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29 October 1985

USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY
No 9, SEPTEMBER 1985

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NATO'S EXTREMIST 'ROGERS PLAN' THREATENS EAST-WEST PARITY

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[Article by A. A. Kokoshin: "The 'Rogers Plan,' Alternative Defense Concepts and Security in Europe"]

[Text] Within the subsystem of international relations between the European countries of the socialist community, including the USSR, and Western Europe and the United States, tendencies possessing great significance both for current world politics and for the long-term prospects of international relations, including at the level of changes in the structural order, have appeared in sharp relief in the military-political sphere in recent years. Until recently, public attention was particularly concentrated on events connected with negotiations to limit nuclear weapons in Europe and later with the start of the siting of the new American medium-range missiles in a number of West European countries. Recently, alongside the problems of medium-range nuclear weapons and halting the arms race in outer space, growing public attention has been attracted by the actions of the United States and pro-American NATO circles aimed at developing their general-purpose forces and conventional weapons and at developing and introducing new military concepts which increase the danger of the outbreak of a war in Europe. These actions are attempts by extremist imperialist circles to destroy the East-West military-strategic parity which has formed and to restore the decisive role of military force in the system of international relations.

It is in this military-political context that the new NATO military concept of the "deep echeloned strike" (or "strike against second echelons and reserves"), approved by the NATO military planning committee on 9 February 1984, should be examined. This concept is commonly known as the "Rogers Plan," named after the commander-in-chief of the NATO Joint Armed Forces, U.S. Army General Bernard Rogers.

Many American and European specialists regard the concept of the "deep echeloned strike" as a new stage in the development of the NATO strategy of "flexible response" which was adopted in 1967. The realization of this concept in the buildup of the North Atlantic bloc's armed forces may signify, as the bulletin of NATO headquarters in Brussels notes, "the first significant change in NATO's strategy of conducting military operations in 15 years."¹

In accordance with the concept of a "deep echeloned strike" it is supposed that in case of the commencement of military operations in Europe (primarily Central Europe), NATO armed forces will inflict strikes on a condensed time-scale not only directly against those of the other side's units which are in direct combat contact with the,, but also against second echelons and reserves up to a depth of 400 kilometers, and, in accordance with certain developments, also to a considerably greater depth.

As Yu. Andreyev, a Soviet military specialist, notes, what is involved in the concept of a "deep echeloned strike" is not the defense of "intermediate positions" as far as the Rhine, as NATO propagandists have loudly claimed, but the infliction of strikes by the corps and group commands of armies to a great depth of the territory of the Warsaw Pact countries.²

NATO sources try to emphasize that, strictly speaking, the concept of a "deep echeloned strike" envisages the use of non-nuclear means of destruction with the emphasis on new and future weapons of increased precision and strike capability.

The actions of the United States and other imperialist states in this direction have not gone without the attention and due evaluation of the military leadership of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries. Evaluating the "Rogers Plan," Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov wrote that "its essence consists in the achievement of military superiority in conventional weapons over the Warsaw Pact countries, and also in the creation of favorable conditions for conducting combat operations with the aim of routing the opposing armed forces in the initial period of a war without using nuclear weapons."³

In a direct examination of the growth of the threat from the United States and NATO due to the new stage in the development of conventional weapon systems, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. F. Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, noted that "one of the most important problems continues to be the correct prediction of the development of the possible military-strategic situation and the methods of waging a war if the imperialists should succeed in unleashing it. In recent years our probable adversaries, aware of the inevitability of a retaliatory nuclear strike and its catastrophic consequences, are paying particular attention to the development of conventional weapon systems with higher power, range and precision characteristics. At the same time they are also perfecting methods of starting military operations with the use of conventional means of destruction, and primarily new types of automatically controlled high-precision weapons. Soviet military science does not lose sight of all the actions by the adversary. We take account of these trends both in training the troops (forces) and in directing them."⁴

At the same time, as Soviet and foreign specialists justly note, there is a great deal of evidence that the adoption of the concept of a "deep echeloned strike" does not as yet signify cardinal changes in NATO and U.S. nuclear policy with application to Europe, including policy with regard to the principle of the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States when it considers this necessary. A similar approach is being maintained by both

Great Britain and France which, apart from the strategic forces in the troops deployed on the territory of the FRG, possess their own tactical nuclear weapons. As a whole, a great deal speaks of the fact that the new concept does not extend to all NATO military policy and does not embrace all of its aspects, including those connected with the use of nuclear weapons (in particular, B. Rogers himself calls it a "subconcept" or "one of the NATO concepts").

At the same time, NATO propaganda is trying to convince the public that with the adoption of the concept of the "deep echeloned strike," the nuclear threshold will supposedly be raised, that is, the probability of the use of nuclear weapons, especially in the early stages, will be reduced.

A subject of debates and disagreements in the NATO countries is the question of the connection of the NATO concept of a "deep echeloned strike" with the new concept of the U.S. ground forces (army) which has received the name of "air-land operation (or battle)." It was officially adopted in August 1981, that is, more than 2 years earlier than the "Rogers Plan." Like the latter plan, it envisages the infliction of a powerful, coordinated and swift strike to a great depth of the operational formation of the other side's troops (in the zone of operations of the U.S. army corps, to a depth of up to 150 kilometers).

The concept of "air-land operation (battle)," Lieutenant-General M. Proskurin, a Soviet specialist, notes, represents a further development of the methods of combat use of heterogeneous groupings and formations of ground forces and also of the tactical aviation of the U.S. Air Force on an operational and tactical scale, taking account of their re-equipment with new models of weapons and military equipment and the perfection of their organization and establishment.⁵ The basic propositions of this concept are already finding practical application in the course of the combat and operational training of U.S. troops and staffs. Although precedence is given to the newest high-precision conventional means of destruction, the "air-land operation (battle)" also envisages coordination and combined use of all elements of combat power, including nuclear and chemical weapons, at brigade, divisional and corps levels, if this is considered necessary. The 1982 Field Manual FM-100-5 of the U.S. ground forces, which sets out the basic propositions of this concept, stresses that the decision to use nuclear or chemical weapons is within the competence of the "national command." However, it is impossible not to pay attention to the fact that the choice of targets for the use of operational-tactical nuclear weapons and particularly the evaluation of the situation which has developed, on the basis of which such a decision must be made, lie almost exclusively in the hands of the commanders of units and formations in the immediate zone of combat operations.⁶

Analysis of many American and West European sources makes it possible to say that the concept of the "air-land operation (battle)" began to be intensively developed in the U.S. armed forces as far back as in the beginning of the 1970's. To a considerable extent these developments were oriented toward a revival of the "offensive spirit" of American military strategy, which had been lost (particularly by the ground forces) as a result of the prolonged, and

lost, war in Vietnam. The development of a new concept for the U.S. ground forces was regarded as a means of overcoming the "excessively passive" nature of the concept of "forward defense," which is part of the NATO strategy of "flexible response."⁷

The development of this concept was also aimed at substantiating the new and considerable increase in state appropriations for conventional weapons, tactical nuclear weapons and chemical weapons in the first half of the 1970's, when the critical attitude toward the inflated military budget was intensified in Congress. In this period many areas of development of U.S. armed forces were placed under increasing doubt in connection with the Soviet Union's achievement of strategic parity with the United States, under the influence of the relaxation of international tension, and in connection with the start of talks on the limitation of armed forces and arms in central Europe and the adoption of the CSCE Final Act in Helsinki. The aspiration to substantiate the new round of increasing appropriations for the ground forces and to ensure large-scale purchases of new kinds and types of military machines and equipment, even contrary to the genuine interests of the security of the United States and other NATO members, largely explains the reasons for the appearance and aggressive, offensive nature of the new concept.

Since in the American army operational concept of the "air-land operation (battle)" its aggressive and destabilizing nature as well as the decisiveness and swiftness of the use of conventional, nuclear and chemical weapons stand out even more clearly, the political and military leadership of the United States is trying to prove by all means, to influence West European public opinion, that there are supposedly fundamental differences between this concept and the new NATO concept. General B. Rogers himself takes great pains in this respect. In particular, he says that the concept of the "deep echeloned strike" developed by his staff, unlike the concept of the "air-land operation (battle)," does not envisage pre-emptive strikes.⁸

These kinds of "explanations," however, are not capable of convincing many people. The "spiritual kinship" and the practical interconnection between these two concepts can be traced fairly clearly in an analysis of open American and NATO military documents and the research of Western military theorists. The common theoretical basis of these concepts, primarily the presence of the common principles of "deep strike" and an "expanded field of engagement (battle)," is noted with good grounds by, in particular, Colonels J. Landry, W. Clarke, M. Armstrong and H. Estes, who are students at the U.S. National Defense University (a sort of equivalent of the General Staff Academy), by former CIA employee B. Satton in his research work "Deep Attack Concepts and the Defense of Central Europe," by French researcher P. Grasset, by R. Mason, former chief scientific adviser to the British Ministry of Defense, and by other authors. Contrary to the assertions of B. Rogers, a number of American studies of the concept of the "air-land operation (battle)" openly note that it is intended to be used by the U.S. Army in various parts of the world, the first being Central Europe, followed by the Near East and the Korean peninsula.⁹

On the whole, there are sufficient grounds to consider that the propositions of the NATO concept of the "deep echeloned strike" are in practice closely

interwoven with a number of propositions of the American army concept of the "air-land operation (battle)." This also makes it possible to regard it as a new, dangerous and destabilizing step in U.S. and NATO policy.

In the view of the existence of the "air-land battle" concept of the American ground forces, which continue to play a key role in the structure of the NATO forces in the 1980's, it can hardly be expected that the United States will adjust its actions to suit the NATO concept and not the reverse, especially with respect to the use of nuclear and chemical weapons. This aspect is being recognized to an ever greater extent by many West European social and political figures, particularly in connection with their growing concern over the refusal of the United States and of France and Great Britain to assume an obligation of no first use of nuclear weapons.

The principle of the first use of nuclear weapons in Europe in the event of an East-West conflict continues to be one of the central elements of the U.S. and NATO strategy which the NATO strategists substantiate with the necessity of allegedly compensating for the "Soviet superiority" in conventional forces in Europe.

Such an approach, D. M. Proektor, a well-known Soviet specialist on military-political problems, says, did perhaps have some sense, but only in the 1950's. NATO's conventional forces were not then so powerful as they are at present. The United States did not yet have substantial stocks of nuclear weapons at its disposal there, and Britain and France had not started to prepare for their production. The United States had superiority in strategic weapons over the USSR. At the same time, after the war the Soviet Union possessed considerable numbers of ground forces here, which it was forced to maintain because of the "cold war" which was declared against it, and because of West Germany's remilitarization and territorial claims. During these years President Eisenhower elevated the massive use of nuclear weapons to the level of a doctrine; in order to "reduce reaction time," he put U.S. strategic bombers in Europe. However, after the Soviet Union had achieved approximate equilibrium with the United States in strategic, medium-range and tactical nuclear forces, and after the NATO bloc had considerably strengthened its conventional forces in Europe, these "compensatory functions" of U.S. nuclear weapons on the European continent lost their sense. In connection with adopting the doctrine of "flexible response," NATO had considerably strengthened its conventional forces in Europe, which had in principle become equal to the analogous forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. As a result there has formed, as D. M. Proektor justly notes, a very critical situation: An alien component of a previous doctrine continues to exist within the framework of NATO's contemporary doctrine as if it were built into it.¹⁰

The "compensation" of NATO nuclear weapons for Soviet superiority in conventional forces has become essentially senseless not only because of the absence of Soviet superiority, but also as a result of the fact that these weapons themselves are in turn "compensated" for by analogous Soviet weapons. The United States is thus creating a vicious circle and increasing the risk of total nuclear war.

An important role in materially ensuring the new NATO concept is assigned to the use of the future means of armed struggle that are being intensively developed primarily by the United States. Mainly involved are various kinds of intelligence and attack complexes. Each of these complexes will consist of intelligence and strike elements spread out over an area and coordinated by means of an automatic weapon control system. Missile systems, army aviation helicopters and tactical aviation aircraft are expected to serve as the strike elements. Intelligence and attack complexes are intended for the infliction of strikes to a great depth with the use of tactical aviation and tactical and operational-tactical missile launchers, and also for use by the operational commands, mainly of the army corps.¹¹

A key role in the functioning of various types of intelligence and attack complexes, B. Rogers emphasizes, is assigned to the acquisition by technical means of various kinds of information on the enemy and to high-speed processing, interpretation and analysis of it for the purpose of issuing target instructions for the means of destruction.¹² According to some evaluations, this will require the active introduction of supercomputers and "artificial intelligence" elements into the system of command, control and communications.¹³

Analysis of a number of areas of development of this kind of equipment makes it possible to say that, for the needs of weapons systems included in the "Rogers Plan," certain designs can be used, for example, which are now being used intensively in a seemingly different area--within the framework of the program for the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" ("Star Wars").

Western researchers note the exceptionally high cost of such long-term complexes and the numerous unresolved problems in their architecture, configuration and control, particularly in real combat conditions, when the other side will be using numerous means of neutralization and counteraction.¹⁴ In accordance with the "Rogers Plan," virtually the key role in ensuring highly accurate strikes against small-scale (and highly fortified) targets is assigned to the American satellite navigation systems--"Navstar."

In addition to the creation of new types of weapons and the restructuring of the command, control and communication systems in accordance with the concepts of a "deep echeloned strike" and "air-land operation (battle)," one must also note that since the beginning of the 1980's the United States and NATO have increased the scale of their maneuvers and exercises in their aggressive preparations.

Opposition to the "Rogers Plan" appeared in various political and social circles in West European countries from the very moment when information about it reached the press. But until recently this opposition did not assume its proper scale. Obviously, one of the main reasons for this was the fact that in 1982-83 the attention of the West European public was mainly concentrated on the problem of the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles with nuclear warheads in the FRG, Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. It is only approximately from the summer of 1984 that the public and various political figures in Western Europe have begun to devote increasingly close attention to the new NATO concept of a "deep echeloned strike" and also to the American army concept of an "air-land operation (battle)." Criticism of the

"Rogers Plan" increased after the aforementioned decision of the NATO military planning committee of 9 November 1984. To a certain degree this process has also affected the United States, although, as in the question of the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles, this problem occupies a lesser place in the activity of various social circles than the issue of strategic nuclear weapons.

Summing up the different criticisms addressed to the new NATO concept, one can single out the following basic theses.

The question arises, in particular, whether the NATO bloc, while talking about raising the nuclear threshold, is not leading the matter toward lowering the threshold of conventional war and whether a conventional war will thereby become more probable. In this connection it is noted (for instance, by Professor N. Brown, chairman of the British Council for Disarmament Control) that the outbreak of even small-scale conflict in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact states would represent a most powerful blow to the entire system of world politics.¹⁵ And combat operations on a more or less larger scale could lead to the annihilation of all life in the area of combat operations and its adjacent zones with no lesser degree of probability than in the event that nuclear weapons were used, in view of the fact that in the territories of European countries and especially of central European countries large stocks of highly flammable hydrocarbons are accumulated, highly toxic waste of chemical production is stored, a large number of nuclear power plants are located, etc.¹⁶

Sober-minded West European specialists justly call attention to the fact that in reality the nuclear threshold may turn out to be lowered and not raised as a result of any implementation of the "Rogers Plan." It is noted in this connection, for instance, that in the event of missile weapons strikes against the second echelons, reserves and various rear targets in the country against which these missiles would be aimed, it will not be possible for that country to recognize immediately what weapons--whether nuclear or non-nuclear--are being used against it. It will be quite right to proceed from the assumption of the "worst version" of attack, that is, from the assumption that a disarming nuclear strike is being made against it, and thus its response will be of a corresponding nature. Thus, the results of the research of the Hamburg Institute for the Study of International Problems, published under the title "Strike in Depth" in April 1985, state that in the event of the outbreak of an armed conflict, the "Rogers Plan" may accelerate its escalation and activate military operations because the success of its combat application lies in the speed of decisionmaking and of the realization of these decisions.

The danger of the outbreak of a war in Europe as a result of the adoption of the concept of "deep echeloned strike" and "air-land battle" is further intensified in connection with the 1982 adoption by the U.S. military-political leadership of the principle of "horizontal escalation." According to this principle, in the event of a crisis situation in any region of the world in which the United States finds itself in a situation in which it is not able to gain the upper hand over the forces that are supported by the socialist community, the American state leadership retains for itself the "right" to unleash

military operations in Eastern Europe, or, in other words, against the Warsaw Pact countries.¹⁷

Serious concern over the dangerous linkage between the concept of "air-land battle" and the principle of "horizontal escalation" has been expressed in works by several West European authors as well as in the political documents, including the 19 May 1984 resolution of the SPD (FRG) federal conference on the questions of a policy of peace and security.

The West European public and political circles are also greatly alarmed over the fact that, according to the logic of the implementation of the "Rogers Plan," the authority for decisionmaking is shifted from the political to the military level: Whereas processes of political control are envisaged for orders for the use of nuclear weapons by NATO, the military determination of targets under the "Rogers Plan" requires an almost automatic military decision at a very early stage. In this connection, attention is called to the fact that the short time available makes it virtually impossible to include political organs in the decisionmaking process.

The fact that the "Rogers Plan" fails to take into account the military counteractions of the Warsaw Pact countries, which may reduce to naught all "advantages" of the new NATO concept, is also seriously criticized in Western Europe and the United States.¹⁸ Apprehension is also expressed in connection with the fact that the entire range of response by the other side will, in the final analysis, even weaken the relative opportunities of NATO's conventional forces and thereby again lower the "nuclear threshold." An overwhelming majority of West European specialists of moderate and centrist views agree that in any event the implementation of the "Rogers Plan" will provoke new spirals in the arms race, thereby making the military-strategic situation in Europe less stable.

The political costs of the "Rogers Plan" are becoming obvious to increasingly large West European circles. In particular, it is justifiably noted that the new NATO concept and the corresponding measures to build up NATO's armed forces and promote their combat training in no way correspond to the interests of lowering the level of East-West military confrontation in Europe. The implementation of the "Rogers Plan" can undermine all chances for success of the negotiation on the reduction of armed forces and arms in central Europe and seriously hinder a constructive solution of the problem of confidence-building measures at the Stockholm conference. As the aforementioned investigation by the Hamburg Institute for the Study of International Problems notes, the "Rogers Plan" may also have a negative effect on the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons because the potential missile weapons systems with non-nuclear warheads can have the same range and flight-time characteristics as the weapons systems included in the range of systems discussed in these negotiations.

As many West European experts note, serious additional difficulties arise in connection with the "Rogers Plan" in relation to the question of ensuring adequate control over the observance of accords on arms limitation because the introduction of the systems for strikes against second echelons and reserves would make the control over the observance of accords much more difficult.

The report by the same Hamburg institute says that, even if these systems were equipped only with conventional warheads, it would also be possible from a purely technical standpoint to equip them equally successfully with nuclear or chemical warheads. Reliable control over the specific equipping of missiles of each of the sides would be possible by means of inspections on the spot, including direct inspection of the warhead installed on the missile, but this would require the inspection of all stores, especially in periods of tension. It is a completely justified conclusion in this connection that the "Rogers Plan" requires extraordinary and unrealistic verification powers.

An important characteristic of debates in Western Europe and the United States about the "Rogers Plan" and the concept of "air-land operations" is the advancement (simultaneously with the aforementioned critique of their propositions) of alternative versions of ensuring the security of Europe as a whole and of individual countries on the continent. These versions have become the subject of widespread discussion in recent years. This is especially noticeable in the FRG, Great Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands. The advancement of these alternative military concepts fits in with the general growth of the antiwar and antinuclear movement and the accompanying politicization of many questions not only in the area of military-political doctrines and strategy but also in that of the art of operations and tactics.

The alternative ideas and concepts of security are oriented, according to their authors (who are usually experts close to the social democratic and "Green" parties as well as those who work for various American antiwar organizations), toward reducing the danger of a war in Europe, lowering the level of military confrontation and significantly reducing military expenditures. Thus, the goals are proclaimed within the framework of these concepts which are contrary to what the authors and advocates of the "Rogers Plan" hope to achieve. In a number of cases the authors of the alternative concepts emphasize that their proposals are aimed not only at preventing a new round of the arms race but should also radically change the situation that has developed here over a period of several decades as a result of the military confrontation between the two blocs.

These circles question the figures cited by the Pentagon and NATO headquarters about the balance of forces in Europe and expose the most odious juggling of facts about the Warsaw Pact armed forces. The specialists of moderate orientation strive not to adopt such a tendentious approach toward appraisals of the military doctrine, strategy and art of operations of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries. However, it must be noted that in this respect they are far from consistent or from free of stereotyped NATO propaganda. Insufficient understanding of the legitimate security interests of the USSR and its allies, of their geostrategic position and historical experience, and the tradition of the formation of Soviet military thought are often characteristic of them. Sometimes they mistakenly place the USSR and U.S. military policies on the same level and exaggerate the thesis about an alleged "equal responsibility of the superpowers."

The alternative security concepts are especially actively discussed in Great Britain, including among the leading circles of the Labour, Social Democratic

and Liberal parties. Along with these parties' efforts toward Great Britain's unilateral nuclear disarmament, their leading workers and experts also propose significant reductions of conventional forces and arms, that is, of air, naval and ground forces. All these measures must be considered in shifting Great Britain to the system of "independent territorial defense" on the pattern of such neutral states as Sweden and Switzerland.¹⁹ Similar concepts have also been proposed with regard to the FRG, Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands. In this connection, the latter is considered to be the most likely candidate for changing over to the system of "independent territorial defense" in the foreseeable future.²⁰

The question of lowering the danger of military confrontation in the central European region where the most powerful forces of two military groups face each other has attracted considerable attention among researchers and political activists with moderate views.

For instance, one study of this kind proposes the withdrawal of heavily armed brigades, divisions and corps of the NATO ground forces from the zone adjacent to the FRG-GDR border and their replacement with so-called light infantry that would not be capable of conducting any significant offensive operations but would only be suitable for effective defensive operations.²¹

It is proposed--as a long-term process--to achieve a gradual reorganization of the structure and composition of the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in a way that would significantly reduce the proportion of their forces and weapons that can be used for defensive and offensive purposes. Correspondingly, the task is set to increase the proportion of forces and weapons that can be used in the main only for defense and, at the same time, to achieve an absolute reduction in the numerical strength of the armed forces of the sides. A proposal is also made to change from the system of long-range strike operations to the system of close-range operations, which would not make it possible to create a material basis for the implementation of the concept of "deep echeloned strike" and "air-land battle."

The formation of a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons on both sides of the GDR-FRG border in Western Europe in accordance with the idea advanced by O. Palme and supported by the Independent Commission on Security Issues is considered by many Western antiwar activists to be one of the important stages of transition to "nonprovocative defense." The idea of creating nuclear-free zones in other parts of Europe, including the north, have also won widespread support among the West European public.

The idea of S. Lodgaard, P. Berg and G. Herolf, specialists in military policy from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, on setting up a zone along the FRG-GDR border (75 km on each side) which would be free of battlefield nuclear weapons and of conventional weapons that can be used primarily in offensive operations has become quite popular in Western Europe in the last year and a half or two years.²² They believe that this kind of agreement could easily be controlled by national technical means.

On the whole, it can be said that the concepts of military security in Europe, proposed as alternatives to the "Rogers Plan," have become part of the

political programs of influential mass opposition parties in a number of West European countries. Along with the Labour Party, the SPD also clearly shows this in its directions. The aforementioned resolution of the federal conference of this part of 19 May 1984 states that the "structure and armaments of the federal armed forces must be of a clearly defensive nature." The task is also set that the equilibrium of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact should be maintained at the lowest possible level. The SPD also advocates the conclusion of an agreement between the two alliances on the non-use of force, applying to both nuclear and conventional weapons. Special emphasis should be placed in this connection on ensuring a provision on no first use of nuclear weapons within the framework of such an agreement.

All the aforementioned alternative concepts and ideas have provoked furious criticism among Western militarist circles. The parties and groups in power in the United States, the FRG, Great Britain and other West European countries continue to follow the approach that involves increasing military preparations and a disruption of strategic stability.

The rightwing forces are publicly dishonoring the authors and adherents of alternative concepts and those who advocate the formation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of Europe and other analogous measures, and they are accusing them of undermining the "unity of NATO" and striving for neutrality.

Faced by the growing military threat from the United States and NATO, the Warsaw Pact countries are compelled to take measures to further strengthen their defensive alliance and maintain the military balance. The meeting of the highest party and state leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries in Warsaw on 26 April 1985 was held for that purpose and, as a result, the protocol on the renewal of the 14 May 1955 treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance was signed. Speaking at a reception honoring the participants, M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said: "It was not the Soviet Union and other socialist states that initiated the division of Europe and of the postwar world. The founders of NATO did that, and our alliance only came into being 6 years later. Since then we have repeatedly expressed our willingness to dissolve the Warsaw Pact if the NATO countries should agree to do the same. This principle position continues to be fully maintained. Regrettably, the other side has not displayed any such intention. On the contrary, before our eyes new aggressive doctrines are being promoted on the other side and both nuclear and conventional weapons are being built up intensively. This is now forcing us to consider the further reinforcement of the Warsaw Pact Organization."²³

Although the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries have been forced to take countermeasures, they are actively working against a new round of the arms race in this specific field. Along with their constructive proposals for agreements with Western countries, they are also taking unilateral steps that contribute to the reduction of tension in Europe. Among these important practical steps to strengthen confidence were the Soviet Union's decision, made in coordination with other Warsaw Pact members, to withdraw 20,000 Soviet military personnel, thousands of tanks and other types of military equipment from the GDR in 1979-80; the introduction of the moratorium on the deployment

of Soviet medium-range missiles in the western parts of the USSR in the 1981-83 period; the unilateral declaration of a new moratorium on 7 April 1985 on the deployment of such missiles and on the suspension of other countermeasures until November of this year.

The Soviet Union's pledge not to use nuclear weapons first has become part of the Soviet military doctrine. Following up the proposal made at the 26th CPSU Congress (1981), that CSCE participants pledge no first use of nuclear or conventional weapons against one another, and the proposal incorporated in the Prague Political Declaration of the Warsaw Pact countries (January 1983), that NATO and the Warsaw Pact conclude a mutual non-aggression treaty and maintain peaceful relations, the Soviet Union submitted the "Basic Propositions of the Treaty on Mutual Non-Aggression and the Maintenance of Peaceful Relations" to the Stockholm conference for consideration on 29 January 1985.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly expressed its willingness to act as guarantor of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe and to consider the question of certain substantial measures concerning its own territory adjacent to the zone to aid in strengthening the zone's nuclear-free status.

The USSR has extended its principled support to O. Palme's idea of creating a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons in central Europe.

The Soviet Union agrees with the idea of setting up a zone free of chemical weapons in Europe, an idea actively supported by the SPD in the FRG.

The Soviet leadership has suggested more than once that all nuclear weapons be removed from Europe, including medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons.

The USSR and its allies persistently strive for progress at the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in central Europe. On 14 February 1985 the Soviet delegation, acting on behalf of the GDR, Poland, the USSR and the CSSR, introduced the draft of the "Basic Propositions of Agreement on the Initial Reduction of Ground Forces and Arms of the Soviet Union and United States in Central Europe and the Subsequent Non-Augmentation of the Armed Forces and Arms of the Two Sides in That Region." This proposal takes into consideration a number of elements of the positions of the Western participants in the negotiations.

The realistic and active policy of the Warsaw Pact countries, the development of the antiwar movement in Europe and the new ideas raised in the sphere of security cogently show that a significant improvement of the situation in Europe, a lowering of the level of military confrontation and a radical reduction of the danger of war represent a task that is possible even though it is difficult. Precisely this course is in the interests of common security.

FOOTNOTES

1. ATLANTIC NEWS, 14 November 1984, p 1.

2. Yu. Andreyev, "The Bundeswehr Is NATO's Strike Force," ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, 1984, No 9, p 11. In the United States, several types of conventionally armed, high-precision, long-range ballistic missiles (with multiple warheads), intended primarily for putting the runways of airfields out of commission, are being developed. One plan, for example, envisages the use of two stages of the Pershing II medium-range ballistic missile, and another envisages the use of elements of the Trident missile ("Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe. Proposal for the 1980's," Report of the European Security Study, N.Y., 1983, p 238).
3. V. Kulikov, "Curbing the Arms Race," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 February 1984.
4. S. Akhromeyev, "The Superiority of Soviet Military Science and Soviet Martial Arts Was One of the Most Important Factors of Victory in the Great Patriotic War," KOMMUNIST, 1985, No 3, p 62.
5. M. Proskurin, "Another Aggressive Concept," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 6 January 1984.
6. See V. Volobuyev and N. Nikolayev, "The 'Air-Land Operation (Battle),' " ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, 1984, No 7, pp 20, 32, 34; "Field Manual 100-5, Operations," Department of the Army, Wash., 20 August 1982, pp 7-1, 7-12, 7-13; P. Braken, "The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces," New Haven, 1983, pp 129-178.
7. J. Romjue, "From Active Defense to AirLand Battle. The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982," TRADOC Historical Monograph Series, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe (Va), June 1984; A. Smith, "DEFENSE Talks to the Pentagon's NATO Mentor," DEFENSE, November 1984, pp 651-654.
8. B. Rogers, "Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA): Myths and Realities," NATO REVIEW, 1984, No 6, p 7.
9. B. Satton et al, "Deep Attack Concepts and the Defense of Central Europe," SURVIVAL, March-April 1984, pp 50-70; P. Grasset, "AirLand Battle 2000. Easy When You Know How," DEFENSE AND ARMAMENTS, September 1984, pp 30-34; R. Mason, "New Technologies and Western Defense," ARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT INFORMATION UNIT (ADIU), July-August 1984, pp 1-3; "Operational Concepts for the AirLand Battle and Corps Operations--1986," Department of the Army, Fort Monroe (Va), 25 March 1981, pp 2, 5-6.
10. D. M. Proektor, "Osnovy mira v Yevrope" [The Foundations of Peace in Europe], Moscow, 1983, p 33.
11. For many years, the United States has been developing the "Assault Breaker" type of search-and-destroy unit, designed to detect and inflict non-nuclear strikes on enemy tank subunits at a range of 160-200 km. long before their entry into battle. Another unit of this type is the advanced air-defense detection and destruction complex, intended for the detection and destruction of enemy air defense radar stations at a range of several hundred

kilometers. In addition, another unit is being developed for the detection of impulse radar stations, radio stations, jamming transmitters and other sources of continuous wave transmission. It will be used in conjunction with the second type of complex (M. Belov and V. Shchukin, "The Search-and-Destroy Units of the U.S. Army," VOYENNNYY VESTNIK, 1985, No 1, pp 86-89).

12. B. Rogers, "ACE Attack of Warsaw Pact Follow-On Forces," MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, 1983, No 5, p 45.
13. M. Gerencser and R. Smetek, "Artificial Intelligence on the Battlefield," MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, 1984, No 6, p 86.
14. The authors of a study of the possibilities of the "Assault Breaker" complex, a study conducted jointly by the U.S. Army and Air Force and completed in May 1984, concluded, judging by data cited by French experts, that it would take another 5 years or so to perfect it, and that the total cost of this kind of complex for just one U.S. army corps in Western Europe would be around 8 billion dollars (including the cost of around 2,000 small missiles, needed for a week of intensive combat)--DEFENSE AND ARMAMENTS, 1984, No 9, p 31.
15. N. Brown, "The Security Question in Central Europe," ADIU REPORT, September/October 1983, p 3.
16. T. de Montbrial, "The French Position Vis-a-Vis NATO/WTO Negotiations" in "European Security: Nuclear or Conventional Defense?" edited by M. de Perrot, London, 1983, p 267; F. Barnaby and E. Boeker, "Non-Provocative, Non-Nuclear Defense of Western Europe," ADIU REPORT, January/February 1983, p 9.
17. C. Weinberger, "Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the Congress, FY 1983," Wash., 1982, pp 1-14, 1-16.
18. D. Goure and J. Cooper, "Conventional Deep Strike: A Critical Look," COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, 1984, vol 4, No 3, pp 240-241; R. Coolsaet, "NATO Strategy: Under Different Influences," ADIU REPORT, November/December 1984, p 7; R. Gomez, M. van Atta, "AirLand Battlefield Environment Trust," ARMY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION MAGAZINE, May/June 1984, p 17.
19. A noteworthy analysis of the Swedish experience in "independent territorial defense" can be found in a work by the Institute of International Relations of the Swedish Defense Ministry ("Neutrality and Defense: The Swedish Experience," INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF MILITARY HISTORY, Stockholm, 1984, No 57).
20. F. Barnaby and E. Boeker, "Defense Without Offense. Non-Nuclear Defense in Europe," PEACE STUDIES PAPERS, No 8, November 1982, p 57.
21. S. Canby, "On the Uses of Light Infantry in Forward Areas of the East-West Confrontation" (Mimeo), 1985.

22. It is proposed that tanks, heavy and medium cannon artillery, volley-firing rocket systems, missile launchers and tracking devices be banned in the corridors on both sides of the border. A limit of 20 tons is to be set for armored equipment and of 100 millimeters for cannon and rocket artillery (with the exception of antitank and antiaircraft artillery)--BULLETIN OF PEACE PROPOSALS, 1984, No 4, pp 306-310.

23. PRAVDA, 27 April 1985.

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD DEVELOPING WORLD IN 1980'S ATTACKED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 85 (signed to press 13 Aug 85) pp 15-26

[Article by A. V. Nikiforov: "The United States and the Developing Countries in the Mid-1980's"]

[Text] "In the past 10 years it has become absolutely obvious that the common nature of the conditions and goals--and consequently of American foreign policy--in what is known as the 'Third World' is a myth and a quite dangerous one at that."¹ In this statement, A. Haig, the first secretary of state in the Reagan Administration, not only expressed the views of conservative U.S. circles on the changes in Asia, Africa and Latin America in the 1970's but also defined the conceptual basis of their policy on the developing countries. It is true that, in contrast to the previous decade, when people in Washington believed that the "North-South" conflict had almost eclipsed the conflicts between East and West and was coloring the entire international atmosphere, now the United States is acting as though the developing countries do not and cannot have any foreign economic and political interests in common. On what grounds and for what purpose was this reversal in the American approach to the young states made? What is the substance of Washington's current policy line? What are its results?

It would be wrong to say that this approach does not take present realities into account. The process of the economic and sociopolitical differentiation of developing countries has sped up perceptibly in the past decade. The economies of several countries and territories in Latin America and Southeast Asia (Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and others) have displayed relatively high growth rates. Many of them have reached the level of middle-income capitalist countries and have made progress in the stabilization of their bourgeois-democratic political systems. These countries are extensively involved in the international production and sales network of transnational corporations and are energetically building up their own national exports of manufactured goods. Their economic conflicts with the West are still essentially a matter of the neocolonial relationship of domination and submission. In the struggle for the new international economic order (NIEO), however, these countries also have their own specific interests, differing considerably from the interests of other young states.² These countries are catching up with the developed capitalist countries in terms of their level

of internal development and, as Soviet researchers have pointed out, in terms of the nature of their participation in international division of labor.³

The international position of the oil-exporting developing countries has also changed perceptibly in the past decade. Without going into the well-known causes and consequences of the sudden "burst of energy" displayed by young oil-exporting states, we should stress that although the balance of power in the world capitalist oil market has now changed in favor of the West, many OPEC countries were able to solidify, so to speak, their new international status and are still (even those which are now debtors instead of creditors) among the main targets of the commercial and investment expansion of imperialist countries.

This group of slightly over 20 developing countries (the ones exporting oil and the ones with the highest level of industrial development) occupy the main position in U.S. economic relations with Asian, African and Latin American states. According to our calculations, 60 percent of all American direct private investments in the developing countries were concentrated there at the beginning of this decade. The role of these countries in U.S. foreign trade grew much more important throughout the 1970's. Whereas in 1970 they supplied the United States with 61 percent of all the goods (in terms of cost) purchased from developing countries, in the 1980 the figure was 79 percent, and their share of American exports rose from 60 percent to 73 percent. The share of almost 100 other young states decreased accordingly.

These changes in U.S. economic relations with developing countries coincided with the noticeable reduction of interest in the movement for the NIEO at the beginning of the 1980's. The United States and its allies were able to tone down North-South differences and direct the conflict into the channel of "dialogue." Lengthy negotiations and insignificant concessions from the West created the illusion of progress. A slight nominal increase in the funds extended to young states by international organizations and through bilateral official channels and the abundance of cheap credit from private Western banks made it easier for these states to tolerate the absence of perceptible results in the North-South talks.

When it became obvious at the beginning of the 1980's that there had been no real progress in carrying out the NIEO program, the developing countries were far less able to launch a new round of struggle with the West. The severe cyclical economic crisis reduced the demand for the raw materials and manufactured goods of the young states and their foreign currency receipts. The "oil weapon," which had once forced the United States to agree to the North-South talks, was now ineffective. The problem of indebtedness took the central place in U.S. (and, in general, Western) relations with the developing countries. But the main debtors, whose difficulties could undermine the entire Western credit system, are the same few countries (Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, Nigeria and others), and this gave Washington another reason to concentrate on settling differences with them, to the detriment of the needs of the majority of emerging states.

Subjective changes also contributed to the reversal in the American approach to the developing countries. Over the long history of U.S. interaction with

these countries, specific differences took shape in the policies of the Democratic and Republican parties. The Democrats, for a number of reasons,⁴ are more sensitive to the problems of poverty and inequality in the developing countries and are more inclined to take socioeconomic processes in the "Third World" into account. The Republicans, on the other hand, usually base their approach on the loyalty of the given regime and on its ability to unconditionally support the global military-strategic and economic interests of the United States. The Reagan Administration is no exception to this rule.

These reasons, however, are not enough to explain the reversal in American policy. It has been engineered by the ruling class primarily for the purpose of striking economic, political and military blows against the national liberation movement, which entered a new stage of development in the 1970's.

The disintegration of the colonial empires was completed in the last decade, "marking the end of an entire historical period in the lives of the formerly enslaved countries--the period of anticolonial struggle."⁵ This was accompanied by the intensification of the anti-neocolonial struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American people, a struggle which became the mainstream of the national liberation movement.⁶

This struggle has been reflected primarily in the growth and victory of revolutionary movements in some countries, movements against the undemocratic, pro-Western regimes which have thrown their doors open to foreign capital and have frequently ensured their own survival by sacrificing national interests to the political and military-strategic ambitions of imperialist powers. In addition to this, in the atmosphere of international detente in the 1970's, young states were able to fight a more vigorous collective struggle against neocolonialism, especially the economic variety, on the basis of the demands in the NIEO program.

The number of socialist-oriented developing countries rose perceptibly in the past decade. This choice was made, in particular, by Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Cambodia and several other states. They expanded and reinforced their ties with socialist countries, which gave several revolutionary governments effective assistance in the struggle against foreign aggression and domestic counterrevolution. At the same time, ruling circles in some young states, such as Egypt and Somalia, departed from the progressive domestic and foreign policy line. Their actions complicated the search for fair solutions to several international problems (particularly the Mideast crisis and the problem of limiting military activity in the Indian Ocean) and created a pretext for increased military-political interference by the United States and other imperialist states.

In general, however, imperialism was wrong in assuming that the socioeconomic differentiation of young states and the sometimes acute conflicts between them (including their differing views on national liberation forces and revolutionary reforms in a number of countries) would weaken the anti-neocolonial thrust of their policies. Their common interest in struggle against economic exploitation, in accelerated national development and in the augmentation of political strength through collective action aided in preserving the

anti-imperialist unity of the majority of developing countries in their approach to major international political issues.

In the most general terms, the essence of the current U.S. policy line in Asia, Africa and Latin America consists in the maximization of existing economic and political conflicts in the "Third World" and the active use of these conflicts to eradicate the progressive achievements of the national liberation movement. Obviously, this aim is not new in principle. It is most likely a natural imperialist reaction to the intensification of processes of national and social liberation on the former colonial periphery and has always been part of U.S. policy. When we look back over the fairly lengthy period of U.S. interaction with the young states, however, we cannot fail to see that this aim, which was most apparent in the 1950's and 1960's, was later combined with another approach in American policy. Washington had to depart from its pointedly negative, hostile attitude toward the policy of non-alignment. The line of military intervention, which led to utter defeat in Vietnam, was replaced in the second half of the 1970's by attempts to secure American interests in the developing countries primarily by economic and political means, through the convenient but conciliatory resolution of conflicts and contradictions. This was when the view of the emerging states as a specific socioeconomic community seemed to become a firmly established element of American policy, and there were signs of an awareness of the global significance of their development. It is precisely against this background that Washington's current policy line, which resurrected many of the distinctive features of American policy during the first two postwar decades, looks like a serious reversal.

Export of Counterrevolution

In its strategy, the Reagan Administration is closely coordinating the struggle against the national liberation movement with its efforts to become militarily superior to the socialist world. The resulting international tension and the war hysteria fueled by the United States are supposed to facilitate, according to Washington's calculations, its struggle against revolutionary forces and governments in the developing countries and against the movement of the young states for the NIEO.

Above all, the escalation of tension is used to justify the buildup of the U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, the West Pacific and the Caribbean. Undertaken allegedly to counteract the "Soviet," "Cuban" and other mythical threats, this buildup represents preparations for the use of the main instrument of U.S. strategy in relations with developing countries--military force. The regeneration of the "cold war" atmosphere is also, according to Washington's plans, supposed to injure the non-aligned movement, weaken the solidarity of developing countries and force them to "make a choice" between the East and the West. Finally, the deliberate U.S. exacerbation of security problems is supposed to divert the attention of the leaders of young states from the resolution of development problems and thereby tone down the fight against neocolonial exploitation.

Washington is trying to ignore the internal social causes and autonomous nature of revolutionary liberation movements in the developing countries by

calling them varieties of international terrorism instigated by the Soviet Union, Cuba, other socialist states and some developing countries (for example, Libya and Syria). When A. Haig was still secretary of state and was arguing with American opponents who drew a distinction between terrorism and revolutionary liberation wars, he invented a supposedly Marxist "two-stage strategy," in accordance with which the USSR allegedly first created terrorist groups in developing countries and then began "direct intervention," using the "philosophy of so-called liberation wars."⁷ The present U.S. secretary of state, G. Shultz, recently reiterated that the goals of terrorists, in the opinion of the administration, include "social and political revolutions" and that "the Soviet Union and its clients are financing, equipping and training terrorists throughout the world."⁸

The attempts to depict the popular struggle for national and social liberation as "terrorism" are certainly not anything new in American policy. In particular, there were Washington's stubborn attempts to label the PLO a "terrorist" organization in order to justify its refusal to acknowledge the PLO and its support of Israel's efforts to eliminate this organization. Now, however, the United States is giving the label of terrorist activity not only to all revolutionary and liberation movements but also to the assistance they receive from socialist states and several developing countries. Lists of states "supporting international terrorism" and subject to various types of sanctions have been drawn up. Furthermore, since last summer Washington has persistently suggested to its allies and the world public that "active defense" against terrorism will entail "preventive or pre-emptive actions."

Washington's specific interpretation of the sources, driving forces and aims of terrorism suggests that the idea of "active defense" serves primarily to justify the use of military force against the national liberation movement, and not to prevent real terrorist acts, which lead to murder and the disruption of diplomatic activity and of normal international contacts and meetings for no good reason. The United States wants the world public and the majority of emerging countries to condemn young states with a socialist or progressive orientation, especially those maintaining close relations with the socialist world and offering assistance to liberation movements. Washington is striving for the international isolation of such countries as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola, Syria, Libya and several others in order to facilitate attempts to destabilize and overthrow their governments and to destroy national liberation forces.

This line is being implemented in three main areas, which are closely inter-related: further convergence with reactionary and conservative regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America and their stronger support; the direct use of armed forces against progressive movements and states; diplomatic pressure and blackmail.

The closer U.S. military-political interaction with South Africa, Israel, Pakistan, Thailand, conservative regimes in the Middle East and Africa and dictatorships in Central America encourages them to take aggressive actions against neighboring countries and is turning them into bridgeheads for the deployment and use of American armed forces. The Reagan Administration has

effectively eliminated all of the friction in earlier U.S. relations with South Africa, resulting from the White House's occasional expressions of disagreement with the apartheid system to gain favor with the states of black Africa. The United States has now begun "constructive cooperation" with the racist regime, and this has changed its approach to the settlement in Namibia considerably. It is now arming itself with Pretoria's old demand to make this settlement conditional upon the withdrawal of Cuban internationalists from Angola. Bypassing congressional decisions prohibiting aid to the counter-revolutionary Angolan UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] group, the White House is rendering it through covert CIA channels and through South Africa, is trying to regenerate another antigovernment organization, the FNLA [National Front for the Liberation of Angola], and is supporting the Cabinda separatists. With Washington's direct encouragement, South Africa launched a broad aggressive campaign against Angola in 1981, striving for the simultaneous defeat of the Namibian liberation forces (SWAPO) and the eradication of the progressive government in Luanda.

The United States' already close ties with Israel grew even stronger. American military assistance to this country increased from a billion dollars in 1980 to 1.6-1.7 billion by the middle of this decade. Within the framework of their "strategic cooperation," Washington and Tel Aviv began perfecting the interaction of their armed forces in the Middle East. The United States approved of the Israeli aggression against PLO detachments in southern Lebanon in summer 1982 and then, after sending 2,000 of its own soldiers to this country and concentrating large naval forces near its shores behind the screen of the "multinational force," it launched its own aggression against the Palestinians, the patriotic forces of Lebanon and the Syrian troops stationed there.

American military aid to Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Somalia, Kenya and several other pro-American countries increased by tens and hundreds of millions of dollars in the 1980's. The increased military support was supposed to reinforce ruling regimes there, many of which are facing mounting domestic opposition, and to urge them to start conflicts with neighboring progressive states, particularly Ethiopia, Algeria and Libya. Besides this, in exchange for its assistance, Washington received access to the ports, airfields and other military installations of some of these countries for the use of the American "rapid deployment force."

Under pressure from the administration, the American Congress lifted the ban on military aid to Pakistan, which was instituted in the 1970's in connection with Islamabad's efforts to build a nuclear weapon. In addition to giving this country tremendous economic assistance, the United States began to send it huge shipments of modern weapons, turning it into a bridgehead for the undeclared war against Afghanistan. A large share of the military and economic resources from the United States, the total value of which should reach 3.2 billion dollars between 1983 and 1987, will be used for the maintenance, training and arming of Afghan counterrevolutionary gangs in Pakistan. Besides this, the United States annually sent more than 100 million dollars, according to official data, directly to these gangs. In 1985, according to JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY, the figure will rise to 250 million dollars.

The massive buildup of weapons in Pakistan is intended, in Washington's plans, to pose a serious threat to neighboring India, no matter how vigorously Islamabad may try to conceal this fact. It is probably no coincidence that the growth of shipments of American weapons to Pakistan since 1983 has coincided with the dramatic intensification of the activities of Sikh religious fanatics and separatists in the Indian state of Punjab and of nationalist extremists in Assam and several other Indian states.

In Southeast Asia the United States has assigned a role similar to Pakistan's in many respects to Thailand, where gangs of Pol Pot's forces and other Khmer reactionaries are based. Joint American-Thai military exercises and the increased military aid to Thailand are supposed to strengthen support for Khmer counterrevolutionaries and urge the government in Bangkok to take aggressive actions against Cambodia and Laos.

The U.S. efforts to stifle the revolutionary movement in Central America and the Caribbean have taken on the most sinister characteristics. With a view to the high intensity and old traditions of this movement and to the obvious weakness of pro-American regimes in the region, the Reagan Administration relied from the very beginning on a buildup of American military force and direct intervention here. In October 1983 the United States committed an unprovoked aggressive act against Grenada, liquidating the progressive reforms of the Bishop government. Revolutionary Nicaragua is being openly threatened with a repetition of the "Grenada option." Neighboring Honduras has been converted into a bridgehead for aggression. Behind the screen of the regular joint maneuvers with this country's army, the Pentagon has stationed 2,500 servicemen here permanently and built around 10 airfields and several radar stations and supply depots. The United States is arming former members of Somoza's forces, who have found a refuge in Honduras and have become the main counterrevolutionary strike force. The CIA is actively supporting counterrevolutionaries operating against Nicaragua in the south, from the territory of Costa Rica. Washington is now trying to coordinate the actions of both groups for the overthrow of the legal government in Managua.

Washington's effective refusal to seek diplomatic solutions to conflicts in the "Third World" on the basis of the recognition of liberation movements and revolutionary governments in the developing countries as a real political force has become part of its policy of exporting counterrevolution. The United States feels that the main function of this diplomacy is to consolidate and legalize changes benefiting counterrevolutionaries in various regions, changes accomplished with the use of military force.

The Reagan Administration is inclined to put forth various initiatives and plans for "settlement" either at the same time as military actions or immediately following them. This was most clearly reflected in the Middle East, where Washington tried to make maximum use of the results of the Israeli aggression in southern Lebanon (the military defeat of the Palestinians and the breakup of the PLO) when it put forth the "Reagan Plan" in September 1982, hoping to force the Arabs to accept a pro-American type of settlement, with no recognition of the Palestinians' right to establish their own independent state.⁹ Washington's subsequent mediating efforts were reinforced by the

presence of 2,000 soldiers in Lebanon and by continuous gunfire from the cruiser "New Jersey."

At the same time, American diplomacy is blocking realistic plans for the political settlement of several international conflicts. In particular, the United States is frustrating the attempts of the Contadora Group to settle the situation in Central America¹⁰ and it broke off the direct negotiations with the Nicaraguan Government in the second half of 1984. Washington has made every effort to prevent a political settlement in Afghanistan. It is precisely U.S. pressure on Islamabad (and it has substantial leverage for this) that has kept the complicated Afghan-Pakistani talks at an impasse. "Each time," PRAVDA commented in this connection, "there was just a glimmer of hope and the Pakistani leaders appeared to be taking a more constructive stand at the talks, someone's invisible hand literally jerked them back by their uniforms."¹¹

In this way, diplomacy generally plays a destructive role in American policy in the developing countries today. Too often its efforts are aimed solely at undermining the political settlement of conflicts to pave the way for the annihilation of detachments of the liberation movement and the violent liquidation of revolutionary governments in the young states.

Economic Pressure

There has also been a significant reversal in the U.S. approach to economic relations with developing countries. People in Washington today, in contrast to the 1970's, see no need to adapt to changes in the world economy or in the balance of power between individual countries and groups of countries. On the contrary, Washington is making a maximum effort to adapt the world economy to its own needs. And whereas in relations with the Western allies the United States sometimes acknowledges the existence of interdependence--that is, the need to consider their interests--the economic needs of the vast majority of developing countries are virtually ignored. This applies above all to the need to reorganize international economic relations and to the demands in the NIEO program. The United States took an obstructionist position at the meeting of the leaders of several developed capitalist and developing countries in Cancun in 1981, which was convened to speed up the commencement of the "global talks" on international economic cooperation, and it is still blocking the implementation of the UN decision on these talks.

Just recently, Washington called the development of emerging countries one of the pressing global problems requiring extensive international cooperation for its resolution. Now, however, the Republican administration equates the economic development of these countries only with the spread and reinforcement of private enterprise. It has called TNC's the main generator of this development and it has stated that chances for success rise as the level of government "interference" in the economy drops.

The main issue here is not merely the desire to extend the principles of "Reaganomics" to the entire world. Speculating on the "Iranian experience," the Reagan Administration has apparently begun to revise one of the main

postulates determining the U.S. approach to economic relations with emerging countries for a long time: the belief that the accelerated development of young states strengthens their political stability. "Excessively rapid modernization," people in Washington now say, "could create such disparities and friction that it could result in a coup instead of stability."¹² For this reason, the current administration is trying to make direct use of economic contacts with the young states, especially aid, to impose a U.S.-approved foreign and domestic policy line on them, and not to solve long-range problems in their development. This is the reason for the unprecedented wave of official criticism of economic assistance programs as harmful "charity on the global scale" and as something ineffective and "counterproductive."¹³ The United States is now limiting this aid (on the bilateral level and on the level of international banks and foundations), coordinating it more closely with military-strategic aims and setting stricter eligibility requirements.

Between fiscal years 1981 and 1984, the expenditures of the American Agency for International Development (AID) on long-term economic development projects in the young states displayed a nominal increase of only 15 percent, rising to 1.8 billion dollars, which barely kept up with the rate of inflation in the permanent funding of the projects. The volume of so-called economic support, on the other hand, increased by 40 percent (to 2.9 billion dollars). These funds are offered only to countries regarded by Washington as key states from the standpoint of the strategic deployment of U.S. armed forces and the struggle against the national liberation movement. Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, Sudan and El Salvador now receive around 70 percent of these funds. Although shipments covered by this kind of assistance consist mainly of non-military goods, its chief purpose is to compensate at least in part for the losses suffered by American "clients" as a result of excessive military budgets. It is indicative that recent allocations of this kind, particularly to Israel, have been used to pay off military loans--in other words, directly for military purposes.

Multilateral assistance in the economic development of young states is being limited. According to the estimates of the UNCTAD Secretariat, the capital entering developing countries through the channel of international credit organizations had already ceased to increase in real terms in the 1975-82 period, staying "approximately on the same level."¹⁴ Washington is now taking every opportunity to frustrate attempts at the expanded crediting of young states by such organizations as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the related International Development Association (IDA). In fall 1983, the IBRD, which extends loans on terms close to market terms, decided under pressure from the United States to limit the regular increase in its capital to 8 billion dollars instead of 20 billion in the next few years. The U.S. position on the capital increments of the IDA, which extends credit to young states on relatively preferential terms, aroused severe criticism, even from Western allies. At Washington's insistence, the increment was reduced to 9 billion dollars instead of the projected 12 billion, which, as IBRD President A. Clausen stressed, is smaller than the previous increment even in nominal terms.¹⁵ All of these measures are severely limiting the possibilities of young states to finance economic development with more or less preferential multilateral loans. The situation has been complicated by the dramatic decrease in credit from private banks, as a result of which the

developing countries' payments to these banks on long- and medium-term loans, particularly in 1982 and 1983, exceeded new incoming capital by 7 billion dollars and 21 billion respectively.¹⁶

Certain nuances in Washington's general efforts to reduce multilateral financing for developing countries were revealed only its approach to the IMF [International Monetary Fund]. Under the conditions of the unprecedented exacerbation of the "debt crisis," the United States agreed in 1983 to increase the quotas of IMF members by 47.4 percent--to 98.5 billion dollars, which could theoretically augment the opportunities of young states to receive loans from the fund. In addition to this, however, the IMF leadership resolved, under U.S. pressure, to reduce the annual credit eligibility of each member from 150 percent of its quota to 102 percent, and to 125 percent only in exceptional cases.¹⁷ As a result of the reductions connected with the quota access of IMF members to its loans, the general increase in fund capital, according to expert estimates, will benefit only a small group of the most highly developed young states, while the absolute size of loans for which most of the developing countries will be eligible will remain the same at best (at 125 percent of the quota), and will decrease at 102 percent.¹⁸ Furthermore, loans in the amount of 125 percent of the quota will be extended by the fund only after the recipient country has consented to an "austerity program," which generally envisages, using the struggle against inflation as an excuse, the limitation of social programs and government economic regulation and the reduction of commercial activity. The United States intends to continue reducing the crediting of young states by international financial organizations. "Now that the bomb of global indebtedness has apparently been defused," FORTUNE commented, "the administration will oppose any attempts to pour new funds into these multinational establishments."¹⁹

Therefore, the United States is deliberately exacerbating the economic problems of emerging countries. This is being done in the hope of accelerating the economic differentiation of young states, separating the small group of relatively developed countries from the rest, and attaching these countries more closely to the imperialist nuclear. The reduction of preferential aid and the establishment of stricter eligibility requirements should, according to Washington's plans, make the developing countries more receptive to TNC investments and promote the reorganization of their economic policy in a direction benefiting the West. At the same time, the policy of the Reagan Administration is distinguished by obvious contempt for the needs of the least developed countries, which are of no interest to American capital and the Pentagon.

What Now?

The most visible result of current U.S. policy in relations with emerging countries is the dramatic escalation of regional and global tension. As a result of Washington's opposition, conflicts in southern Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia and Central America have remained unresolved. American intervention stopped the social progress in Grenada. The aggressive actions of the United States and pro-American regimes are escalating the arms race in the "Third World." The movement for a new international economic order has come to a halt.

In spite of this, the Reagan Administration has been unable to attain its main goal--the regression of the national liberation movement. The people of Palestine and Namibia are still fighting for national liberation and the creation of independent states, and the revolutionary movement is still alive in El Salvador and Guatemala. The people of Syria, Lebanon and Libya are steadfastly opposing Israeli aggression and U.S. military pressure. The United States has been unable to undermine socialist-oriented states or to curtail the assistance they are receiving from the USSR, Cuba, Vietnam and other socialist countries.

Washington's hope of "polarizing" the non-aligned movement and forcing the developing countries to give up the struggle for the NIEO turned out to be futile. American policy was severely criticized at the Seventh Conference of the Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries in March 1983. Its political declaration says that "the attempt to mistakenly describe the struggle of people for independence and human dignity as an element of the confrontation between East and West deprives them of their right to decide their own fate and strive for their own legitimate aims." More people in the young states are aware that the implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence and detente are essential conditions for the democratic reorganization of international economic relations. "Stable development throughout the world and a viable international order," the heads of state and government of the non-aligned countries declared, "will necessitate the cessation of the arms race, followed by immediate steps toward disarmament, which will free urgently needed resources for economic development."

Washington's behavior in international affairs is the direct opposite of this line. In the efforts to solve global problems, the United States is impeding the search for solutions satisfactory to the international community and is undermining existing agreements (for example, the international convention on the law of the sea). It is pursuing an openly egocentric policy of financing its own economic growth and excessive military expenditures at the expense of others, including the developing countries. The United States is now more inclined to oppose the majority of states.

Is this one of the regular "cyclical" changes in American policy, a result of the economic crisis and the conservative outlook of the current administration? There is no question that these factors play an important role, but something else is also obvious: The national liberation movement's transition to the stage of anti-neocolonial struggle has forced the U.S. ruling class to revise its long-range approach to developing countries. For more than two decades after the war, when this movement was concerned mainly with national liberation and the creation of independent states, Washington tried to "intercept revolutions" by putting bourgeois-nationalist forces in power in the young states, forces capable of ensuring the development of emerging countries in a direction benefiting imperialism--that is, the capitalist direction. At this time, attempts were even made to accelerate the economic growth of developing countries to eliminate the internal social conflicts engendered by surviving feudal and pre-feudal practices, to put pro-Western regimes on a solid foundation of capitalist relations and to facilitate TNC expansion in the "Third World." It was for this purpose that programs of bilateral

assistance began to be carried out, IBRD activities were reorganized, the IDA and regional development banks were founded, the young states were given more opportunity to receive IMF loans, and so forth.

In the majority of countries, however, capitalist "modernization" takes abnormal forms, widening the gap between the underprivileged masses and the military-bureaucratic, bourgeois-oligarchic elite in close contact with the West. The resulting revolutionary outbursts have an anti-American thrust and are viewed in the United States as an attack on its international positions, and this frequently leads to the conclusion that the rapid development of young states is contrary to American interests.

But even the comparatively few "Third World" countries which have already progressed quite far along the capitalist road are presenting the United States with increasingly acute problems. The rapidly growing exports of their finished goods to U.S. markets are dealing painful blows to many American industries. In general, due to the large capital investments of American TNC's and the broad scales of commercial and financial transactions, U.S. economic relations with these countries are limiting Washington's ability to dictate its will and disregard their political interests.

Therefore, the "Third World" is presenting the United States with a problem which no longer consists merely in deciding the proper way of dealing with an undesirable government or of reacting to OPEC's behavior or the "tyranny of the majority" in the United Nations. It is much broader and consists in the fact that the economic and social development of young states (as it is in reality, and not as it is simulated in research centers and State Department offices) now poses a threat to the positions of American imperialism. How should it respond to this "challenge"?

The prevailing line in current U.S. policy is another attempt to control the economic development and political orientation of emerging countries. But it is a defect of this line that it inevitably leads to the use of military force and disrupts the mechanisms of international economic and political cooperation.

This policy is certainly not foolproof. For one thing, it does not aid in the resolution of the real problems facing the developing countries, but, rather, exacerbates them. These problems cannot be solved by exporting counterrevolution, by suppressing liberation movements with military force or by supporting undemocratic regimes. They will not disappear and they will not become less dangerous for the United States even if the West is able to attach 10 or so young states more closely to its own policy. The severity of these problems is certainly not being alleviated by the fact that the world community has been forced by Washington to use its intellectual, political and other resources primarily for the prevention of war.

A realistic and constructive policy toward developing countries must be based on the realization that the consolidation of their independence and autonomy is an irreversible process. International relations are being influenced to an ever greater extent by the interests of individual young states and by

their common interests, stemming from the distinctive features of their current status and their position on the major international issues.

FOOTNOTES

1. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, February 1981, p Special-D.
2. In the sphere of trade, they are interested, for example, less in the stabilization of income from raw material exports than in the elimination of the customs barriers blocking exports of their manufactured goods to Western states; they are not demanding that the West cancel their debts, but they do want to reach a compromise on deferments and refinancing.
3. "Razvivayushchiyesya strany v sovremennom mire: yedinstvo i mnogoobrazie" [The Developing Countries in Today's World: Unity and Diversity], Moscow, 1983, p 153.
4. See, for example, "Sovremennaya vneshnyaya politika SShA" [Contemporary U.S. Foreign Policy], vol 2, Moscow, 1984, pp 112-129.
5. K. Brutents, "The Emerging Countries in the Early 1980's," KOMMUNIST, 1984, No 3, p 103.
6. The unresolved problems of the self-determination of the Palestinian Arabs, the people of Namibia, Western Sahara and several small territories, primarily islands, in the possession of imperialist powers testify to the incomplete process of decolonization. Although these problems were engendered by "traditional" colonialism, they are interwoven in the fabric of contemporary neocolonialism with its distinctive methods: reliance on the police functions of regional powers friendly to the West and on the class-related division of national liberation forces, the closest possible economic attachments, etc. It is obvious that the national liberation goals of these people can be achieved only through struggle against imperialism's neocolonial policy.
7. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, May 1981, pp 16-17.
8. Ibid., August 1984, pp 31-32.
9. For more about the "Reagan Plan," see A. K. Kislov, "The United States and the Middle East, 1982," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1983, No 1.
10. For a discussion of the Contadora Group's proposals, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1984, No 6, p 26.
11. PRAVDA, 29 June 1984.
12. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, July 1983, pp 57-58.
13. Ibid., March 1983, p 31. Of course, people in Washington are ignoring the fact that Western assistance is quite meager in comparison to the sums

pumped out of the developing countries into the safes of transnational companies and banks. Apparently, they also take no notice of the largely "objective" need for this assistance to maintain the system of neocolonial exploitation: It is no secret that it serves primarily to bring the economies of developing countries up to a level ensuring the profitable investment of Western private capital, and to compensate in part for the losses and imbalances caused by TNC activity.

14. "Trade and Development Report 1983," N.Y., 1983, p 17.

15. VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, 15 March 1984, p 331.

16. Ibid.

17. "World Economic Survey 1984," N.Y., 1984, p 51.

18. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 13 October 1983, p 64.

19. FORTUNE, 10 December 1984, p 22.

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SOCIOECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL REVOLUTION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 85 (signed to press 13 Aug 85) pp 49-59

[Article by V. B. Supyan: "Current Stage of the Technological Revolution: Some Socioeconomic Consequences in the United States"]

[Text] The CPSU views the fundamental acceleration of scientific and technical progress as the main means of national economic intensification. The problems engendered by the current stage of the technological revolution in all industrially developed countries have much in common, although the means, methods and speed of their resolution naturally depend primarily on specific conditions in the two opposite socioeconomic systems. In connection with this, an analysis of some new developments in the sphere of employment and personnel training in contemporary capitalism's leading country seems important and pertinent.

Changes in the productive forces of society have always had a significant effect on social relations and on the status of the worker in national production. The current stage of the technological revolution is no exception. Its distinctive features include the rapid growth of new science-intensive fields in the United States and in other developed capitalist countries and the incorporation of fundamentally new equipment and technology, based primarily on the use of microelectronics, in various spheres of production and public life. The socioeconomic consequences of scientific and technical advances in national production, both those that are taking place right now and those that are just becoming apparent, are of unprecedented scale, are long-lived and are also profoundly contradictory. The differing effects of the current stage of the technological revolution on production and social relations stem, on the one hand, from the fundamentally new nature of many technical innovations and qualitative advances in several means of labor and, on the other, from the system of capitalist production relations, in which the latest scientific and technical discoveries are being put to use, and the type of social reproduction characteristic of U.S. state-monopolist capitalism in the 1980's. As the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress said, "in the capitalist society the use of the latest scientific and technical achievements in production works against laborers, driving millions of them out of factories and plants."¹

Scientific and technical progress in the United States is now having a significant effect on employment, the sectorial distribution and occupational skills of manpower, personnel training and retraining, and the content and organization of labor. The social structure of society and the nature of the class struggle are changing.

Employment and Unemployment Problems

The socioeconomic effects of scientific and technical progress are most apparent and most contradictory in the labor market. An analysis of the influence of the current stage of this revolution on the employment sphere in the 1980's seems especially pertinent because it is precisely in this period that structural disparities in the labor market have achieved record dimensions. This is reflected in the growth of unemployment at a rate unprecedented in more than 40 years, in the shortage of some specialties and in the increasingly severe problems of personnel training and retraining. According to official data, for example, 10.8 percent of the civilian labor force was unemployed in late 1982 and early 1983. There were 12 million people without any jobs at all. Besides this, there were 6.6 million people with part-time jobs and 1.8 million who had lost all hope of finding jobs and had therefore stopped looking for them. Although the rate of unemployment was slightly lower in the second half of 1983, in 1984 and in early 1985, there were still 8.4 million people who were completely unemployed in March 1985--an unprecedented indicator for a period of economic upswing.

At the same time, there is a shortage of some categories of specialists in the labor market, and it is expected to grow more acute. For example, according to the estimates of the National Science Foundation, by 1987 the economy will be suffering from a shortage of 115,000-140,000 computer specialists, 30,000 electronic engineers and 10,000-35,000 aircraft engineers.² According to the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, there will be a demand for 31,000 skilled machine operators each year in the current decade, but only 2,300 will have the necessary skills.³

The reasons for this dramatic aggravation of employment and unemployment problems in the United States include temporary factors, especially the Reagan Administration's undemocratic social policy and the effects of the cyclical crisis of 1980-1982, the most severe crisis of the postwar period, as well as comparatively long-lived factors, the cumulative effect of which became especially apparent in the early 1980's. The latter include the more "efficient" organization of production, structural changes in the economy, the longer duration and increased severity of the crisis phase of cycles, slower economic growth, demographic factors, the export of capital and the government's foreign economic policy.

The effects of many of these factors are directly or indirectly connected with scientific and technical progress. Above all, these are the rapid development of production and the intensive incorporation of new equipment and technology in various spheres of the economy, based on the use of microprocessors and microelectronics in general, microcomputers, robots, flexible automated systems, processing centers, word processors, etc. According to a General Electric

forecast, the sales volume of the latest automatic production equipment will rise from 4 billion dollars in 1981 to 29 billion in 1991,⁴ including a rise from 200 million in 1981 to 2 billion in 1990 for robots, and even to 4 billion for robots with various attachments. During the same period the number of robots in the economy will rise from 14,000 to 50,000-100,000 (according to different estimates).⁵

Experts from the Dataquest consulting firm believe that the demand for electronic office equipment will also rise more quickly: Sales of this equipment will increase by 34 percent each year until 1986. Purchases of electronic word processors alone will amount to 6 billion dollars in 1986, in comparison to 2 billion in 1981.⁶

It is also significant that the automation of labor processes with the use of microelectronics will have certain qualitatively new features in comparison to previous stages of automation. The miniaturization of computers, in the first place, has dramatically expanded the technical possibilities for their use and, in the second place, has reduced their cost. In industrial production, for example, the use of microcomputers and robots has made the automation of many more labor operations technically possible. For example, according to experts from Carnegie-Mellon University, the use of the existing generation of robots could automate around 7 million jobs, or almost a third of the jobs in the processing industry. According to American experts, the complete automation of production processes in the automotive and electrical equipment industries, in general machine building and in the production of metalware will be technically possible after 1990.⁷ Both routine operations and many operations requiring a more creative approach can now be automated. Furthermore, microprocessors are changing the appearance of plants and even of offices. Automated systems for the collection, processing and storage of data, word processors and other equipment are now being used here more extensively. According to different estimates (for example, those of the Xerox Corporation and of Carnegie-Mellon University), by 1990 microprocessors will affect the work methods and employment of 20-50 million "white-collar workers."⁸

It is significant that whereas the influence of the technological revolution in the 1960's and 1970's was reflected primarily in the development of new products, in the 1980's the reorganization of American industry, especially its older branches (automobile engineering, ferrous metallurgy and others), and the widespread use of metal-saving and energy-saving equipment began contributing to the increasingly extensive use of highly productive labor-saving equipment. This was dictated above all by the need to enhance labor productivity and by the desire of capitalists for a higher profit margin and for a stronger competitive position for American corporations in the international market.

It is already apparent that the incorporation of fundamentally new automated equipment will considerably enhance labor productivity and lead to the relative--and, frequently, also the absolute--reduction of manpower requirements. The use of robots, for example, augments labor productivity by 10-90 percent in various fields of production.⁹ The automotive industry, where robots are used most extensively, is an indicative example. At the present time, 10 robots

can replace 17 workers at enterprises with a two-shift production cycle, or 27 workers at enterprises with three shifts. According to the United Automobile Workers union, by 1990 the incorporation of robots will reduce the demand for assembly line workers in the automobile industry by 50 percent.¹⁰ According to the forecast of the prestigious Upjohn Employment Institute, robots can replace up to 200,000 workers in branches of the processing industry--primarily fitters, welders, loaders and painters.¹¹ A Stanford Institute study cites an even more impressive prediction: By the year 2000, 80 percent of all manual labor in the U.S. economy will be automated--in other words, the number of people performing this kind of labor, including heavy unskilled labor, will drop to 5 million by the beginning of the next century (25 million at the beginning of the 1980's).¹²

It seems, however, that some forecasts underestimate many of the economic and social factors deterring the introduction of new equipment. They include the need for capital investments, the often negative attitude of labor unions toward the broad-scale automation of production, which leads to mass layoffs, and others.

It is true that corporations in capital-intensive branches have colossal amounts of fixed capital in existing enterprises and they could hardly afford the simultaneous replacement of all equipment. Expressing his doubts about the "galloping" automation in the current decade, President J. Engleberger of Unimation,¹³ the largest American company producing robots, said that "the replacement of just 5 percent of the workers in the production sphere in Western countries will require the investment of 3 trillion dollars in automation each year for 40 years."¹⁴ The speed of the incorporation of micro-processor equipment and technology will also depend largely on the relative prices of manpower and new equipment. The opinion that several forecasts exaggerate the speed of the dissemination of robots and other modern equipment is also shared by prominent union leaders, such as W. Winpisinger, vice president of the AFL-CIO. He believes that the speed of the replacement of manpower in production will be limited by economic and technical factors and by the active struggle of workers for job security.¹⁵

Besides this, it must be said that the development of the technological revolution is now creating new jobs as well as replacing manpower with machines. Above all, new jobs are being created in science-intensive branches producing microelectronic and other advanced equipment. It is also giving rise to new industries and new occupations which did not exist just a few years ago--for example, the production of home computers, the transmission of information to the business community and the population on a qualitatively new technical basis, etc. Employment in science-intensive branches, where proportional R & D expenditures in the net product are at least twice as high as the industry average (in the medico-biological and aerospace industries and in the production of computers, communication systems and electronic components), increased by 36-37 percent between 1972 and 1982 (by 1 percent in industry as a whole) and is expected to increase by another 34 percent before the middle of the 1990's.

In spite of the high growth rate, however, the number of people employed in these fields will still be quite insignificant--3.5 million in 1995 (2.9 percent

of the labor force; 2.8 percent in 1982). In branches where the proportional number of scientific and technical personnel on the total staff and proportional expenditures on R & D in sales volume are equal to or higher than average indicators for the processing industry, the figure will be 7.7 million in 1995, or 6.6 percent.¹⁶

The increase in employment, even in science-intensive branches, will obviously not be enough to compensate for the tendency noted in this decade toward a reduced demand for manpower in many sectors of the American economy. Furthermore, even in several science-intensive fields of production, labor-saving equipment is being used on a broad scale.

The development of automation will create several structural disparities in the labor market and, in general, will compound the unemployment problem. Reality has refuted the allegations of some bourgeois theorists of "reindustrialization" and the promises of members of the current administration that the vigorous retooling of the economy will eventually reduce unemployment and increase employment. This was graphically demonstrated in 1983 and 1984, when the replacement of obsolete equipment in the automotive industry, for example, led to the dismissal of hundreds of thousands of skilled workers even at a time of favorable economic conditions, especially in the northeastern states where the main automobile engineering centers are located. This compounds sectorial and regional disparities in the labor market. President M. Satron of the Forecasting International consulting firm believes that 1.2 million of the more than 12 million unemployed at the beginning of the 1980's will never find jobs in their specialty: Their jobs have been eliminated, primarily in connection with the incorporation of robots, flexible automated production units, machine tools with digital programmed control, etc.¹⁷ The new program of the CP USA says that "automation gives corporations the ability to increase production dramatically, which sometimes allows them to close down some plants and lay off workers, who then become part of the permanent army of unemployed."¹⁸

What is more, structural imbalances in manpower supply and demand are turning into a characteristic feature of the U.S. labor market, reflected in the growth of so-called "structural unemployment," which is now becoming chronic. This happens because the structure of manpower supply often cannot meet the requirements of modern production in terms of education and skills. In addition to exacerbating disparities in the labor market and increasing unemployment, this leads to several contradictory changes in the occupational skills of the labor force and the content of labor.

Changes in Occupational Skills and the Problem of Education

The basis of social division of labor, including division according to occupational skills, is the development of productive forces, especially the tools of labor. This means that the developmental level of the means of production at any given time requires a corresponding level of occupational skills. Pointing out this connection, F. Engels wrote: "The growth of industrial and agricultural production...requires more than just auxiliary mechanical and chemical means. It also requires the appropriate development of the skills of the people putting these means to work."¹⁹ The technological revolution is

affecting increasingly large segments of the U.S. labor force, but various categories of manpower are being affected to varying degrees.

Changes in the relative numbers of people engaged in mental and physical labor have been accelerated. The percentage of workers engaged primarily in mental labor rose from 48.4 percent in 1973 to 54.4 percent in 1983, or by 6 percentage points (PP), whereas the figure for the previous 10 years was 4 PP.²⁰ The educational level of manpower is rising. The average in 1981 was 12.7 years.²¹ According to estimates, four-fifths of all workers over the age of 25 will have at least a high-school education by 1990, and around 25 percent will be college graduates.²²

An important feature of the past decade was the quicker rise in the number of highly skilled specialists--scientists, engineers, teachers, physicians, etc. The increase was 45.2 percent between 1972 and 1983, whereas the total number of people employed in the economy increased by only 22.7 percent. The number of specialists in fundamentally new professions connected with the development of the technological revolution is displaying an exceptionally high rate of increase--systems analysts, specialists in genetic engineering, computer engineers, etc. In 1980 there were 320,000 students majoring in computer science, or three times as many as in 1975.²³ According to forecasts, the number of computer specialists will increase by 81 percent between 1982 and 1995 and will reach 943,000.²⁴ According to American experts, only 30 percent of the increase in the number of scientists and engineers in the United States will be due to the overall increase in the gross national product, and the remaining 70 percent will be connected directly with the development of the technological revolution. In particular, the demand for highly skilled technical specialists is much higher in the rapidly growing science-intensive fields than in traditional industries. In robot engineering, for example, around 40 percent of all the employees are engineers and technicians, whereas the figure in the automotive industry is 3.5 percent.²⁵ In the science-intensive sector of industry as a whole, 38 percent of the employees are engaged in mental labor. This is 1.5 times as high as the indicator for other branches of industry.

The higher level of the professional training of scientists, instructors, engineers and other highly skilled specialists is attested to by the rise in the number of Americans with college degrees. In the 1970's alone, the number of specialists with master's degrees or doctorates increased by 71.7 percent and totaled 412,100, and in 1985 the figure is expected to reach 447,000.²⁶

The new stage of production automation is leading to definite changes in the employment and skills of technicians. The slight reduction in the number of these workers, especially in fields of technical expertise, due to the use of new instruments and computers was more than compensated for by the rising demand for them in the 1970's and early 1980's for the maintenance of the new equipment and for service as assistant researchers and engineers. According to American estimates, the number of technicians in the United States engaged only in engineering research had reached 800,000 by the middle of the 1980's, and the number of computer service technicians will increase by 154 percent in the 1980's and will reach 160,000 by 1990.²⁷

In general, employment in professions connected with the development of new equipment and technology (American experts include natural scientists, computer engineers and engineering research technicians among them) will rise from 3.3 million in 1982 to 4.8 million in 1995, or by 46 percent, in comparison to the projected increase of 25 percent in the total labor force.²⁸

Many American experts, however, are alarmed by the shortage of specialists in the engineering professions, especially electronic and computer engineering. In spite of the rapid rise in the number of engineering college applicants (50 percent between 1973 and 1980), engineers accounted for only 7 percent of all college graduates in 1980, whereas the figure in Japan, for example, was 15 percent.²⁹ At the same time, there is an obvious surplus of highly skilled specialists in some professions, especially in the humanities. Unemployment among them was 3 percent in 1983.

The potential of skilled specialists is being underutilized even in the engineering professions. For example, 50,000 people move from engineering professions to non-engineering ones each year. The main reasons are job dissatisfaction and the inefficient use of the creative potential of these engineers.³⁰

The new stage of production automation in the United States is having contradictory effects on the employment and skills of workers. Progressive forms of production equipment and technology (processing centers, robots, automatic assembly lines and, in general, equipment with digital programmed control) are enhancing the productivity of the labor of machine operators and are reducing the demand for some categories of operators. At the same time, the demand for highly skilled workers, especially in repair and installation services, is rising.

In partially automated production units, many machine operators are transferred to the category of semiskilled manpower; their previous skills are no longer required and their work is confined to fairly simple control functions. In completely automated units, which are more typical of the current stage of the technological revolution, the skills of operators rise, the content of their jobs changes and the functions of the operator and trouble-shooter are integrated.

The skill requirements of auxiliary workers servicing the new equipment are rising and often introduce fundamental changes into the content of skills. Dynamism, the ability to adapt quickly to changing equipment, to new forms of labor and production organization, and certain social and psychological elements are becoming essential attributes. The role of purely physical aspects of labor, on the other hand, is less important in the operation of this kind of equipment.

Other tendencies are also apparent. In some cases, for example, the maintenance of equipment based on microelectronics does not require highly skilled personnel. The technical maintenance of the Xerox Corporation's duplicating machines previously required a good knowledge of electrical equipment, electronics and mechanics and the ability to diagnose and correct malfunctions quickly. Now that machines are being produced on a microelectronic basis,

the functions of repairmen are much simpler--all they have to do is replace the defective module with a new one. The problem is then corrected at the manufacturing enterprise.

The development of the technological revolution has led to a significant increase in the number of people employed in many related professions. Above all, these are engineers and technicians in electronics, specialists in systems analysis and computer and office equipment programmers and operators. By 1990 the number of specialists in the information sphere is expected to increase by 92.3 percent, with corresponding increases of 67.8 percent in the number of computer specialists, 59.8 percent in the number of office equipment service technicians, 48.9 percent in the number of computer programmers and 44 percent in the number of peripheral computer equipment operators.³¹

There have also been changes in the organization of the labor process in connection with the incorporation of qualitatively new technical equipment in national production. For example, the rapid development of telecommunication systems and the growing number of home computers connected to central computers give rise to new production relations and change traditional beliefs about the organization of labor. There are already tens of thousands of Americans whose place of employment is their own home and whose tools of labor are home computers. By 1990 the number is expected to reach 10 million (and this applies to a broad range of professions--engineers, designers, systems analysts and office workers). The limited experience in this kind of organization of labor to date attests to its substantial economic advantages: Labor productivity rises 10-20 percent, overhead costs are lowered, rush-hour traffic is reduced, workers save time and money on transportation, etc.

The rising levels of the education and skills of workers are making labor efficiency systems--strictly regulating personnel functions, discouraging creative initiative and fragmenting labor to the maximum--an anachronism in the capitalist society. As a result of the enhanced quality of manpower, various concepts and methods of capitalist labor organization are being widely disseminated--the "quality of professional life," the "enrichment of labor," the "humanization of labor" and others. Although these concepts declare the need for the development of the worker's social and production activity and the improvement of the content of labor, they are actually supposed to secure the more intensive use of manpower and its more effective exploitation by capital.

The shortage of some categories of specialists in the U.S. economy was discussed above. The systems of higher and secondary specialized education and of vocational training are not fully prepared to deal with this problem. This is not simply a matter of difficulties connected with the planning of specialist training for these professions. The quality of education on all levels is becoming an increasingly acute problem; the training of personnel in many specialties does not meet the changing requirements of production. This also has a significant effect on the results of production. American economist James Medoff believes, for example, that the failure of the skills of many workers to meet the requirements of modern production is to blame for 60 percent of the decline in the growth rate of labor productivity in the United States in the last decade.³²

Proportional expenditures on education in the GNP, however, decreased from 8 percent in 1975 to 6.8 percent in 1981. The quality of training in the majority of American colleges, especially public institutions, is still relatively low. So-called "research universities" are the exception. Here the high level of education is constantly maintained by research projects in which instructors and students participate. At the beginning of the 1980's, however, these universities accounted for only around 100 of the more than 3,000 higher academic institutions in the country. American experts have also pointed out the shortage of instructors in many colleges: 10 percent of the faculty positions are vacant, and the figure is 25 percent for professors and instructors in computer science and electronics. There is a shortage of equipment and instruments in professional engineering schools and universities representing the second level of higher education and conferring master's degrees. All of this naturally affects the quality of the training of highly skilled specialists, particularly in the newest fields of technical progress. It is interesting that more than 30 percent of the master's degrees and 50 percent of the doctorates conferred by American universities are awarded to foreigners, most of whom return to their own countries.³³

The system of public education is the target of even more complaints in the United States. For example, according to experts, Japanese high-school graduates have an education surpassing that of American graduates by approximately 4 years of schooling. Many graduates display an extremely low level of knowledge: 28 percent of surveyed students were unable to read a text and then convey its content accurately, and 10 percent could not write a grammatical composition. Furthermore, students in the natural sciences and mathematics had a particularly low level of knowledge.³⁴

The public system of vocational training and retraining has also been quite ineffective. For example, only 40 percent of the funds allocated in the 1970's for programs envisaged in the 1973 act on employment and labor training were actually spent on vocational training, while 60 percent were used to cover administrative expenses. Furthermore, only 3 percent of the people who were trained received jobs.³⁵ The list of professions did not meet the requirements of production either: 73 percent of these people received training in office work, automobile repair, nursing, metal processing and welding.

The difficult problems facing the American system of education and the growing disparity between the quality of specialist training and the new requirements dictated by the technological revolution have been discussed in scientific literature and in the mass media. Furthermore, it has been emphasized that education should not concentrate only on conveying a certain amount of knowledge and specific skills, but should also teach theory and methods of analysis and should cultivate analytical thinking and other qualities allowing students to adapt quickly to the changing conditions of production. These teaching methods are being incorporated by the best American universities, and some private corporations are also striving to master them. It must be said that although the state system of vocational training and retraining in the United States is in a pitiful state, private corporations are satisfying their needs, although not entirely, for skilled workers by establishing their own systems of courses and on-the-job training. According to American estimates,

corporations spent 30 billion dollars on this kind of training in 1980, or around twice as much as the federal government spent (including military agencies).

To keep up with the requirements of the technological revolution, capital must increase expenditures on advanced personnel training substantially. The Polaroid firm offers workers and employees a choice of 100 different courses. General Electric annually trains 6,000 engineers in computer science (the corporation employs 35,000 engineers in all).³⁶

Computers are being used on a broad scale in the training process. For example, the computer-aided training methods developed by the Control Data Corporation are being used extensively by American Airlines, General Motors, General Mills, Shell, du Pont, Federal Express and other firms. In general, 76 percent of all American corporations with 500 or more employees have personnel training and retraining programs.³⁷

Nevertheless, the adaptation of all links of the personnel training system to the new requirements of the technological revolution is still a pressing problem. This is due, on the one hand, to the massive scales of the job of training specialists in new professions and retraining many workers, employees and engineering and technical personnel and, on the other, to the desire of capital to minimize expenditures on manpower training, to the high cost of higher education in the United States and to the extremely ineffective regulation of labor resources by the government.

The exacerbation of employment problems and changes in the quality of manpower are having a significant effect on the social structure of the adult population and on the alignment of class forces in the nation.

The rapid development of science-intensive branches of industry in the 1980's laid the foundation for the accelerated growth of the industrial proletariat, with higher levels of skills and education. The saturation of public services with the latest equipment is having the same effect by increasing the demand for workers in the labor professions--installers and repairmen of computers and peripheral equipment, office equipment and duplicating machines and specialists in the maintenance of telecommunication systems and various types of trade equipment.

One important feature of the current social structure of the adult American population is the rapid absolute and relative growth of various categories of employees and service personnel. The rapid development of science-intensive production areas is turning the professions of scientists, engineers, technicians and other specialists with a higher or secondary specialized education into mass occupations. Many types of office work have been simplified and confined to a small group of operations, which makes them quite similar to the operations of assembly line workers. All of this is objectively bringing the status of employees closer to the status of the industrial proletariat.

At the same time, there is the intensive social differentiation of the hired labor force, largely due to scientific and technical progress. People in the

new professions engendered by the technological revolution are in a more privileged position in the labor market (at least until the market has reached the saturation point), receive higher wages, etc. Other categories of people employed in the new science-intensive branches have similar advantages over workers in traditional industries. The social separation of laborers, which benefits capital, is also stimulated by some fundamentally new forms of labor organization, particularly those based on the use of the labor of people working at home with computer terminals or home computers. This gives rise to new methods of exploitation, the development of so-called "electronic monitoring" (that is, the regulation and supervision of the activities of people with the aid of the latest mass communication media), intensifies the alienation of workers in the system of capitalist production and their isolation and reduces the influence of labor unions.

The improvement of robot engineering, the relative decrease in the cost of robots and their rapid incorporation are crowding many industrial workers out of production, which is overloading the labor market and allowing capital to exert pressure on employed workers and on labor unions to force them into concessions in the sphere of wages and working conditions. An important factor weakening the influence of labor unions and the working class in general is the crisis in old industries (steel, automobile and others), where the labor movement has traditionally been strong, and the simultaneous development of science-intensive branches, employing primarily highly skilled manpower and usually affected least by the labor movement.

Therefore, some of the technical and technological innovations introduced under the conditions of capitalist production relations can strengthen the position of capital and weaken the position of the working class. At the present time these purposes are also being served by the undemocratic policy of the bourgeois state, which is completely devoid of liberal impulses and has the ultimate aim of dramatically intensifying the exploitation of the laboring public and maximizing profits. Capital wants to "discipline" the working class--that is, impose labor agreements benefiting employers on workers and employees and limit allocations for programs for the creation of jobs and the retraining of manpower.

This policy is being protested by the laboring public and is exacerbating social conflicts in the society. In the 1980's more vigorous action by the union rank and file, resolutely protesting concessions to monopolies, became a distinctive feature of the movement. The marches of the unemployed on Washington are acquiring massive dimensions. In 1983 a convention of unemployed Americans was held in Chicago. In view of capital's present onslaught, the need for the consolidation of the working class and all antimonomopolist forces in a struggle for their rights is becoming increasingly obvious.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXVI syezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1981, p 20.

2. SCIENCE RESOURCES STUDIES HIGHLIGHTS, Wash., 23 February 1983, p 1.
3. TIME, 6 July 1981, p 31.
4. "Job Forecasting. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 6-7 April 1983," p 68.
5. "America's Economy: Problems and Prospects," Wash., 1983, pp 145-147; "Impact of Robots and Computers on the Work Force of the 1980's. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on General Oversight and the Economy of the Committee on Small Business, U.S. House of Representatives," Wash., 1984, p 41.
6. "Job Forecasting," p 68.
7. MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, September 1982, p 11.
8. Ibid., p 12.
9. "America's Economy: Problems and Prospects," p 135.
10. Ibid., p 150.
11. "Impact of Robots and Computers on the Work Force of the 1980's," p 41.
12. "Micro-Electronics, Robotics and Jobs," OECD, Paris, 1982, p 261.
13. In 1983 Unimation was taken over by the Westinghouse Company.
14. MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, September 1982, p 13.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., November 1983, p 53.
17. THE FUTURIST, June 1983, p 16.
18. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1983, No 1, p 121.
19. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 4, p 335.
20. Calculated according to: EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, January 1984, pp 14, 177; "Employment and Training Report of the President," Wash., 1982, pp 178, 227.
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22. S. Levitan, G. Mangum and R. Marshall, "Human Resources and Labor Markets. Employment and Training in the American Economy," N.Y., 1981, p 90.

23. "High Technology: Public Policies for the 1980's. A National Journal Issues Book," Wash., 1983, p 28.
24. MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, November 1983, p 38.
25. "Job Forecasting," p 71.
26. S. Levitan et al, Op. cit., p 173.
27. "America's Economy: Problems and Prospects. Editorial Research Reports," Wash., 1983, p 11.
28. MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, November 1983, p 54.
29. "High Technology: Public Policies for the 1980's," p 23.
30. Ibid., p 84.
31. "Advances in Automation Prompt Concern Over Increased U.S. Unemployment," Wash., 25 May 1982, p 13.
32. "Technology and Employment. Joint Hearings," Wash., 1983, p 828.
33. "High Technology: Public Policies for the 1980's," p 85.
34. "People and Productivity. A Challenge to Corporate America. A Study from the New York Stock Exchange," N.Y., 1982, p 11.
35. THE FUTURIST, June 1983, pp 16, 22.
36. "High Technology: Public Policies for the 1980's," p 28.
37. "People and Productivity," p 25.

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26TH CANADIAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS REVIEWED

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[Article by V. P. Svetlanov: "The Communists of Canada in the Struggle for Peace and Labor Interests"]

[Text] The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) was held in the country's largest industrial and financial center, Toronto, from 5 to 8 April 1985. It was held under the slogan "Building a Canadian Party of Peace and Socialism" and was distinguished by great political enthusiasm and unanimity. Items on the agenda were discussed in a businesslike, specific and discerning manner due to the extensive pre-congress discussions of the draft main political resolution, "The Road Ahead," and its detailed elucidation in the party press and in a special bulletin.

The forum of the Canadian Communists was held at a time of international difficulties. In our day the question of war and peace has become the main problem facing mankind. "The world must make a choice," said CPC Secretary General W. Kashtan, "between the road of confrontation and aggression, leading to war, which has been chosen by the aggressive forces of American imperialism and their NATO allies in an effort to turn back the hands of time, and the road of peaceful coexistence, international detente and disarmament on the basis of equality and equivalent security, which is the choice of the Soviet Union, the socialist community of states, communist and workers parties and the forward detachments of the peace movement."

The international atmosphere is still dangerous, and as congress delegates pointed out, the U.S. administration and the leadership of the NATO bloc are completely to blame for this. The policy of American imperialism is still based on the idea of achieving military superiority to the socialist countries, and it is precisely the United States that is escalating the arms race. Washington is not content with the accumulation of nuclear forces and the creation of more and more new weapons of mass destruction and is now striving to militarize outer space. It has embarked on the path of flagrant interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states and overt armed aggression. Pursuing a policy of confrontation, Ronald Reagan announced a "crusade" against socialism. The deployment of American missiles in Western Europe, which became the direct personification of the nuclear first-strike strategy, coincided,

speakers noted during the discussion of the resolution on the 40th anniversary of the victory over fascism, with the revival of revanchist feelings in the West and with increasing attacks on territorial-political realities in Europe. This poses a new threat to peace.

The domestic political situation in Canada has also changed considerably since the time of the previous congress. The Progressive Conservative Party, representing the interests of financial capital, won an overwhelming majority in the federal parliament (211 of 282 seats) in the September 1984 elections. The new Conservative government, headed by B. Mulroney, made a rightward shift in policy. This took the specific forms of attacks on the socioeconomic gains of the working people, the limitation of government economic regulation, stronger support for big business, a departure from the Canadization of the economy and an emphasis on closer commercial and economic integration with the United States.

In international affairs, the Canadian Government took an abrupt turn toward Washington. In spite of the campaign promises to play a "more active role in nuclear disarmament," the Conservatives are increasing the Canadian military budget and Canada's contribution to NATO, giving the foreign policy of the American administration stronger support and working toward a closer military-political alliance with the United States. At the beginning of 1985, for example, a new series of tests of American air-based cruise missiles under conditions approximating combat was authorized. The tests are being conducted over the Canadian north and the province of Alberta, where natural-climatic and geographic conditions are similar to those in the northern European regions of the USSR. The Pentagon submitted a request to the Canadian Defense Ministry regarding tests of six new types of weapons in addition to the cruise missiles. The Conservative government's plans envisage an annual increase of 6 percent in military expenditures instead of the 3 percent stipulated by the NATO Council in 1978. The Canadian military contingent located in West Germany as part of the North Atlantic bloc's armed forces is to be increased by 1,200 men.

Some Conservative leaders have unequivocally supported Reagan's "star wars" program, taking cover behind references to its supposedly investigative nature. Washington has responded by promising to grant Canadian companies contracts worth millions of dollars. The United States used the same lure to involve Canada in the modernization of the NORAD early-warning system. According to the leader of the New Democratic Party, E. Broadbent, it will pave the way for Reagan's program of preparations for "star wars."

In this way, congress speakers stressed, Canada is turning into the "advance frontier" and nuclear missile testing-ground of the United States, and its policy is being attached to Pentagon military-strategic plans.

This domestic and foreign policy line is being vehemently rejected by Canadian working people and other population strata, including monopolist bourgeois circles favoring the policy of international detente. The defeat suffered by the Progressive Conservative Party in the provincial elections in May 1985 in Ontario, the province with the largest population and greatest

industrial potential, was quite indicative in this respect. As a result, the Liberals took power in Ontario with the support of the New Democratic Party.

Proceeding from the current domestic political and international situation, the congress of Canadian Communists focused attention on three main areas of party work:

the struggle to prevent nuclear war and to oppose the American administration's aggressive policy line and the Canadian Government's involvement in it; the expansion and stimulation of the peace movement in Canada;

the protection of the socioeconomic interests of working people under the conditions of a Conservative government and an onslaught by monopolies;

party organizational and ideological activity; party work in mass public organizations.

Assigning priority to the struggle for peace, the congress drew up a detailed program of communist participation in the peace movement, which is constantly growing in Canada.

An unprecedented increase in public antiwar feelings and the growth of the peace movement were witnessed between 1981 and 1984, particularly after the Trudeau government consented to the testing of American cruise missiles in Canada. More and more Canadians, representing the most diverse social strata, are realizing that the country's future is connected not with unconditional support of Washington's policy, but with an independent and peaceful policy meeting Canada's national interests and aimed at the consolidation of world peace.

The largest undertaking of antiwar organizations in 1984 was the "Peace Caravan" campaign, during which 430,000 signatures were collected in support of the slogans: "Stop the testing of American cruise missiles in Canada!," "Use military budget funds for the satisfaction of the population's social needs!" and "Turn Canada into a nuclear-free zone!" One important area of communist work is help in the unification of the many antiwar organizations and groups (there are more than a thousand of them) in a Canada-wide antiwar coalition around the demand for an independent Canadian foreign policy. The idea of creating this coalition came into being during the "Peace Caravan" campaign. Communists believe that this coalition should become a permanent national center of antiwar activity, a center for the planning and coordination of undertakings by antiwar organizations on the national scale. The creation of a Canada-wide peace coalition, congress speakers said, would represent a new stage in the development of the Canadian peace movement.

Canadian Communists attach great importance to the further involvement of trade unions in the struggle for peace. "The peace movement could be even more effective," the main political resolution of the congress says, "if the union movement and the working class could play the decisive and central role in it.... The struggle for peace and the struggle for jobs are one and the same." The slogan "Defending peace is everyone's business," put forth by the

Canadian Peace Congress, is becoming a truly nationwide demand. Realistic politicians from various political parties believe that the antiwar feelings of the general Canadian public can no longer be ignored.

In the ideological sphere, the Communists are concentrating on debunking the Western thesis of the "equal responsibility of the two superpowers for the arms race" and on elucidating the peaceful policy of the USSR. The absence of a clear understanding of the source of military danger, many congress delegates stressed, confuses participants in the peace movement and weakens the struggle. The knowledge of this source, on the other hand, provides answers to questions about the possibility of stopping the slide toward nuclear catastrophe and about the means of accomplishing this.

In contrast to imperialism's pursuit of an aggressive policy, congress speakers said, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have repeatedly displayed, in actions rather than in words, their intention to do everything within their power to prevent nuclear war. "The determination of the Soviet Union and the socialist community to maintain the approximate military-strategic balance with the United States and NATO not only enhances the security of the socialist countries but also reduces the danger of nuclear war. In the interests of peace and humanity, this balance must be maintained and the work of mutual arms reduction must be continued, to the point of their final and complete elimination," the resolution says.

Delegates enthusiastically approved the special resolution in support of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev's new major foreign policy initiatives, including the moratorium on the deployment of Soviet medium-range missiles (in the western regions of the USSR) and on other countermeasures. Delegates condemned the position of the U.S. administration: It rejected the Soviet initiatives without even taking the trouble to study them carefully, and thereby again demonstrated its obstructionist approach to the Geneva talks. The congress called upon all Communists to engage in broader explanatory work with the population, basing their discussions on the materials of the theoretical conference on "Imperialism Is the Source of Military Danger," held by the Communist Party in February 1985.

Canadians are particularly alarmed by the American program of preparations for "star wars." Statements by antiwar activists and the special congress resolution on this matter point out the grave danger of the "star wars" plans, their aggressive essence and the serious implications of Canada's participation in them. Canada's participation in the implementation of the "strategic defense initiative," a special congress resolution says, will involve it forever in the American strategy of the first nuclear strike.

Canadians do not want to take part in Reagan's "star wars," the delegates said. This is attested to by the disagreements within the Conservative cabinet over the American invitation to take part in the "star wars" plans and by the mounting opposition to the plans in the Liberal and New Democratic parties and in the labor, women's, youth and other democratic movements. It is the duty of the Communist Party, congress speakers noted, to support Canadian public pressure on the government to force it to dissociate itself from U.S. military

preparations, take effective steps to curb the arms race and normalize international affairs and conduct an independent foreign policy in the interests of peace.

The guarantee of this kind of policy, W. Kashtan stressed, will require the further expansion of the antiwar and antimissile movement and its transformation into a movement by the majority of the population. The congress proposed a sweeping campaign under the slogans "No to star wars!" and "No to Canada's participation in Reagan's plans for the militarization of outer space!" and resolved to publish a resolution exposing the truth about the "star wars" plans, in leaflet form, in 230,000 copies for distribution throughout the country.

The idea that present conditions will necessitate the united efforts of all peaceful forces, all nations and states, to stop the world from slipping into nuclear war, was clearly expressed at the congress. "The most urgent task will be the creation of a worldwide front of antiwar forces, of all those who realize that there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence," the main political resolution of the congress says. Delegates examined the connection between the struggle for a peaceful Canadian policy and the worldwide campaign for peace, for a nuclear freeze, for a pledge by all nuclear powers, following the USSR's example, not to use nuclear weapons first, for the prevention of the militarization of space and so forth.

Congress speakers mentioned the urgent need for the continued unification of the international communist movement and for concerted and coordinated actions by fraternal parties against the danger of war.

Along with questions of war and peace and the prevention of nuclear war, the significance of the 40th anniversary of the victory over fascism was discussed at length. In a special resolution "To Turn the Year Marking the 40th Anniversary of the Defeat of Fascism into the Year of Victory Over Nuclear War" stressed that the victory over fascism was of historic significance. It paved the way for profound changes in the world, marked the beginning of the creation of the socialist community and the collapse of imperialism's colonial system, displayed the moral and political superiority of socialism and demonstrated the possibility and reality of cooperation by countries belonging to different socioeconomic systems. The delegates condemned the falsifiers of history who try to distort the causes of World War II and say nothing about the Soviet Union's decisive contribution to the victory, as well as the actions of certain circles in the FRG and other Western countries attempting to revise the Yalta and Potsdam agreements.

Delegates at the 26th CPC Congress thoroughly analyzed the current domestic political situation in Canada and examined the party's position on urgent domestic problems, particularly the need for the stronger resistance of monopolies organizing the attacks on the socioeconomic gains and democratic rights of the working public and the need to stimulate the struggle for the independent development of the country. "Which pattern of development should Canada choose--total submission to American imperialism or the pattern of independent development? This question will most probably become more critical within the

near future and will be the main political question." In connection with this, the congress confirmed the accuracy and pertinence of the strategic slogan adopted at the December (1983) CPC Central Committee Plenum: "Unite forces to stop American imperialism! For peace, jobs and the independence of Canada! Canada's interests come first!"

Canadian Communists have put forth a program representing an alternative to the government policy of commercial and economic integration with the United States. It envisages independent economic development on the basis of the nationalization of natural resources, financial institutions and branches of American companies, the expansion of the country's processing industry on a rich raw material base and the development of mutually beneficial commercial, technological and other relations with all countries, including socialist and developing states.

The CPC intends to intensify its purposeful criticism of Conservative policy. Emphasis will be placed on the demands that the government take specific measures to reduce mass unemployment and protect the public standard of living instead of seeking additional allocations to subsidize large corporations and banks and to finance military programs.

The most acute social problem is unemployment. There are over 1.5 million unemployed people in the country, representing over 11 percent of the entire labor force. Unemployment not only means humiliation and poverty but also threatens the labor movement and complicates the working public's struggle for its socioeconomic interests. This is precisely why the congress of Canadian Communists assigned priority to this acute problem. Communists feel that the solution lies in economic development through programs of economic growth and the establishment of government control over investment policy. Congress delegates demanded that the government assume the responsibility to create new jobs. A special resolution expressed complete support for the Canadian Labor Congress' decision to hold a "March for Jobs," to demand full employment. Delegates called upon Communists to take a more active part in the mobilization of the unemployed and the working public and in the organization of demonstrations, rallies and meetings for the exertion of stronger pressure on all levels of government.

The current problems and objectives of the union movement and the role of Communists in it were discussed at length. Noting the exacerbation of class conflicts, delegates focused attention on the need to stimulate the struggle against the policy of class cooperation and against attempts to force the "social contract" on the working public and to eliminate or restrict the rights of unions to call strikes and conduct collective bargaining. One speaker at the congress, worker J. McLennan, made special mention of the need for struggle for the unity of the working class and the union movement and for autonomous Canadian labor unions independent of the United States.

Delegates expressed genuine labor solidarity with the striking employees of the Eaton Company in Toronto by joining picketers during a break in congress proceedings. This strike, called for the right to form a union, raised an important issue for the entire labor movement. The victory proved that workers can be organized successfully and the encroachment of monopolies can be

resisted effectively even at a time of high unemployment. This struggle was also quite important because 80 percent of Eaton's employees are women. The strikers' victory was simultaneously a victory in the struggle for equal rights for women.

Congress speakers stressed that the maximal unity of the working class and democratic forces, concentrated public pressure on the government and the correct combination of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary struggle under the supervision of a progressive popular coalition will be needed to obtain government guarantees of full employment and a higher standard of living. "Communists must publicize the idea of creating a popular majority based on an antimonopolist program, which could pave the way for fundamental changes," a congress resolution says. Conditions for the creation of this kind of anti-monopolist coalition, speakers noted, are growing more favorable, although the process has not developed at the same speed in all provinces. The movements and organizations which could make up the coalition are still acting separately, placing their own specific objectives above the common interests of the struggle for peace and disarmament.

Delegates from the party organization of British Columbia discussed their experience in unifying the working public and other population strata for the defense of their socioeconomic interests and democratic rights. "Operation Solidarity" and the "Solidarity Coalition," public organizations founded in this province with the active participation of Communists and leftist social democrats, have become a vivid example of united struggle, with labor unions representing the main force.

Canadian Communists want to unite the union movement, various popular movements and national democratic forces in Quebec and other leftist and progressive organizations in a powerful antimonopolist coalition, with the working class playing the leading role. The Communist Party has asked the New Democratic Party, trade unions and other democratic public organizations to intensify the collective opposition to the Mulroney government's conservative pro-American policy line.

In the struggle for the urgent needs of the working class and the laboring public, the Communist Party of Canada is not losing its socialist perspective. Although socialism is not on the immediate agenda in Canada, as the main political resolution points out, laborers with leftist and socialist attitudes must be encouraged to consider the question of a socialist future. The road to socialism, the resolution says, lies through struggle for the genuine independence of Canada and the creation of a popular antimonopolist government.

Questions of party organization were discussed at length at the congress because the transformation of the CPC into a mass organization with a broad base of support among the laboring strata of the population is still a primary objective.

Certain positive changes took place in this area after the December (1983) CPC Central Committee Plenum. There has been a gradual rise in the number of party members and of subscribers to party publications. More young people and

women are joining the party. In particular, this is attested to by the fact that one out of every four congress delegates was under 30 (the average age of delegates was 44) and one out of every three was a woman.

Delegates noted the expansion of party contacts with mass public organizations and the more active party work in labor unions and on the municipal level. In particular, the election of Communists to executive positions in labor associations, sectorial trade unions and union locals is an acknowledgement of the more important role of Communists in the labor movement. "The party today...is establishing itself as the leading force of the Canadian Left and is constantly winning the activists of union and popular movements over to its side. The growing influence of the party, a result of its correct policy and consistent work, is in sharp contrast to the disorder and decline of ultra-leftists," a congress resolution says.

Although delegates noted certain positive changes in party organizational work, they also said that the growth of the party still does not correspond to the tasks it must perform or to its more extensive involvement in mass organizations and movements. In connection with this, the congress listed party construction as a primary objective.

In spite of the changes in the social composition of society under the influence of the technological revolution, the working class is still, congress speakers stressed, the leading revolutionary force. For this reason, the central aspect of party construction must consist of party work at industrial enterprises and the elevation of the class consciousness of the working class. Primary party organizations must become centers of political and mass work.

The CPC congress demonstrated the Canadian Communists' strong international solidarity with fraternal parties and peoples fighting for their national and social liberation.

The statements of all fraternal party delegations, messages of greetings to the congress and congress resolutions of solidarity with people fighting for their freedom and independence met with the general approval of the delegates. The message from the CPSU Central Committee said: "The CPSU commends the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist position of your party, the mutual trust and solidarity characteristic of relations between the CPSU and CPC for more than six decades, and your active defense of the international authority of the communist and workers movement. Soviet communists attach great importance to your party's contribution to the development of friendship and cooperation between the populations of our countries."

Delegates commended the achievements of developed socialism in the USSR and the successes of other countries of the socialist community. They stressed that their strength, unity, economic cooperation, coordinated action and consolidation of positions in the world arena are constantly being augmented, in spite of American imperialism's attempts to weaken them by means of an arms race, economic sanctions, boycotts and the export of counterrevolution, as in the case of Poland.

The congress resolved to intensify ideological work, give it a more militant nature and expose anti-Sovietism and anticommunism at every opportunity. "The people of the world can rely on the socialist community, which is working with them toward a fair and lasting peace and toward national and social liberation. It is precisely for this reason that the struggle for peace must include the elucidation of real socialism by all progressive forces and constant objections to anti-Sovietism and anticommunism."

Delegates listened with great interest to the speech by a representative of the Nicaraguan Sandinista National Liberation Front, who described American imperialism's subversive activities against his country and discussed the mounting threat of overt American invasion and the efforts of the Nicaraguan Government to raise the public standard of living and secure socioeconomic and democratic rights. The congress called upon the democratic public of Canada to launch a campaign under the slogan "Hands off Nicaragua!" and assist the Nicaraguans, who are building a new democratic society.

Summing up the results of the congress, Secretary General W. Kashtan noted that, in spite of the difficult conditions of Canadian communist activity and the concentrated anticommunist and anti-Soviet propaganda, there are objective possibilities for the growth of the party and its influence. The tasks stipulated at the congress direct Canadian Communists to attain these goals. The results of the congress inspire strong confidence in the accuracy of the party's chosen policy line and impart new energy for the impending political struggle.

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THE U.S. AND EVENTS IN SUDAN

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 85 (signed to press 13 Aug 85) pp 74-79

[Article by A. V. Frolov]

[Text] The events in Sudan in April, which led to the overthrow of President Nimeiri, a friend and ally of the United States, seemed unexpected at first. While Nimeiri was in Washington asking Reagan for new sops, a bloodless coup took place: Minister of Defense Suwar el Dahab announced the removal of all ministers, dissolved the ruling party, the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) and National People's Assembly and declared a state of emergency.

To some degree, however, these events were predictable, as the Nimeiri regime had turned the country over to the absolute control of international imperialism, especially its American segment, contrary to the interests of the people of Sudan, and led the economy into an impasse. The fall of the regime was also accelerated by the unresolved ethnic problems which started a civil war in the country's south (Christian negro rebel forces numbered 15,000), and by the severe drought in a territory populated by around 5 million people.

Sudan's role in U.S. military-strategic plans grew much more important in the last 10 or 15 years. Before the 1970's the United States paid almost no attention to Sudan, which was somewhat removed from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Furthermore, this country did not have any oil or any other valuable natural resources. When G. Nimeiri took power in 1969, he originally pursued an anti-Zionist, anti-imperialist policy and established close relations with Egypt, Syria and Libya, as well as with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. At this time the Arab struggle to neutralize the effects of the 1967 Israeli aggression was headed by Egyptian President G. Nasir, whose aims Nimeiri appeared to support.

Under the pressure of rightwing forces within the country and beyond its boundaries, however, Nimeiri was already keeping representatives of progressive forces out of the government before 1970. This policy was openly pursued after the abortive coup in 1971. Communists were the main target. The Sudan Communist Party was banned, and its secretary general, A. Mahgoub, was arrested and sentenced to death. President Nimeiri himself gradually turned into a dictator. In place of the public democratic organizations banned in 1971, he founded the

amorphous Sudan Socialist Union (the only party in the country), which was controlled almost totally by him alone. After striking a blow at communists in his own country, Nimeiri viciously attacked the USSR and decided to curtail Soviet-Sudanese cooperation. At the same time, he offered Western capital certain privileges and began to conduct something like an "open-door policy."

Diplomatic relations with the United States, which had been broken off by Sudan in 1967 to protest Washington's support of Israeli aggression, were restored in July 1972. The United States allocated 32 million dollars in economic aid to Khartoum, and in April 1973 it signed an agreement on military aid to Sudan. This program was not carried out, however, as a result of the United States' openly anti-Arab stand during the Arab-Israeli war of 1973.

At the end of 1974 a victory was won by the antifeudal popular-democratic revolution in Ethiopia, where the United States lost an important ally, Emperor Haile Selassie. At this time, the leaders of Libya, Sudan's neighbor, established closer ties with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and this did not please Washington. All of this heightened the United States' interest in Sudan and motivated it to use the Nimeiri regime for the escalation of tension on the border with neighboring countries.

Nimeiri responded by playing a more active role in the defense of Western interests in the Middle East and Africa. Above all, this took the form of Khartoum's alliance with Arab reactionary forces.

In view of Nimeiri's active pro-Western policy, President Carter favored an increase in arms shipments to Sudan in 1977. The military transport planes of the Lockheed firm began arriving in Sudan that same year. Military cooperation with the United States was not, however, developing as quickly as the officials in Khartoum wanted it to. In September 1978 Nimeiri made an official visit to the United States, as a result of which Washington decided to sell Sudan 12 F-5 fighters, 100 M-113 armored personnel carriers, 50 M-60 tanks and other military equipment.

The United States grew even more interested in Sudan after the American leadership decided to create the "rapid deployment force" (RDF). Decisions were made on the composition and weapons of the force in the beginning of 1980. Access to military installations in the projected zone of RDF activity became a matter of great importance to the American leadership. Sadat, who was then the president of Egypt, served Washington well in this area, and Nimeiri followed his example. The United States wanted to use three bases in Sudan--Suakin (on the Red Sea coast), Dongola (north of Khartoum) and El-Fashir (on the border with Chad).

When the Reagan Administration entered the White House, it instituted more active military cooperation with all pro-Western regimes in the Middle East, including Sudan, which was second only to Egypt among recipients of American military and economic assistance in Africa. When Reagan and his advisers developed the cooperation with Sudan, they were working toward the following goals.

First of all, they wanted to maintain Sudan's solidarity with Egypt to secure at least the semblance of support for the Camp David accords (the separate Egyptian-Israeli "peace treaty") in the Arab world.

Secondly, they wanted to make Sudan a counterweight to anti-imperialist regimes in the region, especially Libya. Nimeiri had repeatedly accused Libya of attempts to overthrow him and invade Sudan, and Washington instantly responded to each of his complaints about Libyan threats by sending a carrier task force of the Sixth Fleet to the Libyan coast and squadrons of fighter planes and AWACS planes to Egypt and Sudan.

Thirdly, they wanted to use Sudan's territory for RDF exercises. The first exercises of this kind, which were called "Bright Star" and in which American Rangers took part, were held at the end of 1981. Later, joint American-Sudanese naval maneuvers were held near Port Sudan in June 1982 and were personally observed by the Sudanese president from the deck of the American destroyer "Spruance." In summer 1983 the next RDF maneuvers, "Bright Star-83," were held in Sudan with the participation of American fighter planes. Sudanese troops also took part in the exercises, using equipment recently purchased from the United States. As for military bases on Sudanese territory, Washington was not in any hurry to remodel them because they were apparently regarded as auxiliary installations in comparison to the bases in Egypt, Somalia, Oman and Diego Garcia.

Fourthly, they wanted Sudan to form a bloc of conservative Middle Eastern forces, which was supposed to include, according to the plans of the American administration, Israel, Saudi Arabia and some other states in addition to Sudan. These plans were not implemented, but they were not forgotten by the Washington administration either. When it was unable to bring about the convergence of conservative Arab regimes with Israel, it changed its tactics and began to secretly encourage the unification of pro-Western Arab regimes by directing their activities into militarist channels. This was also reflected in the U.S. approach to the treaty Sudan and Egypt signed in October 1982 on political, economic and military integration. By supplying Egypt with Hawkeye radar detection and guidance planes, the Americans hoped to create a centralized air defense system in this country, which should also cover Sudanese territory (something like a "mini-NORAD" for Sudan and Egypt).

Fifthly, they wanted to promote the development of private enterprise in Sudan, which should, in Washington's opinion, strengthen Khartoum's pro-Western orientation. In terms of quantity, American allocations to Sudan have been sizeable (see table).

But the loans and grants have usually been used to purchase American goods and have not expanded production or aided in the resolution of urgent problems in Sudan's economic development. Around a third of the total was used to buy American foodstuffs.

The plans to turn Sudan into the granary of the Arab world with the aid of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf countries and to establish joint Sudanese-Egyptian industrial enterprises did not have the anticipated impact. The plan to turn Sudan into a major oil exporter with U.S. assistance also failed. All

of this exacerbated domestic political problems in the country. The widely publicized American economic assistance was not a panacea for the Sudanese economy.

American Assistance to Sudan (millions of dollars)

<u>Years</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Economic</u>
1973	15.3	--	15.3
1977	6.5	0.1	6.4
1978	20.1	0.2	19.9
1979	42.8	5.3	37.5
1980	122.0	25.4	96.6
1981	134.7	30.7	104.0
1982	206.8	101.3	105.5
1983	224.3	101.6	122.7
1984	238.0	101.6	136.4
1985*	261.0	70.7	...
1986	253.0		

* Estimate.

"U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants," Wash., 1974, 1977, 1980, 1981; MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST, 8 February 1985.

The situation in Sudan remained tense throughout the first half of the 1980's. In July 1981 a conflict broke out between the government and the trade unions. The leaflets of the "Officers of the People's Armed Forces for the Salvation of the Motherland," an underground organization, condemning the regime's ties with Sadat's Egypt and calling on progressive forces to fight a more intense struggle against the undemocratic leadership, were distributed in the cities. This was followed by the arrests of more than 150 prominent politicians and public spokesmen. A state of emergency was declared in September and a new wave of repression swept through Sudan.

It is indicative that in neighboring Egypt, Sadat began persecuting progressive forces at approximately the same time after leading his country into a blind alley. Washington reacted to the unrest in Sudan by sending a special group of American advisers to the country. They took control of the country's security agencies and drew up plans for the establishment of a private guard for Nimeiri.

The situation continued to deteriorate, however. The largest country in Africa was still one of the poorest on the continent. Sudan's foreign debt in the beginning of the 1980's exceeded its national income, which was just slightly over 300 dollars a year per capita. Acceding to the pressure of the IBRD, the IMF and other organizations of big capital, Nimeiri accepted their terms regarding an "austerity" program. The prices of food and vital necessities crept upward. The reaction to this took the form of more frequent strikes and demonstrations against the government, which were often of an anti-American nature. The crowing touch was a clash between government troops and

rebel forces headed by former Colonel of the Sudanese Army G. Harang in southern Sudan. "Nimeiri," the journal JEUNE AFRIQUE reported in July 1982, "has become the sole target of the criticism of all the discontented."

When the Sudanese president encountered all of these difficult foreign and domestic problems, he resorted to a rapprochement with clerical circles, began implementing the laws of the Shariat (for example, chopping off the hands of thieves) and chose religious "fundamentalists" from the Sufi sect to serve as his closest advisers.

Nimeiri's actions worried the United States. "Relations with Nimeiri," the WASHINGTON POST commented on 9 June 1984, "have become delicate and require a cautious approach, so that he does not take an extreme position." In fact, now that Nimeiri had lost his footing and had virtually no one on whom he could rely within the country, he instituted the laws of the Shariat in the hope of gaining the support of the religious opposition, including the Muslim Brotherhood.

Although officials in Washington knew what rising prices could mean in Sudan, they did not modify the demands for the stricter regulation of the Sudanese economy. In March 1985, angry demonstrations, sometimes of an obviously anti-imperialist nature, followed the cancellation of state food subsidies, which increased prices dramatically, particularly the price of bread. People were killed and wounded in skirmishes with the police. Nimeiri took repressive actions against everyone, even the Muslim Brotherhood, the group he had tried to please by instituting the laws of the Shariat. More than 100 members of this organization were arrested. When he left the country for his final visit to Washington, he still hoped to obtain some kind of financial concessions. But it was too late. The government in Khartoum was taken over by the military.

The following facts about the coup in Sudan and Washington's reaction to it cannot be ignored. It is no secret that the Pentagon relied on the support of the Sudanese military elite for a long time. The CIA maintained close contacts with the Sudanese security service. Almost immediately after the coup, the United States announced the continuation of military and economic assistance to Sudan, to keep it from leaving the Western camp. "The coup will not have a major effect on Washington's close ties with Khartoum," said L. Speakes, White House press secretary.

The new leadership in Sudan cautiously advocated the development of relations with the United States, avoiding any discussion of the ticklish question of the American use of military bases.

In connection with this, some Western newspapers suggested that Nimeiri had done everything he could for the United States (the last service he performed for Washington was the transport of Ethiopian Falasha Jews from Ethiopia to Israel through Sudan, for which he received a large bribe) and had outlived his value as a political protege. It was for this reason that the United States began to turn away from Nimeiri, who was now too odious. Under the conditions of the universal dissatisfaction with the regime within the country, the overthrow of Nimeiri and the assumption of power by the military

became the only way of preventing more serious upheavals (particularly the assumption of power by leftist forces).

A transitional government headed by a civilian, Chairman of the Physicians Union and leader of the Union of National Forces for the Salvation of Sudan El Gizouli Dafalla, was formed in Sudan at the end of April 1985. The government has concentrated on economic problems, on participation in the non-aligned movement and on the development of relations with all states, including the USSR and other socialist countries, Libya and Ethiopia. Difficult problems face the new leadership. Washington will probably exert pressure on it to keep Sudan within its orbit. But it is also significant that progressive forces in the country, including the Union of National Forces for the Salvation of Sudan, have been granted certain liberties. They are demanding sweeping sociopolitical reforms, and there is no question that this will influence the policy of the Sudanese leadership.

Another ticklish matter for the new leaders is the question of what they should do about Nimeiri, who is now in Egypt. The Sudanese public is demanding his extradition so that he can be put on trial and forced to return all of the wealth he amassed.

At the end of May, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs C. Crocker visited Khartoum to sound out the new government's position. Washington announced that it would not ask Sudan to participate in the "Bright Star-85" maneuvers because it was aware of the Sudanese leadership's current difficulties. The new defense minister, M. Abdalla, responded by advocating the diversification of arms suppliers. The future of Sudan and of its relations with the United States will apparently be decided after a permanent civilian government has been formed. The military leaders have promised that this kind of government will be formed in 1986.

The events in Sudan were the subject of numerous commentaries in the United States because they revealed the defects of the policy the United States is pursuing in relations with many developing states by striving to include them in its own orbit. An indicative statement was made by International Development Agency staffer R. Feinberg in an article in the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR: "As for Sudan, the treatment killed the patient. What happened to Nimeiri could be a preview of what could happen in other countries."

In its relations with Nimeiri (just as in its earlier relations with Sadat), the United States encountered a contradiction of its own creation: The more it urges a regime to conduct a policy approved by Washington, the more the regime is isolated within the country and the region and the more its international prestige suffers. The result is always the same: another lost wager for the United States.

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U.S. CONGRESSIONAL REPORT ON BINARY WEAPONS REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 85 (signed to press 13 Aug 85) pp 99-101

[Review by Yu. A. Shvedkov of report "Binary Weapons: Implications of the U.S. Chemical Stockpile Modernization Program for Chemical Weapon Proliferation. Report Prepared for the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, by the Congressional Research Service," Library of Congress, Wash., Government Printing Office, 1984, 94 pages: "The Dangers of U.S. Chemical Rearmament"]

[Text] The issue of the use of the latest binary chemical weapons (they consist of two relatively non-toxic components which combine to make up a lethal substance when they are used in combat) by the United States is now the subject of a heated battle between the administration and Congress. The fact is that when the United States temporarily stopped the production of single-component chemical weapons in 1969 due to overstocking and to the serious hazards connected with their transport and storage, it did not stop all preparations for chemical warfare. On the contrary, in the 1970's all branches of the American Armed Forces were already training their units for combat operations involving chemical weapons and simultaneously perfecting the binary weapons. At the beginning of February 1982 the Reagan Administration announced a new program for the production of these weapons, the further training of personnel and the continuation of research projects for the development of even more lethal poisons. The Pentagon hoped to obtain around 10 billion dollars to finance this program.

The American military establishment's plans, however, encountered serious opposition in Congress. Despite the assurances of the President and other high-level members of the administration, who alleged that the production of binary weapons was "needed for U.S. national security," the Congress, after lengthy debates, allocated a specific sum only for the construction of a new plant in Pine Bluff (Arkansas) for the production of these weapons, but refused to finance their future production on the grounds that stockpiles were already sufficient for protracted chemical warfare, and that the replacement of older weapons with the new binary ones could lead to the proliferation of chemical weapons throughout the world. When a vote was taken in the House of Representatives on 31 May 1984, 298 legislators voted against the modernization of

chemical stockpiles and only 98 voted for it. It was to study these arguments that the Congressional Research Service compiled this report.

The White House responded by taking countermeasures soon afterward: In the draft budget for 1986, the administration again demanded appropriations for binary weapon production. Besides this, a special commission on chemical weapons was created at the beginning of February 1985. It was clear that the commission was supposed to agree with the need for the immediate modernization of American chemical stockpiles and thereby encourage legislative support for this undertaking. In light of the administration's maneuver, the basic premises and conclusions of the Congressional Research Service are especially pertinent.

In a discussion of the technical possibilities of chemical proliferation, the authors of the report are primarily concerned with the toxic characteristics of these weapons. They stress that binary weapons are simply one variety of the highly toxic nerve gas developed in the 1950's and stockpiled in large quantities by the American Army. They note that the lethal dose for one person of "GB" gas is 1 milligram and that of "X" gas is 0.4 milligram. These chemicals are particularly dangerous because they are colorless and odorless.

The authors admit that chemical weapon production does not require complex enterprises or special safety equipment. But it is precisely this, they stress, that could make chemical weapons appealing to countries which do not possess them now, "especially some Third World countries." The technology for the production of complex organic chemicals, the authors write, "was disseminated in connection with the development of the chemical industry in all countries and the urgent need for fertilizers and insecticides in Third World countries."

The fact that the United States is producing chemical weapons is discussed at length in the report (p 28). The language of the report is restrained, but its conclusions reflect the anxiety of the authors and even some indignation. "In summation," they write, "it can be said that the projected binary weapon program could be interpreted as a sign that the U.S. military leadership has re-evaluated chemical weapons: Today these weapons are of greater military value than they were 14 years ago, when their production was halted" (p 29). The report unequivocally states that "the threat of chemical proliferation is real. Many prerequisites for this already exist" (p 30).

The authors pay special attention to the possibility of the use of chemical weapons by terrorist groups. They recall that such groups have already threatened to poison local reservoirs or commit acts of sabotage at chemical enterprises in the past. "Toxic industrial and agricultural chemicals are widely accessible, and the purchase of these substances is not a serious problem for terrorists" (p 40). Furthermore, the authors state, "from the terrorist's standpoint, binary weapons have certain technical advantages" (p 41). "In general," they conclude, "the chemical weapons which can be used by terrorists are more reliable and technically more accessible than biological or nuclear weapons" (p 46).

In the final sections of the report, the authors advise the international control of chemical weapons. This, they assert, could strengthen the 1925 Geneva protocol prohibiting the use of chemical weapons and prevent the spread of these weapons (p 54).

There is no question that the Congressional Research Service's conclusions warrant consideration. They point up the dangers inherent in the U.S. intention to launch a new program for the massive restocking of arsenals with the most dangerous chemical weapons and the training of the armed forces for their broad-scale use in Europe and in developing countries, where the Pentagon has already tried to use various poisonous substances. This is a reference to the chemical warfare in Southeast Asia. The authors do not mention that the victims of this war were not only inhabitants of Indochina, but also the American servicemen there and the soldiers from New Zealand, South Korea and other countries who fought on the United States' side in this war.

The authors also do not mention the fact that it took the United States 50 years to sign the Geneva protocol banning chemical weapons and that it made this signature conditional upon numerous stipulations weakening the impact of the ban. Of course, this was no coincidence. The United States has been actively developing and producing the most diverse chemical poisons for many decades, and the Reagan Administration's new program only confirms this general policy line.

Finally, although the authors of the report point out the danger of the use of chemical substances by terrorist groups, they do not say a word about the crime committed by two transnational corporations--an American one and a Japanese one. In 1981 they used a new defoliant (a chemical similar in composition and purpose to the ones used in the war in Indochina) in a large area in the Amazon River basin, which cost around 7,000 Indians their lives. And then there was the recent tragedy in Bhopal, when 2,500 inhabitants of the city died! Although the owners of the American corporation have made every effort to relieve themselves of the responsibility for this crime, the Indian press has published the findings of scientists, testifying that new toxic substances were being developed for the tropics at enterprises in Bhopal. Solid American chemical corporations, and not terrorists, were guilty of killing and crippling thousands of people.

In view of these facts, which are not mentioned in the report of the Congressional Research Service, it is obvious that the dangerous implications of the new U.S. program of chemical rearmament are even more sinister than they seem to its American critics, especially after a conference committee of both congressional houses and representatives of the Pentagon decided in July 1985 to give the "go-ahead" for the production of binary nerve gas weapons.

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U.S. BOOK ON LATIN AMERICA, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY REVIEWED

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[Review by A. P. Kireyev of book "Latin America and the U.S. National Interest: A Basis for U.S. Foreign Policy" by M. Hayes, Boulder and London, Westview Press, 1984, XV + 295 pages: "The Defense of Great-Power Ambitions"]

[Text] The authors of many recent U.S. publications have tried to prove that Washington's military efforts in various parts of the world allegedly serve the interests of the American people and are intended to defend their security. This monograph by M. Hayes, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffer who was once assistant director of the Johns Hopkins University Research Center for Latin American Studies, is no exception to this rule.

The author begins her study with the statement that the United States has traditionally wanted friendly relations with Latin American countries and has tried to keep them from being influenced by forces hostile to the United States, because "Latin America and the Caribbean are extremely important to the United States and will be even more important in the future" (p 4). Hayes singles out two main groups of U.S. "vital interests" in the region. The first consists of political interests, including problems of "national security." Economic interests make up the other group.

The development of U.S. political relations with Latin America, the author stresses, has certain distinctive features because their geographic proximity promoted the establishment of close contacts in various fields and the development of a system of regional cooperation. This system was created under U.S. leadership at the first international conference of American states in 1889.

Since that time, Hayes notes, regional cooperation has gone through several stages. During the first, which lasted until the 1920's, the United States was primarily interested in expanding economic relations with the Latin American states. The next stages, which ended during World War II, was distinguished, according to Hayes, by the total "harmony" of U.S. and Latin American interests.

In the postwar years, however, the considerable divergence of the goals and objectives of the United States and the Latin American states, as members of

the same international organization, became apparent. Whereas "national security" was the most vital U.S. issue during the "cold war" years, the countries of Latin America were demanding the reorganization of regional cooperation in line with the most pressing needs of their economies. Washington had to agree to several concessions and an increase in economic "aid," but only to "complaisant" regimes.

The main U.S. objective, in M. Hayes' opinion, is the consolidation of pro-American forces in Latin America and the reinforcement of the position of countries "not striving for revolutionary reforms in the region" (p 10).

The need to create a network of puppet regimes in the region, which could be used as policemen against countries infringing upon the United States' notorious "vital interests," is clearly suggested in the work, although in a round-about way. The author feels nostalgic about the irretrievably lost days when Washington could easily dictate its wishes to the Latin American countries and organize coups with no fear of condemnation by the world public.

Hayes admits that there is also another point of view in the United States: the view that the Latin American must be given some independence to choose patterns of socioeconomic development. But she herself feels that this point of view is unacceptable as a basis for American foreign policy, because then the United States will be unlikely to attain many "important" objectives. The nature of these can be judged just from her references to Guatemala and El Salvador as examples of countries where goals are being attained successfully with the aid of the United States.

Hayes divides Latin America into three subregions for a more detailed examination of U.S. military-political interests in the region: the countries of the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, the countries of the south and east coasts and the countries of the west coast.

The author calls the Caribbean states the "main object" of American political interests in the Western Hemisphere, because they represent the "most vulnerable" southern flank of the United States but are also particularly appealing in view of their rich natural resources and their convenient location near major shipping lanes. Mexico, in Hayes' opinion, should act as a buffer between the explosive Central American countries and the United States.

The location of relatively large states, such as Argentina and Brazil, in southern and eastern Latin America makes this region strategically important to the United States as well. The growing economic potential of Argentina and Brazil, the rapid development of their foreign economic relations, their growing military potential and their direct control over the most important shipping lanes around South America have all forced the United States to build a special relationship with these states. Hayes believes that the United States should strive for a common view on major international issues with Argentina and Brazil. Then it can rely on their support in the resolution of conflicts in various parts of the world (p 232).

The countries on the west coast of South America, on the other hand, are more isolated from international events, in the author's opinion, and relations with them present no great problems for the United States.

Hayes believes that the United States also has the right to impose its own model of economic development on the Latin American countries because it has "vital interests" in the economic sphere there as well. Hayes displays touching concern about the preservation of these interests. In particular, the fact that some Latin American states now have their own processing industry disturbs her greatly. The neocolonial idea of conserving a backward, archaic economy and of preventing any structural economic changes contrary to the interests of American TNC's can sometimes be discerned in the book.

In general, we must admit that an objective and impartial analysis of the problems and prospects of U.S. relations with Latin American countries cannot be expected from an author with extreme rightwing views. She does agree, however, that the world has changed radically in the last quarter of the 20th century. The United States has to take this into consideration and can no longer expect to exercise unlimited power and authority even "next door."

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REVIEW OF BOOK ON U.S. MILITARY POLICY, BUDGET

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[Review by V. P. Konobeyev of book "SShA: voyennaya politika i byudzheta" [U.S. Military Policy and Budget] by Yu. V. Katasonov, Moscow, Nauka, 1984, 192 pages: "Policy Reflected in the Military Budget"]

[Text] The thorough scientific study of the sources, substance and causes of the dramatic intensification of U.S. militarist preparations is an important condition of successful struggle to curb the arms race. This is the purpose of Yu. V. Katasonov's book. The author examines major military-political issues in relation to U.S. military budget dynamics. This is a new approach to the study of American militarism.

The author cogently shows that the Reagan Administration's abrupt intensification of military preparations in the early 1980's was no coincidence. "All U.S. administrations have contributed much to the preparation of political conditions for the reversal of Washington policy toward an intensive arms race and to the organization of the propaganda needed to mold public opinion" (p 5).

American imperialism counts on its military strength, using it not only to defend the capitalist system as a whole but also to secure its economic and political interests in the world. In the name of the global interests of monopolist capital, the author stresses, the U.S. leadership has begun working on massive long-range military programs and increasing allocations for their financing (p 9).

The reader will be quite interested in the analysis of specific indicators of the military budget and its dynamics. The author examines the distinctive features and structure of the budget and then cites numerous statistics to reveal the actual amounts of military spending. The author's research proved that "the real scales of the financial and economic base of American militarism are at least twice as great as those reflected in official U.S. budget statistics" (p 35). Yu. V. Katasonov presents an interesting analysis of the evolution of the military and military-budget policies of American administrations over the last 20 years and reveals their interconnection and their effects on the U.S. position in arms limitation and reduction talks.

The author describes the sources and substance of the present stage of the arms race, which was escalated by the Republican administration. According to its military-strategic concepts, the entire world is the object of U.S. military strategy and the USSR is the main adversary. "The Reagan Administration's policy reversal toward a more intense arms race," Yu. V. Katasonov says, "reflects the assumption of power by a group directly connected with the interests of the military-industrial complex and transnational corporations, especially oil companies" (p 97). The interests of these groups are served by the expanded production of weapons, both strategic nuclear and conventional, and the creation of the "rapid deployment force," intended to "defend" American capital's position abroad.

Reagan's policy worries the public in the United States and Western Europe. With a view to this and to financial and economic difficulties, Reagan supplemented his militarist rhetoric with statements about his "love of peace" and desire for "arms control" talks with the USSR. The buildup of U.S. military strength is continuing, however, accompanied by the growth of the Pentagon budget.

In connection with this, Yu. V. Katasonov's statement about the reduction of American militarism's potential in the late 1960's and early 1970's seems debatable (p 42). Obviously, this was a matter of temporary difficulties, and not of general potential. Events in the early 1980's proved that the American leadership is capable of resorting to a dramatic increase in military spending without considering the grave state of the economy and the colossal budget deficit, and will even resort to cuts in social programs.

Nevertheless, as the author correctly points out, the U.S. ability to build up military potential is not unlimited. In particular, the mounting antiwar demonstrations by various segments of the public and by renowned politicians and public spokesmen in all countries, including the United States, are a serious obstacle to Washington's dangerous plans. "The internal front," Yu. V. Katasonov writes, "could seriously limit militarism and its arms race policy" (p 158).

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BOOK ON U.S. DOMESTIC SITUATION, FOREIGN POLICY REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 85 (signed to press 13 Aug 85) pp 106-107

[Review by V. K. Parkhomenko of book "Amerika trevozhnykh let. Dokumentalnyye ocherki vnutrenney zhizni i vneshney politiki SShA v 70-80-ye gody" [America in the Alarming Years. Documented Essays on U.S. Domestic Affairs and Foreign Policy in the 1970's and 1980's] by Igor Pavlov, Moscow, Politizdat, 1984, 254 pages: "America in Our Day"]

[Text] Since the time of the "Founding Fathers," the American ruling elite has always said that the Government of the United States and the related way of life are unique and represent the culminating point of the mainstream of human development. The messianic mirages of Americanism's apologists were dispelled long ago by reality itself. This is the subject of this new book by Soviet expert on international affairs Igor Pavlov.

The symptoms and effects of the complete crisis the United States is suffering today are well known in general. They have been thoroughly analyzed several times in Soviet academic literature. They are unemployment, inflation, the chronic poverty of underprivileged strata, racial discrimination, the inferior status of women, the constantly rising crime rate, the corruption permeating all levels of government and the spiritual crisis. On the basis of the latest statistics and facts, Pavlov analyzes all of these problems of the "ailing" American society. The author correctly notes that even before Ronald Reagan entered the White House, the Carter Administration was forced by the failure of its domestic policy to resort to a time-honored tactic of U.S. ruling circles: the escalation of international tension and the stimulation of the militarist passions of the average American to compel him to close his eyes to problems in his own country.

The foreign policy line of the Reagan Administration is analyzed in great detail in the book. Pavlov describes the conservative-militarist forces in the government as "the vanguard of the political circles responsible for starting the fight against positive international tendencies back in the mid-1970's. The members of Reagan's group were united by the battles against detente, the improvement of Soviet-American relations, SALT II and progress in the sphere of disarmament and by the consistent struggle for a reversal toward confrontation in Washington policy" (pp 148-149). When the members of this

group were esconced in key position in Washington, they decided to restore the United States' earlier military superiority at any cost.

To substantiate the transfer to this policy line, conservative-militarist forces made use of the entire ideological arsenal of American hegemonism of the "cold war" era, especially the myth of the "Soviet military threat." Furthermore, the author stresses, the Reagan Administration went much further than the Democrats. It is ranting about the "general crisis in U.S. security." All world developments keeping Washington from achieving hegemony are now blamed on the "Soviet threat."

The Reagan Administration's primary concern after taking office was the intensification of military programs. The main purpose of all militarist preparations is, as U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger frankly admitted, "the achievement of superiority to the USSR in a nuclear war and its conclusion on convenient terms for the United States" (p 168).

The "anti-Soviet and antisocialist aims of Washington's line are far more obvious now than they were even in the 'cold war' era," I. Pavlov writes. The administration has resolved to eradicate one of the Soviet people's historic achievements--the approximate military balance between the USSR and the United States and between socialism and capitalism in general (p 171). This will shake the only reasonable foundation of relations between the socialist and capitalist systems--peaceful coexistence--and replace it with imperialist authoritarianism on the part of the United States. The use of commercial and economic pressure to influence the internal development of the USSR has also been suggested as a government aim.

Examining the changes in the American approach to disarmament during the Reagan presidency, Pavlov notes that this approach is now defined as negotiation from a position of strength.

The section dealing with the antiwar movement in the United States at the beginning of the 1980's is quite interesting. The author stresses that in spite of the outbursts of chauvinism and militarism, the majority of Americans did not believe in the possibility of "limited" nuclear war and opposed the Reagan Administration's military policy. The central political idea of the American antiwar movement was the nuclear freeze, which was supported by various segments of the American public, religious and social organizations, hundreds of cities, some state legislatures and, finally, the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The new public mood also left its distinct mark on the 1984 election campaign, when questions of war and peace were vigorously debated. This was an important factor motivating the re-elected President to resume the dialogue with the USSR on pertinent aspects of disarmament and begin the talks on nuclear and space weapons.

I. Pavlov's book is a noteworthy contribution to the scientific analysis of U.S. domestic and foreign policy in the last 10-15 years.

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JARUZELSKI'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER ON U.S.-POLISH RELATIONS

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[Report on lecture presented by Major Veslav Gurnitsky, Polish journalist and expert on international relations, in Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] Major V. Gurnitsky, renowned Polish journalist and expert on international relations, presently serving as the chief foreign policy adviser of First Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee and Chairman of the PPR Council of Ministers W. Jaruzelski, was a recent guest lecturer at the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. He presented an informative and brilliant lecture on Polish-American relations to institute researchers.

V. Gurnitsky distinguished between two periods in these relations. In the first (from 1945 to 1980), U.S. strategy in relations with Poland was invariably colored by the desire to undermine the political structure established by the popular government and to interfere in the construction of socialism. The tactics and instruments used in the 1950's and 1960's ranged from overt attempts to coordinate the actions of subversive elements and splinter groups of old bourgeois parties to more subtle and disguised forms. Gambling on objective difficulties in the construction of socialism in Poland, Washington shrewdly offered Poland certain "favours" and methodically and purposefully used credit and cultural exchange as a means of exerting forcible pressure. The United States made equally cynical use of the traditional bonds connecting the Polish and American people in the interests of psychological warfare against socialism. Imperialism's direct aim was the arousal and stimulation of dissatisfaction in Poland.

Washington's concentrated economic, political and moral-psychological pressure on Poland was the immediate prelude to the social crisis of 1980, V. Gurnitsky stressed. "Diplomatic" channels were also put to active use in its organization: The American embassy played an important role in coordinating the extremist elements who took control of "Solidarity"; it helped them plan an antigovernment coup.

The speaker discussed the indisputable failure of the U.S. plans to organize a lengthy blockade of People's Poland by the capitalist world and to turn

Poland into the "weak link" of the socialist community. The firm and principled policy of the Polish leadership has played a definite role in the gradual stabilization of national affairs and the elimination of economic difficulties. The Soviet Union, V. Gurnitsky said, has always been viewed by the Polish people as the most reliable guarantee of political stability in Europe, a stronghold against attempts to revise the intergovernmental "status quo" which took shape in Europe as a result of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements 40 years ago.

V. Gurnitsky stressed that the dramatic lessons of Polish-American relations are of value to the entire socialist community: Their assimilation can prevent the repetition of past mistakes and serve as a basis for future plans. The strategy of imperialism, no matter what form it takes, has always been spearheaded against the socialist countries and has tried to disunite them.

The institute's guest concluded his report with an analysis of political processes in the United States in recent years. The worst, crudest and most primitive elements of anti-Sovietism and anticommunism have been revived, V. Gurnitsky said, in the thinking of U.S. ruling circles. It is certainly no coincidence that they are repeating the old ideas about America's superiority to the rest of the world, including Europe, and about the U.S. mission to "bring liberty" to other nations. The psychological mood of certain elements of the American ruling elite can seriously complicate a realistic approach to international relations.

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