Fleet Air Defense in the Falkland Islands Conflict: A Failure in Operational Protection?
Abstract
When the hastily composed British task force was dispatched to liberate the Falkland Islands in the spring of 1982 the difficult challenge of operational protection began. Not only was the task force not equipped for this type of operation but the capabilities and intent of the enemy was unknown. Upon reaching the South Atlantic the British task force commander faced a variety of decisions on courses of action and faced the dilemma of protecting an unprepared fleet and hastily concocted amphibious landing against a superior number of opposing aircraft. The task force commander's operational scheme has been questioned and the grievous cost of recapturing the islands is still controversial. In this paper I will examine what effect the operational factors of time, force and space had on the task force commanders available courses of action. I will also look at how the task force commander dealt with the dilemma of protecting a shifting operational center of gravity. I will look at the missing components of operational protection and how the operational scheme was developed in hopes of minimizing this critical vulnerability.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 05, 1999
- Accession Number
- ADA363067
Entities
People
- Mark A. Wilcox
Organizations
- Naval War College