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Gorbachev's Advisor on Mideast, Bilateral Issues

44230033A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 3 Oct 89 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Vadim Zagladin, political advisor to USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, by 'Akiva 'Eldar; date not given]

[Text] Moscow (Special to HA'ARETZ)—“I believe that an international conference is the most realistic way to a solution to the Middle East problem,” said Vadim Zagladin, the political advisor to USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, in an interview with HA'ARETZ that was held in the offices of the NOVE VREMIYA newspaper in Moscow. Zagladin is responsible for foreign relations in the framework of Gorbachev's team of advisors.

[HA'ARETZ] Could you point to alternative ways which the USSR could suggest in order to advance the peace process in the Middle East, aside from an international conference?

[Zagladin] We are not alone in confronting the Middle East problem. Along with us the members of the Security Council and other countries are working also. But the ways of arriving at a peace settlement, which is an essential thing in the Middle East, must be determined by the parties who are directly involved in the conflict. We proposed, together with France, the convening of an international conference, and this idea was supported by many countries. At this conference there can be meetings and discussions of all kinds. This is, in my opinion, the most realistic way to a solution to the problem. I want to be an optimist but, to my regret, this is difficult in view of the situation in this sphere.

[HA'ARETZ] What is your position on the 10-point plan?

[Zagladin] The plan is not directed towards us, but rather to the parties involved in the conflict. We can only follow and watch. We'll respond when the positions are clear.

[HA'ARETZ] How is your support of Iran, and through it, in effect, also the Hizballah, consistent with your declarations against terror?

[Zagladin] Each country can adopt its own policy. I can tell you that we, in the USSR, oppose terror and identify with the countries that oppose terror.

[HA'ARETZ] How can the USSR contribute to the easing of the fears of many Israelis about a dialogue with the PLO, which they consider to be a terrorist organization?

[Zagladin] I do not believe that the USSR must convince the Israelis that the PLO no longer advocates terror, as the PLO can convince them itself. We have had many meetings with the leaders of the PLO, and they are well acquainted with our position. In our opinion, the PLO's position has changed considerably in the past year, but you must understand that the position of the organization will change positively along with a positive change in Israel's position.

[HA'ARETZ] Are you satisfied with the role that Syria is playing in the region?

[Zagladin] Syria is a party to the conflict in the region, and it must be a partner in the effort to solve it. Moreover, Syria, like other countries in the region, must increase its involvement for the purpose of finding a solution to the conflict.

[HA'ARETZ] Hungary has decided in the last few days to restore relations with Israel. What must happen for the Soviet Union to decide to do that?

[Zagladin] An end to the conflict in the Middle East would be the best reason for the restoration of relations with Israel. The opening of the international conference would be a milestone in that direction. By the way, in recent years contacts between our two countries have become closer and there is an ongoing dialogue between us. Your visit in Moscow is additional testimony to that, and I believe that this is the way to bring greater mutual understanding and to the normalization of relations. But the act of restoring relations, which has symbolic significance, depends on the settlement of the conflict.

As for Hungary, it is an independent state, and, of course, it can do as it pleases. Attention should be paid to the fact that, along with the announcement of the restoration of relations, Hungary announced that this does not change its position on how to find a solution to the conflict in the Middle East.

[HA'ARETZ] What do you feel with regard to Poland, your neighbor, which is a member of the Warsaw Pact and is governed by a non-Communist regime?

[Zagladin] Poland is an independent state, and it can decide for itself what government it wants. I can say that Poland will play a more active role in the Warsaw Pact, and also in the economic relations within the Pact. The relations can become even closer. We have common interests on central questions of peace and foreign relations.

[HA'ARETZ] Is a non-Communist government possible in your country?

[Zagladin] I do not believe that our people would vote for a non-Communist government, but already today there are members of the government who are not members of the Party, and there may be more of these. The most important element of our new policy is to include the representatives of the people in the Congress and the Supreme Soviet in the most important decision-making processes, both on internal and external affairs.

[HA'ARETZ] You yourselves assert that it is not possible to confront the difficult economic and national problems without the involvement of the people. When, in your opinion, will the masses be involved in the effort?

[Zagladin] Your question is not formulated properly. Not only do the Soviet people support perestroika, but they want to speed up the process. We are holding

discussions on ways of implementing perestroyka and on the pace. Solving a few problems raises other issues, and there will be more. This is normal, and the discussion contributes to finding a real solution.

Israeli-Serbian Friendship Association Established

*44230033B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 10 Oct 89 p 3*

[Text] A call for the restoration of diplomatic relations with Israel was the first of four decisions that were passed last week at the convention of the Association for Friendship between Serbia and the Jewish People and Israel, which was held last week in Novi Sad in Yugoslavia.

The convention was held following the founding of the third branch of the Association, which was established a few weeks ago in Belgrade, and its second branch has already been established in the city of Valjevo. The Association has about 3,000 members, most of them

non-Jewish intellectuals and public figures. The other decisions made at Novi Sad demand the restoration of citizenship to every Jew who emigrated and also wishes to have Yugoslavian citizenship; the establishment of a memorial to the victims of the Holocaust; and a memorial plaque for the Jewish Quarter in Belgrade, which was liquidated by the Nazis.

The head of the Association, Prof Lubomir Taditch, who is a member of the Yugoslav Academy, and his wife Klara, the coordinator of the Association, arrived in Israel at the end of last week, bringing with them an invitation from the Belgrade Journalists' Association to their colleagues in Israel. With the heads of the Association also arrived Milovan Grigorvitch, the editor of NIN, the most important weekly in Belgrade.

Political observers believe that Belgrade will not decide soon on the restoration of ties with Israel, due to difficult internal problems.

Diaspora Urged To Help Karabakh Cause

Dashnak Party Calls for 'Mobilization'

46050005A Paris GAMK in Armenian 19 Oct 89 p 2

[Editorial originally published in Athens DROSHAK, the official press organ of the Dashnak Party: "Crisis"]

[Text] The economic blockade that has been imposed around Artsakh and Armenia has already assumed critical proportions. Soviet Azerbaijan evidently continues to oppress the Armenian people and to strangle it with its communist government, its so-called Popular Front and its Armenian-hating mobs.

The warning the Kremlin issued to Baku and its ultimatum demanding the lifting of the blockade immediately proved ineffective. On the contrary, they served to deceive the public and to throw dust in the eyes of our people. Therefore, it is not surprising that our people in Armenia and across the Diaspora are skeptical about reports that the Kremlin has given the Azeris 5 days [to lift the blockade] and that otherwise the Red Army will intervene.

A full-scale crisis is at hand, and the Armenians of our homeland are justifiably alarmed.

Our people remain firm and resolute on its demanding stance in both Stepanakert and Yerevan. Aware of their national and political responsibilities, the authorities in NKAO [Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] and Soviet Armenia have already begun to demand "more determination, more perseverance and more action" from all the ruling bodies of the Soviet Union. Aware of the extremely critical nature of the moment, all nonofficial organizations and popular movements in Soviet Armenia have extended their hands to each other and the government so that they can overcome and conquer this crisis together. Foreign news sources have already begun to report that the brave sons of our economically besieged nation are resorting to force when necessary to take the food that has been brutally seized from them.

But the blockade continues, the ring of economic and cultural pressure is tightened, and the crisis of the people of Armenia becomes increasingly more intolerable.

And the bells of alarm are sounded.

The alarm bells are certainly addressed at the leaders of Kremlin so that either they stand up to their constitutional responsibilities and end the blockade or they leave the door constitutionally open for Armenians to seek the means of extricating themselves from their crisis outside the borders of the Soviet Union.

The alarm bells are also addressed at the Armenians of the Diaspora before whose eyes the most important component of our struggle for the Armenian Cause, the Armenians of Soviet Armenia, are being strangled, once

again having been caught unprepared by an enemy whose pan-Turanist conspiracies persist even under Soviet rule.

The calls of the Soviet Armenian people for help are enough to realize that the current meek and passive posture of the Diaspora can have fatal consequences for the future of the entire Armenian nation.

That is why the solidarity of the Diaspora has historic significance especially today because with every day and hour that passes without an all-communal mobilization the Armenians of our homeland sink deeper into their anxiety of having been left alone.

Finally, the Armenians of the Diaspora are committing a historic sin today by not mobilizing all of their forces to form for our people in Soviet Armenia a lifeline through which it can breathe and ease the pressure of the blockade.

The Diaspora has the means to mobilize the international community to reenact the compassion it demonstrated after last year's earthquake, because the present political calamity that has been brought to bear on Artsakh and Armenia, namely the Azeri blockade, is as severe as the earthquake.

It is also within the means of the Diaspora to use the political weapon of a coordinated campaign to put pressure on the Soviet leadership from all corners of the world making maximum use of the political and government ties of our communities.

The homeland is in crisis.

The enemy tightens the ring of blockade.

The Diaspora has no right to delay its mobilization.

Need for Greater Protest Activity Stressed

46050005A Paris GAMK in Armenian 27 Oct 89 p 1

[Editorial: "We Have no Other Alternative"]

[Text] With the complicity and even at the suggestion of the Azeri leaders in Baku, the central Soviet authorities recently tried to impose on the Armenian nation a half-baked, ostensibly political solution which in general would hurt the interests of the people of Artsakh.

The representatives of Soviet Armenia and Artsakh justifiably remained firm on their demanding stance.

Faced with this rejectionist stance, Moscow postponed a solution again and passed the issue to the Supreme Soviet.

This was a pretext to gain time so that it can formulate a new conspiracy against the Armenians.

Since February 1988, the people of Artsakh have been staving off numerous conspiracies in different forms aimed at forcing Armenians but especially our kinsmen in Artsakh into submission.

Our compatriots in Artsakh have found the correct path. Although they seek the assistance of Armenia as well as the Diaspora, they rely first and foremost on their own strength. They demonstrated this posture from the first day they proclaimed their demands by choosing death or unification with the Motherland over Azeri repression.

Given the posture that has been adopted, it can be said with confidence that the leadership of Armenia will continue to defend the just cause of its compatriots—we do not say “its citizens.” In this regard, there is still much that the Soviet Armenian leadership has to do to reform the internal life of our homeland particularly in terms of preserving its Armenian character and winning the hearts of the Diaspora.

That is, in terms of becoming a pan-Armenian force.

As for the Diaspora, we must continue to demonstrate our solidarity at this stage of the Artsakh movement. The demonstrations, marches, hunger strikes and sit-ins in Soviet missions must be staged more often so that they acquire meaning and we can have interlocutors.

Especially at this stage, we must set aside all of our differences and we must carry on our political and public relations work with organized ranks.

We say “with organized ranks and unanimously” but especially persistently.

It is only then that we will have interlocutors who will listen to us.

Who will LISTEN to us.

Otherwise, all of our demands would be “cries in the desert.”

We have no other alternative to make our voices heard.

So that the disfranchisement of the people of Artsakh can be ended in the broadest sense of the term.

Dashnak Party Absent at Pannational Movement Congress

46050005B Paris GAMK in Armenian 8 Nov 89 p 1

[Excerpt] Today, on the morning of 4 November 1989, the Founding Congress of the Armenian Pannational Movement [APM] opened with the participation of approximately 1,500 delegates. Attending the Congress were representatives of various movements and organizations in Armenia as well as delegates from Artsakh, Javakhs and the Soviet Diaspora. Some of the various organizations and individuals who were invited from the Diaspora were also present at the Congress.

One of the speakers at the Congress was the first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party, Suren Arutyunyan. When, in one part of his speech, Arutyunyan welcomed the participation of the Social Democratic Clarion [Hunchak] Party and the Democratic Liberal [Ramgavar] Party in the Congress, the delegates interrupted him with loud and passionate protests for not hailing the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF] [Dashnak Party]. Arutyunyan asked the delegates to be patient and declared that given the posture of the Dashnak Party there is no reason to be opposed to it and that he will cooperate with the ARF.

During the course of the Congress, the delegates saluted the Dashnak Party with passionate applause whenever its name was heard over the loudspeakers.

Another speaker at the Congress was Levon Ter Petrosyan. He detailed the events of the past 2 years in Armenia and concluded his speech by declaring that the struggle and the Artsakh movement that has been launched have led to “the independence of the people of Artsakh, democracy in Armenia and national unity.”

Remarkably, the state television of Armenia initially refused to air the deliberations of the Congress directly, but later the authorities relented before a threat of a strike by the employees of the television corporation, and the deliberations of the Congress were aired live to the people.

The central television system aired a relatively lengthy report on the Founding Congress of the APM in its news program.

The Congress formed committees which were asked to examine the various issues on the agenda of the Congress.

Second Day

The Founding Congress continued its work on 5 November 1989.

Several delegates and invited speakers addressed the Congress during the second day.

A notable feature of the Congress was the reaction to a speech by [Yerevan State University professor] Rafayel Ishkhanian who criticized organizations which raised the issue of the return of Turkish-held Armenian territories. Speaking on behalf of the Hay Dat [Armenian Cause] organization, Lendrush Khurshudyan spoke in favor of an anti-Turkish struggle. He said: “We cannot forget the territories that have been seized by Turkey. Turkey cannot run away from us unless we renounce our territorial claims. The territorial demand issue will have its place in the APM program.” Khurshudyan pointed out that the Karabakh demand movement is not adequately echoed in the APM program and that, therefore, the APM program cannot be considered a pannational program. Khurshudyan spoke favorably about the ARF and demanded that its reputation be reinstated in the Soviet Union.

Another speaker was Mekhak Gabrielyan, the leader of the Armenian National Independence Party. Referring to the APM program, Gabrielyan said that we stand on the threshold of a new phase which presumes that we will have a national plan of action. He said: "The APM program is a blueprint for a resistance movement, but it does not say what to do and how. It does not speak about crowning our national liberation struggle with success. That program does not mention anything about economic sovereignty. A pannational program can help the establishment of a free, independent and united Armenia." Gabrielyan also spoke about the ARF and demanded that the 1928 decision [to declare the ARF illegal] be repealed and that the people be told the truth. He emphasized that "we are in debt to the Dashnak Party for its policies of the past 70 years."

Hamlet Nahapetyan, a teacher who addressed the Congress, said: "The Azeris must be made to understand that they must not be moved by either Ankara's or Moscow's strings." He declared that "the ARF has pursued the only

correct path." He added: "Even under the repressive conditions of the past decades, the goals the Dashnak Party pursues could not be taken away from the hearts of the people." Nahapetyan declared that independence is the principal objective and that "sovereignty" is the first step on that path.

Representatives of popular movements from other Soviet republics also addressed the Congress.

The bylaws of the APM were discussed and approved. The APM, which has been officially recognized, was registered as an organization in the last few days.

The Congress tried to elect the members of the leadership of the APM organization, but the votes cast were too fragmented because of the large number of candidates. As a result, the election was postponed to 6 November. At that sitting 45 of the 90 candidates to be proposed by the Karabakh Committee will be elected. [passage omitted]

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Views on OPEC Oil Prices in 1990's Expressed*90OL0111B Doha AL-'ARAB in Arabic 22 Oct 89 p 5*

[Article: "Saudi Minister of Oil: Oil Experts Have Conflicting Views on Prices in the Nineties; OPEC Has Learned Its Lesson; It Is Important That Market Forces Rely on OPEC Supplies"]

[Excerpts] The prevalent belief in the world of oil these days is that things may start to improve in the nineties. But in the wake of violent tremors in this industry, between shortages at times and a glut at other times during the period that followed the 1973 Arab embargo and up and down prices, experts are wary of making any kind of predictions.

Hisham Nazir, Saudi minister of oil and mineral resources, said that oil price estimates in the last decade ranged between \$2 and \$100 a barrel. The minister wondered what conclusions are supposed to be drawn from this wide spread.

Nazir delivered the keynote address at the 10th annual oil and money conference held in London on the 19th and 20th of this month and attended by 350 oil and money experts who got together to discuss prospects of the nineties.

C. G. Silas [as published], president of Phillips Petroleum, said that long-term oil strategies are forever changing.

Silas expects oil prices instability for the coming year at least, even though prices will range between \$15 and \$20 a barrel, the same rates of fluctuation witnessed this year.

Chiding the oil sages, Nazir did not offer any projections, but said, "All I know today is that there is a growth cycle and I would like to share a big secret with you, which is that the growth cycle in the oil market is on the rise and the next decade heralds a boom in the oil business."

Jean Mieux [as published], president of the French Petroleum Institute, says that US imports, which currently account for one-third of OPEC production, may triple in the nineties when US production will drop and oil consumption in the third world will rise.

But Nazir said that OPEC has learned a lesson from the oil glut of the eighties.

The Saudi minister said that "the lesson OPEC has learned through a difficult labor has been fully assimilated. This lesson teaches OPEC the benefits of discipline, moderation, and a better understanding of the long-term concept."

Nazir expressed his doubt in even OPEC's ability to maintain price stability.

He said, "OPEC does not have a magic wand for dealing with oil market instability phenomenon. OPEC is but one partner in the market and not the major partner at that."

The Saudi minister said that the theory that OPEC will return to the helm when its production reaches 80 percent of its capacity or when the demand for OPEC oil hits 24 or 25 million barrels a day is meaningless if used as shock treatment.

Nazir added, "I do not see what possible benefit OPEC can derive by returning to the helm. OPEC's control of market forces is not as important as these forces' need to rely on OPEC supplies."

Ludwig van Wachem, chairman of the board of Royal Dutch Shell, said that two-thirds of the oil revenues and over three-quarters of the output capacity are found in the five great gulf states that are OPEC members.

Iraqi Minister of Oil 'Isam 'Abd-al-Rahim al-Shalabi said that these five gulf states share a common goal in securing a fair, profitable price, but not so high as to be detrimental to demand.

Speakers at the conference pointed to a number of vague oil-related issues such as the world economic growth rate and the economic situation in the Soviet Union, the largest producer of oil.

Experts talked about the importance of technology as a card to be played in the energy field. Mieux said that technology can help to minimize the expected decline in oil production outside OPEC.

American Deputy Secretary of Energy W. Henson Moore expressed the belief that the American people and Congress will oppose imposition of a gasoline tax of up to 50 cents a gallon as a rationalization measure in the United States, which consumes one-third of world production.

Egypt's Islamic Alliance Visits Jordan's Islamic Trend*45000042 Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 13 Dec 89 p 1*

[Report by 'Adil al-Ansari]

[Excerpt] Yesterday, Tuesday, a delegation from the Islamic Alliance went to Jordan to congratulate the Islamic Trend there on its great victory in the parliamentary elections held last month.

The delegation was comprised of Liberal Party leader Professor Mustafa Kamil Murad, Labor Party leader Engineer Ibrahim Shukri, and Justice Ma'mun Hudaybi of the Muslim Brotherhood. It also comprised Sayf-al-Islam Hasan al-Banna, Hasan al-Jamal, and Dr Hasan al-Husayni, Islamic Alliance deputies in the People's Assembly. [passage omitted]

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Dissent Felt Between PLO, Groups in Territories

44230050A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 8 Nov 89 p 11

[Article by Ory Nir: "A Time for Extremists"]

[Text] Progress in beginning a political process on the basis of Baker's initiative is finally breathing a sense of relief into the territories, although this relief is accompanied by a certain anxiety. After long months of a deep political freeze, a ray of hope has now appeared on the horizon. At the same time, the big question is how Palestinian extremists will react to it.

The intifadah has been marching in place in the past few months. Lack of progress in the political arena, tiredness, loosened constraints concerning Palestinian unity, and the authorities' stubborn policies have contributed toward creating phenomena and processes whereby the intifadah is turning inwards; serious internal conflicts, killings of real or imagined collaborators, and a lot of suppressed rage among broad strata of the Palestinian public against its leadership abroad and local activists.

Growing frustration has been threatening to turn into despair.

Armed struggle using firearms is still not in the offing and is not viewed as likely.

An all out nonviolent popular uprising (collective disobedience and general tax rebellion), which would step up the intifadah, is too extreme for the population to bear. The Palestinian leadership, which is opposed to escalation through the use of firearms, is very much interested in obtaining the same result through a general rebellion, but it is also aware that it cannot expect the population to take upon itself such a difficult and painful burden. The only development apt to bring a breath of fresh air to the people is political progress.

On the other hand, political developments entail great risks. The dilemma of the composition of a delegation to talks is a source of internal tension and personal and public confrontations in the territories, while dilemmas concerning the meaning of the process constitute a source of serious organizational conflict within the PLO, and to a certain extent, in the territories themselves. Thus, the question is what is the weight of Palestinian opposition factors and what harm can they inflict in the future on the diplomatic endeavors of the organization's pragmatic faction.

Leftist forces within the PLO are not very strong. Naif Hawatimah's Democratic Front has so far remained in partnership with Fatah, and its representatives are active partners to all of 'Arafat's and his associates' diplomatic steps. George Habash's Popular Front continues to eat straw because of its doctrinaire insistence on preserving unity among Palestinian ranks. Explains Habash: "When

we speak of the importance of Palestinian national unity we do so not for the sake of Yasir 'Arafat's black eyes, but for the sake of the youngsters and children throwing stones at the enemy, who look upon 'Arafat as their leader....We must remain within the framework of national unity," he says, "because discord is worse." (From an interview given by Habash for the Lebanese newspaper AL-SAFIR last January).

However, there is a limit to what the Popular Front will do to preserve unity, which may harm potential candidates for talks with Israel, but according to Palestinian observers, if indeed there is real political progress and the Palestinian public shows itself disposed to back it, Habash will think twice before he dares jeopardize whatever support his organization still enjoys in the territories, support that is in any event dwindling.

Palestinian secular organizations that do not belong to the PLO (Ahmad Jibril and others) have no support whatever in the territories, and their influence can be measured only by their ability to try to torpedo political moves through resounding terrorist attacks outside Israel, attempts on lives abroad, and so forth. The PLO leadership does not take their positions into consideration when it comes to hammering out its policies.

Another potential source of opposition is the Palestinian fundamentalist camp, which enjoys considerable support among Palestinians in the territories. If Hamas and the Islamic Jihad decide to go into action and to torpedo the political process, the PLO will find it very difficult to fight and neutralize them. Having said that, there are indications that Hamas does not automatically rule out the possibility of talks on elections, holding elections, and even participating in them (several Hamas leaders have made statements along this line in recent months).

However, recently a new and far more dangerous source of opposition has been emerging in the territories. Those are local hoodlums, members of street gangs who are often armed with firearms and are motivated by brutal force. Such gangs exist in Nabulus, for example, whose members say they identify with Fatah, but at the same time don't hesitate to express overt contempt for the organization's leadership and proudly tell reporters that they don't obey 'Arafat's orders. It appears that the mixture of power dizziness and underground romance, of extreme puritan striving to purify the society through the use of the most cruel and despicable means, has turned some of those gang members into unbridled murderous bullies.

'Arafat is well aware of this phenomenon and he mentioned it in a special message to Palestinians on the anniversary of 22 months of the intifadah. He stated in the message that from now on all the strike committees and forces must unite under one umbrella and that all suspected youngsters fleeing from the Israeli authorities should join the strike forces. For the time being it seems that 'Arafat's appeal has remained a voice in the wilderness.

Thus, the process taking place in the Palestinian arena is a growing conflict between internal PLO dynamics and the internal dynamics of the territories. Attempts to tighten mechanisms regulating internal conflict within PLO ranks abroad (and there are many examples of that) are encountering impulses opposing those mechanisms from the Palestinian society in the territories.

Political progress will undoubtedly imbue the inhabitants of the territories with fresh optimism, but it may also greatly exacerbate internal tensions if something is not done to improve and tighten those mechanisms that regulate internal conflict.

Notables from the territories whose names were mentioned as possible candidates for the Palestinian delegation to talks with Israel have recently expressed fear for their lives, which may indeed be in danger if it is not made clear a priori (rather than post factum) that the PLO agrees to have them included in the delegation. They know, however, that this hope is still far from coming true.

Masked Popular Army Members Interviewed in Nabulus

44230050C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
(Supplement) in Hebrew 2 Nov 89 pp 9-10, 13

[Article by Ari'ela Ringel-Hoffmann: "One Day in the Company of Masked Men"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] My talk with three masked men was held in English. They chose to answer some of my questions in Arabic, which someone translated. My impression was that the translation was a standard formula supplied after a short discussion of the question.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] How old are you?

[Popular Army Members] "20, 22."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Natives of Nabulus?

[Popular Army Members] "Yes."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] High school graduates?

[Popular Army Members] "Yes. Some of us have university studies, too."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] To what PLO faction do you belong?

[Popular Army Members] "Fatah."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] How long have you belonged to what you call the Popular Army?

[Popular Army Members] "A long time."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Do you belong to the same team, the same cell?

[Popular Army Members] "Yes."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Do you know each other well?

[Popular Army Members] "No comment."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Why do some of you wear green uniforms and some black?

[Popular Army Members] "The green uniforms belong to a certain street, for example the 42nd, and the black to another street."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Does this mean that each street has its own group?

[Popular Army Members] "Yes."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] And each group has its own uniform?

[Popular Army Members] "Yes."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Do the members of one group know the members of the others?

[Popular Army Members] "No. Each cell knows only its own members."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Do cell commanders know the commanders of other cells?

[Popular Army Members] "The more senior the position, the more people and things they know."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What term do you use, "cells" or "groups?"

[Popular Army Members] "Cells."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Do these cells also include children, I mean under the age of 15 or 16?

[Popular Army Members] "There are different forms of organization for each age group. Missions are also assigned according to age. Many children have been killed in the intifadah, and they were not wearing masks."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Where do you get the uniforms?

[Popular Army Members] "Anyone can sew uniforms, can't they?"

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] And anyone can wear any uniform he makes for himself?

[Popular Army Members] "It's like in your army. Can anyone wear a uniform? Even if someone can obtain an uniform, he still needs special permission to use and wear it."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Does this mean that there are membership committees for these cells?

[Popular Army Members] "There is order."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Do you receive training?

[Popular Army Members] "According to need."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What do you mean by that?

[Popular Army Members] "Just as you have the Golani, Giv'ati, infantry, so do we; each group has its job and its missions."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] And each cell is trained according to its missions?

[Popular Army Members] "Yes."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Can you give me examples of missions?

[Popular Army Members] "No, we cannot."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Do you also go into action individually?

[Popular Army Members] "No. Always in a group, at least five or six men together."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Do you wear your uniforms on missions?

[Popular Army Members] "No. In certain places the men do change into uniform." [passage omitted]

They have no faces and one cannot establish eye contact with them. The large uniforms disguise body outlines. They make a fist when posing for pictures, hand in hand, fist to fist. The masked men disguise their feelings, too. At night, when they knock on doors, ill-boding messengers, there is no one to complain to, no one to implore. It can be the boy who grew up across the street. It can be a relative. Now he is a soldier in the revolutionary army. He is both the wheel and the oil, a soldier without a past.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Why do you wear masks?

[Popular Army Members] "At the beginning of the intifadah people covered their faces so the army couldn't photograph them and later identify them. Now we cover our faces mostly so that collaborators cannot identify us."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What you mostly do is eliminate collaborators?

[Popular Army Members] "Not necessarily. Each Palestinian has his orders from the strike committees. When someone doesn't obey the orders, masked men take care that he does."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] How do you identify collaborators?

[Popular Army Members] "Usually people are found out by accident. Someone saw them, heard them, suspected them, followed them. Sometimes it takes years to unearth a collaborator. Some of them are found out in jail. There are all kinds of methods to discover them. For example, we know that collaborators pass information through bathroom windows in jail. We smear toothpaste around the window and wait till it hardens. If someone

goes in and opens the window, the toothpaste crumbles. We check after each person and find out who was inside. At that moment he becomes a suspect. There are other methods, too."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Do you also wear masks when you write slogans on walls or lay ambushes for the army?

[Popular Army Members] "If it is necessary."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What is the purpose of the uniforms?

[Popular Army Members] "They are our symbol. We are proud to wear them, regardless of our actions."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Are you aware of the army's current regulations, concerning masked men, to open fire?

[Popular Army Members] "Yes."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Does it have any impact on your decision to wear masks?

[Popular Army Members] "These regulations are relatively new, so we haven't had time to react to them. Besides, policies to kill existed before, too. The claim that they apply to masked men is only a fig leaf for the army. The only difference is that when it comes to shooting at a masked man, the army does not have to pay lip service to investigating the case."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] The moment you put on masks and uniforms you declare yourselves an army. You are clearly not peaceful citizens.

[Popular Army Members] "The percentage of masked men among the victims is negligible. The number of masked men killed in Nabulus doesn't even come to 10, and almost 120 people have already been killed here."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Yes, but the regulations concerning shooting masked men were changed only recently.

[Popular Army Members] "It makes no difference, the conclusion is still the same. We will fight anyway, even if it costs us our lives. The regulations don't change anything as far as we are concerned. This is our country and this is a struggle of principle. As far as we are concerned, the decision to continue the occupation is far worse than the decision to open fire on masked men."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] As declarations go, it sounds good.

[Popular Army Members] "We're talking about dying. We sometimes laugh at the whole thing. When one of our own dies, we name a street after him, so everyone chooses a street for himself. Then we say to him, why don't you die already, so we can change the street name."

Twenty-one years of occupation have released into the West Bank and Gaza over 25,000 former inmates of

Israeli prisons, men who served terms of several years, all of them accused of security offences, and we're not talking stone throwers here.

The military says that Israeli prisons are training courses for intifadah officers and soldiers. Each one advances in rank in jail. Prisoners learn underground organization, receive minor fighting training, practice tossing hand grenades made out of soap, and when those are confiscated, they make new ones. They train in hand to hand combat, learn how to manufacture Molotov cocktails, and take their place within the hierarchy.

We, said a senior officer, are in charge of prison facilities from the outside. What happens inside is decided by the prisoners, even if the prison authorities won't admit that.

Inmates came out and continue to come out trained, better prepared, and far from remorseful. Before the intifadah, some of them joined the national committees active in the territories. Later, they became members of popular and strike committees, and some undoubtedly joined the military organization of the same committees, namely the army of masked men.

Jails supply some of its soldiers with intifadah prisoners arrested for erecting roadblocks and writing slogans. Some say we supply them with soldiers and commanding officers.

It is important to recall that the popular committees did not spring up during the intifadah. The infrastructure was created years earlier. Already in 1976 the Popular Front was the first PLO faction to establish what was at the time called "1976 committees:" youth organizations that drew their inspiration from Russian doctrine. A few years later Fatah established the "Youth Social Action Committees" and the communists the "Voluntary Action Committees."

The intifadah, which began in Gaza mosques and attracted enthusiastic crowds into the streets, very quickly fell into the trained hands of those field committee members, who laid the foundation for the rule of popular committees.

In September 1988, 1 year and 1 month ago, in the Nabulus Qasbah, the first parade of what we now call the Popular Army took place. Only foreign reporters were invited to view it. Two weeks later, gigantic color photos appeared in AL-THAWRAH, Fatah's official newspaper. "Palestinian military parade," read the column; masked men, standing at attention and saluting a hand-sewn Palestinian flag.

The pseudomilitary parades that followed that first one in Nabulus were the result of a local, field initiative. Young men talked of strike forces and copied a model developed in the Balatah refugee camp 1 year previously. In the summer of 1987, in Balatah, gangs "cleaned out" the camp of collaborators and fought crime.

By the end of December, close to the first anniversary of the intifadah, a flier in English was circulated in Gaza,

signed by the "Popular Palestinian Army." "The army comes from the people," it read, "for the people, for guard duty, security, and discipline, and for fulfilling the principles of law and justice."

According to that flier, the army was under orders to the supreme command of Force 17, which is Fatah's military arm under the command of Abu-Tayib.

Flier No 32, issued 1 week after the establishment of the army, was the first and last signed by the Unified Command that dealt with the Popular Army. The leadership, the flier stated elegantly, welcomes the establishment of the army and stresses that this is a PLO army. In other words, not a Fatah army, not subordinated to Force 17, and not under orders to Abu-Tayib.

Thus, the principle of the unified command, according to which "No voice will be raised above the call of the intifadah," designed to preclude fighting for prestige and influence among the various factions, was preserved.

The Popular Army disappeared from fliers, but not from the field. Groups of masked men took upon themselves increasingly more missions. What in the beginning appeared to be negligible local groups turned out to be not just an active and threatening factor in the field, but also the force that will promote the intifadah to the next, higher stages of violence. They are the tense coils threatening to turn the "white revolution" into a red revolution.

Gaza commanding officer Colonel G., who was interviewed last week on the Mabat news program on television, asked whether that was a paramilitary group, said that it was a "full fledged military organization."

At a discussion held at headquarters, regarding judicial elements, before expanded firing regulations were issued against masked men, one jurist asked: What if among the masked men there are people wearing kufiyahs against the cold. Cold? officers replied, they're cold in Gaza in August?

IDF [Israel Defense Forces] members refer to the new decision as improved shooting regulations. Improved regulations, say field soldiers and commanders, in fact mean open season on men. A senior officer said that in fact, that was the first time in 2 years of the intifadah that a target was defined for the Army. I've been told exactly who my enemies are and how to fight them. The problem is that I am supposed to shoot at a man even before he has done anything, only because his face is covered.

Moreover, some may say that the new regulations may well strip the masks off those men, at least for daytime activities, but they will escalate the circle of violence. I do not believe that, if indeed this is a popular army, we can deal with it through gun sights.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Are the masked men the intifadah army?

[Popular Army Members] "Yes. We are all army, and anyone can put on a uniform and start the war."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What do you mean, start the war? Hasn't it begun already?

[Popular Army Members] "We can decide to lie in ambush with stones, with knives, or with firearms."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What do you mean by firearms?

[Popular Army Members] "Firearms are firearms."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Does it mean that the opportunity for taking up firearms exists, and you are only waiting for orders to do so?

[Popular Army Members] "We have faith in 'Arafat. We believe that he represents our cause. 'Arafat says he holds a gun in one hand and an olive branch in the other. If the olive branch drops out of his hand, it will drop out of ours, too."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Can there be a situation in which the olive branch is still in 'Arafat's hand, but no longer in yours?

[Popular Army Members] "People here are fed up. There is no one among Palestinians that hasn't been beaten up or that some misfortune hasn't hit him or someone in his family under the intifadah. Hundreds have been killed, thousands have been injured and maimed. Today every Palestinian is an enemy to the State of Israel."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] You believe then that the next stage is fighting with firearms?

[Popular Army Members] "The key to that is in the hands of the Israeli leadership. Fighting with firearms will be terrible. If Israel persists in its stubbornness, it will come. We would rather spare that from us and from Israel. What we mean is that the State of Israel must understand that life is like a clock, whose hands turn all the time. Today we are down and you are up, but this may change. You should treat us the way you would want us to treat you."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Can you give me some idea of how many men are in your army?

[Popular Army Members] "Thousands."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] How many thousands?

[Popular Army Members] "We don't know."

In the West Bank there are several hundred Arab villages. IDF members estimate that masked men are active in each one of those villages. The number of young men in each such group is between 10 and a few dozen, depending on the size of the village and its involvement in the intifadah. Modest estimates speak of thousands of masked young men in Arab villages; the figures are higher in cities. According to estimates, one group of masked men is active in each city neighborhood, and in some places, in each street. If we add up the figures, including Gaza, involving extensive actions by men with covered faces, we come up with some 10,000.

Garment workshops in Qalqilyah and Gaza make uniforms for them. They buy axes wholesale. They do not train for taking military positions, nor do they develop warfare doctrines. But they are not far from doing so. The cold weapons now in their hands are not indicative of their capability to procure firearms. According to military estimates, there are lots of firearms in private hands in the West Bank today, which can be used in the service of the uprising should the need arise.

They are the stubborn, pitiless hard core. They are not yet militias, but they could be. They have read the appropriate literature and have heard of Che Guevara. [passage omitted]

EGYPT

Egypt Seeking New Trade Links

34000223Y Nairobi DAILY NATION
in English 28 Oct 89 p 11

[Article by Peter Warutere]

[Text] Egyptian businessmen are seeking stronger trade links with their Kenyan counterparts in an effort to increase the volume of trade between the two African states.

The head of a three-man Egyptian trade mission in Nairobi, attending a session of the African Development Bank president's round table of businessmen in Nairobi, Mr Said Ahmed El-Tawil, told the NATION that Kenya and Egypt could greatly improve their exchange in goods and services by exploring potential areas of trade.

Mr El-Tawil, who is also the chairman of the Egyptian Businessmen's Association (EBA), said that the current volume of trade valued at just over US \$10 million (over Sh200 million) between the two countries was highly in Kenya's favour.

Last year, he said, the two countries exchanged goods valued at \$11 million, the largest proportion of which comprised Kenya's exports to Egypt.

He said that the base of trade between the two countries was very narrow considering that tea alone accounted for 85 percent of Kenya's exports to Egypt.

Other Kenyan exports to Egypt include coffee and hides and skins but Mr El-Tawil felt that a lot more could be added to this short list.

On the other hand, he said, Kenya could import a wide range of goods from Egypt, including engineering goods, ready made garments, cosmetics and chemicals.

Kenya is already importing aluminum from Egypt and is soon likely to start importing various pharmaceutical products.

He said that Egypt had developed very strong small and medium industries, some of which were manufacturing specifically for export to Europe, Arab countries and other parts of the world.

Asked what incentives the export industries were given by the government, Mr El-Tawil said the industries were given tax rebates and allowed to retain the foreign exchange they generated from exports for purchasing their inputs and raw materials.

Some industries were allowed to retain the entire amount of foreign exchange generated from their operations while others were required to submit part of it to the government depending on their needs, he said.

In addition to fostering stronger trade links, Kenyan and Egyptian businessmen could also explore possibilities of joint venture investments and transfer of technology, said another member of the mission, Dr Adel Gazarin.

Dr Gazarin is the chairman of the Egyptian Federation of Industries and also a board member of EBA. He was recently elected the chairman of the 21-member states Pan African Employers Organisation during its last meeting in Lagos, Nigeria.

Mr El Tawil said stronger trade links between Kenya and Egypt would facilitate the promotion of intra-African trade.

Population Committee Chair on Family Planning Problems

90OA0146A London AL-HAWADITH
in Arabic 17 Nov 89 pp 46-48

[Interview with Mahir Mahran, chairman of the National Council for Population, by AL-HAWADITH correspondent in Cairo; date not given]

[Excerpts] [AL-HAWADITH] The population problem in Egypt is a purely national problem and constitutes one of the obstacles to development. What is your excellency's opinion on this and what are the real magnitudes of the population problem?

[Mahran] [passage omitted] Statistics show that the number of Egypt's population has been doubling every 50 years since the early 19th century and up to the middle of this century. The population then doubled only after 28 years, reaching 40 million in 1978. The population continued to increase until it reached 53 million in 1988. In the early 21st century, the population will reach about 76 million, if the situation remains as it is. [passage omitted]

[AL-HAWADITH] What is the future plan the council is preparing in order to work out suitable solutions for the population problem?

[Mahran] [passage omitted] The National Council for Population laid down a strategy up until the year 2002 and this has led to formulating a 5-year plan (1987/88-1990/91). Regional population councils have also

been established under the chairmanship of provincial governors so that each governorate will have its own annual standard plan, since problems and conditions differ between one province and another. We need planning from the base to the top, which then will be coordinated with the various plans so that we will once again go back to the base for implementation. [passage omitted]

[AL-HAWADITH] How do you deal with the opposing views and why do some people reject the idea of family planning?

[Mahran] [passage omitted] As to why people oppose family planning, analysis shows that the opposition categories are:

- Women facing problems with family planning. It is easy to deal with this faction. Guides, nurses, physicians, social workers, and men of religion solve these problems with the help of tests or the resort to other means [of pregnancy avoidance] or seeking clarification of the religion's opinion on the matter.
- Certain midwives who believe that family planning is contrary to their interest. These too can be dealt with easily since the family planning program intends to benefit from them. Many of them have already been recruited to work with the program.
- Certain number of men of religion in villages. These are particularly found in local mosques. They too can be dealt with in cooperation with the Ministry of Awqaf [religious endowments]. Training courses are held for them in which the "physiology" of pregnancy and birth is explained. Experience has shown that their knowledge in this field is deficient and that they establish their views on unsound basis.
- The last of the opposing groups is that of certain educated people whose information in the field of population and family planning is deficient too. The best way to deal with this faction is to hold joint meetings with them in order to explain the magnitude of the population problem or to publish research papers about it.

[AL-HAWADITH] Is the call for family planning meeting with a satisfactory response?

[Mahran] Yes, the call for family planning is meeting with a response in Egypt. This is evident from the fact that before 1965 and prior to launching the national program for family planning it was difficult to put the idea before the masses publicly. Now the question is being discussed on all levels and through the public media (radio, press, or television) and through personal contact with no sensitiveness or embarrassment.

The rate of knowledge about family planning and its various means is continuously increasing, reaching 98 percent in 1988.

The use of family planning means went up to 36.6 percent in general, with 51.8 percent in urban areas and 24.4 percent in rural areas.

[AL-HAWADITH] How do you envision Egypt in the year 2000?

[Mahran] Undoubtedly, the population will rise to between 65 and 70 million by the year 2000. [passage omitted]

[AL-HAWADITH] What problems and obstacles does the National Council for Population face?

[Mahran] Despite the national population policy and plan, this plan has not been incorporated into the national economic and social plan, and thus there is still a feeling of noncommitment to this plan on the part of the concerned office.

As regards following up and evaluating this plan, the executive office remains largely uncommitted to the communicating with the council via periodic reports on its accomplishments. There is still a small role for the localities, that is, the governorates, in family planning, and a strong push from the governors is needed. The law of local administration must be amended to bring in the [proper] parties. Family planning budgets must be moved from the central level to the governorate level to give the workers there a strong incentive.

[AL-HAWADITH] Does the religious viewpoint on family planning influence an increased birthrate?

[Mahran] We cannot ignore the importance of religion as a factor influencing the increased birthrate. In spite of statements by religious figures that family planning does not conflict with the divine religions, we find that opposition to using family planning methods because of the religious factor reached almost 7 percent, as reported by a survey conducted in 1984. From this, one can see the importance of the role of missionaries and mosques in explaining the religious viewpoint on family planning. [passage omitted]

[AL-HAWADITH] To what extent are family planning methods used today?

[Mahran] Practice of family planning methods among married women in their childbearing years reached 44.1 percent in the first half of 1989, an increase of 5 percent over the first half of 1988.

We note that there is a tangible increase in the distribution of IUDs and contraceptive injections, along with a decrease in the distribution of the pill, the rhythm method, and dermal patches. The highest proportion of family planning practices was achieved in the Wadi al-Jadid governorate, followed by Cairo, Alexandria, al-Jizah, and Port Said.

Statistics Reveal Parliamentary Activity Under Mahjub

90OA0185B Cairo AL-MASA' in Arabic 11 Nov 89 p 1

[Article by Samir Rajab: "Rif'at al-Mahjub by the Numbers"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Throughout his People's Assembly speakership, Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub has, to tell the truth, been able to lead parliamentary activity capably and efficiently, to confront numerous urgent popular problems, and to establish the ideal system for bringing the government to account in a manner that does not undermine the government's public existence and that, at the same time, does not squander the masses' interests.

The NDP [National Democratic Party] Parliamentary Committee took all these into full consideration when it made the choice.

Because the language of figures does not lie and because it is always the truth that nobody can deny. Indeed, because it is the language capable of severing the tongues that cast doubt, falsehood, and slander, I will now present Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub by the numbers:

In the past session, the People's Assembly convened 96 times. The parliamentary committees held 361 meetings.

A total of 376 members spoke under the assembly's dome, including 291 NDP members and 75 opposition members (44 from the Socialist Labor Party [SLP], 25 from al-Wafd, and 6 independents).

This means that the opposition was given the full opportunity to express its opinion.

The members spoke 2,650 times. The majority spoke 1,640 times, at an average of 4 times per member, and the opposition spoke 1,010 times, at an average of 12 times per member. This simply means that any opposition member expressed his opinion three times more often than his colleague in the NDP.

Kamal al-Shadhili, the NDP representative, spoke 72 times; Ibrahim Shukri, the SLP representative, spoke 69 times; and Yasin Siraj-al-Din, al-Wafd representative, spoke 51 times! [passage omitted]

In its last session, the People's Assembly passed several extremely important laws after a vigilant and purposeful debate that was largely free of personal whims. The most important laws passed are:

The drug law (discussed in 10 meetings in which 66 NDP members and 21 opposition members participated).

The inheritance tax law (which lasted 5 meetings in which 56 NDP members and 16 opposition members participated).

The investment law (discussed in 3 meetings in which 36 NDP members and 14 opposition members participated).

Amendment of the Consultative Assembly law (29 NDP members and 16 opposition members took part in the discussion).

Perhaps a most eloquent proof of the firm control over the government is embodied in the vast number of questions, queries, and inquiries. The NDP submitted 100 questions

and the opposition 71 questions. There were 9 queries, all made by the opposition. The government answered all of them.

Because of all of this, the NDP Parliamentary Committee has kept Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub as assembly speaker. The assembly members gave him their vote of confidence because they believe in his capabilities and ability, and because they are well aware that his broad experience with the law enables him to manage the sessions wisely and confidently. They are certain that to him, they are all alike under the assembly's dome.

Also because of this, I am most optimistic that the current session will see further progress in parliamentary action in Egypt.

Editorial Says Carter's Peace Concepts No Longer Applicable

900A0185A Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 8 Nov 89 p 14

[Article by Amin Huwaydi: "Peacebuilding Phase"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] There is peacemaking by attacking the problem and arriving at a solution by accomplishing lesser objectives. This is what is expressed by the words "land for peace," which is what Jimmy Carter did at Camp David with President al-Sadat and Menachim Begin under the international and regional circumstances which dictated this approach.

Now, they are talking of building for peace. The circumstances have changed with the eruption of the intifadah, the end of the Iraq-Iran war, the proliferation of medium-range missiles and chemical weapons in the region, and with the complexity of the Arab-Israeli conflict. All of these changes make it impossible for President Bush's administration to adopt the shuttle policy which was adopted by Richard Nixon and implemented by Henry Kissinger, or the breakthrough policy which Carter adopted to make peace. The problem's increasing complexity dictates adopting the policy of "building for peace" in order to create the climate and elements of mutual trust in preparation for negotiations between the parties concerned. This requires a long transitional period in which to control the intifadah's violence, to allow the emergence of a moderate Palestinian leadership that agrees to coexist with Israel, and to entrench the balance of forces in favor of Israel so as to guarantee Israel's security and to prevent the proliferation of medium-range missiles and chemical weapons. The U.S. administration is moving quietly and cautiously to create the desired climate. This may be done over a period of years that may last until the end of the century. [passage omitted]

ISRAEL

Shamir, Arens Criticized for Working Style

44230047A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 2 Nov 89 p 11

[Article by Aqiba 'Eldar: "The Meanderings of the Broken Telephone"]

[Text] Policymakers Yitzhaq Shamir and Moshe Arens have made secrecy and fog a camouflage for a simplistic and barren diplomacy. Never have so many ministers known so little about the political courses of action intended to advance an initiative for which they bear the responsibility for success or failure. Last week the foreign minister claimed that leaks to the press were taking the cards out of his hands even before the game had started. As always, the finger is pointed at the office of Shim'on Peres, accompanied by the leak that the telegram distribution system is being reorganized to forbid him from seeing secret material.

Senior officials in the Foreign Ministry who get a salary for their intellectual contribution to political processes don't have the slightest idea what is going on in the office of the minister on the second floor. "Working groups" that were set up with great fanfare the day after the government decision of 14 May, to put together papers on each of the four paragraphs of that decision, were quietly dispersed. The officials are free to ponder with envy their counterparts in Syria, the USSR, Egypt and even the political department of the PLO, that are fed regular up-to-date information on the contacts between the Israeli foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state.

The most junior assistant in the Foreign Ministry knows that the international telephone lines are reserved for gossip and unclassified administrative matters. Field security instructions forbid them to use the telephone to pass information that Israel does not want undesirable ears to hear. Then would you believe that in the last few weeks the international operator in Brussels could tell her friends what Arens said to Baker about his five points, which amendments he liked, and what he told Baker about the unwritten U.S. plans that the United States is ready to submit to Israel to protect Shamir, on the one hand, and 'Arafat, on the other, from their "big wheel" ministers. The community of listeners can get an updated timetable in the ministers' offices of the week's expected telephone conversations. The spokeswoman for the State Department in Washington, Margaret Tutweiler, and the general director of the Foreign Ministry, Re'uven Merhav, have already made sure that the Australian and Japanese operators will not be deprived when Baker visits the land of the kangaroo and Arens visits Tokyo.

The confidantes of Shamir and Arens will say "What do you want from them, Baker is a guy who likes to talk and you can't slam the phone in his face." True, but it is quite possible to send the amendments to ambassador Moshe Arad and instruct him to hand the classified document to assistant Dennis Ross and, while doing so, send out feelers as to how much room to maneuver Egypt is left in the hands of the State Department. It can be assumed that Baker will take the hint and pass along his reaction to the proposal via ambassador William Brown, and during that same opportunity the authorized and discrete American representative will get the "oral law" version of the guarantees Shamir wants. Everything will be written down, and when differences of opinion arise,

the document will be pulled from the file and the speakers on both sides will have no need to twist or explain things.

Lame Procedure and Shallow Substance

Baker delayed his next telephone conversation. He still doesn't have a blanket long enough to cover the fear of the Shamir camp that the PLO will come in through the back door, nor the demand of the PLO that no one apart from the Palestinians put together the Palestinian delegation. Here we are entering a realm where the lame procedure meets the shallow substance lacking in sophistication. On the assumption that Shamir and Arens really are interested in advancing the issue of peace while at the same time preventing disconnections in relations with Washington, they have to consider the limits of the concessions that their American customers at the other end of the line can make.

It is hard to believe that within these limits you will find 'Arafat's agreement that Israel bring the good news to the world that Ari'el Sharon of Sabra and Shatila will decide for the Palestinians who will represent them in talks with Israel. Arens continues to claim that had Peres not rushed to demand a cabinet resolution on the Egyptian proposal, he would have been able to get a written certification from Baker as to the formula that the latter had proposed in a private conversation in New York: "the United States, Egypt, and Israel will decide the composition of the Palestinian delegation."

Let's assume that Baker really did say that to Arens last month (had the Israeli ambassador been present during the conversation, we could leave out the "let's assume"); but now, after it has become absolutely clear that the prospects for the Palestinians agreeing to have Israel participate in the makeup of their delegation are the same as the Colombia team's agreeing to have Shne'ur or Grondman pick their goalie, wouldn't it be better to drop the issue and espouse Baker's second point verbatim? Shamir and Arens' stubbornness about getting the impossible gave birth to Baker's first amendment: the one that allows the sides to skirt the preconsultation stage between Egypt and the Palestinians, as well as the consultation option between Israel, the United States, and Egypt on the matter of the composition of the Palestinian delegation.

Israel is thus likely to wind up the loser on both accounts—no veto and no consultation. You could already write the scenario: the PLO hands Egypt a list of Palestinian residents of the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem and the diaspora; Egypt passes them along to the United States; the United States passes them to Israel. Shamir will invalidate the list and, relying on the third point, will leave the Israeli delegation at home claiming that the Palestinian composition does not satisfy him, and that is the end of the election initiative.

It was actually one of Shamir's confidantes who pointed out to me something that Kissinger had said: "Israel has no foreign policy, she has only an internal policy." How

can you conduct a sophisticated policy when the Prime Minister's courses of action are dictated by the moods of Levi and Sharon? In Shamir's eyes these even dwarf the insult of the U.S. President's having the Israeli prime minister view the White House from the outside.

Avraham Boreg compared Shamir to a hard-boiled egg; the more you cook it the harder it gets.

Therefore Bush is mistaken if he thinks that delaying a decision on meeting with him will soften the prime minister.

Constraints Ministers Strive To Get Shamir Out

44230048F Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 6 Nov 89 p 3

[Article by Menahem Shizef: "Likud Central Committee Endeavors To Remove Shamir as Chairman"]

[Text] Moves have recently begun among Likud Central Committee members and branch chairmen designed to bring about Yitzhaq Shamir's removal as party chairman. Behind this campaign stands the chairman of Northern Tel Aviv branch, David Appel, one of Deputy Prime Minister David Levy's close associates, but even Central Committee members who do not belong to the constraints camp have joined it. "The only way to topple the 'Alignment government' is through a vote of no confidence in Shamir," claim the campaign organizers.

The constraints ministers, too, will mount an extensive propaganda campaign directed at the Likud Central Committee, which will probably be convened after Shamir's return from Washington, but they are waiting until after the Histadrut elections for fear of being accused of sabotaging the electoral campaign.

Yesterday voices were heard in the constraints camp to have the constraints ministers resign from the government and join the Likud opposition to Shamir and Arens, in parallel with an intensive campaign against "being dragged behind Alignment." The constraints ministers are also considering appearing at a large demonstration against surrendering to the Americans which is being organized by the Greater Israel Front in cooperation with Gush Emunim and extreme right parties.

The Likud ministers meeting that decided to accept the formula agreed on by the forum of the four with a majority of nine against the three constraints ministers, proceeded in a tense atmosphere, but without surprises. Shamir stressed the importance of unity, while Arens pointed out that Baker's letter contained significant changes concerning the composition of the Palestinian delegation and talks on negotiations.

"Indirect negotiations are being conducted with the PLO," Minister Sharon said. Minister Moda'i claimed that we must not act in haste. "Why doesn't the prime minister give his answer to Baker during his visit to the United States. The Americans are against a Palestinian

state today, but if we encourage them, they will cease to oppose it." Levy claimed that the process will necessarily lead to meeting with the PLO. "We are contributing to a process that all along we wanted to avoid," he said.

After the meeting the constraints ministers sharply attacked the Likud ministers' decision on grounds that it is opposed to Likud Central Committee decisions, which it ignores and holds in contempt.

Jerusalem Hosts Jordan International Conference

44230047B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 2 Nov 89 p 3

[Article by Yizhar Be'er: "Killing Under the Cover of Procedure"]

[Text] "Those who want a change in the Jordanian regime need to take into account who will accomplish that change. If, indeed, change occurs there, I am not sure that the PLO would be the one to take over. I consider it more likely that Syria and Iraq would quickly take over that country and set up a puppet regime there. From a strategic point of view, that would be very dangerous for Israel, so that we would now consider the entry of a foreign army into Jordan as a *casus belli*," declared Deputy Foreign Minister Binyamin Netanyahu yesterday in his appearance before the international conference on "Jordan Is Palestine," being held at the Ramada Renaissance Hotel in Jerusalem.

About 200 representatives from Israel and the rest of the world are taking part in the conference, among them Baron Balfour, the direct descendant of Lord Balfour, historians, and Jewish activists. The deputy foreign minister explained that the entry of a foreign army into Jordan would hasten war in the region because Israel sees not only the Jordan River as her defense border, but all the area beyond it, as well. Netanyahu expressed strong support for bringing the idea that "Jordan is Palestine" to public attention. He averred that the attempt to create a second Palestinian state at the expense of the only Jewish state "is intended to complete the invalidation of the Balfour Declaration so as to negate the right of the Jewish people to their own country and to destroy Israel."

The minister of environment, Roni Milo, said that "there are those who think Israel made a mistake when she helped Jordan in 1970 in suppressing the PLO's attempt to take over the country: If the Palestinians had succeeded then, everyone would today recognize Jordan as Palestine and no one would be asking us to give them self-determination in the territories," he said.

Baron Balfour, the son of Lord Balfour's brother, said, to the applause of the audience, that there had been no independent Palestinian state in the last 2,000 years up until the founding of the Kingdom of Jordan, which is the Palestine of today.

He expressed strong opposition to a Palestinian state between Jordan and Israel, saying: "As a Scottish farmer I know that sometimes an apple looks pretty on the outside but is rotten on the inside. A Palestinian state would be like that sort of apple that can cause a whole box of apples to spoil." He thanked the Government of Israel for reconstructing and beautifying East Jerusalem. "As a Christian I am ashamed that the Western countries do not appreciate those actions."

Mexico Halves Oil Exports to Israel

44230048C Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 6 Nov 89 p 11

[Text] The Mexican Government has cut back oil shipments to Israel by 50 percent. This was announced by the Mexican ambassador to Israel Martin Aguillar to Energy and Infrastructure Minister Moshe Shahal.

Israel has been purchasing from Mexico 2 million tons of oil yearly, 1 million tons of "light" Isthmus-type oil, and 1 million tons of "heavy" Maya-type oil.

The ambassador suggested increasing the volume of heavy oil delivered to Israel, and said that Mexico also cut back oil exports to the United States, Japan, and France.

Director General of the Energy and Infrastructure Ministry Dr Nathan Arad told 'AL-HAMISHMAR that this reduction is temporary and is due to technical difficulties at Mexican refineries.

Arye Levy, director general of the Paz company, which imports the oil from Mexico, told 'AL-HAMISHMAR that Mexico carried out the 50-percent cut without warning and that company representatives in Mexico are trying to get the decision reversed. According to him, this 50-percent cut was applied only to Israel, while cuts to other countries are only symbolic. The suggestion to increase heavy oil imports did not seem feasible to him, because the refineries are not prepared for such a change.

Investigations by 'AL-HAMISHMAR revealed that only "light" Mexican oil is worth processing. The refineries have difficulties processing "heavy" oil and are willing to give it up.

On the occasion of Energy Minister Shahal's visit to Mexico 1 year ago it was agreed that Mexico would purchase Israeli products, know-how, and services to facilitate oil imports. However, so far Mexico has not increased its imports from Israel.

Problems Expected in Immigrant Absorption

44230047D Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
(Supplement) in Hebrew 2 Nov 89 p 1

[Article by Gad Li'or, Gid'on 'Eshet, Dani Qifer and Yisra'el Tomer: "Thousands of Immigrants Will Be Looking for Work"]

[Text] If it were possible to take money, even solid currencies like the American dollar, and use it to build houses and factories, it would be very easy to save the new immigrants the many tribulations they will experience over the next 2 years. It is a simple truth that we have more than enough money, even dollars. What we don't have is the ability to turn that money into substantial things that immigrant families will need. That will not happen in the near future.

It is now almost an accomplished fact. Last year about 2,000 immigrants arrived in Israel. Last month about 1,500 immigrants arrived from the USSR, some of them on direct flights. If this pace of immigration keeps up, it will mean 20,000 men and women—10 times the number in 1988. This is a completely different ball game from what we have known.

Once, in the 50's and 60's, Israel had a different kind of government. If it wanted houses, it built them. If it wanted to, it built factories. Not only did the government have money, but it had operational capability. Since then a lot of liberalism has flowed into the river of the economy. The government has stopped building, has left the market. The decline in government involvement in the economy has put it in the position that even if it wanted to, it wouldn't be able to.

What the government can do is infuse money. This week it did precisely that in the institute for coordination between the government and the Jewish Agency. More than \$2 billion will be allocated for the absorption of 100,000 immigrants from the USSR who are expected to arrive in Israel over the next 3 years. The money will go for building 25,000 new apartments and the sprucing up of 5,000 old ones, for additional classrooms, for the professional retraining of the immigrants for jobs needed by the Israeli economy, and for creating new work places.

The confusion surrounding the absorption of the expected immigration begins with money. Only a few days ago the treasury minister spoke of \$3 billion. A committee headed by his deputy, Dr Yosi Beilin, even determined how to spend the money—which indicates, among other things, that money is not the problem.

Then what is the problem? Turning the money into what people need. The many documents prepared within the government and the Agency explain the difficulties:

- Who will be coming? There will be a lot of engineers, teachers, doctors, and artists. There will be very few nonprofessionals. In today's Israeli economy, it is very easy to absorb nonprofessionals at the expense of workers from the territories. It is hard to absorb doctors—we have more than enough of them; engineers will have to be retrained; and for teachers, even if they know Hebrew, there are no teaching hours available.
- Where will they go? The declared policy of the Absorption Ministry is "direct absorption." No more concentrating immigrants in absorption centers, but

rather their immediate relocation to housing in private apartments. This sounds good when you consider the tie-ups in those centers and the tendency of the immigrants to stay there a long time. But it seems a bit depressing when you look at our apartment market.

If apartments are built at the usual rate of speed in Israel, the first apartments for absorbing immigrants will be ready sometime in 1992, and the last ones will be completed in 1995. With the usual construction technology in Israel, the building of an apartment lasts between 20 to 24 months. In the period of the intifadah, the pace of construction was messed up even more because of the lack of Arab workers from the territories.

Where will the tens of thousands of immigrants live in the meantime? In tents? In tin shacks? In military camps? Or in hotels? Over the last few years the Ministry of Housing has "abandoned" the construction of apartments. The relative scarcity of apartments that exists even now is the reason why, over the last 2 years, apartment prices have been going up at twice the rate of inflation. To that will now be added the increasing demand of apartments for immigrants—for apartments that don't exist.

- What will they find when they get here? Today in Israel there are 50,000 receiving unemployment checks. Over the next few years especially large draft cycles will be discharged from the IDF [Israel Defense Forces]. The integration of those two groups assures an enormous supply of job seekers. The government has been unsuccessful in overcoming the investment slack. But even if they were now to begin infrastructure projects, highways, homes, and classrooms, it is hard to see the immigrants being integrated into this labor market.

Apparently the government has systems that are supposed to handle this sort of problem. For instance? Professional retraining. In the Labor Ministry they point out, and rightfully so, that the system is already overloaded. With larger investment, it would be possible to absorb only a few thousand more there. But that is not the scope of immigration we are talking about.

In this context, it is interesting to note that this situation does not come as a total surprise. The head of the Manpower Planning Authority within the Labor Ministry says that 2 years ago the Authority submitted a slew of recommendations aimed at the successful work-place absorption of the Soviet immigration. The recommendations were based on comprehensive research conducted by Professor Gur 'Ofer of the Hebrew University, who studied the lessons of the absorption of Soviet immigrants up till now.

The main conclusion, both of the research and of the Manpower Planning Authority, was that a sizable period of time was needed to prepare and adjust the immigrants to the Israeli labor market. It was recommended that detailed programs be prepared for an interim period for

every profession represented among the immigrants. But during those 2 years, these recommendations were ignored. Only recently have the higher-ups in the Labor Ministry begun to discuss them.

In this sad situation, the economic solution in the field is in the area of prices. If the Absorption Ministry continues its stubbornness about direct immigration, the immediate effect will be in the prices of apartments. That says a lot about that branch of the economy that constitutes about one-fifth of the consumer price index. Even now they are saying that we have jumped to a new inflation level. Added demand for apartments could push us even further in that direction. But even if there is housing, the lack of work will be a difficult burden for immigrants. If we make work for the immigrants, then the discharged soldiers will grumble. The forecast of the experts today is that this absorption will be even more painful than that of the 50's, since expectations have also changed.

The general director of the Ministry of Labor and Welfare, Shmu'el Salbin: "The Ministry has set up an emergency staff. We have the tools and the people to manage the problem, especially in the area of professional training, so long as there is financing. I hope that this mass immigration will be the stimulus for a flowering of the economy." That optimistic statement can be checked out a year from now.

IDF Denies Using Collaborators

44230030B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 4 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by Dan Sagir]

[Text] "The IDF [Israel Defense Forces] is not using residents of the territories for operations in its place, and the arms that are given to collaborators are given to them explicitly for purposes of self-defense only," military sources said yesterday following repeated assertions of injuries and murder of Arabs by fellow villagers or townsmen who had received weapons and other defensive equipment from the IDF and other security authorities.

The last murder incident, which Arab sources assert was committed by collaborators, occurred yesterday in the village of Ta'amun near Tubas. The body of a local youth, who was described as wanted by the Israeli authorities, was found near the village. Military sources responded that this did not occur on a security background and that the investigation was turned over to the police.

In recent months, following the increase in attacks on collaborators by intifadah activists, some of the collaborators went out armed on revenge operations, mainly in the West Bank.

In some cases in Samaria, it was reported that collaborators were organizing into small groups on a family basis in order to operate against the residents.

One of the striking examples of family-based organizing of collaborators is the family of Najar from the village of Yabed in the Janin district. Members of the family were chased out of the village about a year ago after they were accused by local activists of collaboration with Israel. About 2 months ago, they returned to the village armed with automatic rifles and with pistols and with IDF support.

When they returned to the village, the IDF set up a military outpost that had not existed previously. (A military source said that there was no connection between these events.) Family members are setting up make-shift roadblocks in the village and are harassing villagers who are hostile to them, while the soldiers are refraining from intervening in what's going on. The exploits of the Najar family were published this week also in the British newspaper the DAILY TELEGRAPH.

It is asserted in the IDF that the increase in reports and complaints about brutal behavior and incidents of murder committed by the collaborators are linked to a propaganda effort of the leadership of the uprising to shift public attention from the increase in incidents of internal murders among the Palestinian population. The judgement is that this news is disseminated as a counterbalance to the embarrassing phenomenon, which they cannot deplore, and on which there are no clear directives from the PLO leadership in Tunisia.

Military sources emphasized again yesterday that while the IDF is investing many efforts in aiding the residents of the territories who are exposed to threats and terror from the factors in the uprising, it is not organizing groups of these residents for aiding the authorities. The security establishment uses various kinds of helpers in the territories, mainly on the level of local intelligence, but not groups that carry out direct activities against the intifadah committees.

Controversy Continues on IDF Settlers Units

44230048G Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 6 Nov 89 p 21

[Article by Uri Urbach: "So Who Is Fit and Suitable To Serve in the Territories?"]

[Text] As someone once said, leftists always come in pairs. Leftist A comes to a settlement and immediately says: "What beautiful villas these settlers are building with our money," to which his opposite responds: "For this miserable Potemkin Village and its miserable few huts we are fighting against the whole world...." Leftist A says: "It's nothing but a bedroom settlement. Every day they go to the big city and only come back to go to bed," and Leftist B says: "And look how much industry they are building here, instead of building in development towns."

This kind of attack in pairs has also been directed at the newest issue on the agenda concerning "settlers companies." One leftist says: "Has the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] gone mad, to give uniforms and weapons to

settlers to mow down Arabs?" And Leftist B complains: "Why are they sending me on reserve duty to guard Rabbi Levinger's house? Let the settlers themselves guard their own houses." When a reserve soldier does his active duty on the northern border, guarding Menara, Misgav Am, and Qiryat Shemona he is requested to think as if his own family, his wife and children, lived there. But when settlers mobilize to guard their homes in reality, all those worried about IDF ethics come to life and begin to fear that they will wreak havoc in the territories. According to this logic it is unclear who is fit and suitable to serve in the territories at all. Settlers are not, as we showed, but neither are members of Peace Now, because, in view of their hostility toward settlers, they cannot become a "mediating factor between settlers and Arabs in the field," as opponents of the settlers' service recently claimed.

Maybe religious soldiers, most of whom are too right-wing, won't be allowed to serve in the territories either, since even moderately religious men from Jerusalem or Netanya may become dangerous once they're patrolling the streets of Gaza?

Reserve regional defense companies are reserve units just like any other. They should serve in the north, in the south, and in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. They should be sent anywhere where the IDF needs them, and the political views of their members should not be factored into military considerations. A religious settler guarding Sabbath desecrators in Menara is at the same time guarding his own home and the security of the country, just as the secular man guarding Qiryat Arba' is also guarding his own house.

Molotov cocktails in Hebron do not concern just the inhabitants of Bet Hadassa, and terrorists infiltrating from Jordan are not merely Bet She'an's problem. Only dangerous members of "There Is a Limit" can afford the luxury of picking and choosing where it is permissible to serve and where it is not. It is not the IDF's duty to "mediate between the sides." The IDF's duty is to protect mainly Jews from murderous Arab attacks, and insofar as possible, to protect Arabs from other Arabs. Drawing this kind of misleading parallel between Arabs and settlers is pure nonsense. The dangerous factors in the territories are the Arabs, not the Jews. The IDF is not the United Nations, and most Arab rioters are injured because of what they do and because fortunately, the IDF is stronger than they are.

Soldiers' views must not be allowed to influence their behavior in the service, and soldiers must not be selected for particular operations according to their political views. I am not consulted either, and justly so, when I have to spend a Sabbath at the gates of a northern kibbutz whose members are all Sabbath desecrators and raise pigs.

But what do Sarid's friends care about that? The main thing is that they have an additional opportunity to find fault with the capabilities and suitability of settlers. Any

man who wears a yarmulka and a beard is suspected of harassing Arabs, unless he can prove otherwise. Settlers may serve anywhere, except Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, because they are a party in the conflict, as opposed to the rest of the country, which has nothing to do with the conflict and is only patrolling the area as a neutral, mediating force.

Settlers called up this week for reserve duty in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza can expect to be subjected to studies ad nauseam. Reporters will be hiding next to each Arab, photographers behind every mound of stones, and Dadi Tzucker will be kept informed of everything that Yankele from Pisgot did during his 2 hours of duty in the streets of Hebron.

Palestinian Detainee Figures Revealed

44230046E Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 31 Oct 89 p 7

[Text] According to figures supplied by Batzelem, the Israeli Information Center for human rights in the territories, 60,000 Palestinians have been arrested since the beginning of the intifadah. Military sources put that figure at only 40,000, of whom 9,000 are in administrative detention. Currently, 14,000 Palestinians are in detention facilities in Israel, 2,000 of whom are administrative detainees.

More than 60 Palestinian writers and poets were put in administrative detention for lengthy periods of time, without trial. Once released—without having been accused of any offense—they were banned from entering Israel. This week they were banned from attending a protest meeting organized by Batzelem on the subject of "Forbidden Writers and Books in the West Bank."

Some 650 books are banned from distribution in the territories and in detention facilities, and the Defense Ministry and the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] are at times hard put to explain for what reason. Asad al-Asad, editor of AL-KATIB in the territories, claims that he knows of a list of 5,000 banned books, including children's books. According to him, inhabitants have been punished for possession of certain periodicals or books, and some are afraid to keep books at home, "because, if there is a search, who knows what they may find against them." Correct, Nisim Calderon, Ha'Erev moderator and a member of the Israeli-Palestinian Writers' Association admitted, "anti-occupation protests are in a difficult, bad situation."

Some 100 people crowded this week into the Bograshov Gallery in Tel Aviv to protest the ban on books in the territories and in detention centers. Yoram Qanyuq referred to that in his speech, saying that once again, greater attention is given to stupidity than to injustice, and we protest the fact that detainees are not allowed to read certain books, instead of protesting the fact that thousands of detainees are put in prison without trial.

Palestinian Leaders Lecture Inside Green Line

*TA2812185489 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 28 Dec 89 p 2*

[Text] Faysal al-Husayni has been giving a series of lectures in the last two weeks in Arab towns in Israel, including Shefar'am and al-Tayyibah. Other Palestinian leaders, among them Radwan Abu-'Ayyash, have also lectured recently in the Galilee and the triangle. At the beginning of December, the o/c [officer-in-charge] central command and o/c southern command issued orders limiting al-Husayni's movement within the territories for a period of 6 months "because of his hostile activity, which has recently increased." It was claimed that he serves as the head of an independent legal system established in the territories in order to deal with disputes among Palestinians. In his lectures, al-Husayni gives a political overview and answers questions. He advises his listeners to support the intifadah, but to remain loyal to the country in which they live, and not to bring the intifadah into Israel.

Israeli Arabs Reportedly Want To Integrate

*44230049E Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 10 Nov 89 p 2B*

[Article by Ory Nir: "Israelis First and Foremost"]

[Text] Israeli Arabs' strivings for equality within the state and Israeli society is more important to them than their identification with the Palestinian national struggle. The intifadah in the territories, although it deepened the solidarity of Israeli Arabs with Arabs in the territories, did not in any way affect their efforts to consolidate and expand their participation in the Israeli political system. More than ever before, they are taking advantage of the tools of Israeli politics in an organized and orderly manner to obtain equal rights and opportunities within the framework of the Jewish state. The more acute their separate national Arab awareness, the more intense becomes their struggle for equal rights through special Arab institutions. Knesset member 'Abd-al-Wahhab Darawishah's new party bore witness to this phenomenon in the last Knesset elections; the "Joint List for Labor and Equality" formed to run in elections for the Histadrut is another proof of that.

The above conclusions emerged from studies by six senior researchers in various disciplines who examined the pattern of Arab voting in elections for the 12th Knesset last November. The studies were published in a new collection of articles of the Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies, edited by Ya'akov Landau, which will be released in 2 days.

The article by Yosef Ginat, former adviser to the prime minister on Israeli Arab affairs, mostly based on direct experiences (personal interviews and talks with Arab notables and visits to house political circles), clearly indicates this phenomenon which emerges from all the articles in that collection in one form or another.

According to it, the main consideration that motivated Arab voters in the 1988 elections was an integrative-civic aspiration for equality. The political messages that had the greatest effect on Arab voters concerned equality, and their influence was greater than that of national Palestinian messages, despite the ardent atmosphere of the intifadah (or perhaps because of it). "First we must take care of village sewage, and then of regional problems," Ginat cited from one of the house circles he visited. Although the elections results showed Israeli Arabs' solidarity with Arabs in the territories, their identity is clearly Arab-Israeli, and as such they "develop extreme attitudes concerning their struggle for equality with the Jewish majority." One important distinction that Ginat makes, and that even government ministers tend to forget at times, is the distinction between identity and solidarity, two concepts that are not at all synonymous. Ginat's clear conclusion is: "Results at both micro and macro levels show that the intifadah has not had an impact on the Arab voter."

A similar conclusion emerged from the statistical analysis of Avraham Diskin, a political science expert at Hebrew University, who stated that in the elections for the 12th Knesset there were no significant changes in the voting patterns of Israeli Arabs compared to previous elections. He attributed the lack of exhaustive studies on the electoral potential of minorities in Israel to the fact that they are represented by a multitude of parties and to the absence of agreements between the parties representing the Arab sector on distributing surplus votes.

Sociologist Majd al-Haj of Haifa University studied the effects of the intifadah on the contents of electoral propaganda and on electoral results in the Arab sector. He came to the conclusion that although the intifadah had a decisive impact on the contents and tone of the electoral campaign in the Arab sector, the results did not show real intifadah influences. Non-Zionist parties, which pinned their electoral hopes on the intifadah, simply did not correctly read the mood of the Arab population in Israel. In contrast to the distinction between solidarity and identity made by Yosef Ginat, al-Haj differentiated between "two components in the Palestinian-Israeli identity of Israeli Arabs: a national element stemming from inescapable adherence to the Palestinian nation, and a civic element stemming from their being Israeli citizens struggling for equality."

Al-Haj concluded that, over the years, Israeli Arabs learned to preserve the delicate balance between those two elements. Although the intifadah sharpened the contradiction between them and narrowed the room they had to maneuver between the two elements, "the change was not sufficiently radical to influence the voting patterns and political behavior of the Arab population in Israel." He warned that "the absence of civic equality and continued alienation and frustration, combined with the continued occupation of the territories and the political freeze, in the future will erase the Green Line and the different orientation that has so far distinguished between Palestinians on both sides of that line."

Researcher Ilan Greilsmer, head of the Political Sciences Faculty of Bar-Ilan University, who focused on the doctrinaire and ideological problems of RAKAH [New Communist List] in the last elections, explained that the absence of change in its electoral clout was the result of several forces that acted upon it and forced it to preserve its traditional image and its ideological principles. Its efforts to remain within the law at all times, the threat of the Progressive Party and the Muslim Fundamentalists on the one hand, and the electoral threat of left-wing Zionist "consensus parties" on the other, forced RAKAH to hang on to its old positions and its doctrinaire leftist bent in order not to lose its voters to the "consensus parties," which also stand for two states for the two nations.

Middle East expert Yitzhaq Reiter of Hebrew University did a fascinating analysis of the new party phenomenon in the Arab sector in the last Knesset elections: 'Abd-al-Wahhab Darawishah's Arab Democratic Party emphasized its links to Arabism and Islam, the two main cultural elements of the complex identity of Israeli Arabs, and the fact that it belonged to the framework of Israeli parliamentary consensus (as opposed to RAKAH and to the Progressive Party). The latter characteristic conferred a pragmatic nature on Darawishah's party that brought it closer to the camp of Zionist parties, in view of the fact that the Arab Knesset member, formerly of the Alignment, declared in the electoral campaign that he will join a coalition under Alignment and will strive to be included in the political consensus. Emphasis on ethnic identity placed Darawishah in a radically isolated position compared to the Progressive list and RAKAH, which are joint Arab-Israeli parties. Reiter attributed great importance to the success of the Arab Democratic Party in winning a Knesset seat, because it was "the first time that a nationalistic Arab party managed to enter the Knesset as an independent party, rather than as an appendage to some Zionist party," as Darawishah himself proudly pointed out on election night.

Reiter emphasized Darawishah's efforts to carve a special place for himself, precisely in the belief that the ideological polarization among Arab political movements is being narrowed down. Reiter's definition of the complex identity of Israeli Arabs, which is very similar to the views of the other authors in the collection, is that the struggle of Arab Israelis for equal rights, although it bears all the signs of an internal, civil issue, is viewed by them as a basically national struggle. From here, Reiter points out that the main political objective of Israeli Arabs is equal rights and equal opportunities. This is both a civic and a national objective. Consequently, according to Reiter, the sharper quality assumed by the Israeli-Arab orientation in the wake of the intifadah is reflected in their methods, rather than their political objectives. Those methods are actually becoming increasingly conformist; demands for equality are being heard from inside and within the democratic Israeli political establishment, but nevertheless, on the basis of organization within a separate political Arab national

body. Proof of this political phenomenon among Israeli Arabs, which in Reiter's view stands a good chance to grow and develop, is the joint party formed by the three Arab national parties for the Histadrut elections, the Joint Party for Labor and Equality. The importance of this party indeed lies in a separate organization based on nationality.

The electoral potential of Israeli Arabs (which was weighted against 14 mandates in the November 1988 elections) may rise to 18 mandates in the 13th Knesset according to demographic forecasts. This potential exceeds the combined mandates of the religious bloc. If the process of unification of Arab votes along national lines continues, as it has given signs of doing, the major parties will have to prepare themselves for completely different coalition and parliamentary considerations than what they have been accustomed to in the past.

Arab Academy Will Not Open

44230049G Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 8 Nov 89 p 4

[Text] Senior governmental sources are worried about inflammatory statements found in Islamic Movement publications, particularly in the movement's new paper, SAWT AL-HAQQ [The Voice of Truth], which supports Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement], which is active in the territories.

Governmental sources revealed to HA'ARETZ that it has been decided to turn down the request filed by the leadership of the Islamic Movement to establish a Muslim academy in Umm al-Fahm. The request will be officially denied on grounds that 2 years ago the Ministry of Education promised to recognize the new academy in Baqah al-Gharbiyah, and sees no need for an additional academy. Unofficially, the sources said, the decision was determined by the alarmingly inflammatory tone of the movement's publications and spokesmen.

One source reported that governmental factors are undecided as to how to deal with the inflammatory tone of the movement's publication, "but the indecision will not continue for long." The source added that 6 months ago leaders of the movement staged a campaign in which they retracted what was described as past mistakes—their involvement in underground organizations and terrorist actions—and promised that they will devote their time and energies to promoting the welfare of their localities.

The source expressed astonishment that several senior state officials joined the Islamic Movement initiative concerning the academy in Umm al-Fahm, among them the chairman of the Education Department of the Ministry of Education and Instruction, 'Ali Haydar, the judges of the Islamic Court, Shaykh Tawfiq 'Asliyah, the chief judge of the Appellate Court, and Judge Ahmad Natur of the Islamic Court in Yafo. The source stated that governmental factors warned those state officials, and they promised to refrain from their activities.

Islamic Movement sources stated that their support for Hamas is not inconsistent with reporting important information which "some parties try to conceal."

The movement leaders are now on a propaganda tour designed, among other things, to lay the foundation for an organization to collect Muslim funds in the United States to finance development and education projects in Muslim localities in Israel, including the proposed academy.

So far 140 student enrolled in the academy, and its board of trustees held its first meeting at which it expressed satisfaction with "the preparations made for the new school year."

Border Police Actions Described

44230048D Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 6 Nov 89 p 9

[Article by Uri'el Ben-Ami: "Border Police Jokes"]

[Text] Reports such as the following reach journalists in Jerusalem and the territories almost every evening, so no one gets excited anymore. Most of them don't even make it into the newspapers.

However, two evenings ago, about 2 hours after the police spokesman's report, Khalil Abu-Diyab called me up, hysteria in his voice: "They carried out a pogrom at my house, those border policemen. Come now and see with your own eyes what they did to me."

The family was waiting for me at his house, which he shares with his father Daud. Khalil works as a dishwasher at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. When he came home at 1900 hours, the border police were already there. He couldn't get into the house for the chaos: Youngsters from the village were throwing stones and policemen were firing rubber bullets and tear gas.

According to Khalil, he was waiting at his father's house when he heard his daughters begin to scream. He ran home, this time paying no attention to the border policemen, and found them in the house. According to him, the border police had entered the house by force. He counted 28 of them roaming the house. An officer named 'Amos told him to shut up, while Khalil demanded that Police Commander Kraus be brought over. "The officer laughed," Khalil said, and promised to bring along Kahana instead—that would be more suitable.

A border police officer claimed that a stone had been thrown from Khalil's house. Khalil's reaction was, look, there are only small children here. He has four daughters and two sons, all under 15. But the border police men insisted. They shouted at the children to open the door, and when they didn't, they broke in by force. The eldest daughter, although scared, wanted to open the door, when all of a sudden, the glass in the door was shattered, and she burst into tears.

The border policemen came in, overturned the living room furniture, emptied all the closets in the bedroom, trashed another room, and overturned the refrigerator and washing machine. When they finished trashing the house, not having found the mystery stone thrower either in the fridge or the washing machine, they went out.

Before they left, one of them said to the 66-year-old Daud: "If you don't shut up, we'll break your heads." Daud said that he laid down on the floor and told the policeman: "Go ahead, if you're a man then kill me, this is your opportunity." According to him, 'Amos the officer saw what was happening and shouted at his men to leave the house.

Now the police can claim: Those people are killers, that's the famous Abu-Diyab family! (Daud and his son Hasan spent years in prison for killing a daughter of the family and a sister-in-law they accused of adultery).

Daud, Hasan, and Khalil don't deny that: "We killed for the honor of the family, but why are they now killing our honor?"

In the meantime came Samir Abu-Diyab, another member of the family, and he told us more about border police methods. "Druze and Bedouin policemen," he said, "themselves throw stones at the people to provoke them and make them come out, and then the fun starts. Three days ago border policemen built a roadblock themselves, then they forced the people to clean up the road. That was supposed to be a joke. At night they shout, 'Whores, we'll screw your mother,' and we go crazy."

Before leaving the place we saw the burned car of Qar'in Yahya, a municipal worker in Jerusalem. Two days before it was still a wonderful 1986 Opel Cadet, but now there was nothing left of it. In Silwan no one can tell for sure who burned it, who is against whom, and who could be smart enough to sort things out.

"Silwan is a hostile village," the police like to claim. Now, instead of dealing with the village youngsters, the police deal with the entire village. And the village—at the foot of Mount Olive, right under the nose of the police southern district staff—is in fact a proper town with a population of thousands.

The Jerusalem police spokesman, Inspector Uzi Sandori, promised to seriously look into the complaint from Silwan and even to invite the people involved to file an official complaint.

In the meantime, "Rubber bullets and teargas were fired in Silwan. There were no casualties." What a boring item.

Relations With Churches Allegedly Deteriorate

44230049C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 8 Nov 89 p 13

[Article by Nadav Shraga'i: "Christians Coming to Life, Too"]

[Text] Dry statistics will record Nidal al-Rabdi of Aqbat al-Taqiyyah in the Old City as the first intifadah victim in Jerusalem. Up to that point local authorities, the mayor, and the police commander were proud of their success in preventing bloodshed within the city limits. On that hot and windy morning of the end July of 1988, 15-year-old al-Rabdi was riding his bicycle from his home in the Old City in the direction of Bayt Hanina.

Some 300 meters before al-Ram in the Dahiyat al-Barid neighborhood—an area of luxurious villas in new Bayt Hanina—the boy was trapped in a stone-throwing incident in which he was injured. According to testimony, the pursuers—two soldiers and one civilian—mistakenly fired on al-Rabdi, who was riding his bike toward them. The boy died in the cab that was taking him to the hospital.

On the very same day, 17-year-old Simon Elias Ganam was killed in Bayt Sahur. That night he was accompanied on his last journey by 3,000 Muslims and Christians in a raging demonstration of solidarity. On that day, the voice of the muezzin and the chimes of church bells in Jerusalem blended into one.

Anyone nowadays who wishes to study the ways and positions of Jerusalem churches as part of the intifadah, both as a subject and object of the uprising, must mark that July as a turning point, although the deterioration had begun a few years previously.

It would be hypocritical or naive to claim that Christians in Israel are so totally devoted to God's business that they don't do anything else. No official factor in the country will think of disputing the involvement of eastern churches in international politics. In the past, Israel had recourse to the services of priests and religious officials, just as other countries in the area did. Useful ties were established in particular with two churches, the Armenian and the Greek Orthodox Church.

At the time of the arrest of Rafi Levi, formerly in charge of the Jerusalem District at the Interior Ministry, contacts between Israel and those churches slackened considerably. The involvement of Levi—who was the main liaison man for the state and its security authorities with the two churches—greatly strengthened the pro-Arab camps within those churches. Israel and some of its vital interests came out the losers from the affair.

In retrospect it became clear that Levi's recommendation in 1983 to deport Armenian Archbishop Kazanghian from Israel stemmed mainly from the weakened position of his pro-Israeli rival Shakha Agimian, who was personally close to Levi. "The Australian," as Kazanghian was referred to in the blue cables exchanged between Levi and the Israeli Foreign Ministry, is still in Israel. The State of Israel did not deport him, but the relations between the Armenian Church and the state suffered a heavy setback.

Rafi Levi's personal relations with members of the Greek Orthodox Church, which were revealed at the

time of his arrest in 1988, also damaged the relations between the state and that church. It turned out that Levi's endeavors were designed to line his own pockets as much as to advance Israel's cause with those churches.

And as if the affairs in which the senior Israeli official became involved were not enough, Greek Orthodox Patriarch Deodorus I found himself implicated in a mysterious case at the very same time, for which he was investigated at length by the police. On the morning of 13 February 1987, the patriarch was riding in his car from Amman to Jerusalem. Deodorus, whose influence spans both sides of the border, was used to traveling that route several times a month.

At the border crossing on the Allenby Bridge, Israeli security men proceeded to search the patriarch's car. The search lasted a long time. The patriarch and his driver in the meantime waited in a public room next to the checkpoint on the bridge. The careful search yielded results. In the car's air filter and other hidden spots were found 200 gold locket frames weighing about 3 kg and 4.5 kg of heroin.

A mere 1 and 1/2 months later Deodorus was summoned to the office of Police Minister Hayim Bar-Lev, who informed him and the press that he had been found innocent of any suspicion. It was reported that the gold and the heroin had been planted in the car without his knowledge. In spite of the public announcement, investigations continued. The timing of Deodorus' exoneration before the end of the investigation was due to his lofty position.

Yisra'el Lippel, former director general of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and currently a recognized authority on religions and head of the Jerusalem Institute for Religious Affairs, now says that in past years, long before the intifadah, the state began to treat the churches and the heads of Christian communities in Jerusalem with almost intentional disdain. "Someone must have forgotten that the 14,000 Christians in Jerusalem represent over 1 billion Christians throughout the world, in the United States, Soviet Union, Ethiopia, and everywhere. They have an enormous influence on public opinion, governments, and presidents."

Lippel pointed out the fact that in recent years Christian and church affairs were relegated to a lower rung of the Israeli hierarchy. "In the past it was director generals and deputy directors of the Ministries of Foreign and Religious Affairs and of Justice that dealt with these matters. The people in charge were also professionally competent in the area, while today it is mostly diligent Middle East experts with a lot of goodwill and not much understanding of Christianity."

Lippel, who takes care to attend holiday services at various churches, points out, for example, that in all too many cases these services are attended only by junior state representatives, sometimes from the Ministry of Tourism or the Police, something that is interpreted by church officials as a mark of disdain. He also stated that

various tax exemptions that the churches enjoyed in the past have been canceled. "I meet with them every week and I hear all about their annoyances—a tax here, a family reunification affair there, this sort of thing—which they have trouble resolving because of our unbearable bureaucracy and cumbersome official procedures concerning church affairs."

No less than 10 bodies are currently directly involved in Christian and church affairs in the country: Jerusalem City Hall; the Ministries of Foreign and Religious Affairs, of Justice, Tourism (pilgrims), and Finance (the Customs Duty Returns Committee); the prime minister's adviser for Arab affairs; Minister Ehud Olmert; the Civil Administration, the Police, and General Security. "This is the kind of chaos that patriarchs and archbishops have to contend with," Lippel said. "Israel, which assumed responsibility for the holy places, is also responsible for the welfare of the churches and their senior officials, but clerks sometimes try to play politics instead of dealing with the issues at hand."

At the head of the anti-Israeli front that is currently taking shape in Jerusalem one can name three prominent figures, who are apparently motivated by belief in the justice of the Palestinians' struggle and identification with their Christian Palestinian community. First and foremost among them is Latin Patriarch Michel Sabah, a Nazareth native who was appointed to his position by Pope John Paul II. Samir Capitti, the Anglican bishop and president of the Assembly of Bishops of all Anglican Churches in the Middle East, is second on this list, followed by Greek Catholic Archbishop No'al Lutfi Laham, Capucci's heir and representative of Patriarch Maximus Hakim of Damascus.

Although a few years ago Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi declared that Arabs could not be Christians, only Muslims, this trio proves that they can very well indeed. As a tiny Christian minority in an all-Muslim Middle East, Christians always stood out as leaders of national movements. That was the case in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and now Jerusalem (see the Bayt Sahur case). The Christian minority, which felt persecuted by the far greater Muslim minority, was often compelled to show themselves more Catholic than the pope, and in this case, than the Muslim judge or Palestinian nationalists.

The "Palestinian trinity," as they are known to Israeli security officials, was behind the two fliers issued by Church leaders in Jerusalem last April and at the end of October, and only 1 week ago they organized religious demonstrations and prayers in Bayt Sahur. The three archbishops travel a lot and disseminate information and statements abroad unflattering to Israel, to say the least.

There is currently almost no Christian ceremony or sermon free of expressions of identification with the suffering and just struggle of the Palestinian people, and of anti-Israeli hints. Michel Sabah, who met with Ronald Reagan, asked Reagan to contribute to the realization of a Palestinian state. Sabah also canceled a meeting with

Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin. He had asked to meet with Rabin, but after learning that the meeting was scheduled to be held in the Knesset building in Jerusalem, he canceled, and also stopped two other patriarchs from meeting with the defense minister. "The position of the Vatican and of the Church in this matter is clear," Sabah later explained, "The Vatican does not permit meetings with political figures in Jerusalem."

Many reports claim that, because of the situation, Christians are leaving the country and there is fear that no one will be left to administrate the holy places. The wording of such reports is sometimes amazingly similar to fliers issued by the PLO in the territories or to articles appearing in the East Jerusalem press. The Foreign Ministry keeps these reports on file, some of which carry the signatures of, among others, the World Council of Churches, delegations of all Dutch and British Churches, a delegation on behalf of the U.S. Bishops, the World Federation of Lutheran Churches, and even a Baptist delegation that recently visited Israel.

Custodian Carlo Cicutelli is sometimes actively involved in the pro-Palestinian policies of the Church leaders. He is the de facto administrator of the Holy Christian Places in the country: the Church of the Tomb, the Nativity Church, and the Annunciation Church in Nazareth. He is appointed by the pope and serves as head of the Franciscan Order in Israel. At the beginning of the intifadah, the custodian, together with Michel Sabah, sent a letter to the Israeli authorities protesting the behavior of Israeli police and soldiers.

Study Surveys Impact of Intifadah on Soldiers

90OL0122G Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
(Supplement) in Hebrew 6 Oct 89 pp 10-13

[Article by Tami Lotem]

[Text] "The platoon sergeant apprehended an Arab boy, and told him: 'Climb up the electricity pole (it was high voltage), and lower the flag from there.' This was a huge pole. It was impossible to climb it at all. There is no 'impossible,' so he climbed several meters, no further. He could not go further. So the sergeant began to beat his legs, saying: 'Continue upward, continue climbing,' and he did not allow him to descend. And we were simply the oppressors.

"Then his father, who was prohibited from leaving the house, left the house and began to cry: 'Leave my boy alone. Get him down quickly. I will go up and bring him down.' Then the father, who was really elderly, began to climb, but unsuccessfully; he said: 'Wait, I am going to bring ladders.' He connected ladders, but did not succeed, and the platoon sergeant began to beat him.

"Yiftah and I really cried. This was real—impossible. I began to almost actually fight with the platoon sergeant right there. We almost fought with clubs there next to them and next to the soldiers, but he gave in. They did not remove the flag from the pole."

The preceding monologue was one among dozens of testimonies gathered in research conducted by the Smart Communications Institute of Hebrew University, which examined the effect of the intifadah on soldiers serving in it, thus putting academia's stamp on the most surveyed subject in the past 2 years. Dozens were interviewed. They generated hours of conversations and hundreds of pages.

This is not a normal research study. A representative model was not chosen. Many of the soldiers who were studied volunteered to be interviewed on their own initiative, jumping at the chance to get everything out. The researchers themselves were also compelled to contend with a difficult and abnormal process. In striking contrast to dry, formal, normal research studies, they entered into an emotional cauldron on account of the testimonies, completely changing previously held opinions and becoming dumbstruck by the bottom lines which emerged from the study.

The study in question is part of a comprehensive study conducted by the Smart Communications Institute of Hebrew University. The overall topic is bombastic: Israeli Society's Coping With the Intifadah. In this framework, reporting in the press, on television, and in foreign coverage was examined in particular.

A team of three researchers examined the most fascinating angle of all, that of the soldiers. The team examined the perception of the reality of the intifadah among those who have the greatest accessibility to it and who contend with it personally, psychologically, physically, and the way it affects them.

The team believes that, among the dozens of interviewees, only one suffers from a psychological breakdown due to service in the territories. The rest indeed reported severe depression and a change in world view, but they did not reach a pathological state.

The team did not conclude that anyone serving in the intifadah would lose his peace of mind within 5 years, or that children of fathers who served in the territories would have greater difficulties in their studies, despite such a conclusion's potential for making the headlines.

Regarding this study, it is more accurate to speak of bottom lines than numerical conclusions measured in percents and sketched on diagrams. This is a matter of a summary of details regarding a situation and its effect on those involved in it. Even the central question of whether a process of routinization exists has a much more complex answer than a simple yes or no, and we will come to this below.

The first part of the study is currently about to end, and articles will soon be published in professional journals abroad.

The members of the team are Professor Shoshana Blum-Qolqa and Dr Tamar Liebs from the Communications Department at Hebrew University. They have been

working on the study for a year. This summer, they were joined by Dr Itamar Luria, a psychologist who deals with clinical treatment and research.

All of the monologues collected for the purpose of the study are anonymous, according to the promise made by the researchers to the interviewees. The monologues blended into this article are intended to exemplify experiences soldiers chose to share with the researchers.

Monologue: "It is especially difficult for a combat soldier who is considered a good soldier to be humiliated. Children 12 and 13 simply humiliate him. He is actually always losing, and one is never taught to lose in the army, never."

The team interviewed recruits—currently serving soldiers and fresh reservists discharged within a year of the study. The material was collected in discussion groups of three participants and in deep personal interviews.

Only after the interviews did it become clear to the researchers that the examined group is more or less homogeneous. All of them are high school graduates, the sons of college graduates, and middle class. The soldiers and the reservists were all combat soldiers with basic, strong loyalty to the IDF [Israel Defense Forces]. None had refused to serve in the territories, but gray methods of evasion were discovered.

The researchers felt that they were dealing with people with center and leftist political orientations, although political orientation was not elicited explicitly.

In the next phase, in order to enrich the study, they intend to interview other groups with different characteristics.

The team analyzed the monologues by reading the texts a number of times. Each time, they sought something different in the texts, reading them with different eyes, from a different angle. The analysis even plumbed nuances in language and language usage. The manner in which utterances were formulated provided yet another dimension to lexical technicians.

The first angle from which the texts were read sought how the soldiers perceive a situation at the experiential level. The second angle focussed on ways of coping. The third, actually in the completion stages, examined the internal, moral world of the individual.

All of the material which was gathered—and here is the thorn in the study—is laced with contradictions, not between monologues of different people, but within the text provided by the same person: dry laconic sentences versus rich formulations; moments of maximal candidness versus distant, dry speech; moments of identification with the Arabs of the territories followed by a sentence dripping with hatred; unequivocal justifications of behavior running counter to accepted values beside troubling question marks and self-criticism; hostile behavior toward Arabs versus participation in demonstrations against the policy of suppression. The

researchers were surprised to discover how each voice actually spoke to them in several voices.

The team concluded that this internal conflict is indicative of a strong conflict being fomented by service in the territories. In the professional jargon, they call this cognitive dissonance. The conflict is between each soldier's previously held values system and the values system according to which he is supposed to behave in the intifadah. Here, one comes to a central, and surprising, conclusion of the study.

Monologue: "Five Arabs were sitting there. They tied their legs and put them on a stretcher next to some wall. They remained this way for 8 hours on a cold day. To sit like that for 8 hours. That is really cold. Then the platoon sergeant major, who is also somewhat disturbed, took it upon himself to supervise them, lest God forbid—I do not know what they could still do. The whole time he was at pains to lower their heads, so that they would not raise their heads.

"He would hit them a bit with a club, scream and laugh at them, and he actually urinated on them. Yes, seriously. This was really a terrible sight. Humiliated people sitting on their knees, and he is beating them. Then I and four others began to scream at him to stop. He stopped. However, he later did other things."

The professional literature argues that one resolves such a conflict by adapting to the new values system, internalizing it until the conflict is completely neutralized and one is free of it completely—straightening a line and becoming reconciled.

This is what the researchers expected to find. They thought that the soldiers would accept as natural and routine what initially seemed shockingly inhumane. They believed that if a soldier were shocked by the mistreatment of detainees in his first week in the territories, he would, after another week, not be as agitated by this, and he might also subsequently begin to issue mistreatment. The professional literature argues that this is what happened in Vietnam, for example. The study revealed, to the researchers' astonishment, that this is not so in our case.

There is normalization, adaptation, and desensitization, but only to a certain extent. Starting at a certain level, the soldiers, surprisingly, are actually at pains to foster the conflict and allow it to continue. An interesting contradiction develops. In order to cope with the dilemma, they intentionally attempt not to resolve it because, as long as a certain level of dilemma is maintained, everything is all right—one still cares; the old values are preserved. One enters into a routine, emotions are neutralized, and action is casual, but only to the extent required to function and survive.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] How is our case different from what happened in Vietnam?

[Luria'] In Vietnam, they had home leave once a year. An isolated society constructs its own scale of values, and the soldier sees the world through the eyes of the group. In our case, there is a high frequency of home leave and current reporting in the media. Therefore, other perspectives exist, and matters are judged differently.

[Monologue] "We felt that they were making a joke of us. We were chasing after 12-year-olds with rocks while we had rifles—such strong soldiers, unable to do a thing, chasing after them in circles the whole day, some 8 hours in the Casbah. Chasing, playing, like children playing cops and robbers. We felt the same thing, only here I was afraid."

There was another main point which contradicted another previously held opinion of the researchers. The team expected to find dichotomous models: a good soldier, a bad soldier; a good-hearted soldier, a brutal soldier. Actually, they encountered composite people, with multiple layers of characteristics, opinions, and forms of behavior regarding everything related to service in the territories.

Even before it began analyzing the texts, the team obtained material worthy of study from the manner in which the soldiers presented themselves in meetings with them, i.e., the soldiers' initiative in volunteering to be interviewed, their flowing monologues, and their need to share perceptions for hours upon hours, their effusion constrained only by time. All of these factors underscored that these are people in distress.

The researchers believe that the interview actually functioned for the interviewees as a vent for which almost no other possible alternatives exist. One interviewee said that if he had no one with whom to share, he would not stay sane.

The researchers felt that they themselves represented the generation and values of their subjects' parents. Dr Blum-Qolqa stated: "They were really calling out for help. Get us out of this. If you are our parents' generation, look where you've led us. There was also much contradiction, protest, and, above all, the message: You do not know how horrible it is. Only we do. You do not understand. Otherwise, you would not allow this to happen."

Incidentally, there were no outbreaks, crying, hysteria, or screams in the course of the interviews.

[Monologue] "They take the man of the family. The woman begins to cry, to scream. The children cry. The children, by the way, cry from the moment you enter. Small children. A soldier comes into their home with a weapon, and with a communications apparatus on his back. These are people in very remote villages. They have never seen such things. This communications apparatus seems very frightening to them. It is a strange, frightening type of instrument. The children begin to cry immediately, and there are very many children there."

In all of the material gathered, the researchers identified 15 incriminating cases of deviancy which were not

publicized in the media. The researchers have no intention of using information for purposes of uncovering and punishing. They promised the interviewees to maintain discretion and to make only research use of the monologues.

Example: A soldier described how he stood under a building. An Arab man of 40 stood on the roof, a rock in his hand. The soldier threatened to kill him if he threw the rock. The man responded, "I do not care, so kill me," and threw the rock. The soldier managed to slip away. He had no intention of entering into a physical confrontation with the Arab, but his friends stormed the man, and beat him to death.

The researchers related that the soldier described this incident so laconically that they had to read the text repeatedly to convince themselves that this was truly a matter of a lynch.

But surprisingly—again, surprising—it was not the deviations which especially shocked the soldiers. Their most difficult coping concerned the very actions which they were ordered to carry out—the routine actions.

Another example which made a deep impression on the researchers was the story of an Arab who was stopped during a curfew with a bag of flour. The soldier being interviewed wanted to allow him to pass. The platoon commander ordered him to scatter the flour on the ground. The soldier hesitated. The platoon commander decided to provide an example; he poured the flour out and ran over it ceremoniously with his jeep.

[Luria'] "The notion of deviation assumes a norm which is maintained, and from which deviations occur in exceptional cases. However, the soldiers do not know how to cope with what is considered acceptable and permitted in the territories as well. They have a dilemma with what is legitimate to do, with what is in their orders."

[Blum-Qolqa] "Even regarding a normal matter, such as taking an identification card, they told us: 'Why do this to a person my father's age. It is a terrible invasion of privacy.'"

All of the signs indicated an emotional crisis of confidence in the IDF system and in the way in which it copes with the intifadah. The researchers expected that this would have practical implications. Here too, the results continued consistently to present surprises. It became clear that there is a crisis of confidence, but not a crisis of loyalty.

Despite disappointment with the values to which the intifadah had dragged the IDF, a strong sense of duty to the army remains. The soldiers have continued to recognize the important value of maintaining an army, and they expressed a desire to succeed within the system.

[Luria'] This stems from the IDF's emphasis on a feeling of collective responsibility, the importance of the group, and the suppression of the individual."

The study did not indicate any uniform trend, change, or extremism regarding political opinions as a result of service in the territories. Nor did it find a correspondence between political orientation and behavior in the territories.

[Monologue] "Then the group takes the person with it, in whatever state he may be. If he is only in his pajamas and slippers, he goes with us in pajamas and slippers. He might walk with us in this way throughout the village for 2 hours. It is 4 degrees outside, we have very warm parkas and IDF heating equipment. He has only pajamas, and he walks with us. On the way, he is humiliated."

A central part of the study examined how those serving in the territories cope with the abnormal situation in which they are thrown. A varied complex of popular coping mechanisms was found.

A frequent method among recruits was to choose a unit not destined to be sent to the territories.

Another was to define for oneself a personal, limited army, having other, ethical norms, to which the soldier affiliates himself. "Our platoon does not engage in all types of violent acts. We neither beat nor run wild. We have done everything in the most humane way possible."

And the anger, when someone upsets this balance: "We were very careful, not firing at anyone for a month and a half, until we went with my platoon sergeant. I recall that it was really a difficult day. They surrounded us from all sides. He fired in the air and shot someone in the leg. We got a hold of ourselves. Here we are, absorbing rocks and curses, running all day, and extinguishing every tire for a month and a half, and he begins to fire after only 2 hours in the Casbah."

According to Luria', it is not certain that this subjective feeling of "I am all right" is anchored in reality.

Another technique is compartmentalization, to file things in different drawers. One is a certain way in the territories and another way at home, consciously maintaining a complete separation, so that one reality does not impinge on the other.

Another tactic is alienation, meaning severance. The soldier sees himself from the side, as an uninvolved observer looking at someone else.

Another mechanism is automation—learning to neutralize the emotional effect which accompanies the performance of actions, and to perform actions casually and routinely.

Another way is evading tasks which will pose dilemmas, instead preferring contemptible but "neutral" jobs, such as, for example, cleaning the tank.

There were also attempts to soften the manner of carrying out an order, to say good morning at the roadblock, to smile. "If the orders say: 'When a person throws a rock

at you, and you apprehend him, beat him,' we would apprehend but not beat him."

Another method is lodging a protest. "We once even thought of rebelling. We planned to have people sign and submit a petition. We almost did this, but a somewhat clever officer managed to explain that we would only become embroiled, and that nothing would come of it."

Other ways are to argue with specific orders, or to even protest against one's friends by denouncing them, even in front of them. One interviewee related how others mistreated Arabs on the way to jail. He tried to stop them. When the commander arrived, he ran up to him and reported on his friends, while they were listening.

Another story is about a commander whose hobby was to grab Arabs around the neck. "He would say that this did not hurt Arabs, because they lack a bone here, being inhuman. We had a conversation with the platoon commander, and I described this commander. However, people who did not think as we did learned from it and imitated him, without any problem whatsoever, I think."

An external yet unique aspect of the study is the exceptional dynamic experienced by the researchers themselves. They systematically shattered theses. They developed sympathy and a parental relation with the interviewees, even a desire to defend them.

Before the study began, they thought that they would encounter monstrous people who did monstrous things. Now they maintain that they have met human beings who do inhumane things. They enthusiastically defend the interviewees, emphasizing that they are not to be blamed for the situation, and that a solution will not come from them.

The researchers identify almost totally with their subjects, having become very involved with them emotionally. They testify to having had a very difficult psychological struggle with the study and plumbing the depths of difficult texts. Blum-Qolqa relates that when she wrote an article about the study, she could not sleep for 3 weeks.

Luria' relates that after every several pages of text, he would stop and find himself wondering as he attempted to digest what he was reading. Had he managed to do without these breaks, he maintains, he would have finished the study 3 months ago.

The researchers believe that the impressions which they brought to light are clear. What is unclear are the political conclusions supposed to flow from the study. They believe that each political party will provide an interpretation compatible with its position.

However, according to the researchers, the results must concern every citizen. They see especially long-range dangers. Luria': "The intifadah is a genuine struggle with a vague situation, which creates new, relatively sectorial ethics, such as the development of different values toward different minority groups, desensitization for

example. This can spread. One day, it is different treatment of Arabs, the next day it is different treatment of the unemployed."

[Box, p 13] A Giv'ati Case as an Example

"Our Study does not show that cases such as the Giv'ati episode have legitimacy," states Professor Shoshana Blum-Qolqa. "Our study shows, partially, how it is possible to enter similar situations. However, explicitly, there is no basis among the groups which we interviewed for the behavior of the Giv'ati soldiers.

"There is a range of violent, normal as it were, behavior reported by our interviewees. However, the Giv'ati case involves unrestrained, completely swept-away violence. It is impossible to even say, based on our testimonies, that there is justification even, psychologically, to speak in terms of this magnitude.

"In our study, in contrast to the Giv'ati case, the soldiers felt shame, strong shame. They did not emerge proud and encouraged by what they did.

"Beyond the study, my personal opinion regarding this episode is that the environment created the possibility for such acts. Apparently, there was also clear encouragement from higher up. However, this does not release one from personal responsibility. In any case, the true guilty parties in this incident were not brought to trial. Clemency has a negative effect, because it creates an atmosphere of added legitimacy."

Political Situation Blamed for Economic Ills

90OL0122E Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 12 Oct 89 p 11

[Article by Tzvi Timor]

[Text] Political events have pushed the problems of the economy into a dark corner. The draft law for 100 accelerated projects has run aground on the political bureaucracy. Although, according to distinctions, there is a difference between the bureaucracy and the political echelon, Peres has meanwhile withdrawn his draft law and will attempt to effect his ideas by other means.

Peres also withdrew the dollar-index alternative savings plans after this rubric was criticized. Criticism was also voiced, especially by the Bank of Israel, of the cyclical financing of the state budget deficit, effected as follows: The banks provide credit to finance the savings plans, and the Bank of Israel provides credit to finance the banks' liquidity deficits, while the money from the savings plans finances the treasury deficits.

Friction apparently exists in the treasury. Director-general Ya'akov Lifshitz is not getting along with Budgets Branch Head David Bo'az, nor apparently with Deputy Minister Yosi Beilin. In an interview with THE JERUSALEM POST, Lifshitz called budgets branch officials recently graduated 25-year-olds who know textbooks but not the economy.

Disagreements exist not only in the Finance Ministry, but also between it and the Industry and Commerce Ministry, among other things, over the process of opening the Israeli economy and the protection to be given to the edible oils industry. However, this disagreement is only one of many. Another pertains to the participation, or nonparticipation, of Industry and Commerce Minister Sharon in the ministerial committee for the 100 projects.

Regarding all economic processes, we are creeping. The basket has been creeping upward, rising, since it began to be managed, from 1.49 to 2.05 new shekels. The dollar has also risen from 1.49 in July 1985 to about 2 new shekels in 1989. The currency rate policy also constitutes another area of discord, between a fixed rate and a creeping rate subject to periodic adjustments.

Regarding employment, matters creep on their own. The number of unemployment compensation recipients, which has been increasing at a rate of 3,000 per month, totals 51,000, with no foreseeable way out.

Tax Collection Regresses

Taxes are also creeping—backwards. Tax collection is declining and is the main cause of the government's treasury deficit. In the first quarter of 1989, income tax collection declined by 5 percent, compared to the same period last year. In July and August, it declined to 10 percent and 12 percent respectively compared to the same months last year. The collection of indirect taxes did not fare much better, recording a real decline of 8 to 12 percent.

The collection of taxes on nondefense imports declined at an even steeper rate, fluctuating between 32 to 38 percent.

A similar decline occurred regarding the added-value tax, because the added-value tax constitutes the bulk of indirect taxation. However, surprisingly, the collection of taxes imposed on cigarettes and fuel also declined. Regarding cigarettes, it is surprising because the Finance Ministry had managed to shift a portion of the public to the consumption of imported cigarettes, on which the tax is especially high.

In contrast, negative taxes are increasing. National insurance transfer payments increased under all types of headings, regarding both work injuries and maternity, as if the baby boom had returned.

There is also a large, real increase in work accidents, not to mention unemployment compensation, which increased by 96 percent.

In sum, according to all processes, the economy employs fewer workers in 1989 compared to 1988; in 1988 it employed 1,303,000 persons compared to 1,278,000 in 1989, which is an absolute decline of 25,000 persons, instead of the addition of 26,000 persons. In the public services, on the other hand, an increase of 12,000 persons occurred, and in the business sector, there was a

decline of 37,000 persons. Hence, the policy of liquidating industry and agriculture is succeeding and yielding results.

The Solution—On the Political Plane

If this policy continues, residents of Israel will exist by providing services to each other. The contraction of the production branches, and unemployment, which is partially hidden in agriculture, testify more than anything to the impasse caused by this policy. If goals do not change significantly, the economy will fail to emerge from the quagmire.

Goals cannot change significantly unless political problems are solved. The IDF [Israel Defense Forces] is again requesting about 580 million new shekels for unapproved expenditures stemming from the intifadah. This sum is taken from other objectives, e.g., local industry.

As long as the intifadah is the top priority, there is no chance of finding the sums required to solve the problems of the economy. In order to remove the intifadah from the order of priorities, decisions must be made in the political cabinet.

Bill Passed To Encourage Investment

44230049F Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 7 Nov 89 p 24

[Text] The Ministerial Committee for Financial Affairs yesterday endorsed the Treasury's initiative to revive a law enacted in 1973 with a view to encouraging investment in capital-intensive companies, which in its first version was known as the "Israel Enterprise Bill." However, it was decided that the validity of the bill should elapse in 1991.

The decision was passed after Income Tax Commissioner Moshe Gavish answered the ministers' technical questions of last week.

The ministerial committee also endorsed an amendment to the bill, according to which foreign investors will be entitled to special tax rates if they apply for permits before the end of 1991.

The Treasury intends to reexamine by then methods of encouraging investment featured in all the bills existing in this area and then to initiate changes apt to contribute to increasing investment in the economy and allow it to prepare for opening up markets to the European Community in 1992.

The bill on encouraging investment in capital-intensive companies passed yesterday features extensive benefits, such as exemptions from income and capital-gains taxes for 30 years, and 28-percent commercial tax credits for company revenues.

Similarly, the bill grants tax exemptions on dividends paid by capital-intensive companies and for capital gains derived from the sale of its stock.

In contrast to the bill on encouraging capital investment, the "Israel Enterprise Bill" does not obligate companies to file detailed plans for the enterprises approved, and allows them to invest in anything they choose, provided it complies with the objectives specified in the bill. Benefits are also granted for longer periods of time, in view of the fact that the bill on encouraging capital investment stipulates only 7 to 10 years.

Study Recommends International Financial Center

44230049B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 7 Nov 89 p 24

[Text] Israel has the potential to become an international financial center like Singapore, and as such can promote peace in the Middle East. This is the conclusion of Prof Dan Gila'i of the Hebrew University School of Business Administration from a study presented yesterday at a seminar organized by the Economic Studies and Policy Department of the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies in Jerusalem.

Professor Gila'i said that as a first stage, the government must establish a "free zone" that will offer less expensive international finance services, as in Luxembourg, Singapore, the Cayman Islands, and the Bahamas.

In order to establish such a "free zone," the government must reduce to a minimum foreign currency constraints, refrain from taxing the transactions of the proposed financial center, and ensure the free transfer of funds.

The establishment of an international financial center does not necessarily require amended tax laws or changes in foreign currency control, only to define which financial transactions will be exempted from taxation and foreign currency control.

Within the framework of the international financial center Israel can establish multipurpose stock exchanges for trading in bonds, futures, and options. It will also be in a position to become integrated in mushrooming world electronic stock exchanges and to capitalize on its time zone and on the fact that Sunday is a regular working day in Israel in order to do business while other stock exchanges in the world remain closed.

Israel will also be able to establish international clearing houses like those existing in Luxembourg, offer extensive banking investment services, and encourage the formation of new financial assets. In the long term, Israel will be able to offer financial services to neighboring Arab countries. For example, our financial infrastructure is more developed than Egypt's, and Israel can help mobilize financing for industrial and agricultural projects in Egypt.

The study concluded that the establishment of an international financial center would increase employment, both in the institutions which will participate in the proposed center, and in auxiliary areas such as computer services. The financial center would attract immigrants

trained in financial professions, as well as international investment and commercial banks. That will encourage increased international investment in Israel. Lifting controls from financial markets in the country will also increase economic liberalization, something that in turn will contribute to increasing competitiveness, productivity, and the per capita gross national product.

The study did not ignore Israel's unstable security and economic situation, but noted that currently the importance of political and economic risk has decreased in financial markets, because in most international transactions money is transferred outside financial centers.

Economic and political stability is still important for centers such as Switzerland, where money is actually deposited. On the other hand, the center in the Cayman Islands serves only for bookkeeping purposes and most deposits are not physically there.

Unemployment Increases Among Israeli Arabs

44230047C Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 2 Nov 89 p 3

[Article by Muhamad Halilia]

[Text] According to research conducted by the economist Dr Rimon Jubran, the Histadrut's economic advisor on Arab affairs, the rate of unemployment among Arab workers has gone up by more than 36 percent over the last 2 years. In 1987 the rate of unemployment in the Arab sector reached 11 percent while today it is over 15 percent.

Dr Jubran notes that unemployment is most striking among farm workers, academicians, and free professionals. The research shows that the highest number of unemployed are in the three Arab cities of Nazareth, Shefar'am, and Umm al-Fahm and in the large villages in the Galilee and in the triangle—Sakhnin, Tamra, 'Arba, Tayyibah, Tirah and others.

The main reason for the unemployment in the Arab sector, according to him, is because of the freeze in construction projects and because of the lack of authorized developed industrial areas.

Pollution Rises in Haifa

44230049I Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
10 Nov 89 p 6A

[Text] A serious deviation from air quality regulations involving sulfuric acid was recorded last night in the Karmel Center area of Haifa. A special apparatus installed on the roof of the Hugin School registered a concentration of 1.153 micrograms of sulfuric acid per cubic meter of air, while regulations in effect allow an overall concentration of that pollutant of 780 micrograms per cubic meter.

It must be noted that the Karmel Center of Haifa was considered until recently as a relatively clean area, while the most highly polluted areas of Haifa were usually at

the other end of the Karmel, in the Neve Sha'anani neighborhood and the mountain slopes.

However, after the Power Company installed its apparatus there, it emerged that the Karmel Center, too, was highly polluted. Record pollution figures were registered on 1 May 1989, when the school station measured a national record high: 2.680 micrograms per cubic meter.

Since the beginning of 1989, 65 violations of the 780-microgram standard were registered in the Haifa area. The latest violation was recorded at a time when the two major polluting enterprises in the area—the refineries and the Power Company—as well as the Gadot-Petrochemicals plant were burning low sulfur oil. This situation justifies the steps taken by Environmental Protection Minister Ronny Milo, who 3 weeks ago signed amended, tough individual orders against the two enterprises, obligating them to burn low sulfur fuel at all times. In especially difficult conditions, such as the weather that prevailed 2 days ago, the orders stipulate that the enterprises must burn fuel containing only one-half percent sulfur.

Energy Minister Moshe Shahal protested those orders and brought up the topic at the latest cabinet meeting. The orders are expected to come into effect 3 months after being signed, i.e., on 18 January 1990.

It was reported that high concentrations of sulfuric acid—785 micrograms per cubic meter—were recorded in the Dan area, too, 2 nights ago, more precisely in Benei Beraq.

Sea of Galilee Level Drops 'Alarmingly'

44230049H Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 10 Nov 89 p 5A

[Text] The table level of the Sea of Galilee has dropped to the lowest level ever recorded since regular measurements began in 1926.

Yesterday the level descended to a record 212.44 below sea level, which was only 3 cm above the lowest level on record—212.47—measured in October 1986. In the past 5 days the level dropped approximately 4 cm. If this rate continues, a new all-time record low is expected by next week.

Prof Moshe Gofen of the Sea of Galilee Study Laboratory yesterday said that according to existing Sea of Galilee utilization regulations decreed by the water commissioner at the beginning of the 1980's, the water level may be allowed to drop to a minimum of 213.00 below sea level, to what is known as "the lower red line." Until the beginning of the 1980's the "lower red line" stood at a minimum of 212.00. Ever since it was allowed to lower that figure by 1 additional meter, the water level dropped twice under the 213-meter line, this being the second time. In the course of years there was only one other year when the level dropped below 212, namely in December 1934.

There are two factors that may halt this trend to a certain extent and even contribute to reversing it: One is powerful rains in the Sea of Galilee basin apt to cause a torrential flow in the rivers spilling into the lake. The second factor, which is expected as of the middle of the coming week, concerns the planned turning off of the national pipeline, for periodical repairs; this time the break will also allow the connection of a fourth pumping unit to the national pipeline.

Water administration experts are extremely worried about the possibility that this year, too, a dry winter may bring the water level of the Sea of Galilee to an unprecedented historic low by the end of the summer, something that will have far-reaching implications for the entire water situation. If, however, we have a rainy winter, there is room in the lake for a very high volume of water, approximately 600 million cubic meters, which is about one-quarter more than the entire amount pumped out of the lake in a normal year through the national pipeline.

High Incidence of Work Health Risks Reported

44230048B Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 6 Nov 89 p 4

[Text] About one-third of industrial workers given medical check-ups within the framework of a recent campaign were found to have health problems. Two mobile units carried out this special campaign, the first of its kind, organized by the Histadrut Safety Department in cooperation with the General Sick Fund and the Workers' Council. One unit was manned by Sick Fund physicians, and the other by labor physicians and nurses.

The mobile units visited 24 textile, food, carpet, and other plants, all located in development towns. About 1,200 workers between the ages of 20 and 55 were checked up over a period of 2 months. They were given general tests, as well as eye, hearing, respiratory, and blood-pressure tests. Tests were also done for skin diseases, obesity, and heart conditions.

Approximately 450 workers were found to suffer from various health problems, especially hearing impairment—176 cases, or about 44 percent. Eye problems were found in 132 cases; respiratory problems in 125 cases, and pre-cancer conditions—particularly cancer-susceptible skin growths and suspected breast and colon cancer were found in 20 workers.

According to the chairman of the General Sick Fund's Labor Medical Center, Dr Yosef Rivaq, a direct link between the type of work and the health problem was not investigated, except for the connection between work in a noisy environment and a hearing impairment. According to him, the law that obligates employers to inform employees of work-related health hazards and to provide appropriate protection, is not properly implemented, although currently the situation is better than it has been in the past.

According to the chairman of the Histadrut Safety Department, Sha'ul Ben Simhon, Social Security reports of only 200 people annually affected by work-related illnesses are far from reflecting reality. He gave Finland as an example, a country with a similar-size population, where 3,000 occupational diseases are reported each year. According to him, in the United States some 920,000 materials are on file as health hazards, out of which only 8,000 are clearly defined and identified as such so that they can be avoided.

The findings of the medical campaign will be forwarded to the Knesset Labor and Welfare Commission, so that Social Security authorities will recognize additional occupational diseases. Currently, Social Security recognizes about 50 occupational diseases.

There are improvements in the area of occupational accidents. In the past decade there was a 50-percent decrease in work-related accidents, Ben-Simhon said. Altogether, 54,000 workers were injured in work-related accidents in 1988 (including accidents on the way to work), of whom 92 percent returned to work.

First Gas Power Generator Begins Regular Production

44230030A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 3 Oct 89 p 4

[Article by 'Eli 'El'ad]

[Text] The first industrial gas turbine in Israel began to operate at the end of the week on a regular basis and to supply electricity to the national grid, after a 3-month delay.

Its twin is to join within a week in the commercial production of electricity for the national grid.

The combined output of the two industrial turbines is 200 megawatts. The considerable delay in their introduction into commercial operation, even though their installation was completed 3 months ago by the Electric Company, was due to technical problems and defects that were found in the equipment. The manufacturer of the turbines, the General Electric Corporation, consequently sent to Israel a group of engineers and experts to make the repairs. The Electric Company refused to accept the equipment until these were completed.

The introduction into operation of the two industrial turbines, and the completion in the last few weeks of three small gas jet turbines (each of which has a capacity of 20 megawatts), has increased national electricity generating capacity by about 260 megawatts. Such an increment in capacity is likely to ease the difficult problems of meeting the expected peaks in demand in the coming winter, especially if it is a rainy and cold winter.

Support Increases for Transfer Solution

44230049D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 10 Nov 89 p 2A

[Text] In the past 6 months there has been a steep increase in the number of people supporting Arab transfers. Some 52 percent of the public "are willing to consider deportation of Palestinians, if no peace solution is found," in contrast to 38 percent in favor of transfer 6 months ago. These were the results of a study carried out by Hanokh Smith's institute on those dates. The question was asked of a representative sample of 1,200 people, which included kibbutzim and settlements.

This is the largest number of people recorded in favor of transfer since studies began to ascertain the public's stand on the question. During the time that Me'ir Kahana was a Knesset member, support for transfer was between 34-40 percent, and the first 15 months of the intifadah did not influence the public's view on this matter.

On the basis of these findings Smith stated that the big change was brought about by the cumulative effect of events in the past months and such as those that occurred in Israel itself: the attack on bus No 405, the murders and stabbings in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, and other attacks.

An examination of the background of the individuals in the sample revealed that two-thirds of Likud and right-wing parties supporters are in favor of transfer, but this attitude is spreading among Alignment supporters, too.

Most of the people in the sample were skeptical about Mubarak's 10-points program and mistrustful of 'Arafat's recent statements as a basis for negotiations. More than 50 percent of those questioned believe that there has not been any basic change in the PLO's views, or that the "PLO has found a new way of damaging Israel." Nevertheless, in contrast to their personal opinions, more than 50 percent believe that Israel will conduct negotiations with the PLO in the near future.

A comparison between the data of this study to Smith Institute studies done 6 months ago shows that since the beginning of peace initiatives there has been a hardening in public positions; the public has become more suspicious, something that is reflected in its stand toward a Palestinian state and territorial concessions.

Comparisons also show that there has been erosion of satisfaction with the government and with the personal performance of senior ministers. Less than one-fourth of the public is satisfied with the government, while more than 70 percent believe that the government is unsuccessful. Shamir and Peres' popularity has dropped considerably. Some 50 percent find Shamir's performance "average to bad," and some 60 percent think the same of Peres' performance. Highest estimates went to Rabin's performance, which 62 percent described as "good to very good."

Commentator Lists Possible Likud Moves

44230048E Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 6 Nov 89 p 2

[Article by Hanan Crystal: "The Fight for the Likud Central Committee: Five Scenarios"]

[Text] The political cabinet's decision to accept the amended Baker initiative, which was opposed by the constraints ministers, puts the ball into the Likud court. The fate of the political process and who will steer it, if anyone, will be decided by the party Central Committee.

Several alternative scenarios are possible: The first calls for immediately convening the Likud Central Committee.

According to this scenario, as committee chairman, Ari'el Sharon convenes the top party forum against the wishes of party chairman Shamir even before the Hista-drut elections and before the prime minister's trip to the United States next week. The result: The Shamir-Arens camp boycotts the Central Committee meeting and the Likud is on the verge of collapse. The odds for this kind of far-reaching move are low.

The second scenario would be to torpedo the amended Baker initiative. According to this scenario, the prime minister has to conduct a policy of two small steps forward and one big step back. He rejects the Baker initiative before or after the meeting with President Bush on grounds that the U.S. assurances and guarantees designed to bar the PLO from negotiations do not satisfy him. Result: The confrontation within the Central Committee between the Shamir-Arens camp and the constraints ministers is shelved, while the national unity government is simultaneously dissolved. Odds: average.

The third scenario: Shamir defeats the constraints ministers. The prime minister convenes the Central Committee after his return with gains from the United States. At a tempestuous Central Committee meeting Shamir demands and achieves a personal vote of confidence. Result: The constraints ministers don't comply with the decision. They consolidate their actions and step up their attacks on the prime minister, who in response fires one of them, Sharon or Moda'i. Odds: high.

The fourth scenario calls for the constraints ministers to defeat Shamir. According to this scenario, the Central Committee is convened after the prime minister's return from the United States and it adopts the constraints ministers' position against Shamir's moves. Result: The prime minister presents his resignation to the president and the government becomes a caretaker government. The Central Committee meets again immediately to elect an heir to Shamir. The contest is between David Levy and Moshe Arens. A possible Levy victory leads to a purge in the Likud top leadership and the removal of most of the princes. Shim'on Peres and Shamir's heir try to secure the support of the religious parties and to form

a narrow government. Early elections for the 13th Knesset are simultaneously proposed. The odds for this scenario are average.

The fifth scenario: constraints on Shamir. According to this scenario, the Likud Central Committee is convened after Shamir's return from the United States and the 5 July maneuver is repeated in order to preempt an explosion, namely, Shamir agrees with constraints placed on the amended Baker initiative, which obligate the Likud ministers, but not the government. Result: a serious coalition rift between Likud and Alignment. Odds: average.

Unmanned Helicopter Development Project Described

44000108 Tel Aviv BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR
in English Sep 89 p 109

[Article by Arie Egozi: "And Now—The Unmanned Helicopter"]

[Text] The recent exposure of the unmanned helicopter project by the Israel Navy Commander aroused much interest, as it seems Israel Aircraft Industries intends to keep its edge in the development and production of unmanned air vehicles (UAV).

The Hell-Star, being developed by Helicopter Aircraft Industries (HAI—a subdivision of IAI), is undoubtedly the biggest unmanned helicopter to be found in advanced stages of development. Relying on a photograph published by IAI and on the small amount of information available, it seems the Hell-Star is approximately four metres long and its engine operates two adverse revolving rotors, each with a diameter of two metres. The UAV will be able to carry a payload of about 400 kgs.

At this stage tests are being held on board the missile carrier Sa'ar 4, which is ordinarily equipped with a helicopter of the American-made Dolphin type.

According to foreign publications, the Navy operates two of these helicopters for use with 'over-the-horizon' long-range weaponry, and also for submarine warfare and rescue operations.

The larger missile carriers (Sa'ar 5, now being built in the US) will be equipped with helicopters too. Likewise, it is still unclear whether the Hell-Star is intended to completely replace the manned helicopters. It is more likely to presume that they will operate side by side, on missions where an unmanned air vehicle might be advantageous. The UAV can be fitted with observation and detection systems. It can also be used as an effective platform for electronic warfare systems.

The large amount of experience gained in Israel in the UAV field seems to have given a boost to the development of the Hell-Star. The chief contractor is HAI, but

engineers at the RPV production facilities of IAI are also cooperating in the development.

All unmanned air vehicles for military needs involve a system composed of a ground station and the air vehicle itself. The RPV engineers' success is mainly in their ability to produce a system the field commander can operate according to his needs with maximum flexibility. In the Hell-Star's case, it seems that IAI's large amount of experience is a point in its favour—this, despite the mainly unsuccessful attempts made world-wide in the past to create a UAV that takes off and lands vertically.

The intergration of the unmanned helicopter into the already complex systems of a missile carrier of the Sa'ar 5 type, will demand utilizing all technologies to be found at the disposal of Israel Aircraft Industries.

JORDAN

Awqaf Minister Al-Faqir on Freedom of Preachers

*JN1412111389 Amman AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 14 Dec 89 p 3*

[By Ahmad Shakir]

[Text] His Eminence Dr 'Ali al-Faqir, minister of Awqaf and Islamic affairs, has said instructions to lift the ban imposed on some mosque preachers have been issued. All those previously banned from conducting ceremonies at mosques now can talk about anything that would promote religion and point out what is right or wrong, he said.

Muslims who want to serve their religion must not be remote from it, since the vacuum necessarily would be filled by others who might be less knowledgeable or less virtuous, he said. He added these positions are tools that can be used for both good and evil, and if virtuous people leave them, they undoubtedly will enable evil people to occupy them and inflict much harm.

His eminence said it is a great thing for an authoritative person not to harm Muslims through that authority, and not to abuse his position for his own purposes. He noted we are living through a rapidly changing age, and change is not only happening in a certain region. Winds of change are blowing all over the world, he said. His eminence added Islam must live through this stage to prove capable of effecting better, wider, and more comprehensive change.

Asked about the extent of his coordination with the Muslim Brotherhood to join government, he said the movement did not reject joining the government, and that there were disagreements only on some portfolios.

He said his participation in both executive and legislative authorities will be more useful. "We must be realistic; we must not live in a world of illusions, imagination, and hallucination, dreaming of utopia," he said. "I

think this world reflects the madness and light thinking of its people, which creates doubts and illusions."

His eminence added, "Every faithful scholar must join the government. We have been burned by the fire of those who abused government positions; we suffered a lot, and found no one to say a single word." He wondered: "Shall we leave these positions to such people under the pretext we cannot make 100 percent reforms? Must we wait until full reform is achieved? This cannot come automatically." The minister said he personally is against boycotting or rejecting participation in responsibility. He added: "I said this to my brothers in the Islamic movement; they accepted this and agreed to join the government, but asked for a certain number of portfolios and certain ministries; the principle of joining the government was not unacceptable to them or to any other Islamic side. But there were disagreements over quantity and quality, making the entire thing a bargaining process." In the weekly lecture he delivered at al-Fayha' mosque on Tuesday, Dr al-Faqir said, "Serious Islamic work requires sharing responsibility. Everyone has discovered there is no need to fear dealing with this group, and that if confidence in the Islamic groups is established, then the relation will develop into a friendship, then alliance, then unity. Islam," he said, "honors pledges and never goes back on its conventions when it extends a hand to others."

He said five ministries were offered to the Islamic groups. "Had there been five Muslim leaders in these ministries, no matter what they were, we would have begun serious work to serve this religion," he said. "There is a responsive spirit to these hopes and ambitions as the country—leadership and people—realizes the past era, with all its characteristics, is over and we now stand at the threshold of a new stage. We must realize the nature of the stage we are experiencing, and time does not move backward."

"He that seeks the interests of the nation can express his ideas, even if they are at odds with those of a minister or an official," he said. "We now see the press returning to its positions and assuming its free role, which now is open to all."

His eminence stressed that "From now on, no preacher will be banned from preaching, and no one will be banned in the future unless his actions contradict religion or his proposals indicate inflexibility, fanaticism, or narrow regionalism. Such proposals are unacceptable by all means. Beyond this, one can present Islam in the way he finds appropriate; he can say this is acceptable and this is unacceptable, this is right and this is wrong. The preacher can say whatever is substantiated by evidence; there is nothing wrong in this," he said. Minister al-Faqir said he did not accept the ministry out of desire for power, to serve private purposes, or to affirm reality at the expense of religion, but out of a willingness to serve religion. "If we fail in our mission, then leaving the government is an easy and simple thing to do," he said.

Asked whether the constitutional oath taken by the ministers and deputies was religiously lawful, al-Faqir said if it conflicted with the shari'ah, he would not do it. "I stated this before I was a minister or a deputy, since I was asked this question during the election campaign," he said. He explained loyalty to the king means wrong deeds should be abolished, any acts conflicting the teachings of God and the Prophet must not pass through the king, and that the king should not order any religiously unlawful act or prevent any religious duty. "If I do not draw attention to all misdeeds," he said, "I will not be loyal to the king."

Gold, Foreign Currency Assets Increase

JN0212091489 Amman AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 2 Dec 89 pp 1, 22

[By Muhammad Amin]

[Excerpt] The Kingdom's total assets of gold and foreign currencies rose sharply during the third quarter of this year, reaching 1,218,727,000 dinars at the end of the quarter compared to 1,009,390,000 dinars at the end of the second quarter of the year. This makes for a total assets increase of 209.337 million dinars.

Official statistics indicate the Central Bank of Jordan's assets of gold and foreign currencies rose during the third quarter of this year to 601.594 million dinars compared to 393.542 million dinars at the end of the second quarter—an increase of 208.052 million dinars in 3 months. [passage omitted]

OMAN

Singapore Strengthening Trade Relations

90OL0128C Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 21 Oct 89 p 6

[Article by Haydar Bin-'Abd-al-Rida: "The Largest Singapore Trade Delegation Arrives in the Sultanate"]

[Text] A Singapore trade delegation arrived in the country yesterday for a 4-day visit that includes meetings with His Excellency Salim Bin-'Abdallah al-Ghazali, minister of trade and industry, and His Excellency Maqbul Bin-'Ali Sultan, president of the Oman chamber of commerce and industry. The delegation is headed by His Excellency Radwan Zaphir, director-general of services with the Singapore Trade Promotion Agency and ambassador of Singapore to Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.

Secondary talks between members of the delegation and directors of the chamber of commerce and industry on commercial and industrial cooperation between the two countries begin today at chamber headquarters.

The delegation represents the largest industrial and commercial group and consists of 58 representatives of Singapore companies and institutions active in foods, household furnishings, and computers for administrative development. It also includes representatives of general trading

companies as well as of the major industrial producers of construction and building materials, electronics, electrics, household goods, clothes, and textiles.

The delegation will hold at the Oman Sheraton tonight a seminar titled "Singapore: The World Trading Partner." The head of the delegation is scheduled to meet with their excellencies, the chairman of the General Authority for the Promotion of Farm Products and the executive director of Al-Rusayl industrial zone. He is also scheduled to visit the Port Servicing Authority, Ltd.

His Excellency Radwan Zafir, head of the delegation, made a statement to express his satisfaction at visiting the sultanate and meeting with Omani officials and men of the private sector.

He said the purpose behind the visit and the seminar was to promote and bolster existing commercial and economic relations between the two countries and increase cooperation between their commercial establishments.

He added that trade between Singapore and the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] states has increased noticeably over the past 2 years from \$3 billion in 1986 to \$4.2 billion last year and that trade during the first 8 months of this year increased by 11.3 percent over the same period a year ago. He added that Singapore expects its trade with the Gulf countries to grow rapidly thanks to political stability, firm world oil prices, and the region's current industrialization program.

His Excellency Radwan Zaphir emphasized that trade delegation members do not only seek to sell their products, but also seek to buy Omani products for Singapore and Southeast Asia markets. He expressed the delegation's willingness to discuss the transfer of technology and services to manufacture products in Oman, develop industrial cities, and provide services related to the operation and maintenance of airports, ports, repair docks, telecommunication systems, and electronic systems for marine and defense services.

He invited Omani companies and establishments to open branches in Singapore to market Omani products in local and neighboring markets as well as market Singapore products in the sultanate.

He pointed out that Singapore trade with Oman advanced greatly during the first 8 months of the current year, registering an increase of 60 percent over the same period last year. The official attributed the increase to the doubling of Omani exports to Singapore whose value increased from \$21.6 million to \$45.3 million. Singapore's exports to the sultanate in the same period increased by 16.1 percent.

Armed Forces' Role, Development Reported

44000107B Muscat TIMES OF OMAN
in English 23 Nov 89 p 29-31

[Text] To achieve the goals of the Renaissance led by His Majesty Sultan Qaboos and to develop a modern Oman

it was essential to have strong armed forces capable of protecting the nation and playing an effective role in the building of the State.

His Majesty, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, gave the matter his utmost attention soon after taking over the reins of the Government. The effects of this are evident in the continuous progress of the Sultan's Armed Forces [SAF] with regard to preparedness and armament.

Efforts focussed on the development of the capabilities of servicemen so that they could assimilate the modern equipment provided over successive years of development.

Thus, the development of men combined with that of equipment in making the SAF a force capable of carrying out all the duties of a modern army. A clear proof of this is the participation with other sister and friendly forces in joint exercises within and outside Oman when officers and men have displayed a high capability.

People who witnessed the unfortunate circumstances prevailing before 1970 realise the big difference between the stagnation of the past and advancement and prosperity of today. The difference can also be seen in the size of the Armed Forces and its development in all fields and specialisations. New units have been formed which are growing in size. The picture of the Sultan's Armed Forces today with its three Services, the Royal Guard of Oman and other support units is different in terms of both shape and size compared with that of the early seventies when it was less than a brigade level.

Also, the weapons were obsolete, whether individual or field weapons or combat equipment. An instance of this were the Saladin armoured vehicle, 18 pd field mortars for artillery and individual light machine guns, pistols, the 303 rifle, old aircraft and old ships playing more of a supply than a fighting role.

Moreover, other support units did not have the capability of supporting a fighting force in operations because of the lack of means and the inadequate training of manpower. The events in the Southern Region in the early days of the Renaissance left little time to train manpower to cope with difficult situations. Modernisation was therefore limited because of the circumstances.

Modernisation

However, even in the first five years of the Renaissance aspects of training and armament had to be tackled regularly. This limited modernisation, however formed the solid base of modernisation later. But the starting point on which this modernisation was based was the last operation carried out in Dhalkut, in the Southern Region on December 1, 1975.

From that point on, modernisation took off, because the establishment of peace, stability, security, and tranquility made progress possible. With the disappearance of

fear and worry, a formidable battle was started to put things in order within the country, and steps towards comprehensive development were made resolutely and eagerly. The Armed Forces kept pace with the rest of the country in the modernisation process.

The Sultan of Oman's Land Forces (SOLF)

Thanks to their modern equipment and advanced tactical cooperation with other Services, the SOLF have become the reliable defender of the Sultanate. Their achievements are many.

The history of the Armed Forces in Oman dates to 1921 when the first regular force which was called the Muscat Force was founded. It was the size of a company. A few years later its name was changed and it became the Muscat Infantry. The unit developed slowly because of limited resources and in 1955 it grew to the size of a regiment and was called the Muscat Regiment. It was the first unit to be formed in SAF.

The next unit to be formed was the Northern Frontier Regiment (NFR) in 1952. Its development was as limited as the first unit until 1955 when it became regimental size. In 1959, a third unit was formed and called the Oman Gendarmerie. This was followed by the founding of Bait Kashmir Camp in Sohar for training purposes.

This Regiment, now called the Oman Coast Regiment (OCR), has a unique advantage which distinguishes it from other regiments in that it is the "mother" of several large military formations since 1970.

The nucleus of the Royal Guard of Oman (RGO) came from this regiment in 1970. The size of the RGO increased greatly later to enable it to carry out the formidable tasks they are assigned with the latest weapons. It also gave birth to the Sultan of Oman's Parachute Regiment in 1975 and the Border Installation Guard & Reconnaissance Unit in 1976.

Training

In the seventies many military units and training schools were formed, including for instance, the SAF Training Regiment (SAFTR) which trains manpower for the Armed Forces and many other units to support the fighting ones such as the Field Engineers, the Medical Services, the Parachute Regiment and a Transport Group which meets the heavy transport requirements of SAF along with the Electrical and Mechanical Engineering and Ordnance Service which expanded to a large extent to meet the requirements of the Armed Forces' maintenance and supply services.

The formation of the first regiment of the Sultan of Oman's Artillery was initiated in 1972 and developed largely enough to form an Anti-Aircraft Artillery unit. Smaller units were also formed. In 1976, the School of

Catering & Supply, the Medical Service Training Wing and the Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Centre were inaugurated.

In 1980, the Command Training Centre, known as the Officer Training School was opened. Then the Sultan Qaboos Military College was formed and in 1987 the Command and Staff College came into being. The size and capability of the Land Forces increased with the introduction of more modern equipment.

The introduction of modern means of logistic support to the Land Forces and their supply with modern equipment and the training of manpower in advanced military schools and institutes began in the 1980s to help them cope with the modern equipment and arms.

The Sultan of Oman's Air Force (SOAF)

The SOAF was developed to provide support to the fighting forces in operations. They are provided with highly sophisticated fighter aircraft equipped with lethal arms and air to air missiles. They are also provided with an integrated air defence system of modern missiles and the latest servicing and communication means in order to maintain a high standard of performance. Military schools and institutes were established to train the technical cadres needed in various areas of SOAF.

The SOAF have today become the efficient guardians of the Sultanate's airspace. They are always in a full state of readiness to defend the country and to instill a sense of security in the hearts of citizens in cooperation with the land and naval forces. The Sultan Qaboos Air Academy and the Rapier Training School were formed to train technicians.

The Sultan of Oman's Navy

In view of Oman's naval past and its geographical position which covers a long distance on the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf, the development of Oman's Naval Force, in accordance with His Majesty's directions, took into consideration its basic aim of protecting the shores and territorial waters of the country extending 1700 kms from north to south and secure sea navigation in one of the important straits in the world, the Strait of Hormuz.

Through them more than 60 percent of the world's requirement of oil is transported for the needs of industry, and assistance is given to shipping in all circumstances. For these reasons, Oman's naval force was equipped with modern vessels armed with surface to surface missiles, landing and supply ships and fast patrol boats provided with effective arms to ensure adequate execution of its tasks.

A number of newly-built naval bases ensure that maintenance, support and supply are provided to the fleet effectively and continuously. On November 15, 1988, His Majesty inaugurated Said Bin Sultan Naval Base considered one of the most modern in the area.

It had now become essential to start immediately the training of young and educated Omanis in the SAF.

A comprehensive study of development, modernisation and training aspects was carried out by officials. A number of specialised schools were established for the Services, such as the Naval Training Centre, Diver's Wing, Schools of Engineering, Artillery Signals, Medical Services, Transport, Sultan Qaboos Military Academy and other specialised schools to meet the Armed Forces requirements for technical and operational capabilities. From these schools graduated the pilots, engineers, navigators, doctors, radar technicians, artillery, engineering and staff officers, communication technicians and other categories.

The Medical Services were also developed to cope with this expansion and to provide comprehensive services in war as well as peace. Officer and other ranks are continuously undergoing advanced training in sister and friendly states to improve operational capability and to acquire the required expertise.

In the light of these considerations and the great expansion in the Armed Forces, it was necessary to invite the Omani youth of the new era to share in the responsibility of building the force and the new society. Moved by a sense of responsibility, the youth of Oman responded to the call and filled military institutions. They worked and trained hard before they joined military units and injected new blood in them.

Command and Staff College (C&SC)

The C&SC is the most modern military institute in SAF.

The project for the construction of a C&SC was assigned on a scientific basis to a group of experienced officers (who completed it in 1985) and in 1987 the first course for officers at the college opened. His Majesty took the salute at their graduation in 1988. Then on December 11, 1988, His Majesty inaugurated the purpose built complex.

The C&SC is considered the most advanced military institute in the country. Its main task is to provide adequate training for the tasks of joint command and staff work for SAF officers. The course curriculum which lasts 10 months includes three main topics: staff duties, military training and social, geographical and political studies.

The SAF Museum at Bait Al Falaj (BAF) was inaugurated on December 11, 1988. The BAF fort was selected to house it in view of its historical importance.

The fort was built in 1806 during the rule of Sultan Said Bin Sultan. It gained a particular importance as a centre of power under the leadership of the Busaidi family. The Museum's wings include models, historic and military documents of Oman before and after Islam—a proof of the profoundness of Oman's civilisation. The courtyard contains many specimens of old weapons used by SAF

and RGO. They also reflect the development of the Armed Forces, particularly events of the Renaissance era and past ones which form the history of Oman.

In addition to all the efforts made to update and develop SAF to reach a satisfactory level of modernisation and on orders by His Majesty, SAF played an important part in the overall development of the Sultanate. Although basically responsible for the defence of the country and protection of its achievements, SAF were able to participate effectively in construction and building projects and the development of society. As an example, one can cite the large road projects achieved by MOD's specialised units in several remote parts of the Sultanate.

The three Services contributed by transporting materials and equipment for these major projects. They also contributed in the maintenance of *afalaj* and the airlift of food to citizens in remote areas, the transport by air of people to the cities for medical treatment at hospitals, and agricultural produce from the fields to areas of consumption. Through the Directorate of Morale Guidance and Public Relations and the Welfare Services, the SAF care for the children of martyrs and provide consumer goods to servicemen and their families.

The RGO is considered an essential constituent of SAF, but due to the special nature of their tasks and responsibilities they were given a special command. They had their share of increased development in both shape and size in conjunction with SAF. Modern and advanced training and heavy armaments equipped them to play their part within the overall SAF task. They are, therefore, fully prepared to participate with other military units.

For manpower training specialised military schools were established as well as a training regiment which qualifies the youth under the supervision of efficient instructors. Training in the RGO is of a specialised nature commensurate with their task.

The efficiency of the RGO personnel and equipment is tested through tactical exercises carried out by their units throughout the year separately or jointly with other units of the Armed Forces. The RGO men have displayed a high standard of operational capability and proved their total assimilation of modern weapons, thanks to concentrated, continual and distinctive training they undergo in the units of their training regiment.

Oil Exploration Activities Outlined

44000107C Muscat TIMES OF OMAN
in English 23 Nov 89 p 23

[Excerpts] Petroleum Development Oman [PDO] is approaching the end of yet another successful year of operations in exploring for and producing the bulk of the country's oil and gas.

At the beginning of this year PDO's reserves were at a record 4.1 billion barrels and production has been steady and in line with Government objectives.

Maintaining these reserves requires both an intensive exploration effort and continual reassessment of the production potential of all the existing fields, now numbering more than 60.

Since the 18th National Day PDO has announced a number of new discoveries starting last December with a new deep reservoir of light oil in the al-Huwaysah field below the field's main producing reservoir.

At the same time, heavy oil was found in the Mafrag field, south of Qarn Alam.

In May this year oil was found at Hawqayn in Central Oman and a significant extension to the al-Burj field was announced in August and it is now thought that al-Burj and the nearby Jamil field are one accumulation. Meanwhile a recent discovery, Ghanimah, has opened up a whole new area as an extension of activity in South Oman. The find is 20 kilometres northeast of Jalmud, a large outstep into a poorly explored area.

But the most significant discovery of the year has been of gas deep below the existing Sayh Nuhydah field in Central Oman. This find, the largest for 22 years, was the result of a late change of plan. After the well had reached its target 3700 metres, the decision was taken to go deeper and gas was found below 4000 metres.

The find, the largest gas discovery since Maradi Huraymah in 1967 with recoverable reserves of 11 billion cubic metres, also has a relatively high condensate element which can be produced separately or mixed with crude oil to make it lighter.

High Level

Exploration activity has continued at a high level throughout the year. The month of May saw a sixth seismic party begin working for PDO to equal a 17-year-old Company record.

Exploration manager Pieter de Ruiter said: "The extra party is needed to cope with the increase in the company's concession area in late 1986 when we were awarded 50,000 square kilometres in Dhofar.

"We have also found that by increasing our seismic effort in established oilfield areas we can optimise well positions and so save drilling costs. We are also shooting more three-dimensional seismic which is time-consuming."

A second marine survey was also carried out off the South Oman coast earlier this year in PDO's offshore concession areas.

Paralleling this exploration effort, the rig fleet drilling both exploration and production wells for PDO had reached 13 by May, equalling the previous record fleet size of 1986, and by August had set a new record of 16.

In an effort to keep costs down, a radical new drilling technique for exploration wells will be tried out next

year. The technique is to drill slimmer-than-normal wells which are estimated to cost up to 40 percent less than the company's standard wells.

The slimmer holes mean drillers will use less mud and cement and also drill faster. Smaller and cheaper well-heads can also be used and will contribute to savings, as casing sizes and weights will be reduced.

With projected annual drilling costs of about US \$300 million for the foreseeable future, PDO stands to make substantial savings if the technique proves successful.

Production of oil has continued at around 600,000 barrels a day during the year. Several new fields have come on stream including 'Alam, 15 kilometres west of Qarn al-'Alam in Central Oman, and Thumayd and al-Dhabi, both about 30 kilometres east of Marmul in South Oman.

In all, more than 60 fields are in production, sending oil to Mina' al-Fahal and its offshore loading buoys. The main oil line was "de-bottlenecked" in the summer with the commissioning of a new 42-inch diameter loop line to replace the existing 30-inch line. The project was carried out without interrupting the flow of oil using a complex live tie-in technique known as a "hot tap".

In the area of enhanced oil recovery, a new polymer injection project started in the Marmul field in June, following the success of a pre-pilot project that finished early last year.

This new pilot extension will test the effectiveness of polymer injection and its sweep efficiency over a trial area nine times larger than the original pre-pilot.

The Marmul steam flood pilot, another EOR project, stops by the end of the year. The experts believe they will have learned all they can from this project which began in 1985 and which has shown that the injection of steam under high pressure can significantly improve recovery of viscous oil such as is found in South Oman.

Paving the way for major development of the remote Lekhwair field, work has started on a new permanent camp to cater for about 200 staff and the field will get its power from Yibal power station through a new 132kV overhead electricity line which is also to be constructed. The field at present produces about 20,000 barrels of oil a day but with a US \$450 million project centred on a large-scale supplemental oil recovery technique known as waterflood, it is expected to boost production by 1994 to as much as 110,000 barrels a day.

At Yibal, a gas-sweetening plant is nearing completion. It will remove the potentially dangerous hydrogen sulphide from the gas produced from Yibal's Khuf reservoir.

Training and Omanisation

PDO has reached 56 percent Omanisation and is progressing steadily towards its target of 90 percent by the year 2000. In support of this the company operates a

massive training effort which aims to produce the qualified Omanis needed at every level and in every discipline in the Company.

There are more than 2500 Omanis in the company and there are more than 900 full-time trainees in study courses ranging from graduates pursuing doctorates and others studying for degrees at universities abroad to others seeking business and technical certificates or doing on-the-job training. [passages omitted]

Looking Ahead

At the beginning of this month, PDO produced the three billionth barrel of oil since production began in 1967.

PDO managing director Mike Pink, speaking to staff earlier this year, said that 15 of the older, more mature fields contained about 80 percent of the company's ultimately recoverable reserves of oil. "It is going to be very important to PDO's future to maximise the recovery factors of these fields and to use the facilities to maximum potential."

On the newer fields, mostly in South Oman where both the oil and the geology was complex, the step-by-step approach had to be applied, using simple facilities until the size of the accumulation could be determined. Only then could major investment be justified.

"The fields are likely to get smaller. We are unlikely to find a bonanza," he stressed. "But with dedication, work and effort, PDO could continue to maintain its level of production to the end of the century and perhaps even beyond."

Oil Reserves Figures Released

44000107A Muscat *TIMES OF OMAN*
in English 23 Nov 89 p 3

[Text] Minister of Petroleum and Minerals, Sa'id Bin-Ahmad al-Shanfari said in a newspaper interview on Tuesday that the country's oil reserves reached 4.3 billion barrels this year as a result of His Majesty's encouragement of the oil sector.

He told "AL-WATAN" that Oman's flexible and practical policies has attracted world oil exploration companies to cooperate with Oman in oil exploration.

"This policy has helped in increasing the country's oil reserves to hit the 4.3 billion barrel mark," al-Shanfari said.

He said 11 concession areas for oil prospecting have been granted by His Majesty's Government to foreign companies.

A new Japanese firm "Japex" is expected to join other exploration companies next year.

Favourable

The Minister said Oman's oil production has reached the 600,000 barrel-a-day ceiling while production ten years ago stood at half that quantity.

He described developments in the international oil market as favourable, "prices are rising steadily because of increased demand at present."

The Sultanate was making every effort to coordinate policies of Opec and non-Opec members, in line with requests made by the permanent committee for oil cooperation of the Arab Gulf Co-operation Council states.

He said the Sultanate was also taking part in efforts aimed at serving the market from price fluctuations in the world oil market.

The Minister predicted prices would remain at a reasonably stable level throughout this winter up to next March because of the increase in demand.

He said the Opec ministerial council will meet on Saturday to discuss production quotas and ceilings and expressed the hope that the meeting would lead to a sound accord to ensure market stability.

Garment Firm To Double Production

44000107D Muscat TIMES OF OMAN
in English 23 Nov 89 p 9

[Article by Meena Ganjvr: "Garment Firm To Double Production"]

[Text] The OHI Garments Industry, the largest garment manufacturing unit in Muscat, plans to double its production capacity in the coming months, said Sadiq Hamid, Assistant General Manager of the company.

Speaking at the formal inauguration of the factory at Rusayl Industrial Estate, the young Omani executive said the factory was currently working at about half the licenced capacity of 2.4 million pieces per year.

The factory, which started operations on July 1, was officially inaugurated on Saturday by the Under-Secretary for Commerce and Industry, Dr. Al Yaq-dhan Bin-Talib Bin'-Ali al-Hina'i.

The Under-Secretary, who toured the factory after cutting the ribbon, also planted a tree outside the factory.

Speaking to journalists after the ceremony, Mr. Hamid said the factory was 100 percent export-oriented and it had already sent 192,000 pieces to the U.S.

The industrialist said marketing was no problem as there was a very large market in the US and UK "so long as you are able to match the quality and the price." Every month at least two buyers approach the company, he added.

However, he added both the business sector and the Government were aware of the problems that could arise should

quotas be imposed by the USA, which is the world's biggest market for garments. It is estimated that America imports about \$200 billion worth garments annually.

Aware of the problems caused in several countries due to the imposition of quotas the government and the private sector were very cautious and the Government had been very restrictive in giving licences.

The two were also cooperating closely to avoid any malpractices, such as the import of ready made garments and re-export from the Sultanate with Omani labels on them.

He said prior to receiving the certificate of origin every shipping invoice is given to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry which gives it a code number which is passed on to the American customs authorities, who can cross check.

Mr. Hamid said the company, which at present has a total staff of 375, would be employing another 300 workers in a period of two months.

Giving details about the plans another senior executive said that the new batch of 300 would all be women and the company planned to have one entire shift for women. He said, this would encourage, more Omani women to join the factory and accelerate Omanisation.

At present there are some Omani women and a few men at the factory, which provides on-the-job training to local people.

SUDAN**Report Lists 123 Detainees, Demands Better Treatment**

900A0121A Doha AL-'ARAB in Arabic 27 Sep 89 p 5

[Article: "Dispatch from al-Khartoum: "AL-'ARAB Lists Detained Politicians and Unionists in the Sudan"]

[Text] More than 123 political detainees have been arrested in the Sudan, including 5 from the military, 41 union leaders, and 73 political leaders of all persuasions.

A report submitted to world institutions by a human rights organization says that 123 detainees, including 3 women, are being held at Cooper prison in Khartoum and at the Shala prison camp in western Sudan. The numbers and whereabouts of those detained in the provinces are unknown. Unionists held at other prisons include some members of the employees union of al-Wihdah bank at Umm Durman who were arrested a month ago. Detainees in Kurdufan and Darfur provinces include 'Abd-al-Rasul al-Nur, former governor of Kurdufan who is believed to be held at al-Abyad prison. Prisons at Port Sudan, Suakin [Island], 'Atbarah, and Madani also house a number of political detainees.

The report called upon world institutions to pressure the Sudanese government into improving its treatment of political detainees, into allowing them to see their families, and into permitting human rights organizations to visit them and ascertain the status of their health.

Name	Date Arrested	Description
Al-Sadiq al-Saddiq al-Mahdi	6 Jul 89	Chairman of the Ummah Party
Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani	8 Jul 89	Leader of the Democratic Unionist Party
Muhammad Ibrahim Nuqud	30 Jun 89	Secretary of the Communist Party
Idris 'Abdallah al-Banna	30 Jun 89	Former member of the Presidential Council
Dr 'Ali Hasan Taj-al-Din	30 Jun 89	Former member of the Presidential Council
Mirghani al-Nasri	16 Jul 89	Former member of the Presidential Council
Nasr-al-Din al-Hadi al-Mahdi	30 Jun 89	Vice chairman of the Ummah Party
'Uthman 'Umar al-Sharif	30 Jun 1989	Former minister—Unionist Party
Dr 'Umar Nur-al-Da'im	30 Jun 89	Former minister—Ummah Party
Dr Pacifico Lado Loleik	1 Jul 89	Former member of the Presidential Council
Fadlallah Barbat Nasir	30 Jun 89	Former minister—Ummah Party
Al-Tum Muhammad al-Tum	30 Jun 89	Former minister—Unionist Party
Sayyid Ahmad al-Husayn	1 Jul 89	Former minister—Unionist Party
Al-Tijani al-Tayyib Babakr	30 Jun 89	Journalist—communist
'Izz-al-Din Harikah	1 Jul 89	Ummah Party
Eliaba James Surur	1 Jul 89	People's Progressive Party
Johannes Yor Akol	1 Jul 89	Sudanese African Congress
Joseph Modesto	4 Jul 89	Sudanese Communist Party
Peter Deng	4 Jul 89	Independent
Sidiq Ahmad 'Ali al-'Awad	4 Jul 89	Ummah Party
'Abdallah Abkar	4 Jul 89	Ummah Party
'Abdallah 'Ali al-Tum	4 Jul 89	Ummah Party
Muhammad Adam Muhammad	4 Jul 89	Ummah Party
Ibrahim Habani	5 Jul 89	Ummah Party
Husayn Adam Salama	5 Jul 89	Ummah Party
Nasrallah Ishaq	5 Jul 89	Independent
Dr. Hasan 'Abdallah al-Turabi	30 Jun 89	Leader of Nationalist Islamic Front
Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman Muhammad	30 Jun 89	Former minister—Islamic Front
Ibrahim al-Sanusi	30 Jun 89	Islamic Front
Mustafa 'Abd-al-Qadir	1 Jul 89	Attorney-at-law—unionist
Salah 'Abd-al-Salam al-Khalifa	5 Jul 89	Former Minister—Ummah Party
Tirab Adam	5 Jul 89	Ummah Party
Ibrahim 'Ali Ibrahim	5 Jul 89	Ummah Party
Joshua Dei Wal	6 Jul 89	Former Minister—Political Coalition for South Sudan
Joseph Junu	6 Jul 89	Independent
Ibrahim Hammuda	4 Jul 89	Ummah Party
Dr Khalid Husayn al-Kid	7 Jul 89	University professor
'Abdallah Ahmad 'Ali	7 Jul 89	Ummah Party
Bakri Ahmad 'Adil	7 Jul 89	Former minister, Ummah Party
Dr 'Ashari Ahmad Mahmud	8 Jul 89	University professor
Fath-al-Rahman Shila	10 Jul 89	Unionist Democratic Party
Samuel Aru Bol	15 Jul 89	Political Coalition for South Sudan
Mirghani Khalafallah	10 Jul 89	Ummah Party
Sa'id Nasr-al-Din	16 Jul 89	Ummah Party
Mustafa Nur-al-Din	19 Jul 89	Independent

Name	Date Arrested	Description (Continued)
Dr Adam Musa Madibo	12 Sep 89	Former minister—Ummah Party
Sayyid Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahim	29 Jul 89	Engineer—unionist
Mahjub Sayyid Ahmad	29 Jul 89	Worker—unionist
Husayn 'Abd-al-Qadir Shaqlaban	29 Jul 89	Engineer—unionist
'Umar Ahmad al-Amin	29 Jul 89	Secretary-General, Banks Union
'Umar al-Basiri Muhammad	29 Jul 89	Engineer—unionist
Mihdi Hasan Muhammad	4 Aug 89	Unionist
Hasan Taha Mihdi	4 Aug 89	Unionist
Mirghani 'Abd-al-Rahman Sulayman	5 Aug 89	Former minister—Unionist Party
Al-Sadiq Sayyid Ahmad Shami	5 Aug 89	Attorney-at-law—unionist
Hasan Mursal Abu-Jabal	5 Aug 89	Unionist
Jalal al-Sayyid	29 Jul 89	Deputy Secretary of the Bar Association
Dr 'Ali 'Abdallah 'Abbas	4 Aug 89	President, Khartoum University Professors' Union
Samir Jirjis Mas'ud	29 Jul 89	Journalist—communist
Muhammad 'Uthman Abu-Shawk	5 Aug 89	Journalist—unionist
Muhammad 'Abdallah Salih	8 Aug 89	Worker—unionist
Dr Faruk Ahmad Adam	8 Aug 89	Democratic Unionist Party
Muhammad Tahir Jilani	8 Aug 89	Former minister—Unionist Party
Dr. Isma'il Abkar	8 Aug 89	Former minister—Ummah Party
'Umar Muhammad 'Abd-al-Majid	10 Aug 89	Retired major
Kamal al-Jazuli	10 Aug 89	Attorney-at-law—secretary of Writers's Union
Dr Al-Haj al-Tayib al-Tahir	10 Aug 89	Independent
Dr Bashir 'Umar Fadlallah	17 Aug 89	Former minister—Ummah Party
Dr Mansur al-'Ajab	20 Aug 89	Parliamentary representative—Independent
Nassar Muhammad	9 Aug 89	Retired brigadier-general
'Abd-al-Ghaffar al-Numayri	9 Aug 89	Retired police brigadier-general
Muhammad Sulayman Ahmad	9 Aug 89	Retired lieutenant
Husayn Khadar al-Dimuqrati	21 Aug 89	Student
Mu'tasim Ibrahim	21 Aug 89	Attorney-at-law
Sa'id 'Awad al-Karim	21 Aug 89	Worker
Mahjub 'Uthman	3 Sep 89	Journalist—communist
Mahjub Sharif	1 Sep 89	Poet—communist
Muhammad 'Ali al-Mahsi	4 Sep 89	Union of National Democratic Forces
Dr Al-Tahir 'Abd-al-Basit	4 Sep 89	Union of National Democratic Forces
Hasan Khalid	29 Jul 89	Worker—unionist
Salih al-Khayr	15 Aug 89	Engineer
'Abd-al-Rahman 'Abdallah Nuqd-Allah	4 Sep 89	Ummah Party
Salah Ibrahim Ahmad	4 Sep 89	Ummah Party
'Abd-al-'Aziz Ahmad Daf-Allah	6 Sep 89	Employee—unionist
Sarat al-Fadil al-Mihdi	4 Sep 89	Ummah Party—wife of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi
Sarat 'Abdallah Nuqd-Allah	4 Sept 89	Ummah Party
Rashidah Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Karim	4 Sep 89	Former minister—Ummah Party
Dr Amin Makki Madani	7 Sep 89	Former minister—unionist attorney-at-law
Muhammad Tawfiq Ahmad	4 Sep 89	Former minister—Unionist Party
Muhammad Ahmad 'Abd-al-Manan	4 Aug 89	Unionist—Customs Department

Name	Date Arrested	Description (Continued)
Badr al-Din 'Abd-al-Tam	4 Aug 89	Employee—unionist
Dr Najib Najm-al-Din	4 Aug 89	Secretary-General, Medical Association
Muhammad 'Ali Ibrahim Abu Sunaynah	4 Aug 89	Unionist—Customs
Sadiq al-Dhil'i	22 Aug 89	Communist journalist
Al-Na'imah al-Haj Abu-'Isa	4 Aug 89	Retired private
Makki 'Abbas Makki	5 Aug 89	Legal counsel—unionist
Bitran Muhammad Sa'id	5 Aug 89	Railroad Employees Union
Hasan Ibrahim Kantrul	5 Aug 89	Railroad Employees Union
Tahir al-Da'iq al-Haj	5 Aug 89	Member of Central Federation of Sudanese Workers
'Ali al-Khadr Muhammad	5 Aug 89	Deputy Secretary of the Association of Professionals
Sa'id Mustafa 'Alim	6 Aug 89	Teacher—unionist
Kamal Husayn Mabruk	8 Aug 89	Railroad Employees Union
Hasan Husayn Muhammad	21 Aug 89	Attorney-at-law
Salah Ahmad Karar	21 Aug 89	Administrative officer
Bashir 'Abd-al-Rahim Muhammad	21 Aug 89	Teacher
Ja'far 'Abd-al-Raziq	21 Aug 89	Employee—unionist
'Ali Muhammad Ahmad 'Asilat	23 Aug 89	Railroad Workers Union
Muhammad al-Hasan Kambal	23 Aug 89	Employee—unionist—river transport
'Awad 'Abdallah Sa'id	23 Aug 89	Worker—unionist—river transport
Yahya 'Ali 'Abdallah	29 Aug 89	Member of the Executive Bureau of Federation of Workers
Muhammad al-Fatih Ahmad	23 Aug 89	Employee—unionist—river transport
Tariq Hasan Al-Shaykh	29 Jul 89	Engineer—unionist
Ahmad Muhammad Salih	29 Jul 89	President of Electrical Engineers Union
Majdhub 'Akkasha	29 Jul 89	Engineer—unionist
Sadiq Yahya Muhammad	29 Jul 89	Member of the leadership of the Federation of Sudanese Workers
Dr Faruq Kadudah	29 Jul 89	University professor—communist
Anwar Mahjub Taha	29 Jul 89	Unionist
Dr Muhammad al-Hasan Hamid	21 Aug 89	Physician
Rajab 'Ali Jabril	20 Aug 89	Worker
'Ali Sa'id	15 Aug 89	Teacher
'Ala'-al-Din Husayn	10 Aug 89	Employee—unionist
Hasan Khalid Muhammad	6 Aug 89	Worker
'Abd-al-Rahman 'Ubaydallah	16 Aug 89	Worker

TUNISIA

Government Subsidy Disagreement Prompts Strikes

900A0176B Tunis LE MAGHREB
in French 17 Nov 89 pp 24-25

[Article by Sofiene Ben Hmida: "Round Three of the Bread Battle"]

[Text] Citizens deprived of bread last weekend were many. From Saturday 11 November until Monday, bakery workers, especially in Tunis, Ben Arous, and Ariana, went on strike. For the citizen, bread is becoming a real problem. Bakery owners already deprived the city of its basic foodstuff this summer. They

were demanding that the bread-making rate be revised and the subsidy increased. They seem, moreover, to have won their case since the price of bread—relative to other basic foods—has risen. Now it is the bakery workers turn to deprive us of bread. Paradoxically, however, and in contrast to the usual situation, bakery owners may have had something to do with their workers' strike. A strike that was well-timed, if not encouraged by them, to speed up payment of the subsidy.

Motives

Bakery workers observed a 3-day strike starting Saturday 11 November. This union action was justified, according to them, by the failure to implement the agreement

signed by the "industrial partners" (UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor], UTICA [Tunisian Union for Industry, Trade, and Handicrafts], the Ministry of the Economy, the Ministry of Social Affairs, and the Grain Office) last 22 September. The agreement, reached after lengthy negotiations and even after strike warnings (end of August 1989), stipulates that owners agree to a monthly salary increase of 13 to 14 and a half dinars for their bakery workers depending on their position, beginning in October and retroactively from January of 1989. Furthermore, the government agreed to discuss the problem of increasing the subsidy on the invoice with bakery owners (UTICA). As of Friday 10 October, bakery workers had not received their increase for October, much less back pay for previous months.

Still-Born Agreement

According to union sources, the reaction of the bakery workers is all the more justified and legitimate in that they did not receive the 1988 3-percent increase in base salary or the 1989 increase (5 to 15 dinars). Their fears are made more real by the fact that bosses contacted refused to implement the agreement as long as the government had not paid them the subsidy. Several of them even denied the existence of the 22 September agreement. An emergency meeting was held Saturday, 11 November, at the headquarters of the Ministry of Social Affairs to deal with the situation. According to the terms of the agreements reached, the 22 September agreement was upheld. UTICA also agreed to inform bakery owners of the agreement's clauses and to call for payment of the October increase starting that very day. The UGTT, for its part, promised to inform the bakery workers and call for a return to work. The joint communique broadcast last Saturday was the outcome of those negotiations.

However, the employers' leadership apparently did not properly inform bakery owners. Workers returning to their jobs found either bosses stubbornly entrenched in their former positions, or simply locked and bolted bakery doors. The Saturday 11 November agreement was thus held to be stillborn and the strike extended through Sunday.

This made a new, and energetic, intervention by "industrial partners" necessary on Sunday. A meeting at the headquarters of the Ministry of Economy was held between the UGTT, UTICA, the Ministry of the Economy and the governor of Tunis. This meeting managed to clarify positions definitively and bring the signers around to respecting the agreement. Work was resumed, though not in systematic fashion, on Monday 14 November.

Two Birds With One Loaf of Bread

Bakery owners seem to have profited the most from the whole episode of the bakery workers' strike. Beyond the appeal made to bakery owners by their leadership to maintain production with the help of family members, there are several indications that bakery owners found

the strikes an ideal opportunity for cornering the government into speeding up payment of the subsidy. From there, it is only a small step to asserting, as certain union leaders have, that the strikes were encouraged directly or indirectly by bakery owners. First, there is the refusal of employers to respect the clauses of the 22 September agreement. Next, their condition that the increase not be paid to workers unless the government paid the subsidy. There is also the fact that several bakery owners closed their stores, preventing a resumption of work and prolonging the strike. Finally, there is the fact that the Bakery Owners Union Association called a meeting on Monday 13 November, when the Saturday 11th agreement stipulated that UTICA agree to inform its members that same day. For some, all these indications come together to suggest that the strikes were perfectly timed for owners both to speed up payment of the subsidy and to fire a few workers to avoid paying the increase of the previous months in accordance with the 22 September agreement. Bakery owners thus took advantage of the strikes to kill two birds with one loaf of bread.

According to a union source, these strikes could have been avoided if the agreements had been respected. The same source adds that what is essential is to take care that agreements are no longer open to interpretation in the future. In the meantime, the country actually went through round three of the bread battle after the bakery owners' strike and the increase in the price of bread.

Communist Leader Hammami on Ennahdha, PCT 900A0186A Tunis REALITES in French 17-23 Nov 89 pp 13-15

[Interview with Hama Hammami, secretary general of the Tunisian Communist Workers Party (PCOT) by Nejib Lak-enji and Ali Laidi Ben Mansour: "What's Important to Hama Hammami"; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] Hama Hammami, secretary general of the PCOT, a man who spent time in prison under the old regime—refusing to compromise his principles but, nevertheless, open to dialogue—is a notable figure on the Tunisian political scene.

Hammami, whose background is northern, procommunist and antisectarian, has rejected all temptations to swerve from the pure, hard-line Marxist model he espouses. He has placed PCOT militants in UGET [General Union of Tunisian Students] as well as in sectors such as transport and posts and telecommunications. He styles himself a democrat but is unyielding on issues of principle. The president himself received him several months ago to hear what he had to say.

For a number of reasons quite apart from his ideology, Hama Hammami is a political activist whose views must be taken seriously.

Here he shares his impressions and thoughts with readers of REALITES.

[REALITES] How do you assess the political situation in the country now that 2 years have elapsed since the changes of 7 November?

[Hammami] We don't see it the same way the government does. The people's democratic aspirations are still far from realized. A few reforms have been initiated, but they have not altered the essential nature or structure of the regime. The RCD [Democratic Constitutional Rally] (government party) continues to monopolize public life (institutions, the bureaucracy, the news media, etc.). The laws restricting freedom of expression, political organization, and assembly...are still in force.

A number of parties and organizations including the PCOT have been denied recognition. The press is muzzled. The legal system is still used as a political weapon (the Azzouna affair, the PCOT case in Gafsa, Bechir Essid, etc.).

PCOT is firmly convinced that real democratization of public life requires immediate abrogation of all anti-democratic laws, recognition of all parties and organizations, the lifting of all restrictions on the press, promulgation of a true general amnesty, dissolution of all unrepresentative institutions, and the holding of free elections to create a representative assembly whose task would be to draw up a truly democratic constitution.

[REALITES] In his speech the president ruled against the Ennahdha Movement, saying "there will be no religious parties in Tunisia." What is your opinion? Are you for or against recognition of Ennahdha?

[Hammami] Our party has always defended and will continue to defend freedom of organization. It is a position of principle. That is why we do not support antidemocratic or fascist parties, whether religious or not, whether for or against the government. Indeed, we steadfastly oppose them, because in fighting against them we are defending freedom of organization, expression, assembly, etc.

As to Ennahdha in particular, our position is clear. Ennahdha is a political party that exploits religion for reactionary and fascist ends. It has shown its true colors many times over, most recently in its 2 October statement on the civic and religious education reform. For these reasons, we have opposed Ennahdha and will steadfastly continue to do so as necessary.

However, we do not in any way endorse the government's position on Ennahdha. We are not starting from the same principles. We do not share the same goals.

In prohibiting Ennahdha, the government is only looking out for its own interests. The proof is the fact that the same prohibition is also being used to bar a number of other political formations and democratic organizations. [The prohibition of] our own party—which is fighting for bread, freedom, and national dignity—is a flagrant example. Our militants are being hounded, arrested and

imprisoned for expressing their political, economic and social opinions (the Gafsa affair).

If the government prevents Ennahdha from using religion for political purposes, it only does so to preserve its own monopoly. The government party itself has constantly exploited religion under the pretext of safeguarding our Arab-Muslim identity. Just consider the programming on radio and television, read the newspapers and listen to the religious talks in the mosques, and you will see how far this extends.

PCOT is against all exploitation of religion for political purposes. We support separation of church and state. Religion should be considered a strictly personal matter. Secularism is one of the essential foundations of any democratic government.

[REALITES] Ennahdha has leveled some criticism at the government. How do you react to that? What is your position on the Charfi reform?

[Hammami] Everyone agrees the state education system is in terrible condition. More and more children from poor families are being weeded out by competitive selection, illiteracy is still prevalent in a large part of the population, and courses of study are outdated—culturally, scientifically, and pedagogically.

For some time now we have been telling the government and the people that the school system needs to be reformed. But it seems to me that the government and the people don't have the same priorities. There are some indications that the various plans being drawn up by the government are oriented toward further privatization of education, toward applying competitive selection at every level of the system, etc. The parents, the students, the teachers should all be consulted about any plans for educational reform.

Reform of the curriculum in civic and religious education is only one aspect of overhauling the entire school system. Despite its limited scope, we have supported it; but we say there is a need for more radical, more comprehensive reform. We are opposed to any reform dictated by short-term political concerns (such as the campaign against [Muslim] fundamentalism), since the reform may not survive after those concerns fade away. But Ennahdha attacked this reform from an ultrareactionary standpoint.

[REALITES] On the economic front, the opposition is often criticized for not having ideas and proposals of its own. What do you have to propose?

[Hammami] We are opposed to the government's economic and social options. We have always said that the Tunisian economy was in critical condition. The basic symptoms of this crisis are stagnation of the productive sector, increasing external debt, and rising unemployment.

Two basic factors are responsible for the crisis. First, the Tunisian economy's dependency on monopolies and imperialist states. Second, the concentration of our

wealth in the hands of a privileged minority that thinks only of its own interests. This situation has been responsible for Tunisia's recurrent economic slumps. The one we are in now is only the longest and worst. It is a manifestation of the crisis afflicting the capitalistic system worldwide.

To deal with the crisis, the government has launched—with the help of the International Monetary Fund [IMF]—a so-called reform, the Structural Adjustment Plan (SAP), which in our opinion is intended to put all the hardship on the backs of the impoverished masses. In fact, the liberal measures taken to implement the SAP have served only to reduce people's purchasing power, augment the number of unemployed, aggravate the cultural, health, and housing problems of the masses, and plunge the country into a greater state of dependency. But at the same time, the government is taking good care of the wealthy through loans, lower taxes, etc.

PCOT believes continued implementation of the SAP will have further repercussions on our people and the nation. How do we propose to deal with the country's economic problems? Our answer is that we have our own vision.

It is incorrect to say that none of the opposition parties has an economic program. PCOT believes it is illusory to think Tunisia can free itself from these recurrent crises without doing away with the current socioeconomic system. Our salvation depends on making a complete break with world imperialism, rejecting dependency, recapturing our national independence, creating an economy built on Tunisian foundations, relying on our own efforts, and dealing with other nations on an equal footing. Any other course will only perpetuate our country's dependency and the exploitation of our people.

But PCOT does more than just advocate long-range solutions: it also concerns itself with immediate measures that could ameliorate the material plight of the people.

For example, we are currently agitating for abandonment of the SAP, reconsideration of our economic policies, reorientation of the economy toward satisfying people's needs, improvement in the quality of rural life, a reduction in nonproductive budget outlays, imposition of a progressive tax on wealth, action to offset the decline in workers' purchasing power, upgrading sanitary conditions in the housing and public transportation sectors, provision of free and mandatory public education, etc. To sum up, in dealing with the current crisis we stand squarely with the workers, with the people, and against a privileged minority that feeds on the nation's wealth and plunges our country ever deeper into dependency.

[REALITES] Some people wonder why there are two communist parties in Tunisia, the PCOT and the PCT [Tunisian Communist Party]. What can you say about this?

[Hammami] Our party has nothing to do with the PCT, either ideologically or in practical political terms. Anyone who closely follows Tunisian politics can easily grasp the fundamental differences between the two parties. PCOT adheres to scientific socialism. It has a revolutionary program for the transformation of society. It has no ties to the class now in power. Its tactics are designed to mobilize the people against reaction and imperialism, in order to carry out that transformation. PCOT also has its own view of the international situation. We condemn both American and Soviet hegemonism. The USSR has nothing to do with socialism. It is an imperialist superpower and poses as big a threat to humanity as American imperialism. The PCT, however, is not in the least based on Marxist-Leninist principles.

Its only aim is realization of a few reforms within the framework of the existing capitalist regime. Thus, on balance, it has always been basically supportive of the upper-middle-class regime. On the international scene, the PCT has always supported the social-imperialist policies of the USSR (invasion of Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, etc.).

For a better understanding of the differences between the PCOT and the PCT, readers may refer to the book by Mohamed Kilani on the history of the communist movement in Tunisia from 1920 to 1985. [passage omitted]

Hamma Hammami and Private Property

We in the PCOT are socialists. Consequently we are against capitalistic private property as the source of class antagonism and working class poverty. Our aim is to establish a socialist system based on social ownership of the means of production. It is up to the workers, as the most important class of our era, to lead society toward that goal.

But we must not lose sight of our society's current stage of evolution. Our society's development is being blocked by neocolonial domination, both materially and spiritually. This domination has harmful effects, not only on the working class and the peasantry, but also on the interests of all the other strata of the masses, as well as on bourgeois elements involved in national development activities who are being crushed by foreign competition.

That is why we make a distinction between those [development-oriented] elements and the dominant upper middle class, which opposes any national development. We call on those elements to dissociate themselves from classist politics and express their opposition, especially to the SAP, which goes against the interests of the people and the nation.

That said, our immediate aim in the current phase is not the establishment of socialism. We want to bring about nationalistic and democratic transformations that have the support of all anti-imperialist and anticorruptor social forces.

AFGHANISTAN

Economic Cooperation Accord Signed With Thailand

*BK2112162989 Dhaka Domestic Service
in English 1530 GMT 21 Dec 89*

[Text] Bangladesh and Thailand have decided to further enlarge their bilateral cooperation in different fields to the mutual benefit of the two friendly countries. An agreed minutes to this effect was signed between the two countries at the end of the third session of the Bangladesh-Thailand Joint Commission on cooperation in Dhaka today. Foreign Secretary Abul Ahsan and Thai Deputy Foreign Minister Praphat Limpaphan signed the minutes.

Official sources say the agreed minutes covered trade, cooperation and promotion [as heard], investment collaboration, livestock and fisheries, maritime and shipping, civil aviation and tourism, technical cooperation, cultural cooperation, and exchange of data in the field of environment. Several new areas, including environment, have been brought under cooperation between the two countries. The next meeting of the commission will be held in Bangkok next year.

BANGLADESH

Imbalance Persists in Dhaka Trade With India

*46001120 Dhaka THE NEW NATION
in English 23 Oct 89 pp 1, 8*

[Text] Imports by Bangladesh from India are about ten fold larger than exports by the former to the latter.

Indo-Bangladesh trade pattern, reflecting the operations through the normal channels and excluding across-the-board informal trade activities, has remained steady with persisting heavy imbalances against Bangladesh.

Trade imbalances against Bangladesh stood at over Taka 2.25 billion in 1988-80 [as printed]. While Bangladesh exports to India showed a fluctuating trend with ups and downs on an annual basis, the country's imports from India were, however, on a steady uptrend over the eighties.

The volume of Bangladesh imports from India swelled from Taka 1.18 billion in 1981-82 to Taka 2.73 billion in 1987-88. But the country's exports to India registered a nominal rise from Taka 224.78 million to Taka 276.96 million over the six-year period from 1981-82 to 1987-88.

The bilateral trade relations as they evolved over the eighties showed that Indian buyers public or private accounted for 0.75 percent of total Bangladesh global exports at taka 37.05 billion in 1987-88. The share of such exports was 1.55 percent of related global exports by Bangladesh at Taka 14.54 billion in 1981-82.

The imports by Bangladesh from India accounted for 2.92 percent of the country's total imports at Taka 93.26 billion in 1987-88. The share of the same stood at 2.26 percent of Bangladesh's total imports at Taka 52.20 billion in 1981-82. Thus, Indian exports had an improved share in total imports of Bangladesh over the eighties while Bangladesh exports to India recorded a relative decline over the same period.

Rivalry Over Leadership in Awami League Noted

*46001119 Dhaka THE NEW NATION
in English 25 Oct 89 pp 1, 8*

[Article by Kazi Montu: "Next AL Council Meet Amid Signs of New Polarisation"]

[Text] The next council meeting of Awami League is likely to be held in the first quarter of the coming year. It has already triggered a cold war in the highest echelon of the party over the reconstitution of its central leadership.

The aspirants for the coveted position of general secretary of the party are now in a quiet race to win favour of the apparently mighty party chief Sheikh Hasina while the elderly leaders are trying to gauge how far she may go in dealing with them at the council meeting.

The last council meeting, which took place in January, 1987 witnessed outburst of its intra-party rivalry over the selection of the general secretary. Sheikh Hasina bestowed her blessing on Amir Hossain Amu rather openly while the elderly leaders and a large segment of the party's rank-and-file wanted Tofail Ahmed in this key executive position of the party.

However, finally fortune smiled on Begum Sajeda Chowdhury, who became general secretary as a compromise candidate and Amir Hossain Amu was made first joint secretary while Tofail Ahmed remained organising secretary.

As Begum Sajeda Chowdhury has been sick for a long time, Amir Hossain Amu has become acting general secretary of the party. And he was again a fair chance of getting Sheikh Hasina's patronisation to be general secretary of the party in the next council meeting.

Earlier, a programme was announced working out schedules of conferences at the lower levels of the party in preparation for the council meeting was due in last January in accordance with the constitution of the party.

The programme includes renewal of membership, recruitment of fresh members and reorganisation of the ward-level committees of Awami League through conferences in September and that of union-level committees in October and thana-level committees in November while the conferences of the district committee are to be completed in December.

Meanwhile, Sheikh Hasina has been busy consolidating her position in different tiers of the party. Recently, she sent copies of a controversial circular to the district

leaders, pouring out vials of wrath against whom she described as a hidden group of intriguers.

Besides, her emissaries are moving about to influence reorganisation of the lower committees of the party with those who have allegiance to her. These emissaries are young central leaders who are close to her.

In view of one senior leader of the party Sheikh Hasina is agog to go for a political arrangement with the government but the move has been stalled by the pro-movement elderly leaders. In conversation with this correspondent he expressed his deep disappointment about the unsavoury goings-on in the party.

The last council meeting of the party marked a significant change in its politics and strategy on the question of movement. The manifesto of the party was amended by discarding the programme of "Second Revolution" based on socialist structure of society, politics, economy and culture, and a strategy based on agitational politics was adopted and its anti-BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] stand strengthened.

Accompanying such changes were subsequent compromise on some other intricate issues as well—all meant to make Awami League acceptable to those quarters at home and abroad which matter in power politics of Bangladesh.

Sheikh Hasina evidently distanced herself from her previous stand featured by hostile campaign against the western countries and her bias for the lobby in her party that is identified as pro-Baksal or votaries of so-called Second Revolution. Even she visited the western countries in a bid to build understanding with the key politicians of those countries.

But her dissatisfaction with the US Administration was noticed when Assistant Secretary of State of the USA John Kelly recently came to Bangladesh. Then she kept herself away from the city to address a gathering of the sugarcane growers organised by the peasant wing of her party dominated by pro-Baksal elements of the party.

So far the party was avoiding movement but it succeeded in enlisting support of the Five-party Alliance and other left organisations in resistance to fundamentalism which has eventually paved the way for emergence of a new political pattern in the country.

But the understanding of the party with the Five-party Alliance and other left organisations forged through united resistance to fundamentalism and articulated in consolidation of unity of their student organisations in the Student Action Committee has now fallen through.

The break of the Student Action Committee is attributed to anti-movement stand of Awami League's student wing. Nine components of the 14-member combine have formed a new alliance announcing the goal of building a movement against the Government.

It has occurred amid footsteps of a new movement which Seven-party Alliance, Five-party Alliance and some other organisations are trying to build through coordinated action programmes. In the current polarisation the CPB [Communist Party of Bangladesh] is still ploughing a lonely furrow.

Communist Leader Calls for Opposition Party

46001117 Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 1 Nov 89 pp 1, 10

[Text] Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) Tuesday called for forging greater unity in the opposition camp on the basis of a minimum programme to strengthen the movement, reports BSS.

Addressing a public meeting in front of the party central office in the afternoon CPB General Secretary Saifuddin Ahmed Manik said the Communist Party would support any move from any political quarter to revive the anti-Government programme on the basis of which the combined opposition fought against the "enemies of democracy" in the past.

Presided over by Mr. Manik, the well attended meeting was addressed, among others by Shamsuddoha Nurul Islam, Kasimuddin Mondol and Majahidul, Islam Selim.

Mr. Manik said the people of the country were united to fight against "autocracy"; but the disunity persisted among the leaders of the Opposition. He urged the leaders of all Opposition parties to give impetus to the mass movement.

The CPB General Secretary also announced his party's new programme which would begin on January 5. The programme includes long march" [quotation mark as printed] (Padajatra) to Dhaka from all parts of the country. The programme would conclude through holding a "grand rally" in Dhaka on January 28, he said.

The CPB General Secretary said the new programme would be implemented by the party alone but it would support any initiative by any party to implement simultaneous programme. In this context, he called upon the left political parties to play their catalytic role in forging the greater opposition unity, which he said, is the prime need of the hour.

Mr. Manik, who was critical about what he termed the "hostile propaganda," against communism in the backdrop of changing situation in some of the East European countries, expressed his firm belief that socialism would definitely be established in Bangladesh. "But that socialism must be of Bangladeshi style," he remarked.

He strongly criticised the Government for, what he termed its failure in guiding the country democratically Mr. Manik said production in farms and factories had come down. According to the CPB leader, a section of "influential people" in the Government are making their own fortunes by depositing crores of taka in foreign banks.

Explaining that his party would continue to fight for establishing a "patriotic democratic government" in the country he reiterated the demand for holding free and fair elections under a neutral caretaker government. Mr. Manik also underlined the need for a greater unity among the forces of the country's war of liberation and other "progressive forces to ensure a change in the society."

INDIA

Reports on Developments in Indo-Soviet Relations

Trade Protocol Signed

46001138 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 26 Nov 89 p 10

[Text] New Delhi, November 25 (UNI)—India's trade with the Soviet Union is to be hiked up to Rs8,800 crore in 1990, of which Rs5,300 crore will comprise exports from India.

A trade protocol fixing the trade volumes for next year was finalised here recently. Mr A.N. Varma, secretary, Ministry of Commerce, was the leader of the Indian delegation and the Soviet side was led by Mr V.F. Mordvino, deputy minister for foreign economic relations.

Trade between the two countries is expected to exceed Rs7,000 crores during 1989. This is expected to include Soviet imports worth Rs2,900 crores.

The projected level for 1990 would thus represent a growth of over 25 percent over the current year's plan. The flow of bilateral trade during the current year has been as expected, an official release said.

The major items of imports from the Soviet Union will include a wide range of machinery items such as power equipment, steel equipment, equipment for oil sector, mining machinery, different types of machine tools, air transportation means, equipment for Indian railways, commodities such as crude oil, oil products, metal scrap, pig iron, non-ferrous metals, coking coal and newsprint.

Apart from increasing the provisions for imports in regard to commodities such as PVC, polyethylene, muriate of potash, copper, increased provisions have also been made in regard to delivery of machinery items in areas such as transportation as well as for Soviet-assisted projects. A new entry relating to import of rubber machinery has also been added.

As regards exports from India in 1990, the major categories will consist of agricultural products (tea, packaged tea, coffee, instant coffee, pepper, and tobacco), minerals and ores (including mica and mica products and alumina), a wide range of chemicals and chemical products, a number of textile items, leather items, including finished leather, shoe uppers and shoes, a wide range of engineering goods and other miscellaneous items.

Much higher exports are envisaged regarding cigarettes, mica and mica products, medicines and pharmaceutical preparations.

Past Interference Alleged

46001138 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 20 Nov 89 p 3

[Text] Jaipur, Nov 19 (PTI)—Mr. Satish Chandra Agarwal, a former minister of state for finance, today alleged that the Soviet Union had helped Mrs Indira Gandhi in dislodging the Janata government in 1979.

At a press conference here today, Mr Agarwal, who was in the Morarji Desai government during the Janata rule, released the photostat copy of a letter which he claimed was written by the then Indian ambassador to the U.S. and added that it corroborated his charge.

The letter, purportedly, by Mr Nani Palkhivala, dated January 22, 1979, in part said: "Last week a source from the state government, here, called on and told me in strict confidence that according to American intelligence, the government of the Soviet Union had decided that they should work as far as it lay in their power to see that you cease to be the Prime Minister and he added that some chosen persons in the Communist Party of India, who are pro-Soviet had already received the message."

Shevardnadze, Gonsalves Talk

46001138 New Delhi *PATRIOT*
in English 13 Nov 89 p 9

[Article by Rajiv Shah: "USSR Keen on Still Closer Ties With India"]

[Text] Moscow, Nov 12—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in a discussion with Indian Ambassador Alfred Gonsalves said here yesterday that there was untapped potential in developing bilateral economic and political relations between India and the Soviet Union.

Mr Shevardnadze said the targets of increasing trade turnover by 2.5 times by 1992 appear quite attainable if the two countries keep pace of growth is satisfactory.

He pointed towards unexplored possibilities. "We are two big and important powers," he emphasised. "We must do more than what we have been doing so far."

Mr Shevardnadze's emphasis on utilising the huge untapped potential came against a background when new forms of economic cooperation are not coming up.

The joint ventures are showing no signs of future development, with the existing joint ventures facing an imminent crisis. The Delhi Restaurant has earned millions of roubles within one and half years of its existence, but the Soviet side is not permitting to transfer that money to India due to technical reasons.

The latest solution to end the crisis by allowing only hard currency payments in the restaurant has left the Soviet citizens high and dry as they cannot hope to step into it any more.

There is also a lot of uncertainty with regard to the 1978 Indo-Soviet protocol allowing rupee trade in all commercial and non-commercial transactions. With the non-commercial rate of the rouble having been devalued by 10 times against the dollar, there is a strong rumour that the commercial rouble rate may also go down by 50 to 100 per cent by January 1, 1990.

How would this affect the Indo-Soviet rupee trade is still not clear. While the Soviets have agreed to revise the 1978 protocol, mechanisms have yet to be worked out for this. "One can only indulge in guesswork at present," a well placed source said.

The Soviets are not willing to revise the rupee-rouble exchange rate in non-commercial transactions in the same way as they have revised it against dollar. The Indian businessmen and tourists visiting the Soviet Union will press for hard currency sanctions from the Reserve Bank instead of rupees travellers cheques as it would be cheaper.

However, sources also said, the present problem can be solved only at the political level. The Soviet Union considers the socialist countries as their first priority. But next come the traditional friends.

Plans for Missile Testing, Manufacture Told

46001137 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 14 Nov 89 p 9

[Text] Bangalore, November 13—The Bharat Dynamics Limited [BDL] will manufacture three more "Prithvi" missiles for testing before going in for its regular production in April 1990.

A spokesman of the company told reporters here yesterday that the contribution of the BDL in the three "Prithvi" missiles launched so far was only 75 percent. But the next three missiles would be completely indigenous.

The three test models will be manufactured and test-fired by the end of March 1990 and from April next year the company will begin its regular production.

The BDL has started regular production of "Konkurs," the second-generation wire-guided, anti-tank missiles at its Medak plant in Andhra Pradesh. The missile has a range of four km. The first batch of 94 missiles was manufactured in October this year, he said.

The company has also received export orders from Iran and Iran for the "Milan" missiles. The matter has been taken up by the Ministry of Defence and the government will soon be issuing export licence.

IRAN

Iran To Train Car Manufacturing Workers

34000160Z Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA*
in English 9 Oct 89 p 1

[Excerpts] Tehran, Sunday—Prime Minister General Malimba Masheke has called on foreign countries wishing to join Zambia in developing the land to come forward.

Speaking during a working breakfast when Iranian foreign minister Dr Ali Akbar Velayati called on him at the government guest house this morning, Gen Masheke assured the would-be investors in farming that the climate in Zambia was good for the production of most cereal and other food crops.

He singled out wheat and rice as two food crops fast becoming popular among the modern generation.

Gen Masheke described food production as an effective weapon and first line of defence and expressed gratitude at the interest shown by the Iranian foreign minister to provide some experts in rice growing.

Dr Velayati urged Zambia to intensify additional irrigation schemes adding that irrigation had become popular worldwide as it enabled food production throughout the year.

Meanwhile Zambia has accepted an offer for Iran to train Zambians in the motor manufacturing industry.

Prime Minister General Masheke who is currently visiting Iran said the offer was most welcome and promised the Ministry of Commerce and Industry which was represented by the Minister Otema Musuka would take the training opportunity seriously.

The offer was given to Zambia by the deputy director of Iran-Khodro manufacturing company which specialises in the production of vehicles such as passenger buses and minibuses. The Prime Minister toured the factory at the weekend.

Deputy managing director of the manufacturing company Mr Yosefu Hashemi told General Masheke that his company was looking forward to train the Zambians and asked the ambassadors of the two countries, Mr Mohsen Pakafin from Iran and ambassador Kalengwa Kangwa to closely follow up the issue. [passage omitted]

And Dr Habibi has accepted an invitation to visit Zambia in the near future. [passage omitted]

New Power Projects To Increase Electrical Capacity

46000049B Tehran *TEHRAN TIMES*
in English 26 Nov 89 p 3

[Text] Shiraz (IRNA)—Some 6,000 more megawatts of electricity will be generated with the completion of new

power plants during the five year development plan, said Minister of Energy Bijan Namdar Zanganeh here Thursday.

Zanganeh, inaugurating a seminar on energy, said the new power projects are expected to cost 1.4 billion rials (\$186 million) plus \$6 billion in hard currency.

On water supply, he said, 40 dams are to be built throughout the country during the next five years, which when completed will bring 300,000 hectares of lands under the modern irrigation system."

PAKISTAN

Bhutto Asks Ministers for Progress Reports

46000062 Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 4 Nov 89 p 1

[Article by Javed Syed]

[Text] Lahore, Nov. 3—Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has called for the performance reports from all federal ministries by Nov. 13 covering their progress and performance during last 10 months.

According to sources the ministers have also been asked to put up proposals along with their reports and the expenditure involved to accelerate the completion of projects already assigned to their ministries as well as the recommendation for new plans.

The performance reports, the sources added, would be considered during the cabinet meeting to be held in the last week of November.

It is learnt that the federal cabinet may be broadened and some IJI [Islamic Jamhoor Ittehad] dissidents may be given cabinet posts.

Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani, Khawaja Tariq Rahim, Ch. Anwar Aziz and Gulzar Ahmad Khan are reportedly already in touch with moderate IJI MNA [Member of National Assembly]s in a bid to win over their loyalties.

Mustafa Khar is expected to play a key role in this operation. He demonstrated his persuasive power during the process of no confidence motion.

The new PPP [Pakistan People's Party]'s strategy is to cause dent in IJI's ranks and pave way to move no trust move in Punjab against the IJI Chief Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif.

Mr. Khar, who had earlier been offered the Interior Ministry at the Centre, has accepted the role of opposition leader in Punjab on his personal. Khar is understood to have deep roots in Punjab's feudal class. The PPP leadership believes Khar could attract the IJI MPA [Member of Provincial Assembly]s belonging to feudal class.

Differences Between Prime Minister, President Cited

46000059B Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 10 Dec 89 pp 4, 7

[Article by Khalid Akhtar]

[Text] President Ghulam Ishaq Khan's annual address to the joint session of parliament on December 2 was important for more than one reason. He made one thing clear that he would not be guided by the Prime Minister, the executive head in a parliamentary system, but instead would give his own guidelines for others to follow them.

In a way President Ghulam Ishaq's address was reminiscent of Gen Zia's address to parliament last year insofar as it was equally assertive in style. The PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government was put in the dock and an embarrassed Benazir Bhutto listened to the whole address tense and motionless.

The Opposition has interpreted the President's address as a 'charge sheet' against the Bhutto Government. The PPP's circles while deliberately trying to play down the significance of the address have described it as a 'balanced one' publicly, but privately they have admitted that the President came hard on them.

The PPP's track record of the last one year has left it open to all sorts of criticism. And the President would have failed in his duty if he had not brought into PPP Government's notice its shortcomings. It was all fair and should not be a point of controversy in any way. But in our situation where things said and done, even with the best of intentions, can have the opposite affects, the PPP has felt a little bruised by the President's address.

The President's annual address has made one thing clear that the PM [Prime Minister] and the President have continued to hold divergent views on various issues and the frequent meetings between the two since the no-confidence vote move have not brought the two offices any way nearer. There is a genuine fear that the annual address may become another irritant between the two.

The PM has held the view that the President's office is a non-political one or at least it should be that way. But the President has demonstrated once again that his office is not merely a symbolic one and that he holds definite views on political issues and that they must carry weight. No wonder he was keen to speak out his mind.

Thus the President's refusal not to accept the draft of the speech prepared by the Prime Minister's Secretariat did not surprise anyone. In the absence of clear and definite provisions regarding where the President can act in his discretion and where he has to act on the advice of or in consultation with the Prime Minister the constitutional position has remained fluid. However of the two offices the more stronger one, which in our case has been that of

the President, (courtesy the Eighth Amendment) the latter has been the major beneficiary of constitutional ambiguities.

Prime Minister Bhutto had no way to counter this. The best thing she could do was to approach the people first. And this probably prompted her to reschedule her address to the nation on December 1, from the evening of December 2, which would have been after the address of the President to parliament. But this hardly gave the Prime Minister any advantage. She could neither preempt nor neutralize the President's speech.

The President made extravagant use of vocabulary to tone down the contents of his speech and he did that remarkably well. Finally, he is well versed in the art of performing a balancing act. He gave a good example of this on December 2.

Some of the things which President said won acclaim from all quarters. When he was condemning horse-trading of the legislators he was voicing popular sentiments. He had a valid point that if the changing of loyalties of the legislators proceed unhindered the House would be turned into a non-party one. Here he was making his disapproval clear of the PPP's endeavour to win over the loyalties of some IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] MNA [Member of National Assembly]s and include them in the Cabinet. (It has already inducted three of the IJI MNAs in the cabinet.)

In the economic sector and foreign affairs the President not only supported the Bhutto government's policies, but even lauded its performance. He expressed the hope that the Wullar Barrage issue would be sorted out with India through negotiation and dialogue. Nawaz Sharif, the moving spirit behind the Opposition, has molested the Bhutto Government on the Wullar Barrage issue, accused it of a sell-out to India, and has refused talks with Delhi on the matter.

The President's tacit endorsement of the Bhutto government's policy vis-a-vis Wullar Barrage should take the wind out of the Opposition campaign. But here again much will depend on how Bhutto's aides and colleagues utilize the favorable portions of the President's speech to their advantage. Until now the Opposition has retained the better of the propaganda war and kept the PPP government on the defensive.

There is a widespread feeling that the President's address as a whole has gone to the advantage of the Opposition on issues that really matter. He rebuked efforts and moves to undermine the Senate—a power base of the IJI. It was unwise and apolitical on the part of PPP leaders to have done so. But what was more important was that he appeared to endorse the Opposition's demand for the convening of Council of Common Interests, which the Bhutto government has resolutely resisted and which it considered as a part of the move to oust it.

Similarly, the President's reference to the Shariat Bill has come at a time when the Opposition is claiming for itself

the monopoly of Islam and accusing the PPP of secular tendencies. The PPP's record in initiating new legislation has been poor and dismal to say the least. But at the same time it is the PPP that is answerable to the electorate as to what legislations it should enact.

Gen Ziaul Haq made Islam controversial and his reign saw deepening of cleavages between various sects. Pakistan would certainly not like to recede to that era again. Shariat is a sensitive issue and it has to be dealt with restraint, imagination and religious forbearance. A casual approach towards it can create a lot of complications.

The President's annual address was not the very best of gifts to Benazir Bhutto on the first anniversary of the PPP rule. The PPP's failings have been many. During the last one year there was hardly a moment when it had looked in command. It has been found struggling and has only managed to survive by the skin of its teeth.

The PPP has largely suffered on account of its erroneous initial approach towards the President, Senate, Armed Forces (the Sirohey retirement issue) and the Opposition, with a particular reference to its no-confidence move against Nawaz Sharif in the Punjab. The Senate's ruling against Attorney General Yahya Bakhtiar has been the latest rebuff to the PPP. PPP circles' claim that with Yahya Bakhtiar's case being heard in the Supreme Court, the Senate has shown undue haste in pronouncing its verdict, has lot of weight in it. The incident reflects the state of affairs in which the PPP and the Senate are operating.

Now the crucial question is of the PPP can make up for its past mistakes and failures. Much will depend on how Benazir Bhutto's relations develop with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. One thing that has been ignored is the differences in the perception of President Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister Bhutto. President Ishaq is a part of the system and he is there to protect it. Prime Minister Bhutto has accepted the system but with a declared intention to replace it or bring it in consonance with the system laid down by the 1973 Constitution.

It is basically this difference that has kept the two divided. There has to be a meeting ground between the two if a constitutional crisis, looming large on the nation, is to be averted.

Bhutto May Replace Qaim Ali Shah

46000069A Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 9 Nov 89 pp 1, 6

[Article by Kaleem Omar]

[Text] Islamabad, Nov 8: Chief Minister Qaim Ali Shah, who has come in for a lot of criticism of late from PPP [Pakistan People's Party] MNA [Member of National Assembly]s and MPA [Member of Provincial Assembly]s for what they describe as his "bumbling" administration, may be on his way out, according to PPP high command sources.

His successor, sources said, has not yet been chosen, but among those Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto is said to be considering for the job are Jam Sadiq Ali and Communications Minister Makhdoom Amin Fahim.

Jam Sadiq Ali's candidacy reportedly has the support of a number of Sindh PPP MNAs and MPAs who are said to think only a seasoned politician like him can stem the administrative rot in Sindh and, at the same time, deal effectively with the political situation facing the party in the province following the break-up of its accord with the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement].

This view, however, is apparently not shared by other party MNAs and MPAs from Sindh. They are said to think that whatever Jam Sadiq Ali's merits, they are more than outweighed by his reputation for alleged unsavory dealings from the days when he was a minister in the Sindh government in the seventies.

Makhdoom Amin Fahim's candidacy, too, reportedly has its supporters. Besides the members of his own influential Makhdoom family, they include a number of PPP MNAs and MPAs from rural Sindh.

They are said to think that only someone like Makhdoom Amin Fahim, with a strong political base in rural Sindh, can prevent an erosion in the PPP's ranks there in favor of Sindhi nationalist parties, several of which appear to have gained considerable ground in recent months.

Moreover, sources said, the choice of Makhdoom Amin Fahim as Chief Minister would have the additional advantage of neutralizing, to a considerable extent, the opposition against the PPP leadership voiced by his brother Makhdoom Khaliqzaman and his supporters in recent months.

Qazi: Superpowers Conspiring Against Muslims

46000069B Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 9 Nov 89 p 1

[Text] Lahore, Nov 8: The historic All-Pakistan three day marathon moot of Jamat-e-Islami commenced here on Wednesday at the spacious ground of Minar-e-Pakistan with the inaugural address of the JI [Jamaat-i-Islami] Amir Qazi Hussain Ahmed.

The conference was attended by over one lakh delegates from all over the country, besides some prominent dignitaries from abroad.

Speaking at the inaugural session, Qazi Hussain Ahmed said that both the super powers backing by the favor of Israel, Indian and Jewish lobbies are hatching conspiracies against the Afghan Mujahideen and Palestinians who were fighting for their due rights since long.

The massacre of Muslim in India and held Kashmir cautioning all the Muslims countries in the world to become unite and fight against the evil forces, who are active to wipe out the Muslims from the globe, he added.

Qazi Hussain Ahmed alleged that the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Government which came into power with the assistance of Jews, Hindus and Russians was endeavouring to douse the nation into rivalries. He said the people who had assembled here to participate in this marathon moot should be aware with the designs of the present Government and not deviate from the right path laid down by the Holy Prophet (PBUH).

He called upon the Afghan Mujahideen to forge unity in their ranks and foil the evil designs of anti-Islamic elements.

He said we have gathered in the historic city of Lahore, which was the last resting place of Allama Iqbal and founder of Jamaat-e-Islam, Maulana Syed Abul Aala Maududi with the determination to build Pakistan as a model Islamic state, so that this state emerges as the center and a pivot of the entire Muslim world.

Senator Qazi Hussain Ahmad said people have participated in this moot for earning the pleasures of Allah.—PPI

Qazi Urges United Struggle for Islamic System

46000068A Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 10 Nov 89 p 8

[Text] Lahore, Nov 9: The Amir of the Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan Qazi Hussain Ahmed has said the Islamic world is faced with serious crisis and difficulties and this situation could be overcome by frustrating the conspiracies of the Soviet, American, Hindu and Zionist lobby and enforcement and supremacy of Islam. He urged upon all Islam loving parties in Pakistan that they should join hands and lodge a collective movement for the enforcement of Islam and frustrate anti-Islamic forces.

He was addressing a huge public meeting at the end of the second day proceedings of the Jamaat-e-Islami Ijtim'a here Thursday. This was the main programme of the Jamaat meeting, in which various leaders of other political parties were also invited. He pointed out that the Western civilization had made Pakistan its special target, and under a conspiracy a woman representative of Western society had been made head of the government in Pakistan.

Qazi Hussain Ahmed suggested that for bringing an Islamic revolution a comprehensive programme should be chalked out. It is needed for the success of any programme for Islamic revolution that the public opinion should be mobilized. He reminded those who claim to be the leaders of Millat and revolutionary leaders that revolution was not possible without unity and organization and merely with the crowd of followers no revolution could be staged.

Qazi Hussain Ahmed said the enforcement of Shariat had become the fate of Pakistan and the preset Islamic movement in the country could not be suppressed.

Referring to Afghan issue the Amir Jamaat-e-Islami said the Afghan Mujahideen had won the war but imperialists

were engaged in a conspiracy to turn their victory into defeat. He expressed the hope that the people of Pakistan and Afghanistan would soon achieve their cherished goal of Islamic revolution. The meeting was also addressed by other Jamaat leaders.

Government Steps Up Efforts To Win More MPs

46000067A Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 10 Nov 89 pp 1, 8

[Text] Peshawar, Nov 9: The PPP [Pakistan People's Party] has expedited efforts to contact moderate IJI [Islamic Jam-hoori Ittehad] elected representatives as well as its former allies in MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy] in the wake of the defeat of no-trust move against the Prime Minister and it was gathered that at least one IJI MPA [Member of Provincial Assembly] from Abbottabad had responded positively.

'THE MUSLIM' correspondent in Abbottabad learnt that two Federal and one Provincial PPP Ministers met IJI MNA [Member of National Assembly] Sardar Gul Khitab recently and requested him to back the PPP Government. The Sardar, who belongs to IJI (Darkh-wasti Group), has now reportedly been inducted as a member of the People's Works Programme District Committee in Abbottabad.

It may be added that only PPP elected representatives are included in People's Programme but the PPP-led coalition government in NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] has associated NPAs belonging to IJI democratic group with the programme in their respective districts in Hazara Division in a bid to sustain its shaky coalition in NWFP.

Shamroz Khan Jadoon, a PPP leader and PWP [Public Works Program] administrator for Abbottabad, told 'THE MUSLIM' that he had been directed by the Provincial Government to incorporate Sardar Gul Khitab as the member of the PWP District Committee. The Sardar could not be contacted for comment.

Meanwhile, PPP MNA and Chairman of the National Assembly's public accounts committee, Hakim Ali Zardari, has been in touch with ANP [Awami National Party] leaders in Peshawar to try and seek their cooperation. Mr Zardari was a top ANP leader in Sindh before joining PPP. He phoned ANP MNA Haji Ghulam Ahmad Bilour from Islamabad to seek his support for an alliance between the two parties. Haji Bilour reportedly asked him to wait for ANP President Khan Abdul Wali Khan to his return from the United Kingdom on Nov 17.

NWFP Assembly Speaker Barrister Masood Kausar, who is a top PPP leader in NWFP, has also been trying to restore the lines of communication with ANP. He is reported to have met Haji Ghulam Ahmad Bilour in Peshawar recently to try and conclude a new agreement between the two parties. The ANP withdrew from the PPP-led coalition government last April to protest PPP's inability to honor their coalition accord. Masood Kausar

was one of the architects of the PPP-ANP accord concluded last December which enabled Aftab Sherpao to become the Chief Minister.

Government Policy on Afghanistan Reviewed

46000061B Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 19 Nov 89 pp 4, 5

[Text] The blast at an Afghan Mujahideen ammunition depot in Chitral in which scores of people were killed, again tragically underlines the continuing conflict next door, while highlighting the dangers of its fallout in Pakistan. With our government so preoccupied in recent weeks with questions of its own survival, it is hardly surprising that the Afghan issue has—over the time being—been put on the backburner. However, a stream of American officials have recently been visiting the country in connection with the Afghan problem. They include the deputy chief of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], and the American envoy for the Afghan Mujahideen, Peter Tomsen. Coinciding with their visit has been an escalation in the fighting in certain areas in Afghanistan. Are we to conclude from this that the war will continue to drag on—with varying degrees of intensity in different areas—and any prospect of a political solution to the Afghan tragedy will recede into the background for the immediate future? Certainly Islamabad seems to have settled for drift rather than a coherent and realistic policy on the issue. And it has done so in a way that shows a certain ambivalence, even disregard, for the implications that such an approach holds for both the government and the country in the future. Postponing decisions and hoping that events on the ground will somehow work in our favor can hardly be regarded as a prudent or wise course to follow. It means in fact an abdication of responsibility—an action that puts at risk both Pakistan's long and short term interests.

Tentative moves that the government earlier made toward finding a political settlement seem to have been put on ice and we are now drifting along on a path of wishful thinking that is somehow supposed to substitute for policy. The point out foreign policy-makers should grasp is that Afghanistan is no longer high on the agenda of the two superpowers in their relations with one another. Both, it seems, are able to live with the current situation. Pakistan however has much to lose if the conflict continues or escalates, with possibilities of a political solution dimmed by such developments. How, policy makers should ask themselves will this help attain Pakistan's principal objectives: i.e. the return of refugees and a friendly government in Kabul. Intensifying military pressure without a credible political policy will not achieve either one of these goals. Indeed continuing to back a non-viable Afghan Interim Government (AIG) option which ran out of steam by itself, now puts Pakistan in a position where it risks losing the goodwill of the Afghan people, since more and more of them see it as an imposition.

The government's current approach on the Afghan front may be a 'safe' course to take for the present since it apparently annoys none of its allies and friends, but is it in the country's best interests? If Pakistan ends up losing the goodwill of the Afghan nation (which surely cannot be equated with the AIG), it would have squandered all that it gained by supporting the Afghan resistance against the Soviet presence for so many long years. It is this question that the government should seriously address.

Jatoi: PPP Proposal for Broad-Based Government 'Fraud'

46000065B Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 11 Nov 89 p 1

[Text] Peshawar, Nov 10: Leader of the Combined Opposition in the National Assembly Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi has termed the PPP [Pakistan People's Party]'s proposal for a broad-based government a "fraud" beside expressing his optimism that the fragile edifice of the so-called democratic elements would soon collapse.

He was talking to newsmen at the wedding ceremony of the daughter of Ilyas Bilour, brother of Acting President ANP [Awami National Party] Haji Ghulam Ahmed Bilour in Peshawar Thursday evening.

Substantiating his point he said that PPP will not succeed in forming alliance with the Opposition parties because they have failed to honor the accords it had signed with the ANP and MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement]. He maintained that having simple majority in the House the PPP should better resign because they are not able to rule the country. He accused the Government of intimidating and harassing MNA [Member of National Assembly]s, particularly the Tribals who supported the no-confidence motion against the Prime Minister.

To a question Mr Jatoi said COP [Combined Opposition Parties] was in no hurry to table a fresh no-trust motion against the Government. He felt that the PPP Government was not able to fulfil the promises made to its own MNAs, and thus it would result into its collapse.

Earlier, Mr Jatoi held a detailed meeting with the former Governor NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] Lt Gen (Retd) Fazle Haq at his residence at Defence Colony Peshawar. Both the leaders exchanged views on the prevailing political situation in the country. It is learnt that both the leaders flew into Quetta in a special plane on Friday to participate in the COP meeting starting tomorrow.

Article Says PPP Problem Lack of Popular Policies

46000065A Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 11 Nov 89 p 4

[Article by Moazam Mahmood]

[Text] After overturning the no-confidence motion, the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] will find it easy to slip back into its previous groove. Internal analysis may devolve into blaming

the other, as individuals and groups attempt to protect their own power and privileges. So more objective analyses from outside can be useful.

The question is how did a popularly elected regime, aided by immense goodwill internally and abroad, come so close to losing its majority in only 11 months? The popular answers are based on three sets of factors. (1) The team brought in to administer the PPP regime is inept, too large and unimaginative. (2) The PPP has alienated all its allies. The former MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy] partners, ANP [Awami Nagional Party], JUI [Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam], Bugti, and the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement], all were driven into the extreme right-wing IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] camp from sheer neglect. (3) There have been no policy changes after the first promising month of democratization. So there is a complete vacuum of effective, popular policies.

Policy Goals

I believe that the three factors boil down to one. The inept administration, and the alienated allies, are caused and highlighted by the lack of effective popular policies. Unless the PPP rethinks its policies, and restructures its administration to effect these policies, the decline will continue to its logical conclusion.

The administration has been inefficient, as seen clearly in successive crises—Balochistan, transfers, Tarbela shortage/spillage, Punjab no-confidence move, FIA [Federal Investigative Agency], MQM double-deal, and then the no-confidence motion at the Center. The administration has had a critical lack of information, caused by a random policy drift on these areas, rather than thought-out, consistent policy. And this has paralyzed its response. Longer-standing issues like provincial autonomy, ethnic tensions, narcotics, and education have been mishandled for the same reasons.

The standard criticism of inefficient administration is the charge of overmanning. This, however, is a typical right-wing analysis of the situation. Too many cooks spoil the broth, so let's cut out some cooks and save wages. But the broth has been spoilt not because of overcrowding, but because the cooks have not been told how to cook. There is a lack of policy goals to make the administration work. If the army of ministers, advisors, and OSDs had been beaver away, and seen to be beaver away, at achieving large, grandiose social plans, no one could have carped. If there are no such plans to be met, then the political personnel will lapse into self-projection exercises. And their bureaucratic counterparts over resentful of political encroachment will find it easy to label them as unproductive political drones. So the casual factor of an inefficient administration is the lack of policy goals.

The PPP has eroded its base of support by alienating its allies and sympathetic political parties. This too has been caused by the shifting policies of the PPP on many issues—by the lack of consistent policies. The MRD, ANP, JUI, Bugti, and the MQM all had some common

ground with the PPP, more so than with the IJI. The MRD got together because they needed the combined strength to force a return to democracy. However, just the announcement of elections convinced the PPP that there was no further need for the MRD alliance. But the democracy the PPP inherited was conditional upon sharing power with the President and the army. And the PPP has to fight off the right-wing forces strengthened by the previous regime which have different parameters of democracy from its own liberal notions. Now the PPP has realized that it is still fighting to establish a liberal democratic framework with politics in command.

So there is still a great need for a broad-based, liberal, democratic alliance. Without it the chances of survival of both liberal democracy and the PPP regime narrow down considerably. The PPP has common ground also with Bugti, who was not initially hostile to the PPP. The PPP as a component of the MRD had taken a liberal stand on provincial autonomy. In the battle with the Punjab-based IJI, these stands have been reneged by the PPP. This issue of provincial autonomy had needlessly pushed Bugti into the IJI camp.

The clearest example of the PPP's lack of well thought-out policies was its accord with the MQM. The PPP has an overwhelming Sindhi mandate. But it has taken this for granted by not addressing the primary Sindhi fear of marginalization. The PPP's primary provincial government in Sindh has to coexist with a huge urban Urdu-speaking population. Yet it has not addressed their fear of a Sindhi backlash against them. This is the political war raging in urban and rural Sindh, while the PPP regime has a complete ostrich-like policy in minimizing it to a law and order problem. This lack of a consistent Sindh policy made it very easy for the PPP regime to ally with the MQM initially, but then brought a Sindhi revolt which effectively broke the MQM alliance. So in the political field the PPP desperately lacks clear, far-sighted, and consistent policies which will allow it to choose dependable, long-run allies.

The electoral base of this regime voted for it because the last PPP regime stood for economic growth with redistribution. Two kinds of people now have high expectations. The majority are the poor who have eyes only for redistribution policies. Housing, health, employment, and education. Some dare even hope for land and a share in the denationalized industries. The second are the middle classes in whose socially-conscious judgement growth must be balanced by redistribution. This is a policy of walking on two legs. There must be economic growth. The growth must be led by the sunrise sectors like general electronics, computers, imaging, artificial fibers, energy, biotechnology, to name a few do-ables. The growth must build indigenous capacity in capital equipment, specifically, metal fabrication, precision engineering, and numerically-controlled machine tools.

Feasibility

To feed these capital goods sectors, growth is needed in intermediate goods capacity, metals, plastics, chemicals,

and fertilizers. So growth has to be planned to achieve this balance. This planning has to be guided by economic institutions like Japan's MITI [Ministry of International Trade and Industry], and Korea's planning and technology ministry. The feasibility and acquisition of new technology has to be handled by specific research and design institutes as in Brazil and Venezuela. Most importantly, financial markets have to be restructured and decentralized, and secondary markets created as in India, to fuel this new strategy.

But such growth must walk along with redistribution. Growth must be for everybody, and not just the profit and rent earners. So wages must keep pace with profits. Inflation must be prevented from eroding consumer incomes. And most important of all, a dynamic social welfare sector must be built up. This sector has to be conceptualized not as handout, because there is nothing to handout. It has to be based on two points. One is the critical power of legislation to reduce the exploitation of lower-income groups. Legislate child labor wage rates, general wage rates, bonded labor laws, beggar camp labor laws, employer's health schemes, women's rights, tenancy laws, and rent laws. These groups strengthened by this legislation can then demand their rights.

The second basis of the welfare sector must be self-generation of income and services for distribution. County councils, communities, cooperatives, international welfare organizations, and NGOs from Europe to Africa, have run amazingly successful schemes. At the larger end of the scale, whole factories have been rescued from bankruptcy courts by county councils and run professionally to regenerate employment and income for the community. At the smaller end of the scale, poor communities have generated their own funds, supplemented by some external funding but mostly technical assistance, to establish a priority project. The critical principle is that the target group runs its own welfare project, and not some bureaucratic organization based in Lahore, Islamabad, Geneva or Washington. Based on these two principles of legislation-led community struggles, and community-run projects, welfare becomes an economically active sector.

To rescue itself and liberal democracy, the PPP regime simply needs good policies. Politically, it needs a policy of a broad-based alliance. It also needs a policy on regional issues, critically Sindh. Economically, it needs a policy of walking on two legs, growth with redistribution. Administratively, it needs a team, and political allies to conceptualize and operationalize these policies, now. Before it is too late.

Sayyaf Urges Mujahideen To Forge Unity

46000064B Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 11 Nov 89 p 8

[Text] Peshawar, Nov 10: The Afghan interim government [AIG] Prime Minister Prof Abdur Rab: Rasul Sayyaf, who is currently on his first visit to Quetta after assuming his position, has made an impassioned call to

Mujahideen and refugees to forge unity in their ranks at such a crucial juncture in their struggle.

Prof Sayyaf has been telling gathering of Mujahideen commanders and refugees leaders in camps near Quetta that forces inimical to the Afghan Jihad were plotting against the establishment of an Islamic government in Afghanistan. He maintained that the Afghan interim government had already taken steps to broaden its political and social base and was prepared to do more in this context.

Meanwhile the AIG defence minister Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi who is also touring Balochistan has appealed Mujahideen commanders not to abandon their Jihad at this juncture when their goals haven't been fully achieved. He urged them to continue fighting until the ouster of the Kabul regime and its replacement by an Islamic government.

Lasi Criticizes COP's Irrational Attitude

46000056C Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 13 Nov 89 p 7

[Article by Naeem Ahmad]

[Text] Islamabad, Nov. 12—Ghulam Akbar Lasi, newly appointed Minister of State for Labour, has said that the irrational attitude of the COP [Combined Opposition Parties] is adversely affecting the sensitive political scene of the country. He was speaking to journalists in his maiden Press conference in the present capacity.

Criticising the behaviour of the COP he said, "the no-confidence motion is not a game of boxing where there are subsequent rounds. It is a matter of vital national importance". He further stated that he contested for elections on IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] seat only under the influence of his friends but afterwards, having witnessed the IJI politics from a closer perspective, he could not justify his decision. "But party discipline is also important, so I am not quitting from party."

He also stated that he voted for the no-confidence motion unwillingly and was extremely impressed by the PM [Prime Minister]'s speech in the National Assembly on the voting day. Giving the rationale of his present decision he said that the COP was indulged in negative politics. "This is how I decided to side with the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government."

On his stay in Murree under the surveillance of IJI he said it was totally an undemocratic step and "an act of grabbing power through unfair means."

He ruled out the impression that the PPP government had become weaker after the no-confidence motion and said that the political conditions would improve in the days to come.

When asked whether there were some MNA [Member of National Assembly]s who want to follow his decision, he said that there are people in the IJI also who want a long

term national integrity and if conditions favour them they would rise above the party differences and would work for the integrity and prosperity of the country collectively.

He supported the idea of having maximum participation in the government and said that "Frequent changes in the government can never let a newly established democratic system flourish." He called it PM's greatness that she inducted a man in her Cabinet who had supported the no-confidence motion.

He concluded by saying that he was determined to work sincerely and come up to the expectations of the PM and the people.

COP Criticizes Government's Contacts With MNA

46000056A Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 13 Nov 89 pp 1, 6

[Article by Tariq Butt and Mohammad Riaz]

[Text] Quetta, Nov. 12—The Combined Opposition Parties (COP) have described as a "conspiracy to create disunity" in their ranks the contacts established by the Federal Government with individual Opposition MNA [Member of National Assembly]s, seeking political reconciliation.

After lengthy deliberations late Saturday night, the top COP leaders decided that the Federal Government had to approach them if it wanted reconciliation instead of approaching individuals. The decision formed part of what they called "Quetta Resolution" which was released by them at a joint news conference here on Sunday.

Sources say most of the time during "closed door discussion" was devoted to how to counter the "onslaught" of the Federal Government aimed at weaning away some COP members through different means.

They say that it was decided to hold frequent meetings of the COP leaders and to remain in constant touch with the Opposition members. This is obviously meant to assure the MNAs that the COP had not given up its efforts to remove the Bhutto Government.

Gathering of the COP leaders in Karachi on Nov. 14 sources said, was meant to demonstrate solidarity with the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] which was under immense pressure from the provincial administration.

Sources said the COP leaders from Punjab would persuade stalwarts of Malik Ghulam Sarwar Awan faction of the PPI [Pashtun-Punjabi Ittehad] to patch up their differences with the MQM. This was aimed at bringing all political forces of Sindh on one platform against the Bhutto Government.

The leaders discussed a proposal to make a permanent structure of the COP. However, a decision was deferred in this regard. It would probably be taken at Lahore when heads of the COP components meet on Nov. 26.

Sources said that the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] leaders had mooted the idea in the Quetta meeting.

They say the leaders also discussed the timing of tabling another no-trust motion against the Prime Minister but did not finalise the date. However, observers feel that the next round would be played after a couple of months, but before March 20, 1990, when the President's power to nominate a Prime Minister will end.

Moreover, leaders reportedly felt that at present they did not have sufficient support in the National Assembly to succeed a no-confidence motion. In the Quetta meeting, the emphasis remained on retaining its existing strength and dealing with the defectors politically. There was a consensus that (Minister) Ghulam Ahmad Maneka was the man who scuttled their earlier resolution.

At the news conference the COP leaders repeated time and again that they were united and would remain so against the Bhutto Government and its efforts to create fissures in their ranks would fail.

Maulana Fazalur Rehman said the "important" COP leaders who were contacted by the Federal Government recently presented their reports in the meeting. Reading out the Quetta Resolution, he said, they would not hold talks with the Government unless it rectified its wrong policies which were pointed out by the Opposition leaders in their speeches in the National Assembly before the no-trust motion was put to vote. The Prime Minister, he said, hurled allegations on the COP and vowed to continue her policies instead of admitting her mistakes on the floor.

He said there was no sincerity in its tall talk about reconciliation because on the one hand it was expressing such intentions and on the other, it had embarked on "victimisation" campaign against the Opposition members.

The MQM and FATA MNAs, he said, were being subjected to pressure tactics for supporting the no-confidence motion. The MQM leaders and workers have been threatened with murder. Their houses are being attacked. He said, these actions negated Government's claims about seeking reconciliation.

He categorically said quoting the resolution that there would be no reconciliation unless the Government created a congenial atmosphere by its positive actions.

The COP demanded convening of the National Assembly immediately to discuss the national issues including Wullar Barrage, unnecessary interference of the Centre in the Provincial affairs, victimisation of political opponents, law and order situation, particularly in Sindh etc.

The Maulana said the Bhutto Government would not be in a position to save its "sinking boat" by expanding its Cabinet. "We strongly condemn the tactics employed by it to pressurise the members into changing their loyalties. [quotation marks as published]

COP Chief Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi told a questioner that the "divide and rule" policy of the Prime Minister would not work. "She is morally bound to step down because she knows and everyone knows that she has lost the confidence of the people," Mr. Jatoi added.

Ms. Bhutto was trying to save her government from collapse by increasing the size of her Cabinet. These will prove to be temporary props. "It is ridiculous to have four Ministers besides advisors and OSDs for one Ministry," he said referring to the Ministry of Labour, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis. "This is a sheer squandering of public money. The Prime Minister will not be able to create more Mir Jaffers," he remarked caustically.

Jatoi told a questioner that the COP had performed the national duty by tabling the no-confidence motion. "The timing of the next motion depends upon the circumstances. We expect that the Prime Minister will rectify her past mistakes and if she does not do so, nobody can prevent us from chalking out our next line of action," Mr. Jatoi added.

To another question, the COP chief said they had not decided in the Quetta meeting to approach the President for using his constitutional powers wherein he was competent to ask the Prime Minister to seek a vote of confidence, but he remarked, "The President is also responsible to the nation for his functions."

He accused the PPP of working for the establishment of a "one-party fascist system" and emphasised that the COP was united to foil such designs. Answering a question, he said nearly 100 MNAs attended the Quetta meeting. Those who did not turn up were busy elsewhere, he said, adding that the Federal Government failed to collect even 119 Members in Swat though it had used many C-130s, WAPDA Helicopter and other official resources.

The COP chief declared that the Opposition was organising public meetings throughout the country to mobilise support against the Prime Minister. The first three rallies will be held in Punjab, he added.

Mr. Jatoi told a reporter that the COP condemned political victimisation regardless of the fact where it was practised and said that baseless stories were being telecasted/broadcasted in the television and radio news bulletins that the house of a COP MNA who had defected had been demolished in Rahimyar Khan.

Balochistan Chief Minister Interviewed on COP Alignment

46000047E Lahore THE NATION
in English 12 Nov 89 p 7

[Interview with Akbar Bugti by Amina Jilani: "Both Sides Are Featherweights"]

[Text] [THE NATION] Did you at any time have any hope that some of the pre-election and post-election promises would be kept?

[Bugti] Perhaps a small element of hope, but that was soon dissipated.

[THE NATION] The refusal to convene a CCI [Council of Common Interests] meeting would seem to be the foundation for all your convictions?

[Bugti] The CCI is a constitutional provision, specifically provided for in the Constitution promulgated by the Prime Minister's father and of which she is so proud. It is not to be convened on a whim, or as a favour. It is a statutory body and according to Article 154 it formulates and regulates policies in relation to Part II of the Federal Legislative List—a vast list. It relates to the affairs of the Federation, to the supervision and control of related institutions. For example, the matter of rivers and water control can only be debated by the CCI and no other body. Even the courts have no authority.

[THE NATION] How about Sui Gas?

[Bugti] Of course. The rates of royalty and excise on natural gas and hydroelectric power which are to be paid to the provinces under Article 151 are to be determined by the CCI. Who is now doing this, I have no idea. And this is why that Sherpao has at last raised his vote. Sui Gas is a very sore point. Balochistan gets approximately Rs 80 crores per annum in royalty and excise duty whilst the Federal Government also eats up all the other income from Sui Gas which total perhaps Rs 2,500 crore. It is only the CCI that can decide what must rightfully be given to us.

[THE NATION] Why is it, do you think, that the Federal Government refuse to convene a meeting? Fear? Of what?

[Bugti] Well, the CCI covers the whole gambit of subjects relating to the Federation and its units, from industrialisation, minerals, water and power, oil to—you name it. With so much to cover, there is bound to be disagreement and in case of disagreement the constitutional position is that matters are referred to a joint sitting of Parliament whose decision will be final. The young lady may be afraid that she will lose on certain subjects—on which the provinces will win. But I don't know why she should be afraid of that. In government and in office, one wins some, loses others. If she loses on one matter, will it affect her personally? Will her government fall? Will she have to resign? Were Parliament to decide in favour of the provinces, she should be happy. After all, the provinces are federating units which make up the federation—there would be no federation without them. We'd all be up in the air. Either she is capable of understanding, or she just does not wish to understand—probably the latter. The federating units and the central government are supposed to work together and not at cross purposes. We are in a unique situation—the only example in the world where the federation is opposed to its own federating units and is trying to undo them.

[THE NATION] What can be done about all this?

[Bugti] As far as the present government is concerned, nothing that I can think of. The President has done his job according to the Constitution. He set up or rather constituted, the CCI 7 months ago. It just has to be convened and that the Prime Minister is flatly refusing to do. She has recently let it be conveyed to us in Balochistan that if she can possibly help it there will never be a meeting of the CCI. She sent her Law Minister to see me, who made 'idiotic noises' about there being no need for a CCI, no necessity, no agenda—in short, that it was of no relevance. You can judge the level of their intelligence and bad faith from this. If such a statutory body fails to meet or is not allowed to function, it can be taken as construed that this is a failure not only of the Government and its constitutional set-up but of the Constitution itself. The Constitution without the CCI is inoperative—that is the crux of the matter—and this being so, we have been forced to consider using other means. Were a CCI meeting to be held, our whole attitude vis-a-vis the Government would change.

[THE NATION] How do you feel about the Annual Development Programme [ADP] in relation to your province?

[Bugti] That is another farcical situation. The development and non-development disbursements were dealt out at the NEC [National Economic Council] meeting early in the year. The proposed figures for the provinces were a joke and were forced upon us—any proposals made by Punjab or Balochistan were rejected out of hand. We were given 132 crores, Punjab, Sindh and NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] 659, 270 and 217 cores respectively. The Prime Minister took a unilateral decision on these figures. We were, shot down on every point. For instance, on the repairs and upkeep of roads in Balochistan, which is the business of the Federal Government, we asked for Rs 50 crore and were given Rs 7 crore. We have had what are termed as national highways in Balochistan surveyed—its a gross misnomer to call them 'national highways' as many stretches are worse than donkey tracks. But of the Rs 7 crore not one penny has so far been released—sanctioning is one thing, releasing the funds quite a different thing. I can only suppose that the Rs 9 crore provided for the annual expense of the Prime Minister's secretariat has been released. I walked out of the NEC meeting, it was pointless sitting on. As I walked out, Benazir called out: "There goes your Sandak." I just said: "Let it go." And another thing, the total of the ADP for the whole of Pakistan is Rs 7100 crores of which Rs 1600 crores has been allotted to the four provinces—the balance Rs 5500 is retained by the Federal Government for its own use. Of this Rs 5500 crores, Rs 1500 crores has gone to the autonomous bodies and corporations over which the provinces have no control—and we all know by whom and for whose benefit these are run. That leaves Rs 40M crores for federal agencies and Rs 300 crores from this amount has been diverted to the Peoples Works Programme [PWP]. They have a lot of money to play with and squander.

[THE NATION] You are very sore about the PWP.

[Bugti] Should I not be? The Prime Minister has moved Rs 300 crores from the ADP for it. This is a real deprivation of the provinces for a Stalin-like system which abolishes the difference between the party and the State. We in Balochistan never even allowed it to take off—in my province, the party does not become the States. However, money has been distributed to Party people, to the so-called Party district administrators. The young lady must have known that it would be pocketed by them as there is no way in which all this money can be used for the benefit of the people. This one is a real rip-off.

[THE NATION] So what you referred to as 'other means' to rectify matters was aligning yourself with the COP [Combined Opposition Parties]?

[Bugti] Yes, on the premise that anything is better than this present government. The COP approached us, the BNA [Baluchistan National Alliance] that is, and asked us to join them. We talked and talked, came to an agreement with them, the agreement was put into writing, signed and sealed and we said we would not join the COP as such, but that we would support them. With our agreement, I feel sure that if the government is changed and the COP manage to get in, the rights of the people of Balochistan will be safeguarded and they will receive their just constitutional due. This can never happen with the PPP [Pakistan People's Party].

[THE NATION] According to a statement by the PM [Prime Minister] a few days ago, she and her Party have made approaches to you since the failure of the no-confidence vote. Have they?

[Bugti] Not that I know of. As far as I am concerned there is no contact with the PPP government. Oh yes, they do utter empty words to which our response is equally empty. There has been no real approach, nothing tangible, nothing concrete. And besides, we know that when they open their mouths they mean nothing. Having dealt with them now for 11 months, I can safely say that experience has shown them to be the biggest liars under the sun.

[THE NATION] Is there anyone in the PPP you can trust, for whom you have some shadow of respect.

[Bugti] The Prime Minister is the best of a bad bunch. The PPP is just an amorphous mass which excels in the art of holding public meetings and organising rallies. It has no coherent programme, all it has is the personality of its leader. It has no politics—she is the dominant feature. In the whole of Pakistan there is not one political party, regardless of its origins and background, that could win an election on the strength of its policies and programmes—in fact, no party has either policies or programmes. It is personality and rhetoric that count. Besides, the PPP has no minister or negotiator able enough to give any sense of direction or any coherence to

the government. The Prime Minister herself malfunctions, with her large army of advisors all treading on each others toes. For these past eleven months, we and the PPP have been talking and acting against each other, instead of with each other, and the vote of no-confidence was the final outcome.

[THE NATION] Do you think the timing of the vote was right?

[Bugti] The timing was right. But the planning was hopeless. There was no coordination. Far too much blah-blah, too much boasting about numbers and strength, stupid over-confidence. The COP were just not capable of going about it the right way. At one stage they had the whole thing wrapped up. They unnecessarily blew it and just gave the game away.

[THE NATION] But you were one of the players? Balochistan House in Islamabad was the COP headquarters.

[Bugti] By the time I got to Islamabad and by the time the COP had asked to be able to use Balochistan House as a base, it was too late to save the game, it had already been lost—and I told them so.

[THE NATION] I suppose the government had the better bargaining power?

[Bugti] Of course they did, they had the whole of the State Exchequer upon which to draw. They could merrily indulge in grand larceny without any restraints.

[THE NATION] But could this not have been combatted?

[Bugti] To a certain extent, maybe. The buying and selling of bodies is a sad reflection on our Parliament but it is a fact of life that is unlikely to change. One of my own BNA chaps switched sides—he sold himself for a song.

[THE NATION] A lot of people in the country are saying that there could not have been a more unsuitable choice, in all ways, than Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi as the COP leader. What do you say?

[Bugti] A consensus was arrived at amongst all members of the COP that Jatoi was the best alternative.

[THE NATION] What about this strange and unlikely story of the sequestering of the 22 MNA [Member of National Assembly]s in the PM's chambers before the vote was held in the Assembly?

[Bugti] I suppose it does sound rather ridiculous, but it did happen. Its highly unlikely, though, that a bunch of goats who would allow themselves to be herded out of the Assembly would have had the guts to even think of casting a vote. Seems to have been a useless exercise. Perhaps it made sense to the PPP.

[THE NATION] Do you feel that there might be a slight chance that the PPP and its leader have learnt something from the experience, that they might pull themselves together and perform?

[Bugti] Most unlikely. They have temporarily weathered the storm and there is no doubt that the combat has shaken the government to its foundations—shaken the government, that is, not the country. Not that it was strong before the vote, it was always a weak government. Its just much weaker now. So much so that it is almost at a standstill, it is almost as if there were no government—the leader and the led seem to be in a state of semi-paralysis. I cannot imagine how they hope to function now or in the future. This sort of stalemate situation will lead to desperation and in desperation the young lady is likely to take desperate steps. Then that should be that.

[THE NATION] In talking of the vote to the Press last week, you veered from cricketing to boxing terminology. But do you really think the bout will go the full 15 rounds?

[Bugti] There is no question of fifteen rounds. This is not a heavy weight fight, its nowhere in the Mohammad Ali Clay league. Both sides are feather-weights. I'd say the bout will go for three rounds—time enough for the loser to be thrown out of the ring. Who will be the loser, I have no idea and I am not betting.

[THE NATION] By the time this interview is printed, you will have met the COP leaders in Quetta. Why have you become the focal point of all discussions and COP activity?

[Bugti] After the vote, when we all met in Islamabad, it was decided to get together in Balochistan for a strategy session—we'll decide upon strategy and tactics for the next round, whatever shape that may take—not necessarily another no-confidence move.

[THE NATION] The ultimate aim being to get rid of the present government?

[Bugti] Yes—in a democratic and constitutional manner.

Fazal Reelected JUI Secretary General

46000068C Islamabad *THE MUSLIM*
in English 10 Nov 89 p 6

[Text] Lahore, Nov 9: The central general council of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (F), on Thursday unanimously elected Maulana Abdul Karim and Maulana Fazalur Rehman, MNA [Member of National Assembly] as Amir and Secretary General of party respectively for the next three years.

This announcement was made at the end of the three-day convention of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam which concluded here at the Jamia Madnia Thursday evening. Besides Jamiat office-bearers from all over the country, members of National and Provincial Assemblies including Deputy Speaker Balochistan attended the general council meeting.

Meanwhile, the general council has granted power of attorney to the newly elected Amir and Secretary General for the nomination of remaining 11 office-bearers for the executive council.

Fazal: JUI Cannot Be Used To Stabilize Government

46000067B Islamabad *THE MUSLIM*
in English 10 Nov 89 p 8

[Article by Javed Syed]

[Text] Lahore, Nov 9: The Secretary General of the JUI [Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam] Maulana Fazalur Rehman has said the Federal Government cannot use them to stabilize itself as General Zia had also failed to use the JUI for his objectives.

Addressing a dinner reception given in honor of JUI General Council members here Thursday night, the JUI leader said his party had decided to support the no-trust motion against the Prime Minister after the Federal Government had failed to continue the talks on their draft of Shariat bill. He said JUI firmly believed in politics of principles and it never bargained over its ideology.

He said the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government had offered them a share in power. But the JUI did not accept the offer due to its ideological differences with it, he added.

Maulana Fazalur Rehman felt that the Federal Government was not prepared to give due rights to the provinces. He regretted that certain elements were using the demand of provincial rights to create hatred among the nationalities.

He demanded that provinces be given the rights on the basis of charter which had been drawn by the MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy]. He said that Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto had failed to reply to the objections raised by the Opposition on the day of taking up of the no trust motion. Rather, she tried to influence the people by her oratory power.

The Maulana said the talk of the poor did not suit the PPP without bringing to an end the current feudal and capitalistic order.

He claimed that the JUI wanted to replace the cruel class-based society with an Islamic one where every citizen would enjoy equal rights. He disclosed that the JUI General Council had decided to review its manifesto and the JUI members had been asked to submit proposals in this connection.

PPI Member Inducted in Sindh Cabinet

46000059A Islamabad *THE MUSLIM*
in English 10 Dec 89 pp 1, 6

[Article by M.S. Raj]

[Excerpt] Karachi, Dec 9: The only victorious candidate of Punjabi Pukhtoon Ittehad [PPI] in last November elections, Irfanullah Marwat was inducted in the Sindh Cabinet on Saturday.

Mr Marwat, a leading cotton trader of the country had won the Sindh Assembly seat from the lower middle class and middle class residential area of Mehmoodabad PECHS.

Mr Marwat, son-in-law of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, belongs to the break-away faction of PPI (Hazar Khan Group). During the PPP-MQM [Pakistan People's Party-Muhajir Qaumi Movement] alliance, Mr Marwat used to sit on the Opposition Benches but after the break-up he decided to support the Treasury benches.

He was inducted in the Provincial Cabinet at a simple ceremony at Sindh Governor's House by the Sindh Governor, Justice (Retd) Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim.

Sindh Chief Minister Syed Qaim Ali Shah, several Provincial Ministers, senior officials and leading businessmen of the country were also present.

Earlier three Ministers of Mohajir Qaumi Movement had parted away after an understanding between MQM and IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad].

After the induction of the PPI candidate, one of the three seats vacated by the MQM candidates has been filled while there are indications that the Sindh Cabinet would be further expanded in coming days.

Soon after the induction of the new Minister the Sindh Cabinet went into a session at the Chief Minister's House in which various important matters were discussed at length. [passage omitted]

Abdul Hafeez Pirzada Joins Pakistan National Party

46000066C Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 11 Nov 89 pp 1, 6

[Article by M.S. Raj]

[Excerpt] Karachi, Nov 10: Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, Co-chairman of Sindh National Alliance (SNA) announced to join-Pakistan National Party [PNP] at a crowded Press conference on Friday.

Mr Pirzada who was the founder member of Pakistan People's Party [PPP] and the former Federal Education Minister in the PPP Government justified his decision of joining the PNP as its "basic member" and said that we would provide a "broad-based forum" for the progressive forces of the country.

He said we would all join hands and strive for our rights and weaken all such forces which are eager to weaken the democratic process.

While throwing light on the present state of affairs Pirzada bitterly remarked that both the PPP and the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] have miserably failed to deliver the goods and these past few months of the democratic set-up have led the people to a stage where they have lost their confidence in the democratic system.

Giving his views about the recent move of vote of no-confidence against the Prime Minister Benazir

Bhutto, Mr Pirzada said that two major political contemporaries the PPP and the IJI—have institutionalized corruption and the change of loyalties of the members of the Parliament after accepting huge amount as bribe had destroyed the image of the democratic institutions.

He claimed that he had proofs and could name members who sold their loyalties for money. He also criticized the lavish expenditures on the Members of National Assembly at Saidu Sharif and Murree.

Khar To Contest By-Election From Kot Addu

46000066A Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 11 Nov 89 p 1

[Text] Multan, Nov 10: President Pakistan People's Party Punjab Fakhar Zaman has said that Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar MNA [Member of National Assembly] will contest by-election for provincial assembly for his own constituency of Kot Addu.

Talking to party workers here today he urged the party workers to play their due role in strengthening the democratic government.—PPI

SAARC Urged To Surmount Regional Animosities

46000048B Karachi DAWN in English 20 Nov 89 p 7

[Article by M. V. Naqvi: "Muddling Through Difficulties"]

[Text] SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] Foreign Ministers met in Islamabad the other day. They politely discussed non-controversial matters; failed to resolve the crisis of naming the date and place of the next summit; and went home. The positive decisions were many but of no great consequence. The organisation, to all appearances, is doing well enough within its restricted scope, though few are able to notice its impact on anything or any one in particular. Its political anaemia is unmistakable. A suspicion arises: is it only weakness or is it suffering from political consumption?

Some easing of travel restrictions, just the start of the process, has been promised. A tentative beginning has been made about both cultural exchanges and trade. Here, the chief hurdle was the absence of normal relations between Pakistan and India almost since 1965; region's two biggest and populous states continue to take delight in denying each other's citizens the courtesies and treatment that are civilised countries' normal conduct. While minor visa relaxations are tom tommed, there is as yet no sign of any easing for common (poor) travellers between India and Pakistan—the only sector in the region where scope for greater travel exists—where rules today actually discourage, not to say humiliate, the would-be travellers. Ordinary Pakistanis' passports are not ordinarily valid for India; they have to get special endorsements through a time-consuming and harassing procedure before they can obtain visas and undertake a journey.

Most other areas of cooperation—exchange of newspapers, books, magazines, films, videos and cultural delegations—on a normal day-to-day basis by private citizens within the region is quite a long way off. And, despite voluminous discussions, likelihood of such exchanges between Pakistan and India is even more distant; there is nearly as great a mental blockage in respect of cultural exchanges as about trade, especially in this country. Keeping one-self isolated is somehow being seen as an advantage. How lack of life-warm knowledge about one's immediate neighbour, relations with which constitute three quarters of the foreign policy, and denying oneself the opportunity of making a direct impact on neighbours' ideas and positions is considered a meaningful-policy beats commonsense. The SAARC can certainly talk about and encourage regional tourism and cultural commonalities but, unless Pakistan and India can manage to be somewhat more civilised with each other, its efforts can achieve only partial success.

SAARC's technical good health has been ensured by keeping bilateral issues out of its scope. These however are the main facts of life and without adequately isolating and resolving those parts and aspects of the problems that realistically can be, it would be idle talk of regional cooperation in any politically or economically meaningful sense. The analogy of disease can be extended a little further. The nature of the malaise afflicting SAARC can easily be diagnosed by referring to what is only recent history: most of these states were, in fact, ruled along with some more nearby states, by the British from Delhi. In terms of cultural affinities and historical traditions, these were all parts of what should be called Historical India.

Historical India was never a single political entity; political boundaries within its cultural frontiers moved in all directions and almost constantly. Demographical diversities, in spite of the thousand and one cultural affinities, compelled divisions or emergence of separate states. In this century, passions resulting from wholly insufficient integration of various communities making up the society in British Indian Empire, not to say in all of Historical India, led to two successive partitionings.

The trouble was, people defined themselves in varying terms of religious or other ethnic communities that eventually crystallised into states, other commonalities notwithstanding. Those differing identities or communalisms—both religious and based on other ethnic particulars—had prevented the conversion of Historical India as a political unit. The same factor is keeping South Asia divided within itself. That is why SAARC is finding it hard to grow normally; those divisive passions are still strong, keeping these states distant and suspicious of one another. This is however not the place to discuss the communal phenomenon in Historical India or its latter day version: South Asia. But it is the chief causative factor that is holding back SAARC's growth as a normal regional organisation.

India-Pakistan relations are, of course, an almost lineal continuation of the old Hindu Muslim Problem. The Indo-Bangladesh relations too are, in essentials, characterised by the same continuity. Indo-Sri Lankan deadlock—now holding up SAARC's normal functioning—also originates in the communal legacies of the British Indian Empire: there is a religious dimension as well as are those of language, race and traditions (amidst plenty of commonalities) that lead not merely to the stand between India and Sri Lanka but makes the latter teeter on the brink of multiple civil wars. There is not much that Pakistanis can do about either the international aspects of Sri Lankan troubles 8 IPKF [Indian Peace-keeping Force], its withdrawal and future of Indo-Sri Lankan relations—or its internal peace and progress. But Pakistanis have a stake in SAARC, anaemic as it is; there is always hope it can, given enlightened self-interest of all, be rescued from its prolonged childhood and set on a path of growth. A certain amount of responsible and constructive approach from Pakistan PM, to whom SAARC FMs happen to have referred the matter of next summit as its Chairperson can hopefully help overcome the purely immediate crisis. Pakistanis can only wish the two countries good luck in their continuing effort to compose their complex problems; they can scarcely do anything more.

Indo-Nepalese relations too are not what they ought to be, despite their closeness. Pakistanis, both as common friends of the two and in the region's interests, would wish all success to the efforts to compose those differences, without anyone in this country making the mistake of trying to play a too active role. Even Bhutan, while having good, working relations with India, feels a certain unease in its overall relationships with its big neighbour; indeed their ties are not without stresses of their own.

All these factors impinge rather unfavourably on the regional body's chances of developing into an approximation of a desirable framework of regional cooperation. These problems that one has termed communalism or ethnic fiction are certainly not easy to solve or especially new. But other regional organisations have actually surmounted their region's animosities based on national, communal or ethnic passions that had led to wars in the past. Examples are found both in Europe and Asia, not to mention Americas.

Only two realisations are needed for that: First, remaining fixed in the old grooves of national animosities and being moved by mainly rivanchism (against past aggressions or national grievances) would be needlessly self-stultifying and destructive of everything of value. Secondly, there is far more to be gained by composing the age-old differences and hatreds (just enough progressively to cooperate in growing fields) than by indulging in age-old passions. Wars and conflicts always run in cycles that go on repeating themselves. But it is, wholly destructive and for both sides in each case. Indeed regional cooperation is the device (framework) through which not only more wealth can be created but old

animosities or suspicions can be rendered harmless, even when they do not disappear altogether. Opting for a more constructive and culturally satisfying course of regional cooperation is a sign of maturity and common-sense. Witness the subordination of national animosity between France and Germany within the EC scaffolding to their mutual advantage.

SAARC is no longer a mere infant; it should now be growing up, long out of its nappies. Unfortunately, statesmen within the region have not shown as much maturity, judgment and discretion as in South East Asia. Far too often their conduct is coloured by primary passions, leading to needless and unproductive posturing rather than constructive policy making. It is, therefore, time for the intellectuals in SAARC countries to create a climate of opinion that can enable their governments to rise above those primary passions to the common advantage of all in the region.

Maybe the exercise would help their governments to adopt options and stances that can stand them in good stead in solving their domestic confrontations.

SAARC Urged To Pay Attention to Regional Ecology

46000047D Lahore *THE NATION*
in English 9 Nov 89 p 5

[Article by Dr Akmal Hussain: "SAARC: Protecting the South Asian Environment"]

[Text] The Council of Ministers of SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation) are scheduled to meet for their 7th session in Islamabad on November 8. Whatever the differences of perception may be on politics the council can rest assured that SAARC countries would be united on at least one burning issue: Protecting the environment of South Asia. It is around this concern that considerable potential exists not only for building a programme of collective action but of actualising it in the foreseeable future.

In spite of the great variety of culture, language and perception amongst the sovereign states of South Asia, it is an undeniable fact that the geographical entity of South Asia constitutes an integrated eco-system. This is dominated by two sub-systems, namely the Himalayan Mountain System and the Seas in the South, which influence the entire region in terms of climate, the rivers, the state of soils and other vital resources. The consequence of a common ecology is that human intervention in one country affects human existence in another. For example rapid depletion of forests in the watershed areas of Nepal results in devastating flash floods in Bangladesh. Similarly deforestation in watershed areas in India results in increased soil erosion, more muddy rivers and hence premature clogging up of the dams down-river in Pakistan. Again if neighbouring countries set up thermal plants without treating the poisonous sulphur exhaust, wind currents in summer will carry the pollutants from West to East and in winter from East to

West across international borders. Finally throwing untreated industrial waste into a river upstream by one country, can cause toxicity and the consequent elimination of fish species and mangrove forests downstream for another country.

To the extent that the peoples of South Asia share the same air and in some cases the same rivers, it means that the lungs and intestines of people in one country are being affected by the way people of the neighbouring country dispose of their industrial effluents. In this sense the relationship between our peoples even where it is not visible is truly organic! Therefore, perhaps more than any other sphere the environment provides a dimension for reaching out across national frontiers in South Asia for collective well-being.

What are the specific areas in which Regional Co-operation could be pursued in South Asia? Some of the more urgent ones are as follows:

- i) Joint effort at re-forestation of watersheds, and the treatment of industrial and urban effluent waste could help reduce soil erosion, devastating flash floods and toxicity of rivers.
- ii) Sharing of bio-saline research and technical know-how on controlling desertification of soils. (For example use of miracle plants called Halogenic Phradophytes for controlling salinity.)
- iii) Sharing of know-how on ecologically sound industrial technologies and cost effective and safe methods of effluent disposal.
- iv) Sharing of information on waterflow of rivers, especially flood forecasting.
- v) Sharing know-how on earthquakes and their forecasting.
- vi) Engaging in joint projects for the development of Himalayan resources, especially the prevention of deforestation and soil erosion on the mountain slopes.
- vii) To collect, systematise and subject to scientific evaluation the traditional knowledge systems of South Asian communities which have experience of innovative techniques of conducting their economic existence in a harmonious relationship with nature.

It is important to not only share the aforementioned kinds of information at an inter governmental level, but to also diffuse it amongst national planning institutions, environmental action groups at the national levels, and finally amongst grass roots organisations. SAARC can help achieve this objective by establishing a SAARC Environmental Institute for creating awareness amongst national and local communities on the state of the environment in South Asia and its relationship with human development. An important aspect of the work of such a regional institute would be to produce a comprehensive annual report on the state of the natural and human resource base of South Asia. At the same time it

would not only diffuse information through seminars and special television/radio programmes but also help to network grass roots organisations in South Asian countries that are devoted to the task of environmental protection and sustainable development.

An issue that is integrally related with environmental protection is erosion of the human resource base in South Asia due to poverty, disease and illiteracy. This has become an issue of collective concern for SAARC after Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto made a strong plea during her speech at the SAARC summit in Islamabad earlier this year. She proposed the launching of a major collective effort by SAARC countries for a human resource development programme. SAARC could contribute to the fulfilment of this objective by establishing a Working Group composed of the finest talent in South Asia in the fields of health, engineering and economics. For delivery mechanisms it could examine prospects of developing grass roots organisations in South Asia backed up by an apex organisation to provide quick support whenever bottlenecks occur at the micro level.

An attempt by SAARC to help protect the human and natural resource base of South Asia would be a powerful cohesive force in the region. In so doing there is nothing to lose but our indifference and our lives to win!

Air Defence Command Chief Explains Capabilities

46000048D Karachi DAWN in English 22 Nov 89 p 10

[Text] Rawalpindi, Nov 21: Pakistan's air defence system is equipped with the latest laser-guided missiles and radar controlled guns with almost 100 percent capability to hit enemy aircraft.

It was disclosed by the Chief of the newly established Air Defence Command, Maj Gen Agha Masood Hasan, at the Air Defence Command Headquarters on Tuesday morning while briefing the newsmen.

The newsmen, representing national media, were explained about the capabilities of the Air Defence Command to pre-empt any attack on installation of national importance like the one carried out by Israel on Iraqi nuclear sites and to ensure safety of national assets, strategically important bases, industries and bridges against aerial attacks in war time. There was a display of the equipment, besides a promise to show practical demonstration to newsmen soon.

Gen Agha said that the Indian Air Force [IAF] was equipped with larger fleet of aircraft and helicopters. The Indian Air Force has Mirage 2000 (47), Jaguar (90) MiG 29 (50), MiG 27 (50), MiG 25 (8), MiG 23 (140), MiG 21 (590) and Sea Harrier (24). The IAF was also equipped with Russian gunship helicopters MI-24, (250), MI-8 (125), MI-25 (8) besides Alonettee-III (91).

He said that Pakistan in 1984 started implementing a plan for further strengthening air defence, which was

completed in 1989 leaving no gap on aerial frontiers to allow enemy aircraft to violate Pak territory.

Pakistan's air defence had the world's latest radars which even the NATO countries had yet to get, he added.

Gen Agha said that India had established as many as 56 bases facing Pakistan and added that currently Pakistan had no threat from its western borders after the withdrawal of Russian forces from Afghanistan.

He said that due to common borders with India and tremendous speed of new aircraft the warning time available to the defenders was about 20 seconds.

The air defence personnel deployed at the sensitive installations were empowered to hit any intruding aircraft in their areas. The Hawaldar sitting on the gun did not need to take permission to act, he remarked.

Gen Agha said that fully automated and digital system had been acquired by the Air Defence with indigenously developed facility to assemble computers and other latest equipment which could ensure detection of any introducing aircraft.

This information will be immediately fed into the radar-controlled guns or missiles to hit enemy aircraft, he added.

He disclosed that there was a major change in air defence system all over the world due to introduction of Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSM), Remote Piloted Vehicles (RPVS) and helicopters.

These, he said, could not be engaged by the aircraft.

Only Moscow and Washington had the capability to meet the challenge of SSM, and anti-tactical ballistic missile cover and facility. Pakistan too has yet to develop this facility, he added.

Regarding the helicopters and RPVS, he stated that one needs accurate and instant detection of target capability so as to ensure safety and success in any attack mission.

Israel is on record to have destroyed all the Syrian aircraft in Baka Valley, in the past, without losing any fighter. It was with the help of RPVS that such an accomplishment was possible, he said.

Answering a question, he advocated getting of AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System] system to strengthen PAF [Pakistan Air Force] to enable the force to have early warning set up to superbly defend national frontiers against the large Indian air power.

Highlighting the importance of the air defence system, he said that high-technology aircraft of the modern age had great destructive capabilities and added that in Egypt-Israel war the Israeli Air Force wiped out the might of Egypt within two days.

"It was very essential to have a deterrent force, which could ensure safety", he observed.

To a question, he said, Pakistan with the blessings of Almighty Allah could properly defend its frontiers and strategically important installation jointly with the air force.

He said that all air force bases were being protected by the capable Air Defence Command.

The newsmen were shown missiles that included Pak-made "Anza", U.S. built Stingers and the latest laser-guided missiles. (RBS 70 plus). The guns which were on display included single barrel 37 MM gun. Three different types of radars were also witnessed by the newsmen.

Army Not Responsible for Ojheri Blast

4600056B Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 13 Nov 89 pp 1, 6

[Article by Kaleem Omar]

[Text] Rawalpindi, Nov. 12—The commander of 10 corps, Lt. Gen. Imranullah, who headed the technical inquiry into the Ojheri ammunition dump disaster on April 10, 1988, denied at a Press briefing at the corps headquarters here on Sunday that the army had anything to do with Ojheri, which, he said, was being run by a covert agency, for the sole purpose of supplying weapons to the Afghan Mujahideen.

It was Lt. General Imranullah who was the person charged with conducting the technical inquiry into the disaster.

His inquiry committee completed its report less than a month after the Ojheri explosion occurred and forwarded its findings to the then Interior Minister, Aslam Khattak, who had been appointed by Gen. Ziaul Haq as the Chairman of the Cabinet sub-committee on political aspects of the Ojheri dump disaster.

Mr. Khattak's committee, in turn, completed its own findings a few days later, and submitted both reports to the then Prime Minister, Mohammad Khan Junejo.

On April 20, 1988, Mr. Junejo had assured angry members of the National Assembly [MNA] that the government would not try to cover up the facts of the Ojheri dump disaster or protect those found responsible for it.

Not satisfied with his assurance, several MNAs demanded the appointment of a Supreme Court judge to conduct an inquiry into the tragedy.

More than 17 months later, however, the reports of Lt. Gen. Imranullah's committee and Mr. Khattak's committee have still not been made public, nor is there any indication that they ever will be. Moreover, the demand for a judicial inquiry, too, has continued to be ignored.

Recently, Mr. Junejo told journalists that it was "not in the public interest" for the findings of the Ojheri inquiry reports to be disclosed. In saying this, he was overlooking his own earlier solemn assurance to MNAs on the floor of the National Assembly that there would be no "cover up".

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's government, too, seems to have decided that Ojheri is now a non-issue that does not need to be gone into. But the loss of human lives will never be a non-issue.

At Sunday's press briefing, Lt. Gen. Imranullah told journalists that explosions like the one at Ojheri could occur anywhere. He cited an ammunition dump explosion in the US and a series of explosions at ammunition dumps in the Indian city of Jubbulpore as examples.

What he was not willing to explain, however, was why the Ojheri ammunition dump had continued to be located in the middle of a densely populated area, instead of being shifted to a safe distance out of the town.

When journalists pointed out to him that following the huge ammunition dump explosion near Lahore in 1970, the authorities had announced that all such dumps in Pakistan would be shifted far away from populated areas, Lt. Gen. Imranullah said he was aware of this fact as he had himself been posted as a major in Lahore at the time.

The Lahore dump, which was an army installation, had indeed been moved to a safer location shortly after the explosion occurred, he said, but added that he could not say why the same had not been done in the case of Ojheri.

In any case, he said, the loss of life caused by the Ojheri explosion was a "small price" for the nation to have to pay for having been instrumental in "driving a super-power out of Afghanistan."

Asked if there could be another Ojheri-type explosion in the future, he said "people will know it when they hear it."

Economy: Importance of Indigenous Thinking Stressed

46000047C Lahore VIEWPOINT
in English 9 Nov 89 pp 33-35

[Article by Jamil Rashid: "The Foreign Factor in Economic Planning"]

[Text] The economy of Pakistan is quite simple. It has been made complex by the degree-holders of foreign universities with training in econometrics. These economists try to build models from what they learnt in the advanced economics of industrialized countries. Some U.S. economic historians called cliometricians have made life difficult for the students of economics by producing fancy models of the past for use in the present through applied econometrics. Both are unrealistic in solving the economic problems of the ordinary people.

When young students are sent abroad, it is implied that Pakistan ought to learn from foreign models. It may be acceptable, to an extent, to study courses in natural sciences and advanced technology. But economics is a discipline ingrained in the socio-political system of the society where it is utilized. Training in economics would

mean the total understanding of that system, in which students are taught. This is where the problem arises.

Civil War Model!

For instance, the U.S. cliometricians would teach economics in counter-factual arguments. One of their models is built on the American civil war of 1865. It argues, through econometric models, that the civil war was too costly, compared to the open market exchange of slaves for freedom. In the same vein, R. W. Fogel, a Harvard cliometrician wrote *Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery* (1974), using econometrics to show that American Black slaves were better off than the White free workers in the open market where competitive wages gave them a life much below the poverty line. Slaves were better fed, although in captivity. Does that give a parallel in mortgaged economies, where nations are fed under the captivity of loan-givers?

Yet another exercise which has produced many Ph.D. students is the counter factual argument that the U.S. railways were built expensively in relation to the cost-benefits of transportation by the Great Lakes across the northern part of the American continent. These models are defended in the name of training graduates in the techniques of econometric analysis of historical facts. Unconsciously, they were confirming what Joan Robinson, one of the great economists of this century, had said—that neo-classical economics would be taught in the departments of economic history after fancy models had produced nothing but confusion and collapse of the system. With their accumulated capital, many of these economists in capitalist countries play games, building models.

In Pakistan, economists trained in such techniques play with the real but simple problems of daily life. Going through the official documents prepared by these foreign-trained economists, there is ample evidence of confusion, of jargon mixed with economic terminologies. The *Economic Survey* (1988/89, Islamabad) produced statements such as the following:

(i) "The Survey draws upon numerous sources of information; nevertheless the final presentation does not necessarily represent their views" (Economic Adviser)

(Note: people have views, information is just given; these sources are usually World Bank or reports from various U.S. officials etc.)

(ii) "Policy measures undertaken by the Government helped in curbing the rate of inflation, improving revenue collection, eliminating bank borrowing for budgetary support and improving export performance. The economy was gradually placed on stable growth path".

(Note: this is all done within the first six months of a new government; further, apart from the misplaced terminologies, the statistics produced in the main text do not show any of these aspects of turns in Pakistan economy.

The following without comment:

(iii) "Side by side, the emphasis will be on measures for alleviating poverty, ensuring a wider dispersal of the opportunities and benefits of economic development, improving the prospects for employment, education, health and social services for all"

(iv) "A 30 percent literacy estimated for the year 1988 hinders prospects of socio-economic growth"...

(vi) "Unemployment which is now threatening to disrupt social harmony is under focal view".

Then, the Seventh Five-Year Plan 1988-93 (prepared by Dr Mahbubul Haq, before his departure for errands in the World Bank), which is still the document for the present Government, proclaimed:

"There has been an essential continuity in the process of economic planning, since the inauguration of the First Five-Year Plan in the late 1950s. This continuity has been maintained despite a seven-year interregnum during the 1970s when medium-term planning was abandoned in favour of annual budgeting....The Sixth Plan, which made a decisive shift to a laissez-faire philosophy, and now the Seventh Five-Year Plan, have been prepared as sequel to previous plans, and exhibit this essential continuity in approach and policies, despite their unique features...Both five-year plans and annual plans, by contrast, are documents of an advisor nature".

Syed Mahdi Mustafa is a practitioner in economics at the National Bank of Pakistan. He has written a book, *Focus on the Pakistan Economy* (Royal Book, Karachi, 1989). He did his B.A. (Honours) and M.A. in political Science from the Dhaka and Karachi universities, respectively. He has one year to his credit in training in public administration from London; otherwise his learning and practices in administration are ingrained in the soil of this country. He writes in simple language and without pretence, although his sources remain the Pakistan Economic Surveys and the similar documents. He is editor of the *Monthly Economic Letter* to the National Bank of Pakistan, and Executive Vice-President for Economics and Business Research Department of the Bank.

A Collection

The book is a collection of his 26 articles on the economy of Pakistan, written in various Pakistani newspapers and magazines over the past two to three years. It is divided in four sections:

(i) The Economy of Pakistan;

(ii) Agriculture and Industry;

(iii) Foreign Trade, Aid and External Indebtedness;

(iv) Finance and Development.

In all his articles, he emphasizes that Pakistan's economy is suffering from three key structural weaknesses—high rate of population growth; low rate of savings, and

adverse balance of payments, including high debt liabilities. But then, there are echoes of the official documents when Mahdi Mustafa writes: "Pakistan's growth achieved during the last 10 years (1978-87) has been accompanied by a low rate of inflation which is an achievement of unparalleled significance" (p. 14).

He goes on to say: "While Pakistan's economy has grown by a remarkable annual rate of 7 percent per annum during the last decade, the fruits of this growth have not equitably been distributed amongst various sections of society. The Planning Commission has itself reported in a tentative study that during the last seven years the rich have become richer while the fate of the poorer sections of society has really not improved."

Three Myths

There are three myths to be demystified. First, Pakistan has unique structural problems; second, the type of development which takes place is divorced from income distribution, and some goodwill from the rich will correct such imbalances; and finally, that the private sector will bring miracles once the public sector is dismantled under the programme of privatisation.

Economies which are analyzed through their structural imbalances tend to overlook that any structure is not God-given. Raw land and unskilled labour are the rudimentary elements of an economy on which historical capital is built. How land, labour and capital are inter-mixed and build structural impediments depend on the mode of production and social relations in operation. The mode of production, feudal or capitalist, would only change if there is a free flow of historical development, and how a system is allowed to progress internally.

Pakistan's economic and social structures are a combination of internal and external forces at work. Historically, it has been shown that check on population growth is related to economic and social developments accompanied by a higher literacy rate. Each of these factors cannot be separate structures of the economy: they are inter-linked to the over-whelming fact that the country has not freed itself from the colonial mode of operations, in which foreign factors play a dominating role in keeping the economy under-developed. Pakistan depends heavily on foreign loans and aid, along with the savings of its overseas workers. For a neo-colonial State like Pakistan, structural imbalances will persist for many years to come. It is a smokescreen when the IMF advisers talk of structural adjustments. There is a hidden agenda of pushing up interest-bearing loans from capitalist countries.

It is not surprising when Mahdi Mustafa quotes the Pakistan Economic Survey (1986/87) for a comparison of domestic savings as a proportion of GDP [gross domestic product] in 1984 as follows: Pakistan 4.2 percent; India 22 percent; Burma 17 percent; Bangladesh 4 percent; Kenya 20 percent.

What is rather confounding is that Pakistani economists trained in neo-classical economics have not yet figured

out why savings are in inverse relationship to personal income in this country, when economic theory shows that savings should increase in relation to higher income. Dr Mahbubul Haq and Shahid Burki, the two bright stars of the World Bank, usually say with pride that Pakistan is on the verge of entering the middle-income status of \$400 per capita. This is in comparison to the other over 100 countries which are above us. The simple point is that many of our economists mix cause and effect without recognising them. For instance, poverty is the effect of a certain type of economic system and is not the cause of creating under-development.

Economic Surveys and Five-Year Plans are quoted to show that income distribution is skewed towards the better-offs in Pakistan. This is not unusual as all countries under a capitalist economic system, whether the U.S.A. or India, have similar income distribution statistics, no different from Pakistan's. The top 20 percent, on average, have 45 percent of the income; the lowest 20 percent around 5 to 8 percent and so on. Of course, in absolute amounts there is a vast difference. But does it matter much if a \$400-per capita income is distributed more equitably? The idea is to increase the size of the total cake and distribute it equitably. But that demands a new system.

There is another myth—that with the economic growth of 7 percent in the past 10 years, industrial labour is doing well and indeed that Pakistan has already alleviated poverty. Of course, the fact is disregarded that some of the countries with lower per-capita income have a higher life expectancy than the people of Pakistan. This is due to better public social sectors than we have in Pakistan.

To quote Mustafa, who has taken his cue from official handouts, "industrial labour in Pakistan in the last decade or so derived new strength from the newly found markets of the Middle East between the earlier part of the seventies to the mid-eighties. Large scale employment opportunities were available to the industrial labour...(implying, emigration produced better industrial relations). How could emigration of skilled labour give strength to a country where industries are short of skilled labour? The so-called high economic growth figures are boosted by the inflow of foreign remittances of workers and interest-bearing short-term capital inflow.

The lower-income groups which include industrial labour is miserably low paid, without social benefits. Mustafa has visited a number of factories in Karachi, Lahore and many others in third world countries. The Pakistani industrial workers has one of the lowest wage levels and social security benefits. Under the so-called privatization plans, contract labour is the order of the day in all countries.

Just one more quote will give the flavour of how administration looks at labour relations in Pakistan:

"While changes in the social sector have been profound enough, one must also take note of the changes which have taken place on the economic front. The exploitation of the labour force at least in the urban industrial areas

cannot be so conveniently resorted to as was say about two decades.... Unfortunately the women labour force have not been able to organize themselves as effectively as their male counterpart. The results, amongst other things, is the continued exploitation of women labour force, who are paid lower wages than industrial male workers and are often required to put in extra hours of work without due compensation in the form of over time etc.," (p. 90).

With whatever shortcomings, Mahdi Mustafa's book should be read by economists and administrators in Islamabad to see how their documents are utilized in the departments of banking research. The author of these collected articles is honest about how he gets his information. It will be useful reading for those who should be concerned to write simple books on economic problems for ordinary people to understand. But no economics book or article should be divorced from the system in which an economy operates. For us, there is a lot to be learnt in that direction.

Government-Backed Stability Required for Private Investments

46000047B Karachi DAWN in English 28 Oct 89 p 5

[Editorial: "Improving Investment Climate"]

[Text] Against a background of large-scale unemployment, the sixth meeting of the Board of Investment accorded approval the other day in Islamabad to proposals envisaging an investment of Rs 5,142 million in the chemicals, engineering, medical equipment and fertiliser sub-sectors. According to the Federal Minister for Commerce, industrial projects sanctioned since the formation of the Federal Government entail investments of the order of Rs 20 billion, over half of which is to come from foreign sources. Given the sympathy generated abroad for Pakistan's nascent democracy and the aid in the pipeline, the availability of foreign funds is said to be more or less assured. There is much scepticism, however, concerning the mobilisation of the rupee component of the capital outlay involved. Hamstrung by a massive federal budgetary gap, the public sector would be hard put to it to find the needed money. More so because, under an agreement with the International Monetary Fund, the budgetary deficits have to be almost halved—from 8.4 percent of GDP [gross domestic product] in 1987-88 to 4.5 percent in 1991. The implementation of the accord will further strain the public sector's liquidity position. Under the circumstances, resource mobilisation in the private sector assumes greater importance. But this sector has so far shown little enthusiasm about investing in a big way in new projects. Contrary to official claims and assurances, it continues to harbour serious misgivings about the prevailing investment climate.

Apart from the availability of fiscal incentives, trained man-power, and the necessary infrastructural facilities, what the private investor looks for is the security of capital and the profitability of venture. The outlook does

not look very encouraging to the average investor. The tussle between the Centre and Punjab raises genuine fears of political uncertainty, if not outright instability. The lack of an adequate infrastructure, especially electricity, creates serious problems for the industrialist. In Sindh, there is the additional factor of the law-and-order situation. Daily reports of robberies, murders and kidnappings for ransom, besides ethnic and student riots, all contribute to a climate hostile to economic growth. The gravity of the situation might be judged from the rumours of large-scale flight of capital from the province. In the absence of any mechanism for monitoring inter-provincial movement of capital, there is no way to ascertain whether there has been a flight of capital on a significant scale. But the fact is that strikes, riots and curfews in Karachi and Hyderabad have hit industrial production and there are reports of a slump in economic activity. While the bigger units may be managing to survive, the small and medium-scale industries, unable to pay for their fixed overheads during closures for whatever reasons, are said to be facing a difficult situation. While incomes remain more or less static, inflation and the rise in the prices of the necessities of life are reducing the purchasing power of consumers of manufactured goods, thus affecting turnovers.

The economy now appears to be the victim of a vicious circle in which the prevailing law-and-order situation tends to discourage investment while without investment there is little scope for remedying the situation. Claims that things have improved and will improve further do nothing to end the economic stalemate. The most suitable course would be to sit down with those central to the problem—businessmen and industrialists—and listen to their apprehensions. The public sector alone cannot run and develop the national economy. The private sector has to play a very vital role. What we need is a vibrant and healthy private sector. If in spite of the assurance that there would be no nationalisation (in fact, the Government shows itself keen on privatisation), the industrialists do not come forward to undertake new enterprises, it is something which provides cause for concern. A dialogue with the industrialists would reveal that what is bothering them in Sindh is the crime situation. Unless the government shows determination to crack down on violence and crime and produces concrete results, the industrialists' fears will not be removed, and they are hardly likely to pour their money into projects whose success in the circumstances they are not sure about.

Farm Policy for the 1990's Discussed

46000047A Karachi DAWN in English 28 Oct 89 p 5

[Article by Sartaj Aziz: "Farm Policy for the 1990's"]

[Text] In historical terms the global record of agricultural performance in the post-war period has been unprecedented. The expansion in irrigation and the impressive technological advances have led to a sustained overall increase in agricultural production.

The most outstanding achievement of this period has been the ability of the world to feed itself better, despite a 50 percent increase in world population in the past three decades with a sufficiently large margin to rebuild stocks.

There are certain regions like sub-Saharan Africa where per capita consumption of food has remained stagnant at 2,050 calories per day between 1960 and 1985, but for the world as a whole food availability for direct human consumption has improved from 2,320 to 2,660 calories per day during this period.

In the developing countries food availability for direct human consumption has increased by 23 percent from 1,960 calories per day in 1961 to 2,420 calories per day in 1985. In 35 developing countries, with 52 percent of the total population of developing countries, the per capita calories supply now exceeds 2,500.

The second important aspect of this impressive record is the progress made by many important developing regions, particularly during the past two decades. Asia and Latin America, with 85 percent of the total population of developing countries, have managed to keep the growth of their agricultural production ahead of their population growth and have successfully adopted modern agricultural technology in many sub-sectors.

On average, wheat yields in developing countries have increased by 77 percent in the past twenty years and rice yields by 41 percent. The yield potential of these new technologies is still considerably larger than that actually realised in developed and developing countries. It can, therefore, be confidently predicted that the world as a whole is not likely to face any global food shortages in the foreseeable future.

Thirdly, there has been a welcome shift in policies in favour of the agriculture sector in the developing countries as a result of the food crisis of the 1970s and the debt crisis of the 1980s. The developed countries, somewhat belatedly, are also reconsidering their agricultural policies to make them more rational and less dependent on government support.

Negative Features

This record of positive achievement must be balanced by drawing up a list of negative features and failures.

The first and, perhaps, the most important failure has been Africa where the agriculture sector has not seen many technological improvements in farming or water management and where macroeconomic policies have remained adverse for the agriculture sector. As a result, the growth of agricultural production has not kept pace with the rise in population and per capita production fell between 1970 and 1988 by 1.1 percent per annum.

The second important failure has been in the area of food security for the very poor. Even in countries with a good record of agricultural production, a significant

portion of the population remains hungry and malnourished. Progress achieved in the past twenty years in increasing food production has not been matched by a corresponding improvement in food consumption. In fact, in some countries, particularly in Latin America and Africa, rapid economic growth has been accompanied by a worsening pattern of income distribution and a growing incidence of poverty and under nutrition.

Thirdly, the farmers of this benefitted much from the transformation of agriculture that has taken place. Apart from occasional two- or three-year spurts in prices, the prices of most basic agricultural commodities like wheat, rice, maize and sugar have been declining in real terms throughout the past century.

Unlike the manufacturing sector, in which gains from higher productivity have accrued at least partly to industrial workers through higher real wages, productivity gains in agriculture from higher yields and lower costs have gone partly to the consumers and partly to land values. The farmers have faced persistently adverse and declining terms of trade.

In the developed countries, governments have often come forward to help their farmers by providing subsidies but in the developing countries the agriculture sector has generally been taxed to promote industrialisation. This has further compounded the suffering of farmers in developing countries, resulting from the secular decline in real prices of agricultural commodities.

Fourthly, the policy environment for international trade in agricultural commodities is generally unfavourable. This is partly because many governments have been trying to protect the income of their farmers by restricting imports and subsidising exports to keep domestic prices at a higher level. This has led to structural surpluses for many commodities on the one hand and greater instability in the international markets on the other. In fact, the violation of certain basic principles of economics has been at its worst in the agriculture sector.

Finally the environmental cost of the program achieved seems to be increasing. Apart from the dangers inherent in the overall increase in carbon dioxide and acid deposition, the intensification of agricultural production in the past two decades is directly leading certain negative ecological effects. These include leaching of nitrates into groundwater and soil contamination resulting from the overuse of fertilizers, pesticides and other agricultural chemicals in the developed countries and deforestation and soil degradation in the developing countries.

The present rate of deforestation is estimated by FAO [United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization] to be about 10 million hectares per annum, which is 0.5 percent of the total area under tropical forests. Unless these problems are tackled effectively and in a timely manner, it will be difficult to sustain the productivity of the agricultural sector for future generations.

Agricultural policies will figure prominently in the agenda for development and international economic relations in the last decade of this century. The main focus of this agenda should be three-fold:

- First, how to initiate the process of agricultural transformation in developing countries which have not experienced such transformation so far, and to sustain and strengthen the process in countries in which it has already been initiated;
- Second, how to provide food security to all the people living on this planet before the end of this century; and
- Third, how to improve prospects for agricultural trade and replace the present system based on inward looking protectionist policies by a more open and multilateral framework within a more unified global economy.

Each of these objectives involves a wide range of policy options, some straightforward and relatively easy to implement, and others very complex and politically sensitive. It is not possible to present in a single document a comprehensive discussion of all the policies and their implications, but it would be useful to underline briefly some of the more important policy options in relation to these objectives that would be relevant and meaningful for most countries.

Agricultural Production

Out of 95 developing countries for which the World Bank and FAO publish regular data, about half the countries have already demonstrated their capacity to achieve and maintain average agricultural growth rates higher than 2.5 percent per annum, i.e., a positive per capita growth in agriculture. In the remaining half, apart from occasional good crops as a result of favourable weather conditions, longer term agricultural growth does not seem to be keeping pace with their population growth. As a result, the average increase in agricultural production for all developing countries in the period 1961-85 has been lower than the growth in their demand.

Throughout the past three decades, notwithstanding the importance of the agriculture sector in the economy, governments of most developing countries have followed policies that discriminated against agriculture. This was not a deliberate policy choice but resulted indirectly from efforts to industrialise as fast as possible behind high tariff walls and by shifting the profitability of investment from agriculture to industry.

After the food crisis of the early 1970s, many developing countries undertook policy reforms in favour of agriculture with very good results.

The debt and economic crisis of the 1980s has also demonstrated the positive contribution a healthy agriculture sector can make in minimising the impact of an economic crisis. There is need, therefore, for a systematic review of macroeconomic policies in each country to determine their positive and negative impact on the agriculture and food sectors. The proposal to undertake

structural adjustment reforms for food security would provide a valuable opportunity for such a systematic review.

The nature and scope of policy reforms would obviously differ in relation to the stage of agricultural development which a particular country has reached, but in all countries there is need to eliminate any significant negative protection that may have been imposed on the agriculture sector through exchange rate, fiscal or trade policies.

It is, therefore, very important to maintain a positive flow of resources to the agriculture sector in the initial phase, to raise its productivity, by making investments, both financial and human, in irrigation, rural infrastructure and agricultural research. Once an upward trend in agricultural productivity has been maintained for some time, there would be an automatic transfer of resources through the price and fiscal mechanism to the non-agriculture sectors.

Any attempt to syphon off resources from agriculture, before agricultural productivity has been raised, would kill off the farmers' incentive to innovate or invest and would inevitably lead to stagnation in both agriculture and non-agriculture sectors.

In the next phase, as agricultural productivity per worker rises, there will be opportunities to divert a part of this surplus, through taxation or the price mechanism, to develop the industrial sector, but it is equally crucial to allow a part of the surplus to be reinvested in agriculture to realise further gains in productivity and to improve the efficiency of the sector. This will help to raise the profitability of agriculture and attract private investment in such activities as seed and fertiliser production; production and hire of agriculture machinery, plant protection and agricultural marketing services.

In the third phase, the agriculture sector will gradually become more integrated with the rest of the economy as in response to changing demand patterns, the agriculture sector becomes more diversified from cereals to higher value products like edible oil, fruits, vegetables and milk and meat. These sub-sectors have much stronger backward and forward linkages with the rest of the economy and need a more developed infrastructure like rural roads, electricity and processing facilities. If these improvements can be brought about on an adequate scale and in a timely manner, there will be valuable opportunities for diversification and rural industrialisation, which will not only raise rural incomes and purchasing power, but also provide new avenues of employment in rural areas.

The transition of agriculture through each of these three phases requires different policy approaches and institutional support. In the first phase, the emphasis has to be on public investment in irrigation, infrastructure and research. In the second phase, the supplementary role of private investment by farmers and by-business men becomes more important. But such investment will not take place if the agriculture sector has low profitability.

Increased flow of credit and the role of agricultural price policies become more important in this phase. A price support policy, for example, will assure the farmer of a minimum price for his produce, even if there is a glut in the market.

In the absence of such an assurance the farmer is unlikely to make larger investments in new technologies or take the risks involved. There are many practical obstacles in determining appropriate prices and setting up an efficient procurement, storage and disposal system for different commodities, but these have to be overcome in the light of actual experience which is no fairly rich. It is equally important to learn from the experience of developed countries and not allow the price support policies to move too far away from the price signals generated the market. If the price support policy is generally kept in line with trend international border prices (ignoring year to year fluctuations) it can accomplish its main objective of giving remunerative prices to farmers, without involving subsidies.

As already mentioned, the system's ability to retain a market orientation is greatly enhanced if there is steady gain in agricultural productivity because in that case, support prices can be reduced, if necessary, in response to market signals, without reducing net returns to farmers.

In the third phase, many other macroeconomic policies have to be brought in line, to maintain agricultural growth without worsening income distribution and large scale migration of rural labour force to urban areas. Apart from an active land reform policy, where feasible, the credit policy can promote small scale agro processing facilities in rural areas, preferably owned by the growers themselves. Special efforts can be made to channel technology and resources to small and medium sized farms and livestock units, in an effort to prevent the large commercial farms from preempting most of the profitable opportunities for agricultural diversification that will arise in this phase.

In all these phases of agricultural development, the evolution and spread of appropriate technologies remains a key element. With major technological breakthroughs and the advent of biotechnologies, the advanced countries of Europe and North America are preparing to move into the 'post-modern' age of agricultural technology.

But many developing countries have not even made the transition from a primitive to a semi-modern system of agriculture. Perhaps in no other field of human activity is the technological gap so great. This gap must be telescoped in as short a period as possible by strengthening institutions for agricultural research and extension, for the delivery of inputs and for marketing.

There will be need for much larger investments in these activities and for training the required expertise according to the requirements of each country or region. One specific proposal presented in the paper urges

multilateral and bilateral donors to finance national agricultural research projects in low-income countries on a grant basis, because of the long gestation period of such projects.

Even in countries which have made the transition to semi-modern agricultural systems, there is need for much larger expenditures on research and extension and for the dissemination of the results of research through modern means of communications like radio and television. They must strengthen their capacity for keeping track of developments in biotechnology and to initiate their own efforts according to their own priorities. At the same time, they must learn from some of the mistakes of modern agriculture to reduce its reliance on agricultural chemicals and agricultural practices that damage the soil or the environment.

If the interactions between policies, institutions and technology are positive and mutually reinforcing and are backed by the required infrastructural investments, agricultural productivity can increase very rapidly in most developing countries with very favourable implications for growth, employment and exports. In the developed countries, on the other hand, the key priorities for the next decade are to increase the market orientation of their agricultural trade policies and to reduce the negative environmental consequences of intensive agriculture.

Winter To Worsen Privations in Kabul

46000067A Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 11 Nov 89 p 8

[Text] London, Nov 10: As the severe Afghan winter approaches, apprehensions are rising in Kabul that the capital's two million residents will suffer the same privations as last year, if not worse.

The international relief workers doubt that the food reserves laid in by the Najibullah regime will be adequate. The Mujahideen, who have been besieging Kabul since the Soviet forces left, count on demoralizing the urban dwellers and the army to the point that the regime may collapse.

By early October, wheat prices in Kabul already were approaching the peak levels they had reached at the height of last winter's shortages. Prices have been rising rapidly since July, according to merchants and buyers.

Said a diplomat in Kabul: "This winter is going to be worse than last year because income has lagged way behind the average 300 percent rise in the price of foodstuffs".

Urged by its Soviet advisers, the regime appears to have finally mustered the energy to stockpile supplies for the coming winter to minimize impending privations which could be compounded by the Mujahideen blockade and impossible snow-bound roads.

The principal grain silo in the city, with a capacity of 52,000 tons, reportedly is nearly full with donated Soviet wheat. Wheat is being brought in by round the clock Soviet supply flights and large truck columns down the Salang road.

Foreign relief workers and diplomats said the minimum needed to keep the population fed, they say, is 100,000 tons of wheat. And even government officials concede that fuel for heating, cooking and transport is going to be very scarce.

Relief officials are especially concerned about those Kabulis who have no special standing with the authorities such as pregnant and nursing mothers and young children. "The vulnerable groups will be the last in line—that's who we are worried about," said Ross Mountain, Kabul representative of the United Nations development programme.

Shortages of fuel and transport appear to be even more critical than food, officials and Soviet advisers acknowledge a severe shortage of trucks and spare parts. Negotiations are being carried on with Czechoslovakia for emergency deliveries of trucks and gasoline tankers.

Kerosene, the Afghans' traditional cooking fuel cannot be found even in the black market. Diesel fuel is being used as a substitute, but supplies are running out.

A Kabuli, who said he slept one night in the street in the fuel queue and expected to spend another one before he could fill his five liter can, blamed the shortages on the government. "These are the problems caused by the (SAU) revolution", he complained.

Kabul sources say that one reason why conditions may be worse this year is the departure of the Soviets. Last winter the city was full of Soviet soldiers eager to sell anything on the black market. This year they are gone.

Punjab Government Accused of Harassing MNAs

46000068B Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 10 Nov 89 pp 1, 8

[Text] Bahawalpur, Nov 9: Makhdoom Syed Alam Anwar, an IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] MNA [Member of National Assembly] has alleged that police have registered baseless cases against him and are harassing him on the directive of Punjab government for voting against no-confidence move against Premier Benazir Bhutto.

Talking to APP [Associated Press of Pakistan] here on Thursday he alleged that Liaquat Pur Police have registered five baseless cases against him following the failure of no-trust move and when he arrived here from Islamabad yesterday police tried to arrest him.

Giving details he said prior to leaving for Bahawalpur he contacted D.I.G. Bahawalpur, Tahir Anwar Pasha on phone from Islamabad who informed him that cases registered against him had been "freezed" and he would not be arrested. But when he arrived here and was on his way home from the airport a police party chased and

tried to arrest him. He said he went back to the airport where-from he contacted the higher authorities on whose directives police let him go home.

He said three more concocted cases have been framed against him by police station Garanda Mohammad Panah. Condemning the Punjab Government for adopting negative tactics to harass elected representatives, he said he would continue to play his role in thwarting undemocratic moves of the Opposition.

Meanwhile, the police have registered 10 cases against seven personal servants of Mian Ghulam Mohammad Ahmad Maneka, IJI MNA, on the charge of possessing heroin, charas and illegal weapons.

Mohammad Boota, Rashid Ahmad, Noor Mohammad, Ghulam Mustafa, Mohammad Asgher, Abdul Haq and Maqbool Ahmad, held for keeping 55 grams heroin, 70 grams charas and two illegal pistols.

The police had apprehended two servants from the residence of Ghulam Ahmad Manika.

The police after registering cases sent them to jail on judicial ramand.—APP

Islamic Women's Inheritance Rights Analyzed

46000048A Karachi DAWN in English 18 Nov 89 p 5

[Article by Mushtaq Ahmad: "Women and Law of Inheritance"]

[Text] Equating religion with rites, rituals, customs, and superstitions has been a traditional drawback of the Muslim societies. Traditions in any society are hard to die; in ours they persist under the relentless influence of orthodoxy and unrelenting pressure of self-interest. Separating the chaff from the grain is the true function of the preacher. Feeding the flock on the chaff and keeping the grain to oneself amounts to a distortion of truth and a confession of hypocrisy.

I would have avoided recourse to such an analogy but for the conversation some senior journalists had with an old and revered Muslim League leader in his posh apartment on what was then called Victoria Road. He was seated on a sofa in communion with his flock from his evacuee property estate in Sindh, squatted on the floor. The mission of the writers was to brief him on a television programme, popularly known as Pakistan in Retrospect.

In the midst of the discussion the leader remarked that the flock must follow the shepherd. Rudely shocked and alarmed, we cautioned him against the use of such a terminology in the interview in his own and the party's interest. What we considered wholly unpalatable food for thought for an enlightened TV audience, was and still is, a constant refrain heard from the pulpit every Friday. On a lot of issues our attitudes are conditioned by ulterior motives. We quote and misquote scriptures to sanctify them. The maulvies and the mullahs can be relied upon to contrive and

concoct them to qualm the conscience of the sinners and lift the drooping spirits of the innocents.

Significant for the male-dominated materialistic society are the views about women on their rights and duties, duties more than rights. Held in high esteem in theory, in practice they are treated no better than serfs, speaking of the generality of their kind. It was revealing for me to learn that in China there are separate mosques for women where prayers are led and sermons delivered by their own species. What was even more revealing was that the practice has existed for centuries, probably since the advent of Islam in the region. The role visualised for them by Islam is not subservient to men but coordinate with them; despite their distinct and diverse spheres of activity.

Political emancipation of women is a much later development in the West which has marched ahead of us. We, however, pride ourselves in claiming that Islam was the first religion to have conferred on women the right to property. That claim is by no means unjustified, loudly proclaimed as it is in the laws of inheritance which accord to daughters one-half of the share to which the sons are entitled in parental property and to the mother one-eighth. That was a revolutionary step forward toward equality of the sexes taken fourteen hundred years ago, which became a reality in the West in the twentieth century. The latter was a consequence of the political awakening of women whose demand for equality men were powerless to resist if for no other reasons, for the perpetuation of their political dominance. That dominance still persists, judged by the appallingly low percentage of women in Politics and government. There has been a steady and even rapid advance towards the attainment of parity in several fields of national endeavour, especially in the liberal professions where they have shown their mettle and in others outshone their male counter-parts. The tendency though not equally noticeable in Muslim societies with rare exceptions has become increasingly assertive in Pakistan in science, medicine and engineering which were once considered typical male preserves. Besides education, banking and law they are making their presence felt in industry and commerce.

Their numerical inequality does not prove the much trumpeted validity of the assumption of inferiority. On the contrary, it establishes the potential for equality, given the opportunity for its realisation.

The headway they have made in the fields from which they were shut out on the plea of their incompetence is, however, not a function of a reassertion of their religious rights; it is a result of their own professional and managerial proficiency. Religion was not a driving force, nor did it act as a deterrent to their advance, against which the outcry of the antediluvians fell on deaf ears. All this goes to confirm that the fact of illiteracy was a formidable barrier which was mercilessly exploited by reactionary forces, for whom superstition was a convenient institute for religion. Access to its enlightened principles was literally bared to the millions who could neither read nor write.

The flocks were fed on the hay which they had to chew with unquestioning reverence. Societies both in the urban and the rural sectors were class-based. In the urban sector the basis was secular. A lot of property in the urban areas has now come to be owned by women not by virtue of the divine law of inheritance but by dint of the man-made laws of taxation. It serves the material interests of the new rich to keep their newly acquired riches by whatever means acquired, in the names of their spouses whose number might vary from one to four. Mostly the ownership is fictitious since their management and control rest firmly in the hands of the husbands.

In the agrarian areas while women in the lower strata are active participants in economic activity in the sowing, and harvesting season they are treated more as helpers than wage earners without remuneration in kind or cash. Either landless labourers or owners of uneconomic holdings they don't have much property to bequeath to their sons and daughters on death. Subdivision and fragmentation at that level is a natural consequence of inheritance among the male issues. Even in the landlord class where the division and dispersal of landed property should have taken place under the unparalleled operation of the law has not come about thanks to its circumvention of the male-dominated land-owning aristocracy.

Our statistical departments and the land commissions appointed from time to time, have not maintained a record of the sex ratio in the landowning community. If they have the break-down it has never been publicised. The presumption is that the overwhelming majority of them belong to the other sex.

No scientific analysis has yet been made scrutiny of the persistence of feudalism in the Muslim world. On careful scrutiny it would be traceable to the denial of rights of the recognised share holders in property and its resultant concentration in its present owners. The pretext advanced for the phenomenon is the women's incapacity to manage it. Right or wrong women's own incapacity to assert their claim against the usurpation of their rights is responsible for the deprivation. While it is true that the law of inheritance would not have eliminated the curse of feudalism, its enforcement to a considerable extent would have softened its rigours and rectified the injustices large and extensive estates tend to perpetuate. In the Ayub Land Reforms of 1959 and the Bhutto Reforms of 1972, roughly 5,000 and 10,000 landlords had filed their declarations of land holdings. Few, perhaps none among them were women. But for their systematic exclusion from inheritance, there would have been no justification for the demand for provision of 1,400 produce index units to each of their female dependents. The demand was conceded by the Martial Law Regime although it was not so much a concern for the beneficiaries as for the lands the declarants wanted to salvage from the clutches of the law and keep it in their own control under whatever name registered.

The defiance of the law shows the duality in our character. On the one hand it is maintained that the Shariat

Law is superior to the secular law of the West, and on the other an attempt is made at a collective level through individual action to circumvent it. The well-to-do communities violate the mandatory provisions and the unscrupulous among them abuse the permissive ones.

The custom of marrying four wives is a glaring instance in point. It would not be violative of religious precept or principle to compel a husband to provide security to his divorced wife and yet the law is so interpreted as to deny her the right to seek the protection of the court. Muslim society, particularly in the sub-continent, has been more orthodox than contemporary societies in the Muslim World, especially Turkey. The demise of the Ottoman Empire was not a signal for its secularisation. Islam was reinstated in the Turkish Constitution as the State religion without erecting barriers to country's modernisation programme which proceeded apace so that it could catch up the West.

The progress of Turkish women is a marvel of the Muslim world only if we care to look at the degree of equality she has attained. In certain segments women of the United States lag behind her, particularly in law and medicine. Over 40 percent of the doctors are women against 11 per cent in America.

When I asked a woman police officer who had come to the Administrative Staff College, Lahore, what happens to her husband's posting in the event of her transfer, she replied it takes place simultaneously. Equality of the sexes is not incompatible with the tenets of Islam. Polygamy has been abolished in Turkey and so has the right to inheritance between the males and the females been equalised.

In a recent judgment the Supreme Court has lamented the plight of the untutored rustic women who are deprived of their rightful claim in property of their parents by the male members of the family, strongly urging the welfare voluntary organisations to come to their rescue. The courts can redress a grievance only on a complaint lodged by a petitioner.

In the plethora of cases where property is the subject matter of litigation, petitions of this nature are few, too few to be even noticed by the prosperous legal profession or reported by the Press. A government headed by a woman Prime Minister, cannot be a silent spectator to the perpetration of an abominable injustice.

Commentary Says Benazir Should 'Chart a New Course'
46000048C Karachi DAWN
in English 22 Nov 89 pp 7, 10

[Commentary by Ayaz Amir: "Will She Chart a New Course?"]

[Text] Not even the most diehard supporters of Prime Minister Bhutto can say that her troubles have come unannounced. No administration's failures and blunders could have been more richly catalogued. No Prime Minister could have received more ample warning about the direction her government was headed.

But it is equally true that no administration could have paid less heed to what was being said about it. It went about its business (if the mishaps of the last eleven months can be called business) with a firm belief in its infallibility. If any echoes of criticism penetrated the walls of the Prime Minister's secretariat, they were attributed to the malevolence of the party's unreconstructed enemies.

The no-confidence motion, therefore, came as a rude shock to the Government. It revealed, apart from anything else, wide swathes of disaffection in the ranks of the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] parliamentary party itself. Never mind that the move was ultimately defeated, as much by the PPP's last-minute efforts as by the Combined Opposition [COP]'s overweening confidence (the gods not taking kindly to hubris of any kind). But it did shake to the roots not the country as the Prime Minister rather plaintively alleged (let's hope the country's foundations are made of sturdier stuff) but the PPP's Olympian sense of complacency.

When the mobs shouting for the Shah's blood filled the streets of Teheran towards the end of 1978, the Shah was genuinely astonished. It was beyond his powers to fathom the extent of the bitterness his rule had excited. Mercifully, things in Pakistan are not quite constructed on the epic scale of the Iranian revolution. But the analogy with the Shah's Iran holds in one small respect. Amidst the splendour of his court he was cocooned from reality. For the past eleven months Ms Bhutto too has been cocooned from reality.

Forget about political updates from the intelligence agencies. If the Prime Minister had read only her newspapers regularly and been half as sensitive to them as to the ravings of the Western media, she would have had a better idea of what was going on beyond her secretariat. Not that our newspapers are scattered with pearls of wisdom. But at least they reflect something of the heat and dust of the outside world. Speaking to one of the better and more literate members of the outgoing government, I asked him whether he used to read newspapers regularly. "Only the headlines," was his enlightening answer. If one is to believe some of the things said in Islamabad, things were not vastly different with the—Prime Minister herself. Nor does she have the advantage of having a good and efficient information set-up around her person. Apart from one or two exceptions, her information whizz-kids are a pretty depressing lot.

Now, of course, the chickens have come home to roost. The Cabinet which made a name for itself by being the most unwieldy in the nation's history has slunk less than gloriously into the shades. The Advisers, too, have gone, the good and the bad together because impelled by God knows what strike of misjudgment Ms Bhutto made so many of them that the whole idea became a grand joke, spreading ridicule throughout the land. The no-confidence motion has now brought about the belated recognition that something needs to be done. Which means that the lessons the Prime Minister might have

imbibed when the going was good and the fates not malignant are now having to be learned in a much more painful manner.

For the first time in eleven months Ms. Bhutto has discovered the great truth that in a parliamentary system of government, any government, howsoever powerful, ultimately derives its power from Parliament. So the glitterati who make up the muscle of the parliamentary PPP and whose support was hitherto taken for granted have come suddenly into their own, giving free rein to their tongues and forcing the panjandrums of this Government to sit up and listen to their complaints. A first lesson in humility for the panjandrums and a relishing experience for the MNA [Member of National Assembly]s.

But the question every self-styled sooth-sayer is asking (and attempting to answer in his fashion) is whether Ms Bhutto can undertake a drastic reform and change the disastrous course of the last eleven months. No one can really say. She has a chance to reshuffle her Cabinet and, hopefully, to trim it. But she must know that she doesn't have too many cards to do the reshuffling with. There are two components of the PPP parliamentary party—PPP old-timers and the band-wagoners who joined the party in time for the November 1988 elections. If too many old-timers stay on (the ones, incidentally, who have been the most criticised in recent days) the newcomers stay disaffected. If too many bandwagoners are taken into the Cabinet, the ideological character of the Government (which is already much tarnished) will undergo a further change.

For it should be remembered that administrative incompetence has been only one side of the PPP's tale of misfortune. The total absence of any sense of direction or a broader policy framework has compounded the PPP's difficulty. Turning a mass party once fired by a certain sense of idealism into a crowd of power-seekers little better than the Muslim League. The Jamaat-i-Islami stands for something, the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] stands for something, and the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] stands unabashedly for the status quo. What does the PPP stand for? The trouble is that as a ruling party, even if its goals are vague, the PPP is still under an obligation to provide a minimal standard of good government to the country. But it is in the ext of good government that the PPP's most glaring failures lie [as published].

So the question acquires added urgency: can the lady retrieve something from the ruins? Yes, provided she herself undergoes a refresher course in tactics and strategy. Many of the mistakes of her government have mirrored her own personality and her own rather unique style of government. If her Advisers or Ministers have been a disaster, it is she who chose them. If the PPP's campaign against Nawaz Sharif rested on unsound assumptions, it was she who failed to see as much. If Balochistan has turned into a bastion of opposition to her rule, she cannot blame the stars alone for this outcome. And if she relied on bad advice to exacerbate the Sirohey affair and otherwise alienate the President, it was her own judgment that was at fault. Ms Bhutto has

veered from one extreme to the other: either too suspicious of people and therefore reluctant to delegate responsibility or too trusting and therefore ready to follow advice even bad and self-defeating.

It has been said that the no-confidence motion confronted Ms. Bhutto with her most serious challenge since coming to power. That is not entirely correct. Defeating the COP move was comparatively easy. Changing her style of government will be infinitely harder. The historical record in any case is not very promising. Since January 1984 when General Zia-ul-Haq freed Benazir Bhutto from detention and allowed her to go abroad, her career can be divided into three phases: from January 1984 to the beginning of 1986 during which period she tried to reorganise the PPP from abroad; from April 1986 when she returned to Pakistan till November 1988 when elections were held and from the moment she assumed power till today. Examined closely, her performance in all three phases has not been one of unquestioned brilliance.

Her efforts in London to instil new fire and purpose into the party did not succeed. Senior party figures either left the party or were side-lined and Ms. Bhutto herself retreated into semi-isolation behind a wall of trusted but fairly incompetent advisers. Her homecoming in April 1986, marked by huge public meetings and rallies, was triumphant. But the high tide of approval that this signified had dissipated by the end of the year. An ill-conceived movement against the Junejo government in August ended rightly in failure. Defeat by a by-election that the PPP walked into in Mian Chunnu cast doubts on the party's electoral invincibility. In 1987, the PPP decided to contest the local elections but fared badly in them. Indeed, by the beginning of 1988 it seemed as if the Junejo government had successfully defused the PPP's challenge to its authority. Reprieve for the PPP, however, came with General Zia's dismissal of the assemblies in May 1988. But even the run-up to the elections was marred by a faulty distribution of party tickets (something for which the party is still paying a price). As for the third phase, from the assumption of power till today, it needs no amplification. Had it been any good, things would not have come to such a pass.

So the challenge is not simply to reshuffle the Cabinet but to disprove the conclusions of the past. Is the lady equal to the task? It is easy to say time will tell but it must be realised that not much of it is left.

Commentary Discusses Asghar Khan 'Third Political Force'

46000061A Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 19 Nov 89 p 3

[Text] While the efforts of Air Marshal Asghar Khan, President Tehrik-e-Istaqlal may not have met with much success in the realm of politics so far, he seems to be pursuing his chosen path with a certain degree of determination. In his address on Friday to the newly elected central council of the Tehrik-e-Istaqlal, Mr Asghar Khan announced yet another bid for the creation of a third

political force in the country in anticipation of mid-term elections. The purpose being to provide people with an alternative political platform. Regardless of whether elections take place before schedule, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the idea of a third force in national politics.

The polarization between the country's two major political groupings, represented by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), has now reached alarming levels and conciliation between the two—despite pious avowals on both sides—still seems fairly remote. At a more basic level there is a growing sense of disillusionment among the people not just with this or that party, but the entire framework of representative and democratic politics as their problems and needs go largely unattended. They are, in any case, quicker and harsher in their judgement of a democratic system for the simple reason that expectations from it are much higher. When it fails to deliver accordingly, cynicism sets in quickly. In such circumstances a third force could play an important role. However, its creation is easier said than done.

A mere alliance among disparate parties does not create a political force. The Tehrik's own alliance, for instance, with the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) and the Junejo Muslim League (JML) forming the Pakistan Awami Ittehad (PAI), prior to 1988 elections, could not emerge as an alternative, due to differences over such basic issues as land reforms, status of women, etc. It should, therefore, be clear to the Air Marshal as well as others interested in such a development in our national politics, that it is futile trying to cobble together a third force out of parties that are vastly disparate in their orientation, programmes and objectives. An alliance of this type is relevant only if the sole objective is to dislodge a particular government and take power. But it will obviously fail to post a genuine alternative to the people in terms of policies and programmes.

If Mr Asghar Khan wants to succeed on this score he should be encouraged in his labors, for the effort is likely to have a salutary effect on the general state of our politics—pushing the other parties to improve on their performance. But it is an uphill task. He will have to eschew alliances of convenience with those who do not agree with the socio-economic agenda of the Tehrik. He may well, in doing so, lose members of his own party whose patience—out of power—must surely be running thin by now. Nevertheless such is the task. A credible third force can only come into being if it registers among the people as a superior alternative otherwise they will prefer the comfort of choosing between the options—with all their faults—that they are familiar with.

Commentary: Human Rights Are for Kashmiris Also
46000060 Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 10 Dec 89 p 4

[Text] Human Rights Day is being observed today with the usual run of speeches and pious declarations to mark the

occasion. How much of all what is said and pledged vis-a-vis the various articles of the universal declaration will ultimately see any fruition is a matter of conjecture. As on most other such solemn occasions, the level of platitudes and rhetoric is much higher than normal because there is need to prove by words, if not by deeds, how deeply we are moved by the meaning of the occasion.

Of the thirty articles of the Declaration, many are of a nature that need to be appreciated within the national context, as the existing circumstances in certain fields impinge on the spirit of these articles. These cover legal rights, employment, improved quality of life, education, etc. The comprehensiveness of the articles is such that it goes much beyond the run-of-the-mill manifestos of the political parties, with their profundity of promises. Perhaps, the politicians would do better to adopt some of the articles of the Declaration as the basic principles of their parties, instead of going through the exercise of drawing up their own blueprints, which get bogged down in inane generalities.

At the international level, the articles of Declaration have equal importance, as these directly deal with some of the burning issues of the day like Kashmir and Palestine. In both cases, the people of these areas have arbitrarily been deprived of the benefit of several articles. The thematic aspect of many of these articles aims at annulling the last vestiges of colonialism and neo-colonialism and ensuring the rights of the people to their own lands. The continued Israeli occupation of the homeland of the Palestine people and the refusal of the Zionist state to recognize their nationality contradicts much of the spirit of the Declaration.

The same can be said about the people of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. India still holds by illegal occupation the greater part of the state and has blatantly refused to fulfil the resolution of the United Nations which calls for a plebiscite to determine the future of the state. The United Nations, which is also the moving spirit behind the Declaration of Human Rights, should exercise its duty as an arbitrator in the dispute to ensure a fulfillment of its own resolution. Failure to do this will not only permit grave illegality to continue in the shape of Indian occupation of Jammu and Kashmir, but nullify much of the spirit of the Declaration.

It would be unfortunate indeed if such an important document as the Declaration which aims at upholding the rights of man, remains a dead letter, merely because there are powerful forces which believe otherwise. It is not only the Palestinians and Kashmiris who are still deprived of the basic freedoms ensured to them by the United Nations, but countless others, as in South Africa, where the clock of their freedom has not kept pace with that of the rest of mankind. It is for the comity of nations to not only merely affirm the noble principles enshrined in the Declaration of this day, but also to act upon them, so that this will be a better world for all of mankind.