



**STRATEGY
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**RIGHT FORCE FOR THE FUTURE:
WHO PAYS THE BILL?**

BY

**COLONEL GARY R. ADDISON
United States Army**

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

RIGHT FORCE FOR THE FUTURE: Who Pays the Bill?

by

Gary R. Addison
United States Army

Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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This research project expresses concerns of the ability for the US Army to continue involvement in smaller-scale contingencies operations and support Army After Next. Our current force structure is not designed to support our continued involvement in operations less than war around the world. Military leadership must design a force structure that meets these challenges. We cannot continue to subordinate operations less than war to the less likely scenario of a two-theater war. Logisticians must take the opportunity to lead the way into the next century and at the same time reduce requirements. A Revolution in Military Affairs is underway and a Revolution in Military Logistics will be critical to this program. It is time to redesign the logistics structure and doctrine to support the projected requirements on the US military. Our structure must be a highly mobile, agile force to support our power projection doctrine.

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INTRODUCTION

To prepare for continued involvement in smaller-scale contingency operations and Army After Next (AAN), military leadership must restructure the force to meet these challenges. Our current force structure does not support our continued involvement in operations less than war around the world. During this period of "strategic pause" and the lack of a peer competitor in the near-term, the high probability of U.S. forces deploying in support of smaller-scale contingencies requires a review of our current and future force structure. Since many of our shortcomings are in the logistics field, army logisticians must play an active, aggressive role in this effort.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

President Clinton announced a national strategy of engagement, but our military has not taken the necessary steps to properly implement this strategy. In their 1997 report to the Secretary of Defense, The National Defense Panel stated that they viewed the military requirement to conduct two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts as a force-sizing function, not as a strategy.¹ I do not see any major change to our current foreign policy in the future. Based on this strategy, the number of commitments by our military will not decrease and may increase as we become a global society.

Our acceptance of continuation of the engagement strategy appears to be a logical first step during this period of growing turmoil around the world. The isolationists' argument in some circles that the United States has no business using its forces unless vital interests are at stake ignores the fact that any unraveling of the world economy from lost confidence in the U.S. commitment to regional stability could be devastating.² For the first time in history, the world is a megasystem, with a multitude of interacting and interdependent units.³ As our economy becomes more dependent on other world players, global stability becomes more critical.

Furthermore, our values require appropriate action when humanitarian interests are at stake. We can ill afford to revert into isolationism and allow world events drive us into a major confrontation. When the other elements of national power fail, the military must be prepared to step in and shape the situation to the advantage of American interests. Simplistic solutions to complex problems are not only ineffective but tend to aggravate an already disturbed situation. Certain technological efforts to buffer human activities from small disturbances may make them vulnerable to larger-scale catastrophes.⁴ Many of these situations may best be addressed by troops on the ground. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) amplified this in their Annual Report on the AAN project.

Future joint expeditionary forces and coalitions will coalesce around the land power component; land power will be the common core for most contingencies across the spectrum of conflict, particularly with partners who do not possess significant air, sea, or space capabilities.⁵ In order to support our national strategy of engagement in the future, the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense must be capable of shaping the environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests by responding to the full spectrum of crisis when directed. We must prepare to meet the challenges of an uncertain future with a viable force.⁶

MILITARY STRATEGY

Current military strategy and force structure provides little opportunity for early success in the varied types of actions we can expect in the near-term and as we transition to AAN. Most U.S. troops are not adequately prepared for either "deterrence" or combat missions in the third world, having been trained to meet the threat of a conventional war against the Warsaw Pact.⁷ Our training mentality, doctrine or military structure changed very little with the collapse of the Soviet Union. While the primary function of the American military continues to be winning our nation's wars, it must understand and prepare for the full range of potential interventions, not just those that involve conventional "fight and win" combat.⁸ A force structure must be designed to meet the national strategy

and plans developed for employment of the force. Identifying a problem is the easy part, but solutions are much tougher. It is time to work solutions.

ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

Key leaders must be willing to support and even force change in our military mind set. Designers of force structure must tear down the sacred towers built over the years and rid themselves of parochial bias. Training developers owe the American soldier a sound training program that addresses the role of military in smaller-scale contingencies in detail. To remain relevant in this dynamic world society, the Army must get on with designing a force structure to support the current and expected future administration strategies. A recent text on peace operations cites three alternatives for such restructuring:

1. Creating a pool of U.S. forces that prepare for peace operations as a secondary mission.
2. Restricting U.S. contributions to providing specialized capabilities, equipment and training.
3. Depending more on designated reserve component and civilian contractors.⁹ None of these alternatives offer a total solution to the problem. The active force cannot execute the first alternative of preparing for peace operations within the current force structure. In every recent major deployment,

reserve component forces played a vital role. Currently reserve soldiers are extremely active in Bosnia, running the joint information bureau and conducting civil affairs, psychological operations, postal service and other support functions.¹⁰ The second alternative of severely limiting U.S. commitment disregards the critical U.S. leadership role in the world. Again using Bosnia as an example, UN forces failed to make a significant difference in the region. Until U.S. forces deployed, the situation did not change in this war torn region. The final option of relying more on reserve forces and contracted resources fails to consider the timeliness required of a response. Speed will be critical in establishing a military capability to resolve conflict short of war. Both contractor and reserve forces require significant lead-time. In addition, the impact of multiple short-notice deployments on citizen soldiers and their employers must be acknowledged. It is time we made the tough choices and designed the force to meet the most likely scenario of the future.

Dr. Ernst May, Professor at Harvard's JFK School of Government, offered this testimony at a congressional hearing, "We should consider creating alongside reconstituable war-fighting forces, separately mobilizable police action forces."¹¹ We must recognize the missions of peacekeeping/enforcement and humanitarian as viable missions and allocate the proper

resources to respond where and when needed. Current ad-hoc methods of performing the mission create potential dangers to soldiers involved. Likewise, recent PERSTEMPO cannot be sustained without major negative impacts on recruiting and retention.

FUTURE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

In recent years our soldiers have been busier than ever, participating in 29 of 33 major post-Cold War deployments. In 1997 alone the Army averaged more than 31,000 soldiers deployed every day.¹² Informed individuals should not expect any change in this pace during the coming years. In addition to supporting U.S. policy, UN actions impact and help justify our involvement globally. When the UN Security Council adopted resolution 688, which states that humanitarian suffering in any member state was a threat to global peace and security, it laid the groundwork for a response to domestic conditions, which might have political and non-political dimensions.¹³

In 21st CENTURY EARTH; OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, Joseph Coates in his article on conflict among nations argues that a variety of factors are contributing to economic, ethnic, and religious conflict worldwide, increasing the chances of violence or war in the decades ahead. Coates maintains that although the United Nations will expand its role to ensure peace, many types of "collective violence" among ethnic groups and nations will

become more commonplace. Nations participating in peacekeeping operations seem even more willing to take part in resolving internal and regional conflicts to maintain stability.¹⁴ This trend will increase the involvement of our Army in missions less than full-scale war.

The U.S. military cannot continue to subordinate this critical area of conflict to the less likely scenario of a two-theater war. The time to restructure is now to prepare for challenges of the 21st century. Current force structure is not suited for the missions required to support our engagement strategy. Most Army responsibilities in this arena reside in the Special Operations Forces and Civil Affairs component of the selected reserve. Changes in mission involving greater use of conventional medical, engineer, military police, transportation, and logistics personnel in nation assistance and internal defense could potentially threaten our war fighting capability. On the other hand, the Special Forces serve as an excellent example of how forces can have both combat and non-combat capabilities germane in peace, conflict, and war.¹⁵ We should recognize these capability and resource additional forces to perform the vital missions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We should continue our national strategy of engagement to carry us into the future. We should abandon the two-theater war

scenario. Adherence to this scenario produced a force structure that does not match requirements, thereby contributing to problems encountered supporting operations other than war (OOTW). Army leadership should endorse a plan that calls for engagement in as many as two simultaneous peacekeeping/peace enforcement missions when a major conflict develops in one of the theaters considered a major threat. We require sufficient force structure to continue the peacetime missions while deploying an appropriate force to stop aggression in the area of major conflict. Distribution of forces becomes the next area of consideration.

FORCE DESIGN

A focus on regional or state-centered threats with the capabilities to threaten our interests will continue through the year 2025. This requires us to have the capability to quickly insert the initial forces to deter or repel aggression. In keeping with the total force concept, forces need to be split to support peacetime missions and provide a strategic reserve for full-scale wars. Each component of our military should have the force structure to perform peacetime missions, peacekeeping/enforcement or fighting in a major regional conflict. This will entail a major reorganization of our force structure and at the same time keep the essence of Gen Abrahms'

belief alive that we must deploy the reserve component to insure we have the support of the American public.

The Army National Guard is now aligned heavily with the combat missions of the Army, while the United States Army Reserve is aligned with the combat service support missions.¹⁶ The active force does not possess the capability to perform any major mission without the support of reserve component or contractors. The Army of the future should have sufficient mixture of forces in each component identified to perform habitual peacetime missions without reinforcement. Using a building blocks concept, we could provide a force tailorable to meet specific mission requirements. Identified units would be in a high state of readiness for a period of six months and respond to any crisis or deployment that occurred during this time. These forces would not replace our ready brigades or rapid response forces for major conflicts. Multiple packages capable of responding to smaller-scale contingencies, rather than the ad hoc organizations of today, provide many advantages.

ADVANTAGES

First, leaders at all levels would be able to plan and prepare for contingency missions. Guard and Reserve forces would find this especially beneficial. Frequent and prolonged deployments negatively impact our reserve component's ability to

recruit and retain a quality force. Moreover, civilian employers will not continue to support the total force if their employees continue to be called to active duty on short notice. Many of our skills required to support deployments currently rest in the reserve forces. More than 95 per cent of our psychological operations units and 67 per cent of our combat service support reside in reserve components. With a balanced force, deployment would become more predictable. Forces obtain predictability when multiple organizations can perform similar missions, so a rotation can be effected. The U.S. Air Force recognized the benefit of predictability when they established the air expeditionary force concept. The major benefits achieved have been quality of life enhancements provided through predictability. We should take both the positive and negative lessons from their experience and apply them to future structures. Army forces in a window of time for deployment would maintain levels of readiness similar to our ready brigades in early deploying force packages. Training is the second big advantage to this concept. Identified units could focus their training on the smaller-scale contingency mission while maintaining their go-to-war skills. Predictable training schedules reduce response time when the need arises. Trained and ready units increase the opportunity for success.

The greatest advantage may fall under the heading of unity of command. In today's environment, commanders normally do not have their team together until they arrive in theater. Commanders and staffs lack knowledge in the strengths, weaknesses, and levels of tactical or technical competence of subordinate units. A lot of learning occurs while performing the mission, at the wrong place and time. Habitual relationships foster strong command relationships and teamwork that cannot be developed on short notice.

RESOURCES

As with any plan, a cost is involved. A bill-payer must be identified. As a logistician, I believe we have a lot to offer. Since many of the shortcomings of today are in the logistics field, we will be expected to shoulder the majority of these new burdens. By implementing the Army Strategic Logistics Plan, the Army can obtain efficiencies to meet the goal of a reduced logistics tail and apply the savings to improved force structure to meet the uncertain world of the future.

At all levels, leaders talk about a "Revolution in Military Affairs" with a "Revolution in Military Logistics" being a key ingredient. However, our intuitions tell us the process is more evolutionary than revolutionary. Logisticians' failure to identify or accept radical change may result in our failure to have the capability to support the missions of our nation.

Analyzing the role of logistics during the Gulf War, LTG Pagnois stated, "At the tactical level, logistics is used to affect the battle in progress. However, logistics at the operational level is more than sustaining the force. Logistics is a part of the commander's concept of operations and scheme of maneuver."¹⁷ I support his thoughts, however, his explanation failed to address the strategic level. I believe the reworking of the logistics system must come from the top down. LTG Coburn, DCSLOG of the Army, stated that the vision for future logistics is a seamless logistics system capable of providing world-class support for America's Army in any scenario.¹⁸ As we downsize and reduce the "iron mountains" of supplies, the strategic level's ability to get the right supplies to the right location in a timely manner becomes critical to success in today's battle as well as our ability to prepare for the AAN. Our combat developers have not followed through with changes that reflect this vision.

We must apply all the technological advances to reduce the logistics requirements supporting the operational and tactical commander. Using advances in technology, we can reduce the in-theater "iron mountains" and the related force structure to maintain it. Our focus needs to shift to resourcing the strategic level and holding them accountable for being responsive to the operational commander's needs. Tailored, highly mobile logistics units will deploy with minimum resources

to provide support to commanders in the field. The strategic level will determine our success in future operations.

Logisticians have the opportunity to lead the way into the next century and at the same time provide resources that can be applied to developing the right force structure to support our national strategy and design of AAN. It is time to get on with a true Revolution in Military Logistics.

REVOLUTION IN MILITARY LOGISTICS

A true Revolution in Military Logistics (RML) is possible if we are willing to break through the barriers that habitually hinder change. The smaller more lethal army of the next century requires a logistics force structure that is modular in design and responsive to the needs of the customers. Logisticians must be out front and set the standard for the Revolution in Military Affairs. The Army Strategic Planning Guidance focused on adaptable, responsive logistics. It laid out the five components of RML. Now we logisticians must grab the ball and run with it. RML calls for:

- Reduced demand stemming from more supportable weapons systems.
- More accurate and timely visibility of demands
- Quicker, more responsive processes.
- Increased support from afar.
- Reduced logistics footprint.¹⁹

We are currently implementing changes to meet these requirements. Even so, each process must be reviewed to ascertain that the appropriate technology will yield maximum benefit of the increased efficiencies.

As the Army leadership considers the future design and mix of forces, it is clear that the expectations exist for a reduced number of logistics soldiers. All levels of leadership and defense management are looking for ways to enhance our position and be postured with the right tools to justify the essential force structure to meet the needs of the Army as we move into the 21st century. As logisticians we have the opportunity to positively influence the future if we act now. It is time we pull all actions together under one executive agent and get moving on the transition to the future. Our current force will not meet the needs of the next century.

In the near term, we will not see reduced logistical demands from more supportable weapons systems. In a Parameters article (Winter 1997-98), Lieutenant Colonel Yves Fontaine declares that "The revolution in military logistics will occur only after our research community provides us with combat equipment that minimizes the logistical tail needed to sustain it."²⁰ Indeed we do need to continue the search for technological advances to reduce demands on the logistics system. Numerous agencies, headed primarily by Army Material

Command, support ongoing studies to gain fuel-efficiency and more reliable systems. Even so, there are significant changes we can make to meet the other components of RML. We cannot afford to wait passively for more supportable systems.

The Gulf War demonstrated the technological advantages of the accuracy and lethality of our current weapons systems. Based on this performance, we should take steps to reduce the amount of ammunition moved to a theater. Improved accuracy, greater lethality, and better delivery capabilities should result in a comparable reduction in ammunition stocks, a major contributor to the logistics tail. On the other hand, offsets for maintenance and fuel may have to wait for the next generation of vehicles and weapons systems.

The remaining four RML components are related, improvements in anyone area will make positive impacts on the other. Thomas Edwards and Dr. Rick Eden analyze the situation very well in their article on velocity management in Army Logistician, (January-February 1999). They detail dramatic improvements in the speed and accuracy of logistics processes obtained by the Velocity Management (VM) Working Group created in 1995 by the Army's Logistics Triad. By breaking down the segments and conducting a detailed analysis of logistical processes, the Army realized a reduction of more than 50% in order ship time (OST).²¹ This dramatic improvement can be

realized in other processes with very little investment. We must take the next step and build on this progress through doctrinal changes that will drive force structure changes to meet the challenges of the future.

CURRENT DOCTRINE

Our current logistics force structure is designed based on four levels of logistics and on stockpiling iron mountains of repair parts and other supplies at multiple levels. Some military personnel see more or less than four levels. I see four:

Organizational: At this level, units seek self-sufficiency through reliance on their own organic logistics personnel and resources. Logistics personnel at this level perform tasks required to sustain current operations. Maintenance and supply sections perform most of these functions, however, operator tasks also contribute to self-sufficiency. Units store and maintain their basic loads in all classes of supply. Maintenance actions are limited to routine services and minor repair and replacement.

Direct Support (DS): DS units are normally located in the Division Support Command (DISCOM) within the division or in Corps Support Command (COSCOM). At this level, the logistics footprint starts to enlarge. Maintenance, supply, transportation, field services and medical organizations combine

to provide direct logistical support to units in the division and corps.

General Support (GS): GS refers primarily to maintenance and supply functions. But I would also put transportation into this category. GS supply units normally provide support to DS activities while GS Maintenance supports the supply system. GS units may be found in the Corps or theater.

Depot/Wholesale: This level is managed at the national level; it consists of Army Material Command (AMC) and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) activities. DLA stocks more than 85% of defense supplies and interfaces with the commercial market for replenishment. AMC stocks Army unique items and conducts rebuild of end items and components.

FUTURE LEVELS OF SUPPORT

It is time to configure this system to true three levels: tactical, operational, and strategic. These three levels are consistent with the Army's perspective on battle space management in other doctrine. Three-level logistical support brings our force structure in line with emerging doctrine. Joint doctrine states that there are three levels of war- strategic, operational and tactical. Joint Pub 4-0 breaks out logistics in the same way.²² Even our current Army doctrine has adapted to the new terminology. FM 100-5 uses the same terms in discussing logistics. It states that strategic and

operational logistics supports wars, campaigns, and major operations; tactical logistics supports battles and engagements.²³ But the break between levels is not clear; and in some cases, the levels of support overlap. We must realign our force structure to reflect current doctrine.

STRATEGIC LEVEL

CSS assets at this level are varied and operate primarily from fixed facilities. The day-to-day CSS operations would not significantly change from peacetime to supporting a deployed force. The key contributors at this level continue to be AMC and DLA. Their sustainment functions would expand under this concept. They would manage all sustainment level stocks, repairs, and distribution. In keeping with the growing trend of contractor supported systems, they would manage all maintenance and supply contracts. Civilian government employees or contractors would perform most functions at this level.

Deploying assets into a theater would be a joint decision between the theater commander and the strategic headquarters. AMC's forward logistics support element (LSE) would coordinate the support in theater with the Theater Support Command. The deployed LSE is a forward element of the wholesale logistics base. To structure the LSE, USAMC uses split-based logistics operations. It deploys from CONUS only those

logistics management functions needed in-theater. USAMC performs the remaining functions in CONUS or in another theater. Split-based operations logistics are ideally suited to support force projection doctrine.²⁴

The theater support command (TSC) is a new design that would oversee not only logistics but also personnel and finance assets. This command becomes the single logistics point of contact at the theater level. TSC activities include coordination with the strategic level, arranging host nation support, oversee contracting, and maintaining and operating a centralized distribution system. In broad terms, responsibilities of TSC would be synchronizing and integrating all logistics functions for the theater. This may be a Joint Theater Log C2 organization in the future.²⁵

Integrated Sustainment Maintenance Program can serve as a model for how this system should operate. Sustainment maintenance as used here refers to all maintenance above the current direct support level. The Army sustainment maintenance structure includes Active and Reserve Components, GS maintenance units, installation Directorate of Logistics (DOL), EAC intermediate maintenance operations, national maintenance point (NMP) depots operated by AMC and contractor operations. The peacetime maintenance functions are performed in fixed facilities and managed under AMC. The recently published

mobilization plan calls for the National Sustainment Management Manager (NSMM) to continue monitoring production to meet the needs of any contingency and to deploy elements into a theater as requested from the theater through AMC.²⁶

Supplies will not be stocked at the theater level to support the operational or tactical levels. Transportation assets to operate ports and move supplies forward will be the critical assets at this level. Strategic assets will containerize shipments that move through the theater and down to the tactical level when possible. At a minimum, cargo will be packed to move down to the operational level. Reduced handling and increased speed in getting supplies to combat units go together to improve combat readiness and effectiveness of the logistical tail.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL

The key logistics structure in a theater would come at the operational level. For the first time, we see at this level a concentration of resources with significant stocks of supplies, multiple means of transportation, and maintenance capabilities. The logistics force would be modularly designed; it would be tailored to meet specific mission requirements. Stockage levels would normally be set at a thirty-day level in all classes of supply. Items stocked would be in high demand

and essential for continuous actions. All stocks located in the supply support activities at this level would be accounted for through centralized material management. Material Management Centers (MMC) would have forward-deployed teams with flyaway packages, but the primary systems and support personnel would remain at their home station.

Maintenance activity at this level focuses on the repair of components. Maintenance allocation charts would be reworked to abolish the old classifications of DS, GS, and depot. This level would continue to focus on many of the tasks currently listed as DS and pick up some tasks that migrate from GS level. GS tasks that do not migrate to the operational level would migrate upward to the strategic level. The strategic level would be responsible for those tasks as well as the current tasks assigned to depots. The location of repair would be managed through the ISM Program based on facility constraints, required technical experience, essential test, measurement and diagnostic equipment, and time factors.

TACTICAL LEVEL

This level combines the organizational and direct support levels, as we know them today. At the unit, soldiers would focus on their warfighting missions and perform operator level logistics, as we know it. Logistics organizations at this level

will be highly mobile, with a very limited inventory of supplies and limited maintenance capabilities.

In the Force XXI studies, the designers of the division took the first step in making three level logistics a reality. In the new division, CSS will be centralized: CSS assets previously in maneuver units will be reorganized and assigned to the DISCOM. As currently stated, "multicapable" mechanics, who can perform both organizational and direct support repairs will be found at this level.²⁷ However, as the transition occurs at all levels, this would no longer be valid and a new maintenance personnel classification system will be required. Maintenance at this level will be limited to the replacement of components of weapons systems and evacuation to the operational level for more complex repairs.

Current design thoughts are focused on combat arms organizations for consolidation in the new model. The same concept should apply throughout the force structure. We need one standard system. In echelons above division (EAD), maintenance and supply units would provide support on an area basis as we do today.

We will realize significant savings in both personnel and costs by eliminating the GS level logistics structure. Part of these savings may be required at the operational level to meet requirements. Distribution assets, to include truck companies,

are not resourced at required levels now; plus-ups should be considered. Models developed by Logistics Analysis Agency and TRADOC can demonstrate the true personnel savings.

KEYS TO SUCCESS

Continued development of total asset visibility and in transit visibility enhancers is critical to making this system work. With limited stocks in a theater, managers must have visibility of all stocks and the ability to redistribute on hand or inbound stocks. A centralized distribution manager at every level will track and direct the flow of supplies. Now under development, Global Combat Service Support System-Army (GCSS-A) fuses information from all sources into one integrated database. Program managers set the standard as management from the factory to the foxhole.²⁸ All users providing input during design and testing must insure the system meets the needs of soldiers in the field when a final product is fielded.

Built-in diagnostics and status on weapons systems will provide logisticians the capability to anticipate demands. New systems design should be more reliable and must have internal systems that can predict failures. Micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS) researchers are examining sensors and microprocessors that will be embedded in equipment to predict and isolate failure.²⁹ AMC must continue this effort to reduce the current shortfall in diagnostic training and reduce the need

for costly and cumbersome external test equipment. The objective system must increase the certainty, accuracy and timeliness of predicting component failure.

Electronic technical manuals also offer a significant advantage to logisticians of the future. Electronic displays, using CD-ROM digitized data and interactive technology will replace the bulky paper manuals of today. The key benefits of this initiative are lighter deployment loads, elimination of the requirement for paper change sheets, and enhanced interactive troubleshooting and repair. Further improvements will permit electronic downloads of updates through a battlefield network.

As we continue to develop these systems, we must get the communicators on board to ensure the capability exist to pass the information needed and to be innovative in the way we provide logistics support. In recent deployments, the ability to pass logistics data and have sufficient communications for the logistics community limited our ability to support customers until workarounds or additional equipment was provided. The "sneaker net" no longer suffices in an information dependent, highly mobile, dispersed force.

Knowing the requirement meets the first test in quality logistics. The second test is getting support to the user in a timely manner. Current technology, in the process of being fielded, provides us the capability to track the materials into

a theater. However, we still need an integrated air-ground distribution system. Truck fleets are very effective in local delivery. But when the distance or tactical situation limits our ability to move items by truck, air assets must be available to the distribution manager. Such assets should be a combination of fixed wing and helicopters for lift or sling load operations. The U.S. Air Force recognizes this requirement; their vision for the future incorporates support to ground forces as an integral part of their mission. Given our increased emphasis on the mobility of fighting forces, airlift to support these mobile forces will become more critical. Airlift is far more responsive and mobile than ground-based supply lines. Likewise, it is far less vulnerable in a fluid tactical situation.³⁰

CONCLUSION

A Revolution in Military Affairs is underway leading to Force XXI and Army After Next. A Revolution in Military Logistics is critical to the success of this revolution. The doctrine changes are being formed to incorporate new terms for logistics to coincide with the tactical levels of war. It is time for all logisticians to recognize the need for change and remove the barriers that protect their sacred cows. Future political leaders will require a highly mobile, responsive force to deal with a growing need for an expanded U.S. military role

in peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Conflicts will continue around the world, between ethnic groups, over economic issues, and as a result of border disputes. Getting the right structure to support contingency operations and AAN requires change based on experience and knowledge. If we logisticians fail to shape our destiny, someone else will do it for us. Then soldiers of the future may not get the support they need. We don't want this to happen.

WORD COUNT 6096

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²⁴.Department of the Army, FM 63-11 Logistics Support Element Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 8 October 1996), 2-9.

²⁵."Theater Support Command" linked from U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command Home Page, http://www.cascom.army.mil/theater_spt_cmd.

²⁶.This is based on my personal experience as the Regional Sustainment Maintenance Manager for the West Region from August 1996 through June 1997.

²⁷."New Division Design Centralizes CSS", Army Logistician, (September-October 1998), 1-3.

²⁸. "Project Manager - Global Combat Support System-Army" linked from U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command Home Page, <http://www.cascom.army.mil/gcss>.

²⁹.Emmanuel J. Nidhiry and Dr. Gary L. Anderson, "Diagnostic Repairs With Embedded Sensors," Army Logistician (July-August 1997): 27.

³⁰ John R. Stafford "Dominate Maneuver And Focused Logistics
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