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MANAGING THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE

By

Kevin M Sorbello
MSC Civilian, GS-15

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Signature: *Kevin M Sorbello*

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Faculty Advisor: *David F. Chandler*
Prof. David F. Chandler

Paper directed by
Capt. George Jackson, United States Navy
Chairman, Department of Joint Military Operations

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Abstract

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Managing the Dynamics of Change

Introduction

Change is inherent in all things, yet few welcome change. Ever diminishing budgets require operational changes, but changes driven solely by financial constraints generate a great deal of suspicion and resistance by those directly affected. These "cost saving measures" can take many forms (guidance, directives, instructions, etc.), but invariably appear as misguided edicts to an operational commander not informed of the rationale for the change.

Staffs analyze situations and develop courses of action that will result in achievement of desired end-states. Operational commanders, tasked with implementing changes, can come up with innovating ways to maximize the desired end-state while minimizing collateral impact, *but only when they understand the objective*. When operational commanders do not believe their actions will result in the desired end-state, they implement the required changes but only superficially support them. This lack of conscious or subconscious support lessens the effectiveness of the change and causes friction within the organization. This increased friction manifests itself in lower operational productivity and greater mistrust of Staff competence.

There are no perfect systems for incorporating change, but there are many imperfect ones, often with hidden costs and lost opportunities to the organization. Whether a change realizes any cost savings, or increased productivity, is less important than the manner and environment in which it promulgates. The impacts of flawed plans are exacerbated, good ones lessened, whenever they appear without supporting rationale or invitation to provide feedback/input. The converse is also true: weaker plans can sometime achieve greater results because of support generated by a perceived air of cooperation between provider and recipient.

The organizational dynamics of any social system, with all its blind spots, pitfalls and weak links, will greatly determine the successfulness of any intended change. This paper uses

two Military Sealift Command (MSC) case histories to exemplify typical problems associated with unilateral decision making and implementation of directives. It will illustrate and examine common problems and perceptions associated with operational changes.

Using personal MSC¹ experience, input from MSC Staff and Operational Commanders, this paper provides senior administrative and shipboard operational perspective² and recommendations for minimizing the operational impact of staff-directed changes.

Organizational Dynamics

“People only see what they are prepared to see.”

Emerson, Journals 1863

“Us” and “Them”-- common words that indicate a break in the continuity between Staff and Operational Field Commanders. Staffs, composed of those with direct field experience and those with little or no experience, provide organizational guidance and direction. Their unique position provides a broader view of how all the pieces fit together, but remoteness from the field insulates them from many important details. Operational Commanders are privy to details but often lack the information that would provide them a broader perspective. Understanding and appreciation of this situation, though perhaps obvious to some, is critical as it forms the basis for most problems incurred when implementing change.

Operational Commanders, concerned with a myriad of day to day details, embrace routine as a stabilizing tool. Any outside change to routine is abrasive and disruptive unless clearly understood to be to their advantage. If not fully accepted as such, it is perceived as something that will make their job more difficult. This is to be expected, as “...departmental

¹ Author has 20 combined experience with MSC: 14 years as Chief Engineer, six years in Staff as a Port Engineer and Engineering Type Desk.

² MSC Masters, Chief Engineers, and N3 Staff survey by author regarding the reduction of UNREP rig teams and the restriction imposed on UNREP hours. (Note: Masters and Chief Engineers are O-6 (Officer level 6) equivalents, the Master being a ship's CO.).

experience and motivation provide the expectation and background experience to see things in forms of personal selectivity.”³

Staffs create and promulgate a continuous stream of instructions and changes to their Operational Commanders. However, those changes that directly affect funds and manning are the ones most likely resisted. The Operational Commanders and their subordinates are motivated by personal security and stability as much as patriotism, and any change that has the potential to affect those two areas *must be perceived and accepted as the right kind of change*.

Behavioral psychologists indicate that “selective distortion would operate to block out the perception of information we don’t want to see or to distort such information so that it supports what we want to see.”⁴ This means that Operational Commanders often perceive cost saving measures to be lacking any regard for the wellbeing of those affected by the change; it fits the model already established of “Us” and “Them”. On the other hand, such filtering is equally prevalent by Staffs, who see a need for financially driven changes and perceive any negative feedback as little more than whining by shortsighted operators. Lastly, filtering serves to color the true results of the implemented change, as detractors see only detrimental side effects and supporters see only savings.

When each party starts with this preconception, they fall into the trap of the self-fulfilling prophecy. This results in Staff complaining to Staff, and Operational Commanders complaining to other Operational Commanders, minimal communication between the two. The net result is the negation of effective communications. However, when a change does not ultimately accomplish a desired end-state, fingers will point up and down the chain of command, each saying “They make mistakes, we make miscalculations.”⁵

³ David Lawless, Organizational Behavior, The Psychology of Effective Management, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall) 1979, p81.

⁴ Ibid., p80.

⁵ Ibid., p84.

The Military Sealift Command faces the same financial downsizing as many other government agencies. This situation has inspired a host of changes attempting to lower operating costs and streamline operations. The problem, not peculiar to MSC, is this: those closest to the operation are not in a position to institute changes. Also, since "close your mouth and follow orders" or "it all pays the same" tend to be current paradigms, those who might provide sound feedback seldom provide it. Some of those who do provide feedback often do so in such a manner that it is either ignored or dismissed because of its tone, regardless of its merit.

With this situational awareness, we now examine the two specific case studies: a reduction in the number of Underway Replenishment (UNREP) Rig Teams on MSC's Fleet Oilers (T-AO's) and the restriction of UNREP hours of operation.

Reduction of UNREP Rig Teams

"An Idea can turn to dust or magic, depending on the talent that rubs against it."

William Bernbach, Advertising Executive 1982

MSC operates an organic fleet of UNREP ships, requiring certain well-trained teams to operate the winches, hoists, sound-powered telephones, and other equipment associated with the transfer of fuel and cargo between ships at sea. This, however, was not always the case.

When Admiral Zumwalt became CNO in 1970, he faced the problem of replacing the Navy's aging fleet of UNREP Oilers (AO's) at the expense of building new combat ships. He decided to solve this dilemma by transferring the majority of U.S. Navy Fleet Oilers to MSC, who would operate them with civilian crews supplemented with naval detachments for operating military communication equipment.

The USS Taluga became the first test platform⁶ with a manning level of 105 civilian mariners⁷ and 16 U.S. Navy personnel. Civilian manning was based on being able to support a "Condition 3 UNREP", the maximum number of rigs the CNO wanted passed simultaneously⁸ (three to port for aircraft carriers, two to starboard for other vessels).⁹ Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) designers determined the number of crewmen necessary to simultaneously operate five UNREP stations, plus positions for Safety/Fuel Control officers.¹⁰ Although high by commercial standards, the ship's new manning level (121 total crew) was only half that employed during operation by the Navy¹¹, with the difference in manning attributed to differences in experience between civilian mariners and Navy seamen.¹² This reduction in manning levels provided tremendous savings to the Navy who funded the operation.¹³

Eventually, new UNREP Oilers (requiring less crew for ship operation, but the same for manning UNREP rig stations) replaced the old UNREP Oilers. However, cost projections and predictions of future funding restraints prompted some MSC Staff to take a proactive role in finding ways to reduce ship per diem rates¹⁴.

In support of this effort, MSC conducted an independent study to determine if crew reductions were possible on MSC ships. The finding compared MSC manning levels with those

⁶ Naval Surface Warfare Center, Underway Replenishment of Naval Ships, (Washington: U.S. G.P.O.), 1992 p224.

⁷ Although MSC "civilians" and "commercial mariners" have the same licensing and certification requirements, sufficient differences exist to preclude using the terms synonymously.

⁸ A "rig" is the UNREP term for the system of wire ropes and hardware used between ships to pass fueling hoses or cargo transfer trolleys. "Passing" a rig is the term for the actual ship-to-ship transfer of the rig.

⁹ Condition 1: 2 rigs; Condition 2: 3 rigs; Condition 3: 5 rigs, or any 3 rigs and a simultaneous VERTREP.

¹⁰ 105 civilian crew as follows: 52 for ship operation/navigation; 53 for maximum UNREP operation (10 crewmen for each rig team (50 total), plus 2 safety observers and 1 fuel team supervisor).

¹¹ Daniel B. Levine and Stanley A. Horowitz, The Savings in Operating Costs and Billets from Civilian Manning of Navy UNREP Ships, (Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analyses), 1993, p6

¹² Ibid., MSC crews averaged 24 years of service, compared to 5 years of service for the Navy crew.

¹³ Ibid., "Although MSC ships have smaller crews, merchant rates are higher than Navy rates – but only by a few percent. The net effect is thus a substantial lowering of manning costs. The savings are \$4 million to \$15 million annually per ship, depending on the type of ship."

¹⁴ Daily rate customer (Navy) pays for use of the vessel and crew (MSC).

of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA), the British version of MSC. "The results were negative; the RFA crews were no smaller than those of MSC."¹⁵

Manning for the existing conditions appeared to be at a minimum, so MSC began a series of meetings¹⁶ to discuss possible impact to the fleet by reducing the number of UNREP rig teams. MSC ultimately brought this option before the Navy, who subsequently agreed to reduce the number of rig teams from five to three on certain ships as a cost savings measure.

MSC implemented this change on a few UNREP Oilers operating in U.S. coastal waters as test platforms.¹⁷ The Navy approved the change, but the idea was born within MSC.

Staff personnel viewed this change as "fleet guidelines aimed at reducing costs, not MSC policies being jammed down the fleet's throat."¹⁸ However, survey responses indicate that MSC Masters viewed this change as another MSC attempt to cut costs at the expense of readiness.

Responses to survey questions on how or why MSC implemented this change revealed disparate views; a few Ship Masters perceived something quite different from that indicated by MSC Staff. Most Masters did not recall exactly how or when MSC actually implemented the change. However, every responding Master knew of the reduction and perceived it as an unrealistic attempt to lower operating costs which significantly reduced the ship's capability. They believed MSC would realize little savings, and expressed angst at having to explain to Battle Group Commanders why they would not be able to provide full services as advertised¹⁹. While understanding that MSC does not intend forward deployment of any rig-team-reduced ships, all expressed concerns on the indirect impact to fully manning assets other than those targeted for rig team reductions. Approximately half of those responding indicated they had

¹⁵ Levine and Horowitz, p6

¹⁶ Initial meetings held at MSC Headquarters, Washington Naval Shipyard, Washington D.C. 1991.

¹⁷ Reiterated in NAVMSG, CTF THREE THREE, 221510ZJAN99.

¹⁸ N3 Staff Email to Author DTD 1/26/99.

¹⁹ UNREP planning messages provide Navy customers of the ship's current capabilities, however, Navy CO's often question ships' Masters while alongside as to "why" they are not fully capable.

provided some form of input to MSC Staff without it having any effect on this issue. However, MSC Staff indicated they had received no negative feedback from the fleet, not even from ships with reduced rig teams²⁰. This paradox is typical of organizations lacking established reporting procedures and willing, open-minded participants.

Masters also expressed concern that MSC's SOCAL (Southern California) Oiler (one of the ships in the pilot program) has yet to be tasked with anything requiring "sustainment." Correct or incorrect, here are some other perceptions worthy of note:

- Reduction of rig teams results in a reduction of pipeline.²¹
- Crew shortages are more difficult to absorb with such low manning levels.
- Rig teams require specially trained personnel, unavailable commercially.²²
- Fewer rig teams result in fewer trained crews available for RRF²³ activation.
- Staff personnel do not have to explain to Navy COs why reduced MSC Oilers "can't" provide full support as cited in the ship's ROC/POE (unchanged).
- Material condition of UNREP equipment will suffer in the end due to less crew.
- Fewer rigs translate into more time alongside.²⁴
- The cost in readiness is less than saved in finances.

Whether the claims of the Masters are correct or incorrect is less important than the fact they appear to be unresolved. If these claims are correct, then someone in the decision chain needs to be made aware. If not, then MSC should show its Masters supported evidence that previous perceptions were incorrect. It is obvious that there are sufficient differences in perception to warrant open discussion. Additionally, the few responses from Chief Engineers indicate strong feelings that a) their words fall on deaf ears, and b) their job is not to question policy, but to make the best of bad situations.

²⁰ Author promised anonymity to those taking the survey in an effort to provide a neutral forum for honest commentary.

²¹ MSC bases manning scales on 1.25 persons per billet, so any reduction in billets also reduces pipeline.

²² UNREP rigs exist only within the military and MSC, there is therefore no commercial expertise in this area.

²³ Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF). MSC has two UNREP Oilers, in reserve status, so 10 rig teams would be needed.

²⁴ Time alongside for a combatant is time out of the fray and more time as a target, so all efforts are directed at minimizing time alongside.

MSC Commander (COMSC) Rear Admiral Water T. Piotti, Jr. stated, before the United States Readiness Command Winter Defense Symposium in 1986, that MSC "...will provide the maximum number of jobs for merchant seamen, so as to provide that base of talent for the future." This appears at odds with the idea of reducing rig teams, which, by their very nature, require specialized experience and training.

This situation was especially telling during Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) ship activation for Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Several ships experienced major problems due to a lack of trained personnel familiar with the specific equipment in question.²⁵ Post-Desert Storm analysis clearly indicates a need for insuring a sufficient quantity of personnel are readily available in specialized areas, and that the commercial maritime fleet cannot provide additional UNREP rig team expertise.²⁶

The intent of the rig team reduction was sound: save money or lose ships. However, a perception that actions are ineffective, that input is unwelcome, diminishes the best of efforts. Review of the Pacific Fleet Underway Replenishment Guide indicates that every MSC Oiler "when fully manned" can provide a certain degree of service. What it does not indicate is the possibility that manning levels of ships underway might be so low as to affect the number of rigs they are capable of sending. Reductions authorized by the Navy, effective or ineffective need to be presented as such to both MSC *and* Navy fleet personnel. Navy CO's coming alongside MSC ships with reduced capabilities should understand that any delays due to manning reductions were brought about by a combined MSC/Navy effort to keep ships active at reduced capability as an attempt at cost savings. There should be no need for Masters to explain a situation beyond their control.

²⁵ Phillip R. Kessler, Ready Reserve Force; West Coast activation in support of Desert Shield/Storm, 1991

²⁶ Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries: Our Nation's Ability to Meet Sealift Requirements Caused by American Deployment to the Persian Gulf: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, 1990

Survey responses indicate Masters do what they can to keep up with shortages beyond deliberate rig team reductions. Understanding the need for experienced rig team personnel, they are attempting to move the crews between stations already tensioned and stable, and those being connected.²⁷ They also train additional crew members at various station billets to allow their use during times of critical shortages. Ships' Masters cross-deck personnel between departments to maximize the effectiveness of the entire crew. These measures are sound regardless of the change necessitating their conception. However, Staffs should not count on good innovation at the operational commander's level to make up for poor changes, nor blame good Commanders unable to find a way to implement a bad idea.

Staff personnel are trying to hire, train and promote more merchant seamen to replace those retiring or leaving for work elsewhere. However, "...military staffs at all levels must be willing participants who understand the system and can work to improve it."²⁸ What appears to be lacking, by both Staff and Operational Commanders, is open discourse and education on this subject. There is a pervasive feeling that "*this order has come from above, so we can't do anything about it.*" This is true at all levels. Yet, "officers should not hesitate to help others understand what is feasible, what is not, and where cooperative use of power can be most effective."²⁹ There must be a balance between questioning orders and providing intelligent feedback to those developing courses of action. Such situations require expedient and innovative thinking by Senior Administrators and Operational Commanders, as well as honest evaluation and reporting. Such an environment would unburden both Staff and Operators by allowing preplanning efforts on changes that do not require immediate implementation, and constructive feedback channels on those that do.

²⁷ The highest manpower requirement is during the hook-up phase of each rig.

²⁸ George T. Raach and Ivana Kass, "National Power and the Interagency Process" Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1995, p11.

²⁹ Ibid., p12.

Restriction of UNREP hours

"We do not make a world of our own, but fall into institutions already made, and have to accommodate ourselves to them to be useful at all."

Ralph Waldo Emerson

The Navy implemented another cost savings measure: they requested the fleet operators schedule UNREP operations to normal civilian working hours (0800 - 1700, Monday through Friday). This policy was promulgated as "whenever possible" guidance, but had a net effect of shifting most UNREP operations to these hours. The Navy based this decision on a common misconception of how UNREP overtime affects MSC ship per diem rates.

MSC operates civilian manned ships under a complicated system of wage scales and benefits that allow the payment of overtime for any work outside normally scheduled hours: 0800-1700, Monday through Friday. This request to shift UNREP hours was therefore based on a perception that overtime costs generated for conducting UNREPs outside of normal working hours were significant and could be reduced by rescheduling UNREPs to normal working hours whenever possible. This perception, however, is a flawed.³⁰

MSC Headquarters Staff reviewing the revised operating guidance, predict its reversal, as it appears to have been ineffectual in reducing operating costs or per diem rates.³¹ However, very little of this information has been forwarded to the fleet. Although the Staff prediction may be accurate, not forwarding such information is counter-productive, as MSC's operational commanders perceive Staff silence as support for a method of operation perceived as embarrassing and unnecessary.

The reasons cited by the Masters for this perception is that Navy Operational Commanders, especially those on aircraft carriers, would like to conduct their underway

³⁰ Per Diem rates are calculated based on the average daily cost of operation for a typical year. This figure includes straight time *and* overtime, as well as maintenance and repair costs. Shifting UNREPs to "normal hours" only shifted regularly scheduled maintenance to overtime, thus resulting in no real savings.

³¹ Ship's Master indicated Admiral Perkins (COMSC) quoted actual percentage as 0.07 percent, Dec 1998.

replenishments so as to minimize impact on their training and operational schedules.

When the customer reschedules flight operations to support fleet guidance on UNREP operations, they perceive they are being inconvenienced because MSC mariners make overtime. If MSC's mission is to serve the fleet, to satisfy the customer, the customer should be able to decide when fueling is convenient. The fact that the decision to reschedule UNREPs came from the Navy matters little when the perceived cause is the way MSC chooses to operate.

Here are a few concerns cited by the Masters with the restriction of UNREP hours:

- Fewer night UNREP operations translate into less skill at conducting night operations.³²
- Maintenance schedule disruption aboard ship (either no time for maintenance or increased overtime to accomplish).
- Greater risk of heat exhaustion by the crew in high heat areas of operation.
- Increased customer dissatisfaction.

The general feeling of the Masters was one of frustration. From the Masters' perspective, both Navy and MSC Headquarters personnel reviewing cost data are misguided in their impression of overtime's impact on per diem, and close minded to other options that could significantly cut ship operating costs. Some Masters indicated that they had provided input back up the chain to whoever would listen, but each felt as though their words had been ignored.

The Staff, concerned with a great many things, are seldom willing to aggressively pursue policies or guidance forwarded from Fleet Commanders. Staffs, by their very nature, are concerned with long term projects and policies. Any new instruction, policy or guidance put forth results in someone responding with either "it can't be done" or "it will ruin us" memos, email or letters. Staffs deal with what seems to them an ocean of problems, while Operational Commanders deal with things of much narrower, immediate concern. These observations by the author offer some indication of why differences in perception potentially lead to conflict.

³² NSWV Studies have shown that night operations are inherently more difficult and dangerous, thus requiring ongoing training to insure currency and capability.

The Timeliness of Feedback and Reply

“Feedback is further frustrated by the length of time between decisions and consequences.”

McGill and Slocum, *The Smarter Organization*, 1994

A Master or Chief Engineer often discovers a problem and comes up with a solution, or course of action, in a matter of minutes, sometimes seconds. Staffs, however, would be remiss to make snap-decisions that might set things in motion that would affect the organization years hence. When Staffs ask for input, they tend to receive it from their operational commanders in a very short timeframe. This is partly because of the type or import of information requested, but perhaps more directly because of the way operational commanders perceive their world. This tendency to respond quickly suits Staff personnel well, as they are then able to address whatever issue generated the requirement for information. However, when the operational commander requests something from Staff, the resultant delay sends the wrong message. The Staff may not be ignoring the request, but that is the perception of the operational commander. This is not something that will change, nor should it, but understanding a situation is the first step to resolving a conflict. Any amount of feedback, even to say, “I’m working on it” or “I’ll get back to you” is something that will show that the request has been acknowledged and that it is being taken for action. This alone, however, will not always satisfy; but in those cases where some action is actually being taken, it will at least fill the void between receipt and resolution.

Feedback on changes to operating procedures.

“We’re drowning in information and starving for knowledge.”

Rutherford Rogers, Librarian, Yale 1985

Operational commanders need to insure they make a sincere effort to record raw data, but they must also provide “information.” Insights provided by on-scene Operational Commanders, on how data support or contradict a course of action’s ability to achieve an

objective are invaluable. To simply pass along data in accordance with directives, then provide insights to everyone other than the requester, serves only to undermine the process by denying the value of the insight from those who need it the most. Staff must also insure that an action's objective is properly defined, solicit analytical opinions from those closest to that action, and provide timely feedback to the provider. Shunning analyses in favor of raw data runs the risk of taking data out of context and narrowing others' perception, leading to more misguided action.

Applying the Military Planning Process

***"He who cannot change the very frame
of his thought can never change reality."***

Anwar Sadat

Both Staff and Operational Commanders need to apply the military planning process to problem solving. The chosen courses of action taken by Staff and Operational Commanders would have probably been quite different if they had identified correct objective in either of the two case studies. The correct objective should have been *the reduction of operating costs*. Identified instead was *the reduction of billets* and *the reduction of operational overtime associated with UNREP operations outside of normal working hours*. The difference between correct and incorrect in this case exemplifies the need for the application of the commander's estimate of the situation in developing a proper course of action to achieve a specific objective.

If MSC and Navy Staff had addressed the problem of reducing operational costs using the inverse, or "regressive" method of planning,³³ the two previously chosen courses of action might never have been listed as viable options. The problem in these two cases is that instead of first defining an objective, then trying to work backward through the possible conditions that could achieve that objective, the planners instead chose to attack perceived causes.

³³ Milan Vego, On Operational Art, (Newport: U.S. Naval War College), 1998, p247

When review of manning levels showed little possibility of reduction, someone at the staff level raised the question of reducing the number of rig teams. The focus at the time was reduction of manning, not reduction of costs. This paved the way for a chain of events that led to justifications along the way that reduction of manning was necessary to stay competitive with commercial operation. For example, during one of the early meetings at MSC Headquarters, someone cited how the MV GIANNELLA had done a fantastic job during Desert Storm at half the cost of an MSC Oiler. A senior member in MSC's Comptroller staff informed those present that the MV GIANNELLA was only a few thousand dollars per day less than the per diem of an MSC Fleet Oiler, had only one rig station for fuel, and could not do highline operations, VERTREP, or deliver mail. However, it was readily apparent that this information was either insufficient to change their minds or that their minds were filtering out this information.³⁴

The specter of commercial, non-government, crews operating MSC ships has long haunted Staff, thereby biasing decisions made at their level. Similarly, the Navy is now trying to man some of its non-combatant vessels along an MSC manpower structure. The problem with both these approaches is one of failing to understand the problem and adequately define the objective. Commercial ships cost less to operate because they have smaller crews and less equipment.³⁵ The reason they have fewer crews and less equipment is that they are point-to-point operators, not UNREP assets. Manning a Fleet Oiler with commercial crews would still require the same number of UNREP personnel. The problem with comparing Navy to MSC, or MSC to Commercial, is that there are no ships operated by one group that are being operated the same way by any other group. Merchant vessels perform different tasks than MSC or Navy assets. "UNREP ships are expensive to build and operate compared to merchant ships because

³⁴ Author attended rig team reduction meeting at MSC Headquarters in the capacity of Chief Engineer and MSCPAC Engineering typedesk commander, 1991.

³⁵ Naval Surface Warfare Center, Underway Replenishment of Naval Ships/ Underway Replenishment Department Department Report. (Port Hueneme: U.S. G.P.O.), 1992, p102.

UNREP ships must be able to break out and transfer cargo underway in up to sea state 5 conditions³⁶ at night under darkened ship conditions. In order to do this, UNREP ships carry their own cargo handling personnel and are extensively outfitted with special cargo gear... [while] most merchant vessels are usually designed and built to minimize the size of the crew to reduce commercial operating costs. Combat Logistic Force tasks would require more personnel than the ship could typically accommodate.”³⁷ Likewise, MSC ships are crewed with career mariners who specialize in specific billets and, unlike their Navy counterparts, most remain in the same position for decades. Manning MSC’s UNREP ships with commercial crews would actually cost more if manned to the same levels because crew pay and benefits would be greater and operating overhead (MSC Staff) would remain the same.

Operational overtime is always a sensitive issue, both to Navy personnel who don’t receive it, and to MSC personnel who see it as justified compensation for work in excess of the commercially recognized 40 hour work week. The actual incomes of most MSC mariners, however, even after receiving overtime, is only slightly higher than someone of equal time/grade in the Navy³⁸. This misconception of overpaid civilians, coupled with misinformation regarding computation of per diem rates, has made overtime a target for cost saving measures for decades. The harsh reality, supported by direct experience and survey replies from Ship Masters is that operational overtime is unavoidable due to a ship being underway for seven days a week, 24 hours a day, 80% of each year. The addition of operational overtime due to UNREP operations is less than one tenth of one percent of the total operating budget.³⁹ Regardless of the actual amount, this shift or restriction of UNREP hours appears to be another case of looking at a

³⁶ According to U.S. Hydrographic Scale, Sea State 5 is defined as “very rough, waves 8-12 feet.”

³⁷ Naval Surface Warfare Center, Underway Replenishment of Naval Ships/ Underway Replenishment Department Department Report, 1992, p38.

³⁸ Levine and Horowitz, p6.

³⁹ Ship’s Master indicated Admiral Perkins (COMSC) quoted actual percentage as 0.07 percent, Dec 1998.

perceived symptom and trying to find justification for eliminating it. In this case, it was not a symptom of the problem, but of a lack of system comprehension.

Conclusion

"Too bad all the people who know how to run the country are busy driving cabs and cutting hair."

George Burns

Staffs will continue to initiate changes to the system and operational commanders will continue to come up with innovating ways to implement the changes while minimizing any negative impact these changes may bring with them. However, by application of proper military planning techniques could mitigate the animosity generated by tough decisions, open constructive channels of communication that allow analytical feedback, provide clearer definition of objectives and assist one another with the painful process of change.

The two case studies examined herein provide clear examples of nearly every pitfall both Staff and Operational Commanders will face in an ever-changing environment, where funds grow smaller and obligations grow larger. Communication, understanding, open-mindedness, and patience are essential to any successful organization, especially ones that operate under different methods and philosophy. Understanding human nature, the dynamics of an organization, and the background of its members should allow both sides to better understand motivations and inclinations. The "Us" and "Them" paradigm must give way to a cooperative "Team" effort for an organization to be effective. Yet, understanding alone will not improve the situation; only the application of wisdom -- that synergy of knowledge, understanding, patience and experience-- will allow the discovery and implementation of realistic options to achieve specific objectives.

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