Implications for a Future Non-Linear Doctrine: Operations of German Army Group South (Winter, 1942-1943)
Abstract
To not repeat the lessons of the past, the Army strives to provide relevant historical underpinnings to new concepts, processes and doctrine. It is difficult to find an example of a large mechanized force successfully using non-linear tactics in a modern context. However, the Germans in Russia, by circumstance rather than choice, were often forced to deal with the expanses of Russia, and insufficient forces, by means we could characterize as non-linear. Perhaps the best example is the series of operations from December 1942 through March 1943. In this campaign, the Germans planned and executed a brilliantly conceived defense and counter-stroke that destroyed several Soviet armies and stabilized the southern front. A review of this operation provides direct lessons learned and inferences as to the necessary political and military conditions making Army non-linear and deployment concepts feasible for tomorrow's conflicts. The campaign's conduct highlights lessons and implications in six major areas that are explored: (1) Reliance on Allies and Their Warfighting Capabilities; (2) A Required Transformation in Civil-Military Relations; (3) Political and Media Impacts to Operations - Shaping the Media Environment; (4) Mismatch between the American Way of War and Non-Linear Concepts; (5) Mismatch in Army and Air Force Concepts and Doctrine; and A Decline in "Rear Area" Security.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 23, 1999
- Accession Number
- ADA363941
Entities
People
- Michael A. Hamilton
Organizations
- United States Army War College