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**North Warns of Poisonous Tear Gas Hazards to
Seoul Visitors, Olympians**

41100082 *Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN*
in Korean 10 Jul 88 p 5

[Text] The Central Committee of the Korean Medical Association held a press conference with reporters from within and abroad in the People's Cultural Palace on 8 July in order to publicize the crimes of tear gassing by the south Korean fascist military clique.

A portrait of Comrade Kim Il-song, the great leader of our party and the people, hung in front of the press conference site.

Reporters from press and publication agencies in Pyongyang, foreign correspondents, and workers from publication departments of foreign embassies in our country participated in the press conference.

The opening statement of the press conference was made by Choe Won-sok, chairman of the central committee of the Korean Medical Association.

He made the following speech, saying that the south Korean military fascist clique recently has used a barrage of tear gas canisters in suppressing the struggles of young students and the people and, therefore, came to expose the indecent behavior of its military dictatorial "regime" to the entire world.

Even according to the reduced version of the south Korean puppets themselves, the No Tae-u regime shot 275,000 canisters of tear gas from the beginning of this year up to 10 June in its attempts to suppress various demonstrations such as anti-American and "anti-government" demonstrations of young students and the people.

This figure is twice the number of tear gas canisters which were used in suppressing demonstrations during the same period of last year and is an unprecedented record high.

Tear gas cannons used by the south Korean puppet clique can be largely divided into four kinds: they are, KM 25; SY 44; rapid fire; and pepperfog. Since the main chemical ingredient of these tear gas canisters is CS, which was proved to be a very strong poison, these bombs not only can cause minor irritation to victims but also can cause suffocation, poisoning, burning, disease, and even death.

Several years ago, a U.S. organization studied the use of tear gas canisters in south Korea and revealed that south Korean tear gas (CS gas) should rather be called poison gas because its effect was the same as the poison gas which had been used during the Vietnam war.

In fact, innumerable people in south Korea have lost their lives or have been injured or have suffered from chronic diseases due to exposure to tear gas. Even according to the reduced version of the south Korean puppets themselves, approximately 6,000 people have been injured by tear gas, 300 of whom were seriously wounded, in and around the June People's Struggle and most of them became ill or became disabled with the side effects of exposure to tear gas.

In preparation for the heightened anti-American, anti-fascist struggle with the coming event of the Olympic games, the No Tae-u regime has strenthened its tear gas throwing and launching equipment. In the past, these bums had used launching equipment such as rifles for firing tear gas canisters. These days, however, for suppressing demonstrations, they have used automatic rifle launching equipment which can fire 16 to 32 shots at one time, new gas guns, and a first, second and third gas vehicle.

The world has not seen fascist maniacs who are more vicious than the No Tae-u fascist military clique, which has been using tear gas canisters made from poison gas for its broad Fascist oppression.

It is no wonder that the south Korean people are presently staging a strong opposition struggle against the No Tae-u clique, which has been using poison tear gas canisters.

If CS poison tear gas usage increases considerably more than now in south Korea, the most vulnerable people are the young students and the people of south Korea, not to mention the possibilities of causing injury to athletes and tourists at the Olympic games. It is not a coincidence that even Western nations are expressing their deep concern about holding the Olympic Games in south Korea where tear gas will surround the Olymic stadium.

We, as part of the same nation, cannot just sit and watch the young students and people of south Korea fall victim to poison tear gas.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my wish that worldwide citizens and academic circles and progressive mass media raise their voices of criticism against the south Korean fascist military clique which has publicly been using poison tear gas.

Later, participants in the press conference watched a television showing with recorded footage of the south Korean fascist military clique's indiscriminate firing of tear gas.

The following people participated in the press conference and responded to questions by reporters: Associate Doctor Han Tong-il, director of the Korean Medical and Science Institute; Deputy Director, Professor, and Doctor Yu Suk-kun; department head, Associate Professor, and Associate Doctor Pak Chong-kyu.

A reporter from Korean Chungang Tongsin [KCNA]: They say that the south Korean fascist military clique's tear gas, which is used for the purpose of suppressing demonstrations, uses CS gas as its basic ingredient. I would like you to give us a more detailed explanation of that.

Han Tong-il: Tear gas belongs to the class of stimulative poisonous materials and the etymological meaning came from the word tear-inducing.

CS, the main compound of tear gas used by the south Korean Puppet clique, was first developed in 1923. During the Vietnam war, the U.S. imperialists spread an astonishing amount of 7,000 tons of CS on peace-loving people who were hiding in underground tunnels or hide-outs, thus causing innumerable casualties and victims including those suffering from pneumonia.

CS is a stimulant and poisonous in its original element. However, when it contacts water, it is easily dissolved and creates poisonous materials called chlorobenzenealdehyde and maleic acid denitrile.

Especially, maleic acid denitrile has two cyanogens in its molecule and has a similar poisonous compound which can be found in potassium cyanide. That is why CS is called poison gas.

According to laboratory tests, an animal died an instantaneous death when injected with 4 mg of maleic acid denitrile.

When the poisonous material enters the body, it inhibits the process of organic respiration, thus creating symptoms such as seizures caused by oxygen deficiency, toxicity of the whole body, and ultimately death.

As was described above, CS was first introduced as a poison and in effect, has been used as a poison.

A reporter from PYONGYANG SINMUN: I would like to have a detailed explanation on the effect of CS tear gas on human life and the human body.

Pak Chong-kyu: When CS, which is a small particle with a gaseous formula, contacts the skin or mucous membrane, it instantaneously creates a phenomenon of extremity stimulation because it is easily dissolved in oily objects.

When a CS particle enters the eyes, it is immediately dissolved and diffuses a poisonous compound, thus causing the symptoms of pain and tears in the eyes.

When a CS particle enters the airway, it causes severe sneezing, coughs, heavy discharge, shortness of breath, and respiratory handicaps. Meanwhile, stimulus is conveyed to the circulatory system nerve center and causes

the blood vessels to contract. When it deeply penetrates the airway or lung organs, it stimulates nerve cells in those areas and causes rapid breathing and slows heart contraction.

As for symptoms in the digestive organs, it causes nausea, vomiting, stomach upset, and diarrhea. As for overall bodily symptoms, it causes sore muscles, weak pulse, sore bones, and loss of equilibrium. It also causes depression and psychological handicaps.

According to a lab test of CS with monkeys, it caused symptoms of pulmonary hemorrhage, bronchiectasis and the chronic dilatation of the lung, and its after effects lasted for up to one month. In a stronger dosage, it caused symptoms of pneumonia, pulmonary emphysema and the failure of chronic dilatation of the lung to become chronic.

It goes without saying that it can have a harmful influence on athletes if the Olympic games are held in a place like south Korea where tear gas canisters made from poisonous CS are launched.

Furthermore, CS will give a tremendous disadvantage to the setting of athletic records because the smell of CS which the south Korean puppet clique uses does not disappear from the ground surface for 45 days once it hits the ground.

A reporter from KYOWON SINMUN: I would like to ask you to tell us in detail about the outbreak of diseases and pollution caused by tear gas.

Yu Suk-kun: One of the diseases that can occur due to poisonous tear gas is allergic skin disease.

According to medical literature, there are, in south Korean hospitals, a large number of dermatological patients who have been affected by tear gas. Those patients, who suffer from pains with symptoms such as red dots on their necks and faces, experience the same symptoms every time they inhale tear gas.

Since tear gas is an element which causes allergies, the eruption of other diseases or deterioration of diseases and the development of various complications, it can be said that one of the important reasons for the rapid increase in the numbers of cancer, hepatitis, and tuberculosis patients is related to the use of tear gas canisters.

Tear gas is putting even more pollution into the atmosphere of south Korea, the "kingdom of pollution," and having a vicious influence on the natural ecological zone.

Because of tear gas, it is said that the 80-year-old pine tree in front of Seoul National University is slowly dying and birds with nests on the school campus are also disappearing.

There is no doubt that foreigners visiting Seoul will inhale the already polluted air of the "kingdom of pollution"—called south Korea—plus poison gas, a product of the "kingdom of tear gas," and they will either develop or experience deterioration of heart, respiratory, liver, and digestive tract diseases.

This may be one of the main reasons behind the claim by many people from the world athletic communities that the venue of the 24th Olympiad should be transferred from Seoul to some other place.

A reporter from the Korean Social Democratic Publishing Company: You mentioned that CS tear gas was a poison gas bomb. However, poison gas has been prohibited from use by international law, has it not?

Han Tong-il: According to international law, poison gas is strictly regulated so that even in wartime, it can not be used against enemies.

During International Peace Conferences held in The Hague in 1889 and 1907 respectively, declarations and agreements against the use of poison gas were made and similar actions were taken in general assemblies of the United Nations and the WHO [World Health Organization].

Therefore, not only the use of poisonous tear gas but also its production must be interrupted.

However, the No Tae-u clique does not allow any press reports on tear gas. It also prohibits studies on tear gas compounds and their effects on the human body. If tear gas is not made from poison gas, why would they behave that way?

South Korea, which depended on foreign imported tear gas canisters until the 1970's, began to enter the production stage at the beginning of the 1980's.

There is a company called "Samyang Chemical Co." in south Korea, which produces tear gas canisters. That company, which had been on the brink of bankruptcy due to mismanagement, has been reorganized as a "defense industry" with tear gas production as its main

activity, its production has increased at a tremendous rate, and its financial scale increased 350 times since 1980 when the Chon Tu-hwan clique came to power. In 1982, "Samyang Chemical Co." ranked 16th in south Korea's income group, but in 1985, it ranked 4th. The company established a "research institute" for tear gas production, developed approximately 20 kinds of new tear gas-related products, and is said to be currently in the process of developing eight new tear gas canisters.

As was described above, the south Korean fascist military clique is frantic about the oppression of the people and is giving impetus to poison tear gas production.

Chairman Choe Won-sok made a closing statement at the press conference.

He branded the No Tae-u clique by saying that its rampant production and use of poison tear gas was not only a reckless violation of international law, but also an extremely vicious criminal act which contradicted humanitarianism and morality. He further said the following:

In spite of the fact that those bums of the No Tae-u clique dare to venture, in their cruel criminal brutality, to the use of poison tear gas, they are attempting to indiscriminately arrest those young students and people who have stood up for the righteous struggle for autonomy, democracy, and reunification by their recently fabricated "regulations on fire bombs."

It is preposterous that these people fabricate "regulations on fire bombs" instead of making a law that would prohibit the use of poison tear gas which brings direct harm to the human body.

For the No Tae-u fascist military clique's criminal acts against south Korea's young students and people, in its indiscriminate firing of poison tear gas, which is almost like chemical weaponry, causing fatalities, injuries, and chronic illness, the whole Korean people and the peace-loving citizens of the world will never forgive their crimes against God and man.

MILITARY

O Chin-u Speaks on Solidarity With China

41100073 Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN
in Korean 18 May 88 p 2

[O Chin-u Speaks at a Banquet: "Further Consolidating and Developing Korea-China Friendship, Generation After Generation, Is Our Party's Unflinching Policy"]

[Text] Recently Comrade O Chin-u visited our fraternal country, China, and expressed his pleasure in again meeting Chinese comrades-in-arm, and said as follows:

On this occasion I convey the combative greetings of officers and men of the Korean People's Army to the fraternal Chinese people, the Chinese People's Liberation Army volunteers and combatants.

From the first moment we set our foot on Chinese soil today, we were able to feel the warm feeling of the Chinese people.

It is none other than a special feeling that only class brethren and comrades-in-arm can feel.

Korea-China friendship is a historical friendship based on the friendly relationship that the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song forged with the great leaders of the Chinese people, Comrade Mao Zedong and Comrade Zhou Enlai.

The peoples of the two countries, Korea and China, fully demonstrated the invincibility and power of Korea-China friendship in the days of the anti-Japanese struggle, and of the fierce war against the U.S. imperialists aggressors.

In this process Korea-China friendship was strengthened into an inseparable relationship and into an invincible blood relationship that has overcome stern ordeals of history.

Through our past history and today we have keenly felt the preciousness of Korea-China friendship, and out of this feeling we are heartily pleased that everything in China, our neighbor, is going well.

Under the correct guidance of the Chinese Communist Party the fraternal Chinese people won a victory in the Chinese revolution, and then exerting the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance and strenuous struggle, achieved brilliant successes in the socialist revolution and socialist construction, and built up a prospering socialist China.

Especially, the Chinese people and the Chinese People's Liberation Army volunteers and combatants firmly upheld the four principles since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to achieve successes in the immense struggle for building a unique socialism in China.

The image of China is fresh every day, and its power is growing endlessly.

It is entirely thanks to the refined guidance of the Chinese Communist Party leadership that fundamental changes have been wrought in the lives of the Chinese people, and that the Chinese revolution continuously triumphs.

We sincerely congratulate the Chinese people and the Chinese People's Liberation Army commanders and combatants, upholding high the decisions of the 13th Party Congress, for having continuously achieved great successes in the task of implementing the modernization of the country. And we send firm greetings of solidarity for the just cause of the Chinese people in unifying the entire country in accordance with the "one country and two systems" formula.

Upholding high the letter and slogan of the party Central Committee for the 200-day combat in marking the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Republic, our people and officers and men of the People's Army are generating reforms, day after day, at all fronts of socialist construction, and at all posts in defense of the fatherland.

The struggle of our people for socialist construction is being waged amid a tense climate created by the indiscriminate machinations of the south Korean militarist fascist clique for provoking a new war.

The relaxation of the tense situation and disarmament are world trends, and the sincere wishes of the peace-loving peoples of the world.

Instead of showing an affirmative response to the peace-loving and fair proposal for convening a north-south joint conference proposed by our party and the government of the Republic, the United States and the south Korean authorities are rushing straight toward a path of confrontation and war.

Introducing vast forces of more than 200,000-strong, and massive weapons of slaughter, including nuclear weapons, U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet clique have unfolded the "Team Spirit '88" joint military exercises against our Republic, and are making the situation on the Korean Peninsula extremely tense.

As a rule one who enjoys fire is burnt to death.

Our people and the People's Army soldiers are watching closely the indiscriminate machinations of the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean military fascist clique in their war provocations, and they will resolutely punish any provocation by the scoundrels.

On this occasion I express my deep-felt gratitude to the fraternal Chinese party, government, and people for denouncing the machinations of the U.S. imperialists

and the south Korean puppet clique for fabricating "two Koreas," and for provoking a new war, and for sending their full support and firm solidarity to the just cause of our people for socialist construction and of unifying the fatherland.

He emphasized as follows:

It is the unflinching and firm policy of our party to further consolidate great Korea-China friendship, generation after generation, and it is the unchanging will of our people.

In the future, too, we will treasure traditional Korea-China friendship and will endeavor every way to preserve and develop it forever.

10372

SOCIAL

Bulgarian Medical Weekly on Facilities, Personnel in DPRK

*22000080 Sofia ZDRAVEN FRONT in Bulgarian
30 Jul 88 p 4*

[Article by Doctor Diana Chalukova, candidate of medical sciences, secretary of the Health Workers Trade Union Central Committee: "Meetings and Impressions"]

[Text] A delegation from the Health Workers Trade Union Central Committee recently visited the Korean People's Democratic Republic. The program called for studying the state and prospects of health care in the country. More than 20 major health care institutions specializing in different activities were visited.

At the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Administrative Workers, which includes, in addition to health workers, employees in state establishments, communications and banks, its chairman, Choe Chung-pyong and deputy chairman Doctor Lee Chang-tok acquainted us with the basic tasks being implemented by the Korean people during their 3rd 7-Year Plan.

After the March 1988 13th Korean Labor Party Plenum, which dealt with problems of education and health care, the health collectives joined the nationwide race for the implementation of its resolutions and for suitably welcoming the 40th anniversary of the socialist development of the DPRK. The trade union organizations have mounted aggressive ideological and education work for

the mass involvement of the working people in the "200 shock days" initiative, the purpose of which is completing ahead of schedule a large number of projects in honor of the 9 September national holiday and the solution of a number of problems related to prevention, labor hygiene and overall improvement of care for the sick.

The Trade Union of Administrative Employees has 110,000 health care members, bearing in mind that in Korea every citizen can be a member of only one sociopolitical organization, be it the Korean Labor Party, the youth or women's union or a trade union.

The structure of the health care system is similar to that of the other socialist countries. Traditional medicine is considered an autonomous branch in the science and practice of medicine. There are 130 hospital beds per 10,000 population. The average life span is about 74 years for men and 78 for women.

Powerful modern general and specialized hospitals and the Academy for Oriental Medicine have been established in Pyongyang, the capital. This foundation offers great opportunities for the complete training and developing the skills of medical cadres.

The House of the Mother and Child in Pyongyang, similar to our own NIAG, is quite impressive. It has 1,500 beds (600 maternity, 500 gynecological and 400 nonontological). It took only 9 months to build it in 1980. It is comfortable and has a rich set of modern diagnostic and treatment equipment, a 10-channel video system for meetings and a comprehensive video center for transmission from surgical premises, hospital rooms, etc. The hospital beds provide a good example of the high quality of items manufactured by the Korean medical industry: they are not only beautiful but also very flexible. Their upper and lower tiers have disposal containers and a small tray table.

The Kim Mahn-je Hospital, which was built in 18 months, is another large health palace and a worthy accomplishment of contemporary Korean architecture. It has 1,300 beds on 16 floors, with an overall surface of 52,000 square meters. It is equipped with the latest diagnostic facilities: an echograph, endoscopic and tomographic ward, computer x-ray facilities, angiography, electroencephalography and others, an intensive care ward with complete monitoring facilities, a traditional medicine ward, etc.

The medical equipment manufacturing plant in Hyesan produces annually 400 units and 100 sets of instruments for medical offices for ear-nose-throat diseases and ophthalmology as well as consumer goods, such as frames for eyeglasses and orthopedic aids.

The Oriental Medicine Academy was commissioned in 1967. It has 300 beds and 250 physicians. It has an internal diseases ward in which treatment is based essentially on medicinal herbs and medicines of natural

origin; it has a ward for "external" treatment, which involves acupuncture, manual therapy, thermal and medical treatment with cups, and laboratories for experimentation and the production of medicinal drugs for the entire country.

Trade union activities are focused on upgrading the efficiency of medical cadres and developing in them concern and love for patients. The "Care" movement includes 90 percent of the health workers. The movement for good management of assigned property plays a major role. Let us also note that there is a system of six wage rates based on the level of skill and seniority.

The social measures include all health workers: organized free food in cafeterias, qualification steps, full time or on the job, and beautiful and comfortable free work clothing and shoes.

During our visit, everywhere our delegation was welcomed with fraternal warmth and attention. We were impressed by the emphasis on order and cleanliness. We saw here a nation building a new Korea with enviable labor enthusiasm, pride in achievements and faith in the constructive future and hope for the peaceful unification of north and south, for a united and independent Korea.

05003

POLITICAL

Enhanced SCM, MCM Aid Continuation of Security Relationship With U.S.

41070106 Seoul ANJON POJANG in Korean
Jul 88 pp 6-12

[Article by Senior Researcher at the National Defense Research Institute Pak Son-sop: "Significance of ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting and National Security"]

[Text]

1. Prologue

The ROK-U.S. security cooperation has provided the base for the ROK's security since the ceasefire, and this bilateral cooperative relationship should also continue to develop in the future.

In retrospect, the ROK-U.S. security cooperative relationship has been maintained on a one-sided level of U.S. assistance, protection, and notification of U.S. policy rather than on a bilateral cooperative level.

This asymmetric cooperative relationship is analyzed as having been an unavoidable product of our economically and politically immature condition. However, considering the fact that the ROK's security was heavily dependent on the United States, I think that the absence of a formal channel of consultation between the military authorities of both countries reflects significant problems in our attitudes.

It is fortunate that the "Annual ROK-U.S. Defense Cabinet Meeting," which was established in 1968 inspired by such incidents as the ROK Armed Forces dispatchment to Vietnam in 1965, the 21 January incident in 1968, and the Pueblo kidnapping incident in 1968, has slowly grown into the current Annual ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM). Also, the roles of the SCM and the MCM (Military Committee Meeting) will be enhanced even more for the advancement of security cooperative relations in both countries.

From the external viewpoint, the year 1988 in particular is expected to be a turning point for the existing political policies of the four powers of the United States, the Soviet Union, the PRC, and Japan concerning the Korean Peninsula. From the internal point of view, in the midst of the strong public interest in domestic political issues and the reestablishment of the status of the national security, our nation has the humanistic and cultural obligations to successfully host the Olympic games by overcoming north Korea's open interference maneuvers. As for the United States, in its external situation, the new mood of detente is ripening with the recent U.S.-Soviet INF treaty and the optimistic prospects for a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

However, domestically, the United States is facing difficult situations such as the heightened political competition between the two parties for the 1988 presidential election and the "twin deficit" problems, which have been analyzed as creating difficult economic tasks for the last few years, which are responsible for the serious debate over the issues of reduction and withdrawal of overseas U.S. Armed Forces.

Furthermore, regarding the 20th SCM, this being the first international meeting between the defense secretaries of the two nations since they took office and coming at a turning point for each nation, the public interest in and expectation for the meeting is unprecedentedly large. With this background, I hope that the examination of the significance of the SCM from the perspective of security in the Korean Peninsula will help you in the reserve army to better understand the military relations between the two countries to some extent.

2. Changes in ROK-U.S. Security Relationship

As in the case of countries like Japan and the NATO allies, which are developed nations in many aspects but cannot imagine a situation where they have to maintain their own security with their relations departing from the United States, there has been no change in the fact that our national security is greatly influenced by U.S. political policy and strategy even though our national strength and international standing have improved. However, the ROK-U.S. security relationship has been maturing from a one-sided dependent relationship to a reciprocal partnership.

The United States and Korea celebrated their 100th friendship anniversary in May 1982. The relationship between the two nations, which has been developed during the last century since the United States forced the opening of the then-Choson which had been known to the West as the "Hermit Kingdom" on 22 May 1882, has been in effect a history of vicissitudes. This was because the United States for the last century had at first aided Choson in claiming national sovereignty from China and other powerful countries but later, had come to acquiesce in Japan's rule of Korea. Once again, the United States helped Korea to recover its independence at the end of World War II and then after the war, the United States agreed to divide the Korean Peninsula into two adversaries. However, on that very ground, the United States experienced its first "war without victory" in its history, and finally became the ROK's most important ally in opposition to north Korea.

In order to facilitate an understanding of the ROK-U.S. security relationship which has continued for more than 100 years, this article will briefly explain the characteristics of bilateral relations between the two countries by dividing it into three periods: the early contact period; the open door period; and the special relationship period.

Early Contact Period: 1866-1881

This period can be described in several historical incidents of confrontation: One is the incident of confrontation between the two nations which was caused by the U.S. Ship General Sherman's approach into Korea's inner regions via the Taedong River in 1886; the other is the incident of confrontation which resulted from U.S. Asian Fleet Commander Admiral Rodgers' attack on the shore of Kangwha Island in 1871.

During this period, the U.S. approach toward Korea is analyzed as having been made as an effort to tap the possibility of trade with the three Far East Asian nations of China, Japan, and Korea, which had up until then been shared by the European nations.

Open Door Period: 1882-1944

This period can be described as a honeymoon for trade and political relations. That is, the United States and Korea signed a U.S.-Korea Trade Treaty in 1882, whose format was identical to the trade treaties with China and Japan. However, Korea's economic value and marketability was under expectation as the treaty had evaluated it and the U.S. attitude and enthusiasm toward Korea gradually became cooler, which had finally resulted in its having assisted the Japanese occupation of Korea and Czarist Russia's advance to Korea. Another characteristic incident was the Taft-Katsura agreement which was made by the United States and Japan in 1905, in which there was a mutual recognition of the U.S. interest in the Philippines and the Japanese exclusive control over Korea.

The U.S.-Korea relationship during this period had the consequence of Korea falling behind in the areas of maintaining its national sovereignty and advancing into international society because of the United States' outright pursuit of its own practical interests and indifference toward Korea.

Special Relationship Period: Period After 1945

This period can be summarized as being a special security relationship which has been formed and maintained according to the needs of both countries. The United States and the ROK have maintained a close relationship by making such agreements as the "Tentative Transitional Period Administrative Agreement on Military and Security Affairs" in August 1949, the "Agreement on the Establishment of the U.S. Military Advisory Group in ROK" and the "ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Aid Agreement" in January 1950, the "Taejon Agreement" in July 1950, the "ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty" in 1953, and the creation of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command in November 1978.

Changes in the relationship between the two countries are well reflected in U.S. aid to the ROK. In other words, U.S. Armed Forces in the ROK, which amounted to

approximately 360,000 during the Korean war, were reduced to about 60,000 by 1957 and have been maintained at the current level of about 40,000 since its 7th Division withdrew. The U.S. military aid to the ROK amounted to \$25 to \$26 billion during the Korean war. Also, 80 percent and 50 to 70 percent of U.S. military aid payments during the period between 1955 and 1960 and the period between 1961 and 1969 respectively were given freely and then the free military aid began to decrease and finally ceased to exist in 1978. The ROK was also graduated from paid U.S. Foreign Military Sales Loans (FMS loans) in 1986. While U.S. economic aid gradually decreased, its diplomatic assistance necessary for the ROK's advance into the international community has strengthened. At the same time, the ROK's support and role are expanding in areas regarding the U.S. Armed Forces in the ROK, cost sharing in the use of joint facilities and services, and furthermore, burden sharing for regional security.

These changes in the ROK-U.S. security relationship are testimony to the United States' economic and political burdens and the limitations on the maintenance of military power, rather than a result of "neo-isolationism" and to the relative decrease of the influence of great powers as the ROK's national strength increases.

In summary, the U.S.-Korea relationship, which has continued for more than 100 years, had been kept distant because of the U.S. lack of interest in Korea up until the Korean war and had remained an auxiliary relationship resulting from the U.S.-Japan relationship. Nowadays, however, as the United States has come to acknowledge the value of the ROK as an "advanced base" for its strategy of deterrence against the Soviet Union and the PRC after the war, that relationship has developed on a different level based on the combined U.S. strategy of deterrence against the Soviet Union's military expansionism in Far East Asia and the policy of advancing into Asia, and has been maturing to a partnership in economic, political, and security areas accompanied by the prediction of the era of the Pacific Rim.

Both the United States and the ROK have been partners in several areas: In strategic areas, they have maintained a peaceful and friendly relationship, which was predicted by the 1882 agreement; in economic areas, they have increased mutual interests and prosperity; in political areas, they have respected each other's sovereignty and nurtured pluralistic political systems. In the next century, such a partnership will assume a very active role in the "Pacific Community," where the security, economic, and political interests of the United States will coincide with those of the Asian nations.

3. Establishment and Function of SCM

Background of Establishment of SCM

This meeting had originated from the sudden military tension and crisis that swept the ROK, which was caused by the surprise attack attempt on the Chongwadae and the Pueblo kidnapping incident on 21 January and 23 January 1968 respectively.

North Korea, which has continued to maintain the annexation of the ROK as its national goal since the ceasefire, has engaged in various provocative actions adopting such methods as clinging to the logic of "People's Liberation War" or "National Liberation War." However, at the end of the 1960's, the force and frequency of such provocations suddenly began to soar, which was exemplified by such incidents as the 21 January incident and the Pueblo kidnapping incident, which became the background for the SCM's establishment, and the communist guerrilla attack incident at Uljin and Samchok (2 November 1968), the EC-121 downing incident (15 April 1969), and the KAL high-jacking incident (11 December 1969). At the time of 1965, the atmosphere of ROK-U.S. military cooperation had been rising with the ROK's dispatch of armed forces to Vietnam. However, due to the prompt countermeasures taken concerning the Pueblo incident as compared to the passive reaction shown to the 21 January incident by the United States, the ROK Government felt a keen need for consultation with the United States concerning the political situation in the Korean Peninsula and the United States realized the need for the cooperation of the ROK Government in its effort to return the Pueblo and the crew members through its secret contact with north Korea, which all came to the realization of a Pak-Johnson summit meeting in Hawaii on 17 April 1968. During this meeting, the two heads of state agreed to hold a defense cabinet meeting between the two countries at the earliest date possible and in consequence, the ROK-U.S. Defense Cabinet Meeting was held in Washington on 27 May 1968.

After the third Defense Cabinet Meeting, its name was changed to the current SCM since 1971, when its function and nature were considerably upgraded. In the process of hosting 20 SCM meetings including this year's, the scope of participants and lists of agenda, which could be described as being on the minor scale of the overall ROK-U.S. relationship, have expanded with variety and the nature of the meeting has changed from that of a "one-sided notification and demand," with more emphasis on "political consultation."

Function of SCM

The SCM is the official consultative channel in ROK-U.S. military cooperative relations and its functions are as follows: consultation on overall policy concerning ROK-U.S. security affairs; the assessment of the military threat in North East Asia and the Korean Peninsula and establishment of countermeasures by joint efforts; and arbitration and consultation on methods to overcome differences in opinion between the two nations at the level of improvement in military cooperation, effective construction, and operation of ROK-U.S. combined defense forces. The Military Committee Meeting (MCM), which is headed by the joint chiefs of staff of both nations and held prior to the SCM, functions as follows: a consultative body on military affairs such as

military maneuvers and combined defense strategy; provision of "strategic directives" and "operational guidelines" to the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces commander; and the provision of "strategic directives" to the Combined Forces Command on receiving "strategic guidelines" from SCM. The SCM and MCM are in charge of the "mediation function in security affairs," which consults and mediates prompt and effective security policy and military countermeasures going beyond the level of annual meetings between senior officials from the defense and foreign affairs ministries.

It can be said that the development of the first Defense Cabinet Meeting held in 1968 into the current SCM, which can be described as a reflection of the trend in which the scope of consultation between the two nations has gradually expanded, is rather a result of hidden efforts by high working group officials from both countries. The system of SCM has been reorganized from the previous format of a main conference and a one to one meeting to that of a general meeting and working-level meetings since the 8th SCM. The MCM has been established and been in operation since the 11th SCM. Since the 12th MCM, the working-level meeting has been expanded and reorganized into Military Supply, Security, Technological Cooperation, and Joint Statement Committees. Since the 17th SCM, the "Political Policy Examination Committee" has been added in order to assist a ministerial meeting and to strengthen the consultative function regarding political policy. Since the 20th SCM, the Technological Cooperation Committee has been expanded into the Technological Cooperation and Defense Industry Committee in consideration of the importance of nurturing the defense industry and technological cooperation and the relationship between the two. In addition to this, the "Preliminary Working Group Meeting (Pre-SCM)" has been in operation 2 to 3 months prior to the SCM, and is managed by the SCM host country in order to strengthen the function of working group consultation. In order to continuously pursue agreements made in the SCM, the "Senior Level Working Group Meeting (SWM)," which consists of groups of senior level working staff or people from the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combined Forces Command, and Combined U.S. Military Advisory Group, has been also in operation since 1982. This series of establishments of new consultative channels and the reorganization and expansion of the system are analyzed as having been a reflection of the mutual recognition of the natural consultation concerning more realistic, intermediate to long-term military cooperation issues.

SCM's Past Record of Performance

In the 1960's, the ROK Government established the reserve army in order to cope with rapid increase of military provocation and to effectively deal with an anticipated communist armed guerrilla or armed uprising in the late 1960's. In order to meet the resulting need

for rapidly increasing military supplies, the ROK government had consultations through the SCM for an additional \$100 million in military aid in order to realize such projects as the establishment of a factory to manufacture M-16 rifles and ammunition, and the long-term modernization plan of the ROK Armed Forces.

The ROK-U.S. relationship in the 1970's in fact can be described as the "era of agitation." The Nixon doctrine resulted in the transfer of the Military Assistance Program and the reduction of the U.S. Armed Forces in the ROK. During the President Ford era, the United States changed its policy of construction of a "fan shape defense network" and began to apply its "strategy of forward bases" toward the ROK. Since President Carter came to power, an "uncomfortable relationship" began to accumulate by U.S. pressure on human rights issues in the post-Yusin era in the ROK, the total withdrawal of the U.S. Armed Forces in the ROK on a gradual basis, the Pak Tong-son incident, and the wire tapping incident in Chongwadae. During the same period, north Korea increased its number of divisions from 28 to 41, thus increasing its military force to 700,000.

Accordingly, the SCM concentrated in debating the following issues: a plan to foster the defense industry, including joint production of F-5E/F fighters and the introduction of the F-5 planes; assistance in the modernization of the ROK's military equipment; interruption of the withdrawal of U.S. Armed Forces in ROK; establishment of ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command; and establishment of the MCM. By doing so, the SCM has performed such functions as inducing the United States to adopt a realistic military policy toward ROK, as was exemplified in its effective push for the ROK's military capacity build-up plan and a "guarantee of continued presence of the U.S. Armed Forces in ROK," and developing a concrete ROK-U.S. combined operational system.

As the Reagan administration was launched in the beginning of the 1980's, it declared "security as a first priority" and adopted a "simultaneous multifarious strategic concept" and a "concept of strong ordinary war capacity in preparation for long term war." The Reagan administration is pursuing a policy of shared defense by regional allies and a combined strategic concept in order to alleviate the huge financial burden necessary for the realization of these strategic concepts and to urge partnership among its allies. In this atmosphere, both nations, through the SCM, have reconfirmed the U.S. position of "total cancellation of the withdrawal plan for U.S. Armed Forces in ROK," induced the U.S. Armed Forces' military buildup in ROK by deploying F-16 fighters, Lance battery, and an attack helicopter battalion, and have been developing a combined operational system which will cover deployment, supply, and overall strategy for emergency reinforcement forces.

The SCM has studied a means to strengthen combat readiness by way of the joint production of various weapons and ammunition including fighter planes and a

method to strengthen the capacity for continued war through emergency savings of ammunition, equipment, and resources and through the fostering of the defense industry with the newest military, scientific, and technological cooperation. It has also examined multifarious issues such as the introduction of military loans for the modernization of the ROK Armed Forces and the sale and timely introduction of the latest weaponry.

Beginning with the mid-1980's in particular, as a joint study atmosphere has been formulated between the two countries, they have been studying the "aspects of a north Korean invasion of the ROK" under the supervision of the intelligence agencies of both countries and have been developing their military countermeasures. The two nations are also in the process of consulting each other on "equal" and "balanced" terms for the improvement and overhaul of treaties and agreements which have been already made between the two governments in connection with security issues. They are doing a "CFC-90 Study" centering on the Combined Forces Command, which examines the function and organization of the Combined Forces Command as a part of the improvement measures for ROK-U.S. military relations in the 1990's.

One should also note that behind the successful hosting of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) convention in 1985 and the Asian Games in 1986 prior to the 1988 Olympic games, there had been effective "joint security measures" which had been agreed through the SCM. As was described above, the SCM has been forming the foundations of cooperation in many areas by smoothly handling such current military issues, in which both countries have interests, as confirming the U.S. defense commitment toward the ROK and mediating major security policy issues between the two countries on a large scale, and military operations, combined military exercises, and export of defense industry materials to third countries on a small scale.

4. Final Settlement of 20th SCM

Positions of Two Nations Concerning 20th SCM

As was indicated in the prologue, the situation for the 20th SCM held in 1988 has several factors different from those of the past.

First, a new detente system is being built with the U.S.-Soviet INF abolition treaty, the Soviet Union and the PRC are conspicuously expressing an open door policy and appeasement or "smiling" policy toward the Asian nations with their institutional reform policy and the ROK's north diplomatic policy is active with the occasion of the Seoul Olympic Games, thus contributing to significant changes in the surrounding security situations. Secondly, as for the U.S. internal situation, public opinion is heading toward opposition to political and military intervention in the Korean Peninsula and a pragmatic tendency such as burden sharing by its allies is

coming to the surface; and as for the ROK's internal situation, the demand for the withdrawal of U.S. troops in ROK is being stimulated by anti-American sentiment among some south Korean people and north Korea's claim for "making the Korean Peninsula a nuclear-free zone" and the atmosphere of debate on reunification is heightening. Thirdly, as the new government was launched in the ROK and the presidential election is slated in 1988, peoples' interest in domestic political issues in both countries is increasing. Furthermore, the ROK has the mission to elevate the Seoul Olympiad to a humanistic and cultural festival without fail to overcome north Korea's open terrorist activities and interference maneuvers such as the bombing of the KAL-858.

Considering these situations, it is analyzed that the United States, citing the ROK's "economic miracle" and the growth of national strength, is in a position to request the ROK government for expanded direct or indirect assistance to U.S. troops in ROK including an increase in defense expenditures and furthermore, for assistance in connection with the Persian Gulf conflict as an ally. As for the ROK, it is analyzed that the ROK is in a position to continue the ROK-U.S. combined defense system in connection with the security issue, to reconfirm U.S. defense commitment to the ROK, to request military assistance measures for the successful hosting of the Seoul Olympiad in particular, to develop areas of common interest in the defense industry, military supply, and technological fields, and to take specific measures to promote practical interests toward the United States.

Result of 20th SCM

The 20th SCM, which was held for two days from 8 to 9 June after the MCM on 7 June, closed with the joint press conference by the secretaries of both countries on 9 June. Even though the 20th SCM revealed the interest relations on realistic terms between the two countries more obviously than any other time in the past, it is analyzed as having greatly dispayed the determination for military cooperation between the two nations to the outside world for the sake of guaranteeing security during the Seoul Olympiad and maintaining peace in the Korean Peninsula.

During the 20th SCM, we have consulted on the following items. First, for the successful hosting of the Olympic Games, which is the biggest national task at the moment, we have consulted on the following measures: the deployment of several additional aircraft carriers and the 7th Fleet fortilla offshore of the Korean Peninsula; operation of the Airborne Warning and Control System with a two fold increase of assets; security measures to cope with north Korea's anticipated terrorist activities and interference maneuvers against the Olympic Games. Secondly, for peace and security in the Korean Peninsula and North East Asia, we have reconfirmed the U.S. defense commitment and the guarantee of nuclear umbrella under the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty at

a time of military aggression against the Korean Peninsula and have given the commander of the Combined Forces Command a responsibility to develop the system of combined command within the Combined Forces Command.

As far as the U.S. troops in ROK are concerned, we agreed that "the U.S. Armed Forces should remain in the ROK until a firm foundation for regional security can be established and as long as the threat of north Korea continues and the ROK government and people want them to stay." and vowed our joint efforts for regional security. Thirdly, in order to improve the system for military supply assistance and the capacity to continue a war, we signed an "Agreement on Mutual Military Supply Assistance" and an agreement on the "Extension and Expansion of the Agreement on Ammunition Modernization." Fourthly, in connection with the ROK-U.S. cooperation in the defense industry and exports to third countries, we have come to sign the "Comprehensive Memorandum on Defense Industry Technological Cooperation." Besides these, the fruits of the SCM can be described as having had wide range consultations, many parts of which were commonly shared, on overall security affairs such as a denunciation of the KAL-858 bombing savagery, recognition of natural dialogue between north and south in accordance with the principles of the parties concerned, and maintenance of the cease fire agreement system until a permanent and effective peace guarantee system can be established on the Korean Peninsula.

In this connection, the ROK Government promised to invest and assist with a amount of \$40 million for the maintenance of U.S. Navy planes which are connected with Combined Defense Improvement Programs and the Persian Gulf situation.

5. Epilogue

Since the SCM was founded in 1968, there have been many changes in the ROK-U.S. military cooperative relationship beginning with the issue of the reduction of the U.S. troops in ROK according to the Nixon doctrine. There have also been innumerable transient changes in the international political situations such as the normalization of the Sino-Soviet relationship, the collapse of Vietnam in 1975, and the recent U.S.-Soviet new detente mood. The single fact remaining unchanged in connection with security in the Korean Peninsula is north Korea's strategy of communist annexation of the ROK.

The SCM can be described as having taken a decisive role in deterring north Korea's temptation for war. Even though realistically our military power lags behind that of north Korea, defense and foreign affairs officials convened together through the SCM every year and closely analyzed the enemy's military power and steadily developed countermeasures. The SCM has made innumerable contributions to deterring a war: They are the transfer of U.S. Armed Forces' equipment to the ROK,

introduction of military build-up loans, military assistance, fostering of the defense industry, purchase of the newest weaponry, founding of the Combined Forces Command, and large-scale joint military exercises.

The ROK-U.S. relationship, viewed from the perspective of this year's SCM, makes one realize that it is developing into a relationship of "mutual dependence" and "partnership." Our position, which had been that of a heavy debtor both in mental and in physical aspects toward the United States, is now changing to pay back those debts albeit only partially. The free military assistance was terminated in the 1970's and we have graduated from the U.S. FMS loans in 1986. From now on, we are in a position to put investment on the level of "regional security" and to provide direct and indirect assistance to U.S. troops in ROK.

As the world has been changing its shape by an "economic war through trade" rather than by a "war by military force," the level of mutual dependency among nations is getting higher every day. According to these trends, it is also expected that the "closed concept of the people and the nation" will develop into an "open concept" such as by cooperation between regions, thus giving more emphasis to a "regional community" or "regional cooperation community." Even if we disregard the past blood pledge with or favor of the United States, the ROK-U.S. relationship, which must be strengthened on these virtues alone, should be strengthened in terms of solving future tasks which have accumulated. They are, an advance into the international community, regional cooperation, deterrence of threat in order to survive, and national prosperity and reunification.

Of course, the current ROK-U.S. security relationship should be changed and adjusted in accordance with the changes in the surrounding and domestic situations. When the 1988 Olympiad is completed successfully and some kind of military equilibrium can be determined between north and south Korea, such core security policies as the return of operational rights, the issue of U.S. troop withdrawal from the ROK, and the regional balance of power will be consulted on in depth, which will give a new meaning to the SCM and MCM.

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Reporter Discusses 'New Phase' in Relationship With PRC

41070104 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean
9 Jul 88 p 13

[A special report by reporter Pak Pyong-sok: "A Letter from Hong Kong"]

[Text] The relationship between the Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China came to a turning point last March and entered a new phase with the PRC's attitude toward Korea improving remarkably.

Just 3 months earlier Koreans had difficulty in receiving a visitor's visa to the PRC, even for purely business trips.

Recently, however, not only group inspection tours, including many chairmen of the major business groups, but also, in June, an inspection tour organized by general businessmen and a joint venture survey team of various people visited the PRC and had in-depth discussions on mutual economic cooperation beyond the individual-consultation level.

Korea and Shandong and Liaoning Provinces agreed on the actual establishment of trade delegations, but not on titles, and agreed on direct trade in principle, except for the hoisting of each country's flag. Even though this is still provincial-level cooperation, the mutual relations between the two countries should be judged to be entering a new phase, considering that these provincial decisions are possible only with the permission of the Chinese central government.

Even though this epoch-making change in the Korea-China relationship is based upon China's pragmatic policy to achieve its ultimate goal of a "prosperous China," it is also greatly influenced by the international trend of easing of tensions and peaceful coexistence.

The U.S.-Soviet summit meeting which agreed to a reduction in strategic nuclear arms, and the detente mood in China-Soviet relations created a tension-easing atmosphere in the overall situation in northeast Asia. In particular, the mood of detente in Chinese-Soviet relations narrows the limitations of north Korea's tug-of-war style diplomacy.

Furthermore, north Korea's circle of activities in the international arena became more limited after the KAL incident last November, while south Korea's position becomes stronger because of its economic success and the hosting of the Olympic games.

Thus, the south Korea-China relationship is improving rapidly with the improvement of domestic and international circumstances. We seriously need to establish a strategy and an appropriate policy for dealing with China.

The formation of Korea's policy and strategy for dealing with China should be, in both name and reality, initiated by wisdom gathered from the people as well as experts in various fields. It should not be monopolized by a certain institution or office.

First of all, we should establish institutes for consultation, advice, and research composed of experts from various fields.

Looking objectively at the research reports published in both countries, PRC studies on south Korea are ahead of south Korea's studies of the PRC.

South Korea's studies of the PRC still remain in the realm of general surveys, while the PRC's studies of south Korea have reached the level of detailed studies of each industry or each business.

We can understand backwardness of our studies, when we consider that our research reports mainly depend upon secondary sources in English or Japanese, while those of the PRC use mainly primary sources such as research articles from various fields in Korea, including government statistics and newspapers.

In addition, 5 years ago the PRC established a National Chinese Chosen (Korea) Economic society composed of experts on Korea. This society has held an annual national seminar (closed to the public) every year for the last 5 years, and has exchanged information and brought together collective wisdom.

When we compare ourselves to the Chinese, we have to meditate on the basic weakness of our society in neglecting the training of experts.

Both countries agreed on promotion of the mutual relationship. Both sides revealed, however, mutual differences, in terms of their points of view. South Korea wants to develop the relationship to the political level following economic exchanges, while the PRC wants to tie it to the framework of "practical private sector exchanges."

To improve the relationship to the political level we desire, we need an epochal exchange of ideas in which Korea's strong points can complement the PRC's weak areas. It does not seem very difficult to find such areas.

For example, Korea can support the PRC in its development plan of the Bo Hai area by undertaking the needed construction of large-scale industrial roads or ports.

We can do this based on our good experience, employing heavy construction equipment used in construction projects in the Middle East.

This kind of plan requires huge amounts of capital and manpower. It is beyond the level of a private business. If this kind of plan is achieved, the mutual relationship between the two countries can develop a new aspect.

One other point is that we should change our attitude of "It is better not to report on the south Korea-China relationship," if there really is such an attitude.

The people no longer believe in the idea that some day the government will suddenly announce a world-shaking Korea-China relationship improvement policy. Furthermore, opening of information at the "appropriate level" to the public will bring together ideas from many people.

The PRC recently expressed great enthusiasm for a joint venture with Korea.

Recently, one official in Shantung Province wished to explain his province's investment environment and projects of concern to the chairman of a Korean group, visiting the province. He took the opportunity to accompany the Korean in his car and ask the driver to "slow down."

He wanted to slow down to gain more time to explain. With some doubts about the exaggerated Chinese estimation of Korea, a frank answer is required by the Korean side. It is necessary for us to answer "no" forthrightly, when we cannot help and avoid disappointment because of exaggerated expectations.

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Ruling Sector Seeks Voluntary Testimony by Chon on Corruption Charges

41070103 Seoul HANKUK ILBO in Korean
16 Jul 88 p 3

[Article by Reporter Yi I-chun: "Lightening the Load by a 'Voluntary Explanation'—the Ruling Sector's Strategy With Respect to the Chon Issue"]

[Text] On 14 July, while the president vetoed the bill on the parliamentary right to inspect and investigate the government administration and a bill amending the law on testimonies and professional opinions, the government and the DJP stated that a plan was under consideration that would allow former President Chon Tu-hwan, against whom these two bills are directed, to make a "voluntary explanation." This statement seems to stem from multiple intentions.

First, the government and the DJP believe that the "voluntary explanation" formula can make up in some degree for the tenuous justification of the presidential veto power exercised on the detention provision.

No matter how one may view it, the veto of the two bills, including the detention provision, is hardly justifiable in view of the fact that the ruling camp has continually stressed that there is no sanctuary as far as the investigation of the corruption of the Fifth Republic is concerned.

For this reason, the ruling camp feels that a personal explanation by former President Chon will not only extricate the ruling party from its "predicament" caused by a lack of justification for the veto, but also have the effect of broadening the DJP's narrowed standing in the current parliament dominated by the opposition.

The DJP also seems to have been calculating that by advising former President Chon to make a "voluntary explanation" and by circulating reports that such advice has been made, the DJP will be able to turn the voluntary explanation formula into an established fact, and this will in turn lighten President No's political burden.

In other words, the government and the DJP understand that in view of the complex relationships between President No and the former President Chon, all problems concerning the former president are a tremendous burden for President No. Nothing will make the ruling camp happier at this time than if Chon makes a voluntary explanation.

At the same time, the ruling party thinks that if one of the two nooses (the corruption of the Fifth Republic and the Kwangju Incident) around the ruling sector are removed by the voluntary explanation, it will give the ruling party the justification and strength with which to wage an all-out war on the opposition over the Kwangju issue.

It still remains unknown how far the government and the ruling party have gone in contacting former President Chon concerning their idea of a voluntary explanation. However, judging from the fact that the DJP has disclosed its plan to send a high-ranking party official to Chon soon to consult on this matter, apparently there has been no concrete consultation and contact.

In this connection, it is noteworthy that there is a considerable difference of opinion between the government, namely, the Blue House, the DJP, and former President Chon as to the content and methods of the voluntary explanation in question.

The Blue House's first and foremost concern is to shield President No from the possible ill effects of the corruption and all other issues involving the Fifth Republic. This has been a consistent stand taken by the close associates of President No since the inauguration of the Sixth Republic. This stand became conspicuous during the controversy over the "nomination of Chong Ki-sung as chief justice." The DJP seems to expect that if former President Chon voluntarily presents his case, the corruption of the Fifth Republic will become much less burdensome to President No.

That is why it is pointed out in some quarters that although the Blue House could directly handle the issue of a voluntary explanation, the DJP has taken upon itself the task of handling the matter because his close associates want to ensure that President No will not be adversely affected by handling this matter. In other words, in their opinion, the corruption of the Fifth Republic is a matter that belongs to former President Chon and has no direct bearing on the government of the Sixth Republic. In brief, the view prevailing in the Blue House is that a direct explanation by the person concerned is the only possible solution.

The DJP position is similar. The ruling party believes that the offering of a personal explanation by former President Chon may not settle the whole issue of the corruption of the Fifth Republic but will be sufficient

to blunt the political offensive of the opposition. Particularly those DJP parliamentarians who have no particular ties with former President Chon take the strong stand that "there is no reason why we should be held politically accountable," stressing that the former president should make a voluntary explanation. However, many DJP parliamentarians fear that a voluntary explanation might make the matter worse rather than settling the issue. It is their common view that inasmuch as the Fifth Republic stands in the dock before the tribunal of public opinion, an explanation of the truth about any one part of the corruption of the Fifth Republic would not dispel all the suspicions completely. Therefore, in their opinion, the only solution lies in clarifying the whole truth in the special committee of the National Assembly, and a voluntary explanation would make the position of the ruling sector all the more difficult.

The government and the DJP say that the question of making a voluntary explanation is a matter that former President Chon himself should decide.

In this connection, former President Chon is reportedly seriously studying the matter, but his opinion is markedly different from that of the government and the DJP as to the method of explanation. To be specific, the government and the DJP are of the opinion that it will be perfect if the former president offers a personal explanation at an early date in July, but it may be alright if an explanation is offered through a close aide. However, former President Chon and his close aides take the position that at this point in time, the person concerned can not and should not offer a personal explanation. Nevertheless, they think that a close aide can explain about the personal residence in Yonhui-Tong and the question concerning the 2 billion-won donation by the Ilhae Foundation.

One close aide of former President Chon stressed that "former President Chon's property was reported when the properties of government officials were registered in 1983," and that the personal residence in Yonhui-Tong was previously registered with the Ministry of Government Administration."

The same aide said that as for the Chongnamdae [South Blue House] and other local presidential villas, being pieces of state property, the government should explain and they are not matters former President Chon should explain.

He also made it clear that it may be possible for former President Chon to offer a personal explanation only after the truth has been ascertained through an investigation by the National Assembly special committee, and such an explanation is inconceivable at this moment.

This view is based on the assumption that Chon has done nothing wrong, but he may offer an explanation

about some part of the alleged corruption. However, even if such an explanation is made, the "public mind is already made up," and won't believe his explanation.

The same aide takes the position that it is nonsensical even to raise the question of whether the former president should appear before the National Assembly special committee.

This aide asks how it is possible for former President Chon to appear before the special committee under the circumstances where no "material evidence of corruption" showing that he had personally received a bribe has been produced. However, for 2 months the whole country has noisily talked about the "corruption of the Fifth Republic."

In the opinion of former President Chon's aide, if the National Assembly special committee, after securing a "direct proof of corruption," requests his presence, he will appear before the special committee without hesitation to offer his explanation; otherwise there is no reason for him to make such an appearance. It maintains the position that with regard to various allegations about corruption involving permits and licenses issued by the government, whether these permits and licenses were issued appropriately may be a subject of discussion to determine whether there was a misjudgment in policy decision, but in the absence of any "direct material evidence of corruption," it is impossible for the former president to appear before the National Assembly special committee to offer his explanation.

The same aide, therefore, predicts that the only possible personal explanation by former President Chon will be for him to offer his explanation directly to the public, to the effect that he is "sorry in a political and moral sense for having caused a public controversy in one way or another."

It appears that this posture on the part of former President Chon stems from his maintaining a "certain posture" toward the government and the DJP. Although the substance of this posturing has not manifested itself yet, it is believed that unless a clear prescription to resolve it is found, the voluntary explanation in question may beget yet another question.

Although it is hard to predict just what decision will be made on the plan that the government and the DJP are pushing to have former President Chon offer a "voluntary explanation," it is fair to say that unless a satisfactory formula concerning this question is found among the three parties, namely the government, the DJP, and the former president himself, there may be another discord within the whole ruling sector.

Persons Holding 'Real Power' in Sixth Republic
41070073 Seoul WOLGAN CHOSON in Korean
Jun 88 pp 126-143

[Article by reporter Kwon HYong-ki "People With Real Power in the Sixth Republic"]

[Text] People With Real Power in the Sixth Republic; People With Potential Influence

Who are the "people with real power" in the Sixth Republic, namely, those who can exert some influence on President No Tae-u? This question is of interest not only among politicians but also among the public. It is no longer a question of mere curiosity, since the Sixth Republic has already set sail with the inauguration of President No Tae-u.

Under the presidential system, all power (authority) stems from the president himself. Although the constitution of the Sixth Republic created a system with a considerable degree of decentralization of power, the power of the president remains as awesome and enormous as it was in the Fifth Republic.

Since those with influence on President No Tae-u can affect the tenor and direction of the administration, exerting long-term influence on the future of our country, the question of who they are is a matter of great concern and interest.

Accepting the premise that President No Tae-u is the source of power, one can think of two criteria or considerations pertinent to examining the issue of who holds real power.

The first has to do with how much input or influence one has in the making of personnel and policy decisions by President No Tae-u. Since the President is the person who makes the final decision, whoever has input and therefore is able to exert influence on the president's decision making is the one who holds the real power.

In addition, one has to consider to whom the president assigns the task of implementing his decisions. The person who is responsible for implementation of his decisions is naturally the one who holds real power. Obviously, the first and second criteria are often intermingled and cannot be readily separated from each other.

Viewed from this perspective, one comes to the conclusion that the real power holders are those who are near the president. A person with greater access to the president is capable of exerting influence upon him, whether the access is in the line of one's official duty, one's personal relationship, or family relationship.

It is for this reason that one is justified in saying that a measure of real power is not so much the official title of one's position, as it is the ease of access to the president. For this reason in the past, holders of such posts as the chief of presidential security and the chief of the presidential staff wielded an incredible amount of power. In addition, the relatives of past presidents have gotten out of control in exerting their power. It is the plain truth that an official title alone is not sufficient to gauge the extent of a person's influence on the president.

Four Pillars of the Secretariat, Cabinet, Party, and National Security Agency

Taking into account both official title and "proximity" to the president, we consider those who appear to be holders of real power capable of exerting influence on the president.

In managing the affairs of a nation, the President is assisted by numerous bases including the executive branch and the party. Of these, four in particular constitute key pillars of the Presidency, which are the presidential secretariat, the cabinet, the Agency for National Security Planning, and the Minjongdang (Democratic Justice Party). Those who are in charge of these organizations automatically assume a great deal of real power.

The presidential secretariat consists of the chief of staff, head presidential secretaries for political affairs, administration, economy, civilian affairs, protocol, and public information. The Sixth Republic created additional posts of presidential assistant for policy matters and presidential assistant for security. Although they all belong to the power group because of their official duties, the core power holders based on official duty as well as special relationship to the president would include Chief of Staff Hong Song-chol, Head Presidential Secretary for Political Affairs Choe Pyong-yol, and Head Presidential Secretary for Protocol Yi Pyong-ki.

Within the executive branch, one should recognize that the prime minister holds considerable power. Although Prime Minister Yi Hyon-chae was not appointed due to any close relationship with the president, the prime minister in the Sixth Republic holds far greater authority than at any other time.

Among the cabinet members, one should count Minister of Government Administration Kim Yong-kap, First Minister of State Kim Yun-hwan, and Director of the Government Legislative Administrative Agency Hyon Hong-chu as those holding considerable influence because of their personal proximity to the president.

No one can dispute the plain fact that the director of the Agency for National Security Planning would exert influence in all fields because the agency is responsible for national security, namely, the maintenance of the current political system. Agency Director An Mu-hyok is

particularly powerful because of the role he played in the transition from the Fifth to the Sixth Republic as well as his personal relationship with the president.

The ruling Democratic Justice Party is headed by Chief Delegate Che Mun-sik and Secretary General Sim Myong-po. These men are entrusted by President No, who is party chairman. Since the president has full confidence in these men, they have considerable influence on him.

There is a consensus both within and outside the party that assemblyman Yi Chun-ku will have no less influence than these two men, although he holds no official post in the party. It is said to be no exaggeration that President No trusts him most within the party, as well as the ruling circle. One should add another name to this circle of influential associates, a member of the national policy evaluation committee of the party research center for national policy, Ho Sam-su.

On the other hand, the president's brother-in-law (wife's brother) Kim Pok-tong, who is also a classmate from the Military Academy (former president of the Mining Promotion Company) and another brother-in-law (husband of his wife's sister), Kum Chin-ho, who is a former mit leader Kim Il-song, a briefing meeting was held at the People's Cultural Center and a workshop at the People's University auditorium.

23 September: An international conference on aviation and machine insurance was held in Pyongyang (Minister of Defense Chong Ho-yong. It is said that Mr Chong, who is a classmate from both Kyongbok High School and the Military Academy, enjoys a visible degree of respect and trust from his junior officers and is also a recipient of favorable comments among his senior officers.

Nucleus of Power, the Blue House Secretariat

Presidential chief secretaries are staff persons who are closest to the president and assist him around the clock. They are capable of direct influence upon presidential decisions. Considering that the extent of one's influence increases in proportion to the frequency of seeing the president, these chief secretaries can hardly be ignored in terms of their influence on the president's policy and personnel decisions.

As intermediaries between cabinet members and the president, chief secretaries can exert influence on both sides. Under the Fifth Republic, cabinet members routinely consulted chief secretaries for major policy or personnel decisions. Such routines were motivated not only by a concern for smooth cooperative working relationships, but also by the recognition that chief secretaries by virtue of being close to the president can better read the mind and intentions of the president. Another source of power for chief secretaries is that they usually

possess performance information on a large number of people and have more opportunities than cabinet members to convey such information to the president.

At present, the presidential secretariat consists of Chief of Staff Hong Song-chol, Chief Secretary for Political Affairs Choe Pyong-yol, Chief Secretary for Administration Yi Yon-taek, Chief Secretary for Economic Affairs Pak Sung, Chief Secretary for Civilian Affairs Han Yong-sok, Chief of Protocol No Chang-hui, and Chief Secretary for Public Information Yi Su-chong.

Enormous Role of the Chief Secretary for Political Affairs

There can hardly be any disagreement concerning the assessment that Chief of Staff Hong Song-chol (62) is the key figure of influence inside the Blue House. Although his office is a cabinet-level position, he is the highest and closest confidant, assisting the president overall in leadership and administration. The chief of staff who oversees the presidential secretariat has experienced both expansion and shrinkage of his sphere of influence in the past. Even in a reduced state, the office cannot but remain a nucleus of power.

Chief of Staff Hong has in the past served in a variety of positions including the chief of staff for the prime minister, the Blue House chief secretary for political affairs, minister of home affairs, minister of health and social affairs, chairman of the Korean Association of Food Manufacturers, chairman of the Korean Association for International Culture, and chairman of the Homeland Unification Central Council. Based on his diverse experience, he is expected to live up to his long-standing reputation of a "good chief of staff."

He is said to place emphasis on harmony in human relationships within an organization, and contribute toward creating an atmosphere that induces and encourages unity among his subordinates. Although he has an outstanding ability to analyze and grasp the gist of issues, he does not put himself ahead of others. This has earned him a reputation as being a "master of mediation." He is unceremonious and humble; he maintains smooth interpersonal relationships. In short, he has the reputation of being a "good guy."

The first encounter which Chief of Staff Hong had with President No was in 1982. When he was minister of home affairs, as chairman of the Hwanghae Province People's Association he had an opportunity to meet with 50 some members of the advisory council of the Five Northern Provinces (those provinces now in north Korea). At the meeting, Mr Hong suggested that government assistance is needed to standardize the athletic events of the youths from the Five Northern Provinces. Having started with this relationship, he contributed heavily toward getting the votes of those from the Northern Provinces, and was duly recognized.

At one time during the Third Republic, the chief of staff was said to be second in line after the President. It has been generally understood that he would fulfill his duties as chief of staff without being recognized as one who holds power.

Chief Secretary for Political Affairs Choe Pyong-yol (50) is more of a behind-the-scenes person, who does not like to be in the forefront. He is the president's chief staff person for political affairs. His position carries an inestimable degree of weight since politics precedes all other considerations, and hardly no sphere of our national life is unaffected by politics. It is not difficult to imagine the extent of his influence in party affairs, national assembly matters, and other fields of politics, when one remembers both his personality and the trust placed in him by the president.

It is said that he hides under his earthy, unpretentious manners an outstanding ability for discerning judgement and analysis and a drive for completing a given task. In the last presidential election, he played a key role in political analysis, development of campaign strategy, and deployment of campaign tactics. It was he who sharpened the image of candidate No as one who severed relationships with the Fifth Republic by promoting such election themes as "Ending of authoritarianism," "Admitting the errors of the Fifth Republic," and "The will for democratic evolution." He also preempted the assault of opposition parties by anticipating their criticism. Because of his position on the "severance of ties with the Fifth Republic," he was under considerable restraint and pressure at the time of the political transfer of power.

Although he is unassuming and unpretentious in relating to other people, he is known to be firm and clear in his convictions when it comes to substantive matters in business or decision making. His firm conviction sometimes borders on being dogmatic, and has earned him the reputation of a "Choe-tler" [Translator's Note: A shortened combination of Choe and Hitler]. In the 12th Assembly election, he quit his career as a journalist, one he had pursued since his sophomore year in college, and entered politics as an at-large candidate of the Democratic Justice Party. Since then, he has been serving President No in such varying positions as chief of the political analysis bureau of the Party National Policy Research Center and later deputy director of the center.

He has ascended to the position of a key staff person in the president's inner circle without any special personal ties or power base. Some analysts point out that such ascendancy is indicative of what he will be able to do as the president's chief secretary for political affairs.

Each time President No faced a difficult political situation during the regime of the Fifth Republic, Mr Choe is said to have provided crucial consultation and advice. It is also known that he made his share of contribution to the "29 June Announcement."

Due to his pride and confidence in his own ability, he has the aggressive touch of not shying away from arguments with frontline officials. These traits were effectively utilized in the past presidential election. His basic strategy premise is, "Offense is the best defense." Deviating from the defensive strategy of ruling parties of the past, he preempted the likely targets of criticism by opposition parties, and emphasized outright rebuttals of the opposition parties' attack. Many observers expect his aggressive style to be reflected in his role as the presidential chief secretary for political affairs.

Personal Secretary Yi Pyong-ki, a Shadow of President No

Presidential Secretary Yi Byong-ki (40) is like the shadow of President No, and his role cannot be defined clearly. He maintains a close "proximity" with the president, and one may say that "he does not do anything in particular, but there is nothing in which he is not involved." He is in a position of offering the most confidential and private advice.

He has never left President No since his retirement from the military. He has spent more time with President No than anyone else and has been involved in everything President No does. Although his position is Grade-1, which is rather removed from a position of power, one must mention him as a potential power holder because his personal relationship with President No will likely continue for a long while.

He has accomplished a lot as an assistant to President No. At the time of the "29 June announcement," he is said to have been the only person who assisted the president continuously over a 5-day period, a period of hectic preparation prior to the announcement. In the past, he also participated in behind-the-scenes negotiations with the Chairman of the Democratic Justice Party Yi Min-u and close associates of the Chairman of the Reunification Democratic Party Kim Yong-sam.

Mr Yi graduated from Kyongbuk High School and finished his undergraduate study in the department of diplomacy at Seoul National University. He is trained as a diplomat. He was hired as special assistant in July 1982 when President No assumed the position of minister of political affairs after leaving the post of commander of the Defense Security Command. In searching for a special assistant, President No expressed his preference for a diplomat. Based on the recommendation of then Minister of Foreign Affairs No Sin-yong, Mr Yi was hired, moving from his duty station in Kenya.

Since then, Mr Yi has always followed President No as a shadow and assisted him through numerous positions such as minister of political affairs, minister of sports, minister of home affairs, chairman of the Olympic Organization Committee, chief delegate of the Democratic Justice Party, and chairman of the Democratic

Justice Party. One would not be amiss in picking Secretary Yi as the president's man if one were to choose from among the president's close associates without considering status or position. He is almost like a member of the president's family, having faced the turmoil of complications within the power circle, and stayed with the president through his "difficult" political period. In short, Yi is the person who can intuitively understand President No and be able to provide needed assistance. He is said to have provided assistance and advice not only on public matters, but also on personal family matters as well.

Presidential Assistant Pak Chol-on Enjoys a Special Relationship

Special Assistant Pak Chol-on (46), who was appointed to the position of presidential assistant for national policy, a position newly created in the Sixth Republic, has been an object of special attention from the early days of the Fifth Republic. Presidential Assistant Pak served in a string of important positions such as member of the National Security Council in charge of legislation and judiciary, Blue House secretary for political affairs, Blue House secretary for legislative and judiciary, special assistant to the director of the Agency for National Security Planning. It is known that all through these positions he has enjoyed the trust of both former President Chon Tu-hwan and President No.

Mr Pak's wife is a second cousin of First Lady Kim Ok-suk [as published], thus enjoying a special family relationship with President No. A graduate of Kyongbuk High School, he graduated first in his class from the College of Law at Seoul National University. Having successfully passed the 8th National Law Examination, he served as public prosecutor of public security in the Seoul District Court from which he was recruited in 1980 to join the committee for legislation and judiciary of the National Security Council. When he was a member of the legislative and judiciary committee, he was able to solve many tasks, which others could not resolve. He did this with the help of President No, who was then a permanent member of the National Security Council and commander of the Army Capital Garrison Command.

He was legal assistant for then President Chon Tu-hwan even prior to the beginning of the Fifth Republic, and made a significant contribution toward the launching of the Fifth Republic, although he was rarely mentioned in the media coverage. In the 1980's he started surfacing in such positions as the Blue House secretary for political affairs (1980), the Blue House secretary for legal affairs (1983), and special assistant to the director of the Agency for National Security Planning. Throughout this period, under a special assignment arrangement, he continued to retain his prosecutor's role serving as public prosecutor in the Seoul Superior Court, head of the second special division of the Seoul District Court, and research fellow of the Judicial Research Center.

It is said that his position as a research fellow at the Judicial Research Center, which was equivalent to the directorship of the prosecutor's office, was especially created for him. Among his classmates, none has been promoted to director of the prosecutor's office.

It is also said that he performed an important invisible role in the past presidential election. It is generally recognized that by establishing the Research Center for People's Future, he was able to assist candidate No's campaign. The true picture of this research center was known only to a few within the ruling power structure, and even today it remains behind a curtain of mystery.

His position of special assistant for policy affairs is known to have been created for mid- and long-range policy matters, but beyond that little is known of the functions of his position. Due to his key position within the "Kyong Sang Mafia" and his reputation of being smart, many observers believe that as an insider he will exert considerable influence in diverse areas.

Judging from his track record since 1980 during the Fifth Republic, it is safe to assume that he will be a member of the power elite during the Sixth Republic and exert enormous influence.

From his preinauguration days, President No has been saying, "I will want to delegate administrative responsibilities to the prime minister so that the executive branch could be run under the leadership of the prime minister. I want to provide myself with opportunities to listen to and talk with the ordinary people."

Based on this fact, one may well speculate that Prime Minister Yi Hyon-chae (59) will have far more room for discretion than any previous prime minister. In forming the first cabinet of the Sixth Republic, he has already made considerable input, and a good portion of the personnel appointment authority which has been exercised in the past by the president himself is said to have been transferred to the prime minister or the cabinet.

Since President No has the vision of allow the cabinet be in charge of responsible administration unlike the past cabinets which hardly played more than an auxiliary role, it is expected that Prime Minister Yi would be able to claim an expanding role depending on his performance.

The prime minister is an economist who served in a variety of administrative positions at the Seoul National University culminating in the position of university president. Considering his past record and his rational, team-work style, it is reasonable to expect that he will be a "faithful, competent caretaker of power." Rather than a politically dashing, assertive person, he is more of an administrative manager who places a great premium on harmony and running things smoothly without friction.

Since President No, as he is generally understood, envisions a "balanced administration run in harmony" in which he himself is a policy setter at a higher level, rather than a hands-on administrator, it is quite conceivable that competent performance as an administrative manager would earn him an influential position in running the republic.

Since each cabinet member will be administering unique charges to his department with considerable discretion under the general leadership of Prime Minister Yi, it is only natural that cabinet members will come to exercise a fair amount of influence on national governance. Among the cabinet members, Minister of Government Administration Kim Yong-kap, Director of Government Legislative Administration Agency Hyon Hong-chu, and Minister of Political Affairs Kim Yun-hwan, are objects of special attention due to their particularly close personal relationship with President No.

An Important Role in the June 29 Announcement

When Kim Yong-kap (52) was appointed to be the first minister of government administration in the Sixth Republic, most people were curious about the meaning of this appointment since he was chief secretary for civilian affairs under former President Chon Tu-hwan. During the period of power transition, the former president's camp and President No's camp showed signs of alleged disharmony. At such a time, it was indeed unusual for someone who served for 2 years as chief secretary for civilian affairs under the previous regime to be appointed right away as the minister of government administration.

Within the ruling power structure, however, he had been known for quite some time as a "No Tae-u's person inside the Blue House." When the petition drive for direct presidential elections was in progress in early 1987, he canvassed the Korean people monitoring the pulse of the people and contributed heavily toward generating the idea of the 29 June announcement. Even after the announcement, he is said to have played a major role as an intermediary in resolving the tension between former President Chon Tu-hwan and President No. Regarding the disagreement between the then-President Chon and party Chairman No, he persuaded President Chon to come around to Chairman No's point of view.

A member of the 17th class of the Military Academy, he is a close friend of Assemblyman Yi Chun-ku and the director of National Security Planning Agency Ahn Mu-hyok. During the Fifth Republic, he served for 5 years as director of planning and coordination in the National Security Planning Agency. After the 12 December election, he voluntarily retired himself and went abroad to study at the Center for East Asian Studies at the University of California in Berkeley. While he was at the center, he was called back home as chief secretary for civilian affairs at the Blue House. He retired from the Army as a

major in 1971 and started working at the KCIA (predecessor of the National Security Planning Agency). He is known for his clear-cut judgement and driving force as well as his strong sense of responsibility.

From his days as chief secretary for civilian affairs at the Blue House, he has been known for candid, undiluted advice.

Although director of the Government Legislative Administration Agency Hyon Hong-chu (48) may appear to be a little distant from President No compared to the presidential election days, he is widely regarded as a potential candidate for an important position. There is a widely shared consensus that he served as a member of the "A class" brain trust for President No.

Mr Hyon entered politics in 1985 as an at-large candidate of the Democratic Justice Party and became director of the party's office of policy deliberations. He withdrew himself from the position in opposition to the college campus stabilization law. At the time, chief delegate No Tae-u who had his office in the National Policy Research Center used to assign various tasks to him. From that time on, he started serving Mr No in many ways. His contribution was especially noteworthy in public relations dealing with foreign guests from the United States and other countries as well as the foreign press.

Not only did he serve as an interpreter for Chief Delegate No in the latter's interviews with the foreign press, but he also followed him like a shadow to all major meetings. It is said that at the time of the 29 June announcement he made his own diagnosis of the times, and submitted his candid appraisal of the situation.

Ever since the 29 June announcement, he has been labeled as one of No's men. In August 1987, Chief Delegate No recalled Mr Hyon, who had been without an official party position since the campus stabilization incident, and appointed him as second secretary for political affairs, thus thrusting him into the limelight again.

A graduate of Kyong Gi High School and the College of Law of Seoul National University, Director Hyon passed the higher civil service examination (judiciary section) (the 16th examination), and served as prosecutor of the Seoul district court from which he was detailed to the KCIA. During his tenure at the KCIA, he faced the 26 October incident and the 1980 turmoil and played a central role in reorganizing the agency with his high school senior alumnus Assemblyman Yi Chong-chan.

As the KCIA was transformed into the National Security Planning Agency, he became the agency's second deputy director. In this capacity he developed a high degree of political acumen during the first half of the Fifth Republic as the agency was under the successive directorship of

Yu Hak-song and No Shin-yong. Just prior to the 12 February election, he was visibly active as a dove along with Director No Shin-yong.

He is a person who makes a good impression with his refined manners. He is known for an organized and detailed mind. For these reasons, he is sometimes called a "British gentleman," and a "human computer." President No is generous in praising him as the future minister of foreign affairs under a legislative cabinet system. This may be an indication of how highly President No thinks of him.

The Joining of the Old and New Forces

The First Minister of State Kim Yun-hwan (56) is an object of considerable attention since he has been a close associate of President No Tae-u in both public and personal matters. In addition, under former President Chon Tu-hwan he served as the first chief secretary for political affairs and chief of staff. These facts led to active speculation that he may be part of the linkage between the forces of the Fifth Republic and those of the Sixth Republic. It is generally known that in the latter half of the Fifth Republic he played a key role in the political emergence of Chief Delegate No Tae-u although he was close to former President Chon Tu-hwan.

As a classmate of Kyongbuk High School, he is a close friend of President No Tae-u. Immediately prior to the 29 June announcement, in the capacity of the first chief secretary for political affairs at the Blue House, he was engaged in a serious consultation with Chief Delegate No Tae-u on a wide range of urgent issues.

There is a general agreement that as chief of staff for former President Chon Tu-hwan at the close of his term, Mr Kim fulfilled his duties quite well. Because of his role during this transitional period, he was then called a "man with the most dilemmas" in the Blue House. It was simply because he not only had to assist the ruler of the day, but also had a historical mission of contributing toward rooting the democratization process by aiding the transfer of power.

Once deputy editor in chief of CHOSUN ILBO, he entered politics in March 1979 by becoming a member of the 10th National Assembly as member of the Yujong Hoe. In 1980 he served in the legislative assembly and then became a member of the 11th National Assembly. During this period he was a member of the board of directors of the Korea-Japan Union of Assemblymen, playing a prominent role. As an example of his behind-the-scenes contribution, one may refer to the \$4 billion economic cooperation agreement between Korea and Japan.

For 18 months from February 1985, he served as Deputy Minister of Education, and then was appointed the first chief secretary for political affairs at the Blue House. He is alleged to have always been a dove within the ruling

party, suggesting adoption of a moderate approach on political problems. On 20 July 1987, he was promoted to chief of the presidential staff from first chief secretary for political affairs, which was unprecedented. Some analysts see the significance in this promotion from the standpoint of a peaceful transfer of power. Former President Chon Tu-hwan, President No Tae-u, and Mr Kim—these three people have always been friends.

The functions of the minister of state include serving as a bridge between the party and the executive branch within the ruling power structure and acting as a reception desk between the ruling party and the opposition party. Depending on the person who occupies the position, it can be a position of a mere messenger or one of considerable influence. It is difficult to deny that Minister Kim Yun-hwan is a minister of influence, and not many people would disagree that he is a holder of power within the ruling party.

Our political reality has been such that the person second in command in the ruling party has never exerted much influence. During the Fifth Republic, the position of chief delegate, second in command after the party chairman, was thought to be under numerous restrictions.

Power Due To Being an Unselfish Manager

Chief delegate of the Democratic Justice Party Chae Mun-sik (63) is also a manager who has been delegated certain authority and responsibility from Party Chairman No. Considering both President No's administrative policy being placed in practice and Mr Chae's awareness of his position, it is generally thought that he will be a chief delegate with considerably more influence than in the past although it will be within limits.

President No is said to have a vision of "delegating politics to the party as administration has been delegated to the cabinet." Such political vision is well reflected in President No's comments made this past 14 January appointing Mr Chae as the chief delegate of the party such as, "I plan to delegate all political items to Chief Delegate Chae"; "Please, do accomplish the tasks of democratic reconciliation, general election, and intra-party democratization; you do have the necessary authority"; "You should rid our party of its alleged shortcomings as we are short on self-sufficiency and long on dependency"; "Above all, keep in mind what the majority of the people want and proceed in the task of intra-party democratization."

During the Fifth Republic, passage of even minor political legislation had to be cleared with the Blue House. In contrast, the extent of influence of Chief Delegate Chae in the Sixth Republic will increase as President No's vision of delegating to the party a good portion of non-critical legislation is implemented.

Observers believe that Mr Chae's unselfish personality will help him gain influence and power. The reasoning is that since he is an "unselfish administrator without a personal agenda," President No can afford to delegate more authority to him without concern. In this respect, he provides a good contrast to the speaker of the Assembly Yi Chae-hyong who took over the chief delegate position in the early days of the Fifth Republic. As the party's chief delegate, Speaker Yi Chae-hyong opposed the real power and tried to expand his influence unduly, creating friction. Chief Delegate Chae, on the other hand, is well aware of the limit of his power and for that reason will be able to lead his party realistically, accruing power as he goes along. President No would have no reason not to grant more power and authority to an "administrator who is faithful and unselfish and without a personal political agenda."

His "unselfishness" came to be widely known a long time before his appointment as party chief delegate when he volunteered to "withdraw from politics by turning over his district (Mun-kyong and Ye-chon) to the younger generation."

Party officials believe that because he is unselfish, he will be able to offer daring candid advice to President No. While he was discussing with President No the selection of the chief of staff for the party chairman a little while back, he is said to have requested that an office for the chief of staff of the party chairman be established in the Blue House. Party observers note that "although it may appear to be a trivial matter, no one had made such a proposal during the Fifth Republic."

Probably because he is rather calm and not flamboyant, he has not become a visible public figure proportionate to his position. Observers are agreed that as he always performs important assignments without fanfare, his power is bound to increase gradually.

Secretary General Sim Myong-po Enjoys the Special Trust of Party Chairman

It is the party secretary general who, along with the chief delegate, is in charge of and manages overall party household affairs. The party secretary general has control over party personnel matters, funds, and organization. Due to his control over party personnel and funds, the power of the secretary general in the party is almost absolute. Although he is third in the party hierarchy after the chairman of the policy committee and the floor leader, he is also in a position of being able to restrain them because of his control over personnel and funds. The party officer who can see President No most often along with the chief delegate is the party secretary general.

It is a reflection of trust placed in Mr Sim by party Chairman No Tae-u that Mr Sim was appointed to such a position of importance. At the time of elections, the secretary general usually takes over the chairmanships of

the nomination committee and the election campaign committee. If the party's role is to remain in touch with the people and imprint a viable image of leadership, one may compare the party to an engine of political power. The most important part of this engine, which is a piston, is the party secretary general. Depending on how the secretary general performs his job, his influence can extend far beyond his own party.

It is generally believed that the trust placed in Secretary General Sim by the party chairman is unprecedented, thus accelerating his power and influence. President No once said of him, "He is a man who fulfills his duty without putting himself in the limelight." It is a reflection of how much President No values him.

Mr Sim's relationship with President No dates back to the days when he was given the party spokesperson position as President No was appointed the party chief delegate after the 12 February election. For 2 years and 3 months until May 1987, he literally put himself aside in the service of Chief Delegate No. The party spokesperson's position, to begin with, requires acting in tandem and unison with the chief delegate. What is unique in the present case is that during the early days when Chief Delegate No's position within the party was less certain, Secretary General Sim made singular, delicate contributions. Some observers comment that prior to the 29 June announcement, the only persons President No could talk with in confidence, without reservation, were Spokesperson Sim and Special Assistant Yi Pyong-ki.

Along with his reputed even-temper and accommodating personality, his keen sense for reading the public mood, developed over some 20 years experience in the mass media, was an object of high praise by President No. For these reasons, in August 1987 when the Democratic Justice Party was gearing itself under the leadership of Mr No for the presidential election, he was appointed to the all important position of chief of staff for Mr No, who was then both the party chairman and candidate for the presidency.

During the presidential campaign, he performed as alter ego and sometimes a substitute of the candidate No. Taking full advantage of his skills, he did not hesitate in identifying what he could do best for the candidate. For his untiring work, he was counted after the election as one of the few "loyalist contributors."

A consensus comment about him is "a diligent person with down-to-earth humanity." When he was appointed party secretary general, most of the newspaper commentators placed the spotlight on his sincere personality when appraising his character. Some of their comments are, "He is outgoing and humble. He is a politician who cannot rest unless he covers all sites personally," "He grew up in a farming village under adverse economic conditions and achieved success all on his own. Probably

because of this background, he is a man who can shed tears, and a loyalist who does not hesitate to be of assistance to others." "He is compassionate to others but hard on himself."

The emergence of Mr Sim as a power holder is due to the recognition accorded by President No for his self-sacrificing contributions. His influence along with that of Chief Delegate Chae Mun-sik will further expand when the party is given a lead role in place of a supplementary role in line with the political vision of President No.

Person Most Trusted by President No

Although he does not hold any official position in the party, the one most trusted by President No in the Democratic Justice Party is no doubt Assemblyman Yi Chun-ku. It may not be an exaggeration to say that Assemblyman Yi is the one most trusted throughout the ruling power hierarchy.

If one were to select one person among "No Tae-u's people" who contributed the most in giving political birth to President No, that honor is likely to be bestowed upon Assemblyman Yi.

As director of the presidential campaign headquarters, Assemblyman Yi is the person who "made President No." After the 29 June 29 announcement, he had to step down from the post of party secretary general due to his hard-line position. Soon after the beginning of the campaign, however, he became the director of the campaign headquarters, a post which normally would have been filled by then-party Secretary General Chong Sok-mo. And he led the campaign to its victory.

President No is said to consult Assemblyman Yi on most delicate details of political strategizing. He has the reputation of being "a man of conviction who is untainted and logical," and is being appreciated accordingly by President No.

It is said that President No decided Assemblyman Yi was his man ever since Assemblyman Yi successfully performed his role as party secretary general at the time President No was chief delegate of the party.

A member of the 14th class of the Korean Military Academy, he did not seem to have any special relationship with President No until he became secretary general of the Democratic Justice Party in August 1986. He did not serve in the same unit with President No during their military service. During his tenure as deputy minister of home affairs, however, he had an occasion to serve President No as minister of home affairs. Because of the lack of any special relationship between the two men, it was rumored at the time Mr Yi was appointed party secretary general that his appointment was intended as an antidote and check against Chief Delegate No Tae-u.

During his tenure as party secretary general (August 1986 to July 1987), a period during which the party was engulfed in the most turbulent structural turmoil, he was able to avoid catastrophe by maintaining a balance between then-President Chon Tu-hwan and party Chief Delegate No Tae-u. At the time, he was trusted by both sides and had the reputation of being "a man who is doing his best for the good of both men, President Chon Tu-hwan and Chief Delegate No Tae-u."

During his tenure as party secretary general, he encountered numerous difficulties, but always tried to assist Chief Delegate No while making sure that the situation would not deteriorate into the ultimate catastrophe. It was a time when the ruling party was vacillating on the issue of constitutional amendments, the opposition party was being fragmented, assemblymen were being arrested, and the Pak Chong-chol incident occurred. The socio-political situation was being drawn into a swirl, and the ruling party was leaning toward a rigid hard-line position. As secretary general, he was the only channel of communication to the government in power.

At the time, he attended the party council meetings several times a week and conveyed party views to the executive branch, working toward shifting the scale to the direction of the party position. During this period, he routinely visited the Blue House once a month and offered briefings on party affairs, and met with Chief Delegate No everyday for a couple of hours. He was thus in a position of knowing the most about the thinking and leanings of the ruling power core.

During his tenure as party secretary general, a consensus among party members was that he "was performing the secretary general role flawlessly." Such a reputation arose from the fact that he was able to steer the party clear of major setbacks during the period of delicate government-party relations. This accomplishment was a separate issue from whether or not he was a hard-liner: it had to do with his ability to ward off impending crisis.

As the person second in command, it was only natural for Chief Delegate No to give an extremely high mark for Mr Yi's stewardship. It was in a sense an ordained development that he was to become No Tae-u's man at the time of the 29 June announcement.

With medium height, lean build, dark complexion, and shining eyes, he gives an impression of being an alert dynamo who "would not bleed even if pricked by a needle." During the days of his military service, he was generally viewed to be a man of "integrity, forthrightness, fortitude, the right-wing, and conservatism." This reputation is compatible with his holding such positions as chairman of the social reform subcommittee of the National Security Council and chairman of the Social Reform Council. Consistent with this image, he is generally described as "distant" and authoritarian. At the

same, he has amply demonstrated his leadership potential by successfully performing the duties of the party secretary general and the chief of staff for Presidential election campaign headquarters.

At the beginning of the Sixth Republic, President No Tae-u is supposed to have asked him to serve an important post in the party, which was declined on the grounds that it was not the right time and that he preferred to remain an ordinary assemblyman. There is no doubt that sooner or later he will emerge as an important player during President No's regime, and it remains a subject of intense speculation as to how far he might ascend in his political career.

Director of the National Security Planning Agency An Mu-hyok and Ho Sam-su

Director of the National Security Planning Agency An Mu-hyok (53) is responsible for maintaining the current political regime, and as such he is listed among those with real power. In addition, it is noteworthy that although he was appointed during the Fifth Republic by then-President Chon Tu-hwan, he is also entrusted by President No.

A member of the 14th class of the Korean Military Academy, along with Assemblyman Yi Chun-ku he had a reputation of "integrity and forthrightness." Director An and Assemblyman Yi are still the closest of friends. They are more than close friends: it might be more appropriate to say that they are "in a state of union, sharing a common vision and spirit." Some describe their relationship metaphorically that they are "sailing on one boat." Some observers speculate that Assemblyman Yi might have been behind the appointment of Mr An as director of the security agency at the 26 May cabinet reshuffle. Members of the 17th class of the Military Academy, the Democratic Justice Party national policy evaluation committee member Ho Sam-su and Minister of Government Administration Kim Yong-kap, have sustained more than an ordinary lasting relationship with Director An and Assemblyman Yi.

During the transfer of power from the Fifth Republic to the Sixth Republic, Director An Mu-hyok and the former Presidential Chief of Staff Kim Yun-hwan were the two in the ruling power circle who had the most delicate dilemmas which they could not readily share with others. General consensus is that they played a "rubicant" role in completing the power transfer without much "noise." They are accorded considerable credit in this accomplishment.

When there was an impasse regarding the timing of the presidential inauguration and departure ceremonies between the Blue House side which insisted on holding them simultaneously and the inauguration preparation committee which held out for separate ceremonies, it was Director An who persuaded then-President Chon

Tu-hwan with a common sense appeal. Director An underscored the importance of imprinting a sense of appreciation for a peaceful transfer of power saying, "The people and mass media are bound to pay more attention to the incoming team than to the outgoing team. In such a situation, the historical significance of a peaceful transfer of power by President Chon may get brushed aside. It is important that the historical significance of the event should be conveyed to the people appropriately by holding separate ceremonies." This common-sense approach seemed to have persuaded then-President Chon.

It is said that President No Tae-u appreciates his behind-the-scenes contribution. Observers point out that Assemblyman Yi Chun-ku had cemented the relationship between President No Tae-u and Director An. However, there are some observers who consider that the appointment of Director An in the Sixth Republic is more of an assurance of the continuity in national security and stability. Considering the President No—Assemblyman Yi Chun-ku—Director An Mu-hyok lineage and the president's trust in Director An, it is safe to extrapolate that he will continue to occupy a position of considerable power.

Ho Sam-su (52), a member of the Democratic Justice Party national policy evaluation committee, is not in a position to exercise any power. As a party candidate for the East Pusan district, he is busy campaigning.

Based on the long-standing relationship with President No dating from their military days, some observers expect Mr Ho to be in a position of considerable influence during the Sixth Republic although he was a holder of impressive power during the early days of the Fifth Republic as the presidential chief secretary for investigation and correction. In 1965, he served in the counterintelligence corps under intelligence director No Tae-u. For 20 some years since then, he has maintained a close relationship with President No. Since his sudden departure from the Blue House in 1982, he has maintained, it is said, a close contact with President No while he was staying overseas in Japan and the United States. Many believe that just prior to the 29 June announcement he met with then-Chief Delegate No Tae-u and strongly recommended the adoption of the direct presidential election system and measures of democratization.

He also enjoys a special relationship with Assemblyman Yi Chun-ku and the National Security Planning Agency Director An Mu-hyok. He once served in the same military unit with Assemblyman Yi Chun-ku. He and Minister of Government Administration Kim Yong-gap were classmates, both members of the 17th class of the Military Academy. He was a key member of the "revolutionary leadership" at the beginning of the Fifth Republic, and belonged to the core group of young

generals in the Army. Furthermore, it was he who directly took the then-Chief of the Army General Staff Chong Seung-ha at the time of the 12 December Incident.

Chong Yong-ho, Still Exerting Considerable Influence on the Military

When Party Chairman No Tae-u appointed Chong Yong-ho a member of the national policy evaluation committee of the Democratic Justice Party's National Policy Research Center last August, the foreign press reported that he would serve as a link between the party Chairman No and the young generals in the Army.

At his farewell press conference this past 19 February, former Minister of National Defense Chong Yong-ho said, "Since my high school (Kyongbuk High School) and Military Academy (the 11th class) classmate has been elected President, I came to the conclusion that the best way for me to assist him is to leave my position voluntarily to provide him with an uncluttered opportunity to lead the country according to his own convictions."

One could interpret this comment to mean that he wants to help the president freely as a private citizen. Considering his general position within the ruling power circle, he may be the first and foremost person who could give candid advice to President No. He is generally known as a man of firm convictions; he is respected highly among his junior military officers; and he also enjoys the reputation from his senior military officers that "he is a man we can trust." As a result of his credibility within the military establishment, he is viewed as the person who could provide valuable counsel to the president on matters related to the military.

As for his influence in the military establishment, some cite his role regarding the politicizing of the 12 December Incident as a presidential election issue. He talked to those who took sides with the then-Chief of the Army General Staff Chong Seung-ha at the time of the 12 December Incident and subsequently persuaded them not to make public witness statements at the meetings of the Democratic Party.

Although he was not directly involved in the 12 December Incident, he figured importantly in the launching of the Fifth Republic serving as commander of the Ranger-Commando Force. Even his classmates feel they cannot approach him too casually. When he was appointed minister of home affairs in January 1987 about 1 year after his retirement as chief of the army general staff, the first official comment from the Democratic Justice Party Chief Delegate No Tae-u was the following, "This represents the best hand the ruling party can deal for a peaceful transfer of power."

He was one of the few persons whom Chief Delegate No consulted prior to the 29 June announcement. At the meeting, he is said to have welcomed the move with enthusiasm and, subsequently, made a significant contribution in calming the opposition from the military.

When rumors were rampant last September concerning possible military intervention in the presidential election, he officially stated to the visiting U.S. Senators, "As long as I am minister of national defense, the rumors will remain no more than mere rumors." The simple fact that he can make such a statement with confidence is testimony to the general consensus that he is a holder of real power under former-President Chon as well as now.

"The One Who Can Openly Advise"

Among President No's classmates of the 11th class of the Military Academy, Kim Pok-dong (55) may be said to match former Minister of National Defense Chong Yong-ho in influence. He is not only President No's classmate, but also his brother-in-law. Recently he changed his plans to run for a National Assembly seat and made a public announcement to that effect. He also retired from the position of president of a mining development company, which he had held for the past 6 years.

Mr Kim's decision not to run appears on the surface to be related to President No's 16 December election pledge of not hiring his relatives for high-ranking government positions. Rumor has it, however, that his decision not to run even as an independent candidate is rooted in the friction between former President Chon Tu-hwan and Kim Pok-dong. It is generally said that President No asked his brother-in-law not to run following former President Chon's wish. In return for not running, he was said to have been offered the ambassadorship to Taiwan.

Mr Kim is a man who can provide counsel without being hindered by protocol and formality. Mr Kim himself has said, "If it is for our country and the people, I am prepared to offer advice in spite of any anticipated difficulties and to offer my service."

Political observers say that Mr Kim will establish a policy research center for systematic national policy development, which he denies. Throughout his military career and the Fifth Republic, he stayed away from politics. He said, "I am prepared to sacrifice and concede whatever is necessary if it helps President No from a long-range perspective." It is self-evident that, in whatever way, Mr Kim will be a valuable advisor.

Mr Keum Chin-ho (56), who is the husband of Mr Kim's sister and also the husband of the first lady's sister, is regarded as a loyal advisor to President No.

Mr Keum and President No both married sisters of Mr Kim Pok-dong, forming a triangle of brothers-in-law. Mr Kim and President No are classmates of the 11th class of

the Military Academy, but President No graduated from Kyongbuk High School 1 year ahead of Mr Kim. Mr Keum, on the other hand, is a younger brother-in-law of President No, who graduated from Dae Ryun High School in Taegu and the College of Law of Seoul National University. It is said every summer Mr Keum has spent his summer vacation with President No.

In the early days of the Fifth Republic, he made a notable contribution by making connections between the business and finance sectors and the government when the government had wavering support from the business sector. In 1980 he served as chairman of the industrial resources subcommittee of the National Security Council and was deeply involved in regulation of investment in the heavy chemical industry.

He has since served as chief of staff for the prime minister, deputy minister of commerce and industry, minister of commerce and industry, and chairman of the Consumer Protection Council. Many observers expect that he will serve as a source of advice to President No, taking advantage of his connections with the business and finance sectors.

13270

Selection of Supreme Court Judges Praised 41070098 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 8 Jul 88 p 3

[Article by reporter Han Chin-su]

[Text] People in legal circles both within the government and in the opposition evaluated the new Supreme Court line-up unveiled by newly appointed Chief Justice Yi Il-kyu on the afternoon of the 7th, as not "a superlative job" but "a labored work" showing traces of great effort.

As for their reasons, those in the opposition group pointed out that the new court lineup was insufficient to bring about full-scale reform, while those in the government group pointed out that the new lineup overlooked the hardships suffered by legal circles in the past.

Despite such "discontent," however, a person from the Korea Bar Association (Pyonhyop) gave the new lineup a grade of "75 points," and a member of the Human Rights Lawyers' Association (Minhyop), a hard-core group who are in the opposition, evaluated it as "being in the 70 point range." Such reactions seem to reflect recognition of the pain Chief Justice Yi took in carefully considering several factors in a difficult situation.

The reason why both groups rate it as "a labored work" may be that Chief Justice Yi carefully considered the following factors.

First, Chief Justice Yi stubbornly insisted on, and implemented a clear-cut formula of "four reappointments, four from the opposition members, four from within the government members, and one prosecutor"—a formula

taking into account the demands of both groups. Each group requested six to seven appointments and the prosecution demanded two seats to maintain diversity on the highest court and out of respect to custom. However, one cannot help recognizing that the new chief justice strove to seek harmony among all groups.

Second, it is apparent that an attempt to achieve a regional balance, at least in forming the "cabinet" of the judicial branch, was made in the selections—the political situation of the minority ruling party [Yoso Yadae] and the reality of intensified regionalism being great concerns.

Under former Chief Justice Kim Yong-chol's leadership judicial system of the Fifth Republic, North and South Kyongsang Provinces enjoyed much greater representation: four Supreme Court justices came from North Kyongsang (Kim Hyong-ki, Yi Pyong-hu, Yi Chun-sung, Choe Chae-ho); three from South Kyongsang (Yi Chong-u, Pak U-tong, Hwang Son-tang); two from South Chungchong (Chong Ki-sung, Yi Myong-hui); two from South Cholla (Yun Il-yong, Yun Kwan); one from North Cholla (Pae Sok); and one from Kyonggi (Kim Tal-sik). There was a positive reaction to the fact that local origin was purposefully taken into account in drawing up the new judicial slate: one Supreme Court justice comes from North Kyongsang (Choe Chae-ho, 54, SNU/JEC-7); two from South Kyongsang (Pak U-tong, 54, SNU/JEC-8 and An U-man, 51, SNU/JEC-11); one from South Chungchong (Kim Yong-chun, 50, SNU/JEC-9); one from North Chungchong (Kim Tok-chu, 55, SNU/JEC-7); two from South Cholla (Yun Kwan, 53, Yonsei/JEC-10 and Pae Man-un, 54, Chonnam Univ/Jec-9); two from North Cholla (Pae Sok, 55, SNU/JEC-8 and Yun Yong-chol, 51, SNU/JEC-11); two from Kyonggi (Kim Sang-won, 55, SNU/JEC-8 and Kim U-han, 51, SNU/JEC-11); one from Seoul (Yi Hoe-chang, 53, SNU/JEC-8); and one who came south from the northern part of Korea (Yi Chae-song, 61, Police Academy/JEC-7).

Third, Chief Justice Yi won high praise for breaking with the past and asserted the independence of the judiciary in personnel matters by drawing up and submitting a single list of nominees. Selecting An U-man, the current chief judge of the Seoul District Criminal Court, while dropping those former chief judges of the Seoul District Criminal Court (Yi Chong-u, Kim Hyong-ki, Chong Ki-sung, Hwang Son-tang) who had been denounced by the out-of-office group, is seen as an exercise of the judiciary's right of autonomous personnel selection. The selection results are seen as having taken into consideration each side's situation with an "exquisite operational touch."

Fourth, one can point out that, while taking pragmatic factors such as both within the government and in the opposition groups status, locality, and the political situation into consideration, the chief justice kept his word—"the primary concern will be one's qualification and ability"—his first statement on selection criteria after taking office.

Yi Hoe-chang and Kim Tok-chu, former Supreme Court judges, have an established reputation in general legal theory. Attorneys Yi Chae-song and Kim Sang-won, who are regular members of the Case Studies Committee of the Korea Bar Association; Supreme Court judges Choe Chae-ho and Pae Sok, the chief judge of Seoul District Criminal Court An U-man; and the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office chief inspector Kim U-han are well versed in criminal law. Chief judge of the Family Court Kim Yong-chun is very devoted to his work. Chief judge of the Suwon District Court Yun Yong-chol is well acquainted with administrative matters. Supreme Court judge Yun Kwan has a reputation for thoroughness. Pae Man-un has served as the head of the Judicial Research and Training Institute. The inclusion of such highly qualified persons has already given the new court a reputation of "ability."

Despite such a positive evaluation, however, both groups are expressing dissatisfaction: people in the opposition complained that Chief Justice Yi's new Supreme Court line-up is exclusively composed of conservatives, while the people within the government group complained Yi was so conscious of his formula that he ignored changing times and brought back many old personnel.

Unless the appointments were persons in the opposition group, who had left government service over differences, more consideration should have been given to the younger judges. The government group believes that choosing a new people from the younger members, who have worked hard under some difficult situations, is just as important as appointing opposition members. The appointment of three from the seventh and four from the eighth Judicial Examination Class (JEC) to the Supreme Court disappointed the governmental group. The seventh and eighth JEC are considered the older generation. It was expected that the 13th JEC members would be selected for the new appointments. The government group criticized Chief Justice Yi's appointments and called them a "reactionary personnel decision," ignoring the changing times and the morale of the governmental group.

Chief Justice Yi has many problems to solve following his composition of the new Supreme Court, which the opposition group, who formerly would have attacked Yi severely for any nominee who had the slightest fault, evaluated as a "reasonable lineup."

The first issue facing Chief Justice Yi is how to mollify the government group. His effort to solve their dissatisfaction should be reflected in his personnel decisions on the presiding judges of the courts of appeals and district courts, which are to be made next week. For this, some insist that Chief Justice Yi should urge those who have to retire to make their decision to go. Now that three persons who passed the 11th JEC have been appointed as

Supreme Court justices, those governmental members who passed the eighth and ninth examinations should be virtuous enough to retire in order to pave the way for the younger generation.

The next issue is to expand the independence of the judicial branch in dealing with the legislative and executive branches. Right now only the legislative and executive branches have rights of proposing legislative bills and drawing up the budget. But both the governmental and the opposition groups are suggesting that, for the sake of its own independence, the judiciary should push now to solve this perennial problem by giving the judicial branch a share in these powers.

A fact that the bureaucratic structure of the judicial branch, headed by the chief justice, followed by chief judges in the high and district courts, presiding judges of the high and district courts, and ordinary judges, has been interfering with the judges beliefs and decisions, a structural change is badly needed to regain the judicial branch's lost credibility. The 156 district court chief judges must compete desperately for promotion to the 58 slots for high court. In the process, their beliefs may be distorted by pressures, subtle or outright. It may be thus necessary to set up a personnel committee to insure the fairness.

Soon after his confirmation by the National Assembly, Chief Justice Yi said, "Judges should speak only with adjudication." Many problems must be solved, however, for such words to be practiced in the judiciary.

13456/9604

Press Assesses Achievements of National Assembly Session

Evidence of Opposition Power

41070096 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 9 Jul 88 p 3

[Reportage on 142d National Assembly Session by Nam Chan-su]

[Text] The 142d National Assembly session, which ends on 9 July, has drawn people's attention because it is the first Assembly session of an opposition-controlled four-party system and because it marks a historic turning point in our political reality.

This Assembly session, in which the subtle dynamics of the four parties and their understanding of political problems has brought about acute confrontation among them, has drawn both positive and negative evaluations. It has been a good experience that it can improve the future political situation and the flexibility of choice in future directions.

The evident characteristics of this Assembly session have been that during most confrontations, the stands and relationships between the government and opposition

sides appeared in quite different form from the previous National Assembly because of the opposition control nature. In the case of the Special Committee on the National Assembly Law and the Judicial Committee, it was the ruling Democratic Justice Party that tried, in vain, the tactics of delay to block passage of the bill on National Administration Inspection and the Investigation Law as well as the Witness Evaluation Law. Approval of the nomination of former Justice Chong Ki-sung to be chief justice by President No Tae-u was voted down for the first time in the history of Korean constitutional politics.

In particular, the Assembly's voting down of the nomination of former Justice Chong as chief justice was judged to be very encouraging for the four-party political system. Many worried that there would be considerable political aftereffects if his nomination were approved. However, this evaluation was based more on the Assembly guarantee of the three-way division of power than on prevention of a certain aftermath by means of disapproval.

Voting down the nomination of Chong as chief justice was a good example of the Assembly's power to check the administration. In addition, this Assembly session also provides a case study of the new political structure involving the government's check on the legislature by means of presidential veto power in the case of the National Administration Inspection and the Investigation Law or the revision of the Witness Evaluation Law.

The organization of special committees in the Assembly has been the focus of this session. The opposition pushed the organization of the special committees with the intention of cleaning up the legacies of the Fifth Republic and consequently facing up to a historic turning point. Nevertheless, the Democratic Justice Party was passive in accepting this opposition advocacy, and seven special committees were organized only on 8 July, just 1 day before the closing of the session, indicating a rough road ahead.

The disagreement between the DJP and the opposition on the names of the special committees and their activities were the cause of the limping character of this Assembly session, which was scheduled for 30 days. Thus, the first session in the Sixth Republic could not concentrate sufficiently on discussion of national administration, nor could it avoid drawing criticism for its overall quality and old-fashioned style. Thirty-seven Assemblymen participated in questioning the government in the 5-day main session, which covered the five fields of politics, unification, foreign policy, economy I and II, and society and culture. The questions mostly centered around the criminal wrongdoings of the Fifth Republic and the present government's intention to clean up these wrongdoings.

Even though most of the questions constituted a powerful interrogation of the government, they were judged "questions for question's sake" overall. The responses, including those of Prime Minister Yi Hyon-chae, were also judged "more or less sincere." The contents of the answers, however, still avoided the heart of the matter, using tedious explanation of the situation. The issues that caused the most repercussions in the process of questioning the government were questions on the Kwangju Democratization Movement by Assemblymen Chong Ung (Party for Peace and Democracy). The DJP knew the contents of Assemblyman Chong's question in advance and arranged to have Assemblyman Kim Chong-kil as the next questioner take the offensive in asking questions. The offense and defense between the two sides foreshadowed future conflicts between government and opposition in the investigation process of the special committees.

The speeches by the representative of each party, however, starting on 28 June, set forth each party's political philosophy and its opinions on the political situation in detail, revealing the future lines of each party. These representative speeches clarified not only the different views of the government and the opposition parties on the political situation but also the different views among the opposition parties. Even though all of the speeches adopted "cooperation" and "harmony" as an undertone, they also revealed uncompromising differences on issues such as the Kwangju Democratization Movement or the criminal wrongdoings of the Fifth Republic. A contrast was evident in the DJP high evaluation of former President Chon's 7 year one-term rule and the opposition leaders' focused on wrongdoings by him and those around him.

The government and opposition parties' opinions about the political situation are certainly important criteria for evaluating future political stability under the four-party system. It took 10 days of discussion for the Assembly session just to decide on the name of the special committee on the Kwangju Democratization Movement. In the case of the special committee on the National Assembly Law, it failed to produce a consensus in spite of twice extending the meeting, and it finally solved the confrontation by voting. The committees wasted time on trivial issues, while avoiding discussions of the core of the matter, since both sides were aware of the difference in each side's view of the political situation.

In the Assembly session, the opposition also revealed the limits of cooperation within its ranks, exhibiting differences of opinion on the political situation.

Thus, the Assembly session revealed differences and some hostile feelings among the four parties and strengthened our doubts about how long the present political composition will survive.

Pros and Cons of Government Offices Inspection Law and Witness Evaluation Law, and the Decision on the Release of Prisoners of Conscience

Gist of the Government Offices Inspection Laws and the Witness Evaluation Law

The Government Offices Inspection Law

- The schedule for the Government Offices Inspection falls 20 days from the day after the opening of the annual National Assembly session 10 September.
- The initiation of government offices inspection will be decided by the agreement of more than one-third of the Assemblymen present.
- A regular standing committee can perform investigation of certain issues with the permission of the full house.
- The committee conducting government offices investigation cannot be composed of Assemblymen from only one party.
- The committee can use members in National Assembly offices or policy-making members of each party in the process of inspection or investigation.
- The objects of inspection include:
 - a. National government institutions as well as local government institutions based upon the Government Organization Law.
 - b. Seoul city, self-administered cities, and provinces.
 - c. The National Inspection Office and its objects of inspection.
- The sites of inspection or investigation are all-inclusive, including the National Assembly, the offices of objects of inspection and third sites, etc.
- In principle, inspections are closed, while investigations are open to the public.

The Witness Evaluation Law

- When a subpoenaed witness refuses to testify more than twice without giving an understandable reason, the committee can vote to demand the court "arrest" the witness. The judge will issue a warrant of arrest. The police can arrest the person with an order from the prosecutor.
- Government officials (former and incumbent) and government offices cannot refuse an order for testimony or submission of documents except when the heads of the concerned ministries or offices certify that the information bears on the national security for military or diplomatic reasons.
- When the National Assembly does not approve such authorization, it can request that the prime minister make a statement.
- A witness can be accompanied by his or her lawyer when testifying, and should not be rattled by the testimony.
- In case of perjury in the testimony, the witness is subject to imprisonment of 1-10 years.

Pro Discussion

Assemblyman Sin Ki-ha (Party for Peace and Democracy), Pro:

The National Assembly's right to criticize and supervise the government offices has been developed anew along with its inherent right to pass legislation and the budget.

These rights of criticism and supervision were spelled out in the Constitution as the National Assembly's power of government offices inspection. The power to investigate government offices is generally accepted as a power supplementary to the effective exercise of the legislative and budgetary power of the government offices, even though it is not stipulated in the constitution.

The exercise of the power of government offices inspection and investigation is related to the people's interest and is a matter of concern. Everyone is obliged to do his best to cooperate in the effective exercise of national administration inspection and investigation. Therefore, it is natural to force a person to testify when he refuses to do so.

Some might point out that it is a violation of the three-way division of power, but the authority to issue a warrant of arrest pertains to the court, which is supposed to be the final protector of human rights. The authority to arrest belong to the prosecutor's office. The authority to examine witnesses pertains to the National Assembly. This is based precisely on the idea of checks and balances between the three powers. There cannot be any infringement on the judiciary by the legislature or vice versa.

There will not be any need for ropes or handcuffs for arrests. We need no prisons either, because witnesses will be released after interrogation.

It is an unfair argument that some arrested witnesses might refuse to give testimony. Some witnesses might want to be arrested to avoid threats or intimidation. In most civil or criminal judicial procedures, hardly any arrested witnesses refuse to testify.

Con Discussion

Assemblyman Yi Chin-u (Democratic Justice Party), Con:

First of all, the decision that a session needs a one-third vote of the Assembly members present in initiating government offices inspection violates the democratic majority principle as well as Article 49 of the Constitution.

Even though the opposition advocated it in order to initiate government offices inspection seven with a minority of one-third of the Assembly members present, I have never heard of the minority principle in a democracy. Although it is an important principle of democracy to protect the minority, it does not mean that we should take the minority's decision as that of the whole.

I am deeply skeptical that the opinion of one-third is the opinion of the whole.

This stipulation also directly violates Article 49 of the Constitution. "The National Assembly decides its resolutions by the presence of a majority of the registered Assemblymen and the majority of the Assembly members present, unless stipulated otherwise in the Constitution or laws.

In this case, this special stipulation means more than a majority, such as a two-thirds majority.

The system of arrest also violates the principle of three-way division of power and blurs the boundary between the legislature and the judiciary.

For example, what is the position of judges, if the National Assembly demands a warrant of arrest based upon its own resolution? What happens to the National Assembly, i.e. the institution representing the people, if the judge dismisses it? If the judge is controlled by the National Assembly's demand, this violates the principle of division of power. Furthermore, is not this independence of the judiciary, especially from the administration a matter of concern to the people?

We should pay attention to the fact that the object of such arrest is not a defendant or a suspect but a "witness." It would be nonsense for the National Assembly, which is supposedly the main fortress for basic human rights as the institution which represents the people, to bring forward a witness who is helping the investigation in handcuffs.

Pro and Con on the Decision on the Release of Prisoners of Conscience

Assemblyman Kim Kwang-il (Democratic Reunification Party), Pro:

The change of era means that the rulers of the old era returned to their original places and the people who suffered under the old rule also return to their normal positions.

Now we are in the era of democratization. Those who struggled most for this democratization should return to their normal places and be compensated for their suffering.

If any one of them is left out of such treatment, the realization of social justice cannot be accomplished. Now, not most of them, but all of them, should regain their usual condition and be compensated.

The prisoners of conscience who remain in jail are suffering because of a false judicial system which is no longer legitimate. Thus, the main reason that we are trying to revise the old false legal system and reform the bad laws is to save the prisoners who remain in prison because of these bad, false laws.

Assemblyman Chang Kyong-u (Democratic Justice Party), Con:

Among the prisoners of conscience is a person who was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment on the charge of killing an innocent combat policeman by driving a bus in the turmoil of demonstration. There is also a spy who was proved to have traveled to north Korea. How can we explain the contradiction that one person becomes a prisoner of conscience when he kills a person during a demonstration, while another is a villainous criminal when he kills a person during a robbery?

Since the 29 June announcement last year 1,246 so-called political prisoners have already been released; now, only 41 prisoners, whose crimes are extremely serious ones, are left in prison. Some among the opposition insist that some 600 prisoners of conscience are still left in jail. I urge them to provide a list of these prisoners, which I doubt they can do.

According to the principle of three-way division of power, it is not fair for the National Assembly to interfere in the matter of release or treatment of prisoners who are serving time after receiving final sentences or of suspects under the investigation.

Editorial on Results, Prospects

41070096 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
11 Jul 88 p 3

[Editorial: "Results and Prospects of 142d Assembly Session"]

[Text] The 142d Temporary Assembly Session, in which the opposition-controlled four-party system was tested for the first time in the history of Korean constitutional government, revealed hope for parliamentary politics.

Looking at the composition of the Assembly after the 26 April general election, the people envisaged the alternatives of a future Assembly either limping along or being stabilized through subtle harmony. Therefore, the people watched this temporary Assembly session with nervous caution as a test case. This was especially so because the session had to deal with sensitive issues related to the cleaning up of the Fifth Republic such as criminal wrongdoings of the families of Chon Tu-hwan and the Kwangju problem.

Overall, it may be judged a passable session, although it was also a juncture of both stability and instability, as we look back at the ups and downs of issues such as the organization of various special committees, approval of the nomination of the chief justice, and the passing of the government offices inspection and investigation law.

First of all, the organization of seven special committees through discussions was a big improvement, in spite of some delays in the activities of the standing committees at the beginning of the session, because of an acute

confrontation between government and opposition parties centering around issues related to the chairmanships of the standing committees and the naming of the special committee on the Kwangju incident. It was possible only because the three opposition parties showed self-control through patience and concession. This contrasts greatly with past sessions, where the minority opposition parties used to delay the session with frequent uncompromising confrontations. It may be called a responsible expression of the parties that they engage in competition for political power within the parliamentary system.

There was a remarkable reduction in violent clashes and halts in the session, which were very frequent before, during the main session's period of questions to the government. The issue of one halt was resolved after an hour of negotiation. Most of the previous frequent abuse and shouting was absent, except for a few occasions.

It is also noteworthy that the government party coped with the natural demolition of the previous taboos on questions such as those about former president Chon Tu-hwan and the person who gave the order to fire in the 18 May Kwangju incident, not by physical violence, but by logical argument. At the same time, the opposition parties also showed sincerity by attending the session to the end, instead of using the strategy of withdrawal. After all, we can say that this Assembly session succeeded in drawing all of the problems inside the Assembly session from outside.

Behavior such as the government party's quick nomination of a new figure after the Assembly's disapproval of government nominee Chong Ki-sung as chief justice or the opposition party's delay of the vote on the arrest system, even though they are a majority, until the last day of the session, revealed the intention of both sides to work inside the parliamentary system.

The only disappointment was that the three opposition parties could not maintain the attitude of discussion and compromise until the end of the session, and plunged into the violent logic of a battle by votes. This might bring another confrontational situation followed by the exercise of the president's veto power.

It has been confirmed that there will be frequent battles by votes and the consequent exercise of the president's veto power over controversial issues, especially those such as the basic problems of cleaning out the Fifth Republic, which will be the main reason for confrontation between government and opposition parties. Of course, we should not be overly afraid of those conflicts. It is, in any case, naive to expect a smooth resolution of problems that have remained unsolved for a long time.

Even without referring to the dialectical laws of confrontation between thesis and antithesis and subsequent synthesis, this Assembly session did not have such absolutely negative management.

This writer only wants to discourage the president from exercising his veto power as in the case of the arrest system. Even though there may be some problem in terms of legal theory, he should listen to the people's demands. The composition of the opposition-controlled Assembly itself tells of the people's demand for renovation. President No himself promised earlier that he would accept the reality with humility.

We all understand the difficult position of No in terms of his relationship with former President Chon. Nevertheless, the president should deal with matters in terms of overall plans for the plans for the people and the country. We also urge government and opposition parties to seek smooth solutions by the time of the next Assembly session.

Need for Change in Behavior Seen

41070096 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean
10 Jul 88 p 5

[Article by columnist Kim Tae-chung: "Stereotype Questions to the Government"]

[Text] The world is changing at a rapid pace. Bold voices that were hardly heard just a year ago are booming from all directions, and their level of awareness is quite advanced as well. Clarification of the diverse layers of society is also accelerating rapidly in an atmosphere of an aggressive search for new developments and renovations.

In this atmosphere, there is one place that still seems the same as it was 20 years ago. It is the National Assembly. In a sense, it even looks as if it is moving backward. With a few exceptions, the questions in the Assembly directed toward the government and the answers from the ministers all seem so much the same that one can hardly distinguish the difference in time. The way the Assemblymen offer ridicule and shout impolitely from their seats is unchanged. The process of the almost daily routine of a floor leaders' meeting also remains the same.

In particular, the questions of the Assemblymen to the government cause fundamental doubt about the meaning of the existence of that system. These questions to the government never depart from the pattern. Most questions involved tedious speeches about the questioner's own political opinion followed by a stereotypical tag question at the end: "This is my opinion. Would you give us your comment on this, Minister...?" Typically, these are not questions but totally statements presenting the opinion of the questioner. No matter how good the question, I was sick and tired of listening to the same pattern of "What is your comment on this, Mr Minister?," tagged on to the end after a long statement.

Many times, the substance of a question does not appear to be sincere. It is not always the case, but many times there is a fashionable trend of climbing on the bandwagon of sensitive issues. Good examples of this are an

Assemblyman who is not an expert on foreign policy asking a question on that issue or an Assemblyman who has no experience on the Korea-U.S. military relationship asking about this issue.

Usually, an Assemblyman reads written questions without holding any discussion with staff members on a matter in which he is not an expert. This often causes doubt about the significance of the question session.

Of course, there are various ways of questioning. Most of the style, however, consists of an oratorical self-display rather than a healthy discussion designed to investigate or to reveal the government's hidden plans.

The responses from the government are also unshakable. The ministers' answers have never changed despite endless criticism, requests, and petitions over several decades. An irrelevant answer—in the worst case, a lie—is very common. The whole point is just to escape the situation. The tradition of several decades of giving a minimum response, not a comprehensive answer, seems to become more entrenched every year.

Is Ridicule a Privilege?

Prime Minister Yi Hyon-chae was given a hard time when he implied that the president would use his veto power if the opposition parties were to go through with the arrest system on the last day of the Assembly session. Few government officials will give sincere answers in the future, since this kind of natural answer in which the prime minister refers to the government's policy was put down as an effort to hide behind influence. It is fair and natural for the prime minister to lobby for the opposite view.

I sincerely hope that this kind of vicious circle will be broken in the 13th National Assembly. I believe that a better method would be to have each Assemblyman submit clear written questions and for the government to answer these questions in the National Assembly, where each side could exchange views in a one question-one answer manner. This method would also be helpful for the professional status of each Assemblyman. I really hope, in any case, that whatever the method is, some improved method is found to replace the existing superficial, tedious and oratorical "self-display" in our National Assembly.

As a reference, I understand that the only place in the world such a questioning of the government session exists is in Japan and Korea. In the case of Western Europe, most of the main session consists of pro-and-con discussions about a certain legislative bill or resolution. Questions and answers about the government's viewpoint and policies are put forward in standing committee meetings in the form of hearings. Thus, this is an indication that our National Assembly is following the Japanese system.

Second, I hope that the "violent behavior" such as offering ridicule from one's seat, shouting, pointing, rushing up to the podium will disappear. The ridicule, shouts, and abuse between government and opposition Assemblymen exhibited during the question-and-answer session between Assemblyman Chong Ung and Defense Minister O Cha-pok or during the response session of Prime Minister Yi Hyon-chaе the last day of the main session made it hard for us to tell whether the Assembly was the meeting place of the people's representatives or only of raucous market merchants.

It is really hard to understand, however incorrect the statement may have been, how an Assemblyman could use such impolite language as "Hey, Hey, apologize!" or hurl abuse from his Assembly seat. An Assemblyman should preserve basic good manners as a representative of the people, so that he can at least wait until his turn to speak and then criticize, if he considers the statement unfair and incorrect.

We are not accustomed to dealing with disputes or disagreement. Many people still show a tendency to solve disputes physically, even in this period of democratization and autonomy. Therefore, we frequently see scenes of "swollen veins and vocal chords" and people grasping each others' throats in the streets, back alleys, or offices.

Authority and Assemblyman's Dignity

Although the National Assembly should be in a position to demonstrate to people the custom of patience and rational reasoning in such circumstances, on the contrary, our National Assembly sets an example of how to deal with disagreement by using abuse, yelling and physical force and how to reveal emotional anger. The dignity of the National Assembly is based upon the Assemblymen. The authority and dignity of each Assemblyman is based upon the National Assembly. Assemblymen cannot expect to improve the dignity of the gold badge when they act like thoughtless citizens.

If the dignity of the National Assembly declines, it is the result of the Assemblymen's performance, and the Assemblymen's dignity will also fall. The fact that it is only in the Japanese Diet that Diet members use abuse and yelling makes us more depressed. We really hope the situation of ridicule and abuse stemming from psychology will disappear from the National Assembly.

The first de facto session of the 13th National Assembly ended yesterday. We can understand the less refined contradictions of both sides considering that it just started. There are many Assemblymen in their first term. There is a psychological confrontation between the government and opposition sides.

Each Assemblyman should, however, realize that little change could be discerned in the National Assembly, with the ridiculing and yelling of questions to the government representatives, the way the floor leaders' meeting was conducted, and in the rough behavior of the Assemblyman using impolite language, etc. The National Assembly should renovate itself, too. It is really embarrassing for the people who created the present National Assembly as it is today to see the operation of the National Assembly stick to the old ways after a radical change in its composition.

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ECONOMIC

Aeronautical Industry's Development Noted

Current Status

41070094 Seoul MAEIL KYONGJE SINMUN
in Korean 12 Jul 88 p 13

[Text] The Korean aeronautical industry has taken off, full of energy and aimed at the world market.

Despite its short 10-year history, the domestic aeronautical industry has successfully grown into one of the promising strategic industries which will lead the Korean economy in the 21st century.

The aircraft manufacturers in advanced countries have recently geared up to manufacture replacements for aging airplanes, and are increasingly shopping overseas for foreign parts in order to secure their position in price competition.

Under such circumstances, and based on its low production-cost and capacity to produce parts, the Korean aeronautical industry has successfully grown into a world center for aircraft assembly and parts supply.

In other words, the aeronautical industry is becoming a goose that lays golden eggs. Accordingly, the big three aeronautical companies—Samsung Aeronautics, Korean Air and Daewoo Heavy Industries—plan to spend over 100 billion won for facilities and equipment until 1990 to make the aeronautical industry bloom.

In addition, Sammi Special Steel has recently declared its official entry into the aeronautical business, and Hyundai Precision Industry is still studying its plan to enter into the aeronautical industry, thereby adding heat to the industry.

Rise as a Promising Strategic Industry

In essence, the active investment in facilities and equipment by the aircraft manufacturers and the job orders significantly affect the parts industry.

For example, manufacturing an aircraft requires a delicate assembly of 600,000-700,000 parts, whereas assembly of an automobile, which is called the beauty of the comprehensive technology, requires 40,000-50,000 parts.

Thus, the aeronautical industry has a vast impact on the parts industry.

Domestically, as companies rush to enter into the aircraft parts manufacturing business, the base of the aeronautical industry is widening.

Over 50 companies, including Kumsong Precision, Sammi Special Steel and Hankuk Fiberglass, are currently doing business in the areas of aeronautical electronics, various parts manufacturing, and compound materials for aircraft machinery and structure, and the number is expected to grow significantly.

The aeronautical industry has recently been in the spotlight because the market demand has been growing both domestically and internationally, giving the aeronautical industry a chance to expand.

Of course, another reason for the attention is the overall growth of domestic industries and the continuous progress in aeronautical technology.

First of all, the aeronautical industry's market consists of the domestic market, which is mainly a market for military aircraft, and the overseas market, which is a market for civilian aircraft.

For example, the government is working on the FX [Fighter X] and HX [Helicopter X] projects for the next generation aircraft, which represent production plans for fighters and helicopters respectively.

At present, for the FX project, competition is heating up between the F-16 plane of General Dynamics and the F-18 plane of McDonnell Douglas, both of which are American companies. Domestically, competition has been intense among Samsung Aeronautics, Korean Air and Daewoo Heavy Industries; but Samsung Aeronautics has won the major contract.

In the area of the HX project, which is for helicopters, competition is keen among Samsung Aeronautics, Korean Air and Daewoo Heavy Industries to become a major contractor.

To compete for the HX project, Samsung Aeronautics and Bell Company of America have jointly selected the Bell-412 helicopter, while Daewoo Heavy Industries and the U.S. Sikorsky Company have jointly selected the H76 helicopter.

Both of them are lightweight helicopters, and it has not even been determined yet as to whether a lightweight or a heavyweight will be adopted.

On the other hand, Korean Air has selected the UH60 helicopter, which is a heavyweight, whereas Samsung Aeronautics is competing with the Bell-214.

Given that the business of supplying fighters and helicopters is rather continuous in nature, and judging from its size, we can see that both the FX and HX projects play the role of a cornerstone in the domestic aeronautical industry.

Annual Market Growth of 10 Percent

To meet the project requirements, the big three aeronautical companies have kept expanding their investments in facilities, which laid a ground for them to enter into the business of assembling and manufacturing the large civilian aircraft and their parts.

Whereas the FX and HX projects provided an opportunity to grow for the domestic aeronautical industry, an overseas demand for parts for large civilian aircraft is providing an opportunity for the industry to grow.

The world aircraft market is expected to reach \$73.3 billion in 1990.

Of these, the civilian-aircraft market is as big as \$28.7 billion, which is expected to grow at 10 percent per year.

This is because the world-class makers of passenger airplanes, such as Boeing Company, McDonnell Douglas and Airbus Industries, have begun receiving orders for the next generation airplanes to replace their current aging aircraft.

In particular, as the price competition becomes fierce, the aircraft manufacturers are buying a large portion of the parts from overseas in order to cut the cost.

Under such circumstances, the production cost of an aircraft in Korea is about \$30 per hour, which is much lower than \$80 per hour in the United States and \$60 per hour in Japan.

In addition, the domestic aeronautical industry is said to possess a sufficient technology to assemble and supply the aircraft and their parts, thereby enabling it to rise as a world-class supplier of the aircraft and parts.

Development of Lightweight Airplanes in 1992

According to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry statistics, the orders and exports in 1983 amounted to \$17 million and \$16 million respectively, which increased to \$44 million and \$30 million in 1985 respectively.

Last year, the orders increased rapidly to \$246 million, and the exports, too, increased to \$69 million.

Accordingly, the big three aeronautical companies are planning for a vast investment in facilities to greatly expand their production capacity by 1990.

Samsung Aeronautics plans to invest 270 billion won to expand its production capacity for the fighter engines, fuselage parts and helicopters.

Korean Air, in addition to its existing facilities, has decided to invest an additional 100 billion won by early 1990, to establish exclusive facilities that are necessary for the assembly and manufacturing of aircraft and parts.

Daewoo Heavy Industries, too, has decided to invest an additional 150 billion won to 1991 to expand its assembly facilities for aircraft engines, parts and bodies.

As such, the domestic aeronautical industry is growing in terms of parts orders and facility expansion; however, its technology is still far behind that of the advanced countries.

Just last year Korean Air founded the Korean Aeronautics and Space Research Association, and by 1992 its plans to develop a multipurpose lightweight airplane that can carry 2-5 passengers.

Samsung Aeronautics and Daewoo Heavy Industries, too, are planning to secure their own aircraft design technologies, but there is no definite movement in that direction yet.

Although the domestic aeronautical industry has taken off with full energy, its route is not expected to be trouble-free.

One of the recent worries involves the won's appreciation, which could be disadvantageous to the domestic industry in price competition.

Concerns Over Overexpansion

Since the aircraft orders usually require the orders for materials to be placed 6-10 years in advance, the won's appreciation is becoming a significant threat. In fact, companies like Boeing have reportedly begun reviewing the subcontracted quantity of materials viewing that the advantage of using a subcontract would be lost if the exchange rate falls below 760 won per dollar.

Another problem is that it takes about 10 years to develop a new airplane.

It is expected that the aircraft manufacturing, which is actively in progress now, could decline rapidly at a certain point in time.

Thus, it is pointed out that in view of the current investments in facilities, an annual order of \$500 million must be maintained and technology must be improved as soon as possible.

In view of this, some worry that all three companies, Samsung Aeronautics, Korean Air and Daewoo Heavy Industries, have entered into the business of producing engines and parts and assembling aircraft bodies. In other words, the big three domestic aeronautical companies are working on all areas of the aeronautical business, whereas most of the prominent aircraft makers of the advanced countries are specializing in engine production, body assembly, etc.

In particular, when the domestic aeronautical industry first started, Samsung Aeronautics specialized in engines, Daewoo Heavy Industries specialized in parts, and Korean Air specialized in assembly; however, such a system has recently collapsed.

In addition to worries over the overexpansion of the facilities, the concerned industry authorities agree that it is now time for traffic control in the aeronautical industry.

Future Projects

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[Text]

Samsung Aeronautics

Samsung Aeronautics initially entered into the aeronautical industry as a specialist in aircraft engine production, but it has become a leader in the aeronautical industry since it was selected in 1986 as a major contractor of the FX project which is aimed at developing the next-generation domestic fighters.

Samsung Aeronautics, whose original specialty was in the area of engines, equipped the domestic fighter Cheong-Ho [Air Master] with an engine produced jointly with P&W company of America, and until last year it produced \$50 million in the engine exports alone.

Especially, Samsung Aeronautics has already been designated as a company that meets the quality control standards set by the U.S. Department of Defense and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), thereby enabling it to enter the international industry of aeronautics. Samsung Aeronautics delivered over 1,000 units of jet engines, and none of them were found to be defective, thereby enhancing its reputation.

Using its momentum as a major contractor of the FX project, Samsung Aeronautics has expanded its territory from the previous engine-centered operation to the production of aircraft parts and helicopters, thereby rising as an all-around aircraft manufacturer.

Samsung has already received \$50 million worth of orders for fuselage parts, including the fuselage stringers for the Boeing 747 and the helicopter fuselage parts.

Samsung Aeronautics predicts its annual exports of the aircraft parts, including the fuselage and engine parts, will reach over \$400 million by 1990.

In the area of helicopters, Samsung is working with Bell Company of America to produce jointly the Bell-412SPs, the shipment of which will begin in 1990.

Already Samsung Aeronautics has begun exporting the helicopter parts and is supplying \$20 million worth of parts.

In order to compete as an all-around aircraft manufacturer, Samsung Aeronautics plans to invest 270 billion won by 1991 to expand its base.

Last year, Samsung Aeronautics invested 23.2 billion won in the area of the next-generation fighters, and it has decided to invest an additional 180 billion won, including 20 billion won this year, by 1991.

Accordingly, Samsung Aeronautics has started construction work to add on to the existing plant in Changwon for the production of engines and fuselage parts. In addition, Samsung has started construction of an aircraft assembly plant on a 150,000-pyong site in Sachon, South Kyongsang Province.

Separately, Samsung Aeronautics plans to invest 40 billion won for the production of helicopters.

Coupled with such investments and the technology it has accumulated thus far through the production of jet engines and fuselage parts, Samsung Aeronautics also aims to gain the ability to independently produce domestic fighters and helicopter fuselage, wings, core electronic equipments, and engines.

Samsung Aeronautics and P&W company of America are jointly developing the PW4000 engine for large passenger airplanes and the A225 engine for lightweight airplanes.

In addition, centered on the already established Aeronautics and Space Research Institute, Samsung has prepared plans to develop and secure super-high technologies to support the aeronautical industry.

In this area, Samsung plans to invest 50 billion won for research, and beginning next year, it plans to develop a training aircraft, helicopters and unmanned aircraft, and improve the performance of the existing fighters.

The training aircraft is a multipurpose lightweight plane for 2-5 passengers, and the helicopter is a typical Korean model for 5-7 passengers, all of which will be developed and manufactured through establishment of a research association.

Based on its ability to design and develop a basic airplane, and coupled with its technology and ability for comprehensive management through the production of the next-generation fighters, Samsung Aeronautics plans not only to develop supersonic fighters, but also to enter on a full-scale the space industry in the early 2000's.

Daewoo Heavy Industries

With its establishment of the Aeronautical Business Center in 1983, Daewoo Heavy Industries entered full-scale into the aeronautical industry.

In 1985, Daewoo received orders for the core fuselage parts for 500 units of the F-16 fighter from General Dynamics of America. In the same year, Daewoo completed construction of a for-aircraft-only plant that cost 36 billion won. Daewoo earned its fame in the fuselage parts business when it began supplying those from its newly constructed plant.

Based on a close inspection of aircraft parts, which was held in America, Daewoo's fuselage parts were recognized as top-quality products when compared with those from the six countries in the world that produce the F-16 fuselage parts.

In 1985, Daewoo received orders for aircraft frames for 100 units of the Boeing 747 from Northrop Company of America. In 1986, Daewoo received orders for the aircraft wing parts for 100 units of the Boeing 737 and 767 from Boeing Company, and in 1987 it received orders for the fuselage parts. The total orders amounted to \$100 million.

This year, Daewoo received orders for \$240 million worth of wing parts for the A330 and A340 models from the British BAe Company. Thus, Daewoo has enhanced its manufacturing techniques for fuselage parts of high-performance aircraft, including the latest fighters and superliners.

Meanwhile, in order to expand its aeronautical business, Daewoo Heavy Industries entered into the business of helicopter production. In 1986, Daewoo Heavy Industries and Sikorsky Company of America jointly created Daewoo Sikorsky Company.

Daewoo Sikorsky plans to produce a military helicopter H76 and a civilian model S76, the shipment of which is expected to begin by the end of this year.

Daewoo's annual production capacity for helicopters is expected to be 50 units by 1990, and Daewoo plans to export 50 percent of the total output. In affiliation with more than 50 domestic companies for the production of parts, Daewoo plans to produce more than 70 percent of the parts domestically by 1990.

On the other hand, Daewoo Heavy Industries has already invested more than 60 billion won and possesses a for-aircraft-only plant in Changwon. Moreover, Daewoo plans to make an additional investment of 150 billion won beginning this year up to 1991 to pursue a comprehensive space-and-aeronautics business encompassing the production of fuselages and engines.

At the same time, once the production of fuselages and power systems gets under way, Daewoo plans to build a fuselage assembly plant and a test-flight airfield on a 40,000-pyong site in Sachon, South Kyongsang Province.

In accordance with its plan to pursue a comprehensive aeronautical business, including everything from the production of aircraft parts to the final assembly process, Daewoo plans to transfer necessary technologies from General Dynamics, Boeing, P&W, and Bell.

In the early stage, Daewoo must depend on the import for raw materials that are needed for its business; however, Daewoo plans to increase gradually domestic production of machinery, precision casting, oil pressure machinery, and machine-processed materials through its affiliated companies, and plans to produce at least 70 percent of them domestically by the early 1990's.

Accordingly, beginning in 1991 when it has completed its planned investment, Daewoo Heavy Industries will be able to produce aircraft engines for 200 airplanes per year and the power plant attachment machinery for 230 airplanes per year.

Thus, Daewoo is expected to establish a comprehensive aeronautical business along with its current production lines including the fixed wings, rotor blades and fuselages.

Daewoo Heavy Industries has also created an aeronautical research institute for research and development in aeronautical technology.

Through such efforts, Daewoo plans to establish an independent capacity to design aircraft and be able to assemble the finished aircraft and perform test flights independently. Daewoo also aims at the development of its own aircraft model in the 1990's.

Daewoo-Sikorsky, too, plans to develop its own helicopter model in the mid-1990's by advancing the aircraft materials, power systems, systems engineering, and design technology.

Korean Air

As a forerunner of the domestic aeronautical industry, Korean Air is putting its full energy into the assembly of fighters and helicopters and the export of large civilian aircraft parts.

In the area of helicopters, Korean Air began producing the 500MD helicopters jointly with MDMC Company of

America in 1976 when it created the Aeronautical and Space Business Center.

Korean Air has produced a total of 307 helicopters for the military, civilians and exports, and plans to produce 40 units this year.

In addition, Korean Air produced 125 units of the 500EF helicopter up to last year, and plans to supply 61 units this year.

Early this year, Korean Air signed an agreement jointly to produce the 520MK helicopters, and plans to produce prototype models beginning at the end of this year. Korean Air also plans to produce a medium-weight helicopter, UH60, jointly with Sikorsky Company of America beginning in 1989.

Additionally, Korean Air was selected as a major contractor for the first phase of the FX project, and produced the Chegoong-Ho jointly with Northrop Company of America until 1986.

For the business of producing the next-general fighters, Korean Air plans to produce key machine-work parts for wings and fuselage areas. Korean Air is seeking a leadership role in the production of the next-generation fighters, which will be launched after the mid-1990's.

In particular, Korean Air has been recently focusing on the export of the large civilian aircraft parts.

Korean Air has shown a noteworthy status in terms of orders received, thanks to its own airline business which generates demands for its own products.

Until last year, Korean Air received \$170 million worth of orders for the main wing extension parts for the Boeing company's B747 airplanes and the support parts for wings and fuselage of the MD80 and MD11 models.

This year, Korean Air is expected to sign agreements with Airbus Company of Europe, Aerospaciale of France, BAe company of Britain, and P&W and GE of America for the production of the A330 parts and the MD11 engine parts.

With such a demand for the civilian aircraft parts, Korean Air aims to maintain \$500 million worth of orders per year beginning in the 1990's.

To accommodate the parts orders that have been increasing fast recently, Korean Air plans to expand its investment in facilities.

Until last year, Korean Air invested a total of 140 billion won, including 68 billion won for facilities and 73 billion won for equipment. In addition, Korean Air plans to invest 100 billion won from now until early 1990.

Thus, Korean Air plans to equip itself with all necessary facilities, such as the special machine-work facilities and the sheet metal processing facilities for the large aircraft fuselage structures, for the assembly and manufacturing of aircraft and their parts.

In order to accelerate progress in the aeronautical industry, Korean Air also plans to participate actively in the joint international aircraft development project through a joint manufacturing or consortium with aircraft manufacturers of the advanced countries.

Through its participation in the joint international development of aircraft, Korean Air plans to perfect its entire production management system that encompasses independent design and manufacturing of aircraft, independent quality inspection, and test flight. Centered on its aeronautical research center, Korean Air plans to complete the development of a prototype of a multipurpose lightweight airplane by 1992, and then will enter both the domestic and overseas markets.

Upon completion of design and development of the lightweight aircraft, Korean Air plans to launch a project for the development of an aircraft that can take off and land on a short-range airfield, and plans to complete its test flight in the early 2000's.

In the long run, Korean Air also plans to participate in the joint international development of domestic supersonic fighters and medium-size civilian aircraft.

Sammi and Others

Along with the three established aeronautical companies, Samsung Aeronautics, Daewoo Heavy Industries and Korean Air, Sammi Group has recently declared its entry into the aeronautical industry as a comprehensive aircraft manufacturer.

This means that Sammi Group wants to go one step beyond the supply of its materials for the aeronautical industry, and intends to enter into the business of aircraft design and manufacturing.

To this end, Sammi is studying a plan to enter into the aeronautics and space industry jointly with an Italian aircraft manufacturer Agusta Company.

As a first step, Sammi is studying plans to embark on the assembly of lightweight airplanes, which are more economic and technically safer than others, and move, step by step, toward the business of medium-size aircraft.

In particular, Sammi's aeronautical business aims at manufacturing an aircraft that is suitable for the topographical conditions of Korea, that requires the least amount of time for converting aircraft parts to Korean-made parts, and that is most promising for future exports to semi-developed countries.

In addition, as its first product, Sammi is reportedly studying inexpensive and lightweight airplanes that can take off and land on a temporary, short-range runway.

As an airplane that fits this mold, Sammi is studying the Agusta Company's lightweight plane SF600.

This airplane has a wide range of utility, such as transportation of passengers and freight, photographing, spraying agricultural chemicals, and observation of road, traffic and forest.

It is said that once it makes a concrete decision to enter into the aeronautical industry, Sammi plans to produce 60 percent of the aircraft parts domestically as soon as possible, and acquire aircraft design technologies so as to establish its own design capacity.

Hyundai Precision Industries, too, has, since last year, been actively studying possibilities of its entry into the comprehensive aeronautical industry.

Aside from the comprehensive aircraft manufacturers, business is booming in the aircraft-related industries, including parts, materials and aeronautical electronics.

In the area of aeronautical electronics, for which demand will essentially increase as the aeronautical industry grows, the following companies have already entered or are rushing to enter into the industry: Kumsong Precision that produces the black box and radar, Kumsong Electric, Taeyong Electronics, Effkoa, Korea Litton, Hanbell, Ihwa Electric, Samsung Semiconductors and Communications, Samsung Electronics, and Cheil Precision.

In the area of aircraft parts business, the following companies are seeking entry: Sinil Metals, Tongyang Nozzle, Hankuk Metallic Mold, Hankuk Chigonggu Industries, Taesin Metals, and Samsung Heavy Industries.

In the area of aircraft materials development, too, various companies are rushing to enter into the industry. Samson Industries succeeded in domestic development of aluminum materials, and Sammi Special Steel succeeded in domestic development of parts materials, landing gear materials, and special steel materials for the fuselage structure.

Hankuk Fiber is focusing on the development of a carbon fiber-oriented compound material. Also, Sonkyong Industry, Taegwang Industry, Cheil Textiles, and Cheil Synthetic Fiber are seeking entries into the aeronautical industry through development of compound materials.

In addition, other companies that are actively seeking to enter into the aeronautics-related industries include 40 some companies, such as Kia Machine Industry, Taedong Heavy Industries, Tongmyong Heavy Industries, Rocket Electric, Tongil, Hyundai Precision Industries, Hyosong Heavy Industries, and Ssangyong.

At the same time, since the three established aeronautical companies have set up plans to work with their affiliated companies that specialize in the parts production, their ties with the aeronautical industry are expected to be extended further through the supply of parts.

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