

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**CONSERVING ASSETS: AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM
FOR PEACE OPERATIONS**

BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEVEN P. BUCCI
United States Army**

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.**

19990527 013

USAWC CLASS OF 1999

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050



DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**Conserving Assets: An Alternative Paradigm For Peace
Operations**

by

Steven P. Bucci
U.S. Army Special Forces

COL Lynn Lanzoni
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Steven P. Bucci

TITLE: Conserving Assets: An Alternative Paradigm For Peace Operations

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 12 April 1999 PAGES: 39 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The U.S. is in a paradox. It has "won" the Cold War, and is the sole Super Power. While it has no peer competitors, as the sole Super Power it has greatly increased responsibilities. At the same time there has been an inverse effect on America's means to respond. This is the dilemma. How can the U.S. execute all its duties (ends), without exceeding its resources (means)?

Innovative methods (ways) must be found. This study will propose a new paradigm for responding to one of the most complex and contentious of those duties, Peace Operations. It will do this by looking at utility of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Peace Operations, then studying the African Crisis Response Initiative to seek intellectual underpinnings for a new approach. Next it looks specifically at Exercise Natural Fire '98 as model of a successful Peace Operation. Finally, it synthesizes the approach with the specifics to develop the paradigm. This paradigm will posit a *Regional Partner lead / SOF support* approach vice the traditional *U.S. lead / U.S. asset heavy* way of executing Peace Operations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
PREFACE	vii
Conserving Assets: An Alternative Paradigm FOR Peace Operations	1
Introduction	1
Organization	3
America's Role in the World	3
The Need for Change: The Utility of SOF	5
The African Crisis Response Initiative	10
Exercise Natural Fire 98 in Kenya	13
The New Paradigm	17
A Plan of Action - What Must be Done	21
Conclusion	23
ENDNOTES	25
BIBLIOGRAPHY	29

PREFACE

The U.S. must accept its responsibilities. To do this, her leaders must innovate and be willing to accept some risk. Only by looking to new paradigms in their responses to the challenges of the new post Cold War world will they be able to reach their desired ends with their decreased means. We as a nation must begin that process of innovation now.

CONSERVING ASSETS: AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM FOR PEACE

OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. is in the midst of a paradox. For all intents and purposes, it has "won" the Cold War. While the intention was never to become the sole Super Power, the U.S. has found itself in just such a position. The collapse of the Soviet block and the disappearance of all the threats to the life and liberty of the Western world that went with it was indeed a time of great rejoicing. The paradox has come in the aftermath of that joy. What do we do now? While we are no longer threatened by a mighty, nuclear armed, peer competitor, we are faced with a time of great challenge. Ambiguous threats now surround us, where the straightforward threat of Soviet Communism once looked us in the eye. Finally there is the responsibility we hold as the sole super power, to assist others in the world.¹ The Bible states that "to whomever much is given, much is required"² The concept of noblesse oblige holds true for nations as well as individuals. Hard core realists may decry this idea as mush headed sentimentalism, but the strong strain of idealism that has always run through modern U.S. foreign policy remains strong,³ and animates its policies today.

At the same time as we are facing up to additional responsibilities, we are operating in a time of increasing austerity. The U.S. Foreign Policy budget is being cut, as is the Foreign Policy structure. The military has been cut nearly in half, in a vain search for a "peace dividend." The Clinton Administration (and the Bush team before them) has embraced an activist foreign policy at the same time they have cut back

funding and manning on all fronts. At present, our resources (means), are at best static, and actually are dwindling. Concurrently, missions (ends), are expanding on a nearly daily basis. It is a dangerous error to let means drive the choice of ends, in a strategic context. It is just as dangerous, perhaps more so, to ignore the limiting factor that constrained means put on the options of which ends can possibly be achieved.

This study will look at a possible solution for dealing with one type of mission that cannot be put off or ignored, Peace Operations (PO). There is a great need to define a proper role for U.S. Forces in PO that matches means to desire ends. A way must be found to conserve our precious assets, specifically our conventional fighting forces, while still accomplishing the missions assigned by the National Command Authority. We cannot use an armored division in every PO that occurs, as we have done in Bosnia. The correctness of that decision is not the issue here, but simply that we do not have enough divisions to go around. Another way must be found.

A new paradigm will be posited here. The "model" used for PO has been a *U.S. lead / U.S. asset heavy* approach. It has worked, but very inefficiently, from the standpoint of number of U.S. forces (massive) and dollar cost (extraordinarily high) for each mission. Together, these factors have had a negative effect on readiness.⁴ The new paradigm will entail the use of Special Operations Forces (SOF). Specifically, the use of Army Special Forces (SF) augmented by Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) troops in an advisory role with a *Regional Partner lead / SOF support* approach.

ORGANIZATION

The structure that will be used to articulate this paradigm will be straightforward. First, it will briefly look at the role of the U.S. in the world, as the sole super power, and particularly the articulation of Humanitarian Interests in the National Security Strategy (NSS). These are the interests that will drive U.S. participation in PO even when there is no direct vital interests involved. Next, it will study the utility of using SOF in PO in contrast to using conventional forces. Examples of the lower cost of SOF will be given. The ongoing, real world example of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) will provide the intellectual underpinnings of this new way of approaching the problem. ACRI will provide the "attitude," or mindset for the paradigm. Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise Natural Fire '98 (NF98) will be examined as an archetype of a successful PO that utilized the paradigm. It will supply the "meat" to the bones and show how it can work. These two factors will combine to develop a typology that will build on the intellectual attitude of the ACRI, and the experience of NF98. A broad look at what must be done to execute the paradigm will follow, focusing on each element of national power in turn, proscribing a general program to support such an approach. The conclusion will reiterate the benefits of the paradigm, emphasizing the conservative potential, with regard to our forces, while still achieving the desired ends.

AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD

A National Security Strategy for A New Century is the apex of the American strategic pyramid. All other strategies, be they diplomatic, military, or economic, flow from this document. In it, President Clinton clearly states that "the U.S. is the

world's most powerful force for peace, prosperity, and ... democracy and freedom."⁵ He goes on at length discussing that our challenge and responsibility is to execute that role for the benefit of the American People and people around the world.⁶ This is not a totally altruistic position. By helping others, we normally help ourselves, at least by garnering good will. The President continues by recognizing that in some situations, the U.S. "is the only nation capable of providing the necessary leadership and capabilities for an international response to shared challenges."⁷ We do this for our own security reasons, to defend our interests, either directly, or in defense of key friends.

Today, we have additional reasons for getting involved in PO around the world. This administration has taken the unspoken Wilsonian trait of recognizing our obligation to those less fortunate, and fully codifying it in the NSS. This trait has been present in nearly all modern presidents, Carter being the most notable exemplar, and Nixon the most notable exception.⁸ They start by defining vital interests as "those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety, and vitality of the nation."⁹ Next, important national interests are defined as those that "do not effect our national survival, but do effect our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live."¹⁰ The Clinton document defines a third category. These are Humanitarian and Other Interests. These are less objectively defined and are characterized as actions we take "because our values demand it."¹¹ We do them when we may not get any "pay back." This third set of interests has opened the door for U.S. participation in numerous actions and situations that the realist would reject out of hand. Natural disasters,

violations of human rights, excessive human suffering of all kinds, can trigger an American response, either unilaterally, or in concert with others. It is this group of situations that will create numerous opportunities for PO, and the ones most needful of a new approach. In other portions of the NSS, the calls for promoting democracy and development, and for preemptively dealing with small scale contingencies, will all give rise to PO type scenarios that will need to be addressed.

How will the U.S. provide troops to all these crises? While the U.S. has no history of PO participation to rival the Canadians or the Nordic countries, it is now very much in demand. During the Cold War, it was a forgone conclusion that neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union would play such a role, to avoid Super Power friction. Today, the U.S. seems to be the one critical participant. There are few situations where the combatants cum comrades do not both demand that the U.S. provide at least some of the troops. This adds to the similar calls from other potential donor nations who feel that if the U.S. is not "playing," it is not a serious endeavor. It is surely a great honor to be thought of so highly, but it is a true two-edged sword. The President has acknowledged U.S. responsibility and commitment to participate in PO, while our allies and the target countries are essentially demanding it. What is the U.S. military going to do?

THE NEED FOR CHANGE: THE UTILITY OF SOF

As seen above, PO cannot be ignored. They will not go away and by all indicators, in a continually fragmenting world, the need for PO will increase.¹² A way must be found to execute these missions without exceeding available means. Beyond that,

we have a duty to the Nation to do so while still being able to fight the "big wars" when called upon. This means executing the PO in the most parsimonious manner possible, to husband those precious assets of both manpower and material. A balance must be struck between today's mission accomplishment, and tomorrow's mission readiness. Forfeiture of either is not an option.

Up to now, the model that has been used does not contribute positively to maintaining this balance. In most cases, the U.S. has utilized a method that will be referred to a *U.S. lead / U.S. asset heavy* approach. This is fairly self-explanatory. The U.S. forces are in charge, providing the bulk of the leadership, the motivation, and the initiative. They also provide a large percentage of the troops, most times on at least a one to one basis with the other participants. For the most part, the troops used are conventional force soldiers. This trend started at the end of the Cold War, when most senior officers were worried about maintaining the relevance of our conventional forces, and was later reinforced by force protection concerns. However, since the Gulf War, there is more than enough "employment" for our much reduced military, but the model remains the same. There are several examples of this problematic construct.

In 1995, the Engineer Brigade of the 3d Infantry Division executed two Peacekeeping exercises. The first was in the Ukraine, and the second was in Albania. The same structure and methods were used in both exercises.¹³ The troops to be trained formed a company sized element. The 3d ID sent one engineer company to execute the actual training (classes, situational training lanes, and a short field training exercise). The battalion commander and staff acted as exercise managers and

were situated directly on top of the company. They ran the briefings, provided support, and supervised all training activities. The Brigade Commander and his entire staff also came in country to act as a combined "white cell" (exercise control) and visitor control element. They co-located tactically with the Company and Battalion, added direct communications back to Germany, and added their supervision to that of the battalion commander and his staff. Discounting general officers who visited (5 in a 3-week period), the ratio of U.S. to Albanian participation was still, about 2.5 to 1.¹⁴

In the largest PO in which we are involved, Bosnia, the story is similar. Initially, the 1st Armored Division went in with two brigades, the Division staff, and substantial Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) units. This has been scaled back, with the rotation now consuming one brigade, the division staff, and less CS and CSS troops. Even with this decreased commitment, the mission eats up an entire division, with one-third each focused on preparing for, executing or recovering from "the Boz."¹⁵ The U.S. has only ten Army divisions total, and simply cannot afford to give up an entire division for every PO.

Another potential mission is Kosovo. There have already been calls for U.S. forces to help monitor any peace agreement. The plan initially proposed was to deploy conventional forces, using Bosnia as a model.¹⁶ The questions that come immediately to mind are "where do we find the forces?" and "what missions or tasks will go neglected to execute this one?"

The weight of this model is an almost unbearable burden. The cost in dollars and readiness is not sustainable in a resource constrained environment. In his Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Secretary of Defense Cohen has said as much.¹⁷ The more recent spectacle of the Joint Chiefs of Staff revealing to the Senate Armed Services Committee that the military is suffering in the areas of readiness, infrastructure and modernization due to the costs of ongoing operations and operations tempo was telling. PO in general and Bosnia in particular are a large part of the problem.

There will always be situations and locations where we need or desire large numbers of U.S. troops and U.S. control of the operation (Bosnia and the Sinai come to mind immediately), but we cannot do it that way everywhere. If we are to have enough troops to do PO with the present model in selected locals, and still maintain our war time readiness, we must find economies elsewhere. Perhaps the use of SOF (specifically SF with CA and PSYOP),¹⁸ traditionally a force multiplier, can provide one answer.

Use of SF is inherently less costly in dollars. In this era of shrinking resources, the costs associated with the use of SF are tantalizingly low. They are deployed in smaller numbers. Deployments of one to two individuals are not unusual, with 6-12 man operations being most common. Less people mean less per diem costs, less transportation costs, and less logistical support tail.

These smaller numbers do not mean that effectiveness is sacrificed. SF Soldiers are the Army's foremost trainers of

other nations. An operational detachment (doctrinally 12 men, generally today, 6-8 men) can effectively train an entire battalion of host nation troops, with little or no support outside what it brings organically. This training will comprehensively cover all tasks from those of the privates to those of the battalion commander. This is done on a regular basis around the world.¹⁹

The maturity and cultural awareness of most SF soldiers is such that cultural incidents between the teams and host nation soldiers and civilians do not normally occur. The teams fit in, do their jobs, eat and sleep with their counterparts, without the angst sometimes associated with younger groups of American military personnel. This is not to imply that there is always trouble when the conventional military interacts with foreign cultures and militaries; normally there is not. Nor does it mean SF soldiers never have such problems; they occasionally do. In general, SF soldiers do a better job of blending more effectively in non-U.S. situations because that is what they are trained to do.

It must also be recognized that SF are inherently war fighters, in the same sense as their conventional brothers. Their focus in training must be on their war fighting skills. The difference is that SF can train for war, and the skills developed have a direct application to PO in the advisory role. Additionally, the greater maturity and experience of SF allow a faster and more efficient transition from war fighter, to PO and back to war fighter, than most conventional units can execute.

SOF offers an option that must be examined. The lower physical costs and the lower signature combine to make SOF a

viable alternative to the use of conventional forces in a multinational situation. Is there any precedent for their use in PO scenarios? In fact there is a major, ongoing project under the control of U.S. European Command.

THE AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE

The best contemporary example of the use of SF (with CA and PSYOP) to achieve the type of economies needed is the ACRI. The ACRI is a Department of State (DOS) initiative that strives to "enhance the capacity of the African nations to respond to Humanitarian crises and peacekeeping challenges in a timely and efficient manner."²⁰ The bottom line is that Africa is fraught with instability and problems. The West is, at least reluctant, to provide the bulk of assets for dealing with these recurring problems. The answer is to help those African nations with the present and potential wherewithal to better develop a capacity to help their less capable brethren in Africa. In short, an African solution to an African problem. This is attractive to both the West, who does not want any more "headaches" and the Africans, who want to stand on their own. It is a direct response to the 1994 disaster in Rwanda.²¹

The philosophy of ACRI is a simple one. It is a partnership of the U.S. and African nations to build and improve African crisis response capability. It provides a unique opportunity to improve the technical and operational capabilities of selected African militaries to make them better prepared to conduct PO. ACRI is a training initiative that will create effective, rapidly deployable peacekeeping units that can work together with units of other nations. The U.S. has no desire or intention to create a standing, multinational,

"African Army." The program is designed to provide training in traditional peacekeeping tasks²² in order to develop that capability.

The U.S. recognized that several African nations have long-standing peacekeeping and humanitarian relief training programs. To leverage this experience and the interest in capacity enhancement that many nations had shown, the DOS developed a plan. As the lead agent for ACRI, DOS set the priorities and the evaluation criteria for participation. These included respect for civilian authority and human rights, as well as experience in PO.²³ The countries that met all these criteria and expressed an interest were Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, Tunisia, and Uganda. Teams were sent to each to evaluate their level of training, and all were deemed ready to receive the ACRI program of instruction (POI).²⁴

The training would be conducted by no more than 60 U.S. soldiers (45 SF and 15 CA / PSYOP / logistical). It would take 60 days to train each battalion size element. The POI incorporated aspects from the peacekeeping doctrine of the UN, NATO, the UK, and several Nordic nations. This doctrine is international and intended to promote effective interoperability anywhere in the world. The conclusion of the training is a field training exercise to evaluate the exact level of readiness of each unit. Follow up sustainment training will continue over a 2-3 year period. The final point is a critical one. The U.S. committed to send some of the SF soldiers that trained each unit with them whenever they deploy under the auspices of ACRI for PO.²⁵

To further enhance the African peacekeeping companies and battalions participating in the program, the U.S. provides an internationally approved equipment package. This non-lethal equipment, which is critical to peacekeeping and humanitarian-relief operations, includes tactical communications gear, long distance communications gear, water purification units, lighting and generators, mine detection equipment, and night vision goggles appropriate for use in roadblocks and peacekeeping actions. In order to ensure that individual participants have the necessary personal equipment, the program provides uniforms boots and load-bearing equipment. The African nation is responsible to ensure the equipment is used for only peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. All must sign end user and non transfer agreements to preclude misuse of the equipment.²⁶

The goal of the ACRI is to develop African units that can respond to local or regional crises without the deployment of U.S. forces beyond low numbers of professional SF advisors. ACRI has shown that it can work, as several of the participants have completed their training cycles. Even with the "give-a-ways" of equipment and medical supplies which accompany each training event, the cost is low. Each battalion sized iteration has a budget of \$1.2 million.²⁷ This pays for everything, is far less than any major conventional force deployment, and will in the long run put far less Americans into harm's way. It will free the conventional forces to train for war full time. The question now is "can this type of program work in a short fused contingency type of PO?" The experience of Exercise NF98 in Kenya will provide an answer.

EXERCISE NATURAL FIRE 98 IN KENYA

NF98 had its genesis in a bilateral exercise executed in Kenya in the summer of 1997, between USSOCENT and the Kenyan Department of Defense. Elements of a battalion of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), supported by CA and a contingent of the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), conducted the training. They trained a parachute infantry battalion, a light infantry company, and a troop of engineers for 3 weeks, and capped it with a small field training exercise. This involved an airfield seizure in a PO context. This idea, together with the "spirit" of ACRI that was afoot on the continent at the time gave birth to the Kenyan request to expand the annual bilateral exercise in 1998. Special Operations Command, Central (SOCCENT) eagerly agreed, and plans for NF98 began in earnest.²⁸ The Kenyans actively took the lead in the exercise scenario planning and took their role as host very seriously.

Kenya chose to invite Tanzania and Uganda as additional participants. This had several significant pluses and a few small minuses for the U.S. Both these nations are in US European Command's Area of Responsibility, not US Central Command's. This required that two unified commands had to be involved in all the planning as well as two different SF groups (the 5th and the 3d). This kind of cooperation had only really begun with ACRI so this was a superb run through. Uganda had completed its ACRI training so was a wonderful candidate for the exercise. Tanzania, which until recently had been oriented toward the Soviets and the Chinese, had been relatively cold toward the U.S. and had suspicions about relating to American SF. This chance to work with the Tanzanian Defense Force was a

golden opportunity to open other doors. Finally, it was a chance to do an ACRI-like event, and possibly interest Kenya, which has significant PO experience, in future ACRI participation.

The four nations mentioned all sent contingents. The U.S. provided SF operational detachments, a company headquarters, a strong staff element, a CA detachment (3 officers and 4 NCOs) and a small AFSOC detachment (3 MH-60s and 2 C-130s). The Kenyans had the largest group, with an Engineer company, a light armored squadron, a light infantry battalion, a parachute infantry company, and the framework for both a brigade level HQ to act as the Combined/Joint Task Force (CJTF), and a Combined Forces HQ at the 3-star level. An additional infantry battalion acted as role players and an air support package (4 Buffalo light transports and 2 Puma light Helos) rounded out the Kenyan side. The Ugandans sent an augmented light infantry company and representatives for the CJTF staff and some senior officers for the Combined Forces HQ. Tanzania provided a similar contingent but with an even more robust staff presence, with a Brigadier and several colonels to act as umpires.²⁹

The exercise was conducted in multiple locations. The U.S. SF HQ, acting as a Joint Special Operation Task Force (JSOTF) was co-located with the AFSOC assets and the Kenyan Air Force contingent at Liakipia AFB in central Kenya. The African ground units all moved to Moi Barracks, El Doret in southwestern Kenyan, together with their SF counterparts and CA trainers. Each Company sized element had a SF detachment matched with it for training and advisory assistance.³⁰

The troops were all mobilized based on a scenario written by the training division of the Kenyan DOD. In the notional country of "Sumonga," two warring factions, the Batise and the Gadoas had finally worn each other out. The Batise were the minority, but had the bulk of the wealth and power. The Gadoas, out numbered their countrymen, but were, for the most part, poor and politically weak. The East African Cooperation Organization (EAC) had brokered a peace agreement with the blessing of the UN and the OAU. The troops were being trained in anticipation of a directive to deploy into Sumonga under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, to monitor the peace accord.³¹

NF98 provided 3 weeks of training leading to the "multinational PO intervention." They utilized a generic plan that was on the shelf of the EAC, since all three African participants were members.³² The training consisted of tasks similar to those taught under the ACRI POI. The SF teams focused briefly on basic soldier skills and then went directly to PO execution tasks. The training was intense, the conditions Spartan, but in a very short time, a great rapport and welcome competence was built. A CJTF staff was established and it developed a plan for the PO in Sumonga. The training period ended with the plan approval by "Representative of the UN Secretary General," a real life Kenyan Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

At the conclusion of training, which included classes by the SF detachments, the CA detachment, the ICRC, and the UNHCR, the CJTF was alerted to deploy to Sumonga (actually the Turkana Province of Northwestern Kenya). The forces planned and executed a coordinated ground and air deployment, and then

fanned out over Sumonga's considerable area. This began a nearly 2-week period of dealing with various problems such as convoy security, check points, road blocks, refugee repatriation, negotiations with recalcitrant factions, cease fire violations, and many visits by high ranking political figures, both real and exercise. The SF troops deployed with the troops they had trained, providing advice and assistance. The American staff officers were equal partners in all CJTF staff sections. Only in the CJ5 (Civil Affairs) was the U.S. officer the primary staff member.³³

A one-word evaluation of NF98 was that it was superb. It was far more realistic than any PO exercise in which the author has been involved. NF98 was of a fairly large scale, but with relatively light U.S. involvement in numbers and cost. The Kenyans supported the African contingents, and the U.S. supported itself. Beyond the initial development of the general scenario, the Kenyans completely took the lead. This is the model for the future. Not only was it a military success, but it brought together for the first time ever the 3 Ministers of Defense, and the 3 Chiefs of Defense. The political leaders pointed out that NF98 was the first concrete step toward ensuring that in the event of "another Rwanda," the nations of the EAC would never have to stand by while the West dealt with an "African problem."³⁴ NF98 turned out to be effective, elegant, and efficient. U.S. Ambassador to Nairobi, Mrs. Prudence Bushnell, told the author that she was amazed at what had been done, and how effective the SOF soldiers were in working with the African force.³⁵ It was not the intent of the participants to define a new paradigm, but the African

initiative and fortuitous circumstance has done just that. A typology based on NF98 can be developed.

THE NEW PARADIGM

As shown in the previous sections, a *U.S. lead / U.S. asset heavy* approach, while effective, is costly and is not actually necessary for success. A new paradigm, one which is *Regional partner lead / SOF supported* is feasible and effective as well. This new typology, using the attitude of ACRI and the specifics of NF98 is a simple one that leverages economy of means (SF as a force multiplier), stimulates regional development (gets other players in the game), and portrays America as a team player, not a neo-imperialist power.

The attitude of ACRI can be summarized quickly. It is a DOS led, multi-agency effort that assists friendly states in developing their national and regional abilities to deal with their own problems. It does so without ideology, except for the view of civilian control of the military, and respect for human rights. The U.S. military contribution is primarily one of low cost, low impact SOF provided training with follow on sustainment, and, on employment, advice and assistance in the form of even fewer SF soldiers to work along their counterparts. The U.S. does not direct or dictate, but it guides and mentors, using UN approved tasks and methods.

The specific successes of NF98 were as much in who did what, as in what was done. The Kenyans (the Regional partner) were the lead. They ran the show, assisting their slightly less capable neighbors and providing the overall leadership. The U.S. contributed technical assistance, training and cooperation.

During the "employment" to Sumonga, the SF troops advised the African Commanders when they required it, and the U.S. staff component blended into the CJTF as part of the team. The U.S. commander still controlled his personnel, but it was transparent to all, and the U.S. contingent was as unobtrusive as it was effective. The end result was one of the best and most realistic PO exercises in recent memory.

The first and probably paramount factor in the new paradigm is that all exercises and operations need to be Regional Partner led. The U.S. can and should provide coaching, but without domination. This takes patience and experience in working with militaries of other nations. Every single step in the staff action process, mission planning, and senior to subordinate relations, all may be different than the way the U.S. does them. This is not a problem. It is not the job of the U.S. members to "change" the process, just to make sure it gets the job done, and our allies continue to learn and grow. Not all U.S. forces are equipped intellectually or professionally to do this without frustration leading to flare ups. SF is trained and equipped to do just this task. The regional Special Operations Commands (SOCs) must be encouraged to utilize this *regional partner lead* attitude in all their exercises. Without it, the paradigm will fail.

Multilateral configurations seem to be extremely effective in these operations. If SF troops are linked in training and execution with each regional military element, and in each staff section, the effectiveness can be enormous. The presence of several nations not only brings varied experience and assets to play, but it allows more nations who may be less capable today

to begin the process of developing themselves to the point that they can be regional leaders tomorrow.

On a more practical level, the U.S. staff representation must be appropriate for the specific staff to which they will be assigned. The personnel can be either SOF or other specialists. The use of HQ elements of the teams executing the training and deploying with the troops is probably the most effective and efficient method, but not the only one. Their rank and experience must be matched to fit in comfortably with their counterparts. The situations of too low a rank leading to lack of credibility, or too high a rank leading to U.S. dominance both must be avoided. Senior NCOs and Warrant Officers can and should be used, but a branch officer should always be the senior U.S. representative in a staff section to avoid any social problems with the regional officers.

Training must occur at all levels, including the staffs. The only down side of NF98 was that the staffs did not have a train up period prior to the beginning of the planning for the FTX. Regardless of the experience levels of the staff officers (the three African contingents were very capable), training can provide a commonality that otherwise has to be developed on the fly. This hurts short-term effectiveness as any ad hoc organization will find. The training provided to the troop units needs to be tailored to the mission. Here a very American tendency must be fought. The goal must be to ensure effectiveness, not to turn our partners into Americans. The result may not look like the Ft Leavenworth solution, but if it works well, we need to flex with it. U.S. personnel must also be prepared to learn from our regional partners. Most have considerable expertise in their own regions and in PO. As an

example, LTG Opandi, the Vice Chief of Staff of Kenya has over 10 years of PO experience, and is quite adept at teaching others. During NF98 every American listened to this acknowledged expert.

The U.S. SOF personnel must deploy with their counterparts, both staffs and troop units. This blending is crucial, as the U.S. forces must be seen as part of the overall team. They should also live together with the units they are advising, or the staffs of which they are a part. Any major separation or different living standard will undermine the U.S. effectiveness greatly. Additionally, if PO turns into a Chapter 7 type peace enforcement mission, the U.S. must be ready to leave the SF advisors in place to fight with their counterparts. To do otherwise would destroy the effectiveness of the entire program.

The use of CA and PSYOP troops and officers is extremely important, as is the cooperation with Non Governmental Organizations, International Organizations, and Private Voluntary Organizations (NGO, IO, PVO respectively) they engender. Teaching regional partners to work effectively with the ICRC, the UNHCR, and Medicines Sans Frontiers (Doctors without Borders) during exercises is critical in future operations. The combined effect of CA and PSYOP with NGOs, IOs, and PVOs in PO cannot be underestimated, it is essential. While normal SF troops can aid in these interactions, the most effective method is to tap the full spectrum of SOF capabilities.

A PLAN OF ACTION - WHAT MUST BE DONE

The actions that need to be taken, if the U.S. is to move effectively to this new paradigm, must be defined. This can be accomplished using the elements of national power; diplomatic, informational, economic and military. Actions must be taken in each, if the typology is to work.

In the diplomatic area, we must cultivate and assist in the development of potential regional leaders. Many smaller countries are still suspicious of U.S. motives, dating back to the Cold War.³⁶ It is the job of our diplomats to overcome this. We also will need to avoid the stigma of the Nixon era regional policemen (Iran, Pakistan etc.) This paradigm does not seek to gain surrogates, but to gain partners. They must be seen as such and must be treated in a manner that sends that message. Given DOS's leading role in the ACRI, both in the selection and monitoring phases, they should be more than willing to continue in the lead role here. They must also champion the use of regional forces vice external forces in dealing with crises. The confidence of regional partners in themselves and the confidence of their neighbors must be strengthened.

The informational element of power must be exercised with great skill. It will be a key to credibility building efforts. USIA and its various arms, as well as domestic sources will be needed to convince all concerned that the best way to handle crisis situations is with this new paradigm. The full U.S. role and commitment must be communicated to the regional partners officially, to increase their perceived safety net. Publicly however, it must be played down to give as much credit as

possible to the regional players and the concept of regional cooperation.

The economic element of power, as always can be an effective way to motivate. Increased aid to potential regional leaders will not only help them increase their capabilities, but will encourage others to strive for the same status. Basically, we must back all our diplomatic efforts with financial means. Most of the potential regional leaders are better off than their neighbors, but are still poor, and could not play this role without great sacrifice. We must make it both appealing and feasible for them.

Militarily the means are multiple. ACRI should be continued and expanded. Additionally, similar programs should be started in other regions. The format and training should be as close as possible to ACRI to allow for faster integration across programs during PO. International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Mobile Training Teams (MTT) must be increased to potential regional leaders. Care must be taken to avoid the mistakes of the past, such as training "bad people." DOS leadership in this area can help ease congressional worries as well as any public misgivings. Also, the military and DOS must pursue one agenda. All military actions must be in concert with the DOS plan.

Exercises will play a key role in this developmental period. Habitual relationships must be built, and confidence established. This can only be done through multiple association in exercises. The regional SOCs should do everything they can to encourage multilateral PO exercises using the format of the new paradigm. In these exercises, the U.S. must coach our

partners in their plans and staff skills, as well as their basic PO soldier skills. During these exercises and later in operations, the U.S. must be ready to provide logistical and technical support, either by aid (security assistance) or by participation of U.S. troops. Lastly, the U.S. must be ready to provide the SOF troops for both the exercises and regional contingencies. If the paradigm is executed correctly, the SF teams will become integral parts of their counterpart units, and when those units are committed, they will need their SF advisors.

CONCLUSION

How can the U.S. get from its present model to this new paradigm? First, it needs friends that are ready to play the lead role. To develop that capability, it must use the time between now and 2010 to train likely regional leaders to take up the gauntlet. That goal is very achievable in the intervening 10 years. If we adequately use IMET and staff level MTTs, we can spread the knowledge base. Additionally, as different countries participate in PO exercises they will learn from their regional counterparts.³⁷ This will give a base from which regional leaders can be drawn for PO. There is no need for any U.S. force structure changes. SOF is not scheduled for any significant reductions,³⁸ and the present structure is adequate to execute these missions. As the regional lead model displaces the U.S. lead model, SOF will replace conventional forces as the unit of choice. This does not require a change in structure, only in focus.

The new model will greatly lessen the need for most conventional force deployments for PO. While any relief for our

divisional war fighters would be welcome, there could actually be some major savings. This would allow the meeting of most of our strategic ends, with regard to Humanitarian Interests involving PO, while greatly reducing the expenditure of means. The U.S. could still remain engaged, and would still have significant input to conflict resolution, but at a greatly reduced cost. The only down side would be a loss of direct control of some operations. This would be offset by a greater ability to "pick our spots," and to have direct influence in those places where it is most critical to our interests, and where larger numbers of U.S. troops are warranted.

The bottom line is that the application of this new regional lead / SOF supported paradigm for PO will conserve assets, improve capacities of our friends, deal with problems multilaterally, while still achieving our strategic ends. It could be accomplished within the 10-year period leading to 2010, and probably sooner. This is clearly the way the U.S. must move in the future for the execution of all PO exercises, and the majority of real world PO.

WORD COUNT = 6577

ENDNOTES

¹ William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, May 1997), 7.

² Holy Bible, New International Version, Nashville: Broadman and Holman Publishers, 1995), Luke 12:48.

³ Steven P. Bucci, Finding the High Ground: The Effects of Ideals and Interests on U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Repressive Regimes, (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertation Information Service, 1987), 37-46.

⁴ Numerous general officer speakers at the USAWC all under non-attribution policy.

⁵ William Jefferson Clinton, A National Security Strategy For A New Century (Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 1998), iii.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid, 1.

⁸ Bucci, 45.

⁹ Clinton, 5.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid, 6.

¹² Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 144-147.

¹³ Based on the Author's personnel journal entries after discussions with the Brigade Commander. The Author was the Defense Attache' in Tirana and the exercise coordinator.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Hans Bennendijk, ed. 1998 Strategic Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1998), 76.

¹⁶ Steven Lee Myers and Steven Erlanger, "US Is Stepping Up Military Threats Against the Serbs," New York Times, 7 October 1998, sec A, 1.

¹⁷ William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, 1998), 95.

¹⁸ From this point, the term SF will be used to identify the troops used in the new paradigm. It will mean Special Forces augmented by Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations troops. The use of SOF might add confusion by implying that other parts of the Special Operations Forces community are involved.

¹⁹ The author saw this done in Albania in 1994 and in numerous countries in Latin America, the Middle East, the Horn of Africa and South West Asia over the last 18 years.

²⁰ Marshall F. McCallie, Department of State Special Coordinator for ACRI, statement before the Committee on International Relations. House Subcommittee on Africa. 8 October 1997.

²¹ Vincent D. Kern, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, statement to the Committee on International Relations, House Subcommittee on Africa, 1 October, 1997.

²² Ibid.

²³ David E. McCracken. "ACRI: Establishing a new African Paradigm" Special Warfare. vol 11, no 3 (Summer 1998): p. 8.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Kern.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Figure based on the budget for the Author's battalion to conduct the mission of ACRI in Ethiopia in 1998.

²⁸ Based on the Author's personal journal as a participant in both Noble Piper 97 and Natural Fire 98.

²⁹ The NF98 After-Action Report, and the Author's personal journal.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Chapter 6 of the UN charter covers situations where a mutual cease fire is already in place and both sides request that the UN monitor the agreements.

³² Information gathered by the author during the exercise. This fact was related by the Kenyan exercise author, COL Joseph Moia.

³³ Author's personal journal.

³⁴ The Defense Minister of Uganda in an address to the exercise participants on 19 June 1998 in "Sumonga." The full quotation was that "this exercise is the first concrete step in the process that will ensure that we will never allow that [Rwanda] to happen again without reacting. I stood on the banks of the river and watched bodies floating down, and all we could do was watch the big American planes bringing the western troops. We had no capacity to act."

³⁵ During the reception following the graduation ceremony for the Civil Affairs course run concurrently with NF98, from the authors journal.

³⁶ McCracken p. 12.

³⁷ As a result of watching the Kenyan's successful lead in NF98, Tanzania volunteered to host a similar exercise in the summer or 1999. The Tanzanian staff skills, learned in China, are clearly up to the task.

³⁸ Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, pp. 51-56.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bennendijk, Hanns, ed. 1998 Strategic Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1998.
- Boyatt, Mark D. "Special Forces: Who Are We and What Are We?". Special Warfare. Vol 11, no 2 (Spring 1998): 36-37.
- Bucci, Steven P. Finding the High Ground: The Effects of Ideals and Interests on U.S. Foreign policy Toward Repressive Regimes. Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertation Information Services, 1987.
- Cable, Larry "Getting found in the Fog: The Nature of Interventionary Peace". Special Warfare. Vol 11, no 2 (Spring 1998): 32-40.
- Clinton, William Jefferson. A National Security Strategy for A New Century. Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 1997.
- Cohen, William S. Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review. Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, May, 1997.
- Cohen, William S. Annual Report to The President and The Congress. Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, 1998.
- Department of National Security Strategy. Course 2: War, National Policy, and Strategy, vol III. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College. 1998
- Erckenbrack, Adrian. "Vital Interests vs. Budget Constraints: Planning the Force Structure of the Future." Special Warfare. Vol 11, no2 (Spring 1998): 2-6.
- Harned, Glenn M. "The Nature of Insurgency: Melting the Iceberg" Special Warfare. vol 11, no 3 (Summer 1998): 34-35.
- Holms, H. Allen, and Schoomaker, Peter J. United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement. 1998. Posture statement presented in 1998. McDill AFB, FL. United States Special Operations Command.
- Holy Bible, New International Version. Nashville: Broadman and Holman Publishers. 1995.

- Ignatieff, Michael. The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience. New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. Joint Publication 3-07. Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff. 16 June 1995.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. Joint Publication 3-05. Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff. 17 April 1998.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Tactic, Techniques, and Procedures for Operations. Joint Publication 3-07.3 (Final Coordination). Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff. 6 April 1998.
- Kern, Vincent D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, statement to the Committee on International Relations, House Subcommittee on Africa, 1 October, 1997.
- Lnage, John E. "Civilian - Military Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance: Lessons from Rwanda". Parameters. Summer 1998, 106-122.
- Marquis, Susan L. Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding US Special Operations Forces. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 1997.
- McCallie, Marshall F. "The African Crisis Response Initiative: America's Engagement for Peace in Africa. Special Warfare. vol 11, no 3 (Summer 1998): 2-7.
- McCallie, Marshall F., Department of State Special Coordinator for Africa, statement to the Committee on International Relations, House Subcommittee on Africa, 1 October, 1997.
- McCraken, David E. "ACRI: Establishing a New African Paradigm." Special Warfare. vol 11, no 3. (Summer 1998): 22-33.
- Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, Pandimonium: Ethnicity in International Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1993.
- Myers, Steven lee, and Erlanger, Steven. "US Is Stepping Up Military Threats Against the Serbs". New York Times. 7 October 1998. Sec A, 1 and 8.
- Odeen, Philip A. Transforming Defense. Washington, D.C.: National Defense Panel, 1997.

Passage, David. "Africa: New Realities and U.S. Policy."
Special Warfare. vol 11, no 3 (Summer 1998): 22-33.

Ricks, Thomas E. and Robbins, Carla Anne. "America is Learning
to Play World Cop, But Only Reluctantly." Wall Street
Journal. 27 August 1998. Sec a, 1 and 14.

Shelton, Henry H. United States Special Operations Command 10th
Anniversary History. McDill AFB, FL, United States Special
Operations Command. 16 April, 1997.