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Weizmann Talks in Moscow Reported
44230079A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 7 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by Nahum Barne'a]

[Text] It is the Institute for International Relations of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, a multistoried building in Moscow. Two of Gorbachev's closest advisors graduated from this institute. Last weekend, the institute invited its panel of experts to a political discussion with Minister Weizmann.

Alexander Kislov, director of the Institute for the Study of Peace, assistant director of the International Soviet Institute, and an expert on Middle East affairs led it. He served in Cairo and knows all the current Arab leaders personally.

The Soviets summarized their talk by saying that as long as there is no movement in Israeli Government policy, there will not be full diplomatic relations.

Weizmann: "Why does Egypt have diplomatic relations with Israel and direct airline flights and the Soviet Union does not? If you establish relations, you can be partners in the political process. If you become part of the solution, it will only improve your situation with regard to your Muslim minority."

"We have a problem," answered the Russians. "The majority of public opinion is against you. In the eyes of middle level officials and below in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the United States is still an enemy, and Israel is its satellite, a symbol of the enemy. Given that, why should we do so?"

"The Israeli Government must help us. It must do something: an international conference, for example. Shamir is the main obstacle.

"The problem for the Americans is getting rid of Shamir. We are not asking your opinion about this."

"I am not even smiling," Weizmann responded. "Assuming that you are right—and I am not saying you are right—even so, you ought to be directly involved, like the British, the Italians, the French, since they are strongly critical of Israel. Why are you operating in a clandestine way?"

"The problem is the territories. What do you call them? Liberated?"

The Russians were asked if they were trying to influence the PLO to modify their views.

"Certainly. We are trying to convince them to arrive at a political agreement. We are against terrorism. But you need to know that the only partner you have is the PLO. Now you have 'Arafat to deal with. Within a few years, you could be dealing with someone less desirable."

Kislov told of meeting with George Habash many times. "He is a tough man," he said, "but his word is good."

Weizmann said that he is a great admirer of Gorbachev. Could the bloody revolution conducted by Gorbachev continue, he asked. Will there not be a counterrevolution?

The Russians spoke candidly. "We have to hope that we have passed the point of no return, but the situation is very serious. Not everyone supports Gorbachev's policies. We have problems in all the Baltic countries, a severe problem in Azerbaijan on the Iranian border. There will be more and more economic strikes. The economic situation is very tense."

Weizmann was questioned about problems in the Middle East. "Begin and Sadat furthered perestroika," said Weizmann. "Now we are living in a period of antiperestroika, and it may get worse. In my opinion, the greatest contribution to security is peace."

Weizmann was asked how Soviet policy is viewed in Israel. "We have the feeling that if Syria decided to initiate a military operation, you would not support it, and that is a good sign."

When Weizmann worried about whether to agree to the compromise which Yitzhak Rabin proposed, which kept him in the government, an unequivocal message came from Rabin's office: "Go. Don't be upset." And it appears that with the passing of time, Weizmann feels better in Moscow about remaining in the government in Jerusalem.

The warm atmosphere has restored 'Ezer Weizmann's old charm. At the dinner which was planned in his honor by the heads of the academy for sciences, in which six of the members of the Supreme Soviet participated, he told jokes from his conversations with Sadat and from the period when he served in the Air Force. This was not the same crushed 'Ezer Weizmann seen during the crisis of his dismissal.

Article Lists Threats to Islam, Counterstrategies

90OA0281A Cairo LIWA' AL-ISLAM
in Arabic 30 Dec 89 pp 12-14

[Article by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Qaddus]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The most important challenge which the Islamic current must confront is the destruction and devastation of the Muslim human being. This is stressed by Professor Muhammad Mahdi 'Akif, a Muslim Brotherhood leader, a member of the People's Assembly, and a planner of the demolition being undertaken by local forces in numerous Islamic countries, with planning and incitement, of the forces of world colonialism, which has numerous forms, and which uses convoluted methods that nonetheless have a deep effect regarding the destruction of the existence of Muslims.

The alteration of education curricula is prominent among the forms of destruction found in more than one Islamic country (in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and others), all of which aim ultimately to weaken the creed of the Muslim by distancing him from the Koran and the Prophet's *Sunna* [the Prophet's sayings and doings established as legally binding precedents], and by replacing all of the Muslim's history, religious ideals, and different Islamic symbols with temporal slogans and principles and man-made doctrines. You will find this in different levels of education. Efforts are being made to westernize education and to adopt Western educational principles, such as the theories of Darwin and others, even if time has transcended them. Those responsible for our affairs think that anything from the West is correct and that Islam must be removed from education.

The media in numerous Islamic countries has the same aim, namely to westernize the Muslim instead of shaping the nation based on Islamic values and ideals.

Countermeasures

Professor Muhammad Mahdi 'Akif explains the measures which the pious must take to confront this intellectual, economic, and political destruction. The first measure needed is tireless action to remove the barrier of fear of tyrants and despots and to sanctify, in all of its meanings and dimensions, the freedom of the human being, which God, the sublime, may He be praised, gave to his servants. It is also necessary to oppose anything that violates our God-given human dignity, whose sanctity must be made higher than that of the Kaaba. This is a starting point. We must also resist any police regime that does not recognize the freedom and dignity of the human being.

The second measure needed is the drafting of alternative programs for everything pertaining to educational, informational, cultural, and economic policies.

An important step which must be achieved in the confrontation is the cohesion of the masses. The propagandists of Islam must act everywhere in the service of the people—the simple people, lightening their burdens and

informing them of the facts so that they will ultimately become the voice of truth that calls on the rulers to obey God's commandment. Also, Muslim youth must stand firm in the face of anything incompatible with God's law, first as individuals, then collectively. The ultimate goal is for public opinion to become a strong Islamic rock on which all of these poison darts break.

Writer and Islamic thinker Dr. Muhammad 'Imarah thinks that the 1990s will be filled with challenges to the Islamic current. If we examine the international changes now occurring in Western states, we find that the enormous transformation to which Marxist ideology and the communist regimes have been subjected represents a retreat for the comprehensive totalitarian mode in Western civilization, to the credit of the liberal mode. In other words, the schism that occurred in Western civilization more than 70 years ago is now healing over. Consequently, this area of conflict from which the Third World, including the Islamic countries, has benefitted, is declining and moreover disappearing. The unity of Western civilization is the unity of a front of Islam's cultural and historical enemies.

Dr. Muhammad 'Imarah added, "More than ever, this great international change presents the Islamic world with the task of forming a distinctive cultural alternative able to compete with the Western model. This is the main challenge facing the Islamic current in the 1990s."

Dr. 'Abd-al-Mun'im Abu-al-Futuh, a prominent young person of the Islamic current, and the secretary-general of the Physicians' Union, believes that scientific progress and catching up with scientific progress is the most outstanding challenge facing the Islamic current. The Islamic current must dedicate many of its efforts to this challenge. The Islamic model that is needed as an alternative to Western civilization cannot succeed in an economically and socially weakened state that depends on the East and West for importing all of its needs! The main foundations of success of the Islamic state, which the Islamic current hopes to establish, include self-sufficiency in food, weapons production, and other needs, so that this state is not dependent on others.

The enemies of Islam will never permit this. This is the difficult challenge of the Islamic current.

Dr. 'Abd-al-Mun'im Abu-al-Futuh explains what he means, saying, "The problems and challenges facing the Islamic current are closely tied together locally and internationally. World colonialism has agents in numerous countries of the Islamic world, from which they derive sustenance, and on which they depend in a basic way. If we want true internal reform, it is necessary to reexamine foreign relations, especially the favored relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. Colonialism will not permit this. It will oppose this with its different forces, which comprise information systems and agencies and secularists deployed in primary positions, who were raised on Western cuisine and hatred for all that is Islamic."

Credibility of the Ruling Regimes

Justice Tariq al-Bushra believes that recognition of the Islamic current by the ruling regimes is a problem that must be overcome in the 1990s. True, the call to Islam does not generally lack intellectual and social legitimacy in the perception of public opinion, and the Islamic current has a firm existence by virtue of reality and the historical steadfastness that it has enjoyed. However, the extent of recognition given by the state's legal structure in this connection remains a problem which has its results and effects.

Justice al-Bushra states that this recognition furnishes evidence of the credibility of the slogans that these regimes promote regarding freedom and democracy. However, the continued disregard of a true force in society damages the core of the ruling regime's credibility and spreads anxiety and tension in the basic structure of this society.

The great Islamic thinker, Tariq al-Bushra, turned his attention to an important matter, stating that the political struggle in Egyptian and other societies has reached a stage of polarization, meaning that different and differing political powers have come to adopt their positions on the basis of attitudes toward Islam and secularism rather than on the basis of social, economic, or political policies. This is even true with respect to political forces that maintain that political rather than doctrinal attitudes should be the basis for adopting positions. This situation differs from that in the late 1970s for example, when attitudes toward Israel, economic independence, and other issues had priority in sorting out the political forces from one another, rather than ideological attitudes.

Dr. 'Abd-al-Wadud Shilbi, a canonical law expert and theologian of al-Azhar, and a propagandist of Islam who has travelled the world advocating Islam and unity, states that the danger of missionary activity is the most serious challenge facing the Islamic current in the 1990s. Crusader swords have not perished, but have returned anew to wreak havoc and destruction in Islam's domain. However, this time, they have appeared in a new, sparkling guise that conceals the viper's head, the cat's claw, and the knife of the butcher and murderer! Sometimes, they act directly through the churches. In most cases, they hide behind a multiplicity of signs, which read school, university, shelter, or sanatorium, or behind attractive slogans which speak of gentleheartedness.

They offer the false in the form of the truth, error in the name of guidance, and a poisonous infusion in the form of medicine!

It is worth mentioning that Dr. 'Abd-al-Wadud Shilbi has written a book about the danger of missionary activity entitled "The March on Mecca." In his introduction, he quotes verbatim the following remark made against Islam by the fanatical, American missionary, Robert Max: "Our efforts to Christianize the Muslims will not cease until the cross is raised in the skies of Mecca and Sunday Mass is established in Medina." Their words have become too big for their mouths; they are the dreams of devils.

The Islamic propagandist emphasizes that the problem of southern Sudan was caused primarily by international missionary forces. The churches there play a basic role in provoking discord and igniting war. The World Council of Churches exercises a significant influence on the rebel front. The fanatical West and the Communist East are behind the rebel John Garang, whom they supply with money, weapons, and different types of aid. If the matter were in the hands of the Sudanese themselves, the problem would be solved. However, the international forces conspiring against Islam insist—through the rebel movement which they finance—on eliminating the Islamic *shari'ah* [Islamic law] from Sudan, establishing a secular state, and causing the disappearance of the Muslim majority's rights and *shari'ah*, just as they disappeared from the East African states of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Ethiopia. All of these states have Muslim majorities, but the conspiracies of colonialism and missionary activity have swept the Muslims away and removed them from leadership positions.

The Unity of the Islamic Current

Engineer Abu-al-'Ala Madi, the "dynamo" of the Engineers Union, is certain that the most important challenge now in the Islamic arena is the Afghanistan problem. He hopes, God willing in the beginning of the 1990s, for a Mujahidin victory over the communist government, especially after the shock dealt to communism throughout the world. He hopes that the Mujahidin succeed in establishing a true Islamic government on the land of 'loved Afghanistan, and that the Islamic jihad reaches Muslims in the southern Soviet Union, so that they may become liberated from the Kremlin's red rule, which is oppressing the freedoms of Muslims there with iron and fire.

Quest for New Jerusalem Patriarch Set in Motion

46000083 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 9 Feb 90 p 10

[Article by Haim Shapiro]

[Text] The dark-robed figures of Armenian priests and bishops who make their way through the vaulted passages of the Armenian monastery in Jerusalem will soon be preoccupied with the quest for the next Armenian patriarch of Jerusalem.

Yeshighe Derderian, the incumbent since 1960, who had occupied the position on a temporary basis for 10 years before that, is to be buried on Sunday and a temporary successor will be chosen after the funeral. Then, 40 days later, according to church regulation, the new patriarch will be elected.

To the outside observer, there might seem to be more exalted posts in the Armenian diaspora, serving communities that are larger, wealthier and more prominent. But for one of the historic Christian churches, there is nothing to match the fact that in Christian tradition the archbishop of Jerusalem is the direct successor of Jesus.

Indeed, according to one tradition, the Armenian Cathedral of St. James, inside the monastery of the same name, marks the resting place of James, "the brother of the Lord," who was second in the line of succession, after Peter.

Even if this were not the case, Jerusalem is still a centre of pilgrimage for the entire world. In the Armenian world in particular, the Jerusalem community, though small, is not only deeply religious, but highly committed. It has withstood the cultural assimilation that has beset other Armenian communities in the West.

The choice of the patriarch is in the hands of the Brotherhood of St. James, which includes priests and bishops who have graduated from the Jerusalem seminary, the leading Armenian theological seminary in the West. There are some 50 members of the brotherhood, of whom about 15 live here, with the rest spread throughout the Western world, including the U.S. and Canada, South America, Europe and Australia.

Many Armenian church leaders from abroad have already arrived for the funeral. Some of them may be expected to remain in the country for the election of the patriarch, but others will return home where they will not be able to vote. Since 24 members of the brotherhood constitute a quorum, the 15 local churchmen could be the deciding factor.

All this might have been of little interest outside the esoteric world of church politics were it not for two factors, one within the Armenian community of Jerusalem, the other outside it. The external factor is, of course, the intifadah, and the continuing pressure on local church officials to speak out on behalf of the Palestinians.

Though the Armenian patriarch is probably the least political of the leaders of the three historic churches, his signature has appeared on many of the public statements condemning Israeli actions in the territories. The signature is important because any action by the heads of these three churches is regarded as especially significant.

Within the community, the elections are coloured by the bitter struggle that took place some eight years ago, in 1982, when the patriarch deposed Archbishop Shahe Ajamian, who had hitherto been his second in command. At the time, some Israeli officials had expressed the view that Ajamian was a special friend of Israel and that his removal represented a swing in the church away from the Jewish State.

Before his fall from power, Ajamian was one of the most flamboyant and colourful clerics in local Christian circles. A friend and adviser to Israeli officials said a man of great personal polish and charm, Ajamian is an accomplished speaker of many languages, including Hebrew. He also possesses considerable wealth. A robbery at his home in 1980 netted the thieves an estimated \$1m. in personal property.

After the Six Day War, the urbane archbishop seemed a perfect address for Israeli officials seeking contacts with the church. This was especially true because the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy appeared to take a doctrinaire view in its relations with Jews, and the Greek Orthodox Church seemed wary of contacts with outsiders.

After Ajamian was deposed, the Interior Ministry refused to extend the visa of another Armenian church official, Grand Sacristan Archbishop Karekin Kazanjian, who had come from Australia and had entered Israel as a temporary resident. In the Armenian Church, the move was seen as an act of retribution and an attempt to pressure the patriarch into reinstating Ajamian.

The dispute did not remain at the church and governmental level, but spilled over the Armenian lay community, with rival factions attacking each other with increasing vehemence. Each side accused the other of initiating the violence and each claimed that the police favoured their opponents. In 1986, an Armenian who was reportedly not even involved in the clash, was killed in a knife-fight outside his home near the patriarchate.

The reason the community got involved in what would appear to be a church matter traces back to the Armenian Holocaust of 1915, an event that has been no less traumatic for the Armenians than our own Holocaust has been for the Jewish people. In the aftermath of the Armenian massacre, thousands of refugees converged on St. James Monastery in Jerusalem and took up residence inside its walls.

Today, in the overcrowded conditions of the compound, there is little privacy. Though there is some separation between the living quarters of the clergy and those of the

lay people, they still come into contact daily, if not hourly. Everyone in the compound, religious and secular, must be inside by 10 p.m. every night, when the massive doors of the monastery are locked shut. The physical closeness tends to make the community more cohesive, but it also tends to make any falling out that much more bitter.

In the aftermath of the dispute, Ajamian was expelled from the Brotherhood of St. James. The patriarch also forbade him from entering the monastery. Ajamian challenged the ban in court and lost. The court ruled that he could only enter to attend religious services. Ajamian suffered another setback when he was arrested in connection with the case of former Interior Ministry district representative Rafi Levy, who was eventually convicted and sentenced to three years' imprisonment on fraud charges.

Though Ajamian was eventually released and granted immunity after he agreed to testify against Levy, the arrest seemed to have improved relations between Israeli officials and the Armenian church hierarchy. Indeed, at one church reception, onlookers were amused to note that a large number of the guests were members of the police criminal investigation squad.

Last week, only hours after the death of the patriarch, Ajamian returned to his flat inside the monastery with armed bodyguards. He said that he and the patriarch had had a reconciliation shortly before the latter's death and that the patriarch had withdrawn the ban on entering the monastery and agreed that the expulsion from the Brotherhood of St. James was illegal.

Ajamian denied that he was a candidate for the post of patriarch. Indeed, it would appear to outside observers that even if he were to be readmitted into the brotherhood, his chances would be slim. It is believed that had he quietly accepted his fate when he was deposed, he might now have a considerable number of supporters, but the fact that he conducted an open dispute now appears to count against him. His appearance with armed bodyguards inside the monastery, where weapons are traditionally banned, is also said to have shocked and angered many church officials.

A far more likely choice, say insiders, is Archbishop Guregh Kapikian, the principal of the Armenian school and acting patriarch until a temporary replacement is chosen after the funeral. He is quiet and unassuming, and is said to be a deeply spiritual figure.

But it is not certain that the new patriarch will come from Jerusalem. All members of the brotherhood are eligible. One figure from abroad whose name has been mentioned is Archbishop Serobe Manookian, who formerly served in Paris and now heads the church in the eastern U.S. During the dispute over Ajamian, Manookian was sent as the personal representative of the world head of the Armenian Church, Catholicos Vazken I, to try to solve the problem.

Meanwhile, it appears that the government will follow a hands-off policy, in contrast to 1982. It would also be in contrast to the period prior to the Six Day War, when the Jordanian government interfered in the internal affairs of the Armenian Church to an even greater degree.

In 1950, after the previous patriarch died, the Jordanians favoured Derderian. When his opponent seemed to have a majority, the Jordanians simply loaded the opposition up on jeeps and dumped them at the Syrian border. It was in the aftermath of this action that Derderian served in a temporary capacity for 10 years before being elected patriarch.

The Israeli government, on the other hand, seems to have learned from bitter experience that interfering in church affairs has unforeseen and often highly unpleasant repercussions. Such action is also likely to result in lasting bitterness against Israel.

Israel Lippel, a former director-general of the Religious Affairs Ministry and an expert on Christian affairs, said he was happy that the government had finally learned its lesson, after the experience of eight years ago. He noted that it was Religious Affairs Minister Zevulun Hammer himself who assured the leaders of the community that his only interest was in facilitating the smooth functioning of the elections.

Despite these assurances, however, the government does have a role to play. According to the regulations of the Armenian church, the choice of patriarch must be approved by the head of state. In the past, it was King George V and King Hussein who granted their approval. This time it will be President Chaim Herzog.

Jerusalem Patriarchs

There are three historic patriarchs of Jerusalem—the Greek Orthodox, the Armenian and the Latin—but there are considerable differences in the way the incumbents are chosen and their role in their respective communities.

The highest profile has been that of the Latin patriarch, especially since the incumbent, Michel Sabbah, is the first Palestinian Arab to be named to this position. Sabbah has, in turn, been forthright in expressing his sympathy with the Palestinian cause.

But the Latin patriarch is also, in a sense, the weakest of the three, because he is appointed by the Pope. Though he has a certain freedom of expression, it is the Vatican which sets policy. His powers are also limited by the fact that another Roman Catholic official is considered to be of equal rank. That is the Custos, head of the Franciscans, who are the official guardians of the holy places for the Roman Catholic Church.

The Greek Orthodox patriarchate, which dates its lineage back to the founder of Christianity, is the oldest of the local churches and as such takes precedence in

symbolic functions. Though the patriarch of Constantinople is considered to be the leading Greek Orthodox churchman, he is the first among equals and certainly the head of the church in Jerusalem has a very important role.

More crucial, perhaps, is the fact that he has the power to appoint and dismiss church officials. Though little was said about it outside the church, the incumbent, Diodoros I, carried out a virtual revolution in personnel. He also embarked on an ambitious building programme which has been curtailed as a result of the intifadah.

The Greek Orthodox patriarch is elected by the local synod of bishops, but once elected, he serves for life.

Azeri Deputy Accuses ArSSR of Sending Arms to NKAO

*46050011A Istanbul JAMANAK
in Armenian 16 Jan 90 p 1*

[Excerpt] Michel Perlman reports to MILLIYET from Paris:

Rustem Ibrahim Begov, an Azeri deputy in the Soviet parliament, has alleged that trucks inscribed with the emblem "Aznavour: Aid to Armenia" are transporting arms from Soviet Armenia to Karabakh.

According to a report on the midday news program of Channel 5 of French TV, Begov said at a small public gathering that the said trucks were sent to Armenia as part of the international relief effort after the 1988 earthquake.

Charles Aznavour, the internationally known singer of Armenian ancestry, initiated an relief campaign for Armenia after the earthquake and called it "Aznavour: Aid to Armenia."

Ibrahim Begov said: "The situation is very tragic. The Soviet Union has lost control; it does not do what is necessary. Some trucks are transporting arms from Armenia to Karabakh. What I am surprised at is that, although the entire world contributed a large amount of aid to Armenia, these trucks are inscribed with 'Aznavour: Aid to Armenia.' I do not think that Aznavour allowed that."

During the same public gathering, Henri Papazian, a representative of the Armenian Dashnak Party, described the situation as "serious" and after expressing his deep concern disclosed that volunteers from various countries around the world have gone to Karabakh to help Armenian self-defense forces. Stating that these volunteers come from Armenian Diaspora communities in, for example, Canada, Lebanon and France, Papazian blamed the Soviet authorities for failing to ensure the security of the Armenians in Azerbaijan.

In reaction to the events in the Caucasus, Charles Aznavour made a declaration on France-Info radio and said: "Do not forget that the Azeris are Turks."

Stating that he has sent a telegram to Soviet leader Gorbachev demanding that the army intervene to help [the Armenians], Aznavour said: "I think that these incidents are reminiscent of the massacres that were perpetrated in Turkey in the past. In the future, they will come and tell us that these things did not happen. What has happened is always denied, but history repeats itself. Do not forget that the Azeris are Turks." [passage omitted]

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Limits Set on Israeli Arab Pilgrims to Mecca

44000220 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 25 Feb 90 p 5

[Text] The Jordanian and Saudi governments have decided to limit Arab pilgrims to Mecca from Israel to 3,000 for security reasons. Limits have been set for all countries. Six thousand, three hundred, and fifty have registered for the pilgrimage with the Israeli Interior Ministry this year. The chairman of the organization dealing with the matter, Shaykh Husayn Abu-'Ali, broadcast a request on Israel radio's Arabic service to the Jordanian and Saudi governments asking them to reconsider their decision regarding limiting the number of pilgrims. He also said that until 10 years ago Israeli Muslims were not allowed to make the pilgrimage and that there were therefore many people wishing to do so for the first time for themselves and then for their parents who had died without making the pilgrimage as a result of these restrictions.

POW Question Reportedly Stalls Libya-Chad Talks

45000095 London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 12 Feb 90 p 7

[Text] The Libyan-Chadian talks have reached a dead end in spite of the efforts of the two sides' friends. Informed circles say that the reason for the talks' failure to proceed goes back to a deep difference over solving the two countries' prisoner of war [POW] question. The Chadian authorities felt that no less than 800 Libyan soldiers who were POW's had joined the Libyan opposition and consequently were no longer POW's. Libya however insists on considering all Libyans in Chad to be POW's.

Sudanese Soldiers Turn Down Compensation From Gulf War

90OL0216A London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 1 Jan 90 p 22

[Article: "Sudanese Seek Approval for Relinquishing Their Rights; Iraq Values the National Initiative"]

[Text] Iraqi President Saddam Husayn has ordered that a number of Sudanese citizens who had so volunteered, out of their deep brotherly feelings and their commitment to their responsibility and national duty toward victorious Iraq under the leadership of its hero President Saddam Husayn, not be cut from remittances.

105 Sudanese citizens had sent a letter to the Iraqi President in which they sought approval for relinquishing their right to remittances for periods which they showed in lists they sent with the letter, on the premise that the sons of the Sudanese people were fortunate to have the honor to acquire glory with the vanguards of Arabism in the glorious war against the greedy aggressors. Out of the same basic Arab principles and values

which impelled them to bear arms and fight beside their brothers in the trenches of Iraq to repel the vile brute aggression, and stemming from their patriotic and national feeling and their sense of responsibility in the battle of the single Arab destiny in war and reconstruction, they stand today with noble Iraq so that it may get through the unforeseen economic circumstances which emanated from the war. The Iraqi president mentioned that, while the Iraqi people value this splendid national initiative, he wishes to reassure these noble brother citizens and all sons of the Arab nation that Iraq is fine, God willing, and will soon get through the financial difficulties which it is facing, God willing.

The following is the text of the letter: His Excellency President Saddam Husayn, the leader the fighter, respected President of the Republic, may God protect him:

We have deep national feelings and a sense of our national responsibility and duty toward strong, victorious, able Iraq under the leadership of its bold hero and leader, the symbolic figure President Saddam Husayn, who led his people and his nation in a ferocious battle which threatened the land and goods and all that is sacred in the proud land of Arabism, achieving for his people and his nation in the time of Arab decline a clear, total victory over the aggression of the Khomeyni regime and its greedy ambitions and deceit and over its allies, among the historic enemies of our nation, Zionism and imperialists and Shu'ubis and similar traitors to the nation. The sun of glory and honor rose in the Arab land, and the dawn of national Arab revival broke from the Iraq of Saddam Husayn.

Iraq thereby became the focus of all the noble sons of the nation and all the free people of the world and a shining example looked up to by every Arab from the Gulf to the Ocean and in every parcel of the annointed land of Arabism. Before this Iraq was the proud father, opening his arms welcoming all the sons of his family, including the sons of the Sudan, who went to him pursuing knowledge and livelihood and noble gain, and proud Iraq became a big tent and a broad-branched tree under which there took refuge from the vicissitudes and misfortunes of life all the sons of Arabism who found in Iraq a leader, government, people, and wealth, receptive and of good stature, before the war during it, and after it.

If the sons of the Sudanese people had the honor with the vanguard of Arabism in the glorious war against the greedy aggressors, proceeding from the same basic Arab principles and values which impelled them to bear arms and fight beside their brothers in the trenches of Iraq to repel the vile brute aggression, they stand today with noble Iraq, heart and soul, so that it may get through the unforeseen economic circumstances which emanated from the war and which do not represent a drop in the vast sea of the obstacles and difficulties which fighting Iraq has confronted and overcome, the most serious of them being the conspiracy of the eight-year war.

In this, we are proceeding from our patriotic and national feeling and our sense of responsibility in the battle of the single Arab destiny, Arab fate in war, and reconstruction equally.

Based on that, we the undersigned apply to relinquish our remittances in foreign currency, each according to the period confirmed before his name, hoping that you will thereby grant us the honor of token participation with our Iraqi brothers in bearing some of the imprint of the great victory which they achieved for their nation under your unique historic leadership. Please, Your Excellency, the great leader, accept our abounding respect and appreciation.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Al-Husayni on Situation in Territories

44230084B Tel Aviv DAVAR (Supplement)
in Hebrew 5 Jan 90 pp 4, 5

[Interview with Faysal al-Husayni by Avital 'Anbar in East Jerusalem; date not given; first four paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] We came to the man, who is first and foremost considered our main rival in the public leadership of the Arabs of the territories, to hear what he has to say as the intifadah enters its third year. We discovered a minister's office in his house: telephones ringing incessantly, a facsimile machine, a computer, a driver, a stream of cables, and a stern secretary who repeatedly interrupts the interview. "And this is a relatively quiet day," she states. In the garden, such is the world and we cannot change it; he cultivates it with a gardener's contentment.

Al-Husayni, 49, a graduate of the military academy in Syria, whose brother was until recently a senior member of the military arm of Fatah [Palestine Liberation Movement], defines his occupation as an "officer in the Palestinian Army." This was the case until 1967. In the Six-Day War, he shot at Israeli planes. Not long ago, in New York, he met a pilot, once a brigadier general in the Air Force, who flew one of them. He later became a radiology technician—one of the best: "I can see what is inside you!" Currently, he is, by his definition, a full-time "political warrior," with neither a defined position nor employment to support his wife and two children and to finance his activities. "Where does the money come from?" I asked. He enumerated a list of supporters: The Ford Foundation, Catholic Aid, peace organizations in the Netherlands and England, private individuals in the Palestinian public, and "I am from a rich family." Does he receive support from the PLO? "No. This is forbidden!" Besides, he has "more important objectives than money." He denies that part of his activity involves transferring PLO funds to their destinations.

In contrast to most of the known leaders of the Palestinians, Israeli elements do not meet with him at all, even Rabin, who has met with all of them. "Perhaps because

I am a Jerusalemite," al-Husayni says. "They do not turn to me, and I do not seek them out." However, he does not refuse to meet with them. Nonetheless, he emphasizes that it is possible to "really" talk only in the name of the PLO.

There are two main motifs in his remarks: "An activist only in the framework of the law, without connection to the PLO" and "the PLO is the sole legitimate representative." Outside of the law, your freedom is denied, outside of the PLO, the Palestinian has no salvation—a contradiction which he seeks to reconcile like a tightrope walker as he tries to exhaust the possibilities granted to him by Israeli democracy to conduct his political, informational, and social activity, which Israeli security and political elements point to, in relative calmness. Currently he is prohibited from entering the territories, but Tel Aviv is open to him, and in theory, Paris and New York as well. Tzahi Hanegbi wants to see him and those like him in jail, but the High Court of Justice accepted the arguments of the defense minister and al-Husayni that they must remain protected. It can only be guessed why favor is shown to leaders, who are mentioned as participants in crime in indictments against "commoners of the intifadah," who were imprisoned. The former governor of Judea and Samaria responded to me in this regard: "One is not interested in knowing why. It is good that he is out; that suffices for me."

[DAVAR] How do you view the land of Israel in the year 2000?

[Al-Husayni] If we succeed in solving the Palestinian problem and in establishing a state in the next three to four years, I envision there being two states as part of a regional common market in the manner of Europe, which could lead to a certain political union with the passage of about 10 to 15 years.

[DAVAR] Do you really believe that a Palestinian state will soon be established?

[Al-Husayni] Yes. The situation in the region and the world is approaching a point that requires a solution. What is happening in Eastern Europe indicates that there is no way to prevent people from talking, and to deny them their national rights. The events of Romania have given us more confidence, hope, and power in our struggle.

[DAVAR] In your opinion, is there a majority in Israel which thinks like you?

[Al-Husayni] When the intifadah began, it was difficult for us to start desiring peace. There were conflicts within the camp and in the heart of every Palestinian between absolute justice and possible justice, between a legitimate dream and reality. They were resolved. In the second year of the intifadah, we fought for world public opinion, and we managed to convince it. We can declare that the third year of the intifadah will be focussed on public opinion in Israel, in which changes have already occurred.

[DAVAR] But the leaders?

[Al-Husayni] I do not think that Israel can continue with Shamir's positions and a government that is unable to make decisions. Something has to change, for better or for worse: Shamir and the right—or the Government of Israel. It is important for us to face a government that can decide on war or peace.

[DAVAR] Do you see the possibility of a war?

[Al-Husayni] Yes. In other words, we will fight a government that declares that it rejects everything and attempts to defeat us. We will prove that it is impossible. We have a policy of struggle, in which we insist on a low level of violence. We can continue on the same tactical course, without a strategic change, and succeed. We can exist many years with the intifadah, and with hope.

[DAVAR] The ambassador of Egypt stated that 'Arafat is more moderate than you. What is your position on Israel?

[Al-Husayni] I am fighting for a Palestinian state next to Israel. In the past, I supported a Palestinian state in which Muslims and the Jewish minority would have equal rights. I understood that although this is a wonderful dream from our standpoint, Israel views it differently. It is my right to dream, but not to impose my dream on another.

[DAVAR] Did you dream of destroying Israel in your youth?

[Al-Husayni] Yes. Before 1967, I joined the Palestinian Army in anticipation of the moment in which we would be able to fight and defeat the IDF [Israel Defense Force] and change everything.

[DAVAR] In order to obtain a state, would you agree to limitations on its sovereignty, demilitarization, and Israeli soldiers along the Jordan?

[Al-Husayni] We will distinguish between what is of primary importance, namely sovereignty, and what is of secondary importance, namely, how will I insure the security of my land, and the number of my soldiers. With international guarantees, I have no need for a large army. However, a foreign military presence on my soil would infringe on sovereignty.

[DAVAR] What about the settlements?

[Al-Husayni] Settlers yes, settlements no. I am fighting against the existence of refugee camps. The Jews fought for a long time against the ghetto. We will not permit ghettos of any kind among us.

[DAVAR] What about Jerusalem?

[Al-Husayni] I want a unified city—not like today—in which there are two capitals. We will not agree to another location. Neither will the Israelis.

[DAVAR] Will a state composed of noncontiguous territory in the West Bank and Gaza Strip be economically viable?

[Al-Husayni] Yes. In a true-peace scenario, with an open link between the two areas, but not alone. Can England, France, and Germany exist without each other? No. Neither can Israel. There will be a mutual need for cooperation. I see peace only with open borders.

[DAVAR] How can the moderate leadership cope with the ascent of the extremist Islamic current, which is conquering Gaza, and which perhaps could obtain 40 percent of the vote in West Bank elections as it did in Jordan?

[Al-Husayni] It would obtain much less. They do not threaten Palestinian society. Moreover, there are moderates in Hamas [Islamic resistance movement]. If we presume that we would have a 120-seat parliament, they would receive about 18 seats.

[DAVAR] You think in Israeli concepts....Can Israel be certain of the stability of a Palestinian state despite all the rival extremist factions?

[Al-Husayni] You too had your rival organizations before 1948. Later, new rules came into effect. This will happen with us as well. Matters are decided among us democratically at present. There is no attempt to obtain a consensus, but rather to obtain a majority decision. We have not yet been compelled to sink the ships of rival factions. Everything is by vote. This occurred in other states in the region, and you know whom I mean.

[DAVAR] To make an analogy based on the current situation, it is not as such: Hamas is waging its own intifadah. Is there any measure of coordination between the unified command and Hamas?

[Al-Husayni] They arrested me and restricted my movements, because they thought that I am one of the people who are coordinating with Hamas! If the Israelis think that there is coordination, and they seek those engaged in it, it means that there is coordination. But they had the wrong address!

[DAVAR] Can you confirm that there is coordination?

[Al-Husayni] I think that if a struggle such as this has been waged for two years without clashes....

[DAVAR] In Israel, it is argued that the population obeys Hamas out of fear.

[Al-Husayni] No, out of a desire for unity. People do many things to maintain unity, this is a part of coordination.

[DAVAR] It seems to me that the PLO's *raison d'être* is struggle and not independence, that the present situation is better for it, and that it is not enthusiastic about taking responsibility for the administration of a state.

[Al-Husayni] That is an erroneous perception. Every member of the Palestinian people, regardless of where he lives, hopes for the moment when he will have his own state. This is also the case in the organization. The price which we are paying for the absence of a state is too high. There is pressure from Palestinians who, until now, have only shown their support with money while investing their knowledge in other states, and who wish to return.

[DAVAR] Is 'Arafat the type of leader who can administer a state?

[Al-Husayni] Why not? He has excellent qualifications.

[DAVAR] Do you know him well?

[Al-Husayni] Since the age of nine.

[DAVAR] Have you met him recently?

[Al-Husayni] That is forbidden!

[DAVAR] Do you have a gentlemen's agreement with the government, whereby they allow you to operate within certain limits?

[Al-Husayni] Not at all.

[DAVAR] It is claimed that you were arrested because you are the unofficial representative of 'Arafat. If that is the case, why, in your opinion, were you released, and why have they allowed you to operate?

[Al-Husayni] I only represent the Palestinian position, the Palestinian way of thinking. However, I have no connection with the organizational system. The Israelis have grasped that it is impossible to hold someone in jail because of his thoughts. My views are like the views of many Palestinians, and my confinement would not change anything.

[DAVAR] You are not a philosopher. They confined you because of acts.

[Al-Husayni] If there is proof that I am a member of the organization, why did they not try me? There is no sense in attempting to analyze why the occupation acts in one way or another. It is incomprehensible. The occupation is negative, and all of its acts are negative.

[DAVAR] In your individual case, you can view your release as a positive act!

[Al-Husayni] Yes, but they deny me freedom of movement.

[DAVAR] Another in your position would be jailed for acts, which, in your case, resulted in limitations on your movement. You and several of your colleagues have a sort of immunity. Why?

[Al-Husayni] I do not believe that anyone has immunity. I grant myself immunity by not acting outside the law. However, it is true that there is more to this, and I will tell you how it began. When the intifadah reached a certain level, people from within and without began to

say to Israel: You must speak with the Palestinians. Israel responded that it would not speak with the PLO, only with local leaders. They then asked: What, then, are they doing in jail? Israel released them, with the hope that they could serve as an alternative to Tunis. We here can supply Israel, excuse me, Palestine with new fighters, dozens of suffering martyrs, dozens of Nelson Mandelas, but you will not find quislings among us. If the Government of Israel is willing to speak with us as part of the Palestinian people led by the PLO, we can obtain many agreements. If they insist on solving only local problems and attempting to separate us from our brothers abroad, they will obtain nothing.

[DAVAR] Why quislings? You are the local leadership of a local struggle.

[Al-Husayni] We are one people. I live in Tunisia, I live in Beirut. The Lebanon War was not only 'Arafat's war, but mine as well. I previously fought at Tel al-Za'tar. I can say that 'Arafat blocks streets in the Gaza Strip and throws rocks in Jerusalem.

[DAVAR] At the start of the intifadah, you stated that, "if 'Arafat will not side with us, we will remove him."

[Al-Husayni] No. He is the elected president of the PLO and the Palestinians. Nothing can be done without him. The replacement of a leader is only by authority of the Palestine National Council.

[DAVAR] Do you receive instructions from him?

[Al-Husayni] You do not understand the nature of the connection. The Israelis are very strict regarding the matter, but they have not stopped making it possible for new blood to flow into the Palestinian system abroad. It has been 22 years, and they are deporting more and more local leaders. The deportees, who are very familiar with the situation in the field, are integrated into the leadership abroad. When the locals look abroad, they see people of their own flesh and blood. The same way of thinking exists here and there. It is all a matter of the distribution of roles. I, for example, sit with journalists....

[DAVAR] If peace is achieved and there is a new distribution of roles, what would your role be in the Palestinian body that would be established?

[Al-Husayni] If this were before elections, I would be among those who organized a political base. However, I can tell you now that the leaders who would come from abroad would be the symbol of the Palestinian people.

[DAVAR] Are you in a position to be a minister?

[Al-Husayni] I would not want to be a minister. One who is qualified for a field battle is not always suited to administer and serve as well. He is liable to destroy the good will which he has acquired.

[DAVAR] You stated that 1990 will be a year of struggle for Israeli public opinion. Who decided?

[Al-Husayni] There are think tanks everywhere, in which people from all parts of the spectrum sit and talk about everything. I and others sit here and elsewhere with physicians, peasants, and engineers. We broach the ideas that they raise in different forums and at press conferences. These ideas reach think tanks abroad, where people listen well. They discuss the ideas, insert some changes, and produce something crystallized.

[DAVAR] Is there not here some kind of committee to coordinate between the different factions?

[Al-Husayni] No. This is also prohibited.

[DAVAR] Let us say that you are not a member of such a body. Do you think that it exists?

[Al-Husayni] I believe so, since joint fliers have come out in the past 2 years.

[DAVAR] Are the fliers coordinated with Tunis by facsimile machine, one of which I saw in the adjoining room?

[Al-Husayni] There are fax machines everywhere. However, I think that there is a need for coordination. The connection is like the connection between a general staff and a field command. They handle the strategic side, we handle the tactical side.

[DAVAR] Are you the commander in the field?

[Al-Husayni] If I were, I would not have spare time to grant you an extended interview...no. At best, I am able to analyze the Palestinian position and claim.

[DAVAR] What has the intifadah built in Palestinian society?

[Al-Husayni] Self-confidence, a certain infrastructure. We are supplying our own needs at a growing rate. For example, regarding chicken, we have gone from 15 percent to 45 percent self-sufficiency. Also, we are building the institutions of a state in-the-making, even though "Ansar 4" is filled with people able to play roles, and Israel conspires day after day against this system, whose activities are legal but considered illegal.

[DAVAR] I will not ask why the intifadah is cruelly liquidating Palestinians. I know how you will respond....

[Al-Husayni] Please, ask, and I will answer you.

[DAVAR] Please: The boy from Nabulus, the member of the "Red Eagles," who said on television that he enjoys killing with his bare hands....

[Al-Husayni] When I was in Nahalin, I, and not only I, saw an Israeli soldier who had written on his helmet: "I was born to kill children." This is what he did, and he enjoys it. In such a situation, one sees many such phenomena. In 1937, we had a bitter experience, such that in 1967, the leadership decided not to kill collaborators. The number of collaborators killed between 1967 and 1987 is insignificant. The policy also continued in

the intifadah. In the first year, they called on them to beat and pardon transgressors. However, in the second quarter of the second year, the authorities began a new policy, which entailed: 1) Assembling collaborators expelled by the population, training them, arming them, and reimposing them on settlements; 2) Pressuring and threatening former collaborators, so that they resume their activity; and 3) Killing wanted persons instead of arresting them. The residents realized that most of those killed in demonstrations in the last six months were wanted. On the roofs in Ramallah and in other places, you will see soldiers with binoculars observing targets. The residents began to view collaborators as people who place them in danger, not of arrest, but of being killed. They realized that it was not enough to expel a collaborator from the village, because he would returned armed. Therefore, in the past 6 months, they have been killing them.

[DAVAR] Do you approve of that?

[Al-Husayni] No, I only analyze the situation.

[DAVAR] Why do you not approve, if this is the situation?

[Al-Husayni] Because such a matter must pass through different phases—investigation, trial. On the other hand, how is it possible to conduct such procedures in the current situation? Errors have been made everywhere in the world. History shows that collaborators are usually killed. Look what happened with you and "Stienkars." A final point: It is not fair to say that Palestinians killed 125 collaborators in the last 6 months. They killed 160 persons in the last 22 years.

[DAVAR] Is killing collaborators part of what you call "building self-confidence"?

[Al-Husayni] On the contrary. Our self-confidence would grow if we could control them, and say to them "we know about you, return quietly." Usually this is unsuccessful.

[DAVAR] Do you personally fear assassination?

[Al-Husayni] I was told to take precautions, not to repeat the error of Bassam Shaq'ah and others. Kahana's people positioned themselves in front of my house and shouted "remember Bassam Shaq'ah...."

[DAVAR] I am talking about Palestinian extremists.

[Al-Husayni] We do not have a tradition of political murder.

[DAVAR] What about Sadat?

[Al-Husayni] I am talking about the reality here.

[DAVAR] In which circumstances would the political echelon stop the intifadah?

[Al-Husayni] The intifadah is not only throwing stones, blocking roads, and strikes. It also involves building an

internal infrastructure. This will continue. Regarding violence, everything depends on the political process. If you take small steps, we will take small steps. If you take large steps, so will we.

[DAVAR] In your opinion, is the political echelon still able to order the cessation of the intifadah and be obeyed?

[Al-Husayni] People are entitled to check whether the leadership's demands are correct, and the leadership would not demand a cessation without real progress in the situation. Since the leadership is part of the people, the order would be respected.

[DAVAR] Who can control the violent groups which have gone out of control?

[Al-Husayni] The population, the popular committees. The leadership will not stop the intifadah for the benefit of Israel, but for the benefit of the people! In such a case, the picture would be different: SHABAK [General Security Services] and the IDF would not be controlling the situation. Whoever is asked to stop the intifadah will have the power to do so.

[DAVAR] Will you be a member of the Palestinian representation to the Cairo meeting?

[Al-Husayni] I do not know. The PLO has not yet announced who will be appointed.

[DAVAR] Have you recommended names to them?

[Al-Husayni] If I do, it will not be through you.

[DAVAR] Do you believe that elections will be held?

[Al-Husayni] Not if elections are held according to Shamir's initiative.

[DAVAR] How would you view the third year of the intifadah if there were no progress in the peace process?

[Al-Husayni] In the foreseeable future, the same tactic, the same strategy, without the use of weapons.

[DAVAR] In no case?

[Al-Husayni] Nothing in the world is "in no case."

Intifadah Fliers Indicate Pluralism

44230084A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 3 Jan 90 p 11

[Article by Yizhar B'er]

[Text] Since April 1988, a trend toward a multiplicity of fliers at the local level has become evident. These fliers are disseminated on behalf of bodies that are members of the unified uprising command, and on behalf of independent bodies. The numbered fliers of the unified uprising command deal mainly with the macro, i.e., with analyzing the international and inter-Arab reality, surveying the uprising's gains, attempting to direct internal

activity toward civil disobedience, and establishing memorial and strike days. The local fliers, on the other hand, deal with a varied range of topics, from ideology to targets for attack and elimination. An example of the latter was the call to attack the appointed mayors of Hebron, Yatta, Dura, Qalqilyah, and Janin, and personalities known for their links with political elements in Israel, such as Sa'id Kan'an from Nabulus, Jamil al-'Amlah, and Muhammad Nasir.

In the intifadah's first year, the unified command's fliers revealed differences of opinion between the different forces behind the uprising. Flyer No. 17 was distributed by the unified command. The first version, entitled "A Summons to Abu-Jihad's 40th Day [i.e., the ceremony held on the 40th day after one's death]," was written apparently on the inspiration of Fatah [Palestine Liberation Movement] elements, while the second version, entitled "A Summons to the RPG [rocket-propelled grenade] and Rocks Children," was apparently written on the inspiration of elements of the Popular Front.

The first version supported an acceleration of the transition phase leading to comprehensive civil disobedience, amid the creation of a correspondence between different manifestations of civil disobedience and political developments on the agenda when the flyer was written. The communists, contrary to the Popular Front and part of Fatah, do not support civil disobedience, because they do not think that the public is ready for it yet. Popular Front and Fatah activists in the field display opposition to the uprising's centralization and the need to obtain advance approval from the PLO leadership abroad for the content of fliers.

A partial explanation of this lies in the rivalry with the communists in view of their freedom to act, since the Communist Party leadership operates from the West Bank and is not dependent on outside elements.

The communists themselves have argued more than once that the uprising began to expire the moment its activists agreed to bow to accepting directives from the command abroad.

However, it is mainly the local fliers—a sort of alternative press, which became a daily phenomenon in the intifadah's second year—from which one can learn of cracks in the unity of the Palestinians' leadership in the territories, and of ideological and practical debates in this leadership.

The number of fliers and groups signing them in the territories is great. The flyer has become the primary mouthpiece to take root in every village and area. In contrast to the unified command's fliers, the local fliers provide individual treatment of personalities, events, and places in the territories. One such personality who merited special treatment is Muhammad Nasir, the author of the book, "The Uprising—Beginning or End?" Flyer No. 2, in the name of the "Command of the Punishment Parties in the Hebron District," calls him an "agent," "Mosad [Central Institute for Intelligence]

member," "coward," and "murderer." It portrays him as one who dared to openly place himself in opposition to the directives of the uprising command and who symbolizes collaboration with the occupation, since he continues to maintain his position in the civil administration and is engaged in connecting Arab villages to the Israeli electricity grid. The fliers' focus on certain persons stems, among other things, from the uprising command's perception that such persons are taking part in composing pseudo-fliers and publications intended to damage the uprising's gains.

The local population's lack of personal and economic security amid the uprising's continuation disturbs the authors of local fliers to the extent that they outlaw persons considered negative elements in local society. Anarchy and fear of anarchy are reflected in a flyer signed by the "Popular Committees of the Ramallah Area," which advocates a cessation of gasoline-bomb and other attacks against residents, because these attacks divert the uprising from its main objectives.

Another social phenomenon reflected in the fliers is the appearance of the beginnings of internal rivalries between villages, and the collapse of traditional systems owing to the ascent of unknown youths to positions of power and control in the framework of the local uprising committees.

A flyer distributed in the Tarkumiya area states: "...We strongly denounce those who were dragged after the known collaborators in Bayt Awla [a neighboring village], whether it is a matter of workers who attempted to enter into a confrontation, or of accosting supporters of the committees of fighters, or of notables whose time has passed, who went to settle accounts with residents of Tarkumiya by means of the contemptible tribal method, when degenerate tribalism is collapsing and being replaced by the brotherhood of the true struggle."

Differences of opinion within the PLO also come to light in the local fliers, which are used as a sort of political podium to present positions. A flier entitled "al-Haqiqah" ("the truth"), which appeared on 24 September 1989 in Ramallah, censures 'Arafat's political line and accuses him of betraying the original goal of the Fatah movement as determined in its Fourth Conference, namely, "the liberation of all Palestine, the liquidation of the Zionist entity economically, politically, militarily, culturally, and intellectually, and the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state on the entire area of Palestinian soil." It is estimated that the flyer was written by elements identified with the Abu-Musa faction.

A central part of this publication was devoted to an analysis of the differences between the decisions of Fatah's Fourth Conference, in whose context the organization was called "Fatah of revolution," and the decisions of its Fifth Conference, in whose context the organization was called "Fatah of concessions." A salient decision in the Fourth Conference determined

that "the armed struggle is a strategy and not a tactic. This struggle will end with the liquidation of the Zionist entity and the liberation of Palestine." The Fifth Conference, on the other hand, speaks of a peace plan based on the existence of two states.

An extensive section of "al-Haqiqah" is devoted to a phenomenon called "bureaucratic pollution," which has afflicted the current Fatah leadership led by 'Arafat. By "bureaucratic pollution" is meant the fulfillment of narrow interests at the expense of fighters who are sacrificing all that they have for the movement's sake. In this context, the publication praises the schism in Fatah that occurred with the separation of Abu-Musa and his people in 1983. "Al-Haqiqah" calls for the establishment of a broad national front of workers and peasants headed by a vanguard, revolutionary cadre that would replace Fatah's current leadership.

A special section in this publication is devoted to the escalation of armed activity against Israel from inside Jordanian territory. "Al-Haqiqah" demonstrates a clearly negative attitude toward Jordan (in contrast to 'Arafat's position), calling the Jordanian regime "the traitor Hashemite regime." The flyer indicates that penetrations from the Jordanian border into Israel were intended "to reveal the negative role of the Jordanian Government as a policeman defending the eastern border of the Zionist entity."

"Al-Haqiqah" contains an important section containing an original treatment of collaboration with the authorities. The publication advises against viewing every person suspected of collaboration as an actual collaborator. In reality, there are innocent residents whose behavior only presents certain suspicious characteristics; therefore, their denunciation by society will achieve the opposite effect "and will push them into the arms of the enemy."

Regarding those who are undoubtedly collaborators, the authors of the flyer recommend forcing them to leave their places of residence. If a collaborator's activity presents a serious danger warranting his liquidation, he should be liquidated. However, if his acts are not serious, it suffices to expose him publicly, denounce him, and monitor his activities. In any case, it is necessary to verify that suspicion directed against a collaborator is grounded.

Like "al-Haqiqah," other local fliers engage in self-criticism. A local flyer can accomplish what a general flyer of the "command" cannot. For example, a local problem in Nabulus involves the collections of "contributions" by doubtful elements. A flyer distributed in the city in July in the name of the "National Unified Command—Nabulus" called for an immediate end to the collection of contributions by all elements and called on the public to respond with violence against contribution collectors. The desired procedure for collecting contributions was also published.

As the intifadah continues, a measure of gnawing in the popular committees' response to the unified uprising command's directives is becoming evident.

Arab Contributions to PLO Tallied

44000225 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 27 Feb 90 p 6

[Text] Saudi Arabia has admitted giving the PLO a sum totalling nearly \$1 billion since 1979, apart from \$71 million given to the intifadah fund. Saudi Arabia announced this following PLO publications at the Arab summit in Algiers in 1988 that the Arab countries have not fulfilled their financial obligations toward the PLO. At the summit the Arab countries promised to grant the PLO \$100 million a month, but until now only \$73 million from a few Arab leaders has been received. Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi last year pledged on Radio Monte Carlo that he would support all the Palestinian civil servants in the territories who ceased receiving salaries from Jordan, but has only paid \$8 million. During 1989 the PLO received \$150 million from all the Arab countries although the chairman of the Palestine National Fund claimed that PLO funding of the intifadah last year reached \$370 million. Most of the money was spent on families of casualties and security detainees.

ALGERIA

Demographic Statistics Study Released

900A0300A Algiers EL MOUDJAHID
in French 20 Dec 89 pp 4-5

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] From a historic point of view, the demographic situation in Algeria has always been marked by a tendency toward growth, despite the colonial practices that characterized the period between 1830 and 1962, including, among other things, the policies promoting emigration, the mass deaths, the land expropriations, and so on.

The total population increased from 2,028,000 in 1845 to 12,218,000 in 1966, the year of the first official population census. On this basis, the demographic development in Algeria can be divided into three phases.

The first phase (1900-1920) was characterized by high birth and death rates, resulting in a low rate of natural growth (about 0.5 percent).

The second phase (1922-1970) was characterized by an increase in the birth rate (50.1 percent in 1970) and a steady decline in the death rate to 16.7 percent in 1970, leading to a substantial rate of natural growth (3.34 percent in 1970).

In the period after 1970, a decline in both the birthrate and the death rate (at a more rapid rate for the latter) can be seen. Beginning in 1985, the birthrate declined more rapidly than the death rate, leading to a slowdown in the rate of natural growth.

In reality, this demographic development falls within the framework of the general demographic changes observed in a number of societies, but it is not by any means a question of a norm, because in each of these societies, natural growth is dictated by specific parameters. It is probable that since 1970, Algeria has entered into a phase of demographic development likely to lead to a decline in both the death rate and the rate of natural growth.

This development may be made clear in a broader perspective if a study is made of the relationship between the birthrate and the death rate throughout the different phases of natural growth in Algeria.

Where the marriage rate in Arab-Muslim societies is concerned, it remains one of the basic conditions for reproduction. Weithin this framework, we note a close relationship between age at marriage and reproduction. As the age at marriage rises, general reproduction declines (although in our country, the rate of reproduction for married women remains high). Demographers routinely study marriage on the basis of two parameters—the percentage level of individuals who marry at least once, and the initial marriage age, that is to say the average age at the time of the (first) marriage.

In Algeria, marriage has for a long time been characterized by a high level of coverage, involving almost the entire population. For women, the age at marriage is often very young.

In our country, a considerable increase in the average age at marriage is noted, and it is continuing to rise for both sexes. Men generally marry women younger than they are, but the age difference is dwindling steadily. It was assessed at 5.5 years in 1966, while it was only 3.4 years by 1986.

This is probably due to the changes the Algerian family has undergone (greater dialogue and rapprochement between the spouses, and a more forceful assertion of the identity of women, etc.).

In 1986, the percentage of single women (between 15 and 50 years of age) reached 40 percent. This is an entirely new situation, which could lead to cultural upsets within our society to the point of threatening the morality of our young people. And it is necessary here to note the progressive nature of this development.

One of the characteristics of marriage in Algeria is stability. The available data show that, contrary to popular belief, the proportion of divorces is declining. But it must not be forgotten that the remarriages of divorced persons may conceal the scope of divorce.

In connection with reproduction and the birthrate, it can be seen that because of the high reproduction rate, young people dominate the population structure. The higher the reproduction rate, the greater the increase in the

number of births. The first national reproduction rate survey (1970) brought the extremely high levels to the fore.

Women who remained married from 15 to 50 years had an average of 11 children (born alive). This type of reproduction is called "natural reproduction." The figure declined to nine children in 1986, while in the same period, the average age of women at marriage rose from 19 to 24, which clearly reveals the development toward controlled reproduction.

The average life span increased by 12 years between 1965 and 1983. The difference in life span for the two sexes is relatively small (between one and two years). The fact, nonetheless, remains that infant mortality stands at a high level, despite the efforts pursued by the state in connection with the social and health plans. The rate did not begin to decline until 1970 (149 percent). It was 83 percent in 1983 (see table) and 63 percent in 1987.

With regard to contraceptive practices, they have not been very well-known to a large part of the population. According to the National Statistics Institute, only 25 percent of the women covered in the 1984 survey were using any means of contraception.

Another survey taken in 1986 showed that 35 percent of the married women of childbearing age were using contraception (see Table 2).

Overall, a summary of the results of the survey on the frequency of the use of means of contraception yields the following figures:

- 33.5 percent of the married women of childbearing age use some contraceptive means. Of this group, 74.4 percent take the pill and 5.8 percent use IUDs.
- 48.7 percent use no means of contraception. Of this group, 37.8 percent plan to do so, while 46.6 percent do not.
- 17.6 percent of those using contraception cease to do so for the purpose of conceiving (33 percent), while other do so on doctors' orders (2.9 percent), for other reasons (30.9 percent), or because the method has failed (13 percent).
- The agencies promoting the use of contraceptive means are private medical offices (43.5 percent), mother and infant welfare and birth control centers (23.3 percent), and other health centers (10.4 percent).

Reasons for Population Growth

At the beginning of this century, the mortality rate reached a very high level (32 per thousand), while at the same time, the birthrate increased (37.8 per thousand). A demographic situation like this is characteristic of countries under colonial domination. The reason for the high death rate was the deplorable health conditions from which the people suffered.

As to the increase in the birthrate, this was a phenomenon to compensate for high infant mortality. Since the beginning of this century, the demographic situation has been heavily influenced by the numerous economic crises and epidemics, the two world wars, and the extreme poverty of the population, who have often been displaced and settled on uncultivated land.

To a great extent, the colonial phenomenon explains the great similarities between the birth and death rates, on the one hand, and the negative growth rate (0.02 percent), on the other hand, during World War II, during which large numbers of Algerians were mobilized and sent into combat. This could not fail to further increase the death rate among men and thus to reduce births. To all of this must be added the colonial repression, particularly during the events of 8 May 1945.

Improvements were seen, however, just prior to the outbreak of the armed revolution.

Independent Algeria has not escaped the "baby boom" phenomenon that generally characterizes postwar eras. In the period between 1959 and 1970, the birthrate increased steadily to 50.1 per thousand, while the death rate declined to 16.7 per thousand.

These improvements became possible thanks to the implementation of a national public health policy, which, among other things, made it possible to reduce the death rate.

It was beginning in 1970 that a slow and gradual decline in the birthrate began to be seen (35 per thousand in 1986), linked with a decline in the death rate (8.03 per thousand in that same year), thus resulting in a natural rate of growth of about 2.7 percent.

At the time of the census taken on 20 March 1987, the total population had reached nearly 23 million, while the figure for 1966 was 12,018,000. This means that it had almost doubled in 20 years. [passage omitted]

Table 1
Life Span and Infant Mortality (1965-1987)

Year	Life Span		Infant Mortality (per thousand)
	Men	Women	
1965	51.1	51.2	174
1970	52.6	52.8	149
1977	53.0	53.5	147
1979	55.1	56.3	133
1981	58.0	59.6	115
1983	61.6	63.3	83
1987	65.7	66.3	—

Table 2
Rate of Contraceptives Use by Married Women

Age Group	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	Overall Rate
Rate of Use	17.0	28.6	34.6	40.2	41.1	41.1	21.0	35.0

EGYPT

Internal Disputes Delay First Liberal Party Conference

*90OA0263A Cairo AKHIR SA'AH
in Arabic 17 Jan 90 p 11*

[Article by Zakariyya Abu-Haram]

[Text] What is happening in the Liberal Party? What happened during the party's general conference last Friday? Why did some elements try to block the holding of the conference? Why did the party put off holding its first general conference for 13 consecutive years? And what is the story behind the bylaws which delayed the conference and why were the new bylaws challenged?

Amidst an atmosphere weighed down by signs of division, the Liberal Party held its first general conference on the twelfth of this January. Of all the opposition parties, the Liberal Party was the only one that for 13 years had not held a general conference since it was founded, which places the Liberal Party before various currents that were formed during the period when the general conference was not held. There is the Democratic Front for Restoring the Party Course, which was formed last September from those dismissed from the party.

In its 10 articles which it proclaimed on reforming the course of the party, it stresses that membership should be returned to the rightful sons of the party and to those dismissed, and that the alliance between the Liberal Party and the Muslim Brotherhood and the Labor Party should be severed, and of course it will try to implement that during the general conference.

There is also Muhammad 'Abd-al-Shafi, the secretary general of the party, who was disqualified as a candidate for the post of party chairman, which led him to turn to the courts to challenge the decision to disqualify him, halting the convening of the party's first general conference. And there are currents that could express themselves during the general conference if they had the opportunity.

The fact that the Liberal Party did not hold a general conference throughout 13 years is due to the party bylaws themselves. As Mustafa Kamal Murad, chairman of the Liberal Party, says, they stipulate that party committees must be formed in all the governorates, which is something that the party so far has not managed to do, since there were party committees in only 21 governorates. Therefore the situation required that the bylaws be amended so as to permit the first general conference to be held if party committees were formed in more than half of the governorates. This amendment was

instituted, the committee for party affairs was informed of it, and the general conference was called to be held on that basis.

Convening the Conference

In fact, minutes went by before the conference was convened last Friday amidst an atmosphere mixed with wariness and the insistence of the Democratic Front for the Restoration of the Party Course that the conference could not be held. This caused the convening to be postponed for a whole hour and a half, during which some elements took over the hall in Development and Agricultural Supply Bank in which the conference was being held. This prompted the chairman of the Liberal Party to contact the responsible parties, and in fact the takeover ended and the conference began at 11:30 AM. Observers confirm that the bullying and playing on nerves by which some elements tried to obstruct the conference must be opposed so that they do not pervade the rest of the parties.

The conference has renewed confidence in the party chairman Mustafa Kamil Murad, and it reelected the members of the presiding council, the assistant secretaries, and the treasurer.

It was under the party's general conference that party leaders were to have been chosen by election either at the governorate level or at the level of the party leadership in Cairo. But since it had not been held, the party chairman used to do as he pleased in the party, according to Muhammad 'Abd-al-Shafi, the party general secretary. It is he who chooses the leaders and appoints them and places them in the positions that he thinks appropriate, and it is he who gives salaries to whomsoever he wants, and cuts them off from whomsoever he wants. He makes decisions on his own, and if he puts them before the party leaders that is only as a formality, even for vital decisions.

But the party chairman denies that, stating that the party has a permanent council consisting of 140 members in which all the governorates, the party's special committees, the party's presiding council, and its secretariat are represented. It meets once every three months to set party activity for the next three months and to follow up on the activity of the past three months. "Thus I do not hold sole power, nor do I act alone in making decisions."

After the bylaws were amended, and preparations begun for the general conference, the process began of submitting papers for nomination for leadership positions. Among those who presented themselves for the post of party chairman was Muhammad 'Abd-al-Shafi. However, the

party leadership disqualified 'Abd-al-Shafi from running, which brought about a crisis which reached the arena of the courts.

On the other side the party chairman Mustafa Kamil Murad tells the story of 'Abd-al-Shafi's removal. He says that Muhammad 'Abd-al-Shafi nominated himself for the party chairmanship, and that Rif'at Hal, party secretary in al-Manzilah Daqiliyah also nominated himself. According to party bylaws, the presiding council, including the office of the secretariat general of the party, has the right to limit the number of candidates to any position to double the required number; in other words, there must be only two candidates for the post of party chairman.

'Abd-al-Shafi was disqualified because twice before he had resigned from the party, in 1984 and 1987. He had also been unable to form a party committee in the governorate of al-Buhayrah, which is his electoral district. He also embarked on a policy of denouncing the party in certain newspapers, and when he was asked to refute what had been published he did not comply. Therefore the council unanimously agreed to disqualify him.

Muhammad Farid Zakariyya, assistant secretary general of the Liberal Party, states that Muhammad 'Abd-al-Shafi took part in the undertaking to amend the bylaws, along with Major General Salah al-Rifa'i.

Muhammad 'Abd-al-Shafi denies what is ascribed to him on the subject of the bylaws, saying, "It is strange that they now claim in the party that I took part in the preparations of these bylaws. What happened is that it was decided that the old bylaws of the party would be changed to enable the party to hold its first general conference with the organizations now existing in the governorates, but not in all the governorates. But then it got to the point where suspicious changes were made in election procedures that had not been mentioned in the amendment request. Many opposed the new bylaws, and I was one of them, and I asked the party chairman to rectify them. He told me, 'You and I are sitting down to change conflicting articles, but so far we have not sat down to carry out the necessary amendment.'"

Mustafa Kamil Murad, chairman of the Liberal Party, believes that what the Democratic Front to Restore the Party Course is doing is a plan run by the attorney Muhammad Abu-al-Fadl al-Jayzawi, with the goal of presenting to public opinion an image of failure and division within the political parties. But it is a weak plan that will not achieve any one of the goals for which he is striving. This plan began with the Labor Party, then the Ummah Party, then the Liberal Party, and he expects that they will try to do the same in the rest of the parties.

Study Notes Negative Effects on Migrant Workers' Families

90OA0269A Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 17 Jan 90 p 11

[Article by Muhammad Musa and Mustafa al-Hafnawi]

[Text] "Our husbands made their decision to go abroad without asking us, and when they returned they were nervous and tense."

"Many things have changed, most difficult of which is that after he returned, he wants to marry another woman."

These were the whispers of young country wives who had to cope first with the absence of their husbands and, second, with their return after their character has changed.

Some 98 percent of the wives whose husbands have left waited for them, while only two percent travelled with their husbands and children. From the time of the husband's departure until the time of his return the migrant worker's wife lived a most difficult life. Alone she had to face the envy of others. She has brought up in the Egyptian countryside a whole generation of children who grew up in a family without a father. On the other hand, the migrant worker's wife has enjoyed a greater economic status. But this experience does not end with the husband's return, since this absence continues even after it. The tens of thousands who left home have converged in the oil countries and suffered beyond imagination for the sake of a livelihood and have done so in a haphazard manner. This was the beginning of the problem as a result of which the migrant worker's family suffered from all these ills.

Dr. 'Ali Fahmi, a researcher at the National Center for Social Research and expert in social administration at the Arab League, recalls the uproar that was created in the seventies over the immigration of 1 million Egyptian farmers to Iraq. At that time a study, in which Dr. Fahmi participated, recommended laying strict conditions for the workers' travel. These provided that the worker's age should not exceed 35, that he should be married, have no more than two children, and be accompanied by his family. Obviously all these conditions aimed at protecting the family and preventing what happened in the subsequent decade.

Dr. Fahmi also recalls that when he visited the Egyptian village in which this experiment was conducted he saw that all these conditions were ignored, and he found that among the [emigrating] farmers, barbers, undertakers, and men of all other trades. The experiment ended with failure.

It has been observed, he said, that the father's absence has probably led to the children becoming corrupt, and the husband's absence probably led to the wife becoming corrupt. It is difficult, he added, to conduct a field survey of this matter, but there is no doubt that this has led to a greater demand for drugs. (The opening of borders with Israel played a role in this regard.) With regard to the son, the father's absence meant the absence of the superego and the conscience. As for the husband's absence, we cannot be certain that it has led to the wife becoming corrupt, but we are certain that emigration causes something to crack, the effect of which is felt following the husband's return; it leads either to the husband taking a second wife or to the separation of husband and wife.

Finally, Dr. Fahmi expects waves of counteremigration; workers in the oil countries returning home. In the coming two decades there will be greater feelings of frustration, escalating immorality, and greater criminal behavior and disintegration of families in the communities that export labor after this labor returns home.

Long years of expatriation change man's values and behavior. When he returns home he finds difficulty in readjusting to his people and family. Here lies the disaster.

Expatriation is not entirely evil, stresses Dr. 'Azzah Karim, a researcher and the National Center for Social Research, provided certain conditions are met. The first of these is that expatriation should not exceed a few years: four years, for example. With the husband travelling alone, the family loses its backbone; it is difficult for another person to play his role fully. After two decades of disorganized emigration we can observe the irresponsible consumerist attitude adopted by the children whose head of family is absent. We can see the effect of money on these children and on their morality. Studies carried out about morality show that the children of emigrant fathers are more vulnerable to immorality than to those of divorced or dead parents.

Recalling an incident in a village, Dr. 'Azzah said, "We asked the wife of an emigrant worker about the reason why her husband has gone. She replied, 'He was ill and did not want to travel abroad. But I persuaded him to go. He is the head here just as he is the head there, I told him. I said to him: It's better to die with money than staying here without money.' In certain cases fellahin left the land lying fallow and went abroad."

Thus the poor have hungered for dignified life as they imagine it—affluence, modern appliances, and a new life of consumerism. But they have paid a high price in terms of disintegration of family life, deterioration of discipline, and opening the doors for children and wives to all sorts of corruption.

In one Egyptian village I saw one of the highest rates of emigration. Dr. Muhammad Abu-Mandur, head of agricultural economy at Cairo University, and Safiyah Isma'il, of the psychology department at the Cairo School of Arts, conducted a sensational study about the situation of the wife between emigration and counteremigration. The results were astonishing.

The study said that those who left after getting married and have returned or are still abroad total 1.25 million people. Ninety-eight percent of these left without their wives, while two percent left with the whole family.

As for those who left without their wives, 25 percent of the wives were against that. But all the wives have coped with the demands of the situation they faced, namely the deterioration of the quality of life, and refrained from voicing rejection of the husband's departure, or their sense of concern over their situation and the situation of their husbands following their departure. In fact, 60

percent of the wives contributed to travel expenses whether by selling their jewellery or their household effects or borrowing from relatives.

The motive for the husbands' travel, according to the study, is mainly because of low income and its being insufficient to meet basic needs. The desire to build a house is a major reason for going abroad; it is 90 percent of the reason for travelling. Some 95 percent of the husbands said the reason for going abroad was poverty. The wives' opinion on this matter is identical with that of the husbands'.

The travel of husbands abroad had a great effect in increasing the burdens on the wives. Some 90 percent of the wives said that bringing up the children and caring for their education and health has increased their burdens. In fact, some of the wives had to attend to the formalities of their husbands' travel and, later, attend to collecting their remittances.

It is interesting that the husband's explanation for his wife playing this role is that she is efficient in doing this and that there is nobody else to do it.

What is surprising is that some of the wives played a basic role in all the activities involved in building a new house. Traditionally, this has never been the wife's role, whether in the rural areas or the urban areas when there is a husband around. Some 85 percent of the husbands expressed their satisfaction with the wives playing this role. They said that the wives have done more than what was expected of them in terms of looking after their money and doing things they never did before, particularly with respect to buying land and playing a basic role in overseeing construction.

Some 85 percent of the wives said that loneliness was among the problems they faced following their husbands' departure. Eighty percent said that their burdens have increased, while 50 percent complained of problems with in-laws.

The problems from which the wife suffered during the husband's absence go beyond material and family problems. This is the fear of society's view of her and the enviousness of others towards her. Some 10 percent expressed this view. Some 15 percent expressed the fear that the husband's wealth might lead to his marrying another woman.

The emigrant worker's family has faced a number of problems during his absence. These include: 56 percent who suffered from the problem of the children's deviation, 56 percent who suffered from the husband taking another wife during his absence, 37.5 percent who suffered from family disputes, 25 percent who suffered from children's quarrels with others, and 18.8 percent who suffered from the wife's deviation.

Therefore, according to the study, the children were one of the victim's of the father's absence. This was reflected in the drop in the rate of passes in elementary school

certificates in 1988-89 in a particular village compared with a neighboring village whose husbands did not travel abroad. The rate of decline was more than 11 percent.

The study indicates that the majority of male children of families whose fathers emigrated or have returned did not go to high school or to college, although the returning fathers have wished their children continued their studies at college level. Despite the many problems they faced, most of the wives did not inform their husbands of them for fear of upsetting them while they were abroad.

With regard to the wives' desire for their husbands to return, 55 percent have expressed such a wish, but only 20 percent asked the husband to do so. As for the reasons for returning from abroad, 45 percent were because of the illness of the emigrant himself or of his father or mother. The second reason (20 percent) was because the objectives of travelling abroad had been achieved. A smaller number has returned either because of ill treatment by the employer or the lack of financing to purchase a ticket for a second trip.

Following the husbands' return, there have been conflicting views between husbands and wives with regard to whether or not there were problems. Some 60 percent of the husbands said that there had been such problems. The most important among these problems in the husband's view were the children's illness, the problem of their education, low income, dealing with the people and the government, and complaints of high prices.

As for the wives who said that there were problems, the most important in their view was the husband's idleness, which is reflected in his being excitable and tense in his relations with his family, and the problem of discovering that he had taken another wife. Some 65 percent of the sampled women said that there were no problems after the husband's return. Also, after the husband's return, 75 percent returned to playing the role they played before his departure. The study attributes the reason for the wife not carrying on with playing the unconventional role to the traditional division of labor between men and women, whose cultural environment has not changed despite the woman's success in playing unconventional role during the husband's absence.

In conclusion, the study calls for the need to pay attention to the positive aspects of the phenomenon just as much to its negative aspects. The emigration has contributed to lifting millions from below the poverty line and changing the economic and social position of many families with regard to ownership and the husband's working career.

Finally, the study cites what the two studies said, namely that "certain people propose ideas and shape policies in the absence of adequate knowledge of what is known as the culture of poverty, the most important feature of which is what has been observed from the views of husbands and wives in preferring material benefits that have been achieved through social and psychological

losses. The study also shows that they agree in their primary desire to improve their social status and break away from the poverty circle by owning durable consumer goods rather than caring for furnishing the house and obtaining an adequate number of beds or paying attention to the house's hygienic utilities because durable consumer goods, in their view, is the family's facade in front of the others."

ISRAEL

Arab Countries Viewed as Crux of Mideast Problem

44230085B Tel Aviv DAVAR (Supplement)
in Hebrew 29 Dec 89 pp 24-25

[Article by Yisra'el Landers]

[Excerpts] Arab publications refer to Eli Kedouri as "the well-known Zionist historian." The truth is, Prof Eli Kedouri, an Iraqi-born Jew who immigrated in his youth to England, is not a Zionist. He disagrees with the Zionist view regarding the rejection of the diaspora and the in-gathering of exiles. In his view, it is unlikely that the entire Jewish people will be gathered in its homeland, and he does not view the exile solely as preparation for the establishment of the State of Israel. Therefore, he did not seriously consider immigrating to Israel before leaving his native Baghdad in 1947 to acquire a higher education in England. Kedouri sought to study in a university outside Iraq, because he estimated that the unstable situation there was about to be shaken even more. His eye was caught by an announcement in an English magazine regarding entrance exams for admission to the London School of Economics, to be held at the British Consulate in Baghdad. He registered, took the exams, and travelled to England. Thus began the academic career of the 63-year-old scholar, who is currently considered one of the most foremost modern orientalists. [passage omitted]

Considered a conservative historian, Kedouri's views on the Arab-Israeli conflict differ from the view accepted by many in Israel's intellectual community, who tend toward dovish positions. The hawkish camp in Israel, which does not have an abundance of renowned scholars, can therefore rely on several of Kedouri's views. For example, contrary to the current view, Kedouri is skeptical about the PLO's moderation. According to him, it must be understood that the PLO is a coalition of groups having different views, some of which are more extremist than others. Because of these differences of opinions, PLO leaders strive to obfuscate their statements. The leadership is unable to induce all segments of the PLO to agree to abrogate the Palestinian Covenant. 'Arafat's announcement that the covenant is "caduc" [obsolete] does not disperse the fog. 'Arafat did not state what would replace the covenant, and just as he says one thing today, he could say something else tomorrow. The PLO's position is unclear on three basic issues: The borders of the Palestinian State, the status of

Jerusalem, and the question of Palestinian refugees outside the territories under Israel's control ("the right of return"). This obfuscation is intentional, because PLO spokesmen are attempting to maneuver between the different positions of its components and those of the Arab states whose aid the organization needs.

Despite the continuing intifadah and the strengthening of the PLO's status, Kedouri does not think that the Palestinian question is at the heart of the conflict. The Arab states intervened in the conflict in the 1930s at the request of the mufti and his supporters. Since then, the conflict has not just been between Jews and Palestinian Arabs. According to Kedouri, the PLO is not the main player on the Arab side, and an agreement between the PLO and the State of Israel would not end the conflict as long as an agreement is not reached with Syria and Jordan. "Even if a PLO state is established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, nothing would be solved without peace with Syria. On the other hand, if peace is attained with Syria and Jordan, the PLO question could be solved with much greater ease."

Kedouri points to the dangers hidden in a Palestinian state, and his remarks indicate that he is not a devotee of this solution. A PLO state might serve as a springboard for an attack against Israel. It should not be forgotten that a situation of war still prevails between Israel and Syria and Jordan, despite the cease-fire agreement. PLO members from Tunisia would rule a Palestinian state. They and the refugees in camps outside of Israel's control were not residents of the West Bank, most of them being from the coastal strip. If they came to the West Bank, they would be foreigners in it, and one could predict that frictions would arise between the PLO establishment and longtime residents of the area. Conflicts between the PLO and Islamic and secular groups opposed to it are also to be expected. A Palestinian state might therefore become an arena for internal struggles and a tool of other states, which would exacerbate the situation.

Regardless of whether or not a Palestinian state is desired, many think that it is inevitable. On the face of it, the achievements of the Zionist movement and the Jewish settlement in Israel are not beyond the ability of the PLO and the residents of the territories. Kedouri differs with this assessment. "Nothing is inevitable, as long as it has not happened. Only something which has occurred is inevitable. Even recognition of the PLO by most of the states of the world has no weight. They can send their representatives to meet with 'Arafat and to visit him in Tunisia, but they are unable to exert real political pressure and cause a change in the situation in the field. Only the United States and the Soviet Union can exert real pressure."

Did not European Community members prove their ability to pressure Israel when they delayed approval of the trade agreements with it?

Kedouri states that European countries can indeed exert trade pressure, but he does not attach significant weight to such pressure. "I do not believe in economic sanctions as a diplomatic tool. It was never an effective means. The trade embargo imposed by Napoleon on Britain, or by Britain on Germany in the First World War, did not bring about victory in wars. Would Israel agree to negotiate with the PLO only because it could not send oranges to the Common Market, asks Kedouri rhetorically.

Some state that time is working against us, and therefore, it is best for us to hasten to reach an agreement. Kedouri does not accept the view that "time is working" on behalf of someone. He is skeptical about recommendations to buy now because the price will be higher tomorrow. "If a chance sale or a final price is announced in the market, there is no certainty that it is indeed so." Neither is he impressed by the argument that if we do not talk now with the PLO, we will have to negotiate with bodies that are more extreme than it in the future. Who knows what will happen in the future? Moreover, the extremism of a specific group does not negate the possibility that it would agree to reach an agreement with those whom it most hates. The conditions of reality are important, not what people believe in their hearts. The fanatics of Islam in Iran are known for their extremism. Their revolution was also directed against the West and the Soviet Union. However, they are now compelled to speak with those whom they hated, and perhaps they will even speak with their arch-enemy, Iraq's President Saddam Husayn.

Israel's proposal to hold elections in the territories does not arouse excessive enthusiasm on the part of Kedouri. In his opinion, elections in the Middle East have no meaning. They do not determine decisions, but only approve decisions which were accepted in other bodies or places. The electorate does not sound its independent voice, but is only used as a sounding board. Most populations support whoever seems stronger to them. If the residents of the territories thought that King Husayn had power, they would vote for him. Since the PLO's power seems to be turning the scales at present, they will support it.

Kedouri does not believe that clear, decisive conclusions about political developments can be drawn from the fact that the intifadah is weighing on Israel. His only conclusion is that Israel must impose law and order. This is its right according to international law, and also its obligation to the residents of the territories.

What if the restoration of order requires the use of great force and causes heavy losses? Kedouri states that he cannot advise in this respect because he does not have mastery of the details of the situation. "This is a matter for the security services."

In responding to the process of democratization in the Eastern Bloc, Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir expressed sorrow that there are no signs of such a development in

our region. Shamir believes that if democratic governments were to be established in the states of the Middle East, there would be greater chances for peace. Kedouri casts doubt on this assessment. One of the difficulties in negotiating with the PLO is its democratic nature: No leader or group completely controls all of its segments or is capable of imposing their own view. Relations between England and Argentina do not confirm the assumption that democracy facilitates making peace. After the Falklands War, a democratic government arose in Argentina instead of an autocratic regime of military commanders. Nonetheless, it does not seem that Britain is finding negotiations with the current government easier than with the military regime which preceded it. Just as Kedouri is doubtful about the effect of democracy on peacemaking, he also doubts the power of modernization to reduce tensions between nations. In his book "To Jerusalem and Back," Saul Bellow mentions the view of Yitzhaq Rabin, then prime minister, that as the Arab states become richer and more modernized, they will be less hostile toward Israel, because they will prefer producing and selling products to waging war. Kedouri has reservations about Rabin's assessment. When he heard it from Bellow, he stated that successful modernization will grant the Arab states a feeling of enhanced power, which is liable to weaken their willingness to settle the conflict.

Although journalists think that Kedouri's expertise permits him to respond to questions of any type, he himself prefers researching the past on the basis of clear evidence rather than making uncertain predictions. Perhaps, he is therefore not very impressed by demographic predictions warning of the disappearance of the Jewish people in the diaspora. "Many things can happen to cause changes in demographic processes." In general, when it is a matter of historical forecasts, somewhat greater modesty is required. Did anyone predict the peace agreement with Egypt?

Bank Hapo'alim Estimates Costs of Intifadah

44000214 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 13 Feb 90 p 2

[Text] The intifadah cost Israel up to \$1 billion in direct losses in its first two years, but now has much less impact on the economy, according to Bank Hapo'alim.

In its Sunday newsletter, the bank said its researchers estimated total direct costs from lost growth and production at between \$800 million and \$1 billion—\$600 to \$700 million of it during the intifadah's first year when construction and tourism were hit hard and reservists were forced to serve for longer periods.

"But these effects faded during 1989, and their influence on the overall economy, at less than 1 percent of gross national product, became marginal," the bank said in a monthly report.

The intifadah, translated into a loss of about 1.5 per cent of Israel's \$42 billion economy in 1988 and between 0.5 and 1 percent last year, the report said.

A bank spokeswoman said yesterday that Israel's gross domestic product grew only 1.1 per cent last year—down from 1.7 percent in 1988. She said this was mainly due to government austerity and restructuring of industry.

Palestinian strike days have cut the number of Arab workers entering Israel, and Israel-made goods have been boycotted in the territories.

Troop strength in the territories has fallen from the early months, but remains higher than before the uprising began.

The bank said its researchers found "the situation in all these sectors improved in 1989 compared to 1988, as Israeli producers and employers learned to make alternative arrangements and the labour market responded to the new conditions."

Palestinian absenteeism fell and other workers were replaced with Israelis or new machinery, the bank said. The higher costs were offset by improved quality and productivity.

But, the bank added, there were other costs to the economy, which is suffering low growth and unemployment at a 22-year-high of more than 22 percent.

"There were also indirect costs, such as the political and economic uncertainty generated by the unrest, which had a negative effect on investment."

Commentator Denies Intifadah in Israel

44230085D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 27 Dec 89 p 13

[Commentary by 'Atallah Mansur]

[Text] Pessimists and those with preconceptions loudly repeat from time to time that the uprising in the territories has crossed the Green Line and that Arabs who are citizens of Israel have joined their brothers in the territories in carrying out acts of violence and hostility against the State. Upon checking the data, i.e., official police statements, one sees that a large increase in the number of crimes committed "against a nationalistic background" within the Green Line did indeed occur. However, upon closer examination, it becomes clear that most of these crimes were committed by residents of the territories.

Moreover, it is clear that, within the borders of Israel, no political organization or group, including radical groups of the "Ibna' al-Balad" [Native Population] type, or the "Muslim movement," is giving protection to illegal activity against the security forces.

Intifadah activists and public personalities from the territories are also active inside the Green Line. In the

last 2 weeks, Faysal al-Husayni and Dr Sari Nusaybah visited the Galilee. Surprisingly, they did not go there to encourage Arabs who are citizens of Israel to increase their involvement. The PLO leadership is not currently asking the Arabs in Israel to carry out illegal acts. Yasir 'Arafat himself stated, as quoted in the last issue of *AL-YAWM AL-SABI'*, the Palestinian weekly published in Paris, that he is satisfied with what has been done by Arab citizens of Israel, and that they are not required to do anything more.

Arab activists explain this approach by stating that the PLO leadership has earmarked a role for the Arabs in Israel that is similar to the role played by U.S. Jewry regarding Israel. They estimate that the Arabs in Israel, by means of their vote in the Knesset, the Histadrut [labor federation] and other Israeli institutions, can constitute a pressure group to promote recognition of the PLO and Israeli willingness to recognize the national rights of Palestinians. This explanation is not undermined by the failures of the Arab lists in Knesset and Histadrut elections. These failures are attributed to the insufficient amount of time that was available to the parties that acted jointly in the Knesset elections, and to the fact that many politically astute persons (youths, the educated, and the middle class) do not participate in Histadrut elections.

Although the PLO mainstream and its supporters are satisfied with the solidarity being demonstrated by the Arabs of Israel toward the intifadah, wide circles of Israeli Arabs feel uncomfortable with their small role in the national scene. The visits of Faysal al-Husayni, Sari Nusaybah, Jassan Hatib, and many others to Nazareth and Shefr'am have helped the leaders of Arab activists to overcome this depression. These guests also respond to criticism, and the hesitation and fears expressed by broad segments in the face of the murders and the brutal executions of "collaborators."

Indeed, some of guests from the territories allude to their fear of a deterioration in the uprising, similar to that which occurred in the Arab revolt (1936-39), when the killing and murdering within the Arab camp caused a split in Arab society. Faysal al-Husayni, in his remarks in Shefr'am, placed responsibility for that on the Israeli side. According to him, at the start of the uprising the security forces helped collaborators become settled far from their society. The leadership of the uprising declared "days of contrition" on which collaborators could be beaten for a transgression in public, and could "return in national repentance." In the past year, the Army has been using a completely different method. It provides weapons to collaborators, returns them to their cities and villages, and obliges them to return to action. He illustrated this with a story about an intifadah activist who preached to a collaborator from Ramallah in public. The collaborator reported the activist to the IDF [Israel Defense Force]. When the activist was shot and mortally wounded by soldiers, the collaborator tried to step on his head to demonstrate to residents that no one can hurt him. In the same appearance, Faysal

al-Husayni declared that the uprising leadership in the territories had declared 1990 a year of struggle for Israeli public opinion.

Dr Sharif Kan'anah, a lecturer in anthropology from Bir Zayt University, presented the Arabs of Israel with an especially interesting theory: In his opinion, Israel is not interested in putting an end to the intifadah. On the contrary, it is acting to prolong the intifadah, albeit "on a low level," for a long period. It is doing so, he believes, on the assumption that pressure on the residents in the form of collective punishments, the shut-down of the educational system, and continual friction with the IDF will cause Arabs to immigrate from the territories. According to a study, 90 percent of the youths in the West Bank have been in a physical confrontation with the Army, and 70 percent of them have seen their fathers humiliated by soldiers. The prolonged cumulative effect of these incidents, he believes, is endangering the stability of the Palestinian family and threatening the stability of all of society. The father, a symbol of power and authority in the traditional family, is losing his centrality. Therefore, Kan'anah sees a vital need for the imparting of new values, serious ideological education, and a real cultural revolution that will preserve the Palestinian family and society. He refuses to accept the sweeping glorification which his friends give to all events of the intifadah.

The guest lecturers also spiced their remarks with "intifadah jokes," which reflect the uniqueness of life in the territories. Here is one of them: A woman was in labor at the hospital in Hebron. Doctors and nurses, in their masks, were fussing around her. The baby would simply not emerge from its mother's womb. It would peep out and go back in. When asked about the reason for its strange behavior, the infant responded: I will not come out until the ones with the masked faces leave the room!

Shahor on IDF Intelligence Changes, Intifadah

*90OL0238B Tel Aviv BAMAHA NE
in Hebrew 31 Jan 90 p 11*

[Interview with Chief Intelligence Officer Brigadier General Oren Shahor by Roni Raviv; date, place not given; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Next year the intelligence corps will become a full branch of the IDF [Israel Defense Force], announces Chief Intelligence Officer Brigadier General Oren Shahor in an interview with BAMAHA NE. He says the transfer to a full branch of the Armed Forces makes a lot of sense since the combination of operational-intelligence responsibility on the one hand with manpower and budget authority on the other, will allow intelligence to better carry out its tasks.

[BAMAHA NE] Brigadier General Shahor, what major changes do you foresee in the area of field intelligence over the next few years?

[Shahor] The question of field intelligence got a very significant push after the Yom Kippur War and also after the Peace for Galilee campaign. The intention was that intelligence coming in from aerial photos would be intelligence that we could use both to get a picture of the situation and for targets, in real time rather than with a several-day delay. In this matter there have been a lot of improvements following the Peace for Galilee campaign. In order for field intelligence to meet the needs in real time, visual intelligence devices have to be more widespread in the field, and that is the direction we have been striving for. We are also looking at better capabilities in the area of RPV's [Remotely Piloted Vehicle].

[BAMAHANE] Where does the process of converting intelligence into a full branch of the IDF stand right now?

[Shahor] In my estimation the process will be completed in 1990. We will get full branch authorities in the areas of manpower, maintenance, and, of course, the budget, so that we will be able to divide the budget according to our own priorities. From the point of view of the intelligence corps, the transition to a full branch of the Armed Forces makes a lot of sense since the combination of operational-intelligence authority with manpower and budget authority will enable it to better carry out its missions. Furthermore, your ability to work within your own budget framework means, I believe, better utilization of resources.

[BAMAHANE] With your permission, let's move on to a number of questions about the intifadah. First of all, to what extent is the Intelligence Corps involved with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?

[Shahor] The Intelligence Corps sees its assistance in the struggle against the intifadah as a high-priority mission. The preparation that we provide in the intelligence training center is correlated to the nature of the problem and the challenge, and the officers chosen to serve on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are high-quality field intelligence officers. In our field activity we try to locate those people who are leading the riots, with our goal really being more precise intelligence. On that issue we are constantly learning—in the training center, with technology and devices, with scouts and by bringing in quality intelligence officers.

[BAMAHANE] If you had to decide today which intelligence officer to bring into a regular formation in the north and which, let's say, to the Gaza Strip, where would the very best intelligence officer be sent?

[Shahor] I can say with assurance that the same quality of intelligence officer that you have at the formation level is being sent to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or to the north. Beyond that, we recently took an intelligence officer out of a regular formation, even before his tour was up, in order to have him serve in Gaza. It is our overall concept to put the best intelligence officers in the territories in order to create a quality team there.

[BAMAHANE] Earlier you mentioned the question of the price of the intifadah. What has been the price of the uprising from the intelligence point of view?

[Shahor] There is, of course, a cost to this activity, and the budgetary compensation set aside for it is certainly not full. When you deal with a mission like the struggle against the intifadah, at some point other issues have to be considered. When you send a scouting team into the West Bank, then it is not scouting somewhere else, in some other location. But, as I said, it is a mission we have to deal with.

RPV's Giving Real-Time Information on Uprising

90OL0238C Tel Aviv BAMAHANE
in Hebrew 31 Jan 90 p 11

[Article by Roni Raviv]

[Text] Small pilotless aircraft, RPV's [Remotely Piloted Vehicle], have been operating in Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip for six months now. With their assistance a picture of force movements in the area can be provided in real time, facilitating better utilization for their deployment in the field.

When the RPV's were first employed last July, a senior officer commented that the introduction of RPV's into the territories more than a year and a half after the start of the uprising was rather late since they could have been of greatest use in better utilizing forces in the field during riot flare-ups, which were a frequent occurrence only in the first months of the uprising.

The RPV's are not utilized in the territories with particularly high frequency. The unit responsible for their use belongs to the Intelligence Corps. They are operated by means of a control car and an external flyer. A similar model is also used for sorties in the north of Israel.

Criticism Leveled at IDF Spokesman

44230086D Tel Aviv AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 5 Jan 90 pp 12-14

[Article by Vered Levy; includes interviews with IDF Spokesman Nahman Shay and with former IDF Spokesman Brigadier General Ya'akov Even; place and date not given]

[Text] Several months ago, military correspondents received an announcement on their pagers informing them of an incident involving gunfire in the territories in which three Palestinians were killed and two were injured following a chase by IDF [Israel Defense Force] soldiers. So far, everything sounded more or less normal. However the announcement's continuation startled several journalists. As stated, the small pointers on the beepers registered "...three terrorists were killed and two IDF soldiers were wounded," which was followed without interruption by: "...Also, please do not forget the

group cooking competition tonight at X hours in the Central Command in the presence of the regional commander."

Not the end of the world, right. One could say "the macabre Israeli experience," one could even see the comic side of the matter. However, one can also react. The reactions of the military correspondents, in any case, have resulted in much overtime in recent months.

This announcement is an extreme case. Reports on injured Palestinians and group cooks are not intermingled every Monday and Thursday in the IDF. The announcement's wording and style are far from revealing what is currently happening in the IDF spokesman unit and how it is functioning. However, it definitely conveys something of the atmosphere there, where the prevailing wind is such that nothing can surprise anyone at present.

Public Relations Personnel Instead of Spokesmen

The IDF spokesman unit is not what it used to be, not with respect to its current performance in the field, not as an institution, and certainly not as a concept. There are many different reasons for the corrosive decline in the status and prestige of the IDF spokesman, depending on the person asked and the circumstances and angle of the question. Military correspondents speak of a decline in standards, a deteriorated style, and an entreating tone verging on humiliation. What was once a fortified, impenetrable wall, which responded, if at all, to stubborn questions with practical responses, has changed completely. Once, the "IDF spokesman" did not initiate any contact with the media. Now, the pagers of military correspondents beep incessantly in their pockets, sometimes for justified reasons such as reports on military incidents, but in many other cases, for reasons that emit an unpleasant odor of lobbying on behalf of one regional commander or another, or this or that bureau chief. In not a few cases, it is not exactly the IDF spokesman who conveys the information, but this does not concern those who receive the message. The general picture depicted among them is composed of all the ramified arms of the IDF spokesman in the field and of those beside him. This picture, as stated, is not so clear.

The birth of this new IDF public relations genre must be attributed to more than one factor. Above all, one must remember that the IDF has in recent years undergone a process of opening up to the media, which is only natural and necessary. This drift was inevitable given the penetration of sophisticated electronic media and the effect of forms of communication that arrived from the United States and Europe. The rules of the political game, for better or worse, have also changed. Senior-ranking officers who only yesterday fled from the media as if it were a plague are becoming acquainted with its enormous raw potential. Different regional commanders and corps commanders have begun to understand that insofar as they know the rules of the game and how to maneuver the operable forces, they can derive something

from this game, something no less important than what they can gain on the battlefield.

Those in the IDF who are concerned with its leaders, motivations, successes, and failures have reached a consensus. Since the intifadah erupted, the question of whether it is legitimate for the media to probe inside the Army has been virtually removed from the agenda. The intifadah itself exercises a major influence on the functioning of the IDF spokesman. The Army was not exempt from the general embarrassment into which the State of Israel was thrown. Very quickly, special focus was naturally directed at Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip in the local media, and all the more so in the foreign media. One IDF spokesman sitting in an office in Tel Aviv was no longer sufficient.

In addition, questions of ethics and substance began to bubble and erupt on the surface and in the pages of newspapers: Whether or not to fire, whether or not to use rubber bullets, black orders, grey orders, whether or not to refuse [to serve]. The public debate accompanied soldiers and commanders to Gaza, Nabulus, and East Jerusalem, breaking through the khaki borders once again. When a major general says that it is permitted to cry, and the chief of staff says that it is forbidden, the Army is confused. Despite all the efforts of the IDF spokesman unit in its previous configuration to force the Army to speak with one voice, and despite the chief of staff's efforts to paint events in a uniform color, nothing helped. There were also major generals and brigadier generals who chose to sing other tunes.

Like Mushrooms After the Rain

The IDF has ceased to speak in one voice. The phenomenon of the multiplicity of spokesmen in the IDF belongs to the last 2 or 3 years. Under the scepter of former IDF spokesman Efrayim Lapid, who is now commander of the IDF Radio Station, different, anomalous offices of military spokesmen, separate from the IDF spokesman, were created, established, and consolidated. Initially, these spokesmen took the trouble to call themselves representations of the IDF spokesman, and to maintain a connection at a certain level with the parent office. In time, as more and more local major generals came to favor such representations, Lapid lost control of matters. The small representations of the IDF spokesman actually became regional public relations offices. These spokesmen serve first and foremost the regional and corps commanders posted over them, and they function independently, without a true connection to the institution of the IDF spokesman and the objectives for which it exists.

It is patently clear that each major general has his own attached spokesman. Chronologically, this began as an innocent development, when, some years ago, with the agreement and approval of the IDF spokesman, two majors were dispatched to the northern and central commands. They were representatives of the IDF spokesman appointed by the IDF spokesman, and one

would have to have had a truly wild imagination then to expect matters to evolve to their current state. Three years ago, the current commander of the central command, then commander of the southern command, Yitzhaq Mordekhay, asked why the northern and the central commands merited spokesmen and he did not. He demanded, like the other two regional commanders, his own spokesman. Lapid saw no special reason to object. Three spokespersons with the rank of lieutenant colonel now manage the offices of spokesmanship/public relations of the three regional commanders: Lieutenant Colonel 'Ofra Parvis with Yitzhaq Mordekhay, Lieutenant Colonel Avi Regev with Yosi Peled, and Lieutenant Colonel Hanan Ruven under the command of Major General Matan Vilna'i. More or less around the time the intifadah started, small, independent, IDF spokesmanship offices began to appear like mushrooms after rain. The commanders of the different corps began to ask themselves why they in fact did not have nice, personal spokesmen as did Mitzna' and Mordekhay. The phenomenon spread, penetrating all fields and branches in the Army. In the IDF spokesman unit, they call the appearance of "the new spokesmen" a grey market.

What began as an innocent step intended to improve two-way communication between the IDF spokesman and the field became an almost massive phenomenon. Anyone having knowledge of the system and sufficient authority established a spokesman's office according to his needs. This "grey market" includes, among others, the manpower branch, the quartermaster branch, the Air Force, the Navy, the Field Forces Command [MFHS], the military police, and actually the entire IDF. In addition to all of these spokesmen, there are also two spokesmen for the civil administration, a spokesman for the Lebanon liaison unit, and bureau chiefs who have also functioned more than once as spokesmen or as information muzzlers or leakers for their major generals.

Reporting Impaired

This insane, uncontrolled proliferation of "IDF spokesmen" is pregnant with many accompanying phenomena. There is no doubt that much more information is currently flowing outward from the Army than ever before. It is clear that the IDF spokesman's contribution, or what remains of it, to this flow of information has become so small as to be marginal. The Army has stopped speaking with one voice. Whether this is good or bad is another question, whose answer also depends on the person asked. When five spokesmen respond to one incident, it is impossible for them to maintain uniformity and homogeneity in their responses. These phenomena have inevitable effects that are no less significant. From the standpoint of military correspondents, read the public, these effects can be divided in two. On the one hand, military correspondents have many more sources of information and possibilities to cross breed information. On the other hand, these correspondents believe that the reliability, authenticity, and accuracy of reporting has become immeasurably impaired.

Karmela Menashe, KOL YISRA'EL radio station's military affairs reporter states: "It is one big chaotic situation. Rumors about something are received. We knock on all fronts. I turn to the Press Liaison Branch, to Nahman's office, and to the local spokesman in the area where the rumors originated. The major generals' spokesmen are discriminatory, inviting whomever they fancy. Reporters whom they do not like do not receive a report."

Avi Benyahu, 'AL-HAMISHMAR's military correspondent, tells of manipulation carried out here and there by the spokesmen of the commands according to the needs of the local regional commander. For example, the spokesman of a certain command thinks twice about whether to call a military correspondent or a local reporter, according to circumstantial considerations. If the command's basketball tournament is to take place in another week (the military correspondent will certainly not trouble himself for this), it is appropriate to give a bonus to the local reporter there, to throw him some bone several days beforehand. It turns out that the locals sometimes obtain key military information for absolutely no relevant reason. The advantage of proximity is in their favor. The military correspondents are hurt, and the public receives limited information based on fewer sources.

Phenomena of this type are very prominent in areas under the control of the Commander of the Central Command, Yitzhaq Mordekhay. According to stories originating in the field, Lt Col 'Ofra Parvis, who is called Mordekhay's right hand, rules military correspondents, foreign and local, autocratically. Parvis, relates a reporter, updates only those whom she likes. For example, in a case involving the detection of a Black Panther cell in Nabulus, she informed only Karmela Menashe and Moshe Shlonski from the television network. When they asked her about the rest of the members of the cell, she said that they would hear about this somehow. They protested. With no alternative, the message was forwarded. Later, it emerged that the Israeli correspondents had been invited to come at 9:00, whereas the foreign correspondents were told to come at 11:00, after everything was over. As if this were not enough, it later became known that the IDF Radio Station had been there the day before. All of these developments occurred of course with the knowledge and full backing of Mordekhay.

Mordekhay is cast with particularly tough material. In Lapid's time, he informed the latter—and even went to the trouble of informing his successor, Nahman Shay—that nothing would help them at all. Spokesmen come and go, and only the spokeswoman, 'Ofra, remains forever. Parvis' unshakable authority managed to anger even Lapid, who, to a large extent, created the facts described above. When Major General Mitzna' was still the commander of the central command, Lapid attempted to give weight to his authority by transferring her from the central command. At the time, Mitzna', like Mordekhay at present, simply ignored him.

The next story, which is told by a military correspondent, also indicates the seriousness that regional commanders attach to the IDF spokesman: About 2 years ago, close to the start of the intifadah, Mordekhay found the IDF spokesman's policy unacceptable. The correspondent actually saw a cable signed by Mordekhay and issued in his name to his subordinates, which stated: "Please do not cooperate with the directives of the IDF spokesman."

The Major General Has the Last Word

"The new spokesmen" in the IDF are torn between the IDF spokesman and their major generals or individual commanders. They are subordinate to the IDF spokesman, and, in many cases, their receipt or denial of appointments is decided by the IDF spokesman. In the field, matters of course work differently. The major general or field commander, not the IDF spokesman, have the last word. The IDF spokesman can decide and declare policy from now until further notice. However, as long as there is no power in the Army that can impose something on Mordekhay, Peled, or Vilna'i, this is as valuable as a garlic peel. The IDF spokesman wants to report on every gasoline bomb thrown in the territories within minutes of the incident. Finding this unacceptable, Mordekhay decided that it is sufficient to take stock of the gasoline bombs once a day and to report on all of them together toward the evening. Consequently, correspondents receive contradictory numbers at uncoordinated times, and they are uncertain about what to report, how many, and when. Two months ago, when information was received on a penetration of terrorists in the north, Avi Regev decided to inform local reporters. Military correspondents, with only an hour's notice, were unable to reach the site. If the IDF spokesman had been assigned to this, the military correspondents say, such a thing could not have happened.

Another compelling example is the major generals' access to the media. The commander of the southern command granted extensive interviews to the IDF Radio Station regarding the scandals in the Giv'ati Brigade, the five terrorists in the south, and the pardon of the Giv'ati soldiers. He said "no" to a request by KOL YISRA'EL radio station to interview him. He said "yes" to the IDF Radio Station. Why? Because it is more comfortable for him. Everything is random and arbitrary, as if driven by the ideological-strategic considerations of major generals and commanders, but actually fed by the camouflaged egotistical motives of generals who have uncovered the oracle of Medea, and, very simply, there is no one to stop them.

Lapid Not Willing To Be Interviewed

The IDF spokesman until 4 months ago, Efrayim Lapid, not only constituted a constraint in this process, but to a large extent, he created it. Lapid, for sufficiently understandable reasons, is not willing to be interviewed for this report. "I have no desire," he said in a somewhat pampered voice. "I am no longer obliged, correct?"

Correct. His mind cannot be changed by the fact that almost all streams in this report flow to him. Lapid had notoriously unsympathetic relations with the military correspondents. In the IDF spokesman unit, they tend to attribute a significant share of the difficult phenomena and problems to "Lapid's period." Lapid established for himself the goal of confiscating the exclusive right of coverage of military affairs from the military correspondents. He encouraged and even supported a policy of manipulating military and local reporters, which created a situation in which local reporters began to come in contact with spokesmen in the field more and more, and with the IDF spokesman in Tel Aviv less and less. What Lapid perhaps did not expect was that the military correspondents would follow them. Lapid threw out the baby with the bath water, say elements from inside the system. He thought that he would show the military correspondents where the fish passes water and induce them to seek his benevolence. However, he emerged as the loser on all fronts. Ultimately, all reporters, regardless of type, became accustomed to communicating with and deriving information from the new local spokesmen. The IDF spokesman thus became obsolete, having lost its exclusive control over the dissemination of information and the creation of contact with the media.

Moreover, every military correspondent, in theory and practice, can now directly contact each major general at home or the office, 24 hours a day, to receive an answer to any question. Military correspondents say that they contact the IDF spokesman every several days out of courtesy and friendliness.

Lapid bequeathed to Nahman Shay a weak institution devoid of content and power. It cannot be said that Shay stepped off the moon, not knowing what he was entering. However, he conveys the impression that he has admitted to himself that he is standing quite powerless and staggered in the face of the imperialistic desires being shown toward the media by senior IDF major generals. Shay foresaw trouble, states one military correspondent. So what? He assumed that after starting in his new post, he would restaff the representations of the IDF spokesman according to his choice. Perhaps Shay knows what is going on, but not well enough to know that no one in the IDF can bend, for example, Yitzhaq Mordekhay or most of the other major generals and the chief of staff.

One receives the impression that whoever aspires to the position of IDF spokesman requires a certain measure of masochism in his personality. Even in better days, the IDF spokesman had sufficient difficulties and pressures to contend with. In the current Israeli context, the position, by its nature, is almost impossible, as attested by veteran correspondents. This was also the case when the mechanism functioned as it should, when the IDF spokesman was the IDF spokesman and not dozens of small local spokesmen. However, it is certain that Lapid left a confused and embroiled unit, which communicates autistically and unsuccessfully with media representatives, inexcusably neglects foreign reporters, and is completely powerless in the face of new phenomena in the

field. All military correspondents and people in the system testify to this. The former, good infrastructure that gave rise to the IDF spokesman's reputation and great prestige has sunk. Lapid went to the IDF Radio Station, leaving ruins behind him. Nahman Shay has come to these ruins from the peak of a brilliant career. He has no illusions about any of the facts. Nonetheless, he emphasizes several times in the course of the interview below that he is optimistic.

The Chief of Staff Evades Elegantly

Other winds are blowing above Shay's optimism. Senior elements in the system estimate that Shay will not finish the year as IDF spokesman. The determination that he is not "of the same mind" as the chief of staff has been heard more than once. Shay, these elements say, does not receive a tenth of the backing he thought he would receive. He now finds himself in an unsympathetic domain, opposite major generals who believe themselves to be great media experts, and a chief of staff who is either unwanting or unable to stand by his side at critical moments. For example, Chief of Staff Dan Shomron has elegantly evaded the open battle now spreading between Shay and Maj Gen Yitzhaq Mordekhay. Shay, without the required backing, is starting to understand that his base of support is becoming much more narrow than he perhaps imagined, narrow to the point of strangulation. Based on these facts and personal acquaintance with Nahman Shay, the assessors reckon that his stay in the unit will not exceed several months. Shay is a winner. If it becomes clear that there is no way out of the quagmire, he will find a way out. There is no place in his record for becoming entangled in failures. Shay thinks and responds quickly. Even before Shomron finishes formulating thoughts of parting from Shay, Shay will already be out.

Incidentally, Nahman Shay also initially refused to be interviewed. Shay, IDF spokesman since 1 September of this year, said that the timing was not suitable for him, that he has not yet managed to create order, that we should wait 4 to 5 months. In a typical tone (light, filled with grace and elegance), he also announced that he would not permit any of his subordinates to be interviewed, nor anyone from the IDF spokesman unit, including the major generals' spokesmen. When they were asked to respond and to give their version, 'Ofra Parvis and Avi Regev truly said that they could not be interviewed without the IDF spokesman's approval. Shay kept his word. Approval was indeed withheld. However, for reasons known mainly to him, Shay finally agreed to be interviewed.

Shay is a professional media fox, a sophisticated public relations person, direct, and open. Precisely because of these qualities, state his supporters, if someone can save the IDF spokesman unit, it will be him. Shay is light years away from Lapid's basic antipathy. An offshoot, he reads the map better and quicker. He understands who is against whom, and he is not dragged into excessively

marginal engagements. So far, he has succeeded wherever he has gone. There is no apparent reason for him to fail in the position of IDF spokesman.

Nahman Shay gives a prefatory lecture on the institution of the IDF spokesman, and how he sees the essence of his duty. Afterwards, he allows the limited airing of questions for quotation. The rules call for limited questions, limited answers, and subject areas chosen in advance. He selects his words with skillful care, lest he 1) tarnish Lapid; 2) unduly arouse the anger of the lions, the major generals; 3) drop anything on the chief of staff; and 4) personally deviate from the agenda.

Shay Remains in the Meantime

[AL-HAMISHMAR] Do you think that the situation is reversible? Is it possible to return to what once was?

[Shay] I very much hope so. I certainly believe that the IDF spokesmanship must be centralized and strong. This is clearly in the interest of the IDF. However, in my opinion, it is not only in the interest of the IDF, but also of the media and the public. The centralization of the release of information has become eroded. We are working on this.

[AL-HAMISHMAR] Military correspondents argue that the multiplicity of spokesmen and the other phenomena described in this report have caused damage, and that the reliability of reporting has been impaired. What do you intend to do?

[Shay] I am making every effort so that the announcements will include extensive and accurate information as much as possible, and will be based on the best sources. In times such as these, when there are 200 to 250 incidents per week, it is difficult. Sometimes, we have lapses. We ourselves sometimes find it difficult to know when a report from the field is complete or partial, or when it is initial or final. I am torn between the need to be timely and quick and a desire to go into depth and be well-grounded. Personally, I give priority to speed and timeliness. This has a price. I know.

[AL-HAMISHMAR] What have you changed in the unit since you assumed your post?

[Shay] I established a special branch to handle foreign reporters. Until now, this was the purview of the representation in Jerusalem, with Lt Col 'Ofra Parvis. It was unacceptable to me that one regional command representation was assigned to all foreign reporters, so I made the separation. Currently, foreign reporters have a separate address. I believe that they need to receive special care and good treatment separately. Lieutenant Colonel Moshe Pogel is in charge of this new unit.

In addition, I introduced a daily summary of events, which provides journalists every evening with a detailed picture of what is happening, plus two new publications NETEZ [Ricochet] and 24 SHA'OT [24 Hours], which

supply reporters from Israel and abroad with immediate responses to, and a follow-up of, events.

[AL-HAMISHMAR] How do you intend to solve the main problem raised in this report, namely the multiplicity of spokesmen in the Army and the fact that the IDF spokesman has been supplanted as the releaser of information?

[Shay] To the extent that matters are in my hands, I will try to reach a situation in which spokespersonship will be from one centralized source, with emissaries in the representations. By emissaries, I mean representatives of the spokesman who maintain close contact with the field.

[AL-HAMISHMAR] Between you and me, why do you need all of this trouble?

[Shay] Because I like challenges. I am inquisitive, and I had the feeling that I would find a challenge deserving of the name here.

[AL-HAMISHMAR] In view of the sad situation, are you regretful?

[Shay] At this stage, no. I am stubborn. In the meantime, and I emphasize, in the meantime, I think that it will be possible to achieve the things in which I believe. I am the IDF spokesman as of 1 September 1989, and I have many plans. [End of interview]

The Gazit Report

On 1 August 1989, the findings of the Gazit Report were published. The Gazit Commission, headed by reserve Major General Shlomo Gazit, was appointed by the chief of staff, and was ordered to check, respond to, and make recommendations regarding the following subjects pertaining to the IDF spokesman's unit: the structure of the unit, duty rosters, the array deployed in the commands, subordination and professional connection, treatment of foreign reporters, the military connection of the IDF spokesman's staff, and other aspects. These subjects appear in the commission's letter of appointment, which is signed by Chief of Staff Dan Shomron.

Within the perspective of 2 years, it emerges that every one of the subjects that disturbed the chief of staff's rest was on target, each a painful corn. Coincidentally or not, the members of the commission were asked to locate the Achilles' heel of the IDF spokesman unit in a way that did not permit them to miss even one important vulnerable point.

After recommending three basic principles, namely, the openness, apoliticalness, and independence of the IDF spokesman, the members of the Gazit Commission also indirectly treated the problem of the multiplicity of spokesmen.

In the section on organizational recommendations, it was stated that "...the commission did not enter into the

details of this matter. Nonetheless, we deem it proper to recommend a number of principles:

"a. The most important and urgent problem is to develop the mechanism for channeling information to representatives of the IDF spokesman in the regional commands, so that they will be able to obtain complete, accurate, and reliable information in real time as much as possible....

"We recommend that the entire deployed array maintain a 'soldierly' connection to the IDF spokesman, who should be concerned with the staffing of positions, substitutions, promotions, and full coordination with the commander of the command or of the relevant arm....

"It is important to determine that officers operating in a regional command shall enjoy a status similar to that enjoyed by the IDF spokesman in relation to the chief of staff and the defense minister: They should have the authority to publish local 'spokesman announcements' without the approval of the major general. They should be permitted to approve interviews, tours, reports and so on, according to a basic policy and procedures to be dictated by the IDF spokesman, who shall define their status in relation to the spokesman on the one hand, and to the commander of the command on the other, as well as reporting and control procedures."

The call "to define the status of officers in the representations in relation to the major general on the one hand, and the IDF spokesman on the other," certainly testifies to the excellent discernment and analytical ability of the commission's members. A solution, at least regarding all that relates to this part of the problem in the IDF spokesman's unit, is hidden in this sentence. However, 12 months and two spokesmen later, we ask: Why has this most important recommendation not been implemented? An inevitable question is derived from this last question: Where is the chief of staff in this entire story?

What About Dan Shomron?

No one is happy about discussing the chief of staff. Military correspondents and elements in the military system dismiss the statement that whenever someone says something like "no one can bend Yitzhaq Mordekhay," the chief of staff is meant. They report other areas not directly connected to the IDF spokesman, regarding which Dan Shomron's reach is too short to bring salvation. If this only regards the IDF spokesman, let it be so, they say. However, his lack of control over the major generals affects all areas of the Army. A senior officer in the general staff states that Shomron, by proceeding on the principle of the maximal decentralization and delegation of authorities, has perhaps introduced a concept that arouses sympathy. Shomron empowered his major generals because he truly believed that this had to work. However, he did not take into account that the day would come when the principle of mutual gentlemanliness would not be preserved, and the golem would rise against its creator and would not listen to him.

Dan Shomron could have adopted the conclusions of the Gazit Report, and he could have activated the document prepared by the Planning Branch for Nahman Shay (see box). Dan Shomron will have to respond to the section in the State comptroller's next report, that relates precisely to the IDF spokesman unit on the same point and from the same angle. Nahman Shay is optimistic. However, this is apparently a matter of his character. If Shomron is capable of taking action, he would have done so already. However, Shomron will not make a joke of himself. Our chief of staff is like the king in the "Little Prince," who is careful to give his subjects only orders which he knows in advance they will fulfill. He is aware of his own limitations, and he would not command anyone to sneeze by order.

[Box, p 13] Dan Shomron Does Not Respond

Chief of Staff Dan Shomron decided not to respond to any of the following three questions 24 hours after they were submitted to him:

1. The findings of the Gazit Report were published a year ago. Why have you not applied the conclusions and recommendations of the report prepared by this commission, which you appointed?

2. Are you aware of the problem of the multiplicity of spokesmen in the Army? Do you intend to treat the problem and if so how?

3. The Planning Branch prepared a special document containing a recommendation that could restore to the IDF spokesman a certain degree of control over the release of information. The document also recommends that the representations of the commands be restaffed by order of the IDF spokesman with majors instead of lieutenant colonels whose posts are not connected to the IDF spokesman as is the case now. Will you activate the recommendations of this document and will you back it?

[Box, p 13] Former IDF Spokesman Brigadier General Ya'aqov Even: Only One Decision By the Chief of Staff Is Needed

Brig Gen Ya'aqov Even, a former IDF spokesman, states that a number of years ago, any self-respecting officer kept a distance from the media, not coming into contact with it at all. Even states: "Today, the opposite is true. It is now understood in the Army that information is an important weapon. It is very important for the Army to maintain its centralization for the purpose of control. The best combination for the Army is as many means in the field as possible and absolute control at the center.

"The chief of staff and the IDF spokesman are currently not the exclusive and sole agency of the Army in determining information policy and disseminating information. The situation is approaching the uncontrolled chaos of the Israel Police, where every superintendent has two journalists who exist on what he says. During my tenure as IDF spokesman, the Army spoke in one voice."

[AL-HAMISHMAR] If that is the case, what brought about the IDF spokesman's loss of control?

[Even] There was erosion, and erosion is dangerous. I am certain that there will be those who will dress this erosion in festive, ideological attire to demonstrate that it is good and fine. The truth is that it is very bad for the Army.

[AL-HAMISHMAR] Is the process reversible? Is it possible to return to the situation which existed, as you say, in your time?

[Even] Yes, in my opinion, it is possible to return and to speak in one voice in no time at all. It is not impossible.

[AL-HAMISHMAR] How?

[Even] It is very simple. It only requires one decision on the part of the chief of staff.

Captured MiG-23 Compared to F-15, F-16

90OL0238A Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE
in Hebrew 31 Jan 90 p 9

[Article by Sharon Sade]

[Text] On 11 October 1989 at 11:01 A.M., a MiG-23 MLD landed at the Megiddo landing strip. Its pilot, Major 'Adil Basam, a Syrian pilot of Sunni origin, decided to free himself from the shackles of the Syrian regime in an original way and defect to Israel.

This week the circuit was closed. A little less than four months after the Syrian pilot landed with the MiG-23 at Megiddo, the MiG took off into Israeli airspace again, this time flown by an experienced Israeli pilot. Lieutenant Colonel A., commander of the Air Force's Flight Test Center, took off on Monday, at 2:36 P.M. from an Air Force base in the center of the country. Two seater F-15's and F-16's accompanied the MiG during its flight over Jerusalem. The ground and air test programs for the MiG will last for at least several months.

Flying the plane was not a "so what?" proposition. The sum total of information about it was relatively small, and it was clear from the beginning that the planes vital test log, which was in the possession of the pilot, was insufficient to fly the plane. Therefore test crews had to proceed very slowly before a relatively basic test could be conducted, like running the engine, for example. Expert crews from the Aviation Maintenance Unit and the Flight Test Center, together with the appropriate intelligence bodies, studied the plane's systems very carefully and systematically. At the same time, the test pilot, Lt Col A., was asked to learn the operation of the systems and the way they functioned during emergencies.

They had to overcome many problems. The major ones were: the lack of an objective maintenance layout, the need to learn the Soviet aviation design concept, and the need to come up with a brief but comprehensive test plan with the aim of learning the plane's major characteristics, systems, and flight limitations in as short a time as

possible. The advance discussions held with the Syrian pilot solved some of the initial problems encountered by the test crews, especially in the operation of the breakers and an overall structural description of the systems.

When the pilot landed they even asked the Syrian pilot himself to come and press the appropriate breaker for folding the wings in the cockpit. The unfamiliar ejection seat and the MiG's pair of 23mm guns aroused deep fear at first, and several long, tense minutes passed before they were proven sound.

In the first stage the maintenance people were concerned with creating appropriate restraints and covers for the plane, including engine covers and take-off gear restraints. Afterwards, appropriate elevation points were prepared so that they were later able to carry out more complex tests like running the engine, which requires strong anchorage and connection to computerized gauges. Only after that did the crews turn to the basic assemblies: the fuel systems, the hydraulic systems, and the wheels and brakes, which were found to be in "intermediate" condition. The tubing layout was examined as well as the other mechanical and avionics systems. This included the radar, deterrent systems, scrambling and chaff, ventilation, compression, air conditioning, sticks, etc.

The ejection seat was a problem unto itself. This safety accessory was hardly touched by the Syrians. It was in generally good condition, but a serious defect was found. Another discovery, much more positive, was that the main assemblies, like the takeoff gears, wings, ejection seat, and others were numbered with an identical 5-digit number, unlike Western planes like the F-15 and F-16. Apparently the parts were manufactured simultaneously on one assembly line and were intended to accompany each other for the plane's entire service life.

With the end of the basic acquaintance stage of the systems, a number of ground runs were carried out on the MiG's powerful Tomanski engine. The results showed the engine to be in excellent shape and functioning "like new," despite the fact that it was manufactured five years ago. The most surprising fact was that no oil or fuel leaks developed during the entire course of the tests, which, it should be pointed out, is a characteristic "weakness" of the most advanced Western engines. One person remarked that its basic design was very simple and reliable, which testifies to the high level of the Soviets in engine manufacture.

Last week a test takeoff run was carried out, in which the plane was taxied on the runway at a speed of up to 200 km/hr. The systems functioned as expected. The takeoff run itself demonstrated a part of the enormous potential of the MiG engine: the plane opened a burner and "hit" an amazing acceleration, so much so that some believe it to be faster than the F-15, at least in the initial stages of acceleration.

After examining the results of the test run, nothing remained except to prepare the plane for flight itself, with weather being the only delaying factor.

Senior officers and analysts defined the plane and its pilot as a gift of great intelligence and operational value. They provided us, these sources say, with knowledge of the most advanced tools at the disposal of the Syrian Air Force, and the lessons it learned following the disaster that befell it in the Peace for Galilee war; beyond that, obviously, the flight envelope and the functioning of its systems during various stages of flight and maneuvers will also be tested. The emphasis will be on learning the avionics systems, especially the advanced radar, that requires very high proficiency to operate. After those tests are concluded, the plane will make its way, at one point or another, to the Air Force museum.

It may be that because the results of the research on the plane will be of interest to others beyond the Israeli Air Force, we can assume that some of them may get to examine the findings of the tests on the plane within the framework of agreements on cooperation and information transfer.

Intelligence Community Used for Political Aims

44230086C Tel Aviv AL-'HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 5 Jan 90 p 9

[Article by Avi Benyah]u]

[Text] A question has arisen on the periphery of the political storm caused by the Weizmann affair regarding how much, if any, damage was caused to Israel's intelligence services by Yitzhaq Shamir's use of reports, which were issued to his office by these services, as the basis for his efforts to dismiss Minister 'Ezer Weizmann.

The assumption is that the intelligence services—AMAN [Bureau of Military Intelligence], SHABAK [General Security Service], and the Mosad [Central Institute for Intelligence]—are no longer perceived as sacred cows, and that the damage must be reckoned immediately in a fat reference. The true distress of senior Mosad and SHABAK personnel seems to stem mainly from the transference of routine, innocent intelligence reports to Shamir's office, who exploited them to advance a political interest. Intelligence elements do not think that Weizmann's steps and activity bear any irregularity warranting punishment. Their anger is directed at what is called an "ethical flaw" and the misuse of innocent intelligence material by political elements. They can cope with the rest of the "damages." Minister Weizmann's promotion of the peace process and his support for negotiations with the PLO have never been a secret. Weizmann has spoken at length about these matters in public lectures and in meetings with peace movements and bodies. The question is, did he cross the "red line."

On 6 June, Weizmann was in Geneva with his wife Re'uma and his bureau chief, Arye Shomer. Mosad

personnel managed to obtain a detailed report transferred by the PLO's Geneva representative, Nabil Ramlawi, to his commander in Tunisia, Yasir 'Arafat. The report contained details of a half-hour meeting between Ramlawi and Weizmann in Weizmann's hotel room. The Ramlawi document, whose content was transmitted by the head of the Mosad to Yitzhaq Shamir, contained "quotations typical of Weizmann," said a source familiar with the matter this week. These quotations reinforced Shamir's view that such a meeting in a hotel room did indeed occur. Moreover, Ramlawi describes in the report how Weizmann, in front of his wife, defined Ramlawi as a "high-ranking Palestinian element." Yitzhaq Shamir read the report, was angered, and did nothing. The defense minister was on an official visit in France at the time.

Several months later, Yitzhaq Shamir uncovered, again with the aid of routine SHABAK and AMAN intelligence reports, telephone conversations and meetings that Weizmann had with Dr Ahmad Taybi, a young Palestinian working to advance the peace process.

Conversation Eavesdropped and Transcribed

SHABAK's role in this context was to monitor. Taybi is well known to the security arms. This week, it was disclosed that Israel employed him to advance its attempts to locate information on Israeli prisoners and missing persons. For this purpose, SHABAK allowed him to go outside the borders of Israel to Arab states, even after it was ascertained that he was exploiting his departures from Israel to hold political discussions, receive directives, and transfer messages. SHABAK monitored this activity.

In November, Dr Taybi had a telephone conversation with 'Ezer Weizmann. The conversation was bugged, and a transcript of it was referred to the attention of the prime minister. The eavesdropping was apparently carried out on the telephone lines of the PLO command in Tunisia, and not on Weizmann's house or office. Eavesdropping has been publicized at least twice. The first case involved the famous conversation between Nasir and Husayn just before the Six-Day War. The second was when former AMAN Chief Major General Ehud Baraq presented the text of a conversation, in which 'Arafat gave directives regarding the treatment of hostages in the Achille Lauro cruise ship episode. Security elements reiterated this week that eavesdropping is not conducted on the telephone lines of government ministers, including 'Ezer Weizmann.

According to the "Secret Listening Law," which was approved in Israel in the 1970s, only AMAN and SHABAK are permitted to request to eavesdrop on telephone lines in Israel, and only with the approval of the prime minister or the defense minister.

The eavesdropping on the lines in Tunisia, if that was the case, picked up a conversation between Taybi and Weizmann, in which Weizmann stated that it is necessary to accept UN Resolution 242. He also recommended to the

PLO that it accept Baker's five points. From the text, it emerges that Weizmann certainly expected that call from Taybi. Toward the end of the conversation, he even gave Dr Taybi his office, home, and car telephone numbers for a conversation planned the next day.

The Head of SHABAK Did Not Warn Weizmann

The reports given to Yitzhaq Shamir by SHABAK and the Mosad were texts of Taybi's telephone conversation with Weizmann. Shamir viewed Weizmann's actions as subverting the government's basic policies. He argued to intelligence personnel and his confidants that Weizmann was conveying to Israel's enemies the cabinet's "mood" and the Israeli Government's strategy regarding the PLO and the United States. He even strongly remarked that such material is considered "classified intelligence material," which was conveyed to the enemy by a senior member of the government.

In early December, a senior SHABAK member, on his own initiative, met with Weizmann to update him on developments regarding Taybi. He informed Weizmann that SHABAK intended to restrict Taybi's actions and limit his exits from the country. He asked Weizmann to be aware of these matters. Weizmann, for his part, was distressed by the SHABAK person's remarks, and he requested a meeting with SHABAK's chief, a close friend of his. The two met at the "Triana" restaurant in Tel Aviv about 2 weeks ago. In the course of the meeting, no warning was heard regarding Weizmann, and the topic was not broached at all.

Senior Mosad and SHABAK personnel were also surprised on Sunday at noon when they heard Shamir announcing Weizmann's dismissal based on intelligence material. Components of the intelligence community—the Mosad, which "intercepted" Ramlawi's report, SHABAK, which monitored Dr Taybi, and AMAN of the Israel Defense Force—participated in collecting this material, if that was the case.

These elements feel uncomfortable about the political use made of "intelligence material" to dismiss a minister. Additional charges against Yitzhaq Shamir lie in the fact that he went about for a week with sensitive intelligence reports (owing to the protection of sources) under his arm, and frequently quoted from them in the presence of political elements, activists of parties, and almost anyone who requested, excluding Minister Weizmann. Some see defective reasoning in this behavior, especially since it was exhibited by someone who long served in the Mosad and is acutely aware of sensitivities and limits.

Any Disclosure Is Problematic

Shamir himself is not stirred by the criticism. On the MOKED television program, he rejected arguments against him, and claimed that the intelligence services' role is essentially restricted to gathering material. The use of material is subject to his exclusive consideration.

"Do not instruct me in what is permitted and what is forbidden," he rebuked interviewers.

In the intelligence community, it is said that any disclosure of an intelligence organization is to its disadvantage, and causes irreparable damage. Former Mosad Chief Me'ir 'Amit expressed this approach when he stated at the end of the week that "in the future, everything will be more difficult. The functioning of systems is difficult and sensitive. Every disclosure is problematic." The opposing view is that no harm exists in disclosing certain intelligence material in a controlled manner. The truth is somewhere in the middle.

The disclosure of the acquisition of Ramlawi's report to Tunisia is liable to put pressure on PLO members and other elements to take greater precautions. There are sources of information, intelligence collection methods, activity to locate prisoners and missing persons, and more, whose disclosure confers no advantage. The fact that the prime minister made free use of reports to remove Weizmann from the government testifies to a lack of caution and sensitivity. The heads of the intelligence and security communities are liable to henceforth reconsider the way in which reports are worded and the extent of detail in them in order to prevent the irrelevant use of material. Today, it is Yitzhaq Shamir. Tomorrow, it could be someone else with a different objective.

Legal System's 'Slant' Toward PLO Criticized

900L0204A 'Ofra NEQUDA
in Hebrew Dec 1989 pp 24-26

[Article by Elyaqim Ha'aytzani]

[Text] If there is a persecuted Jewish minority anywhere in the world, outside of the Arab countries, it is the Jews in the settlements of the occupied territories. In fact, show us a single country except for Israel whose prime minister and defense minister openly ridicule Jews ("Ari'el-Shlomieli," "Samaritan Rhinoceri"), make fun of them publicly, cut their budgets with the declared goal of bringing about their demise, predict and even prepare a dark end for them.

Show us a single country in the world where Jews are forbidden to live in certain cities just because they are Jews, as today Jews are forbidden to live in Jericho, Nabulus and Ramallah. Show us a single city in the world where there are ghettos from which Jews are forbidden to leave, like Hebron (where the defense minister has designated four ghettos: Ghetto Avraham Avinu, Ghetto Bayt Hadassah, Ghetto Bayt Romano, and Ghetto Tall Rumaydah). Show us a single ghetto, even in the Middle Ages, where it was forbidden to build to height, as in Hebron. There is the yeshiva "Shavay Hebron" situated in a single poor building, which includes a dormitory for 120 students, but it is not allowed to build a second floor, while Arab Hebron is in the midst of a building frenzy.

Show us a country where the media, written and electronic, and primarily government communications, persecutes Jews, silences them and extinguishes their light, works daily to expose any wrongdoing it can find, is pleased with their misfortune and mourns when they celebrate.

Show us a country where Jews are stoned like dogs on the way home, at times burned alive, while the legal authorities (as opposed to the security forces) do not support them. On the contrary, they hunt them and track them down day and night in order to catch them in some sort of act of self-defense and put them on the pillory of a hostile media and bring them to trial as criminals.

Every day, Arabs are killed by IDF [Israel Defense Force] soldiers, their bodies are snatched and buried secretly, and the government doesn't lift a finger to stop this. But in order to convict Rabbi Levinger of murder, the government used a helicopter to help disband an Arab funeral and grab the body without even finding the bullet!

And not only that. The testimony of a terrorist was needed to prosecute a Jew from the "territories," but his appearance as a convicted terrorist was likely to take away from the credibility of his testimony against that Jew (whose name was not made public because of the restriction of "sub judice"). For this reason, the court delayed the trial date of the terrorist.

Arabs in the occupied territories owe the Israelis tens of millions of dollars, and they do not pay. They transferred their accounts, because of the intifadah, to reliable Israeli creditors, but where will they carry them out? In the offices of Nabulus and Ramallah? How will they even get there and get out alive? And what are the chances that the Arab executors, even if they are totally righteous people, will confiscate and sell the possessions of their fellow Arabs and not be murdered tomorrow? On this subject, the Ministry of Justice is apathetic: "He has no money," but there isn't one official who can deal with this in the executive office in Jerusalem!

The only special effort that the Ministry of Justice is making with regard to matters which time—the time period of the Arab rebellion—has brought about is the preparation of a "Karp Report" (Volume 2) in order to sharpen and perfect the means of oppression against the downtrodden Jews of the occupied territories. And if you say that the "settlers" are not persecuted because they are Jews but, rather, because they are Jews who are trying to settle in specific areas in Israel, then we ask: What is the difference?

We will elaborate on this subject of distortion and derailling of the Ministry of Justice in Israel, with the following episodes:

A. Stoning and Burning

The police, the legal system and the media restrict the "settlers," who face stones and Molotov cocktails, with

portions of the law which allow self-defense only in rare instances. Practically, whoever has a stone thrown at him while driving on the road, must run away from the second stone. He is not allowed to advance and stop it with weapons as long as there is a possibility of escape. No one disagrees about the fact that this is the law, and no one argues with this unreasoned judgment. There is, however, another law, a law which allows, even the citizen, to take the initiative and run after the perpetrator of a crime in order to catch him and hand him over to the authorities, a law which allows even the citizen to use reasonable force for this purpose, including gunfire, according to the circumstances. (Around this law, a legal argument has developed, portions of which come under the heading of "Before a blind man....")

And now let every man carry out his own private reckoning for himself and for his loved ones and, even, for his own trampled honor as a human being and as a Jew. I have conducted mine. I will take action to catch those who throw stones at my vehicle, including shooting under certain circumstances, in order to hand them over to the authorities. I will not allow even my fellow Jews to tie my hands in the face of the enemy. I will fight as long as I can against the political dynamic of the ghetto which the Israeli Government is developing within Israel.

B. The End of the Rule of Law

In contrast to the nice Dr. Jekyll face of the Ministry of Justice, namely, guarding at any cost the "rule of law," see the ugly face of Mr. Hyde. Suddenly, when it is dealing with the leaders of the Arab rebellion, the Ministry of Justice scoffs at the law, actually tramples it, operates according to political dictates, as is characteristic of the final days of the corrupt governments of the world. So has it been written (within the framework of "the days of the judging of the judges").

The reader no doubt notices that, in contrast to the toughness in the way the law is interpreted by the Ministry of Justice in relation to the Jewish settlers, it is applied with flexibility and a broad sense of discretion when it comes to the leaders of the intifadah. The distinction is political and serves a political agenda.

And what is this agenda? In vain do we seek it in the platform of Likud or in the declaration of its leaders. On the contrary, the approach of Likud should have been to convict the Arab rioters and their leaders. Making use of the apparatus and authority of the Ministry of Justice, apart from being natural and understandable, would have fit the political path of the party. But the distortion on the part of the Ministry of Justice with regard to everything having to do with "PLO-Jerusalem," fits with the policy of the Labor Party and Defense Minister Rabin. Rabin is oppressing the Jews in the territories, is conducting a deceitful nonwar with the intifadah with the goal of advancing the "political solution," and, within this framework, is cultivating and encouraging the Palestinian terrorist institution which has arisen in Jerusalem and other places ("American Colony" or

"PLO-Jerusalem"), and is even moving it towards 'Arafat and his gang of murderers, in order to advance the plan for his elections.

Actually, what is taking place here is a kind of gentleman's agreement. The PLO will not shift to the use of firearms, and Israel will not touch the local leadership, namely, the heads of the terrorists like Faysal al-Husayni, Radwan Abu 'Ayyash, Sari Nusaybah, Hanna Sinyurah, and their pals. It should be noted that Faysal al-Husayni, the most dangerous Arab in Israel since the despicable mufti Hajj Amin al-Husayni, was "crowned" by Yitzhaq Rabin and the Israeli media as head of the developing terrorist Palestinian government. They did it—not their Arab brothers.

Al-Husayni is succeeding in penetrating the fabric of Israeli society. The man is planting within us a Palestinian Dabbuk [evil spirit] which is threatening our lives from within. The legal counsel brought to trial (and the judge to sentencing) a simple Arab woman in the Galilee because she spoke in favor of the intifadah. In contrast, this man spits in our faces every day, calls openly for a continuation and even an intensification of the intifadah, instigates and incites Jews and Arabs within our halls and our homes, as well as from the PLO center in Jerusalem, and, despite this, the Likud continues to silence the Justice Ministry, prevents it from doing to al-Husayni what the law demands!

Conclusion: The unspoken agreement concerning the rules of the intifadah game going on between Rabin and 'Arafat, is being sustained by Likud through Prime Minister Shamir and Justice Minister Dan Meridor who is his closest advisor. Day and night we hear of the prime minister's "solid determination" to end the intifadah and never to negotiate with the PLO. And yet, he could have done all that with one decisive move, by taking the whole terrorist group in Jerusalem to court based on the evidence handed over to the Justice Ministry. In any case:

A. The intifadah would receive a mortal blow.

B. The collusion between 'Arafat, Mubarak, and Baker inspired by Peres and Rabin would fall apart by itself. The whole basis for the "peace process," meaning the process leading to talks with the PLO, would self destruct.

C. Jerusalem, half of which has already turned into a Palestinian capital, would return to Israeli rule.

D. The rule of law would be restored. If not, then Israel's rule of law in the territories and in Jerusalem will come to an end. And the end of the rule of law means the end of Israeli political rule in the territories and in Jerusalem.

Dissatisfaction Noted Among Israeli Druze

44230085C Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 1 Jan 90 p 7

[Article by Avner Regev]

[Text] About a week and a half ago, a small item was published in the press about the political organization of

Druze in Israel—in the Carmel and Galilee regions—to protest what they called “deprivation and discrimination.”

Against the background of the dramatic events in the world and Israel, which overshadow each other in their importance, it is appropriate to refocus inward to examine what is happening among the Druze minority, which has lately been sounding distress calls.

When the substitutions among Knesset members of RAKAH [New Communist List] are completed, Muhammad Nafa' will enter the Knesset on behalf of this party. Nafa', a Druze from Bayt Jan, will be the sole Druze representative in the Knesset. He will thus represent all the political hues of the Druze and will be their voice in this forum. His positions will be the result of party and communal pressures, and he will be obliged to give expression to this in his activities in the Knesset.

Members of the Druze community in Israel currently feel that they do not fully enjoy equal rights in the State, which they serve with no less devotion than the Jewish majority. The Druze are demanding what they believe they deserve. They are angry because the treatment accorded to them at different levels is identical to that accorded to Muslim and Christian Arabs, who do not serve the State as they do. They claim that they currently constitute the only friends of Israel in the Middle East, in return for which they receive very little in terms of treatment or material matters.

The Druze community feels negatively discriminated against in different areas of life, in the municipal sector, and everything related to commerce and industry, housing loans, and more. A 1987 decision by the Knesset is repeatedly cited as an example of such discrimination. This decision determines that Druze villages must be made equal to development towns regarding all government activities. Thus, the Druze village of Daliyet al-Karmel must receive treatment identical to that of the municipality of Yoqne'am. However, Yoqne'am was recently defined by the government as a type A development area, while Daliyet al-Karmel was not. This definition, incidentally, entitles Yoqne'am to tax relief and grants for development and investments.

The government did not see fit to define any Druze village as an industrial area or as a type A development area. As a result, there is no equality regarding the grants provided by the Interior Ministry to development towns and Druze villages. The Druze are particularly hurt by the fact that they are on a par with other Arab villages with respect to these grants.

These feelings have caused a certain tendency toward extremism among the Druze. This is not yet the start of a process of struggle and separation. However, it is an initial phase, and it is necessary to be wary of its continuation. Former Likud Knesset Member Amal Nasr-al-Din defined it as follows: “The Druze are not against the State of Israel, but they are in favor of the Druze.”

During the Lebanon War the Druze were faced with an unprecedented dilemma. The connection among them, or their connection with their friends and brothers on the other side of the border in Syria and Lebanon, is stronger than their connection and loyalty to the central government in their places of residence. This solidarity was expressed during the Lebanon War, when Druze from the Galilee went out to help their brethren in Lebanon.

In the last Knesset elections about a year ago, RAKAH's power increased among Druze voters for the first time in many years. In the elections for the local authorities held about 9 months ago, there was also an increase in Druze support for RAKAH. For the first time, the Druze will have—albeit in the framework of a rotation agreement—a council head in Bayt Jan, who is a member of the Communist Party. He will add to the Druze RAKAH Knesset member slated to enter the Knesset in the coming term.

In lectures given recently to audiences comprising IDF [Israel Defense Force] officers, including Druze officers, there is agreement that a creeping tendency to evade military service exists in the Druze public. This trend, slow at this stage, is reflected in a return to religion, or in affiliation with an extremist political body. These processes are undesirable for the community, and if its leaders do not know how to stop them in their infancy, the community will face pressures to adopt more extreme positions toward Israel.

Already at present, it is possible to sense a trend among Druze toward solidarity with the Palestinian struggle. Druze members of RAKAH have contributed blood for persons wounded in the intifadah, and slogans in support of the Palestinian struggle were even heard recently in the Druze public. The secretary of the Democratic Movement for Peace and Equality faction in the Knesset, Nazim Badr, is a Druze who expresses support for the intifadah and the Palestinians' national liberation struggle. It emerges that his remarks are not falling on deaf ears in the Druze community.

The heads of the Druze councils have established an action committee, which does not see itself at this stage as part of the National Committee of Arab Council Heads. There is constant pressure on the Druze, from the direction of the National Committee, to join one committee and thereby demonstrate comprehensive support for the struggle of minorities for equal rights in the municipal, Palestinian, and national areas. Only last week, the Druze demonstrated in great anger, through the action committee, against the fact that the introduction of a long, free school day in Druze villages is not included in the new budget estimate, despite the decision to make Druze villages equal to development towns. Druze leaders sent a cable to the finance minister, requesting that he apply the government's decisions regarding the matter. In addition, in a meeting of the local council of Daliyet al-Karmel, there was a report on the situation of Druze families living below the poverty line. In this village alone, which has a population of

12,000, the unemployment rate is 18 percent, and about 520 families live below the poverty line, with very limited means of subsistence.

In response to these data and to the Finance Ministry's abandonment of the government's decisions, the Druze, led by Salah Tarif, number 40 on the Labor Party's list of candidates for the Knesset, are threatening strikes and demonstrations, in an attempt to shock the Israeli establishment, which is not responding to this sector's feelings of deprivation and discrimination.

Before and after elections, ministers hasten to appoint Druze advisors in their bureaus, but they empty these advisory posts of all content, and criticism is being heard about the lack of purpose in these positions. Meetings between such advisors and their ministers are held once every 1 or 2 months for only a few minutes. The Druze advisors thus do not have the means to promote the affairs of their community in the ministries in which they work. Matters reached the point where several Druze leaders thought that it would be worthwhile to return to being part of the Arab sector, from the standpoint of the treatment received by the community, and to relinquish the "right" to receive equal treatment from government ministries, as no positive result has been forthcoming from it.

For many years, Israel has enjoyed the relative quiet and active support of the Druze community. Recruitment of the Druze into the Army and the other security forces is the crowning achievement of cooperation. If Israel does not know how to preserve this important connection, it will push the Druze toward the Palestinian position. They will choose to withdraw into themselves and to separate themselves slowly but surely from all cooperation with the State.

Economic Forecasts for 1990

44230086A Tel Aviv 'Al-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 31 Dec 89 pp 24-25

[Text] The last weeks of the year belong to the forecasters, and the economic forecasters usually begin summarizing in October. Unlike a weather forecaster, an economic forecaster can be elegantly evasive, saying that it is still not possible to present a forecast for 1990, because the government's policy is unclear. Anyone saying that the positive turn in economic activity will continue in 1990 could be a better newspaper reader than an economist. However, this is actually the surest statement economists are willing to make at the start of any detailed forecast for 1990.

There are fewer differences of opinion over the final results of 1989. The headline of the outgoing year is somewhere on a scale from "a terrible year of slowdown and unemployment" to "moderate economic activity." An assessment of the numbers includes a real growth in product of less than 1 percent, compared to a 1.6-percent increase in 1988 and a 5.2-percent increase in 1987. This assessment was made by economists of Bank Hapo'alim,

who will be featured in this report along with members of the economic department of Hevrat Ha'ovdim [The Workers' Company] and Bank Le'umi.

The year 1989 began badly, with economic activity declining in the first quarter of the year. The second quarter saw a stabilization, and the third quarter saw an increase in economic activity. As of the writing of this report, the fourth quarter has not been summarized, but it seems that the trend toward recovery is continuing and will also continue in the first months of 1990.

The economy was thrown into a difficult situation last year, which included large doses of slowdown and unemployment, and a rise in the inflation rate. In the 2 years preceding 1989, an economic policy that sought to slow inflation by freezing the exchange rate and maintaining relatively high interest rates was tried. These measures energized the slowdown, but the inflation rate could not pierce the tough obstacle represented by the 16-percent line, and thus failed to decline to the desired single-digit level. At the start of the year, the finance minister promise that we would reach the safe shores of single-digit inflation by the end of 1989. After the event, it emerged that we broke through another limit, 20 percent.

Anyone wishing to forget 1989 as quickly as possible can present it as a transition year. The slowdown in this year was influenced mainly by the policies of the past, whereas the policy measures taken during 1989 are bound to bear fruit only after a delay of about a year or more. The main problem in early 1989 was to correct the erosion of the exchange rate without losing control of inflation. At the start of 1989, the shekel underwent a 13.4-percent devaluation, and an agreement was obtained with the Histadrut [labor federation], which neutralized most of the devaluation's effect on wages. At the end of June, an additional devaluation of 4.3 percent was implemented. Also, an expansionary monetary policy was conducted as of the start of the year with the aim of reducing interest rates and encouraging activity in the economy. This policy was also supported by an uninitiated increase in the budget, which stemmed mainly from a substantial decline in revenues owing to the slowdown in the economy and tax returns. The total deficit in 1989 is estimated at about 9 percent, twice as much as in 1988.

One of the main factors in the economic slowdown this year was a drop in individual consumption, which was estimated at about 1 percent. This decline—which was influenced by a similar decline in real wages and a sharp rise in unemployment, which reached 9 percent—created a feeling of uncertainty in the labor market. Another aspect of the slowdown was an estimated 5.5 percent real drop in investments, compared to 1.2-percent drop in 1988. This development resulted from the policy to freeze the exchange rate in 1987-88. Thus, the uncertainty prevailing in the economy also did not contribute to encouraging new investments.

In 1989, there was a real 4-percent rise in goods and services imports, compared to a 2-percent drop in 1988. The export of tourism services underwent a prominent recovery, recording a real increase of about 8 percent, after a recession in the first year of the intifadah. There was an estimated 3-percent real drop in nondefense imports, which stemmed in part from the economic slowdown and the drop in individual consumption and investments. These trends of course caused a reduction in the trade deficit, which is bound to total \$2.4 billion.

The great good news of 1990 is the start of growth. Bank Hapo'alim economists estimate that the gross domestic product is expected to increase at a real rate of 3.5 percent to 4.5 percent. Bank Le'umi economists speak about the middle of the road, i.e., 4-percent growth. According to the estimates, the expansionary monetary policy, which makes possible a reasonable level of debitory interest rates, will continue, and a policy of nonerosion of the real exchange rate will be effected by the implementation of two or three devaluations during the year, but not on the scale of a creeping devaluation. Bank Hapo'alim economists add that the completion of aid arrangements for sectors experiencing difficulties will have a significant, positive effect on economic activity. They also maintain that it should be assumed that the government will increase its involvement in stimulating activity by eliminating bureaucratic obstacles.

An additional factor in the assessment of economic indicators this year is the significant increase in the number of immigrants expected in 1990. At Bank Hapo'alim, it is assumed that there will be about 35,000 to 40,000 new immigrants. At Bank Le'umi, they speak of 24,000 to 36,000 new immigrants. In any case, such immigration will entail essential changes in economic activity. The construction sector is likely to become a leader in economic activity, and the prices of apartments will continue to rise. The construction sector is also likely to receive a boost from the rapid increase in the under-30 population. Because of the natural rate of increase in the 1960s, the number of young couples needing housing has increased, and the continuing rise in apartment prices will certainly not help them. The banks also expect a recovery in the construction sector to come as a result of the liberalization in the mortgage system, which makes it possible to finance a larger share of the price of an apartment by means of mortgages given at much lower interest rates than in the past.

According to the forecasts of the economists of the large banks, the recovery of economic activity in 1990 will rest on an increase in domestic demand and the continuation of the rapid increase in exports. At Bank Hapo'alim, it is predicted that individual consumption will increase by 3 to 4 percent. This rise is expected against the backdrop of a recovery trend in the business sector, which will be expressed by an increase in demand for workers and a moderate increase in wages. At the same time, in view of the high unemployment rate, it is not expected that there

will be a more rapid expansion in individual consumption, something which characterized previous periods of economic expansion.

It is expected that there will be a moderate 2- to 3-percent increase in public consumption, excluding direct defense imports, compared to a 2.8-percent increase in 1987 and 1988. The large deficit which developed in 1989 will lead to a policy that refrains from a larger increase in expenditures. This topic was on the agenda of state budget discussions at the time of this writing.

The first three quarters of 1989 saw a drop in investments in fixed assets, but Bank Hapo'alim economists predict an increase in such investments during 1990, based on a number of estimations: The improvement in the business sector's profitability will continue, a real exchange rate will be maintained, interest rates will approach internationally accepted rates, the government will be active in the area of investments in infrastructure, investments in housing construction will increase, and a recovery will be recorded in several sectors that have been in a crisis over the last 2 years. Regarding exports, a real increase between 6 and 7 percent is expected, and economists indicate that the expansion in economic activity will be accompanied by an increase in imports at a rate which is somewhat slower than the rate of increase of exports. Consequently, a balancing in the current account of the balance of payments is expected.

Unemployment was the focus of great attention this year. Despite the recovery in economic activity predicted for 1990, it is predicted that the annual average unemployment rate will total 8 percent. The number of employees is indeed expected to rise by 45,000, but the number of employment seekers will increase by 30,000, so that the net reduction in unemployment will be relatively small. This situation will cause real wages to increase in 1990 at a relatively moderate rate of about 2 percent despite the economy's recovery.

Bank Hapo'alim economists expect that the level of inflation in 1990 will be between 15 and 20 percent, while Bank Le'umi economists specified 18 percent, which they revised to 20 percent as this report was being prepared for publication. An 11- to 16-percent devaluation to be implemented on two to three dates during the year is predicted. There is no expectation of a return to the creeping devaluation system, nor of a large one-time devaluation accompanied by the freezing of the exchange rate for an extended period. Bank Hapo'alim economists doubt whether a comprehensive policy likely to lower inflation to about 10 percent annually and even less will be pursued, but they indicate that such a policy has good chances of succeeding given the economic slowdown, the rate of high inflation, and the moderation in wage demands. However, as long as policymakers do not view inflation as a matter of great urgency and focus on treating unemployment, it is difficult to predict that inflation will drop to the desired rate.

The economy will also be affected in the coming year by production and industrial sectors that are facing a liquidity crisis and heavy pressures to reduce their debt columns, such as Koor and the factories of the settlement movements. The debt agreement signed with the United Kibbutz Movement and with Kibbutz Artzi is likely to help this sector, but its situation remains unclear. It should be indicated that Koor and kibbutz-based industry constitute about a fourth of Israeli industry. In previous years, they also effected about a fourth of all investments in industry. As long as the investments of these bodies do not return to their previous level, the level of investment in industry will be relatively low.

Faced with the problems of the economy, Hevrat Ha'ovdim economists wisely presented two forecasts a number of weeks ago, one optimistic and one pessimistic. The optimistic forecast is based on the assumption that the government will pursue a decisive policy to extricate the economy from the slowdown and reduce unemployment while coping with the absorption of new immigrants. This policy is supposed to include an increase in incentives for investment in industry and other branches, and actions to quickly implement recovery arrangements that have been crystallized by sectors in distress. According to this forecast, there will be a real 5-percent rise in gross domestic product, a 4-percent rise in individual consumption, a 6-percent rise in exports, and a 7-percent rise in investments. At the end of the year, inflation will have reached a rate of 6.5 percent, and real wages will have risen by 2 percent.

The pessimistic forecast is based on the assumption that some of the required policy means will be delayed because of an incorrect economic policy or other political problems. In such a case, gross national product will increase by 3 percent, exports by 5 percent, individual consumption by 3 percent, and investments by 3 percent, and the rate of inflation will remain at 9 percent. These developments will cause industrial unrest, because the wage-earning public will be asked to accept additional wage controls and another reduction in its standard of living. The rise in individual consumption would be reflected, in this case, in a drop in the savings rate.

Economic Report Indicates Some Growth *44230085A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT* *in Hebrew 27 Dec 89 p 7*

[Article by Gad Le'or]

[Text] The third quarter and last months of 1989 saw an arrest of the slowdown in economic activity. Nonetheless, the level of economic activity is still low, investments are in a slump, and inflation is rising.

It emerges from the periodic survey of the Bank of Israel that a significant improvement has occurred in the construction sector, the industrial sector, and the goods export sector. October and November saw a rise in

exports and a rise in the importation of production inputs, which enabled economic growth to start in the economy.

However, unemployment continues, registering a slight decline of 0.3 percent from the peak level of 9.4 percent of the labor force, which was recorded in the second quarter of the year.

Real wages in the business sector, which dropped in the first quarter of the year, returned in the third quarter to the average level of 1988.

The report claims that the continual erosion that characterized the competitiveness of exports in the last two years was arrested. This observation makes possible the statements of the finance minister and the governor of the Bank of Israel to the effect that a devaluation is unnecessary. Nonetheless, the authors of the report are concerned that the continued high rate of inflation might again erode the competitiveness of exports and require a devaluation.

Among the salient changes of the last two months:

- The rate of uncovered, returned checks dropped.
- The issuance of shares and requests to issue shares rose.
- The demand for housing rose due to a rise in the volume of mortgages in July and the drop in interest on mortgages and credit.
- The rate of immigration to Israel doubled to about 2,200 immigrants per month.

Nonetheless, the report states that the slowdown in the economy has not ended, and that individual consumption is still in a slump.

Yisra'el Tomer adds: The social lobby in the Knesset, which has 30 members, decided yesterday to wage war against several paragraphs in the new budget and to see to it that a majority in the Knesset does not approve them.

Unemployment Figures for Territories Given

44000223 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 26 Feb 90 p 2

[Text] The rate of unemployment in Judeaea, Samaria, and Gaza stands at 4.5 percent, compared to 9 percent within the green line. This was conveyed by Director General of the Employment Services David Mana to representatives of the U.N.'s International Labor organization, who have come to Israel in order to carry out a survey on the employment of Arabs from Judeaea, Samaria, and Gaza in Israel. Leaders of the organization have complained about exploitation and abuse of workers' conditions. Mana stated that since 1967, 28 employment bureaus have been established and the unemployment rate has declined from 15 percent to 4.5 percent. Residents of the territories who are employed in Israel represent 6.5 percent of the Israeli work-force, and 35 percent of the work-force in the territories. The breakdown of workers from the territories employed in

Israel according to sectors is: 53 percent in construction, 14 percent in industry, 12 percent in agriculture, and 21 percent in other sectors.

Conclusions of Weizmann Affair

44230086B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 5 Jan 90 p 1B

[Article by Yo'el Marcus]

[Text] Now that everything is over, it is possible to say that the big winner is the "Triana" restaurant and the big loser is the "white spy," whose friends discovered that the government knows how to make us laugh more than them. When the crisis erupted, Arye Der'i correctly stated that "the government will not fall and the crisis will be resolved within 2 days." He was accurate, down to the minute, because he knows the minds at work, and he also knows physics: A government lying on the floor cannot fall. This is elementary, Dr Weizmann. Der'i was right. All of our disparaging politicians were right. All that fuss for nothing. "The traitor" will not sit in the cabinet, but he can read its protocols, and he will have the right, like the rest of the members of the government, to find out state secrets from the newspapers.

The term "inconceivable," which was heard a million times this week, went bankrupt. It turns out that everything is indeed conceivable. Everyone did the opposite of what they said. In sum, this was the nonevent of the end of the decade.

Rivals state that Shamir is a paper Begin—he would not even know how to plan an overnight trip. In my opinion, Shamir came out the best from the affair. He behaved correctly as a politician and regarding the timing which he chose to unsheathe the material and the way in which the affair was concluded. Since July, Shamir had had in his possession a Mosad [Central Institute for Intelligence] report on a conversation between Weizmann and a PLO representative. Also sitting on his desk was other material on the activities of Beilin, for example. Beilin is indeed more cautious, conducting his extensive discussions with the PLO via "proximity conversations." Nonetheless, he was warned recently. Shamir smartly held onto the material until the addition of other reports, in which Weizmann advised the PLO that if it acted correctly, it would not only acquire a state, but even Jerusalem. Shamir, who banged on the table, was right. We will truly not tolerate this in the government.

The timing was chosen because of the trip to Moscow, which was planned to strengthen Weizmann. Shamir sent him there emasculated, "a minister in the meantime" by Shamir's definition, conditionally fired. Shamir thus managed to constrain the Labor Alignment ministers, leave Weizmann convulsing as a plow cuts into his affairs, and, most importantly, to prove that he prefers compromise to banging his head against the wall. Washington certainly received the impression that he also knows when to fold when necessary.

Weizmann, the Abi Natan of politics, has been excused from everything because of his charm. But when someone remains a child and an urchin at the age of 65, he becomes irritating. He behaved irresponsibly, he embroiled his party, and he did not tell the truth to his friends. Initially, he claimed that he met with a PLO representative only in the lobby of the hotel, that his Egyptian friend, Nabil al-'Arabi, introduced them, and that he only said "hello and good-by." However, the Mosad's report states that Ramlawi knew Weizmann's room number and spoke with him for an hour. When the matter was brought to Weizmann's attention, he said: Perhaps I have become senile, I will ask Re'uma. He asked, and she said that they did not have a suite, but a single room, and therefore, the meeting was in the lobby. Suddenly, Weizmann's partial memory returned, and he acknowledged that indeed there was a half-hour discussion mediated by his Egyptian friend. A half hour is already not far from an hour. In the police investigation, which would be made of any regular citizen who engaged in acts such as his, Weizmann's memory returned completely. Not coincidentally, he ceased demanding an investigation and enquiry. Perhaps he also erred in not adding a presidential pardon to the agreement. Weizmann simply does not have control of his tongue. When he was defense minister, he referred to Begin as the "deceased" in an interview with THE WASHINGTON POST and to Peres as a "Schvantz" [lacking merit] (the reporter explained [incorrectly] to the American reader that this refers to the male sexual organ). This week he called his friends, whose protection he sought, "carcasses," and he applied "SOB" to Peres. With Weizmann as a friend, his friends in the Labor Party do not need enemies. In the course of the affair, he said one thing, then the opposite. Initially, he said that he was glad that the debate had erupted and that it did so over him. Later, he said that he would not remain for a minute in the government if they removed him from the cabinet. Principles, principles—in the end he was concerned about his seat like all the carcasses and schvantes.

The crisis proved that everything said about the Labor Party is correct. I would not wish to be drowning in a lake on whose shore sit Labor Alignment ministers. Friendship is not exactly their strong point. No one in Labor warned Weizmann while there was still time. They would certainly have moved heaven and earth had he been dismissed, but they would have stayed in the government. A seat does not become vacant every day. They are divided, they have lost their way, and they are afraid of their own shadows. Peres created a vacuum in the leadership. Throughout this entire affair, he did not lift a finger to save Weizmann, and he enabled Rabin to take the lead and do what everyone wanted, namely, to stay in the government. It is said that Rabin likes what he is doing very much. He never had such prestige and power as the head of Shamir's camp in the Labor Alignment, and only a bulldozer could remove him from

the government. Labor deserves the Order of Jabotinsky medal, because without Labor, the Likud line would not rule the roost.

As Weizmann left his 6.5-minute conversation with Shamir, he said that he had had a "cordial conversation," and "as they say in plain Turkish, it was a compromise." His head was not lifted in the Turkish case. The bad one was punished, the plotter grinned, justice prevailed. The great perfidy had a happy ending. In the end, everyone went to the beach to eat pilaf and shish kebab. What? A Turkish film? Tell the truth.

Black Panthers Reportedly Threaten Fatah Figures

44000219 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 25 Feb 90 p 6

[Text] In an interview with Israel television's Arabic service, a member of the Nabulus "Black Panthers" group recently apprehended said that the group has threatened cental Fatah figures in the territories, warning them not to take part in the peace process. He said that the former leader of the "Black Panthers," killed in an IDF [Israel Defense Forces] raid against the group, had threatened Faysal al-Husayni, Nabulus lawyer Ghassan al-Shak'ah, and Nabulus businessman Sa'd Kan'an. He also said that the group had maintained constant telephone contact with PLO figures abroad from whom it received orders to murder certain residents suspected of collaboration with the authorities.

New Soviet Immigrants Assessed

44230085E Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 31 Dec 89 p 7

[Article by Uri Gordon]

[Text] Different rumors and predictions are circulating about the character of the new immigrants coming to Israel from the Soviet Union. It is said that they are rightists, and it is said that they are leftists. It is said that they are religious, and it is said that they are distant from Judaism. Israel will absorb them regardless of these matters. It will absorb any Jew who wishes to live there. Nonetheless, because of my close familiarity with the subject, I will attempt to provide a general profile of the new immigrants from the Soviet Union.

Most of the immigrants about to arrive from the Soviet Union differ from those who immigrated in the 1970s, until glasnost. Past immigrants were mainly emigration activists or refuseniks, who sat for years in various prisons and labor camps, or were dismissed from their jobs and forced by the authorities to live through hell over the years. These people fought for the right to study Hebrew, maintain their Jewish heritage, and immigrate to Israel. Naturally, they had very nationalistic views, and when they arrived in Israel, some of them joined the ideological movements of the right.

The currently arriving and soon-to-arrive immigrants are completely different. They loathe life in the Soviet Union and wish to improve their living conditions, having become disappointed with Gorbachev's economic reform. Their economic situation is difficult, and they fear the antisemitism which is breaking out. The great majority of them do not have strong Jewish roots, and many of them are ignorant of Hebrew and Judaism.

Their world view is fed by an absolute rejection of communism and socialism, and by respect and esteem for American capitalism. It is unpleasant to say, but most of them desired to go to the United States. However, because of the new U.S. immigration laws, Israel was the only real destination left open to them. They are spurred to immigrate to Israel by the bleak situation in the Soviet Union, and the good news about the situation in Israel. Such news about Israel, which they receive from the media in the glasnost era, and especially from the many tourists who have visited Israel, contradicts the distorted picture given to them over the years by the Soviet propaganda press.

The immigrants can be divided into several main groups. One group is made up of residents of large cities such as Moscow, Leningrad, Novosibirsk, and others. Most of the people in this group are members of the intelligentsia, educated, and technical or practical academic professionals, such as engineers, researchers, physicians, teachers, and musicians. Members of this group attach great importance to the economic situation, the employment situation, and to the aid that they will receive when they immigrate. Their absorption will be easier, because, unlike the immigrants of the 1970s, they continue to work until they leave the Soviet Union, are skilled and highly motivated to succeed.

Another group is composed of Jews of the Ukraine and White Russia, who are somewhat closer to Judaism. Many of them know Yiddish and recall shtetl life, but they are not really close to Jewish or religious values. They are similar to the last group regarding the other characteristics.

A third group comprises Jews of the Baltic region, i.e., Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and Moldavia (Kishinev), which were joined to the Soviet empire only in 1940. The older generation received a Jewish education, and, in many homes, Yiddish is spoken and Jewish culture is maintained. These Jews were linked to Israel before the immigration to Israel of the 1970s. Many of them were successfully absorbed into Israel by virtue of their relatives who immigrated to Israel as pioneers in the 1930s.

A fourth, large group, comprising Jews of Bukhara, Georgia, and Caucasia, is close to tradition and religion, and lives according to patriarchal family norms. Members of this group have a lower level of education than the other groups, but they are excellent business persons and have the ability to adapt. Many of them have been

absorbed well into Israel, and have succeeded as craftsmen and industrial workers.

One can certainly hope that the absorption of this wave will be easier. These immigrants are less extremist, less nationalistic, more qualified, and have greater ambition than those who preceded them. They chose Israel, because they chose to live a better life. They will therefore be willing to work hard and to endure the initial difficulties of absorption. I have no doubt that, with the correct approach and with much faith, we will succeed in absorbing them.

Statistics on Soviet Immigration Cited

44000224 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 27 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] The 5000 man barrier was broken last night for the first time since the large Soviet Jewish immigration wave began. Since the beginning of February and until yesterday afternoon, 4,990 Soviet immigrants had arrived. Tonight dozens more will arrive. Last month 4,815 Soviet immigrants arrived.

Gaza Birth Certificates Issued, Based on Names

44000226 Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 27 Feb 90 p 6

[Text] The Civil Administration in the Gaza Strip has refused to issue a birth certificate to a 1-month old baby named "intifadah," pending a name change. The same problem applies to another family which named its daughters "Palestine" and "Liberation." Civil Administration sources said yesterday that they are entitled by law to prevent the use of names harmful to the country.

MOROCCO

Developments in Tourism Discussed

90OA0301B Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE
in French 12 Jan 90 p 6

[Article: "Tourist Activity in 1989: Slight Increase"]

[Text] According to provisional figures obtained by LA VIE ECONOMIQUE from the Ministry of Tourism, in 1989 the number of tourists arriving in Morocco from overseas topped the 2.5 million mark, a 27-percent increase over the previous year.

But as we explained in a previous issue (17 November 1989), this statistical improvement is misleading: much of the increase is due to intra-Maghrebian tourists and transiting Algerians employed in Europe, who do not have the same economic impact as European or American tourists.

We do not yet have a final and detailed statistical picture of 1989; however, we believe the figures for the first nine months are enough to show the trend. In the first three quarters, European tourism—which accounts for the lion's share of tourism in Morocco—was down by 4.4

percent, primarily because of a marked decline in the number of European arrivals during the summer. But there were dramatic increases elsewhere in the market: American tourism was up by 35.9 percent and Maghrebian tourism more than doubled. There are also indications the European market bounced back in the fourth quarter.

But foreign tourist arrivals are no longer viewed as a reliable measure of tourist activity. When Spain claims it has 40 to 50 million tourists, how many Algerians, Moroccans, and Portuguese returning home for the holidays are mixed in with the total?

More and more there is a tendency to measure the growth of tourism by its effects, such as hard currency earnings, number of lodging nights sold, investments made, and employment generated.

More Lodging Nights Sold

In the first nine months, the number of lodging nights sold increased by 4.6 percent. We believe this positive trend continued and improved in the last quarter. But in Agadir, the country's biggest magnet for tourists, lodging nights declined (six percent down from last year), despite the larger number of arrivals (up seven percent at the end of December). Thus the volume of tourism in Agadir has declined by 240,000 lodging nights, while capacity has increased by 1,000 new beds since autumn 1988. Occupancy rates have, therefore, dropped; so has the average length of stay in the city, which fell from 11 to nine days. This disturbing trend certainly needs to be understood and concrete action needs to be taken to reverse it.

The Case of Agadir

A roundtable on the revival of the German market (one-fourth of all arrivals) in Agadir was held last August. Among the conclusions reached, several merit particular attention:

- Efforts to promote Agadir in the FRG run into several problems: access to the city, permanent workyards located near the hotels, insufficiently diversified infrastructure and sports activities...
- The remarkable stability of the dirham has made Morocco an expensive destination; thus it was recommended that innkeepers freeze their prices, at least for the next two years;
- Greater diversity in accommodations was recommended, along with improved targeting of advertising and publicity.

1989 saw a clear improvement in capacity: 7,148 new beds were added to the lodging inventory (35 percent of them five-star quality). As of 31 December, overall lodging capacity in tourist-class hotels was 81,491 beds.

By way of comparison, the average annual bed increase over the last decade was 2,550.

Hard currency earnings through the banking system (bank bills and fund transfers) came to 4,733 million

dirhams (up 9.6 percent) in the first 7 months. (Note: Actual earnings are known to be greater, but the parallel market absorbs a large share.) For 1989 as a whole, exchange earnings will probably be between 9.5 and 10 billion dirhams, according to initial estimates from sources close to the Ministry of Finance. This would be a 10-percent increase over the previous year.

Morocco is heading into the 1990's with the announced goal of 3 million tourists in 1992 and 10 million by the year 2000. At the moment, we seem to

be rather far from the latter goal, since tourist activity has grown rather slowly over the last 15 years. The increased capacity (and hence investment) has led to occupancy problems. Market expansion has been hindered, among other things, by problems of physical access (inadequate capacity at some airports, poor condition of the airplanes).... And it is feared that the opening of Eastern Europe to tourists from Western Europe will soon translate into new competition for the tourist dollar and new tourist destinations more accessible than Morocco.

Principal Indicators of Tourist Sector Activity

Year	Tourism as Share of:			Earnings	Tourist Arrivals ¹	Lodging Nights	Beds Built
	Gross Domestic Product	Balance of Goods and Services	Balance of Payments	(millions of dirhams)			
1980	2.4	13.7	6.6	1,785	1,189,736	12,100,000	1,638
1981	2.8	13.0	6.1	2,220	1,285,422	12,500,000	3,335
1982	2.7	14.1	6.2	2,550	1,376,136	13,200,000	1,976
1983	3.3	15.3	6.2	3,250	1,357,012	14,000,000	2,212
1984	3.7	15.7	8.8	4,220	1,407,103	14,700,000	1,113
1985	4.7	18.9	10.2	6,100	1,609,897	16,500,000	3,150
1986	4.4	20.3	11.3	6,730	1,528,862	16,630,000	4,192
1987	4.9	22.0	12.7	7,800	1,660,300	17,300,000	2,843
1988	5.0	20.0	12.7	9,045	2,056,012	18,000,000	2,524 ³
1989							7,148
Index ²				506.0	173.0	149.0	2,550 ⁴

1. Foreign tourists only.

2. Base 100 (year 1980).

3. Not including renovation projects, which cost 476 million dirhams.

4. Annual average.

Foreign Tourist Arrivals

	1988	1989	Percent Increase over 1988
January-November	1,813,129	2,327,195	+28.3
December (provisional)	165,291	198,000	+20.0
Total	1,978,420	2,525,195	+27.6

Tourist Arrivals on Cruise Ships

	1988	1989	Percent Increase over 1988
January-November	69,478	86,390	+24.3
December (provisional)	8,114	16,000	+100.0
Total	77,592	102,390	+32.0

OMAN

Oil Minister Discusses Production, Reserves

90OL0200A Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 17 Dec 89 p 6

[Article: "A 4 Billion Barrel Reserve and Production of 620,000 Barrels a Day"]

[Text] 'Abd-al-Husayn Bin-Ahmad al-'Isa, the director of petroleum affairs in the Omani Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals, asserted that the volume of the oil reserves in the Sultanate of Oman has reached 4 billion barrels.

Mr. al-'Isa said in an exclusive interview with AL-RAYAH that this figure will remain firm throughout next year because the shortage ensuing from extraction and production is being overcome by increased oil exploration and drilling operations which will result in new oil fields.

[Portion of text missing] Omani Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals in the field of drilling for oil, Mr. al-'Isa said, "We presently have five drilling rigs and six units for seismic measurement and exploration, and this equipment belongs to the Omani oil company [Petroleum Development (Oman) Ltd.], which is the largest company in the sultanate, with a daily production of 600,000 barrels. The government owns 60 percent of the company while Dutch Shell owns 40 percent."

He added, "Naturally, Petroleum [Development] (Oman) was not able to carry out comprehensive surveys of all Omani territory. Therefore, there are a number of foreign companies performing the mission of oil exploration, drilling, and production. Two such companies are the American Occidental Company, whose production is currently at around 20,000 barrels a day, and the French Elf [Acquitane] Oman Company, whose production is about 5,000 barrels a day."

Mr. al-'Isa went on to say, "The Amoco Company drills only in the region of the mountains of Oman, and the Swedish Musandum company drills in the Omani maritime areas. All of the present drilling activities have covered only 30 percent of the total Omani lands and coasts. Therefore we expect other oil reserves in the future."

620,000 Barrels a Day

In response to a question concerning the Sultanate of Oman's current volume of oil production, Mr. al-'Isa said that his country is currently producing 620,000 barrels a day of which it consumes approximately 50,000 barrels. The remainder is exported and sold abroad.

Concerning expansion in the construction of refineries and petrochemical plants, Mr. al-'Isa said that there is no intention to build new refineries at the present time. Two refineries exist which are responding to the country's needs for energy and fuel.

With regard to the price of Omani oil at the present time, Mr. al-'Isa said that it runs around \$15 per barrel. He stressed that the Omani Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals is following a balanced policy in this regard because it is the matter of supply and demand which ordinarily determines the path of prices.

Mr. al-'Isa expects that the price of oil on the world market will rise again, the reason being the increase in international demand for the sale and consumption of oil. He expressed his belief that the price of between \$16 and \$17 a barrel is quite appropriate at the present time, because for it to rise or fall below this rate would not be in the interests of the oil producers.

Oil Exportation Routes

Concerning the problems of supplies and shipping and how to overcome them, the director general of petroleum affairs in the Omani Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals said that Petroleum [Development] (Oman) is not faced

with any problem at present in this regard, in view of the fact that all of its wells are within Omani territory not far from the coast, the distance between the farthest well and the port of exportation, al-Fahl, being only 800 kilometers. He mentioned that his country's volume of production of gas is sufficient to meet domestic needs only, since it is used in energy and some factories.

He referred to the fact that the ministry is currently conducting negotiations with the Swedish Musandum company to construct a petrochemicals factory for methanol in the Sultanate of Oman. Concerning the possibilities of oil production in the Sultanate of Oman, Mr. al-'Isa said that the total production capability is 960,000 barrels a day, but that actual production is only 620,000 barrels a day, because the sultanate has a balanced oil policy based on exemplary cooperation with the OPEC member states to preserve the current price rates, at least as they are. "During the current year, we intend to raise production to 640,000 barrels a day in view of the increased international demand for oil," [he said].

The Stability of the Market and the Efforts of the Producers

In response to a question about the efforts of the oil-producing states outside of OPEC to cooperate with the OPEC member states to stabilize prices and the market in general, Mr. al-'Isa said, "The Sultanate of Oman is playing an important role in spreading stability in the world market and creating an atmosphere of reciprocal trust among the oil producers, both inside and outside of OPEC. I mention in this regard the field visits by H.E. the Omani Minister of Petroleum and Minerals to a number of oil producing countries from both sides, and the great efforts he made with them to convince them of the need to cooperate to protect the collective interests of the producers. I also believe that the OPEC countries' adherence to the quotas established for them is enough to maintain stability within the world oil market."

As to whether the Omani official expects his country to join OPEC in the future, Mr al-'Isa said that there is not any intention for the Sultanate of Oman to join OPEC or even OAPEC, the organization of Arab oil-producing countries.

He explained the reasons for that by saying, "I believe that it is preferable for the Sultanate to remain outside OPEC so that it can work on coordinating positions among the oil producers. For example, were the sultanate a member of OPEC, it could not solve a number of the problems which arise from time to time among the producing states."

He added, "I do not believe that the sultanate's being outside of OPEC is incompatible with the oil policies of the Gulf Cooperation Council because the sultanate has influence in the oil field both inside and outside the council. And as I have already told you, the sultanate is coordinating with all of the producers to unify positions and eliminate misunderstandings which might arise from time to time."

Environmental Protection

Concerning the efforts of the Sultanate of Oman to protect the marine environment, particularly after the discovery of attempts to dump toxic wastes in the waters of the Gulf, the Omani official said that the Omani Ministry of the Environment has actually taken harsh steps against any attempt to pollute Omani territorial waters, and at the same time there has been coordination among the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council to take preventive measures against any attempt to throw wastes and poisons into the Gulf.

As to his views on the results of the meetings of the conference on petroleum possibilities which was held in Abu Dhabi, he said, "The subject of the conference is extremely important, and we presented two studies in the field of exploration in the sultanate [where] oil is being extracted at a depth of approximately 3,000 meters. Drilling in the deep areas requires great technological potential, and this is inducing us to pursue such conferences as this."

SAUDI ARABIA

Official Discusses GCC Economic Integration

90OL0217A London AL-HAWADITH
in Arabic 5 Jan 90 pp 40- 41

[Interview with Dr. 'Abdallah Tahir al-Dabbagh, secretary general of the Saudi Arabian Chamber of Commerce in Riyadh: "Muscat Summit Resolutions To Help Overcome Obstacles:" first three paragraphs are AL-HAWADITH introduction; date not given]

[Excerpts] The tenth Gulf summit in Muscat resulted in several important economic resolutions to stabilize and broaden economic cooperation among the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] nations. The leaders reviewed decisions that had been made, with the extent of their implementation, and evaluated new indicators concerning overcoming difficulties and obstacles that have impeded GCC economic progress.

The summit approved the points required to boost the Gulf civil sector toward mutual increased growth, to free up the entrepot trade, and to strive to establish a Gulf common market, after the ministers of finance and economy reach a mutually approved method to unify customs duties with regard to foreign trade. These resolutions also stressed Gulf economic nationalism, which means that a Gulf citizen will have freedom of labor, commerce, investment and ownership in any GCC country, on the same level with citizens of the host country.

In order to clarify the dimensions of these resolutions, AL-HAWADITH interviewed Dr. 'Abdallah Tahir al-Dabbagh, secretary general of the Saudi Chamber of Commerce. [passage omitted]

[AL-HAWADITH] What was the extent of the difficulties and obstacles encountered by Saudi businessmen during implementation of the Unified Economic Agreement?

[al-Dabbagh] Any new experiment has problems that can only be ascertained during the actual application. After these corrective measures, it will be necessary to repair the shortcomings and continue the strong impetus behind this experiment.

Saudi businessmen have in fact encountered some difficulties, with perhaps the most important being:

- Certain differences in laws and regulations, or local measures stemming from them, in implementation of the agreement. For example, businessmen face difficulties in obtaining commercial records or certificates of origin.
- Lack of specific and established criteria as bases of exception from certain articles of the Unified Economic Agreement.
- Lack of establishing specific criteria for the concept of added value required for a manufactured product to gain the stamp of national origin, either in terms of the technical side, which pertains to agreement on a unified concept, or in terms of operational aspects with regard to the certificate of origin's form.
- Incomplete issuance of specifications and standards pertaining to the GCC states, in addition to incomplete quality control and measurement laboratories in the GCC states.
- Nonstandardized transit measures to guarantee application of Article 18, pertaining to means of transportation, since that leads at times to exposing goods and commodities to damage or loss, as a result of implementation of harsh security measures, considered necessary by the other nation.
- Nonunified entry regulations. The most important difficulty created in this regard pertains to bringing in foreign drivers of a specific country, sponsored by a company from another country. It is also impossible to bring in trained female workers to work on a company project, with Saudi nationality, and to obtain a license for them to practise some activity in another country, except with a sponsor from that country in which the activity is to be pursued.
- Lack of policies pertaining to encouraging local investments and the return of Gulf capital from abroad.
- Lack of a follow up mechanism for higher authorities to follow up implementation of resolutions and regulations stemming from application of the agreement.

However, these problems do not affect the many other positive results achieved by the creation of the GCC and the signing of the Unified Economic Agreement. But problems are being created, as previously stated, as a result of the actual application, and the GCC general secretariat is working to adopt measures required to overcome such difficulties as these, after submitting those measures to the quarters concerned.

[AL-HAWADITH] Some believe that without unifying the customs tariffs with regard to foreign exports, a common market cannot be established. Do you agree with this view, and what is your analysis?

[Al-Dabbagh] The fact is that there is an idea being proposed to establish a GCC unified customs barrier to counter foreign goods. Unifying customs tariffs at this stage has become an urgent necessity for several important reasons. There is an obvious disparity between customs tariffs applied in each individual GCC state. It goes as high as 20 percent in a country such as Saudi Arabia, and as low as four to five percent in certain other GCC states. This might lead to imported foreign goods finding an alternative entry point into the GCC states.

Moreover, Gulf products exported to world markets are encountering a rise in unified customs duties, which require collective countering through the unified customs barrier.

Clearly, previous gaps might result in an attack directed against the GCC market, in the form of attempts at flooding the markets and other things that could threaten national industries in general, as well as threatening the idea of establishing the common market, because the solid, mutual basis, upon which this market should be built, would not be available.

[AL-HAWADITH] What are the steps that you deem necessary to hasten the pace of Gulf economic integration and to deal with any challenges this integration faces?

[Al-Dabbagh] Economic cooperation among the Gulf Arab states began to increase tangibly in the seventies, within bilateral arrangements for the most part, and in multiparty arrangements at other times. The creation of the GCC, the signing of the Unified Economic Agreement, and the implementation of its provisions, has caused the GCC states to begin to prepare a strategy for industrial coordination, which is based on the unified strategy for development in various economic fields.

Cognizant of the importance of combining capabilities and mobilizing mutual possibilities, in order to advance the industrialization of the GCC states, the GCC's Unified Economic Agreement has striven to give a prominent place to the reinforcement of industrial cooperation among the GCC states. The first four sections, out of a total of six sections, are devoted to dealing with the general ways of developing industrial cooperation.

One can summarize the most important steps required to speed up the pace of Gulf economic integration as follows:

- Do away with customs duties on industrial goods produced locally in the GCC states.
- Allow the GCC citizen equality with citizens of the GCC host nation to pursue all activities.
- Work to apply a model contract, for the purchase of technology, which is considered to be standard for

doing business with other nations in the petrochemical field or with regard to refineries, power stations, and water desalination plants.

- Exchange expertise and information with regard to technology, and establish committees to train those skills used in certain industries, especially the oil industry;
- Form committees for coordination, particularly for the industries that are duplicated in the Gulf region, such as iron, aluminum and petrochemicals.
- Issue a resolution to establish a data center, which would be available to Gulf organizations to obtain the required technical and commercial data directly.

In light of the above, one could also add:

- Give importance to the correct ways and means of marketing, including advertising and campaigns to enlighten those in charge of improving productivity in form and substance.
- Prepare marketing studies that deal with the problems of the Gulf market, and hold broadbased meetings with specific agencies concerning those studies, for the purpose of countering foreign and competing markets, with a full awareness of countermeasures.

[AL-HAWADITH] Some people talk about border difficulties in bringing in goods among the GCC states. How can these difficulties be overcome?

[al-Dabbagh] The industrial sector in the GCC states has achieved a rapid growth that we can look upon with satisfaction, either officially or in the private sector, both in terms of productivity and marketing. This growth began with goals aimed at developing policies that can be characterized objectively as targeted at strengthening and bolstering efforts to create ways to stimulate the Gulf economy and promote its efficiency, so that the economy will generate self-impetus, to enable it to grow and develop at increasing rates.

This has produced certain obstacles that limit development of commodity exchange among the member nations. Among these obstacles are difficulties which spring from the liberalization and development of the entrepot trade. This phenomenon is considered one of the most important principal problems that GCC industries face, because of its negative, collective psychological effect on the investment climate, and its monopolizing, to a considerable extent, the attention of the leaders of the industrialization process on the one hand and, on the other, the need to establish a serious, constructive dialogue of cooperation among them for the purpose of overcoming and surmounting the difficulties, in the best interests of both producers and consumers alike. These difficulties can be overcome as follows: Take practical and serious measures to ensure implementation of decisions to encourage and support national industries in the GCC states, along with the need for coordination and the restructuring of laws and regulations pertaining to trade laws and regulations, agencies and commercial records in the GCC states.

[AL-HAWADITH] The certificate of origin, is this still surrounded by obstacles?

[Al-Dabbagh] From the beginning of liberalizing the GCC states' entrepot trade, and the exporting of Gulf products, it has been possible for any Gulf firm to export its products to other GCC countries, as if they circulated in its own domestic markets. In this regard, it became possible for the Gulf producer, who wishes to export his products to another Gulf country, to do that without any difficulties. All that he is required to do with regard to that is:

- Obtain a certificate of origin from the quarter concerned with issuing that certificate in his country. This certificate ordinarily establishes that the organization is at least 51 percent owned by the country's nationals, as well as that at least 40 percent of the total market value has been added through the process of exporting locally.
- Provide an export bill (manifest) through the local customs authorities.

In this regard, it is worth noting that there is an agreement among director generals of customs in the GCC states on a unified form for certificates of origin. This form was devised by the Committee of Financial and Economic Cooperation, and has been made generally available to the quarters concerned.

Undoubtedly, the creation of a board of specifications and standards for the GCC states would have positive results with regard to the issuing of unified Gulf standards. This is still in the realm of development and requires many laboratories, agencies, and other factors to speed up the issuance of specifications, in conformity with the national producer in the GCC states, so that ultimately he will be unable to deviate from the Gulf certificate of origin.

[AL-HAWADITH] Do you see the course of joint projects in the GCC moving slowly, and how can these projects be encouraged and spread about?

[al-Dabbagh] On the Unified Economic Agreement level, the GCC states have made long strides toward implementing their goals, by taking measures that are working to encourage projects in light of the following:

- Application of measures allowing the pursuit of wholesale and retail trade in the various member nations, in addition to ownership of real estate and shares of joint-stock companies.
- Application of the principle of preference for organizations and citizens of GCC states with regard to loans from financial foundations, in the same way as for citizens of the host country.
- Direct the Gulf governmental agencies to give priority to the purchase of Gulf products, as a step toward encouraging Gulf industries and products.
- Develop joint projects of importance, such as electricity networks, coordinate industrial investment policies, and write regulations pertaining to that. In

addition, coordinate negotiation policies in the field of foreign trade, especially the export of petrochemical products, and unify our positions with respect to world trading blocs.

The GCC states have also begun well-considered steps in attempting to draw up practical bases to unify customs tariffs, in order to counter foreign trade within two years. This is an action that will have a positive impact on establishing a unified customs barrier, benefitting national production units in all GCC states, through customs exemptions, and facilitating the flow of trade among the GCC member nations. [passage omitted]

[AL-HAWADITH] Wholesale trade will begin in March 1990. How do you see the establishment of these steps supporting the course of integration?

[al-Dabbagh] There is no doubt that freeing the course of commercial activity, including wholesale trade among the GCC states, and the issuing of regulations for that, which will become effective 1 March 1990, will lead to achieving the Unified Economic Agreement's goal with regard to encouraging investment and stimulating capital, at least initially. The regulations have been limited to a period of three years, after which practical evaluation will begin. I have an optimistic view, and a judgement is still premature. However, these steps should result in the cohesion and integration desired, aimed at constructing an economic base through coordination and diversification among the GCC states, which is the goal of the Unified Economic Agreement.

SUDAN

Army Said Only Institution Able To Restore Stability

90OA0310A Khartoum AL-INQADH AL-WATANI
in Arabic 14 Jan 90 p 3

[Editorial by Salah Muhammad Ibrahim: "Meditations on the Sudanese Democratic Experiment"]

[Text] It would be easy now for a follower of events in Sudan to observe that the country, at the start of the nineties, is headed toward a period of political stability, and toward an era in which political, economic, and social life can be rebuilt and formulated. It is clear that the revolution's men, despite the deliberate attempts at discord and distortion from certain quarters both at home and abroad, have established beyond any doubt that they are sincere and determined to save Sudan from the abyss of backwardness and destruction. In my opinion, the various owners of previous political convictions and ideologies, if they would discard the arrogance of political bias and judge matters objectively, would find that the revolution, which occurred on 30 June 1989, has noble goals and is, in fact, directed toward laying a firm foundation for government, after the political anarchy and divisiveness that pervaded the country, which was on the point of impending disaster. There

were those who spread rumors about the heroic revolution and who tried to envelop it with baseless allegations. Their voices now are fading after it has become evident to them that the people, who were buffeted about by the various political experiments, have now come to realize that this revolution has come to work and perform, and that behind it are honorable men, guarding the future of the nation and its development.

From the first day, the revolution began to combat the political corruption that distorted the democratic experiment into a twisted monster and a crippled skeleton, which could not fulfill the aspirations of the citizenry. Those who are shedding tears over democracy must now review the democratic experiment in Sudan, so that they may see how it failed to learn from all the past experiments and lessons, how it became lost in the dark corridors from which emanated a loathsome stench, and how it suffered, because of the lies, hypocrisy, intrigues, and malice practised by the politicians. Could someone now be found in Sudan who would shed one tear for democracy? I think not. Liberal democracy in Sudan has died, with no one to mourn it, nor to regret it, because of the deception and trickery practised by the political parties. If there are those who mourn it, they are the ones who had an interest in its continuing. They come either from that ruling family, or from its retinue, whose interests were increased and fattened by virtue of mutual advantage.

Some people will tell you to be against the army's rule, but they are ignoring this important fact, which has been emphasized by one experiment after another. That fact is that the army in Sudan, as well as in the entire Third World, is the only national institution that is blessed with a national character. It is the institution most endowed with a democratic structure, since within it, it embraces all of Sudan in its cultural, racial, and religious diversity. It is a diversity not found in any political party. After the parties were unable time after time to achieve political stability, it was logical for this national institution to intervene to restore stability, security and tranquility, and to reformulate political life once again.

A valuable part of Sudan's life and history has been squandered and wasted in the marketplace of politics. Everytime the traditional parties were given the opportunity to rule, the country suffered a relapse, went backward, and fell behind grievously. Everytime the people called on the politicians to promote the highest interests of the country, and pursue a proper path in governing, that would safeguard the nation and its unity and stability, the parties would revert and sink into the mire of politics. Democracy, in the form in which the Sudanese people lived and which they experienced during past regimes, became a danger to the country, with its unconcealed flaws. Democracy is a system of government that has undoubtedly thrived and has become a philosophy of government in nations that have made great strides toward progress and prosperity, as happened in Western Europe, the United States, and elsewhere. That does not mean that it necessarily is

correct as a system and philosophy of government, when we, without a doubt, are in need of a long period of contemplation, so that we can decrease the causes of this failure, which stems from a group of factors and elements that are intertwined together, not just in Sudan but also in most of the neighboring countries that are similar to us.

Our brothers, who were accustomed to opposing military governments in our region, who studied western ideologies, look at military governments as the principal and traditional enemy of freedom. Naturally, this concept springs from a mindset that devotes itself to the narrow context of the liberal philosophy that grew and developed in European societies, based on the concept of natural rights. This is a concept that differs according to the standards and values that prevail in our societies. Moreover, our brothers have forgotten that even in democratic societies, the high dignitaries can use their power in dangerous and capricious ways. This happened to us during the recent democratic experiment, when matters reached the point that many ruling parties at that time were practising a civilian dictatorship. The fact is that all the factions that were gathered under the umbrella of democracy did not respect the democratic principles that they sanctioned as a system of government. None of the Sudanese parties respected democratic stability, nor were the trade unions interacting with the system of government, in accordance with the principles of democratic action. Let us look at what happened in Sudan, after the Agreement of 16 November. This is the agreement that enabled John Garang to create the biggest split in the domestic front.

The Agreement of 16 November clearly reveals that one of the largest political parties in Sudan entered into negotiations with an armed movement in violation of the law, and ratified an agreement about certain operational matters, before obtaining the blessing of the then existing government. Could such behavior as this by a political party happen in a state that respects the institutions of democratic government? Could the British Labour Party ratify a treaty with the Irish revolutionaries, without the participation of the Conservative government? Who would think that one of the nonruling parties could sign an agreement with an armed movement that was fighting against the existing government, and then say to that government, either accept this agreement or relinquish power? In such behavior as this, is there respect for democracy and its principles? What happened after that? What happened was that certain trade unions, with political tendencies, allied themselves with the Democratic Unionists, and tried to bring down the government. They in fact succeeded in intimidating the government, especially after the armed forces' memorandum which, at that stage, some quarters exploited for purposes other than those for which it was issued. Prior to 30 June, we were living in a political climate fraught with political and economic corruption, as represented by the Agreement of 16 November and other agreements with the rebel movement. Although veiled

and clothed in terms of peace, they were symptomatic of anarchy and futility, and were reflective of the government's inability to control the reins of power.

Liberal democracy today is expressed by civilization and a superior kind of state, but it was only established after bitter strife, bloodshed, and massacre, as happened in the French Revolution. We in the Third World do not have the time nor the luxury to repeat the European experiment, that is, to change political strife into that bloody anarchy that occurred in Europe and which continued for many long years. Our problem is that democracy has never been a popular movement, but was forced upon the people through the rulers, beginning with colonialism and ending with political parties. Therefore, democracy is an alien blend of concepts, in which terms and meanings were altered. As parties, trade unions, and associations, we began to stop differentiating between the controversial issues that may occur under the aegis of democracy and the national strategies over which there must be a minimum amount of consensus. The parties were lost in democracy, and the trade unions exploited democracy in the ugliest way. Sudan was on the point of being lost in the midst of irresponsible battles. We will continue to speak in an attempt to discover the forms of political multiplicity.

Petroleum, Electricity Sector Development Outlined

90OA0311A Khartoum AL-INQADH AL-WATANI
in Arabic 11 Jan 90 p 5

[Article by al-Muktafi Ballah Surur: "970 Million Barrels of Subterranean Oil Reserves, 250 Million Recoverable"]

[Text] In the first part of the investigation "Energy and the Difficult Time," we assessed the consumption rates of different forms of energy, and we noted the energy stocks and Sudan's possibilities in the area of mineral wealth. In this part, we shall shed light on the important aspect of guidance in the oil sector, as well as future plans to develop the electricity sector.

Guidance in the Oil Sector

In order to guide our consumption of petroleum products, the following must be done:

Review the pricing policy, so that the basic factor for pricing petroleum products is the extent of the product's importance within the production sectors, and raise the prices of certain products, in order to curb their consumption.

Operate the Port Sudan refinery at its maximum capacity, and reduce the rate of loss from the refining process, which amounted to five percent, since the average loss rate from refining worldwide is only one percent.

Construct new storage capacity to assist in breaking up the transportation and storage bottlenecks.

Improve means of transporting petroleum products, by raising the efficiency of pipelines and developing capacity to ship by rail.

Expand the use of kerosene and gas.

Upgrade the telephone system, in order to reduce vehicular movement.

Guidance in the electricity sector is needed as well, in order to direct our consumption of electricity, as follows:

- Set new pricing to reflect the true cost of electricity for all sectors and reduce conspicuous consumption.
- Develop an awareness program to enlighten the citizen as to the importance of electricity guidance and its impact on the level of individual and national economies, as well as introducing energy guidelines into study programs.
- Stop the importation of certain modern appliances that have high electricity consumers.
- Raise the level of collection of electricity bills.
- Rely on hydrogenerators in the future, and construct new thermal stations near areas of population density, in order to reduce the cost of relay.
- Enact laws pertaining to guiding consumption of energy in general, and electricity in particular.

Guidance in the Forest Sector

Harvested trees must be replanted, and more restrictions should be put on harvesting trees.

Electricity

The individual rate of consumption of electricity in Sudan is approximately 60 kilowatt hours a year. This rate increases in cities located within the main electricity net to about 153 kilowatt hours a year. In comparison with certain Arab nations, we find that individual consumption in our neighbor Egypt is more than 400 kilowatt hours a year, and in the Gulf states 1000 kilowatt hours a year.

It so happens that Sudan is a nation rich in primary sources of energy, which can be used to generate electricity in order to achieve self-sufficiency and for export to neighboring countries. There were several experiments conducted by foreign experts to exploit the Nile River waters. Eleven sites were chosen for the construction of power stations along the Nile and its tributaries, to generate electricity at an estimated rate of 22,600 megawatt hours, of which only seven percent has been exploited. There are a number of factors that impede exploiting these sources, the most important being that Sudan, in its exports, depends on primary products from agriculture and livestock, and there is insufficient profit from these exports to fulfill the country's hard currency requirements. This results in Sudan's inability to import modern technology to be used in generating electrical energy, to exploit its available resources, and to supply the fuel and spare parts required for operations.

The government relies on attracting financial aid and the loans required to finance and develop the electricity sector, from international and regional institutions, as well as certain friendly nations. However, financing from our brother Arabs was below expectations, especially when we take into consideration the large amount of capital necessary to finance hydro-energy projects in Sudan.

Electricity's share of total energy consumption in Sudan is two percent, as compared with wood's 80-percent share and oil's 18-percent. Electricity consumption in the industrial sector in 1979 totaled 46 percent of energy purchased, followed by the residential sector with 41.4 percent; commercial and governmental, 4.6 percent; agriculture, 3.6 percent; and other sectors, 5.4 percent. Consumption in 1987 was led by the residential sector at 59.4 percent, followed by the industrial sector, 29.8 percent; commercial and governmental, 7.1 percent; agriculture, 1.8 percent; and other sectors, 1.9 percent.

Future Plans To Develop the Electricity Sector

In view of the economic conditions through which the country is passing, the rate of growth required for electrical capacity ranges from nine to 7.5 percent up to 1993, and then increases again to nine percent up to the year 2000. Since 1966, the National Electricity Board has continued to draw up plans to cover the electricity needs in Sudan, both for the near and the long terms. However, most of the projects proposed for these plans have not found financing, which has led to postponing implementation or to cancellation.

One of the more recent examples of that is the third energy project, which had the capacity to cover the needs for the period 1975-78 by adding 324 megawatts. However, of this capacity, only 180 megawatts were added, and the date to begin operation of some units was postponed for more than three years.

Fourth Energy Project

Plans for this project covered electricity requirements for 1985-90, by adding 300 megawatts, and raising the level of the al-Rusayris reservoir, in order to increase the generating capacity of the al-Rusayris and Sannar power stations. In addition, an economic feasibility study was to be prepared for the al-Hammad Ab reservoir on the Nile River at the town of Marawi.

Units of this project have not yet seen the light of day, except for the addition of the seventh unit at the al-Rusayris hydrostation, with a capacity of 40 megawatts. No financing could be found for these other units.

After this detailed and comprehensive review of the energy problems in Sudan, it is clear to us that our country is extremely wealthy in its resources, but that the exploitation of its sources of energy faces obstacles which, with the passage of time, increase the burdens on the worsening crisis.

Because investment in Sudan would be an important outlet to finance several vital projects, which have been idled despite their importance, the state is trying, through a new law, to encourage investment as a way out of this vicious circle, which entangles most of our important infrastructural projects that support our economy. Energy, which Sudan enjoys in abundance, could constitute projects that should encourage investment, since Sudan could export electricity to neighboring countries, according to studies made by foreign experts in Sudan, and which for its part could be an alternative to the other sources of energy which cost Sudan 70 percent of its export profits.

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

PDRY Officials Communicate With Opposition Group

44000227 London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 22 Jan 90 p 3

[Text] Informed sources confirmed to AL-DUSTUR that an official delegation representing the government and party in Aden is presently communicating in Sanaa with a delegation representing the traditional South Yemeni opposition abroad which formed a delegation for this purpose after meetings in both Cairo and Sanaa. These meetings resulted in the formation of a political committee for this purpose under the leadership of Mr. Husayn 'Uthman 'Ashshal, general commander of the armed forces in the southern half following independence, and Abu-Bakr Shafiq, former governor of Aden, as well as three other members.

PDRY Government To Transform Port of Aden Into Free Zone

44000231 London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 12 Feb 90 p 29

[Text] The Government of South Yemen is eager to put the final touches on a project to transform the port of Aden into a free zone and to regain the economic activity that has characterized this port over the centuries as a result of its strategic location. The port of Aden represents a stopping and a departure point for all sea lines heading towards Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

The Government of South Yemen had started developing the port of Aden and deepening the marine channel in 1987 to permit the passage of large ships carrying heavy loads.

The Saudi Development Fund, the Kuwaiti Fund, and the Abu Dhabi Fund each participated in the financing of this project.

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

Al-Iryani Interviewed on Unification Issues

90OL0231A Paris AL-YAWM AL-SABI'
in Arabic 8 Jan 90 p 12

[Interview with 'Abd al-Karim al-Iryani, foreign minister of the Yemen Arab Republic, by Faisal Jalul in Paris: "The Marxist Trend in Sanaa, Issue of Border Concentrations Settled With Aden;" first five paragraphs are AL-YAWM AL-SABI' introduction; date not given]

[Text] Yemeni-Yemeni meetings and contacts are being arranged, following the announcement of the Aden Agreement, and after the visit of the South Yemen chief of staff to Sanaa. Last week, 'Ali Salim al-Bayidh, secretary general of the Yemeni Socialist Party's Central Committee, visited Sanaa, during which a reference was made to the coming of Yemeni unity. Is it in fact coming? We tried to find this out through an interview that we conducted with Yemeni Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Karim al-Iryani.

"The Yemenis will surprise you with unity." With these words, Dr. 'Abd al-Karim al-Iryani, deputy prime minister and foreign minister of the Yemeni Arab Republic, replied to AL-YAWM AL-SABI's question about the Aden summit.

However, what has happened that makes achieving Yemeni unity almost possible today and not yesterday? Al-Iryani, who was in Paris to take part in the Conference of Arab-European Dialogue, said, "Yemeni unity is a fundamental issue in the life of the Yemenis. In the past, we have tried to accomplish it, and when helpful local, regional and international conditions came together, it became possible. Therefore, it will be achieved; are you still asking how and why?"

Al-Iryani does not usually respond to journalists' questions this decisively and with this kind of candor and, therefore, this calls for posing even franker and more precise questions.

No sooner had the unity agreement been announced in Aden, than news reports began to discuss the existence of many obstacles, some of them expected to turn affairs upside down. We asked the Yemeni foreign minister to clarify the point that only a few days after the announcement at the Aden summit, officials in South Yemen were making clear their intention to settle their relations with the United States. That was interpreted as not being in line with the general tendency to establish one international identity for the future state.

[al-Iryani] Let me emphasize that of course each side will attempt to pursue its own business, which it is undertaking at the moment, while waiting for a date to apply the single constitution. Let me say to you that it is just a question of time. No sooner will the constitution be given to the two legislative assemblies in the country, than it will be submitted to a popular referendum. The

implementation dates after that were determined in the Cairo Agreement between the two countries, which was signed in 1972.

Party Plurality

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] But frankly, will the northern half approve party plurality?

[Al-Iryani] All of it is approved. The unity constitution, in Article 39, guarantees the pursuit of party activity for all the people.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] Sanaa interprets that by saying that the "People's Congress" is the sole organized framework in the country, in which various sensitivities and political trends can come together. Does this mean plurality?

[Al-Iryani] No. I differ with your viewpoint. The constitution is clear in the article that I cited. When it is applied, there is no other interpretation, neither for the north, nor the south.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] It would appear that you no longer fear the left and the Communists?

[Al-Iryani] Communists have been with us before; by that I mean the Marxist left. Since 1980, they have been cooperating with the state. I'll give you some well-known examples. Take for example Abu-Bakr al-Saqqaf, who took part in formulating "the Charter." There were others with him from "the National Front," but not in the name of the front. Take also Yahya al-Shami. He is still here even now, and is an official member in the People's General Congress. Muhammad al-Shibani was a member of the permanent committee of the People's Congress, and his membership continued until the Ta'izz Conference was held in 1986. For some reason of his own, he did not attend, and his membership was dropped.

The step required by the north in this regard is greater by far than the step required by the south. However, matters are proceeding according to plan, and we have no complaints. I emphasize that the Marxist trend was here, but was not overt. Now, we will shift from covert comradeship to open comradeship.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] What about the problem of persons who were removed in the past as mutual obstacles: Jarallah 'Umar in the south, and 'Ali Nasir Muhammad in the north?

[Al-Iryani] President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih met in Aden with Jarallah 'Umar, and told him to come up to the north anytime he wished and, God willing, the democratic, popular will "will raise you to the heavens." We have no objection to that.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] And 'Ali Nasir Muhammad?

[Al-Iryani] You are more concerned with persons than is necessary. I tell you again that you will be surprised by the unity, and the problem of certain persons will not hinder Yemeni unity.

Border Concentrations

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] Did the visit of South Yemen Chief of Staff Haytham Qasim Tahir to Sanaa result in an agreement to end the military concentrations on both sides of the border?

[Al-Iryani] After Haytham's visit to Sanaa, a protocol was signed between the two parties ending the military concentrations, which were unjustified in the first place, are still unjustified, and which were of no benefit to any problem. You insist on finding problems.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] There are repeated reports about the southern half receiving unexpected financial assistance from a bordering country, immediately after the signing of the Aden Agreement?

[Al-Iryani] We asked the brothers in the south, and they assured us that these reports have no basis in truth. We believe that there is no factual basis to these reports, and that they change nothing.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] Let us suppose that Haytham's recent visit to Sanaa has ended all possibilities and reasons for border tension between the two countries. Do you expect tension on your other borders?

[Al-Iryani] You are a journalist; you should "do your own job" in this regard.

Visit to America

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] Let's turn to another subject. What will President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih discuss during his visit to the United States?

[Al-Iryani] The invitation came during Reagan's second term, but was not acted upon. Therefore, it is not new, and comes in response to George Bush's visit to Sanaa when he was vice president. During this visit, we will discuss the Lebanese problem, the issue of the Palestinian people, and the American positions, which we know have not been satisfactory to the Arabs. In addition, there are economic and other issues connected with the relations between the two countries.

Dialogue With Europe

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] The Arab-European conference in Paris, don't you think that its results are negligible?

[Al-Iryani] The meeting itself is more important than what is agreed upon. It is a first step, and the assumption is that it will be completed. Ireland has proposed a meeting in the near future, of the two representative bodies of these two communities, in the first half of next year. Naturally, there is the hope that obstacles in the path of future meetings will be eliminated, especially the tension existing in Libyan-French and British-Syrian relations.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] When the idea of Arab-European dialogue was broached in 1974, the Arabs were at the beginning of the first oil upturn (October War), and the Gulf states were ready to expand building and development plans. All of this constituted incentives to impel Europe at that time to suggest the joint conference. Don't you think that the situation now is different, and that the dialogue is in circumstances not in the Arabs' best interests?

[Al-Iryani] If we take the matter of oil as the cause of what you mention, than oil is still, and will continue to be, an extremely important element with regard to Europe. However, I think that there are many other matters involved in the expansion of relations between the two communities, including diverse economic, military, and political factors.

BANGLADESH

President Ershad Addresses Parliament Opening

Summary of Speech

46001239 Dhaka THE NEW NATION
in English 5 Jan 90 pp 1, 8

[Text] President Hussain Muhammad Ershad yesterday called for "grand national unity" to provide democracy with an institutional shape for which he said, the process had been continuing and would persist, reports BSS.

Addressing the Jatiya Sangsad on the opening day of its winter session at Sangsad Bhaban here the President said the Sangsad had passed the constitutional ninth amendment bill, a great milestone on our long and arduous way to democracy.

He said, the ninth amendment had provided for an elected Vice-President, limited the tenure of office of the President to a maximum of two terms and ensured the continuation of democratic dispensation as well as freed the country from the fear of one-man rule.

Felicitating the Sangsad on his own behalf and on behalf of the nation for passing the ninth amendment bill, President Ershad said this had strengthened not only the foundations of democracy but also democratic values.

The President referred to the coming upazila elections in March next and expressed the determination of his Government to hold the polls in an absolutely free, fair and impartial manner.

He reiterated that other national polls would also be held in a free and fair manner in due course.

He sought cooperation from all concerned including the opposition to help maintain the climate conducive to holding of free and fair polls and expressed the belief that it was quite possible to arrive at a consensus in this regard. "We want to firmly establish election as the only method of changing a Government in Bangladesh," he said adding: "I have firm faith that we shall inevitably achieve success in this regard."

The overall trend of politics of the country had strengthened his optimism on this point, he said.

President Ershad's arrival in the house was heralded with fanfare and the national anthem was played before the beginning of his one hour and twenty-minute long speech.

The inaugural session of the Sangsad was witnessed, among others, by First Lady Begum Raushan Ershad, Vice-President Moudud Ahmed, Adviser to the President on Water Resources B. M. Abbas, A. T. Chief of Army Staff Lt. General M. Atiqur Rahman, Chief of Naval Staff Rear Admiral Sultan Ahmad, diplomats and high government officials.

He said, the eighties were the decade of reforms, restructuring and reconstruction for Bangladesh. It was a decade of peace and stability for the country, he said adding: Let the nineties be the decade of discipline, prosperity, progress and abundance.

President Ershad said during the nineties we should not only consolidate our previous successes but also win newer victories. To achieve this objective, he pointed out the nation required an iron resolve, hard work and unflinching patriotism.

He said, "We must move ahead with the determination that in the century that is to unfold in ten years from now, Bangladesh will be identified as an industrially advanced developed and self-reliant country."

President Ershad noted with a sense of pride that the Fourth Parliament had upheld before the nation a unique example of how to give an institutional base to democracy in the national life and make politics and development activities supplementary to each other.

He said a politics indifferent to the need for improvement of the lot of people could never be able to emerge as a positive social force. That is why we have accepted the politics of development and production as our political philosophy, he said.

The President said his government believed that the construction of a road, a bridge or a factory, electrification of a dark village or installation of a power pump in a dry land was far nobler politics than to organise a strike to the great suffering of the people. The fact that this belief was not wrong has been amply proved by the realities in the past eight years, he pointed out.

The President said being a developing country Bangladesh needed political stability, social peace and discipline and hard work to speed up development. During the last eight years, he said we had reached the best time in the history of Bangladesh. Bangladesh once known as the bottomless basket, had now gained a dignifying place of prominence in the comity of nations, he said.

Palli Parishads

President Ershad mentioned the definite philosophy of his Government on matters relating to development and said in yet another move to bring dynamism in the development efforts, Palli Parishads would come into being in the 68 thousand villages of the country shortly. These palli parishads would serve as the bridge between the people and the government, he said.

Disasters

Detailing the consequences of the natural disasters including floods, cyclones, tidal surge and drought, in the country, he said the Government had taken up steps for their redressal by mobilising resources nationally as well as internationally. He expressed the confidence that the solution to the flood problem in Bangladesh was not far off.

Environment

He said, his Government had given proper importance to protection of environment. Keeping this in view, he said, the Government had formed the Ministry of environment and forest and decided to observe 1990 as the year of environment and set up international institute of environmental studies and disaster management and Bangladesh River Research Institute.

The President referred to the alarming population growth in the country and said at present 11 crore and 32 lakh people live in the country comprising 55,000 square miles. Mentioning the steps taken by his government to check the present rate of population growth, he said, National Population Control Council had been formed to help inspire concerted activities.

He urged all concerned irrespective of their political differences and party affiliations to participate in the programme of the council. He said as a result of untiring efforts the rate of population growth had now come down to 2.2 percent from that of 3.8 in 1982. The target is to bring down the rate further to 1.8 percent during the third five-year plan period, he said.

On health sector, President Ershad said health care was one of the fundamental requirements of mankind and expressed his determination to meet this basic need.

President Ershad said despite unprecedented natural disasters of 1987 and 1988, the trend of growth of Bangladesh economy had continued. During 1988-89 fiscal year the growth rate stood at 2.1 percent and it is expected to rise up to 5.9 percent in the current fiscal year. He said in the year 1982, 73.8 percent of the rural population and 66 per cent of urban population used to live below the poverty line but within a gap of three years this figure had come down to 51.2 percent and 56 percent respectively.

Food Reserve

The President said the government's food reserve had also gone up to 1.4 million tons and with the procurement of another 0.5 million tons of foodgrains from home market the food stock would rise to nearly two million tons. Referring to the steps taken by the Government to modernise agriculture sector, he said side by side steps had been taken to achieve speedy industrialisation in the country.

Communication

President Ershad said since modern communication system and efficient supply of power were the essential prerequisites for rapid development the government had given priority to these sectors. During the past eight years, 3146 kilometres of metalled roads had been built and 24 big bridges were constructed while the power production had gone up to 2,365 megawatt from 8,00 megawatt in 1982, he said [figures as published].

Remarks on Hill Districts

46001239 Dhaka *THE NEW NATION*
in English 5 Jan 90 pp 1, 8

[Text] President Ershad said here yesterday that his Government had been able to create a peaceful climate ending the "distrust, suspicion, and animosity" that prevailed in the hill districts of Rangamati, Bandarban and Khagrachhari for two decades, reports BSS.

Due to the formation of hill district local government councils and with the holding of elections to those councils a new era has opened in this area he told Jatiya Sangsad in his address to the first session of the year.

The President said, the tribal families, who had gone across the border, were now returning home in batches.

Detailing the background of the solution to this problem President Ershad said after he assumed the state power in 1982 his Government became serious for a political solution to the problems of the hill districts of Chittagong.

With this end in view, he said, a national committee was formed in 1987 which made some contribution to economic, social and cultural life of the tribal people and held several rounds of meetings with the 13 tribal groups and local non-tribals for a peaceful solution to this problem.

President Ershad said on the basis of those discussions the Parliament passed three bills.

Ershad Announces Primary Education Compulsory

46001244 Dhaka *THE NEW NATION*
in English 2 Jan 90 pp 1, 8

[Text] President Ershad yesterday inaugurated the "International Literacy Year-1990" with the announcement making primary education compulsory in the country.

He also announced 1990 as the "Year of Female Children" like that of other SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] nations in order to draw attention of the society to the problems of female children and declared that education of girl students up to class eight would be free in all schools outside the areas of municipalities.

Organised by Bangladesh Unesco Commission the inaugural function of the International Literacy Year was also addressed by Education Minister Sheikh Shahidul Islam, State Minister for Education Mansur Ali Sarker and Education Secretary Hedayet Ahmed.

Held at the Osmany Memorial Hall, the function was attended by Vice President Moudud Ahmed, ministers, members of Parliament, high government officials and educationists.

Describing the day as an important day in the history of mankind the President said a united struggle of the people of the whole world started today against illiteracy aimed at ensuring education for all by the year 2000.

President Ershad said it was declared four decades ago that right to education for all is a fundamental right of the people. But he regretted that even after 40 years, 100 crore people out of the total world population of 500 crore were still illiterate.

He said out of them one crore 70 lakh were in the developed world while the remaining 98 crore 30 lakh in the Third World countries. He said this disparity between the developed and the Third World could never deliver the goods to mankind or society.

The President said there was a direct link between literacy and development. In order to achieve speedy socio-economic development in the country, the people should have to be freed from the curse of illiteracy, he pointed out.

In this context, he referred to the steps taken by his government to spread the light of education in the country and said lion's share of the budget was being earmarked for the education sector.

The child artists of the cultural centre presented two songs on literacy on the occasion.

New Bangladesh Defense Secretary Appointed

46001238 Dhaka THE NEW NATION
in English 10 Jan 90 p 8

[Text] Mr Mohammad Siddiquir Rahman yesterday joined as Defence Secretary of the Government of Bangladesh, reports BSS.

Prior to joining the present post he was Rector of Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre (PATC) at Savar.

Earlier, he held the positions of secretaries of different ministries and Ambassador of Bangladesh to the Arab Republic of Egypt.

Papers Report Stand, New Party of Religious Leader

Atrashi Press Conference

46001243 Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 27 Dec 89 p 1, 10

[Article by Shahiduzzaman Khan: "Pir of Atrashi Calls for Greater Unity"]

[Text] Atrashi (Faridpur), Dec. 26—Hazrat Khawza Shah Sufi Hashmatullah Faridpuri, popularly known as "Pir of Atrashi," has called for greater unity of the people for safeguarding the independence and sovereignty of Bangladesh. He said nobody would be allowed to foul play with the country's independence.

The Pir said he would not remain silent in the face of grave provocation as he "belongs to 100m people of the country and 100m people also belong to him." He said he would shed last drop of his blood and ready to be the first martyr for the cause of the nation.

Talking to a group of journalists at Biswa Zaker Manzil at Atrashi on Monday 30 miles from the district headquarters of Faridpur, the Pir (Saint) of Atrashi said the present Government of (President) Ershad must arrange free and fair polls. Peace in the country would be coming if a Government settles through a fair election, he added.

Terming the people as the sovereign of the country, he said, they must be united for the country's welfare which would ensure free and fair polls. Replying to a question about the members of the Zaker Party, which had recently been floated with his blessings. He said his party was the largest one in the country. He said each of the estimated 30m followers, irrespective of their party affiliation, would respond to his call for becoming his party activists.

The Pir said the Muslims, Hindus, Christians and Buddhists would continue to live in communal harmony in Bangladesh. Religious sanctity would also be maintained. In an oblique reference to communal riots in India, the Pir said the Muslims there were being discriminated. "If incidents like Babri mosque take place again, I shall not spare," he said emphatically. He said the country's 100m people would rise to any occasion and if they take up bricks to their hands, at least 100 million bricks would be thrown against the opposing forces.

Replying to another question on the censorship on the Zaker Party news and a misunderstanding with the President (who himself a direct disciple of the Pir), he said President was annoyed when Zaker Sangathan Organisation was turned into Zaker Party. Every disciple is like a son and when "he (Ershad) committed mistakes, I had always told him to be guided by true perceptions."

Asked if he commits further mistake, will you forgive him again? The Pir said after committing mistakes, a son can always come to his father. He said (President) Ershad was now more dedicated and he was coming to the Darbar Sharif more frequently. The Pir, however, did not elaborate what he would actually do if there was further provocations against his party activities.

Replying to another question on the political manoeuvring of Begum Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina, Hazrat Moulana Faridpuri said if they (Khaleda and Hasina) follow the paths of Islam, he will lend his support to them.

Woman as President

"What do you think if any one of them becomes President of Bangladesh?" Replying to this question, the Pir said Islam did not permit a woman to become head of a

state. However, their status in the political arena might be considered and determined with due honour and dignity, he added.

Asked about his feelings on the closure of DAILY MILLAT and a number of weeklies, the Pir said he had heard about the closure of the MILLAT but did not know about the rest. He said he would raise the issue with the President when he comes.

Painting a bright picture of the country, the Pir expressed the hope that Bangladesh would be a holy land. The sun is now rising in the eastern horizon. Mists are now being cleared. Southern breeze will be blowing and all will be OK with divine blessings of Islam getting access to every nook and corner, he added.

BZM

Biswa Zaker Manzil [BZM], a serene sanctuary of divine blessings as it is called by the devotees covers an area of one square mile. The complex witnessed a phenomenal growth over the years. The flourishing complex comprises the Pir's dwelling, madrasha, orphanage, institute of research and culture and a sprawling market. An under construction mosque is being built with the stones with provisions for praying for one lakh muslims at a time. A 600-bed hospital is being built with rapid speed. The Pir in his 80s, supervises the construction work daily where nearly 2,000 labourers are engaged in working part of them, being salaried.

Not a single action is taken in the Darbar Sharif without the Pir's consent. For long 42 years he has been preaching Islam from Atrashi, a sleepy village now turned into a small township. He visits nowhere except his Pir's mazar at Enayetpur, Pabna during Urs time once a year. He has floated a publishing house wherefrom 15 research works on Islam were published.

Zaker means constant remembrance of God and soul. A staunch believer in Naqshbandi and Mozaddedi Tariqa of Islam, the Pir begins indoctrination of his followers by pressing his spiritual current in one side of the would be disciple's chest. As the follower's soul combines with the Pir and the Pir's soul with that of God, there is thus a combination of souls which lead to divine touch of God. The Pir claims he has 30m disciples in both home and abroad. The President, Vice-President, Speaker and 12 cabinet Ministers of the country are his direct followers. Sixty-two members of Parliament and four Generals of the Bangladesh Army are also his disciples.

The day at the Biswa Zaker Manzil begins at 3 a.m. (called by the Pir as the divine bliss) when inculcation of souls starts with Zikir and Askar. The Pir himself leads the final session after the moulana performs the rituals.

Devotees come through day and night from near and far flung areas on an average, the BZM source said, about 10 to 15 thousand devotees come to the BZM every day. During Urs time, nearly 20 to 30 lakh Zakerans and Ashekans attend the congregation once in a year.

The newly floated Zaker Party has the Pir himself, two sons—Pirzada and Mahfuzul Huq (33) and Pirzada Mostafa Amir Faisal (32) as the members of the Supreme Command Council. The Pir's two wives are dead and all his three daughters are married.

Allegations Refuted

46001243 Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 6 Jan 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] Syed Monwar Hossain, Secretary of Bangladesh Zaker Party in a statement on Friday said that the role of Peer Shaheb of Atrashi during our Liberation War was fully known to the local people. Refuting the allegations brought against Peer Shaheb by some political parties about his activities in 1971, the statement said that thousands of people fleeing from the attack of occupation forces got shelter and food at the Darbar Sharif.

He further said that those who were critical of Peerjada Mostafa Ameer Faisal for his statement on secularism contained in the 1972 Constitution, had in fact deviated from the logical contents of the statement. He further said those who were pursuing the politics of tailism of foreign countries, were betraying the cause of the 30 lakh martyrs of the Liberation War.

Replying to allegations by some political parties published in a section of the Press regarding the role of the Peer of Atrashi, Syed Monwar Hossain said that the Peer had been preaching the ideals of Islam for the last 42 years. He is always opposed to all sorts of repressions and injustices as those were not permitted in Islam.

During the country's Liberation War in 1971 the Peer of Atrashi provided food and shelter to the fleeing people irrespective of caste and creed following crackdown in March, 1971, the statement said.

The statement said that many Freedom Fighters including the commanders and deputy commanders of the area had already issued statements regarding the cooperation extended by the Peer of Atrashi during the country's Liberation War. As the Peer provided shelter to the fleeing people there was even an attempt on the Darbar Sharif of the Peer of by the occupation army, Atrashi, it said. [sentence as published] The attempt however, did not materialise as the jeep proceeding towards the Darbar Sharif met with an accident on the way.

The statement further said that not only the freedom fighters of the area kept close contact with the Peer of Atrashi rather freedom fighters from many other parts of the country used to maintain contact with him.

The stand of the Peer of Atrashi as well as that of his son regarding Liberation War of 1971 was very clear. Islam does not permit any repression, injustice and killing as the believers in Islam. They naturally are opposed to such acts of the occupation army, the statement said. The struggle of 1971 was a demonstration of accumulated anger and wrath of the people of this country

against injustice, repression and exploitation of the then Pakistani ruler, the statement said.

Hasina Announces New Program for Awami League

46001240 Dhaka THE NEW NATION
in English 11 Jan 90 pp 1, 8

[Text] Awami League chief Sheikh Hasina has announced a fresh programme for intensifying the anti-government movement and called for unity of progressive, democratic and pro-liberation forces for restoring people's rights.

The programme was announced at a grand rally yesterday at Bangabandhu Avenue in the city marking 18th anniversary of the "home-coming" of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1972 after spending nine months in Pakistani jail.

The rally organised by Awami League was chaired by Sheikh Hasina.

The programme beginning on January 24 and ending on March 7 includes country-side demonstrations, rallies, gheraos at upazila levels and mass contact tour of the party leaders.

Sheikh Hasina said at the rally all the post-'75 governments were responsible for snatching away fundamental rights of the people adding that autocracy gripped the nation following the killing of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

She blamed those in power for "distorting" the history of liberation war and added that certain quarters had been out to tarnish the image and undermine the role of Awami League during war of independence through false campaign.

The AL chief alleged that the people were being subjected to repression, oppression and deprivation by "autocratic rulers" at a time when autocracy was put to an end in many countries in Latin America, Asia, Europe.

Sheikh Hasina in her address painted a grim picture about socio-economic condition of the country.

She also accused those in power of destroying economy of the country by resorting to corruption.

She observed that law and order in the country had deteriorated.

The AL chief said, there was no alternative to a representative government to overcome crises prevailing in the country.

Among others, the AL leaders Sheikh Abdul Aziz, Abdus Samad Azad, Zillur Rahman, Syeda Zohra Tajuddin, Zillur Rahman, Dr Kamal Hossain, Abdul Mannan, Sajeda Chowdhury, Amir Hossain Amu, Polin Dey, Tofail Ahmed and the city AL President Muzaffar Hossain Paltu also spoke at the rally.

Sheikh Abdul Aziz described prevailing situation in the country as anarchic.

He said that the party led by Sheikh Hasina would remain firm in movement aiming at establishing rule of law in the country.

Dr Kamal Hossain said that the followers of Bangabandhu, being imbued with the spirit of liberation war will carry on the movement to exercise franchise for without interference.

Muzaffar Hossain Paltu called for launching a vigorous movement under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina to topple the government and pave the way for implementation of 7-point programme.

The AL leader K. M. Jahangir read out the declaration of the rally which called for mass movement to restore parliamentary system of government as embodied in the constitution of 1972.

It described it as the only way out for emancipation of the people.

INDIA

Prime Minister Addresses Labor Management Seminar

46001219 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 9 Jan 90 p 11

[Text] New Delhi, Jan. 8 (PTI). The Prime Minister, Mr V. P. Singh, today called for a pragmatic, genuine labour participation in management that would keep intact the principles of equity and justice and also the imperative of increased productivity.

Inaugurating a two-day seminar here on the labour participation in management, the Prime Minister said the participative culture was central to achieving industrial peace and enhancement of productivity.

Calling for a sea-change in the traditionally-held concept of employer-employee relations, Mr Singh said a mature democracy could be achieved only when workers and employers had mutual faith, when workers and employers could participate in the process of management.

Those who spoke in the seminar today included the railway minister, Mr George Fernandes, the industry minister, Mr Ajit Singh, CPM [Marxist Communist Party] leader, Mr Harkishen Singh Surjit, the former energy minister, Mr Vasant Sathe and the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] leader, Mr Bhai Mahavir.

The Prime Minister said his government will introduce legislation to give statutory a basis to labour participation in management.

Talking to journalists later, the Prime Minister said the legislation would be introduced in the budget session of Parliament.

Mr Singh, however, agreed that a change in attitude had to come from within. He said it has been suggested that workers should be given right to equity participation in the companies they were employed in and felt a start could be made in this area in the public sector.

The Prime Minister said there had hardly been any workers representatives on the board of directors except in nationalised banks and the International Airport Authority of India.

Mr Singh said in some enterprises individual trade union leaders had been represented on the board of directors but this too had not been satisfactory as they were nominees of the government rather than workers.

Mr Singh said in the past, workers had not been allowed to voice their grievances and get them redressed. This was self-defeating and unless it was expeditiously and amicably settled, workers would hardly discuss any other matter.

He emphasised that workers participation in management should imply their active and full involvement in management and decision making.

The managements must respect workers as equals and the workers must identify themselves with the enterprises and should not view management decisions with suspicion, he said.

According to Mr Singh, one of the major reasons for the failure of the 1983 scheme on labour participation in management was that it did not prescribe a definite mode of representation of the workers.

Observing that the old scheme was not capable of implementation, the Prime Minister calls for concrete action to make the concept a reality.

Earlier in his welcome address, Mr Ajit Singh called for evolving an indigenous system, for ensuring workers' participation at all levels, suited to our cultural, social, political and economic realities.

He said there was urgent need for not only improving performance of industrial units but also developing the idea of co-partnership based on equality of status and mutuality of interest between labour and management.

Mr Ajit Singh said in a developing country like India, the key to progress lay in substantially improving the performance of industrial units.

Observing that cordial relations between management and workers played an important role in establishment of industrial peace and was "vital for the economic growth of the country" the industry minister urged

suppliers of capital, entrepreneurs, managements and workers to fully realise its importance and due place in national life.

The minister said though considerable progress had been achieved in attaining good performance and efficiency in the public sector with a total investment of Rs 80,000 crores, there was a lot of room for improvement.

Mr Ram Vilas Paswan, in his remarks, said the Prime Minister had been the main inspiration behind the seminar.

He said there was urgent need for changing the whole concept of labour-management relations. The relationship should reflect the welfare of the labour as well as productivity.

Delegates from the industry, management, trade unions as well as political leaders and government officials were attending the two-day seminar.

Mr George Fernandes, who has been a trade unionist for the last 40 years, said labour participation in management could be an alternative to tackle the problem of sickness in industry.

He cited the example of Kamanis where the workers had shown that a sick company could be made viable even when all experiments by previous managements had failed.

He also mooted the idea of workers' parliament as an effort to bring about democratisation of the industry. He advocated the need for having secret ballot for representation of workers in management.

Mr Harkishen Singh Surjit described the functioning of public sector undertakings as "most unsatisfactory" and said one solution to this was labour participation in management.

He gave four main reasons for the poor performance of public sector inefficiency, bureaucratisation, corruption and mismanagement.

Mr Vasant Sathe, denied that the Congress government lacked the political will and that it did make "sincere" efforts to bring about labour participation.

He wanted the government to evolve a proper approach paper and have a "proper dialogue" with major opposition parties to tackle this problem.

He did not agree with the view of having secret ballot for electing union representative in the management. "Secret ballots always encouraged irresponsibility," especially when the number of unions were large in an organisation, he said. Also, on an average only 40 percent of the workers were members of unions.

Mr Bhai Mahavi, BJP, wanted the functioning of government companies, which accounted for Rs 20,000 crores investment, to be brought under scrutiny by setting up a committee for the purpose.

External Affairs Minister Talks to Bombay Reporters

46001206 Madras *THE HINDU*
in English 18 Jan 90 p 9

[Text] Bombay, Jan. 17—India does not intend to intervene militarily “under any circumstances hereafter,” and does believe that in the present era no country should intervene anywhere in the world in such a fashion. This was categorically stated by the External Affairs Minister, Mr. Inder Kumar Gujral, here today in an informal chat with reporters. Building of trust and friendships was the essential thrust of India’s foreign policy “which will have continuity as well as judicious change.”

For instance, he did not favour any intervention in Afghan affairs by outsiders because such “intervention by anyone is not in the interests of the Afghan people or peace in the region.” It will disturb further the harmony and amity in the region itself.

But protecting the interests of the ethnic Indians overseas would not preclude diplomatic initiatives as in the case of Fiji and Sri Lanka. In so far as expatriate Indian labour was concerned, Mr. Gujral agreed that though in countries where Indians went in large numbers to work, the missions had Labour Attaches but they “need to be toned up.”

Change of ambassadors who are political appointees in the wake of the new Government coming into being was described by Mr. Gujral as a “good practice” which he himself had followed in the past. But resignations tendered by them was not in any way a reflection on their abilities to carry out diplomatic assignments. Considering the appointment of IAS [Indian Administrative Service] cadre personnel to diplomatic posts was not new because the intent was to “pick the best person for a particular job.” While he had no comment to offer on Mr. Anand Ram’s appointment and subsequent withdrawal, he categorically said that “Mr. Ribeiro stays on in Romania.”

Draft Treaty Returned

India has returned to Sri Lanka a draft of a treaty with its comments and it has been agreed that the draft would be “agreed upon in the near future,” Mr. Gujral said.

India would stick to the deadline for the withdrawal of the Peace-Keeping Forces but was keen that the Tamil groups in that island nation “should not fight each other.”

The Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, Mr. M. Karunanidhi, was also making efforts with this intention and India’s desire was that the post-March 31 scenario in Sri Lanka does not see any violence, Mr. Gujral said. He “appreciated the difficulties of Mr. Varadharaja Perumal” and his fears. The two rounds of talks conducted between the two Foreign Ministers “were useful and were able to sort out outstanding issues.”

There were several issues that Mr. Gujral reacted to, often with caution, and took in his stride such issues as SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] and the United Nations. India’s view was that SAARC should include Burma and Afghanistan but then, it was not India’s view alone that mattered but other member-states have to look at it in the same perspective. In fact, Mr. Gujral said that such cooperation ought to encompass the entire Asia. He spoke of the need to expand and strengthen SAARC.

India had faith in the system on which the U.N. worked, he said in response to a question relating to the justification of the “five brahmins who enjoy the veto” but said that the “system should readjust given the changing world order and become more democratic.”

India considered Tibet an autonomous region of China—“that was an understanding with Nehru”—he said and hoped that the next round of talks between India and China would be held soon.

Ambassador Karan Singh’s Resignation Letter Published

46001208 Calcutta *THE TELEGRAPH*
in English 14 Jan 90 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, Jan 13—India’s ambassador to the United States, Dr Karan Singh, has resigned from his post as directed by the external affairs minister, Mr I.K. Gujral.

Dr Singh submitted his resignation to the Prime Minister, Mr V.P. Singh, immediately after his meeting with the foreign minister yesterday. Dr Singh had been trying for more than a month to get an appointment with the Prime Minister to discuss foreign affairs and the Jammu and Kashmir problem but that did not materialise.

A disappointed Dr Singh tendered his resignation on the eve of his departure to Moscow to attend an “important meeting” of the Global Forum on Environment and Development for Survival in which he is to deliver the final speech and summation. The Soviet President, Mr Mikhail Gorbachev, is scheduled to address the meeting on its closing day.

Dr Singh becomes the first ambassador to resign after the new government has taken over at the Centre. Mr A.R. Deo, ambassador to Nepal, had relinquished his office on expiry of his term in the last week of December. Dr Singh had taken over as ambassador to the United States six months ago.

In his letter to the Prime Minister released to the Press, Dr Singh said, “In the few months since I presented my credentials to President Bush on 14th August, 1989, I took a number of steps to strengthen Indo-US relations, including establishing high-level contacts with the Administration, the Senate and The House of Representatives meeting leading intellectuals and academicians, visiting important states and interacting extensively with

various sections of the Indian-American community and leaders of corporate America, speaking at several universities and scholarly institutions, and developing a high-profile media presence. I am happy that these measures already began to have a positive impact on the whole complex spectrum of relations between the two greatest democracies in the world.

"After the results of the general elections at the end of November, I had wanted to return immediately in order to meet you and personally offer my resignation in case you wished to appoint a new ambassador. However, with Congress in session in Washington, the historic Malta summit coming up, and the fact that I had some important meetings already scheduled, I decided to wait until the Christmas vacations, by which time you would also have gotten through the confidence vote in the newly-elected Parliament. Consequently, I left Washington on 26th December and reached here on the 27th. I had asked for a meeting with you even before I arrived, but for some reason this has not so far been possible. Apart from my diplomatic office, I had also wanted to share some thoughts with you regarding the rapidly deteriorating situation in Jammu and Kashmir.

"I have been in public life now for over 40 years from the age of 18 during which I have had the privilege of working in close association with five Prime Ministers going right back to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, and of holding many high offices. My philosophy of life has been not to seek office but to try and work in a dignified, dynamic and dedicated manner wherever I happen to be placed. As advised by the foreign minister whom I met last evening, I thereby tender my resignation from the post of ambassador and the Cabinet rank that was personal to me with this assignment."

Dr Singh was given the status of a Cabinet minister as ambassador to the United States. Mr Nani A. Palkhivala, who had been appointed ambassador to the United States by the Janata Party government in 1977, had also been given a Cabinet minister's status. Mr Palkhivala had, however, quit the diplomatic assignment much before the Janata government collapsed to continue his practice at the bar. Mr N.G. Goray, high commissioner to the United Kingdom during the Janata government had quit after the government fell.

Activities, Remarks of Akali Dal Leader Mann Reported

Party Officials Elected

46001209 *Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 17 Jan 90 p 1

[Text] Amritsar, Jan 16 (UNI)—Mr Simranjeet Singh Mann was reappointed president of the Shiromani Akali Dal (Mann) at a meeting of senior party leaders held at Wantara Singh village, near here, yesterday.

A statement issued by the local party office today said the senior party leader, Baba Joginder Singh, was re-elected as the patron of the Dal. Baba Joginder had been appointed to this post by Mr Mann last month.

Sant Ajit Singh and Mr Tarlok Singh, father of Satwant Singh, slain assassin of Mrs Indira Gandhi, were appointed senior vice-presidents.

Mr Sawaran Singh was made the junior vice-president while Mr Harcharan Singh Rode, Mr Gurtej Singh and Mr Ram Singh general secretaries.

Mr Ajit Singh was named the organising secretary while Mr Manmohan Singh the office secretary.

A 35-member working committee was also named. The prominent names in the committee include Mr Atma Singh, Mr Ranjit Singh Brahmputra, Mr Sucha Singh Chotepur, Mr Trilokchand Sing Tur, Mr Baldev Singh Brar, Mr Charanjit Singh Walia and Mr Talib Singh Sandhu.

The working committee, which was dissolved on December 11 last year, would look after day-to-day party affairs. The committee would also be taken into confidence before taking major decisions.

The statement, signed by Mr Mann asked the party office-bearers and the working committee members to declare within 15 days "lists of their movable and immovable property" to the party president.

Sunrita Sen Interview

46001209 *Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH*
in English 19 Dec 89 p 7

[Interview Part I with Simranjit Singh Mann by Sunrita Sen]

[Excerpts] [THE TELEGRAPH] How were you treated in jail?

[Mann] Brutally, I was given electric shocks. They had a very sophisticated Soviet machine with three terminals—one was attached to my genitals, the others to my toes. They pulled out a part of my beard, you can see it. They hit my face with their fists—my lower jaw is displaced. I have just been to one of the leading kidney specialists in the country. He says the grace of God saved me. But I have a number of permanent impairments.

I was tortured emotionally and mentally by various methods. In Bhagalpur they put me in a lunatic cell for four days.

Initially when I was arrested on December 4, 1984, they wanted to eliminate me. But the head constable in charge of the four member firing squad was from the districts of Himachal Pradesh neighbouring Punjab. When he saw me he sort of couldn't do it. The other three also lost heart. Then I was taken to Patna (where) they did not allow me to receive letters from my children or any books though the Supreme Court had allowed that. They

did not allow me medical aid and as a patient of high blood pressure I would have died had my fellow prisoners detained in another jail in Bhagalpur not bribed our common doctor to give me medicine.

I was only allowed brief meetings with my parents and sister through a little window with iron bars. My children were not allowed to see me after April, 1986. I am meeting them after a gap of three years.

[THE TELEGRAPH] How long did the torture continue?

[Mann] The physical torture was from November 30 to December 12, 1984, then for brief periods when Mr Anantram used to send in his special team, which was illegal. They couldn't meet me in jails. This was brought to the notice of the Supreme Court, but it ruled that it was not necessary for the jail superintendent to disclose the names of the people who had been torturing me.

Then Mr Ram Jethmalani put in an application of bail. But this was also turned down even though in my case the chargesheet was filed one year after my arrest.

I was kept in solitary confinement for most of these five years and barely given any of the amenities accorded to prisoners of conscience. And, as you see, as arbitrarily as I was treated right through the five years of confinement, in an equally arbitrary manner, Mr Rajiv Gandhi withdrew the case, as a lame duck Prime Minister, when he had no authority to do so.

[THE TELEGRAPH] What questions did the special investigating team ask you during interrogation?

[Mann] They were simply torturing me. And they did not ask me even once of my alleged involvement in the murder of Mrs Indira Gandhi. Not even once. Neither did they ask me about the bombs that I was to place in Parliament or the hi-jacking or putting poison into reservoirs.

The only thing they were asking me was to come to terms with Mr Rajiv Gandhi because he was going to be Premier for the next 20 years. And I would stay in prison [if] I did not come to terms with him. I said I am not going to make any unprincipled accord or sign an agreement with any person. [passage omitted]

[THE TELEGRAPH] What will be the role of your party MP [Member of Parliament]s in Parliament?

[Mann] We shall try for the restoration of democracy and its institutions at the earliest. And for the end of repression. We shall also raise the issue of human rights violations in Sri Lanka, Burma and neighbouring countries and insist on good relations with them all. We would also want the restoration of ties with Nepal and the opening up of transit routes to that country, another arbitrary decision of Mr Rajiv Gandhi. Our endeavour will be to restore human rights and normal functioning not only in the state but also at the Centre.

[THE TELEGRAPH] Do you have any hopes from the new government?

[Mann] We definitely have. We hope they will not manipulate Punjab politics like the Congress did. They should let the people prevail and if they want their own set of politicians, I am afraid the political health of the state will not be restored.

[THE TELEGRAPH] What of Mr V.P. Singh's visit?

[Mann] A very good gesture. It shows he wants peace.

[THE TELEGRAPH] You say you will achieve your demands within the Constitution. The AISSF [All India Sikh Students' Federation] says "Nothing short of Khalistan." How do you reconcile to the contradiction?

[Mann] If you don't see any contradiction between the RSS demanding Hindu Rashtra and the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] saying clearly that it's goal is a Hindu Rashtra, why do you see an anomaly in this?

In our manifesto we have said that we want the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. There should be a difference and we should be treated with a sense of justifiable criticism. Not unjustly that if the AISSF wants "Khalistan" you attach us pell-mell to the whole affair. They have supported us and we are very grateful and look forward to their support in the future. But our goal is realising the Anandpur Sahib Resolution.

[THE TELEGRAPH] The Anandpur Sahib Resolution stands for autonomy for Punjab, the Janata Dal manifesto promises greater autonomy for all. So would you be preferring a Jammu and Kashmir type special status?

[Mann] A Kashmir type settlement could be worked out. Our demands are very much within the Constitution. But we would not like autonomy for all the states. Because of historical reasons there were three parties invited to the negotiating table in 1947 when the British left—the Hindus, the Sikhs and the Muslims. The Hindus were represented by the Congress, the Muslims by the League and the Sikhs by the Akali Dal. The Hindus got independent India, the Muslims Pakistan they also got Section 370 in Kashmir, whereas the Sikhs got nothing. So we will have to get something for the Sikhs.

But we are not in favour of giving autonomy to all states. We want a strong Centre. This business of autonomy has been cooked up by the communists. By the Lin Piao theory they propagate that all poorer nations like Africa, Asia, Latin America surround the social democratic western nations and therefore the communists came to seize power. We see a similar design in this autonomy-for-all-states plea, and we don't want a communist takeover at Delhi. That is certainly out. We just want autonomy for Punjab. If the communists want greater autonomy they must sacrifice their lives like we have done and they can't have it on our sacrifices.

[THE TELEGRAPH] Do you foresee the communists and the BJP being a hurdle to the realisation of your demands?

[Mann] You must remember, the very arbitrary, ambiguous, funny stand taken by the communists. They were the first people to propagate "Khalistan" and now they call the Anandpur Sahib resolution secessionist.

Historically, it was the communists who first demanded an independent sovereign state of Pakistan and subsequently the same for the Sikhs. But after Partition, they found that they could not annoy the majority community. So they are, as they say, running with the hare and hunting with the hound. What they are saying is not in the sense of Marxist thought. It is purely opportunistic and they will run into trouble later on because we are not supporting autonomy for all the states. They will not get support for autonomy in Kerala or West Bengal from us. And if they don't get support from us, they will not get autonomy—let me make that clear. [passage omitted]

[THE TELEGRAPH] The AISSF insists on a mediator from the UN for the talks.

[Mann] In Namibia the UN was mediator. It is not unprecedented.

[THE TELEGRAPH] But do you think the government will agree?

[Mann] It doesn't. I see your point they might not agree, but talking is a democratic right. And we believe in the UN. We advocate that all such things should come to an end through it. The government has supported the UN initiative on Afghanistan, on Namibia and elsewhere. So I don't see why if the militants want such a thing and they wholly endear themselves to peace, it should bug the government. There is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in it.

[THE TELEGRAPH] Will it be a precondition?

[Mann] You must ask the militants. I have not met them.

[To be concluded]

Sunrita Sen Interview

46001209 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH
in English 20 Dec 90 p 7

[Interview Part II with Simranjit Singh Mann by Sunrita Sen]

[Text] [THE TELEGRAPH] Do you condemn the killing of innocents by the terrorists?

[Mann] There may have been killings, but none of the militant bodies have claimed credit for them. They are attributed to criminals and I have come to know that some very respectable people, encouraged by the police, are indulging in these lootings and killings in houses and homesteads. Your suggestion exhausts the very logic of it. Why should the militants intimidate those very people

they seek refuge from? If they alienate them then like Mao Zedong who said "A fish cannot live without water" they would be digging their own grave. I don't think any of these people are indulging in these killings. The government agencies are doing them.

Mr Chidambaram was very cautious in giving information to Mr Vajpayee that the rockets used in Punjab were imported illegally. He warned Mr Vajpayee that as a nationalist he should not ask such questions and that import of such weapons do take place for certain things which could only mean undercover operations.

So if you analyse all this and what the agencies were up to, you can only come to the conclusion that they wanted to keep the Punjab problem alive, tell Hindus that Punjab was seceding and that it was very necessary to keep the Congress party strong politically. Rajiv Gandhi was ready to call us secessionists for wanting the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, but this accord with Sant Longowal had the resolution as its base.

We will have to have a commission to study how deeply the government of India was involved in Punjab and Assam.

[THE TELEGRAPH] What sort of commission?

[Mann] Like the Hunter Commission which probed into the Jallianwala Bagh massacre. We could have a committee of very detached independent jurists. Mr Jethmalani would be the best person to suggest the names.

[THE TELEGRAPH] What about Pakistan's involvement?

[Mann] I have no concrete evidence of its involvement. I can't say anything further. I have not been approached by any Pakistan or foreign agent either before I went underground and then into incarceration or after.

[THE TELEGRAPH] What about border crossing?

[Mann] That does take place. It has taken place since the Radcliffe line was drawn. The demographic set-up, language, culture is the same on both sides. The only difference is that on the other side they are Muslims and on this side Hindus and Sikhs. There has never been any concrete barrier which can prevent them from interacting with each other for economic reasons. There has been border traffic since the creation of Pakistan.

[THE TELEGRAPH] Do you think Partition was a mistake?

[Mann] It was a constitutional, historical, partisan blunder on the part of Mr Nehru who did not want a federal set-up and carry the Muslims with him. He wanted to create a Hindu state and he was the paramount arbitrator of the fate of India. This Partition on communal grounds has neither been a success in Pakistan nor in India. It has not worked out as Mr Nehru visualised it. Nothing communal ever works out.

If Mr Nehru, educated at Harrow and Cambridge, had kept his secular identity and not played communal politics, I am sure we would not have had to come across this problem at all today. Given evolution. India with a federal structure would have been much better than what he thought in 1947.

[THE TELEGRAPH] Would you advocate undoing the damage?

[Mann] In Germany the Berlin Wall.... I am very much in favour of the Unification of Germany. It will decrease tensions in Europe. The NATO and Warsaw Pacts will crumble. Germany will become a barrier between East and West. Similarly, if this could be achieved here, it would be very good. But it must be achieved through the will of the people, through the ballot and not any military intervention either way.

[THE TELEGRAPH] What is your opinion of the new Governor?

[Mann] The people have given my party a mandate and we are bound by certain traditions and conventions. There is a convention that I should have been consulted in the matter of his appointment. I was not consulted. Since he has come, I have no objection. We have to operate somehow. And if he can restore the constitutional system in Punjab, we would welcome it. But it is strange that this very set of people were crying hoarse about how the conventions were being ignored by the Congress government and Governors imposed on Janata and communist-ruled states. I say they should have adhered to the principles they advocated while in the Opposition.

[THE TELEGRAPH] But you don't have an elected government.

[Mann] That is true. Technically you may be right but I think morally I stand on a good wicket when I make this statement.

[THE TELEGRAPH] What exactly is this legal action you intend to take against officials?

[Mann] There is no need for any extra constitutional effort. By Article 59 of the Constitution, India is bound by all the international treaties it has signed. In 1949 it became a signatory to the Act of Genocide, in 1964 the Venice Treaty forbade it to destroy cultural heritages. See what has been done to the Golden Temple. The beautification scheme in the name of security has destroyed the very buildings and streets planned by Guru Amar Dass and Arjan Dev. And security through such means has broken down. You know in Hungary ... the barbed wire fencing has come down, so has the Berlin Wall in Germany. In the last years of this modern century these people are living in ancient Moghul days and are not receptive to the changes taking place all round the globe.

[THE TELEGRAPH] What about accusations of intimidation by supporters of your candidates during the elections?

[Mann] All violence was sponsored by the state. As the political parties are concerned, they never brought anything to the notice of the Election Commission then. Why do they complain now that they have lost? As far as future elections are concerned, you will see for yourself. And if Mar Chautala, the Haryana chief minister, has said Mr Devi Lal lost in Ferozepur because of intimidation by the AISSF [All India Sikh Students' Federation], and if the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] and the leftists have no faith in the Election Commission they can go to the UN or bring in the foreign Press. We would welcome any impartial agency as we are sure we used no violence in word or deed.

[THE TELEGRAPH] There are allegations that you too have been sponsored by Mr S.S. Ray and the Congress.

[Mann] My group has been the main sufferers in their hands. We have been eliminated in fake encounters, my group has been in jail for five years. The others have moved in and out of jail. Mr Ray had a good working relationship with the secretary of the SGPC [Sikh Temple Management Committee], with the MP [Member of Parliament]s from Ludhiana and Faridkot. He had his sources within the traditional leaders. If I had an agreement with them I would certainly have been treated better in jail.

[THE TELEGRAPH] If they want to invite traditional leaders for the talks, would you be agreeable to include them as well?

[Mann] In politics we talk of reality. The reality today is our unprecedented mandate. If you start negotiations with mirages and manipulate politics you cannot reach a correct conclusion. If you want reality to prevail in Punjab, you must have faith in the ballot and not manipulation or the bullet.

[THE TELEGRAPH] But Deputy Prime Minister Devi Lal is known to be very close to Mr Parkash Singh Badal.

[Mann] I am not a manipulator. I am an honest man. I have a strong mandate. My horizontal equation with the people is very very good. I don't seek any support or promotion by any person at the Centre. In politics there are no permanent friends or enemies. Mr Devi Lal, who has risen to his position after so many years of politics, will also accept reality.

[THE TELEGRAPH] They say you will bring peace to Punjab. But how much of the initiative is really with you and how much with the Centre?

[Mann] Obviously, we have nothing to give. They are the persons who must restore the democratic, constitutional set-ups and call us to the negotiating table. As Hobbes said, Treaties are kept by the sword. I don't have the sword. It is in their hands. And they have to seek our views and redress our grievances.

As far as I am concerned, I have been treated in a brutal manner and now I see the brutality of the state in our villages. But I am still not reacting violently. God has given me a certain peace. I have meditated a lot in jail. I am not speaking ill of any person and I hope to keep calm under very provocative situations.

[THE TELEGRAPH] Will you put up any pre-conditions for talks?

[Mann] General amnesty for all Sikh prisoners held under such horrible conditions. The rest the party will decide.

[THE TELEGRAPH] While you were SSP [Samyukta Socialist Socialist Party] Fardikot there were allegations that you yourself ran gangs.

[Mann] No, I never went beyond the law.

[THE TELEGRAPH] But these officers you complain against, aren't they merely following orders?

[Mann] At Nuremburg the Nazi criminals took the same plea. It was held then that you need not follow illegal orders emanating from your superiors. Any verbal order should be noted down on the file, if it's within the law then comply, if not, make a note that you don't agree.

We have an iron framework. The IAS [Indian Administrative Service], IFS [Indian Foreign Service], IPS [Indian Police Service] are a treasured lot. They have a high status and are paid highly. We maintain a high order of discipline. They are above criticism in Parliament. We give them all these facilities to see that the rule of law prevails in this land. If they are not willing to abide by the law in spite of all the protection society and the Constitution gives them, they are not worth their salt and must be taken to task.

[THE TELEGRAPH] In the context of the future how would you place the Damdami Taksal and the AISSF in relation to your Akali Dal?

[Mann] The Taksal is very, very, important. It is the Sikh university on wheels. Its chief, Baba Thakar Singh said so many prayers for me. He was a source of inspiration to my family. He sent me such wonderful messages in jail. Without him it would have been impossible for me to survive the torture, mental and physical. The Taksal has done similar spiritual work among other parents who have lost their children. It has provided succour, hope. We hold it in great respect. As for the Federation, they are the people who have supported our party and they carry the maximum burden of state repression. They have confronted the state and its draconian laws. I have the greatest respect for them as well.

Our group is now the main Akali Dal. It has fought a wonderful battle and it has been rewarded, and the people have reposed confidence in us.

[THE TELEGRAPH] But how much will the Taksal or AISSF influence your decisions?

[Mann] The Taksal is a religious body. It doesn't interfere in politics. All our workers are from the Taksal. It is our university. We owe allegiance to it like a British premier would to Oxford or American Senators and Presidents to Harvard. We demand respect for this great institution. I cannot succeed and I do not want to if I cannot carry the Taksal with me.

[THE TELEGRAPH] But isn't religion and politics inseparable in Sikhism? And in that case would not the Taksal play a religious-political role as well?

[Mann] Yes. The Akali Dal says so and the gurdwaras say so but the Taksal has voluntarily restricted itself to a religious role. But like a British Premier would be amenable to influences from Oxford so politicians in Punjab are amenable to the influence of the Taksal.

There is nothing extraordinary or strange about it. I cannot say where the Taksal begins and where it ends. But its influence is all pervasive in the life of the Sikhs.

Amirdashah Singh Interview

46001209 Calcutta THE STATESMAN
in English 23 Dec 89 pp 1, 14

[Interview with Simranjit Singh Mann by Amar Jasbir Singh]

[Excerpt] [THE STATESMAN] Now that you are out after five years of solitary confinement, how do you contemplate using your freedom?

[Mann] I intend to be out in the field looking after cases of torture and illegal imprisonment which are continuing even today in Punjab. Also of death and fake encounters. I have also to apply the balm and heal the wounds; that is my primary aim after my release. Unless I do that, I shall not be able to take off in any direction.

[THE STATESMAN] Would you say that time is perhaps running out, and that you will need to move fast?

[Mann] Yes. The last Government has destroyed our democratic institutions, the due process of democracy has been non-existent for the last 10 years. They used Article 356 arbitrarily and threw out our democratically elected Governments. We have had no panchayati elections, no municipal elections, no election to the SGPC [Sikh Temple Management Committee]. Why? So I am at a great, great disadvantage to take off. Moreover, I have to build up my cadres. The Akali Dal has a very clear charter and a laid-down constitution. We must hold elections, build up the district jathedars and various executives.

Since all these elected functionaries have been removed, I am at a great disadvantage for the moment. You are correct in asking that I should act quickly. But I am sitting on a volcano, as it is. There is also pressure from certain quarters, from the Centre, but in the interests of

the State, I am going to take my time and not going to be hurried. Unless I am seen to apply the balm by the people, I cannot take off.

[THE STATESMAN] How do you propose to get the militants to change their ways, to cooperate and, at the same time, bring the Government round to your point of view?

[Mann] I haven't met the militants. I need to meet them to seek their cooperation, and thereafter see whether we can work out a formula. At present, the situation is very fluid, the youth have fled their homes. It is very, very difficult to contact the people. As I go around meeting people, I shall press for consensus by persuasion and not by confrontation.

[THE STATESMAN] When you say that you have not met the militants that is of course quite possible, but surely you know who they are, don't you?

[Mann] No, I do not.

[THE STATESMAN] Well then, their leaders, if nobody else?

[Mann] I do not know their leaders, because they have gone underground, just as I had also once gone underground. Underground leaders are elusive, hard to meet, as my experience has shown. Unless I can identify them, or meet them, it is impossible to say anything concrete regarding them.

[THE STATESMAN] How do you see yourself reconciling your past as a serving police officer and having to take some unpopular steps to get the militants to come within the due process of law and to cooperate with you?

[Mann] First, the Government must follow the constitutional procedures, stop all these barbaric practices and act within the law which has been violated. Then only will I be able to convince the others to come to the path of constitutionalism. They must be allowed legal redress for their grievances.

[THE STATESMAN] If the Government were prepared to give these assurances are you optimistic that you could, in part at least, bring the disenfranchised Sikhs into the mainstream of political life?

[Mann] Because of the massive mandate that I have been personally given, and if I could be confident that the Centre would restore our democratic rights, I do believe that I could bring Sikhs of all hues on to a single platform, in fact to the negotiating table.

[THE STATESMAN] Would you agree that one of the problems for the Sikhs has been the Akalis themselves, their differing claims and inability to come to an agreement amongst themselves?

[Mann] Partly true. They have contributed to their own destruction by not adhering to principles, they have been bought off and for very immediate goals, they have

sacrificed the interests of Punjab, the interests of the Sikhs, and they have not been able to bear the pressure or the repression and some of them have been attracted to the crumbs of office. That has been the major flaw of the leadership. I hope that with my background in the service, the rich administrative background, I shall fill the void in the Sikh and Akali leadership.

[THE STATESMAN] How do you propose diffusing the old leadership and to bring up new Akalis?

[Mann] The old order changeth, giving place to new. The voters have given an overwhelming answer and very courageously too.

[THE STATESMAN] What about the cooperation of men like Badal, Tohra, etc.?

[Mann] I shall not go into this controversy. I shall operate according to my own feelings and wisdom.

[THE STATESMAN] You will want elections to the SGPC, no doubt. Will your party demand, under the Gurdwara Act, that these elections be held?

[Mann] The word demand is a very strong term. We have been butchered over here, the constitutional provisions have been destroyed, and the law does not apply to the Sikhs. In fact, an act of genocide has been passed through the Indian Parliament, calling itself the 59th Amendment. Nothing would please me more than to see the democratic processes restored. We have been so brutalized, beaten up, terrorized that even to think of a demand is too strong a word. We must fight for our rights. That is what I intend to do and to see that our rights are upheld under the law of the land.

[THE STATESMAN] Where do you hope to begin, and what are your priorities?

[Mann] I have studied the Indian Constitution and it (the Union Government), is bound to implement all national treaties which it has signed. The Act of Genocide is one such. Since India is a signatory to the Venice Conference, under the auspices of the United Nations, hands of the 4th Guru, Amar Das, the 5th Guru Arjan Dev, all destroyed. Operation Bluestar destroyed the whole Golden Temple complex. Genocide of the Sikhs, all comes within the Constitution. We are asking for constitutional rights under the Criminal Procedure Code itself. I believe that the right to self-preservation is the right denied to us. At the first stage, release all political prisoners, give a general amnesty.

[THE STATESMAN] There are in Punjab administrative officers, policemen and security men who the Sikhs believe are tarred with counter-terrorism and collaboration. How do you intend dealing with them?

[Mann] They will be dealt with according to the law. If the Centre allows us to have a free hand, we shall act within the framework of Article 51, Article 311 of the Constitution. Machinery for redress will be set up on the pattern of the Nuremberg trials.

[THE STATESMAN] When a new Governor was appointed for Punjab, none of you attended the swearing-in ceremony. What was your objection?

[Mann] I was not informed of the appointment. I hold the largest mandate in this province, yet I was sent a cyclostyled invitation without any signature. To have acknowledged this would have gone beyond my brief. Moreover, since this new Government has stated that a Governor (should) be appointed in consultation with the person holding the majority mandate, why was I not consulted?

[THE STATESMAN] So it isn't the Governor himself you object to? In fact, you might in the future cooperate with him to get the province into some sort of order.

[Mann] I want to cooperate. We would like to cooperate, but we expect a certain procedure. We want a little tradition, some courtesy and protocol to be observed. We do not want to be treated like a bunch of barbarians. Nor do I want to project myself as a person hungry for power. But they may not overrule my mandate, and it is my wish to carry it out for the welfare of the people of this State.

[THE STATESMAN] Your personal mandate may be large, but at some point you may be forced to deal with the other Akalis like Talwandi, Tohra and Badal. What will be the reaction of the electorate to this?

[Mann] The masses are allergic to their very names, they are an anathema and they do not want anything to do with the corrupt. I do not expect those who have deals with the Centre to respect this mandate. They will continue to try and manipulate politics in Punjab through under-the-table deals.

[THE STATESMAN] Would you agree that Mr V.P. Singh comes with a clean slate and that he is anxious to bring back the rule of law to Punjab?

[Mann] Yes, I think the Raja will try. He has a Socialist background, he comes from a good family and is aware of the sufferings of the people over here. He is also principled and I hope is going to be more amenable. It does not mean that because he has taken certain steps without consulting us that we will not cooperate with him. That's what I feel will happen.

[THE STATESMAN] What about your demand for Khalistan?

[Mann] My party has got this on its charter. To stick to the Anandpur Sahib resolution, to try and implement it. This is something that the party believes in more and more.

[THE STATESMAN] What about the All-India Sikh Students Federation leader insisting that nothing less than Khalistan will do?

[Mann] I haven't had conclusive meetings with them yet, and we shall have to work out a via media. I hope to

bring them to the negotiating table. They can then discuss all their demands with the Raja.

[THE STATESMAN] Do you personally want Khalistan?

[Mann] No personal feelings on this. It all depends on the party, on the people. So far, I am tied up with the people's grievances within the constitutional system. I haven't thought beyond that.

[THE STATESMAN] No situation in Punjab can be solved without removing the involvement of Pakistan, or at least the Pakistan Government, in Punjab. Would you agree?

[Mann] I personally have no evidence of interferences by Pakistan in the Sikh problem. I will not comment on any situation of this nature when I have no proof of Pakistan's involvement.

[THE STATESMAN] But do you not suspect their interest, whether financial, whether through arms or drug running, etc.?

[Mann] My hands are clean. I have not come across a single person either before I was incarcerated or after my release from prison. That is the gospel truth, and the whole truth. You will have to believe my sincerity on this matter.

[THE STATESMAN] I may believe you, others may not. In fact, you believe that this is a tale to discredit the Sikhs?

[Mann] Yes, I do. I am being accused of many things. These accusations have not been backed by any substantive evidence, either before I went to jail or during my incarceration, let alone after my release. Nobody from Pakistan has ever approached me; my conscience on this point is clear.

[THE STATESMAN] When I discussed Pakistan with Mr Sukhinder Singh, secretary of the Akali Dal (Mann) before your release, he said that he wanted better relations with Pakistan, in fact, open borders with Pakistan. This statement, from a legal-historical viewpoint, is asking for a secessionist State. Has he spoken without due thought, let alone beyond his brief? Or are you in agreement with his statement?

[Mann] He did not consult me. However, it is a constitutional provision that the country should get on well with its neighbour and not throw armed men into Pakistan. These are constitutional clarities. It is written very clearly that the sovereignty of another nation will be respected by the Sikhs, or any citizen of India.

[THE STATESMAN] You are not wishing to negotiate some sort of special provision for Punjab vis-a-vis Pakistan, are you? Are you, in fact, prepared to go along with the Government of India's policy on this matter? That is you personally?

[Mann] I do not know whether these points have been discussed in my absence in the party forums. Unless I study them, I cannot give you a definitive answer. Openness as you know in Eastern Europe the barbed wire fence in Hungary has come down, the Berlin Wall has fallen. These artificial barriers are coming down all over the world.

As a human being I cannot see why these barriers should exist in any case. That is the model people are longing for. Even Russia is coming out of its isolation, and this process is overtaking the world. Why should the Sikhs be the only ones to be isolated?

Sukhinder Singh has not said anything unconstitutional, it is not against international principles, it is not against any convention. It is his personal opinion, and like good democrats we should respect his views. I have yet to discuss this with him.

[THE STATESMAN] Can we look at India in a wider context. Her relations with her neighbours—Pakistan, China and Nepal—are far from tranquil. Punjab being a border State is very sensitive for the Government, particularly when seen in conjunction with the Kashmir problem from where illegal trade stems and is carried onwards through Punjab. Are you prepared to offer cooperation to stem the tide of this inflow of contraband?

[Mann] We have never been consulted regarding this matter. We are aware of our geopolitical situation, and since foreign relations fall within the purview of the Government of India, they will need to seek our cooperation. I can assure you, we will be willing to give a helping hand if our assistance is sought.

[THE STATESMAN] There appears to be some evidence that the Kashmiris might be drawn towards a federation with Pakistan. How do you view that?

[Mann] I have been in gaol for five years, and I cannot say what the mood of the Kashmiri people is. They are, however, also an independent vehicle. For instance, when there have been liberal rulers at the centre, like Ashoka and Akbar, then the federated units have been drawn towards the centre. On the other hand, with atrocious rulers, like Aurangzeb and the Congress regime of the latter years, the federated units have (had) a tendency to draw away from the Centre.

[THE STATESMAN] You are obviously a great admirer of Bhindranwale. Nor would your party criticize his involvement in the momentous events which led to the storming of the Golden Temple. the blame is laid fairly and squarely on Mrs Gandhi's shoulders. Do you really believe that he was an innocent tool of the Government or would you agree that his political ambitions led him to his inevitable end?

[Mann] I have no hesitation in saying that he was doing his religious duties by preserving the sanctity of the Golden Temple.

[THE STATESMAN] What about the arms found in the Golden Temple?

[Mann] Well, there may have been arms. In our historical tradition, it is quite clearly stated that we should resist any armed intervention in the holy precincts of the Golden Temple. In that he was merely doing his duty by his religion, and he did nothing short of that. He has been much maligned.

[THE STATESMAN] Who has maligned him? If by politicians with whom he was in contact, then do you accept that he may have been used by them?

[Mann] He was never a tool; he was too great to be a tool. He had great political wisdom and great religious wisdom. He was merely doing his historic duty in protecting the holy precincts of the Golden Temple.

[THE STATESMAN] Nothing can wipe out the fact that the Golden Temple was destroyed by armed forces. Would you, therefore, admit that, perhaps after all, Bhindranwale showed a singular lack of wisdom in his dealings with the government?

[Mann] I have given you a very clear idea that within the Constitution there were and are legal commitments to the Sikhs. Why were they not used? In fact, I can wager you a bet that even with these constitutional provisions, the Government of India will not talk with me.

[THE STATESMAN] You are not hopeful.

[Mann] The way we have been treated for the last 40 years, the promises given by Mahatma Gandhi, by Nehru, have not been fulfilled. I am, however, an optimist, and it is my hope that wisdom may yet prevail and that the new National Government may fulfil its part of the bargain.

[THE STATESMAN] In you, the young Sikhs and many others have reposed their hopes. If you are too pessimistic or non-cooperative, what of the future?

[Mann] Please let the government follow the Constitution. So far it has not fulfilled its legal obligations to the Sikhs for the past 40 years, and in that it is common sense that pessimism remains. I hope, nevertheless, to bring the Sikhs to the negotiating table.

[THE STATESMAN] You are yourself prepared to cooperate?

[Mann] Yes, absolutely I must and will show the world that Sikhs are capable of intellectual and political sense. That political reason is in us. But I am sitting on a time bomb and it rests with the Government to make a similar declaration of honest intent.

Refusal To Take Oath

46001209 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH
in English 28 Dec 89 p 1

[Article by Sunrita Sen: "Mann Refuses To Take Oath"]

[Text] Chandigarh, Dec 27—The Unified Akali Dal (Mann) president and MP [Member of Parliament] from

Tarn Taran, Mr Simranjit Singh Mann, today said he would not take oath until the Khalistan Liberation Organisation chief, Mr Atinder Pal Singh, was released from Tihar jail. He added that as president of the party, he would have to be allowed to carry his sword into Parliament as "it is a Constitutional right."

Mr Mann, who insists that any talks with the Centre should include the militants, said he had not met them yet as there was no point meeting them till he had some contact with the Centre. Asked why he had not approached the Centre yet, he said, "The minority should never go along with the majority but the majority must try to carry along the minority." He added that it was totally up to the Centre to take the initiative at the moment.

Asked why his group had not joined the all-party meeting in that case, Mr Mann said he had felt insulted at being given a post-dated invitation and he refused to sit with "butchers of our race, like Shri Buta." Asked whether Mr Buta Singh's excommunication had made a difference, he said, "That is why I called him Shri Buta, not Buta Singh."

Mr Mann feels that considering the massive mandate the people of Punjab gave his party, the Centre should have a one-to-one dialogue with it. He feared that given the present political pressure on the Prime Minister, Mr V.P. Singh, he would soon become "another Mr Gandhi."

Mr Mann said that under Mr Gandhi, Punjab had been reduced to a state of utter lawlessness. "He was like the Al Capone of Indian politics," he said of Mr Gandhi.

Mr Mann said those committed to the ideology of Khalistan could not and would not kill innocent people and reiterated that all the violence, including the bomb blasts on buses, was the doing of government agencies.

Mr Mann said the Centre should assure the militants of a security zone before asking them to come out into the open.

He said the Anandpur Sahib resolution was the creation of the young Sikh students and intellectuals who were in Oxford in the 1920s and returned to find that Sikhs were being denied their rights by the government.

Record Foodgrain Production Expected This Year *46001205 New Delhi PATRIOT* *in English 18 Jan 90 p 9*

[Text] A record foodgrain production of 174 million tonnes is expected to be achieved this year, Deputy Prime Minister and Union Agriculture Minister Devi Lal said on Wednesday.

Addressing a press conference, he said this would mark an increase of three million tonnes over last year's production.

Similarly, a record sugarcane production of 210 million tonnes was expected. The Ministry also expected a

massive cotton production of 10.2 million bales. Of these, one million bales would be allowed to be exported to enable farmers to get a good price, Mr Devi Lal said.

The Agriculture Minister claimed that general prices had come down as a result of higher production of oilseeds, potatoes and the like.

He disclosed that a comprehensive scheme on waiving of agricultural loans would be announced during the next Budget Session of Parliament. He told a questioner that unlike in the past when the total outlay of agriculture never exceeded 21 percent, it would now be 50 percent. The emphasis henceforth would be on maximum utilisation of allocated fund.

In view of the problems arising in respect of land reforms in the various states, it had been decided to make it a totally central subject.

In reply to a question, Mr Devi Lal said the Government was very much in favour of declaring agriculture as an industry as it would help the cause of the farmers. A committee was to be formed to examine the while issue. [as published] A final decision would however depend on the recommendation of the committee, which would be headed by former Minister Bhanu Pratap Singh.

The Agriculture Cost and Prices Commission had been revamped and now it was composed of only professionals. There will be no non-officials on it any more, the Minister said. It would be headed by Dr C. Hanumantha Rao.

Mr Devi Lal said the Government, during the last 40 days, had striven to fulfill the election pledges made by the National Front. Debt relief to small farmers and decentralisation of the planning process were being worked out by the Government, he added.

The Deputy Prime Minister said the remarkable increase in milk production and collection by cooperatives had resulted in an "almost glut situation," needing an expansion of the processing capacities. The National Dairy Development Board has been asked to improve the quality of milk (without raising its selling price) and make value added products like ice-cream and yoghurt.

He added that the increase in milk availability had enabled the Government to forego the Rs 36 crore worth of European Community milk powder aid this year. The amount in Euro dollars was sought to be utilised for improving capital goods for processing milk products, he said.

The Deputy Prime Minister announced that an investment of Rs 2,000 crore would be made in the fertiliser industry during the Eighth Plan. He said the investment to be made in public, private and cooperative sectors was intended to create an additional capacity.

During the Plan (1990-95), the major plants which are expected to be set up and commissioned are nitrogenous plants at Kakinada, Babrala, Gadepan and Shahjahanpur in the private sector and expansion of the existing capacity of Aonla plant in the cooperative sector, he said.

Besides, further new capacity would have to be created in the industry and for that public and cooperative sectors would continue to play an important role, he said.

Mr Devi Lal said there are also proposals to revamp and technologically upgrade many of the existing fertiliser plants to increase their capacity utilisation and make them more energy efficient.

To repeated queries whether there would be a review of the allotment of the Shahjampur plant to a private company instead of to a leading cooperative society, Kribhco, by the previous Government, the Deputy Prime Minister merely said that the Government would consider it.

Papers Continue To Report on Indo-Soviet Cooperation

Soviet Aid in Antarctic

46001204 Madras *THE HINDU*
in English 22 Jan 90 p 4

[Text] New Delhi, Jan. 21—With the Soviet Union coming forward to assist India in flying the bodies of our scientists of the Ninth Indian Antarctic Expedition, who died on January 8 under unusual circumstances, the Government will be bringing back the bodies soon. The tragedy is reported to have occurred at a field camp 100 km north of Maitri, the new Indian base situated 70 km away from the first Indian station, Dakshin Gangotri. The team was on a geological mapping project.

The cause of the deaths is believed to be poisoning by carbon monoxide being exhausted by a 4 kVa generator used for heating purposes. The incident is being probed by an inquiry committee constituted by the Government. It is speculated that either the generator had been switched off after running it for a while or it had malfunctioned and had stopped running while the four were asleep. The carbon monoxide exhaust must have hung in the air at low levels due to the prevalent cold conditions.

The Madhya Pradesh High Court yesterday directed that the body of Virendra Kumar Shrivastava shall not be cremated or otherwise disposed of and that his belongings shall be preserved until further orders. The court had responded to a petition moved by the father of the deceased, Mr. Rajendra Kumar Shrivastava. The bodies are being maintained in refrigerated containers of the Swedish ship Thuleland, which has been contracted for the Indian expedition and is stationed near Dakshin Gangotri. The Indian expedition is scheduled to return on March 29.

The Soviet Union is one of the few countries who operate an air base in the icy continent. Realising the logistical difficulties of transporting the bodies by ship the Union Government had been in negotiation with other countries to seek their help in this task. From the

Soviet Union's point of view, while in principle they were inclined to extend this help when contacted, necessary environmental assessments had to be made before making a commitment. Preparation of the air strip itself takes about 10 to 15 days.

The Department of Ocean Development (DOD) had been in touch with the Soviets immediately after the incident. The bodies will be airlifted by a smaller Soviet aircraft IL 14 from Novolazarevskaya, the Soviet station nearest to and east of Dakshin Gangotri, to the larger Soviet base, Molodezhnaya, 1,000 km further to the east. From there, an IL 76 will fly the bodies back to India. The bodies are expected to arrive by February end. According to the DOD, efforts are afoot to persuade the Soviets to fly directly to New Delhi instead of flying via Moscow.

The DOD press note issued today also mentioned that Lt. Attar Singh, who had suffered a mild heart attack there, will be flown back along with the bodies. Lt. Singh is, however, reported to be mobile and well now. The release also stated that Dr. Shikar Jain of the National Geophysical Research Institute (NGRI), a member of the Indian expedition to Weddel Sea in Antarctica who suffered from duodenal ulcer, is out of danger.

Cooperation in Chemicals

46001204 Madras *THE HINDU*
in English 20 Jan 90 p 6

[Text] New Delhi, Jan. 19—India and the Soviet Union have signed a memorandum of understanding and set up a joint working group to organise contacts and exchanges between the two countries in the field of chemicals and allied products, and also to assist in technology transfers and set up joint ventures.

The signing of the memorandum of understanding followed a seminar on Indo-Soviet cooperation in the fields of chemicals, pesticides and petrochemicals held here under the auspices of the India-USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Papers on dye-stuffs, fibres and pesticides were read at the seminar.

The Soviet side indicated its capability to provide technology for the disposal of toxic, solid and liquid effluents and for recycling waste water from chemical plants. It also evinced interest in importing polyester staple fibre and polypropylene yarn from India.

Both the Indian and the Soviet sides established one-to-one contacts and stressed the existence of a special relationship between the two countries, and the relevance of this relationship even in the changing context of developments in East European nations.

The memorandum was signed by Mr. M. S. Gill, Secretary, Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals, and Mr. A. S. Chegolya, Deputy Minister in the USSR Ministry of Chemicals and Oil Processing.

Railway Cooperation

46001204 New Delhi PATRIOT
in English 20 Dec 89 p 9

[Text] India and the Soviet Union on Tuesday signed a protocol for further cooperation in the railway sector, report agencies.

The protocol was signed by the Member (Engineering) of the Railway Board, Sreedharan on behalf of India and Mr V. N. Butko, Deputy Minister for Railways of the USSR after the end of the second six-day meeting of the Indo-Soviet Joint Working Group on the railways.

The protocol also recorded the progress made in the field of collaboration in railway research and railway sports between the two countries.

Analysis Views, Questions South's Support for Congress

90010154A New Delhi DINMAN TIMES
in Hindi 10-16 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by K.R. Sundarajan: "Is the South Not in the Political Mainstream?"]

[Text] The average Indian is shocked by the fact that the wave of opposition to Congress (I) never even touched the South. Pundits in the opposition are asking "Why couldn't the South stay in step with the rest of the country?" The Congress (I) camp is, of course, disappointed, but is consoled by South India which, according to a Congressite, has shown wisdom and patriotism. It is true that Indian politics is very complex and it is impossible to describe it in a consistent manner. Analysis of South India's voting pattern, however, would require profound political understanding.

It is not very difficult to understand why the voters in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Kerala favored Congress (I). The way Ramarao had risen called for a fall. He is very similar to Rajiv Gandhi in many aspects. He made decisions at will and was cynical. We can grant that his state government was a bit less corrupt than Rajiv Gandhi's central government. The euphoria of the 1984 election victory made Rajiv Gandhi break all traditions, and pushed Ramarao further into becoming more self-centered and important. Ramarao had emerged as a leader with his promise to restore the Telugu pride hurt by the Congress (I). He lost all popular support just like Rajiv Gandhi.

The Janata party would have fared much better if it did not suffer from internal strife. It was mainly hurt by its own people. In Kerala, disenchantment with the Marxist government and slick use of the factionalism issues made the Congress (I) the victor. Church and temple organizations contributed heavily to the Congress (I) victory. According to Marxist leader Hakishan Singh Surjit, BJP's [Bharatiya Janata Party] indirect support was decisive in the Congress (I) victory and the Communist

defeat in Kerala. Mr. Surjit means that the BJP weakened the Marxist party's stronghold.

Why did the DMK [Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam] party deteriorate in Tamilnadu, despite its good administrative record during its short tenure there? The main reason for this fall was the reincarnation of MGR's [M.G. Ramachandran?] ghost. The truth is that MGR is still a strong force even after his death. It is surprising how MGR is still so popular, in spite of his leading such a bad government for so long. He was in a coma for almost three years and still managed to keep his hold on the Tamilnadu people. Karunanidhi would never have won, even when MGR was in a coma.

Jayalalitha, who is a controversial politician, is considered the political heiress to MGR. MGR's post mortem influence on the Tamil mentality is really scary. Ramarao's myth was destroyed in Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka has also shown its sagacity. Kerala does not fall prey to anyone's charisma as the people there are more interested in intelligence. It is often said that if three people in Kerala are discussing politics, they will have six opinions. Anyhow, the Tamils are still lost in their dream world.

The recent Lok Sabha elections were not only the dirtiest and most violent, but also the costliest. THE STATESMAN had estimated that these elections would cost about 20 billion rupees in official and unofficial expenses. This does not include the payroll and expenses of the law enforcement agencies. Quoting sources from the Finance Ministry, the newspaper had said that the Congress party was going to spend 15 billion rupees and the opposition parties another 20 billion rupees. All this sounds unbelievable, however THE STATESMAN did not invent these figures.

According to this report, removing the ban on the business organizations to donate money for elections opened the huge door of the rich families. Business and industry leaders opened their purses to the Congress (I) and the opposition parties. A representative of one of the great industrial families was quoted as saying that it was not possible to keep away from either the Congress (I) or the opposition parties. No one knew who was going to form the government and did not want to be accused of not helping.

Sources within the Ministry of Industry and Company Affairs told THE STATESMAN that proposals from about 200 foreign collaboration companies were approved. One percent of the 130 billion (about 1.3 billion) rupees involved in these proposals was donated to the ruling party. In addition to this, about 20 licenses for industrial production were awarded. A cabinet subcommittee ignored the opposition of the directorate General of Technical Development. It is important to know that the chairman of this cabinet subcommittee was Rajiv Gandhi and the two industrialist families most favored were the Singhanias and the Reliance.

Another amazing fact is that the election expenses of all political parties during the recent elections were almost one-third of our defense budget!

All these facts mock the announcements made by the election commission that election expenses were to be limited. Democracy also appears to be just a facade here. Lok Sabha members admit, in private conversations, that each political party spent between 2.5 to 4 million rupees on each individual election race. One Lok Sabha member made a merciless statement. He said that millions of people made money by hanging posters and raising slogans. We can sum it up by saying that the representatives of the people tried their best to "help" the people.

Editorial Discusses 'Right to Work' vs. Reservation

90OI0154C Bombay NAVBHARAT TIMES
in Hindi 27 Dec 89 p 4

[Editorial: "Right to Work or Reservation?"]

[Text] The middle castes are demanding reservation of employment quotas in the name of social equality; however, our experience tells us that they do not want to give equal opportunity to the Harijans in the villages. The high caste Hindus have relaxed their demands to maintain the caste system, but the middle castes are increasing their demands in this area.

Then there is another strange phenomenon. The Janata government had promised to include the right to work in the Constitution. Why do we need reservation if everyone has the right to work? What will the government do with the job applications it receives if everyone is guaranteed employment? Fifty percent of the government jobs will be given away to the scheduled castes and the remaining 50 percent will be given to qualified people through competition. Then what? The central commission has still suggested some required reservations. All farm and labor jobs depend on the reservation policy. Yes, they could start a development army to help with roads, dams, canals, lakes, 100-percent literacy goals, and development of women's rights. However, this would require radical measures and a casteless society like in China. High and middle castes, low castes, and tribes have not given the message to form such an India to the Janata government.

Actually, the paper guarantee to the right to work will only increase the frustrations of those who do not have any reservation quotas. The government had no responsibility for qualified high caste persons now, however, they are free to try their luck in the open job market. What will happen to them when jobs are promised to everyone?

The rationale given by the commission is based on the situation in states like Bihar, where high caste officials give jobs to their own people without considering their

qualifications. The question of quotas arises when individual bias is involved. The right to higher positions cannot be left to the high caste people. We should take steps to stop the situation in Bihar and not spread "Biharism" all over India!

Commentary Says Caste Issues Can Topple New Government

90OI0154B Bombay NAVBHARAT TIMES
in Hindi 27 Dec 89 p 4

[Editorial: "Caste Friction Can Drown New Government"]

[Text] The anti-reservation campaign is gaining momentum and is becoming more violent. No government winning the elections, thanks to Rajiv Gandhi's involvement in the Bofors scandal, had imagined such a violent movement. Reservation was not even an issue before the elections. When the Uttar Pradesh Janata government had to face this anti-reservation campaign as soon as it took the oath, it believed that the Congress party was behind it. However, the spread of this movement into Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and even in Andhra Pradesh indicates that this issue has left party politics and has gone into the people's arena. This is not a regional issue either. All of this has made the silence of the V.P. Singh government appear bizarre.

The only reason for the silence of the central government could be that the Janata party is not able to decide how to satisfy the demonstrating students, without making the scheduled castes angry. There is no doubt that the disenchantment with the Congress party contributed to the opposition's victory. However, the 41-percent vote that the Congress got clearly indicates that the role of low caste and Rajput votes was decisive in the Janata Dal victory. The anger of the present campaign is directed more against the backward castes than the scheduled castes. The quotas reserved for these castes, as the result of a central government commission recommendation, reduce employment opportunities for the high caste people. This will push the country into a caste war.

The Congress government could not implement the commission's recommendation even though it did try. The recommendation called for the reservation of 27 percent of the jobs for the backward castes. The commission's recommendation would have been even higher if the the Supreme Court had not decided that the total reservation must not exceed 50 percent. The scheduled castes and tribes already have 15 and seven and one-half percent of the jobs reserved for them. Therefore, the commission could not reserve more than 27 percent of the jobs for the backward castes and tribes that make up only 52 percent of the total population.

The anti-reservation campaign started in the country before the Janata Dal government had the opportunity to announce its intention to accept the commission recommendation through a presidential speech. Why did this happen? The castes who have no jobs reserved for

them knew that the new government was dependent on the equality of castes, which would mean even further reduction in employment opportunities for them. A similar situation emerged when the Janata government was formed in 1977. The caste-related feelings are stronger this time.

We should forget the fallacy that a handful of high-caste students are behind this campaign. They are, of course, involved. When 50 percent of the jobs are reserved for the scheduled castes and tribes, in addition to the high caste people, there are religious minorities that make up 17 percent of our population and are economically deprived. Devilal's angle about economic backwardness is a ruse. He is trying to protect only the backward castes that helped him move from Chandigarh to the deputy prime ministership in New Delhi.

All in all, this campaign was born out of the fear that the government in Delhi is supportive of the low castes and wanted to be recognized by the scheduled castes with their quotas. Prime Minister V.P. Singh must remove this belief and it is not an easy task. He had encouraged this doubt by mentioning Mr. Lohia repeatedly. Calling this campaign the result of a misunderstanding and that the question is related to Vidhan Sabha seats is childish and erroneous. The students who are raising their fists all over the country know well that the reservation of jobs is permanent and it does not need any addition. They are not opposed to reservation for the Harijans. They are attacking the proposal of the central government commission. The campaign is so strong now that it might divide the population when these proposals are implemented. What else could happen if we look at the whole country from the view point of religious groups and backward castes? Reservation of jobs for the backward is basically against the philosophy of social idealism, under which the decision was made to reserve jobs for the scheduled castes. If we add more quotas, they will never be removed and the country, from an employment perspective, will be divided in various caste regions.

IRAN

Minister Announces Building of Six New Airports

90OI0192E Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 17 Feb 90 p 2

[Text] Urumiyeh—KEYHAN correspondent—Sardasht is connected to Mehabad, Piranshahr, and Baneh via a 360-kilometer road, and likewise airports are to be built in six cities.

This was announced by Sa'idi-Kya, minister of roads and transport, during a visit of road construction projects by the Qods General Engineering and Combat Office in West Azarbaijan.

The minister of roads and transport discussed the continuation of the Martyr Kalantari Highway Construction Project over Lake Urumiyeh. He said: The continuation of these projects will be carried out under that five-year

plan. He added that for the construction of a bridge along the course of this highway a contract with a consulting engineer has been signed for a bridge research project.

He then added that airports are to be built in the cities of Zanjan, Arak, Ilam, Tabas, Yasuj, and Saravan and that under the five-year plan the Ardebil and Urumiyeh airports are to be renovated and improved.

As future plans for the West Azarbaijan Office of Roads and Transport, the minister of roads and transport mentioned the completion of the second section of the Urumiyeh road to Sarv, and as projects currently underway he mentioned 400 kilometers of main and secondary roads, 200 kilometers of rural roads, and 250 kilometers of border roads.

In the last 10 years, 170 kilometers of inter-city roads, 1,800 kilometers of rural roads, and 1,000 kilometers of road improvements have been made in the Province of West Azarbaijan.

Education Minister: New Tax System Needed To Ease Obligation

90OI0192C London KEYHAN in Persian 1 Mar 90 p 4

[Text] In order to meet some of its financial needs, the Islamic regime's Ministry of Education and Training is seeking to collect tuition from elementary and secondary school students. Recently the Islamic Republic of Iran's minister of education and training announced that the doubling of the Ministry of Education and Training's development budget in the coming years will not solve this ministry's problems, and that some costs must be recovered through taxes and the collection of tuition from those able to pay.

The regime's minister of education and training, who had gone to Bushehr to inspect its educational facilities, told correspondents: Concerning the shortage of classroom space in the years 1361-1366 [21 March 1982-20 March 1988] it must be admitted that the matter of building classroom space has been neglected.

This official added: Our development budget will be doubled in the year 1369 [21 March 1990-20 March 1991], but even with this we will still have problems.

Elsewhere in his talk, the minister of education and training announced: Our basic responsibility is that we find the basic solution to the problems of education and training, and in my view we must recover some costs through taxes and the collection of tuition from those able to pay, because it is impossible to rely on the government's financial resources.

Reports from the Islamic Republic of Iran state that most elementary and secondary schools have been collecting tuition and other funds from the parents of students for some time. The collection of tuition from the parents of students is so pervasive that it has given rise to numerous complaints from the people to officials.

Educational observers consider the statements by the minister of education and training on his recent trip to Bushehr as an indication of elements of new policies to generalize the collection of tuition from students, and they expect that soon the subject of collecting tuition will be officially at the top of the Ministry of Education and Training's program for financial procurement.

Expansion of Bakhtaran Industries Planned

Two Industrial Areas To Be Built

90OI0120A Tehran ETTELA'AT
in Persian 11 Dec 89 p 4

[Text] Bakhtaran—In view of the policy of encouraging the owners of industries and projects to maximize the utilization of the existing domestic machinery and capabilities, the Ministry of Industries has made appropriate provisions in the Five-Year Plan to meet the foreign exchange needs for the procurement of the machinery and equipment from abroad so that the needs of the productive and industrial units can be secured.

According to IRNA [Islamic Republic News Agency], Mr. Ne'matzadeh, the minister of industries, stated the above yesterday at a press conference in Bakhtaran and added: The central objective of the government's five-year plan is the expansion of production, and the first stage in this process is to increase the production of the existing units and execute new projects aimed at self-sufficiency of the country.

In relation to the provision of employment for the combatants and families of martyrs, the minister of industries pointed out: A special project for investment in the productive sectors has been instituted outside the regular norms of the Ministry of Industries to provide jobs for combatants and the honorable families of martyrs.

During the same conversation, the minister of industries referred to the expansion of industrial and productive units in Bakhtaran and said: Bakhtaran enjoys a highly attractive position for industries due to its environmental conditions and infrastructure facilities, and two new industrial areas will be established in the vicinity of Bakhtaran as part of the program to develop and expand the productive and industrial units.

Minister Visits Industrial Units

90OI0120B Tehran ETTELA'AT
in Persian 11 Dec 89 p 4

[Text] Bakhtaran—ETTELA'AT reporter: Engineer Ne'matzadeh, minister of industries, and the deputies of the ministry together with Mr. Arsalan Safa'i, the representative of the people of Bakhtaran in the Islamic Consultative Majles, arrived in Bakhtaran and were received at the airport by Mr. Neku'i, the governor of Bakhtaran, and the general managers along with some of the authorities from factories in that province.

Upon his arrival in Bakhtaran, the minister of industries met with the Friday prayer leader of that city.

Mr. Ne'matzadeh also visited some of the industrial-production units including Biston sugar factory, Gharb textiles, and Biston glazed tile factory. He also broke ground for the establishment of a textile factory in Karp-Naz. This factory will be built between Harasin and Bakhtaran.

Tire Factory Construction Begun

90OI0120C Tehran ETTELA'AT
in Persian 11 Dec 89 p 2

[Text] Bakhtaran—ETTELA'AT reporter: Engineer Ne'matzadeh visited three of the production factories in the industrial city of Bakhtaran.

The Islamic Consultative Majles representative of the people in this area and the deputies of the Ministry of Industry were in the company of the minister on his visit to Gharb Tire factory, producer of small tires, and the Zagros can factory as well as the oxygen gas production factory of Bakhtaran Province. The same report indicates that engineer Ne'matzadeh also broke ground during an official ceremony for the establishment of the Bakhtar Tire factory in the Mahi-Dasht region.

This factory will be established in a six-hectare area at the cost of almost 14 billion rials and will produce 25,500 tons of a variety of tires for automobiles and trucks.

It should be mentioned that the authorization for the establishment of this factory had been issued in the year 1367 [21 March 1988-20 March 1989].

The same report indicates that the minister of industries proceeded to Ilam at the end of his visit to Bakhtaran Province.

Grant Set up for Assisting Researchers, Inventors

90OI0192G Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 18 Feb 90 p 3

[Text] Economic Service—A fund was opened to give financial support to researchers, innovators, inventors, and explorers yesterday afternoon (Saturday) during ceremonies addressed by the minister of heavy industries and the director general of the Central Bank.

During these ceremonies, held at the bank training center, Dr. Nezhad Hoseynian, minister of heavy industries, stressed the importance of alleviating the problems of the nation's researchers. He said: The growth of technology, and along with that the growth of industry, depends on scientific research.

He then cited the four factors of machinery, obtaining information, organization and management, and skill as the main factors for industrial advancement and growth. He said: The basic problem with industry in Iran has nothing to do with machinery, and we are chiefly faced with problems in the other three factors, information and scientific knowledge, organization and management,

as well as skills, and we must work to overcome these problems. The nation needs aware and educated manpower, and in the nation's reconstruction priority must be given to education and research. He regarded the fund to give financial support to research as a factor that can be effective in providing manpower.

Dr. Mohammad Hoseyn 'Adeli, director general of the Central Bank, in his talk also mentioned the importance of the role of research in advancing the goals of economic expansion. He said: The defect in our economy is production, and to overcome our failure to expand we must expand production, and increased production apart from machinery needs constructive thinking and initiative.

The director general of the Central Bank noted that the management of society must aid constructive thinking and initiative in whatever way possible.

He regarded the fund to give financial support to research as a step in this direction. He said: The five-year plan gives special importance to education and the utilization of innovation.

Dr. 'Adeli stressed that this fund aims to help the nation's researchers by providing financial resources, and to take steps toward the utilization of innovation to promote prosperity.

He added: The work of this fund must not become a bureaucratic game. The banking system and the banks must help this fund so it will be able to take steps to improve research conditions for intellectuals and scholars.

The ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY reports that the purpose of forming this fund is given in the appropriate charter as providing financial help to researchers, innovators, inventors, and explorers for the purpose of achieving the nation's economic self-sufficiency and independence and to release the nation from dependence. Applicants who are inventors or innovators wishing to utilize this fund's financial facilities must submit a completed letter of inquiry applying for financial aid from the fund to this fund through the Iran Scientific and Industrial Projects Organization. Research centers wishing to utilize these funds may also contact the fund directly or one of the industrial ministries.

The fund's address is Pasdaran Street, Zarabkhaneh Station, Postal Code 205.

Aviation Official on Plans for Expansion of Flights

90010192F Tehran KEYHAN
in Persian 18 Feb 90 p 14

[Text] Shiraz—KEYHAN correspondent: Under the five-year plan, the capacity to transport air passengers will increase 75 percent.

This was announced to a gathering of news correspondents by Engineer Shafte, chairman of the Board of Directors and acting director of the Islamic Republic of Iran Airlines, who had gone to Shiraz at the head of a

delegation to study airline resources and inspect airline offices. Mentioning the lack of sufficient resources to expand flights, he said:

Unfortunately, since 1361 [21 March 1982-20 March 1983] not only have there been no increases in resources, equipment, and personnel, but we have lost six aircraft, four of which were stolen by Iraqi elements, one of which was damaged by rocket fire at the Shiraz airport, the other shot down by the Americans in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, since demand exceeds supply, we are faced with many difficulties. He added: The necessary provisions have been made in the nation's five-year plan for the purchase of aircraft and the expansion of air transport. God willing, with the support of the government, measures will be taken in this area, and the air transport of passengers will increase from five million per year to 8.8 million, which will actually be a 75 percent increase. He added: As of 22 Sha'ban, 22 Esfand [13 February] the birth of His Holiness Mehdi (May God Hasten His Joyful Advent), direct flights will begin between Iran and Malaysia, and we will have two 747 flights weekly to Kuala Lumpur, and this will have a good effect on the establishment of relations with the Islamic nation of Malaysia. With regard to the expansion of flights to Syria and the creation of direct air links between the centers of the large provinces such as Fars Province, this matter is being studied by the Pilgrimage Affairs, Religious Endowments and Air Transportation Organization, and when the results become clear they will be announced.

He added: Under the future plan flights will be made to Muscat, the capital of Oman, but this matter has not yet been finalized, and flights to the Eastern European nations are being studied.

He added: In the summer we will expand both domestic and foreign flights, and arrangements have also been made so that if a passenger does not claim his seat at the airport, another passenger may use it and there will be no empty flights. With regard to strengthening travel agencies, he said: We will support travel agencies who aim to serve, therefore a number of them in Tehran have been equipped with computers, and measures will also be taken concerning the rest. We will also increase their commissions from three to five percent. This is an incentive for them to sell more tickets for domestic flights. God willing, we will also get to the agencies in the municipalities, and clearly Shiraz, with nine travel agencies, has priority.

According to the same report, the acting director of the Islamic Republic of Iran Airlines also met with the governor-general of Fars.

During this meeting, emphasis was given to the need to establish flights from Shiraz to Sharjah and to schedule more flights between Shiraz and Bushehr, and Shiraz and Hormozegan, as well as the need to establish an air link between Shiraz and Kerman.

Likewise, during this meeting discussions were held and decisions were made concerning non-petroleum exports

and the problems the merchants of Fars have moving freight to the Persian Gulf nations.

Non-Oil Export Value Reaches 814 Million Dollars

90OI0192D Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 17 Feb 90 p 3

[Text] Economic Service—1.075 million tons of non-petroleum goods valued at 57,005 million rials, or \$814 million, were exported in the first nine months of the current year [21 March 1989-21 December 1989], representing increases of 25.5 and 36.3 percent by weight and value respectively.

In announcing this, the Iranian Customs has predicted that with future exemptions for currency contracts for the two groups of exported handicrafts and mined ores, there will be increases in the exports of these two items and ultimately in all export items.

At the same time, hand-woven wool carpets, pistachios, pistachio meats, and various hides remain the nation's chief non-petroleum export items, so that they constitute 62.3 percent of the total value of non-petroleum export goods.

Among the major export items, hand-woven carpets alone accounted for 31.9 percent of the total value of non-petroleum export goods, which was an increase of 25.8 and 20.4 percent by weight and value respectively over the same period last year.

Exports of pistachios and pistachio meats weighing 42,076 tons and valued at 12,107 million rials ranked second place among non-petroleum export goods, accounting for 21.2 percent of the total value and showing an increase over the same period last year.

The third item on the list of non-petroleum export goods is assorted hides, accounting for about 9.2 percent of the total value, and showing increases of 45.7 percent and 55 percent by weight and value respectively over the same period last year.

It is worth mentioning that the most active customs ports for export goods in terms of value were at Mehrabad, South Tehran, and Kerman, with 71 percent of the total value of non-petroleum export goods passing through these three ports during the period studied. However about 73 percent of the weight of all non-petroleum export goods passed through the two ports of Bandar 'Abbas and Bandar Emam Khomeyni, due to the export of heavy export items such as sulphur, cast iron, copper, rock, and construction materials.

PAKISTAN

Media: Government Accused of Manipulation, 'Cultural Pollution'

90OI0148A Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 9 Jan 90 p 3

[Editorial]

[Text] The abuse of the official media, especially radio and television, after the PPP [Pakistan People's Party]

government came into power, the likes of which had not been seen during any of the previous regimes in Pakistan, is that from the very first day they claimed that the government accorded full freedom to the official media, and now the radio and television will broadcast news of the opposition. The people began to welcome this move in the beginning, but soon it was realized that though the opposition was being mentioned, it was by no means a good harbinger. It was not dependent on it. But the government, claiming to be the standard-bearer of the federation, is openly following a policy of discrimination against its provinces. Since the government in the Punjab does not belong to the PPP and, incidentally, the chief minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif, is also the leader of the biggest alliance in the country—the Islamic Democratic Alliance [IJI—Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad], therefore if someone is pricked with a needle, it is shown as if he is attacked with a lance. Whereas in the provinces belonging to the PPP, it is the other way round. An example in point is a case of dacoity of one lakh [100,000] rupees in the Sargodha city of Punjab. Not only was this news reported in detail on the national news program, but an interview with the affected people was also published. The same day, as well as a few days earlier or later, dacoities involving lakhs of rupees took place in the Karachi city of Sindh, but no mention whatsoever was made of this incident. This is not one isolated incident. Despite the fact that the central government overlooks the situation, everyone knows full well that the law and order situation is worse than ever before and is causing great concern. Because the PPP is in power here, the PPP views everything here to be in order. But the truth is that, before coming into power, this very party agitated against the situation there. Here in this province, in addition to dacoity and murder, people are being kidnapped like sheep and goats, but the television does not speak of these incidents. Before this, with reference to the FIA's [Federal Investigation Agency] director general, we had stated that although the conditions of the police stations throughout the country are the same, the PPP only complains about the stations in the Punjab. In an unrelated manner, they gave a lengthy speech on television about the Punjab police station. Had they spoken about the conditions in police stations all over the country, there would have been no cause for complaint. In this way, during the no-confidence motion, the radio and television were used to abuse the opposition. Before this, the opposition's name was not even mentioned on the radio and television. But now, no one except the PPP and its people seem to be worthy of praise. So much so that even Maulana Ehtiramul Haq's statements are broadcast in full, only if they are in their favor.

This is only one aspect of the performances and limitations of television. The second aspect is much more frightful. There was a deliberate and well organized plan to turn Muslims away from their religious values to obscenity and nudity. During the martial law period, we had stated that the military government had tried to cover the dirt and filth temporarily, but had made no

attempt to clean up. Now, the whole nation has to pay for this carelessness and shortcoming. With the lid off, the dirt has started to spill all around. The Koran warns in no uncertain terms that the people who spread obscenity and immodesty among the faithful deserve dreadful punishment in this world as well as in the world to come (Chapter Al-Nur: 19). To the governments and the people loyal to those governments, who buy for themselves the dreadful punishment, there is nothing we can say. But we are afraid lest the whole nation may not have to suffer for their sins. There is no doubt that Pakistani television fully conforms to the sayings of the Hadith and Sura [chapters in the Koran]. Luqman states that "Among the people there are some who buy the tablet of Hadith [enchanted words] which leads the people astray from the road of God without knowledge and makes fun of the invitation to this road. For such people there is a debasing punishment." These verses descended when the unbelievers of Mecca, in order to make the teachings of the Holy Koran inefficacious, brought musicians and singer girls and story tellers from Rome and Iran. They tried to lead the people astray by showing their performances. Isn't Pakistani television doing just this today.

If steps are not taken to stop this evil immediately, then the whole society will be contaminated and, with the slightest jolt, the whole building will come down like a bunch of playing cards. The COP [Combined Opposition Party] has decided to voice its timely protest against the performance of Pakistani television. In this connection, there will be a demonstration in front of the television headquarters in Islamabad this evening. Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the leader of the COP, in a statement after a meeting said that the opposition is using its democratic right to protest against the wrongdoings of the government, which is continuously trying to blemish the opposition in the eyes of the people. The fact is that Pakistani television and its organizers are engaged in abusing the opposition at the instigation of the government. It is regrettable that the official media is being misused by the government. As Mr. Jatoi stated, it is the democratic right of the opposition to protest. But we hope that on this occasion the central government, as usual, does not act unwisely because, if it does, dangerous conflict will be unavoidable.

Commentary Criticizes Dependence on Loans

90OI0148B Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 10 Jan 90 p 3

[Editorial]

[Text] Ghulam Mohammed Ishaq Khan, the president of Pakistan, has rightly said that we have mastered the art of obtaining loans, and we have been living on these loans for a long time. The president, while speaking to a group of national and international economic experts, on Monday advised that in order to save the balance of payments from disaster, dependence on foreign loans should be reduced. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who is himself an economic expert and has for a long time been minister of treasury, is now head of the state and, as such, is in the best position to know about the economic situation of the country. The situation is such that the whole country is groaning under the heavy burden of 6.4 billion rupees. Internal loans have reached five times the 1980-81 level. No one thinks of how the loans will be paid back. The coming generations too have been kept as pawns under foreigners. These creditors are no well-wishers. It does not require much thinking to come to the conclusion that creditors always think of their own. Along with loans, the loan receiving country is burdened with a lot of other things and they are involved in unending difficulties. To enter into agreements to pay the loans, one has to take further loans. A major part of these loans is spent on experts who accompany as necessary components of the loans. Up till now, we have not succeeded in establishing a strong financial system in the country. The governments are concerned only with their own extravagances. The present government, despite being elected by the people, is the most extravagant of all the others, and has proved to be most unmindful of the economic situation prevailing in the country. Under these frightful conditions, two steps need to be taken immediately. First, the government and the people should strictly adopt a simple way of life and second, Islamic economic system should be imposed in the country. In his speech, the president himself stressed looking for solutions to the many ills facing this country in the Islamic economic structure. This is a constitutional responsibility. It has been proved (beyond doubt) that the capitalist and communist systems of economy have both failed. This leaves only the Islamic economic system as the only alternative, and which has proved its truth. It is necessary that this alternate system be implemented in full sincerity and truthfulness.

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