizer of a front offensive operation and a master in launching divisive thrusts, the massed employment of artillery and the use of mobile troops. In solving the difficult questions of preparing for the operation, he carried out extensive work directly in the troops: before the offensive he visited all the armies and divisions fighting on the main sector.

During those days the great humaneness of K.K. Rokossovskiy was apparent. Upon his initiative, the Soviet Command sent an ultimatum to the enemy grouping surrounded at Stalingrad, proposing that they cease resistance. However, von Paulus and his staff rejected this proposal thereby dooming the troops to senseless sacrifices and complete defeat.

The Kursk Battle was another vivid page in the life and generalship activities of Col Gen K.K. Rokossovskiy. Under his command the Central Front successfully repelled the thrusts of the enemy panzer hordes on the northern face of the Kursk Salient, causing them great harm and then, going over to the offensive, with its right wing in cooperation with the troops of the Bryansk Front and the left wing of the Western Front, defeated the Orel enemy grouping.

In the course of this battle, K.K. Rokossovskiy creatively employed his own rich experience in organizing defensive and offensive actions. The defense of the Central Front had an active nature. This was expressed above all in the carrying out of artillery counterpreparation fire prior to the start of the

enemy offensive, in the decisive concentration of the main efforts of the troops on the axes of advance of the enemy assault groupings as well as in the bold maneuvering of reserves and troops removed from unattacked sectors. The commander took a risk but the risk was justified, as it was based upon a realistic assessment of the situation, the anticipating of the ideas of the Nazi Command, upon a thorough consideration of the balance of forces, the morale factor, terrain conditions and so forth.

In the Battle of the Dnieper, I happened to be fighting on the Southwestern Front and liberate the Donbass, in commanding the 3d Guards Army. During this period the Central Front, after concluding the Orel Operation, initiated an offensive to the west. The shifting of the main efforts of the Central Front from the right to the left wing (from the Sevsk to the Glukov axis) in the aim of achieving a rapid advance has been sufficiently examined in our military literature. I would like to emphasize that this was one of the examples of the military art of K.K. Rokossovskiy and proof of his outstanding abilities in troop command.

In planning the Belorussian Operation, Army Gen K.K. Rokossovskiy took an original decision to defeat the Bobruysk enemy grouping by having the troops of the First Belorussian Front which he led launch two approximately equally strong thrusts on converging axes. This was dictated by the developing situation and the terrain conditions which he knew well. However, such a plan ran counter to the established views on one main thrust of a front and for this reason was not immediately approved by Hq SHC.

Subsequent events were to fully confirm the correctness of Rokossovskiy's viewpoint. The enemy Bobruysk grouping in a short period of time was surrounded and eliminated. A quick success was achieved due to the fact that the commander had established a deep operational configuration of the assault groupings with the presence of strong mobile groups in them. In the course of the Belorussian Operation, K.K. Rokossovskiy was awarded the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union and he also received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. This was high praise for the military talent and intense daily military service of Konstantin Konstantinovich.

In the Berlin Operation, MSU K.K. Rokossovskiy headed the Second Belorussian Front which was fighting on one of the crucial axes in this final battle. The troops under his command thwarted all the enemy's attempts to break through from the north to the surrounded capital of Nazi Germany and use the Baltic Coast for shifting reinforcements from Kurland. To the numerous battle decorations of Konstantin Konstantinovich the Order of Victory was added and this crowned his generalship activities in the war years.

K.K. Rokossovskiy always approached the solving of problems creatively and was an opponent of routine. Like all of us commanders, Konstantin Konstantinovich learned a great deal from MSU G.K. Zhukov, particularly the ability to consider in adopting a plan the terrain conditions, the season and the time of day, the strong and weak points of the enemy as well as to most rationally utilize the available men and weapons, attacking where the enemy did not expect them. For example, in the defensive engagements around Volokolamsk, for repelling enemy panzer groupings advancing along the roads, he made

skillful use of all available artillery, including the anti-aircraft, having concentrated this on the most important routes and echeloned it in depth. The guns and tanks were covered by man-made obstacles and surprised the enemy from ambushes. Groups of specially trained tank hunters were widely employed. In the counteroffensive of our troops at Moscow, when the enemy which was unprepared to fight under wintertime conditions, was basically positioned in the population points, turning these into centers of resistance, K.K. Rokossovskiy took the decision to break up the enemy battle formations at night (here vigilance was dulled and the enemy's combat readiness declined), to attack from the flank and rear, to come out on the escape route and defeat the enemy piecemeal. In another instance, for eliminating the enemy grouping surrounded at Stalingrad, when the enemy had established a strong defense using man-made structures and stone buildings, the commander gave chief attention to the careful organization of artillery fire. The skillful employment of artillery demoralized the enemy and caused it great losses. In Belorussia, in conducting the Bobruysk Operation, in order to achieve surprise of the attacks, K.K. Rokossovskiy extensively employed the wooded-swampy terrain which was considered impassable. Over planking from improvised means the tanks carrying infantry on board pushed deeply into the enemy rear, defeating its reserves and capturing strongpoints. As a result, the enemy suffered a crushing defeat.

One of the important qualities of K.K. Rokossovskiy was the fact that he always considered the opinions and proposals of subordinate commanders and staffs. Moreover, he saw to it that they showed useful initiative and added their own bit of creativity to the common cause of victory.

Inherent to K.K. Rokossovskiy were high organization and efficiency in work. In knowing military affairs brilliantly, he always carefully assessed the situation, he thought out plans profoundly and completely, he set tasks for subordinates in a clear and precise manner and verified the execution of orders strictly and at the same time tactfully. In his activities he skillfully directed and used the creative force of the military council, the political directorate, the staff, the chiefs of the branches of troops and services as well as the party and Komsomol organizations. He excelled in the ability to recruit, indoctrinate and unite around himself talented associates and assistants such as the military council member K.F. Telegin, the chief of staff M.S. Malinin, the artillery commander V.I. Kazakov, the armored troops commander G.N. Orel, the chief of the rear services N.A. Antipenko and many others.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, K.K. Rokossovskiy headed the Northern Troop Group. Under his leadership and with his active personal involvement, extensive ties were established with the Polish workers, with the government and social organizations and units of the Polish Army. Soviet troops provided effective help in rebuilding the national economy as well as in developing the Polish Armed Forces.

In October 1949, at the request of the Polish government and with the permission of the Soviet Government, K.K. Rokossovskiy was sent to Poland. For 7 years, he faithfully served the Polish people and did a good deal to strengthen the friendship between Poland and the Soviet Union. He was the

Polish minister of national defense and the deputy chairman of the Polish Council of Ministers, he was elected a member of the Politburo of the PZPR Central Committee and a deputy of the Sejm and was awarded the military rank of Marshal of Poland.

Upon returning to the USSR in 1956, K.K. Rokossovskiy was entrusted with important leadership positions in the Soviet Armed Forces, including USSR deputy minister of defense and chief inspector. He successfully supervised the training of the troops and the maintaining of them in constant combat readiness and did a great deal to develop the Armed Forces considering the experience of the Great Patriotic War and the scientific-technical revolution in military affairs.

In the postwar years, I frequently met with K.K. Rokossovskiy in maneuvers and exercises, meetings, drills and field trips and worked with him in the Group of General Inspectors. I remember every meeting with K.K. Rokossovskiy. He was not only a strong-willed and demanding military leader but also a man of great heart, sensitive and attentive to others. His great erudition, profound military knowledge, rich experience in life and combat, principledness in large and small, sincerity and personal charm won him universal respect.

Over a number of years I was witness of the great intense work which Rokossovskiy carried out as a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee and deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet. In visiting the troops and in meeting with the inhabitants of towns and villages, he explained the policy of the Communist Party, he generously shared his human and combat experience and told about the heroic feats of the Soviet people. He constantly emphasized that the youth in a better and more accessible manner and with a feeling of patriotic pride should be made familiar with the heroes of the revolutionary struggle, the heroes of the past wars and with the life of remarkable people in the nation and on this basis develop high moral qualities in the soldiers. He was a convinced communist totally dedicated to the motherland and the Communist Party, a talented general and military leader. This was the Konstantin Konstantinovich that I knew and this was the man known and beloved by the Soviet people and the men of the Army and Navy.

#### FOOTNOTE

1. Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy was born on 9 (21) December 1896 in Velikiye Luki. He joined the Soviet Army in 1918 and became a CPSU member in 1919. During the Civil War, he commanded a cavalry regiment. He completed courses for the advanced training of superior supervisory personnel under the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze (1929). He participated in the fighting on the Chinese East Railroad. During the Great Patriotic War, he successively headed the IX Mechanized Corps, the 16th Army, the Bryansk, Don, Central and Belorussian Fronts as well as the First and Second Belorussian Fronts. On 24 June 1945, he was in command of the Victory Parade in Moscow. After the war, he was the commander-in-chief of the Northern Troop Group, the USSR deputy minister of defense and the chief inspector of the Ministry of Defense (1957 and 1958-1962), and commander of the Transcaucasian Military District. From April 1962, he was a member of the Group of General Inspectors of the

Ministry of Defense. From 1961 he was a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee and a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 2d, 5th-7th Sittings. He was twice Hero of the Soviet Union. He was awarded seven Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, six Orders of the Red Banner, the Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov 1st Degree. He received the Order of Victory. He died on 3 August 1968 and was buried on Red Square by the Kremlin Wall.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1986.

10272

CSO: 1801/97

## SERGEANT'S HEROISM IN DRA DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 86 (signed to press 18 Nov 86) pp 59-60

[Article by Lt Col B.Ye. Pestov: "An Internationalist Hero" and published under the rubric "Mastery and Heroism"]

[Text] On 14 December 1985, Sgt I. Chmurov carried out a feat for which he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

I met Igor Vladimirovich Chmurov at his home in the town of Odintsovo in Moscow Oblast. At the ringing of the bell, the door was opened by a tall, smart pleasant-looking young man dressed in a sports outfit and he invited me in. He went ahead, limping slightly. This was the effect of the wound which he had received in combat in Afghanistan. Participating in the conversation struck up were Igor's parents, Vladimir Sazonovich and Aleksandra Markovna.

They began with his schooling. In school Igor was an average student and did not excel in anything. He was active in sports and was interested in fencing and track and then joined an air club. It was at that time that the dream was born of becoming an airborne officer. Here an important role was played by the instructor of military affairs, Georgiy Petrovich Savenkov. Himself a veteran of the airborne troops, he was able to pass on to the children his love for military service. In beginning to study military affairs, Igor began to show a more serious attitude toward other disciplines and realized that profound knowledge on all subjects was needed for admission to military school.

After completing primary school, there was no hesitation in choosing a vocation. Igor was firmly determined to enter the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School imeni Leninskiy Komsomol. The medical commissions in the military commissariat and school were successfully passed. He passed his first exams well and then "failed" physics. Returning home upset by the failure, however he had still not abandoned the idea of becoming an airborne trooper. At a family council they decided that he should go to work and prepare himself to serve in the army. The parents had no doubts as to where the son would work. Workers themselves, they advised him to take a job at the furniture parts combine. In settling into the workspace in the shop, Igor won the respect of his comrades for not fearing difficulties. Here, in the labor

collective, he gained lessons in worker conditioning which were to stand him well in the future.

To his joy, Igor was to serve in the airborne troops. A new army life began. No matter how the fellow prepared for it, it was still much more difficult than he thought. The strict and measured pace of combat training in the training subunit where he was sent to serve conditioned those qualities which he had endeavored to develop prior to service in the army, that is, will power, tenacity, hard work and stubbornness in achieving the set goal. He completed the training subunit excellently and was sent as part of the limited contingent of Soviet troops to Afghanistan.

Arriving in the new place of service, I. Chmurov quickly became part of the collective and immediately proved to be an intelligent, excellently trained machine gunner. Seeing the boldness, efficiency and good training of the young soldier, the company commander, Sr Lt V. Peskov, always chose him to carry out the most difficult battle tasks.

Thus, in August 1985, as part of a patrol which had entered an area where a dushman band was operating, I. Chmurov by machine gun fire covered the retreat of his comrades who had fallen into an ambush. He was the last to disengage.

In September 1985, as part of a subunit he was accompanying a motor vehicle column. On the way it was attacked by a dushman band. The head vehicle was hit. The bandits, counting on an easy success, began in short rushes to close in on the column to capture it. However, they were unable to carry out their plans. In firing accurately and skillfully changing firing positions, I. Chmurov forced the dushman to hit the dirt and prevented them from approaching the vehicles until the arrival of the main security forces. For courage and valor shown in this fighting, he received the medal For Combat Services. The company communists showed I. Chmurov high confidence in admitting him to the ranks of the CPSU.

In December 1985, the company in which Igor was serving was given the mission of sealing off a gorge in which the dushman had established a large base with extensive supplies of weapons, ammunition and food. In approaching the gorge covertly, the soldiers blocked the exit from it. Seeing the hopelessness of the situation, the bandits decided at any price to break out of the stone pocket. They were aided by the weather as it was snowing and fog swirled all around. With the support of mortar and recoilless weapon fire, the dushman began the assault. In the course of the developing combat, there was the threat that the bandits would break through on an adjacent sector. The company commander, Sr Lt V. Peskov, was ordered to help the comrades. Having left a cover group on a prevailing height, V. Peskov with two platoons hurried to help them. Being unsuccessful on the defensive sector of the adjacent company, the dushman endeavored to break through where the cover group was positioned. I. Chmurov was part of it. Having detected the screen, the enemy unleashed all its fire power against the elevation held by the Soviet troops and rushed into the assault. The rush was halted by the machine gun and submachine gun fire of the airborne troops. Again and again the bandits endeavored to take the hill. In the brief intervals between assaults, I. Chmurov provided first aid to the wounded. In changing firing positions,

the courageous soldier by accurate fire prevented the enemy from approaching the hill. At one of the moments in changing firing position, a dushman bullet caught the paratrooper. Wounded in the thigh and bleeding heavily, Igor continued to hit the enemy with machine gun fire. He knew that if the bandits broke through, they would succeed in coming out in the rear of the company and for this reason stood to the last. Then his cartridges ran out. Grenades were used. The next assault was driven off. I. Chmurov fired the last cartridges from the machine gun while already losing consciousness.

Help hurried up on time. Comrades with difficulty removed Igor from the machine gun, carried him from the battlefield and sent him to the hospital.

Then followed long months of treatment and after a certain time an old dream of Igor's came true. He was admitted to the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School imeni Leninskiy Komsomol.

With honor, as a Soviet soldier should, having carried out his international duty, the communist Sgt Igor Chmurov has joined those for whom the defense of the motherland is the career of their life.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1986.

10272

CSO: 1801/97

### 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF CUBAN ARMED FORCES NOTED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 86 (signed to press 18 Nov 86) pp 73-78

[Article by Maj Gen I.D. Statsenko and Capt 2d Rank A.F. Shcheglov: "The Shield of the Cuban Revolution"; the article was written on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the establishing of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba]

[Text] The Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba were born in the course of the revolution which shattered the dictatorial regime of the henchman of the American monopolies, Batista, and eliminated the more than 50-year domination of U.S. imperialism in Cuba.

On 2 December 1956, a detachment of revolutionaries headed by Fidel Castro landed from the yacht "Granma" on the eastern coast of Cuba with the aim of continuing the struggle against the dictatorship. By a decision of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba, this date is celebrated as the Day of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba. Over more than 2 years of fighting, the detachment of Fidel Castro grew into the Insurgent Army which with the aid of the masses of people achieved the victory of the revolution on 1 January 1959.

One of the national features of the Cuban revolution was that the combat operations of the Insurgent Army were the main form of revolutionary struggle in the situation which developed in the nation during those years. Its special role in the victory of the revolution was pointed out at the First Congress of the Cuban Communist Party: "The Insurgent Army was the soul of the revolution.... During the days when neither the union of all revolutionary forces nor the party which arose later existed, the Insurgent Army contributed to the unity and solidarity of all the people and ensured worker power and the existence of the revolution itself...."(1)

After the victory of the revolution, the Insurgent Army came to the defense of the peaceful labor of the Cuban people, the dependence and sovereignty of the republic. In October 1959, the Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces was established and this was headed by now Army Gen Raoul Castro Ruz. The army personnel took an active part in carrying out fundamental socioeconomic changes in the nation, in establishing the bodies of power, in rebuilding the

economy, in eliminating illiteracy, in the campaigns to harvest the sugar cane and so forth.

The Soviet people and all progressive mankind welcomed the victory of the Cuban revolution. In the United States, the attitude was different. Initially, the United States intended to suppress it by an economic blockade. However, due to the fraternal aid of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, Cuba held out. Then the U.S. imperialists began preparing armed aggression. On 17 April 1961, in the area of the Playa Giron [Bay of Pigs], some 1,500 counterrevolutionary mercenaries trained by the CIA were landed. They did not doubt their success and counted on support from the Pentagon. But the interventionists miscalculated. After 72 hours from the beginning of the landing, the Insurgent Army and detachments of the people's militia had defeated them completely.

The events on the Playa Giron and the Caribbean Crisis which followed in 1962 as well as the constant threat of invasion by the United States showed that a modern regular army was needed for dependably defending the revolution's victories.

The beginning of the transformation of the Insurgent Army into the regular Revolutionary Armed Forces (RAF) dates to the middle of 1961. At this time, the first units and formations of the RAF were organized. Up to the end of 1963, the Cuban Army was manned by volunteering. On 26 November 1963, the Cuban revolutionary government, in the aims of further strengthening the defense capability of the nation, approved Law No. 1129 on introducing universal military service.(2) On the basis of this, from 1964 young men began to be drafted into the RAF. Ten years later, in 1973, the new Law Governing Universal Military Service No. 1255 was adopted and at the same time the "Regulation Governing the Fulfillment of the Law on Military Service" was introduced.(3) These documents strengthened the principles of military organizational development in Cuba.

According to the law, all males from 17 to 50 years of age are liable for military service. The period of active military service in all the RAF services has been set at 3 years. Women over the age of 17 can volunteer for regular service in the RAF ranks.(4)

The tasks of the direct execution of the party and government defense policy were entrusted to the RAF Ministry. This was established in the law governing the organization of the central Cuban administrative state bodies. This stated that the RAF Ministry "provides leadership over the armed forces, including the military formations of the MIA [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the Youth Labor Army (YLA) and civil defense by their organization, arming, combat training and employment as a military force."(5)

In organizational terms the Cuban RAF consists of three services: ground troops, air defense troops and air force (a single armed service) and the Revolutionary Navy.

The ground troops are the basis of the RAF and they include motorized rifle, tank, artillery and engineer units equipped with modern tanks and armored

personnel carriers, artillery, automatic weapons, as well as diverse engineer, motor vehicle, tractor and other combat equipment. This has increased their maneuverability and provides an opportunity to quickly execute marches and regroupings, and independently or in cooperation with the other armed services to carry out the tasks of modern combat under the specific geographic conditions of the country.

The air defense troops and the air force are armed with supersonic fighters, antiaircraft missile systems, antiaircraft artillery and radar equipment. At night and during the day, under any weather conditions, the air defense and air force personnel vigilantly guard the air frontiers of Cuba and are ready to support the operations of the units and formations of the other Armed Services.

The Revolutionary Navy possesses significant combat might and it includes combat ships, units and subunits of shore defense, observation and warning. The ships of the Revolutionary Navy are armed with modern missile weapons and radio electronic equipment.

In 1973, upon a decision of the Cuban government, the Youth Labor Army was established and its personnel, while on active military service, takes part in harvesting the sugar cane and works on major construction projects of the country. With its establishing, the regular units of the RAF were able to be more concerned with combat training.

Combat training in the RAF was organized considering the requirements of modern combat and was aimed at the successful execution of the combat training tasks of the troops and at a constant rise in the level of combat and mobilizational readiness of the units. Much attention was given to improving the training facilities and to saving the weapons and combat equipment and this was particularly important under the conditions of the humid tropical climate in Cuba.

The training year in the RAF is divided into two training periods of 5 months each. Twice a year, inductions for military service are held. The young soldiers are traditionally greeted in a ceremony. They hear speeches by the commanders of the units and subunits and representatives of the superior command who tell of the history of the RAF and urge the young soldiers and sailors to be disciplined and tenacious in mastering a military specialty. Here also the men being discharged into the reserve turn over their personal weapons to the new recruits.

Those drafted for military service take the military oath. In a ceremony in the presence of representatives from the command, the local party and administrative bodies, the Young Communist Union and other social organizations, the men vow their loyalty to the motherland.

In the combat training process in the RAF, great attention is given to field, air and sea skills and to instilling in all the personnel the practical skills in operations on the battlefield with the effective employment of combat equipment and weapons, combat teamwork of the subunits and units and their readiness to successfully carry out the battle tasks. The exercises held in

recent years, in the estimate of the command, have demonstrated an increasing level of training of the RAF personnel.

The socialist competition is an effective means for instilling in the RAF personnel a conscious attitude toward military service, toward carrying out one's duty to the motherland as well as for developing a feeling of collectivism and mutual aid and creative initiative. The winners of the competition in a ceremony are presented chest insignias "Outstanding Man of the RAF," they are invited for a week to the capital where they become acquainted with its attractions and they visit enterprises and troop units. Interesting measures are organized for them. As a rule, the insignias of military valor are presented to the men in a ceremony by representatives of the superior military leadership of the republic. This measure is widely covered by the military press and the mass information media of Cuba.

For many years, high indicators in military and political training have been won by the men of the aviation and anti-aircraft missile units of the Cuban Air Defense and Air Force as well as by one of the troop units of the Revolutionary Navy. For the first time in the RAF, these three units were awarded the honorific designator of guards.

One of the main conditions ensuring a high level of combat readiness of the units is the good training and competence of the officer personnel. The Communist Party and the Cuban government have shown constant concern for training totally dedicated and well instructed military personnel. Over the years of communist power, a number of military schools has been established in the nation. These include: the Gen Maximo Gomez Military Academy, the Gen Antonio Maceo Combined-Arms Command School, the Maj Camilo Cienfuegos Artillery School, the Military-Technical Institute, the Naval School and others.

The RAF academies and schools have modern training facilities and a faculty that is well trained and possesses significant experience. This makes it possible to prepare militarily skilled and politically mature officers for the RAF. Hundreds of Cuban servicemen have been trained in Soviet military schools.

By tradition each year on 26 July (on the eve of the National Insurrection Day, the anniversary of the storming of the Moncada Barracks), on Revolution Square in Havana, a ceremony is held for the awarding of the primary military ranks. The young officers who have graduated from the nation's military schools in the presence of party and government leaders vow loyalty to the motherland and to the cause of the revolution.

The Cuban Communist Party has shown constant concern for improving the living and service conditions of the officer personnel and all the men of the RAF. In 1976, the nation adopted a special law on social security for the RAF.(6)

Cuba has established and is successfully operating the Maj Camilo Cienfuegos Military Schools (similar to the Suvorov military schools in the USSR). School-age young men and women who attend these schools gain basic military

training and a secondary education here. Then they continue their studies in the higher military schools.

In the RAF an important role is played by the subofficers(7) and sergeants. They are the largest detachment of command personnel directly linked to the daily activities, routine and training of the soldiers and sailors. The subofficers in the RAF are professional military men and the closest assistants of the officers and are experienced specialists in various areas. They take an active part in indoctrinating and training the personnel.

After completing active military service, the servicemen can remain for re-enlisted service for a period of at least 2 years.

The necessity of further strengthening the RAF has been caused by the recently sharply increased anti-Cuban campaign of the imperialist circles and by the policy of flagrant blackmail and threat. The United States several times a year conducts provocative naval maneuvers off the coasts of Cuba with the landing of assault forces at the Guantanamo Base. In such a situation the Communist Party and the nation's government have shown particular concern for strengthening Cuba's defense capability. The decisions of the Third Congress of the Cuban Communist Party held in February 1986 emphasize that the period which has passed since the previous congress has been marked by a labor upsurge of all the Cuban people. Over this time the program for training the troops, staffs and the military training centers has been improved and around 1.5 million men and women who were part of the territorial people's militia formations have been trained and assigned to combat subunits. Over 100,000 leading workers of all levels have undergone training in special courses.(8)

Military training for the territorial militia formations is conducted in time off from work and partially in vacation time. Upon a decision of the militia personnel, clothing and weapons are purchased from money received from the enterprises and from the personal savings of citizens deposited in the territorial militia fund. The Territorial Militia Troops are the reserve of the RAF and in addition to this are entrusted with the task of defending plants, factories and various structures in the event of an attack by the aggressors.

The strengthening of the nation's defense capability and the improving of the regular RAF as a socialist-type army have been carried out under the leadership of the Cuban Communist Party. Great attention has been given by the party to party political work which is conducted on the basis of the decisions of the party congresses, the Program Platform, the by-laws, decrees of the Central Committee plenums, the orders and directives of the commander-in-chief and the minister of the RAF as well as the instructions of the Chief of the Central Political Directorate.

The Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party directs party activities in the RAF through the Central Political Directorate which works as a section of the Central Committee. In all the services of the RAF, in the formations, military schools and major military facilities, political sections have been established. The chief of the political body is the deputy commander for political affairs.

In the regiments, on the ships, in the battalions and companies there are also deputy commanders for political affairs. Party commissions have been set up under the political bodies and these are elected at the corresponding party conferences. The Party Commission under the RAF Central Political Directorate is approved by the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party.

The party organizations in the RAF carry out party policy in the army. They focus their work on fulfilling the tasks posed by the Central Committee for the RAF and indoctrinate their personnel in a spirit of close solidarity with the Communist Party, total dedication to the socialist motherland, in a spirit of proletarian internationalism and a strengthening of ties with the working class and all the people.

"The party organizations in the RAF and MIA," state the By-Laws of the Cuban Communist Party, "work on increasing and strengthening the morale of the personnel, they organize Marxist-Leninist training essential for maintaining high combat readiness, and in addition instill in the personnel a spirit of loyalty to the military oath and the carrying out of the orders and tasks posed by the commanders, in a spirit of the strict observance of military discipline."(9) Great attention is given to indoctrinating the RAF personnel in a spirit of proletarian internationalism and combat cooperation with the armed forces of the fraternal socialist countries.

The Cuban Communist Party through the party organizations in the RAF influences all aspects of troop life, proceeding from the specific tasks confronting the units. The party organizations mobilize the servicemen to successfully carry out the combat and training tasks, to master the equipment and weapons and to continuously improve combat expertise.

The army organizations of the Young Communist Union (YCU) are the active combat assistant of the party in the armed forces. The YCU members comprise a significant stratum amongst the rank-and-file, NCO and officer personnel. They are the progressive, most active part of the young soldiers, their combat vanguard and party reserve in the armed forces. The battleworthiness of the subunits, units and ships of the Cuban Army depends largely upon the combat training level of the YCU members, upon their ideological conviction, attitude toward their duties and creative enthusiasm.

In their work the army YCU organizations give particular attention to the examples set by their members in military service as well as to increasing their ideological-political and general educational level. The best of them have been entered in the Honor Book of the troop units and many have won the high title of "Outstanding Man of the RAF."

The Fourth YCU Congress held in 1982 emphasized the great role of the army YCU organizations in preparing the young men for service in the Armed Forces and in the military patriotic indoctrination of the Cuban youth. For services to the motherland in strengthening its defense capability, hundreds of YCU members have received the Pedro Sotro Alba Medal, named after a Cuban national hero.

Ideological and political indoctrination of the personnel holds an important place in the Cuban RAF. Various forms and methods of ideological work are employed, including those which have proven effective in the Soviet Armed Forces and in the armies of the other socialist countries.

The basic forms of this work are Marxist-Leninist training for the officers, political exercises with the rank-and-file and NCO personnel, party education, agitation-propaganda and mass cultural work.

The exercises for the Marxist-Leninist training of officer personnel are conducted on a differentiated basis, considering the nature of officer service. The lecture and seminar method of exercises had been adopted on a level of the staffs of the armies and services of the RAF and in the directorates of the Ministry and military schools as the basic one in Marxist-Leninist training. The narrative-talk method is employed in the exercises with the remaining officers.

Political exercises with the rank-and-file and NCO personnel are organized by subunits. Their theme envisages the studying of the materials of the Third Congress of the Cuban Communist Party as well as the subsequent decrees of the Central Committee plenums and other party documents.

Along with this, in the political exercises they study such subjects as the role of the socialist commonwealth countries in the anti-imperialist struggle, the aims of socialism as a social system and the aggressive nature of imperialism. The life and activities of the RAF are studied as well as the life of the fraternal socialist states and their armies. In ideological work a significant place has been given over to indoctrinating in the Cuban military a class hate for imperialism and to demonstrating its aggressive essence. Under the conditions of the unabating ideological subversion against Cuba, the RAF commanders, the party and youth organizations have intensified the work aimed at instilling high political vigilance in all servicemen.

Here significant aid has been provided by the RAF press organ, the magazine VERDE OLIVO. Its pages periodically publish materials on Marxist-Leninist training and elaborate the themes of political exercises.

Agitation and propaganda work holds an important place in successfully carrying out the tasks of indoctrinating conscientious and ideologically convinced soldiers. The men of the Army and Navy are indoctrinated in the examples of the heroic feats of the outstanding fighters for the freedom and independence of Cuba such as Jose Marti, Maximo Gomez, Antonio Maceo, Camilo Cienfuegos, Che Guevara and others. The Cuban people hold sacred and add to the revolutionary and combat traditions of the previous generations of fighters.

The ideas of the outstanding Cuban thinker and revolutionary, Jose Marti, who dedicated his life to the cause of liberating the motherland have left their impression on the shaping of the political views of many prominent figures in the Cuban revolution. "Marti," emphasized Fidel Castro, "has taught us to warmly love our motherland, to passionately defend the liberty, honor and

dignity of man, he taught us hate for despotism and an endless faith in the people."(10)

In the companies, batteries and on the ships of the Cuban RAF, rooms have been organized which bear the names of Lenin and Marti. Here they have installed busts and stands describing the life and struggle of V.I. Lenin and Jose Marti. This is not only the mark of respect to the founder and leader of the world's first socialist state and to the outstanding Cuban revolutionary, but also an indicator of the ideological focus of the mass political and cultural educational work with the personnel of the units and subunits.

During the time which has passed since the Cuban revolution, the combat cooperation of the Cuban RAF with the Soviet Armed Forces and with the armies of the other fraternal socialist states has been established and grown stronger. This continues to develop in many areas. Military delegations from both countries make trips in the aim of exchanging experience in combat and political training, friendship calls by Soviet naval ships are made, the USSR provides help in the training of Cuban military personnel, joint military scientific conferences are held and military literature, periodicals and films are exchanged.

The most important aim in the military cooperation of the fraternal countries is the indoctrinating of ideologically strong men of the Army and Navy who are loyal to the cause of communism and socialism, who are well trained and are capable of mastering modern combat equipment. The development of contacts between the armies of the USSR and Cuba and Soviet aid to Cuba in strengthening its defense capability serve the cause of the dependable defense of the victories of the Cuban revolution.

\* \* \*

The men of the Soviet Armed Forces and all the Soviet people are happy for each success of the Cuban friends in building a new life and in increasing the battleworthiness of the RAF, in viewing this as a contribution by the workers of the Island of Freedom to the fraternal commonwealth of socialist states. The plans of American imperialism of intimidating Cuba and forcing it to move from the selected path are doomed to defeat.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "I syezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Kuby. Gavana, 17-22 dekabrya 1975 g." [First Congress of the Cuban Communist Party. Havana, 17-22 December 1975], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 176.
2. I.N. Shkadov et al., "Muzhestvo i bratstvo" [Courage and Fraternity], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1982, p 160.
3. GAZETA OFICIAL, Havana, 12 August 1973.
4. Ibid.
5. GRANMA, 29 November 1976.

6. VERDE OLIVO, No 52, 1976, pp 30-39.
7. A subofficer is a military rank corresponding to warrant officer [praporshchik, michman] in the USSR Armed Forces.
8. PRAVDA, 6 February 1986.
9. "I syezd Kommunisticheskoy...", p 402.
10. SOVETSKIY VOIN, No 12, 1982, p 48.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1986.

10272

CSO: 1801/97

## 45 YEARS OF YUGOSLAV PEOPLE'S ARMY CELEBRATED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 86 (signed to press 18 Nov 86) pp 79-84

[Article by Lt Col N.I. Andreyev: "Born in the Flames of Battle"; the article was written on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the Yugoslav People's Army]

[Text] In April 1941, Yugoslavia was the victim of Nazi aggression. In less than 2 weeks, its Royal Army was defeated by the Nazi troops; the government headed by the king fled hurriedly abroad. Bourgeois Yugoslavia ceased to exist as a state. After occupation it was split up into parts and these were apportioned out to Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Horthy Hungary and monarchical-Fascist Bulgaria. Under the aegis of the foreign conquerors, there arose the pro-Fascist, so-called "Independent State of Croatia" which included up to 40 percent of the territory of prewar Yugoslavia.(1)

The black night of occupation against descended on the much-suffering land where peoples for the centuries had fought for freedom and independence. In implanting the lamentably well-known "New Order," the invaders established a regime of cruel terror. They were aided in this by the local Quislings including the Ustashi (Croatian fascists), Chetniks (Serbian bourgeois nationalists) and other supporters of the invaders. The enemy concentrated a large military grouping on Yugoslav territory: in July 1941, it had 23 divisions, 12 brigades, around 20 separate battalions and over 100 police battalions, numbering up to 400,000 men.

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) was the sole political force in the nation which under the arising, difficult situation maintained a firm determination to fight the enemy. From the first days of the occupation the CPY did everything possible to organize the people's resistance to the enslavers. It was the inspirer, organizer and leader of the people's liberation struggle and the socialist revolution in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav working class was in the front ranks of the fighters against fascism and here the vanguard was the Communist Party which from the start of the war had raised the slogan of not only national but also social liberation.

On 22 June 1941, on the day of the attack of the Nazi hordes on the Soviet Union, the CPY called upon the Yugoslav peoples to rise up to a liberation

war. The Appeal of the Politburo of the CPY Central Committee states: "A decisive struggle has commenced against the evil enemies of the working class, a struggle which the Nazi criminals themselves have initiated by the perfidious attack on the Soviet Union, the hope of the workers of the entire world. The precious blood of the heroic Soviet people is being shed not only for the sake of defending the nation of socialism but also in the name of the final social and national liberation of all working mankind. For this reason, this is also our struggle and we should support it with all forces, even to the point of our lives...."(2)

On 4 July, the Politburo of the CPY Central Committee approved a decision on the start of a nationwide armed insurrection (in commemoration of this event, 4 July in Yugoslavia is annually celebrated as the Day of the Fighter). The flames of insurrection, which broke out on 7 July 1941, in the village of Bela Crkva, soon spread to all Serbia. The legendary "Uzita Partisan Republic" was established on territory liberated from the enemy and in an enemy encirclement it survived 67 days. Here were located and operated the Politburo of the CPY Central Committee and the Main Staff of the People's Liberation Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia (PLPDY) established on 27 June, weapons and ammunition were produced and the party newspaper BORBA published. On 13 July, Montenegro rose in revolt, an armed struggle began in Slovenia on 22 July, in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina on 27 July and in Macedonia on 11 October. At the end of the first year of the war, the partisan formations numbered around 80,000 fighters organized into many-score detachments and battalions.(3)

However, the situation in which the people's liberation movement developed was extremely complex. The enemy had a many-fold superiority in personnel, weapons and combat equipment and this unconditionally told on tactics, the organizational structure and combat capability of the Liberation Movement forces.

The partisan detachments which were the main armed formations at that period of time were tied down to a certain territory or population points where they obtained food, clothing and lodging. This restricted them, it impeded maneuvering and limited the scale of the struggle against the enemy. At that time the enemy was constantly increasing the pressure and had stiffened the terror and repression against the local population. In the developing situation, the need arose of forming formations and units not linked to a certain territory and capable of fighting the strong enemy forces. Upon the decision of the CPY Central Committee in the village of Rudo the 1st Proletarian People's Liberation Assault Brigade was organized on the basis of the partisan detachments and this consisted chiefly of Serbian and Montenegrin workers and peasants, predominantly communists and Komsomol members.(4) The date of the baptism in fire for this first regular formation, 22 December 1941, is considered the birthday of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA). The 1st Proletarian People's Liberation Assault Brigade was the pride of the YPA personnel and all the Yugoslav people. During the war years, the brigade fought its way over a long and difficult path stretching 25,000 km and fostered in its ranks more than 80 People's Heroes of Yugoslavia. Inscribed in its combat history are the vivid pages of the fight for the Yugoslav capital, Belgrad, where men of the 1st Proletarian fought shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet soldiers.

By November 1942, 28 partisan brigades had been organized and this was of important significance for the further development of the people's liberation struggle. The brigades were mobile formations capable of quickly appearing where the situation required. They accepted only volunteers (up to the autumn of 1944) and iron military discipline was maintained among the fighters. The number of partisan detachments increased simultaneously with the formation of regular brigades. The improved structure of the armed forces made it possible for the Supreme Staff in November 1942 to adopt the decision to establish the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia [PLAY] organized into divisions and corps. At the end of 1942, the forces of the people's liberation movement numbered 150,000 men in 2 corps, 9 divisions, 38 brigades and 36 partisan detachments which by their actions tied down 18 Italian divisions, 6 German, 5 Bulgarian and units of 3 Hungarian divisions.(5)

In using the many-fold superiority in men and weapons over the PLAY and the partisan formations, the enemy repeatedly attempted to suppress the liberation movement in Yugoslavia. Difficult times befell the Yugoslav fighters in 1943, when the enemy organized major offensive operations against the PLAY, including those known under the code names of Weiss and Schwarz. In Yugoslavia and abroad, these events are known as the battles on the Neretve and the Sutjeske. Having established a large grouping numbering almost 80,000 occupiers and their local supporters, the enemy was endeavoring to force the main forces of the PLAY out of Western and Central Bosnia into the unforested areas and destroy them there. However, the PLAY responded to the enemy offensive with a counteroffensive, creating for this the Main Operations Group of 5 divisions, the 1st and 2d Proletarian, the 3d, 7th and 9th.(6) In the third week of February, the Main Operations Group defeated the Italian Murdge Division and reached the Neretve River. But the superior enemy forces at the end of February succeeded in squeezing the PLAY troops. The danger of their complete encirclement arose. However, in the fighting of 14-23 March, the skillfully maneuvering 2d and 3d PLAY Divisions in turn launched effective strikes against the united forces of the Chetniks and occupiers, supporting the escape of the Main Operations Group from the Neretve Valley. The Yugoslav patriots developed an offensive on the territory of Herzegovina and at the beginning of April reached Sanjak and Montenegro. Regardless of the significant losses, the People's Liberation Army maintained its battleworthiness and by the influx of new forces grew numerically, it enriched its tactics and liberated her territories.(7)

In May 1943, the enemy again attempted an offensive action, this time using a grouping consisting of around 9 divisions totaling 127,000 men. In Montenegro and Herzegovina they were opposed by 4 divisions and 2 brigades of the PLAY numbering around 16,000 men. In addition, there were 3,500 sick and wounded with this group. Against the fighters worn down in the course of the previous fighting and exhausted from lack of food, the enemy threw its formations armed with first-rate military equipment for those times. The PLAY units put up fierce resistance. The 1st and 2d Proletarian Divisions broke through the ring of encirclement in the Sutjeske Valley. As a result, the Yugoslav formations were able to break through into the rear of the punitive troops. The plans of the Nazi Command were thwarted, although the Yugoslav patriots

lost 6,000 fighters. The fighting on the Sutjeska became a symbol of the steadfastness, bravery and self-sacrifice of the Yugoslav soldiers.

In the course of the struggle, the organizational structure of the PLAY was improved. In 1942-1943, along with the ground troops, the navy and aviation were founded and began to develop. During the war years, the forces of the Yugoslav Navy destroyed or captured 65 small enemy vessels and damaged 70. In May 1945, the Navy numbered up to 400 cargo and fighting ships and boats with a personnel of around 14,000 men. In October 1943, the PLAY Supreme Staff issued an order on the formation of the 1st Air Base. The PLAY combat formations were basically organized along territorial-national features. As a rule, the divisions were made up of 3 brigades, usually numbering around 1,000 men.(8)

In Yugoslavia the struggle for national independence developed into a revolutionary struggle. On the territory liberated from the enemy, bodies of new power were established, the people's liberation committees, and these became the "sole and truly popular bodies of power."(9) The communists played a leading role in them. On 29 November 1943, the second session was held of the Antifascist Council of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOY). The AVNOY was proclaimed the supreme legislative and executive representative body of the people. At the same time, the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia was founded and this carried out the functions of a provisional people's government.

Soviet-Yugoslav combat cooperation was born and strengthened in the fight against fascism. There had been years of a harsh and severe struggle since the start of the armed insurrection to the arrival of the Soviet Army in Yugoslavia. From the very outset of the war, the USSR endeavored to provide the PLAY with the maximum possible aid which consisted, first of all, in the titanic struggle of the Soviet people which brought closer the hour of liberation for all the countries enslaved by fascism. The Appeal of the CPY Central Committee to the peoples of Yugoslavia of 25 July 1941 contains the call: "Let us follow the example of the heroism of the Soviet peoples, the unprecedented heroism of the Red Army the men of which are fighting in disregard of death...." The report of I.B. Tito at the first session of the AVNOY on 26 November 1942 pointed out that "everything achieved by us in the struggle to the greatest degree is the result of the accomplishments of our great Slav brothers, the Russians and all the peoples of the Soviet Union. Only a faith, a deep faith in the strength and might of the Soviet Union, in the strength and might of the Red Army has supported us until we overcame all those difficulties through which we passed these 18 months."(10)

As the Soviet troops drew closer to the frontiers of Yugoslavia, the scale of material military aid increased. At the beginning of 1944, military missions were exchanged to carry out practical measures involved in strengthening ties between the new Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and for providing aid to the PLAY. From the first months of 1944, regardless of enormous difficulties, Soviet weapons, ammunition, communications equipment, clothing, food, medicines and so forth were delivered and for this bases in the Kiev and Vinnitsa area were employed. Subsequently, air bases were established in Romania (Rosiorii de Vede), Italy (Bari) and Yugoslavia (Zemun). The Soviet

pilots A.S. Shornikov, B.T. Kalinkin and P.N. Yakimov committed a heroic feat. In June 1944, they under bad weather and combat conditions removed from enemy encirclement in the Kupresko Polje area members of the PLAY Supreme Staff headed by Marshal of Yugoslavia J.B. Tito and delivered them to the air base in Bari. For this they were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union and People's Hero of Yugoslavia.

As a result of transferring to the PLAY an air group of 2 Soviet air divisions (10th Guards Ground Attack and 236th Fighters), several airfield service battalions, separate air units and air defense forces as well as weapons and supplies for 12 infantry divisions and 2 air divisions, the combat capability of the PLAY was significantly increased. A large group of Soviet instructor officers was sent to the Yugoslav troops; Yugoslav servicemen, primarily aviators and tank troops, began to be trained in Soviet military schools. Just in 1944 and the first 5 months of 1945, the Soviet Union turned over to the PLAY more than 180,000 units of small arms, more than 1,000 artillery and antitank guns, over 3,360 mortars, 491 aircraft, 65 tanks, almost 1,330 radios and so forth. In the second half of 1944, the 1st Separate Infantry Brigade and the 1st Separate Tank Brigade which had been organized on Soviet territory from Yugoslavs and had received Soviet weapons and equipment were merged into the PLAY.(11)

The high point of Soviet-Yugoslav combat cooperation was the joint combat operations of the units and formations from the Soviet Army and the PLAY on Yugoslav land. In September 1944, an agreement was reached between the Soviet government and the PLAY leadership on the crossing of Red Army units over the Yugoslav border into Eastern Serbia in order to help the PLAY liberate Serbia and Belgrad. By this time, the PLAY had 50 divisions, 2 operations groups (with 2 brigades in each), 16 infantry brigades and 130 partisan detachments. These forces numbered around 400,000 men.(12) The PLAY troops and partisan detachments possessed rich combat experience and high morale. However, superiority in men and weapons still remained on the enemy's side. The PLAY lacked aviation, tanks, naval forces and did not have enough guns and mortars and automatic small arms. On Yugoslav territory the enemy still possessed a large, well-armed grouping numbering around 600,000 men, including around 400,000 Nazi troops. The Nazis gave particular attention to the holding of Serbia and Belgrad as here ran important lines of communications linking their main forces with the troops in the south of the Balkan peninsula. Moreover, having created a strong defensive rampart here, the enemy was hoping to halt the advance of the Soviet Army. However, the Soviet, Yugoslav and Bulgarian troops in close cooperation defeated the enemy Army Group Serbia, a large portion of which was completely exterminated. On 20 October, Soviet and Yugoslav soldiers by joint efforts liberated Belgrad.

In the last war, the peoples of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were united by the high goals of defeating fascism, defending the liberty and independence of the peoples and the world historical victories of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The USSR played the crucial role in defeating the Nazi aggressors and provided inestimable aid to the enslaved peoples in their struggle for liberation from Nazi tyranny. The Soviet people had high regard for the contribution of the Yugoslav peoples to the common victory over Naziism. On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the victory, the General Secretary of

the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev, emphasized that "we will never forget the steadfastness and courage of the Yugoslav people and their People's Liberation Army."(13) By the victorious 9 May 1945, the Yugoslav Army consisted of 4 combined-arms armies, a navy and an air force and numbered almost 800,000 men.(13a) Thus, from the moment of the organizing of the 1st Proletarian Brigade it had grown by 10-fold! The Yugoslav soldiers during the war tied down from 30 to 55 enemy divisions and destroyed over 450,000 soldiers and officers and a large amount of enemy military equipment. The peoples of Yugoslavia paid a dear price for their freedom and independence. The war claimed the lives of 1,706,000 persons and this was 10.8 percent of the nation's population. The material losses caused by the Nazis to Yugoslavia have been estimated at almost \$47 billion.(14)

In December 1951, the Yugoslav Army was renamed the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA). At present, the YPA is a regular, technically equipped, modern socialist army. It consists of ground troops (the main service), a navy, air force and air defense troops (a unified service). In all the services and branches of troops of the YPA during the postwar period there has been an ongoing process of modernization: the organization and establishment and the combat training of the troops have been improved, the units and formations are receiving evermore modern types of weapons and combat equipment. The socialist industrialization of the nation has made it possible to establish domestic production of many types of modern military equipment. According to the data of the Yugoslav military newspaper NARODNA ARMIJA, from the beginning of 1970, 70 percent of the requirements of the Yugoslav Armed Forces for weapons and combat equipment have been met by the production of Yugoslav plants.(15)

The armed defense of Yugoslavia is based on a concept of national defense and public self-defense worked out considering the experience of the people's liberation war and the particular features of the postwar development of the Yugoslav state. According to the Yugoslav law, all citizens of the nation are liable for military service. Since 1986 the period of regular service in the YPA for male citizens has been reduced to 1 year. Women undergo a 3-month period of instruction in military affairs in the YPA subunits on a volunteer basis.

According to information in the Yugoslav press, recently there has been a process of improving the training system of military personnel as they existed in each Armed Service. Several years ago they eliminated the category of "subofficer" and instead introduced "junior officers" such as vodnik, zastvnik and others.

Immediate leadership of the YPA is provided by the Union Secretariat for Affairs of National Defense (USND) headed by a union secretary (presently, Flt Adm B. Mamula).

Intense combat training is carried out in the troops and in the navy of the YPA. In carrying out the decisions of the 13th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] (this was held in June 1986), the men are constantly improving their field, air and sea skills and are learning to act in a situation as close as possible to real combat. Each year a socialist

competition is held in the Army and Navy for the title of best unit and the results of this are given by Army Day, 22 December. The winners of the competition are set in each Armed Service, military district, formation, unit and subunit. To be a pacesetter means to have high indicators first of all in the subjects which determine combat readiness. For example, in the ground troops in 1985 the best was the unit commanded by Lt Col Dragoljub Ojdanic. The men completed both periods of the training year with good results. Among the right-flank formations is the troop collective headed by B. Miletic. During the autumn camp period of 1985, the subunit carried out a 120-km march on foot, immediately after which there was a tactical exercise with field firing. The "enemy" was dependably hit with fire and the men received good and excellent grades.(16)

The process of improvement is also being carried out in the area of party political work in the YPA. During the period of the war and in the first postwar years, the institution of military commissars existed in the Yugoslav Army. In 1953, the principle of one-man command was introduced. Definite changes have been carried out in the structure, forms and work methods of the political bodies and these for a certain time were named moral and political indoctrination bodies. The LCY directs political work in the Armed Forces through the political bodies and political organizations. At present, the superior political body of the YPA is the Political Directorate of the Union Secretariat for Affairs of National Defense (PD USND). It provides overall leadership of the work to ensure a high morale and political state of the personnel, political training and ideological-political indoctrination of the servicemen and cultural education work in the troops. It organizes information activities to familiarize the Yugoslav and foreign publics with the aims and tasks of the YPA and it organizes and directs the activities of the military press. In the Armed Services (with the exception of the ground troops), the military districts and formations, political work is organized and carried out by political sections while in the units and subunits there are assistant commanders for political affairs.

The army organizations of the League of Communists and the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia play a major role in mobilizing the personnel to carry out the tasks posed by the 13th LCY Congress in the area of increasing the nation's defense capability and the combat readiness of the armed forces. The 8th Conference of the Organization of the LCY and the YPA (April 1986) affirmed a new version of the basic document of the army party organization, the By-Laws Decision. According to this document, the primary party organizations are to be established in battalions (divisions) or equal subunits. LCY committees are to be elected in brigades and higher. The primary organizations of the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia are established in the companies (batteries) and equal subunits.

In the YPA, great importance is given to indoctrinating the men in revolutionary and military traditions. At the sites of previous intense fighting obelisks and monuments have been put up around which numerous measures for the military patriotic indoctrination of the youth are held, including for the men of the YPA. The present units and formations of the YPA are the heirs and continuers of the glorious combat traditions of the PLAY formations during the period of the war. Here they have established

commemorative rooms ("spomen-soba") and museums. In this regard extensive work has been carried out by the Military Museum in Kalemegdan (Belgrad).

Born and strengthened in the fight against a common enemy, Soviet-Yugoslav combat cooperation has undergone further development in the postwar years. In his speech at the 27th CPSU Congress, the Secretary of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee, B. Belovskij, said: "The foundation of our collaboration rests on the joint struggle against fascism in the storms of World War II."<sup>(17)</sup> This foundation is unbreakable as it has been fused together by the shed blood. At present, the Soviet and Yugoslav military are united by common goals and tasks: preserving peace, providing good external conditions for socialist and communist construction in our nations. The USSR Armed Forces and the YPA exchange military delegations and calls by naval ships. Cooperation is also being developed by the political bodies of our armies, the military press bodies, military historians, artists, the workers of military schools, museums and so forth.

The Soviet soldiers, loyal to the glorious traditions of Soviet-Yugoslav combat friendship, welcome with satisfaction the successes of their Yugoslav comrades in arms in military service and on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the YPA wish them new achievements in improving combat skill.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 3, 1974, p 271; M. Stanisic, "Komunisticka partija Jugoslavije u izgradnji oruzanih snaga revolucije," Beograd, Vojnorzdavacki zavod, 1973, p 7.
2. A. Ratnikov, V. Zavyalov, "Vooruzhennyye sily Yugoslavii" [The Armed Forces of Yugoslavia], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1971, pp 14-15.
3. A. Ratnikov, V. Zavyalov, op. cit., pp 31-32, 37; "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 4, 1975, p 451.
4. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 4, p 450.
5. Ibid., Vol 5, 1975, p 411; NARODNA ARMIJA, 9 May 1985.
6. "Vojna enciklopedija," Belgrad, Vol 5, 1973, p 778.
7. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 6, 1976, pp 311-313.
8. A. Ratnikov, V. Zavyalov, op. cit., pp 42, 48.
9. J. Tito, "Izbrannyye stati i rechi" [Selected Articles and Speeches], Moscow, Politizdat, 1973, p 129.
10. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, No 10, 1984, p 124.
11. A. Ratnikov, "V borbe s fashizmom" [In the Fight Against Fascism], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1974, pp 103-104, 107, 111.

12. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 9, 1978, pp 172-174.
13. PRAVDA, 9 May 1985.
- 13a. On 1 March 1945, this was the name given to the PLAY.
14. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, No 11, 1985, p 28.
15. NARODNA ARMIJA, 19 November 1981.
16. Ibid., 26 December 1985.
17. PRAVDA, 1 March 1986.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1986.

10272

CSO: 1801/97

INDEX OF ARTICLES FOR 1986

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 86 (signed to press 18 Nov 86) pp 91-96

[Index of Articles Published by the Journal During Year of 1986]

[Text]

Issue  
No.

CPSU -- THE ORGANIZER AND LEADER OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES

|   |    |
|---|----|
| V.I. Lenin and the CPSU on Increasing the Vigilance of the Soviet People<br>(Editorial) . . . . .   | 1  |
| A Program of Peace and Creation (Editorial) . . . . .   | 2  |
| CPSU Concern for Strengthening Economic Bases of Socialist State Military<br>Might (V.A. Zubkov) . . . . .  | 3  |
| 27th CPSU Congress on Increased Defense Capability (Editorial) . . . . .  | 4  |
| 27th CPSU Congress and Tasks of Military History Science (Editorial) . . . . .  | 5  |
| Historical Experience of the CPSU and the Soviet Government in<br>Strengthening Military Discipline and Its Importance Under<br>Present-Day Conditions (O.F. Suvenirov) . . . . . | 6  |
| Development of Lenin's Teachings Concerning the Defense of the Socialist<br>Fatherland in the Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress<br>(P.A. Zhilin) . . . . .                      | 7  |
| The 27th CPSU Congress on Urgent Questions of Ideological Work<br>(D.A. Volkogonov) . . . . .   | 8  |
| Role of Discipline in Achieving Victory (M.D. Popkov) . . . . .   | 9  |
| On the Sources of Heroism in the Soviet Military (V.P. Khrobostov) . . . . .  | 10 |

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Rise, Development of Officer Certification in USSR Armed Forces<br>(V.G. Lebedev) . . . . .                        | 10 |
| The Soviet Army -- A School of Indoctrination (V.S. Rodin) . . . . .   | 11 |
| Closeness to People -- A Crucial Condition for Successfully Carrying<br>Out Battle Tasks (V.P. Savelyev) . . . . . | 11 |
| Patriotic and International Indoctrination of the Soviet Military<br>(Editorial) . . . . .                         | 12 |

MILITARY HISTORY AND MILITARY ART BEFORE THE GREAT OCTOBER  
SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

|   |   |
|---|---|
| V.I. Lenin and Revolutionary Events in the Black Sea Fleet in 1905<br>(V.N. Bagrov) . . . . . | 1 |
| Military History Research in the Russian Army (V.A. Avdeyev) . . . . .                        | 3 |
| Development of Defensive Tactics of Russian Army in world War I<br>(B.P. Frolov) . . . . .    | 6 |
| Methods and Forms of Fighting by Generalissimo A.V. Suvorov<br>(A.A. Stokov) . . . . .        | 7 |
| On the St. George Awards in the Russian Army (V.G. Burkov) . . . . .                          | 8 |

SOVIET MILITARY ART

Ground Troops

|  |   |
|--|---|
| Questions of Soviet Strategic Deployment at Start of Great Patriotic War<br>(A.G. Khorkov) . . . . .                     | 1 |
| From the Experience of Army Offensive Operations Conducted Under<br>Mountainous Conditions<br>(V.T. Yeliseyev) . . . . . | 1 |
| Work of Staff of 108th Guards Rifle Division<br>(V.P. Savelyev) . . . . .  | 1 |
| Meeting Engagement at Borisovka (A.V. Yegorov) . . . . .   | 1 |
| Development of Fire Plan in Defensive Combat<br>(A.A. Pastukhov) . . . . .   | 2 |
| Shock Group Operations in Breaching Fortified Areas, Capturing Cities<br>(B.N. Petrov) . . . . .                         | 2 |
| Basic Directions in Development of Soviet Armed Forces in Years of<br>Great Patriotic War (P.T. Kunitskiy) . . . . .     | 2 |

|   |   |
|---|---|
| Maneuvering of Strategic Reserves in First Period of Great Patriotic War<br>(A.I. Yevseyev) . . . . .   | 3 |
| Ability to Achieve Set Goal -- A Major Quality of a Military Leader<br>(P.N. Lashchenko) . . . . .  | 3 |
| Crossing of Southern Bug, Vistula by Tank Corps Without Halting<br>(Yu.N. Sukhinin) . . . . .   | 3 |
| Ways to Ensure Survival of Control Posts of Front (Army) From Experience<br>of Great Patriotic War (R.M. Portugalskiy) . . . . .                                | 3 |
| Offensive of 104th Rifle Division on Alakurtti Sector (A.A. Sinkliner) . .  | 3 |
| Artillery Support for Infantry, Tanks in Combat in Depth<br>(V.A. Chernukhin) . . . . .   | 3 |
| Superiority of Soviet Military Science, Military Art in Great Patriotic<br>War (F.F. Gayvoronskiy) . . . . .  | 4 |
| Reinforcing, Widening Bridgeheads in Vistula-Oder Operation<br>(A.M. Sokolov) . . . . .   | 4 |
| Question of Strategic Operations in Great Patriotic War<br>(N.K. Glazunov, B.I. Pavlov, V.S. Shlomin) . . . . .   | 4 |
| Combat Operations of 35th Rifle, 31st Tank Brigades on Solnechnogorsk<br>Sector (G.A. Ostreyko) . . . . .   | 4 |
| Development of Soviet Military Art in Operations of 1944-1945<br>(V.A. Matsulenko) . . . . .  | 5 |
| Experience of Army Commanders, Staffs in Organizing, Maintaining<br>Cooperation in Offensive Operations of Great Patriotic War<br>(R.M. Portugalskiy) . . . . . | 5 |
| Organizing, Maintaining Cooperation During Division's Offensive in<br>Iasi-Kishinev Operation (V.P. Savelyev) . . . . .   | 5 |
| Experience of Controlling Artillery Group Fire During Offensive Operations<br>of Great Patriotic War (G.F. Biryukov) . . . . .                                  | 5 |
| On the Question of Strategic Operations of Great Patriotic War 1941-1945<br>(A Discussion) (A.I. Mikhalev, V.I. Kudryashov) . . . . .                           | 5 |
| Certain Questions of Strategic Defensive in Great Patriotic War<br>(A.P. Maryshev) . . . . .  | 6 |
| Achieving Covertness (P.M. Simchenkov) . . . . .  | 6 |

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Combating Enemy Artillery in Course of Stalingrad Counteroffensive<br>(M.D. Sidorov) . . . . .  | 6  |
| The Heroic Defense of Uralsk in 1919 (A.M. Ageyev) . . . . .  | 6  |
| Choosing Sectors of the Main Thrust in Campaigns and Strategic Operations<br>(P.T. Kunitskiy) . . . . .   | 7  |
| Defensive Combat of Rifle Division in Repelling Offensive by Superior<br>Enemy Forces in Initial Period of War (N.M. Ramanichev) . . . . .                        | 7  |
| Question of Strategic Operations in Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945<br>(Kh.M. Dzhelaukhov, B.N. Petrov) . . . . .  | 7  |
| The 4th Fighter Brigade in the Battles of Kastornoye (M.M. Bondar) . . . . .  | 7  |
| Combat Operations of 184th Rifle Division in Dukhovshchina-Demidov<br>Operation (V.T. Yevdokimov) . . . . .   | 7  |
| Build-Up of Effort in Front Offensive Operations of Great Patriotic War<br>(V.N. Kiselev) . . . . .   | 8  |
| Experience in Defensive Combat by Rifle Divisions at Stalingrad<br>(P.I. Balashov) . . . . .  | 8  |
| The 39th Guards Rifle Regiment in the Battles for Mamayev Kurgan<br>(S.S. Dolgov) . . . . .   | 8  |
| Experience of Maneuvering for Concentrating Efforts Against Enemy Assault<br>Groupings in Course of Front Defensive Operation (A.I. Yevseyev) . . . . .           | 9  |
| Ways of Maintaining Tank Army Battleworthiness in Offensive Operations of<br>Great Patriotic War (V.N. Shevchenko) . . . . .                                      | 9  |
| Importance of Combat Experience in Lake Khasan Area and on Khalkhin-Gol<br>River for Development of Soviet Military Art (M.V. Novikov) . . . . .                  | 9  |
| Elimination of Nazi Troop Yelnya Salient in 1941 (A.N. Bashenov) . . . . .  | 10 |
| Repelling Enemy Counterattacks From Experience of Great Patriotic War<br>(I.N. Venkov) . . . . .  | 10 |
| The Counteroffensive of the Southern Front in October-November 1919<br>(V.O. Daynes) . . . . .  | 10 |
| Restoring Battleworthiness of Tank (Mechanized) Units, Formations in<br>Course of Offensive From Experience of Great Patriotic War<br>(Yu.I. Zavatskiy) . . . . . | 10 |
| Combat Employment of Artillery in Mountains (V.A. Chernukhin) . . . . .   | 11 |

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Engineer Organization, Maintenance of Crossings of Water Obstacles<br>(A.A. Soskov) . . . . .  | 11 |
| The Dawn of the Great Victory (On the 45th Anniversary of the Defeat of<br>the Nazi Troops at Moscow) (N.G. Andronikov) . . . . .                                | 12 |
| Achieving Success With Overall Enemy Superiority in Forces (From the<br>Experience of the 10th Army in the Moscow Counteroffensive)<br>(B.I. Nevzorov) . . . . . | 12 |

Air Forces

|  |   |
|--|---|
| Air Operations Against Enemy Reserves in Offensive Operations of Great<br>Patriotic War (V.Ye. Pankin) . . . . .                     | 7 |
| Employment of Air Army Formations for Front Mobile Groups Fighting in<br>Operational Depth (A.N. Yefimov) . . . . .                  | 8 |
| From Experience of Launching Long-Range Air Raids Against Enemy<br>Military-Industrial Objectives (V.V. Reshetnikov) . . . . .       | 9 |
| Improved Radio Communications for Radar Support of Air Operations in<br>Great Patriotic War (B.B. Lariokhin, I.A. Tretyak) . . . . . | 9 |

Air Defense Troops

|  |   |
|--|---|
| Improving Command System of Air Defense Troops in Great Patriotic War<br>(I. M. Maltsev) . . . . . | 4 |
|--|---|

Navy

|   |   |
|---|---|
| Naval Operations on Maritime Sectors (G.A. Ammon) . . . . .   | 1 |
| Achieving Surprise in Course of Preparing, Landing Amphibious Forces<br>(K.V. Penzin and V.D. Dotsenko) . . . . .   | 1 |
| Northern Fleet Operations to Defend Sealanes in War Years<br>(P.N. Navoytsev) . . . . .   | 2 |
| Landing of Amphibious Forces in Offensive Operations of Great Patriotic<br>War (Yu.S. Bondarevskiy) . . . . .   | 4 |
| Experience of Employing Ship Armament in Naval Cooperation With Ground<br>Troop Formations, Units (V.V. Sinegubov) . . . . .  | 4 |
| Submarine Operations in Different Maritime Theaters of Great Patriotic War<br>(V.N. Chernavin) . . . . .  | 7 |
| Organization of Pacific Fleet Communications in Preparation, Landing of<br>Amphibious Troops in Ports of North Korea, Sakhalin, Kuril Islands<br>(P.Ya. Smirnov, V.I. Solovyev) . . . . . | 8 |

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Meeting of Navy Leadership, Specialists on Studying Combat Experience of<br>First Year of World War II (A.P. Aristov, A.G. Nazarenko) . . . . .  | 10 |
| Organizing Cooperation of Naval Forces With Ground Troops in Defense of<br>Naval Bases, Ports, Cities (Ye.Ya. Dvoryanov, V.G. Oppokov) . . . . . | 11 |

Rear Troop Support

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Obstructing Railroads in first Period of War (A.Ya. Ponomarev,<br>V.G. Smirnov) . . . . .   | 3  |
| Technical Reconnaissance of Railroads (Ye.G. Antonov, V.Ya. Ostashevskiy)   | 4  |
| Logistic Support of Fronts in Encirclement Operations (K.N. Abramov) . . .  | 6  |
| From the Experience of the Directorate of Military Railroads (1939-1941)<br>(Yu.I. Kirsanov) . . . . .  | 7  |
| Certain Questions of Control of Army Rear Services in Offensive Operations<br>of Great Patriotic War (K.K. Yeremenko, V.V. Ovsyannikov) . . . . . | 10 |
| Establishment of Center Supply Depots (S.N. Skryabin) . . . . .   | 10 |
| Organizing Rear Support of Operations of Air Formations in Years of<br>Great Patriotic War (V.I. Borodulin, V.P. Shchukarev) . . . . .            | 11 |

Combat Art of Partisans

|   |   |
|---|---|
| Unforgettable Meetings (G.F. Pokrovskiy) . . . . .  | 5 |
| Defeat of the Krasnopol Garrison (P.I. Borovichev) . . . . .                              | 6 |
| Partisan Reconnaissance During Years of Great Patriotic War<br>(V.N. Andrianov) . . . . . | 8 |

DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS

|   |    |
|---|----|
| The Third Conference of Naval Communists (Compiled by N.Yu. Berezovskiy) .                  | 1  |
| Engineer Support of First Belorussian Front in Berlin Operation<br>(Unattributed) . . . . . | 3  |
| Organizing of Offensive Operations (Unattributed) . . . . .                                 | 5  |
| Archival Documents on Actions of soviet Troops at Moscow<br>(V.V. Tarakanov) . . . . .      | 12 |

PARTY POLITICAL WORK

|  |   |
|--|---|
| Organization of Party Political Work in Vistula-Oder Operation<br>(V.K. Balabanov) . . . . . | 2 |
|--|---|

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Experience of Commanders, Political Bodies and Party Organizations in<br>Indoctrinating Men in Loyalty to the Military Oath<br>(A.G. Yevdoshenko) . . . . . | 4  |
| From the Experience of Party Political Work in the Berlin Operation<br>(V.M. Maltsev) . . . . .   | 5  |
| Organization and Conduct of Party Political Work in Air Units and<br>Formations (A.D. Zaytsev) . . . . .  | 6  |
| Military Council Activities in Operations of Third Period of Great<br>Patriotic War (L.V. Kalinchuk) . . . . .  | 7  |
| Cohesion Problems of Multinational Collectives Discussed (A.N. Razmaznin)   | 8  |
| Experience of Party-Political Work in Crossing Water Obstacles in<br>Operations of Great Patriotic War (G.A. Stefanovskiy) . . . . .                        | 10 |
| Party-Political Work at Exercises, Maneuvers (V.G. Malikov) . . . . .   | 11 |
| Features of Party Political Work in Battle of Moscow (N.A. Maltsev) . . .   | 12 |

MILITARY LEADERS AND CHIEFS

|  |    |
|--|----|
| MSU G.K. Zhukov: A Glorious General of the Great Patriotic War<br>(A.M. Mayorov) . . . . . | 12 |
| MSU K.K. Rokossovskiy (D.D. Lelyushenko) . . . . .   | 12 |

MASTERY AND HEROISM

|  |      |
|--|------|
| Nearby in Battle (N.F. Shakhmagonov) . . . . .                         | 1    |
| Showing Boldness and Daring (P.Ya. Grishchenko) . . . . .              | 2    |
| The Steppe Eagle (A.I. Inchin) . . . . .                               | 3    |
| According to Aerial Photography Data (I.S. Tishchenko) . . . . .       | 4    |
| Ordered to Conduct a Search (A.N. Zaytsev) . . . . .                   | 5    |
| Steadfastly Defended (F.K. Gavrikov) . . . . .                         | 6    |
| The Battalion imeni V.I. Lenin (A Chronicle) (P.Ye. Yefimov) . . . . . | 9    |
| The Feat of the Podolsk Cadets (D.V. Pankov, D.D. Pankov) . . . . .    | 10   |
| An Internationalist Hero (B.Ye. Pestov) . . . . .                      | 12   |
| Heroes of the Civil War . . . . .                                      | 1, 6 |

## MEMOIRS AND ESSAYS

|   |    |
|---|----|
| The Surrender of the Nazis in Konigsberg (P.G. Yanovskiy) . . . . . | 2  |
| Our Brother "Artem" (G.F. Ditskiy) . . . . .                        | 2  |
| Supporting the Flight of G.K. Zhukov (A.P. Silantyev) . . . . .     | 11 |

## OUR INTERVIEWS

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Faithfulness to the Truth of History (A Talk With the Writer V.V. Karpov)<br>(Unattributed) . . . . .   | 10 |
| Contribution of Military Historians to the Development of Soviet Military<br>and Historical Science (Interview With the Chief of the Military<br>History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense,<br>Lt Gen P.A. Zhilin) (Unattributed) . . . . . | 11 |

## IN THE ARMIES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

|   |   |
|---|---|
| 30th Anniversary of the GDR National People's Army<br>(V. Zaroba) . . . . .   | 2 |
| Sixty-Five Years of Mongolian People's Army (R. Gunchin-Ish) . . . . .  | 3 |
| The Fundamental Change in World War II and the National Liberation<br>Struggle of the Czechoslovak People (Zdenek Prohazka) . . . . . | 8 |

## IN FOREIGN ARMIES

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Evolution of American Views on Possible Nature of Wars<br>(V.A. Aleksandrov) . . . . .      | 6  |
| Evolution of Japanese Military Doctrine Views in Postwar Period<br>(V.P. Zimonin) . . . . . | 8  |
| Tank Development Trends in NATO Countries Since World War II<br>(B.S. Safonov) . . . . .    | 9  |
| Postwar Development of Antitank Weapons in Capitalist Armies<br>(N.F. Fomich) . . . . .     | 11 |

## LOCAL WARS

|   |   |
|---|---|
| U.S. Imperialism -- The Main Source of Local Wars 1945-1985<br>(G.V. Malinovskiy) . . . . . | 1 |
| Electronic Combat in Local Wars in Near East (S.V. Seroshtan) . . . . .                     | 3 |
| Development of Fighter Bomber Tactics in Local Wars (V.A. Sokolov) . . . . .                | 4 |

|  |   |
|--|---|
| Development of Air Defense Weapons and Experience of Their Employment in<br>Local Wars (V.K. Strelnikov) . . . . . | 5 |
| Combating Tanks (V.P. Shipovalov) . . . . .  | 9 |

AGAINST BOURGEOIS FALSIFIERS OF HISTORY

|   |   |
|---|---|
| Truth and Fiction on the 1939 Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact<br>(A.S. Yakushevskiy) . . . . . | 1 |
| Collapse of Nazi Barbarossa Plan (N.K. Glazunov) . . . . .                                      | 5 |

SCIENTIFIC PAPERS AND INFORMATION

|   |    |
|---|----|
| International Formations in the Armed Defense of the Soviet Republic<br>(V.G. Krasnov) . . . . .  | 1  |
| On the Yakut National Military School and Its Graduates (A.A. Ammosov) . .  | 1  |
| Basic Directions in Development of Communications Equipment in Years of<br>Great Patriotic War (V.P. Zaytsev, Ye.Ya. Dvoryanov) . . . . . | 2  |
| Development of Torpedo Weapons in War Years (V.P. Vorobyev) . . . . .   | 3  |
| Commissars of Partisan Formations (V.I. Gulenko) . . . . .  | 3  |
| First Relief Maps (N.M. Disskiy) . . . . .  | 4  |
| German Submarine Operations in the Atlantic (B.S. Bannikov) . . . . .   | 5  |
| On the Terms "Platoon Defensive Area," "Platoon Strongpoint" and<br>"Platoon Position" (P.D. Alekseyev) . . . . .                         | 6  |
| DOSAAF Youth Work Examined (V.V. Mosyaykin) . . . . .   | 7  |
| Patriots of the Fatherland (N.V. Borisov) . . . . .   | 8  |
| Tanks in Combat and an Operation (I.Ye. Krupchenko) . . . . .   | 9  |
| Allotment of Battle Tasks (S.P. Ivanov) . . . . .   | 10 |
| Combat Training of 15th, 222d Rifle Divisions From Experience of Great<br>Patriotic War (B.Ye. Pestov) . . . . .                          | 11 |
| Basic Stages in Organizational Development of Interior Troops<br>(V.F. Nekrasov) . . . . .  | 11 |
| On Troop Parades and Worker Demonstrations on 7 November 1941<br>(P.M. Bukovetskiy) . . . . .   | 11 |
| Meeting With an Author Aktiv (N.Ye. Medvedev) . . . . .   | 11 |

|   |    |
|---|----|
| The Feats of Heroes (A.S. Zhukovskiy) . . . . .   | 11 |
| The Southern Boundary Lines and Their Role in the Defense of the Russian State in the 16th-17th Centuries (V.V. Kargalov) . . . . . | 12 |

MILITARY HISTORY WORK IN THE TROOPS

|  |   |
|--|---|
| From the Experience of Military History Work in the Red Banner Odessa Military District (V.A. Semenov) . . . . . | 2 |
|--|---|

HISTORIOGRAPHY AND SOURCE SCIENCE

|   |   |
|---|---|
| A Treasurehouse of the Combat Experience of Soviet Aviators (Ye.V. Simakov) . . . . . | 1 |
|---|---|

CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

|   |   |
|---|---|
| The Force of the Ideological Weapon of the Communist Party (M.P. Bolshakov) . . . . .                                 | 1 |
| A War of the People (N.Ye. Medvedev) . . . . .  | 1 |
| A Reference on the Liberation of Cities (D.D. Gorbatenko) . . . . .   | 1 |
| An Army of a Victorious Revolution (P.S. Smirnov) . . . . .   | 2 |
| Ships of October (B.P. Tyurin) . . . . .  | 2 |
| Sailors on the Moscow Lines (F.Ya. Lisitsyn) . . . . .  | 2 |
| Another Page on the Feat of the Muscovites (A.N. Belyayev) . . . . .  | 3 |
| Defeat of the Counterrevolution in Central Asia (N.N. Azovtsev) . . . . .   | 3 |
| A Panorama of the Nationwide Struggle for Liberty, Honor and Independence of Our Motherland (L.M. Sandalov) . . . . . | 5 |
| Merits and Shortcomings of a Book (Ya.M. Gorelik) . . . . .   | 5 |
| A Book on the Soviet Army (Ye.N. Tsvetayev) . . . . .   | 6 |
| A Distant and Close Time (I.F. Kurchavov) . . . . .   | 6 |
| Soldier Committees in the Struggle for Soviet Power (A.Ye. Martovoy) . . . . .  | 6 |
| The Soviet Armed Forces at a New Stage (V.V. Serebryannikov) . . . . .  | 7 |
| Hungarian Military History (V.I. Fomin) . . . . .   | 7 |
| The Tank Troops Are Attacking (V.D. Zelenskiy) . . . . .  | 8 |

|   |    |
|---|----|
| A Four-Volume History of the Patriotic War of Bulgaria of 1944-1945<br>(I.I. Shinkarev) . . . . . | 8  |
| A Dictionary of German Military History (V.I. Kuskov) . . . . .                                   | 11 |

MILITARY HISTORY DATES

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Army Commander 1st Rank I. P. Uborevich (D.V. Pankov and D.D. Pankov) . . .   | 1  |
| Around the World Under Water (M.V. Filimoshin) . . . . .  | 2  |
| A Prominent Party and State Leader (Unattributed) . . . . .   | 2  |
| Unforgettable Meetings (S.Ye. Zakharov) . . . . .   | 2  |
| Chief Mar Armored Trps A. Kh. Babadzhanyan (Yu.M. Potapov) . . . . .  | 2  |
| Adm S. Ye. Zakharov (V.M. Grishanov) . . . . .  | 2  |
| The Military Political Activities of S. M. Kirov in Astrakhan<br>in 1919-1920 (Yu.V. Morozov) . . . . .   | 3  |
| A Quarter Century of the Space Feat (A.G. Nikolayev) . . . . .  | 4  |
| On the Military Revolutionary Activities of E. Thalmann (G.M. Ivanitskiy) . . .   | 4  |
| Documents and Materials on Ernst Thalmann at the Memorial Museum of<br>German Antifascists (A.A. Krupennikov) . . . . .                           | 4  |
| A Prominent Military Construction Engineer (N.F. Shestopalov) . . . . .   | 5  |
| A Military Leader of the Great Patriotic War (A.A. Sharipov) . . . . .  | 6  |
| Biographic Sketch of Adm A. G. Golovko (V.N. Chernavin) . . . . .   | 6  |
| On the Fronts of Republican Spain (V.O. Daynes) . . . . .   | 7  |
| 15th Anniversary of the Ministry of Defense Central Archives<br>(I.V. Yaroshenko, V.R. Zhuravlev) . . . . .                                       | 7  |
| Born in Combat (S.I. Isayev) . . . . .  | 9  |
| Facets of Military Talent (S.P. Ivanov) . . . . .   | 9  |
| Army Gen I.Ye. Petrov (N.G. Lyashchenko) . . . . .  | 9  |
| 50th Anniversary of Orders of Lenin, Suvorov USSR Armed Forces Central<br>Staff Military Academy Imeni K.Ye. Voroshilov (F.F. Gayvoronskiy) . . . | 10 |
| Mar Armored Trps Ya.N. Fedorenko (A.L. Getman) . . . . .  | 10 |

|   |    |
|---|----|
| The Shield of the Cuban Revolution (On the 30th Anniversary of the Founding of the RAF of the Cuban Republic (I.D. Statsenko, A.F. Shcheglov) . . . . . | 12 |
| Born in the Flames of Battle (On the 45th Anniversary of the YPA) (N.I. Andreyev) . . . . .   | 12 |
| Mar Engr Troops M.P. Vorobyev (On His 90th Birthday) (S.Kh. Aganov) . . .   | 12 |
| A Famous Hero of the Civil War (On the 100th Birthday of A.Ya. Parkhomenko) (V.T. Roshchupkin) . . . . .  | 12 |

\* \* \*

|  |                          |
|--|--------------------------|
| A Chronicle of the Organizational Development of the Soviet Armed Forces . | 6                        |
| From Reader Conferences . . . . .  | 2, 6, 7, 10, 12          |
| You Ask and We Reply . . . . .   | 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 |
| Dialogue With a Reader . . . . .   | 12                       |
| Chronicle, Facts, Findings . . . . .                                       | 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, 12    |
| Index of Articles for 1986 . . . . .                                       | 12                       |

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1986.

10272

CSO: 1801/97

END