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SOVIET UNION MILITARY AFFAIRS

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

COL GEN VOLKOGONOV ON IDEOLOGICAL UPBRINGING OF TROOPS

Moscow POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE in Russian No 2, 1987 (signed to press 15 Jan 87) pp 53-61

[Article by Col Gen Volkogonov, deputy chief of Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The Upbringing of the Fatherland's Defender"]

[Text] Wars always were the companion of exploiter societies. Since 1945 alone, imperialism has unleashed about 100 wars and conflicts, large and small, which brought tremendous suffering to many peoples. But the scales of damage of all the battles of the past fade before the consequences of thermonuclear war which is hanging over the world and which places the very existence of civilization under threat. The source of this danger is imperialism and militaristic forces, the center of which is located in Washington.

The new political thinking which is spreading more and more widely in the world is bringing sensible state figures and all people of good will to the unalterable conclusion: in the contemporary era there can be no resolution of political contradictions with the use of nuclear weapons. Either the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems or the destruction of life on the planet --no other choice is given. However, for the present this new thinking has not become predominant. The chief restraining factors of nuclear war today are the political will of socialism, its economic might, and its ability to maintain military-strategic parity, the creation of which was evaluated by the 27th CPSU Congress as our historic achievement. The realization of these factors depends in considerable measure on the ideological work of the CPSU in society and the Soviet Armed Forces.

The Components of Combat Potential

The armed forces, having been a weapon of coercion and war for the duration of the entire history of class societies, have been transformed under conditions of socialism into a factor for the peace and security of peoples. They can accomplish this fundamentally new role which they have only with the presence of a powerful combat potential. Therefore, in the new wording of its program, the party stressed that "in the future, too, it will inalterably be concerned that the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces are a firm alloy of military skill and the high-level technical equipping, ideological steadfastness, organization, and discipline of the personnel and their loyalty to their patriotic and international duty" ("Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Materials of the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Moscow, Politizdat, 1986, p 161).

As we see, combat potential is the synthesis of material and spiritual as well as military-technical and ideological elements. Hence, the tremendous role of ideological-educational work which the party is conducting in the Armed Forces also becomes obvious.

The process of molding the fatherland's armed defender proceeds under the influence of society's entire social medium, its way of life, and system of education and upbringing which is now undergoing radical changes. The process of renewal, which was begun after the April (1985) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and consolidated and developed by the 27th Party Congress, signifies important revolutionary shifts not only in the socio-economic, cultural, scientific, and technical spheres, but also in the sphere of social consciousness. The rise in activity and civil responsibility and the broad scope of the masses' historic creativity characterize in ever greater measure the spiritual atmosphere of our society. All this also affects the army beneficially.

The development of the serviceman is also influenced by the special features of army and navy reality, living conditions, and military service which are inherent in socialist Armed Forces. In the postwar decades the training and upbringing, living conditions, and the entire internal tenor of army and navy service underwent important changes under the influence of the military-technical revolution. The troops and the fleet are in a state of constant combat readiness under the conditions of the present international situation. Now and for days to come. Today and always. The time factor has acquired a fate-bearing role. For even 100 steps in the correct direction may be completely cheapened by one in the wrong direction. It is a reality of tremendous social significance which imposes an indelible impression on all of army life and on its spiritual atmosphere.

The maintenance of high combat readiness has especially important significance now, when the imperialist circles are again trying to achieve decisive military superiority. They are planning an arms race in space in order to destroy the present balance in strategic forces. The tremendous political and historic responsibility which falls on the Soviet servicemen to ensure the security of the socialist fatherland furthers the development of their ideological maturity, moral conviction, and high civic responsibility.

The main path for the spiritual and moral development of the servicemen lies in the channel of the organic combination of political training with military labor in which a high degree of regulation of actions, great stress, and the ability constantly to subordinate their personal efforts to the common goal and previously assigned mission are inherent. Social significance is had by the very content of soldierly labor: the mastery of a military specialty, accomplishment of a combat exercise, and the maintenance of equipment in a state of combat readiness. At the same time such labor itself is the source of many spiritual and moral values: persistence, industriousness, endurance, initiative, self-discipline, and so forth. It instills in the troops mutual assistance, collectivism, and responsibility and molds combat friendship, courage, and selflessness.

Combat exercises, naval cruises, flights under difficult conditions, forced marches, and missile launches are a good school for the molding of lofty

qualities. Field lessons permit the accomplishment of a dual task: on the one hand, to develop and strengthen needed moral and combat qualities, and on the other--to disclose and overcome specific moral weaknesses in individual servicemen--timidity, irresolution, lack of self-control, and so forth. Lessons in the field, on the tank driving grounds, on the range, and at sea are correctly called the "soldiers'" and "seamen's" university.

A substantial influence on the serviceman's personality is exerted by routine army life itself with the strict order, rhythms, tempos, and clear regulation of activity which are inherent in it and with the special methods for the functioning of combat systems. Long and superlong flights of missile carriers and, for submariners--a long stay beneath the water (or ice) in the ocean's expanses have become ordinary. Missile garrisons have arisen with a specific tenor of life, living conditions, and traditions. All this exerts a constant positive influence on the development of the serviceman's political, moral, and physical qualities.

In the consciousness of the young person called up to the Armed Forces, military labor is connected by close ties of continuity with the glory and immortal exploits of heroes which were performed in battles against the enemies of our motherland. The soldiers of the 1980's are striving to imitate these heroes with their daily activity. In the majority of cases, the service of the soldier and seaman begins namely with a visit to the rooms of combat glory, museums, and memorials which tell of the glorious past of the Armed Forces and their own unit or ship. Our revolutionary and combat traditions are a stainless weapon. Association with them leaves a profound trace in the consciousness of a young person who has put on the military uniform and stimulates him to be a worthy heir and continuer of his father's and grandfather's combat glory.

These as well as several other factors which mold the serviceman's personality are considered in ideological activity. In our opinion, the skillful use and coordination of the influence of the social sphere, system of training and upbringing, mass media, and a person's ability for self-education also comprise the essence of control of the molding process.

In the restructuring of ideological work in the Armed Forces, special reliance is placed on bringing it closer to each person and on accustoming him to active participation in socially significant matters. Commanders and political organs are attaining the great closeness of officer personnel to their subordinates and a maximum rise in their social and political activity. At all levels, party organizations are striving to introduce into practice to the highest degree a specific criterion for the public evaluation of the activity of each serviceman: what he did after the 27th CPSU Congress, what heights he attained, and how he overcame or is overcoming errors and omissions. The highest requirements are imposed here. All this is providing favorable results. This is just how matters stand in the units where communist S. M. Smirnov is the chief of the political department.

Ideological support of the troops' combat readiness was and is at the center of ideological and education work in the Armed Forces. The task has been posed to see that each serviceman clearly realizes: the higher our readiness to foil imperialism's aggressive inclinations, the smaller the probability that the

militaristic forces will decide on a nuclear adventure. The important political meaning with which training and service are filled permits the soldiers, seamen, and officers to feel the entire depth of their common and personal responsibility for the fatherland's security and that of the socialist commonwealth and to understand with mind and heart that the high level of skill, class consciousness, and technical and special training of each one strengthens the combat potential of the USSR. In this regard, commanders and political officers place special stress on the realization of the Armed Forces' role in preserving peace by all servicemen.

But in the process of the serviceman's upbringing, of course, one cannot be limited by the abstract, general condemnation of war as such. The main thing is to brand the actual perpetrators of the nuclear threat, those for whom socialism is a "random page of history" whom the last war taught nothing. There can be no placing of an equals sign between the struggle for peace and vegetarian pacifism. The deep-seated source of wars was and remains in the social system which engendered militarism and fascism and is preparing "crusades" and "Star Wars." Realization of these causal dependencies makes the servicemen more mature ideologically and more active and purposeful politically.

The Ideological Upbringing of Servicemen

A specific system of ideological upbringing has developed in the Armed Forces. In two or three years the soldier, seaman, sergeant, and petty officer pass through a course of political education which includes the principles of Marxist-Leninist theory, the urgent problems of the CPSU's domestic and foreign policy, and many problems of Soviet military organizational development, upbringing, and training. At the basis of this system today lies the deepened study of the materials of the 27th Party Congress and the military problems and questions formulated in its documents. The political training which is included in the overall system of ideological upbringing furthers the formulation, in the serviceman, of a Marxist-Leninist world outlook and devotion to the motherland, party, and people.

In the course of implementing the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress much is being done in the Armed Forces to raise effectiveness and improve all ideological-upbringing work and to make the human factor more active. How is this expressed?

First, in many large units and units the gap between propaganda and actual reality is being overcome more consistently than formerly. In those places where there is restructuring in this direction persistently and in a businesslike manner, the ties of propaganda and agitation with the life of the troops and with the accomplishment of specific tasks of combat readiness and combat training become closer. There has been a strengthening of the influence of political-upbringing work on the organization of military service, the conduct of operational readiness, the improvement of field, air, and naval training, and the process of the men's mastering of new equipment and armament. As a result the operational and tactical skill of commanders and staffs increases and the level of the personnel's technical and special training rises.

The Nth missile unit of the Strategic Rocket Forces which is commanded by Lieutenant Colonel N. Ulyanov can serve as an example. Its personnel turned to the men with the call to initiate competition under the slogan, "We are implementing the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and marking the 70th anniversary of the Great October with selfless soldierly labor!" For the glorious anniversary, in the unit it was decided to raise 27 percent masters of military affairs and 63 percent specialists with an increased proficiency rating and to see that 56 percent of the combat sections are headed by masters of military affairs.

Turning with such calls to the men of their services of the Armed Forces to greet the great anniversary were the personnel of a Guards tank regiment (commander--Guards Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Pakhomov), a Guards air defense surface-to-air missile regiment (commander--Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Soshko), a Guards bomber air regiment (commander--Guards Colonel A. Labkovskiy), and the crew of a missile-carrying nuclear submarine (commander--Captain 1st Rank V. Nikolayevskiy).

Second, the concern of commanders and political organs for the state of ideological work increased. The approach to the organization and conduct of political training and mass-political measures became more creative. A persistent search for and introduction into the practice of political-upbringing work among the troops and in the fleets, of scientific recommendations is under way. In the leading units attention to the organization, ideological content, and procedure for political training was intensified. On political lessons, stress is placed on the narrative talk which presumes the active participation of the leader of the lessons as well as of the students. Discussed more objectively in the course of Marxist-Leninist and commander's training are questions of military upbringing, the quality and effectiveness of ideological measures, and the introduction of active forms for the conduct of political lessons. Many officers prepare papers on the urgent problems of military organizational development which are based on the results of research work. The rise in the quality of political training and all ideological activity is furthered by the preparation of new programs and textbooks by the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. This is served by the wider use of technical means of propaganda and improvement of the conditions and quality of the men's independent work.

Third, after the party congress questions of the propagandizing of our party's foreign policy, political information sessions for the personnel, and explanation of the military-political situation which developed specifically on corresponding directions began to be resolved more objectively. In particular, great significance is attached to exposing the aggressive actions of the reactionary circles of the United States and NATO. Commanders and political officers do not limit themselves to simply informing about the military policy of the United States and NATO but tie specific facts with the nature of imperialism and with the dangerous influence of the military-industrial complex on the life of a bourgeois society. Party literature, documents, and evidence of the actions of militaristic forces which are striving to attain military superiority over socialism are used considerably more widely than formerly. Special attention is attached to the disclosure of the hypocrisy of Washington which, in essence, looks upon our planet as a potential arena for a nuclear clash and "Star Wars."

It is this which is shown by the specific steps of the American administration which has refused new arrangements and is breaking existing ones in the field of monitoring nuclear weapons. Actually, the nudging of mankind toward the line beyond which can be only the unthinkable is continuing under the cover of phrases about adherence to peace. We cannot fail to consider that although imperialism is in no condition to win a nuclear war, it can unleash it.

The main result of the ideological-upbringing work being conducted was the ever stronger political-moral condition of the troop personnel, their rallying around the Communist Party, and the whole-hearted support of the Soviet state's domestic and foreign policy. The men unanimously approve the party's strategic course for acceleration of the country's socio-economic development and, together with all our people, they are struggling for the realization of its decisions.

The overwhelming majority of the Soviet servicemen are conscientiously accomplishing their patriotic and international duty, be it combat standby duty at missile complexes or rendering assistance to friendly Afghanistan. For courage and selfless labor displayed when eliminating the damage at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, a large group of men were awarded orders and medals of the USSR, and two--Generals V. K. Pikalov and N. T. Antoshkin--were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Of course, some positive steps in renewing ideological activity are only the beginning of important work in raising the effectiveness of the entire process of upbringing. As formerly, we see in a number of cases the low quality of ideological and political-upbringing work in the battalion-company element, that is, where soldierly skill, combat qualities, and the morale of the personnel are forged and the military collectives of squads, sections, and crews are put together. At times we ascertain high activity, if it can be stated like this, in the "upper echelons" of ideological work and its noticeable weakening in the "lower ones." The center of such work is not being transferred directly to the troop collectives, where the primary party organizations are called upon to play a tremendous role, with sufficient energy. Everything is still not being done to give the proper scope to individual work--that most important form of upbringing.

A leading place in ideological work in the Armed Forces is occupied by molding in the men a scientific, Marxist-Leninist world outlook and boundless devotion to the Communist Party and the socialist motherland. Here, a tremendous role is played by improvement of political training. The ideas contained in the CPSU program and set forth in the political report of the Central Committee at the 27th Party Congress enrich the men with new approaches to the military-political realities of our time. Important significance is had by the questions which were formulated in the congress' decisions pertaining to Soviet military doctrine, on military-strategic parity, on ways to block the causes of war, on the social role of the Soviet Armed Forces, on the unity of the army and the people, on the foundations of military organizational development, and so forth. And, of course, the making of political training more timely is unthinkable without the deep study of the Lenin ideological heritage.

By what means should the quality of the personnel's political training be improved? First of all, all ideological work should be conducted in close connection with the military-political situation, with the life of the country, and with the specific missions of the unit or ship. For the men should not only understand well the essence of the problems but should also see their place in their solution and receive an ideological charge to raise their social and moral activity.

A special role belongs to the leaders of political lesson groups. In this training year the majority of the political organs approached their selection and training more carefully. For example, on some ships of the Northern Fleet it was recommended to the future group leaders that they first finish the propagandist department of the university of Marxism-Leninism. Methodological materials began to be published regularly for them in military journals. Command personnel of units and ships are used more often for the conduct of lessons on especially important subjects. Brief courses were organized to raise the qualifications of the propagandists. All this permitted raising the attention and interest of the soldiers and officers in political education and lifting its level.

Intensification of Moral Tempering

The entire system of moral upbringing under conditions of army and naval service is directed toward the attainment of a noble goal--instilling lofty moral-political and combat qualities in the defender of the socialist fatherland. The core problem of moral upbringing is the transformation of the principle of communist morality into deep personal convictions. At the basis of the moral upbringing of the Soviet servicemen lie the congress' conclusions on the role of the army as a school "for the instilling of civic responsibility, courage, and patriotism" ("Materialy XXVII syezda KPSS," p 62).

It has long been noted that well organized military labor and the entire rhythm of army and navy service temper the personality in a forced manner and strengthen it spiritually and physically. It is well known that military labor is distinguished by its difficulty and severity. Time standards, accuracy, and punctuality are important here. Combat training and combat standby duty, the operation and servicing of combat equipment, performing guard duty, and daily living little by little but steadily mold many qualities in the personality: persistence in the attainment of a goal, performance, steadfastness, consistency, endurance, the ability to operate under conditions of a rapid change in the situation, and a readiness for self-sacrifice.

It should be noted, however, that the Armed Forces tenor of life accomplishes its upbringing function when it is well-organized, when it is well adjusted, when the unit, ship, or any, even the smallest subunit or section live according to the laws of military service, and when the requirements of the regulations are implicitly implemented by all chiefs and subordinates. The adjustment of daily routines also molds in a person a "military core" which many retain all their lives. This is exactly how the servicemen of the Guards airborne regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel O. Babich live and serve.

A special place in the moral upbringing of the men is occupied by the molding of Soviet patriotism. Here, special stress is placed on seeing that love for

and devotion to the socialist motherland and the ideals of communism do not bear a contemplative, "platonic" character but step forth as a mighty motive force for the building of a new society and its defense against any enemies. The revolutionary-creative nature of Soviet patriotism was and is displayed at all stages of our society's development.

In the years of the first five-year plans, it was the striving to make the motherland a mighty power more rapidly, during the Great Patriotic War--to completely smash the fascist aggressor, and in our time--to contribute to the maximum to the renewal of society and the acceleration of its socio-economic development. For the men the highest patriotic duty, according to the definition of the 27th CPSU Congress, is ensuring the security of the socialist fatherland.

An important sector in the field of moral upbringing is work on the further improvement of the means and methods for molding moral-combat qualities in the personnel. They are a complex alloy properly of moral and volitional components which provide a person with the possibility to accomplish military and combat activity successfully. They are, first of all, discipline, courage, resolve, boldness, self-control, a readiness for self-sacrifice, heroism, combat comradeship, an indomitable striving for victory over the enemy, and so forth. These qualities are molded most successfully on lessons which are as close as possible to combat. The serviceman is objectively placed in situations where he receives the possibility to realize in practice and actually accomplish the concepts of courage, duty, responsibility, and steadfastness which are stored in his consciousness.

In the practice of ideological-upbringing work they have also begun to consider more completely the special features of military collectives and the spiritual, social, and other changes in the appearance of the personnel which have occurred in recent years. Today's soldiers are, as a rule, yesterday's schoolboys who nevertheless are enduring the process of the personality's development. The increased educational level and high degree of information level are accompanied by the effort of critical irreconcilability, in the spirit of the congress' "lesson of truth," toward everything which has been "marked down" by time and has become outdated. It is clear that party and Komsomol organizations have begun to hold the communists and Komsomols considerably more strictly responsible for their personal behavior and attitude toward their duties. For example, in the Moscow Air Defense District the public accountings of officers, sergeants, and soldiers concerning their accomplishment of obligations which have been assumed are being practiced.

Nothing so unites people as common activity based on a unity of interests, goals, and means for their attainment. The accomplishment of socialist obligations and the attainment of new, specific positions in combat skill and the mastery of equipment and weapons testify to the high moral attitude of the men and the healthy moral atmosphere of the collective. And conversely, it is adversely influenced by uncompleted matters and unrealized intentions and undertakings.

A healthy moral atmosphere is characterized by irreconcilability toward shortcomings and everything foreign which, at times, is still encountered in our life.

Sometimes the standards of interrelations between fellow servicemen are violated in the troop collectives. This is expressed, in particular, in the attempts of senior servicemen to shift some of their duties to new recruits and, at times, in the abasement of their personal dignity. Such instances do not have a mass nature but our attitude toward them is all the more irreconcilable. If, in the subunit, intolerance toward any manifestations of coarseness, hypocrisy, and a haughty attitude toward young servicemen were firmly established in the subunit and, at the same time, acts of nobility, military honor, and loyalty to word and obligation are encouraged in every possible way, then motives, deeds, and actions are engendered in the moral relations of fellow-soldiers which correspond to the requirements of the regulations and the principles of the communist ethic. The more completely and consistently prescribed order is observed in the unit and on the ship and principled, comradely relations are maintained, the more favorable the conditions for each serviceman's development.

We often try to solve the problem of discipline by a "head-on" attack, straightforwardly. But you see, many conditions are important for its strengthening: prescribed order, the personnel's adherence to Armed Forces traditions, well-organized living conditions, well-organized cultural leisure time, and the authority of the commander and the political officer. There is a need for a favorable example and for the assistance of the family, school, and enterprise from which the young people come to the Armed Forces, and for much more. Therefore, special significance is acquired by the propagandizing of the standards of military ethics: nobility, honor, responsibility, and dignity. But do these categories always become a subject of our intelligent conversation? Unfortunately, not very often. It should not be forgotten that discipline as a socio-moral phenomenon is one of the most important criteria of a person's overall good breeding.

A tremendous role in moral upbringing belongs to the example of the teacher himself. Devotion to principle and demandingness toward oneself and comrades in the large and small always distinguish highly moral people. It has been noted that the greatest successes in combat training and service are usually attained by those officers whose moral makeup is pure and clear. A teacher who is more strictly demanding of himself than of his subordinates is always a shining example for imitation. Any word of his, advice, recommendation, suggestion, condemnation, or desire is perceived more acutely and more sincerely. After the 27th CPSU Congress the political organs began to devote more attention to the training of officers in military educational institutions as well as to their development in the units and on ships. The wide dissemination of leading experience and a well organized system of professional training further the officers' actively becoming accustomed to the recommendations of science.

The development, in the officer-teachers, of a "taste" for theory gradually increases their ability to see the deepest reasons for various phenomena in army life, to find a scientific substantiation for specific measures, and to forecast events more correctly. In other words, the growth in the theoretical maturity of the educators is one of the most important methods for the broad introduction of scientific achievements into the daily practice of the men's ideological upbringing.

Preparation for Military Service

The preparation of the youth for military service is a nationwide task. Under the leadership of party and soviet organs it is conducted by the Komsomol, DOSAAF, schools and vocational and technical schools, military commissariats, and troop units. They are doing much for the preparation of future soldiers, seamen, and officer candidates. Unfortunately, there still are many collectives and regions where the increased complexity of military service is not considered: in some schools there are no military offices, shooting galleries, and other facilities of a material-technical base. Military patronage work is not well organized everywhere nor are sports improvement camps created everywhere, and there is a shortage of qualified military instructors.

There has been a noticeable increase in the number of youths coming to the Armed Forces from the school bench without labor and living experience. In these cases, the army assumes a number of upbringing functions which were formerly accomplished by the production collectives. This presumes intensifying the class upbringing of the personnel and the development, in the young servicemen, of aims of a social nature which are inherent in the socialist type of personality.

Military-patriotic upbringing, being a part of the party's ideological work, is accomplished in our society in various forms. It is the propagandizing of military and military-technical knowledge among the population, and sections on military-applied types of sport, and the "Zarnitsa" and "Orlenok" military sports games which have received union-wide recognition, the Memory Watch, trips of Komsomols and youths to places of revolutionary, combat, and labor glory, months of mass-defense work in honor of memorable dates and anniversaries, and so forth. War veterans, troop formations, and cultural institutions are widely used for participation in military-patriotic work. Ceremonies for send-offs to military service and various forms of specific ties of enterprises, kolkhozes, and educational institutions with units and ships have come into being and taken hold in many places. The leading experience of such activity shows that it provides the most tangible results if it is conducted in an integrated manner and if the ideological tempering of the youth, moral-psychological preparations for enduring the burdens and difficulty of military service, and sports-improvement and mass-defense work are organically combined in it. The All-Union Organization of Veterans of the War and Labor is called upon to make a large contribution to the military-patriotic upbringing of the workers.

The main meaning of ideological work in the Armed Forces is to make the human factor more active, ensure the maximum increase in the men's social activity, and to teach them to be in constant readiness and to accomplish the order for the defense of the motherland under any conditions. The decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress assigned a historic mission to the personnel of the Armed Forces: to ensure favorable conditions for our people for the creation of a communist society. All ideological activity in the units and on the ships is subordinate to this.

With the entire colossal might possessed by the Soviet Armed Forces which are ensuring the fatherland's security, their main element remains man--firm in his communist convictions, with a strong will, high professional competence, and a rich spectrum of noble moral features. And such a man is being raised in our Armed Forces.

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VOLKOGONOV LEADS DISCUSSION ON KOMSOMOL, PRE-DRAFT TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Apr 87 p 5

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Semenov: "Prepared to Stand in Formation"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] A candid and self-critical discussion on ways to improve Komsomol efforts in preparing our youth for military service, and on restructuring the form and content of these efforts in light of requirements of the 27th CPSU Congress, was held 16 April in the Central Hall of the Soviet Army imeni M. V. Frunze. Presiding over a session of the debate center at the 20th Komsomol Congress were Colonel General D. Volkogonov, Deputy Chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate; S. Krechetov, director of the sports and popular-defense section of the Komsomol Central Committee; and Major I. Yefimov, assistant chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate for Komsomol affairs.

What can a reserve servicemen's club do working with teenagers? This question often resounded in the meeting hall. And delegate Yu. Kraskov, from the Moscow area, set the tone for a sharp exchange of opinion. Many servicemen returning to their native provinces after service burn with a desire to make their contribution to the patriotic, international education of young people. Spheres of concern are wide and diverse--the organization of leisure time in cultural pursuit, the struggle against negative phenomena in the youth environment, military sports activities... Young people reach out to those who have learned lessons of military brotherhood, discipline and ideological temperament in the ranks. Delegates note, however, that the enthusiasm and aspirations that issue from the souls of yesterday's motorized riflemen, tankers, sailors and border guards are still often extinguished by a bureaucratic approach on the part of certain local public organizations, schools and Komsomol workers. This cannot be tolerated. Delegates also stressed that the clubs' poor material base was alarming. A proposal was made in this regard to establish a coordination center responsible to the Komsomol Central Committee which would monitor the activity of patriotic associations located all over the country and stimulate their educational efforts. No less important, it would provide a strong liaison with various ministries and departments to keep reserve servicemen undertaking this effort from losing heart upon their first encounters with sluggishness and indifference.

Young people have a romantic inspiration, an internal taste for heroic beginnings. The feats of older generations feed their hearts with pride, facet the crystals of honor and merit, and form a stable psychological readiness to execute their constitutional duty before the socialist Motherland. Examples were cited during discussions where dozens, hundreds of young pathfinders have ventured out each year to get close to the bravery of front line soldiers, to see with their own eyes the sites of soldierly valor. And this is good. Additionally, a variety of so-called special-purpose activities conducted by the Komsomol Central Committee have been used to facilitate the education of our young people in the traditions of revolution, combat and labor. Such activities have also been carried out by primary Komsomol organizations. Congress delegates stated, however, that the time is forever gone when figures indicating project scope could be used to make an impression. We must rid ourselves of stagnation phenomena once and for all. It is no secret that all kinds of rallies, campaigns and other "grand-scale measures" often turn into a suitable cover for those who would substitute thunderous reports for painstaking patriotic work in the heroic spirit with our young people. A sharp turnabout to concrete actions is required. We must proceed towards progress, restructuring en route.

During the course of discussion, many proposals and critical observations were also made with regard to further development of the military sports events "Eaglet" and "Summer Lightning."

Emotional aspects of the discussion increased noticeably after the presentation of retired Lieutenant General of Aviation G. Beregovoy, USSR pilot and cosmonaut, who specifically noted an attitude of indifference on the part of certain DOSAAF organizations towards methods of preparing youth for military service during the pre-war years. Here we have information to reflect upon. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, hundreds of parachute towers were operational around the country--today there are only two. The speaker noted that the search for a city to hold this year's "Eaglet" finals was being dragged out--a fact which could be explained only by a reluctance to accept the responsibility.

We must feel the pulse of time and not hold ourselves prisoners to outmoded ideas on the content and direction of military-patriotic work. We must search creatively for new ideas and use them to build the preparedness of our youth to stand in formation as armed defenders of our socialist Fatherland. It is precisely such an approach that has been taken in the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and Council of Ministers on further improving the preparation of young people for military service. It is important to unite and multiply the educational efforts of the family, the school, the army and production collectives in this regard. Many congress delegates, veterans of war and labor, articulated these thoughts in their presentations.

A great deal of attention was devoted to questions of increasing the role of each Komsomol worker and activist in preparing our youth for service. It is hardly possible today for someone to count on success in such an important matter who has not himself, figuratively speaking, taken off a single pair of soldiers' boots, who has not felt the magnetic force of combat brotherhood or personally tasted the salty perspiration of far-off, romantic campaigns...

Congress delegate Yu. Sorokin from Altayskiy Kray shared his experiences of working in the selection and education effort of Komsomol personnel, and related ways of using propaganda to instill in young people a love for the army and for the heroic profession of being a Soviet officer.

Why do we see in a number of oblasts a decline in the prestige and moral influence of the Komsomol track a young person follows to reach the exams for entrance to a military institute? How can we overcome formalism in such an important sphere of Komsomol committee activity? This was the subject of presentations by Lieutenant Colonel V. Yeremin, assistant chief of the air force political directorate for Komsomol affairs, and other delegates. Specific judgments and opinions were expressed. A collective search was made for answers to troublesome questions posed by actual experience in this difficult, interesting and exacting time of restructuring.

A topical theme of discussion was Komsomol sponsorship of aviation, navy and border troops. There are quite a few positive examples here. We cannot close our eyes, however, to the fact that efforts have deteriorated in this regard in a number of places. Sometimes everything is reduced to ceremonial receptions. There is something to think about here, said I. Boltikov from Novosibirsk Oblast, N. Gafurov of Leninabad Oblast and other congress delegates. Sponsorship ties should be functional! They should yield concrete benefits--increased political and physical toughening in recruits, technical training and mastery of the Russian language, the language of international relations.

The great social relevance of military service under conditions of today's strained international environment is well known. The youth press, television and radio services must help young people realize this relevance. Unfortunately, the army way of life is often depicted in rosy colors, devoid of difficulties and severe ordeals. We must present matters more closely to the truth, delegates stated. Without detracting from the romantic aspects, we must show and glorify the arduous, heroic spirit of military service. Literature and art still do not depict vividly and convincingly enough the exploits of our soldiers of the eighties--successors to the traditions of our front line soldiers.

A discussion on the quality of Komsomol work and on the military-patriotic education of our young people is, in the final analysis, a discussion about the face of tomorrow's glorious armed forces, noted Major A. Kanshin, assistant chief of the land forces political directorate for Komsomol affairs. The words of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev spoken at the congress are addressed to each one of us: "Dear Soviet soldiers, I wish to use this forum to turn to the army Komsomol, to those who have already completed their service in our armed forces, who have fought for a just cause in Afghanistan--go to our young people and tell them about yourselves and about your comrades, about your commanders and mentors, about valor, heroism and combat brotherhood."

These words are a call to action.

Taking part in the work of the debate center of the 20th Komsomol Congress on "Military-Patriotic Education of Our Youth" were responsible workers of the CPSU Central Committee and Komsomol Central Committee, representatives of various ministries, departments and public organizations, veterans of the party, Lenin Komsomol and USSR Armed Forces.

9768

CSO: 1801/178

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

LT GEN SAMOYLENKO RESPONDS TO LETTERS ON KOMSOMOL WORK

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 May 87 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen V. Samoylenko: "Young Officers. Lt Gen V. Samoylenko, a Member of the Military Council and Chief of the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Baltic Military District, Comments on Mail Received by RED STAR"]

[Text] After the 20th VLKSM Congress quite a few letters arrived at the editorial office in which questions are touched upon concerning the ideological and professional maturity of young officers and the growing role in this important matter of committees and buros of the VLKSM. All of the multifaceted work of the Komsomol with yesterday's graduates of military schools, the authors of these letters correctly emphasize, should meet the requirements of the 27th Party Congress and the January plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, and it should be carried out in an integrated way and in close unison with life.

A RED STAR correspondent asked Lt Gen V. Samoylenko to comment on letters that have come to the editorial office from subunits and units of the Baltic Military District.

[Question] A feature of RED STAR mail these days is the problem of restructuring, including restructuring in Army Komsomols. Lieutenants V. Golubev and P. Panasenko, platoon commanders, and Sr Lt I. Chernikov, company deputy commander for political affairs, and other comrades, noting the good changes in youth collectives, still complain of the inadequate effectiveness of the influence of VLKSM organizations on youth. It is not possible everywhere to overcome stock phrases that have been formed, and inertia. . .

[Answer] To people of Komsomol age, perhaps the most applicable dynamic words are assertiveness, drive, daring and readiness to assume responsibility. And efforts must really be made so that the enthusiasm of spirit like this should be supported by the Komsomol.

Recently, I became acquainted in one of the motorized rifle regiments with Capt V. Pinchuk, a holder of the Order of the Red Star. The company he

commands has a good record in the unit. But the young officer unequivocally declared that he is not satisfied with the results, correctly supposing that at the present, a time of changes, it is not possible to work according to the old standards. Otherwise, you will get bogged down in complacency and pride. It is in this kind of atmosphere that V. Pinchuk teaches his subordinates.

But there are letters of a different content in the editorial office mail. For example, letters about eyewash and contrivances in restructuring. Certain young officers think for some reason that the main thing now is to "send a timely signal" of one or another deficiency. But, they say, let someone else apply measures. Here one cannot help but recall the words that resounded from the rostrum of the 20th VLKSM Congress--restructuring begins with everyone. Precisely with every person! I will refer to the letter of Lt I. Kalinin who criticizes the deputy commander of a battalion for technical affairs.

We delved into this case thoroughly. Yes, a definite share of the blame fell on the shoulders of the deputy commander for technical affairs. He was not able to organize service in the motor pool. But is he the only one who is responsible for deficiencies? Because each combat vehicle is assigned to a specific serviceman, and, what is more, to a Komsomol member. And control was implemented by young officers--platoon commanders, a majority of whom also were VLKSM members.

We directed the attention of the commander, the political worker and members of the VLKSM committee to this aspect. We showed how to do the work better. Now it is important not to forget about these "lessons." Remind, teach and verify. . .

It is especially necessary to talk about such problems as political and moral fortitude, and the struggle to increase military readiness, irreproachable discipline and a united military collective where Komsomol activists are summoned to show their better qualities. This is particularly important where there are no party groups. And, of course, also overcoming various kinds of negative phenomena: mutual relations that are at variance with regulations, rudeness, eyewash, etc. Here is where a word of truth, which the party teaches us, should ring out with particular force and where the widest field of activity is for the VLKSM committee and for young Komsomol officers.

[Question] You touched upon a very important aspect: young officers and the assertiveness of VLKSM organizations. The authors of some of the letters, in particular political worker Lt S. Sazonov and company commander Sr Lt G. Belousov, and others, report that there is still no firm association between the VLKSM buro and committee and the lieutenants. . .

[Answer] This strange situation comes up quite often. Quite a few young officers are elected to Komsomol bodies. Some of them there and then forget about those problems which troubled them when they were, so to say, ordinary VLKSM members. Moreover, some committees and buros actually lose sight of graduates of military schools. Relatively recently, the section on Komsomol work of the political directorate in our district conducted an investigation on the basis of the VLKSM committee which is headed by Lt O. Vorobey: what

portion of its measures does the committee direct at young officers? It turns out that only 1 percent of the total. What kind of directed influence can we be talking about here? However, it is not enough to state a negative fact. It should become a kind of starting point for restructuring all Komsomol work. And here, of course, communists must have their say.

Here we must recall the meaningful words of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev which were spoken from the rostrum at the 20th VLKSM Congress: "To inspire young people to fulfill complex tasks. . . appeals and slogans are not enough. The enthusiasm of youth must be fortified by active concern for the destinies of young people."

Of course, we also have examples of interesting and searching work. The Komsomol committee of the 'N' unit where Sr Lt I. Usov serves was, so to say, at the sources of creation of advice to young officers. It is notable that the commander and other communist supervisors were continuously informed of all of his concerns. From the first days of their arrival at the unit, graduates of military schools are helped to enter the system more quickly and to be included in the process of personnel training and education.

This kind of work of course, requires additional efforts. But it pays with interest.

As you see, there are a great many ways for intensifying the influence of the VLKSM organization on the professional development of young officers. The main thing is that there should be a desire, and that here, as the saying goes, searching, creativity and a fresh wind of change should be more perceptible.

[Question] It is no secret, comrade lieutenant general, that the process of professional development of part of the officers is being dragged out. Sr Lt N. Avdeyenko, a secretary of the VLKSM organization, and Lt L. Krutikov, commander of a motorized rifle platoon, have written to the editorial office about this. . .

[Answer] Well, it is all right if a lieutenant is surrounded by sensitive, exacting and concerned comrades. But what if this is not so? I had to examine this kind of a case. Lt Ye. Bezgin's service "did not hack it." Nobody considered it necessary to look into the reasons for this. And punishment poured out on the lieutenant as if from a horn of plenty. And the Komsomol organization reprimanded him with an entry in his registration form. Now, try to put yourself in his place. What can he do, where can he go and to whom can he unburden himself. And so a so-called hopeless situation sets in. I had to correct the comrades. I became interested in the matter of Lieutenant Bezgin recently--they are straightening out for him. What does this example say? First of all, about the fact that members of the VLKSM bureau and committee should be more attentive to the fate of young officers. And they must not blindly duplicate the administrative decision of an official. Even if the lieutenant is to blame for something, the reasons for what has happened have to be investigated. And not to think about punishment measures first of all, but how to help a person to believe in himself.

Or let us take another example. Some young officers declare: military schools gave them knowledge which was too divorced from reality, and the like. I myself saw how difficult it is for another person to conduct a conversation with subordinates and to organize a youth debate. It is quite natural that the guiding hand of the Komsomol committee should be felt here. It is necessary to prompt novices, to help them, but what is better--to work with them. For it is no secret: a person who is experiencing difficulties and who does not see any interest on the part of the VLKSM organization will not turn to that organization for advice.

And here is something else. You sometimes hear: "the young are green." I was never personally an adherent of this saying. An officer's youth--this is a difficult and beautiful time. The entire history of our armed forces shows that the party and the people entrusted the most responsible tasks to youth, and youth always successfully accomplished them. It is sufficient to mention the youthful regimental commanders during the civil war and the unparalleled deeds of young officers during the Great Patriotic War. Many examples can be cited from life in our day. The courage and bravery of Heroes of the Soviet Union, officers G. Kuchkin and R. Aushev, I. Ploskonos and others speak convincingly of this.

[Question] Some comrades write: you sometimes feel uncomfortable at a Komsomol meeting. Criticism is aimed at them, they say, and their subordinates hear it. At times this is the reason for all of the difficulties in mutual relations...

[Answer] In this connection, I recall a meeting in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. At one time, I became acquainted with a Komsomol worker who was a White Russian by nationality, but who had an Uzbek last name. I admit that I was overcome by an urge to ask how he, a blue-eyed native of Minsk, got the name Alimdzhani. Once he told me all about it. During the war, having lost his parents and not knowing his name, he was brought to Tashkent, together with thousands of other children. He was adopted, reared and educated by an Uzbek family. And afterwards he found his natural mother, who had been searching for him for many years. The son returned to her, but he kept his former name. The name of those to whom he was indebted forever.

Does not the fate of this person reflect, as in a drop in water, a warmth in mutual relations and the active and vital ties of the Soviet people. All of us--privates and officers--are bound by a single military duty, and all of us, figuratively speaking, were born in October. This time of restructuring profoundly and brightly illuminates both our common tasks and our single approach to their resolution. And I admit that I cannot understand the position of people who for objective reasons are attempting to explain that one or another collective cannot in any way get rid of mutual relations that are not sanctioned by regulations. Here immediately the question comes up about the effectiveness of work of the young officer. And if one is to speak right out, the grumbling of young officers distresses me when they say that it is "awkward" to be at the same Komsomol meeting with subordinates and to

listen to criticism of themselves in their presence. But is is not command orders that criticize people, but behavior and the position of a Komsomol comrade. One should set an example in everything, then one will not have to blush in front of comrades in the youth league.

[Question] And finally. A large number of authors of letters broach questions of the honor of a young officer. What, in your view, is the role of the Komsomol organization in this plan?

[Answer] Honor, in the words of Vladimir Dal, is the inner moral virtue of a person, valor, honesty, nobility of soul and a clear conscience. An officer's honor, I think, is first of all the personification of a sense of responsibility for the defense of the socialist homeland. We belong to our glorious armed forces which stand vigilantly on guard of the world's first socialist state, a country of the socialist community. And the immediate duty of the VLKSM committee is to assist commanders and political workers to educate worthy young officers.

Definite experience has been accumulated in this plan in the district. However, concluding our conversation, I want to emphasize that I agree completely with the authors of letters who spoke of unutilized capabilities, about "spinning around" in the activity of a number of VLKSM committees and buros in such an important matter. It is with these considerations that the critical tone of our conversation was conducted. At the present time, the Komsomol movement is renewing its arsenal of forms and methods of influence, and it is restructuring on the march. And this means that the contribution of young officers will carry more weight in the resolution of tasks that confront the military district in the year of the 70th anniversary of Great October.

13052

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PROCURACY CALLS FOR IMPROVED WORK WITH COMPLAINTS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Apr 87 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel of Justice A. Bilokon: "Improved Work With Complaints"]

[Text] The next regular session of the Main Military Procuracy Board has been devoted to questions of improving procurator supervision of the examination of letters, applications and complaints.

It has been noted that such work does not meet today's requirements everywhere in the troop units. Instances have been disclosed of reprisals for criticism expressed in the correspondence of servicemen, workers and other employees addressed to higher agencies and the editors of newspapers and magazines.

An example of this is the unlawful dismissal of V. Kholodnyy, chief agronomist of the "Burnenskiy" military sovkhoz, who reported on the misuse of official position on the part of the sovkhoz director--his exclusion from the records of more than 1500 hectares of arable land, which resulted in inflated crop productivity figures and bonuses being awarded to sovkhoz management personnel.

Responsible rear services personnel of the Central Asian Military District used far-fetched justification to relieve V. Kholodnyy from his duties and refused without justification to satisfy the objections of the district procuracy. Comrade Kholodnyy was reinstated in his job capacity after intervention of the Main Military Procuracy and remuneration was made for the forced time off.

Indications of misuse of official position by Lieutenant Colonel A. Marchenko were also confirmed, as a result of which he was brought to strict party accountability and was convicted by a court of honor of officer comrades. Responsible individuals failed to take measures with respect to many violations of the law on the part of Marchenko which had been earlier disclosed in the correspondence of servicemen.

For a long time, the appeals of S. Vezelyan, an employee of the Soviet Army, to be reinstated in her job position were not properly resolved. Responsible officials of the trade directorate of the Far East Military District, and then

the Main Trade Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense declined her requests based on a devised justification.

Neglect still persists in resolving complaints, even in the activity of military procuracy agencies themselves. Local military procurators do not always analyze the reasons complaints arise, particularly repeated complaints. Results of inspections are not well publicized or used effectively in formulating public opinion or developing the active participation of servicemen in the struggle against law-breakers.

The procuracy board has required all military procurators to take decisive measures towards improving work with complaints, relying on the widespread support of party organs, the army and navy community, and public supervisory agencies in this regard.

In exposing instances of suppression of criticism and callous attitudes towards resolving complaints, procuracy organs must provide such information to party organizations and political organs. They must pose principled questions as to the responsibility of guilty individuals, issue procurator cautions and use such instances to promote discipline, employing the entire arsenal of response available to the procurator.

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COL OGURTSOV ON LEGAL WORK, MILITARY CADRES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Apr 87 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Ogurtsov, chief of propaganda and agitation section, political directorate deputy chief of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "In the Interests of Discipline"]

[Text] Not too long ago officers of the district political directorate had to get involved in a rather unusual story. A procurator's inspection had uncovered an deplorable incident. Military motor vehicle inspectors detained on the road a couple of vehicles belonging to the same unit (chast). The drivers had neglected to prepare their vehicles for the trip. Their documents were not in order and they displayed a lack of discipline en route. The officers in charge of the vehicles did not distinguish themselves by their actions either.

However many violations were committed, just as many replies came back from the unit. All in all, what was being checked over was the interaction among the command, party and Komsomol organizations of the military collective and--actively assisting them in establishing order and consolidating discipline--the military motor vehicle inspection office. Why would the military lawyers suddenly become alarmed?

Because, to put it briefly, the procurator's inspection uncovered an established "sham factory" in one fell swoop. As it turns out, the unit commander and his deputies wrote the motor vehicle inspection office with regard to punishment given the violators, when in fact no one was punished at all. It was communicated in official replies, for example, that the motor officers, Lieutenant Colonel V. Koryakov and Captain A. Shalagayev, received reprimands on three occasions for negligence and lack of discipline. In actuality, no traces of such reprimands were found either in orders or on the officers' official cards. Nor did the unit's party organization react in any way to the misdeeds.

The absence of supervision and exactingness had a corrupting effect on all aspects of personnel activity. Instances were uncovered where gas and oil were looted, spare parts were sold on the outside... The results of the procurator's inspection were reported to higher headquarters and its political organ.

What else must be done so that all possible measures are taken to set up proper order according to the regulations?

Instead of appropriate measures being taken, the procurator's office received a response signed by Colonel A. Molostvov, most of which was devoted to how the military motor vehicle inspectors and their superiors were "dressed down" and lectured.

There is no sense in going into further details here and there. We will limit ourselves to the final result--today the situation has been corrected. A comprehensive motor park inspection was conducted in which condition of the vehicles and quality of maintenance and servicing was checked. Storage of fuels and lubricants and organization of their issue procedures were brought into conformity with appropriate regulations. The reasons behind the recent instances of dereliction were made widely public at meetings of personnel, and at officer and warrant officer conferences. Those who had failed to take appropriate measures in restoring proper order in the unit after the military procurator's revelation were brought to strict accountability.

If we digress from the picture of infringements against the law, then the substance of the matter does not in any way come down to a problem of "there was no order--order was established." The substance of the matter lies in the concept that in order to establish order--after the procurator's statement--it was necessary to implement an entire series of "supplementary" measures, including those which were undertaken by the district political directorate. Everything had to be resolved immediately, as soon as the inspection documents went to higher headquarters and its political organ. Alas, the disconnection between the actions of commanders and political organs, on the one hand, and military legal specialists, on the other, has still not been dealt with satisfactorily everywhere.

There are certain military units today in which the presence of the military legal specialist is not treated in a businesslike manner, but rather with perceptible apprehension. Instead of inviting legal personnel to participate with commanders, political workers, peoples' inspectors and comrades' courts of honor for officers and warrant officers, instead of allowing them the opportunity to make personnel presentations and respond to servicemen's questions, such opportunities are wasted. And consciously so. Contacts between the military legal specialist and military personnel are intentionally limited.

It is not necessary to spend a great deal of time looking for examples. The picture we see uncovered in the unit where Lieutenant Colonel V. Reshetnev serves would perhaps have satisfied many until recently. In any case, the list of measures conducted was vast. As proof of "close interaction with law-safeguarding organs," listings of lectures and discussions conducted by military legal specialists were lavishly strewn about. But one only had to inquire as to what specifically a discussion was about and the rainbow colors faded. As became clear, legal propagandists retold articles which had appeared in magazines and discoursed abstractly about theoretical questions in front of listeners who understood little. It was dry material impassively delivered, without any connection to the life of the subunits

[podrazdeleniye]... Is there very much benefit from this kind of "interaction"?

It is not surprising that they were unable in this unit to effectively organize officer instruction on Soviet law, as provided for in the officer training system. The commander and political officer, who knew the specific situation in the subunits, thought it right not to get involved in details provided by "outsiders." And so they did not invite legal specialists to the instruction at all!

When means such as these are used to achieve a state of well-being, it is an extremely fragile situation. And it is no accident that, as a result of the procurator's inspection, the commander of this unit himself received a warning in connection with his ignorant--from a legal point of view--actions.

I will offer another, quite different example--one of creative, coordinated effort on the part of commanders and political workers in the unit in which officer V. Polkunov serves, and where law experts from the Alma-Ata garrison, headed by the the procurator, Colonel of Justice A. Afanasyev, and military tribunal president Lieutenant Colonel of Justice A. Krasnopevtsev, are serving. A day of legal instruction is conducted every month in the unit through their joint efforts. It begins in the companies and platoons, where the legal experts go for individual discussions with servicemen together with their commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol activists. They use problems affecting everyone, questions posed by the servicemen, as subjects of analysis in the open discussions which follow. These can involve the reasons for a certain disciplinary action, prescribed allowances for soldiers, assistance to servicemen's families where they reside... The day of legal instruction here has become an effective means of maintaining a healthy moral atmosphere in the subunits.

The political section of special units (spetschast) at the Alma-Ata garrison studied the state of military discipline in its subunits. The political section chief reported the results during a conference at which the garrison's deputy military procurator, Lieutenant Colonel of Justice V. Tyutyukin, also made a presentation. Lt Col Tyutyukin warned certain commanders and political officers against an attitude of indifference towards minor violations of military discipline which, as a rule, go untreated and lead to a deterioration of military order, where violations are repeated.

Another widely used forum is presentations by legal experts in district units as part of the officer training system and political training in a Marxism-Leninism university. Officers and warrant officers, employees and workers of the Soviet Army, and their family members as well, are invited to an evening of questions and answers. Exhibits that reflect the basic provisions of the USSR Constitution and elucidate the requirements of military regulations are set up in officers' clubs and unit centers. Matinees, thematic evening programs, film lectures--all forms are actively employed here with ingenuity and have proven effective.

The role of the district political directorate as coordinator has increased here in recent times. It has become a rule that officers of the political

directorates participate in the monthly garrison conferences of commanders and political officers, military legal specialists, medical personnel and post commandants. Thorough and comprehensive analysis is conducted of negative occurrences and the reasons behind them, and measures are outlined to prevent recurrence.

With respect to such negative occurrences, some attention should be given an inspection conducted in a certain unit (soyedineniye) with respect to observance of the law regarding servicemen's material responsibility for losses and damage to the state. It was established that officers P. Rudenko, Sh. Urinbayev, I. Bukhanets and V. Beyzerov held their subordinates materially accountable without proper justification. Their illegal orders were noted after a procurator's objection and the reasons behind them analyzed at unit (chast) commanders' conferences. The unit (soyedineniye) political section also got involved, hearing out the explanation of the officers who had permitted this distortion of disciplinary procedure to take place.

The actualities of life show that the struggle for discipline and strict observance of procedures laid down by the regulations is not to be won through a campaign-style approach in the military collectives. What is required here is continuous, well-coordinated activity on the part of commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations. A close relationship and interaction with legal establishments, combined with a search for new forms and methods of joint effort, will only increase the efficiency and productivity of this great and important work. Inadequate legal knowledge and insight on the part of military personnel is especially intolerable today, when the restructuring which is taking place affects servicemen in every aspect, when the party presents increased requirements with respect to legal aspects of the actions of every responsible individual. The effort that has begun in the district with regard to studying Basic Legal Knowledge for Officers should well overcome the shortcomings that still exist in this area.

9768

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'FIRST STEPS' IN WAR AGAINST ALCOHOL DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Apr 87 p 4

[Article by Captain 3d Rank M. Lukanin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "For the Sins of Others"]

[Text] Tolerance of any kind of intoxicating libation is noticeably disappearing from our lives. The situation today in this regard differs substantially from that of yesterday--it is very seldom that you will see a sailor who has had one too many on the streets of a harbor city, very few servicemen will risk arranging a "banquet for the occasion," celebrating a new job appointment or promotion with alcohol. I received the following data, for example, from the political directorate of the Black Sea Fleet. The number of officer communists brought to accountability before the party for drunkenness in 1986 was half that of the year before.

How should we feel about this data? If we are to compare it to the past, then it is impressive, progress has been made. If we look to the future, then quite frankly, only the first--although, perhaps, the most critical--steps have been taken in the struggle to affirm a sober lifestyle. Here we see stern punishment meted out to someone who is given to the wine and vodka poison. In another instance, an individual is discharged from the armed forces. Restaurants and other "watering holes" that have survived have become zones of heightened attention for military patrols. All of this has served to turn many people away from "the green dragon."

It has turned away many, but--alas--not all who wear epaulets. As reported to me in the commandant's office of the Sevastopol garrison, the number of officers detained for drunkenness in the city the first quarter of this year is markedly greater than for the same period last year. Especially alarming is the increase in the number of repeat offenders. Senior Lieutenants L. Kuzmin and V. Afanasyev have accumulated four "visits" to the commandant's office; Captain Lieutenant Yu. Vylezhanin has had three.

Major V. Zverev, military commandant, shared his observations with me. In the first months after CPSU Central Committee adoption of the resolution on measures to overcome drunkenness and alcoholism, the reaction in the units (chast) to each report of servicemen's detention was substantially more pronounced. Now we get supportive letters in response.

The view at the commandant's office is generally shared by other units and on ships. Everyone in the navy I had the opportunity to speak with agreed--the decisive eradication of drunkenness has not yet taken place. But how do we proceed from here? On this there is a divergence of opinion. Some believe that you cannot really build a wall of intolerance against the officer who likes to drink "half a glass of champagne" after coming home from work, that the struggle should be waged against abusers. Then there are those who think events should not be forced--time is going by and our navy will soon consist mostly of people to whom pernicious habits are absolutely foreign.

Those who say that we will achieve our utopia are undoubtedly right. But we cannot forget the lessons of the past, where a condescending attitude towards "moderate drinkers" would often turn around as a result of dashed hopes, and the expectation that everything would turn out by itself, would become normal, in essence often meant cutting short efforts in anti-alcohol education. When you talk with people for whom such an atmosphere of connivance turned out to be highly dramatic, people that the "drinking tradition" helped lead astray and who saw no one deterred from turning to alcohol in such an atmosphere, you often have occasion to hear words of true bitterness and regret. It is felt that were they to be beginning their officer careers now, in the healthy environment we have today, things would have turned out differently.

I remember especially well an encounter with a lieutenant hydrographer, not at all a young man. His file included three junior officer courts of honor, demotion in duty assignment and in grade (throughout his rather lengthy service he never rose above senior lieutenant). Now he was facing dismissal from the armed forces. He said he began drinking while still at the institute, although no serious attention was paid to it there. The lieutenant still felt no embarrassment in his unit of assignment by virtue of his weakness. The "gallant" lieutenant even earned sympathy. Let it pass, it was felt. At least he is sober while on duty. But it did not pass, and his inclination towards alcohol grew with the years into a sickly passion.

Aleksander Vladimirovich requested the newspaper not give his last name, since he still has his hopes up that they will believe him this last time:

"Just let me stay in the navy. Everything will change with me. I've had a lot of problems. And I want to serve."

What was coming out here--a bitter experience, repentance? Probably. But there was also the idea that the environment itself today would help him, weak of spirit, to resist temptation, to rise up.

To say that the story of this officer is instructive for new lieutenants who are filling the navy's ranks today would be erroneous. Such stories simply could not come about today. Today's generation of young officers comes into contact with a completely different moral environment on board ship and in the units. No one will send a lieutenant off for a bottle, no one will suggest that a promotion or a birthday needs to be "wetted down." (If something like that does happen somewhere, it cannot be considered a phenomenon, but rather a disappearing echo). And if adherents to the alcohol tradition pop up suddenly among young officers, putting the blame on the surrounding environment would

be tantamount to engaging in self-deceit. It may therefore be justifiably said of alcohol lovers among today's lieutenants that they did not "catch" the "alcohol virus" in the navy--they rather brought it on board themselves. This, of course, in no way lessens their personal responsibility. But this is a topic of serious discussion for another day.

Experience we have gain throughout our lives suggests that it is easier to ward off an illness than to cure it later on. And preventive measures always prove more effective in the earlier stages. This applies in full measure to anti-alcohol education.

Here we must state directly that navy commanders and political officers are sometimes finding themselves in a difficult situation. Severe demands are made of them to uphold the state of military discipline, but what can be done when behavioral flaws among lieutenants in a certain unit--who have not even been there long enough to be sized up--can clearly be traced back to origins in the institute? This is what happened, for example, in the surface vessels unit (soyedineniye) where Lieutenant G. Mashlyatin, a graduate of the Leningrad Naval Engineering Institute imeni V. I. Lenin, was initially assigned. The call from the commandant's office was received at the unit: "Your officer is being detained in our guardroom for drunkenness." Nobody had even seen the lieutenant in the unit--he had not even left the navy personnel section where he received his ship assignment. Nonetheless, as the expression goes, you have to pay for the sins of others. And here you have the institution that released an undeserving individual from its halls into the officer ranks and, as the saying goes, it could care less.

It is possible that a justification could be found here--a lieutenant is graduated from the institute with the hope that, once in the navy, he will change, will "get straight." Alas, experience shows that such expectations are illusory more often than not. Life seems to have a basic rule which is borne out on any ship, in any unit--the habits a person has acquired during his cadet years are the ones he displays in his new capacity, wearing officer epaulets on his shoulders. Exceptions in this regard are very rare. Today's "difficult" lieutenants are those who were earlier labeled "difficult" cadets.

Let us look at another example from this same unit. Immediately upon his arrival on board ship from the Pacific Ocean Higher Naval Institute imeni S. O. Makarov, Lieutenant Yü. Selin assumed a lifestyle of drinking sprees, and when pressure started being applied he submitted an application for discharge into the reserves. An uncomfortable situation, once again, for the unit. But is this fair, when Lieutenant Selin's diploma from the institute reads "He did not strive to become a good officer or skilled specialist. He set low standards for himself. He is prone to the use of alcoholic beverages." It would be interesting to know just what was in the minds of course director, Captain 3d Rank Ye. Levakov, faculty head, Captain 1st Rank V. Ivin and institute chief (at the time) Rear Admiral I. Karmadonov, when they affixed their signatures to the following diploma notation: "Merits graduation from the institute and awarding of the rank of lieutenant."

Yes, we must objectively reflect the personal qualities of our young officers. But objectivity is the minimum required from our institutions--the maximum being release of officers who have merited nothing less than good ratings.

And what do the instructors think who deal with the cadets directly? Let us pursue this based on the example of two training institutions--the Black Sea Higher Naval Institute imeni P. S. Nakhimov and the Sevastopol Higher Naval Engineering Institute. The former, as is noted here with pride, is considered one of the most prestigious. This is confirmed in part by the competition in entrance examinations which is traditionally high year after year. What with the great outpouring of young men who want to become cadets, this is extremely beneficial--the opportunity to select those who are truly the best. But how then do you explain the following circumstance--the predominance in numbers of individuals detained this year in the city for not being sober lies with the "Black Sea group." And it is at the institute, apparently, that they acquired this habit.

On the very day that I visited the Black Sea Higher Naval Institute imeni P. S. Nakhimov, a couple of its recent graduates, two brothers, were languishing in the garrison guardroom--Senior Lieutenant P. Yermak and Lieutenant A. Yermak--still "high" from the restaurant.

"It is strange," said Captain 2d Rank V. Pomanko, who had taught one of the brothers in his course. Reacting to the news, he stated that P. Yermak was a quiet cadet.

But it became clear in further conversation that the "quiet" cadet's behavior at the institute included faults related to the use of alcoholic beverages that were no secret to the course director.

This fact can certainly be relegated to the past. But let us look at the recent case of Cadet A. Doroshchenko. This cadet's behavior arouses indignation in the commandant's office--many times he was detained in a drunken condition in the city, but for some reason which remains unclear, the institute did not really become concerned about this. Here they were even inclined to suppose that the patrols were simply overzealous at times, and it was to this precisely that Captain 1st Rank D. Stoyanov, deputy faculty chief for political affairs, attributed one of the latest occasions A. Doroshchenko wound up in the guardroom.

One would get the feeling that the institute leadership felt uncomfortable discussing the lack of discipline in certain of its cadets. But the time has come when it is extremely important to look the truth straight on, when any other way of dealing with the matter will inevitably drive in the sickness against which a decisive battle is today being waged.

Even the director of the institute, unfortunately, failed to conceal his displeasure and remarked during our meeting that the newspaper had cast an undeserved shadow on the institute. The fact is that on 3 March of this year, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published a critical report mentioning an officer of the Nakhimov Institute, Captain 3d Rank V. Ovchinnikov, who tried to transport alcohol on an aircraft. Our editorial staff soon received an official

response on this from the institute. The acting director of the institute and chief of the political section wrote: "For unlawful acquisition of alcohol and attempting to transport it by air, Captain 3d Rank V. P. Ovchinnikov is held accountable before the party and will be investigated at a comrades' court of honor of senior officers as well as undergoing examination by a council of the institute."

We must say that such a response is practical and based on principle. However, it turns out there was an unofficial opinion--why did it have to be mentioned that Officer Ovchinnikov serves in the Black Sea Higher Naval Institute imeni P. S. Nakhimov if he had just recently been assigned there and was en route to his new duty station?

Perhaps it is indeed unfair to reproach an institute for the misdeeds of a newly appointed officer. Earlier in this article we mentioned instances in which the prestige of a unit sometimes suffers due to institute graduates who have not yet arrived... The similarity of the situations here is purely superficial, however, and the differences are based on principle. If lieutenants are being assigned to the units, then the institute is selecting officers for itself.

It is a more complicated matter, of course, to identify individuals inclined to alcohol among the many people who leave school. But it is important to do so. It is simply intolerable for young people to be joining cadet ranks who are already alcohol-prone. For this is a sickness in both the moral and physical sense, and the armed forces need officers with exceptionally good health.

Yes, we cannot have lieutenants leaving the halls of our institutes with eroded moral principles--even isolated cases of such must be seen as an extraordinary event, a sign of trouble. Rear Admiral M. Korotkov, director of the Sevastopol Higher Naval Engineering Institute expressed an interesting thought on this subject:

"We will look the truth straight on--the navy sometimes loses more than it gains from certain graduates. We therefore strive to maintain close contact with the units and get more information about those whom we have graduated--not only information of praise (which everyone takes pleasure in getting), but objective information which will sometimes be bitter."

"According to such information," notes Mikhail Vasilyevich, "we must ourselves take the blame issuing from an unbiased accusation. And with regard to personnel training this is particularly intolerable."

Yes, the future of our navy directly depends on how personnel training and education are structured. Today it is simply impossible to look at the issue any other way. And institutions are going to have to accept responsibility for their lieutenants. Behind their walls our future officers are learning the lessons which long afterward--if not forever--will determine their behavior. And this includes the extremely important moral choice of a sober lifestyle.

FAILINGS OF GRADUATES OF KAZAN TANK SCHOOL

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 May 87 p 2

[Article by Guards Lt A. Dolgiy, Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District: "In Order Not To Stumble. Open Letter to Instructors and Cadets of Military Schools"]

[Text] I hope that the reasons that prompted me to write this letter and to express that which has bothered me for a long time will be understood correctly. Indeed, not only me but the many who hold dear the honor and glory of our Kazan Higher Tank Command School imeni Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR.

But I will start with a fact which, I think, should be seriously considered by us, graduates, by our former instructors and by today's cadets. Here it is. Of the graduates who completed school in 1985 and who arrived on assignment to one of the better regiments of the district, service for the majority, as the saying goes, did not turn out well. Many criticisms were levelled against them by commanders, and there were many evident errors in their work and service.

I will immediately reject any possible blame of the regimental command element in the event that someone decides that we, the young officers, were not given enough attention and help. On the contrary, from the first day to this day, we sense the concern for us of commanders, political workers and senior colleagues. So we ourselves bring about failures in service. I know this from personal experience.

This incident happened to me last year in a battalion exercise. The platoon which I was commanding as part of a company was executing a difficult task. In the very heat of battle, the machinegun jammed. I hastened to correct the malfunction and stopped commanding the platoon. This led to the fact that the mechanic driver Pfc D. Belov seriously violated safety measures.

The breach of regulations was serious. The battalion commander imposed a penalty on me, and communists discussed this incident at a party meeting. But, in addition, some of them found justifiable motives to a certain extent: they said that it was only half a year since I got out of school. Moreover, from what kind? From the Kazan school. . . The last reason, as the saying

goes, cut me to the quick. It was offensive, and I was ashamed of myself and of such an unflattering reputation of the school. Indeed, it was impossible not to be ashamed. For, you see, I graduated with a gold medal; I received an excellent diploma, and, logically, I should have become a full-fledged platoon commander. But in actual fact it turned out that I was to stumble many times. What can be said of those who tried to get from a 3 to a 4 during their entire training! No, it appears that we were not prepared in many ways after graduation.

In the very first days of service I, for example, was suddenly surprised to find that I did not understand the psychology of a military collective and that I was not able to make contact with people--I absolutely did not conceive this. I once got to thinking: whose fault is this? First of all, evidently, it was my fault: although I tried to study conscientiously and to be truthful, I subconsciously had the idea that military pedagogy and psychology were secondary as disciplines, but it seems that they had to be mastered completely and not just for a good grade. And it turns out in practice that military pedagogy and psychology are principal disciplines.

What happens in the first days of an officer's service? Questions arise at each step in working with people and in relations with them. In seeking answers to them, you rush to the school abstracts with the hope of finding some kind of hint, some kinds of starting points, typical examples, practices, advice. But, alas! Everything is absolute theorizing, and there is nothing specific.

Indeed, there could not be any specificity, when military pedagogy and psychology were presented in monologue methods, and when we did not perform practical exercises, did not conduct professional games and did not participate in the analysis of instructive situations taken from life.

Now, thinking over why we cadets divided training subjects into important and secondary, I come to the conclusion that the matter does not lie so much with us as it does with the attitude of the instructors to their subject. For example, we went to military history lessons as if on a holiday. And not only because they were fascinating and interesting. But also because we were assigned a lot of things that were not in the textbook, which prompted us to reflect, to argue and to discuss.

I do not know what it is like now, but in the years of our training similar lessons in other subjects in the school were a rarity. Lessons essentially were a recital of textbook contents, which could have been studied independently.

I will say frankly that we coped with the electrical equipment of a tank without rolling up our sleeves, and, indeed, judging by everything, no other approach was required of us. It is possible that they felt that we will get to all of the details in practice ourselves. And, actually, we are forced now to get to them ourselves. But you can imagine my feelings, when driver mechanics reported a malfunction in some system, and I did not know how to handle it.

I understand how unpleasant it will be for some of our instructors to read these lines. But I believe that all of them will understand: I am not writing this to discredit or to cast aspersions on anyone. It is only so that someone, perhaps, would draw inferences to improve the organization of training and to prepare those who join the troops after us.

When we graduates of the Kazan school gather together, the conversation invariably turns to how much we had missed. The 5's and 4's that we received by far do not correspond to the marks that real service gives. And I will say honestly: I do not think very highly of some of the instructors.

But, of course, I blame myself most of all.

Not long ago Lt M. Tukhvatulin "distinguished himself" in an inspection. He could not answer elementary questions on the structure of a tank. And then once again what was for all of us a bitter "justification" of complete incompetence rang out, that the officer, you see, graduated from... the Kazan tank school.

It is offensive, very offensive, to hear such an opinion about the school. You see, it was not many years ago, as is known, that it was entirely different. What has happened in recent years, so that what was good was lost? I will not try to judge. I will talk only about ourselves: too infrequently during our cadet days did we think about the fact that the school would be judged by what we would do, by our future service and that we were the school's ambassadors among the troops. That each of us will bear a fraction of its fame--good or bad. We did not think about and did not especially fight for our honor and the honor of our comrades which, as is known, begins in one's youth. This is not an unfounded assertion.

At the present time, for example, our fellow-graduate Lt Tukhvatulin has been discharged from the service for service unfitness. But did not we, his classmates, see this unfitness earlier? Did they not understand that he would be of no benefit in the service? They saw, and they understood. By his behavior and his attitude toward studies. During all the years of training, he was a drag on the platoon and the school. He occupied a strange place. But who of us, communists and Komsomols, spoke up about this, and who tried to raise the issue that there should be no room for people like this in the school?

We only registered some deficiencies and breaches of regulations, but each of us took the position: it is clearer to the authorities; our job is to stand aside.

But not at all, and not stand aside. We must be responsible not only for ourselves, but for comrades also, for their every act of misconduct. Only in this situation can one become a real officer.

Restructuring is going on in the VUZ's, and, of course, many things will change in this process. I think that cadets should take part in it in the most aggressive way. Not to wait until someone introduces changes, but to act. How? Get rid of passivity, wage an implacable fight against 3's, get rid of everything which hinders studying military affairs in a real way. Take as a chief principle: each day that I live I must ready myself for outstanding service in the troops, and I must become such that the school will be proud of me.

PACT SEEKS END TO PRODUCTION, DEPLOYMENT OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Apr 87 p 3

[Article by O. Mikhaylov: "In the Name of the Security of Our Planet"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] 1987 must become the year marking the beginning of universal and total chemical disarmament.

It happened on 22 April 1915. For the first time in history, the Kaiser's troops used chemical weapons on a sector of the French-German front in the Ypres River region. Five thousand French soldiers perished in horrible torment. Chemical weapons have been used repeatedly since that time by imperialist governments in military operations. And every time their use has turned into a mass slaying not only of military personnel, but of the peaceful population as well. Today this "noiseless death" has been transformed into a weapon of mass destruction, threatening all of mankind along with nuclear weapons.

The socialist countries have consistently called for the banning and destruction of all chemical weapons reserves and the production base for their manufacture at the earliest possible time. As was recently announced, the Soviet Union has ceased production of chemical weapons. Establishment of a special enterprise to destroy reserves has already been initiated.

It is appropriate to recall that new approaches to resolving this serious problem were formulated by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev in his declaration of 15 January 1986.

At the April 1986 Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the USSR introduced additional proposals on the destruction of chemical weapons reserves and chemical weapons production sources. Strict monitoring--to include international participation--is envisioned in the proposed measures. Considerations were also set forth as to specific procedures for destroying war gas reserves and their production sources. In November 1986 the Soviet Union introduced proposals with regard to prohibiting commercial production of

chemical weapons, to include trans-national corporations. Many participants in the negotiations noted the severity of the monitoring measures put forward by the USSR, which would allow all participants to a prospective convention to guarantee observation of its provisions.

Finally, in February 1987 the Soviet delegation to the Geneva Disarmament Conference introduced proposals providing that each state participating in the convention must, 30 days after it goes into effect, provide notice as to its chemical weapons storage locations and must take measures to close warehouses and prevent relocation of chemical weapons reserves, with the exception of relocation for the purpose of elimination. The businesslike, specific nature of the Soviet proposals was noted in disarmament conference circles, and it was widely admitted that these proposals were compromising in their nature, striving to take into account to the greatest possible extent the interests of other countries participating in the negotiations.

While attempting a radical solution to the problem of banning chemical weapons, the socialist nations in the meantime support intermediate measures--GDR, Czechoslovakian, Bulgarian and Romanian initiatives on the establishment of chemical weapons-free zones correspondingly in the center of Europe and in the Balkans.

It is precisely this kind of approach which provides the opportunity for successfully drawing up a convention. "If the United States and the other NATO countries so desired, it would be possible to conclude an appropriate convention as early as 1987," noted Marshal of the Soviet Union S. F. Akhromeyev, Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and First USSR Deputy Minister of Defense, in an interview with the West German magazine STERN.

However, the United States and its allies are surrounding our constructive proposals with silence. Moreover, as several participants in the negotiations have noted, the USA position is becoming still more obstructionist with regard to further progress in the initiatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist states. And those Western countries that are attempting to introduce alternative proposals are being subject to political pressure by the United States.

Additionally, to say that the United States is leaving unanswered the initiatives of the socialist states would be untrue. The USA is responding--through preparations for development of full-scale production of the newest type of chemical weaponry--binary chemical weapons.

In allocating funds for the production of binary weapons, the US Congress required the administration to obtain the agreement of US allies for deployment of this weapon on their soil. Under pressure from the United States, a NATO session in Brussels in May 1986 agreed to the placement of binary weapons in Western Europe and thus gave the green light to the American program of chemical rearmament. In this manner the United States and its more militant NATO allies disregarded not only the peaceful initiatives of the

socialist nations, but also the opinions of NATO governments--Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Greece, Luxembourg and Iceland--which expressed reservations and objections to the American plans.

In effecting realization of its program for chemical rearmament, the United States is waging a propaganda campaign that strives in every way possible to minimize the extent of its already existing chemical arsenal, maintaining that in scope it is "small and antiquated to a significant degree." In planning its chemical rearmament, however, the Pentagon is clearly in no hurry to destroy its on-hand reserves. In this manner, the chemical rearmament--which envisages bringing the number of weapons to five million--is essentially a program of additional armament.

Additionally, the goal in modernizing chemical armaments is not only to increase their numbers, but also to enhance the effectiveness of such offensive weapons. The concept of a binary application consists in varying the components of binary mixtures so as to obtain the greatest toxicity and produce fundamentally new operating mechanisms for poisonous substances.

The relative ease of production of binary components may lead to a widespread "unraveling" of chemical weapons. Aside from this, the binary concept substantially complicates questions of monitoring observance of the provisions of the prospective convention. Perhaps it is precisely for this reason that, at negotiations on the banning of chemical weapons, the United States is trying hard to exclude commercial industry enterprises from being subject to monitoring, especially private firms and trans-national corporations, which the Pentagon is enlisting on a widespread basis for the development and production of chemical weapons.

The United States plans in the next 10 years to spend more than 12 billion dollars in preparation for chemical war. Located at Pine Bluff, Arkansas, the first plant for producing binary warheads, slated to produce 700,000 artillery shells per year, is ready to go into operation. The Pentagon has requested 25 million dollars from Congress to complete development of the "Big Eye" binary chemical air bomb in fiscal year 1988 and is asking another 99 million dollars for 1989, when full-scale production is scheduled to begin. In addition, the US Department of Defense has requested 31 million dollars more for development of a chemical warhead for multi-barreled rocket launchers, which should be built by 1991.

Nations of the Warsaw Pact are once again calling upon all countries to refrain from taking any steps which would complicate achievement of mutually acceptable understandings, to refrain from producing chemical weapons and deploying them on foreign territory, and to withdraw chemical weapons from foreign territories on which they are currently stationed.

The socialist countries call upon all negotiations participants to exert political will, realism and a high degree of responsibility in making 1987 the year which marks the beginning of full and complete chemical disarmament. We must not miss a real opportunity to end the chemical threat for all mankind.

CRITIQUE OF TRAINING OF RECONNAISSANCE UNITS IN GSFG

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 May 87 p 1

[Article by Lt Col A. Nitishvskiy, senior officer in the directorate of combat training of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Do Not Make a Move Without Reconnaissance! Is This Frontline Precept Adhered to Always"]

[Text] The phase of combat firing, which was supposed to be conducted during the exercise with the tank battalion commanded by Maj V. Yavlyanskiy, was one of the most crucial moments in checking the proficiency of tank crewmen. Naturally, they were preparing for it with particular care. But the subunits had not reached the line of fire positions when the higher headquarters representative at the exercise decided to stop the attack.

The case, frankly, was not an ordinary one. It was occasioned by the fact that the tank crewmen learned about more than 80 percent of the targets not from reconnaissance acquired by their own forces and means but from information given them by the exercise director. Thus, there was evidence of obvious oversimplification.

It has long been known that the outcome of battle to a decisive extent depends on the ability of commanders and staffs to conduct reconnaissance. Now its tasks, conditions of organization and conduct have become considerably more complicated. In particular, the depth of reconnaissance has been increased, and the requirements for accuracy of the data acquired have been raised, especially in determining target coordinates. But it is as if this was forgotten in the battalion.

Moreover, not only in the battalion. Afterwards, when what had occurred was thoroughly analyzed, it became clear that a similar organization of exercises with subunits was also a normal occurrence in the regiment to which the battalion in question belonged. The fact is that with this kind of an approach, there are more chances of getting high ratings. It is now known what led to this approach: many subunits that at one time had received high ratings in tactical training found themselves in great difficulty when executing complex scenario instructions for performance evaluation, because of the inability of commanders to organize and conduct reconnaissance.

The neglectful attitude toward reconnaissance preparation that had taken root in some units led to the fact that, even after the intervention of officers of the directorate of combat training of a group of forces, it was not possible to correct the problem everywhere. This was particularly evident in many of the episodes in the last performance evaluation. Here is just one of them.

Finding himself in direct contact with the "enemy," Capt S. Petrakov, commander of a motorized rifle battalion, during the night preceding an offensive, was able with the help of reconnaissance to make an outline of the forward edge of the battle area, the boundaries of fortified positions, and the disposition of minefields and other barriers. It would seem that this should have promoted success.

However, in the morning, going over to the offensive, the motorized riflemen saw that the first trench of the "enemy" was empty. The commander of the battalion ordered exploitation of the offensive in depth. But when approaching a hill where, according to reconnaissance data, "enemy" reserves were supposed to be deployed, the motorized riflemen came under intense fire from a direction from which fire power was not expected at all. In a word, fulfilling the assigned task, the battalion was forced to go on the defensive. And all because the commander did not follow through on reconnaissance measures. The reasons for failure were similar in the battalions commanded by Lt Col A. Savin and Maj S. Migunov.

The performance evaluation showed that many officers have a very rough idea about how to organize reconnaissance in various kinds of combat. The organizational and staff structure of subunits of the probable enemy are not studied in sufficient depth in some places. Some subunits are poorly trained in the conduct of reconnaissance by such methods as intercepts, search, raid and ambush. Not enough attention is paid to the development of questions associated with the organization of reconnaissance in force.

How come? Are such lessons absolutely necessary in order finally to deal seriously with reconnaissance training. Is it possible that this matter could not be placed on a proper footing in some places without the intervention of higher offices? It seems that it will be better if each commander independently and without prompting comes to the firm conviction: "Do not make a move without reconnaissance!" As is known, this was a law for combat veterans.

There are a lot of officers in units and combined units of groups of forces who pay the most serious attention to improving reconnaissance training and displaying creativity and initiative in this matter. Among them is Guards Lt Col V. Lesnov. It is no accident that his subordinates operate successfully in all tactical exercises. Guards Lt Col Lesnov does not allow a situation where those being trained get too much ready data on the "enemy." He organizes exercises in such a way that subunits constantly face aggressive counteraction. Guards Lt Lesnov believes that making training sessions complicated is an effective form of improving the reconnaissance training of

personnel. Questions of tactics, organization and staff structure and models of weapons and equipment of the armies of a probable enemy are studied in the course of training sessions on tactical, firing, engineer and other types of training.

At present we see our task as insuring that other commanders arm themselves with the experience of such officers as Lt Col Lesnov. During preparation for summer combat training, we will try to make him everyone's property. At the same time, it is important that more attention also be given at unit locations to everything which arises in the process of combat training and competitions, including what is new in reconnaissance training. The issue is: everyone should be able to conduct reconnaissance in combat.

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WARSAW PACT

TASS: CHERNYSHEV ON MILITARY DOCTRINES

LD041250 Moscow TASS in English 1247 GMT 4 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow, 4 Jun (TASS)--TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

The results of the Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty members continue to command much interest the world over.

Figuring prominently among the numerous questions I am being asked by diplomats accredited in Moscow in connection with the meeting's decisions are queries concerning the document "On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Member Countries" which has been adopted there.

Why is this problem so pressing? What is the goal behind the proposal to NATO countries for consultations to compare military doctrines, analyze their nature and jointly consider their future evolution?

The complicated world situation today, the growing interdependence of states, scientific and technological progress and the development of weapons of unprecedented destructive power have made it the task of priority importance to strengthen trust among nations, especially those belonging to different social systems, and understand correctly each other's concerns, objectives and intentions in the military field.

The military policy of any country or alliance is reflected most fully in its military doctrine. This is why it is so important now to formulate the fundamental provisions of the military doctrine of a country or military-political alliance bluntly and coherently.

The members of the Warsaw Treaty organizations have summarized in detail their military doctrine which forms the basis for their alliance's activities and reflects the military-political aims of all its participants and their national military doctrines.

The clear-cut, to-the-point summary is graphic evidence of the defensive nature of this doctrine and its complete subordination to the need to avert war, either nuclear or conventional, and a confirmation that the alliance's members never had and do not have a desire to have more armed forces and armaments than are needed for defense.

It is very important that the doctrine has provisions saying that a world war, the more so nuclear war, would have catastrophic consequences for the very life on earth and that strategic military parity remains the decisive factor for preventing war but a further raising of the parity level will not bring greater security.

Hence the need to apply efforts to preserve the balance of armed forces at an even lower level. This is the bedrock of the policy of socialist countries on the reduction of armed forces and armaments.

There should be the same kind of clarity about the military doctrine of NATO and the members of that military-political alliance. So far, however, the state of things in this respect has been extremely unsatisfactory.

President Ronald Reagan in November 1985 signed a joint Soviet-American statement in Geneva, saying that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought and containing the pledge not to seek military superiority.

However, the U.S. military doctrine, the main provisions of which are summarized in a whole number of official U.S. documents that have not been rejected or cancelled to this day, attests to something quite different.

The doctrine, according to a statement by U.S. Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger, is underlied [as received] by a strategy for "countervailing" the USSR at global and regional levels, which provides for securing a full and indisputable U.S. military superiority.

The Pentagon's directives bluntly summarize calculations that the United States can survive and win a nuclear war and envisage the first use of nuclear weapons both globally and in the theater of operations.

It also stressed the need to accelerate work to develop new systems for strategic nuclear forces and sets the goal of being prepared to fight effectively a war from space.

The directives testify that the U.S. military doctrine is an offensive one gambling on nuclear weapons and the possibility of using them to gain political purposes.

It banks on the continued buildup of the nuclear potential and actually rules out the possibility of secure peace without nuclear arms.

All these provisions are reflected in programs to develop the Armed Forces and in specific plans for using them.

Upholding nuclear weapons, in Washington and some other NATO capitals they do everything to upgrade them and draw up programs for their use, specifying at what phase of a war they should be used and which and how many weapons should be employed against which targets.

The main thing is that there is a striking discrepancy between documents signed by the U.S. President and current statements by representatives of the American leadership, on the one hand, and what is known in the world about the U.S. military doctrine as well as U.S. practical activities to develop the Armed Forces, on the other.

Isn't it a task of exceptional importance in these conditions to hold consultations and compare the military doctrines, as suggested by the Warsaw Treaty members?

There is no doubt that it could be possible by joint efforts to lift the mutual suspicion and mistrust that have been piling up for years, achieve a better understanding of each other and make sure that the military concepts and doctrines of the military blocs and their participants are based on the principles of defense.

Using the latest Soviet terminology which is very popular today also in the West, there is a need for Glasnost about military doctrines in order to enhance the governments' responsibility for the fate of mankind.

/9604

CSO: 1812/244

WARSAW PACT

BRIEFS

REGULAR SESSION OF MILITARY COUNCIL--A regular session of the Warsaw Pact Military Council was held in Minsk 16 through 18 April under the chairmanship of Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov, commander-in-chief of Warsaw Pact combined armed forces. Several current issues concerning the activity of the Warsaw Pact forces were examined during the course of the session and agreed-upon recommendations were adopted. The session was conducted in a businesslike atmosphere, in the spirit of friendship and mutual understanding. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Apr 87 p 1] 9768

1801/178

DEFENSE MINISTER SEEKS 'LIQUIDATION' OF COMPUTER ILLITERACY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Apr 87 p 2

[Article by Captain I. Zaslavskiy, computer programmer, Order of Lenin Computer Center of the Moscow Military District: "Computers--Not Just For Interior Decor"]

[Text] Do we need computer technology in the military, let's say for administration in the mid-level military establishment? I can see some wonderment here--what doubts can there be now that people are talking about computerization of all our activity on the broadest scale, when personal computers are being produced at full capacity...?

Practical experience has shown convincingly that effective use of computers can significantly reduce the administrative workload at any level of operation, and can increase the productivity of administrators three or four times, or more. We who work at the military district computer center see this all the time. Data which in earlier days was computed at headquarters, directorates, departments and service sections of the district over periods of long days and even weeks, can now be prepared in minutes on the computer.

But it is hardly necessary to talk about the possibilities presented by computers these days. It is something else we need to talk about--our psychological and professional readiness to transfer part of our administrative workload to the computer, overcoming the obstacle of "distrust" and timidity with respect to it.

Let me begin with a positive example--the district's military transportation service. Every day the railroads carry diverse military freight, an activity monitored by this service. Until recently, the duty officer's head was reeling, so to speak, with an abundance of "information to reflect upon."

So when an automated monitoring system was introduced here, efficiency in processing information improved right away and the necessity for compiling stacks of paperwork disappeared. Most importantly, however, the officer on duty was now able to work with a sense of perspective. Reference information stored in the computer allows an accurate determination at any point in time of the presence and condition of railroad flatcars and tank cars. The system of monitoring shipment progress of military transport freight has an effect on

the customer. The computer helps conduct in-depth analysis of the accomplishment of daily and monthly shipment plans for supplying directorates, departments and services, and can opportunely determine idle time.

I can remember how we began with Lieutenant Colonel G. Boyko, how he "liquidated his illiteracy" with respect to computers. Then Lieutenant Colonel V. Kondratenko got into it. But perhaps the individual who got most carried away by the idea was Lieutenant Colonel V. Verigin. We--professional computer programmers--were truly amazed at how quickly and thoroughly he learned to carry on a dialog with the computer, how well he came to grasp its capabilities in solving a whole array of specialized service tasks. Other officers proved themselves to be equally enthusiastic about this new approach--Lieutenant Colonels V. Antropov, secretary of the district military council, A. Kaledkin, a chemical corps officer, and A. Mishin, an air defense artillery officer.

All the same, are computers being well utilized? Unfortunately, they are not. Apprehension on the part of commanders and managers is understandable, of course--this business can seem somewhat mysterious and the process itself of transition to an automated data processing system doesn't take place in a day, or even in a week. But the significant fact is that many mid-level administrative organs lack in their organizational scheme not only the personnel to service computers, but the computers themselves.

Yes, for the time being they don't have them. That same district office of the Military Communications Service has a "foreign" machine. They borrowed it, as I understand, from one of the military registration and enlistment offices, where it was "available" but not in operation.

Thus, I would like to pose the question--why, in some of these organizations, do expensive computers only fulfill the role of providing interior decor? Why haven't centralized programs been developed for them? Well, experience shows a way out of this situation can always be found. The personnel of our computer center are always eager to meet with those who are just beginning to deal with computers and turn to us for programming assistance.

There is, apparently, another reason. Enthusiasts are lacking--or, more accurately, the informational culture is lacking in the minds of certain personnel in military commissariats. They simply cannot imagine any ways other than the existing ones for accomplishing clerical work or collecting and processing information, any procedures other than the existing ones for making decisions using the information. The little counters on bookkeepers' abacuses are still clicking in the offices of rayon, city and oblast military commissariats. Dozens of commissariat officers are digressing into functional areas which are unusual for them.

But the defense minister has issued a directive establishing the process to be followed in introducing computer technology, and it calls for the elimination of "computer illiteracy." Time is passing, and what do we have? Where are the specially trained officers, for example? They are graduating from institutions, but generally not like they should, and there are too few of them. And often they are not utilized according to their designation. We

must thoroughly investigate the reasons for this situation and implement yet one more means at our disposal for increasing the stability of troop control and administration, and enhancing staff work effectiveness.

In short, computers are necessary for the work we have to do, and not for interior decor.

9768

CSO: 1801/178

COMPUTERIZING MARXISM-LENINISM

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 May 87 p 2

[Article by Lt Col O. Nikonov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Ideological Work: Facets of Renewal. Dialogue With A Computer"]

[Text] The study of programs for the Marxist-Leninist training of officers with the help of microprocessing equipment today is no longer a flight of daring fancy but a reality. For the second year at the Military Communications Academy imeni S. M. Budenny, on the initiative of the department of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and scientific communism, which is headed by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Professor Maj Gen V. Malkov, undergraduate and postgraduate students engaged in independent study of the history of the CPSU, philosophy and scientific communism are using automated teaching systems created on the basis of third-generation minicomputers.

The idea of using a display class for the study of social sciences is not new. Several years ago a group of scientists of the Leningrad Institute of Precision Mechanics and Optics began work in this direction, and soon the system was created. It was introduced at the USSR VDNKh [Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy], received a good rating by specialists in the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education of the country, and the scientific research institute on problems of higher schools proposed that this development of B. Fedorov, Z. Dzhalilashvili and A. Kirillov be put into use in VUZ's.

However, it turns out this was only theory. The path to implementation is thorny. As was remarked by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Professor B. Fedorov, the research manager for the creation of the AOS [automated teaching system], computerized teaching methods scare social scientists, and traditional thinking still prevails. To the credit of the Military Academy of Communications, people there, so to say, latched on to the idea and properly estimated the practical utility of the new method of instruction. Workers of the political section of the academy, headed by Maj Gen G. Ivanov, together with teachers of the department of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and scientific communism, began to implement the system aggressively. In addition, they asked the developers to improve the system, taking into account the display

auditorium available in the academy. This is the way the fruitful cooperation of the political workers and the scientists began, which led to results about which Viktor Ivanovich Malkov said with pride:

"If you take the mastery of the training program by our officers in the year 1985 as a base index, then today this level has been doubled. The application of control-teaching systems based on EVM [computers] enabled us not only to determine exactly the quality and degree of mastery of material being studied by officers, and simultaneously to evaluate their knowledge, but also to liven up the entire training process. In the final analysis, all of this has led to an increase in the productivity and quality of work both of the teachers and of the students."

One factor should be emphasized here. The technical systems of teaching and control employed today in military VUZ's model only the method of questioning with the simple selection of an answer. This is not very effective in teaching social sciences, inasmuch as the thinking process "is emasculated," and work is reduced to the level of guessing, let us say, the correct answer entered into the equipment.

The teaching system about which we are speaking does not have this shortcoming. Because the video terminal unit--the display [monitor]-- makes it possible to work in a "student-computer" dialogue mode, which is made to approximate human intercourse as much as possible. The program has a large number of problem situations. Any freely constructed answer is evaluated.

"Do you want to test yourself? Select a display," Lt Col V Andreyev, the senior instructor, offered when we met in the equipment room. In the next room, where a regular class had just ended and the officers came out for a break, the computer screens were already turned off. "Nothing complicated," Vladimir Fedorovich remarked, "now the engineer will change the magnetic disks. It takes a minute, and we can start. What shall we check ourselves on: CPSU history or philosophy?"

I selected philosophy. The first sensation in front of a lit up screen is curiosity. It does not go away while you are selecting the necessary data on the keyboard. The thought comes up: it is all right for communicators--they are taught, but how about those who are not officially associated with typing? An adult poking away with one finger at the keyboard of a smart machine looks helpless, like a first grader in front of an ABC panel. We are moving to total computerization of teaching, while we have not yet planned for such a minimum requirement as typing in training programs, if only as elective courses. But this is incidental.

Not being particularly prepared for this conversation with a machine, I decided not to take risks. I let it "understand" that I wanted to start with the alphabet. I will repeat here a frequently held dialogue.

Machine: "The work of F. Engels 'Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy' occupies a special place in the legacy of Marxism, because it is, as V. I. Lenin noted, 'the handbook for any conscientious worker.'" (Complete Collected Works, vol 23, p 43.) It reveals the relationship of

Marxism to its philosophical forebears--representatives of the German classical philosophy of Hegel and Feuerbach. The work was written at the beginning of 1886, and it was published initially in the theoretical journal of German social democracy "New Times," and afterwards it came out as a separate edition. The formulation of the basic question of philosophy, which became classic in Marxist philosophy, has exceptional significance in the theoretical content of the work of F. Engels. Formulate the basic question of philosophy."

I compose an answer. Vladimir Fedorovich warned that a stopwatch in the machine will calculate the time spent by me on the answer.

"Try to be concise," he said, "or the computer will think that you are groping for an answer."

And actually within a fraction of a second, I get nine disarming lines on the screen: "You did not answer the question correctly. The basic question of philosophy is the question of the relationship of thought to matter, consciousness to existence and the spirit to nature. 'The great basic question of all philosophy, particularly of the new philosophy,' writes F. Engels in the second chapter of his book, 'is the question of the relationship of thought to existence. (K. Marx, F. Engels--Works, 2d edition, vol 21, p 282.'" And then immediately: "Into what two basic directions are philosophical studies divided, subject to the resolution of the basic question of philosophy?"

I admit, after intentionally inserting an error in the answer, that I did not expect this reaction from the computer.

"That is one of the merits of the system," explained senior instructor Col M. Tkach. "The machine adapts itself to the level of knowledge of the user, and it will narrow the limits of the theme being studied until the user does not find deeper knowledge in some aspect. Then the dialogue will proceed to increasing complexity. In the event that you are not prepared, the machine itself will break off the dialogue, and it will refer you to a list of primary sources with an indication of chapters and pages, which it is absolutely necessary to read and master before sitting down at the display.

I was not expecting a sad finale when the computer, getting utterly "angry," said: "You did not master the subject. I am ending the dialogue." I made amends and, responding to all subsequent questions, tried to strain my memory. And this was the result: the machine gave me its blessing in my next encounter with it, but it warned me about the kinds of questions I should study beforehand.

"Working with the system is really interesting," Maj N. Luparev, a student at the academy, said later. "It was difficult at first, because the machine demands clear thinking and conciseness. You see, it is also experiencing the art of thinking. I had to avoid the usual generalities."

Our conversation proceeds along the lines that one can foresee that in the near future there will be an aggressive invasion of teaching equipment in the

training process in a variety of forms, and that personal computers will literally inundate the population of the country; that is, we are faced with the very acute question of the broad movement to acquire computer literacy. Thus, we have to look into the future.

The officer was supported by Maj Gen V. Malkov. But the general began from another angle:

"During their years of training, students in academies and cadets in schools have to study about 400 different sources with an overall volume of more than 11,000 pages. Psychologists assert that a person can handle 5-6 pages of socio-political text in 1 hour. It turns out that to master the training material, 2,240 hours of fruitful and independent work are needed. Where does one get so much time? The requirements do not match capabilities, and circumstances at best compel a quick review of recommended literature. Cadets and students in such a state of affairs frequently turn to formalism in training. And we, the teachers, unfortunately, are not yet able to direct their independent work. One cannot seriously believe that a check of abstracts is directing independent work. An automated teaching system can be a help here.

Departmental teachers with whom we compared notes about the work of an AOS express themselves solely in support of a wide introduction of computer methods. "This is our future," they said. Of course, traditional forms of studies--actual work with books, lectures and many other things--are not given up, but they are supplemented substantially. Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor Colonel V. Fedotov noted, for example, that 1 hour of work at a display today corresponds in effectiveness to 6 hours of work with a book. And machine information is forgotten a lot slower. This is also made note of by science.

"But it is fundamentally important, and I would like to emphasize this fact especially," said Vasilii Grigorevich, "that an automated teaching system helps in managing the teaching process better, and it changes its structure materially. How does this happen? Imagine that I take a summary table from the computer printer of work that appears on the display of the entire training group in which values and dialogue times are recorded for each fragment. These individual indicators and the indicators for the whole group correctly define the quality of a lecture and how it is perceived by students. It can be seen how thoroughly or superficially a subject is studied, what kinds of questions caused difficulties, how much time was spent on composing an answer, and what the completeness of an answer was like. . . Also, inferences are derived from this, corrections are made in lesson schedules and independent studies, and teachers of the subject and methodology commission get operationally involved, because the machine also compels the development of a single methodological viewpoint on one or another problem."

Not everything, of course, is stored in the system. The department jointly with developers from the Institute of Precision Mechanics and Optics is conducting a search for the most flexible methodologies and is improving the speech dialogue. But in the meantime the main problem is not being solved: there are not enough programs in the social sciences.

Maj Gen G. Ivanov, chief of the political section, said the following in this connection:

"Developers have created two philosophy programs, two CPSU history programs and a partial program on scientific communism. But to proceed further requires the independent creativity of our teachers. Of course, this is an extremely complicated matter. Months and months of intensive activity by scholarly collectives is required. They work out of enthusiasm, because, as the saying goes, they are not entered in any kind of a record book. The question comes up as to how to proceed: create the programs themselves or sign contracts with social science teachers of other VUZ's? Perhaps a single centralized order for all military training institutions is needed, so that there would be no duplication and needless and unwarranted expenditures. We are prepared to assume the responsibility for an experimental laboratory for the creation of a bank of programs and the development of new methodologies."

Well, the offer has been made, as the saying goes...

But in conclusion, I would like to recall the words which were heard in conversations with teachers: "This is our future." The new method of political teaching and political self-education with the help of modern equipment sooner or later will be employed widely--both in military VUZ's and in units. And it is better to know about this sooner than later, to think about it and to be ready for it. And to take specific steps to meet it halfway.

13052

CSO: 1801/194

BENEFITS: SERVICE TIME ON WORK RECORD QUESTIONED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 May 87 p 4

[Article under rubric "RED STAR Information Service": "On the Length of Compulsory Service"]

[Text] Parents of draftees Tikhonov, Smirnov, Omyrkulov and others ask what terms have been established for active military service and whether their sons can be detained beyond the established terms.

The terms of active military service for soldiers, sailors, sergeants and master sergeants are specified by the USSR Law "On Universal Military Duty." The following terms have been established:

--for soldiers and sergeants of the Soviet Army, coastal units and aviation of the Navy and border and internal troops--2 years, and for soldiers and sergeants with a higher education, 1 year 6 months;

--for sailors and petty officers of ships, vessels and coastal combat security units of the Navy and naval units of border troops--3 years, and for sailors and petty officers with a higher education, 2 years.

The term of active military service is calculated:

--for those called up in the first half of the year--from 1 July of the year of callup;

--for those called up in the second half of the year--from 1 January of the year following the year of callup.

Servicemen who serve the established terms of active compulsory service can be detained if necessary up to 2 months past the established terms.

13052

CSO: 1801/194

RECENT VOYENIZDAT PUBLICATIONS, APRIL 1986

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Apr 87 p 2

[Unattributed report: "VOYENIZDAT Publications"]

[Text] "The Military-Theory Legacy of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Modern War." N. I. Basov, V. M. Bondarenko, D. A. Volkogonov and others; edited by A. S. Milovidova. 1987. 360 pages. Price: 1 ruble, 70 kopeks.

The military-theory legacy of V. I. Lenin comprises a very rich world outlook and methodology base for Soviet military theory and practice. Based on it the book examines topical issues of modern war and the Soviet military establishment, a knowledge of which is very important for military personnel.

The monograph is intended for officers and generals of the Soviet Armed Forces and for everyone who is studying Lenin's military-theory legacy.

"We Shall Fulfill the Decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress. We Shall Celebrate the 70th Anniversary of the Great October With Selfless Military Labor!" Poster. 1987. Price: 15 kopeks.

"Criticism of Bourgeois Concepts on Issues Concerning the Soviet Military Establishment." S. A. Tyushkevish. 1987. (To assist in Marxist-Leninist training for officers). 48 pages. Price: 5 kopeks.

"The Valginskaya Red Banner." A. Z. Borovinskikh. Military historical essay on the campaign record of the 377th Valginskaya Red Banner Infantry Division. 1987. 120 pages. Price: 40 kopeks.

The book relates the campaign record of the 377th Infantry Division, formed in the Urals, which received its baptism by fire in the battles at Leningrad, fighting at the Volkhov and Narva bridgeheads. It participated in joint efforts with other units (soyedineniye) in liberating the Baltic region and greeted Victory Day in Kurlyandiya.

9768

CSO: 1801/178

OBITUARY: LT GEN I. A. LEBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Apr 87 p 4

[Text] Lieutenant General (Retired) Ivan Alekseyevich Lebed, former deputy chief of construction and troop billeting, veteran of the Great Patriotic War, passed away suddenly. I. A. Lebed dedicated all of his conscious life to selfless service to our Motherland, the Soviet people and the cause of the Communist Party, in whose ranks he had served since 1930.

I. A. Lebed was born in 1910 in Poltava Oblast. After graduating from the Leningrad Engineering Institute of the Civil Air Force, he served in engineer units (soyedineniye) of the Black Sea Fleet. He worked as chief of the engineering directorate of the Black Sea Fleet, Deputy Commander for Construction, Black Sea Fleet, chief of the engineering directorate of air defense forces and, since 1964, as deputy chief of construction and troop billeting in the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government have appraised highly the services of I. A. Lebed for his Motherland. He was awarded six orders, many medals, and awards from the socialist countries.

May the memory of Ivan Alekseyevich Lebed, faithful son of the Communist Party and the Soviet people, always be preserved in our hearts.

N. F. Shestopalov, N. S. Kovalenko, L. V. Shumilov, V. I. Ivankov, N. V. Chekov, S. A. Spirin, I. T. Chernyshov, G. I. Domanin, K. I. Mukhin, A. G. Zhoromskiy, V. S. Grigorkin, N. V. Gryaznov, V. N. Charkin, K. F. Pogorelov, V. I. Drakin, G. A. Proskuryakov.

9768

CSO: 1801/178

OBITUARY: LT GEN B. Ya. KUTSENKO

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 May 87 p 4

[Obituary "B. Ya. Kutsenko" signed by Ye. F. Ivanovskiy, M.D. Popkov, D. A. Grinkevich, V. A. Merimskiy, Yu. T. Chesnokov, Yu. A. Andersen, V. A. Gatsolayev, Yu. P. Belkov, V. S. Kuzmichev, K. B. Zhdanovich and A. G. Luzan]

[Text] Lt Gen (Ret) Boris Yakovlevich Kutsenko has passed away suddenly. He devoted his conscientious life whole-heartedly to the service of the Soviet homeland and to the cause of the Communist Party, of which he was a member since 1942.

B. Ya. Kutsenko was born on 3 May 1921 in the village of Pechenga, Kharkov Oblast, to a peasant family. In 1939 he was called into the Soviet Army, and he went through the ranks from private to lieutenant general. He was on active duty during the years of the Great Patriotic War from 1942 and until his death.

In the postwar years, he graduated from the M. V. Frunze Military Academy and completed various command assignments with PVO Troops of the Ground Forces. In all posts that the party assigned him to, B. Ya. Kutsenko performed his party and military duty with a sense of great responsibility. He was invariably distinguished by adherence to principles, demands on himself and his subordinates and a sensitivity and attention to people.

The services of B. Ya. Kutsenko to the homeland are highly valued by the Communist Party and the Soviet state. He is decorated with the Order of Labor Red Banner and Patriotic War 1st Class, two Orders of the Red Star and many medals.

A bright memory of Boris Yakovlevich Kutsenko, an ardent patriot and courageous communist soldier, will be preserved in our hearts forever.

13052

CSO: 1801/194

ARMED FORCES

BRIEFS

SOKOLOV INVITED TO HUNGARY--By invitation of Col Gen F. Karpati, minister of defense of the Hungarian People's Republic, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov will visit the Hungarian People's Republic in the latter half of May of this year. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 May 87 p 1] 13052

CSO: 1801/194

GROUND FORCES

ARMY GEN IVANOVSKIY ON DEVELOPMENT, CURRENT REQUIREMENTS

Moscow TEKHNICA I VOORUZHENIYE in Russian No 4, Apr 87 pp 2-5

[Article by Army General Ye. Ivanovskiy, Commander-in-Chief of Ground Forces, USSR Deputy Minister of Defense, Hero of the Soviet Union: "Satisfying Current Requirements"]

[Text] When one observes maneuvers or major exercises and observes the swift, coordinated actions of motorized riflemen, armor and artillery personnel, airborne troops, combat engineers and other specialists, he once again becomes convinced as to the exceptional might of our ground forces. They have been and are today the service having the greatest numerical strength, greatest diversity in armament and greatest variety of means with which to carry out combat operations. Their combat capabilities allow them to accomplish major strategic missions of varying nature and substance either independently or in conjunction with strategic rocket forces, air defense forces, the air force or the navy. Today they have been relegated a deciding role in consolidating final results of operations and in annihilating an enemy.

The Communist Party and the Soviet people have taken care to see that our ground forces have everything necessary for fulfilling the missions entrusted to them--modern combat equipment, powerful armament (tanks, armored fighting vehicles and personnel carriers, missile, artillery and air defense systems, communications and engineer equipment, etc.), and well trained military personnel dedicated to the cause of defending the Motherland.

The history of establishment of our ground forces comprises several stages, during which they gathered fighting strength, developed and became more sophisticated. Satisfying current requirements has been the unchanging formula of their development.

The foundation of the young Red Army in 1918 consisted of the ground forces--various branches (infantry, artillery, cavalry, armored forces) and special troops (engineer, communications, motor, chemical and others). The chief combined arms tactical units (soyedineniye) of that time were the infantry and cavalry divisions. The main armed force during the years of foreign military intervention and the civil war was the infantry. It is the infantry, allied with the cavalry, which guaranteed the utter defeat of numerous enemies of the Soviet republic in those difficult times.

Substantiating the origins of the fortitude and combat readiness of our army, V. I. Lenin wrote that soviets of workers are creating a new "armed forces of workers and peasants, forces which are not detached from the people, as were the forces of the old standing army, but are very closely linked with them; in the military sense these forces are incomparably more powerful than their predecessor; in a revolutionary sense, there is nothing else which can take their place."

The ground forces underwent further development as a result of the military reforms of 1924 and 1925, which established a proper organizational structure, introduced unity of command, instituted new regulations and set in motion the technological re-equipping of the army. This was the time when the armed forces of our Motherland were brought into accord with the economic opportunities available to the young state of workers and peasants, and with the level of development of military science and technology.

The growing strength of the Red Army was put to the test in encounters with imperialist aggressors of every variety. Many times it dealt a decisive blow to provocative enemy onslaughts. This was the case with military conflicts in the region of the Chinese Eastern Railroad in 1929, near Lake Khasan in 1938, and in the Khalkhin-Gol River region in 1939.

Prior to World War II, development of the ground forces proceeded keeping in mind the ability to wage an extended and intense armed conflict against a powerful enemy. Significantly increased maneuverability, fire power and strike capability of combined arms units (soyedineniye, chast) constituted the basis of this development. I personally had the occasion to witness the process of development of our armored motor vehicles and tanks, and in fact participated actively in it. I joined the Red Army in 1936 and, upon completion of the armor institute, served with armor troops--as tank platoon leader through formation (obyedineniye) commander.

In the pre-war years, our mechanized troops consisted of units (soyedineniye, chast) and had various types of tanks in the inventory. The light T-26 and medium T-28 tanks were used to support combined arms units. The swift-moving BT-5 and BT-7 half-track vehicles formed the main component of the tank brigades. The heavy T-35 was used for additional troop reinforcement for breakthroughs of fortified positions. The T-27 light tank, T-37 and T-38 light amphibious tanks, and the T-40, which entered the inventory in 1940, were designed basically for reconnaissance. New tanks were built in the years 1938-1940--the T-34 medium and KV-1 heavy tanks with anti-missile armament were the best in the world.

Over the same period the inventory was complemented with artillery systems and mortars (76-mm cannons, 122-mm and 152-mm howitzers, 82-mm and 120-mm mortars) which significantly increased the fire power of rifle units. A new rocket armament was built as well--the BM-13 multiple-charge launcher, later referred to as the legendary "Katyusha."

Basic trends in the development of rifle weaponry included increased rate of fire, enhanced reliability and a more simplified mechanism having smaller

mass. In 1937-1940 troops were issued the semi-automatic Tokarev rifle (SVT-40) and the 12.7-mm Degtyarev and Shpagin heavy machine gun (DShK). The Shpagin sub-machine gun (PPSh) entered the inventory early in 1940. By that time, the country's defense industry had become more firmly established and already possessed the necessary scientific-technical and design engineering base to provide the capability for launching mass production of the newest types of armament and combat equipment. At that time, a fundamental, technological re-design of the entire Red Army was initiated. Unfortunately, history allotted us an extremely short time in which to accomplish this task.

The leading role in accomplishing missions of annihilating Hitler's hordes in the Great Patriotic War belonged to the ground forces, which constituted the backbone of all operational and strategic, offensive and defensive groups of forces.

Our ground forces rapidly built up their strength in fire and striking power during the course of the war--their maneuverability and combat effectiveness increased. This was made possible thanks to the development and deployment of new, more effective arms and equipment systems, improvement of means and methods of control, and the growth of troop combat experience and the skills of combat arms officers. Each branch of the ground forces underwent further development.

The economy of the country was restructured on a military footing. In an unprecedentedly short period of time, plants effected the transition to military production and dozens of new enterprises were established in regions far removed from the fronts. From July 1941 through August 1945 our industry produced 102,800 tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces, 825,200 cannons and mortars, and many other items of combat equipment and armament. A sharp increase in tank output and improvement of their combat features significantly increased troop capabilities in breaking through an enemy defense and in developing a rapid, in-depth offense. By 1945 the field army had 34 tank and mechanized corps, about half of which belonged to tank armies. Armor and mechanized infantry troops comprised the main strike element of the ground forces and were the most important means of transforming tactical successes into strategic ones. At the same time, anti-tank, rocket and air defense artillery were undergoing rapid improvements, as also were communications and air defense systems, engineer and other types of equipment. Having played its role in combat operations, the cavalry gradually lost its importance.

Soviet infantrymen bore the brunt of conflict with the enemy and displayed great combat skills, fortitude, bravery and endurance in the battles they waged. The Soviet Guards designation was born in September 1941 in the fire of the Battle of Smolensk. The first units to earn this high distinction were the 100th, 127th, 153d and 161st infantry divisions, becoming the 1st, 2d, 3d and 4th Guards divisions, respectively. In all, 11 combined arms armies, each of the six tank armies and hundreds of units (soyedineniye, chast) became Guards units over the years of the Great Patriotic War.

By the end of the war our ground forces had at their disposal great fire power and strike capability. They had acquired diverse combat experience, had battle-toughened troops, experienced commanders and political officers. Their

fighting qualities and moral attributes surpassed those of the ground armies of all the countries that participated in World War II.

By the start of the 1960's, scientific and technological progress and the development of nuclear missiles exerted a tremendous influence on qualitative changes in armament and combat technology which, in turn, brought about the further development of tactics, operational art, strategy, organization of forces, and methods of training and educating personnel.

The ground forces became equipped with new varieties of small arms automatic weapons, tanks with improved protective armament, enhanced fire power, greater speeds and better maneuverability, rocket systems, new medium and heavy artillery systems, mortars, multi-barrel rocket artillery, recoilless weapons, new anti-tank weapons, air defense missile systems and other means of field air defense.

Our ground forces underwent drastic change in the post-war period thanks to successful economic development of the country and achievements in science and technology. As compared with the previous war, the power of conventional means of destruction became many times greater.

Today's multiple-launch rocket systems, for example, significantly surpass the famous "Katyushas" with respect to all parameters. The destructive force, rate of fire, range and accuracy of artillery pieces have increased as well. Having many times enhanced their fire power, striking capability and maneuverability, our ground forces are today capable of accomplishing any assigned mission.

Experience shows that troop combat readiness and effectiveness depends to a tremendous degree on the quality and quantity of armament and combat equipment. Unabated attention is therefore being devoted to outfitting combined arms units (soyedineniye, chast) of rocket troops and artillery, field air defense, army aviation, and engineer, chemical and transportation troops with new combat technology. The basis for further enhancement of the combat might of our ground forces is the harmonious array of combined arms units and the development of their organizational structure, the search for new, more effective means of conducting combat operations, and the introduction of automated means of command and control of forces and weapons. It is the task of our personnel to take full advantage of the combat capabilities afforded by our armament and equipment.

Things do not stand still in the military. The continuous development of science and technology leads to new types of weapons and changes in the combat employment of ground forces formations (obyedineniye) and units (soyedineniye). The development and assimilation of new means and methods of employing troops in combat, in turn, influence the development of armament and present science and technology with new tasks. Such a two-way, dialectical process leads to a constant development of the means and methods of armed conflict.

Development of the ground forces, as well as of other services of the USSR Armed Forces, is a necessary responsive measure. It is predetermined by the

aggressive aspirations of our probable enemy, his development of weaponry, enhanced combat capabilities and sophistication in his means of carrying out combat operations. According to foreign press reports, the United States and the NATO countries today are relying heavily on the development and introduction of more effective weapons systems, striving to attain technological superiority over our armed forces. Highly accurate systems of destruction, remote minelaying equipment, reconnaissance systems and other examples of the newest equipment are coming into the American and West European army inventories. Troop organizational structure is being more precisely defined; forms and methods of conducting combat operations are undergoing development. Under conditions in which modern means of waging armed conflict will be employed, acquiring and maintaining superiority in fire power over the course of combat operations takes on a special sense of urgency.

Based on the nature of a possible conflict, if the imperialist aggressors should initiate such a conflict, our armed forces are presented with the mission of breaking up and repulsing the enemy aggression, then destroying him. The necessity to prepare our troops for the conduct of defensive and offensive operations in various theaters of combat operations is a natural outcome of this. Our ground forces have modern nuclear-missile armament, highly maneuverable infantry and armor forces, troops of other branches and specialized forces available to fulfill these missions.

The further development of armament and equipment is inseparably linked with employing the achievements of scientific and technological progress, with developing a well-founded combat-technology ideology and establishing a modern material and technical production base. Accomplishment of these tasks will facilitate enhancing the ground forces' combat potential and maintaining them at their required level of combat readiness.

The diversity in types of weapons and combat equipment leads, naturally, to an increased number of combat specialties. Whereas during the years of World War II there were not many more than 130 specialties in the ground forces, today there are over a thousand. This complicates training--makes it more diverse in content and direction.

Requirements today with respect to the technical skill level of personnel have increased immeasurably. In essence, servicemen's technical mastery has become one of the major indices of troop combat effectiveness and readiness. Only those soldiers who have a good knowledge of materiel, its tactical and technical characteristics, who are able to bring their weapons systems to a state of combat readiness in the shortest possible time and adroitly eliminate malfunctions and delays which arise can truly be considered in control of today's complex military equipment. In this regard we are presented the task of sharply increasing our level of technological readiness, knowledge of combat arms and equipment, and practical skills on the part of personnel in the operation, servicing and maintenance of materiel.

Experience shows that this task is accomplished most successfully in those units and subunits in which commanders and staffs think out their approach to the organization of technical training and servicing of weapons systems, where

a modern material and technical training base has been established, where maintenance time is used properly and senior officials exercise strict supervision.

Among the important factors in improving servicemen's technical knowledge are using competition in training exercises, tightening the time standards for bringing weapons systems and combat equipment to a state of combat readiness, and propagating the best methods and experience among the troop units so that these may be implemented in timely fashion.

It is difficult to imagine combat readiness under today's conditions without the intensive employment of weapons and combat equipment. Servicemen acquire genuine combat expertise in the intense environment of everyday training. Equipment is used everywhere--at special-purpose training events and a variety of drills and exercises. Here it is important to insure not only that the entire field of technical training is covered with respect to the equipment, but also that--without fail--not a single piece of military equipment, weapon, tractor, launcher or radio is returned to the motor pool or place of storage without thorough servicing immediately after its operation and use in the field.

Personnel of the guards tank regiment (three times awarded) of the Kantemirovskaya Guards Armor Division have appealed to all soldiers serving in our ground forces to set up socialist competition in the 1987 training year under the motto: "We Shall Fulfill the Decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress! We Mark the 70th Great October Anniversary With Selfless Military Labor!" The servicemen devoted one of the socialist competition pledges to technical training. They committed themselves to the capable operation of weapons and equipment and to their maintenance in a constant state of readiness for use in combat. They also obligated themselves to enhancing their qualifications--to train at least 70 percent of specialists for a higher skill qualification category by the end of the training year, and to make every soldier proficient in one or two associated skill specialties. They also undertook the obligation of increasing the time interval between repairs by seven percent for tanks, ten percent for wheeled vehicles. They promised to wage an aggressive fight in the inspection and competition for best vehicle park in the ground forces, and committed themselves to effecting a ten percent reduction in energy expenditure, a five percent reduction in fuels, lubricants and rubber, and a five percent increase in mileage efficiency.

This initiative shows the aspirations of our tankers, and of all our ground forces soldiers, in striving to make significant contributions towards fulfillment of the tasks prescribed of our armed forces by the 27th CPSU Congress. It shows their efforts to maintain combat readiness on a level which guarantees reliable defense of the gains of socialism and insures a shattering defeat for any aggressor.

The militaristic posture and aggressive policies of the United States and NATO present a serious threat to peace. These policies have become so open that the United States and West European countries make no effort to hide or camouflage them. In essence, the US administration and leaders of the leading NATO nations are issuing a military challenge to the socialist community.

Analysis of the international environment shows that it continues to be complex and, as stressed at the 27th CPSU Congress, we do not as yet have any significant reason to believe that tension will decrease in the near future.

Under such conditions, the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet government have been resolutely and consistently struggling to maintain and consolidate peace, and have taken supplementary measures to strengthen the country's defensive capability. They are doing everything necessary to guarantee the security of the Motherland and her allies.

It will soon be seven decades now that the mighty USSR Armed Forces, armed and equipped with everything necessary, have been standing watch over the gains of socialism. And included in these armed forces are the USSR Ground Forces, fulfilling their sacred duty to the party and our people.

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CHEMICAL RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLE BRDM-2RKhB

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 87 pp 12-13

[Article by Retired Col V. Khyazkov: "Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle"]

[Text] From time immemorial military specialists have held the opinion: "Reconnaissance is the eyes and ears of the army." However, under modern conditions it is not enough for operational reconnaissance personnel to be able to see far and hear well. They have taken on new tasks and duties. It is necessary, for example, to conduct chemical and radiation reconnaissance. It is necessary to be prepared, if necessary, to detect in a timely manner contamination of the terrain by toxic and radioactive substances (OV and RV). And, you see, this is such a perfidious enemy, which, in our usual understanding cannot be seen or heard. OV and RV can be detected only using special instruments. And this must be done as quickly as possible. Therefore, it is no accident that specialists have placed two main requirements upon such instruments: the must operate automatically, and they must move at a definite speed.

Realizing these requirements in practice led to the creation of the BRDM-2RKhB. The idea of its arrangement is utterly simple: An armored reconnaissance-scout vehicle, onto which special equipment was mounted, was used as the base for this specific self-propelled reconnaissance vehicle. As a result an original model of military equipment was obtained, the capabilities of which are vast and varied.

For example, with the aid of reconnaissance devices it is possible to determine the presence of OV and RV in the air and on the terrain; measure the level of radiation and degree of contamination of the surfaces of various objects, water and food; identify the OV; and select samples of materials contaminated with OV and RV. These are so-called specific tasks. In addition, the equipment makes it possible to determine the location of the moving vehicle on the ground, and to report the results of reconnaissance by radio. Finally, it protects the crew from the effects of OV and RV, and designates contaminated terrain sectors by boundary markings.

As we see, the amount of work is great, and one task is just as important as the next. Also important is the fact that the crew can conduct chemical and radiation reconnaissance, both during movement and at short halts, and even

upon departing the vehicle. Such flexible tactical employment of the self-propelled reconnaissance vehicle is provided by an entire complex of reliable and accurate instruments and systems. Let us discuss some of them briefly.

First, the means of reconnaissance. We have, for example, the GSA-12 automatic gas notification instrument. This unique electronic "nose" has an excellent "sniffer." The outside air, which enters the instrument through an intake pipe, is subjected to quick and accurate analysis. If the concentration of OV vapors in the air exceeds the threshold, the gas notification instrument unerringly establishes this fact and immediately signals, activating an automatic device. Visual and audible signalling instruments are turned on.

Thus, the GSA-12 has done its job -- warned us about the danger in time. The tactical chemical reconnaissance instrument (voyskovoy pribor khimicheskoy razvedki -- VPKhR) will help us determine the type and magnitude of the danger. It operates on the principle of chemical interaction of the OV with special reagents contained in indicator tubes. Each of them is "programmed" only for "its own" OV. As soon as the reagent has changed color, consider that the type of OV has been determined unerringly. Now it is only necessary to compare the intensity of the color with a gauge and digital information about the concentration in the air can be given, as well as about the degree of contamination of the article or object.

Sensitive indicators locate and determine the radiation danger with high reliability. These indicators include the DP-5B dosage strength gauge and the DP-3B roentgenometer. The former measures the level of gamma radiation and the radioactive contamination of various articles from gamma radiation. The crew uses the instrument only outside the vehicle. The roentgenometer measures the strength of the exposure dosage of gamma radiation at the location of its detection unit, on the lower hull front plate of the vehicle.

Means of detecting contaminated terrain sectors are a special subject. This is because more and more attention is being paid to the tremendous, at times decisive, importance of the time factor in modern warfare. As they examined chemical reconnaissance from this standpoint, specialists saw one weak place in the overall "technological" chain: How can the contaminated sector be marked effectively? The crew would spend much time if they walked, and in protective clothing yet, around the perimeter of the contaminated sector and marked its boundary by hand. There was only one answer -- mechanize this work.

The designers provided for a special attachment on the right side of the rear deck of the BRDM-2RKhB. Through its use boundary markers are driven into the ground by solid-propellant gases.

A pressure apparatus is one of the means of collective protection. It creates excess pressure within the manned compartments of the vehicle, and at the same time filters pressured air, cleaning it of OV and RV. Rather comfortable conditions are created for the crew in the closed environment. On board are also traditional individual means of protection; an automobile kit for special decontamination; a device for automatic launch of chemical alarm signal

shells; and six smoke hand grenades for camouflaging the vehicle and determining the wind direction. Communications gear includes telephone apparatuses for three users for internal communications and an R-123 M radio with a 20 km range for external communications.


As for the TNA-3 navigation apparatus, which is computer based, its importance for the self-propelled reconnaissance vehicle is hard to overestimate. The apparatus is used when orientation is hampered; for example, when traveling at high speeds over unfamiliar terrain, and when conducting reconnaissance in the steppe or desert, where there are no visible reference points. And, of course, it is also used at night, in fog and in all other instances when there is poor or no visibility. The instruments automatically determine the coordinates of the vehicle and its angle of movement. In addition, a special writing unit draws the route of movement on the map, like the self-recorder on an electrocardiograph functions. Therefore, it is very convenient to use the apparatus. The commander needs only to glance once at the panel to obtain graphic information on the location of the vehicle and its direction of movement.

The crew consists of three men: commander, chemical reconnaissance soldier and driver-mechanic. The commander commands the crew. The chemical reconnaissance soldier works with all the radiation and chemical reconnaissance instruments. He also has the duty of firing from the PKT machinegun. The driver-mechanic provides technically competent operation of the vehicle.

Now let us model a small military training episode. An exercise input has arrived: "The GSA-12 instrument has given a signal." The commander immediately switches it from the cyclical to the continuous operating mode. The gas notification instrument begins to provide information about the presence of OV vapors, with updating every two minutes (plus or minus 10 seconds). The driver-mechanic reduces the vehicle speed to the established technical level -- 20 km per hour. As soon as the boundaries of the zone of contamination have been determined, the chemical reconnaissance soldier begins to manipulate the switch, putting it consecutively in positions 1, 2, 3, etc., and pushes the button. The boundary marker is shot out. The markers are placed at a distance from one another that enables the next marker to be seen by the naked eye.

And what if there is hard and rocky soil or frozen earth on the route of movement of the vehicle? The designers also anticipated this situation. In this case the crew leaves the vehicle and sets up the markers using a special pole.

A very valuable component of the military capabilities of the self-propelled reconnaissance vehicle is its ability to operate successfully at night. For example, both commander and the driver-mechanic use night vision devices. And the chemical reconnaissance soldier will also mark the zone of contamination in the dark. For this purpose, all odd-numbered markers have miniature flashlights, which are positioned on the shafts so that the beam of light is aimed at the inscription "Contaminated."



1 -- boundary marker mounting attachment; 2 -- cannister; 3 -- boundary marker kit; 4 -- antenna; 5 -- turret covered by protective jacket; 6 -- night vision device lamp; 7 -- observation hatch cover; 8 -- observation hatch; 9 -- rear vision mirror; 10 -- wave reflecting shield; 11 -- cable reel; 12 -- spare wheels; 13 -- bracket; 14 -- cowl; 15 -- lever; 16 -- panel; 17 -- clamp pin; 18 -- wire; 19 -- lock; 20 -- contact nut; 21 -- explosive charge; 22 -- boundary marker rod; 23 -- casing; 24 -- spring

Chemical reconnaissance soldiers have praised their vehicle highly. It has good dynamic indices, high cross-country mobility and the ability to negotiate water obstacles from the march.

Inclines up to 30 degrees are not difficult for the BRDM-2RKhB. The vehicle easily traverses pits, trenches, foxholes and ditches a meter wide. Its water-jet type propeller pushes it to speeds in the water on the order of 10 km per hour. Even the season of bad roads will not stop the self-propelled reconnaissance vehicle. It goes through forested-swampy and mountainous terrain, pastures and snow-covered cross-country terrain. And, if it gets on a highway it is the equal of many high-speed vehicles: its maximum speed is almost 100 km per hour. There is one more military characteristic that is very important for a vehicle of this class and purpose -- its un-refueled range is 750 km.

The combat-ready weight of the vehicle is 7,090 kg. Its dimensions are: length -- 6,100 mm; width -- 2,350 mm; height -- 2020 mm. It can operate over a wide range of temperatures, from -40 degrees C to +40 degrees C.

The chemical reconnaissance vehicle meets the strict requirements of modern combat. Its small crew can quickly and reliably fulfill a wide range of missions associated with chemical and radiological reconnaissance.

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AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

COL GEN BOBYLEV MARKS PVO DAY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Apr 87 p 3

[Interview with Colonel General S. Bobylev, chief of the political directorate, air defense forces: "Confirming New Approaches"; unnamed correspondent; date and place not given; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] On the eve of Air Defense Forces Day our KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent met with Colonel General S. Bobylev, chief of the political directorate, air defense forces and military council member, and asked him to answer some questions.

[Question] Comrade Colonel General, celebration of this Air Defense Forces Day is taking place as preparations for the 70th Great October Anniversary are getting under way everywhere. Is this circumstance having a visible impact on the activities of air defense servicemen?

[Answer] Without a doubt. Just as it is on the activities and achievements of all the men in our armed forces and all the Soviet people. Anniversary documents of the Communist Party--the CPSU Central Committee resolution on preparations for the 70th Great October Anniversary and the Address of the Central Committee to the Soviet People--have been received by servicemen with a feeling of pride for the achievements and victories our people have achieved over the years of Soviet power. Moreover, we have treated these documents as a military command--to significantly enhance our work efforts so as to more reliably defend the cause of the revolution, the cause of October.

The current year is noteworthy also by virtue of another important political event--the January CPSU Central Committee Plenum, which laid the groundwork for extending and expanding the restructuring effort in all spheres of activity. These events and the great goals of renewal in our country charted by the 27th CPSU Congress serve to rally and unite personnel. They motivate servicemen to develop their combat skills, enhance their political knowledge, and increase vigilance and combat readiness.

[Question] Does today's international environment convince us of the necessity of this?

[Answer] Yes. An exhaustive, scientifically based evaluation of the international situation is given in the documents we have mentioned. And we see that the realities of life confirm beyond a doubt the correctness of the conclusions drawn by our party. The threat of imperialist aggression remains a stern reality of modern times.

Means and weapons of air attack play a special role in United States programs for building up strategic offensive armaments. Efforts to build new ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles are speeding up. All of this obliges us to keep the powder dry, to increase vigilance and combat readiness...

[Question] ...which, for air defense forces, manifests itself primarily through standing military watch?

[Answer] Yes, that is the chief mission of our troops and the main criterion for evaluating our activities. By the way, are you familiar with what it is to stand military watch? It requires a great intensity of effort on the part of individuals.

[Question] The ritual procedure for changing watch relief is particularly impressive. The stern words of the mission order--"On military watch to defend the air borders of our Motherland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, take your post!--never fail to induce an elevated emotional feeling, and somehow charge us with a sensation of increased responsibility.

[Answer] And major efforts on the part of commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations are being directed towards insuring that the sense of acute responsibility does not for a minute abandon those who assume the duty of standing watch. Here outside our window we have a sunny spring day, and in Kamchatka, let's say, it is deep in the night. But at this very minute and at every hour around the clock, radar operators, air defense missile troops, airmen and communications specialists are standing military watch. And not only there--the air borders of the Soviet Union extend 60,000 kilometers. That invisible line stretches over the country's western borders, over the Kurile Islands, over the Arctic Ocean coast and the Pamir Mountains. Servicemen of our air defense forces are standing constant guard over this entire stretch.

Today we have at our disposal everything necessary to defend the air borders of our native land. Air defense missile forces, fighter aviation, radar troops, communications units (chast) and subunits (podrazdeleniye), and facilities for exercising command and control are outfitted with the most modern combat technology. This technology is the product of the mind, talent and labor of the Soviet people, and evokes in us a feeling of pride. But the chief arsenal of our might and capability to perform assigned missions under any circumstances is people--with boundless devotion to the cause of the Party of Lenin, the ideals of October.

Serving on military watch, conducting tactical exercises, engaging in everyday military training and mastering the operation of their equipment, soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers and officers are fully capable of the feats

accomplished by our heroes on the front lines, and in their activities of today they are continuing the traditions of generations gone by.

[Question] How do today's servicemen maintain combat traditions in their activities?

[Answer] Many of our servicemen have received high awards of the state in peacetime. And Colonels K. Popov, N. Kutyntsev and I. Zhukov, and Lieutenant Colonel A. Levchenko have the glorious distinction of having been named Heroes of the Soviet Union. Here we see the succession of generations, the source of heroic consciousness and faithfulness to one's military duty, the highest responsibility for the grand mission entrusted them by the party and the people--defense of the air borders of the Motherland.

However, it is not in the nature of the defenders of our country's air borders to flatter themselves by virtue of what has been achieved or bask in their glory. Like all personnel of the USSR Armed Forces, they live the concerns of the people and they check their work with the faithful compass of party policies, the course it is taking towards acceleration and restructuring.

[Question] How is restructuring going in the ranks? What can you tell us about that?

[Answer] We see the concept of restructuring in troop readiness primarily in regard to increasing the effectiveness of training. The key to this task lies in approximating combat conditions to the greatest possible extent during training, decisively eradicating stereotypes, simplifications and other indulgences.

Commanders, political organs, staffs and political organizations are searching for modern ways to accomplish the tasks that stand in front of us, striving to eliminate everything that's outdated, that has not withstood the test of time. Political organs and party organizations have begun to react more sharply in response to people's formalism, indifference and complacency, and are steering their efforts towards inculcating grains of innovation.

Thus, in the Guards air force unit (chast) in which officer V. Nechiporenko serves, the collective efforts of all unit specialists were applied to develop more advanced, feasible means of accomplishing training tasks. There are quite a few military collectives where a new moral-psychological atmosphere is being created, where work styles and methods are undergoing reevaluation and a creative comprehension of new requirements is coming about.

But I must state directly that the scope and quality of restructuring has not acquired a mission orientation everywhere. There are many problems in organizing combat training, consolidating military discipline and conducting political education work where new approaches are necessary. There are some commanders, staffs and political organs, however, that are attempting unsuccessfully to operate according to the old methods and are giving the outward appearance that everything is all right. The mission is suffering as a result.

And there are other problems in the sphere of personnel training and education where the undivided attention, primarily of the party organizations, is required. They must constantly be keeping their fingers on the pulse of life, be fully exercising their mobilizing influence and acting decisively to promote that which is new and progressive.

What's required here is a more purposeful restructuring of all party and political work, at the epicenter of which the political organs are located. In restructuring their own efforts, many of these organs are setting the tone as guiding party organs. There is considerable instructional value, for example, in the activity of the party political apparatus of the air defense missile unit whose political section is headed by Lieutenant Colonel A. Chuchalin.

But, on the whole, and we are talking about this quite frankly, restructuring is going slow. There are quite a few people for whom it hasn't come easy, and we are striving through every means possible to help those who understand that there is no other way. But there are also people who show no desire to renounce work methods which are unacceptable today. They stubbornly cling to their old ways, although in their words they seem to be fighting for renewal and restructuring.

The discrepancy between word and deed of our leaders has a pernicious effect on the moral climate in the collective. It undermines people's faith in the achievement of charted goals, and this naturally has a negative effect on the state of affairs. Until recently this was the situation in the air defense missile regiment commanded by Colonel V. Terentyev. On many occasions this officer was shown deficiencies in his work style and offered the opportunity to correct the situation, but he engaged in restructuring in words only. Terentyev was recently relieved from his duty position and reassigned with demotion.

[Question] Where do you see the major difficulty in affirming new approaches to mission accomplishment? What is holding things back?

[Answer] I think the reluctance lies in the psychology of people. Stereotyped ways of thinking have taken shape over the years and people find them in conflict with the environment of expanded democracy and openness. This retards the development of new processes.

[Question] Nonetheless, they are coming about--the new is replacing the old in people's thinking and in their actions. Isn't this true?

[Answer] Yes. The process of restructuring is irreversible. And it is gratifying to see it bear real fruit, albeit not very significantly as yet. The issues which encompass a high level of combat readiness are exceedingly broad. They involve working with military personnel and developing the social atmosphere, concern for the families of servicemen and much more. Reliable, durable results are achieved when the entire range of issues is approached from the orientation of new party requirements, when work is creatively accomplished, when the reasoning, will and energy of personnel are fused into an integral whole. The concepts of restructuring must be persistently imbued in people's minds, must become their standard of conduct, their guidance for action. We see our task as effecting confirmation of these new approaches in all units and subunits.

AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

AIR DEFENSE HERALD: INDEX OF ARTICLES, 1986

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CSO: 1801/126

CIVIL DEFENSE

MAJOR-GENERAL DESCRIBES CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING

Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian 22 Jan 87, p 2

To the level of present-day demands

From the field of action of the Civil Defence Workers

[Text] 1986 was rich in events of great overall political importance. It was the year of the 27th Party Congress whose characteristic trait was the struggle led by the CPSU against the danger of the nuclear war and the arms race.

Following the decisions of the Party and the government about the strengthening of our homeland's defence capability, the Civil Defence organs have been solving the tasks set before them. On the whole, the last study year was successful. Enterprises, establishments and other national economy installations and their Civil Defence headquarters and formations fulfilled their planned tasks for the most part well. The standard of integrated exercises as the most important training at installations rose considerably. Majority of the installations arranged their planned exercises with good preparation and fruitfully. By this the Civil Defence system's readiness to act in extraordinary circumstances was increased.

Civil Defence courses also became more effective. An essential part in the improvement of their work was the improvement of the basic training material. The methodological side of the material was also improved. The latter was supported by the inspection which took place at the end of the study year. The best results were achieved by those who had taken the course at the town of Narva and the Mere and Kalinini rayons of the town of Tallinn.

Much has been done for the training of the Civil Defence formations personnel and their leadership. Supplies to the formations also improved.

Student Civil Defence training has also improved. This has been helped along considerably by the work of Civil Defence base schools which were recently set up in our towns and rayons. As centers for studies and methodology, they have fulfilled their role.

In discussing the work which is done with students, it is also necessary to dwell on the military and sporting games. At last year's "Kotkapoeg" republican finals it was demonstrated that preparation for such contests and participation in them is a good Civil Defence school. This is borne out by the results of the No 11 Kohtla-Jarve vocational school, No 2 L. Koidula secondary school of Parnu and No 32 Tallinn secondary school (they won the three first places).

However, it must be stated that Civil Defence activity is not yet adequate everywhere. One has had chances to witness in studies and spot checks that the managers of several establishments and commanders of formations do not have the correct understanding of their duties; they do not know exactly what to do and when to do it. As a result of that, they cannot instruct those under them adequately. It has occurred that all of the work lies on the shoulders of the chief of staff.

One of the reasons for fairly poor training of formations and of the population is the feeble control on the part of the leading personnel. Last year in several places hardly anything was done to improve the material training base. All this shows that more efficiently than before we should take advantage of all possible measures in order to eliminate the shortcomings which have come to light.

This year, the Civil Defence tasks stem from the situation which has developed in international relations and the military and strategic situation of the present moment, where the U.S. governing circles contribute towards achieving military superiority. They also pay much attention to the use of chemical and biological weapons and the conventional means of combat with great destructive power, together with nuclear and space armament. One cannot forget also that the ideological struggle is growing more acute.

In those conditions the CP and the Soviet government are doing everything in order to keep the defence capability of the Soviet state at the necessary level. Hence also our Civil Defence tasks emanate for the 1987 study year which has started. Quite a few established and traditional methods do not allow the fulfillment to the full extent of the new and more complex tasks, because the Civil Defence system has been confronted with the need to take into account the serious lessons of the accident which happened at the Chernobyl atomic power station.

It is self-evident that the main direction of our activity has to be a further improvement of the Civil Defence system and a guarantee for its all-around preparedness. On all levels, the task of the Civil Defence organs will remain the training of the leadership, formations and the whole population for skillful activity in extreme situations. For this, the whole training system, however, needs to be given a practical content.

The main task for our workers is to carry out their Civil Defence duties knowingly and conscientiously while being guided by the principle established by the party; everything that our people have created must be resolutely defended.

As in the past, it is also now necessary to pay special attention to integrated exercises and object training sessions. As it appears from the experiences of organizing them, the quality of exercises and training sessions has generally risen. But still many a task, however, awaits here. The organizational foundations of exercises and training sessions of this kind have to be improved even more, especially at the enterprises where effective toxic substances are needed in the production process, at water purification plants, and at meat and dairy combines, where chlorine and ammonia are used.

It is important for all exercises to be interesting and useful to the participants. Many people and a large number of pieces of equipment are involved at integrated exercises. It is necessary for the efficiency factor to be a maximum one. This demands a continuous improvement of the organizers methods, skills and experiences, taking into account the characteristics of production activity and realistic possibilities of one or another object. This also applies to the staff exercises to be carried out with the leadership, training exercises and to tactical special exercises of formations.

The maximum efficiency factor can only be achieved when everything is well prepared. For an improvement of the training of organizers of exercises a reliable system has been established here, at the central point of which is the schooling of leadership at civil defence courses.

In this study year a great deal has to be done for the development of the basic training materials and for an advancement of methodology. Let a further differentiation of work of the courses, corresponding to the contingent of listeners, be the aim, in order to give them a maximum amount of what would be required later in practical work.

In the study year which has begun a start will be made to train the leadership of enterprises and establishments on the basis of the new subject matter sent out to target groups. It is essential to achieve that every leader and commander of a formation would know how to fulfill his duties not only arising from a possible war situation, but also in the elimination of the consequences of accidents and natural disasters. A necessity for this was convincingly demonstrated by what happened at the Chernobyl AES.

Training of formations in the new study year will be organized in accordance with the subject matter of the third study year of the 1984 programme. Practical exercises are the main thing; the aim is to acquire skills for fulfilling tasks in various kinds of hotbeds of damage and for the elimination of the consequences of accidents and natural disasters.

It is necessary to create at the tactical special exercises of formations an instructively extreme situation, because only in such a way it is possible to make the participants think intensely before making a decision. It has to be borne in mind that at exercises nothing has such a bad influence upon the quality of training as all kinds of simplifications of the situation, which only teach one to go along the road of the least resistance.

The workers of establishments and enterprises and collective farm members are being taught on the basis of the subject matter sent to the target groups. Here also the main aim is to give knowledge and skills for a practical solving of tasks. The basis of the studies of this contingent is the training for fulfilling norms and an active participation in the practical execution of civil defence undertakings at training areas.

Training of the population not working in production and public services spheres will continue in accordance with the programme published in 1985. Also, these people have to be painstakingly trained so that they would know how to act correctly on civil defence signals, to use individual means of protection, to conduct themselves sensibly in contaminated areas, and to give assistance to themselves and others.

Training of students and pupils will continue on the basis of approved programmes. Recently pupils have manifested better knowledge and skills in civil defence than previously. To a great extent this depended on a better training of teachers. The task to make the studies even more useful awaits all pedagogical collectives.

Civil defence propaganda must be considerably more effective. It is necessary to explain more consistently than previously the necessity and possibilities of the means of protection, to improve on an organized manner and discipline, and moral and psychological training of formations and the entire population for activity under extreme conditions.

Consequently, great tasks of a practical nature await our civil defence system. This demands strenuous work from the heads of enterprises and establishments and from all the workers of the civil defence system in order to improve their training form and methods and to find additional reserves for more effective work.

It is important that the entire activity take place in an organized manner and according to plan; without fail, use must be made to a maximum of the time of winter, especially at agricultural training areas.

Let the successful solving of the tasks set in 1987 become a contribution of our republic's civil defence workers to the strengthening of our homeland's defence capability.

Vello Vare,
Estonian SSR Civil Defence chief of staff,
doctor of military science, major-general.

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CSO: 1815/26

CIVIL DEFENSE

BRIEFS

GOVOROV ADDRESSES LITHUANIAN CONFERENCE--(ELTA)--Today, a republic conference on civil defense questions took place in the House of Political Education of the Lithuanian Communist Party's Central Committee.

At the conference, a report was given by the country's civil defense chief and Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Army General V. L. Govorov.

Taking part in the conference were Comrades P. P. Grishkyavichus, V. S. Astrauskas, Yu. I. Bernatavichus, A. K. Brazauskas, N. A. Mitkin, V. V. Sakalauskas, R. I. Songayla, Yu. M. Sheris, the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian SSR, Yu. L. Rusenko, and executive of the CPSU Central Committee, A. P. Khomenko. [Text] [Vilnyus' SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 20 Feb 87 p 1] 6367

1801/126

REAR SERVICES, DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

CHIEF OF MAIN TRADE DIRECTORATE INTERVIEWED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Apr 87 p 4

[TASS interview with Major General N. G. Sadovnikov, Chief of the Main Trade Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense: "New Approaches in Military Trade"; unnamed correspondent; date, place and occasion not given; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The processes of acceleration and renewal taking place in our country today have affected all aspects of the life and activity of the USSR Armed Forces. In conversation with our TASS correspondent, Major General N. G. Sadovnikov, Chief of the Main Trade Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense, tells how restructuring is going in the sphere of military trade.

[Question] What has been done in restructuring work in the sphere of military trade?

[Answer] The period following the 27th CPSU Congress has been a time of breaking away from the old way of thinking and outdated work methods. As a result, the collective of military trade employees has well managed the chief tasks of 1986. The sale of goods on military posts has increased primarily in animal products, potatoes, fresh vegetables, juices and non-alcoholic drinks, clothing and footwear, and products for improved everyday living conditions. Alcoholic beverages have been taken out of circulation.

[Question] What work remains to be accomplished in military trade?

[Answer] We have to improve our provision of everyday necessities for servicemen, workers and other employees of the Soviet Army and Navy and their family members.

At the beginning of this year, military trade effected a transition to new methods of planning, material incentives and management. The principle of self-financing has been introduced everywhere. From now on, the amount of trade enterprise assets available for production and social development--to include housing construction and wages--depends on the enterprise's level of profit return.

Working under the new conditions would be unthinkable without active technical re-equipment of the trade industry and restructuring of goods circulation. We believe the introduction everywhere of the team work method and piece-work system of wages will have a great effect. Accomplishing the largest volume of work with the least number of people raises labor productivity and significantly enhances profitability. The team work method has been especially effective at trade enterprises in the Kiev and Far East Military Districts and in the Moscow garrison.

New management methods require each worker--leaders and managers first and foremost--to show a new way of thinking, initiative, erudition in questions of economic trade and management, and an active, operations-oriented approach.

-Question] The course of restructuring in the country involves an increasing role for personnel. What is the state of affairs in the sphere of military trade in this regard?

[Answer] The decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the January (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum forced us to take another look at personnel policies and gave us the opportunity to shed light on the true abilities and capabilities of our leaders and managers.

Many personnel have gotten actively involved in the restructuring effort, are seeking new approaches, putting their positive experience into practice and attaining good results. Among these specialists are Colonels V. Fedosov and E. Khorevich, trade directorate chiefs; V. Dragayev and I. Khaskelberg, trade purchasing office chiefs; M. Khaybullina, mess hall trust chief; and other store and mess hall managers.

There are other leaders and managers, unfortunately, who have gotten lost in the independence that has been given and await guidance from senior leaders as before. We might mention the following military trade directorate chiefs, for example--Colonel N. Fesenko, Black Sea Fleet, Colonel I. Kiselev, Central Asia Military District, and Colonel E. Drozhzhin, Moscow Military District--who have continued to work up until now looking back to higher authority.

We were recently required to relieve from their duties Colonel A. Shchuplyak, trade directorate chief of the North Caucasus Military District, and Colonel B. Kurtov, book trade directorate chief. They were unwilling to change their outdated work style and had a hostile attitude towards new, progressive methods. Relieving an individual from his duties is a drastic measure, but we were required to resort to it in order to remove aspects of stagnancy. And we do have such aspects. Some leaders "sympathize" with restructuring in words but take no notice of the low efficiency in providing everyday services in the trade directorate, nor of irregularities and interruptions in providing goods of everyday necessity not in short supply. They do not reliably screen out trade directorate personnel who are poor workers or who violate regulations, and they fail to create a normal work environment for people. Such leaders are apparently hoping that restructuring will pass them by. These hopes are not to be.

Restructuring of personnel agencies is also necessary. A great, painstaking effort is necessary to find specialists with a sense of the new approach, extensive professional knowledge and skills, and a readiness to assume full responsibility for the entrusted mission. Not all military trade directorate personnel workers are up to the task. They often fail to maintain a reserve of personnel eligible for advancement, judge people superficially and lack a knowledge of personnel job-performance and moral qualities. There are frequent instances of personnel placement based on personal loyalties. Two trade directorate deputy chiefs for personnel--N. Chikrizova of the Turkestan Military District and I. Avdeyeva of the Leningrad Military District--were relieved of duty for serious work dereliction with regard to personnel selection and placement.

[Question] Nikolay Grigoryevich, what return do you expect from restructuring?

[Answer] Our efforts should lead to more tangible results in the second year of the five-year plan. The provision of everyday commodities in military garrisons will improve. An additional one quarter of a billion rubles worth of goods will be sold over last year. Everyday services will be improved, one of the reasons for this being the opening of new hiring points. One fact that shows we are headed in the right direction--retail goods turnover plans for the first quarter of this year in trade and public catering have been accomplished.

We are striving to greet the 70th Great October Anniversary with new achievements.

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U.S. AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES DISCUSSED

Moscow TEKHNIIKA I VOORUZHENIYE in Russian No 3, Mar 87 pp 40-41

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Novichkov, candidate of military sciences, under the rubric "In the Armies of the Capitalist Countries": "Air Launched Cruise Missiles"]

[Text] American military experts consider cruise missiles with nuclear warheads the most effective weapon of strategic bombers. Today several squadrons of B-52G and -H bombers, as well as B-1B strategic bombers coming into the inventory, are being outfitted with the AGM-86B air launched cruise missile (ALCM).

According to foreign press reports, the B-52G aircraft is capable of carrying 12 cruise missiles on pylons under its wings, and the B-52H is armed with an additional eight missiles on a suspension inside the fuselage. The AGM-86B missile is intended to destroy heavily defended ground targets deep inside enemy territory. Characteristic of these missiles is the capability of being launched without the necessity of the carrier aircraft being inside the enemy's air defense operational zone, the capability of effecting extended flight at low altitudes (60-150 m) with the purpose of breaching the air defense network, and the high accuracy of the guidance system.

The AGM-86B has a standard aerodynamic configuration and is made of aluminum alloys. It consists of four compartments. The central compartment houses the fuel tanks. The nose compartment contains the inertial guidance system and "Terkom" navigation system, a radio altimeter and other navigational devices. The forward compartment contains the warhead with safety actuating mechanism and the tail section holds the sustainer engine, movable air intake, thermopiles and horizontal control actuators (elevons). The wing, with protraction mechanism, is located below the central compartment. Prior to missile separation, the wing is in its retracted configuration, as are the tail fin and rudders (around the tail section of the body). In extended position the wing has a sweep angle of 25 degrees. The aerodynamic profile of the wing is supercritical. Guidance during flight is accomplished with the horizontal tail rudders, which deflect symmetrically (using direct-current electric motors) to effect pitch control and differentially for heading and bank.

A detachable connector is used prior to missile launch to feed it cooled air and provide electric power from the carrier aircraft. Power supply of on-board missile systems after launch is accomplished using the thermopile, activated by explosive cartridge. During transition to flight phase, the thermopile supplies power to the inertial platform and computer, mechanism for exposing the control surfaces, fuel feeds for starting the turbofan, and tail assembly actuator. During the flight phase, power is supplied from a direct-current generator operated by the engine.

Maximum range of the AGM-86B is 2500 km. Its cruising velocity is about 800 km/hr. Launch weight is 1280 kg. The 200-kiloton W-80 nuclear warhead weighs 123 kg. The missile is 6.3 meters long. Wingspan is 3.66 m, body diameter--0.62 m.

The F107-WR-101 sustainer engine has a thrust of 272 kg. It is a twin-shaft, double-circuit turbofan engine with a small degree of double flow, the mixture of flows taking place in the nozzle. The low-pressure circuit consists of a two-stage axial-flow fan and two-stage axial-flow compressor, which are activated by a double-flow axial turbine. The high-pressure circuit consists of a single, unadjustable, centrifuge compressor. Engine length is 1232 mm, diameter--305 mm.

Guidance over most of the flight trajectory is accomplished using an inertial system which, according to press reports, has a navigational error of about 1 km/hr. Error accumulated at various time intervals during flight is eliminated by trajectory correction using the "Terkom" terrain relief correlation system for guidance. Foreign experts confirm that the circular error probable (CEP) of the missile is about 30 meters.

The principle by which the "Terkom" system operates is based on the use of terrain-relief data for enemy territory previously obtained from reconnaissance satellites. These data are used to prepare terrain reference program charts in digital format. A series of such charts with varying resolution is stored in the missile's on-board computer memory. Using the radio altimeter, the "Terkom" system obtains information as to the actual terrain relief the missile is overflying. The on-board computer compares this information with that which is stored in computer memory, determines the missile's location and issues corrective commands to the autopilot, which returns the missile to calculated trajectory. The U.S. Air Force has about 1700 AGM-86B cruise missiles.

The United States is developing a new cruise missile, the ACM, programmed to replace the AGM-86B. It is reported that this missile will have increased range, greater speed, higher accuracy, and be less detectable. The increased range and speed of flight is to be achieved by equipping the missile with a new engine, based on that of the F107 and designated the F112-WR-100. It is believed that a 40 percent increase in thrust and 5 percent reduction in specific fuel consumption, along with the use of new fuels, should provide the missile a high subsonic speed and increase its range to 4400 km.

Foreign experts believe the ACM missile will be significantly less detectable with the use of "Stealth" technology, which would decrease detection

characteristics in the radar, infrared, optical and acoustical spectra by selecting optimal aerodynamic shape, lowering engine-flame temperature, introducing radio-wave absorption materials and coatings, etc. Missile accuracy to target is expected to increase as a result of sophisticated guidance systems and the use of information from navigation satellites of the "Navstar" system.

American experts believe the ACM cruise missile will retain its effectiveness until the mid 1890's, when the United States expects to build a third-generation cruise missile to fly at supersonic speeds. Research is being conducted today in which scale models of prospective missiles are undergoing wind-tunnel testing for the purpose of selecting the optimum aerodynamic shape, and in which cruise missile subsystems are being developed. It is expected that the prospective cruise missile will have a flat lower surface and decreased fuselage height, which will require an elliptically-shaped engine combustion chamber, adjustable nozzles and engine air ducts. Composite materials are planned for widespread use in the design of the missile, whose speed is about Mach 4. The range of the missile is about 3500 km.

According to foreign press reports, the third-generation cruise missile is intended as armament for the B-1B bomber as well as the "Stealth" aircraft under development.

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JAPANESE MILITARY COOPERATION WITH U.S. DECRIED

Moscow GUDOK in Russian 7 May 87 p 3

[Article by I. Lebedev under "International Notes" rubric: "Country of Rising Militarism"]

[Text] Three thousand Japanese police and a special group of American "experts" worked day and night. For almost a month, they carefully combed the extensive area in the forested mountains in the southeast part of the island of Honshu. But they were not able to find "object X," as official reports called the Sparrow missile that fell from the American F-4 fighter bomber from the U.S. naval base at Iwakuni.

Meanwhile, the 4-meter-long cigar represented a serious danger: the blocking mechanisms could be damaged when the missile hit the ground and then there would be an explosion. The authorities of the nearby community of Oasa ordered its inhabitants to observe strict precautionary measures and not to go beyond the boundaries of the locality. The inhabitants of neighboring cities and communities visited the base at Iwakuni and demanded reliable information from the American command on the course of the search, declaring that "people are in constant fear for their lives."

And only on 2 May was it reported: peasants from the community of Oasa discovered the missile in the woods completely by accident. The local inhabitants were finally able to breathe easily. But the worries of the Japanese public did not go away.

There is no doubt that the explosion of a single Sparrow missile can cause considerable damage. And what if there are hundreds of missiles, and not just one type, and what if their power is many times greater? And with nuclear warheads?

The country of the rising sun is being pulled more and more into Washington's military strategy. American military ships with nuclear weapons on board visit Japanese ports, the island of Okinawa has been converted into a U.S. military base, and the country is ringed with a network of American military bases and facilities. And the Japan Defense Agency is doing everything possible in support of the idea of the necessity of cooperating even more

closely with the United States, which, in its opinion, is the "main guarantor of Japan's security." And it is already taking practical steps.

As the journal U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT close to the Pentagon reports, "negotiations are now under way on the U.S. deployment in Japan of its own aircraft equipped with early-warning radar stations of the AWACS system, on the permanent basing of the battleship "New Jersey" in the Japanese port, and on the joint production of a new fighter.

Yuko Kurihara, director of the Japan Defense Agency, came out in favor of the development and production together with the United States of a new-generation fighter for the Japanese Air Force. "The unification of the military aircraft of the two countries is very important," he declared. In short, reliance on Washington is at the center of Tokyo's military policy. And, as an argument in favor of such cooperation, they make use of the trite but always convenient pretext of the supposed "Soviet threat."

In 1982, official Tokyo promised the United States that it would take control of the 1,000-mile sea communications zone adjacent to the Japanese islands. Pentagon and Japan Defense Agency experts wasted no time in calculating on computers innumerable variants of the rise of conflict situations in different regions of Asia, in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and so on. At the same time, "combat tasks" were established not only for the American formations deployed in these regions but also for Japan's so-called "self-defense forces," which are assigned an auxiliary role in the strategic plans of the American military. The United States intends to entrust its "junior partner" with the export of its aircraft carriers, the blockade of international straits--the Korea, Sangar and Laperuz straits--and antisubmarine operations in the western Pacific Ocean. In all of the many possible scenarios for Japan's taking part in an armed conflict on the side of the United States, the Soviet Union was and is seen to be its invariable enemy.

The United States is assigning Japan an important role in the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul militaristic triangle being put together under its aegis. Is this not the reason for Tokyo's decision to renounce the ceiling on military expenditures of 1 percent of its gross national product and thus to take the path of uncontrolled armament of the country? Is this not why Japan's position is so evasive in relation to the USSR's initiatives aimed at strengthening peace and security in the Asian Pacific region?

The activation of military ties between Washington and Tokyo is producing uneasiness in the Japanese public. The democratic forces are setting the task of not allowing the conversion of the country into a major military power, into a bridgehead for American imperialism in the Asian Pacific Ocean region. They are particularly alarmed by attempts to get around Japan's three non-nuclear principles. Representatives of the Japanese Communist Party recently publicized the content of a secret telegram from 24 February 1966 sent by Dean Rusk, then U.S. secretary of state, to Edwin Reishauer, the American ambassador in Tokyo. He was ordered to remind Tokyo of the necessity of fulfilling the existing agreement permitting the importation and deployment of nuclear weapons in the country and to make it understood to the Japanese Government that the treaty then being prepared on the nonproliferation of

nuclear weapons does not at all mean the termination of the nuclear deal between the United States and Japan.

Let us remember that the proposal then put forward by our country on the inclusion in the treaty of a position prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries that have renounced the deployment of nuclear arms in their own territory met with support throughout the world, including in Japan. And Washington reacted in this way: "If this proposal is accepted, then the ambiguity with which the Japanese Government has heretofore acted toward the presence of nuclear weapons on American ships, in Japanese ports and also on U.S. transit aircraft can turn out to be unacceptable," stated Rusk's telegram. The secretary of state demanded that his embassy take measures so that the Japanese cabinet would not in any case support the proposal of the USSR.

As we see, even then the United States did not leave its partner any doubts about the fact that Japan was and will be used as a U.S. nuclear base. The fact of the nuclear deal between the two countries has now been documented.

Tokyo's striving to climb the militaristic ladder and to strengthen its military ties with Washington gives cause for serious reflection. The entire complex of measures by the government in the military connection, notes the newspaper JAPAN TIMES, for example, contains the threat of a significant and arbitrary expansion of the concept of Japan's "defense" and can, in the final analysis, be a new factor destabilizing the situation in Asia.



"The Unsinkable Island" by V. Sviridov

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CSO: 1801/183

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

SPANISH-AMERICAN TALKS ON U.S. BASING NOTED

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Feb 87 p 1

[Article: "Zero Result"]

[Text] The fourth round of Spanish-American talks on a reduction of the U.S. military presence in this country ended, just as all preceding ones, with a zero result.

It is completely obvious that this recurrent "diplomatic draw" in essence signifies mutual defeat. For Spain--because the American counterproposal in response to her demands, first of all concerning the complete removal of 76 F-16 airplanes and 4,500 servicemen from the base in Torrejon and of tanker aircraft from the base in Saragossa, which she awaited with such hope, proved to be completely unacceptable to her. And for the United States--because it never succeeded in forcing the Spanish delegation to make any concessions despite pressure and persistent calls to "think of the defense of the West and of its own contribution to NATO's military efforts."

The talks took place with carefully closed doors, and not one of the delegations reported even the slightest details of the content of the American counterproposal. Nevertheless, Madrid newspapers, referring to sources from the Spanish MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], present eloquent evaluations of this document: "Too unsteady, disappointing," "It is not what we expected from the United States," "There are no grounds to jump for joy--extremely far from our demands," and so forth. The authors of these opinions find only one consolation in it: for the first time in a long time there appeared at least "something which can be discussed without staring, as formerly, at a wall of silence."

All the arguments of the American side are the same: the United States cannot undertake the removal of its troops from the base in Torrejon so as not to weaken NATO's southern flank because "Spain is unable to replace them with its aviation and, in addition, her relations with NATO have not been completely determined." But the representatives of Madrid reject this argument, planning subsequently to locate at this base F-18A airplanes purchased in the United States and insisting on a reduction in the American presence as the first step, after which the next one would be taken--determination of the specific forms of her participation in NATO. As we see, the approaches are basically different from one another. As the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, F. Fernandez-Ordoñez, declared upon the

completion of the fourth round of talks, "We will be guided in the future, too, by responsibility, wisdom, and firmness in our striving to achieve an agreement."

The pessimism and disappointment and the deep concern with the ever greater divergence of the positions of both parties were not concealed by the Spanish representatives at the talks. "Time is pressing," they say, having in mind the ratification of the Spanish-American treaty which is approaching in November. As the minister reaffirmed in the name of the Spanish government, "It will not take place here if there is no reduction in American troops although, as formerly, we tried to achieve a convergence of the joint interests of the two allied countries; however, one should not expect concessions from us."

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COMPANY TACTICAL GROUPING IN LIGHT OF 'ARMY-90' DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 87 pp 26-27

[Article by Lt Col Yu. Kuropatov: "Company Tactical Groups"; from materials in the foreign press]

[Text] The military-political leadership of the United States, in conducting a course of making aggressive preparations more active, is allotting important significance to the further development of the ground forces--the most numerous service of the U.S. Armed Forces. The American command believes that the motorized infantry and tanks are capable of closing directly with the enemy in the first place and capturing territory.

The Pentagon is accomplishing the organization of the ground forces in accordance with the "Army-90" long-range program which envisages an increase in combat capabilities of units and subunits by equipping them with contemporary weapons and military equipment and improving the organization and establishment.

As the American journal ARMY reports, recently changes have been introduced into the tables of organization and armaments of a large portion of the motorized infantry and tank battalions of the U.S. ground forces' mechanized and armored divisions and, first of all, in those based on the territory of Western Europe. These battalions differ insignificantly from former battalions in personnel strength. However, now four motorized infantry or tank companies are organizational in each of them instead of three. As NATO specialists believe, the four-company composition of the battalion will permit it to launch strikes on the battlefield on two rather than one directions and to a great depth and, in the defense--to create more saturated combat formations.

The firepower of the motorized infantry and tank subunits increased. Instead of M113 armored personnel carriers equipped with a large-caliber machinegun, the motorized infantry received the M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle [IFV] with gun armament. As Western experts estimate, in their combat qualities the M1 Abrams tanks which are reaching the troops are 1.5-2-fold superior to the latest modification of the M60 tanks.

The motorized infantry company of the old organization included a headquarters, three motorized infantry platoons, a weapons platoon, and a repair section. It numbered 170 soldiers and officers. It was equipped with 15 M113 armored personnel carriers, 12 Dragon antitank guided missiles [ATGM], two TOW ATGM's, three 81-mm mortars, 15 M60 machineguns, and more than 20 hand-held grenade launchers.




Figure 1. Organization of the Motorized Infantry Company

Key:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Company commander | 12. Total in company |
| 2. Company headquarters | 13. Officers |
| 3. Motorized infantry platoons | 14. Sergeants and privates |
| 4. Sections | 15. M2 Bradley IFV's |
| 5. Of the company commander | 16. Dragon ATGM launchers |
| 6. Company executive officer | 17. Machineguns |
| 7. Headquarters section | 18. Machineguns |
| 8. Motorized infantry squads | 19. Light machineguns |
| 9. Personnel | 20. M113A1 armored personnel carriers [APC] |
| 10. Company headquarters | 21. Radios |
| 11. Three motorized infantry platoons (in each) | |

In the reorganization, the weapons platoon and the repair section were taken out of the company and were brought together in the battalion in special subunits. The new composition of the motorized infantry company includes a headquarters and three motorized infantry platoons. The company headquarters consists of the company commander's section of five men (company commander, company first sergeant, IFV gunner-operator, mechanic-driver, and radiotelephone operator) and the company executive officer's section consisting of six men (company executive officer, machinegunner, mechanic-driver, radiotelephone operator, chemical serviceman-instructor, and rifleman-grenade launcher). The commander's section uses a Bradley M2 IFV, and the executive officer's--an M113A1 APC.

The motorized infantry platoon has a headquarters section of five men (platoon leader, deputy platoon leader, gunner-operator, mechanic-driver, and radiotelephone operator) and three motorized infantry squads.

The motorized infantry squad numbers 10 men (squad leader, deputy squad leader, IFV gunner-operator, mechanic-driver, machinegunner, Dragon ATGM launcher operator, two automatic riflemen, rifleman-grenade-launcher operator, and radio-telephone operator) who are in an M2 Bradley IFV.

There are 116 men in a motorized infantry company. It is equipped with 13 M2 Bradley IFV's, 1 M113A1 APC, 9 Dragon ATGM launchers, and so forth (see table).

Prior to reorganization, the tank companies had 90 soldiers and officers. They were equipped with 17 M60A1 or M60A3 tanks, 1 M113 APC, and other armament. Now the number of tanks in the platoon has been reduced from five to four.

Just as formerly, the newly-organized tank company includes a headquarters and three tank platoons. The company headquarters includes 13 men: company commander, executive officer, company first sergeant, a sergeant who is a specialist of the technical service, two gunners, two loaders, two mechanic-drivers, a chemical serviceman-instructor, vehicle driver, and radiotelephone operator-clerk. They have at their disposal two M1 Abrams tanks, one motor vehicle, and four radios.

The tank platoon has four M1 Abrams tanks. The crews consist of a platoon leader (tank commander), gunner, loader, and mechanic-driver.

The tank company numbers 61 men. It contains 14 M1 Abrams tanks, 1 motor vehicle, and 16 radios.

The motorized infantry (tank) company can be used for the conduct of combat operations in its regular establishment or for the creation of a company tactical group on its base.

According to the views of the American command, the most complete realization of the combat capabilities of motorized infantry (tank) subunits of the new structure is attained as a result of their being drawn together into company tactical groups. This will permit using more effectively the subunits and the new models of combat equipment which they have in their inventories: M1 Abrams tanks, Bradley IFV's (cavalry fighting vehicles [CFV]) (M3), and other equipment.

Company tactical groups are created by the decision of the battalion commander. The composition and number of the groups being created depend on the availability of organizational and attached personnel and equipment and the nature of enemy operations, terrain conditions, the senior commander's concept of operations, and other factors.

Company tactical groups can be of three types: motorized infantry, tank, and balanced. The ratio of motorized infantry and tank platoons in the group determines its type. For example, the motorized infantry company tactical group includes two or three motorized infantry and one tank platoons. In addition, the group may be reinforced by sections of the Stinger surface-to-air [SAM] missile complexes and combat engineer and other subunits and can be supported by a battery of 155-mm self-propelled howitzers.




Figure 2. Motorized Infantry Company Tactical Group in the Attack (version)

Key:

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| 1. Immediate mission (objective) | 5. Antiaircraft section |
| 2. Subsequent mission (objective) | 6. Motorized infantry company with tank platoon |
| 3. Motorized infantry platoon | 7. Up to |
| 4. Command-observation post | |

At the basis of the tactics for the combat employment of companies (company tactical groups) are the ideas of a new military concept which is called "AirLand Operation [battle]." It requires the conduct of offensive and defensive operations with decisive goals for the capture and retention of the initiative to the entire depth of the enemy's operational formation.

In the course of the attack, the significance of envelopments and turning movements around the defending enemy by motorized infantry and tanks for the swift penetration and destruction of his second echelons (reserves) is increasing.

The width of the attack frontage of a company (company tactical group) is up to 1.5 kilometers, of a platoon--400-500 meters, and a squad--100 meters. The companies are assigned immediate and subsequent missions (objectives) to a depth of 1.5-2 kilometers and 3-4 kilometers respectfully. The subunit organizes the combat formation, as a rule, in two echelons, having two platoons in the first and one platoon in the second. A one-echelon formation is not excluded (see diagram).

Special attention is devoted to offensive operations at night which are conducted with the same intensity as during the day. According to an estimate of the American command, this is furthered by the saturation of the troops with night-

vision instruments and the technical capabilities of the instruments (operating range out to 2,000 meters).

During darkness, it is planned to make wide use of the infiltration of small mobile infantry groups through the defenders' combat formations. In this case, the groups' assembly area is designated at a distance of two to three kilometers from the FEBA (forward edge of the battle area). Their subsequent attack should be supported by tank, IFV, and mortar fire.




Figure 3. Motorized Infantry Tactical Group in the Defense (version).

Key:

- | | |
|---|-------------------|
| 1. Motorized infantry platoon | 4. Local security |
| 2. Command-observation post | 5. Up to |
| 3. Motorized infantry company with tank platoon | |

The operations of a company (company tactical group) in the defense have not undergone substantial changes after the reorganization. The width of the company defense area is up to 1.5 kilometers frontally and up to 1.1 kilometers in depth. Platoon strong points are established with a width of 400-500 meters frontally and 200 meters in depth. The company (company tactical group) usually structures its combat formation in two echelons. Tanks (IFV's) are so disposed as to ensure the fire support of the first echelon and participate in the counterattack of the company or battalion. Temporarily created antitank groups are organized on tank avenues of approach. Local security is sent out to a distance of up to 500 meters from the FEBA (see diagram).

At the same time, as noted in the American journal INFANTRY, the motorized infantry company (company tactical group), when organizing the combat formation, may create a separate, so-called maneuver, group in addition to the first and second echelons. Its mission consists of the conduct of counterattacks against the second echelons of the enemy's attacking companies to restore the position which has been lost and render fire support to the defending infantry.

According to reports in the press, in accordance with the concept which has been adopted the American military command envisions a new version of the conduct of a counterattack by a company tactical group (tank company) which is operating as the battalion reserve--a counterattack with emergence beyond the FEBA. It may be conducted by launching destruction by fire against the enemy from a previously planned position or by the combination of fire with the maneuver actions of the subunit for a preemptive strike in the flank and rear of the enemy second echelon (reserve) which is moving out for commitment to battle.

Proceeding from the basic principles of AirLand operations, American staffs plan to use the company tactical group, as a rule the tank group, as a tactical maneuver group, leaving it in the rear of the attacking enemy troops. In the period for the organization of the defense, when there is no contact with the enemy, the company tactical group emerges in a previously selected area located at a distance of five kilometers or more from the FEBA. Here it occupies an all-around defense. The area is selected outside the presumed direction of the main enemy blow, preferably in a forest tract. With the start of the battle and the enemy's penetration into the defensive formations of the brigade (battalion) the tactical maneuver group conducts a counterattack in the flank and rear of the opponent's attacking forces, trying to inflict destruction on his second echelon and artillery subunits and to disorganize the operations of the rear area.

The modernization of the units and subunits of the U.S. Army ground forces which is being conducted and the adoption of the new military concept reflect the aggressive essence of the foreign policy of the United States' ruling circles; they are the next step in the implementation of the strategy of "direct confrontation" which has been adopted by the administration of R. Reagan, and carry a threat to the countries of the socialist commonwealth and the peoples of the entire world.

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CONVENTIONAL THREAT IN EUROPE, POSSIBILITIES OF ARMS CONTROL

Kiev POD ZNAMENEM LENINIZMA in Russian No 3, Feb 87 pp 80-84

[Article by I. Onishchenko: "From the Atlantic to the Urals"; first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] The CPSU solemnly declares: There is no weapon that the Soviet Union would not be prepared to limit or ban on a mutual basis, with effective verification. From the CPSU Program.

The European dialogue on the future is becoming more and more active. And this is not surprising. Our continent, which has twice been crippled by world wars, is today the epicenter of a dangerous military confrontation. It is here that two worlds, two societies with different social and economic systems confront one another directly, and that two powerful groupings of armed forces, equipped with the most destructive types of weapons, stand face to face. Besides nuclear weapons, they possess the most modern tanks, missiles, aircraft and small arms of all types.

Conventional weapons are acquiring more and more power, accuracy and range. Their other technical specifications, especially those of precision guided weapons, are also improving. These are weapons which are controlled, adjusted and operated according to the "fire and forget" principle. Their accuracy is almost independent of range, weather, visibility or the psychological state of the personnel. Ever newer types of non-nuclear weapons, which are more complex, more costly and more powerful, are being developed and created. According to their characteristics some of them are approaching weapons of mass destruction. They make conventional warfare fierce, cause tremendous destruction, and bring grief and suffering to millions of people. It is enough to say that during the period from 1960 through 1972 alone 10.7 million people perished in "conventional" wars, unleashed or provoked by imperialism.

The importance of not permitting a nuclear catastrophe is obvious. But, we must also not release the "conventional genie." The use of conventional weapons alone may also be catastrophic.

Myth and Reality

Inflaming militaristic psychosis and anti-Soviet hysteria, Western bourgeois propaganda, especially American, attempts in every way to kindle the myth of some sort of "Soviet military threat," in so doing spreading a story about the "superiority" of the OVD [Warsaw Treaty Organization] over NATO in numbers of armed forces and individual types of conventional arms. With the aid of this story attempts are being made to justify the need for a nuclear and conventional arms buildup.

Back in 1978 the so-called NATO long range program was approved. Nine out of its ten sections are devoted to strengthening conventional armed forces of the bloc. The NATO decision on an annual three percent increase in military expenditures can also be related to this. In November 1984 the NATO Military Planning Committee approved the so-called Rogers Plan (named after the commander-in-chief of NATO armed forces in Europe, American Gen B. Rogers), which provides for overall modernization of conventional weapons, and in which the concept is set forth justifying an attack deep into the territories of the OVD countries.

Reliance in this is placed on "promising technical innovations." This refers to multi-charge rounds to operate in large areas within the enemy rear. In several NATO bloc countries programs for creating such systems are already being implemented. Thus, the U. S. is developing anti-tank rounds with wide range of action; Great Britain is developing runway destruction systems; the FRG is developing a multi-charged remote system for strikes against airfields and columns of tanks; Great Britain, France, the U. S., the FRG and Italy have jointly developed and will produce a multi-tube rocket launcher; etc.

In Rogers' opinion, strengthening and modernizing conventional armed forces can raise the "nuclear threshold," provide effective operations using conventional weapons and strengthen the "defense might of NATO against the threat from the East." At the same time, the general considers the three percent annual increase in military expenditures insufficient, and demands that they be increased by four percent. It is necessary to note that the Rogers Plan does not do away with the official NATO concept of first use of nuclear weapons. In fact, it supplements NATO nuclear strategy, making it still more aggressive.

We are talking, essentially, about a new "blitzkrieg" concept: in the first stage of aggression NATO will make a series of lightning-like strikes against the second echelon of the OVD countries, to disorganize the rear and hinder the arrival of reinforcements and their deployment in the zone of combat operations. Thus, the new "defensive" directive proposes "defending oneself" against the enemy in his rear area.

In this regard, Washington and the other NATO capitals are attempting to convince their populations that, supposedly, the USSR, continuing the technical improvement of its forces, gives priority to preparing its troops for "rapid offensive operations, characterized by sudden actions, massive fire

and high mobility," and holds forth about some sort of "disbalance in ground forces in favor of the Warsaw Treaty Organization," and about the "fundamentally offensive conventional capability" of the OVD.

Such assertions are absolutely groundless. The existence of equality between NATO and the OVD is convincingly confirmed, not only by official data, which the OVD countries presented during the Vienna negotiations on reducing armed forces and weapons in Central Europe, but also by many Western sources, debunking the myth about some sort of USSR and OVD superiority over the U. S. and NATO in conventional weapons.

Thus, (W. Mako), a well known expert on military-political issues from the Brookings Institute in the U. S., noted that neither side has clear quantitative superiority, and therefore there is no basis for any sort of "pessimistic forecasts" in the West.

But, let us cite the facts, which give us a correct picture of the correlation of forces on the two sides.

It is known that, besides the armed forces of the European NATO countries, 355,600 U. S. military personnel are today concentrated on our continent. They are armed with up to 150 operational-tactical missile launchers; 3,400 tanks; 2,500 guns and mortars; more than a thousand helicopters and more than 750 combat aircraft. Besides this, 170 warships of the 2d and 6th U. S. fleets, including 6 aircraft carriers and 50 nuclear submarines, constantly ply the Mediterranean and Atlantic.

In addition to military personnel, numerous civilian employees work in the armed forces of the Western states (FRG -- 180,000; Great Britain -- 315,000; U. S. -- approximately a million people). In the Soviet Armed Forces military personnel occupy similar positions. Division personnel strength also differs. Army divisions in the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries number a maximum of 11,000 - 12,000 men; the numerical strength of a deployed American division is 16,000 - 19,000, and that of a FRG division is 20,000 men.

It is entirely understandable that the USSR has more ground forces divisions than does the U. S. The Soviet state border extends a total of approximately 67,000 km; including more than 20,000 km of land borders. These borders must be defended and protected both in the west -- from the threat from NATO -- and in the east, and in the south -- taking into account the American Armed Forces, the armies of its allies and those of other countries deployed there.

It is enough to say that the large number of U. S. conventional weapons in the developed network of numerous military bases on overseas territories (1,500 bases and facilities in 32 countries), which virtually surround the USSR on all sides, are not always included in the overall balance of forces. Recently weapons supplies have been placed on American floating bases in various waters of the world's oceans.

On the European continent, 94 NATO divisions (including the armed forces of France and Spain) oppose 78 OVD divisions, while, as was noted above, the number of personnel in OVD divisions is more than 50 percent smaller than in similar large units in the NATO countries.

Approximate force equality also exists in tactical aviation. NATO is inferior to the OVD in number of fighter-interceptors, but has some superiority in number of fighter-bombers and ground attack aircraft. The so-called "tank threat" from the USSR is also a fabrication. Today there are more than 17,000 tanks in NATO troop units, as well as approximately 8,000 tanks in depots in Europe. This number approximately corresponds to the OVD tank forces.

On the whole, the North Atlantic bloc is superior to the Warsaw Treaty Organization in overall number of personnel, number of divisions and anti-tank weapons; and it has approximately equal numbers of artillery and armor. NATO has superiority in fighter-bombers, which the OVD compensates for through a somewhat larger number of air defense fighter-interceptors.

Taking these factors into account, a balanced assessment of NATO and OVD armed forces permits the conclusion that approximate equality exists between them. Such equality objectively permits stabilization of the situation in Europe and has a positive effect on the security of our continent.

No attempts to justify a conventional arms race in the West by reference to the "threat from the East," or some sort of "disbalance" in the correlation of conventional armed forces can withstand criticism. "Not a single Soviet political objective," writes (P. Breyken), an American researcher from Yale University, in an article, "Problems of the Defense of NATO," "can justify any motive for attacking Western Europe."

In connection with this, it is appropriate to cite the words of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev, stated at the 11th SED Congress on 18 April 1986: "Our country will never, under any circumstances, initiate military actions against Western Europe, unless we and our allies become the targets of attack by NATO! I repeat, never!"

A Platform of Specific Actions

The foreign political activity of the CPSU and Soviet state are aimed at strengthening peace, in particular in Europe. This can be achieved not through a further arms race, but through negotiations, reducing all weapons, and universal and total disarmament. Our country struggles tirelessly and consistently to implement this objective.

Back in 1946 the USSR raised for the examination of the UN General Assembly the question of regulating and reducing armed forces and weapons and creating a commission on conventional weapons. Moreover, in 1955-1956, as well as in 1960, our country reduced its armed forces on a unilateral basis.

The policy of reducing armed forces and weapons was approved at the 24th and 26th party congresses. In 1980 the USSR proposed to members of the UN Security Council and to countries associated with these military agreements,

already beginning 1 January 1981, not to increase their armed forces and conventional weapons as a first step toward their subsequent reduction.

Owing to the efforts of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, a convention on banning or limiting the use of specific types of conventional weapons, which can be considered to cause extreme damage or have non-selective effects in our day, was developed and entered force on 2 December 1983. More than 20 states participated in this convention along with the Soviet Union. Another 40 countries signed, but have not ratified it.

With the objectives of escaping the blind alley of the negotiations on mutual reductions of armed forces and weapons in Central Europe that have been going on in Vienna since 1973, in February 1985 the USSR offered for examination a draft document, "Basic Provisions of an Agreement on Initial Reduction of Ground Forces and Weapons in Central Europe by the Soviet Union and the U. S. and Subsequent Stabilization of the Level of Armed Forces and Weapons of the Two Sides in this Region." It proposed concentrating attention on implementing a reduction in troop units of the USSR (20,000 men) and the U. S. (13,000 men), with their weapons, in connection with a subsequent freeze on the level of armed forces and weapons in this region on the part of all direct participants, which is based on a legal treaty.

The draft of a corresponding agreement was based on the fact that negotiations on subsequent, substantially greater reductions in armed forces and weapons would be continued, with the objective of achieving equal collective levels of armed forces of the two sides in Central Europe of 900,000 men, including 700,000 ground forces. The agreement would enter into force at the day it was signed and would be in effect for three years.

A statement by the CPSU Central Committee general secretary of 15 January 1986 proposes, along with removing weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of the states before the end of this century, that conventional weapons and armed forces become the subject of agreed reductions.

The 27th CPSU Congress emphasized that our party sees as the very essence of its foreign policy strategy the struggle against war and for disarmament.

"Our program on the whole," it is stated in the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the party congress, "is essentially a fusion of the philosophy of establishing a secure world in the nuclear-space era, with a platform of specific actions. The Soviet Union proposes approaching the problems of disarmament as a whole, for as far as security is concerned, one problem is associated with another. We are not talking about rigid links or attempts to "concede" in one area in order to erect a barricade in another. We are talking namely about a plan of specific actions, strictly calculated in time. The USSR intends to seek its implementation persistently, viewing it as the central direction of its foreign policy for the coming years."

The position of our country is unambiguous -- both in the field of military-political concepts, and in the field of the material base of war. Along with its OVD allies, it has proposed to the NATO countries an agreement on non-first use against one another of either nuclear or conventional weapons.

On 18 April 1986 a new Soviet proposal was made from the rostrum of the 11th SED Congress. This was a proposal to negotiate a substantial reduction in all components of ground forces and tactical aviation of the European states, as well as corresponding U. S. and Canadian forces deployed in Europe.

This proposal became the foundation of the Budapest Appeal of the Warsaw Treaty Organization states to the NATO countries, and all European countries, with a program to reduce armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe. "The appeal approved at the conference on this issue," it is stated in the decision of the June 1986 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, "importantly supplements and buttresses the program for the complete elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction."

Simultaneously with conventional weapons, operational-tactical nuclear weapons with a range up to 1,000 km would also be subject to reduction. Let us recall that in accordance with the program for the elimination of nuclear weapons advanced on 15 January 1986 and approved by the 27th CPSU Congress, the USSR proposed that reductions in such nuclear weapons begin in the second stage; i.e., after 1990.

It is proposed that the geographic zone of reduction encompass the territory of the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, that it take place step by step, in coordinated time periods and with the continuous retention of military equality at reduced levels, without damage to anyone's security. Along with large units and units, their organic weapons, including nuclear, would also be reduced, and would be subject to destruction or storage on national territories.

It is proposed that the overall amount of reduction be established at approximately 25 percent of the current level. This would constitute more than a half million men from each side. This result could be achieved by the beginning of the 1990s and then, if the NATO countries are prepared, the reduction process would continue.

As a first step, the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries propose a one time mutual reduction over one or two years of the number of forces on both sides by 100,000 - 150,000 personnel and a reduction in tactical strike aviation. It also has in mind that those European countries which are not members of military-political alliances also be included in the arms reduction process.

The reduction must be carried out with reliable verification at all stages, both with the aid of national technical means, and international inspections, including, if necessary, on the ground inspection.

The Budapest appeal proposes that all states participating in the agreement on the reduction of armed forces and weapons pledge themselves not to increase their ground forces and tactical strike aviation outside of the boundaries of

the zone of reductions. The need for this stems from the following circumstances. First, the territory of three participants in the agreement is located completely (U. S. and Canada) or partially (USSR) outside of the zone of reductions. Secondly, some states whose territory lies completely in the zone have armed forces outside of Europe. An increase in armed forces and weapons of participants in the agreement outside of Europe, on the one hand, would lead to increased military danger in other areas of the world, and on the other hand, would increase the danger of a return of armed forces and weapons to Europe, in violation of the agreement.

Decreasing the danger of a surprise attack and strengthening military-strategic stability on our continent are of considerable importance in this. For this purpose it is necessary to agree on a significant reduction from the outset of NATO and OVD strike aviation, as well as on reducing the concentration of forces along their line of contact. An agreement on limitations on the conduct of major military maneuvers (in terms of their number and scale), on exchanging information on them, including on forces and resources which are brought into Europe from other areas for the exercise period, as well as about other measures which strengthen mutual trust, would also be conducive to this.

It is worth noting that, owing to the great efforts of the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community, after three years of work the Stockholm Conference on confidence building measures, security and disarmament in Europe last fall approved a final document, aimed at expanding mutual understanding and turning our continent into a region of stable peace and cooperation. It imparted effectiveness to the principle of non-use of force and specified measures for trust and security in Europe.

The creation of favorable conditions for reducing armed forces and weapons would also promote the creation on the continent of zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons, the gradual reduction of military activity by both military alliances, and the establishment of cooperation among their participants on questions of arms limitations and disarmament. As is known, at one time the OVD countries came forth with an initiative to create a chemical weapons-free zone in Europe. But the negative position taken by the NATO countries is hampering its implementation. Under these conditions the GDR and CSSR propose that the process of freeing Europe from chemical weapons begin in its central area, the FRG, GDR and CSSR.

The Soviet Union and the other OVD states favor the creation of nuclear weapons-free zones in northern Europe and the Balkans. Their favorable attitude toward Sweden's proposal to create a so-called nuclear-free corridor along the NATO and OVD line of contact in Central Europe is also well known. They propose that this corridor be 500-600 km wide.

Posing the question of a substantial reduction in conventional weapons and armed forces on a broad basis would make it possible to untie the knot which for many years has prevented progress in the Vienna talks. Such a reduction would open the door to an expansion of economic, trade and scientific-technological cooperation among the countries of Europe.

The program of specific actions in the field of curbing the conventional arms race, proposed by the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, found a favorable response throughout the continent. Consciousness is growing among the European public of the fact that, in any variant -- conventional or non-conventional -- armed conflict in Europe can trigger a worldwide catastrophe.

The interests, not only of Europeans, but of all people, demand a reduction in the level of military confrontation in Europe, the creation of a stable situation there, and a reduction of the threat of war. This is precisely the aim of the Budapest platform of specific actions.

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DATA ON F/A-18, OTHER U.S. FIGHTERS

Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian No 1, Jan 87 pp 28-29

[Article by V. Kuzmin, Engineer: "For Strike Forces"]

[Text] Dear Editors! The militaristic group in the United States which represents the military-industrial complex is possessed by the idea of the arms race. In implementing its will, the administration of President Reagan is constantly building up the power of all the services of the armed forces, including aviation. Series production was recently begun of the F-18 aircraft, which was mentioned in an article in KRYLYA RODINY from the "Kosmo-88" world exhibition. Please tell us in greater detail about this airplane.

A. Mikhaylin, Volgograd

N. Aleksushkin of Krasnodar, A. Bazilevskiy of Noyabrsk, S. Klimak of Ekibastuz, V. Tkachenko of Malakhovka, and many other readers turned to the editors with a similar request.

The ruling circles of the United States are allotting the most important place in their expansionist plans to the naval forces, in particular to their carrier strike forces. These forces have been used for many years already for the performance of gendarme functions, a show of force, and direct armed actions as was the case in Korea, Vietnam, and quite recently in the Mediterranean Sea against Libya. Airplanes are the basis of their combat power. An air wing of 75-95 airplanes of various types, including 40-50 carriers of nuclear weapons, and helicopters are based on each attack carrier (and there are 14 of them in the U.S. fleet). The Pentagon spares no resources on the improvement and renewal of these wings. They were also generously released for the creation of an airplane to replace the F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber and A-7 Corsair bomber on aircraft carriers and in the Marine Corps.

The new airplane--in series production it received the designation F/A-18 Hornet--was developed in the fighter (F-18A), attack (A-18), and reconnaissance (RF-18) versions. According to the terms of the contract, it was to have a small takeoff weight, simple design, good rate of climb and maneuverability, and not a very high cost. According to the plans of the U.S. Naval Command, the F-18 together with the F-14 Tomcat* were to become the basic combat force of naval aviation and the Marine Corps.

* See KRYLYA RODINY No 10, 1983, about it.

The UF-17 airplane of the Northrup Company was taken as the basis for the development of the new aircraft. The McDonnell-Douglas Corporation became the primary company for the Hornet program (70 percent of the expenditures on development and 60 percent on production). At the end of 1978 the first test airplane was built. It differed from the UF-17 by an increase in the wingspan and wing area and a substantially greater takeoff weight and fuel reserve. For use from carriers, a reinforced landing gear and a device for the catapult and an arresting hook were employed on it. The wing panels were made folding. In accordance with the requirements of the naval command, the designers paid special attention to the aircraft's reliability and survivability. To hinder its radar detection and tracking, they tried to reduce to the minimum the amount of effective reflecting surface and infrared radiation and they employed a special paint.

The F/A-18 aircraft is a monoplane with a normal layout with a trapezoidal wing and twin-fin tail unit. In front of the wing along the fuselage are large extensions which increase the lift at large angles of attack and decrease induced drag and shifting of the focus at supersonic flight speeds. Automatically, depending on the angle of attack and flight speed, deflectable leading-edge and trailing-edge flaps improve the maneuverability of the aircraft when conducting aerial battle. Two by-pass jet engines with a thrust on the afterburner of 7,250 kilograms each are installed on the F/A-18. Within the limits of the radius of action, the airplane can also return to base with one operating engine.

A typical feature of the Hornet's layout is the absence of fuel tanks above the engines and between them. All the fuel--about 5,000 kilograms--is located in internal tanks. To increase flight range, the aircraft is equipped with an in-flight refuelling system. The receiving rod is located ahead of the cockpit on the starboard side. The suspension of additional tanks is also envisaged.

The basic control system is electrohydraulic. However, mechanical control is also retained as a backup. The system includes four computers. They ensure control of the aircraft for pitch, yaw, and bank. To increase survivability, each computer is placed in a separate compartment and operates independently. With the failure of one, two, or three computers control is accomplished by those which are functioning, and if all computers fail, the pilot changes over to the mechanical system which ensures control of the stabilizer cantilevers which are deflected together for control for pitch and differentially for control for bank.

A second feature of the F/A-18 is the weapons control system which is common to a considerable degree for the fighter and attack versions of the aircraft: it differs only in the electronic equipment in suspended containers which ensures the employment of the corresponding armament. Multifunctional display units are used in various operating modes depending on the combat mission being accomplished. The weight and volume of the Hornet's radar is half, and the reliability is four times greater than those of the Phantom's radar. For attack operations a forward-looking infrared system and a combined laser target indication system are employed on the F/A-18. Located in suspended containers, they permit correcting the data from the navigation system and determining the target's position more accurately, and they increase the possibility for tracking it and the probability of its destruction.

The armament of the Hornet consists of a built-in 20-mm six-barrelled gun with a unit of fire of 570 rounds. On nine external suspension assemblies the airplane in the fighter version is equipped with two close-action Sidewinder guided missiles and two to four medium range Sparrows. It is also planned to arm it with the AMRAAM new guided missile with an active homing head. When using the F/A-18 as an attack aircraft, in addition to a gun it may carry both conventional as well as guided bombs and air-to-ground missiles with a total weight of 6,200 kilograms. The reequipping of the aircraft from one version to another is accomplished in a short time. In the RF/A-18 version, a platform with reconnaissance equipment is installed in the nose portion of the fuselage instead of the gun.

With consideration of the Pentagon's "appetites," the company has created a twin-seater training version of the aircraft and also the F-18L--for the U.S. Air Force and deliveries to other countries.

Large-series production of the fighter, and then of the attack versions of the F/A-18, was begun in March 1983, although the conditions concerning its takeoff weight and "low" cost were not met. The cost of one airplane increased to 30 million dollars. The U.S. Secretary of the Navy, J. Lehman, threatened that if the cost is not reduced to 22.5 million dollars the Navy would stop the purchase of the Hornets and would buy the F-14 fighters of the Northrup Company and the A-6 attack aircraft which would cost it respectively 26.1 and 16.4 million dollars per aircraft. However, this "threat" was not frightening. The leaders of the corporation are confident that the Reagan administration will find the money for their production. And actually, the U.S. Department of Defense is adhering to the plan for the purchase of 1,366 Hornets for the armament of the Navy and the Marine Corps, including 799 in the attack version, 305 in the fighter version, 112 in the reconnaissance version, and 150 two-seater combat training aircraft. In addition to this, McDonnell-Douglas is counting on selling 1,200 aircraft to other countries. By the way, Canada has already decided to purchase 139 Hornet aircraft. The first of them, under the designation of the CF-18, have begun to arrive in the inventory. Spain intends to purchase 70 aircraft, and Australia--75. The FRG, Italy, and Israel are considered as potential customers.

About 350 F/A-18 aircraft were built by the beginning of 1986. Their production has now been brought to 12 per month. According to the Pentagon's plans, production of Hornets will continue to 1996.

Basic Characteristics of the F/A-18

Length of airplane	17.07 meters
Wingspan	12.41 meters
Wing area	37.16 square meters
Height	4.51 meters
Maximum takeoff weight	23,000 kilograms
Takeoff weight in fighter version	15,200 kilograms
Maximum speed	M = 1.8
Radius of action without suspended tanks	740 kilometers
Ceiling	15,250 meters
Maximum combat load	6,200 kilograms

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

TURKISH OFFICERS MEET WITH AKHROMEYEV--On 12 May, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. F. Akhromeyev, chief of the general staff of the armed forces of the USSR and first deputy minister of defense of the USSR, received General of the Army N. Torumtay, first deputy chief of the general staff of the Turkish armed forces, who is in the Soviet Union on an official visit. A discussion was held on questions of mutual interest. On that same day, a meeting was held between Colonel General V. N. Lobov, first deputy chief of the general staff of the armed forces of the USSR, and Army General N. Torumtay, first deputy chief of the general staff of the armed forces of Turkey. The guest from Turkey visited an air unit in Kubinka, where he was acquainted with the combat equipment and life of Soviet aviators. [Text] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 May 87 p 3] 13052

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