

**STRATEGY  
RESEARCH  
PROJECT**

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**TRAINING THE ARMY AFTER NEXT**

**BY**

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## ABSTRACT

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As the US Army looks toward the future many challenges emerge. The end of the Cold War removes the Army's 50-year focus on the threat of Warsaw Pact forces. This creates an environment of uncertainty and ambiguity. This environment generates the need for change in an Army conditioned to a clear-cut threat. By necessity changes have already begun. To maximize resources and transition the force to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, the Army generated two broad initiatives - Force XXI and the Army After Next Project. Through these initiatives the Army will implement change to meet the demands of the future. Army After Next focuses on the time period 2015 and beyond. This paper addresses training doctrine and methodology for the Army After Next as concepts turn to reality. The study highlights that current Army training doctrine and training methods are not sufficient to develop an effective force for the future. The study concludes that to be successful, our training doctrine and methodology must undergo an immediate transformation to

effectively and efficiently develop soldiers, leaders, staffs,  
and units for future demands.

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## INTRODUCTION

*The almost studied indifference of the American people towards reasonable preparation for the contingency of war makes more urgent the duty of all officers or those who hope to become officers, to do all in their power in advance to prepare themselves and those committed to their care for the immense responsibilities that will rest upon them when the storm bursts upon the nation.*

— P.S. Bond

As the nation presses into the uncertain, complex and challenging environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, the United States Army strives to define its role in support of the nation's security requirements. Realizing the consequences of a haphazard transition into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, the Army aggressively seeks to control its future. The Army looks to meet its requirements - shape the global environment in concert with political objectives and respond upon demand across the full spectrum of conflict.<sup>1</sup>

Although limited by decreasing resources, a significantly increased operations tempo (OPTEMPO), and an uncertain global environment, the Army leads the way within the Department of Defense (DOD) with its Force XXI and Army After Next (AAN) initiatives to generate a path to future readiness. These initiatives address the need to maintain selected methods, adjust certain others, and in several

areas outright change to meet the nation's demands and future challenges.

Both initiatives build their structure based on a foundation using Doctrine, Training, Leader development, Organization, Material, and Soldier systems (DTLOMS). Each area is important and the Army addresses each to construct a smooth road to the future. General(Ret) William W. Hartzog, former commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) understood the importance of using a structured approach. Moreover, he recognized the delicate relationship among DTLOMS areas.

At the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command... which is charged with preparing the Army for war and being the architect of its future, we are making changes in all our mission areas - doctrine, training, and combat developments. We know that these are related, that they are interdependent. If they are kept in balance, we will wind up with a trained and ready force. If we pay more attention to one than others, the result will be an untrained and ill prepared force.<sup>2</sup>

Although change within each area of DTLOMS impacts the future readiness of our force, this study focuses on the training aspect.

The training of soldiers, staffs, leaders, and units has always challenged the armies of the world. Numerous accounts exist of untrained armies, in some instances larger and better equipped armies, being beaten by well-trained armies with

limited resources and out-dated equipment. Of particular note though are those nations that produce well-trained soldiers, leaders, and units. Throughout the ages they acquitted themselves well in armed conflict. Effective training enables soldiers and units to execute the concepts outlined in doctrine, to operate efficiently within the established structure of the organization, and to leverage the available technology and equipment to enhance their individual and collective capability. In short, despite the requirement for a balanced approach within DTLOMS, training ultimately becomes the decisive element. Without a trained force we invite failure, succeed at great cost, or at best defeat an unprepared foe.

Despite past performance and on-going efforts to address future training requirements, the United States Army must immediately and with extreme urgency update its current training doctrine. This doctrine must accurately reflect current reality in order to effectively and efficiently direct AAN training. It must retain its focus on the principles of training yet accurately define the methodology (the "how to") that efficiently sets the conditions for the force to achieve the desired results. Additionally, the Army must actively involve the force in the development process and then inculcate the resultant doctrine into all soldiers. Anything less jeopardizes

the Army's ability to respond across the full spectrum of conflict - now and in the future.

To fully appreciate the severity of the situation, the study briefly defines the Force XXI and AAN strategies. It then identifies and highlights the competencies that the Army expects its soldiers, leaders, staffs, and units to possess and execute. Focusing on training within DTLOMS, the study then defines the Army training strategies. Finally, it identifies strengths and weaknesses and offers recommendations for consideration.

## THE U.S. ARMY'S ROAD TO THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY

*Strategy includes the working out of consequences. The ranks...from general to modest chevron correspond to an ordering of reality in which plans produce orders, orders produce actions, and actions produce isolated episodes of swirling fury where the issue hangs or falls on the skill and fortitude of individual human beings, under conditions of indescribable repulsiveness and stress.*

— Eric Larabee

The United States Army truly recognizes the grave importance of an overarching strategy to guide us into the future and the consequences of that strategy.

Additionally, the Army understands the importance of the human element. What is missing, however, is recognition of the importance man plays in forging the skills required to operate in the AAN environment and the methodology to acquire those skills.

### **FORCE XXI**

Force XXI is the near term strategy used to guide the Army into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century up to the year 2010. TRADOC PAMPHLET 525-5, *FORCE XXI OPERATIONS, A Concept for the Evolution of Full Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century*, validated the Army's direction in 1994 but the genesis for FORCE XXI occurred in 1982.<sup>3</sup>

The FORCE XXI process incorporates a number of wide ranging, but integrated activities including research, field trials, wargaming, computer assisted analysis and simulations, strategic management, professional development, training and force modernization programs, all focused on providing the synchronized development of landpower.<sup>4</sup>

Force XXI fuels the Army's venture into the future and will continue to provide direction for the next 11 years.

#### **ARMY AFTER NEXT**

AAN drives the U.S. Army's longer-term strategy for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. DTLOMS structures the strategy as the Army anticipates revolutionary technological advances and military applications of those advances. Rooted in doctrine, organization, and material, the AAN initiative defines an overarching doctrine in response to anticipated roles and projected threats. AAN proposes a tentative doctrine, organizational changes (**Strike Force Concept**), and addresses soldier, staff, leader, and unit capabilities.<sup>5</sup> What hasn't been clearly articulated in both initiatives is how the Army will train to achieve these visions.

## **AAN REQUIREMENTS**

As the Army strives to master itself during this period of change, it faces daily and near term challenges. A severely reduced budget, an extreme drawdown of personnel, and a rocket like OPTEMPO all drain time and energy from the force. In response, the Army mortgaged current readiness for an increased capability in the future. By accepting risk, the Army invested time, energy, money, and people into Army After Next experimentation. Fortunately, our enemies have not capitalized on the lack of depth our investment strategy created. Although the Army sacrificed in many ways that it should not be required to, the AAN experiments generated Army After Next baseline characteristics. These are listed below:

- **Exceptional strategic, operational and tactical mobility**
- **The right force mix**
- **The right combination of lethal and non-lethal technologies**
- **Expandable for continuous operations in a hyper-fast complex environment**
- **Enhanced logistics systems**
- **Strategically agile in addressing the range of unconventional threats we may face**
- **Maximizes human resources<sup>6</sup>**

These characteristics focus AAN efforts and guide developments throughout the DTLOMS arena. Analysis of the characteristics from numerous sources reveals the skills our Army After Next

soldiers, staffs, leaders, and units require. These requirements are listed below:

#### **SOLDIER REQUIREMENTS**

- Physically fit and mentally tough/agile
- Radically enhanced "physical agility"
- Greater situational awareness
- Display initiative to implement critical tasks
- Interface with other governmental agencies, allies, and non-governmental partners
- Ability to learn as an individual and within an organization
- Leverage technology and new equipment
- Live fundamental Army values
- Operate in an NBC environment
- Operate in a decentralized, less controlled environment

#### **LEADER REQUIREMENTS**

- Physically fit and mentally tough/agile
- Capable of massing decisive effects
- Function with other governmental agencies, allies, and non-governmental agencies
- Manage an increased amount of information
- Handle increased pressure and stress
- Capable of leveraging technology
- Employ a myriad of systems
- Must be able to reflect/inquire
- Comfortable operating on a larger battlefield
- Leadership requirements enhanced
- Develop their own techniques and individual methods for receiving, viewing, and filtering information
- Develop plans and make decisions faster
- Learning as an individual and within the organization

#### **STAFF REQUIREMENTS**

- Design the right force mix to meet the requirements

- Gain and apply the results of information dominance
- Streamline and accelerate sound and creative planning, decisionmaking and control
- Work as an internetted "team of teams"
- Operate through split-basing
- Operate as a member of an ad-hoc team
- Must be far more agile and perceptive to support dynamic decisionmaking
- Act as a receptacle headquarters
- Must be adaptive to current information
- Capable of processing more information into useable knowledge

#### UNIT REQUIREMENTS

- React to increased tempo
- Operate in a distributed, decentralized, non-contiguous manner
- Execute within an enhanced strategic, operational, and tactical mobility, velocity and sustainability environment
- Operate jointly
- Deploy as a hybrid force consisting of a mix of dissimilar units - each with different capabilities and vulnerabilities
- Understand and display proficiency using power projection infrastructure
- Rapidly deploy and execute missions along the full spectrum of conflict
- Protect against and react to asymmetric threats
- Participate in homeland defense operations
- Gain and sustain proficiency in urban environments
- Execute operations with interdependence on and mutual support of the other services, allies, governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and private volunteer organizations (PVO).

Although the above lists are not all inclusive, they provide a glimpse of the skills necessary for success in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. These skills focus the force as it develops a training strategy

to produce and sustain the required skills. Implementing an effective training strategy enhances the prospects of training a competent full spectrum force for the future. The study now looks at the Army's training initiatives for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Will they achieve the desired results?

### **TRAINING THE ARMY FOR AND IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY**

*The traditional strengths of the American soldier—an indomitable spirit, ingenuity and true grit—will allow the Army to remain the world's dominant land force, capable of employing decisive ground combat power across the full range of 21<sup>st</sup> Century operations. As the Army contemplates the most audacious visions of the future, its most powerful guarantor of the future is its oldest tradition: the well-trained and combat ready soldier.*

—GEN. John N. Abrams

The Army truly recognizes the importance of developing and maintaining well-trained soldiers, staffs, leaders, and units. The Army Training (AT) XXI Campaign plan and its three components - Warfighter XXI, Warrior XXI, and WarNet XXI - defines the direction for future Army training.

#### **AT XXI CAMPAIGN PLAN**

The draft AT XXI Campaign Plan published in 1996 "sets forth the objectives, direction, and process to ensure the best quality training and leader development of the Force XXI Army."<sup>7</sup>

It structures the Army's strategic movement into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century training arena. The Campaign Plan states that "Today's training doctrine is solid. It has served us well -- and will continue to serve -- as the foundation for our training strategy as we enter the new millennium."<sup>8</sup> This study disagrees with the assumption that our training doctrine is solid. Although much of its content remains valid, numerous aspects have evolved and must be re-addressed. Moreover, requirements of the AAN dictate that the training doctrine must adjust to keep pace.

Additionally AT XXI emphasizes that "the essence of Army Training XXI is the application of key enabling technologies to enhance the execution of Army training by exploiting new technologies in information systems and training methods."<sup>9</sup> There is no doubt that if employed properly, information technologies will enhance training. This occurs, however, only if we develop a new training doctrine that trainers at all levels can apply.

#### **WARFIGHTER XXI**

Warfighter XXI addresses the collective component of training. It focuses on the battle staff and collective tasks. Warfighter XXI consists of two major components - Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) and training management which includes Standard Army Training System (SATS), Training Support Packages

(TSP), Training Aids, Devices, Simulations, and Simulators (TADSS), Standard Army after Action Review System (STARRS) and the Army Training Digital Library (ATDL).

#### **WARRIOR XXI**

Warrior XXI addresses the training of the individual and the institutional role in developing soldiers and leaders. It consists of eight major initiatives:

- **Distance Learning**
- **Classroom XXI**
- **Total Army School System (TASS)**
- **Automation/Digitization**
- **Pre-testing**
- **Training Development (TD)**
- **Advanced Training Strategies**
- **Clusters and satellites<sup>10</sup>**

#### **WARNET XXI**

WARNET XXI analyzes the modernization efforts across the Army and ensures that training acquisition, new equipment training, and systems training support products are synchronized. It also ties into the Joint Venture aspect of modernization.<sup>11</sup>

## THE URGENT NEED FOR A NEW TRAINING DOCTRINE

Future commanders and staffs will have to master methods that will be more demanding than today. They must become more comfortable with IT, decision aids and simulations that will help provide direction and maintain control. They must maintain the traditional skills that provide purpose and motivation. A far higher percentage of leaders, planners, fighters and supporters will shoulder greater responsibility and receive less close supervision. Subordinates will need experience and expertise currently enjoyed by their superiors... We will not need super-humans, but individuals and organizations will have to achieve far more of their potential.<sup>12</sup>

Recent history confirms that the United States Army is the best trained ground power in the world. Success throughout the full spectrum of operations, despite decreasing resources and an intense OPTEMPO, resulted from a comprehensive training system and methodology. "Desert Storm's success was not magic, but rather the result of tough, realistic training honed to a razor's edge at home station and in our Combat Training Center (CTC) program."<sup>13</sup> That system based on current doctrine and methods served us well but as the introductory quote recognizes we must exceed our current capabilities to maintain our training edge in the future. The United States conducted Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Much has changed since then!

Although our training doctrine served us well in the past and sustains us in the present, it is now time to change. Moreover, evidence suggests we cannot achieve our full potential

as a force due to the inadequacies of our training doctrine and implementation of it.

But what about the Desert Storm experience? The much talked about post-Vietnam "rebirth" of the Army and its subsequent impressive effectiveness against the Iraqis seems to belie both the existence and importance of a competence gap. Unfortunately, some of this competence was illusory, and much of it transitory. While the performance of American Commanders was excellent overall, the extended preparation time afforded most units in-theater prior to the Ground War and the relative non-performance of the Iraqis threatens to skew conclusions. Further, post-war downsizing, resource constraints, competing non-combat missions (e.g. peacekeeping) and continual changes in technology contribute to the atrophy of critical competence.<sup>14</sup>

Our AT XXI initiatives recognize the need for change. We recognize the need to revisit our war fighting doctrine as outlined in FM 100-5. Additionally, overwhelming evidence indicates that our training doctrine and the inability to implement it limit our potential. Why then do we resist addressing the shortfalls within our training doctrine and fail to devise a doctrine that satisfies the requirements within our system? The CTC's cannot solve all of our training challenges. Our training doctrine must adapt to meet current and future realities. Our leader development system must then provide intense instruction to our leaders. This must happen quickly to prevent skipping a generation of trainers as we transition.

We must develop a new doctrine that defines the methods we will use to achieve the requirements specified by AAN concepts.

We cannot assume that all leaders are capable of identifying the implied training tasks that are essential tasks to mission accomplishment. The following looks at several key shortfalls currently evident and identifies the mismatches for the future.

### **TRAINING REALITY**

Soldiers, staffs, leaders, and units face current reality daily. Engaged throughout the world, they understand the strategy capabilities mismatch the Army currently faces. Over-tasked, underpaid, and under-resourced, they manage to effectively meet the demands of our NSS through hard work, dedication, and determination. They know, however, that despite a solid starting team the bench is not deep. We have sacrificed depth to meet multiple ends with limited means.

As a result when our soldiers and company grade leaders look to the future they realize that the status quo will not be sufficient. Many realized this years ago and adapted the Army's training doctrine to their specific circumstances. In the process numerous commanders instituted training policies within their units to efficiently and effectively maximize their training time. The CTC program gave true bite to this effort as units deployed to the CTCs and were given the opportunity to truly flex their collective muscles and stress their combat functions. Consequently, units improved. We must now include a

comprehensive analysis of our doctrine within the AT XXI initiative in order to lay the doctrinal foundation for commanders and their units. This foundation is necessary to respond successfully to current realities and meet the expectations of tomorrow. This doctrine must be understood by all and it must set the conditions for our junior leaders to effectively ready themselves and their units for the dangers that may arise in the future.

#### **MEETING THE CHALLENGE**

As we deal with our current circumstances, how do we begin to build soldiers, staffs, leaders, and units to meet AAN requirements? How do we develop and sustain the characteristics identified for our soldiers, staffs, leaders, and units? Strike Force, receptacle staffs, adaptive soldiers and leaders operating in a decentralized non-contiguous environment across the full spectrum of conflict - **How do we develop them?**

Certainly, AT XXI seeks to define a solution. AT XXI provides an initial look at 21<sup>st</sup> Century training; however, does not adequately address a functional training methodology. It does not actively involve the force and is ultimately flawed because it assumes our current training doctrine is sound.

The comprehensive training doctrine contained in FMs 25-100 and FM 25-101 is very good. We have clearly demonstrated - most recently in our preparation for

Bosnia- that it works well and continues to wear well too. It will remain the basis for our training as we enter the next millennium...I do not intend to invest a lot of time rewriting this doctrine.<sup>15</sup>

Our doctrine though is not sound. Units throughout the Army struggle under current doctrine to produce effective soldiers, staffs, leaders, and units. One study addresses the Army's leader development system and its inability to produce competent commanders.

In the summer of 1997 new lieutenants, products of Reserve Officer Training Corps programs at civilian universities, West Point, and Officer Candidate School will attend respective branch oriented officer basic courses, their first formal training as commissioned officers. Eighteen years later, in 2015, many will assume command of battalions, and soon after some will lead brigades. If tradition and trends continue, most will be intelligent, courageous and dedicated leaders, the product of years of work and the Army's Leader Development System, **and at the outset of hostilities, largely lacking key warfighting skills required for combat command.**<sup>16</sup>

How can we then build leaders for the future with a doctrine that struggles to produce competent leaders today?

This competence gap extends to soldiers, staffs, and units as well. It results from a lack of doctrine covering the methods for developing training within units. This lack of doctrine hampers those who lack the intuitive skills to adequately apply the principles of training within the current reality of our over-stressed system.

The process for developing training for units is ill-defined because there is no taxonomy or structure to

guide the development of the training. The doctrinal Field Manual FM 25-100 is excellent in laying out the broad principles of the Army training system. Although there is substantial material available on the Systems Approach to Training and ample TRADOC documentation on institutionalization of training in the school house, there is no overarching system or concept for the development of training to be conducted in units.<sup>17</sup>

That overarching system or concept must be a training doctrine that addresses the environment we expect to operate in. Not just the global environment but the realities of our own internal system. We must truly address the limitations placed upon us by the system we strive to defend using a comprehensive analysis. What missions are we required to perform above and beyond our mission essential task lists - Olympic support, Natural Disaster relief, demonstrations for Congress and other services to advertise our capabilities, Installation Support, renovating our infrastructure (self-help), Guard requirements, annual celebrations, etc? All of the above require time and energy and distract our real training efforts. What environmental restrictions limit our freedom to train realistically? How much actual time is available to train our soldiers, leaders and units in their primary tasks? How many troops are available? All of these items limit our ability to implement the current training doctrine. They must be accounted for and embedded in a new training doctrine. If we don't mitigate these limitations by removing or addressing them, we

retain a doctrine that is conceptual not realistic. This then drives the execution problems that the force experiences today.

## **FORCES FOR THE FUTURE**

How do we gain the characteristics identified in the concepts of Force XXI and AAN? Clearly the efforts we have generated to date will contribute. As we develop and implement a new strategy we must understand that

The revolution in military affairs will fundamentally alter how the Army conducts operations on future battlefields. To exploit this enormous potential, we must prepare for a new training revolution. Only a second training revolution can translate the potential of Army XXI and Army After Next into the lethal, cohesive and versatile organizations that the future will demand.<sup>18</sup>

How can we start a second training revolution without addressing the doctrine that generated the first revolution and adjusting or changing that doctrine to drive our future needs?

During the Army's first training revolution started in the early 1970's, Army leadership recognized that

By the mid-1970's, there was a consensus within the Army, the executive branch, and Congress that the Warsaw Pact nations possessed technology equal, and in many cases superior, to that of the United States, as well as forces outnumbering those of NATO. All those factors came together to convince many senior trainers that the perceived deficit might be substantially offset in a future conflict by better training. The Army needed a training system that was capable of maintaining acceptable levels of readiness at all times.<sup>19</sup>

As the Army moved through the process of institutionalizing the concepts, the leadership recognized that "Combat readiness was based upon successful implementation of the training philosophy ... in... FM 25-100...which required TRADOC to develop a complete training strategy that was battle focused and based on each unit's mission essential task list."<sup>20</sup> The Army understood that FM 25-100 although essential was not the complete answer. Training the force gained further resolution when

Late in 1990, the Army introduced the long awaited FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training, its newest major training doctrine manual, which was intended to guide the training of battalion and company soldiers, leaders, and units... While FM 25-100 focused primarily on the responsibilities of senior active and reserve commanders, command sergeants major, and staffs at levels above battalion, FM 25-101 served as a "how to" manual for battalions and companies. FM 25-101 also reflected the ideology and philosophy behind CATS and other new Army initiatives: the Army could not afford to train in the future as it had in the past.<sup>21</sup>

As we enter into a similar period with today's Army, why does our leadership feel that our doctrine both at the FM 25-100 and 25-101 level is relevant enough to transition us into the future? Leaders at the local level adjusted training doctrine to handle reality. The majority of these adjustments have never been formally documented. Consequently, numerous effective methods are unavailable to the entire Army. These good ideas at a minimum need to be addressed.

Several senior leaders have recognized implementation problems with the current doctrine as well.

The training doctrine in FM 25-100 must become institutionalized across America's Army...We are not there yet, despite the fact that our training doctrine has been in place for many years. We must continue to push it down to the lowest levels. It must be internalized.<sup>22</sup>

Could it be that our training doctrine briefs well (and in an ideal world would be the perfect answer) but in the real world the doctrine proves unexecutable?

With the Army's analysis of AAN requirements we expect the environment both globally and internally to be different. We expect more from our soldiers, staffs, leaders, and units. We expect our warfighting doctrine to be different. Moreover, we expect our forces to be trained across the full spectrum of war capable of rapid transition within the spectrum of conflict. This then blurs the intent of establishing a mission essential task list as units must operate across the full spectrum. The expectations of the AAN warrant a focused, and critical review of our current training doctrine. Once this review begins, it must be accelerated in order to effectively leverage the AAN capabilities and achieve the desired AAN endstate. Several recommendations are offered below.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### **Update the Principles of Training**

Overall the principles of training remain relevant for today's Army and the AAN. They do, however, need refinement to ensure leaders truly understand the general direction provided by the principles. "The principles provide direction, but are sufficiently flexible to accommodate local conditions and the judgment of commanders and other leaders".<sup>23</sup> To build an effective force for the future, the principles must adjust to reflect projected requirements.

For instance operations across the full spectrum of conflict with multi-national forces, other governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and private volunteer organizations (PVO) have risen in frequency and importance yet our training doctrine neglects the subject. Combine with the ***Train as a combined arms and services team*** principle to emphasize the importance of training with these other organizations to achieve full spectrum success.

***Use appropriate doctrine*** is another principle that requires clarification. As we experiment to find our optimum AAN doctrine, trainers must be aware of the requirement to train to the accepted doctrine. This principle must highlight the experimental nature of the doctrine and ensure functional understanding by all when the doctrine is finally accepted.

**Train to sustain proficiency** requires study and refinement as well. With the increased OPTEMPO and requirements placed on units, leaders, staffs, and individuals, skill decay becomes an extremely important issue. Flexibility and rapid response power projection relies on decreased skill decay. How do we minimize skill decay at all levels? One method for consideration is the synergistic use of all training domains to retard skill decay. The three available domains - live, virtual, and constructive - all bring benefits to the training environment. As the technological concepts become reality, virtual and constructive systems will provide effective and efficient methods to supplement our live training. By providing low cost repetition against changing scenarios and threats, these systems will enhance training. The optimum balance must be determined and demonstrated to the force in order to apply the most effective mix while developing training strategies. Efficient use of the different training domains will slow skill decay and minimize the need for live training. "It is the evolving relationship of these three areas that provides the best insights into the future of Army training."<sup>24</sup>

**Train using multiechelon techniques** is another principle requiring refinement. Application of the three training domains will improve multi-echelon training as well. FM 25-101 must identify and address the available combinations.

Moreover, multi-echelon training within units is misunderstood. Training doctrine must provide illustrated examples of efficient multi-echelon training for junior leaders to model their training.

Add ***Train Yourself*** as a principle. A key component to the success of any organization is the individual. His personal competence, his role as a team member or leader, and his ability to progress through the organization contribute to organizational health and development. The potential consequences of individual actions across the full spectrum of Army operations magnifies the importance of personal competence. "While individual training doesn't get the special attention that collective training does, it is nevertheless the flat-out MOST important of the two types... Collective skills are dependent on individual skills".<sup>25</sup> The individual must understand that importance. Although leadership retains a role in individual training no matter at what level, the individual himself must understand that he is responsible for his own training as well. Army training doctrine must highlight this as a training principle. The Army must adapt a personal training strategy patterned after Peter Senge's personal mastery strategy outlined in his book, *The Fifth Discipline*.

The way to begin developing a sense of personal mastery is to approach it as a *discipline*, as a series of practices and principles that must be applied to be

useful. Just as one becomes a master artist by continual practice, so the following principles and practices lay the groundwork for continually expanding personal mastery.<sup>26</sup>

**Training Yourself** then becomes the principle that provides direction for the young soldiers and officers as they progress. By guiding individuals to seek personal mastery we create an organization that continually learns and develops.

"Organizations learn only through individuals that learn."<sup>27</sup> If we develop individuals who strive to achieve personal mastery the entire organization benefits and will be better suited to meet the challenges of the future. "One of the most fascinating aspects of people with high levels of personal mastery is their ability to accomplish extraordinarily complex tasks with grace and ease."<sup>28</sup> Extremely desirable in our soldiers and leaders of today, it will prove essential for future survival.

We already envision that future battlefields will be a less forgiving crucible, and relative advantages in leadership, teamwork, competence, creativity, commitment and steadfastness will play an even greater role in deciding who wins, who loses and at what cost.<sup>29</sup>

Well-trained individuals will be the key!

### **Analyze the concept of Mission Essential Tasks**

Since the progress of global events in the next decades cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty, we need forces suitable for dealing with a broad range of strategic requirements and threats with speed, agility and decisiveness. The solution is building adaptive forces, commands that can be rapidly

tailored to meet diverse, changing requirements. We will develop these capabilities through a new organization we call the Army's Strike Force.<sup>30</sup>

How does the above force develop a Mission Essential Task List (METL)? It is not possible to refine your training tasks when you are responsible for multiple tasks across the full spectrum of conflict on short or no notice. A 1998 US Army War College Strategy Project proposes a Core Proficiency Task List (CPTL) which would identify those tasks fundamental to the unit accomplishing any mission it might be assigned.<sup>31</sup> This is a possible option; however, still does not address the resource shortages that drove units to a METL in the first place. There simply is not enough time, energy, or funds available to train every possible task. Possibly instead of focusing on mission essential tasks the units dedicate their efforts to their most likely rapid assault tasks and those tasks that occur in all possible environments like movement, reaction to contact, and force protection. The units then train to other likely tasks using only the virtual and/or constructive domain.

#### **Develop a MOOTW to War training template for 25-101**

Current as well as future requirements will possibly necessitate a rapid transition from engagement to major theater war. "Our military must also be able to transition to fighting major theater wars from a posture of global engagement - from

substantial levels of peacetime engagement overseas as well as multiple concurrent smaller scale contingencies.”<sup>32</sup> With this a reality, doctrine must highlight a training template that will help focus leaders at all levels to the essential tasks required for a successful transition. It will give senior leaders a feel for the time required to do so to standard. For instance, as a Battalion Commander in the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division, I had 71 training days to transition the Battalion from Peacekeeping Operations in the Sinai to mission readiness. At the time it was the quickest transition back to mission readiness that the 82<sup>nd</sup> had experienced. We rushed, pushed the soldiers hard, and really needed more time to fully implement all of our required warfighting skills. I anticipate that in the future, operations will dictate an even faster transition. If the force expects this rapid transition it must develop at a minimum a generic transition template. Units can model and adjust their training using the template. Ideally the template will have been tested and analyzed to determine the optimum training requirements based on available time and assign risk if other permutations are needed.

#### **Update training management practices to reflect reality**

Current training management procedures and the execution of those procedures do not adequately address the reality on the

ground. Frustration in the field results when training scheduled at higher levels is improperly forecasted limiting essential preparations for effective and efficient training. Ultimately a lack of timely and detailed implementing instructions (accurate staff work), forces subordinates at all levels to operate at the crises level thereby expending energy that is needed elsewhere. This is seen at all levels. Sound units are able to minimize the impact but still suffer from numerous training distracters. Mitigate these distracters at the highest levels. Every level producing friction in the system requires energy and time expenditure from subsequent lower levels. Consequently, maximum energy is expended by all prior to executing the training or in some cases training effectiveness and efficiency is degraded because time runs out.

AAN concepts will exacerbate this as the Strike Force Headquarters will require connectivity throughout the Army and Joint arena to ensure training exercises (whether live, virtual or constructive) are scheduled and conducted on a recurring basis. As we struggle with our current training management system that struggle will increase as we stress the system with even more requirements. This affects the next recommendation as well.

## **Ensure Leader Development programs emphasize training doctrine**

As we fight with the implementation of our current doctrine, we must ensure that our leaders truly understand training doctrine, training philosophy, training management, training exercise design, and training methodology. Evidence exists that the majority of our leaders at all levels do not have a functional knowledge of how to train under the current limitations of our system. "Given the many training events that units must accomplish in our smaller-power projection Army, *predictability* has become a real problem for our soldiers."<sup>33</sup> Although magnified by a lack of trained leaders, the overall system itself does not promote the elimination of training distracters.

## **CONCLUSION**

Our current training doctrine struggles to provide the direction required when placed under the stress and strain of current reality. How can we then expect it to serve as our foundation for the future when we anticipate that the future challenges will be even more demanding? As a result, we need to aggressively address all facets of our training doctrine and strive to develop a functional doctrine based on reality -- not the ideal environment. In all we do the key components remain the individual soldier, non-commissioned officer, and officer.

They will continue to contribute their best - we must give them a training doctrine that enhances their efforts. We cannot maintain one that limits them. Ultimately "machines can assist but warfare will remain an intensely human activity".<sup>34</sup> Training for warfare must be addressed with the same intense human action.

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## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY, The White House, October 1998, 12, 14.

<sup>2</sup> Gen. William W. Hartzog and Susan Canedy, "Training the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Army," Army, February 1997: 24.

<sup>3</sup> Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1993) 9.

<sup>4</sup> Department of the Army, Landpower(Draft), Army Pamphlet, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1999) 13.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>7</sup> Department of the Army, Army Training XXI Campaign Plan (Draft), Army Pamphlet, (Fort Monroe, VA.: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1996) 1.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>11</sup> Department of the Army, Warrior XXI Campaign Plan(Draft), Army Pamphlet, (Fort Monroe, VA.: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 3 March 1996) 2.

<sup>12</sup> Brigadier General (Ret) Hubba Wass de Czege and Major Jacob Biever, "Optimizing Future Battle Command Technologies," Military Review LXXVIII, (March-April 1998): 20-21.

<sup>13</sup> General Dennis J. Reimer, "Training: Our Army's Top Priority And Don't You Forget It," Military Review LXXVI, (July-August 96): 55.

<sup>14</sup> Col. Stanley A. McChrystal, LTC John D. Gardner, LTC Timothy P. McHale, Bridging the Competence Gap: Developing Tactical Leaders for the Army of 2015, Strategy Research Project, (Carlisle Barracks, PA.: United States Army War College, 1997) 1.

<sup>15</sup> Reimer, 56.

<sup>16</sup> Mchystal et al., 2.

<sup>17</sup> Fredric J. Brown, Information age training: converting potential to performance, (Alexandria, VA.: Institute for Defense Analyses, April 1995) I-3.

<sup>18</sup> Gen. Thomas N. Burnette, "The Second Training Revolution," Army, October 1997: 111.

<sup>19</sup> United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, The Army's Training Revolution 1973-1990, (Fort Monroe, VA.: Office of the Command Historian, 1991) 4.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 29.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 44-45.

<sup>22</sup> Reimer, 58.

<sup>23</sup> Department of the Army, Battle Focused Training, Field Manual 25-101, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 30 September 1990) 1-3.

<sup>24</sup> Burnette, 112.

<sup>25</sup> Col. Dandridge M. Malone, Small Unit Leadership, (Novato, CA.: Presidio Press, 1983) 65.

<sup>26</sup> Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the Learning Organization, (New York: Doubleday/Currency, 1990) 147.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 139.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 161.

<sup>29</sup> Wass de Czege, 15.

<sup>30</sup> Landpower, 3.

<sup>31</sup> LTC Michael D. Jones, LTC Mark E. O'Neill, LTC Curtis M. Scaparrotti, Training America's Army for the Next Millennium

Strategy Research Project, (Carlisle Barracks PA., United States Army War College, 1998) 35.

<sup>32</sup> A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY, 22.

<sup>33</sup> Reimer, 59.

<sup>34</sup> Wass de Czega, 15.



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