Access to the President by Combatant Commanders: Does the Secretary of Defense Have Too Much Power.

Abstract

This paper examines one aspect of the Goldwater - Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: communications from combatant commanders, through the Secretary of Defense, to the President. The 3 October 1993 firefight between US forces from Task Force Ranger and Somalia irregulars aligned with Mohammad Aided will serve as a case study for this project. Beforehand, the combatant commander requested armor (for force protection purposes) "up the Goldwater-Nichols chain of command." The Secretary of Defense denied that request - but the President (the person ultimately responsible) never knew. Subsequent congressional testimony revealed that the requested armor might have made a difference. Accordingly, this paper examines the then existing chain of command processes (which had developed over the past 40 years); whether the President's constitutional function as Commander in Chief was well served by those processes; and ultimately suggests improvements to the same.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Apr 07, 1999
Accession Number
ADA363928

Entities

People

  • Kevin H. Winters

Organizations

  • United States Army War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • C4I
  • Ground and Sea Platforms
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Air Force
  • Armored Vehicles
  • Combatant Commanders
  • Employment
  • Law
  • Marine Corps
  • Military History
  • Military Operations
  • National Security
  • Navy
  • Personnel Management
  • Unified Combatant Commands
  • United States
  • United States Central Command
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Defense Acquisition Program Management
  • Government and Public Administration Law.
  • Military Science