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**JOINING NATO:  
CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR POLAND**

**BY**

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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## **ABSTRACT**

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Poland's preparation for accession to NATO this year is well on track, and the country may even be set to become a net contributor rather than a net recipient within the Alliance. "Technically, it seems that all preparations for Poland's accession are well underway"- NATO's Military Committee Chairman General Klaus Naumann told a news conference when he visited Poland in early December 1998. This research project examines the key security issues and challenges facing Poland along the path to NATO membership. Particular research emphasis is placed upon Poland's efforts to redefine and restructure her civil-military relations and the turbulent transfer of control of the Polish military to democratically elected civilian authorities. In the research process, the major benefits and hazards associated with NATO membership are examined from a Polish perspective.

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## **BACKGROUND**

The end of the Cold War and the spread of democratization along with the collapse of Soviet communism meant that many countries around the world faced declining external-security threats. This situation has forced a new understanding of the armed forces' role. In many countries, a need emerged to redefine the roles and missions of military establishments and to reexamine civil-military relations. Among the newly established democratic countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Poland has led the way in these processes.

Before the democratic changes, the Polish military played a role in internal as well as external security, and remained strictly subordinate to communist authorities. Poland's efforts to build a new system of civilian controls over the military have been an essential aspect of the democratization process. One of the first priorities of the Solidarity-led government that came to power in Poland in 1989 was to reform the military and establish a new system of civilian controls. That process continues and will continue for the foreseeable future. NATO membership will provide Poland with credible security guarantees for the first time in its modern history, and also will give Poland the confidence that in case of aggression it can count on the assistance of its Allies.

On the other hand, by joining the NATO collective defense system and actively participating in NATO outreach activities, Poland will contribute to stability and security in Europe based on dialogue and cooperation.

If Poland is to make further progress down this road, the security assistance programs and the budgetary process must be reformed, guidelines must be established for the role of the military during domestic emergencies, and, perhaps most importantly, civil officials must be better informed on military issues. Establishing effective democratic relations between civilian and military spheres in Poland and building awareness of internal and external affairs related to Poland's future membership in NATO are not only Polish civilian political matters; Polish officers also need to study civil-military relations as part of their professional military education. Poland appears to be committed to building armies of soldiers who respect democratic political control and embody the foundations of democratic military professionalism. Infusing democratic military professionalism throughout the ranks will help to ensure that Poland makes a complete transition to democracy and achieves 'human interoperability' with NATO. Without democratic military professionalism, the Polish armed forces will lack the authority, leadership,

discipline and morale necessary to be effective and reliable partners in the integrated military structures of NATO.<sup>1</sup>

In order to analyze and understand Poland's civil military relations and control of the military in the context of Poland's membership in NATO and new Europe's security environment, it is necessary to examine Poland's new democratic realities in detail.

## **POLAND TODAY**

After fifty years under communism, Poland is trying to reestablish its general civil orientation towards the West and to participate in building European unity and creation of a new and just international order. Poland conducts its security policy in accordance with international law, in particular under the provisions of the United Nations Charter and those of other bilateral and multilateral inter-state agreements. This policy is also conducted in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

One of the key goals of the new Republic of Poland is the strengthening of its independent and sovereign statehood, along with guaranteeing human rights, freedom and civil rights. The permanent, independent and secure existence of a state is a prerequisite for the formation of an efficient democratic system. Such a system is based on the principles of a citizens' society as well as on market reforms, which improve the national economy. In the realm of international relations, Poland places particular importance upon the inviolability of the existing borders in Europe, abstinence from territorial claims, respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and the renouncement of the use of force or the threat of the use of force.

The United States has four fundamental national interests, and all of its interests and foreign policies can be aligned into these four categories. These long-term interests are defined as follows: Defense of Homeland, Economic Well-being, Favorable World Order (international security) and Promotion of Values (ideology).<sup>2</sup>

Polish national interests nearly mirror the U.S. ones, although there are some differences in the approach to "Favorable World Order" and "Promotion of Values" interests. Taking these interests into consideration, Poland is eager to accept the challenge to obey international rules and law in aspiring to NATO membership.

During the communist, Warsaw Pact period, Poland lacked a separate national military doctrine, had little capability for independent action, and had almost no national security planning experience. In Poland, the first attempt at new doctrine appeared in January 1990, based on the changed Polish context. Next, similar changes occurred in other Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), although their formulation was extremely difficult. These early doctrinal changes often appeared to be "out of touch with changing realities at home and across Europe"<sup>3</sup> in the eyes of the public.

Further changes in Poland in 1992 were more oriented towards the West and, in particular, NATO. Poland introduced a

new definitive defense policy and doctrine in "Defense and Security Guidelines" - written by General Stanislaw Koziej (1992).<sup>4</sup> These guidelines declared that Poland did not view any of its neighbors as enemies, although four main threat scenarios were identified: local limited conflict; large-scale war; threat from foreign forces based on Polish territory; and participation in the elimination of conflict outside the country's borders.

The threat from foreign forces based on Polish territory was eliminated with the Russian military withdrawal in 1993. New definitive defense doctrines and policies were slow to emerge primarily because of lack of experience and competent personnel, but also because of the fluid international environment of the nearly 1990s. In the Polish case, the new defense doctrines required the restructuring of the armed forces. In 26 March 1993, Polish Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz told the Parliament Defense Committee that the restructuring of the Polish armed forces and the General Staff was complete and now "we are talking about adjusting the structure and deployment of troops to new strategic concepts."<sup>5</sup> Onyszkiewicz also noted that during the next few years the Polish armed forces would be restructured along NATO lines, so the vision of further restructuring of the armed forces met the twin challenges of democratic transition and integration with the

West. That restructuring was based upon the concept of smaller, leaner and more mobile forces capable of participation in international security structures and operations. Poland also envisioned a shift in emphasis toward professional all-volunteer forces. In reality, however, all was not done. In fact, the enormous process of restructuring is nowhere near completion, nor can it be expected to be for another ten or twenty years.<sup>6</sup>

In Poland since 1989, efforts to establish civilian control have focused on three primary concerns: restructuring the military, ensuring that the military is removed from the political sphere, and creating a new sense of mission compatible with new geopolitical realities. Under the communists in Poland, civil-military relations were crucial and all-encompassing. As in the other communist countries, the military in Poland was actually subordinated not to the state but rather to the communist party. After 1989, major steps were taken to transform the Polish armed forces and their relationship with society, as party-army structures were dismantled. In Poland, the transformation has been from a component of the Warsaw Pact to a national force aspiring to NATO membership.<sup>7</sup>

"In addition, most East Europeans accept the Western standard that the military be apolitical -

that is, that the military be an instrument of policy in the hands of legitimate authority. The military is not to make policy; nor is it to lobby for policies beyond those which affect its narrow institutional interests.

In Poland, however, there has been much confusion over depoliticizing the military and democratizing it. Civilian control under the old regime consisted not just of submitting the officer corps to the will of the Polish United Worker's Party (PUWP) but also of mobilizing party members among the officers for political purposes, thereby politicizing the military. Consequently, the establishment of democratic civilian control has become mixed up with the concept of "decommunizing" the military, which is often referred to as democratizing the military. This idea of democratization is especially confusing to Poles when examined in light of the ideal of an apolitical military. How can an institution be both apolitical and democratic? Does "democratic" not suggest an ideology, as "communist" did?"<sup>8</sup>

Is the last paragraph of the above quote entirely true? It is not the aim of this paper to argue this point. The major point is that in each of the former communist countries of central Europe it was the military that viewed the transformation to democratic control as most important. In Poland, it was necessary to restructure the armed forces, to change rules, and to establish effective democratic management and democratic security policy in order to deal with the transformation problem. Those factors, taken together, provided a framework for interpreting and evaluating the transition regarding security policy in Poland.

The following were deemed necessary, by new Polish democratic government, for restructuring in Polish civil-military relations:

- a. Depoliticization (de-communicization) of the armed forces
- b. Establishment of civilian capability to control the armed forces with a civilian defense minister in charge
- c. Establishment of a new size, structure, equipment, nature and orientation of the armed forces
- d. Changes in the military education system, especially for staff officers

It was also clear that Poland needed a new constitution - one that effectively limits state institutions in existing law as the necessary condition to establishing proper control of the military.

## POLISH CIVIL-MILITARY RESTRUCTURING

Analyzing the Polish political situation at the beginning of the 1990s, it is clear that the Polish military did not effectively cooperate with the civilian defense ministry and that the military was politicized.

"De-communicization, or depolitization, as an element of civil-military restructuring had to be complemented by a process of demilitarization, or civilization, of defense policy-making. Under the communist system, as far as there had been policy and doctrine formation in any of the CEECs, it was understood that this was a charge of those with expertise - who were, of course, in the military. One of the major elements of democratic restructuring was the need to introduce a great civilian component within the policy formation process, notably, within the defense ministers. This meant the installing of civilian defense ministers, on one, relatively straightforward level, as well as the creation of cadre of civilian administrators to run defense affairs, on second, more complex level."<sup>9</sup>

Tadeusz Mazowiecki's first noncommunist government set several military-related goals for Poland:

- ◆ Securing the military's loyalty to the new government;
- ◆ Depolitization of the Armed Forces, in particular dismantling of all communist party organs within the ranks and elimination of the system of political officers;

- ◆ Severing the army's ties with Moscow and bringing the Polish armed forces completely under national control;
- ◆ Instituting personnel changes in the military high command;
- ◆ Fashioning a strategic reorientation of the armed forces and changing the nation's military posture accordingly;
- ◆ Reforming the special services, especially counterintelligence.

Implementation of these government initiatives to bring about civilian control of the military proved to be difficult. The institution of civilian defense minister has evolved gradually (Appendix 1). In the first non-communist government, the Defense Ministry remained under the military control of holdover communist General Florian Siwicki, with two "Solidarity" figures being appointed as deputy defense ministers in April 1990. General Siwicki was replaced by another military holdover, Rear Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk, in July 1990. Finally, the first civilian defense minister - Jan Parys - was appointed in December 1991. Parys was followed by Janusz Onyszkiewicz who served as Deputy Minister (1990-92) and then Minister of Defense (1992-93). Onyszkiewicz believed strongly that Poland must reorient her armed forces from their former allegiance to Moscow. His staff worked out independent

national and military doctrines and brought the Polish military under democratic civilian control.

"The essence of democratic policy management is that there should be the possibility of choice concerning not only policies themselves, but also those responsible for the execution of policy who can be held accountable - whether by parliament, the electorate, or law - for their actions."<sup>10</sup>

Given the importance of having democratic rules established, it follows that in the defense sphere, as in others, there may be problems where responsibilities are not clearly laid out. Among the CEECs, the most striking example of this type of problem emerged in Poland. The issue was not political control of the military "per se", but arguments in the political sphere about where civilian control would reside. Tension was created by "overlapping areas of authority" between the President, the National Security Council and the Defense Minister.<sup>11</sup> At that time - the early 1990s - there also was no legal framework setting out how the various committees should interact, largely because Poland lacked an effective constitution until May 1997. The Polish Constitutional Act dated October 17, 1992 (called "Little Constitution") which came into effect on December 8, 1992 did not effectively define the apolitical role of the army and hierarchy of responsibilities (e.g. - subordination of Chief of General Staff).

Since solid civil-military relations and effective civilian control of the military are fundamental components of a stable successful democracy,<sup>12</sup> Polish politicians - lacking their own experience in these areas - have adopted Western concepts.

U.S. military manuals on the law of war do not treat the question of resort to war; that is a matter for civilian authority to decide. The principle of civilian control over the military is an intrinsic part of American constitutional and political tradition. The legal basis for a military establishment is clearly set forth in the U.S. Constitution.

"This responsibility, coupled with treaty-making authority, the power to appoint federal officers, and the requirement to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," provides the principal constitutional bases for Presidential direction of national security affairs. Thus the responsibility for providing the nation's defense through the armed forces of the United States is constitutionally shared by civilian officials in the legislative and executive branches of the Federal Government".<sup>13</sup>

The military responsibilities to contribute strategic advice in support of policymaking and to produce military plans and operations to implement the decisions of civilian authorities are clear. According to the theory taught at the U.S. Army War College, achieving an appropriate and effective balance in civil-military relations today involves three important and interrelated dimensions of the challenge:

1. Maintaining a positive and effective working relationship between military and the political "estates."

2. Maintaining a positive and effective working relationship between the military and the media (the "fourth estate").

3. Employing the military as an instrument in support of the national security strategy objective of enlarging the community of market democracies through a variety of military-to-military programs. <sup>14</sup>

In each of the CEECs, as democracy was embraced, parliament gained a prominent role. One of the key indices of transition to democracy was the way in which defense and security committees functioned.

"It might be judged that the elements for effective democratic management of military matters were in place if the parliamentary committee and its chair were suitably able to scrutinize policy, the work of the defense ministry and the condition of the armed forces through use of formal and regularized procedures, and through the exercise of appropriate powers of scrutiny and reporting on behalf of parliament as a whole."<sup>15</sup>

In Poland, the question of the division of responsibility between the President and the government was dealt with in parliament. The so-called "Little Constitution" of 1992 did not define clearly the armed forces' role or hierarchy of responsibilities. In May 1994, Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk presented a document titled "Defense Problems and Military

Aspects of Polish Republic's Security Policies" to a closed cabinet session. This document was then reviewed by the Defense Affairs Committee, which insisted that the Commander of the Armed Forces should be subordinate to the Defense Minister and not to the President. President Walesa was strongly opposed to this plan. No final decision on subordination was made and the furor that followed eventually resulted in Kolodziejczyk's dismissal by Prime Minister Pawlak and the fall of Pawlak's government.

Following the election of a new president in 1995, subsequent legislation, and the adoption of a constitution in 1997, arrangements for democratic control in Poland became more settled. In the first chapter of the new constitution, titled "The Republic," the main principles of the political system have been defined, the political neutrality of the armed forces is codified, and their subordination to civilian and democratic control is clearly established. The new constitution paved the way for a civil-military relationship based on principles of hierarchy and responsibility. In terms of overall restructuring, it is clear that not only Poland but also a small group of other European countries have made relatively substantial and comprehensive progress. In no case is this evolutionary process anywhere near completion, but it

is significant that there has been notable progress in all areas in Poland.

## CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

The civilian political sector and the armed forces commonly constitute two of the most important players in any national political process. They are often different in political and social character and thus have a complex relationship. Military principles and democratic principles stand in fundamental opposition to each other. The military hierarchy involves authority from the top down; democratic systems are based on the consent of the governed from the grass roots up. The military principle develops the idea of discipline and unquestioning obedience; democratic political society is based upon the consent of the governed, freely given<sup>16</sup>.

Understanding the complex issues involved in civil-military relations in Poland's new democratic society was the main task for military and civilian leaders from the very beginning. The establishment of democratic structures between the civilian and military authorities was one of the most important achievements in the new Polish democracy and played a key role in accomplishing healthy civil-military relations as an essential element of security. Examination of this problem requires us to answer the question, "What are the criteria for democratic structures?"

First, there must be a constitution or basic law that clearly defines:

- ◆ The relationship between the president, government, parliament, and the military;
- ◆ The checks and balances applying to these relationships, including the role of the judiciary;
- ◆ Who commands the military;
- ◆ Who promotes military personnel;
- ◆ Who holds emergency powers in a crisis; and
- ◆ Where the authority lies for the transition from peace to war.

Second, there should be civilian oversight of an apolitical military. This should be exercised via democratic political control over the General Staff through the defense ministry - and the defense ministry should include a controlling civilian component which itself is subject to parliamentary control, especially in regard to the defense budget.

Third, the military should maintain adequate levels of training and equipment in order to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of the state, and to prevent demoralization and Bonapartism within the armed forces.<sup>17</sup>

Civilian control often depends largely on the individuals involved: how each side views its function, the public

respect, and the bureaucratic or political skills possessed by the various officials. In Poland, these factors have all varied over time. Taking into consideration the Polish situation dealing with the function of civil control of the army and applying the analyses of Samuel F. Huntington in his article "The Soldier and the State", we can see that the changes in Polish civil control have been "objective" ones.<sup>18</sup> Even so, the multiparty system of Polish society is still not ideally suited to such change because some party leaders still conceive of civilian control in "subjective" terms and insist upon the subordination of the officer corps to their own interests and principles. Particularly in the early post-communist years, Polish politicians often forgot that with civilian control goes civilian responsibility, and civilian control should be a shared responsibility of the executive and legislative branches.

"Democratic political control is strengthened when the military is given a stable, legitimate, institutionalized status within the state. To achieve this status, democratic states must order their civil-military relations to satisfy three conditions. First, the military must realize that it is not the ultimate guardian of the state's social/political order, and it alone cannot define the national interest. Second, the state must assign to the military a credible and honorable role in the defense of state and the accomplishment of national goals. Third, the state must prevent civilian politicians and military officers from misusing the military's monopoly of force to attain political goals or resolve partisan political disputes. In other words, the military must remain politically

neutral and non-partisan so that service members can serve successive elected leaders".<sup>19</sup>

The 1997 Polish Constitution solved some of those problems and many other long-range problems concerning civil-military relations and control of the armed forces. The principle that effective civil military control in a democracy requires pervasive transparency was taken into consideration when the 1997 Constitution was established.

The 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland spells out the provisions pertaining to the place and role of the armed forces in accordance with the principles of civil democracy. No separate chapter was devoted in this Constitution to the functioning of the armed forces and the defense of Poland. General concepts, civil rights, and the duties connected with this field nevertheless are rooted in the 1997 Constitution as important elements of the political system, the functioning of public authorities, as well as the legal and financial structure of the Polish State. Article 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland specifies that:

"1. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland shall safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of the State, and shall ensure the security and inviolability of its borders.

2. The Armed Forces shall observe neutrality regarding political matters and shall be subject to civil and democratic control."<sup>20</sup>

Article 26 formally integrates the Polish armed forces into the democratic mechanisms of the country. It imposes a clear constitutional ban against attempts to involve the military in politics and prohibits the armed forces from being governed by their own interests without observing the will and without the knowledge of the organs of public authority. The practical interpretation of the form of executive supreme command over the armed forces is contained in Article 134 in the chapter pertaining to the Office of the President of the Republic of Poland. The first section of Article 134 reads as follows:

"1. The President of the Republic shall be the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland.

2. The President of the Republic, in times of peace, shall exercise command over the Armed Forces through the Minister of National Defense.

3. The President of the Republic shall appoint, for a specified period of time, the Chief of the General Staff and the commanders of branches of the Armed Forces. The duration of their term of office, the procedure for and terms of their dismissal before the end thereof, shall be specified by statute."<sup>21</sup>

Thus the President is the constitutionally appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Polish armed forces, with direct control over the Minister of Defense and the highest military commanders. Of significant importance in exercising this control is a personnel rotation system. The Constitution creates a system of filling posts of command in the armed forces based on modern pragmatic principles. In accordance

with the Polish Constitution the basic executive powers associated with the management of the defense structures belong to the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Defense, who is also responsible to Parliament as a civil servant. In peacetime, the armed forces are commanded by the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, the highest-ranking officer in active military service, who commands on behalf of the Minister of National Defense. (See Appendix 2.) It is also significant that in accordance with the Constitution the Polish Parliament has full control over the armed forces' budget, as part of the national budget.

Is this transition to civilian control of the military completed? Probably not, but there has been significant movement in the right direction. Further progress will be heavily dependent upon maintenance of a meaningful dialogue between the executive and legislative branches on military control issues, and parliament's full participation in any negotiation process.

## CONTROL OF THE MILITARY AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY

In general terms, security means the relative absence of threat. In international relations, security can be broadly defined as the relative absence of the threat of armed conflict, that is, war. Thus, efforts to enhance European security must first aim at reducing the danger of war or any other armed conflict in Europe.

"Security rests both on political and on military stability. Political stability means that there is no incentive for armed conflict on the political level, be it because no major tensions exist which would induce the military solution, or be it because the peaceful solution of conflict has become a regular and accepted pattern of international relations. Military stability means that no state could hope to gain reasonable results by employing military force."<sup>22</sup>

The passing of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated conflict between two ideologically hostile blocs as the dominant feature of world politics. The political changes that resulted in the Warsaw Treaty dismantling created new international security conditions. Defense system reform and restructuring of the armed forces were two of the principal challenges that Poland faced after the fall of communism in 1989. Polish politicians had to resolve the following dilemma: was the country capable of becoming militarily self-reliant, or was participation in a collective

security system necessary to ensure the nation's security? No intricate calculations were needed to see that it would be cheaper for Poland to join a collective security system than to depend solely on national military resources. For a country of Poland's size and means, participation in an alliance was the only feasible way of ensuring the country's safety. In an effort to ensure security from external threats, Poland as a strategic objective set out to achieve membership in the North Atlantic alliance. Overcoming the heritage of the Warsaw Pact was among the chief conditions for the success of Polish efforts to join cooperative security under the leadership of NATO. The complexity of meeting the challenges of East-European regional stability demands the use of all the elements of national power - diplomatic and economic as well as military. The key question is how to integrate them effectively. The success of future Polish military alliances or coalitions will depend on a great degree of cooperation; it will require developing and implementing common doctrine, training, and the ability to operate smoothly as a combined, integrated force. The transformation of Poland's immediate and more distant international environment - emergence of new neighbors, intensification of the integration process in the European Union and strengthening of NATO's role in Europe -

has convinced Poland to build her security policy on three principal pillars:

- ◆ The development of good relations and regional cooperation with her neighbors.
- ◆ The participation in all-European cooperative arrangements, and support for the UN global system of security.
- ◆ The integration with West European and Euro-Atlantic security structures - NATO, the Western European Union and the European Union.<sup>23</sup>

Early on, in 1994, Poland joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and the process of adapting the defense system and the armed forces to the NATO model was set in motion. Substantial changes in the structure of the forces and the command and management systems have since been introduced. Most significant among the changes to date are:

- ◆ Creation of a separate service of Land Forces and establishment of its command.
- ◆ The development of the concept for new command and staff structures, corresponding to those in NATO countries.
- ◆ Changes in the structure of divisions from regiment-to brigade-based organization.
- ◆ Organization of two air defense corps and one air corps in the Air Force.

- ◆ Reorganization of the Navy into three flotillas of warships and a naval aviation brigade.
- ◆ Initiatives to modernize the defense infrastructure, including the logistics system.
- ◆ Launching governmental programs of technical modernization of the Polish armed forces.<sup>24</sup>

Central to NATO and EU concerns regarding security and democracy in Poland and other central and east European countries is the evolution of stable civil-military relations. Polish advocates of cooperative security have added the military control mechanisms developed in the last three decades to the traditional collective security repertoire. The implementation of civilian democratic control of the armed forces has been part of the construction of the democratic state and modern defense system. It also has been one of key elements in the process of adapting the Polish defense system to the requirements of NATO membership. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) has served as the basis for extended discussions with Polish civil and military leaders on the role of the military in society, and has helped to develop civil-military structures which are consistent with civilian control of the military in a democracy.

As Poland moves toward NATO membership through establishment of effective democratic civil-military relationships, civilian

army control and adaptation of her armed forces to NATO structure, there will be shared political, cultural and economic benefits. Poland also must be aware that the responsibility for stability in Europe should fall first on European nations and international organizations built on cooperative security. Such security processes are almost always based on accommodation and compromise, often on the lowest common denominator. Poland must be willing to work out differences on security issues in a spirit of cooperation. For the maintenance of Alliance unity, a commitment to building consensus is essential.

Taking into account the progress in the adaptation of Poland's defense system to NATO standards, Poland has prepared basic assumptions for a program of a long-term development of the armed forces.<sup>25</sup> The program's provisions are based on an estimate of possible threats to national security, assume Poland's membership in NATO, and include explicit tasks that the forces may be required to carry out in the future. The chief objectives of the program are:

- ◆ Further improvement of the command system at all levels,
- ◆ Modernization of basic weapons and equipment to bring them closer to NATO technical standards and to ensure maximum possible mobility of the armed forces,

- ◆ Reduction of the strength of the armed forces to 160-180 thousand and increases of professional cadre to 50-55%, (See Appendix 3.)
- ◆ Reduction of the conscript service term from 18 to 12 months,<sup>26</sup>
- ◆ Adapting the military education system to the new needs and increasing funds allocated for military education,
- ◆ Ensuring financial stability for the armed forces,
- ◆ Creation of a modern logistics system.

The program has also been crafted with a view to Poland's future membership of NATO by providing for:

- ◆ Building of the combat composition of the armed forces on two principal components: operational forces (committed to NATO) and territorial defense forces.
- ◆ Preparation to accept large quantities of possible future allied combat assets supplied by land, sea and air.
- ◆ Preparation of selected units in each of three services to become part of NATO rapid reaction forces.
- ◆ Preparation of selected units for operations within multinational corps.<sup>27</sup>

A cooperative security strategy depends on the ability of international organizations to coordinate collective action<sup>28</sup> and places a heavy burden on control of the military. Poland's

participation in the international security system envisages the possibility of its military involvement in the resolution of conflicts beyond Polish territory. Such involvement probably will be required by treaties binding Poland and result from the decisions of appropriate international bodies. After years of systematically deepened cooperation with Western Countries and intensive internal preparations, Poland now appears ready to contribute to cooperative security and for full membership in NATO. Since 1997, Poland has been an active participant in the NATO's Partnership for Peace program. Poland also has taken part in international peace-support operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, contributing substantial forces to NATO-led "Implementation Force" (IFOR) and NATO "Stabilization Force" (SFOR) contingents there. The potential problem with the Polish armed forces' continued participation in cooperative security abroad is addressed in Article 117 of Poland's 1997 Constitution:

"The principles for deployment of the Armed Forces beyond the borders of the Republic of Poland shall be specified by a ratified international agreement or by statute. The principles for the presence of foreign troops on the territory of the Republic of Poland and the principles for their movement within that territory shall be specified by ratified agreements or statutes."<sup>29</sup>

This is the constitutional provision that applies to Poland's prospective participation in NATO's military

structures. It places decisions about the use of Polish troops on foreign territory and the presence of foreign troops in Poland at the highest legislative level. For such important decisions the approval of the Polish Parliament is required, and approval must be expressed as a formal Act of Parliament or a ratified international agreement. Therefore specific, formal approval - expressed in the form of a vote by the democratically elected legislative authority of the Republic of Poland - will always be required in each instance. Can this model of legislative solution actually work after Poland's integration into NATO? For example, what about the troops assigned to NATO Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF)?

## THE POLISH ROUTE TO NATO

Polish steps toward NATO membership since 1989 have been very halting and uneven. Limited experience among either the civilian politicians or the senior military commanders has led to many mistakes, and a lot of government money has been wasted. Was there any way to have avoided or changed this situation? Theoretically it seems so; it should have been easy to enumerate the tasks and allocate appropriate resources to carry them out. Practically, however, it was far more complicated because of a lack of necessary knowledge, experience and qualified personnel. Further, the domestic political situation has not been helpful in achieving total consensus in this area. The former civilian and military structures had influenced destructively the pace and enlargement of the most important changes. Even today it is difficult - perhaps impossible - to make a complete analysis of Poland's democratic and armed forces' transformations because the process has not yet been finished. At first, according to Tadeusz Mazowiecki, efforts to transform the armed forces were concentrated mainly on depolitization and bringing the military under national democratic control. At the same time, the Polish political elite and the majority of the public quickly developed a belief that integration with

NATO was of fundamental importance. The development of Polish-American ties was treated as an important - perhaps the most important - element of preparations for integration with NATO. At the same time, Poland began to develop cooperation with other individual NATO members. Since the early 1990s, Poland has energetically pursued defense cooperation with Germany. Since 1991, Polish -French cooperation has been developed in the framework of the Polish-German-French "Weimar Triangle". In 1992, Poland signed its first formal agreement on defense cooperation with a NATO member country - France. Subsequently several agreements on military cooperation were signed in 1993-1996 (with the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Norway, the United Kingdom, Italy, Portugal and Spain). Membership in NATO was officially declared the priority of Polish security policy in the national security strategy adopted in 1992. The turning point in Poland's cooperation with NATO members was the January 1994 NATO Brussels Summit that initiated the Partnership for Peace Program and announced that NATO was open to future expansion. Soon thereafter, on 25 April 1994, Poland became the first partner to submit a formal document to NATO outlining the scope of its intended cooperation with the Alliance. On 5 July 1994, Poland became the first partner to sign an Individual Partnership Program (IPP).

When President Clinton visited Warsaw and addressed the Polish Parliament on 7 July 1994, he noted that NATO expansion was "no longer a question of whether, but when and how".<sup>30</sup> Before that, beginning in 1991, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) had begun to oversee Polish systematic cooperation with the Alliance. The annual NACC work plans made possible focusing of efforts on the most important problems and facilitated undertaking of comprehensive preparations for future integration with NATO. Representatives of the Polish Foreign Ministry and Ministry of National Defense began to take part regularly in NATO-organized conferences, seminars and workshops devoted to such problems as military doctrine, defense planning, international security, armed forces structure and democratic control of the military. Poland currently is participating informally in NATO's defense planning process, thus ensuring that Poland's force capabilities meet the standards outlined in the U.S. Ministerial Guidance, placing Poland on the same defense planning timeline as current NATO members. As the first step in this process, Poland completed NATO Defense Planning Questionnaires (DPQs) in October 1997. In February 1998, Polish Minister of Defense Onyszkiewicz received NATO Target Force Proposals (TFP) for the Polish armed forces and Poland

began working with NATO officials on the details of the Target Force Goals (TFG).

Poland also is cooperating directly with NATO in the area of conceptual preparations for peacekeeping operations (PKO). Such cooperation has made possible the linking of Poland - NATO political relations with a more dynamic development of military cooperation to prepare Polish armed forces for integration into NATO. Command and communication systems, defense planning, standardization, defense infrastructure, and military education and training were set as priorities. Between 1994 and 1997, Poland's cooperation with the Alliance focused on those specific areas. A PfP defense planning and review process, similar to the Alliance's force planning system, was a key means for Poland to achieve the goal of developing forces capable of operating effectively with NATO forces. In 1997, Poland was engaged in about 450 different PfP activities, including 25 military exercises.<sup>31</sup> Participation in the military activities in the PfP framework focused on NATO-Partner cooperation. For example, Polish participation in exercise Strong Resolve 98, which took place from 9 to 21 March 1998<sup>32</sup> was also used effectively in preparing Poland for integration into the Alliance. The participation of Polish soldiers in IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia since 1996 has validated Poland's commitment to efforts to maintain and restore peace,

and demonstrated Poland's readiness to meet future obligations of NATO membership.

On 12 November 1997, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Bronislaw Geremek sent a letter to the NATO Secretary General officially confirming Poland's interest in joining the Alliance and Poland's readiness to accept all obligations and requirements of membership as formulated in the Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation. The following month, in December 1997, Foreign Ministers of the NATO countries signed the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on Accession of Poland and the document was put forth for ratification in all sixteen member-countries. NATO and Poland are currently conducting intensive consultations that are to spell out the requirements which the Polish armed forces must meet in order to cooperate effectively with NATO countries in collective defense and other missions. In a December 1998 meeting in Brussels, the foreign ministers of the NATO-member states agreed to accept Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into the Alliance as early as March 1999 - a month earlier than originally planned - but only on the condition that the prospective entrants "speed up preparations for fulfilling the minimum military conditions of membership." At the same meeting, the Polish Minister of Defense said that the minimum military conditions should be met within several

months, whereas full integration with NATO would require a longer period of time. Out of the total of 65 tasks ahead of Poland in the process of integration with NATO, there were still 17 major ones to be tackled to reach the minimum level of interoperability<sup>33</sup>. Crucial among the NATO standards already met by Poland was the passing of a law on the protection of state secrets - to facilitate compatibility with NATO regulations and the exchange of classified information between the alliance's members.<sup>34</sup> A requirement for a secure communications capability between the armed forces and ministries of defense and foreign affairs in Poland and NATO headquarters has been established in January 1999. Another key issue to be resolved rather sooner than later is the restructuring and modernization of the Polish defense industry.<sup>35</sup> This process has begun but it will be necessary to assign a great deal of money and time in order to complete it.<sup>36</sup>

On 30 January 1999, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs received a letter signed by NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana on 29 January 1999.

"Dear Minister, Dear Bronislaw

I am pleased to inform you that all Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have notified the Government of the United States of America of their acceptance of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary and the Republic

of Poland, signed at Brussels on 16 December 1997. The Protocols, consequently, have entered into force.

On behalf of the all Parties, I am particularly honoured to communicate the Government of the Republic of Poland an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty."<sup>37</sup>

Poland's lower chamber of Parliament ratified documents on 17 February 1999 for joining NATO, one of the last formal steps for Poland to enter the Western military alliance. Poland formally joined NATO on March 12, 1999 having barely met the alliance's minimum military requirements for integrated air defense, security procedures and foreign language-training. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic became the first former members of the old Soviet bloc to join NATO, expanding the Western military alliance to 19 members. At a ceremony in Independence, Missouri - the hometown of the late President Harry Truman - the foreign ministers of the new member states signed admission documents and gave them to U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who told the ministers: "You are truly allies, you are truly home."

Much work remains to be done; full integration of Poland into NATO will take several years at least. This integration will naturally lead to Polish involvement in the Alliance's multinational civilian and military structures. Good communication is the backbone of all efforts to meet these

challenges - which means learning English. Does the Polish military have access to sufficient English-language linguists to meet the challenges? If so, is Poland ready to send its best qualified English-speaking national military representatives to serve at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic (SACLANT) or to put forth candidates for posts at the International Staff, International Military Staff, and other NATO agencies?<sup>38</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS

- ◆ Armed forces by their nature are hierarchical structures and thus inherently undemocratic<sup>39</sup>. For that reason, in a democratic society they must be brought under civilian democratic control. A democratically accountable and civilian - controlled military is much more likely to serve legitimate public national interests than a party-controlled military, as history demonstrates.
- ◆ In early post-communist Poland, implementation of civilian control of the military did not proceed in a smooth and steady fashion. The Polish military didn't easily accept the concept of civilian control, at least in part because it viewed civilian politicians as having only limited experience in military affairs.
- ◆ In just a few years, military personnel employed in the civilian side of the defense ministry have been influenced by the concept of civilian control; they in turn will inevitably educate their colleagues who work in the strictly military institutions.<sup>40</sup>
- ◆ There will always be different opinions on how and when to achieve political aims with the use of armed forces and where to draw the line between military and civilian responsibility.

- ◆ The military implements decisions within a clear framework and rules of engagement established by their political authorities, who remain ultimately responsible and accountable to the people for those decisions.
- ◆ The creation of the armed forces fully embedded in the public and legislative processes was - and continue to be - an indispensable element in the transition of Poland to democracy and a market economy.
- ◆ The Polish armed forces now are clearly under democratic civilian control, and fundamental changes have been made in the structure and the command system of the armed forces.
- ◆ A key task remaining for the Polish armed forces is achieving the ability to cooperate effectively with forces of other NATO countries.
- ◆ Poland is aware of the remaining challenges, and has begun a planned process of adaptation of its defense system and the armed forces to integrate with NATO. Particular attention is being paid to developing the ability for joint actions with NATO forces, modernization of weapons and equipment, and adaptation of the defense infrastructure to NATO standards.
- ◆ The progress that Poland has made in the area of interoperability, some of which is a direct result of

Polish participation in the PFP, already has generated tangible benefits for Poland's integration with NATO.

- ◆ A new system of measuring combat readiness has been introduced, similar to systems used in NATO countries.
- ◆ Poland sees NATO enlargement as a process of historic significance, one that will benefit all nations of the Euro-Atlantic area, and one that will bring stability and security closer to its borders and eliminate the old dividing lines in Europe.
- ◆ International cooperation should be embraced for specific political or mutual security reasons to meet specific needs of coalition warfare. For Polish politicians and military leaders this means the road to full cooperation with NATO may be rocky, especially in the financial area.<sup>41</sup> However, Poland is aware that joining NATO will entail considerable financial implications, and is prepared to bear the costs of its integration.

Any expectation that the process of establishing proper civil-military relations, democratic army control and reorganization of the Polish armed forces to achieve the ability to cooperate effectively with NATO forces will be finished quickly is overly optimistic. These processes need more time and will require further efforts to work out and refine a suitable framework for the future. Full integration

into NATO is bound to take several years at the least. The NATO military requirements must be taken into consideration as Poland works to achieve initial interoperability in these four key areas;

1. Communications, Command, and Control (C3).
2. Integrated Air Defense.
3. Training and exercises.
4. Reinforcement reception infrastructure.

C3 requirements are particularly crucial and must be met as soon as possible. The NATO ministers decided to provide \$400,000 to facilitate adaptation of Poland's military telecommunications network. Another key issue is integration of the air defense system, planned for April 1999.

Considerable effort also will be needed to train, exercise, and assess the Poland's capabilities in interoperability in command and staff procedures. Additionally, from the Warsaw Pact era, the Polish armed forces have a highly developed surplus infrastructure that must be evaluated and put to better use. This infrastructure could be used effectively in support of NATO contingencies such as NATO deployments to Polish territory, should a need for such deployments arise. In fact, elements of Polish infrastructure have served various PfP activities and units of Allied countries (UK, France) already exercise on Polish training grounds.

By late summer 1999, Poland intends to upgrade two airfields, two seaports and two storage bases to meet NATO standards.<sup>42</sup> In the following years, further installations will be similarly upgraded.

Perhaps the two most important issues remaining to be solved are the military personnel policies and the retirement and pay systems. These issues continue to be debated and discussed. The serious debate began in November 1998, but many officers and NCOs thus far remain very disappointed.<sup>43</sup> There is widespread uncertainty in the armed forces and, according to public debate, the whole situation is not stable.<sup>44</sup> In the military, everything has been changing - retirement, pay and health systems<sup>45</sup>, and the personnel system. These problems are boiling against a backdrop of turbulence generated by units being deactivated, others being moved to different garrisons, and new units being created. Perhaps the most troubling fact is that the military has been deprived of its own retirement pay system and that there have been several other changes in recent last years. Moreover, Poland's senior military leaders need to pick the best young people to serve in the newly shaped Polish armed forces of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Polish politicians and government leaders must be willing to invest more in taking care of the Polish armed forces if they really want the military that the nation needs in the future. Poland

has an exciting historical opportunity to change the military into something fundamentally different in the near future; how the opportunity will be used depends largely on Polish politicians.

All of the problems discussed above can shape the framework for a discussion of readiness. Poland wants to join NATO for the same reason the current members do not want to leave it; she wants to work with existing allies for stability and security in Europe. The primary role of the Atlantic Alliance in the post-Cold War era is still to guarantee peace in Europe, a peace no longer achieved by strategic military deterrence but mainly by the political cohesion of its members. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are seeking membership in the Western security system largely because the stability it provides allows them to pursue their internal reforms. At the same time, the prospect of NATO, EU and WEU membership has provided the incentive to resolve regional problems peacefully. One of the key characteristics of today's European security environment is its openness to change. Cooperation rather than confrontation reigns.

Poland would like, in a modest way and commensurate with her newcomer status and obvious weakness, to participate in decisions which will shape Europe's political, economic, and security dimensions. For us, NATO membership means we have reached a crucial threshold among the many steps

taken since 1989. We are not interested in pursuing a zero-sum game in Central and Eastern Europe. On the contrary, the relative improvement in our international standing will best be used to the advantage of our Central European neighbors and in the broader interest of Europe as a whole. But it will not be easy. The era of Polish strategic certainty corresponding to Poland's strong national desire to join NATO is coming to an end. With an equal determination, we approach the vital goal of EU membership. Membership in the EU must be considered as a vital element of Poland's independence and security."<sup>46</sup>

Only NATO and the European Union working in tandem can guarantee real security and buttress political, economical and social stability in Poland. Poland is neither Norway nor Austria; she is situated on such a crossing of geopolitical highways that neither European Union membership (without NATO) nor NATO membership (without the European Union) can give Poland any stable and long-lasting security guarantee.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Polish military leaders and national authorities will have to work hard for years to create, maintain and improve civil-military relations, civilian army control and a new structure of the armed forces. Their primary task will be to analyze all possible alternatives to reach their intended goals. There is no universally accepted definition of civilian control of the military;<sup>47</sup> however, Samuel Huntington has offered general suggestions for improving the performance of civil control that can be applied in Poland.<sup>48</sup> In 1996, he outlined his concept of objective civilian control and divided it into four categories.<sup>49</sup> Examining them, one can determine the most important goals that are necessary to achieve effective civil control in Poland. A number of these goals already have been achieved; several others will be met in the near future. In Poland, democratic governmental structures are still fairly new. Economic stability, crucial to political development, also is still far from assured. According to Huntington, under such circumstances a military such as Poland's is by definition unprofessional, but if one adopts looser standards of professionalism, it is not difficult to imagine numerous occasions of military interference with incompetent

governments.<sup>50</sup> Avoiding such situations is very important; however, they have appeared in Poland.

To facilitate the process of establishing full civilian control in Poland, more civilian politicians should prepare themselves for positions within the defense ministry and other defense-related institutions by studying national and military strategy. Additionally, Poland's military leaders should not merely be passive recipients of political instructions. Whenever political guidance is unclear or contradictory, military commanders have the right and duty to voice their concerns and this should be understood by government officials as well as other civilian leaders. Senior military leaders should help shape national defense policy and ensure that the military institution is properly armed and trained to conduct the missions assigned to it by civilian authorities. They should provide advice on what they consider is feasible in military terms and what is necessary in resource terms. Proper civil-military relations will have to be taught to the Polish officer corps at every level with a new sensitivity and a sophistication of understanding so that past practices can be reversed. Poland's military leaders must help the political leaders by ensuring that the rationale and justification for military operations are completely consistent with policy objectives, and by helping policymakers explain to the public

and media the links between operations and policy. Education of both the civilian and military staffs will be helpful in reaching an appropriate and more stable level in civil-military relations and democratic military control.

Poland, a country with a long tradition of democracy, has just recently rejoined the modern democratic world, and should learn from and follow the same principles Western countries use in their democratic institutions. The preparation of an adequate number of competent military personnel will be a necessary condition to effective integration into NATO's military structures. Such preparation will be also a key factor in the process of ensuring interoperability of Polish armed forces. The Polish Ministry of Defense has recognized the necessity of general changes in military personnel policies in the military. Such changes should be tightly linked to the new military structures and NATO requirements. There are five things Poland must improve to build better military leaders.

- ◆ Poland must ensure that Polish military leadership instruction provides a foundation for the lifelong study of leadership and prepares leaders for changing responsibilities early in their careers.
- ◆ Poland's senior military leaders must improve their ability to assess leadership, and Polish military leaders

at all levels must learn to provide more effective feedback to their subordinates.

- ◆ Polish military personnel also must learn to value feedback as a means of improving their own performance as well as a means to increase subordinates' effectiveness.
- ◆ Poland also should improve developmental assessments and feedback via the use of leadership development action plans.
- ◆ Polish military leaders must create a positive command climate in which improvements can take place. This leadership improvement process already is underway in Poland and has a high priority; however, it will not succeed overnight.

Poland must determine what level of combat power the Polish armed forces should maintain, and what missions they should be capable of performing. Put simply, the Polish armed forces should be strong enough to deal with military challenges resulting from local conflicts or limited-scale regional conflicts.<sup>51</sup> In case of more serious threats, Allied assistance may be necessary. Such assistance, however, will not be the result only of NATO security guarantees extended to new members, but will be driven by the interests of NATO countries in overcoming serious threats to European security. On the other hand, Polish NATO membership will require sharing


the same responsibilities and facing the same theoretical and practical challenges as the other NATO members. Poland's approach to the strategy of engagement and enlargement should be focused on preparing for the future, shaping the environment and responding to crises. Polish political and military leaders should have a vision of how the world is going to look in the 21st century. The internal relationships, geographic focus, and formal structures of alliances must adapt to a new security environment defined by changes in the geopolitical situation, military capabilities and economic circumstances. Poland should concentrate on less ambitious, more concrete short- and medium-term goals that will directly serve to enhance European security and stability. It is equally clear that, in striving for a more secure Europe at the turn of the century, three fundamental societal issues must remain in clear view: democratization, living standards, and economic development and security. In the Polish case, security - especially cooperative security, as a shield enabling both democratization and economic reform - can be a rational way of prioritizing the foreign and security strategies of Poland. The core security of an enlarged European community of nations should be built around NATO because it is the most successful and capable political-military alliance in history. NATO is a unified force for

stability even in the fragmented, unstable, post-Cold War world. Poland's foreign policy, particularly regarding her neighbors to the east, must be in careful consonance with international efforts for the institutionalization of European security that Poland supports.<sup>52</sup> Joining NATO and consequently total improvement of Poland's security demands new modern defense policies as well as update national and military doctrines. In this context, Poland's national security strategy must be crafted and carried out as a part of the overall NATO effort to maintain and enhance stability in Central and Eastern Europe.


The awareness that the NATO Alliance is guarantor of European democracy and a force for European stability has to be shared by the entire Polish nation.

Word Count=9601

Appendix 1: Chronology of Transformation of Polish Civil-Military Relations and Establishment of Democratic Army Control



Appendix 2: Management structure of the Polish Defense System



\* Organization on 1 January 1999

Appendix 3: Planned Reduction of the Polish Armed Forces

The Polish Armed Forces *	Professional Military Service	Corps of Career Officers	Corps of Warrant officers	Corps of NCOs	Conscript Service	Total
1998	78,891	37,067	24,793	17,031	144,019	223,000
2003	90,000	26,000	27,000	37,000	90,000	180,000
2012	99,000	27,000	27,000	45,000	81,000	180,000

\* Data according to the Polish Department of Defense, January 02, 1999.

	1998	2003 *	2003 - 2012 **
Land Forces	(1) 168,650	107,500	107,000
Polish Navy	17,000	14,000	14,900
Air and Air Defense Force	56,100	38,000	38,000
Territorial Defense Force	(1)	20,500	20,100
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>241,750</b>	<b>180,000</b>	<b>180,000</b>


(1) This total includes numbers of TDF soldiers. \* According to Polish issue, *Armia*, / The Army/, October 1998, No.1, Ed.S.Kowalski & S-ka, Warsaw 1998. \*\* According to the Polish Department of Defense, January 2, 1999.

	1998 *	2003 *	2003-2012 **
Generals	126	225	8,100
Colonels	2,755	1,125	
LColonels	5,736	3,825	
Majors	9,648	2,700	15,200
Captains	9,451	6,075	
Lieutenants	10,879	8,550	
Contract officers	262	3,500	3,700

\* According to Polish press *Gazeta Wyborcza*, PAP /Polish Press Agency/, Warsaw, October 1998.

\*\* According to the Polish Department of Defense, January 2, 1999.

Appendix 4. Proposed Organization of the Polish Armed Forces General Staff.



According to Polish military press, Polska Zbrojna No.51, Warsaw, December 1998.

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Frank E. Fields and Jack J. Jensen. "Military Professionalism in Post-Communist Hungary and Poland: An Analysis and Assessment", Journal, European Security (Spring 1998), Frank Cass Publishers, Newbury House, Ilford, Essex, Vol.7, No 1, 150.

"This article defines *democratic military professionalism* as the image and practice of the soldier in the state that allows the professional armed forces of a democracy to be effective, while at the same time reflecting certain democratic values. Military professionals in a democracy are experts in their field who respect civilian control of the military, embody the ideal of democratic citizen-soldier, and are accountable to society".

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Army War College, Core Curriculum, Course II: "War, National Policy & Strategy", AY99, 150.

<sup>3</sup> Hieronim Kubiak: Poland: National Security in Changing Environment: Poland, 1993.

<sup>4</sup> Brig. Gen. Prof. Stanislaw Koziej is a Director of the Defense System Department in Polish Ministry of National Defense. He worked for many years in the Polish General Staff Academy and Polish National Defense Academy. In 1993-1994 he worked in the National Security Bureau of the Polish President's Office. He is the author of approximately 300 publications on the art of war, including several books and manuals.

<sup>5</sup> Warsaw, Polska Agencja Prasowa (PAP) /Polish Press Agency/, 26 March 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-060 (31 March 1993), 30.

<sup>6</sup> James Gow, and Carole Birch. Security and Democracy: Civil Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe. London Defence Studies 40. London: Brassey's for the Centre for Defence Studies, University of London, September 1997, 27.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>8</sup> John Lovell and David E. Albright, eds., To Sheathe the Sword: Civil-Military Relations in the Quest for Democracy. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997, 53-54.

<sup>9</sup> Gow and Birch., 15.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 28.

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<sup>11</sup> Kubiak, 93.

<sup>12</sup> Strategic Assessment 1998. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University 1998, 98.

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Department of the Army. The Army, Field Manual 100-1. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, June 1994, 13.

<sup>14</sup> Curriculum Pamphlet AY99, U.S. Army War College, 9.

<sup>15</sup> Gow and Birch, 35.

<sup>16</sup> Charles E. Merriam, Security without Militarism: Preserving Civilian Control in American Political Institutions, in Civil-Military Relations in American Life, (Jerome G. Kerwin, ed, 1948), 148 (citing Quincy Wright).

<sup>17</sup> Anton A. Bebler, ed., Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Central and Eastern Europe in Transition. Westport: Praeger, 1997, 9.

<sup>18</sup> According to Huntington, civilian control in the objective sense is the maximizing of military professionalism. Subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state. Objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state. The one prime essential for any system of civilian control is the minimizing of military power. Objective civilian control achieves this reduction by professionalizing the military, by rendering them politically sterile and neutral.

<sup>19</sup> Frank E. Fields and Jack J. Jensen, 119.

<sup>20</sup> Albert Pol, Bureau of Research and Andrew Caldwell M.A., of the Middle Temple, Barrister (Translation from the Polish), The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Chancellory of the Sejm, Warsaw, 1997, 9.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 44-45.

<sup>22</sup> Bebler, 16.

<sup>23</sup> Polish Ministry of National Defense (MND), Report on Poland's Integration with NATO, Publishing House Adam Marszalek, Torun, 1998, 3.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 18-19.

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>26</sup> According to the Polish Minister of Defense decision No.95, December 1998 the 12-month term of conscript service has been enforced since 1 January 1999.

<sup>27</sup> Units have become parts of the corps: Polish 12<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Division, Danish Mechanized Division and German 14<sup>th</sup> Division of Armored Grenadiers - have already established regular and intensive cooperation. Each national component numbers about 10,000 soldiers. Headquarters of this MNC NE is in Szczecin (Poland).

<sup>28</sup> U.S. Army War College, Core Curriculum, Course 2: "War, National Policy & Strategy", AY99, 32.

<sup>29</sup> Pol and Caldwell, 36.

<sup>30</sup> "As President Clinton has said, the question is not whether enlargement will happen, but when and how". Security Strategy for Europe and NATO, Chapter 2, Engagement and Enlargement, 5. Available from <[http:// www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/](http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/).

<sup>31</sup> Polish MND Report, 8.

<sup>32</sup> Strong Resolve 98 was the first major exercise in which multiple crises within the spectrum of NATO missions were staged simultaneously in separate geographical regions. Involving 50,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and civilian from 25 countries, this was the first large-scale NATO exercise jointly planned and executed by the two major NATO commanders, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The exercise helped promote interoperability between NATO and its partners through participation of Partnership for Peace (Pfp).

<sup>33</sup> NATO enumerated 65 Target Force Goals for the Polish Armed Forces; 26 concerned the entire Polish Armed Forces, 16 dealt with Land Troops, 11 with Navy and 12 with Air and Air Defense Forces.

<sup>34</sup> In January 1999 the Polish Parliament passed a new act about protection of national and military secrets and classified information.

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<sup>35</sup> A prominent example is the case of acquisition of missiles from Israel for the Polish attack helicopter "Huzar". After several years of obfuscation and confusion surrounding the choice made, the process is to start anew. At the beginning of December 1998 the Polish government stated that it is canceling an \$800 million deal to buy advanced anti-tank missiles for its "Huzar" attack helicopters from Israel. The deal was scuttled because Israel failed to meet the requirement to test the missiles in Polish weather and terrain by the end of November 1998.  
<<http://www.jpost.com:80 /com/Archive/09.Dec.1998.html>

<sup>36</sup> According to Polish Minister of Industry Janusz Steinhoff, the Polish government accepted the main goals of military industrial restructurization in January 1999. Polish Press Agency /PAP/, "Czy Ameryka nas uzbroi", Rzeczpospolita No24 (5189), Warsaw, January 1999.

<sup>37</sup> A copy of this letter was printed at Polish press, "Wielki Dzień dla Polski" / The Great Day for Poland/, Rzeczpospolita, No 25, PAP /Polish Press Agency/, Warsaw, January 30-31, 1999.

<sup>38</sup> NATO stated that as of April 1999, date of Poland's full membership in NATO, there will be 50 posts in SHAPE for Polish officers and specialists, including four general-office posts; two each in SHAPE and AFNORTH headquarters.

<sup>39</sup> Daniel N. Nelson, "Civil Armies, Civil Societies, and NATO's Enlargement", Armed Forces & Society, Vol.25, No.1, Fall 1998, 143.

"In obvious ways, armed forces are never democratic. Their hierarchies of rank and seniority predetermine a command system without which armies do not function. (...). In their implementation of commands, armed forces cannot pause for votes, consultations, or committee review. But these characteristics of rank, discipline, and hierarchy in no way define militaries as antidemocratic. Instead, the "democratic quotient" of any army is judged by its institutional relationship with civil authority and the behavioral conformity of the armed forces to external norms".

<sup>40</sup> Janusz Onyszkiewicz, "Poland's Road to Civilian Control" Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996, 108.

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<sup>41</sup> The double-digit, sustained unemployment and the demands of social welfare economic policies have created extraordinary budget pressures to spend as little as possible on defense. A military force has political utility when the expected costs of develop it are deemed acceptable by political leaders and the public. The challenge for future Polish military leaders is to monitor and understand the changing relationship among the various dimensions of political utility. Military leaders must be aware that this is a fluid equation that can change rapidly, and the type of force they create, train, and equip must, in part, be determined by the need to maximize political utility.

<sup>42</sup> Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, Report of Poland's Integration with NATO; available from <http://www.wp.mil.pl/integra5.html>.

<sup>43</sup> About 7800 Polish officers left the Polish armed forces in 1998. The problem is that majority of them did not achieved pension age and they were highly technical educated. According to Polish Press Agency (PAP), "Armia sie rozchodzi" /Army splits/, Gazeta Wyborcza, No 20(3018), Warsaw, January25, 1999, 9.

<sup>44</sup> This unstable situation in the Polish armed forces was argued during the meeting Polish Minister of National Defense J.Onyszkiewicz at a press conference on December 1998; available from < <http://www.wprost.pl/iso/nr51> (20.12.1998) /numer/s19.htm.

<sup>45</sup> Due to the health-care system reform coming into force next year, army expenditures on health will be significantly reduced.

<sup>46</sup> Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Polityka polska wobec integracji europejskiej w polowie r. 1997, Warszawa: Rada Polityki Zagranicznej, July 2, 1997.

<sup>47</sup> Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. "Welcome to the Junta: The erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military", 29 Wake Forest Law Review, 1994., 341, and 342-343.

<sup>48</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy and Armed Forces," Current, February 1996, 17.

<sup>49</sup> Professor Huntington restated his concept of objective civilian control in the February 1996 issue of Current. Specifically, he said that objective civilian control involves: 1) A high level of military professionalism and recognition by military officers of the limits of their professional competence. 2) The effective subordination of the military to the civilian

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leaders who make the basic decisions on foreign and military policy. 3) The recognition and acceptance that leadership of an area of professional competence and autonomy for the military; and 4) As a result, the minimization of military intervention in politics and political intervention in the military.

<sup>50</sup> Jerzy Wiatr, "Military Politics and Society in Poland during the Democratic Transition," Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Central and Eastern Europe in Transition, ed. Anton A. Bebler, (Westport: Praeger, 1997), 81-83.

<sup>51</sup> So long as the Polish public is not convinced that the nation will face threats and dangers in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, there will be resistance to investment in military development.

<sup>52</sup> In this concept, taking into consideration Poland as a NATO member, the main Polish goal is "not under any circumstances can the 5<sup>th</sup> art of the treaty be weakened. It has been the basis of NATO power since half a century and cannot be changed," - said Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland - Bronislaw Gieremek. According to Polish Press Agency /PAP/, "NATO powiedzialo tak", / NATO said yes/, Gazeta Wyborcza, No 25, Warsaw, January 30-31, 1999, 7.

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