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14 DECEMBER 1988



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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

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## REGIONAL

### Egypt Calls For Arab Cooperation To Protect the Gulf

45000060 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic  
2 Nov 88 p 6

[Text] Via secret communications with certain Arab offices, Egyptian officials have submitted a proposal calling for "Arab cooperation" to take responsibility for protecting the "oil route" and ensure free navigation in the waters of the Arab Gulf, especially since the larger Western nations present in the region are inclined to tangibly reduce their number of warships after the end of the Iraq-Iran war. The Egyptian proposal calls for cooperation between Egypt and several Arab countries concerned in the matter to take responsibility for protecting the oil route. The Arab offices that received this Egyptian proposal promised to study it, but did not seem enthusiastic about it.

### Egyptian General Discusses Arab Military Industry Prospects

45040073 Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic  
2 Oct 88 p 9

[Interview with Major General Dr Ahmad Nabil Ibrahim Ahmad of the Nasir Higher Military Academy, under the title: "Interview With Arab Expert on Strategy and National Security: How Do the Arabs Manufacture Their Weapons Themselves? New Arab Strategy for Military Industrialization," by 'Abd-al-Sattar Abu-Husayn, in Cairo; date not specified]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [AL-ITTIHAD] The Arab countries have good armaments, both quantitatively and qualitatively, much of which is imported from the world arms market which is relatively open now. What, then, are the justifications for setting up an Arab industry not equal in quality or price to imported weapons, according to some strategists?

[Ahmad] The importance of importation as a primary source of Arab armaments notwithstanding, the claim that any Arab military industrialization strategy will achieve self-sufficiency for the Arabs is overstated. The challenge, however, is to have a balance between the weapons we manufacture and those we import under some restraints on arms imports, the most important of which are:

1. Arms deals are not merely a profitable business for the exporting countries, but are a political decision in view of the fact that weapons are a strategic commodity.
2. The seller-buyer relationship does not end with the importation of the weapons themselves. Indeed, there are relations of dependency growing out of the need to import many other related items such as munitions and spare parts that must be obtained from the same

arms sellers. Consequently, producing countries can exercise pressure through this medium on importing countries should they fail to fulfill their pledges.

3. Arms-producing superpowers make regional and international calculations about the balance of power in the Arab region before ratifying various deals in an effort to determine the impact such arms could have on the strategic balance in the region. The Arabs have suffered many blocked requests for arms in the U.S. Congress, and the Soviet Union imposes restrictions on the types of weapons it sells to Arab countries, stipulating that weapons must be defensive and must not be sold to third parties.

This is one side. The other side is that the Arab region is being subjected to a tremendous amount of threats that have compelled them to manufacture tools to counter such dangers instead of waiting for them to come from the outside. Topping those threats is the Arab-Israeli conflict stemming from the military imbalance between the Arab countries and Israel which has U.S. backing. We must own up to the fact that the prospects for peace with Israel remain farfetched and the Arab-Israeli conflict will persist with Israel representing the number one future threat to the Arabs which can only be countered by Arab armed forces backed by military industrialization that can allow the Arabs to achieve superiority through which the conflict may be resolved in their favor. [passage omitted]

[AL-ITTIHAD] But do the Arabs possess the essential ingredients for military industrialization?

[Ahmad] Let us review the essential ingredients for military industrialization to see which ones the Arabs possess.

Marketing is considered the key to this industry's success. So long as there is a demand for the product, all other necessary ingredients for setting up a successful industry can be made available. Demand in this respect centers on the Arab armed forces and certain African countries. Arab forces can absorb much of the production because this industry often starts with conventional weapons and munitions, high-consumption items that guarantee the successful marketing of Arab military production.

With regard to Africa, it can be done via credit through rich Arab countries. As for financing, military industrialization is such a high-cost industry that European countries have opted for cooperation in certain joint ventures such as that between England, West Germany, and Italy in the manufacture of the Toronado fighter aircraft. Spain has joined them as well to produce a fighter called Fighting Europe (EEA) with a \$21 billion budget for the manufacture of 800 aircraft. Therefore, that the Arab countries possess the financial means does not mean that each country should set up its own private military industry. It is better to choose financing through

joint cooperation so as not to burden individual national economies with these costs or a waste of resources or technical cadres needed for this industry at the Arab nations' level. We have much of the above, but the deficiency lies in the organization of what we already have. Add to that the possibility of seeking the help of certain foreign expertise in the early stages which does not detract from the industry so long as such assistance is limited to the training of Arab cadres to replace them at the proper time.

As for feeder industries which constitute the key to the military industry's success, the Arab countries have the ability to make long-term plans for the feeder and supplemental industries at the Arab national level. Moreover, Arab countries have the raw materials the military industry needs, save for certain kinds that can be obtained from the outside without adverse effects on the industry for most of them are available on the market and have civilian as well as military uses. We have numerous examples of countries such as Japan and Switzerland that relied on imported raw materials in setting up their sophisticated industries.

[AL-ITTIHAD] Talk about essential ingredients for military industrialization brings us to the subject of military technology as one of the challenges facing this kind of industry. How can a sophisticated Arab technological standard for this industry be attained?

[Ahmad] [Passage omitted] We must not count much on special Arab relations with any of the superpowers as an alternative for making military technology available, for this would be overoptimistic. Israel, which is considered an American state, still obtains American technology by stealing it, and everyone knows that the United States impedes the advancement of Arab and Egyptian industry. Furthermore, special relations with the Soviets were a most important obstacle for the Egyptian military industry. At any rate, the Arabs' technological standard is high enough now to start an Arab arms industry for conventional weapons. [passage omitted]

[AL-ITTIHAD] If we were to talk about specific steps that must be taken to accomplish the Arab industrialization project, what are the new Arab strategic features in this area?

Maj Gen Nabil Ibrahim specified a number of elements in such a strategy, namely that Arab military industries will be able to take their place domestically and internationally only through joint cooperation rather than competition:

- The Arab political leadership must define Arab military industrial objectives at the outset as a primary condition before the project gets under way whether these objectives pertain to safeguards for Arab national security, to the realization of an economic boom, or to other objectives.
- This should be followed by a distribution of roles among the Arab countries taking part in this industry.

This step has been achieved by the Arab Industrialization Agency, but the political dimension has had an adverse effect on the agency's experiment. However, it remains in its totality a positive action as the first joint Arab effort to secure a tool for safeguarding Arab national security with the participation of several countries, an experience that has not yet been repeated.

- The formation of a supreme Arab countries' council to determine what products this industry is required to put out, provided that countries participating in the venture commit themselves to buying the product they agree to manufacture. Topping the list of priorities is the small arms system (rifles, machineguns, light artillery, ammunition), for these weapons are indispensable and do not require foreign assistance. Scientific advancement in this organization is slow with regard to other weapons which means that these weapons will remain in service in the Arab armed forces for a long time to come. This is not to mention the fact that they are easy to market in African and Asian nations having special relations with the Arab countries. Another priority is the joint production of a training aircraft selected by the council to help unify Arab air force training.
- Arab countries' continued fulfillment of their previous arms deals commitments. For a country producing a certain type of weapon can go on producing it and fulfilling its previous contracts, and if the producer obtains the supreme council's approval to select the products, the other Arab countries can take part in it as well.
- Electronics are the backbone of any sophisticated industry, be it military or civilian, and so far the Arab region does not have an electronics industrial complex able to meet civilian and military needs.
- Starting an Arab nuclear military industry is an extremely important dimension, and we must reaffirm that nuclear technological developments will only originate in the Arab countries for such a nuclear weapon cannot be bought or sold, but must be manufactured locally. No special relations of any kind with any of the superpowers can provide us with a nuclear cover against the Israeli threat in view of the fact that Israel is the chief enemy of the Arabs, for the foreseeable future at least, and it is certain that this enemy possesses nuclear weapons. Therefore, a deterrent against Israeli nuclear weapons can only be achieved through a similar Arab weapon. Nonetheless, the Arab nuclear weapon remains one of deterrence rather than use, for our efforts to possess this weapon do not mean that we are building an offensive strategy or that we are calling for war. Our many experiences with Israel, however, underscore the fact that it is a difficult enemy to deal with without using the same tactics it uses. Golda Meier's threats in 1973 to use nuclear weapons against the Arabs are still in our minds.

[AL-ITTIHAD] But how can we safeguard the Arab industrialization project against Israeli retaliation?

[Ahmad] Our recognition of Israel and our assertion that it represents a threat to any joint Arab action must not lead us to blow this threat out of proportion. The arms industry must have the necessary safeguards before it gets underway, something which is on the minds of the Arab armed forces. By coordinating their current capabilities, they can provide protection for the Arab military industrialization project. Moreover, Israeli threats exist against any Arab or Egyptian project, but this will not prevent the establishment of an Egyptian or Arab arms industry. True, the Israeli threats vis-a-vis joint Arab military industrialization efforts will grow, but this should be an incentive rather than a hindrance to such a project, and we should not be intimidated by any Israeli threat in this regard. Israel's threat to strike at such a project must be countered by an Arab threat of similar retaliation, given the fact that the Arabs possess deterrents that can reach the heart of Israel. Furthermore, locations of Arab military industrialization units must be spread over more than one country for reasons of security and so that no country can monopolize privileges at the expense of others.

#### **Jordanian, Syrian Ministers Discuss Electricity Network**

*JN21N131688 Amman Domestic Service in Arabic  
1200 GMT 21 Nov 88*

[Text] Talks between a Jordanian delegation under Dr Hisham al-Khatib, minister of energy and mineral resources, and a Syrian delegation under Dr Kamil al-Baba, electricity minister, began in Damascus today. They reviewed areas of cooperation between the sisterly countries in electricity and energy, with special emphasis on strengthening and boosting the current joint electricity network and the prospect for turning it into a permanent project.

#### **Unified System for Foreign Capital Investment Approved**

*Doha AL-'ARAB in Arabic 29 Oct 88 p 3*

[Text] The Gulf Cooperation Council's unified system for foreign capital investment will be applied as a demonstration for 3 years, a Bahraini newspaper said.

In its recent meeting in Riyadh the Economic and Financial Cooperation Committee, which includes the national economy and finance ministers of the GCC, approved the project of the unified system for foreign capital investment.

Deriving its information from economic sources, the newspaper indicated that the general secretariat for the six GCC states will record the member states' comments on the project [draft] during this period, and then the project [draft] will be issued as unified and binding.

The sources explained that the project is based on article 21 of the unified economic agreement which stipulates that the member states will try to unify the laws and regulations pertaining to investment to draft a joint investment policy which aims at directing national and foreign investment.

The sources pointed out that the unified system project for foreign capital investment defines foreign capital in its first article as what can be cash appraised by material or moral rights, or property transmitted or imported from outside the GCC for investment purposes, whether this property is owned by non-GCC individuals or corporations.

The sources stated that article four stipulates that foreign capital investments which meet the conditions of licensing in the state will enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and guarantees which are approved by the concerned administrative party in accordance with the policies and controls pertaining to foreign capital investment established by the state, or which would be agreed upon within the framework of the council.

### **PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS**

#### **West Bank Unions Declare Independence From Jordan**

*JN17N095288 Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic  
17 Nov 88 p 1*

[Text] Palestinian labor and professional unions, institutions, and societies in the occupied Arab territories declared their independence from their counterparts in Jordan.

A statement by representatives of Palestinian trade unions and national and popular establishments said: In implementation of the PNC resolutions, we declare our independence from our counterparts in Jordan and that we are an integral part of the independent Palestinian state.

The statement was issued following a meeting held in Jerusalem the day before yesterday, after the declaration of the Palestinian state. The statement was distributed in the occupied territories.

#### **Waqf Official Predicts Increasing Violence On Temple Mount**

*44230010 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
4 Oct 88 p 15*

[Article entitled "A New Outbreak of Violence" by Nadav Shragay, including a passage from an interview granted to the PLO publication FILASTIN AL-THA-WRAH by Waqf official Shaykh Sa'd-al-Din al-'Alami charging the Israeli Army with use of chemical weapons against Arab demonstrators]

[Text] In the last 9 months, the intifadah has been carried on in Jerusalem at different levels of intensity. There have been some very difficult weeks, with dozens

wounded and arrested, intrigues for Jewish neighborhoods along the sector boundary, and almost complete severance between the eastern part of the city and the western. There have also been weeks in which the intifadah has simmered at a low flame, a bottle here and a stone there, and only a few days of absolute quiet.

The coming weeks apparently will open a new front between Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem. On the bright side, the confrontation may take place in the corridors of the courts or in tense deliberations shrouded in cigarette smoke. In the worst case, the streets will blaze and the dispute will shift to the street. In that case, the street will be the Temple Mount and its immediate vicinity. To the political struggle will be added a fanatic, religious dimension: The moving party, which will determine the timing, will be the Waqf (the Supreme Muslim Council on the Temple Mount) which, since Husayn's renunciation of interest, now remains the sole official body in the territories acting on Jordan's behalf.

In recent weeks, the Waqf has begun to form close ties with members of the extremist Islamic organizations as a balance against the PLO. Each is a rival to the other, and the result is escalation, even in Jerusalem. The Waqf enjoys a relatively pleasant theater of operations. Its members operate on sovereign Israeli territory, and the government is limited in the possible action it can take against it. Its institutions stand on a sensitive spot, the Temple Mount and, in practice, its members enjoy autonomy. Almost the only tool at the disposal of the Israeli Government to meet violations of law or order by the Waqf is judicial process. Nonetheless, the authorities until now have kept to a minimum legal action against the Waqf. Behind this line of passive action has stood the desire to limit the national conflict to political channels and to prevent it from boiling over to religious channels.

Israel has no interest in a religious confrontation with millions of faithful Muslims in all parts of the world. An active line of conduct by the authorities to a large extent provoked the intifadah in the space of a month, and various signs indicate that it is destined to provoke still more.

On Thursday, 10 days ago, a group of Waqf employees went to the slope of the Temple Mount and put up a fence some hundreds of meters in length in the Qidron Valley. In effect, this closed the entire slope of the Temple Mount outside the walls between the City of David and Gat Shemanim. Because the Waqf does not recognize Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem, it had not sought any permission for this act. At the urging of some in the government, the municipality quickly turned to the courts and issued a demolition order.

Last Wednesday, the police force was readied. The municipality was about to carry out the order that afternoon, but the Waqf succeeded in stopping the

process at the last moment. Contrary to its usual practice, the Muslim Council formally applied to an Israeli court and obtained a restraining order against performance of the demolition until consideration of the positions of the two sides.

The dispute over ground on the slope of the Qidron Valley is fraught with the potential for violence of the worst sort, religious violence, but it is only the last of a series of events that is slowly transferring the struggle from the political field to the religious.

During the last 6 months, security officials have been pressuring the political branches to allow them to prosecute some of the leaders of the Supreme Muslim Council. The security officials have claimed to possess clear evidence of the organization's involvement in organizing breaches of the peace. These demands were all rejected, despite the recurring events every Friday on the grounds of the Temple Mount immediately following prayer [at the Mosque].

Last July, the picture changed. The Religious Affairs Ministry decided to break open a passage between the Hasmonean tunnel to the Via Dolorosa in order to remove 1,000 tons of dirt and mud that had piled up in the tunnel. Zevulun Hamer, minister for religious affairs, sought to open the tunnel to the public as early as the holiday of Tish'a Be'av. The Ministry also wanted to direct the public through the new passage in the tunnel straight from the depths of the earth into the markets of the Muslim Quarter above. Meanwhile, the plan has ended with fights, in which hundreds took part, between crowds of Muslims and Jews in the alley leading to the Temple Mount, after which the security services and the Jerusalem Police Department imposed a veto on continuation of the work.

The deputy mufti, who called the faithful to go to the Temple Mount to protect it, was invited, with all respect, to the Jerusalem district police station at the Russian Compound and questioned at length. At the end of the inquiry, the police recommended legal action against him. The prosecutors' office adopted the recommendation, and the political level, in contrast to its previous policy, confirmed it. The trial of the deputy mufti will begin in a few weeks.

The man himself, Shaykh Jamil al-Jamal, has no intention of denying his part in the course of the event. He is even proud of it. During his interrogation at the police station, Jamal explained to his investigators that he does not see his action as an incitement. "It is the right of every Muslim to go to the al-Aqsa mosque any time he wants. I did not call the people to slaughter the Jews. I called them to go to the scene." The deputy mufti intends to explain to the judges as well that it was his duty as a Muslim religious leader to call the crowds to the

spot for the defense of Islam's holy places. Even today, he does not soften his message, and recently even warned, "If the excavations resume, there will be a slaughter there."

Another sign of extremism is the mufti himself, the old Shaykh Sa'd-al-Din al-'Alami. One of his last religious decrees dealt with sales of land to Jews in Jerusalem and its suburbs. 'Alami ruled that this type of activity is absolutely forbidden to every Muslim. Violators are considered under the religious law as traitors to God. After this decree, an incident arose in which the mufti claimed that he was pushed and struck by soldiers of the Border Patrol. A thorough inquiry revealed that there was no basis to the complaint; indeed, no marks of violence were found on the mufti's body. Nevertheless, the complaint succeeded in arousing the Muslim faithful to one of the violent riots the place has known, in which a member of the Border Patrol was seriously injured.

After that came a shocking interview the mufti granted the PLO's official publication, FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH, as part of a propaganda campaign the newspaper was conducting to encourage the intifadah. His remarks were quoted only in part, and below is a fuller text: "Despite the presence of the media and its agents in the occupied land since the start of the intifadah, to the best of my information, no one remembers that the primary cause for the outbreak of this great rebellion and its growing power was that Israeli soldiers seized three young men at the Islamic University in Gaza and tore out their eyes with their bare hands. Then the soldiers shot them and, in that condition, sent the bodies to their families...."

"Question: Does this mean that the Zionist detention centers are not under any national supervision, and that the new centers are death factories?"

"Al-'Alami: They truly are death factories...and that is thanks to the United States, which has supplied the Israelis with new inventions that, when placed on the eye of a man, draw out the optic fluid, causing the loss of his sight...."

"Question: We know that Israel is using large quantities of weapons to stop the intifadah. Is there weaponry about which nothing has yet been made public?"

"Al-'Alami: There is a new weapon they have tested. It is a type of powder spread somewhere, and anyone who is in that place suffers coagulation of the blood in his arms and legs and is taken to the hospital while he is unconscious and unable to speak. I saw such incidents in Janin, but the Israel Army closes the area when it uses this weapon so that no one can see what is happening. When I went there, the Zionist soldiers tried to keep me from entering the area."

"Question: There are many Arab institutions working to supply money to the occupied land. What is your opinion of this?"

"Al-'Alami: We in the occupied land do not need money. We need weapons. Our country produces grass. We prefer to eat the grass. If the Arab nation wants to do something, it should activate its armies that haven't done a thing, armies that know nothing except defeat. Let it mobilize the weaponry it buys through the strength of its children. That is what we want from the Arabs."

Another focal point at which the Waqf will take a star role in coming weeks will be the High Court of Justice. For some 3 years, the Court has been studying the petition presented by the "Temple Mount Faithful" group against the state institutions. They are asking the High Court to require the City of Jerusalem, the Israeli police, and the Department of Antiquities in the Ministry of Education to impose its authority upon the Waqf and enforce the planning, building, and antiquities laws on the area of the Temple Mount. After extensive argument, the High Court is now waiting for clarifications from Yosef Harish, the government's legal advisor, concerning his position on the issue.

Waqf officials were also requested to respond to the petition, and they argue that it is a provocation. "The petitioners do not hide their intention to convert the place to a spiritual, religious, and national center for the Jewish people by razing the al-'Aqsa mosque and expelling us from the Mount." The Waqf still remembers the teaching of a remark by the king [of England] during the Mandate and argue: It is a matter of dispute. They say the place is theirs, we say it is ours, and the king's dictum prohibits you, Honorable judges, from interfering here because this is a holy place.

A Waqf representative, Abu Tu'amah, a lawyer, has made it clear that the Waqf is arguing in the High Court on the basis of a position announced in advance. According to this fundamental position, the High Court has no authority to consider the petition because the ground upon which the petition turns, the Temple Mount, and for that matter all of East Jerusalem, is still under Jordanian sovereignty. As is known, the Supreme Muslim Council does not recognize Israel's sovereignty over East Jerusalem. The state does not deny a large part of the facts the "Temple Mount Faithful" present. Dan Bahat, the district archaeologist, writes for example. "It is true that things have been done on the Temple Mount without proper authorization. What has been done on the Temple Mount was not entirely unknown to us. Offenses certainly have been committed there. The antiquities law clearly did not permit this."

In the past, the judges of the High Court have tried to find a compromise that would defuse the land mine that the petition represents. Judge Aharon Baraq once suggested that the plaintiffs withdraw their petition, if only temporarily. The petitioners' representative, Moshe

Drori, Esquire, has been steadfast in refusing. The Court cast another idea towards the Waqf: Perhaps the Court would visit the Mount. Lawyer Tu'amah announced on behalf of the Waqf that such a visit would be impossible to carry out if its declared purpose were an examination of the petitioners' claims. The Waqf also rejected police investigation, a possibility raised by Judge Shlomo Levin.

Another focal point in which the Waqf finds itself, once again as a party to a controversy, is the Religious Affairs Ministry's plan for the Hasmonean tunnel. The plan, which caused an uproar at an earlier time, is not acceptable to the Waqf. On the authority of all the Israeli officials involved, a compromise plan was devised, by which laborers of the Religious Affairs Ministry will remove the dirt and mud through another outlet. The opening is an ancient air passage, currently blocked off, located in the ceiling of a pool of water at the end of the tunnel. An understanding in this spirit had already been reached with the mother superior of the Convent of the Sisters of Zion, next to the work zone, but the Waqf, which opposes the compromise although the grounds involved are not under its authority, has imposed a veto, freezing for the time being all work on the spot.

Thus, points of friction with the Waqf continue and are growing. They are even becoming sharper and forcing the parties to go beyond limits they had previously established for themselves. The Waqf no longer avoids using the Israeli courts while the state does not refrain from employing judicial processes to halt various undertakings of the Waqf. The experience of past years in Jerusalem (especially in the Old City) has proved that disputes of this sort have been decided not in the halls of justice but in the arena of the streets.

## ALGERIA

### **Egypt Denies Ben Bella Request To Operate From Cairo**

45000055b Paris *AL-MUSTAQBAL* in Arabic  
12 Nov 88 p 7

[Text] Former Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella will not pursue his political activities out of Cairo after the Egyptian authorities denied his request, submitted after the deterioration of Algerian-Egyptian relations, for permission to do so.

### **Effect of Arabization, Islamic Movement on Youth Analyzed**

45190014 Paris *LE MONDE* in French 14 Oct 88 p 2

[Article by Gilles Kepel, professor at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris and author of "The Suburbs of Islam," published by Seuil Editions: "The Rebellion Against the Cultural Impasse"]

[Text] The only surprise in connection with the events in Algeria is that they did not occur sooner. All of the ingredients for a social and political explosion have in

fact existed for a long time. The dilapidation of the economic system is profound, and there has been no freedom of expression for 25 years. But all of this, which is well-known, is aggravated by the deculturation of civil society, with one of the most striking aspects being visible in the consequences of the policy of forced Arabization the regime has tried to implement. This policy was inaugurated in the first half of the 1970's, when the legitimacy the regime had won in the war against France began to lose ground in the disillusioning aftermath. Establishing a "national language" by suddenly requiring the almost exclusive use in the educational system of classic Arabic imported directly from the Middle East served to discredit not only French, but also Berber and dialectical Arabic, as cultural vectors.

This was a battle against all forms of autonomous expression by civil society in an effort to promote—like George Orwell's Big Brother—a "newspeak" which through media under strict state control would popularize the ideology of the single party possessed of the truth and the means of expressing it.

Fifteen years later, this policy has produced its effect. One can now find graduates of the higher educational institutions in Algeria who can no longer express themselves in conversational French, much less read a book or a newspaper in French. They are thus protected against the pernicious influence of Western culture, particularly insofar as critical thinking is concerned. But as reasons for discontent with their lot have done nothing but increase among young Algerians, it is precisely toward the greatest questions about the written Arab culture today that a number of students on all levels are turning. These challenges are seen in the declarations and pamphlets of the Muslim Brotherhood and the various Islamic movements which the Egyptian teachers entrusted with the Arabization effort bring with them from Cairo in their luggage. And their criticisms, moreover, are even more of a threat to the regime.

The Islamic movement was also spread in Algeria in the early era with the encouragement of those in certain government circles who hoped to use it to offset the influence of the Marxists on the university campuses. This was also done by al-Sadat and Bourguiba in the same era, and they later suffered from the counterstrike. One of the leading ideologists of the movement, Sheik Abdellatif Ben Ali El Soltani, who was formerly affiliated with the Great Mosque in Algiers and who spent the end of his life in 1984 in forced residence, devoted his sermons to the denunciation of socialism, which he compared to an intolerable heresy.

The most popular figure in the Algerian Islamic movement, Moustapha Bouyali, who was shot down by the police on 3 January 1987, began his preaching in the poverty-stricken quarters on the outskirts of Algiers (where the uprising took on such broad scope), and the trial of his companions in June of 1987 involved the largest number of defendants (202) in all of Algerian

history. In other words, even though very harsh repression decapitated the infrastructures of the Islamic groups and rendered them incapable of taking the lead in the revolt of the young people, the fund of sympathy they had accumulated remains substantial. They know how to find the words to convert the humiliating daily battle to find flour or drinking water into a united battle against the political regime accused of responsibility for the frustrations of the moment.

Opposed to the ideology of the Islamic militants, who are capitalizing on popular resentment all the easier since all lay opposition (even in the form of an association for the defense of human rights) has for a quarter of a century been silenced, imprisoned, or exiled, there are the French models, on the one hand, and the Moroccan and Tunisian models, on the other. Everyone in Algeria knows that the immigrants' bread is sometimes bitter, and that social inequalities and censure have not disappeared entirely among our neighbors in the Maghreb. But in all these cases, each individual has a tangible hope of improving his lot. And the fall of Bourguiba has demonstrated that it is possible to put an end to a discredited regime and to launch a calm transition toward democracy. The youth of Algeria are denied these hopes.

The whole question is whether or not there are political elites in Algeria today who would be capable of heading such a transition toward democracy or who could, in grappling directly with the cultural problem, sponsor an alternative, offering an ideal other than the establishment of Shari'ah. The members of the opposition in exile in Europe have not given to date convincing proof of a following or of credibility. In the field, the most dynamic cultural extreme in civil society is found in the "raj," the rock which originated in Oran and expresses the discontent of the young people in dialect. But their spokesmen are hardly equipped to play a political role.

At present, the violence of the repression, with deaths multiplying even among the ranks of young children, is encouraging the extremists in each camp, particularly those among the Islamists who claim the right to martyrdom. But Western governments and our intellectuals, frightened by the prospect of a fundamentalist rebellion, deem it wise to say nothing about the massacres (what would we think if Pinochet did the same?).

This is a very bad plan, because if the pressure of international opinion does not succeed in putting an end to repression, the slim chance of a transition toward democracy is likely to become even more distant, and Algeria would then embark upon the vicious circle of military dictatorship and Islamic challenge which has already made prisoners of so many countries in the Middle East where civil societies have seen their political cultures permanently destroyed.

### Citizens of Mostaganem Express Views on Leadership

45190010 Paris LE MONDE in French 12 Oct 88 p 3

[Article by Jacques de Barrin]

[Text] Before sitting down in front of his television in Mostaganem to listen to President Chadli speak, Kader had learned that soldiers had fired on the demonstrators. "That's done it," he commented in a somewhat weary tone. "Things have gone too far." Does this, then, represent the workings of violence? He believes so.

An hour later, after listening to "his" president, Kader noted that the tone of the message was rather "conciliatory," intended perhaps to calm the thinking of the people. "It is not he who is the issue, but those surrounding him," he said, as if he wanted to safeguard the position of the chief of state, to avoid overwhelming him. The Muslim fundamentalists claim to be the spearhead of the challenge. "We don't like them either," he admitted.

Mostaganem listened, perplexed and silent, to the presidential message. In the opinion of some citizens, it had been too long in coming. In the upper part of town overlooking the port, many of the small merchants had lowered the grills in front of their shops. Groups of adolescents exchanged confidences on the sidewalk. It is a way of passing the time when one has nothing better to do. Weapons in their slings, soldiers were guarding the town hall, the post office, and the fuel depot in these uncertain times. At the FLN [National Liberation Front] headquarters, the shutters were closed. "The party command post has been transferred to a safe place," a police inspector explained.

"Things heated up greatly last week," if one is to believe the "sidewalk radio." It is said that 250 people are dead. But to what extent can this figure, probably greatly exaggerated, be trusted? In any case, the visible evidence left by the revolts does not leap to the eye. There are just two plundered service stations, some broken windows—at the two Monoprix (the state stores), the Air Algerie, office and the Tourist Office, among other buildings.

### 'They Went Too Far'

"There is electricity in the air," says one native. It seems that the soldiers, many of them young conscripts, are very nervous. Many of the residents of Mostaganem do not believe that "This will end just like that." For in their view, "They—those in power—went too far."

On one wall of the ancient St Vincent de Paul Church, which has now been converted into a mosque, there is a handpainted electoral slogan—"Vote yes for the FLN candidate." It seems to have aged dramatically in just a few days.

In many towns in the Algerian West, like Mostaganem, one gets the impression that the slogans sent down from the capital have been obeyed. Their purpose is to destroy the symbols of the state, a shameful state which has betrayed its duty and has done nothing to improve the well-being of the people. On the rich Chelim Plain, for example, from one large market town to another, from Khemis-Melyana to Ain-Demla, and including Sidi-Lakhdar, it is the Monoprix, "where one can never find anything," which has been the favorite, if not the exclusive, target of the rebels.

In Ech-Cheliff (formerly Orleansville), events took a more dramatic turn. To the dilapidated buildings which still remind one of the terrible earthquake in October 1980, others damaged by angry young people—the prefecture, the mayor's headquarters, and the courthouse—have now been added. If the public rumors are to be believed, there were 30 some deaths here. The demonstrators even hauled down the national flag and hoisted to the top of the pole in its place...a sack of semolina! It is the symbol of a whole program.

With the passage of a little time, the residents here are beginning to yearn for the era when Colonel Boumediene had the reins of power in hand. "Society was more egalitarian then," they comment. "Today there is more freedom, but there are more profiteers as well." It is to the state, which serves them as a screen, that the residents of Mostaganem have also addressed a warning. Will it be heard? Kader does not know exactly what to think about this.

## BAHRAIN

### Arab Funds To Finance Electricity and Water Projects

*Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ in Arabic  
26 Oct 88 p 1*

[Text] A meeting was convened in the Ministry of Public Works, Power and Water under the chairmanship of Engineer Jamil al-'Alawi, the deputy assistant for electricity and water affairs. The meeting included senior officials of electricity and water affairs, representatives of the National Economy and Finance Ministry, the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development, the Islamic Bank, and the Saudi Development Fund.

Future plans for electricity and water projects were reviewed in this meeting together with a program prepared by the mMinistry to provide for Bahrain's needs in the next 10 years in order to choose among technical and economic options which resulted from consultants' studies made at an earlier date. A review was also made to determine the phases to implement the project, and to agree on the project's first phase costs which will cover the period from the present to 1995.

The possible participation of the Arab Funds and the Islamic Bank in financing part of the project's first phase costs with easy loans was also discussed in this meeting.

## EGYPT

### Interior Minister Meets With Alexandria University Students

*45040034 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 20 Sep 88 p4*

[Article by Muhammad Shakir]

[Text] A violent, heated confrontation [took place] between the youth of Alexandria University and Interior Minister Zaki Badr. Lasting 3 hours and occurring a few days before the university started a new academic year, the dialogue gave expression to the thoughts of the young people on national issues and on activities in the area of security.

There was not a single issue that the young people failed to discuss with complete objectivity and openness.

The minister was naturally anxious to respond, and he told them: "I'll remain with you until morning."

They asked him about prisons. They asked him about the incidents of 'Ayn Shams and Dayr Mawwas. They confronted the minister with the rumors about acceptance into the Police Academy and asked whether connections were the determining factor. They asked him about the role played by the police in combating drugs. They asked him about the things which the opposition papers publish about him, namely, that the interior minister retires well-qualified policemen to eliminate police officers who could replace him as interior minister!

They asked him about the big stick. They asked him about the detention orders. They asked him about the rise in prices and the role of the police.

The questions were very provocative. The minister was frank, patiently explaining everything. He repeatedly said "I want you to ask more questions."

### 'Yes' to the Emergency Law

The first question was from the student Khalid Abu-al-'Aynayn of the Faculty of Law. He asked: "Is it because the regular law does not facilitate stability that we resort to an emergency law?"

Before answering the questions, the minister said by way of introduction: "I am all yours tonight so we can exchange opinions. It is true that you are young, but I am also young. In response to our young man's question let me say: "Yes, the emergency law protects stability, and I will give you an example. It happened in al-Minya that a few guys set out at night, at 3 o'clock in the morning, and set off explosions at the YMCA, where there were Muslims and Christians (we are all Egyptian; there's no

such thing as Christian and Muslim). There were 400 Egyptians in the club, including a university professor. There was panic. The professor suffered fractures in his leg. People, children and their families, ran away. There was terror; people were in a mess. Is that acceptable to anyone from an Islamic perspective? Is it acceptable from a religious perspective?

"The emergency law allows me to summon them and gives me flexibility in taking action. For your information, the emergency law is constitutional. It was sanctioned by the parliament and the constitution, and it is being implemented under the jurisdiction of the legal authorities and the prosecutor's office.

"Let's take a look at comparable laws in other countries.

"In European countries with a long tradition of democracy there are official systems called 'physical liquidation systems'; when they find someone disturbing the peace, they say: take this young fellow and let's get rid of him. Of course, such things occur in America and Europe.

"Another type of people that I subject to the emergency law comprises those without known or legal sources of income. When I look around I see them all over the place buying tons of shrimp, for example, and living high on the hog. Should I let them go free? No, I merely say to a person, come here a minute so I can find out where your money came from. All this is subject to the control of the prosecutor's office and the judiciary. The judiciary has the first and last word.

"A heroin dealer who shoots policemen—should I let him go free? I say to the police officers: If someone fires at you, shoot to kill, because that would be legitimate self-defense."

#### The Contractor

Zaki Badr said to the young people, "You've heard about the contractor." They laughed, saying, "We would like to know!" Zaki Badr said, "The contractor is a heroin dealer or a big trafficker in drugs. One word from him, and the goods are exported; one word, and the money is transferred; one word, and the goods are distributed in the market. I might search his home but not find a single gram of drugs or a single straw. Knowing him, should I let him go free? No, I ought to keep him a while in [the prison of] Abu-Za'bal.

"Those guys, the al-Qamari brothers—you know, of course, that they wanted to leave the country illegally. They forged a loan for 400,000 pounds from a bank in al-Jizah and changed it into dollars. Well, can such an action be considered a defense of the faith? No, I say that those are liars.

"So I must use the emergency law.

"I agree with you that prices are indeed high. But when I see someone profiting from the people's food, should I let him go free?

"Take a look at the young people of Bulaq, whose conference I attended and whose command posts I visited together with the minister of awqaf, the mufti, and the governor of Cairo. The young people were a joy to behold and they called for the execution of those who sell or deal in drugs. In fact, they urged lawyers not to defend them in court. Should I let the drug dealers go free? No, of course not.

"Why are you angry over the emergency law? Have we arrested a political party leader or a party member? Rather, the emergency law is for every lawbreaker, for everyone who is against Egypt and Egypt's security, and we are here to frustrate such people's efforts. No matter what plans they make, they will achieve nothing. To be completely blunt: let them be ever so diligent in making plans to kill me; my life belongs to Egypt."

#### Incidents of 'Ayn Shams and Dayr Mawwas

The minister was asked about the truth regarding the incidents of 'Ayn Shams and Dayr Mawwas. Zaki Badr explained the details of the incident. He said, "The police had prior knowledge of the incidents, and I notified the prosecutor's office before the incidents took place. My intention was to alert the people and the prosecutor's office to the incidents in advance.

"I would like to say: you talk about those outlaws, but you forget the martyred police officer who was considered one of the best. It was the same way in Dayr Mawwas, when they started a rumor that there was a bishop who wanted to turn his home into a church. They burned his home, and eight police officers suffered injuries.

"I say that any threat from them or from anyone else to the country's security or to the security of any citizen will continue to be dealt with through force and deterrence as long as we live. Let those who are present tell those who are not. They either shape up or ship out, and they should stop getting money. Let them repent and concentrate on constructive activity; that would be best for them.

#### The Stick Is for Transgressors

[Question] "Why are you following a big stick policy? Why is your policy not based on reform and rehabilitation?"

[Answer] "The stick is for transgressors. I therefore offer this advice: Refrain; keep the country and security in mind. Let the mufti travel back and forth throughout the country with his colleague Dr Muhammad 'Ali Mahjub.

Let them merely display for me the image of a stick. I hold that a hint is sufficient for a free man, because he is free and honorable; but a slave has to be beaten with a stick."

[Question] "We frequently read about prisons as well as collective and individual torture. To what extent is such news true?"

[Answer] "Look, they accused the officers of torturing them. The courts have determined the truth in this regard. I would like to point out that all Arab and foreign countries requested the record of the ruling which was handed down by the Egyptian court on the torture case, and which declares the innocence of the officers. That [case] is considered one of the proud achievements of the Egyptian judicial system. The record was sent to them because it is a matter [to be cited] whenever an issue of this type occurs anywhere in the world. When they falsely accuse Hasan Abu Basha of trampling on the Book of God, I say I am prepared to swear by God and His Holy Book an oath by which I will be bound on the Day of Judgment that neither Hasan Abu Basha nor anyone else would have the audacity to slight a book that God has preserved. God forbid! God would wipe him out and not just cripple him. I say judge me now that I am before you. There are young men among you who went to the prison; ask them! I swear it wouldn't anger me."

[Question] "Are there blank orders for detention?"

[Answer] "I would like to have an explanation of this nonsense. When someone constitutes a danger in any way and poses a threat of any kind, a memorandum is written up in which the threat to society is explained. It is presented to a committee known as the committee on dangerous persons, a three-member committee headed by a deputy director. There is also a supreme committee. I study the case again and again, and if I need further explanation, I ask for it. When my conscience has been satisfied, I approve the arrest. The order has a number, it has a legal format, it is subject to oversight by the judiciary, and I challenge any one of the drug dealers to say that the reason for his arrest stems from the claim that someone asked him for money, because God will silence him. Would I detain anyone simply because I don't like his looks? Of those who would say such a thing, I say that words cannot describe them accurately; but I [also] say: Sufficient for me is the grace of God."

### **The Police Academy and Connections**

[Question] "Is it now true that the only qualifications an applicant to the Police Academy needs are connections and the disregard for requirements?"

[Answer] "I assure you that neither the police department nor the Interior Ministry is subject to the influence of connections.

(Voices in the room: "Yes, they are!") Zaki Badr responded, "Calm down. Tell me who it is you mean, who his connections are, and whom he paid. The matter can be easily resolved."

The young men replied, "Those who get in through connections aren't going to say so!"

The minister responded: "How then did you find out? Incidentally, talking about the transfers that took place in the police department—they say that I retired so-and-so on a whim, even though there is a supreme council consisting of 32 assistants to the minister who review transfers and secret reports with no interference from the minister. So, I kicked someone out on a whim, and the political leadership came and selected him as minister; can anyone say no ..."

The dialogue ended with Zaki Badr saying: "The police department will regain its prestige when a policeman is respectable, honest, incorruptible, a noble example, one who treats people decently, respects both the young and the old, one who does not use force, and who performs his duties conscientiously and devotedly. This is what we swore to uphold, and I personally swore this 43 years ago. Finally, we should make our peace with God; we should believe in the nation, and be strong in faith."

The dialogue ended close to midnight, but the informal discussion went on—an open, constructive discussion characterized by frankness, sincerity, and courteous debate.

### **Interior Ministry Holding Palestinian Uprising Leader**

*45000051 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 8 Nov 88 p 5*

[Text] A state of fear now prevails in the Palestinian ranks after the interior minister refused to comply with a court ruling to release an arrested Palestinian—one of the leaders of the uprising—who is likely to be turned over to the Israeli Mosad.

A national security investigator had arrested Palestinian citizen 'Abd-al-Karim Rajab Mahmud Khalil, one of the leaders of the Palestinian uprising. All sorts of torture and mistreatment were practiced on him in Torah Prison, where he was imprisoned on charges of entering the country illegally.

It is worth mentioning that the south Cairo court had issued its ruling to free the suspect on 29 October, but that the interior minister rejected the ruling and re-arrested him.

Confirmed reports have been received that there is the intention to turn him over to the Israeli Mosad based on his request. A Labor Party delegation was sent to visit him.

## NPUG Struggles To Gain Support

### Political Role of NPUG

45000040 Cairo CAIRO TODAY in English  
Nov 88 pp 74-75

[Article by Michael Georgy. The first paragraph is introduction.]

[Text] The National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party is finding it difficult to garner support. In the early 1970s, Sadat tried to crush leftist activity on university campuses by encouraging fundamentalist groups to spread the word. Today the left is finding it increasingly difficult to win over university students.

National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party (NPUG) Tajammu' is very familiar with the meaning of the word struggle. Aside from trying to maintain a balance between its Marxist, Nasirist, progressive and "enlightened Moslem" elements, the Tajammu' (Grouping) is faced with the seemingly impossible task of trying to build popular support in a society which automatically equates leftists with kafirin (non-believers). Remarkd a well-informed Western source: "The Egyptian left is in disarray. Its biggest weakness is that it is associated with atheism." Although the NPUG is well aware of its position on the Egyptian political ladder, party leaders are convinced that a socialist program would alleviate Egypt's political, economic and social hardships.

The Tajammu' first entered the political contest in 1976 when the late president Anwar Al-Sadat laid the groundwork for a multi-party system by permitting the formation of left, right and center platforms within the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), the only official political party in Egypt at the time. Khalid [Muhyi-Al-Din] (see interview) established a National Progressive platform which contained left-wing opponents of Sadat's Infitah (Open Door) policy. The platform later splintered into the National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUG) and the right-wing Socialist Liberals Party (Ahrar). Says an authority on Egyptian politics: "Sadat was not that keen on pluralism, but wanted the appearance of a pluralistic system. The party on his right probed how far he could change while the left-wing party got blamed whenever anything went wrong."

During the January 1977 bread riots, Egyptians took to the streets in protest after Sadat removed subsidies on basic commodities. The NPUG was blamed for the upheaval and many party members were arrested. Party leaders denied involvement and attributed the turmoil to widespread discontent. Recalls Khalid [Muhyi-Al-Din], Secretary General of the NPUG: "The people raised the slogans of the Tajammu' and the left, but we didn't instigate the riots. It all happened because the government said they would solve the people's problems and didn't."

Like all of Egypt's secular opposition parties, the NPUG is feeling the crunch of Islamic fundamentalism. "The mood of the masses is religious," says the authority. "If you want to keep your contact with the masses, you have to speak the language they understand." For the NPUG, the new rules of the game may be too difficult to follow.

In the early 1970s, Sadat tried to crush leftist activity on university campuses by encouraging fundamentalist groups to spread their word. Today the left is finding it increasingly difficult to win over university students. Islamic groups dominate student elections and provide services. For example, students can buy books at discounted rates from the Islamic groups. "Students are looking for the best prices and services," says Hazim Munir, a member of the Central Committee of the NPUG's Youth Organization. "But we think the best way to influence students is to convince them of the democratic idea and to make them believe they must have their rights."

However, democracy is a very vague term for the majority of Egyptians. Commented Rifat Sa'id, General Secretary of the Tajammu' Central Committee: "When you speak about democracy, it is very important for political life and intellectuals. But what does it mean for peasants and workers?"

The 1987 election was one major indicator of the growing popularity of Islam. The Moslem Brotherhood ended up with more parliamentary seats than any other opposition party. Meanwhile, the NPUG was not able to gain parliamentary representation because of a law which requires a party to win a minimum of eight percent of the national vote to enter parliament.

Most experts agree that the NPUG is tied down by its different ideological components. "The idea of creating a forum where diverse political trends can interact is a noble one. But in practice it presents all kinds of difficulties," says Ali Dissuki, director of Cairo University's Center for Political Studies.

NPUG leaders insist that ideological barriers can be broken by focusing on a political program. "We have minimum ideological agreement and complete political agreement. We always stick to the political program," says [Muhyi-Al-Din].

However, the current political situation in Egypt may prevent the party from developing internal equilibrium. In the late 1970s, the Tajammu' was unified around its strong opposition to Egypt's "separate peace" with Israel. "During the Sadat years the party had a more consistent opposition to the official line. This was especially true in connection with the Camp David Accords," says the authority. "Today things are not that black and white. The regime is trying to re-adapt itself out of Camp David into a global package. Basically, the NPUG is not against that policy."

Although the NPUG is facing some hard facts, the party has embarked on a long-term strategy for establishing a socialist state in Egypt. Its economic formula consists of a larger public sector, increased production and decreased imports. The Tajammu' argues that Sadat's Open Door policy is responsible for Egypt's present economic plight. Says Mahmud Nufal, the Secretary of the NPUG political committee: "Infatih has brought about the balance of payments crisis and the high cost of living. Ninety-five percent of the population are still suffering."

One of the most burning issues of the day is Egypt's strained relations with the IMF. President Husni Mubarak's recent criticism of IMF policy suggests that the government will be pressured to increase the price of bread. Says Mahmud Maraghi, Editor in Chief of the NPUG weekly AL-AHALI (The People): "Subsidies should not be cut in order to meet the demands of the IMF. There are other ways of solving the problem. For example, one billion pounds can be raised by taxing higher income groups."

Whether the Tajammu' will ever see the day when its socialist program will be implemented is very much open to question. All of Egypt's parties are confronted with a politically passive population that is becoming more interested in religion. In this context, the Tajammu' leftist image may prove to be a serious liability. As 'Ali Dissuki put it: "The Egypt of the 1980s is more conservative, and Islamic fundamentalism has proved to be a main vehicle for the expression of this conservatism. Therefore, it is more difficult for leftist pronouncements to be accepted. The fundamentalists have changed the milieu in which the left exists."

#### **Biography, Views of Leader**

45000040 Cairo *CAIRO TODAY* in English  
Nov 88 pp 77-78

[Khalid Muhyi-Al-Din, leader of the left-wing National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party, talked to Michael Georgy about the current political situation and the problems facing the left in Egypt]

[Text] Khalid Muhyi-Al-Din was born in 1922, in Cairo. After graduating from Cairo's military academy in 1942, he became a member of the Moslem Brotherhood. (Muhyi-Al-Din met Jamal Iabd-Al-Nasir in 1944 and kept up relations with him. Eventually, [Muhyi-Al-Din] left the Moslem Brotherhood and became involved in the communist National Liberation Democratic Movement. In 1948, he was a cavalry officer in the Palestine War. He came in contact with Al-Nasir again after the war, joined the original Free Officers group which was created in 1949 and took part in the coup that overthrew the monarchy in 1952.

At the Revolutionary Command Council [RCC] he was known as the "Red Major" because of his communist leanings. After [Muhyi-Al-Din] resigned from the RCC in 1954, he was exiled to Switzerland. He returned to Egypt after Al-Nasir asked him to edit the leftist daily, Al-Masa', in 1956.

In July 1957, [Muhyi-Al-Din] was elected to republican Egypt's first National Assembly. Two years later, however, Al-Nasir cracked down on communists and their sympathizers and [Muhyi-Al-Din] left the political arena for five years until he was reelected to the assembly in March 1964. [Muhyi-Al-Din] became the editor in chief of the daily Al Akhbar (The News) and a member of the general secretariat of the Arab Socialist Union. However, his problems did not end there. After the death of Jamal Iabd-Al-Nasir in 1970, he witnessed President Sadat's expulsion of the Soviet advisors in 1971 and was placed under house arrest by the Sadat regime in July of the same year.

Today Khalid [Muhyi-Al-Din] heads the National Progressive Unionist Grouping party (NPUG). He is also a well-known figure in Arab and international leftist circles. In both 1977 and 1979 he was elected vice-president of the World Peace Council. [Muhyi-Al-Din] recently expressed to [CAIRO TODAY] his views on the NPUG party and Egypt.

#### **Excerpts:**

[CAIRO TODAY] What program is your party presenting at this time?

[Muhyi-Al-Din] We are to the left of all parties. We are not a communist party because we are not defending a communist goal. Our party's program is the most democratic because we are the only party which defends the right to strike, the right of creating trade unions and the right of assembly. Egypt must pursue economic independence in a manner that will allow for socialism. We are a reformist party with socialist aims. We are not radicals, but people seem to think we are extreme leftists.

[CAIRO TODAY] Do you think the public believes that the Tajamu' (NPUG) is made up of atheists?

[Muhyi-Al-Din] This is a problem. They say we are Marxist and communists. Marxists and communists mean atheists. But on the other hand we always say that we are not Marxists and that we respect religion. But this is not enough. We are for a reformist religion. This is part of our shortcomings. We haven't mobilized our classes. We are still a political opposition, not a popular opposition. There's a big difference.

[CAIRO TODAY] How has Sadat's Open Door policy affected Egypt? [Muhyi-Al-Din] When Sadat started the Open Door policy we thought it would be a way for Egypt to open economic relations with many countries, West and East. But Sadat stopped cooperation with the East. The policy encouraged local capitalists. The private sector is the weak point of Egypt's economy. It must develop under the auspices of the public sector. Nobody planned for long-term economic development. Everyone turned to the field which provided quick returns. There was no industrial or agricultural development. The policy catered to the richer classes. The poor are paying the price of inflation. This policy will never improve the economy.

[CAIRO TODAY] Do you think the Mubarak regime is restricting political freedom in Egypt today?

[Muhyi-Al-Din] The restrictions came before. He relaxed restrictions on the press but the other restrictions still exist. For instance the Emergency Law is still in force.

[CAIRO TODAY] Recently there have been some problems with Islamic fundamentalists. How do you think the government is handling the situation?

[Muhyi-Al-Din] The government is not able to fight them politically and ideologically. The government hasn't been able to convince the people of the soundness of its policy. If they are not able to convince us, they will not convince the fundamentalists. The fundamentalists can gain popularity for a few years at most. But they are not presenting a program. There is no economic program in the KORAN. The idea that "Islam is the solution" is nonsense. Khomeini didn't succeed. Iraq was able to convince its Shiite population to defend the country against the Shiites of Iran. It was a significant achievement. Iran as a state can make it. But the so-called Islamic government of Iran will face many problems.

[CAIRO TODAY] What should Egypt do to solve its \$40 billion debt problem?

[Muhyi-Al-Din] Egypt should not pay part of its debt. Especially the military debt owed to the United States. The political price has been paid. I am astonished that Egypt paid all this money despite the special relationship with the United States. Egypt should not accept loans except for specific projects. We are too dependent on the United States.

[CAIRO TODAY] Should Egypt play a more active role in the Middle East peace process?

[Muhyi-Al-Din] Egypt has been weakened politically by its economic situation. The country is not very clear on the Palestinian problem. One step forward is followed by two steps backward. The Palestinian uprising has created more possibilities for joint Arab action. The Arab world is getting stronger militarily. The Israelis must find a way for peace.

[CAIRO TODAY] Who are your greatest supporters?

[Muhyi-Al-Din] The employees are workers of the public sector. Also, we are backed by intellectuals and people who have benefited from Nasser's free education system, and farmers who have benefited from Nasser's land reforms. Our greatest support comes from old forces. The Tajammu' is a potential power for the future. The Egyptian dilemma can only be solved through the adoption of a socialist state. There is no capitalist solution. A regulated economy is needed.

[CAIRO TODAY] Do you feel threatened by the growth of Islamic fundamentalism?

[Muhyi-Al-Din] All secular parties are threatened. Secular parties must unite against the fundamentalists.

[CAIRO TODAY] Are you a Marxist or a Nasserite?

[Muhyi-Al-Din] I am a Tajammu'. That means I am a socialist. I believe in Egypt. I am not against religion. I believe in Arab unity. They say "Marxist" and "Nasirist." That doesn't mean anything to me ideologically.

[CAIRO TODAY] The Tajammu' was not able to secure any seats in parliament during the last two elections.

[Muhyi-Al-Din] The elections game is new to us. The state has a lot more experience than us in playing this game. We are a new party. The Wafd and the Moslem Brotherhood are old. Our candidates have no connections with the old families. The time will come when we have electoral personalities. We are outside parliament, but the parties in parliament cannot do anything without us because we speak for a large number of people.

#### **Muslim Brotherhood Seen as Least Radical Islamic Group**

45040052 Cairo *AKHIR SA'AH* in Arabic  
28 Sep 88 p 48

[Article by Hamid Sulayman: "The 'Brotherhood' Is One Thing and The 'Jama'at' Are Something Else"; all quotation marks as published]

[Text] Open and suspicious attempts are now being made to mix up the cards between the Muslim Brotherhood concept and the jama'at [Islamic groups] activities as a preliminary step toward holding the Brotherhood responsible for certain radical manifestations on the Egyptian scene. The purpose of this is to force certain security apparatuses to clash with "all" the Islamic tendency factions, be they moderate, radical, enlightened, or closed-minded. This is with a view to realizing the old goal of striking at anything related to Islam and the Islamic movement in order to push the Islamic concept back into the mosques and the monasteries.

These attempts now appear to be "scattered" but are ultimately aimed at stripping the "enlightened" Islamic awakening itself of its meaning.

A few months ago, Dr 'Abd-al-'Azim Ramadan attacked the shaykh of al-Azhar for merely challenging an idea calling for the separation of religion from the state and affairs of public life, accusing the shaykh of holding a position in agreement with that of the radicals.

A few weeks ago Dr Fu'ad Zakariya charged that "some" of Shaykh al-Sha'rawi's legal opinions and interpretations ultimately served the ideology of the hardliners and the radicals!

A few days ago, Mr 'Ali al-Dali repeated his charges—in AL-JUMHURIYAH—that the radical jama'at ideology is the same as the ideology the Muslim Brotherhood has espoused from the sixties "up to this day!"

As we can see, the charges are "varied" and "diverse" but are ultimately cast in an attempt to strike at the Islamic movement and its symbols, be they represented by Shaykh al-Azhar, by Shaykh al-Sha'rawi, or by the Muslim Brotherhood, and to push them all—their moderation and enlightenment notwithstanding—to radicalism, thus provoking the authorities and causing a clash in order to bury the Islamic movement alive. If we exclude the charges against Shaykh al-Azhar and Shaykh al-Sha'rawi for being overly simpleminded and lacking credibility, accusing the Muslim Brotherhood of holding views similar to those of the radical jama'at is very much like mixing up the cards of history and objectivity.

The Brotherhood's secret organization was originally created to confront Egypt's enemies and the "non-Egyptian" enemies of the Islamic movement as evidenced by this organization's activities in the Palestine war against Zionism and its battles with the British occupation army at al-Tall al-Kabir. When "some of them" assassinated al-Nuqrashi, the Brotherhood leadership, represented by Hasan al-Banna, condemned this action in a historic communique with the well-known title: "They Are Not Brothers...and They Are not Muslims."

When Shukri Mustafa repudiated his ideas—under the pressures of detention—and called for charging the government and society with unbelief, Hasan al-Banna published his famous book, "Preachers, not Judges," to counter this radical ideology which is "alien" to that of the Brotherhood.

The positions of the third Supreme Guide, al-Talmasani, and the fourth Supreme Guide, Abu-al-Nasr, were no different from those of Hasan al-Banna and al-Hudaybi in condemning the radical jama'at, publicly, prompting the Asyut and the Suhaj jama'at to put out a large number of publications attacking the Brotherhood.

Indeed, the disagreement between the two sides escalated into a violent clash in some Upper Egyptian mosques which the press reported under sensational headlines: "Violent Clash Between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jama'at."

These facts notwithstanding, scheming continues, for the most part limited to three main platforms which may differ in everything except their hatred of everything Islamic, the enlightened Islamic movement in particular, because they believe that the growth of this movement will put an end to their existence and mass following in the Egyptian mainstream. Since the Muslim Brotherhood represents the largest of these moderate and enlightened movements, it is getting the brunt of their artillery fire while its activities are being enveloped by a heavy smoke-screen of suspicion. The "ready" argument of these platforms is: "Fear for Egypt's Security and Egypt's unity!"

Whether these platforms are Marxist-Leninist or "Western-secular" or "fanatic-sectarian," their means are the same: pushing the security agencies into a clash with the Brotherhood by casting a cloud over the latter's activities through allegations that it maintains a relationship with the radical groups in the hope of finding among these organizations a group of "hawks" who can be influenced by these "venomous claims" about the Brotherhood, thus widening the circle of "mutual violence" to include this broad, moderate Islamic tendency which, in truth, poses a threat to "their existence" rather than to Egypt's security. However, these security forces have "dashed" these wily attempts more than once:

Major General Ahmad Shukri, former minister of the interior, stated that reports in his possession confirmed that the Brotherhood activities had nothing to do with the activities of the religious radical groups,

Major General al-Nabawi Isma'il absolved the Brotherhood of the charge of terrorism when he stated to AKHIR SA'AH on 9 September 1987 that "We must not get carried away with accusations or be rash in saying that those terrorists came out from under the Brotherhood cloak because, in doing so, we would be committing an injustice against these Islamic tendencies."

Nevertheless, attempts to cast doubt over the Muslim Brotherhood continue and I do not think they will stop so long as there are those who believe that its presence on the political scene is a threat to their "own" presence rather than to "Egypt's security." The Brotherhood concept is well known. It has not come out with a "new religion" but rather with a sophisticated concept about Islam as a general theory for managing our daily life. It is not merely a set of religious observances and rites practiced at mosques or a form of dervishism or puritanism or retreat to dervish monasteries. It is a movement that has never deviated from legitimacy and one that operates under a constitution drawn from the Islamic shari'ah.

So for whose benefit is this provocative campaign being launched and an "enlightened movement" being removed from the scene, a movement that can greatly contribute to the eradication of the radical movement and assume its symbols and young members, especially if it is allowed to work within the legitimacy and under the parties' law?

This is not my opinion, but that of all the wise men and saviors of this country and, indeed, of the experts who have dealt closely with the problem of radicalism and have suffered from its adversities. I am talking about the former minister of the interior, Hasan Abu-Pasha, who said upon his return from Europe following the attempt on his life that "failure to promptly counter this radical concept with proof and arguments derived from the Koran and the Sunna is one reason why the radical tendency has had free reign. Religious leaders must join hands with the 'proponents of the enlightened ideology' to confront this radical ideology. Opinion is not countered with coercion but rather with other views. The spirit of the time must be the source of inspiration for counteracting any zealotry."

Thus, this brave man spoke the truth before the doctors had a chance to unbandage his bleeding wounds. He made it quite clear that "the removal of the proponents of the 'enlightened Islamic ideology' from the scene widens the circle of radicalism and not the other way around," as alleged by the wicked proponents of Marxism, secularism and sectarianism or as claimed by our colleague 'Ali al-Dali, who never ceases to amaze us with his "tearful cries" for Egypt's security. We are just as bewildered by the question some people ask about his platform which drives him to such ludicrous "cries" as pitiful as they are nauseating.

#### **Government Wants To Buy, Utilize Arab Factories**

45000054 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic  
19 Nov 88 p 31

[Text] Egypt is looking toward purchasing some Arab factories which will make an adequate profit. In fact, Dr 'Atif 'Ubayd, minister of cabinet affairs and administrative development, has announced that he is now conducting studies into purchasing certain factories from a number of Arab countries, especially since these factories are not fully exploited and represent wasted energy from which no one benefits. The studies are targeted at setting up these factories in Egypt to work toward providing new job opportunities for young people, and at investing Egypt's human and natural resources, work force, and capable cadres in operating these factories at full capacity in order to increase production.

#### **Government Resists Businessmen's Privatization Measures**

45000050 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 8 Nov 88 p 5

[Text] Economic sources have affirmed that the government is resisting intense pressures from the Association of Businessmen and branches of Egyptian-foreign joint

chambers of commerce to legislate structural changes in the current economic structure, beginning with expanding the leasing of public sector projects to foreign and Egyptian private management, in preparation for transferring the ownership of successful public projects to the private sector and liquidating unprofitable companies.

The sources indicated that these measures will include establishing and developing brokerage and investment service companies on the national level, in order to encourage and facilitate the investment process in the financial papers of companies intended for transferral to the private sector, and developing investment banks on the local and national level to direct the processes of guaranteeing and selling stocks and bonds in the new companies. The accredited banks will promote investment opportunities in the public sector. They will establish the specializing institutions, administer the investment funds, and offer financial advice. They will also develop the stock market by amending its law and special regulations and will create other investment instruments, such as variable-rate commercial and financial paper and bonds.

#### **Soviet Ambassador Promoting Construction Cooperation**

45000059 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
29 Nov 88 p 9

[Text] Soviet ambassador in Cairo Gennadiy Zhuravlev has sent an urgent letter to his country's foreign ministry following President Mubarak's speech at the opening of the new Egyptian parliamentary session, in which Zhuravlev requested the preparation of a list of basic construction projects which the Soviets could carry out in Egypt. The ambassador wanted his letter to be accompanied by the official text of Mubarak's announcement, especially the paragraph that praised the United States' cooperation with Egypt, its construction of 700 schools so far, and preparation to build 800 more in the framework of the bilateral cooperation project.

In his letter, the Soviet ambassador suggested the conclusion of the agreement with Egypt for financing and establishing certain cultural projects and establishing cultural centers as a symbol of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation in the Mubarak administration. He also requested the complete compilation of bilateral cooperation projects that have been carried out in Egypt during Mubarak's rule, and the preparation of media campaigns in the Egyptian press to illustrate this before Egyptian public opinion.

#### **Abu-Sultan Power Plant Completed, Provides Canal Zone Power**

45040044c Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 25 Oct 88 p 4

[Article: "Super Power Plant in Abu-Sultan Produces 600 Megawatts and 24 Percent of Egypt's Energy"]

[Text] As part of the government's plan to alleviate the people's suffering and provide them with all the services they need, it has been decided to inaugurate the fourth

unit of the Abu-Sultan electric power plant in Ismailia, thus making it the largest and most efficient power plant in Egypt. This plant produces 600 megawatts which are used to feed the loads needed for the Canal Zone in the Governorates of Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez. This is in addition to meeting the needs of al-Sharqiyah Governorate which comes under the administrative authority of the Canal Electric Power Zone.

Engineer Muhammad Tal'at al-Najjar, inspector general of the Abu-Sultan plant, said in an interview that "the first and second units were inaugurated in 1983 and the third phase was opened in 1985. Today, we announce the inauguration of the fourth and last phase of the plant which stands on 48 feddans and employs 600 engineers, chemists, technicians, and workers 24 hours a day 7 days a week. Statistics confirm that our plant generates 53 percent of the total energy produced in the Canal Zone whose plants contribute 25 percent of the thermoelectric power generated in the country's unified network. To understand the value of the Canal Zone's electric power output, it must be noted that the zone transmits to the unified network a whopping 55 percent of surplus power produced by the two major plants in the Canal Zone: Abu-Sultan in Ismailia and 'Ataqah in Suez."

Regarding the way the Abu-Sultan power is used, the inspector general emphasized that the plant puts out a 220,000-volt current which is received by the unified networks and transmitted to the generators where it is reduced to 66,000 volts, then to 11,000 volts whereupon it is distributed to companies, factories, and other regular users, just like the power produced at the High Dam power plants. He also said that each unit puts out 150 megawatts which is highly efficient compared to similar High Dam units that put out 180 megawatts each. The plant's efficiency has reached 39.8 percent which is higher than the old plants (22 percent).

#### **Egyptian Youth Epic**

How did the plant come into existence? How was it financed? How has it contributed to the world of electric power? These questions were put to Engineer Muhammad 'Abd-al-Mun'im, director general of the Abu-Sultan power plant, who affirmed that "this super plant was set up in 1979 under a contract with an American company and was financed by a \$250 million grant from the American Agency for International Development to build the first three units, to which a fourth unit was added, bringing the total cost to \$320 million and 50 million Egyptian pounds, or close to one billion Egyptian pounds. We had to build these thermoelectric plants to make up for the steady increase in electric power consumption which was exceeding the output of the highly productive hydroelectric power plants. Had we not built the Abu-Sultan plant, we would not have been able to accomplish the rapid progress in industrial and agricultural projects and could not have faced the increasing demand for electric power in new areas and rural development centers."

The director general shed some light on the most significant accomplishment of the Abu-Sultan plant, namely the creation of young technical cadres able to install, operate, and maintain such plants anywhere inside or outside Egypt. He said: "Suffice it to know that the work force inside the plant is 100 percent Egyptian and that 80 percent of the young engineers received on-site training. They are the true resource of the electric power sector, as evidenced by the fact that the first and second units were installed in 5 years while the fourth took 3 years to install and begin operating by young Egyptian hands."

#### **Editorial Rejects Idea of Democratic Coup in USSR**

*45040044b Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 21 Oct 88 p 5*

[Editorial by Ahmad Zayn: "Without Problems"]

[Text] I do not know why all these changes in the communist camp pass without comment or explanation to the people that falsehoods cannot last, regimes based on atheism and denial of human rights cannot survive, and deviation from God's path cannot be right.

Some writers showed disdain for people's intelligence by portraying events in the Soviet Union and other communist countries as a democratic coup staged without one shot being fired. These writers forgot that this so-called coup was undertaken by the rulers and not the people, and hence there was no need to fire any shots because the change came from the top, not the bottom.

It was undoubtedly a great historic occurrence for communist theory to be declared bankrupt at the hands of its leaders and for the communist leaders of the world—those leaders who often promised God's paradise on earth, quashed religions, scorned all heavenly laws, and seized all freedoms—to stand humbly before the whole world to declare the bankruptcy of communist theory and their return to individual freedoms—albeit in a limited way—and private ownership and to tear down everything they had advocated throughout the past years and everything they had used to deceive the people and propagate unbelief, atheism, and libertinism.

And so stood the communist leaders in the world, "destroying their dwellings with their own hands," according to the Koran; declaring their bankruptcy and proclaiming their system was wrong and their inevitable return to the truth to set matters right. They return perforce to religion and individual freedoms and individual ownership, a basic principle of Islam.

Indeed, this matter has spread to noncommunist countries. In Great Britain, a violent battle has sprung up within the British Labor Party which was shaken by its four consecutive election losses. This violent battle erupted among party leaders, some of whom tried to break away from the socialist theory desired by the British Labor Party to espouse one closer to capitalism,

while some labor unions opposed this tendency. The upshot is that the party will fade away in the next election and the conservatives will prevail, as the polls show.

Hence, the bankruptcy of international socialism and communism requires more than one stance, the most important being the view that any regime based on fighting religion cannot survive. Indeed, it will vanish for sure and will do so at the hands of its leaders and those who made and preached it.

**Editorial Holds Consumers Responsible for Prices**  
45040044a Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 12 Oct 88 p 7

[Editorial by Ahmad Zayn: "Without Problems"]

[Text] The problem of prices is the topic of conversation everywhere due to the fact that we have so far failed to arrive at a solution that can put an end to inflation.

Whereas inflation is a world phenomenon, public confrontation of this issue in Egypt is nonexistent while in other countries it does exist and is effective.

Some merchants come to me complaining about the recent boycott that was observed in certain sections of Cairo, saying that price manipulation occurs at the farm and wholesale levels and not at the retail level.

I know that in any problem one side tries to blame the other. I contend, however, that retailers are the key because if they refuse to buy at inflated prices, wholesalers would not be able to sell.

Some retailers earn one Egyptian pound for every kilogram they sell. Indeed, I know a retailer who earns two Egyptian pounds from one kilogram of mango. Is this reasonable?

Retailers have admitted as much, but they claim that it takes place in specific areas such as al-Zamalik, Garden City, Muhandisin, Heliopolis, and Manyal, while in other areas the class of consumers governing the market makes it impossible for prices to go up so much.

Merchants have told me that the consumers are to blame because, when they go to the market, they order what they want first and ask about the price second. When the merchant presents them with the bill, they pay it without looking at it or checking it. If this is the case, why should the merchant not profit so long as there are people willing to pay?; hence, the inflated prices.

The policy of setting up government outlets such as cooperatives and other markets can succeed only if true controls over them are instituted.

In the absence of controls, however, most of the items delivered to the cooperatives at low prices will find their way to the merchants. Consequently, the only thing we

would have done would be to offer another new service to the retailers, and these cooperatives would be working for them rather than for the consumer.

It all comes down to the available purchasing power, the power that can manipulate any market in the world and impose a price to which no one can object. Add to that ample production, which is the key factor, and a reasonable price, acceptable to all, can be attained.

**Columnist Sees IMF Economic Solutions As Too Much Too Soon**

45000038 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic  
11 November 88 p 43

["A Point of View" column by Walid Abi-Murshid]

[Text] Between one delegation visiting Cairo and another one leaving, the IMF seems to have become an Egyptian problem these days. Between the economic fund's priorities and the social priorities of Cairo, the Egyptian economy remains a hostage to bringing these priorities closer together.

It is obvious that the solution for an economic crisis as big as Egypt's must be a complicated and diverse one, and most of all, of a long duration. It is necessary, in the end, for this solution to accomplish the rebuilding and restructuring of the Egyptian economy, through radical reform measures. Such strong measures may result in a general psychological shock in a people who are, to a high degree, consumption oriented, whose numbers are increasing by one million every 9 months, and who according to official Egyptian statistics produce only 24 percent of their own food and drink.

It is no secret that Egypt is increasingly undergoing difficulties in servicing its foreign debts, which are estimated to be 44 billion dollars, and U.S. aid, as humble as it is in comparison with the overt and covert aid received by Israel, has failed to cure the disorder in the Egyptian economy to the same extent as it has postponed the time for making the difficult decisions.

It is also no secret that Egypt spends much more than it earns, for after the last rescheduling of its debts, and after the U.S. economic aid, the deficit share in its gross national product is approximately 22 percent, and the size of the deficit in its balance of payments is about 1.5 billion dollars.

Against this difficult background, the IMF is trying to convince Cairo to take a quick dose of "the bitter medicine" which it has prescribed for its economy, before deciding on a new plan to reschedule its debts. The IMF medicine obligates the government to pay off the general budget deficit and improve the balance of payments with strict emergency measures in the areas of controlled consumption and increased production.

This is a fair demand to which Egypt does not object basically, but rather objects to the prescribed speed of the cure, for to cure an ailment existing for more than three decades with one quick dose may do away with the patient before the ailment.

In this particular case, Egypt has not failed to implement a gradual cure for its economic ailments, for it has already agreed to reducing the general budget deficit by 2 percent annually, to decreasing the subsidy funding for basic goods from 2 billion dollars in the year 1985/86 to 1.78 billion dollars for last year, and to standardizing the exchange rate of the pound after establishing a free exchange market. Today Egypt is also headed towards encouraging the collecting of taxes, diminishing the reliance on the banking system for financing, and decreasing the growth rate of monetary expansion.

But economic reform in Egypt is the same as any similar reform in any of the developing countries. It cannot be separated from the country's general social circumstances. In this particular aspect, the IMF demand to abolish the official rate of the dollar in the Central Bank complex, which finances the importation of necessary goods from the country's income of foreign currency and the demand to raise the price of energy to the international level, before raising the income of the vast segment of the population which benefits from the official subsidy, show the IMF to be not only ignoring the social realities existing in Egypt but also the nature of the needed reform.

And of old it was said: If you want to be obeyed, ask for the possible!

## ISRAEL

### Likud Plans To Relocate Refugee Camps

[Article: "Relocation Of Camps"]

44000118 [Editorial Report] Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic on 12 November 1988 carries on page 8 a 200-word unattributed article entitled "Likud Plans to Liquidate Uprising: Relocation of the Camps." It includes the following passage:

"With the uprising in the occupied territories entering its 12th month, its course has reached a decisive turning point with a fateful decision to be made in the political and security arenas...."

"At this time characteristics of Likud's plan for liquidating the uprising have begun to leak to the news media. This plan is based on moving the camps from their current locations and building new camps. The first camp proposed for destruction and reconstruction is Jabaliya in the Gaza Strip."

### Alleged Secret Deal for Emigration Of Ethiopian Jews

44000119 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic  
12 Nov 88 p 6

[Text] Informed Western European sources confirmed that Israeli officials have recently been making arrangements with American and Western European concerns to make secret efforts to strike a "deal" with Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam to organize a new operation for the emigration of a large number of Ethiopian Jews (Falashas) to Israel. The sources reported that the Israeli officials requested during these contacts that between 15 to 20 thousand Ethiopian Jews be allowed to emigrate by way of two African countries. They promised the Ethiopian leader a guarantee on "loans and Western aid" for his country if he agrees to the deal. The information from these sources confirm that the Ethiopian leader has not yet agreed, but contacts are still continuing. These sources revealed that Israeli officials plan to train thousands of Ethiopian Jews to send them as "civilian and military experts" to a number of African countries to strengthen Israeli influence in the area.

### Finance Minister Interviewed on Economy in Light of Uprising

44230004 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew  
11 Sep 88 pp 9, 16

[Interview with Finance Minister Moshe Nisim by Tzvi Timor; date and place not given]

[Text] ['AL HAMISHMAR] Recently, there has been a great deal of evidence of an economic recession, that is, industrial production is declining. We heard today that there is a drop of 17 percent in the textile and clothing sectors, of 8 percent in cement, and in industry generally, 3 percent. Is this a result of the economic policy?

[Nisim] Definitely not. In any event, if at all, in the most partial way. I am speaking of the policy of the treasury and not of any policy not under our control, and you understand what I mean. What is occurring now in the economy is a slowing in the rate of growth in production. We already knew of this last year and issued an announcement, and it was made public in the national budget that we submitted that commercial production would grow this year less than last year. That was still before the intifadah. We foresaw that commercial production would grow approximately 4.5 percent in 1988. But meanwhile the intifadah came and it has caused a slowing of the rate of growth.

['AL HAMISHMAR] You did not take the intifadah into account. At first, you did not treat it as an economic event. There were a number of announcements in which you dismissed this phenomenon and only Gad Yaacobi set the government straight about the severity of the economic situation resulting from the intifadah.

[Nisim] First of all, with all respect, he said what he said, and I say what I say. Already at the beginning of March, I said that there is a slowing in the rate of growth. I said that in March. I don't rely on Yaacobi's figures and their significance, but I say that the intifadah has brought a slowdown in the rate of growth. What are we talking about? There is a drop in tourism. You brought up at the start textile and clothing—there has been a drop in local production and a drop in purchases, there is a lack of workers in construction and in agriculture. And this is slowing the rate of growth by about 1.5 percent. At the Bank of Israel, they think it may even reach 2 percent. Therefore, instead of the 4.5 percent that we expected, the growth in production will be about 2.5 percent. That is not sufficient growth, but little by little there is growth here. Anything above 1.5 percent, which is the rate of population growth, is real growth. The slowdown springs from three causes:

a) A reduction in consumption, which we foresaw as far back as October-November last year, stemming from the fact that after 2 years of rising private consumption, there is a certain saturation;

b) The intifadah; and

c) Inventory grew in 1987. Because some thought that 1988, as an election year, would be a year of high living and heavy demand and extensive consumption, they did not think that we would not administer an election economy, and that we would not take these considerations into account, and so there is a slowing just now in activity in the manufacturing sector. These are the three causes of the slowdown in the rate of growth in production. There was high private consumption last year. It was argued to us, rightly so, that this needed to stop. Now, when demand has slackened, they are shouting, "You have brought a slowdown upon Israel!" It is necessary to remember that growth accelerated rapidly in the years 1986-87. In those 2 years together, growth was 12.7 percent, something not seen for years. This growth was fed partly by an increase in private consumption. Thus, those who speak harshly today about the slowdown were critical last year of the large private consumption. They are contradicting themselves. This indicates that the considerations behind these arguments are not purely economic. It is not a sense of responsibility that accompanies their statements.

[AL HAMISHMAR] We have read of late in the newspapers that Treasury economists are proposing immediate steps, such as elimination of subsidies, a devaluation and other actions, even before the elections.

[Nisim] I know the office staff, they usually speak with me...I know every opinion they have. What I can say is that we are making exacting efforts to preserve the budget framework. We forecast for this year a deficit of

1.35 billion sheqels. This deficit will apparently exceed our forecast because of unforeseen factors or because of decisions with budgetary significance. I will give you some examples:

a) There is a drop in demand and consumption, and so there is a reduction in indirect tax revenues. That is the principal cause.

b) We have the intifadah and its heavy costs for the security system—100 million sheqels. That is real money. Prices for grain and fodder have gone up, a steep rise that was unforeseen, and unexpected.

[AL HAMISHMAR] That is an expenditure for the economy, not an outlay from the Treasury.

[Nisim] It is exactly the Treasury's, not that of the economy. It raises the costs of subsidized goods and therefore increases subsidies considerably. The wage agreement was something we imagined would mean a rise in wages, but we are not accustomed to include in the budget the rise in wages from very clear circumstances. All this has brought us an increase in the deficit of about 700-750 million sheqels, including the decline in indirect taxes. In other words, the excess in budget outlays is 300 million sheqels. That is not a great difference from what we forecast. Here is another example. The desert wind came and caused agricultural losses, and I am not speaking of the Kibbutz and cooperative farms, for that was included in the budget reserve from the start. We took that into account.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Do you intend to act immediately on subsidies?

[Nisim] This component of the rise in prices is one we did not expect. We must weigh what to do. It is interesting, there were both rises and drops in prices. The drought in the United States passed, and there were days when prices rose and others when they went down. We are dependent on this to make decisions at the right time.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Before the elections?

[Nisim] Everyone knows that if there is a need for economic decisions, we will make them, whether before or after the elections, as if there weren't any elections.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Does the drop in foreign currency reserves worry you?

[Nisim] There is no drop. I will explain what it is. There is no decline in the account balances. There is a physical drop. But there is no real drop. The private sector is buying less than expected, proportionally. In the past, it sold dollars and didn't buy. When you examine the balance for the year, it is less than expected. Point two: We have plenty of foreign currency. Point three: That has a cost. We do not profit from holding excessively large stocks of foreign currency because of differences in

interest and the exchange rate. Therefore, we are converting debts to short term, which is a positive process. This month, September, there will be a major drop because we are making a heavy payment, about 200-250 million dollars, on debt. We hope to recycle our debt to the United States with an installment of 3 billion dollars in September. As you know, we have guarantees from the American Government on 90 percent, but on 10 percent we must make our own deposit. The deposit is 300 million dollars. This sum is coming off our account balances. But before this interview ends, we will receive at the end of October 1.2 billion dollars, and again we will be in a situation of very high balances, possibly above 5.5 billion dollars. Therefore, the situation is not worrisome, it is better than good.

[AL HAMISHMAR] How do you deal with the criticism heard primarily from the industrialists but also from your colleagues, Ministers Sharon and Moda'i?

[Nisim] I am not prepared to refer to anyone by name. I say that a fair share of the criticism has always existed and always will, and that does not bother me. There has been criticism of me as well, when I presented the extension of the economic plan in November-December 1986 and the country raged and stormed because of the major reforms. But a close examination of the criticism will lead us to this unequivocal conclusion—those doing the talking and criticizing have axes to grind, for subsidies, supports, aid and other economic interests.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Mainly on export incentives.

[Nisim] By the way, there is nothing contemptible or improper in having economic interests, but there are also those with political interests. The entire Labor Party alignment or individual persons whose names I do not recall are ax-grinders par excellence. Our vision is comprehensive. An interested party must see, or is able to see, only his own interest. We act in a clear-headed way. I know that the policy does not always satisfy everyone, but we have made up our minds to direct the economy responsibly, taking into account neither the elections nor pressures.

[AL HAMISHMAR] You don't fear that industry is about to collapse?

[Nisim] You must distinguish between the Workers' Association and the rest of industry. The Workers' Association is in deep trouble. As a general body, the roots of its crisis didn't sprout yesterday, they go back years, flowing first of all from a concept and a management that is not economic or commercial, but political; party interests have run it and still do. And that is causing results such as these, taking the easy route, dangerous wage expenditures. Look at the Koor company and the percentage increase in salaries in 1987, when it suffered a loss of 165 million sheqels. A failure of management. Megalomania spread too far. No wonder things are as they are.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Still, there are difficulties in private industry, and people are talking about 3,000 companies in trouble.

[Nisim] I spoke first of the sector of the Workers' Association. If you pay attention, the entire Association is in a crisis. It is not that there are some industries in good shape and others that are in a bad state. The whole thing is in big trouble. That includes Hapo'el, Qupat Holim Sick Fund, Solel Boneh, Yuval Gad, and Koor. What isn't included? In private industry, you find differences from operation to operation. Those which are efficient or becoming efficient are not losing money. When you speak of 3,000 companies, those aren't big enterprises, that includes small companies without economic significance, and there is a figure like that every year. How is this year different from any other year? A few more, perhaps. Such companies go down every year and in every period. It is necessary to identify the cause. There definitely are operations in trouble. But those that improved efficiency are not. Take for example Scitex, a company that sent 90 percent of its production to the dollar market and was among those losing money. It was not efficient. It raised its efficiency—and now it is turning a profit, even today, without a devaluation, in the dollar market. It has a 98-percent export rate. That is proof that we are at the start of a basically positive process of improving efficiency. Some suffering is inevitable. There is no good without evil. But the evil here is essentially making us better.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Was there an episode involving elimination of the 1 percent export incentive that some in the Liberal Party sought to preserve?

[Nisim] No one from the Liberal Party sought that from me. Dan Tikhon raised the subject in the finance committee. No one at all spoke with me. The Liberal Party does not exist today, nor does the Herut movement. No one from Likud spoke to me. But Dan Tikhon did raise it in the finance committee. This 1 percent was given because I did not agree with the proposal to impose a 3 percent tax on capital imports. I told the governor of the Bank of Israel, who had made the proposal, that I was ready [to agree], but that it would not be applied to exports. That is what we agreed on in principle, but the industrialists brought the finance committee a judicial opinion that says that this is impossible. It was legally unacceptable, so it was decided to add 1 percent to exchange rate insurance. The fee was eliminated, therefore, the percent needed to be set against it was eliminated. One percent in exchange rate insurance amounts to close to 80 million sheqels, a substantial sum. At this stage, that is my opinion.

[AL HAMISHMAR] One of the big problems for the economy is that interest rates are too high. All the economists say that there is no place for that in a period of recession or a slowdown.

[Nisim] Right. Monetary policy contracts; the time for it is when there is fear of excessive flows or high demand. We are not in a period of high demand. Most definitely, there is room for a meaningful reduction in interest rates. I know that this is the opinion also of the governor of the Bank of Israel, and he will take practical steps to bring down interest rates significantly.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Another subject in the news is that some accuse you of wanting to nationalize the banks.

[Nisim] That is interesting. Here, too, that is a thrilling subject. The real sources of the idea of nationalization, or the concept that the government needs to interfere with and control everything, are those who express fear that the banks might be nationalized. And when do they express this fear? Precisely when they find themselves at the center of a vested interest, that is, on the basis of interests that are antipublic, antieconomic, almost unethical. I hope that these matters are understood. No one is further from nationalization than I. I, the one who is bringing about a process of privatization in Israel, will not begin an age of nationalization.

[AL HAMISHMAR] What solution do you propose?

[Nisim] I say that the bank shares arrangement laid a heavy yoke on the Israel taxpayer unprecedented in the world: 7 billion dollars, 11.5 billion sheqels, that is about 45 percent of the annual national budget without debts. It has fallen to us, to the Treasury to do everything to reduce the damage. That won't happen unless we grant equal voting rights to shareholders. That will allow sale of the shares at a more realistic, higher price. The second thing is that it doesn't occur to anyone that a body that has no wealth in a company or in the bank will be in exclusive control. We are not doubling like last year. Our outlook, both in this matter and in the matter of voting, is identical to that of the Bank of Israel. Those are the two foundations of our policy. The Bank of Israel and we are full partners in this opinion.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Let's turn to the agricultural sector where things are developing very slowly. In fact, the capital market which you promised would be a solution has failed and is not serving as a solution because it is too small and too expensive.

[Nisim] First of all, I want to reply to a claim that I hear from a few parties with special interests to the effect that I bear responsibility for the agricultural situation. That is nonsense. I assumed my position when agriculture was in a state of ruin, when the debts were at their peak, when interest rates were many times higher than they are today, when agriculture stood on the brink of total collapse. Kibbutz farms from all the collective organizations except the religious collective and the cooperative farms. The religious collective organization did not engage in speculations, did not go through megalomania, did not try financial manipulations; all the others are no paragons of virtue. That is the situation I found and I am

the one who undertook action to restore agriculture. That action has resulted in a recovery program for the United Kibbutz Movement [UKM] and the Ravid Commission plan. The slowdown in putting the plans into operation for the cooperative farms, not for the kibbutz farms—it is in operation for the UKM—is not attributable to the Treasury. What do they want from the Treasury? They argue with us all the time over distribution of the budgets. We are tough on allocating budgets, but when we decide, we carry it out. We reached a decision on this, and the budgets are allocated and ready for operation. The kibbutz farms received their part. The cooperative farms have received only some of theirs. According to my information, the delays certainly are not from the Treasury. Possibly from the banks. But the most serious delay comes from a negative motivation created by certain politicians, such as Nisim Zvili, who calls for the cooperative farms not to pay [their debts] and says that the banks are able to wipe out additional hundreds of millions of sheqels [of debt] at a time when he knows that this will not happen. This is pushing the cooperative farms away from the idea of joining in the program to restore themselves.

The same applies to other ministers from the Labor alignment, who I shall not name, but two of them, candidates for the post of Minister of the Treasury, are proposing strange ideas with a high budgetary cost that will replace the Ravid Commission plan. That too weakens the will of the cooperative farms to join in. They surely will say to themselves, "Look, this fellow and that one speak of the need to do this or that, we can get by paying less, so why join the plan today?" Those are irresponsible acts, especially by Nisim Zvili, who is head of the settlement unit.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Under this plan, at such interest rates, the cooperative farms won't be able to survive.

[Nisim] I don't believe that, because the fact is that 21 cooperative farms have already received funds and another 40 have already ratified their participation in all the procedures and will soon start receiving. The more cooperative farms that get on the path of the plan, the more likely many others will join in.

[AL HAMISHMAR] The National Kibbutz Federation attempted to solve its problem on the capital market, but it became clear that the price is compound interest above 10 percent because of the narrow character of the market.

[Nisim] To the best of my knowledge, that arises from the nature of the issuer. In fact, interest rates for the government have gone down. We are today offering long term issues at 4.7 and 4.9 percent, which is comparable to those of the most developed nations. Clearly, issues cost more for the banks than for the government. It costs solid companies more than banks, and companies and enterprises in weaker positions pay still more. It is a matter of graduations.

[AL HAMISHMAR] Agree with me that there is no solution in that?

[Nisim] The correct solution to every problem in the manufacturing sector or the business sector is to use the capital market to acquire funds. The country does not need to be a bank. The country needs to finance activities and to allocate budgets for positive projects that are a sign of the nature of the government's work.

[AL HAMISHMAR] How do you see developments concerning wages? In fact, an agreement is yet to be signed with the academics.

[Nisim] That is not a matter for the Treasury. We signed with the Histadrut, with the professional union of the Histadrut, a wage cap agreement, and, from our point of view, we have finished the wage problem in the public sector. We will sign a good agreement in the business sector. As far as we are concerned, we are done with cap agreements. From now on, every union and every sector of the workers in public service can receive only the cap agreement.

[AL HAMISHMAR] I thank you and wish you a good year.

#### **Gush Emunim Leader Interviewed on Arabs, Messianism**

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[Interview with Gush Emunim leader Rabbi Levinger by Pinhas 'Inbari; date and place not given]

[Excerpt] [HADASHOT] Some time ago, you told NEQUDA [a Gush Emunim publication] that the age of the messiah the son of Joseph had ended and the age of the messiah the son of David had begun. What did you mean by that?

[Levinger] I will use other terms, not those words. I believe that we find ourselves at a very high level of technological attention that engages the general public. For hundreds of years, the pace of technological progress was almost at a standstill, while in the last 20 years this development has risen dizzily on the graph. There is enormous development, and this expresses itself also in the great competition in the field of security—who will overcome whom by technological means. The key to victory always comes back to technology, and national investments around the world are shifting to that field. Thus national budgets and industry are continually improving computers and all technological innovations.

In my opinion, this is causing weariness with idealism, with observation of the depth of the mission of the soul of man; the mission of society in a limited or national sense. That is because there is so much investment in the scientific and technological sphere.

If we consider Israel itself, there is the same material progress, recognition of the material above the realms of the intellect—and it is a matter of intellectual progress. There is in it a recognition of what has been done in the world throughout the forces at work in the world. That is the center of attraction, and with it also comes slackness. For example, the flow of young people going around the world or the inclination of the media to take more of an interest in what has happened in the world. No wonder that television by nature tends to show more and more of what has happened in the world. What interest is this global shrinkage to you—yet they must know what is happening in the world. And it is reasonable that one day we will seek not only the ideals that go beyond the kibbutz, the group, or the private individual, but the mission of the whole world, for which it was intended.

This is a very joyous event. And I have already told the young people that this event need not bring despair but internal joy, because man has succeeded in coming to understand so much. When man lives only with himself, or with his own community, he thinks, about his idealistic mission. Now, we will seek out things in a more comprehensive manner. We find in the last verses of the Book of Psalms that the sun and the rivers and the streams and the ponds all will sing. What does this mean? That, in every place, we will ask what this is for, and certainly it has some mission, some purpose.

Now we are drawing near to what has been called the mission of Joseph, who was the begetter, the provider, who took care of the goods of the children of Jacob, and brought them among the gentiles of the land. It is said of Joseph that he knew 70 languages; that is to say, he was the start of our contact with the world. And the poetry of David is not contradictory to the words of Joseph, but their completion.

[HADASHOT] Is it possible to be impressed that, given the changing global reality, of which Israel is a part, the proportions by which we have dealt with settlement of the land until now are changing?

[Levinger] In all the world, some change is destined to come. In the process of establishing a national scientific base in which we have attained achievements unimaginable in the 17th century, we will, in 200 years, arrive at wondrous arrangements, governments, and highly developed scientific organizations.

In Israel, too, by forming economic and administrative systems, we have established ourselves as a nation standing on its own two feet. Gordon [A. D. Gordon, early 20th century socialist Jewish philosopher] and others spoke of our need to "invert the pyramid" [translator's note: to shift Jews from trades and professions to agriculture and physical labor] and, indeed, our achievements go beyond anything they dreamed. Our agriculture leads the way for many countries; the same is true of industry and our scientific research.

The people of Israel are given to searching for metaphysical meanings, always asking what our traditional mission is. In light of the development of the world, we are destined to ask, what is the mission of all this great reality? It is possible that the nation of Israel is to be a leading factor, that is reasonable. Throughout all our history, we have been bound to a religious mission, and today, too, questions will arise concerning the work of Israel and the house of Israel. There are debates about security policies, how to behave with the Arabs, what is justice, what is not, whether we are still on course or veering to another, taking a firm, forceful course or one of compromise. These are the first sparks towards a reality in which the nation of Israel will determine its mission. For us, the inspiration will be still higher because for us the traditional mission, the supertraditional mission, is still higher. If that exists in the world, it stands out more for us. That is what the poetry of David relates to.

And all this is tied to the matter of Judea and Samaria. If we look at our national mission in full, which also contains an ideal, then the question is whether we are able to carry out our ideal in Uganda or in Berlin. The fact is that we never dreamed of such directions in our prayers. The natural place for the nation of Israel is the land of Israel. The prayer and poetry concerned themselves only with return to the land of Israel and it is clear today that all that was designed not only for the purpose of a material existence, but also for our national mission. And so there is a question: If we have a national mission, can it be fulfilled on only part of the land of Israel?

[HADASHOT] Can it?

[Levinger] No, that would not be natural, just as it is not natural that it could occur in a place that is not ours, or while we are less than the whole of the nation, or while we do not hold the entire land. We must strive to see to it that all the land shall be in our hands, and all the people of Israel will be here with us.

[HADASHOT] Is "striving" enough for you, or do you believe that the need for all the land and all the nation is absolute?

[Levinger] I am speaking generally. We must strive for this. The meaning of the value of settlement, whether in Tel Aviv or in all the southern coastal plain, must get us thinking about the mission of settlement in Tel Aviv and in the coastal plain, whether it will forever be restricted only to recognizing the value of buildings, the comforts of life in the city, improving the streets, houses, gardens and promenades, or whether, ever so slowly, we need to think about the educational goals of Tel Aviv, of the State of Israel and of the 1948 borders.

[HADASHOT] Someone in Gush Emunim explained to me what you meant by the messiah the son of Joseph and the messiah the son of David, that the chapter of

physical settlement has ended and we must be satisfied with what we have, and now it is necessary to devote ourselves to the spiritual message of the nation of Israel.

[Levinger] On the contrary, I argue that if we do not recognize the mission of Tel Aviv which contributed to our return from Poland, Morocco, and Paris, a spiritual flight from Tel Aviv, followed by physical flight, will begin. The spiritual flight will start because we will not understand why we need to be here of all places and not in other cities around the world. Our youth are no different from other generations; they have idealistic goals and want to understand the objectives of the 1948 country. I say the same thing about expanding settlement. We will be unable to explain to ourselves and to the whole world why this place is so important to us if we do not recognize its mission. The more we recognize its mission, the more we will desire its physical well-being. Spiritual well-being depends on physical well-being. To be spiritually healthy, one needs all one's limbs, and therefore it is essential for one to recognize the value of the settlements, of the 1948 borders, and the value of their structure and its creation, in order to recognize the value of settlements in the 1967 borders.

[HADASHOT] But did you say that we have finished the period of the messiah the son of Joseph?

[Levinger] Those words were not properly understood. I did not say that the period had ended. Recognizing the goals, the poetry of that which is beyond reality, which I call the poetry of the world, will strengthen the world, not weaken it. They will bring reason to the world. The material of the world will seem more precious to a thinking man, he will esteem that material more. But this does not exist, not in the world, not within the boundaries of 1948 and not within the 1967 borders.

[HADASHOT] But there are those who understand your words that the period of concentrating on holding the land, and of the existing bases, has finished.

[Levinger] And from the existing bases we must read the map of world and Israeli thirst for words a little more sublime that exist in rapid world development. This period is not complete, but it has aroused the need to add the supernatural layer, in order to give it more strength. In all the different circles that stand for the ideas that you have cited, there is a diaspora mentality that "the more the world adds structure, the more the intellect adds destruction." We absolutely refused that course. The need was to "invert the pyramid," and that was achieved, and it will be strengthened by adding idealistic poetic layers, to exalt Israeli society still more. And from a certain vantage point, I see this in the whole world too.

[HADASHOT] The discussions about the messiah the son of David are arousing dangerous associations concerning the Temple Mount, of the situation of the Temple Mount today. I have taken note that you do not participate in groups active around the Temple Mount.

[Levinger] It is possible to give the Temple Mount two interpretations. We have built Judea and Samaria, a state within the 1948 borders has been created, a certain progress continues in maintaining the state in the direction of the 1967 borders, our basis continues to gain strength by holding the settlements, so you can come and say, we have done this, let us do the same thing on the Temple Mount. And that is where I differ. I think that the Temple Mount is the place of poetry for the Jewish people. The Levites would sing in the Temple. When an atmosphere of poetry towards God exists in the world, that rests on lower poetry of a public that is not ready or does not know the higher poetry, then as much as there shall be higher expressions of mentioning the name of God in the nation, as much as the matter will be more natural, and the nation will enjoy a pleasant life, and quiet and tranquility, then the basis for the Temple as an expression for the general atmosphere will arise. Accordingly, I reject the assumption of: we shall go up on the Mount, we will destroy the mosques, we will build some kind of Temple. That is not the way. That only reduces the value of the enterprise. That shrivels the value of the building. When there shall be an air of poetry in the nation, and a certain harmony, and song shall rise up, and the pleasant life prevail and refined ways spread throughout us, so also the place will be more suitable for a Temple that belongs to them all and is in keeping with them.

[HADASHOT] Don't you think that everything connected to the intifadah—the daily killing, the growing brutality—all that works against a spiritual revival and reduces the chances of realizing your goals?

[Levinger] The great men of Israel always knew that in Jewish education exists the sublimity of the whole world, not a chauvinist sublimity, even in difficult situations. Expressions such as "Arab," "40 Years in the Grave," "Don't Believe Him"—those are foreign to Judaism. That is not how those who have guided Israel's spirit from the time of Moses today have spoken. It is said of Joseph that he was fluent in 70 languages. Moses translated the Torah into 70 languages. What is the significance of 70 languages? That there is a connection to the world, perhaps also to contribute something to the world. That is the meaning of being a light unto the nations and a kingdom of priests and a holy nation. The aim of loving the world, and understanding that all of creation has some kind of mission was the clear and firm path of the geniuses of our past in all situations, both in difficult conditions and in difficult disputes. It may be that these matters were not always spoken of in public, but we knew that fundamentally this was the mission, even though we were unable to speak directly to the Cossacks and all those who acted savagely against us. The same applied to the mission of the state: to bring light to the whole world, not just to ourselves, and if it is a matter of the whole world, that means to the Arabs as well, the children Ishmael among us. But here, in Gush Emunim too, the idea has taken hold that all this must be done immediately. Haste here is most unfortunate.

[HADASHOT] You draw on the wisdom of the Arabs....

[Levinger] (Laughing) Yes. There is a picture that David Grossman drew in his book, that he is good and we are evil. But the matter is basically not so. The immediate application in current politics is not so. From this point of view, the intifadah has clarified matters that we have been trying to speed up. There were those who said that the Arabs were created in the image of God. What does that mean? That they are good, that their intentions are for the best? They did not think that it was a matter of popular committees. They mocked and said that it was a matter of individuals, and did not think that a leadership stands behind everything. A leadership that has an ability to control, and burns houses and stores. We did not draw for ourselves the reality of fanatic control in the streets, and instruction beginning with young children for throwing stones and Molotov cocktails. Really, in the end of the whole world will see the depth of the structure, but that will not come right away. And now we have come to our senses. It has been a frequent mistake in different times to believe that the situation is good and that the Messiah has already come....

It may be good that things are becoming dear, that powerful hatred still exists, and that the means of dealing with it cannot be those previously considered.

[HADASHOT] Still, when you speak of the connection we have with the world, you certainly know that one of the obstacles is the way in which the world sees our relations with Arabs, for which it does not praise us.... When we pretentiously claim to radiate our light to the world, they immediately ask, And what of the Arabs? To integrate itself into the world's great development, does not Israel need to remove this obstacle?

[Levinger] We need to take two paths at the same time. To see all the time where the world is going and the good times at which we are destined to arrive, and at the same time to understand the current situation. These matters exist also in private education. We sometimes believe that a son or daughter will take the correct course, but when we see aright, we discover a serious crisis, a gross deviation. In that situation, we must adopt a certain method to advance the future. Of course, our goal must be love for the entire world, for every man, and everything created. But at a time when this future is not being revealed, and there are deviations from the pure, future situation, then it is our obligation to walk in the way of the wisest of all men, King Solomon, who appreciated the poetry of everything, the language of everyone, and said, a wicked people will become loathsome. Sometimes, it is necessary to hoe a tough row towards the final goal. Sometimes, we must employ the deterrence of punishment to assure absolute quiet. It may be that this fact contradicts the refinement and the purity and the joy that are destined to come, but that is the way.

[HADASHOT] There is widely held opinion that after the coming elections there will be dramatic developments towards political arrangements. What will be your position regarding a situation which Israel would be locked into a comprehensive political settlement requiring withdrawal from the territories?

[Levinger] If such a strong tendency should arise within the parties of the right, its origin is the failure to make clear that we are striving for peace and good relations with our neighbors, but that this does not always happen quickly. If we agree to concessions, there will be grave crises in the nation. Many will not approve of these concessions. The pain will be great, and it will grow when we realize that the Arab world is not ready to make peace with us. At the most, such arrangements will enable us to achieve a peace agreement of the type realized with Egypt. That is the most we can hope for. Whether or not that happens depends on the Arabs; if they maintain their extremist positions, nothing will happen. But whether they change their position or pretend to follow Egypt's course, I think the day is not far off for a bloody war in which we shall suffer great distress within the new borders because there is a problem with a very difficult basis. The Arabs are still shouting, "Allah is great." And behind these shouts, as I understand the Islamic religion, we hear "The law of Allah is in the sword." That is, anyone who rebels against the Islamic mission is judged by the sword. It is very possible that a peace treaty will be signed with other Arab countries while they maintain their fundamental hatred of the infidel Zionist state; and for tactical reasons only, they will act as did al-Sadat. The result will be a grave crisis and great suffering, and war will break out. And next time, we won't be such idiots.

The true core that will prevent all this is our assessment of the world, and meanwhile, we need to build the land of Israel and continue to move the state forward. We cannot be deceived by illusions. We must better appreciate our mission. There has been no more war with Jordan, although we have made no concessions to her; there has been no war with Syria, although we have given her no concessions. Why then assume that we can make progress only through concessions? Even if Mr 'Arafat should himself come and speak in the Knesset, that still would not be genuine. That is a fraud. He thinks, "Meanwhile, we will take something until war will come." That was al-Sadat's calculation, and it may also be 'Arafat's. It may be that a part of the Israeli public would like this. But I think that this course would lead to concessions over important parts of our land, in the old city of Jerusalem and in Hebron and Shekhem [Nabulus] as well. And the war will not stop. If the war should stop; forget it, it will not stop. Someday, it may end. Meanwhile, I don't foresee any progress in that direction.

[HADASHOT] What is your opinion on the "transfer?"

[Levinger] For close to 5 years, I have been thinking about the security problem. We have the means at hand that are suitable to the Arabs. In the days before the

intifadah as well, the Government of Israel did not do everything it needed to do, and we did not achieve absolute quiet. I have made known my protests and pain and cries on all these things. Whenever a single stone a day was thrown, or just two stones in a week, I would go to Duhayshah to scream that a stone had been thrown without any justification at a Jew in the land of Israel. This does not need to happen in the land of Israel. And so I tried to make a one man demonstration, and I told the defense ministers and the chiefs of staff that we do not live in Kishinev or in Casablanca, where some Cossak or rioter would get up and throw a stone or break a Jew's leg. I thought those things then, and I feel the same way today.

There is a way to bring about absolute quiet. Those responsible for security are not making arrangements to establish absolute quiet, although when you talk with them they say that is their goal.

[HADASHOT] Do you think that the chief of staff wants the intifadah to continue?

[Levinger] I do not think that he wants the intifadah to continue. God forbid that I should attribute that to him. But he does not sufficiently want it to end. There is a difference between a negative inclination and decisions. The top security men are not arranging for a complete end to the intifadah, and I am not speaking of the lower ranks.

I want to say some things that I said to the prime minister and addressed to him in a telegram that I sent two weeks ago. I think that we made the same demands of the nobility in the diaspora, and they understood it. There were rabbis, public servants of the great communities, who would go to the tsar or the king or the sultan and say: We are your citizens, you are responsible for us. We want to live as you live, in peace and quiet. And there were decades, even centuries, in which such actions had an influence, while we cannot achieve the same result from the Government of Israel today. The government does not provide us the service that we sometimes received from some Russian, Rumanian, or Moroccan noble. I think that in those discussions that we had with those nobles, we told them: Whether you like it or not, and by all means, protect us, because the responsibility of any government is order. And we told them: You need to carry out heavy punishments, to impose the death penalty. You need to solve this problem. Some of the foreign rulers understood this. Whereas, the top security leadership, with the defense minister at its head, and to a certain extent also the cabinet and the chief of staff, are not undertaking to the fullest extent of their power to restore order, and that is a moral injustice and a terrible threat. The Government of Israel owes this to us and to the Arabs. The Arabs are suffering more than we are. This confuses them, throws their businesses into disorder and upsets their education.

One of my friends is a medical orderly in the Gaza Strip. He spoke with an Arab who was struck by IDF soldiers. The Arab cried and said, "What have you done to me—I build houses for you in Tel Aviv and you beat me." The orderly, treating him, said, "You must influence your friends not to go wild." And the Arab said to him, "I cannot influence them." He is correct. He cannot influence them. He is a little man among his comrades. He would like to continue to travel to Tel Aviv and to live his life, but power rests in the hands of the popular committees, and they rule. And they in turn are maintained by stronger factors. It seems to me—and I follow these matters somewhat—that hundreds of people who took part in activities were killed even before the intifadah. The media are interested in this just now, and when an activist is killed, they report on it extensively. But even before, there certainly were hundreds of stores set on fire, burnings of cars, beatings, and even killings of collaborators with the government. There must be control at any cost—that is the main problem. We must have control. The loss of control will later spread within the green line.

That is the fundamental core that requires attention—first of all, there must be control. That does not necessarily need to be done by a transfer. Just as in education, the teacher cannot get control over his class by throwing around the students. The Arabs are mocking us because of the absence of control. They do not respect us because of the absence of the strong hand. And although we are trying to appear as though we are in control, we are not. We carry out a deportation, then shut down a newspaper, and all this is done in a careless, bureaucratic way. This is a state of war, not a regular war, but war all the same, and with our current practices, we will be conducting it for another 50 years.

I think Rabin has failed. I think it would have been proper for him to resign, or at least to set up a team to handle the problem. There are people besides Rabin who know how to deal with terror. Ari'el Sharon was right when he said that the command team needed to sit down every day and to do what needs to be done. That is morally appropriate for both the Arabs and the Jews—the Arabs also deserve quiet—and the world would have understood that. Rabin did not understand the essence of the matter and therefore failed. The right thing is for him to resign or at least say that, in this way, he alone cannot deal with it. Sometimes, a man must admit that he cannot do something by himself. In business and commerce as well, a man feels that he is not able to manage alone. There are many veterans of this type of field of operations, and if they had been added to the team, they would have jointly decided how to take the necessary actions. Both Peres and Rabin have said that since the territories are in our hands, we are obliged to restore order completely. That is what they said, but they are not doing that. The result of all these failures is that many people are coming to think that transfer is the solution. I have already told Sharon and especially Arens

that if they act with a strong hand, Kahana will get his wish. The inclination for transfer is a result of the absence of control.

[HADASHOT] Earlier, you surprised me when you said that the right wing parties would give away Judea and Samaria. I would have expected you to say this of the left. Do you suspect that, after the elections Likud will pursue a political process?

[Levinger] That may be.

[HADASHOT] Won't you be specific?

[Levinger] Likud today says it will regain the settlement momentum that existed before 1984. I hope that this will occur. That would be fitting. But it has not been sufficiently energetic the last 4 years, and could have achieved much more; so I am not 100 percent sure that it will go all right this time. (With a sigh.) I hope that it will be alright.

[Box, p9]

#### Premessianic Tribulations

According to the Kabbalah, a time called "premessianic tribulations" will precede the messiah the son of David. The messiah the son of Joseph will redeem the nation of Israel in the "war of Gog against Magog," and will be killed in the war. Then the messiah the son of David will appear, and will finally redeem the nation of Israel, and that will also be the redemption of the world.

The sages of Israel understood the great danger of giving a concrete interpretation to this belief, but the Kabbalists nonetheless engaged in "reckoning the end," and messianic ferment has almost never been absent from the people of Israel despite all the disappointments of false messiahs. Many attribute a fundamental messianic attitude to Gush Emunim, and many of the settler publications clearly are characterized by the use of messianic expression.

Rabbi Levinger distinguishes between the messiah the son of Joseph and the messiah the son of David. The messiah the son of Joseph is a symbol of physical, earthly Zionism; the redemption stage tied to establishing settlements, conquest of the land, founding a state and an army. The messiah the son of David is a symbol of the spiritual message of the Jews returning to their land. The messiah the son of Joseph is destined to die, that is, the role of physical Zionism is about to come to an end. The meaning of the appearance of the messiah the son of David is the revelation of the spiritual message of the people of Israel in the entire land of Israel.

**IDF General Analyzes Arab Surface-to-Surface Missile Threat**

44230002 Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew  
31 Aug 88 pp 12-13

[Interview with Brigadier General, retired, Aharon Levran by Dor'am Gonat; date and place not given]

[Text] [BAMAHAHE] Brigadier General, retired, Aharon Levran, what is Israel's situation from the point of view of the surface-to-surface missile threat from Arab countries?

[Levran] The real threat began in the seventies when Syria armed itself with SS-21 missiles and with the development of chemical warheads for the SCUD missiles in its possession, but the Egyptians and the Syrians have only had surface-to-surface missiles since the mid-eighties. Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Saudi Arabia also have surface-to-surface missiles with ranges permitting direct hits inside Israel, but most of the missiles, generally SCUDs, are not very accurate and their expected deviation from the target is about 1,000 meters, which makes them ineffective for use against military objectives. The SS-21 missiles in Syria's hands are the only ones in the region usable against military targets because of their precision; they can be expected to land within 50-100 meters of the target. The range of the SS-21 is only about 100 kilometers and covers only the north of Israel, but Syria's ambition—so far thwarted by the Soviets—is to acquire accurate missiles with ranges sufficient to reach the center as well as the north of the country.

[BAMAHAHE] In that case, what is the point of acquiring inaccurate missiles?

[Levran] The objective is to acquire accurate missiles. Military targets can be threatened only by accurate missiles. Surface-to-surface missiles have brought about a dramatic turning point in the region. For the first time, we foresee a situation in which the Israeli rear is not entirely immune from attack, and the Arabs, who are aware that Israel's soft underside is its fear of strikes against its rear, find themselves for the first time in a position to present a genuine threat to the civilian population. This means that they will hesitate to use this power, for they know that Israel will not stand silent in the face of such an action and will retaliate against the aggressor with much more force than the aggressor can bring to bear against her.

[BAMAHAHE] What damage can a surface-to-surface missile cause? What would happen if such a missile were to land in a civilian population center?

[Levran] The damage that results depends on the type of missile and the weight of the warhead it carries. A warhead weighing 1 ton can create a giant crater 20 meters across, destroy buildings within a radius of dozens of meters, and also cause injuries by shrapnel and

broken glass. This damage is no different from that caused by a 1 ton bomb dropped from a plane, and a warplane can carry tons of bombs. To equal the weight of armament that 4 warplanes can carry, it would be necessary to launch about 20 surface-to-surface missiles, and when you take into account the fact that the Soviets have supplied surface-to-surface missiles with a stock of 3 or 5 missiles per launcher, you cannot view the surface-to-surface missile as any competition for explosives delivered by air. For the Arabs, the advantage of surface-to-surface missiles is that their air forces so far have not been able to penetrate Israel's air defenses, while surface-to-surface missiles are an easy means for getting through and striking targets in Israel.

[BAMAHAHE] In your opinion, what are the chances that the Arabs will have to use surface-to-surface missiles against Israel?

[Levran] The use of surface-to-surface missiles in wartime against military targets is almost certain. There has already been a precedent for this in the Yom Kippur War, but the missiles then were not accurate and struck civilian targets. There is no reason surface-to-surface missiles would not be used in time of war; the Arabs are also able to use missiles for a pre-emptive strike in an attempt to paralyze military installations to gain supremacy at the start of a war. The difficulty for them will be that the vital military installations apparently will be protected and immune to conventional warheads, and they will also have to take into account Israel's great power to inflict punishment. The Arabs will not use chemical warheads, because that would shift the fighting into categories completely different from what has become accepted. In my opinion, use of a chemical warhead is possible only as a final desperate step on the verge of military annihilation.

The introduction of surface-to-surface missiles in the region may serve as a catalyst to ignite a war from a spark caused by a provocation while the two sides are displaying extra caution; the Syrians are reducing their attacks on Israel and Israel is moderating its own actions. Since the night of the gliders, for example, an action that in the past would have been worth a massive retaliation, Israel has moderated its actions. In the situation created in 1986 when a bomb was discovered on a woman about to board an El-Al plane, it was possible, had this [sabotage] not been prevented, that Israel would have taken a grave step that possibly could draw the Syrians to fire a surface-to-surface missile, after which war might even have followed.

[BAMAHAHE] How is it possible to meet the threat of surface-to-surface missiles?

[Levran] It is not possible today to stop a surface-to-surface missile. From the moment it is launched, nothing can be done against it; but Israel, in a joint effort with the United States, is working on the Star Wars project which, through sophisticated techniques, will enable

in-flight interception of missiles. Bombing the launchers with a dare-devil raid, like bombing the [Iraqi] reactor, is not an effective action because there are so many targets; and even if it were possible to destroy them, new launchers can be acquired in a short time.

**Naval Chief Discusses Maritime Operations,  
Submarine Project**

44230003 Tel Aviv BAMAHA NE in Hebrew  
24 Aug 88 p 3

[Interview with Commander of the Israeli Navy Admiral Avraham Ben-Shoshan by Sarit Rosenblum; date and place not given]

[Text] [BAMAHA NE] In recent months, the maritime theater has been quiet. Is that an accident, or can we note a marked tendency within the terrorist organizations to abandon for some time this zone in which they have not been very successful?

[Ben-Shoshan] In my opinion, when you examine terrorist activity, you must study processes and not whether at a given moment in a period of 6 months or a year there have or have not been terrorist attacks. First of all, there were attempted raids this year. Some were foiled and some we prevented from starting through pre-emptive measures. In 1987, the level of terrorist activity at sea was, in general, lower than in previous years, although the attempted operations were much broader in range. All the terrorist organizations are making efforts to under take seaborne hostile terrorist activities and investing heavily in obtaining various means to improve their capabilities, and so it is necessary to examine the activities not only on the basis of what you see in the field, but according to developmental trends. From that standpoint, we always need to be one step ahead of them, to see what they are buying, what they are developing, and what are the expected directions of their activities, in order to be ready in time.

Our activity, speaking generally, is continuous security activity and actions against drug smuggling, some of which serves as a conduit for hostile terrorist penetration. Last year, we enjoyed great success, primarily off the Gaza strip, in intercepting drug smuggling. Sometimes, the boats manage to throw the drugs overboard before we get to them. Then, despite tests and evidence, we cannot bring legal action against them. We are doing our best to block this route.

[BAMAHA NE] Is capturing drug smugglers a task done for its own sake?

[Ben-Shoshan] We see in drug smuggling a means that, in the end, will bring gun running; therefore, we cannot permit this route to exist. In some cases, the smugglers understand that it is worth it to them to be caught and, perhaps, sit in prison and not attacked; in other cases, in which the ship refuses to reply to instructions or acts in a suspicious manner, the attempt at smuggling may end

with casualties. This week, a ship running with all its lights out attempted to evade a "Dabur" crew that had discovered it. When the "Dabur" fired, one of the men aboard the ship was killed. Investigation revealed more than 2 tons of hashish on board, and that was after the smugglers threw some of the drugs into the sea.

[BAMAHA NE] Some months ago, there was a lot of talk about the equipment buildup of the Navy. Where do the negotiations on the buildup stand today?

[Ben-Shoshan] The equipment programs are not simple and require negotiations between three countries—Germany, the United States, and Israel. When you reach the point of executing these plans and turning them into reality, every company and every shipyard tries to get the most out of the contract. We are now at the negotiation stage that, in the end, will bring the plan to fruition through someone who will have the patience and coolness to conduct the negotiations. The Germans have said that we changed the nature of the work and the specifications, and that, as a result, the project will cost more, but we have proven by means of an item-by-item examination of every specification that we did not change a single thing and that all their demands for more money are baseless. All the negotiations are supposed to conclude by the end of the year.

[BAMAHA NE] The package deal contemplates that one submarine will be built in Israel and one in Germany. Are the considerations behind construction of a submarine in Israel entirely professional, or are there other considerations as well?

[Ben-Shoshan] The considerations are economic-professional. Our interest is in receiving the best submarine for the money. Of course, I cannot work against the interests of the state of Israel, but the question of how many to build at what price is central in the weighing that will determine where the two submarines will be built.

[BAMAHA NE] How much are we talking about?

[Ben-Shoshan] The project amounts to 1.212 billion dollars, half for buying missile boats and half for submarines.

[BAMAHA NE] In October, you are launching the Devora, the new continuous security ship of the Navy. What makes it special, in what way is it preferable to the Dabur?

[Ben-Shoshan] The Devora answers the operational need for a ship of much greater speed for pursuit of terrorist ships. Terrorists today are operating fast boats, and we are entering a period of even faster craft. A second aspect is our ability to cover wider areas. As a result of those two requirements, we acquired the Devora, which was adapted to get under way at much higher speeds than the

Dabur, and which has a number of more advanced systems. Nonetheless, for manpower purposes and simplicity of use, we have seen to it that the Devora will be simple like the Dabur.

[BAMAHANE] Is the end of the Iran-Iraq war destined to have an affect also on our naval theater, and what are the lessons learned from the war?

[Ben-Shoshan] In the Iran-Iraq war, we saw how serious the problem of mines is. We saw a great world power find it difficult to deal with that problem. The second threat that we saw clearly is the use of sea-to-land missiles. We saw the significance of the problem of making identifications at sea and how errors in identification can lead to a mutual strike both from seacraft and from aircraft. We saw the extent of resources needed for defense against a threat presented from the sea.

From the West, the Iraqis bought and are buying ships that will arrive in the arena sooner or later. In the broadest terms, these highly technological weapons have an affect on the strategic balance between us and the Arab states. In our conception, we are on the offensive in an effort to prevent mine laying on the coasts and to prepare hard-hitting countermeasures. From an operational point of view, the problem is not simple and the solutions to it are not easy. But he who prepares himself well is able in time of war to deliver the proper reply.

## JORDAN

**Columnist Proposes Debt Reduction Measures**  
*JN20N084188 Amman JORDAN TIMES in English*  
20 Nov 88 p 4

["Sunday's Economic Pulse" column by Dr Fahd Fanik:  
"Reduce Debt Servicing"]

[Text] According to official statistics, Jordan's external debt stands at \$3.5 billion. Adding military, private sector and other debts puts the figure in the neighbourhood of \$5 to 6 billion. This is not a huge figure in comparison with debts of other developing countries, but it is not a light burden in relation to the small Jordanian economy.

The capital account in the balance of payments indicates that debt service during the last three years averaged JD [Jordanian Dinars] 213 million or \$650 million a year. This is quite a large amount because it swallows 16.5 percent of the gross receipts in foreign currencies from all current sources, including exports of goods and services, expatriates' remittances, and Arab aid. It is also equivalent to 11.5 percent of the gross national product (GNP), or 14.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).

The volume of Jordan's external public debt, like the debt of all developing countries, is growing even without new withdrawals from loans, because of the rise in the exchange rate of foreign currencies which results in an increase in the burden of debt service measured in local currency.

The government has a declared policy towards external public debt. The policy stipulates no withdrawal of new loans in excess of repayments of old loans. Such policy, if adhered to, would halt the growth of external debts, and reduce the outstanding debts. The government has also announced that it would continue to service the debts and pay all commitments on time. Such policy, if adhered to, will maintain the credit worthiness of the country in international markets.

Other additional points are in order. Shifting towards internal borrowing is no solution. Domestic borrowing has almost the same effect. The banking system could not acquire more governmental assets except at the expense of liquidating foreign assets. The deficit in the budget, under relative stability in money supply, must be translated into a balance of payments deficit. There is no cure for the deficit in the current account without the budget deficit being under control.

On the other hand the picture should be completed by including all other external debts. There is no reason to shy away from stating the military debts incurred to arm our forces, which must be an Arab responsibility. Private sector loans are also part of the external debt, even when they are not guaranteed by the government. Only short term credit can be excluded because it is automatically renewable under normal circumstances. It should be pointed out that a major part of the public external debt is due to Arab governments. The outstanding balance in favour of Kuwait is JD 72 million, Saudi Arabia JD 64 million, Abu Dhabi JD 27.5 million, Iraq JD 20 million, Libya JD 1.5 million.

All these countries are in debt to Jordan according to their Baghdad summit financial commitments. All, except Saudi Arabia, are late in transferring huge amounts to Jordan. Their excuse is lack of liquidity and the unavailability of funds. Therefore, the Ministry of Finance may want to contact the governments concerned to write off these debts against part of their late payments.

Such a step, if taken by mutual agreement, will reduce Jordan's external debt substantially, and improve the image of the Jordanian economy. It will reduce the burden of external debt service and keep it within the Kingdom's ability.

It is in the interest of the Arab oil producing countries to keep Jordan strong, because Jordan protects their northern flank and operates as a buffer zone between them and the Zionist war machine. The strength of Jordan is a security asset for their countries.

## KUWAIT

### AL-WATAN Reports Unemployment Among University Graduates, Government Denial

44000128 [Editorial Report] On 29 October 1988 the Kuwait Arabic-language daily AL-WATAN published two articles on Kuwaiti university graduates' complaints about their unemployed status, and on 30 October 1988 followed up with a government rebuttal of these complaints. The 29 October article, published on page 6 and entitled "Graduates Without Work," was based on a newspaper initiated interview of unemployed Kuwaiti university graduates. It reported that the general consensus of the unemployed graduates interviewed was: that unemployment among university graduates is a problem in Kuwait, particularly among liberal arts majors; that connections are necessary in order to find a job; that the government should work more closely with the university in planning and channeling students into those areas where job opportunities exist; that the university should close those departments whose specialties offer little employment potential; that foreign workers are occupying too many positions in Kuwait; and that the government is not doing enough to "Kuwaitize" the job sector. A separate editorial published the same day on page 12 and entitled "The Kuwaiti Graduates: Employment and Specialization," also deplored unemployment among Kuwaiti graduates and cited lack of coordination between the government and the university as the major reason for this problem.

On 30 October AL-WATAN published a front-page headline article entitled "We Cannot Dispense with Foreign Workers and Jobs for Kuwaitis are Plentiful." The article quoted a representative of the Office of Personnel, 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Zabn, as denying that unemployment is a problem for Kuwaiti graduates with the possible exception of history and geography majors, and stating that Kuwait cannot dispense with foreign workers. He notes that the government has made large expenditures to help locate employment for Kuwaiti graduates, and states that a law will not be passed requiring the private sector to hire Kuwaitis. Al-Zabn adds that the Civil Service Commission has appointed a committee tasked with studying the matter, which is headed by the Ministry of Education, and includes representatives from the university, the Ministries of Planning and Education, the Office of Personnel, and the Authority of Applied Education. He also revealed the establishment of another special committee by the Civil Service Commission consisting of officials from the Ministry of Planning, the Office of Personnel's training committee, and others from the university and the Authority of Applied Education, to produce a study of manpower on the national level based on the development plans.

## LEBANON

### Lebanese Writers Discuss Syrian Involvement in Lebanon

44040123 [Editorial Report] The 14-20 November 1988 issue of the Beirut Arabic-language weekly AL-NAHAR

AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI contains a variety of articles that describe, analyze, speculate on, or express personal opinions of Syria's current involvement in Lebanon.

The first article, written by Nabil Braks and published on pages 11-12, discusses the appointment by Prime Minister Salim al-Huss of Brigadier General Sami al-Khatib to head the Lebanese Army, referring to the appointment as "one step in the Syrian plan." The writer suggests that al-Khatib's appointment, which was announced in Damascus prior to its announcement in Beirut, is a move toward the partition of Lebanon. He points out that the typically Syrian policy of "divide and rule" has been successful in the past, and cites as proof the Ba'th party split (between Syria and Iraq), the factionalization of Amal into two camps under the leadership of Nabih Birri on the one hand and Husayn Musawi on the other, and the split in the Progressive Socialist Party between followers of Walid Junblatt and followers of Muhsin Dalul and Riyad Ra'd.

The writer believes that Syria will do the following:

1. Insist on imposing the American-Syrian agreement to nominate Mikha'il al-Dahir for the presidency.
2. Consolidate military units in West Beirut under the command of al-Khatib.
3. Unify the militias in West Beirut and force them to integrate into the army under al-Khatib.
4. Withdraw the Syrian Army from Beirut, redeploy it in other strategic locations, and support al-Khatib's army when necessary.
5. Expand the domain of al-Khatib's army in Sidon and in the South to facilitate Syrian Army intervention in case of confrontation with the Palestinians.
6. Start an intensified propaganda campaign by the Ministry of Information in Beirut to improve al-Khatib's image.

In order to counter these Syrian moves the writer suggests that Prime Minister Michel 'Awn do the following:

1. Force recognition of the legality of his government in East Beirut by not recognizing any action taken by the al-Huss government in West Beirut.
2. Immediately appoint persons to vacant positions to affirm the authority of his government.
3. Consult and share decisionmaking responsibility with other factions in East Beirut in order to avoid dissatisfaction.

4. Move from a defensive posture to an offensive one by exposing Syria's intentions, and "explain facts in a timely manner and with absolute frankness."

5. Be circumspect in following the letter of the law to ensure smooth management of daily life in East Beirut and to prevent charges of illegality and domestic problems.

The second article, written by Johny Munayyir and published on pages 14-15, reports that Syria is carefully preparing itself for a confrontation in Lebanon. The writer claims that one Syrian tactic is to raise the level of tension between East and West Beirut, while at the same time preparing for military attacks on the South. He reports that at one point Syria tried to pressure Lebanon's Central Bank into not sending money to the government of East Beirut, but that this was rejected by the government in West Beirut since the supply of water and electricity is controlled in the East and the Lebanese people would have been the victims of such action. The writer further claims that Syria would like to direct a strike against the Palestinians and fundamentalist Muslims and bring Lebanon into subjugation by partition. He states that the al-Asad-Murphy agreement includes "striking the Palestinian camps in Sidon and in the South," and "expelling the fundamentalist Islamic organizations from the region." According to the writer, the agreement was leaked to the Lebanese press by Moscow with the intention of preventing Syria from destroying the PLO.

A third article, published anonymously on page 18, alleges that Syria is manipulating Druze leader Walid Junblatt for the purpose of incapacitating the Sunni leadership in Beirut, al-Liqa' al-Islami. The article claims that Junblatt, at Syria's behest, made an oral attack against al-Liqa' al-Islami, charging it with collusion with the Iraqi regime, dealing with the Maronites, and supporting Yasir 'Arafat's "deviation" from true Palestinian goals; and that Junblatt allegedly threatened its members with assassination. The article maintains that while Syria enjoys this use of Junblatt against the Sunnis who backed Lebanon's sovereignty 45 years ago, it still accuses him of cooperating with Israel and executing Israeli plans in Lebanon.

## OMAN

### Consultative Council To Issue New Directives 44040069 Muscat AL-WATAN in Arabic 1 Oct 88 p 3

[Report on the State Consultative Council including an interview with Council President Shaykh 'Abdullah ibn 'Ali al-Qutabi by Mu'min Khalifah, in Muscat—date not given]

[Excerpt] The words His Exalted Majesty Sultan Qabus ibn Sa'id—may God keep him—uttered in his sublime address on occasion of inauguration of the State Consultative Council on 3 November 1981 are a bright torch leading the Council's steps to achieve the objectives for which it was created.

The sublime objective of his exalted majesty's creation of the Council was to continue the policy of seeking to offer citizens the broadest opportunity to participate in efforts made by the wise government to implement its economic and social plans and to consolidate and highlight the capabilities and efforts of the various Omani citizens.

In his lofty opening address, his majesty defined the general framework of the State Consultative Council's work, saying: "While entrusting your Council with the task of expressing opinion and offering advice on the country's general economic and social policy, we want the Council to be the framework for a joint effort by the government and private sectors and want it to study the objectives and dimensions of our development plans, of the priorities given the plans' projects, of the obstacles the implementation of these plans may encounter, and of the proper solutions for such obstacles."

The State Consultative Council was created by the sultan's sublime decrees Nos 84, 85, and 86/81. In these decrees, his majesty underlined his sublime wish to give the citizens the broadest opportunity to take part in the government's efforts to implement its development plans and to allow this participation to take a form that highlights the citizens' efforts and capabilities, contributing to crystallizing the hopes and aspirations of the various development activities being witnessed by the country.

Throughout the Council's existence, these sublime decrees have been followed by other decrees aimed at bolstering the Council's work and focusing its objectives.

In the light of these objectives, the State Consultative Council was created as a legal-status entity enjoying financial and administrative independence from other state agencies. The Council members were appointed on the basis of allowing the Council to consist of a mixture of expertise from the government and private sectors. The Council had 17 members representing the government sector and 28 members representing the national sector, including 11 representing the private sector and 17 representing the sultanate's various provinces.

At the outset of the Council's second term, a sublime decree provided for increasing government representation in the Council to 19 members and provincial representation to 25 members, thus raising the total number to 55 members instead of the 45 members previously forming the Council.

The government sector in the Council consists of two groups: First, the undersecretaries of the Ministries of Interior, Education, Youth, Health, Housing, Social Affairs, Labor, Commerce, Industry, Communications, Agriculture and Fish Resources, Electricity and Water, and Post, Telegraph and Telephone.

The second group representing the government sector is the group of government officials appointed in their personal capacity on the basis of their experience and expertise in areas with which the Council is concerned.

#### **Commendable Practice**

The State Consultative Council's Executive Bureau is the center of the activity of the Council and of its agencies. This bureau drafts the agenda for the sessions of the Council and of its committees. The bureau assists the committees, drafts the rules to regulate their work, coordinates between the various committees, refers to the committees the issues they need to study and examine, and receives from them the outcome of their studies as well as their recommendations.

On the basis of experience, the Executive Bureau has established a commendable practice that further stresses the cooperation existing between the Council and the government. The bureau invites some of their excellencies the ministers to joint sessions in which the Council and a committee study an issue within the jurisdiction of the invited minister. The conferees listen to the statements the minister makes and to the clarifications he offers in response to queries made by the conferees. This practice helps to greatly clarify the dimensions of the issue discussed and to eliminate the ambiguity engulfing some of its aspects.

The Executive Bureau is formed of the Council president as chairman; one of the Council's two vice presidents, selected by the president; two members from the government sector; and three members from the national sector. The Council elects these five members with a majority of the members attending the first meeting of the Council session.

#### **Permanent and Temporary Committees**

The sublime decrees governing the Council guarantee it the right to form permanent or temporary committees from among its members. These committees study the issues the Executive Bureau refers to them. Four permanent committees have been formed, namely: The Economic Committee, the Legal Committee, the Services Committee, and the Utilities Committee. In defining these committees' tasks, the Council made sure to empower the committees to discuss the issues that fall within the Council's jurisdiction.

The committees operate in the light of a program and timetable drafted by the Executive Council. In conducting their studies, the committees are guided by the broad lines established by the Executive Bureau in the message assigning a committee to study a certain issue. These committee sessions are not public and are attended only by committee members and by those enlisted by a

committee. The committee meetings have a quorum only if attended by no less than two-thirds of the members and their resolutions are adopted by a majority of the members attending.

In September 1984, the Executive Bureau issued a directive providing for formation of the permanent and temporary committees, taking into account the importance of giving members not previously involved in these committees' activities the opportunity to participate in such activities.

This directive is tantamount to reinvigorating these committees and to expanding the base of active participation by all the members.

#### **Numerous Recommendations**

Since its creation, the State Consultative Council has made numerous recommendations that contribute to serving the country's development plans. They include, for example, recommendations on health, land, and highway affairs; settlement of commercial disputes; marketing agricultural products; housing renovation and improvement; population studies; development of agricultural and livestock resources; social security; bolstering the media's role in and influence on economic and social development; strengthening the means to encourage fishermen and their children to continue their vocation; encouraging national investments; marketing citrus fruits; enhancing the conditions of university graduates, the education sector, and of the postal and telephone services; providing essential services to the remote provinces; evaluating municipal services beyond the Muscat area; and the means to strengthen and enhance the livestock, agricultural, and fish resources as well as other recommendations which have clearly contributed to the sultanate's comprehensive development procession which is being staged under the canopy of the prosperous era of His Exalted Majesty Sultan Qabus ibn Sa'id.

#### **Three Important Recommendations**

On the occasion of the start of the Council's third session (in the fourth quarter of 1988), this interview was conducted with His Excellency Shaykh 'Abdullah ibn 'Ali al-Qutabi.

His excellency has said: "In this session, the Council has three important recommendations to discuss, approve, and then refer to his exalted majesty, the sultan.

His excellency has pointed out that the Council will discuss the social insurance bill concerning private sector workers. This bill was prepared by the Council's Legal Committee.

His excellency further said: "This bill has been carried over from the previous session, held last May, to give the Council the chance to draft it carefully and so that it may ultimately come out reflecting the objectives for which it has been drafted.

His excellency added: "The presence of a social insurance law for the private sector will encourage citizens to turn to this sector [for employment] and will consequently contribute to the steps taken to Omanize jobs in this sector.

His Excellency Shaykh 'Abdullah ibn 'Ali al-Qutabi, the State Consultative Council president, further added: The Council will make a recommendation on the sultanate's technological education and education policies. This recommendation has been presented by the Education Committee. His excellency noted the importance of technical education in the sultanate and pointed out the development program's need for this type of education.

His excellency said: The sultanate needs citizens with technical expertise to curtail foreign labor and to successfully implement the replacement policies concerning technical jobs in the country's various sectors.

Regarding the third recommendation which the Council will discuss and which concerns Omanization in the government and private sectors, His Excellency Shaykh 'Abdullah ibn 'Ali al-Qutabi said: This recommendation has been drafted by the Council's temporary committee and it will have a positive impact within the framework of the steps taken by the wise government to Omanize state jobs.

His Excellency Shaykh 'Abdallah ibn 'Ali al-Qutabi stressed that the studies of the three aforementioned committees have been discussed and reviewed by the Council's Executive Bureau in the presence of the committees' chairmen and that the recommendations to be presented to the Council's session for a general debate have been drafted.

#### **Omanization Symposium in December**

[Question] What preparations is the Council making to hold the Omanization symposium which is scheduled to be convened next December?

[Answer] The State Consultative Council has been honored with a directive from his majesty the exalted sultan—may God keep him—instructing the Council to organize a national symposium in which all government authorities; the public sector; and the country's trade, industry, agriculture, fishing and public service sectors will participate to discuss and examine what the government has accomplished compared to what the private sector has accomplished in the area of Omanizing jobs and filling them with national manpower. The symposium is then to ponder and examine the obstacles, if they exist, and to formulate the proper solutions to facilitate

the policy of Omanizing jobs and filling them with qualified national capabilities and cadres in implementation of the Omanization policy declared by His Exalted Majesty Sultan Qabus ibn Sa'id—may God keep him. The labor market needs must be filled with Omanis and enlistment of foreign labor must be confined to the limits of the essential and only to cases where the needed labor is unavailable locally.

#### **Considerable Stride**

[Question] What is your excellency's view of the State Consultative Council's performance since this Council was founded up to the present?

[Answer] The State Consultative Council has made considerable strides since it was created at the beginning of 1981. The Council has explored numerous important issues in the economic and social areas, has conducted studies and research on these issues, and has come up with purposeful and constructive recommendations generally aimed at enhancing the country's development. The Council has assisted the government with opinion and advice on implementing the development plans and on establishing priorities for the vital projects on which the comprehensive development policy, led most wisely and capably by his majesty the redeemed sultan, is founded. [passage omitted]

#### **Growth in Horizontal Expansion Farm Land Planned**

*44040100 Doha AL-'URUBA in Arabic 20 Oct 88 p 10*

[Text] An Omani official stated that cultivated areas in the sultanate increased during recent years from 41,000 hectares to approximately 54,009 hectares, equaling 33.9 percent as a result of the efforts exerted by the ministry to support and encourage farmers.

Undersecretary of Agriculture and Fisheries Ibrahim Ibn Hamad Ibn Salman al-Harithi said that the ministry's strategy of horizontal expansion for farm lands includes increasing production units through land reform and farming new areas, and that there is a program to expand wheat farming aimed at increasing the farm area and increasing wheat production. He indicated that during the current farming season 1,000 acres had already been planted.

He indicated that the ministry is currently conducting economic and technical feasibility studies to set up model farms in various parts of the sultanate and that water and soil resources are currently being surveyed to determine the most suitable modern irrigation system and basic structure for establishing the farms and to determine their most productive design.

## QATAR

### **Arabsat Board Of Directors To Meet** *Muscat UMAN in Arabic 8 Nov 88 p 12*

[Text] The Board of Directors of the Arab Space Agency will convene its 48th session in Doha next Sunday.

The general director's report on activities of the agency and its financial situation together with the draft of the project's estimated budget for the next year will be discussed by the council during its meeting which will last one week.

The opinions of the executive apparatus on requirements to support operations, to study the extension of the first generation satellite's life, sample agreements with parties utilizing the Arabsat system, and the study of the measures pertaining to the launching of the third Arab satellite will be discussed. Likewise, some matters pertaining to other technical and administrative affairs will be discussed.

Delegations representing nine Arab states members of board of the directors will participate in this meeting.

## SAUDI ARABIA

### **1988 Statistics Show Increase in Trade Surplus** *44040097 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic* *22 Oct 88 p 28*

[Text] The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's balance of trade realized a surplus worth 2.6 billion riyals in the first quarter of 1988 in comparison to a surplus of 1.2 billion riyals in the first quarter of 1987. The Kingdom's national exports reached 22.2 billion riyals while its imports reached 19.6 billion riyals.

The bulletin of foreign trade statistics for the first quarter of 1988, published by the Ministry of Finance and National Economy's Department of Public Statistics, attributed the realization of this large increase in the trade surplus to a 4.5 billion riyal rise in export figures. The 22.2 billion riyal figure for exports in 1988 was a 25.4 percent increase over the figures for the first quarter of 1987 when exports amounted to 17.7 billion riyals.

The bulletin disclosed that exports of petrochemicals and plastics registered a major increase of 75 percent, jumping from 1.2 billion riyals in the first quarter of 1987 to 2.1 billion riyals in the first quarter of 1988. All other exports also registered an increase from 0.4 billion riyals in the first quarter of 1987 to 0.8 billion riyals in the first quarter of 1988.

## SUDAN

### **Commissioner Discusses Obstacles to Southern Aid Efforts**

*45040050a Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic*  
*13 Oct 88 p 3*

[Article by Mahjub Muhammad Salih: "Why Are Aid Activities Interrupted"]

b al-Tahir, the aid and reconstruction commissioner, has sent us the following comment which sheds greater light on the factors that have caused the delivery of aid to southern citizens to falter.

Dr al-Hajj al-Tayyib says:

In its edition of 9 October 1988, the esteemed AL-AYYAM carried a commentary by Mahjub Muhammad Salih entitled: "So What Obstructs the Aid Activities?" In the commentary, Salih wonders about the reasons that have motivated the People's Movement to back down on the agreement concluded between the government and the International Red Cross on the one hand, and the movement and the International Red Cross on the other on allowing this international organization to deliver aid to the civilians who have nothing to do with the war and who, nevertheless, suffer most painfully from its consequences, with some of them starving to death in their own provinces and with others starving on the road while seeking food or security.

To begin, we are eager to stress several facts, the most important of which is that the aid activities, even in the secure areas, have constituted and continue to constitute one of this commission's most complex tasks. The talk about the disintegration of infrastructures in the entire country, especially infrastructures that concern this commission, pales in comparison with the disintegration being experienced by these infrastructures in the South. It suffices to say now that all means of delivering aid to the South have been employed and continue to be employed and that all of them have been subjected and continue to be subjected to armed attacks by the People's Movement. The attacks on the river ferries loaded with aid for the Upper Nile, on the trucks and trains headed for Bahr al-Ghazal and on the aircraft transporting aid to Equatoria are still fresh in the memory. The past few days have seen an incident in which an aid plane was fired upon.

This is not the place to talk about the exorbitant material cost of transporting aid to the South. The scarcity of material resources, the difficulty of getting them from contributors, and the extraordinary efforts made by the aid commission officials, by the armed forces' officers, and by the workers in the various fields of transportation are considered very modest when compared with rescuing thousands of citizens whose only sin is that their misfortune has thrown them into the zone of a meaningless and unjustifiable war.

Second, the Sudanese Government is the party which invited the International Red Cross Committee and agreed with it to provide aid to the innocent victims out of its sense of responsibility for the life of these citizens. For a more effective performance, the government formed a committee comprised of prominent state officials to make the necessary contacts, to provide all the facilities needed by the International Committee team, and to coordinate with all the institutions concerned with this affair.

Third, this committee held talks with the Red Cross. Considering that every operation of this type usually begins with conducting the necessary survey, a survey plan was formulated during the talks and it was approved by the People's Movement. The provinces of Waw, Juba, and Malakal were actually surveyed. The provinces of Yirol, Fashala, and Pibor on the other side were also surveyed.

Fourth, the International Red Cross Committee then proposed, because of the fall season conditions, a slight change in the plan to make it possible to survey Akun Province instead of Fashala. The Sudanese Government Committee approved the proposal. When the survey was completed, the International Committee formulated a working plan to transport the aid. The government approved this plan. To this point, matters were proceeding normally, except that the International Red Cross Committee chairman then asked for more talks to be conducted at a meeting to be held in Geneva with the participation of the three parties concerned.

Naturally, the Sudanese committee chairman rejected this proposal, considering that the Sudanese Government had demonstrated enough goodwill and made numerous initiatives, including the initiative of inviting the International Red Cross Committee and approving its plan. There are no disputed points to be discussed, unless what is required (of the government) is to go to Geneva to renounce what has already been agreed upon. But if the other side is engaged in the policy of arm-twisting, of dictating conditions, and of playing for time, then let the talks be held with this side alone. All that we wish to stress in this context is that the government will not review and will not back down on the policy it has declared in connection with rescuing these victimized citizens, and that it clings to its agreement with the International Red Cross Committee.

We are fully aware that what disrupts the southern aid operations is the method of procrastination and delay which the People's Movement has employed with relish to gain lost time which it believes may gain it a small objective here or a smaller goal there. The movement is trying to mislead world public opinion, whose support it lost in large part when this opinion discovered that one of the weapons employed by the movement is to starve the innocent and to use them as hostages. This is a rejected terroristic method, regardless of its objective. As

punishment fits the crime, the means completely fits the cause. The more treacherous and terroristic the means used to serve a cause, the more the cause loses and becomes ugly.

The outside world, which is now aware how welcome is the aid delivered to the southern cities, fully realizes that the People's Movement strategy is founded largely on using the starvation weapon and on turning citizens into captives of starvation. This realization has been repeatedly reflected in the world press.

Finally, we wish to express to the esteemed AL-AYYAM and to Mahjub Muhammad Salih profound thanks for the objective article which has given us the opportunity to shed some light on some chapters of this human tragedy and to clarify the position of the aid commission which is being subjected to attack even by people holding prominent constitutional positions.

#### **Official Explains Contribution Imposed on Overseas Employees**

*45040047b Khartoum AL-USBU' in Arabic  
18 Oct 88 p 4*

[Interview with 'Umar 'Ali 'Ajib, deputy commissioner of the Tax Bureau, by Amal Ibrahim—date and place not given]

[Text] Muhammad Jawdah Ahmad, a teacher in Yemen [says], "In itself, the contribution strengthens the citizen's tie to the homeland. Compared to what the homeland gives, it amounts to nothing. But we hope that the working class will be taken into consideration."

'Uthman al-Amin says, "I wonder why the contribution assessments of all groups are not reviewed so that they will be appropriate and satisfying to all."

In our exploration of this subject, we met Mr 'Umar 'Ali 'Ajib, deputy commissioner of the Tax Bureau, and raised the questions of overseas Sudanese with him.

[AL-USBU'] Is there a difference between the term "contribution" and the term "taxes"?

['Umar 'Ali 'Ajib] Certainly, there are essential differences between the two terms. The most important of them is that the contribution currently applied is apportioned according to profession at a fixed grade, regardless of the amount of income realized. In spite of income differences within a single profession, the achievement of equivalence within it is greater than the contribution. The sum assessed as a contribution is fixed.

A tax is completely different. It is imposed on income. The amounts or rates go up or down according to income realized. Accordingly, the level of what was imposed was a response to the recommendations of the Deliberative Conference of Sudanese Working Abroad, which was held in Khartoum in July 1985.

[AL-USBU'] Some overseas Sudanese assert that they pay taxes on their income in the countries in which they work and then they are asked to pay the contribution on the same income. What is your comment?

[Umar 'Ali 'Ajib] Yes, if we go back before 1985 and what was in force before the compulsory contribution, we used to allow for such cases and take them into account when we assessed taxes. For example, we used to ask overseas Sudanese workers in countries that imposed taxes on the income of workers in them to bring an income certificate showing how much had been deducted as tax. The object was to compare this amount with the rates in force as a tax obligation to the Sudanese Government. When we made the comparison, if we found that the deduction had been greater than our rates, we issued an exemption, so as to prevent double taxation and the imposition of more than one tax on a single income. If the deduction were less, we assessed payment of the difference.

After the Deliberative Conference of Sudanese Abroad was held in July 1985, as has been mentioned above, the recommendations of the conference were that the tax imposed at that time should be cancelled, and that a national contribution should be introduced. It would be compulsory and would be imposed at rates lower than the previous tax rates on every Sudanese working and living abroad, without considering the subtraction of any tax he had paid in his work place. Thus we find that the law has adhered to the same rates as were proposed in their draft recommendations, despite the negative effects of those rates on general revenues.

[AL-USBU'] Are there exceptions or deferments for paying the contribution?

[Umar 'Ali 'Ajib] If we go back to the Compulsory Contribution Law of 1406 [1985-86], we find that it exempted no individual working outside the Sudan from paying this contribution. As for the second half of the question, we in the Overseas Sudanese Tax Department take account of certain emergency circumstances that occur to our brothers when they spend their vacations in the Sudan. Often these circumstances make it impossible for them to pay the contribution in Khartoum before they leave. In such cases, to make it easier for the overseas Sudanese worker to complete the rest of his arrangements, we defer the payment process for him, but with conditions and guarantees that assure the government what is owed to it.

#### **Union Official Claims Present Law Undermines Civil Service**

*45040050b Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic  
11 Oct 88 p 4*

[Article by 'Awatif Siddiq: "What Is Being Designed for Civil Service and Labor Institutions; Professionals' Federation and Latest Crisis: We Are Against This Method of Driving Workers Away; New Criminal Law Bans Strikes Completely"]

[Text] The civil service is exposed to violent winds these days. It has become evident that, at times, the political

authority intervenes rudely in the civil service's performance. It has also become evident that several actions amounting to codified displacement have taken place and that more such actions might be forthcoming. There are, moreover, the new laws which, if passed, will prohibit strikes and paralyze the trade union movement which is the only weapon held by employees.

Engineer 'Ali Khalifah, secretary general of the Federation of Unions of Professionals and Skilled Workers, has talked to AL-AYYAM on this issue, saying: Articles 26A and 26B empower a minister to pension off a civil servant in the public interest. The federation's Constituent Congress, convened last April, issued a resolution demanding an end to the policy of displacing civil servants under the name of dismissal in the public interest and calling for abolishing Articles 26A and 26B. The resolution stressed that accountability is sound and necessary and stressed that there can be no punishment without rendering account.

These two articles are a sword hanging over the civil service's head and, they have been employed to dismiss economists and managers from the Ministry of Labor, from the National Radio and Television Authority, from the Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Irrigation, and from numerous others. It is evident that there is a tendency toward more such dismissals. The Khartoum commissioner wants, it seems, to rid himself of [some] administrative officers. The same goes for the National Water and Electricity Authority. At the same time, special promotions, or so-called vertical leaps, have been given. Khalifah went on to add: We, as a federation, believe that these two articles harm the civil service. We will organize within the federation and the unions affiliated with it a campaign to end this tendency. We will try to meet with his excellency the prime minister and with the minister of civil service and administrative reform.

#### **On Unions' Demands**

'Ali Khalifah has further said: Several general unions, such as the unions of engineers, economists and managers, graduates of the Technical Institute, technical engineers, skilled medical and engineering workers, and other unions, have submitted demands connected with the deteriorating living conditions and have called for making goods available and for stabilizing the prices of essential goods. These unions negotiated with the government but the negotiations reached a deadend. The unions called for a strike but then cancelled it and suspended their demands in the wake of the national catastrophe for national reasons.

But now that the catastrophe's impact has diminished and the government has begun to turn its attention to carrying out duties beyond the scope of averting catastrophes, the unions will in turn revive their demands and defend these demands until they are achieved.

### On Alternative Laws

The talk then turned to the alternative laws and Khalifah said: The federation has demanded that the September 1983 laws be abolished and replaced by democratic laws that safeguard Sudan's unity, do not discriminate among the citizens, and open the way toward Sudan's development. The bill submitted at present poses a threat to Sudan's unity. Articles 75 and 76 of the 1988 criminal law ban strikes to wrench away the unions' right to strike, something which the May regime was not able to achieve. The new law calls for the death penalty for a striker.

As a federation, we signed the memorandum the Lawyers Union submitted to the official authorities in an endeavor to fight this law and defend democracy. We demand that the opportunity be given for debating other submitted bills, along with the attorney general's bill. After consideration, we have decided to support the National Concord Committee's bill.

We asked Khalifah about the government's charge that those who oppose the law resent democracy and majority rule.

The federation's secretary general responded: This charge is unfair and it misleads citizens. Democracy has not been demonstrated in actuality as evidenced by the fact that the proposed law—a law which reflects a single viewpoint—is the only law that has been submitted to the assembly to the exclusion of all others.

Another example of the lack of democracy is what is happening in the government-owned information media. We find that these media have not given the opposition a single opportunity to present its viewpoint to the Sudanese people. The Lawyers Union asked the minister concerned to provide such an opportunity but he has refused.

### On the Social Contract Issue

On the proposed social contract, the federation secretary said: The prime minister has talked about the social contract issue. This is a clear acknowledgement of the unions' national and political role and of the unionist movement's struggle for independence and in defense of democracy in October 1964 and April 1985. It has been proven that when the unions undertake national causes, they do not align themselves with one party or another but always stand with the supreme interest. If the unions' positions are compatible with any party's positions, this does not mean that the unions are aligned with such a party.

As a federation, we welcome the social contract about which the prime minister has talked. But there are things that must be done to achieve the social contract, namely:

- Hold direct dialogue with the unions to determine the social contract's identity;

- Demonstrate goodwill and open bridges with the unions; refrain from antagonizing, slandering or harassing the unions; abolish the provisions that curtail unionist activity in the industrial and individual relations laws; abolish the 1988 criminal law; and end displacement without trial in the name of public interest.

(Proposals) previously made by the country's political forces and often reiterated by the prime minister should be submitted to debate so that a formula may be developed to represent the modern forces, meaning representation of the unions in the country's political, executive and legislative administration. Without these points, it is futile to talk of the social contract.

### Editor's Note

In its new structure, the Federation of Professionals and Skilled Workers was formed last April. It includes in its membership nearly 20 general unions, of which 16 are general professional unions and 6 are general vocational unions. The other unions that have not convened their congresses yet are: The General Union of University Professors, the General Union of Geologists, the General Union of Administrative Officers, and the General Union of Counselors at the Attorney General's Office.

### Spinning, Weaving Factory Seen as Source of Hard Currency

45040047a Khartoum AL-USBU' in Arabic  
18 Oct 88 p 5

[Article by Salih Mukhtar 'Ajab al-Dur: "Marangan Witnesses Opening of Largest Spinning Factory in Africa and the Middle East, Prime Minister Calls Production Our Way to Real Independence"]

[Text] "Countries are built up by their people" is a true saying that points to an important reality: Development only begins from within. Secondly perhaps, it takes place on an individual basis. As we say this, a towering achievement stands before us. Perhaps if the Sudan's adversities are alleviated for us, we shall boast and take great pride in it in coming days. This achievement is the Al-Huda Spinning Factory. Its operator is Sharaf International, behind which stands Citizen Fath-al-Rahman Bashir. At the opening ceremony, he rose to speak and said, [quoting the poet al-Mutanabbi]: "No horses have you to give, nor money; let words help, if circumstances do not help." When the prime minister's turn to speak came, he said to him, "Nay, horses you have to give, and money, too." Thus he returned the ball to the right court. So charming and novel was the situation that the chairman of Sharaf's managing board had no choice but to go before the crowd to dedicate this achievement.

### The Dialectic of Production and Freedom of Decision

Mr al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, head of the Council of Ministers, spoke on this occasion. In the name of the unity government, he praised the great achievement represented by this national edifice, saying "We congratulate Sharaf on this achievement through which the international climate has been enriched in thought, action, money, and technology. I praise the social climate that prevails in these fields, particularly as regards the position of women. This is the way things ought to be, women being the sisters of men. I commend Sharaf's interest in a sound method of production relations. I say that this course of action suits democracy, and that democracy cannot be sound unless the relations of production are sound. This method, based upon mutual understanding, cooperation, and clarity, deserves praise, appreciation, and encouragement. Whenever we import a single yard of cloth, we feel shame and dishonor, because importation takes place out of subservience. Production is what can save us from this—namely, the inability of the talented to rally together and strike a blow against capitalism. It is the pillar of progress and prosperity in the shadow of the wounds from which we are suffering—wounds of debt and war which have caused an imbalance that has affected our abilities to import inputs. Nevertheless, we must carry on; despite the wounds, we must work with all our abilities to provide a suitable climate, whether in agriculture or in industry. I say that the way out is not through loans or grants, but through self-reliance. If we do not realize production, we shall remain subject to others. Only through our own production will we protect our capacities, make products available, and live an independent life. There is no way other than this."

### Why a Basic Industry?

Mr Fath-al-Rahman Bashir, chairman of the board of Sharaf International Corporation, then spoke. He said: "The spinning and weaving industry is a basic industry not only in the Third World, but also at the level of wealthy countries for the second hurdle in life, after food, is clothing. The question that arises is why we are not powerful and leaders in this field.

"There is an internal market. The international average individual consumption for the Third World is 8 yards a year. In the Sudan it is 12 yards a year. Thus the market here is bigger. And there are hundreds of thousands of workers without work.

"Modern industry began in this field. In the late fifties there were the present weaving factory (formerly the American Weaving Factory) and the Khartoum Spinning and Weaving Factory (Japanese)—modern and large factories. Sharaf came third. The first part of it, the Blue Nile Spinning and Weaving Company, was powerful during the seventies. But for the setback that affected this sector, the industry might have continued forward."

### Obstacles

The director of Sharaf said the following about the problems and obstacles that confront this sector of industry: "Electrical power is one of these problems. We read the following figures about it: In 1978, power to the Blue Nile Company was cut off for 1,850 hours. In 1979, it was cut off for 1,980 hours. In 1980, it was cut off for 1,579 hours. In 1981, it was cut off for 2,240 hours during the year. In 1982, it was cut off for 1,280 hours. In 1983, it was cut off for 1,580 hours. In 1984, for 607 hours; in 1985, for 357 hours; and for 602 hours in 1986. In 1987, electrical power was cut off for 397 hours during the year, and this year it has been cut off for 1,328 hours. In short, in 10 years there were a total of 83,678 hours of outage, the equivalent of 2 years and 13 days, or more than 20 percent on the average over the last decade.

"Another obstacle is the decline of the quality of cotton because of the cotton boll blight. As for prices, taking the kantar as a unit, in 1983-84 [as published] a kantar sold for 84 [Sudanese] pounds. In 1983-84, a kantar sold for 37 pounds; in 1984-85 for 49 pounds; in 1985-86 for 52 pounds; in 1986-87 for 60 pounds; and in 1987-88 we find a kantar selling for 128 pounds. This is for (al-Akala) cotton. For the same years, Barakat cotton sold for 47 pounds, then 73, 93, and 180. This year, 1988, it is selling for 296 pounds.

"Then comes another obstacle: industrial inputs. We were paying 0.50 pounds to the dollar in 1978. We now pay many times more, with the exchange rate now at 20 times that price, taking the dollar as selling for 10 pounds. However, when you pay at the current free price of 10 pounds, the ministry holds you accountable at the official exchange rate of 4 pounds to the dollar.

"All levels of the work force have seen emigration to the Gulf countries, fleeing to realize better conditions and a better life. We at Sharaf have experienced this to a great extent. We have trained more than 100 engineers, no more than 20 of whom are still present."

### Results of Experience

Regarding the experience of moving these obstacles into the arena of challenge and solution, the chairman of the board of directors said, "The experience began in the early seventies with a factory containing 100 looms (weaving machines) and a dyeing factory sufficient for these looms. The dyeing factory could dye 2 million yards a year. Two years later, Blue Nile had 260 looms, and then 700 looms with a production capacity of 30 million yards a year. During 12 years, we jumped in weaving from 100 looms to 960. During the same period, Madani Weaving was established, with 25,000 spindles and 420 weaving machines, producing 15 million yards of spinning and weaving a year. Red Sea Weaving goes back to the same period. It has 25,000 spindles and

produces 2,000 tons. The Blue Nile dyeing factory was also established, with a capability of 40 million yards a year of polyester and blended cotton."

#### Then This Event

Regarding the factory in question which is considered the largest spinning factory in Africa and the Middle East, Mr Fath-al-Rahman spoke, saying "Throughout the past period, based on our abundant experience, we kept investigating the creation of a balance between spinning and weaving. Then came this factory. It rounds out a previous plan to supply 80 million yards. This factory produces 10,000 tons. The factories need 7,000 tons; 3,000 tons a year will be exported. This is beside providing 50 million yards. It produces dammuriyah [a coarse cotton upholstery fabric], sakubis [a fine handkerchief fabric], dabalan [plain white calico], polyester blend, and women's dresses. This factory can be considered a real national achievement and a fruit of international cooperation. Czechoslovakia was in the forefront of this cooperation. The Czechoslovaks graciously accepted the guarantee by Sharaf International Corporation. [The factory] represents the transfer of technological innovations to the Sudan, the export of surplus thread, and the provision of honorable work for more than 3,000 men and women. It contains 7 divisions containing 125,000 spindles, which produce 10,000 tons of thread, and 716 [weaving] machines, which produce 50 million yards a year and 6 million meters of denim. Truly, it is a sector in the Sudan to which one must turn for help. A salutary solution to problems in this domain lies in the creation of abundance, and this lies in the government's interest in studying the problems of the industrial sector which are not difficult by nature. Women represent 52 percent of the personnel of this factory and earn 570,000 pounds a month.

"This factory contains the most modern spinning machines in the world today—machines from Czechoslovakia, West Germany, England, and Switzerland. The weaving department, which forms its cornerstone, contains 1,517 wide and medium automatic machines, producing 50 million meters a year of dark fabrics in addition to 6 million meters of denim. The factory includes a generating plant (under construction) with a capacity of 12 megawatt-hours to act as a reserve during outages. The imported spinning and weaving machines and equipment cost about \$80 million; the buildings and their annexes cost 57 million Sudanese pounds. The work force is Sudanese, with a small number of non-Sudanese: 134 Chinese and 110 Egyptians. Total investment in these factories is 1.250 billion pounds."

#### Will Self-Sufficiency Be Achieved?

Mr Bashir also said, "As we stand in front of this achievement today, certain facts and figures about the spinning and weaving industry are indispensable. For example, a total of about 6,757 looms or spinning machines operate in the Sudan. Sharaf with its four

sections (Blue Nile, Red Sea Weaving and Spinning, Madani Weaving, and finally al-Huda Weaving with the opening of its first spinning phase) represents about 42.11 percent of the approximately 5,897 in Sudan. Total production capability of the spinning and weaving industry in the Sudan is 300 million meters a year, of which Sharaf represents 36 percent (94 million meters). On the basis of these rates, we can say that with this production rate the Sudan is self-sufficient in textiles and thread and does not need to import. Rather, it should export, as is stated in the program for the new al-Huda factory which will export about 3,000 tons of thread after the factories have met their requirement of 7,000 tons a year. Hence the question arises as to how and by what means self-sufficiency is to be realized."

Here is where the state's role may come in as an intermediary to protect local industries—garments, weaving, and spinning—from imported foreign products. If we hold that this is the state's role, how can it be realized? Mr al-Sadiq [al-Mahdi] said the state would help overcome the obstacles that Mr Fath-al-Rahman al-Bashir mentioned. These he summarized as a shortage of free currencies for the importation of such production inputs as dyes, chemicals, equipment, help, and spare parts. Then the matter of electrical outages in the factories must be remedied since the electricity to these factories is repeatedly cut off for long periods. As the chairman of the board mentioned, these periods exceed 30 percent of working hours per year on the average.

To the problems of the spinning industry and the problem of how to reach self-sufficiency and prosperity, Mr Fath-al-Rahman added the unavailability of sufficient petroleum products to produce steam or operate the machines or generators. Furthermore, there is the emigration of workers to the wealthy countries. "With the achievement of a few solutions in this respect, or if a contribution is made to overcoming some of these [problems], we could contribute to turning the wheel of production and development in this vital sector which could flood the market with its products and provide us with hard currency." As Mr al-Sadiq al-Mahdi said in his speech on this occasion, "We find that the country has a very pressing need for us, especially in the time of these wounds."

#### University Seminar Points Out Danger of Adopting Shari'ah Laws

45040047c Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic  
16 Oct 88 p 5

[Article by Shakir 'Uthman: "University of Khartoum Professors Hold Seminar Discussing Law"]

[Text] The Khartoum University Union of Professors held a seminar last Saturday at its headquarters under the title "The 1988 Criminal Law and the Political Future in the Sudan." The seminar fell within the framework of a series of seminars being held in various places to inform citizens about the danger this law poses

to the country's territorial unity, equality among citizens, and general freedoms. A religious state would be entrenched by this law, and numerous party-related forums would be suppressed. The speakers pointed out the danger this law poses to the political future in the Sudan.

The following professors spoke in the seminar: Dr Sadiq 'Abd-al-Baqi, lecturer in the Faculty of Law and member of the Khartoum University Union of Professors; Professor Jiris As'ad, lawyer; Professor Taha Mirghani, lawyer; and Professor Buna Malwal, editor in chief of the newspaper SUDAN TIMES.

The speakers were introduced by Professor Bushra al-Fadil, who spoke about the great and distinguished activist role the union had played in opposing dictatorial laws, the September laws, and the Public Tranquillity Law by which the bloodthirsty Numayri planned to suppress freedoms. We will content ourselves with summarizing what the first speakers said.

The first of the speakers, Dr Sadiq 'Abd-al-Baqi, said that the question of opposition to the so-called Islamic laws should [not] be restricted to jurists alone. Each person should handle it within his field—the economist in his field, the politician in his field, and so forth. Since the law posed a danger to all fields, the question should not be restricted to the context of law and lawyers.

Advocates of this law, he said, were in the habit of reiterating the goal, which, according to their opinion, is to sanction a cultural attitude and return to the nation's heritage. There is no doubt that this call, in the manner in which it is being raised, is remote from reality; for the ideal government for a particular society must take place according to the law derived from the heritage of the country to which its application is desired.

This call and the philosophy upon which it rests closely resemble the political and social philosophy that prevailed before Nazism. Hegel's philosophy is thought to have played a prominent role in the racism and chauvinism that led to Nazi rule in Germany. Because this philosophy, which advocates the rule of a particular community which represents it as derived from the people's tradition, is a means of suppressing the people because it inevitably employs force and deterrence without consideration of the social and economic circumstances that make it necessary for people not to submit to these laws.

The present circumstances of the Sudanese differ from the circumstances of people who lived 14 centuries ago and from what was customary then.

Advocates of this program have not considered the change that has taken place. They have not considered the great difference in time between past and present. This call is defended by forces in this country that base

themselves on the Salafi school of Islamic thought—a school that by its very nature advocates the abandonment of reason and the rule of tradition.

This school of thought originated at the beginning of the decline of the Islamic state in the time of King [i.e., Caliph] al-Mutawakkil. Its first victims were the Mu'tazilites. Since that time, the Salafi school has not developed any ideas argued solely on rational principles; for the school grew up under the protection of the political authority, not on rational support.

We, therefore, find that the countries where *hadd* punishments are imposed are the most dictatorial countries in dealing with political opponents. Opponents are dealt with by coercion, force, and physical liquidations—not by dialogue, thought, and discussion. This Salafi school can therefore be considered a starting point for the establishment of a dictatorship and a religious state. If this school were adopted in a liberal regime, it would inevitably be the ruin of democracy.

Dr Sadiq 'Abd-al-Baqi asked whether the application of a group of *hadd* punishments should be considered a return to the [country's] heritage and cultural attitude.

"The matter involves misleading people, keeping them ignorant, and exploiting their religious feelings. People are being kept ignorant, because political party leaders exploit the fact that the great majority of people do not know the history of the legislation. This is a misfortune, but they see it as a boon."

He continued, saying, "The question of defining a cultural direction is inapplicable and weak. One cannot separate any law found in the book from the cultural, political, economic, and social reality to which it was intended to be applied. The reality enters into the definition of its meaning and benefit. A cultural direction is therefore a problem subservient to reality. No person can regard it in any other context. Daily economic crises and other matters are not isolated from reality; and all of them enter into the cultural direction."

He said the government's preoccupation with this law and its striving to apply it while the country was teeming with thousands of people left homeless by civil war, famines, and deteriorating living conditions was to be considered demagogery.

A cultural direction is defined by the problems of the day, not by a return to several centuries into the past. "We repeat that political decisionmaking that wants to control the definition of a cultural direction is only headed for political suicide. Such decisionmaking cannot change the living cultural direction; indeed, it is only trying to isolate itself from the real cultural direction. The experience of the overthrown regime is lesson enough for us."

### The Opposition's Secularism

In reference to the persistent argument that those in opposition were secularists, Dr Sadiq 'Abd-al-Baqi explained that secularism was a complete school of thought and that all schools of thought that appealed to reality and experience could be called secular.

"Secularism strives to judge reality by rules drawn from reality. It is a complete philosophy and method of thought. During the renaissance in the 16th and 17th centuries," he said, "the church used the word 'secularism' to condemn certain thinkers, whom it described as having abandoned religion, and to intimidate political opponents.

"A large number of philosophers have laid the foundations of secularism: Hume, Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Saint-Simon, and Comte. Secularism is the method upon which all the human sciences throughout the world and all the branches of human knowledge base themselves.

"Democracy is the offspring of the West's secularism. If they do not want this democracy, what is the alternative? The answer will be the establishment of a religious state. Advocates of Islamic legislation have not revealed the true nature of such a state." Dr 'Abd-al-Baqi said, "Proposing a part of Islamic law is doomed to failure. Advocates of Islamic legislation have presented no proposal for an Islamic state, nor have its features yet become clear in the minds of those who want it. The advocates of a religious state have given us no clear idea of the particulars and the proposed programs of the religious state. What I have said applies to every Islamic proposal, whether it has been put forward or not. The current legislation (the criminal law) has teemed with errors in every stage through which it has passed—from the stage of drafting, to the Council of Ministers, to the debate in the Constituent Assembly.

"Because it depends on the striking of political balances, criminal law is positive, human legislation. It is fallible, human understanding. The idea that it is God's law is a misleading of people—the propagandistic reflection of a certain political direction. In the end, [criminal law] is positive law and must be considered in that light."

Dr Sadiq 'Abd-al-Baqi said, "The elements who are most behind this criminal law are the least principled ones on the political scene. They are the very elements known for their shifting positions. They stood for the September 1983 laws, but condemned them when the people condemned them. Now they stand for them again. Perhaps they will stand against them, if people overturn them.

"This criminal law contradicts some of the things its proponents, even within the Islamic Front, say. It is supported only by advocates of guided investment within the Islamic Front."

Dr Sadiq 'Abd-al-Baqi pointed out the serious mistakes that accompanied voting on the criminal law. "The Constituent Assembly does not yet represent a parliament. Elections have not yet been held in 42 districts. Also, the modern forces are not represented in the assembly. Furthermore, all these mistakes took place in the presence of deputies of the unity government parties in the assembly, but they remained silent and did nothing. They are not trustworthy or independent, but follow their party leaders."

"There are broad sectors," he said, "that ought to participate—the Sudanese Army, for example, since it will shoulder the major responsibility as a result of the expected secessions in the wake of this law. It must have an opinion, because it will bear all these results."

At the end of his speech, Dr 'Abd-al-Baqi said, "This law contains individual interpretations on which even the earliest Islamic jurists did not agree. It violates the Constitution and prematurely decides a number of issues. Its presentation and approval will be followed by an unnecessary amendment of the Constitution."

### Jiris As'ad, Lawyer

The second of the speakers was Professor Jiris As'ad, a lawyer. At the beginning of his speech, he dealt with the heroic story of the Sudanese people's struggle to regain their freedom and democracy. "Having discarded one-man rule," he said, "the Sudanese people returned to their authentic nature with the aim of safeguarding their revolution and gains. The transitional Constitution of the Sudan was promulgated in October 1985. In its fifth article, it included the state's duty to work to implant a spirit of national unity and solidarity among all Sudanese. In its sixth article, it included the state's obligation to work to reinforce and strengthen the pillars of democracy. The seventh article specifically stated for the first time that the political system was based on the freedom to form political parties. The 11th article stated that the state was subject to the rule of law, and not above the law. The 20th article specified the right to form unions and associations. Other articles confirmed the rights and freedoms [the Sudanese people] had previously seized through fighting and struggle.

"In some of its sections, including those that fix criminal responsibility, the proposed criminal law gives many crimes religious definitions and fixes punishments for them according to the Koran, Sunnah, and Islamic jurisprudence. The law makes all citizens, regardless of their religion, subject to the specified punishment. In other words, the punishments of Shari'ah law are not limited to Muslims. Section 76 criminalizes every work stoppage in public services. It does so categorically and without making exception for stoppage that is legitimate or supported by legal justification. A legitimate strike by any union, federation, or association thereby becomes a crime punishable by 3 years' imprisonment, fine, or both."

Professor Jiris As'ad dealt with this part in some detail because of its great effect on the future of political activity in the Sudan.

He said, "Everyone admits that federations, unions, and associations played a pioneering role in opposing army rule and in recovering democracy. Making the leaders and members of these unions and federations subject to arrest, trial, and imprisonment, even when they exercise legitimate activity under the law, will tend to weaken the national political activity that these unions and federations exercise. It will have a negative effect on their resoluteness. It will open the door for opportunists, profiteers, and flatterers to jump into leadership positions in them so that these organizations will become a tool in the ruler's hand, unable to deter and oppose him when he is excessive. All this will tend to fragment labor's militant unity and thus greatly harm the future course of politics in the Sudan. This aspect represents one of the dangerous effects of the proposed criminal law of 1988."

Professor Jiris As'ad examined the other effects that would result from embodying a religious doctrine—the Islamic religion—in the proposed criminal law. He said, "Basing the criminal law on the religious doctrine of part of the Sudanese people, even if this part represents a majority, will tend to give the upper hand to religious feeling which, by its very nature, will outweigh national feeling. Affiliation to the homeland will thus take second place to religion. Citizenship, considered as affiliation with the land and its sanctities, will become weak. National feeling will be enfeebled. This will inevitably lead to discrimination between citizens. Among Muslim citizens, it will create a spirit of ascendancy over other citizens who do not embrace Islam. This will be countered by a feeling of inferiority on the part of non-Muslims, since they will have come to be at an inferior or second class position in relation to their Muslim fellow countrymen. This would undermine the rights of equality guaranteed by Article 17 of the Constitution. It would destroy or at the very least weaken national unity and solidarity among the Sudanese; and this would be done at the hands of a government passing laws at a time when Article 5 of the Constitution obliges it to work to strengthen the spirit of national unity and solidarity among all Sudanese and do away with racial prejudice and regional chauvinism. This will have a harmful effect on the future of political activity in the Sudan since, under the pretext of religion, a spirit of breakdown and clannishness will prevail instead of unity and solidarity. As a result, our newborn democracy will be exposed to many dangers."

Professor Jiris As'ad said, "In the application of *hadd* punishments, the proposed criminal law of 1988 has not even observed the fundamental principles of Shari'ah law. It is a recognized fact that the intention of the Islamic Shari'ah in imposing *hadd* punishments is to purify [the criminal] from the crime he has committed. This implies that Islam be a necessary condition in the

person of the criminal, if one is to be able to impose *hadd* punishments on him. Accordingly, the intentions of the Islamic Shari'ah will not be fulfilled or realized if we subject non-Muslims to *hadd* punishments. In fact, the spiritual intentions of Islam will be frustrated when *hadd* punishments are applied to non-Muslims. Consequently, non-Muslims should have been exempted from *hadd* punishments. Also, the application of the religious punishments of a religion to which the criminal does not belong surely involves coercing him and violating the principle of freedom of religion guaranteed in the Constitution. As a result, the hearts of non-Muslim Sudanese will be filled with bitterness and scorn. This will gravely harm the political future in the Sudan."

Having concluded this point, Professor Jiris said, "I ask you not to misunderstand what I have just pointed out. I merely intended to throw light on the 1988 criminal law's effect on labor or on the political future; I did not intend to say that I am one of those who support applying Islamic *hadd* punishments and exempting non-Muslims from them. Such an exemption would violate the principle of equality specified in Article 17 of the Constitution. I have recorded this in a note to the National Reconciliation Committee (the al-Nasri committee), of which I was a member."

Continuing his speech, he said, "I think the framework and meaning of this speech will not be complete without consideration of the question of religion and state or religion and politics: Is Islam a religion and a state? In my humble opinion, Islam is a religion only. It came to bring men out of darkness into light; out of injustice to justice and virtue; out of unbelief to worship, self-denial, mutual responsibility, and mercy; and to build the family upon a spirit of brotherhood and equality. This is the mission of Islam. This is confirmed in a text of unquestionable authenticity and unambiguous meaning in the Holy koran—part of the second verse of the Sura of the Table. The noble Messenger [of God] quoted it in his farewell sermon. It goes, 'Today I have perfected your religion for you, and I have completed My blessing upon you, and I have approved Islam for your religion.' Had God—may He be praised and exalted—wanted Islam to be a religion and state, that would not have been difficult for Him. The basis of the mission of Islam is mercy—not legislation, as was the case in the mission of Moses. One should note that the Holy Koran contains 6,000 verses. Only 80 of these deal with matters of inheritance, marriage, divorce, and personal status in general. One verse deals with the subject of selling and interest: 'God has permitted selling and forbidden usury' [2:275]. A few verses define the crimes subject to *hadd* punishments and the punishments to be imposed for them. Apart from this, the Holy Koran did not legislate about the state, politics, or government affairs. About this, the professor and justice Dr Muhammad Sa'id al-'Ashmawi has said in his book, 'Political Islam: 'God wanted Islam to be a religion; men wanted it to be politics. Religion is general, humane, and comprehensive. Politics are restricted, limited, tribal, and temporary. To restrict

religion to politics is to isolate it in a narrow, specialized zone, a particular community, and specific time. Religion illuminates what is highest and most exalted in man; politics excites what is lowest and most base in him. Practicing politics in the name of religion or dealing with religion with the method of politics turns religion into endless wars, ceaseless factionalism, undying struggles, and an unquenchable furnace—not to mention the fact that it narrows goals to offices, mixes ends and profits, and corrupts consciences with shows.

"From this we deduce that the politicization of religion harms the cause and unity of the nation. In my opinion, the political future of the Sudan depends on not mixing religion and politics.

"Government in the name of religion or based on a religious belief—Islam, in the Sudan—rests on the slogan, "Judgment belongs to God," or "Dominion belongs to God." This was the slogan that the Kharijites raised. The Umayyads and Abbasids snatched it up, and it became part of Islamic thought because it served their purposes, strengthened their authority, and justified human tyranny.

"A mixture of religion and politics or political rule that dons a cloak of religion aims at striking at opponents and liquidating them. Not just those who oppose politically—anyone who expresses his opinion about Islam will be thrown into jail or prison. A sufficient example in the very recent history of the Sudan is the tragic execution of martyr Mahmud Muhammad Taha, who became a victim because he expressed his opinion. He paid with his life because of his opinion, and not because of his opposition to the ruler. He said that what the September laws set forth was not the Islamic Shari'ah. As a result, the ruler ordered that he be declared an unbeliever. The courts of Imam Numayri ruled that he had apostatized from Islam and sentenced him to death. From this we conclude that government in the name of religion or a religious state does not accept the expression of opinion. In this respect, Christian government was the same when the clergy tried the astronomer Galileo for heresy—not because he opposed, but because he had spoken his scientific opinion as a vision of the earth at that time. The clergy must have known at that time what is said in the Old Testament of the Bible. In the book of the prophet Isaiah one reads [40:22] that says, 'God is seated upon the globe of the earth.'"

Addressing the seminar, Jiris said, "You know that Europe reached its present state of advancement and culture only when it freed itself from the domination of the religious state and separated religion from state.

"I venture to say that this 1988 criminal law is a product of mixing politics and religion. It will inevitably lead to undermining all freedoms—freedom of the press, publishing books, etc.—on the grounds that the [government's] opinion is correct and does not err, since it rules in the name of the Divine Holiness and on the basis of

the slogan, 'Dominion belongs to God.' There will be no freedom to form parties, since the only party that will be legitimate and rule will be the ruling party or party of God.

"With its content entrenching religion as a basis of legislation, the proposed criminal law can be considered a first proposal toward embodying a religious state in law. It is therefore a crucial question, one that will decide the political future of the Sudan, because:

"1. It decides the form of government in the Sudan. It ordains that all its provisions will apply to the Northern Region, but exempts the Southern Region from the application of some sections. Thus this proposal has decided, or at least provides a point of entry, for partition of the Sudan into a southern and northern region. That is, the Sudan will become a composite nation instead of being a single, unified country.

"2. With its basing of law on Islamic Shari'ah, the proposal will have embodied the religious state in law—or at least it will lay the first stone for that—and will thus have closed the question of politics and religion.

"3. By dividing the Sudan into a southern, African, non-Muslim region and an Arab, Muslim, northern region in which Islamic Shari'ah is applied, the proposed criminal law can be considered to have settled the question of Sudanese identity.

"In short, this criminal law closes a number of questions which it was agreed were to be raised in the constitutional convention—questions relating to the form of government, religion, state, and politics, and the Sudanese identity. It is not an exclusively criminal law, but was drafted to realize certain ends. This is a dark future. Doubtlessly, the Sudanese people, with their enlightenment, keen sense, and experience of struggle, will rescue their gains. They will not allow their national unity to be torn apart. Long live a free and powerful Sudan! Long live its unity! God protect it from the evil of strife! Religion belongs to God, and the country belongs to all!"

## UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

**Report Provides Dubayy's 1988 Trade Statistics**  
*44040105 Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic*  
31 Oct 88 p 6

[Text] The volume of Dubayy's trade during the first seven months of this year amounted to 3.2 million tons at a value of 16.5 billion dirhams.

The volume of imports alone amounted to 2.58 million tons at a value of 12.6 billion dirhams while the volume of exports and re-exports amounted to 675,000 tons at a value of 3.9 billion dirhams.

Statistics published by the Dubayy government's Bureau of Statistics noted that the volume of re-exports alone amounted to 331,000 tons at a value of 2.98 billion dirhams. The statistics showed that the top import items in terms of value were machinery and transport equipment, the imports of which reached 3.5 billion dirhams. The next biggest import items were manufactured goods, imports of which reached 3.3 billion dirhams. Next in line were various other manufactured products, worth 2.6 billion dirhams, and foodstuffs and livestock, worth 1.4 billion dirhams, which also included vegetable and animal oils and greases, raw materials, lubricating materials, and chemicals and chemical-related items.

### YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

#### France Reportedly Preparing To Sign Weapons Deal

44040104 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic  
22 Oct 88 p 7

[Text] North Yemen and France are preparing to sign an important weapons deal that falls within Sanaa's policy of diversification of its weapons sources. Sanaa is seeking to

buy advanced radar equipment to protect its land. During his last visit to Paris, 'Abd-al-Karim al-Iryani, the Yemeni deputy prime minister and foreign minister, held a long meeting on the subject with Jean Pierre Chevenement, the French defense minister.

#### Agreement Signed for Japanese Agricultural Assistance

44040101 Ta'izz AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic  
31 Oct 88 p 2

[Excerpt] An agreement was signed yesterday at the Ministry of Agriculture and Fish Resources for Japanese aid offered to our country amounting to 500 million Japanese Yen which equals 21.7 million Yemeni riyals. The aid, which is meant to increase food production over the 1987 level, is to be utilized to provide agriculture equipment, insecticides, and fertilizers to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fish Resources.

Dr Nasir al-'Awlaqi, minister of agriculture and fish resources, signed the agreement for our country and an official from the Japanese embassy in Sanaa signed it for Japan. [passage omitted]

## INDIA

### **Gandhi Faces Dilemma in Relations With PRC** *46001093 Madras THE HINDU in English* *29 Sep 88 p 1*

[Text] New Delhi, Sept. 28. The Prime Minister Mr Rajiv Gandhi's statement yesterday that there was no question of giving any land to China during his proposed visit to China and his challenge to the Opposition to put forward concrete suggestions on the China policy of the country was an expression of the dilemma that the Government faces over its efforts to improve its relations with Beijing and settle the vexed border issue that has kept relations between the two Asian giants at a low key. The statement was also the first official confirmation that the Indian Prime Minister would be visiting China in the near future.

The focus of the dilemma is the upcoming visit of Prime Minister to China, the first by an Indian Prime Minister since the border conflict between the two countries in 1962. Mr Gandhi's willingness to accept a longstanding Chinese invitation for a visit was conveyed during last year's eight round of border talks between the two countries held in New Delhi which by all accounts represented a forward movement in Sino-Indian relations given the serious crisis that emerged in 1986-87. There was a basic agreement by both sides not to resort to force and to exercise restraint on the border as well as an acceptance by the Chinese side that the resolution of the border issue was central to better Sino-Indian relations.

Eliciting reactions: Ever since the beginning of this year, the Ministry of External Affairs and the Prime Minister himself have been quietly probing individuals and groups for reactions on a possible Prime Ministerial visit to Beijing. Overall, the reactions were positive, but as the year progressed and the political fortunes of the Congress Party declined, there were serious doubts expressed by many as to whether anything substantive could emerge from a Prime Ministerial visit.

In a closed-door high-level discussion within the Congress Party it was felt that the visit should go through and the strategy proposed was that while the Prime Minister should avoid any discussion or commitment on the border issue, he should stress India's desire to have an improved climate of relations with China in the areas of culture, science and technology and so on. The idea put forward was that the visit should be bigger on the image and lower on the content and for the purpose, a large delegation of top scientists, cultural figures and media should accompany the Prime Minister.

At another level, the Prime Minister's Office has sought to pinpoint areas that could be agreed upon between India and China during the visit. Efforts in this direction included the soliciting of the views of the Army Headquarters on a possible agreement on a mutual withdrawal

in the Tawang sector. It may be recalled that the Indian deployments in the area following the Chinese establishment of a permanent post in the Sumdorong Chu area in 1986 spurred off a verbal barrage from Beijing and the sudden reinforcement of the PLA [People's Liberation Army] in Tibet gave rise to rumors of a Sino-Indian clash in the summer of 1987.

'Militarily inadvisable': However, it is reported that Army Headquarters stuck to the position that any withdrawal from the Hathung La area north of Tawang would be militarily inadvisable. In any case Chinese and Indian forces in this area of the disputed McMahon Line are separated by the Namka Chu River. However, where Indian and Chinese forces are 'eyeball-to-eyeball' in a saucer-shaped area overlooking the Sumdorong Chu, there could be a mutually acceptable withdrawal.

Another area pinpointed and where an agreement will emerge is on the reopening of border trade between India and China. Two likely routes have been discussed and the chances are that there will be an agreement to reopen the route through the Lipu Lekh pass in the non-controversial central sector. This route will follow from Pithoragarh-Dharchula-Garbyang across the Lipu Lekh pass to Taklakot (Puland Chong) in Tibet. The Indian road-head is at Tawaghat, some 10-days march from Lipu Lekh pass and the Chinese border. The Chinese road-head is at Taklakot, just about a day's march away.

Prior to the routes being closed, border people on the Indian side, called the Bhotias, obtained wool and borax from Tibet in exchange for consumer items like salt, matches and so on. Given the quarter century hiatus in the trade, the transborder trade will take up a new character and will initially be in low key.

Given the brisk trade between India and Nepal in the region, and also the trade between Nepal and Tibet, Indian and Chinese goods have been familiar to the people on both sides of the border. This is the same area where the Chinese have permitted groups of Indian pilgrims to travel to Kailash-Manasarovar lake since 1981.

Key issue: The Prime Minister's visit is therefore likely to be a major public relations event—not in itself an undesirable goal, given the possible benefits that accrue from the atmospherics that accompany summitry. The problem still remains as to developing proposals to untangle the border issue. Since any settlement would have to involve a surrender of India's notional claim, probably in the Western sector, the key issue would be the political stewardship of the negotiations and stemming from this, the political credibility of the leadership that finally signs the border agreement.

As of now it would seem that the preoccupations of the two countries with other areas would preclude an early settlement on the border issue. China is busy with internal reform and trying to set right its relations with

the USSR. In India, the Government is busy with a host of internal problems and gearing up for the next elections. Since the goal is a durable settlement and any settlement will require considerable political management, no one is likely to advocate or make haste.

**Nepalese Receipt of PRC Arms Strains Ties**  
*46001095 Madras THE HINDU in English*  
24 Sep 88 p 7

[Article by Manoj Joshi]

[Excerpt] Kathmandu, Sept. 23. Indo-Nepalese relations appear to have reached a low ebb with the recent news that the Nepalese have acquired 400 truckloads of weapons from the People's Republic of China. Nepalese officials speaking on condition of confidentiality said the news was substantially accurate though the consignment contained only some anti-aircraft guns, ammunition and related equipment. Indian officials for their part have expressed serious concern over the event which they say violates the spirit if not the letter of the Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950.

Nothing to worry about: Previously, Indian arms and ammunition were supplied to the Nepalese Army, though Nepal has procured equipment from other sources as well. A Nepalese Foreign Ministry official told this correspondent that he could not understand what India was miffed about since the treaty referred to the Nepalese side keeping the Indians informed of weapons acquisitions that transited through India, which was not the case here. He maintained that the Nepalese wanted nothing but the best relations with India since, 'India and Nepal are entangled with each other through the force of geography, history and culture.'

A highly placed source told this correspondent that when Mr Natwar Singh met King Birendra, the latter told him that the trucks carried some anti-aircraft guns and equipment and that the trucks would remain in Nepal. He is reported to have informed the Minister that Nepal planned to raise two additional divisions in the next 10 years. One interpretation of the remarks can be that Nepal would have welcomed Indian assistance, but it is not known if South Block is thinking on those lines.

According to the authoritative Institute for Strategic Studies publication, *MILITARY BALANCE*, Nepal's armed forces comprise 30,000 personnel which are divided into a Royal Guards brigade, five infantry brigades, one support brigade comprising artillery and signals elements and one logistics brigade. It has a small air force consisting of two Shorts Skyvan aircraft and one Avro as well as seven helicopters. The essence of the Nepalese plan, therefore, is roughly to double its forces in the coming decade.

One of the Nepalese officials who spoke to this correspondent however disclaimed any knowledge of plans for the expansion of the Army. He said there was no need for

additional personnel and in any case, a large Nepalese Army should be viewed with greater alarm by China rather than India. His argument stemmed from his belief that there was essentially a greater and even a fundamental identity of interests between India and Nepal rather than Nepal and China.

Problem of trade: One of the major problem areas is in trade. India is a major trading partner of Nepal and the balance favours India. The Nepalese feel their 'rationalisation' of tariffs which has eroded the Indian advantages ought not be viewed in a negative fashion considering the size of the Indian economy.

Another area is that of water resources. As one official put it, when there is plenty of water there is no problem but when there is too little problems arise. The Nepalese feel unhappy at the slow pace of negotiations over the Karnali multi-purpose project. The World Bank which is funding the scheme wants Indian participation mainly to ensure that the surplus electricity generated has a market in India. 'Had Nepal and India seen eye to eye,' the official noted, 'approval would not have involved 10 years of negotiations and the project would have been completed by now.'

Reaching the blue water: A related project seeks to provide Nepal access to the sea through the river systems. The Nepalese want Indian cooperation to use the Ganga waterway through their rivers for direct access to the sea, either via Bangladesh or India. The Kosi, the Gandaki and the Karnali supply 30-40 percent of the water to the Ganga in the lean season and the Nepalese want to put across the idea that cooperation with India on the issue of waters would help them balance their trade through energy export and also provide the landlocked country with access to the high seas.

These and other irritants would be minor but for the mutual suspicions that have crept up over the past two decades. Nepal feels that India wants to perpetuate its dominance over it and India for its part feels Nepal is using these issues to build up a climate of anti-Indianism. The truth, as is usual, probably falls somewhere in between though many observers point to the Indian problems with Bangladesh as indicative of New Delhi's inability to handle the sensitivities of neighbours.

Nepalese officials insist that the irritants are only minor and no substantive issue exists to prevent better Indo-Nepalese relations. Certainly the Nepalese monarchy has attempted to distance itself strategically from its giant southern neighbour whose democratic institutions and culture exert a powerful pull in Nepal. [passage omitted]

**CPI Leader Talks to Press on Return From PRC Visit**  
*46001094 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English*  
29 Sep 88 p 4

[Text] New Delhi, Sept. 28: The Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi's forthcoming visit to China is essential in

order to "establish some sort of mutual trust which has broken down since 1961" and not to resolve the border issue, the CPI [Communist Party of India] leader and Aituc general secretary, Mr Indrajit Gupta, told newsmen, here today.

China was very keen to establish an "all-sided" exchange with India pending a solution to the border problem, Mr Gupta said. Mr Gupta, who led a five-member Aituc delegation to China earlier this month, was discussing his impressions of China at the press conference.

Mr Gupta said China was interested in establishing cultural, trade and scientific ties with India. The CPI shared the view that the Prime Minister's forthcoming visit would improve ties between the two neighbors and set the ground for further discussion on the border issue. Pointing out that official-level talks on the issue were continuing, he said, "The Prime Minister's visit should not be a forum for discussing the issue. That is not his job."

He pointed out that fears in certain circles in India that China might "jump across the border" were unfounded in view of the country's preoccupation with its economic problems. It was in China's own interest to "develop friendly relations with as many a countries as possible," in order to concentrate on developing its economy. "Internal compulsions will prevent any adventure," he said.

On the Prime Minister's statement yesterday that there was no question of giving any piece of land to China during his visit, Mr Gupta said, "No Prime Minister in the world is expected to say that he would give away territory." He felt the question posed to the Prime Minister was foolish and uncalled for and Mr Gandhi had made the only possible response.

Mr Gupta insisted that "normal and friendly relations" with China was possible despite the border issue and pointed out that the Soviet Union and the U.S. had had four summits despite the many differences that existed.

The example of the U.S.-Soviet summits was also brought up before the Chinese leadership when the Aituc delegation touched upon the question of a possible Sino-Soviet summit. Mr Gupta said that during their talks with the international liaison department of the Chinese Communist Party, they had asked why the Chinese were reluctant to hold a summit with the Soviets.

The Chinese reply was that though they had no objection "in principle," no such summit would be possible until the Vietnamese troops pulled out of Kampuchea. The Chinese leadership continues to hold the view that the Soviets are behind the Vietnamese action.

## CPI-M Leaders Discuss Congress-I Unity Offer

### Namboodiripad on Offer

46001097 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English  
26 Sep 88 p 1

[Text] Cochin, September 25. (PTI. The CPM [Communist Party(Marxist)] general secretary, Mr E. M. S. Namboodiripad, today rejected the veteran Congress leader, Mr Kamalpathi Tripathi's suggestion that the Congress and the left parties form a national progressive front to counter the challenge posed by the National Front (of opposition parties).

Answering questions at a news conference here, he said the CPM considered the Congress as its 'class enemy' and had all along been against the party. In fact, the undivided CPI and the CPM had been the only parties to oppose the Congress all these years, he said, adding the CPI which had once aligned with the Congress had now realised its mistake.

Welcoming the decision of the four opposition parties—Janata, Lok Dal, Congress-S and Jan Morcha—to form a united party, Mr Namboodiripad said this party could provide an alternative to the ruling Congress at the Centre provided it stood for nationalism and eschewed partisanship and casteism.

The BJP's [Bharatiya Janata Party] exclusion was all the more 'welcome', he said.

Asked if the CPM would forge an alliance or strive for an electoral understanding with the new party, he said, 'Let the elections come and then we will decide'.

On the state PCC [expansion unknown] president, Mr A. K. Antony's charge that the CPM in Kerala was politicising and administration and law and order had broken down, he said, 'It is Rajiv Gandhi who has been politicising the administration in Punjab. In Punjab, there has been not even a day without some people being killed and Mr Antony has nothing to say on this.'

On Sri Lanka, he said the cease-fire declared by the Indian Peace Keeping Force, expiring today, should be extended only if there was at least some vague indication of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's readiness for a dialogue.

Questioned if there would be any change in the CPM's approach to the Congress in the context of the projected visit of the Soviet leader, Mr Mikhail Gorbachov, to India later this year, he said it was the CPM in India that deliberated and decided on its policy and approach to other political parties.

Mr Gorbachov too was of the view that each country's communist party should frame its policy taking into account the situation there, he added.

### Other Matters Discussed

46001097 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English  
26 Sep 88 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, Sept. 25: The CPI(M) [Communist Party(Marxist)] today ruled out the formation of a progressive national alliance with the Congress(I). The CPI, too, has rejected the veteran Congress(I) leader, Mr Kamlapati Tripathi's proposal that the left parties join the Congress in such an alliance.

Addressing a press conference in Cochin today, the CPI(M) general secretary, Mr E. M. S. Namboodiripad, said his party considered the Congress(I) to be a class enemy and there was no question of any alliance with it, reports UNI. He said that at one time, the CPI had an understanding with the Congress, but it had proved to be a mistake.

Mr Tripathi's suggestion was made in a letter to the Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi. He said a Congress(I)-Left alliance had become necessary because of the formation of the National Front of "rightist and fascist" parties.

In his letter, Mr Tripathi said the Congress(I) and the left parties had similar approaches to subjects like foreign policy, democracy, national integration and the minorities.

The CPI(M) Politburo member, Mr Harkishen Singh Surjeet, said there was no concrete proposal on the subject from the Congress(I) yet. "We are totally opposed to the policies of the Congress(I). We have made it clear that we are consistently against the monopoly on power enjoyed by the Congress." Mr Surjeet said foreign policy was the only aspect on which the two parties agreed. "But how can we forget the attack on democratic rights through the Defamation Bill?"

The Congress(I) talked of socialism, the CPI(M) leader said, but in practice multinational corporations were invited to the country, and 24 percent of the total export earnings went towards the external debt servicing.

The CPI central executive and national council member, Mr M. Farooqi, said his party was totally opposed to the economic policies of the Congress(I). Mr Farooqi said if the Congress(I) was serious about a progressive alliance, "let them spell out their policies and programmes."

Mr Tripathi's letter was addressed to Mr Gandhi, Mr Farooqi said. Therefore, it was for Mr Gandhi to spell out what his position was on this matter. "We are not interested in the proposal," he asserted.

### IRAN

#### East Germans Offer To Assist Railroad Construction

46400037B Tehran RESALAT in Persian  
24 Oct 88 p 11

[Excerpt] Mr Alfred Shultz, East German deputy minister for electrical engineering and electronics, in Iran on an official visit, on Saturday met with Engineer Afshar, the deputy minister of roads and transport and managing director of the Islamic Republic of Iran Railroads.

During this meeting the East German deputy minister announced that his country was ready and willing to provide equipment and facilities needed by the Iranian railroads and participate in communication and electronic signals projects.

Expressing an interest in the expansion of commercial exchanges and technical cooperation between East German companies and the Iranian Railroads, the East German deputy minister hoped that East German companies will have an opportunity to effectively participate in the contracts to secure wagon cars and parts and electronic signaling systems, and have a significant cooperation with the Railroads.

#### Minister on Port, Railroad Facility Improvements

46400037A Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian  
2 Nov 88 p 2

[Text] In the future, Bandar-e Imam Khomeyni in Khuzestan Province will be one of the country's largest and best equipped ports for the loading and unloading of ships.

Mr Sa'idi-Kya, minister of roads and transport, on a visit to Khuzestan, made this announcement this afternoon during an interview with an IRNA correspondent in Bandar-e Imam. He added that with the creation of a large loading terminal in Bandar-e Imam, which is to become operational soon, a positive step will be taken in improving the port's transport capabilities.

The minister of roads and transport also pointed out that the two-track Sar-e Bandar—Bandare-e Imam railroad is in the final stages of completion. When completed, the project will create a great transformation in the transportation of goods from Bandar-e Imam.

He added: Dual tracking the Ahvaz—Bandar-e Imam rail line is also underway and 85 km of the rail bed have been completed thus far.

## PAKISTAN

### **Zia Had Plans To Occupy Afghanistan** *4600029c Kabul KABUL TIMES in English* 24 Sep 88 p 1-2

[Text] Dr Mobasher Hassan, Finance Minister in the People's Party Government of Pakistan has said that the main mission of President Zia-ul-Haq was to work out a new law on the basis of a presidential system of government and creation of more provinces in an attempt to rule for long time in the country.

In a press conference held last week at his residence Dr Hassan claimed that the minutes of Zia's plan were disclosed by General Akhtar Abdur Rahman to one of his friends. It happens by accident that General Abdur Rahman is a friend of Dr Mobasher Hassan also.

Dr Mobasher Hassan said that the promise of General Zia to hold elections on 16 November was not so important. What Zia really had in mind was the holding of elections for the legislative assembly. When elections were held and the new constitution was approved Zia would proceed ahead to hold another election which had nothing to do with democracy.

Parallel to the adoption of these measures, Dr Hassan went on to say, large-scale arrests would take place so as to suppress oppositions. Those who claim they are the followers and supporters of Zia's plan should think about these points. They, in fact, have not much information about Zia's mission. However, this engineer-politician described his information about Zia as authentic.

In the words of Dr Hassan, President Zia had plans to occupy Afghanistan and in this connection he would count and rely on stirring riots in the republics of Soviet Central Asia.

### **Government Blamed For Not Stopping Subversives** *46560002a Karachi AMN in Urdu 5 Oct 88 p 3*

[Editorial: "The President States Again"]

[Text] "Subversive elements and their agents will be crushed. A large scale investigation will be held to apprehend the persons responsible for the murderous incidents in Hyderabad and Karachi. Persons responsible for arson and subversive activities will be summarily tried and given exemplary and strict punishments. We are discussing enactment of a new law to curb arms smuggling and terrorism. All major roads leading to large cities will be guarded round the clock. Police and the army will work together to patrol the city. The police will be supplied with state-of-the-art weapons and communication equipment. Intelligence agencies have failed in arresting the persons responsible for unrest in Hyderabad. We will take action in improving the effectiveness

of our intelligence agencies. Enemies of our country will not be treated with leniency anymore. Terrorism should not be attributed to racism. We will not allow postponement of elections."

These are the promises that President Ghulam Ishaq Khan made in his speeches given in Hyderabad and Karachi during his 10-hour whirlwind tour of these cities. He also stated that implementation on these plans will begin within 10 days. He also admitted that 14,000 policemen were grossly insufficient to protect the 10 million people living in Karachi.

The amazing and deplorable fact still remains that the same day this statement was made during the curfew hours in Hyderabad there were shooting incidents in Qila in which 5 people were killed. Six people were killed in Karachi the same day. This carnage did not begin yesterday; it has been happening for the last 3 years. All these promises to deal with this problem were made only to be broken. No action was taken when muhajirs [refugees, people moved from India] were massacred openly in Orangi Town, Qasba Colony, and Aligarh Colony. This same Muslim League government was here and these very "preachers" of Zia's regime were in power with total authority over everything. They have not done anything to arrest any of those criminals who murdered innocent and helpless people without any discrimination. These rosy promises now are like torturing the already hurt people. Do not the president, the prime minister and their lackies know how some of the masked murderers who were caught red-handed in Karachi were treated? They were whisked away quietly and nobody knows where they went. Why were not those criminals shot right there? Where were all the judges who give permission to the police to open fire sleeping? Is not it common for the police to open fire on innocent people and drag them from their homes to police station to torture them without any reason?

Terrorism is not new. It has been happening for a long time and it started the day Zia implemented the martial law. Dangerous arms and ammunition are being smuggled openly into the country. Guards posted at checkpoints are partners in this smuggling business. The president is telling us today that he will arm the police forces in large cities with modern weapons. Newspapers all over the country have been suggesting this step for a long time and no one took any action. What is the use of expressing disappointment at the inefficiency of our intelligence agencies when everything is out of control? These intelligence agencies were telling the government that "all is well" in their reports should have been punished for anti-national acts.

Now, finally they are talking about improving our intelligence agencies. Provincial governments are responsible for blaming regional and racial politics for incidents of terrorism. These governments had people fight with each

other by encouraging group politics. All these barbarian acts were committed at the orders of General Zia-ul Haq to prolong his autocratic rule.

Mr President! We do not doubt your sincerity about implementing these plans to save the country from a civil war. First, however, you must win the faith and trust of the Pakistanis. Put your right hand on your heart and tell us do you think even one member of the Muslim League faction that you have appointed to rule various provinces and the country can be trusted by the people of our country? Mr President, as long you let these inept leaders sit with you and as long you let your inefficient bureaucracy conspire to loot the country, your honesty and sincerity will be suspect in the eyes of our countrymen.

**Air Marshal Sees Need for Nuclear Deterrent**  
*46000028 Karachi DAWN in English 4 Nov 88 p 9*

[Article by Air Chief Marshal (retired) Anwar Shamim]

[Text] There appears no immediate likelihood of the threat from India subsiding in the least. If the propaganda campaign launched by India in recent years accusing Pakistan of assisting the Khalistan Movement of the Indian Punjabis, being engaged on a nuclear programme with military capability, acquiring sophisticated weaponry particularly from the USA and India's nibbling at Pakistan's territory such as in Siachen are any indicators, the Indian designs are directed towards Pakistan's annihilation. Displaying considerable patience and accommodation, Pakistan has made successive conciliatory moves, including late President Zia's "peace offensive," but India's response has generally been negative. Pakistan's long-term defence preparations have, therefore, of necessity to be geared to meet the Indian threat.

India possesses the third largest conventional armed forces in the world after those of the two superpowers. Besides exploding a nuclear device of its own in 1974, India has recently acquired nuclear submarines from the Soviet Union and is constantly on the look out to add more teeth to its military machine.

India's hegemonistic designs and regional superpower ambitions are no secret. Ideally, it would like to redraw the map of India to incorporate Bangladesh, Pakistan as well as perhaps Burma. However, with the passage of time these states have developed characteristics of distinct nationhood and India may find it difficult to absorb them. Adopting a pragmatic line, therefore, its aim would be to reduce these countries to the status of client states. It is doubtful whether any Pakistani, or for that matter Bangladeshi or Burmese, would willingly accept his country to be placed in such a situation. As Pakistan has always remained India's primary target for aggression, it has no choice but to prepare for a grim, determined struggle to resist any such Indian attempt so that its national independence and territorial integrity are safeguarded. Pakistan's present conventional armed

forces are hardly a match for their Indian counterpart, either in number or in fire-power. No amount of acquisition of sophisticated weaponry either through cash purchases or foreign assistance can bridge the gap in this sphere. It must, therefore, possess a suitable deterrent which would make India think ten times before embarking on a military adventure against Pakistan. Such a deterrent, to be credible, must be an appropriate mix of the nuclear and conventional forces.

Weapon-grade nuclear capability may be difficult to acquire, because of the lack of technical know-how, which is often withheld on political ground, even by the so-called friends. It is also expensive while still in the research and development phase. Once, however, such a capability is developed, building up of sufficiently strong nuclear forces to act as a bulwark against Indian designs need not necessarily be an expensive affair. Also, contrary to the common belief, no special aircraft is needed to deliver nuclear weapons and evolution of a suitable delivery system for nuclear weapons does not pose a serious problem.

Once a nuclear deterrent has been obtained, it should not be necessary to maintain such large armed forces as Pakistan plans to raise to provide an answer to the Indian threat. Such an arms race is neither feasible nor winnable for a small, resource-deficient country like Pakistan. The organisation and administration of the armed forces, in any case, needs to be reviewed drastically to cut expenditures as also to put them to productive employment in peace-time which should incorporate elements of their training for war. The following points may be considered in this regard:

(a) The armed forces should be composed mainly of small, highly mobile battle groups. Cumbersome headquarters concerned with repetitive administrative detail should be curtailed to the minimum;

(b) Standardisation of equipment, particularly of the non-operational nature such as vehicles and ordnance stores must be insisted upon. Joint Services Headquarters should be assigned greater responsibility and authority for this purpose.

(c) Support services should mainly be provided by retired persons, re-employed in civilian capacity and/or by conscriptees. If necessary, a compulsory national service for two years after matriculation should be introduced, which would raise an enormous war reserve;

(d) Non-operational expenditure such as on transfers, particularly of those posted in depots and workshops should be kept to the minimum. Promotions in non-commissioned ranks should be made on time-scale so that they do not have to shift from place to place on promotion;

(e) Unnecessary expenditure on ceremonials and uniforms etc. should be done away with;

(f) Institution of men in uniform employed as batmen to army officers and JCOS should be abolished. Such a measure would immediately add two infantry division operational strength to the army. If the proposed measure is likely to cause a morale question, the affected officers and JCOS may be given cash allowance in lieu.

Strengthening of political friendships is essential besides acquiring a credible military deterrent. Relations with both the superpowers must be kept at their best. Traditional friendship with China and the Muslim world must be reinforced at all levels. With the adoption of a principled stand, sympathy of non-aligned nations must always be enlisted. An effective role in the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] is also vital. Diplomatic skills must be refined and exercised effectively. Defence and foreign policies go hand in hand. Greater coordination between the two concerned departments is, therefore, essential for the evolution of practical plans and policies.

Pakistani nation is to be indoctrinated as to the need for positive thinking and action for its very survival. The indoctrination must begin almost in the cradle and should be an integral part of education. It must also be preached in mosques, offices, factories and agricultural fields. We should know that if we resolve to stay free and are prepared to die for truth and honour, with God's blessings, no aggressor can deprive us of our sovereignty.

#### **Trouble in the Maldives**

*46000029b Karachi DAWN in English 6 Nov 88 p 6*

[Text] The short but gory drama in the Maldives seems to have ended with the failure of the coup attempt, but its effects will continue to be felt in the Indian Ocean island-nation for quite some time. Who masterminded the coup remains a mystery. But reports suggest that Tamil mercenaries, in collusion with some local Maldivians, attempted to overthrow the Government of President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. Some of the Indian troops who landed on the islands and helped defeat the conspirators and their foreign hirelings have withdrawn but over a thousand paratroopers are still there, reportedly to search for the mercenaries believed to be hiding in some islands. The survival of the Gayoom Government is a matter of satisfaction for Pakistan. As President Ghulam Ishaq Khan said in his message to the Maldives President, "the Government and people of Pakistan express their solidarity with the Government and brotherly Muslim people of Maldives and are confident that they would always be able to safeguard their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and continue to play their important role as part of the Ummah."

In what is now a post-coup situation, with normality fast returning, a few points merit attention. One is the military weakness of the Maldives Government. Granted that the Maldives is a tiny country with a small population and limited resources, but the imperatives of

internal security seem to have been woefully neglected. The ease with which the Tamil mercenaries operated in the initial stages and even managed to kidnap some ministers before escaping testifies to grave weaknesses in the Maldives' security arrangements. Which, obviously, made it necessary for the Male Government to address an urgent appeal of India to rush its troops to help put down the coup attempt. One would like to hope that having accomplished the task requested for, New Delhi would not choose to over-extend its military presence on the island-State. With India's domestic situation not exactly going Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's way, the temptation could be great to make most of the Maldives enterprise to shore up the government's sagging position. That would only confirm an aspect of New Delhi's regional policy which most of its neighbours have come to regard with deep suspicion. The lessons learnt in Sri Lanka must not be forgotten. There is no such thing as a friendly foreign military presence. In the longer run, such presence invariably acquire a repugnant connotation from the point of view of the host country. Besides, it would be important for New Delhi to overlook the political and material costs of its dragged-out military engagement in Sri Lanka.

While hastening to withdraw, the Indians must also help determine the identity of the Tamils involved in the coup attempt. An offshoot of the Indian adventure in Sri Lanka is the militarisation of a large section of the Tamil activists in both India and Sri Lanka. Their commandos are now armed to an extent that would not have been possible but for New Delhi's policy of first conniving at the supply of arms and training for the Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka and then of trying to suppress them by military means. It is plain that the rise in Tamil militancy is going to be a source of considerable political instability in the region. However, in the light of what happened on Thursday, the Maldives Government would do well to strengthen its internal security outfit and seek the cooperation of other SAARC member-countries instead of relying on one power in any future emergency. Any other course could seriously compromise Maldives' existence as a sovereign and independent nation.

#### **Public Sector Is Mother of Industry**

*46000029a Karachi DAWN (Supplement) in English 5 Nov 88 p III*

[Article by Muhammad Ilyas]

[Text] Within the last fortnight Pakistanis have been treated thrice to gratuitous 'advice' on how they should manage their economic affairs by our American friends.

Ambassador Robert Oakley promised that there will be no shift in U.S. policy towards Pakistan but in both his statements he also warned that economic assistance might be in jeopardy if it was felt that "economic policies framed by a future government are harmful for

Pakistan's economy." And the U.S. Counsellor in Karachi stated that Pakistan might be in trouble with its creditors in case the privatisation of economy pledged by pre-election government was tampered with by post-election government.

Man does not live by bread alone. Agreed. The trouble, however, is that in countries like Pakistan, economic activity is like the jealous wife which compels 90 percent humanity to think of nothing else.

The slogan "Roti, Kapra aur Makaan" may have been a political slogan for the Pakistan People's Party but that it electrified the socio-political environment could mean only that it struck some vital chord in the mind of the masses. If it is out of currency today, this does not mean that it is also irrelevant; more plausibly, the reason may be that the politicians concerned are afraid of reminding the electorate of the expectation that could not be fulfilled.

#### Neutral Stance

So Ambassador Oakley's assurance that U.S. had "no favourites and was neither for nor against any political leader or party in Pakistan" diminishes in meaning because constraints on economic decision-making cannot but constrain politically also a future government which may not agree that the recipes prescribed by IMF-World Bank are not harmful.

Pakistan has learned enough by now to know that privatisation is no word of abuse. Nor is "nationalisation" for that matter. The latter was very popular among economists and intellectuals of progressive inclinations for a long time but in a totally different social context; different also from the way PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government enforced it.

In contrast to the Government's fixation with deregulation, PPP manifesto, 1988, has ruled out denationalisation as well as additional nationalisation. Only the sick units would be jettisoned from public sector but not for "tycoons." The basic industry such as defence, heavy mechanical-industrial complexes would remain in public sector. Target of rebuke and ridicule though, public sector is still not as bad a guy as the official rhetoric would have us believe.

Basically, dichotomy between public and private sectors is spurious, for the most part. The attitude of discussing the two in "either," "or" terms only distorts the issue. In Pakistan public sector is the mother of industry and, therefore, of private sector as well.

#### Dividing Line Hazy

The world capitalism itself has reached a stage where the dividing line between private and public sectors has all but evaporated. South Korea and Japan are extolled today as the models of private enterprise; but where

would it be without massive, constant governmental intervention and control? It is a different matter if the transnational corporations [TNCs] are enmeshed with the official decision making apparatus everywhere in capitalist world.

At its inception, Pakistan had no industry except a few textile mills and four cement factories. Most, if not all, belonged to non-Muslims who emigrated to India. It was the public sector Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, established in 1952, which pioneered industries in such basic and diverse sectors as cement, fertilizer, jute, paper, shipyard, heavy engineering.

The massive inflow of foreign credit during the Ayub era coincided with disinvestment of a number of public sector industries. On the positive side, that era also produced a class of industrial entrepreneurs who made valuable contribution to industrial development. This golden era of private enterprise lasted till 1965 war. The state-erected walls of protection against external competition and suppression of labour had played a vital role in the success of private sector's industries; but then this also made for an artificial green house which stunted their growth.

The trickle-down philosophy that underlay this process had also resulted in a widespread sense of alienation among poor and lower-middle classes. Growing insidiously in the minds, it burst forth into a country-wide agitation in 1968-69. PPP won 1970 polls riding the crest of this resentment against the government as well as private sector industrial class.

Nationalisation was then considered the sine qua non of all problems and the PPP Government took over 29 industries ranging from heavy engineering, steel, chemicals, petrochemicals, automobile and tractor assembly to the manufacture of such essential commodities as cement and fertilizer.

Many people mistakenly took this to be the beginning of the process of socialisation. In fact, it was bureaucratisation of the industry at the cost of private entrepreneurship. Former Deputy Commissioner, Deputy and Joint Secretaries overnight found themselves heads of factories for the running of which they had neither the aptitude nor orientation.

As against this, private sector was the new god discovered by the Zia regime, No balanced, two-way discussion is possible when religion is used as cloak for a policy.

For all the invectives of inefficiency heaped upon public sector, what we have seen concretely are mere motions of "deregulation." Reason: The "losses" notwithstanding, public sector, now reduced to 23 industries, is a major source of revenue, paying Rs. 5 billion in taxes to the government, besides earning Rs. 1.6 billion annually. It pays the taxes ungrudgingly—no agitation, no strikes.

According to a knowledgeable estimate, the revenue from these to the Exchequer would plummet down to Rs. 1 billion, were these surrendered to the private sector.

The pathological reluctance of the private sector to pay taxes is well known. Of this, the latest example is the agitation by big business against subjecting their accounts books to scrutiny by tax collectors.

Tax, for private owner, denotes an additional cost of the product and not his contribution to the society in lieu of the resources, market and security it provides him with.

### Mythical Profitability

The mythical "profitability" of private enterprise is really derived from a variety of practices in the accounting and other areas. Profit earned by the private sector from what is essentially a social process is considered by the owner as his own which he may or may not plough back into productive activity, fritter away in frivolities or sneak it out to a Swiss bank.

The intention here is not, of course, to gainsay the indispensability of the private sector. These observations have been made in the spirit of calling a spade a spade. After all no self-respecting private entrepreneur would find it edifying to be characterised as a voracious, selfish creature. Would it rather not like to be defined as an individual or a set of individuals engaged in the effort to upgrade their value to the society at large and, of course, to themselves.

The public sector thus represents the other facet of the same coin. Its shortcomings notwithstanding, it is like the renewable pool of resources, talent and energies from which all the rivers of private enterprise flow. People's well-being and their aspirations are both the source and destination of both public enterprises and ideally, of private entrepreneurship, whether industrial, commercial, intellectual or artistic.

This reality is admitted in the 7th Plan, although its avowed objective is to further diminish the role of public sector. It says: "Key projects which are likely to benefit backward areas by stimulating economic activity, which the private sector is not willing to sponsor due to low profitability, will be undertaken by public sector on no loss basis."

The principal bane of public sector in Pakistan has been the lack of a long term policy. What one sees is erratic hopping from one policy option to another. Public sector enterprises have been used as treasure islands for close relatives, friends and political allies of the rulers. Lacking professionalism and integrity these persons indulge in corruption without fear of accountability.

All executive and professional jobs in these projects should be filled by open competition. Most importantly,

these projects need an institutionalised democratic control to escape arbitrary manipulation. Moreover a clear line of demarcation should be drawn between public and private sectors.

### Sacred Trust

Public enterprises are sacred trust and should be given their due respect. There should be no doubt about the fact that these are vital, indispensable elements of national sovereignty equal in importance to any other organ of state.

Private sector is good but privatisation is a different matter altogether. The motivations underlying western insistence on it need to be investigated with all care and conscientiousness. It should be viewed in the context of current strides of high-technologies in which the electronic communications play a key role. These developments contain the seeds of a global control by TNC's. Privatisation, as sought to be administered by the very powers which oppose the Third World's struggle for New Information Order, can mean the evaporation of national boundaries with Third World governments potentially being reduced to the role of telephone operators with no will of their own.

The mode of such inroads into national sovereignty will be the joint ventures in which local subsidiaries will act, per force, as outreach channels of TNC's operations. The lure will be "transfer of technology" but it will be lure only and very little more. There will be transfer but out of national control. The privatisation of Telegraph & Telephone Department in Pakistan is the first twist in the rope.

### Frequent Use of Curfew Criticized

46560002b Karachi AMN in Urdu 18 Oct p 3

[Editorial: "Government Abuses Curfew"]

[Excerpts] It has been 2 weeks since curfews were enacted in Hyderabad and Karachi after the bloody incidents there. The only action the government has taken since then is to synchronize the time of curfew in the two cities. Curfew is relaxed from 0600 to 1600 every day. Strict curfew is observed during the evening and the night.

The curfew weapon has been used so often by the government during the last 3 years that people have stopped fearing it. It has lost its effectiveness. A good government is the one that does not use extreme measures every time peace is disturbed. A government that enacts curfew to control every little incident is a very weak government that has lost control of the situation.

Local governments in Karachi and Hyderabad also have this problem. For the last 3 or 4 years these governments have been depending on the army for controlling crises. It is the people who suffer most when a government takes

such extreme measures. Business organizations and schools are closed and industrial production is stopped. All these hurt a country's economy.

A close look at the incidents of the last half of the decade shows that the government was always ready to take extreme measures, but it never tried to apprehend people responsible for disturbing the peace. Whether it was the firing in Sohrab Goth or the massacre in Aligarh Colony or various incidents in Hyderabad, the government never tried to arrest the people responsible for these incidents or killings. The government kept telling us that the criminals responsible for these incidents have been identified and steps were being taken to punish them. However, there was no followup.

External powers have been accused of these incidents to mislead people. The people have begun to think that the government starts all these incidents to serve some ulterior motives. [passage omitted]

We would be amazed at the losses incurred to all these curfews enacted in Sind during the last 3 years. It is the government and not the people who is responsible for these huge losses to the nation because of its unplanned and stupid actions. [passage omitted]

### **Commentary: Elections Dominated by Personalities, Not Parties**

46560004 Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu  
20 Oct 88 p 9

[Commentary by Ali Sufyan Afaqi: "Elections—Party Or Personality Based !"]

[Text] President Ayub Khan was against elections based on parties. Ziaul Haq was also strongly opposed to party-based elections. He went as far as to say that if he would have his way he would hold the next four elections without involving political parties. Unfortunately, he did not have his way and the Supreme Court also ruled in favor of political parties. As a result of this the next elections are being held with full party involvement. Are these really party-based elections? The speed with which leaders and candidates have changed party affiliations during the last few days makes us wonder if anyone is really associated with a particular party. A journalist friend of ours has a difficult problem. He has been trying to write an analysis of the forthcoming elections for the last 3 weeks. He has been unable to finish his article as the constant party-switching tendency of candidates renders a good forecast impossible. He studies newspapers daily and forms an opinion, but the whole picture is changed by the evening. The voters are facing the same dilemma. They just cannot think of one candidate or a party long enough to form an opinion. The parties and candidates are too volatile for the poor voter to make a decision.

When the debate on party or non-party elections was being carried on, opponents of party-based elections reasoned that even a lamp post running on a popular party's ticket

could win an election. A review of recent developments makes us wish that only lamp posts were included in various parties. One important thing in favor of lamp posts is that they do not change their position and will stay where they are installed. Unfortunately, we did not learn anything even from lamp posts. During the last few months people have been joining and quitting political parties continuously. It has become impossible to tell who has joined and who has quit. This turnover of people changes political parties. A party in itself is nothing; it is the people who join it make it what it is. It is impossible to say what a party would be like when the people who made the party leave it and join another party. Imagine what the Muslim League would have been if Quaid-e Azam had decided to leave it and join Jamaat-i Islami! What would have the Congress [Indian National Congress] Party looked like if Mr Gandhi had decided to join the Muslim League Party and Pundit Nehru and Sardar Patel had joined the communists? What would have happened to the Khaksar movement if Iqbal Mashrafi had quit it to join the Congress Party? Changing affiliations is no big deal for our leaders and politicians. They are used to this change for a long time and have become expert in this area. Establishing one's own party or joining a new party became a tradition after Pakistan was established. It is possible that the leaders did not have any time for such changes when they were busy in the struggle for independence. After the establishment of Pakistan, this tendency became a political tradition. It appears that a leader or a candidate gets bored with a political party in no time. Here today and gone tomorrow! One day a leader is roaring in support of one political party and the next day he is taking this party to task from another party platform. One day a leader is announcing his joining a specific party and the next day he is heard denouncing that very party in a press conference. Neither a party nor a leader has any consistency. This has caused an atmosphere of instability.

Traditions pertaining to politics and parties are greatly respected in other countries. England is such a tradition-loving country, that it does not even have a written constitution. Their democratic government runs and flourishes merely on tradition. Establishing a tradition is out of question for us since we could not even establish a democratic government during the last 41 years. If we can call leaving a party and establishing a brand new party a democratic tradition, then we are really practicing this tradition wholeheartedly. The situation is so bad that if you do not have the habit of keeping a regular political diary then you would not know anything about our political parties. If asked, you cannot even tell which veteran politician is affiliated to which political party!

There is a funny story about England's weather. A tourist arrived at a swimming pool to find the weather sunny and warm. He changed into swimming shorts and got on the diving board. The sun was still shining as he dived. On his way down it became cloudy and cold wind began to blow. He had not even started to worry when it became extremely hot. When he hit the water it started to snow and the swimming pool almost froze. He caught

pneumonia and died. His last will was never to trust the weather in England. Pakistan's political climate is very similar and cannot be trusted. You never know at what time who will jump into which party's swimming pool. What will happen to him there and how long he will stay in that party. This state of affairs is causing problems for news reporters. They are called in daily by their news editors. The political picture changes before the ink on their reports dries. It is not even appropriate to think about the political situation much less to make forecasts on election outcomes. Our elections are being held on a party basis as required by the constitution and the law. However, how can we depend on a party when it changes its shape by the minute? At best, we can call these elections "personality based" mainly because in our country everything from government to politics is based on personalities. Every political party is personified by a famous person. Pakistan People's Party is Bhutto's party. Tehriq-e Istiqlal is Mr Asghar Khan's party. There are other parties that belong to Mr Noorani, or to Wali

Khan, or to Sherbaz Mazari, or to Maulana Fazal-ur Rehman. The Muslim League party sometime belongs to General Zia and other times it becomes the joint property of Pir Pagara, Junejo, and Nawaz Sharief. Then there are smaller groups within the Muslim League that belong to "smaller" personalities. It is also common for a personality to start his own party if he is tired of one party. Those who cannot afford to start a new party, join an already established party to satisfy his desire or be contented by starting a smaller groups within the same party. Party tickets for elections are given out on the basis of personality and it is the personalities that help win elections. The more important a person is the more tickets are offered to him and the more constituents he represents simultaneously. It is obvious that the government is also run by personalities. In other words the whole political system is being run by people of importance, the personalities. In the light of all this how valid is it to say that the elections are being held on a party basis?