NonLethal Weapons, NonLethal Policy, and Complex Contingencies
Abstract
Advocates promote NonLethal Weapons (NLWs) use in a complex contingency as a way to enforce U.S. with an absolute minimum of violence and destruction. They believe that NLWs will offer the operational commander a rheostatic means of applying force that will exactly and precisely and benignly compel the opponents to either cooperate or face incapacitation. However, the environment of a complex contingency is a nonlinear, chaotic, and highly interactive place. The commander will find the operational landscape inhabited by noncombatants and fighters, women and children, and friend and foe alike, all of whom will repeatedly engage with his forces at different times, levels, and ways. NLWs will introduce another element of uncertainty into this environment, malting the outcome even less predictable. A robust NonLethal Policy incorporates and integrates all the assets available to the operational commander, including nonlethal and lethal force. Instead of relying mainly on technologies, a policy of minimal casualties (or a NonLethal Policy) will more likely capture the commander's intent, as well as offer an operational level tool to achieve the political goals. One way to appropriately devise a NonLethal Policy lies with reviewing NLWs in light of the Six Principles of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), and then proceeding to answer the Four Questions of the operational commander's mission analysis.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 05, 1999
- Accession Number
- ADA363056
Entities
People
- Rex D. Sheldon
Organizations
- Naval War College