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**GLOBAL SECURITY IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY –
THE CHALLENGE TO INTERANIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS**

BY

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS

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ABSTRACT

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The increasing effects of globalization mean a reduction in the power of individual states to act unilaterally; this applies across the spectrum of international activities but it is particularly significant in the security environment. International organizations designed to meet the requirements of the past have yet to evolve to meet the requirements of the future. Traditional concepts of collective security on the NATO model will need to adapt, and move towards a more cooperative approach that might embody many of the characteristics of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Naturally, it would be too simplistic for the answer to be either one or the other; the probable solution is more likely to be a hybrid that embodies the strengths of both, not to mention the UN.

In any event the fundamental point must be that security is a global problem; it will increasingly require a global response which will mean increased emphasis on international organizations that are sufficiently robust to tackle the issues, international cooperation both within alliances and coalitions and an environment that encourages trust between the major players. In this context the subjects of NATO expansion and an expanded European defense role are significant and the need to become more proficient in integrating multi national efforts is essential.

Failure to rise to this challenge will produce an environment that is increasingly unstable.

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**GLOBAL SECURITY IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY - THE CHALLENGE TO
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS**

"Look into the matter of his alliances and cause them to be severed and dissolved. If an enemy has alliances the problem is grave and the enemy's position strong; if he has no alliances the problem is minor and the enemy's position weak."

Sun Tzu on "Waging War"

Taken at its most simplistic it is hard to argue against the hypothesis that a group of nations acting together, either in a formal alliance,¹ ad hoc coalition ²or within major transnational organizations such as the UN is likely to be more effective than those same nations acting unilaterally. The potential synergy achieved through these groupings is enormous but at the same time there are numerous factors that can reduce their effectiveness; such is the power of these factors that they can virtually nullify the advantages unless steps are taken to preempt them. As the twentieth century draws to a close the problem is not that we fail to recognize the difficulties inherent in working in the multinational arena, but more that we carry the legacy of the past. Major players such as the UN, NATO and OSCE were formed in the aftermath of World War II, or during

the Cold War (1945, 1949 and 1970 respectively). The challenges that were faced then are not the challenges of today yet the transition to face new demands is far from complete. Increased 'globalization' will continue yet we are a long way from achieving the consensus that will enable global problems to be met with global solutions; this is emphasized by the fact that, almost without exception, the role of the major players has been shaped by transatlantic or European interests. In itself this is not necessarily a disadvantage but it is likely to become one in the future as globalization will force us to take a broader view. A fundamental start point must be a secure and stable environment yet we continue to live in times that will be remembered for conflict, not peace.

In order to answer the question as to what can be done to be more effective and how we can shape the environment to produce maximum stability, it is necessary to examine that environment and identify the potential threats. Thereafter, an analysis of possible measures to improve the situation needs to be conducted at two levels. Of these the first is best described as 'conflict prevention' in which groups of nations use their influence as a third party to prevent war; by implication this will be a geo-strategic problem. The second, 'conflict resolution' might occur either as a result of the failure of 'conflict prevention'

with nations acting in coalition to conduct Peace Enforcement (PE), or as part of treaty obligations as enshrined within NATO Article V.³ In either 'conflict resolution' scenario the key objective must be to ensure maximum effectiveness amongst participating nations with speedy resolution; in this context NATO is likely to be a key player which raises a number of questions as to the future of the Alliance: how it can integrate within the global security architecture and how it can serve multiple national interests.

GEO-STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The United States has summarized the likely geo-strategic situation⁴ in that while the threat of global war has receded, the danger of regional instability remains significant. These dangers are most relevant in areas that impinge on national interest, not only for the US but for other nations as well, particularly in the Middle East and Asia. Second to this is the danger posed by 'failing states' such as the former Yugoslavia which, like super nova, have the potential to implode while sucking in all around them. In either case the situation may be exacerbated by the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the increased availability of advanced technology, both of which may tempt hitherto latent adversaries to attack the US or other first world countries. Similarly, the availability of WMD has raised the significance of asymmetrical attack, against which there is currently little realistic defense. Then there are the transnational threats posed by terrorism, drugs, and organized crime and the ever-present possibility of some unforeseen development, or 'wild card', that could change the environment completely.

Balanced against what might appear to be a gloomy situation in which the US and other developed countries are held a 'hostage to fortune' there are some encouraging signs. US National Security Strategy recognizes the "Imperative of Engagement"⁵ through "peacetime engagement activities and active participation and leadership of alliances." Across the Atlantic similar sentiments have been expressed by the British Prime Minister:

By becoming engaged, we can play our part in shaping the EU's future. We are pro-Europe but pro-reform. There are important areas where we should work together more: for example, the economy, crime, the environment, foreign affairs and defense.⁴

Engagement may be a move in the right direction; it represents a response to the perceived security threats and a statement of intent. On its own it is not enough. In an increasingly uncertain environment leaders and policy makers have become familiar with the concept that change is endemic; policies made one day may be obsolete by the next and failure to keep pace will lead to loss of credibility. The pace of change is accelerated by increased interdependence between states and the changing character of those states and symbiotic relationship

between the various areas of policy. "We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny, part of one moral universe."⁵

One trend that is sure to dominate the first decades of the twenty-first century is the decline of the power of the state. Its power is a relatively modern phenomenon having only evolved as the central state took power from the various power bases within; previously it was no more than one competitor amongst others as was seen in the struggle between church and state in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe. The key to the strength of the state lay largely through centralization of education and economics and it is ironic that those same influences are now acting in reverse. The rise of global capital markets, the leaps in information technology and the influence of global media combined with shortcomings in individual national policies have highlighted the need to tackle problems from a global perspective.

The global financial crisis shows that we can only tackle global problems if we work together...The need for co-operation has never been greater. The agenda ranges from terrorism to nuclear proliferation, from climate change to drugs. We can only defeat these threats together.⁶

The global financial crisis has demonstrated the interdependence between states more graphically than anything else. Taking the relationship between the US and the EU as an example it accounts for \$270bn annually; European firms are the largest investors in 41 US states; more than half of US direct foreign investment (\$400bn) is in Europe; US firms employ some 3 million Europeans and approximately the same number of Americans work for European firms in the US.⁷ Similar comparisons could be made in other parts of the world. Interdependence on this scale is a product of 'advanced' economies, which are stable, enjoy a high standard of living and are capable of exploiting technology. Unfortunately these countries represent only a small proportion of the total (28).⁸ The rest of the world falls into one of two remaining categories. 'Transitional economies' (28) which are essentially remnants of failed states or former communist countries which lack many of the essential institutions, may suffer widespread deprivation and consequently are prone to violence. 'Developing economies' (127) account for the majority of the world; usually with limited resources, often with fragile democracies and with populations whose expectations often remain unfulfilled; consequently these too are prone to violence. Economics and stability go hand in hand; those countries with the faster rates of economic growth tend to be those with greater political

equality; conversely those with stagnant economies tend to be those subjected to more authoritarian rule. "Political freedom and economic development are not in conflict, but are mutually reinforcing."⁹ For those countries that are classified as 'transitional' or 'developing' the degree of economic interdependence is less and, while it will increase with time, the importance of 'engagement' in other areas is increased proportionately. Global engagement must become as fundamental to security as it is to finance or information technology.

GLOBAL SECURITY

As the only remaining superpower the US is not immune from the influences that will reduce the power of the state. In some ways it is able to resist some of the pressures through its size and economic capability; in others it is more susceptible to those pressures purely because it is there. Fortunately the current balance is in favor of the former which means that there is time to adjust to the changing environment; how long is anybody's guess and the only certainty is that the current trend of globalization is set to continue. The options open to the US are to continue with the status quo which is not realistic in the long term or to engage in a global rather than a bi-lateral, or even multi-lateral sense. The latter implies a move away from traditional collective security towards co-operative security, albeit still with the US as the major partner.

In looking at the potential models for twenty-first century security the three significant organizations are the UN, NATO and the OSCE, the problem that arises is that they are each different in their roles and capabilities; no single one can be seen as a solution, the real question being how they can integrate most effectively and what balances need to be struck.

Furthermore, it is important to include the European dimension and to that end it is necessary to assess the implications of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and the Western European Union (WEU). With the possible exception of the UN this is a very Atlantic orientated view; this is no accident or bias as the countries represented are primarily those from 'advanced economies' who possess both the will and the capability. It is not to ignore Asia, particularly China, but it is believed that it will be some time before any one in the region will become a significant player. Similarly the role likely to be played by Russia, while potentially significant, is not likely to be a leading one.

GLOBAL SECURITY - THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

The debate over the future shape and roles of the UN has been ongoing for some time. By trying "to be all things to all people" it has failed to be as effective as it might have been; it has yet to evolve to be able to meet the issues that it is likely to have to face in the next century. By many it is seen as an outdated legacy of World War II. Organizationally it remains an amalgam of agencies, funds and programs, many of which have their own independent governing bodies. It lacks

strength and flexibility, notwithstanding the attempts at reform initiated by the current Secretary General who suffers from the fact that his role is 'to propose not to dispose' and consequently lacks the real power needed to be fully effective. It has many strengths and potential strengths but currently it lacks the ability to focus on these; it needs to determine what its role is and its core functions. In many areas such as the environment, drugs, refugees and human rights it has made a significant contribution; these are global problems and the UN offers a logical forum and the potential for global initiatives but frequently it is hampered by its own bureaucracy and individual national agenda; the current US position with regard to its payments being a case in point.

The situation worsens in the context of Peace Operations due to lack of commitment and support from member governments. The UN record in Bosnia Hercegovina was little short of disastrous largely because few national leaders were prepared to give it the power to act and consequently it lacked an effective mandate. Any new approach in this field will require greater commitment; the UN cannot function effectively if support can be given, or withheld, on a whim. Of equal significance is the need for a more reliable decision making process that will enable resolutions to be made in a timely fashion; the old adage

applies 'a seventy per cent solution in time is better than a hundred per cent solution too late.' In response to both the need for support and the need for timely action there is much in favor of the proposal for a standing UN force that could deploy rapidly in order to stop conflicts in their early stages before they had had the opportunity to escalate. This would require a commitment of a new kind, one that was prepared to allow transfer of authority without protracted negotiations; there is no doubt that such an arrangement would be difficult to achieve but it would represent a new kind of co-operative security which would add enormous credibility to the UN in this capacity. The alternative will leave it increasingly on the sidelines.

In common with the UN, NATO is trying to shed the legacies of the past and broaden its approach. Whereas the UN was formed as an attempt to produce a forum to resolve world issues, NATO was formed with a very specific intent and under conditions that were both dangerous and competitive; consequently its charter, structures and decision making mechanisms were designed to combat the Soviet threat. Few would have predicted the long years of peace and prosperity that would follow in Western Europe; fewer still would have ventured to suggest that Germany would be re-united and that the Soviet Union collapse without a shot being fired. NATO has been fundamental to the course of

post war history and has underlined the importance of transatlantic solidarity and the effectiveness of modern alliances. However, the world has changed and that which was good for yesterday is not necessarily the solution for tomorrow. Nobody would dispute the fact that NATO needs to change, least of all NATO itself, which is already implementing reform. Care must be taken to ensure that such change that is implemented is focussed towards enhancing NATO's capability and credibility in a new environment; there is always a danger that extraneous factors will constrain the evolution or that the reasons for change will be misunderstood. Nonetheless NATO has a key role to play in the future of Europe particularly, and the world in general.

NATO can do for Europe's East what it did for Europe's West: prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen democracy against future threats and create conditions for prosperity to flourish.¹⁰

Since the end of the Cold War a massive realignment of interests has taken place within the US and Europe with economic factors becoming predominant. In general terms defense budgets have reduced by 30%, armed forces have been scaled down by 28 to 40% and the US presence in Europe has been reduced by two thirds.

Emphasis has been forced to shift from high readiness, forward-deployed heavy formations to lower readiness forces backed up by a rapid reaction corps. The temptation to reduce spending beyond the savings made by the reductions remains a threat to force modernization; fortunately a threat that is generally being resisted by the majority of NATO members who recognize the necessity to maintain the relevance of NATO's capability. Nonetheless, credibility means having an effective force that can be used to back up diplomacy; equally importantly it means having the will and the agreement amongst members to use it. All members of the Alliance must play their part; an effective alliance cannot rely on the efforts of a few and the cries of 'burden sharing' and 'proportionality' will be increasingly common.

Enlargement remains at the top of the agenda, particularly as a means of improving stability and creating the conditions for prosperity but support is by no means unanimous.¹¹ We have to be clear that an enlarged NATO will provide the basis from which peace, democracy and prosperity can build; at the same time we must be wary lest expansion is seen merely as 'neo-containment,' or an attempt to justify NATO evolution in the post Cold War era. Essentially we need to decide what is that we want of NATO and how we can develop it to meet the requirements of the

twenty-first century. The growing aspirations of the eastern European countries of the former Soviet bloc have to be met if the long term stability of Europe is to be maintained, yet meeting them is likely to become a balancing act with Russian concerns on the other side of the scales. Russian concerns over her own security verge on paranoia and often they are more perception than reality; nonetheless the inevitable consequence of history is that perceptions count and any eastward expansion will always be seen as a potential threat. These fears cannot be discounted but they must not become an obstacle to progress; frustrated aspirations within the former Soviet bloc countries of Eastern Europe raise the specter of inherent instability within Europe itself, a phenomenon already seen in the Balkans. Given that expansion is already in progress the question that arises is not whether NATO should expand but how it can do so most effectively; it must meet the needs of the West and simultaneously placate Russian fears, while remaining a credible organization. Expansion cannot come without a price but this is far outweighed by the signal that it sends to the world, in the form of a commitment to the principle of Europe whole and free. While this ideal is laudable the reality of expansion is that some aspects of the process risk becoming mutually exclusive; extension of Article V guarantees may be problematic and there is a danger of new divisions within the Alliance - between rich

and poor, new members and old and so on. Underlying the whole process is the need to ensure that Russia does not become isolated. The momentum for change continues to be driven by two distinct factors; on one hand there are the countries who see joining the Alliance as a means to an end in their own development; on the other NATO has been seen to be effective and to continue to represent a fundamental pillar of the security architecture. To say that NATO is the victim of its own success in the latter respect is to exaggerate but therein lies the problem as it adjusts to new demands.

NATO's orientation is moving somewhat away from its traditional Article V responsibilities towards Peace Support Operations, and the potential for deployment outside the established NATO area; consequently the nature of the Alliance is changing. Members are no longer obliged to participate in operations under the terms of the Charter yet the nature of likely threats is increasingly likely to have global implications, albeit less immediate in many cases. The current US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton, referred to the need to tackle "the by-products of globalization"¹² which include the spectrum of asymmetrical threats from international crime to terrorism and environmental issues to technology transfer. This is not to say that NATO is necessarily the organization to spearhead the

assault in every case but it is to say that this is very much the environment in which Alliance must operate, and that it needs to ensure that it is prepared to do so. With the combination of expansion and a changing environment with a constant stream of new challenges, NATO must be flexible. As the world evolves so must NATO; its Article V obligations remain but the historic concept of collective defense that they embody is less relevant than in the past; expansion must be handled carefully with Russia being a part of the process and Europe adopting a more coherent approach to its own security. In short, it is time to move away from the historic collective defense approach which was representative of the old bipolar world to a more co-operative approach which recognizes the multi-lateral nature of the world in the twenty-first century.

An essential element of NATO's evolution has to be the role played by Europe as a whole. As an organization of 16 member nations NATO has always been plagued by the need for consensus; in itself, a perfectly acceptable requirement in a democratic organization but the price has been that decision-making can be slow NATO's position has sometimes lacked coherence and has occasionally been reduced to internal bickering. Under the concept of collective defense, and Article V obligations, unanimity was almost assumed but with the changing focus the

danger is that individual national interest will prevail over the common good, especially when the threat is not seen as particularly pressing, thereby exacerbating any shortcomings. While the US will remain the major contributor and player within the Alliance there is a pressing need for Europe to take a more coordinated approach; the days of a fully integrated European Foreign and Defense policy are a long way off; indeed they may never arrive but that does not obviate the need to face the problem.

In the upcoming Washington Summit, NATO will attempt to grasp the issues and issue a new Strategic Concept which will outline how it intends to adapt to the changing strategic environment. US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright has emphasized the need for "the right balance between affirming the centrality of NATO's collective defense missions and responding to such crises as Bosnia and Kosovo." ¹³ She goes on to stress the need "to improve both our (NATO's) flexibility and our capability to prevent, deter and if necessary respond to the full spectrum of possible threats to Alliance interests." In seeking these goals she has pointed at the need for Europe to play a full part:

Our interest is clear: we want a Europe that can act. We want a Europe with modern, flexible military forces that

are capable of putting out fires in Europe's back yard and working with us through the Alliance to defend our common interests. European efforts to do more for European defense make it easier, not harder, for us to remain engaged."

From both the US and the European perspective there is a need to bolster the latter's ability to act on its own, but such a goal will require effort on both sides of the Atlantic. There will be a continued need for US support and involvement even in a European led operation; there will be the need to include non NATO European countries which will embody elements of both the Partnership for Peace Program and NATO expansion; there will be need to develop ESDI in order that WEU-led operations can become a reality. While the US will be tempted to achieve these goals by providing external support to the process it must recognize that it is equally important that it remains fully committed from within the Alliance. By way of illustration, the disparity between certain elements of US and NATO doctrine and procedures remains an anomaly, one that the US should attempt to correct from within rather than impose from without or ignore altogether. For their part the Europeans need to show genuine political will if ESDI is to be more than an empty shell; it must become the second of two pillars in NATO, with the US providing the other. There is no need to duplicate NATO, create

a European standing army, or move away from intergovernmental decision making but there is a requirement for a European decision making and command structure which can operate rapidly and effectively; this needs to be supported by an appropriate structure at the European Union (EU) / European Council level that is prepared to take strategic decisions in Europe-only operations¹⁴. A step in this direction, provided the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty is ratified, will be the appointment of the EU's first 'High Representative for Foreign Policy' who will attempt to co-ordinate policy, although he will have no troops at his disposal, and will represent the voice of Europe in the event of a global crisis; a voice that has some way to go before it can carry the weight commensurate with Europe's economic position, but a voice nonetheless. The fact that ESDI is evolving might have been resisted by the US in the past but as already stated it is seen increasingly as the means of ensuring continued US engagement. As Europe begins to play a defense role more in proportion with her economic status, individual countries will be increasingly bound together and have to speak with through the WEU with a common voice; as such ESDI is the path away from national defense to a Europe wide approach in which the individual nations have to take a more co-operative approach. The problem that arises here is that such an approach must include not only those countries that belong to NATO and

the EU but it must expand if it is to become truly capable of addressing issues from a global perspective; failure in this respect will mean that decisions will continue to have a transatlantic emphasis. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), formerly the North Atlantic Co-Operation Council (NACC)¹⁵, is an attempt to address this problem as it includes NATO, the WEU, the Council of Europe and the CIS countries as illustrated at Figure 1.




Figure 1

The role of the EAPC, and the NACC before it, is largely consultative within the existing framework of collective defense, it provides an essential element in a number of defense-related fields¹⁶ but it suffers from inevitable constraints in that it remains a regional rather than a truly international organization.

While the UN represented one model of an international organization, it has been only partially successful as discussed previously. An alternative model is found in the OSCE, which has the potential to act as "the foundation of a new security environment."¹⁷ Referring again to Figure 1 the breadth of OSCE interest and involvement is immediately apparent and to quote General Shelton again:

As we stand on the threshold of a new century, we have a unique opportunity to achieve a co-operative security regime on the Eurasian continent that is founded on mutual respect and trust. And I believe that the values, interests, and risks we now share are far greater than those issues that may still divide us.

The OSCE has served as an important forum for the reduction of international tension and the establishment of arms reduction and arms control measures. Its members have demonstrated their commitment to security, stability and peaceful settlement of disputes, and the OSCE has developed procedures and institutions to promote and secure peaceful settlements under the UN Charter.¹⁸ As such it incorporates an approach which can be described as both comprehensive and co-operative; most significantly in terms of its potential for success all states have equal status within the organization which underpins the principle of co-operative security. However, it does not include any form of military capability; for this it needs to look elsewhere and consequently it cannot provide any defense guarantees. In addition much of its credibility is derived through a policy of mutual trust and confidence building based upon maximum transparency and exchange of information; quoting General Shelton once more:

After 50 years, we are trying to replace Cold War mistrust and suspicion with the transparency and mutual confidence essential to success in the 21st Century. In other words, we are trying to replace an iron curtain with a picture window....and it's a complex task.

The challenge that emerges is how potential of the OSCE can be maximized and how it can be integrated, or at least ensured maximum interaction, with other organizations such as the UN , NATO and the WEU. Formal links do exist and, particularly in the context of NATO, these have been reinforced through the co-operation that has been necessary in recent years in Bosnia where NATO has provided considerable support for OSCE sponsored elections and the process of arms control and verification. In itself Bosnia provides an interesting case study in that it has brought a greater realization of the need for closer co-operation; what is essential now is that the lessons that have emerged and the various shortcomings that have been revealed are fully understood. They must be used as the basis for developing long term relationships that lead to a closer alignment of the collective security approach of NATO and the co-operative model offered by OSCE; co-operation between the OSCE and other security organizations must be mutually reinforcing at both the political and the operational levels. Unless this occurs the goal stated by Secretary of State Albright will be little more than illusion:

Since 1975, the OSCE has been an important instrument for preventing conflict, a champion of human rights and the rule of law, a standard bearer for open economies, open

societies, and open minds. We should see it today as our institution of choice for defending democracy in Europe.¹⁹

Developing true co-operative security is an ambitious task; fundamental to its success is the need for trust. Confidence and security building measures such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) stress the importance of trust by virtue of the need for transparency, exchange of information and effective verification between nations, but loopholes remain through which the less scrupulous can circumvent the terms. Herein lies the biggest difficulty, the central issue that all participating states within a co-operative security agreement must accept the principle not to enhance their security at the expense of the security of other states, either collectively or individually. In this context Russian views on NATO expansion are understandable in that it appears to contradict the more altruistic ideals of the co-operative approach to security. Achieving meaningful co-operative security may be thwarted from another direction; this is the tendency for the West in general, and the US in particular, to seek short term solutions to what are essentially long term problems, an approach that carries inherent risk of being misunderstood.

At this stage it is necessary to draw together some of the emerging conclusions associated with operating within a global security environment, before looking at the implications for the application for military force within the alliance or coalition context. First, there is no suggestion that one or other of the major international security organizations (UN, NATO, OSCE, WEU) is the most appropriate model; each has its own characteristics and strengths and there are considerable differences in their origins, charters and capabilities that would make it impossible to nominate one or other. However, what is clear is the need for change that goes beyond what can be termed 're-engineering;' change that enables these organizations to interact with each other more effectively. To this end UN reform should concentrate on putting the emphasis on its core capabilities with the OSCE playing a greater role in global security; in both cases the essential first step is the agreement and commitment of member nations. With NATO expansion likely to remain an ongoing process, the next step is to ensure closer and more formal links between it and the OSCE in order to give the latter a more robust capability; such a move must be done under the banner of 'co-operative security' if it is to succeed. In addition NATO's evolution in this direction needs to encompass an increasing role for the WEU.

GLOBAL SECURITY - THE MILITARY DIMENSION

If trust between states is essential in terms of agreeing to any meaningful approach to co-operative security within the political context, then it is equally so when it comes to executing any form of collective military action⁶. Assuming that political agreement has been reached, the first obstacle either within NATO or within a coalition is the inevitable difficulty in achieving agreement as to what constitutes an appropriate force for whatever mission has been decided. Views will range from those who wish to deploy disproportionately large forces in order to ensure success with minimum casualties to those who are motivated by a mix of military requirement and political expediency which says 'let's make the smallest possible contribution for the maximum political gain.' While the debate rages the quality and nature of the forces being offered has to be taken into account; to suggest groupings of forces and carefully tailored missions commensurate with the capabilities of the individual alliance members may be a partial answer. In reality the ability to pick and choose may be denied, added to which the principle might work for Peace Operations but could well lack the necessary flexibility for warfighting. The result of this phase of any deployment is potential delay to what would otherwise have been a timely deployment; even within NATO,

or perhaps especially within NATO the need for consensus within the North Atlantic Council (NAC) epitomizes the difficulties. The argument that this is inevitable within a group of democratic countries is valid but needs to be viewed with a little skepticism if NATO is not to run the risk of becoming a hollow threat in the long term.

With timely deployment of a force appropriate to the task as the first prerequisite; the next hurdle is interoperability. Increasingly there is a technology gap between members of NATO and prospective members, or coalition partners; this is particularly acute in the case of the US and other allies. To exacerbate this further procedural differences are numerous. As the major partner the US must address the problem of conflicting, or merely, different procedures and capabilities amongst alliance partners. As operations become increasingly complex and the technological gap increases between individual members of an alliance there must be a higher degree of integration. It is important to avoid the situation summed up by Air Marshall McCormack of the Royal Australian Air Force: "The US will do what it will, leaving the rest of the world to do what it can."

As far as technological differences are concerned the US needs to develop sufficient compatibility in data and information to provide a reasonable level of technical interoperability with prospective coalition members; failure to do so not only creates potential difficulties in command and control but it presents an open invitation for exploitation by an enemy and undermines both the number of countries willing to participate, and cohesion within the coalition once it has been formed. Technological differences will raise some sensitivities but this must not become an excuse for inaction. Procedurally the situation is similar but there is less justification, other than for some procedures that are linked directly to technology. The goal must be maximum commonality amongst alliance and prospective coalition members; this has been one of NATO's strengths and thus it remains an anomaly that the US still elects to adopt an 'optional' approach to NATO procedures. There is no suggestion that the US should abandon its own procedures and adopt NATO ones overnight but it could be advantageous to take a more emancipated approach under which it worked from within NATO to ensure greater commonality in future. The US does not stand alone in this respect as is shown by the current approach to logistics on multinational operations under which national 'stove-piping' causes anything between 35% and 40% wastage;

nonetheless a greater commitment to NATO doctrine and procedures from its biggest member would send a message.

Returning to the theme of 'trust,' much has been said about its significance within coalition operations; particularly given the assumption that the center of gravity within these operations is likely to be the coalition itself. Trust must be real. There is no doubt that trust builds up once multinational troops are deployed within a coalition on operations; equally there is no doubt that within NATO much has been done to establish mutual understanding and co-operation outside actual deployment on operations and increasingly multinational planning is the rule rather than the exception. Nonetheless, trust should not be taken for granted; it will often need to be earned and will embody mutual respect from the highest to the lowest levels and it is essential that everything is done to encourage it. Openness and honesty are the foundations upon which trust is built but for it to be translated from an abstract concept into concrete product there is a need to develop the mechanisms and procedures through which it operates; these include exchange of information, the use of liaison officers, the integration of officers of other nationalities into national headquarters, more effective joint integration within headquarters and more combined training to name but a few.

The process of change that started with the end of the Cold War has produced an opportunity to go beyond the normal process of evolution with its conations of protracted periods of time, to a more fundamental and rapid period of change within the global security environment. International organizations are facing the challenge but there remains a pressing need to ensure that there is much closer multinational integration at all levels. Failure to do so will result in those organizations and alliances becoming increasingly ineffective; success will multiply their potential influence exponentially.

5853 Words (Excluding bibliography, endnotes and quotations).

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Alliance defined as " The result of formal agreements (ie treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long term objectives which further the common interests of the members." AJPI(A)
- ² Coalition defined as " The grouping of nations or forces, usually on a temporary basis, for the accomplishment of a stated goal." AJPI-(A).
- ³ NATO Article V: " The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of the individual or collective self defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." NATO Handbook.
- ⁴ UK Prime Minister Blair in an interview with 'Die Welt Am Sonntag' 1 November 1998
- ⁵ Martin Luther King Jr
- ⁶ Prime Minister Blair. 6 October 1998
- ⁷ Economist Annual Review 1998
- ⁸ University of Miami. North / South Center Lecture, November 1998
- ⁹ UK Foreign Secretary, Rt Hon Robin Cook, 16 October 1998
- ¹⁰ President Clinton on the subject of NATO expansion.
- ¹¹ Ambassador Kennan, former US Ambassador to the Soviet Union has stated that " expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era"" Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the Cold War to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our (US) liking. And last but not least, it might make it much more difficult, if not impossible, to secure the Russian Duma's ratification of the START II agreement and to achieve further reductions of nuclear weaponry."
- ¹² " Factors Prompting Change in the European Security Environment and Their Influence on Security Concepts." A paper given to OSCE on 26 January 1998 by General Henry H Shelton, US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- ¹³ " NATO: Ready for the 21st Century" by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. December 1998.

¹⁴ This much was agreed at the Berlin Conference in 1996.

¹⁵ The North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) was superseded by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) at Sintra, Portugal on 30 May 1997.

¹⁶ These include political consultation, PfP matters, economic issues, information and cultural relations, scientific and environmental issues.

¹⁷ "Factors Prompting Change in the European Security Environment and Their Influence on Security Concepts." A paper given to OSCE on 26 January 1998 by General Henry H Shelton, US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff.

¹⁸ As a regional arrangement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter the OSCE has made clear its willingness to participate in, conduct or lead Peace Support Operations under Chapter VI.

¹⁹ Secretary of State Albright.

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