The Real Cost of "Engagement"
Abstract
This paper analyzes the terrorist bombings in Beirut, Lebanon in 1983 and Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in 1996, and draws some universal lessons learned on how the Chain-of-command. Lessons learned include: (1) Tactical warning on where, when and how big a bomb was going strike was not available in either of the bombings. Given the complex nature of terrorist organizations a warning order this specific will most likely never be available; therefore, the chain-of-command must figure out how to protect their forces without it. (2) Particular attention must be paid to where forces are bedded-down initially. In both bombings United States forces were located in urban areas which are much more vulnerable to terrorist attack. Given the disruption to the mission and the cost of moving forces it is much wiser to place forces in more isolated locations that are less susceptible to standoff bombs even if the security environment at the time seems benign. (3) The chain-of-command must be ever vigilant if the security environment in their theatre declines because this is when their forces will be most vulnerable to terrorist attack. As the security situation declines, the chain-of-command must err on the side of asking for too much rather than too little. While it is the responsibility of the chain-of-command to ensure United States forces are protected while forward deployed, it simply is not possible to eliminate the terrorist threat. The military and civilian leadership in the United States must understand that its forward deployed forces will always face an asymmetric threats like terrorism and when these threats are acted upon, some will be successful, despite the best efforts of the chain-of-command.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 05, 1999
- Accession Number
- ADA363230
Entities
People
- Gina M. Grosso
Organizations
- Naval War College