

**STRATEGY  
RESEARCH  
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY LOGISTICS:  
SURVIVING THE BUDGET PROCESS**

**BY**

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN R. ANGEVINE  
United States Army**

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:  
Approved for public release.  
Distribution is unlimited.**

19990527 017

**USAWC CLASS OF 1999**



**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050**

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**The Revolution in Military Logistics:**

**Surviving the Budget Process**

by

Lieutenant Colonel John R. Angevine  
United States Army

Professor Douglas V. Johnson II  
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:  
Approved for public release.  
Distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013



## ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: LTC John R. Angevine

TITLE: The Revolution in Military Logistics, Surviving the Budget Process

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 8 April 1998 PAGES: 42 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The Revolution in Military Logistics (RML) is a high priority for both the Army and its Logisticians. The RML is well organized and can meet the needs of the Army After Next (AAN), however we now face the most difficult part of any revolution - the orchestration of its implementation and its funding. If the Army fails to reap the benefits of RML in the short term, it will not bode well for our ability to accomplish the programs and goals outlined for the AAN. In order to be successful RML must compete and survive the budgeting process. This is not an easy task, and the Army has traditionally had difficulty in disciplining itself to invest dollars today for the future. If the DCSLOG is to fulfill the vision of RML, he must be given the responsibility to program and budget for its enablers. Failure to do so will result in a system that is not optimized and may not meet the expectations of the Army.



## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

Abstract .....	iii
List of Illustrations .....	vii
List of Tables .....	ix
Introduction .....	1
What is the Revolution in Military Logistics .....	3
SETTING THE STAGE .....	3
RML DOMAINS .....	5
TENETS OF THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY LOGISTICS .....	6
RML - HOW MUCH WILL IT COST .....	9
Description of the PPBES Process .....	11
PPBES STRUCTURE .....	12
PROGRAM EVALUATION GROUPS (PEG) .....	14
MANAGEMENT DECISION PACKAGE (MDEP) STRUCTURE .....	16
Problems with Current Method of Management .....	18
Recommended Changes .....	20
Conclusions .....	25
Endnotes .....	27
Bibliography .....	29



**LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS**

Fig 1. PPBES Timeline ..... 12



**LIST OF TABLES**

Table 1. Critical RML Enablers ..... 9

Table 2. Dollars Programmed for RML Critical Enablers ..... 10



## **THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY LOGISTICS, SURVIVING THE BUDGET PROCESS**

*"There will not be a Revolution in Military Affairs  
unless there is a Revolution in Military Logistics"*

— General Dennis J. Reimer  
Chief of Staff Army

### **INTRODUCTION**

The statement above, by the Chief of Staff Army (CSA), has been so overused that it has become a sound bite, but it still has two very important implications. First, the Revolution in Military Logistics is a high priority for both the Army and its Logisticians. Second, it implies that the Revolution in Military Logistics is going to help pay for the Revolution in Military Affairs. To date, the Logistics community has only focused on the first of the implications. The Revolution in Military Logistics is well organized and can achieve the goals established by the Chief, however, we now face the most difficult part of any revolution - the orchestration of its implementation and its funding. If the Army fails to reap the benefits of the Revolution in Military Logistics in the short term, it will not bode well for our ability to accomplish the programs and goals outlined for the Army After Next.

In order to be successful the Revolution in Military Logistics must compete and survive the budgeting process, more

commonly known as the Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES). This is not an easy task, and the Army has traditionally had difficulty in disciplining itself to invest dollars today for the future. Many examples abound:

- Sensor technology has been available for at least the last decade that would allow vehicle on-board diagnostics; wide spread application of this technology would prevent wasted manpower and greatly reduce the expenditure of repair parts.
- With few exceptions, the entire truck fleet is overage, in particular the 2½ and 5-ton fleets. The Light-Medium Truck (LMTV) family is being fielded, but will take 30 years to complete based on its current funding profile in the POM. Operations and Maintenance Account (OMA) costs on these vehicles continue to sky-rocket, consuming dollars which could be invested in training. In some high OPTEMPO areas, like Bosnia, USAREUR estimates it is spending enough on maintenance in a 24 month period to procure a new vehicle.

The Army does not have a good record of staying the course over the long term when it comes to the investment in Logistics. Potential saving and cost avoidance are willingly taken in the short-term, but within one or two budget cycles the investment

dollars required to accomplish or maintain the earlier saving are reprogrammed.

## **WHAT IS THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY LOGISTICS**

### SETTING THE STAGE

Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010) identifies four operational concepts that will emerge in the future as a result of information superiority: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics. Focused Logistics is the fusion of information, logistics, and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even when enroute, and to deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of operations.<sup>1</sup>

Army Vision 2010 (AV2010) translates the JV2010 template into six patterns of operations: Project the Force, Protect the Force, Shape the Battlespace, Decisive Operations, Sustain the Force, and Gain Information Dominance.<sup>2</sup> AV2010's "Sustain the Force" is aligned with JV 2010's "Focused Logistics".

The Army defines focused logistics as the fusion of logistics information technologies, flexible and agile combat service support organizations, and new doctrinal support concepts to provide rapid crisis response to deliver precisely tailored logistics packages directly to each level of military

operations.<sup>3</sup> Focused Logistics provides the desired ideal end-state for sustaining the force as envisioned by the CSA. Focused Logistics unites the logistics community's organizational process, requirements determination, and vision with a sense of common purpose and synergy.

The CSA charged the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) with developing a plan that will implement Focused Logistics in support of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The DCSLOG developed a program entitled the "Revolution in Military Logistics" (RML) to accomplish this task. The intent of RML is to "transform Army Logistics into a distribution-based system that substitutes logistics velocity for logistics mass to provide the right stuff at the right place, at the right time and - at the best value." <sup>4</sup>

The Revolution in Military Logistics describes a process; this point is critical to understanding the program. RML does not define an absolute end-state but describes a path of change that will carry us through Army After Next. Therefore we must expect that both the enablers and RML tenets will change over time as we move along the path.

The near-term focus of RML (through 2010) can best be characterized as evolutionary. Efforts are focused on improving business practices and Command, Control, Communications,

Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) systems. These improvements will allow a greater throughput and follow-on sustainment.

The long-term direction of RML (after 2010) looks to take advantage of emerging technologies to lighten sustainment requirements, deploy them more quickly, and reduce the overall demand for logistics on the battlefield. Strategic Research Objectives (SROs) include Biometrics, Nanoscience, Smart Materials, Compact Power Sources, Mobile Wireless Communications, and Intelligent Systems. The objective is to provide real-time logistics control and support to the warfighter.

#### RML DOMAINS

Three domains have been established to assist in defining the direction of the Revolution in Military Logistics.<sup>5</sup>

- Force Projection: Army combat and logistics forces must be deployed from the CONUS-base to anywhere in the world more quickly, both on the strategic and operational levels. The objective is to deploy within hours with overwhelming combat power into the area of operations. In order to accomplish this, force projection systems must have a combination of speed, power, sustainable, and allow flexibility.

- Technology Application and Acquisition Agility: In order to be successful, a distribution based logistics system must take into account DOD, Joint, and Service perspectives. We must use all the sources available within our national technology and industrial bases. In turn, those technologies with a military application must be identified early and exploited.
- Force Sustainment: This domain encompasses the major thrust of RML. It focuses on the readiness of the total force during peacetime, the capability to support the force across the full spectrum of operations, and insuring that the Army obtains the maximum effectiveness from its limited resources.

The success of RML is based on the Army's ability to balance the elements of these three tenants. The predicated synergy that results is being relied upon to propel the near-term evolution into a revolutionary leap-ahead in the long-term.

#### TENETS OF THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY LOGISTICS

The tenets, or principles, of the Revolution in Military Logistics form the doctrinal underpinnings that support the domains identified above. The DCSLOG has identified six tenets, they are the essence of RML: a seamless logistics system, distribution-based logistics, agile infrastructure, total asset

visibility, rapid force projection, and an adequate logistics footprint.<sup>6</sup> A short description of each of the enablers is provided below:

- Seamless Logistics System: The joint Global Combat Service Support System (GCSS) and its Army component, GCSS-Army are the near-term solution for providing an elementary seamless logistics system. The ultimate goal is to provide precision management through an extraordinary level of connectivity across DOD and the government. Beyond the expected interface to Army C2, logistics, and administrative systems, links will be provided to digitized weapon systems, onboard prognostics, electronic commerce systems, readiness systems, distribution management, and asset management systems.
- Distribution Based Logistics: The distribution pipeline becomes the warehouse of the future. The objective is to offset mass with velocity. There will still be inventories on hand, but they will be based on missions, not historical demand data. As the mission changes, the inventory changes. Managers must have the ability to adjust the supply chain in real time. They will rely on situational awareness, continuous coordination with operational planners, and the seamless logistics system.

- Agile Infrastructure: Agility has been a principle of logistics for many years, but it includes new elements in the RML. Structural agility, the integration of all Army components, joint, coalition, and industry. Physical Agility refers to the ability to rapidly deploy and maneuver the components of the logistics system without degrading its throughput. The final element is mental agility, the ability to think ahead and understand the second and third order effects.
- Total Asset Visibility (TAV): TAV tracks input from sensors and the document flow generated by GCSS-A, keeping the managers aware of the status of a requisition in the supply chain. TAV will be essential in providing precision focused distribution based logistics to the AAN.
- Rapid Force Projection: The AAN must have modern transportation platforms and infrastructure to insure rapid and efficient deployment and sustainment.
- Adequate Logistics Footprint: The logistics tail can be minimized if all the elements of RML are implemented. However there comes a point where further reductions will adversely impact the warfighter's flexibility. Logisticians must keep this in mind and insure that adequate structure remains to guarantee support to the combat units.

The six tenets of RML provide a roadmap and define how logistics will be performed and describe the capabilities required for the Army After Next.<sup>7</sup> The DCSLOG has designated enablers, which assist in the implementation of the tenets. These enablers include modernization programs for distribution platforms, strategic lift platforms, information technology, communications, automation, demand-reduction technologies, and improved business practices.

#### RML - HOW MUCH WILL IT COST

The DCSLOG has designated 38 modernization enablers as being critical to the success of RML. These systems are included in the Army Program today, fielding has already begun for some of them.

Adv Avn Forward Area Refueling Sys (AAFARS)	Logistics Over the Shore (LOTS)
All Terrain Lifter Army System (ATLAS)	Movement Tracking System
AMC Logistics Mgmt Spt System	Power Projection C4 Infrastructure (PPC4I)
Appropriation Fund Support DBOF	Prepo Afloat (APS-3)
Army C4I Architecture	Rough Terrain Container Handler (RTCH )
Army Information Processing Center	Standard Army Ammunition System (SAAS)
CH-47D Improved Cargo Helicopter (ICH)	Standard Army Maintenance System (SAMS)
Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS)	Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS)
Commodity Command Standard System (CCSS)	Standard Depot System (SDS)
Deployment Outload	Strategic Logistics Program
FORWARD REPAIR SYSTEM-HEAVY	Tactical Management Information System (TACMIS)
Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-A)	TMDE/ADIP
Heavy Tactical Vehicle (PLS)	Total Distribution Program
HEMTT Tanker Aviation Refueling System (HTARS)	Trans Coord Auto Info Mgt Sys II (TCAIMS II)
Horizontal Battlefield Digitization	Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS)
Industrial Preparedness End Items	Velocity Management
Integrated Logistics Systems (ILOGS)	War Reserves (APS-5)
Joint Computer Aided Logistics System (JCALS)	Warfighter Information Network (WIN)
Life Cycle Software Support (LCSS)	Water Equipment Modernization

Table 1. Critical RML Enablers

The programmed investment for these systems total over \$12 Billion during the period FY00-05.

**Critical RML Enabler Funding (\$M)**

	FY00	FY01	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	Total
Requirement	\$2,583	\$2,748	\$2,916	\$2,978	\$2,898	\$2,972	\$17,097
Funded	\$1,807	\$1,982	\$2,170	\$2,268	\$2,179	\$2,239	\$12,646
% Funded	70%	72%	74%	76%	75%	75%	74%
UFR	\$775	\$766	\$746	\$710	\$719	\$733	\$4,049

Table 2. Dollars Programmed for RML Critical Enablers<sup>8</sup>

This is a good representation of the dollars required to meet the near term evolutionary requirements for RML. As reflected above there is currently an unfunded requirement of \$4.0 billion over the POM. The long-term requirements that will accomplish the revolutionary leap ahead objectives are only now being formulated, but can be expected to total at least another \$20-30 billion through 2020.

Part of the difficulty in calculating the cost is related to the method that we use to determine requirements. The TRADOC Commander is responsible for identifying, developing, and approving warfighting requirements. These approved requirements are forwarded to the Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) for prioritization and resourcing. The DCSOPS must be based on the resources available and what is affordable. For example, the Land Warrior System

would be fielded to every Infantryman in a fully modernized force, based on affordability the Army will only purchase approximately 30,000 systems. This decision by the senior leadership establishes the actual requirement at 33,000. The total required to modernize the Army is never programmed.

The requirements determination process for the Revolution in Military Logistics enablers must remain flexible to be successful. The Army leadership must have the ability to change priorities and investments as new technologies, doctrine, and organizational structures are identified. The RML path is not a straight line into the future, it will be full of twists, turns, and dead-ends which must be overlaid upon a very inflexible system, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES).

### **DESCRIPTION OF THE PPBES PROCESS**

The National Security Strategy is translated into missions, missions to requirements, requirements to programs, and programs to the budget plan. Each step becomes more detailed and comprehensive. The Army's system for linking strategy to resources is the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES). PPBES is designed to complement the DOD Planning, Program, and Budgeting System (PPBS). PPBES is used at every level of command to support Army planning, program development and budget preparation. In the end, PPBES should

support the senior leadership's policies and priorities with the desired balance of systems, force structure, and infrastructure.

### PPBES STRUCTURE

PPBES is concerned with allocating resources over time. The most convenient way to view the timeline is in four time periods: the year of execution, the budget year, the program years, and the extended planning program. The PPBES timeline for the current year is shown below in Figure 1. The program years cover a six-year window and the extended planning program includes an additional 12 years.




Fig 1. PPBES Timeline

In the near term, the execution year and the budget year, there is little flexibility to reprogram resources due to Congressional Appropriations and the submission of the President's Budget. The farther out one moves in time, the greater the flexibility for reprogramming.

During the budget year, the President's budget converts program requirements into requests for actual manpower and dollars. After the President forwards his budget, Congress ultimately enacts appropriations and manpower authorizations, and these resources become available to support the approved programs.

The Program Objective Memorandum (POM) covers the program years and accounts for the all the manpower and dollars programmed by the Army. The POM represents the Army's mid-range investment plan and is supported by The Army Plan (TAP), the Army Modernization Plan, and other long range planning documents. When the Army POM is approved and forwarded to DOD it serves as input to the DOD Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

DOD manages the resources within the FYDP and PPBS process using Program Elements (PEs). A Program Element represents an organizational or functional entity and all of it's associated resources. The PE's are organized into 11 major force programs, for example these include: Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces, Research and Development, Central Supply and Maintenance, Support to other Nations, and Special Operations Forces. The 11 programs form a readiness and mission-oriented structure, used primarily for internal DOD review and to satisfy congressional reporting requirements<sup>9</sup>. Each DOD PE is composed

of individual weapon systems and other hardware procurements that are assigned unique Standard Study Numbers (SSN) and Budget Line Item Numbers (BLIN).

To accommodate the Army's process of resource management, we have further stratified the DOD PE structure. The Army adds a number of subprograms, which allows designation by Army Staff agency functional responsibility. The Army program is composed of approximately 500 DOD Program Elements. Unfortunately the Army does not use the same PE organization that DOD uses.

#### PROGRAM EVALUATION GROUPS (PEG)

The Army organizes its' programs into Program Evaluation Groups (PEGs). PEGs are designed to integrate the Army's six Title 10 responsibilities across the PPBES process; it includes a separate PEG each for the USAR and NGB. The Army PEGs and their proponents (chairmen) are<sup>10</sup>:

- Manning (DCSPER): The Manning PEG interests include actions to provide the Total Army with authorized personnel. Includes recruiting, leader development, quality of life, and personnel readiness.
- Training (DCSOPS): The Training PEG is responsible for developing a trained and ready force as well as to sustain combat operations. Includes collective training, flying hour program, strategic mobility,

combat training centers, mobilization, and military operations

- Organizing (DCSOPS): Concerned with the development of MTOE and TDA organizations and the Trainees, Transients, Holders and Student accounts. Includes manpower authorizations for military and civilian requirements.
- Equipping (DCSOPS): The equipping PEG integrates new doctrine, training, organizations, and equipment to field fully ready units for the Total Army. Responsible for research, development, and materiel acquisition.
- Sustaining (DCSLOG): Sustains the Total Army, focuses on readiness to prepare the Army for the future. Interests include industrial preparedness, central supply, depots, maintenance, arsenals, secondary item acquisition, and strategic logistics systems
- Installation (ACSIM): Maintains essential services and infrastructure on installations for use as power projection platforms. Responsible for real property

maintenance, environmental compliance, and family housing.

- Army National Guard (CNGB): Integrates the Title X PEGs to accomplish DOD and Army statutory requirements across the NGB.
- U.S. Army Reserve (USAR): Integrates the Title X PEGs to accomplish DOD and Army statutory requirements across the USAR.

Each of the PEGs will have RML enablers imbedded in them. The DCSLOG is charged with integrating the efforts of the PEG Chairmen to accomplish the CSAs vision for the Revolution in Military Logistics.

#### MANAGEMENT DECISION PACKAGE (MDEP) STRUCTURE

Each PEG is composed of multiple Management Decision Packages (MDEPs). MDEPs are used to account for all Army resources. They describe the capabilities programmed for the Active Army, National Guard, Reserve, and the civilian work forces. An MDEP describes a particular organization, program, or function and records all the resources needed to provide the desired capability. The resources identified within an MDEP include:

- Military and civilian manpower
- Dollars (Procurement, Sustainment, Training, and etc.)
- Displays resources across commands and appropriations.
- Justifies the resource expenditures.

There are 567 MDEPs contained in the FY 00-05 POM. Keeping the number within manageable limits the Army Staff tries to incorporate proposals for new MDEPs into existing MDEPs.

Therefore most MDEPs are composed of multiple Standard Study Numbers (SSNs) and Budget Line Numbers (BLINs) which identify individual weapon systems and other procurements.

During the program years, manpower is only restricted by end strength and program dollars are restricted by total obligation authority (TOA), resources are not limited by Congressional appropriations. This allows the MDEP managers to redistribute previously programmed manpower and dollars to meet changing requirements within the guidance provided by the senior leadership. In each succeeding program submitted, the Army can freely move resources between MDEPs and Program Element Groups. However, in the near-term of the execution and budget years, tighter controls are on placed on the redistribution of dollars and manpower. In particular once the President's budget is forwarded to Congress no changes are allowed until Congress

completes their authorizations and appropriations. Therefore it is important to time the introduction of new enablers to coincide with budget submissions.

In preparing the program, the members of the PEG, as needed, adjust the requirements proposed by the MDEP managers. In general this balancing of requirements is a zero sum game within the MDEP and then the PEG. In other words, for one MDEP to gain resources, another must lose the same resources. A PEG is not likely to receive additional resources until late in the PPBES process when unfinanced requirements are being prioritized. The result of the effort is a balanced program that meets the planning, programming, and fiscal guidance established by the senior leadership.

#### **PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT METHOD OF MANAGEMENT**

The Army's Organizational Life Cycle Model (AOLCM) is the tool used by the Army leadership to manage change over time. The RML enablers must be integrated into all the elements of the AOLCM - Force Development, Acquisition, Training, Distribution, Deployment, Sustainment, Development, and Separation. If the enablers are not incorporated into each stage and in the proper time sequence, there is no opportunity to apply the two principal inputs to the model: resources and prioritization by our senior leaders. During last year's development of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) FY 00-05, the extended

planning period looked out as far as the year 2015. The initial prioritization of resources is already being applied for the period between Force XXI and the Army After Next!

MDEP managers update their MDEPs on almost a daily basis to reflect the status at each stage of the program and budget process. MDEP and PEG managers continually weigh how the funding stream effects the MDEP and how a change within the execution year or budget year will affect the remaining program. These changes come from many sources: Congressional language in appropriation and authorization bills, contract awards and protests, changing requirements, changing priorities, and new technological developments, to name a few. The associated competition, between MDEPs, at every stage of the programming and budgeting system means frequent change to the distribution of resources within the PEG.

The balancing of requirements within an MDEP, and then within the PEG, presents one of the challenges to accomplishing the Revolution in Military Logistics. The 38 critical enablers, discussed earlier, are represented by 33 different MDEPs. These MDEPs are in turn spread across six PEGs. As new enablers are identified, they must compete in their earliest stages for resources within the appropriate MDEP and PEG. At each step in the process, the new program advances at the expense of another. It doesn't take much imagination to understand how difficult it

is to reduce the resources for an established program and apply them to a new program.

The PPBES and AOLCM processes create four points of friction that the DCSLOG and our senior leadership must deal with on a daily basis:

- Each PEG is managed by a different agency on the Army Staff.
- A different individual generally handles each MDEP within that agency.
- All changes start as a zero sum within an MDEP/PEG.
- No single person controls the RML purse strings.

The fact that each PEG Chairman and MDEP manager believes that they are in charge, has contributed to the construction of the stovepipe systems we live with today. The DCSLOG and senior leadership conduct periodic reviews to insure that the RML enablers are funded and their development is on track, but this is not conducive to making the many changes required as we move down the RML path to the Army After Next.

### **RECOMMENDED CHANGES**

Restructuring the PPBES process in the short-term is not going to occur. Its' inflexibility has long been a recognized problem, but it is firmly entrenched in the bureaucracy. Significant and lasting change is only likely to occur if it is forced from above (Congress, DOD, or the Joint Staff). However,

there are at least three options that could be implemented within the existing PPBES framework that will provide the flexibility necessary to accomplish the Revolution in Military Logistics:

- Establish an RML Program Evaluation Group.
- DCSLOG serves as Co-Chair on the other PEGs to oversee RML related MDEPs.
- Consolidation of existing RML related MDEPs under DCSLOG control in the Sustaining PEG.

None of these alternatives will be widely embraced by the Army Staff. Dollars equal control and no one on a staff wants to give away control to another agency. There will be 1,000 reasons presented describing why we should not change, but change is required if we are to move ahead.

The first option presented above would require the greatest reorganization. The tradition of organizing the PEGs along the Title X responsibilities goes back to the earliest days of PPBES and is, on the surface at least, a logical way to classify resources. However it does not align with how DOD and Congress program resources. DOD links resources to eleven Program Elements (PE's) that represent organizational or functional entities. For example: Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces, Research and Development, Central Supply and Maintenance, Support to Other Nations, and Special Operations

Forces. RML does not fall clearly into any of the eleven PE's, so it would be difficult to justify restructuring the Army PEGs to match the DOD system for the purpose of RML.

The second option would allow the DCSLOG to serve as a Co-Chair on the other PEGs to oversee RML related MDEPs. This option will probably be the most palatable to the other PEG chairman and Army Staff agencies. However, the day to day decisions on programming and procurements occur at the action officer level. The DCSLOG would require a greatly expanded Resource Management Division to keep up with, and influence these changes.

The third option, consolidation of existing RML related MDEPs under DCSLOG control within the Sustaining PEG would provide the DCSLOG and leadership with the greatest flexibility to respond to new technologies, doctrine, and organizational changes. Requirements must still be determined by TRADOC and approved by DCSOPS, but the DCSLOG would control the dollars for procurement. The DCSLOG would have the authority to reprogram POM dollars to keep RML on track and on the cutting edge of new technology.

The mechanisms are available today within the current PPBES process to implement this change, and perhaps have a minimal impact on the other PEGs. There are six types of MDEPs in the PPBES process:

- Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) units. Resource warfighting missions.
- Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) units. Resource support functions to MTOE units.
- Standard Installation Organization (SIO). Support garrison installations and the populations they serve.
- Systems Acquisition. Resources the acquisition, fielding, and sustainment of weapon systems, other materiel, and information systems.
- Special Visibility Program (SVP).
- Short Term Project (STP).

The first four types of MDEPs are considered to be permanent while the last two support temporary management structures. The majority of RML enablers will be found in Systems Acquisition MDEPs under the current organization of the PEGs. If the RML enablers are reorganized as SVP or STP MDEPs they could be moved under DCSLOG control. The following definitions are provided in the "MDEP Procedures Guide"<sup>11</sup>:

- The Special Visibility Program MDEP is designed as a short-term structure, and cuts across two or more management areas. It allows the ARSTAF to define and protect resources for an area having high-level interest. Past

examples include an MDEP for Military Personnel, Army (MPA) and Retired Pay Accrual. SVP MDEPs have also been used to track an issue that is the subject of a report required by Congress, OSD, or the Army leadership. These MDEPs are reviewed to assess whether the requirement can be lifted and the MDEP resources transferred to a permanent management structure.

- The Short Term Project MDEP, also a temporary structure, defines and protects resources for a designated project of specified duration. A short term MDEP may define an Army Management Review issue, a base closure, force structure realignment, or other short-term projects. When building the POM or budget, a STP MDEP can also define a resource wedge, an aggregate resource total for planning that over time must be spread in the required detail to specific MDEPs. The STP MDEPs are also reviewed periodically to assess whether the project can be terminated and the MDEP resources transferred to a permanent management structure.

The Special Visibility Program MDEP may be the best choice for the RML enablers. It provides sufficient flexibility that emerging technologies can be rapidly included in the RML program. Those systems which may turn out not to be critical to in the RML effort can be easily transferred back to the

appropriate PEG. Using this methodology, the MDEP managers could remain under the control of their current PEG and continue working their other MDEPs. However any changes to the RML enablers would require DCSLOG approval. In the end, DCSLOG would have the authority to reprogram POM dollars to keep RML on track and on the cutting edge of new technology.

### **CONCLUSIONS**

The Army must have a Revolution in Military Logistics and Logisticians must insure that the end product meets the intent of:

"Transforming Army Logistics into a distribution-based system that substitutes logistics velocity for logistics mass to provide the right stuff at the right place, at the right time and - at the best value.<sup>12</sup>"

In the short term, there can be no doubt that the Army will collect the savings attributable to the Revolution in Military Logistics. In order to meet the CSAs guidance, the DCSLOG must be given control of programming and budgeting for the enablers that will make RML possible. Failure to do so will result in a system that is not optimized and may not meet the expectations of the Army.

Word Count = 4,773



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> John M. Shalikashvili, Joint Vision 2010, (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff), 24.

<sup>2</sup> Dennis J. Reimer, Army Vision 2010, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army), 10.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>4</sup> Logistics Integration Agency, "Preparing for the Revolution in Military Logistics: The Way Ahead." 20 January 1999: available from <<http://www.lia.mil/rml>>. Internet. Accessed 20 January 1999.

<sup>5</sup> Coburn, John G. "Focused Logistics - Projecting and Sustaining Force XXI." Army 46 (October 1996)

<sup>6</sup> Wilson, Johnnie E., Coburn, John G., and Brown, Daniel G. "Our Revolution in Military Logistics- Supporting the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Soldier." Army Logistician (January-February 1999)

<sup>7</sup> O'Konski, Mark J. "Revolution in Military Logistics: An Overview." Army Logistician (January-February 1999)

<sup>8</sup> DCSLOG Spreadsheet, POM FY00-05, prepared June 1998.

<sup>9</sup> Chief of Staff Army, Management Decision Package, A Procedures Guide (Washington D.C., 1996).

<sup>10</sup> U.S. Army War College, How the Army Runs, A Senior Leader Reference Handbook (Carlisle Barracks PA, 1997).

<sup>11</sup> MDEP Procedures Guide.. Chief of Staff Army, Management Decision Package, A Procedures Guide (Washington D.C., 1996).

<sup>12</sup> Johnnie E., Coburn, John G., and Brown, Daniel G. "Our Revolution in Military Logistics- Supporting the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Soldier." Army Logistician (January-February 1999): 3-6.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Apgar, Mahlon and Cobuurn John G. Revolution in Military Logistics. Washington, D.C.: US Department of the Army, n.d.
- Baker, Caleb E. "The Disconnect Between the Force and the Funding." Army 45 (February 1995): 35-38
- Baker, Sue. "Single Stock Fund." Army Logistician (January-February 1999): 26-27.
- Bergeron, Scott M. Revolution in Military Logistics: No More Mountains to Move? Personal Experience Monograph. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, March 1995.
- Biass, Eric H. "Logistics - A Quiet Revolution." Armada International 21 (August-September 1997): 20-30.
- Chief of Staff Army, Management Decision Package, A Procedures Guide (Washington D.C., 1996).
- Coburn, John G. "Focused Logistics - Projecting and Sustaining Force XXI." Army 46 (October 1996): 127-132.
- Dibb, Paul. "The Revolution in Military Affairs and Asian Security." Survival 39 (Winter 1997/1998): 93-116.
- Fitzsimonds, James R. "The Coming Military Revolution: Opportunities and Risks." Parameters 25 (Summer 1995): 30-36.
- Forster, William H. "The Toughest Challenge We Face. (Equipping the Army for Force XXI)." Army 45 (February 1995): 30-34.
- Geehan, Brian I. U.S. Army Logistics in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century and the Challenge of Change. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, May 1995.
- Glisson, Henry T. "Revolution in Military Logistics - Improving Support to the Warfighter." Army Logistician (January-February 1999): 8-9.
- Houck, Roger and Cousins, William R. "Communications Technologies for the Revolution in Military Logistics." Army Logistician (January-February 1999): 24-25.
- Hoeper, Paul J. and Kern, Paul J. Research, development, and Acquisition Master Plan. (Washington, D.C.: US Department of the Army 1998): 1-10.

- Institute of Land Warfare. Army Budget Fiscal Year 1999.  
Washington, D.C.: Association of the United States Army,  
1998.
- Kratz, Louis A. "Designing Digital Base can Quicken Logistical  
Provisions." National Defense (October 1998): 30-31.
- Lesser, Harry K. The Revolution in Military Affairs and Its  
Effect on the Future Army. Newport: US Naval War College,  
Advanced Research Department, June 1994.
- Logistics Integration Agency. The Army Strategic Logistics Plan:  
Battlespace Logistics, the Vision. Alexandria, VA: 1996.
- Mazarr, Michael J. The Revolution in Military Affairs: A  
Framework for Defense Planning. Carlisle Barracks: US Army  
War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 10 June 1994.
- McDuffie, John M. "Joint Vision 2010 and Focused Logistics."  
Army Logistician (January-February 1999): 7.
- Metz, Steven, and Kevit, James. Strategy and the Revolution in  
Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy. Carlisle Barracks:  
US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 27 June  
1995.
- Naylor, Sean D. "Revolutionizing Battlefield Logistics: Force  
XXI's Success Riding on Savings from Strategic  
Restructuring." Army Times 57 (11 November 1996): 30.
- O'Konski, Mark J. "Revolution in Military Logistics: An  
Overview." Army Logistician (January-February 1999): 10-14.
- Reimer, Dennis J. Army Vision 2010. Washington, D.C.: U.S.  
Department of the Army. 1996.
- Reimer, Dennis J., Togo D. West, and William W. Hartzog. Force  
XXI. America's Army in Transition: Process of Change to a  
Capabilities Based Army. Fort Monroe: U.S. Army Training  
and Doctrine Command, Commanders Planning Group, 1996.
- Salomon, Leon E. "Transforming Logistics for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century."  
Army Logistician (July-August 1995): 19-21.
- Shalikashvili, John M., Joint Vision 2010, (Washington D.C.:  
Joint Chiefs of Staff)

- Smith, Larry. "Commercial Logistics Best Practices for the Revolution in Military Logistics." Army Logistician (January-February 1999): 33-35.
- Tilford, Earl H., Jr. The Revolution in Military Affairs: Prospects and Cautions. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 23 June 1995.
- U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Army After Next, 1998 Annual Report (Fort Monroe, VA, 1998)
- U.S. Army Logistics Integration Agency, "Preparing for the Revolution in Military Logistics: The Way Ahead," 20 January 1999; available from <http://lia.army.mil/docs/rml.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 January 1999.
- U.S. Army War College. Communicative Arts Program Directive, AY99. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1998.
- U.S. Army War College, How the Army Runs, A Senior Leader Reference Handbook (Carlisle Barracks PA, 1997).
- U.S. Department of the Army. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. The United State Army 1998 Modernization Plan. Washington 1998.
- Wallace, Roy and Hardy, Christopher, R. "Seamless Logistics System." Army Logistician (January-February 1999): 18-19.
- Weidenthal, Kurt I. "Critical Information Technology Must be Funded to Achieve a Successful Revolution in Military Logistics." Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 12 March 1998.
- Williams, Norman E. "The Revolution in Military Logistics." Military Technology 21 (November 1997): 50-57.
- Wilson, Johnnie E. "Forging the Army's Critical Logistics Links." Army 46 (October 1995): 115-119.
- Wilson, Johnnie E., and Roberto Capote. "Leveraging Logistics Technology toward Force XXI." Army Logistician (July-August 1997): 14-18.
- Wilson, Johnnie E., Coburn, John G., and Brown, Daniel G. "Our Revolution in Military Logistics- Supporting the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Soldier." Army Logistician (January-February 1999): 3-6.

Winstead, Anthony B. "The Evolution of Logistics in the United States Army Reserve to the Revolution in Military Logistics." Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 20 April 1998.