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ROLE OF NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL IN SOVIET MILITARY VIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 83 (signed to press 31 Jan 83) pp 3-11

[Article by Lt Gen B. Utkin, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The Soviet Army--An Army of Friendship of Peoples"]

[Text] Our people and their armed defenders are celebrating a great and joyous holiday, Soviet Army and Navy Day, in greeting it with new achievements in labor and military service. The decisions of the 26th Party Congress, the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Food Program are being successfully carried out. The men are living and fulfilling their duty under the motto "To Raise Vigilance and to Dependably Ensure the Motherland's Security."

In the past, jubilee year, a new step was taken in improving the quality of military and political training, in combat readiness, in strengthening military discipline and establishing firm, proper order. The ranks of outstanding men in training and class specialists have been constantly growing. The field, air and naval skills of the men as well as the tactical cohesiveness of the subunits and units have improved. The results of the year, as was pointed out at a conference of military leaders in the Kremlin, confirm that there are undoubted successes in improving the combat readiness and bettering the military skills of the Armed Forces personnel. Major operational, technical and organizational measures were carried out and these have increased the combat might of the Army and Navy. Positive results have been achieved in the major exercises of recent years and from the results of these important conclusions have been drawn for the future.¹

The Army and Navy personnel have arrived at their jubilee with high indicators. The initiators of the competition in all the Armed Services successfully fulfilled their obligations. The communists and Komsomol members, as always, set the example in training and service. At present, an absolute majority of the Army and Navy communists, as was pointed out by the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Army Gen A. A. Yepishev, at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, fulfill their duty properly and one out of every two is an outstanding man in training.² Among the Komsomol servicemen more than two-thirds are high-class specialists and one out of two has mastered a related specialty and has surpassed the combat standards.³

Over the period of the existence of the USSR, the Soviet people, under the wise leadership of the Communist Party have achieved outstanding successes in socioeconomic, political and cultural development. "The path traveled by the Soviet Union over the 60 years," stated the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov,

at a joint ceremonial session of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet devoted to the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, "is an entire epoch. History perhaps knows no such rapid ascent from a state of backwardness, calamity and chaos to the might of a modern great power with a high level of culture and constantly growing prosperity of the people. ⁴

A developed socialist society has been built in the nation, socialist social relations have been established and a new historical community of people, the Soviet people, has been formed. The USSR has been turned into a powerful industrial state with highly mechanized agriculture. While in 1922, the share of the USSR in world industrial production was 1 percent, at present it has risen up to 20 percent.⁵ Our nation holds leading positions in world science and culture. The standard of living of the people has constantly risen. In the 1970's alone, the real per capita income increased by almost 1.5-fold.⁶ Socialism has given the Soviet people, as was pointed out in the report by the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade V. V. Grishin, at a ceremony devoted to the 65th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, what the capitalist system was unable to provide. This is confidence in tomorrow and a securely guaranteed right to work. This is the lowest apartment rent in the world, free education and medical services. This is the new relations between people which are of enormous social value and are founded on the principles of collectivism and comradesly mutual aid and active participation of the masses in the running of the affairs of the state and society. The USSR has achieved legal and actual equality among all the nations and nationalities and there are no backward national borderlands. A great fraternity of people and a feeling of a single family have grown up and the unbreakable Leninist friendship of peoples has come into being.

"...The Soviet Union," states the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR," "presents itself to the world as a close-knit family of equal republics which together are building communism. The sociopolitical and ideological unity of our society is monolithic. The solidarity of the Soviet people around their own Communist Party and its Central Committee is monolithic...."⁷

The revolutionary victories and the construction of the new society are being vigilantly guarded by the Soviet Armed Forces which were created by V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party. In being a carbon copy of our social and state system, they have imbibed all the achievements of developed socialism. Due to the constant concern of the Communist Party and the unstinting labor of our people, the Army and Navy have been equipped with the most modern weapons, including nuclear missiles, and powerful military equipment. The organizational structure of the Armed Forces, the system of personnel training, the theory and practice of troop training and indoctrination and military science are on a level of the requirements of modern warfare.

Everyone sees, as was pointed out at the meeting of military leaders in the Kremlin, that the Soviet Armed Forces are a powerful factor for peace and security and a dependable means for checking the aggressive forces. The people have spared nothing so that the Armed Forces would always be up to their tasks. We have equipped the Armed Forces with the most modern weapons and military equipment. The Soviet Army must be on top of all questions including: equipping, structure and training methods. It must meet the present-day tasks.⁸

The USSR Armed Forces embody the achievements of developed socialism also in the area of social relations, its humanistic essence and nobility of goals. The Communist Party is the leading force in Soviet society and the core of its political system, state and social

organizations. The CPSU provides unchallenged leadership over the Armed Forces. The leading role of the party, as was pointed out at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, has been constantly growing. The CPSU has elaborated a military policy and doctrine, it has organized their implementation, it is concerned with the development of military science and military art and has given constant attention to the indoctrination of the personnel. The party and its Central Committee have paid particular attention to making certain that the Armed Forces are in a state of high combat readiness. The leadership of the CPSU is the main source of the strength and invincibility of the Soviet Army and Navy. In all stages of military organizational development, it has done everything possible so that the defense might of the Soviet nation has always been on the highest level. At the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, in speaking about the importance of the 1983 national economic plan for the further development of the nation's economy, emphasized that it "as always, has sufficiently considered the defense needs. The Politburo has considered and does consider it an obligation to give everything necessary to the Army and Navy, particularly in the present international situation."⁹

The Soviet Army is an army of a state of all the people. It guards the socialist fatherland and defends the interests of all the people.

Our Armed Forces are the beloved offspring of the multinational Soviet people, a new social and historical community of people. A close and unbreakable link with the people is one of the most important sources of their combat strength and invincibility. "Like a mighty tree sinks its roots deep into the ground nourishing it," said the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "so the Soviet Armed Forces draw their strength from the people. The vital ties linking the army and the people, as we advance to communism, become evermore enriched, improved and stronger."¹⁰

Our army, like Soviet society as a whole, is a monolithic unity in the sociopolitical and ideological areas. The representatives of all classes and social groups serve in its ranks. The Soviet military is closely rallied around its Communist Party and the Central Committee, they completely and fully approve the domestic and foreign policy of the party and the Soviet government, they are completely dedicated to their people and to the ideals of communism and are ready at any moment to come to the defense of the motherland.

The USSR Armed Forces are the living embodiment of socialist internationalism and the unbreakable friendship of peoples. What are the distinguishing features of the Soviet Army as an army of friendship of peoples?

In the first place, the Soviet Army, as an army of friendship of peoples, is marked by the international principle of its manning. The Red Army, pointed out M. V. Frunze, has never viewed itself as a Russian army or an army of one nationality. The duties of defending the Soviet land with weapons in hand on principles of complete equality should "be extended ultimately even to those peoples who did not owe military service."¹³ The Tsarist autocracy did not entrust weapons to the representatives of around 40 nations and nationalities. Thus, according to the Ukase of 1874, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kazakhs, Turkmens, Kalmyks, Jews and the nationalities of the North and Northern Caucasus were not permitted to serve in the Army and Navy.

The Soviet government, in being loyal to Lenin's policy of friendship and equality of peoples, provided equal rights to the workers of all nations and nationalities in serving in the Red Army and defending the victories of Great October. Even in the Decree on the Organization of the Red Army signed by V. I. Lenin, it was pointed out that service in it is a duty for all Soviet citizens without any restrictions because of nationality. During the years of the Civil War, representatives of almost 50 nationalities fought shoulder to shoulder in its ranks. During the Great Patriotic War all the peoples of our vast motherland rose to defend it against the Nazi invaders.¹⁴

At present, all nations and nationalities of our country without exception send their sons to serve in the Army and Navy. Each military collective from a subunit, unit or ship up to the Armed Forces as a whole is international in its composition. The representatives of all nations and nationalities in our great motherland serve in the same formations. Each soldier, regardless of his nationality, is an equal member of a military collective. The same demands as for everyone else are made on him and he has the same rights and obligations as all other servicemen. As an equal member of the collective, he participates in sociopolitical life. These rights are guaranteed by Soviet laws and the military regulations.

Each military collective is a close-knit multinational combat family. It lives by the same great deeds and ideas as all the Soviet people. "We all are one family, one people," wrote the USSR pilot-cosmonaut A. Nikolayev. "I do not need to carry with me a handful of Chuvash ground, for me the ground of Moscow where I live now is just as precious. Until the end of my days I will consider my homeland to be both Karelia where I first began my working life, the land of Kirghizia where I first flew an aircraft and the land of Kazakhstan from whence in a mighty roar of engines I was twice carried by missiles into distant space."¹⁵

The officer personnel of the USSR Armed Forces is also multinational. "We organize our army in such a manner," pointed out M. V. Frunze at one time, "that each nationality of our Union does not feel itself offended or bypassed."¹⁶

All officers and generals, whatever their nationality, have equal rights. They are given equal opportunities for creative labor and promotion. "We," said M. I. Kalinin, "make our promotions not because of nationality, but rather because of intelligence, bravery.... If a person, a soldier or an officer, is talented, able and knows his job well, then he will rise high, whatever his nationality. This principle is firmly carried out by our High Command."¹⁷

Due to the carrying out of the Leninist nationality policy in the Soviet Army and Navy, commanders and superiors of all levels have emerged from the representatives of the most diverse nationalities.

V. I. Lenin pointed out that our army should "protect the victories of the revolution and our people's power...."^{17a} It is the constitutional duty to the people for the men of the Soviet Army and Navy to securely defend the socialist fatherland and to be in constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor.^{17b}

Secondly, in carrying out the tasks of defending the revolutionary victories shoulder to shoulder with the armies of the other Warsaw Pact nations, the Soviet Armed Forces serve the interests of the workers in all the socialist states. In carrying out their great international, liberation mission and in being a bulwark of peace and international security, they have won the love and respect of the workers of many nations and peoples.

The historic purpose of the Soviet Army, thus, objectively conforms both to the fundamental national and international interests of the workers. Its activities in carrying out the tasks posed by the CPSU help to strengthen international solidarity and fraternal friendship among peoples. Thirdly, the Soviet Army is a school of internationalism, a school for indoctrinating feelings of fraternity, solidarity and mutual respect among all the nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union.

All military service, intense military work, activities in the mastering of complex collective military equipment and weapons as well as the overcoming of physical and moral-psychological stresses help to strengthen the international solidarity of the troop collectives and to instill in the men feelings of fraternity and friendship, combat cohesiveness and a desire for cooperation and a helping hand.

Effective political indoctrination plays the main role in the process of forming the patriot-soldier and internationalist.

"In the area of international indoctrination, as in all ideological and mass political work," pointed out Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, "we are confronted with major tasks. A convincing and concrete demonstration of our accomplishments, a serious analysis of the new problems constantly created by life, freshness of thought and word—here is the way to improving all our propaganda which should always be just and realistic, always interesting and accessible, and hence more effective."^{17c}

In the Army and Navy an ordered system of international indoctrination for the personnel has come into being and is operating successfully. The major elements of this system are the basic forms of political training including: Marxist-Leninist training for the officers, political training for the warrant officers ["praporshchik" and "michman"], as well as political training for the soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers. This system is constantly being developed and improved.

In the troops there is also a constant struggle to improve the effectiveness of all forms of political study, party education and political information for the personnel. The ideological-ideological-theoretical and procedural abilities of the regular and volunteer propagandists, group leaders and their assistants is being improved. The command and political leadership is being evermore widely involved in political indoctrination. The political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations are constantly seeking out and finding new, interesting, more effective forms of work in the area of indoctrinating the men in a spirit of international friendship and military comradeship.

In the political study exercises, in the press, the oral propaganda and visual agitation they have begun to more profoundly and convincingly bring out the revolutionary transforming force of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and the outstanding role of the Communist Party in carrying out the Leninist nationality policy. The flourishing and integration of the nations and nationalities area eloquent proof of this.

The historic advantages of socialism and the achievements of the USSR and the Union and autonomous republics in all areas—economic, sociopolitical, scientific-technical and cultural—are becoming more and more vivid. The propagandizing of the military and labor feats of the representatives of all nations and nationalities of the country is being strengthened. Wide attention is being given to the course of the 26th CPSU Congress to further strengthen the friendship of the Soviet peoples and to increase the material and spiritual potential of each of the republics. In military indoctrination more attention is

being paid to elucidating the importance of friendship of peoples for strengthening national defense capability and the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces and to showing the enormous role which this unbreakable friendship has played in the achieving of victory over fascism during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

In carrying out the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and the demands of the CPSU Central Committee on the reorganizing of many areas and spheres of ideological work, our army propaganda has begun to fight more aggressively and effectively against bourgeois propaganda and to promptly rebuff the ideological subversion of the enemies blinded by class hate.

The rabid anticommunists in every possible way are disseminating myths about the so-called "Soviet military threat," in endeavoring to represent our army as a "weapon of political expansion." For this reason, in the ideological and political indoctrination with the personnel an important place is given over to explaining the peace-loving policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government, the Peace Program as well as the peace initiatives contained in the speeches of the party and Soviet government leaders and in the Political Declaration of the Warsaw Pact Member Nations adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee held on 4-5 January 1983 in Prague.

Using a solid line of argument and specific facts, the true causes have been shown for the sharp exacerbation of the political situation and the growing military danger. We are unmasking the aggressive, criminal plans of the reactionary U.S. and NATO forces which are preparing a new nuclear missile war. At present the international situation is particularly acute. The reactionary U.S. circles and their NATO partners have initiated a broad offensive against socialism and the national liberation movement in all areas.

The USSR Armed Forces act as a powerful barrier opposing imperialist aggression and as a bulwark of international security and peace in the world. "The aggressive intrigues of imperialism," said Comrade Yu. V. Andropov at the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "force us together with the fraternal socialist states to be concerned, and to be seriously concerned, for maintaining defense capability at a proper level."¹⁸ The explaining of the historic purpose of the Armed Forces, their international nature and international mission is one of the most important tasks which is presently being carried out by the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations.

In order to undermine the friendship of the Soviet peoples, to spread discord in our multinational family and revive nationalistic moods in the population of the socialist countries, bourgeois propaganda has been endeavoring to introduce the idea of the "incompatibility" of patriotism and proletarian, socialist internationalism, and to set them into opposition.

This false reactionary thesis is not new. In criticizing it, the French Marxists as early as 1893 emphasized: "The person who sets out on the path of internationalism leading to the true flourishing of mankind does not cease to be a patriot.... On the contrary, internationalists can call themselves the sole patriots...."¹⁹

V. I. Lenin developed and deepened the Marxist thesis on the inseparable unity of internationalism and patriotism. In the work "On the National Pride of the Great Russians," he wrote: "Is a feeling of national pride alien to us, the aware Great Russian proletarians? Of course not! We love our language and our motherland and we work most on bringing its working masses (that is, nine-tenths of its population) up to an aware life as democrats and socialists.... We, the Great Russian workers, are full of feelings of national pride, and we

want at whatever the cost a free and independent, democratic, republican and proud Great Russia which organizes its relations with neighbors on the humane principle of equality and not on the bondage principle of privileges which belittles the great nation.... For the revolution of the proletariat, it is essential to have extended indoctrination of the workers in a spirit of truest national equality and fraternity.... The interest...of national pride in the Great Russians coincides with the socialist interest of the Great Russian (and all other) proletarians.²⁰

The explaining of Marxist-Leninist theses about the inseparable, organic link of Soviet patriotism and proletarian, socialist internationalism is a most important task which is presently being carried out by all the workers on the ideological front of the Army and Navy.

Fourthly, the Soviet Armed Forces are an army of friendship of peoples also because they carry out their duty in the same formation with the Warsaw Pact armies. In speaking about the cooperation of the Soviet Armed Forces with the armies of the fraternal socialist states, the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries emphasized that it is permeated by a spirit of internationalism, it is founded on principles of equality, mutual respect and sovereignty and includes the ever-closer coordinating of the plans for the development of the armed forces in the allied nations, the consistent carrying out of a unified military-technical policy and coordinated measures as well as exchanging experience in the training and indoctrination of the men.

This same goal is pursued by the ever-more fruitful cooperation of the political bodies and party organizations.²¹ The joint carrying out of common tasks by the men of the fraternal armies, interaction, a helping hand and comradely aid contribute to their drawing together and to the development of friendship and confidence.

The flourishing and drawing together of the nations have objectively helped to raise the social potential, one of the structural elements in the military might of our state. For this reason, V. I. Lenin urged the uniting "of all military forces into a powerful international Red Army...."²² He emphasized that then "no force of the imperialists will be able to resist us!"²³ The unshakable friendship of peoples, as history shows, was the source of victory for the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in the Civil War as well as the victory over German Naziism and Japanese militarism during the years of World War II.

The true friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union, as was pointed out by M. I. Kalinin, in being fostered in peacetime, burst out in vivid flames during the war years and amazed not only our enemies abroad, but also our friends.²⁴ It became an insurmountable force on the path of the Nazi enslavers. From the first day of the Nazi invasion, in all republics numerous requests to volunteer for the Red Army began to be received from the workers. Thus, during the first 10 days of the war, 7,613 applications were received from the workers of Dnepropetrovsk Oblast. The oblast military commissariat as well as the Kuybyshevskiy and Oktyabr'skiy Rayon military commissariats in Tashkent by 26 June of the same year received 1,552 applications. Prior to 5 August 1941, 1,156 persons had stated a request to be sent to the front in Namangan Oblast of Uzbekistan. Some 3,000 volunteers were sent from Turkmenia.²⁵ As a total during the war years, more than 80 divisions and separate brigades were organized in the republics.²⁶

The sons of all the peoples fought courageously on the front. KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA on 5 November 1942 told about the heroic actions of an international platoon under the

command of Lt M. Kabribov. During the period of the battle on the banks of the Volga, this subunit was ordered to capture elev. 115.2. For 4 days it was stormed by the men and when the top was reached, only 11 men remained alive. These were the Uzbeks A. Irdanov, D. Akhmedov, S. Pyziyev, N. Khaitov, S. Mordanov, Kh. Musayev, B. Alibekov, S. Tlepov, T. Khuzin, the Kazakh B. Gayarov and the commander, the Azerbaijani M. Kabribov. In endeavoring to recapture the lost position, the Nazis made one attack after the other. But the men of the platoon drove them off. Finally, the Nazis threw up to 300 soldiers and officers against the handful of brave men. The defenders of the elevation did not flinch. They vowed: "We will die, but we will not retreat!" And they fought to the last man. The land for which the sons of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan shed their blood has been named "The Elevation of the Eleven Heroes of the East."²⁷

Many soldiers from various nations and nationalities received high military decorations for courage, tenacity and valor. Thus, among the men who received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union there are representatives of more than 100 nations and nationalities of the USSR, including: 8,160 Russians, 2,069 Ukrainians, 309 Belorussians, 161 Tatars, 108 Jews, 96 Kazakhs, 90 Georgians, 90 Armenians, 69 Uzbeks, 61 Mordvins, 44 Chuvash, 43 Azerbaijanians, 39 Bashkirs, 32 Ossetians, 18 Maris, 18 Turkmens, 15 Lithuanians, 14 Tajiks, 13 Latvians, 12 Kirkhiz, 10 Komis, 100 Udmurts, 9 Estonians, 9 Karelians, 8 Kalmyks, 7 Kabardinians, 6 Adygians, 5 Abkhazians and 3 Yakuts.²⁸

Thus, the Soviet Army is an army of friendship of peoples. The men of the USSR Armed Forces are true patriots and internationalists. At present, as was stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress, the sons and grandsons of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War are already serving in the ranks of the defenders of the motherland. They have not experienced the severe hardships which befell their fathers and grandfathers. But they are loyal to the heroic traditions of our army and our people. Each time that the interests of national security and the defense of peace so require, when the victims of aggression need aid, the Soviet soldier presents himself to the world as a selfless and courageous patriot, an internationalist ready to surmount any difficulties.²⁹

"We are well aware," said the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, at the Extraordinary November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "that you cannot ask peace from the imperialists. It must be defended solely by relying on the uncrushable might of the Soviet Armed Forces."³⁰

The soldiers of the Soviet nation are profoundly aware of their responsibility to the Communist Party and the Soviet people for the task assigned to them. They are steadily improving their military and political skills and are vigilantly guarding the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the great victories of socialism.

FOOTNOTES

¹ See KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 October 1982.

² Ibid., 12 May 1982.

³ Ibid., 20 May 1982.

⁴ PRAVDA, 22 December 1982.

- ⁵ See "O 60-y godovshchine obrazovaniya SSSR. Postanovleniye TsK KPSS ot 19 fevralya 1982 goda" [On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR. Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 19 February 1982], Moscow, Politizdat, 1982, p 7.
- ⁶ Ibid., p 12.
- ⁷ Ibid., p 3.
- ⁸ KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 October 1982.
- ⁹ PRAVDA, 23 November 1982.
- ¹⁰ D. F. Ustinov, "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 35.
- ¹¹ [Not in text.]
- ¹² [Not in text.]
- ¹³ M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Voenizdat, 1965, p 214.
- ¹⁴ See D. F. Ustinov, "The Army of Friendship of Peoples," PRAVDA, 23 February 1982.
- ¹⁵ Quoted from: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 2 March 1982.
- ¹⁶ M. V. Frunze, op. cit., 1977, p 361.
- ¹⁷ M. I. Kalinin, "O kommunisticheskom vospitanii i voinskom dolge" [On Communist Indoc-
trination and Military Duty], Voenizdat, 1967, pp 583-584.
- ^{17a} See V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 35, p 216.
- ^{17b} See "Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) SSSR" [The USSR Constitution (Basic Law)],
Article 31.
- ^{17c} PRAVDA, 22 December 1982.
- ¹⁸ Ibid., 23 November 1982.
- ¹⁹ K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 39, p 459.
- ²⁰ V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 26, pp 107, 108, 110.
- ²¹ See KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 12 May 1982.
- ²² V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 37, p 26.
- ²³ Ibid.
- ²⁴ See M. I. Kalinin, op. cit., p 663.

- 25 See I. Z. Zakharov, "Druzhba, zakalennaya v boyakh" [Friendship Tempered in Battle], Moscow, Mysl', 1970, p 22.
- 26 See "Partiya i armiya" [The Party and the Army], Moscow, Politizdat, 1977, p 180.
- 27 See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 11, 1982, p 5.
- 28 See "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945. Kratkaya istoriya" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945. A Concise History], Voenizdat, 1970, p 581.
- 29 "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], p 66.
- 30 PRAVDA, 13 November 1982.

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EARLY ACTIVITIES TO ESTABLISH PARTY CONTROL OF ARMY REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 83 (signed to press 31 Jan 83) pp 12-17

[Article by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col (Res) A. Chliyants: "V. I. Lenin and the Creation of the Political Bodies and Party Political Apparatus in the Soviet Armed Forces"]

[Text] In the area of military organizational development, the Communist Party has always given and does give unflagging attention to party political work in the Armed Forces. The birth and creation of an ordered system of political bodies and party organizations in the Army and Navy are closely tied to the name of the founder of the Communist Party and Soviet state. V. I. Lenin defined the tasks of party political work as well as its ideological-theoretical and sociopolitical principles. He directed the creation and strengthening of the political bodies, the political apparatus and the party organizations in the Armed Forces. During a talk with N. V. Krylenko during the night of 3 March 1918, V. I. Lenin voiced the idea of the need to form a Higher Military Council.¹ On the very next day, he signed the decree of the Council of People's Commissars [SNK] for the establishing of this body. It was to include a military leader and two political commissars. On 9 March, the military council of the Western Sector of the curtain was organized with the same membership. On 13 June by an order of the SNK signed by V. I. Lenin, an analogous body was formed for directing all operations against the rebel Czechoslovak corps, but under the name of the Revolutionary Military Council [RVS].² Subsequently, this became the RVS of the Eastern Front. During the summer and autumn of 1918, RVS were created in all the fronts and armies. From September 1918, the Higher Military Council began to be called the RVS of the Republic. These were the leading military-political bodies of the Red Army. They were also concerned with questions of party political work.

At a conference of party and military workers on the questions of the organizational development of the Red Army on 25 March 1918, V. I. Lenin raised the question of the need to establish the institution of military commissars.³ Lenin emphasized that the commissars should be the proponents of the Communist Party and Soviet government policy in the troops. In them he saw not only a supervisory device for Soviet power over the military specialists, but also political workers, that is, he envisaged a second function for the military commissars: the organizing and carrying out of party political work among the personnel. In commenting on the importance of the military commissars in creating and strengthening the socialist state's army, Lenin said that precisely because hundreds of thousands of commissars and workers had been sent to the front, a change had come about in the war, a new army had been created and within it new discipline.⁴

Under the instructions of V. I. Lenin, the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars (VBVK) was instituted for directing their work. Initially this bureau consisted of instructor-inspector and agitation-education sections. However, life demanded an improving of its staff structure. A special commission was formed which worked out the appropriate proposals. In October 1918, two new sections appeared in the VBVK: military lines of communications and commissar courses and in December, another two: registration-distribution and information.

In the second half of this year, political sections were set up in all the armies and fronts. These were united and headed by the political section of the Republic RVS which had been created in April 1919 upon the decision of the 8th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congress and in May transformed into the Political Directorate of the Republic RVS. This ended the formation of the system of political bodies in our nation's Armed Forces.

The completion of the organizational structuring of the political bodies in the Red Army was preceded by an acute struggle against the "military opposition" and the Trotsky supporters at the 8th Party Congress. In speaking at its closed session, V. I. Lenin soundly criticized the erroneous views and conclusions of the "military opposition" and gave great attention to demonstrating the role of the commissars and the party-political apparatus in the instruction and indoctrination of the men. He emphasized that party political work is an inseparable part of general party work and is one of the unswerving bases in military organizational development and which ensures high battleworthiness of the troops, the strengthening of one-man leadership and increased authority for command personnel. Under the leadership of V. I. Lenin, the 8th Congress elaborated measures to strengthen party leadership over the Armed Forces.

In 1918, the basic functions were established for the individual elements of the military-political apparatus.⁵ Nevertheless, at that time there was still no precise delimitation of duties between the political sections, military commanders and party organizations. The report and speeches by delegates at the 1st All-Russian Congress of Political Workers mentioned the necessity for a more precise determination of the principles of relationships between the RVS, the political sections, the commissars as well as between the local party bodies.

Many comrades turned to V. I. Lenin, to the RKP(b) Central Committee and to the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] with a request to resolve these questions of military organizational development. For example, the chief of the political section in the 1st Army of the Eastern Front, S. A. Savel'yev, in a letter to V. I. Lenin and Ya. M. Sverdlov in December 1918, wrote: "There must be immediate intervention for defining the place and importance of the political section and political work in the army."⁶ A similar request was found in the telegram of the political section head of the Southern Front, I. I. Khodorovskiy.

V. I. Lenin personally undertook practical measures to define the place, role and functions of a number of elements in the military-political apparatus. Upon his instructions, on 15 December 1918, Ya. M. Sverdlov in a telegram to the chairman of the RVS on the Caspian-Caucasian Front, A. G. Shlyapnikov and particularly to the representative in charge of political work on the front, the member of the party provincial committee Ye. B. Bosh, stated that the political section was completely under the military council. Since the provincial committee and provincial executive committee in Astrakhan had not ceased in attempting to intervene into the affairs of the RVS, V. I. Lenin instructed

Ya. M. Sverdlov to strictly delimit the functions of these bodies. On 8 January in a telegram to Shlyapnikov and Bosh, it was stated: "The conflict in Astrakhan requires us again to categorically point out: 1) the subordination of the political sections to the revolutionary councils, 2) the complete inadmissibility of any intervention by the local party organizations in the work of the revolutionary council and in particular its political section."⁷

These provisions about the relationships between the military-political and local bodies were supplemented by V. I. Lenin in two telegrams to Astrakhan of 7 and 8 January 1919. In the first addressed to the provincial committee and Ye. B. Bosh, he raised the question of strict party responsibility for the persons who did not carry out the instructions of the party Central Committee and categorically demanded that the Astrakhan communists "cease any friction and join forces for the military cause."⁸

In the second, to the chairman of the Front RVS, A. V. Shlyapnikov, he wrote: "The conflict with the party committee is intolerable. Take all measures for close, coordinated work.... More tact is needed...."⁹

Thus, V. I. Lenin clearly established that party political work is organized and carried out by the political sections which are subordinate to the corresponding RVS and work under their direct leadership and that the military political bodies in their work are independent and free of the local party bodies and their activities are directed by the party Central Committee and by the Soviet government. At the same time, he pointed out that the RVS, the political bodies and political apparatus of the units and formations should work in close contact with the local party and soviet bodies. These recommendations of Lenin's underlay the work of the military councils, the political bodies and party organizations of the Army and Navy. The party has followed them in all subsequent stages of Soviet military organizational development. In the spring of 1920, the question arose of turning over the political-educational and literature-publishing functions of the PUR [Political Directorate of the Republic] respectively to the People's Commissariat for Education and Gosizdat [State Publishing House]. In being guided by Lenin's ideas on the organizational development of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] political bodies, the military delegates of the 9th Congress in their resolution stated: "In considering that the tasks of the Red Army are not only not concluded but, because of the transition to the labor principle and militia system, will become further complex, the apparatus of the PUR is to be completely maintained, in no way splitting it up among the various institutions and commissariats of the RSFSR."¹⁰

The viability of Lenin's ideas about the structure and functions of the military political bodies has been confirmed by all subsequent experience in Soviet military organizational development. The experience showed that planned, effective, purposeful and direct party political work in the troops is possible only with a centralized system of political bodies, a political apparatus and party organizations in the Army and Navy. The importance of this organizational principle for the military political bodies has increased immeasurably under present-day conditions which necessitate exceptionally high mobility and flexibility in the life and activities of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In the organizational development of the political bodies and party-political apparatus of the Red Army, a significant place is held by V. I. Lenin's activities to recruit and place political personnel. The questions of filling out and strengthening the troops with political workers were constantly at the center of his attention. V. I. Lenin personally promoted many party workers who had gone through the schooling of political struggle in the

party's ranks to leading work in the RVS and political sections of the fronts and armies. His excellent knowledge of people helped him carry out this very difficult task. the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces S. S. Kamenev wrote in his memoirs: "The exceptional selection of members for the RVS of the fronts and armies as well as the commissars for the divisions and units struck one positively. It took a great knowledge of the qualities of those comrades who received responsible assignments in the Red Army and Lenin knew each of them."¹¹ Thus, at the beginning of July 1918, V. I. Lenin sent K. Kh. Danishevskiy to the Latvian division which was involved in suppressing the SR revolt in Moscow. Lenin had long known Danishevskiy in party work and later recommended him to the RVS of the Eastern Front. On 16 July, Lenin signed the corresponding credentials for him.¹²

In the summer of 1918, V. I. Lenin recommended V. V. Kuybyshev, S. I. Gusev and other professional revolutionaries and experienced party workers well-known to him to the positions of members of the RVS which were being organized on the Eastern Front.

V. I. Lenin systematically received extensive information including the summaries of the RKKK Field Staff, the informational bulletins of the VBVK, the PUR, telegrams, notes, letters and reports from the leaders of the military and political institutions, the fronts and the armies. All of these contained information on the presence of political workers in the troops and the demand for them. In studying these documents, V. I. Lenin responded quickly, in turning repeatedly to the party and Soviet bodies with a demand to send to the troops as many workers as possible to staff the army political apparatus. One of the first such demands was expressed in his letter to the leaders of the Petrograd party organization of 20 July 1918.¹³ Then on 17 July in a telegram to the Petrograd party committee he again raised the question of sending active and militant party workers to the front. In appealing to the Petrograd leaders, V. I. Lenin and Ya. M. Sverdlov wrote that Moscow had already given the front 200 agitator-commissars. "Petrograd should give no fewer.... We are awaiting your energetic and rapid support, comrades!"¹⁴

The RBVK carried out active work to provide the troops with political personnel, having appointed and sent off hundreds of persons to the fronts in October-December 1918. For the VBVK and for the other bodies at that time the basic instructions were found in the resolution from V. I. Lenin on 15 December in a telegram to the commander-in-chief: "...Nothing to the west, a little to the east and everything (almost) to the south."¹⁵ In following this, the RKP(b) Central Committee, the VTsIK, the VBVK and the local bodies in January-February 1919 sent off 216 political workers to the Southern, Ukrainian and Caspian-Caucasian Fronts (60 percent of the total number of all the persons sent over this period to all the RKKK troops).¹⁶

V. I. Lenin devoted particularly great attention to the question of providing political bodies and the party-political apparatus of the Red Army with personnel in 1919, when the Civil War had reached its greatest scope and the number of fronts had increased up to six. In the spring of this year, the Eastern Front had again become the main front of the republic and to provide it with political personnel was one of the most important areas in the activities of the party and V. I. Lenin personally. On 21 April at a session of the Defense Council he gave a report "On Strengthening Work in the Area of Military Defense" and proposed a draft decree which would have recognized the necessity "of stopping for 3 months or very significantly reducing those sections in the central and local commissariats which are not absolutely essential and which could provide useful workers in the Army and the rear for the war, for supply, agitation and so forth."¹⁷ In accord with this, hundreds of workers, including women, were individually mobilized for political work.

In April-May 1919, the RKP(b) Central Committee, the VTsIK, the VBVK, the political section and later the PUR and the local party organizations sent 443 political workers to the Eastern Front (80 percent of the total number) (552 sent to the Red Army as a whole over this time).¹⁸

In June 1919, because of the liberating of significant territory by the troops of the Eastern Front, mass petitions began arriving to release the political workers from army ranks and return them to their previous work. V. I. Lenin responded sharply to this and on 20 June telegraphed to the members of the Eastern Front RVS: "It is absolutely prohibited for the political workers or anyone else to leave the army until the taking of the Urals...."¹⁹

On 14 July 1919, the RVS member of the 10th Army M. Ye. Yefremov, because of Denikin's offensive, sent V. I. Lenin a telegram which announced a shortage of political workers in the army formations and requested the sending of additional personnel for the position of regimental commissars and heads of division political sections. In his letter "Everyone in the Struggle Against Denikin!" V. I. Lenin pointed to the necessity of sending additional political workers to the Southern Front. On 1 August, the PUR reported to V. I. Lenin that during July it had sent 238 political workers to the Southern Front and 189 of them in August.²⁰ V. I. Lenin saw to it that the political bodies of the Southern and Southeastern Fronts were constantly supplied with personnel. In a note to the Organizational Bureau of the RKP(b) Central Committee of 10 December 1919 about the requests of M. V. Frunze to send political workers to the Turkestan Front, V. I. Lenin wrote: "First the Ukraine must be completely taken, and Turkestan must wait and suffer."²¹ In December 1919--January 1920, another 459 political workers were sent to the Southern and Southeastern Fronts while the remaining four fronts received 172 men over this same time.²²

In the spring of 1920, because of the danger of attack by landowner Poland on the Soviet nation, more and more political personnel began to be sent from the central bodies, the military districts and from other fronts to the Western and Southwestern Fronts. During January-March 1920, a total of 94 political workers arrived on the Western Front while, as was stated in a PUR report to V. I. Lenin, in May-June 2,585 were sent there and 1,433 to the Southwestern Front.²³

Thus, from the very beginning of the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces and over the entire period of the military intervention and Civil War, V. I. Lenin was continuously concerned with the questions of strengthening the political bodies and the party-political apparatus of the Red Army. Due to his unceasing concern and active involvement in this important matter, the Communist Party and the Soviet government promptly carried out the necessary measures to recruit and correctly place the political personnel. This ensured a constant influence of the Communist Party in the Red Army, it activated party political work in every possible way in the troops and contributed to their successful carrying out of the tasks of defeating the interventionists and domestic counterrevolution.

The system which developed for party leadership over the Armed Forces brilliantly has withstood the test of time and has shown its vitality and effectiveness both during the years of peacetime construction and during the Great Patriotic War. At present, in the Soviet Armed Forces the political bodies head a broad network of party organizations, they organize party political work among the personnel and provide a daily party influence on all the life and activities of the troops. This system of party leadership ensures the

unity of the Soviet military around the CPSU, their unbreakable unity with the people and profound dedication to the motherland and to the ideals of communism.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ "Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. Biograficheskaya khronika" [Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. A Bibliographic Chronicle], Vol 5, Moscow, Politizdat, 1974, pp 291, 293.
- ² "Dekrety Sovetskoy vlasti" [Decrees of Soviet Power], Vol II, Moscow, Politizdat, 1959, pp 429-430.
- ³ V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, pp 685-686.
- ⁴ V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 37, p 382.
- ⁵ See "Regulation Governing Commissars" (IZVESTIYA, 6 April 1918), "Regulation Governing the Political Sections of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the Fronts and Armies" ("Partiyno-politicheskaya rabota v Krasnoy Armii (aprel' 1918-fevral' 1919 g.)") [Party Political Work in the Red Army (April 1918--February 1919)], Documents, Moscow, 1961, pp 92-93.
- ⁶ TsGAOR [Central State Archives of the October Revolution], folio 1325, inv. 93, file 105, sheet 35 verso.
- ⁷ Ya. M. Sverdlov, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Vol 3, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1960, p 108.
- ⁸ V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 50, p 240.
- ⁹ Ibid., p 379.
- ¹⁰ "Partiyno-politicheskaya rabota v Krasnoy Armii (mart 1919-1920 gg.)" [Party Political Work in the Red Army (March 1919-1920)], Documents, Moscow, 1964, p 86.
- ¹¹ "Vospominaniya o V. I. Lenine" [Recollections about V. I. Lenin], Vol 3, Moscow, Politizdat, 1969, p 469.
- ¹² TsGAOR, folio 130, inv. 2, file 361, sheet 17, copy.
- ¹³ V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 50, pp 124-125.
- ¹⁴ "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza. Dokumenty, 1917-1981" [The CPSU on the Soviet Armed Forces. Documents, 1917-1981], Moscow, 1981, p 34.
- ¹⁵ V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 50, p 221.
- ¹⁶ TsGAOR, folio 130, inv. 3, file 1011, sheet 1 (estimated by author).
- ¹⁷ V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 54, p 414.

- 18 TsGAOR, folio 130, inv. 3, file 1011, sheets 1, 3 (estimated by author).
- 19 V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 50, p 355.
- 20 TsPA IML [Central Party Archives of the Marxism-Leninism Institute], folio 19, inv. 3, file 70, sheet 52 verso; TsGAOR, folio 130, inv. 3, file 189a, sheet 15.
- 21 V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 51, p 89.
- 22 TsGAOR, folio 130, inv. 4, file 261, sheet 2; file 264, sheet 4 (estimated by author).
- 23 TsGAOR, folio 130, inv. 4, file 261, sheet 2; file 264, sheets 7, 9 (estimated by author).

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MAJOR PINCER OPERATION IN STALINGRAD BATTLE DESCRIBED

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[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Lt Col V. Yeliseyev: "From the Experience of the Surrounding and Destruction of a Large Troop Grouping in the Stalingrad Battle"]

[Text] The Battle of Stalingrad, one of the greatest battles of the Great Patriotic War and World War II, ended on 2 February 1943. On the banks of the Volga and Don, the shock forces of the Nazi bloc had been dealt a decisive defeat. The counteroffensive at Stalingrad was a triumph for Soviet military art and set an example of the rapid encirclement and complete destruction of a large enemy grouping by conducting a series of successive offensive operations. On 12 November 1942, the Soviet troops on the very first day broke through the enemy defenses on the flanks of the enemy assault grouping, they developed the pincer offensive and on the 5th day completed the encirclement of the main forces of the 6th Tank Army and units of the 4th Tank Army consisting of 22 divisions and more than 160 separate units with a total of around 330,000 men,¹ simultaneously creating the external encirclement perimeter.

In the aim of relieving its surrounded grouping and restoring the situation at Stalingrad, the Nazi Command decided to concentrate fresh forces in the regions of Kotelnikovo and Tormosin, to break through the perimeter of envelopment by strikes at Stalingrad and then together with the troops of the surrounded grouping to restore the situation.²

However, all the attempts by the enemy command to liberate the surrounded troops ended in failure. In the course of Operation Ring which was the concluding stage in the counteroffensive by the Soviet troops at Stalingrad, the surrounded enemy grouping was finally crushed.

In establishing the overall concept for the counteroffensive and in working out its plan, Headquarters Supreme High Command [Hq SHC] skillfully used the existing situation. Even the preliminary considerations reported on 13 September 1942 to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief by his deputy, Army Gen G. K. Zhukov and the Chief of the General Staff, Col Gen A. M. Vasilevskiy were based on real calculations. The operation, in their opinion, could be provided with the necessary resources in 6 weeks.³ It was clear that over this time the combat capabilities of the 6th Army and the other troops in the enemy Army Group "B" aimed at Stalingrad would be significantly reduced. For this reason, the decision was taken to conduct a counteroffensive which would radically alter the situation in this area and lead to the collapse of the southern wing of the enemy front.⁴ An important condition which predetermined the method for defeating the enemy was the fact that

the main forces of its army group were involved in the struggle for the city and their flanks were covered by Romanian troops which were on the defensive along a broad front. The enemy had provided engineer works for the tactical zone which consisted of a main zone 5-8 km deep, however the enemy did not have prepared defensive lines in the operational depth. It also did not have sufficient reserves. In relation to the Nazi assault grouping, the Soviet troops held a threatening position from the north.

In full accord with the situation and considering the arguments of the front commanders, Hq SHC outlined the overall concept for the pending counteroffensive. The plan of operations worked out by the General Staff made provision for powerful strikes from the bridgeheads on the Don in the areas of Serafimovich and Kletskaya and from the area of the Sarpa Lakes to the south of Stalingrad in the aim of defeating the troops on the flanks of the enemy assault grouping, developing the pincers movement against Kalach and Sovetskiy and encircling and destroying the enemy main forces fighting directly around Stalingrad.

In accord with the plan of the operation (code named "Uranus"), the troops from three fronts reinforced by strategic reserves were to be involved in carrying out the tasks. This made it possible to achieve an overall superiority over the enemy as follows: 1.1-fold for personnel, 1.5-fold for guns and mortars and 2.2-fold for tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery mount]. A small superiority in aircraft was also achieved.⁵

The fronts boldly masked the men and equipment in the sectors of the main thrusts. For example, the commander of the Southwestern Front in his zone (250 km long) concentrated 50 percent of the rifle divisions, three tank and two cavalry corps, around 85 percent of the RVGK [Reserve of the Supreme High Command] artillery and all the rocket artillery in the breakthrough sectors of two armies some 22 km wide. Supporting the assault grouping of this front were the 17th and 2d Air Armies (under the command, respectively, of Maj Gen, from 20 December, Lt Gen Avn S. A. Krasovskiy and Maj Gen Avn K. N. Smirnov) as well as the long-range aviation. As a result, in the sectors of the enveloping strikes by the Southwestern and Stalingrad Fronts, a superiority over the enemy was achieved as follows: by 2-2.5-fold for personnel, by 4-5-fold and more for artillery and tanks. This was of decisive significance for breaking through the enemy defenses and exploiting success in the operational depth.⁸

The axes of the counterthrusts supporting the encirclement of the enemy were skillfully selected. In contrast to the Battle of Moscow, where the initial strikes in the counteroffensive by the Soviet troops were made against the strong enemy flank groupings, in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad the strikes were made against the less battleworthy 3d and 4th Romanian Armies. The axes of the strikes ran across terrain open for tanks and this made it possible for the formations of the tank troops to reach the link-up points by the shortest route and complete the creation of the inner perimeter of envelopment.

A particular feature of the Stalingrad Offensive Operation was the single-echelon configuration of the fronts. On the other hand, the operational configuration of the armies in the sectors of the main thrusts included, as a rule, two echelons and a mobile group. This increased the depth of the army thrusts. Thus, the depths of the operation by the 5th Tank Army of Lt Gen P. L. Romanenko which in the first echelon of its assault grouping had two rifle divisions reinforced by a tank brigade and battalion and in the second echelon two divisions and a mobile group consisting of two tank and one cavalry corps, reached the depth of a front-level operation. Characteristically, the formations from the mobile

troops of all the fronts (five tank, one mechanized and three cavalry corps) in Operation Uran fought as part of armies as their mobile groups.

The times that the field forces were to go over to the counteroffensive were set considering their distance away from the link-up points: the Southwestern Front was to go over to the offensive on 19 November and cross 140 km while the depth of the strike by the Stalingrad Front was less and for this reason its troops were to begin the breakthrough of the defenses 24 hours later.

There is one other particular feature in the plan for the strategic offensive operation at Stalingrad, that is, the conducting of it in two stages: in the first--the breaking through of the defenses, the surrounding of the main forces of the two enemy armies and the formation of a secure external perimeter of envelopment; in the second--the repelling of enemy attempts to relieve the sealed off troops and their elimination. "The idea of such an external perimeter," commented Army Gen S. M. Shtemenko, "was worked out in detail on the maps; forces required for the creating of it were carefully calculated; the lines of possible operations were determined with particular care."⁹

The simultaneous creation of external and internal perimeters in the Stalingrad Offensive Operation was a further step in developing the art of surrounding and destroying the enemy. In considering the experience of the Demyansk Operation of 1942, where the external perimeter had been formed late, with small forces and had not been solid, the commanders of the fronts for creating the external perimeter for enveloping the enemy at Stalingrad assigned a sufficient number of men and equipment. The areas of the external perimeter closest to the jump-off areas were formed after the breaking through of enemy defenses by those troops which were supporting the external flanks of the front assault groupings. The broken external perimeter which was created first was gradually filled in with troops and there were fewer and fewer gaps in it. By the end of 30 November, on the external perimeter there were 12 rifle divisions, 1 tank and 3 cavalry corps, a fortified area and a tank brigade. The IV Mechanized Corps was regrouped to the weekly covered sector in the area of Nizhne-Chirskaya on 1-2 December.¹⁰

The experience of utilizing the tank and mechanized corps in the Battle of Stalingrad merits particular attention. A portion of these formations participated in completing the breakthrough of the main enemy defensive zone while the IV Mechanized, the XXVI and IV Tank Corps played a decisive role in completing the encirclement of the Stalingrad enemy grouping, having closed the inner perimeter on the fifth day of the offensive.

The presence of tank and mechanized corps in the armies, the high strike power and maneuverability of these formations created an opportunity to employ them in the sectors of the army main thrusts away from the rifle troops. These same factors gave rise to the mobile groups which were organized in the fronts to carry out operational tasks at a significant depth. The experience of the massed employment of the tank and mechanized corps in the decisive sectors and away from the rifle troops, together with the experience of utilizing mixed tank armies, served as the basis for forming homogeneous tank armies at the beginning of 1943 and employing the latter as the mobile groups of the fronts. In subsequent offensive operations, particularly in the encirclement operations, these played an exceptionally important role in defeating the enemy groupings.

The enemy counterthrust made from the region of Kotelnikovo in the aim of relieving the surrounded grouping was skillfully repelled. The 2d Guards Army of Lt Gen R. Ya. Malinovsky, made a significant contribution to defeating the enemy counterstrike grouping.

This army had arrived from the RVGK and promptly shifted from the internal perimeter to the external one. Its formations which had moved by forced march into the region to the south of Stalingrad together with the 51st Army of Maj Gen N. I. Trufanov repelled an enemy offensive in this sector and then until the end of December, in fighting boldly and decisively in the enemy flank and rear, defeated the Kotelnikovo and partially the Tormosin (in cooperation with the 5th Assault Army) groupings. The successful defeat of the enemy on the external perimeter of envelopment shows the able employment of the troops by Hq SHC and the command of the fronts as well as the prompt maneuvering of reserves on the threatened sector. The methods for defeating the relieving enemy forces at Stalingrad were creatively utilized in subsequent encirclement operations.

The Soviet troops began to destroy the encircled grouping immediately after it had been cut off from the basic forces. During the night of 24 November, the fronts received instructions from A. M. Vasilevskiy stating that they should defeat the surrounded grouping by pincer strikes and destroy it piecemeal. Involved in carrying out this task were the troops of six combined-arms armies from the Don Front (commander, Lt Gen, from 15 January 1943, Col Gen K. K. Rokossovskiy) and the Stalingrad Front as well as the 21st Army from the Southwestern Front reinforced by the XXVI and IV Tank Corps.

The period of the fight against the surrounded grouping from 24 November through 12 December was characterized by the fact that the forces which had formed the internal perimeter initially endeavored to destroy the enemy. However, the fatigue of the troops which had been worn down in previous intense battles, the losses suffered by them and the stubborn enemy defense along the entire perimeter of envelopment did not make it possible to achieve any significant results. The Nazi Command was able to withdraw from the small bend in the Don the divisions which had been threatened with being cut off, it used these to fill out the battle formations of its formations to the west of the Rossoshka River and strengthened the other sectors of the front.

The experience of the fight at the given stage showed what enormous importance must be given to correctly determining the number of surrounded troops. Initially the number of troops surrounded was significantly below the actual and for this reason a portion of the men and equipment was shifted from the internal perimeter to the external one for reinforcing the troops which were to repel the expected enemy counterstrikes. At the end of November and in the first days of December, five rifle divisions, the IV Mechanized, the XIII Tank and III Cavalry Corps, a tank brigade and a separate tank killer brigade and several artillery regiments were shifted there.¹¹ The initial superiority of the Soviet troops on the inner perimeter of envelopment gradually declined and by 5 December the ratio for men and tanks became approximately equal. In addition, the Soviet troops were experiencing shortages of ammunition, fuel and other materiel. The heavy ice drifting on the Vogla impeded the delivery of materiel from supply bases of the Stalingrad Front and the supply levels for the troops of this front were significantly below the planned. In the developing situation, the Soviet Command drew correct conclusions and on 8 December took a decision to conduct a special operation to destroy the surrounded troops.

The troops of the Stalingrad Front which previously were conducting offensive tasks on the inner perimeter, from 13 December were shifted to a fixed defense in order to prevent the breakthrough of the surrounded enemy.¹² The efforts of the 64th Army of Lt Gen M. S. Shumilov and the 57th Army of Maj Gen (from 19 January Lt Gen) F. I. Tolbukhin were aimed at increasing the strength of the defenses as it was in these zones

that attempts to break out by the encircled troops were the most probable. The commander of the Don Front the armies of which formed the northern and western sections of the internal perimeter of envelopment, on 15 December decided "to continue the particular operations in the aim of keeping the enemy in constant tension and consistently improve the positions held by the front's troops, in squeezing the ring of encirclement."¹³

Due to the heroism and courage of the Soviet soldiers and to the skill of the command, an enemy counterstrike on the external perimeter was successfully repelled, its relief was not permitted and a going over to the effective destruction of the surrounded grouping was possible. At the start of January 1943, the command, the staffs and the troops of the Don Front continued to prepare actively for the offensive operation to eliminate the surrounded troops. This was code named "Ring" (conducted from 10 January through 2 February 1943).

In the course of the fight against the surrounded grouping, there was an effective sealing off of its troops from the air. "A sufficiently ordered system of utilizing aviation as well as artillery was worked out to combat enemy air transports. Strict responsibility was also established for the procedure of destroying enemy aircraft with the clarifying of duties for troops on the external face and inner ring of encirclement (the aircraft were destroyed in approaching the ring and during the period of loading and taking off)."¹⁵ Even at the beginning of December, the 8th and 16th Air Armies of Maj Gens Avn T. T. Khryukin and S. I. Rudenko received a directive from the Commander of the Soviet Army Air Forces which demanded the destruction of enemy air transports to be considered as the basic task" and defined a number of provisions on organizing the air blockade. In the directive particular attention was paid to the sealing off of airfields in the disposition of the enemy grouping.¹⁶ The tasks of blockading the grouping from the air were also carried out by the 102d Air Defense Fighter Division, the 1st, 3d, 17th, 24th and 53d Long-Range Air Divisions,¹⁷ the anti-aircraft artillery units of the fronts and the Stalingrad Air Defense Corps Region. As a total, over the period of the blockade, around 1,200 enemy aircraft were put out of action, of which almost two-thirds were transports and this sharply reduced the delivery of cargo to the surrounded enemy divisions. Success was ensured by the precise operation of the observation and warning system and by careful interaction between the involved men and equipment.

By the start of Operation Ring, the surrounded troops had created a deep and strong defense, benefiting from the fact that in the second half of December there had been no active operations on the inner perimeter. A portion of the enemy reserves formed a second defensive zone in individual sectors. The two reserve tank and cavalry divisions were placed in the planned sector for the main thrust by the Soviet troops. The dimensions of the surrounded area were still significant: 35 km from north to south, 35 km from west to east with a perimeter 174 km long. In the main defensive zone, the operational density of enemy troops was one division per 9 km.

The Soviet Command entrusted the carrying out of the operation on the Don Front which consisted of seven combined-arms armies and one air army. Due to the fact that Hq SHC had turned over to it from its reserves an artillery division, two regiments and one battalion of heavy artillery, five tank killer artillery regiments and two rocket artillery divisions, superiority over the enemy was achieved of 1.7-fold in terms of guns and mortars of 76-mm caliber and over. In terms of the number of personnel, the Don Front, considering the rear units and the facilities of the front and the armies, surpassed the surrounded enemy by 1.9-fold.¹⁸ In terms of the number of tanks, the Soviet troops were

1.2-fold less than the enemy. A 3-fold superiority in combat aircraft created favorable conditions for the final elimination of the enemy.

Initially, the Soviet troops "cut off" the western salient of the encirclement area, having reached the Rossoshka River by the end of the second day. After regrouping their forces, they crushed enemy resistance on its defensive lines. In the course of the further advance, it became more and more difficult for the enemy to maneuver its reserves. Over the 16 days of battles, it lost more than 100,000 men killed and wounded,¹⁹ and was deprived of the airfields through which the air transports endeavored to supply the sealed off troops. On 26 January the Soviet troops split the surrounded grouping into two parts. On this day, the troops of the 21st Army which were advancing to the east to the south of the settlement of Krasnyy Oktyabr' and on Mamayev Kurgan linked up with the units of the 62d Army of Lt Gen V. I. Chuykov which were advancing to the west. The southern enemy grouping was eliminated 5 days later and the northern surrendered on 2 February.

The defeat of the enemy on the Volga was a major military-political event which made a decisive contribution to achieving a fundamental change in the course of the Great Patriotic War and all of World War II.

The Battle of Stalingrad enriched Soviet military art with experience in conducting a strategic operation the aim of which was to surround and destroy a major enemy grouping. The strikes against the enemy were made when its offensive capabilities had been exhausted. Careful preparation for the operation, the skillful choice of the axes of the enveloping strikes and the skillful creation of the troop groupings became the major prerequisites for the successful combat operations to surround the enemy.

The operation demonstrated the high effectiveness of the two-sided envelopment of the main enemy forces by strong assault groupings. This method of defeating the enemy groupings was successfully employed by the Soviet Command in the second and third periods of the war.

The simultaneous creation of the internal and external perimeters of envelopment was a significant step in developing the art of encirclement. Their strength was ensured by the regrouping of the formations or by assigning new forces as well as by the courage, tenacity and combat skill of the troops. In creating the necessary groupings on the encirclement perimeters a particular role was played by the strategic reserves which were employed on the axes of the main thrusts and were promptly made available to the commanders of the fronts.

The experience of the Battle of Stalingrad showed that a concentrating of superior forces was needed for splitting the surrounded enemy which had dug in on defensive lines. The absence of large formations of armored and mechanized troops on the inner perimeter led to a situation where the offensive at the beginning of the operation developed at a slow pace (2-2.5 km a day) and the splitting of the surrounded grouping was achieved only 7 days before its complete elimination.

In all the stages of the operation, the questions of troop control were creatively solved. After the breakthrough of the enemy defensive zone, the command of the front made provision for and carried out the transfer of certain formations and units between the armies in the aim of their most efficient use. This helped to strengthen the perimeters of envelopment.²⁰ Hq SHC and the General Staff devoted particular attention to organizing

cooperation between the troops advancing on the link-up axes. With the very first necessity a portion of the troops on the external perimeter of envelopment was incorporated in the just-created 5th Assault Army. Under the conditions of the extended struggle on the inner perimeter of envelopment, there was a tendency to combine command over all the forces fighting on it. In the concluding operation, the leadership over the latter was exercised by the command of one front. In all stages of the fight against the surrounded grouping, the efforts of the troops were coordinated by the representatives of Hq SHC. In having high praise for the actions of the command and the troops in the Battle of Stalingrad, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I. V. Stalin, in the order of 23 February 1943, pointed out that the Soviet Army was destroying the enemy, "in conducting such serious operations to encircle and eliminate the enemy armies which could serve as an example of military art. Undoubtedly this is an indication of the maturity of our commanders."²¹

The rich experience of the Stalingrad Strategic Offensive Operation, in being characterized by the employment of different methods and forms of combat operations in the fight against the surrounded and relieving groupings, has not lost its timeliness and can be creatively employed in training command personnel, staffs and troops to conduct operations under present-day conditions.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 6, Voenizdat, 1976, p 59.
- 2 "Velikaya pobeda na Volge" [The Great Victory on the Volga], Voenizdat, 1965, p 299.
- 3 G. K. Zhukov, "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" [Recollections and Reflections], Vol 2, Moscow, Izd-vo APN, 1978, pp 76, 77.
- 4 A. M. Vasilevskiy, "Delo vsey zhizni" [A Cause of One's Whole Life], Moscow, Politizdat, 1974, p 219.
- 5 "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 7, Voenizdat, 1979, p 519.
- 6 [Not in text.]
- 7 [Not in text.]
- 8 "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 6, p 48.
- 9 S. M. Shtemenko, "General'nyy shtab v gody voyny" [The General Staff in the War Years], Book 1, Voenizdat, 1975, p 110.
- 10 TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], folio 232, inv. 590, file 6, sheet 41; file 7, sheet 8; folio 48, inv. 451, file 60, sheets 171, 180, 187; file 98, sheets 104, 107.

- 11 TsAMO, folio 48, inv. 451, file 98, sheets 104, 107.
- 12 Ibid., file 56, sheet 278.
- 13 "Velikaya pobeda na Volge," p 305.
- 14 [Not in text.]
- 15 A. M. Vasilevskiy, op. cit., p 239.
- 16 TsAMO, folio 368, inv. 6476, file 1, sheets 93-94.
- 17 The 24th Long-Range Air Division has not been previously mentioned in the literature.
- 18 VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 2, 1973, pp 37-38.
- 19 TsAMO, folio 206, inv. 262, file 180, sheet 139.
- 20 Ibid., folio 232, inv. 590, file 17, sheets 16-17.
- 21 I. Stalin, "O Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne Sovetskogo Soyuzha" [On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union], 5th Edition, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1951, p 93.

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EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL AVIATION IN WORLD WAR II REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 83 (signed to press 31 Jan 83) pp 25-30

[Article by Honored Scientist of the RSFSR, Doctor of Naval Sciences, Prof, Vice Adm K. Stalbo: "The Experience of Employing Naval Aviation in the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] During the prewar period, naval aviation was assigned the role of a force with the job of supporting the combat operations of surface vessels. It was considered chiefly a means of reconnaissance and a major element in air defense for naval bases and ships at sea. At the same time, there was recognition for the ability of naval aviation to make bomb and torpedo attacks against enemy naval vessels, the sealanes, defense industry installations and naval and air bases.

On 22 June 1941, the Naval Aviation numbered 2,581 aircraft (116 in the Northern Fleet, 656 in the Baltic Fleet, 626 in the Black Sea Fleet and 1,183 in the Pacific Fleet).¹ Here the number of torpedo planes was 9.7 percent, bombers were 14 percent, fighters were 45.3 percent and reconnaissance seaplanes were 25 percent² of the total naval aviation. In it there was a predominance of fighters and scouts (70.3 percent, that is, support forces.

The assigning of aviation to the fleets basically corresponded to their purpose in the prewar years. The insufficient number of aircraft in the Northern Fleet was largely necessitated by the insignificant capacity of its airfield network.

Prior to the war, the aircraft fleet of naval aviation consisted chiefly of aircraft of the following types: DB-3, SB, TB-1, TB-3, I-15bis, I-16, I-153 and MBR-2 which were inferior to the German aircraft in flight performance. The rearming of naval aviation with new types of aircraft namely the PE-2, YaK-1, MIG-1 and MIG-3, had just commenced. Naval aviation did not have ASW aircraft. Initially, the MBR-2 aircraft and later the wheeled DB-3, DB-3f and PE-2 were adapted for ASW purposes. Aside from a small number of Gneiss radars, the aircraft did not have any equipment for detecting subs. Being armed scouts, they could detect submarines only when surfaced, for at that time there was no aircraft equipment for locating them when submerged.

The air forces of the fleets did not possess special long-range fighters which to some degree would have compensated for the lack of a carrier-launched fighter cover. Because of this, the fleets were provided only with frontal [tactical] fighters and this greatly narrowed the opportunities for the combat employment of surface vessels.

From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, Naval Aviation in accord with the situation existing on the land fronts, carried out the following tasks: assisting the ground troops in combating the opposing formations of enemy ground troops and attacking its rear installations; participation in the defense of naval bases; destruction of enemy combat vessels and transports in the course of countering the enemy's maritime shipments; air defense for ships at sea and base areas; supporting landing operations and the landing of tactical landing parties.

During the period of the strategic defense on the Soviet-German Front, a larger portion of the fleet aviation was employed for attacking enemy ground installations and the battle formations of the ground forces. Its operations over the land theaters were scattered in time, as a rule, they were of a tactical nature, however their total effect, as is seen from the figures given below, represents a major operational contribution to the struggle of the Armed Forces on the land front. As a total during the war years, around one-quarter of the naval aviation aircraft sorties was spent on combat operations over the land front. It destroyed around 130,000 enemy soldiers and officers, more than 1,500 tanks and over 9,000 enemy vehicles.⁴

The fleet aviation was also used for combat operations against enemy rear installations. Even during the first days of the war, the long-range bomber aviation made a number of strikes against Constanta and the oil fields in Ploesti. From 2 July through 18 August 1941, the air forces of the Black Sea Fleet made 22 raids against installations in Ploesti. As a result, Romania lost 15 percent of its oil supplies and, in addition, a railroad bridge and oil pipeline across the Danube were put out of operation and two oil refineries were damaged.⁵ These actions were of operational significance, for under the threat of the loss of Romanian oil, the Hitler Headquarters on 12 August 1941 ordered the Army Group South to capture the Crimea and thereby eliminate the Soviet airfields from which the raids had been made against the Romanian oil fields.

The strikes against Berlin in August 1941 hold a special place in the combat activities of Naval Aviation. These raids by the aviation of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the long-range bomber aviation which caused a blackout to be observed on the Berlin streets until the end of the war clearly repudiated the false assertions of Nazi propaganda about the destruction of Soviet aviation. They were of enormous moral-political significance, causing a political upsurge among the Soviet military on the front and among the rear workers.

In examining the nature of the employment of naval aviation during the course of the war, one must particularly mention its combat operations in the defense of naval bases and maritime cities.

Some 22 fighters were assigned for air support in the defense of the Hanko Naval Base. The airfield where the group was based was under continuous artillery shelling. On individual days the enemy fired off up to 1,500 rounds against the airfield. Under such difficult conditions, the air group had to carry out a broad range of diverse tasks. It supported the air defense of the troops and base facilities, it conducted air reconnaissance, it stormed the enemy troops and firing positions on the land front, it operated against ships at sea, it destroyed enemy aviation on airfields, it supported the combat operations of amphibious landings and carried out other tasks, including the correcting of artillery fire.

During the heroic defense of the Hanko Base, the small air group honorably carried out the tasks entrusted to it. The naval pilots destroyed 34 enemy aircraft, hundreds of

enemy soldiers and officers found their death because of their fire and they sank more than 20 ships, launches and vessels.⁶

In the defense of Odessa, the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet was an important and very effective means of assisting the troops. An air group was assigned directly as part of the offensive defensive grouping from the fleet's air forces and this group included 35 fighters and 6 ground attack planes⁷ which were based at the Odessa airfield. Bombers for attacking the enemy besieging the city took off from Crimean airfields while fighters from the Odessa group provided cover for them in the raid area. This greatly complicated the organizing of cooperation and excluded the possibility of jointly preparing the attack and fighter aviation for combat operations.

The pilots of the Odessa air group also had to operate in a very complex situation. They had to take off and land at the airfield under enemy artillery shelling. As an average they made three or four sorties every 24 hours, and on individual days up to 7. As a total in the course of the defense of Odessa, the aviation made more than 4,600 aircraft sorties. As a result, 168 enemy tanks, 135 motor vehicles, 25 tanks with fuels and lubricants, 7 guns and up to 2,000 enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed. In air battles and at the airfields, the naval pilots destroyed 80 enemy aircraft.⁸

The aviation of the Black Sea Fleet during the heroic defense of Sevastopol covered the installations and troops of the Sevastopol Defensive Region, the ships and transports in moving at sea, they made bombing raids against enemy personnel and equipment on the forward edge and deep in its battle formations and also conducted air reconnaissance.

An air group consisting of 82 aircraft was based directly in Sevastopol,⁹ and this group included predominantly fighters and seaplanes. The remaining airfields—two land and one sea—could not take a larger number of aircraft.

The destruction of enemy personnel and equipment on the land front was carried out by systematic air bombing and ground attack operations. The ground attack planes operated most effectively against the enemy troops. They caused enormous damage to its personnel and equipment and in individual instances determined the outcome of the engagement of the ground forces in our favor by their strikes.

Here it is essential to bear in mind the enemy's numerical superiority in aircraft. For example, by May 1942, up to 400 enemy bombers and around 150 fighters were operating around Sevastopol.¹⁰ Under the most difficult situation, the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet during the defense of Sevastopol made over 16,000 aircraft sorties, including 5,735 for operations over the land front. As a result, more than 20,000 men, 115 tanks, over 1,500 vehicles and more than 100 artillery pieces were destroyed. Some 438 enemy aircraft were destroyed in air battles and at airfields.¹¹

An analysis of the employment of the fleet air forces in the defense of bases showed that their activities were carried out under the conditions of significant enemy air superiority. The limited opportunities for the basing of aviation in the defended areas did not make it possible to increase the air groupings. The difficulty of basing was also apparent in the fact that not only the enemy air forces, but its field artillery could strike our airfields.

It is essential to consider that in assisting the ground forces, the naval aviation had limited opportunity for combat operations against a sea enemy, however it was not freed from the tasks in armed combat at sea and to the degree that it was able it successfully carried these out.

In the combat activities of naval aviation, the operations to disrupt the enemy sea movements hold an important place. Due to the insufficient amount of attack aviation and its use in operations chiefly on the land front in 1941-1942, a relatively small number of flights was made to attack enemy transports and ships at sea and in bases. During those years, aviation employed the "free hunting" method by individual aircraft or in pairs. Frequently these flights were not supported by preliminary reconnaissance of the enemy sealanes and for this reason were not always successful.

Over the enemy sealanes bomber and mine and torpedo-dropping aviation were utilized and the latter was employed in a version of high altitude torpedo planes. The effectiveness of level-flight bombing strikes and high-altitude torpedo launching by a small number of aircraft was low. This increased significantly with the changeover to low-level torpedo dropping, divebombing and subsequently to masthead bombing.

In keeping with the increased number of attack aviation in the fleets and the reduced amount of missions carried out over land, in the operations of naval aviation to disrupt sea movements from 1943 concentrated combined strikes began to prevail against convoys at sea and ships in bases and ports. During these, divebombers, torpedo planes and ground attack planes under a fighter cover were employed in the most advantageous sequence. Up to 160 aircraft participated in such strikes. The effectiveness of naval aviation operations rose and from 1943 it emerged in first place in the sinking of enemy ships and vessels.

A significant achievement was the tactical cooperation between aviation and the torpedo boats in attacking the convoys. This was particularly characteristic for the Northern Fleet. Cooperation with submarines was of an operational nature.

As a total during the war, naval aviation expended approximately 10 percent of the aircraft sorties on strikes against ships and vessels at sea and in bases and ports. As a result of these, over 50 percent of the total transport tonnage and around 70 percent of all the combat and auxiliary vessels destroyed by the fleet were sunk.¹²

Naval aviation dropped over 1,300 torpedoes and laid around 2,500 mines.¹³ Torpedo aviation demonstrated high results and it sank 1.5 more combat vessels and transports than bomber and ground attack aviation. At the same time, one must note the quite effective operations of ground attack aviation in combating small enemy ships, launches and vessels.

Naval aviation concentrated significant effort on carrying out the tasks of ASW defense of the base areas and covering the ships at sea. Fighter aviation of the fleets destroyed more than one-half of all the enemy aircraft shot down by the naval air defenses. However, the insufficient radius of the fighters limited the opportunities to cover ships at sea to a narrow coastal belt. When the surface vessels were forced to operate outside the range of fighter aviation, the air enemy caused it significant losses and this in numerical terms comprises around one-half of all our ship losses.

During the course of the war, the methods of utilizing aviation to combat the air enemy were continuously improved. Among the methods for the combat employment of fighter aviation, one might mention: the guiding of the fighters to the target using radio and radar; standing patrols in threatened sectors; alert duty at airfields; "free hunting"; the sealing off of enemy airfields.

In the combat operations of naval aviation, pre-emptive strikes were employed against enemy airfields in the aim of neutralizing its bomber and torpedo aviation which threatened our ships and transports during the periods of escorting convoys.

It must be pointed out that the cover for Allied convoys in the Berents and White Seas assumed the form of operations and for carrying these out as of May 1942, Hq SHC put the aviation of the Karelian Front, the Arkhangelsk Military District and a portion of the bomber aviation from the SHC Reserve under the air force commander of the Northern Fleet. Headquarters issued special directives for escorting convoys PQ-16, PQ-17 and PQ-18.¹⁴

For combating the air enemy, Naval Aviation made over 40 percent of its aircraft sorties. More than 5,500 enemy aircraft were either shot down by it in air battles or destroyed at airfields.¹⁵

In the course of the Great Patriotic War more than 100 amphibious parties of various sizes were landed. While in 1941-1942 the landing parties were landed predominantly without air softening up, from 1943 until the war's end, aviation was widely employed in all stages of the amphibious operations. In the course of the landing operations, aviation provided reconnaissance and a fighter cover in the troop loading areas, in the move at sea and at the landing points; it also neutralized the enemy antilanding defenses and assisted the landing forces in carrying out the tasks on shore.

Thus, in the Kerch-Eltigen Landing Operation of 1943, the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet and the 4th Air Army made more than 4,400 aircraft sorties. In the period from 1 through 3 November alone, the ground attack aviation participated in repelling 37 enemy infantry and tank counterattacks in the area of Eltigen.¹⁶

The aviation of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in landings to capture the islands of Vyborg Bay was the basic force for neutralizing the enemy fire plan on the islands. It made more than 7,500 aircraft sorties¹⁷ for assisting the landing forces as well as for striking enemy surface vessels which endeavored to impede the landing and operations of the forces on the shore.

Aircraft, and predominantly bombers and ground attack planes, were the basic strike force which ensured the success of combat in all stages of the landing. Here the actions of bomber aviation were most effective in the stage of preliminary preparations for the landing and the ground attack aviation in the course of direct support for the landing and the escorting of the landing party in carrying out missions on the shore. Fighter aviation provided cover for the attack aircraft and the operations of the landing forces in all stages of the operation.

In the aim of achieving success for amphibious landing operations, at times they could be preceded by a paratrooper landing as occurred in the landing by forces from the Black Sea Fleet at the village of Grigoryevka in September 1941 near Odessa. The amphibious landing in the region of Stanichiki and Yuzhnaya Ozereyka was supported, and very effectively, by a paratrooper force landed near the village of Vasilyevka.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War has convincingly shown that the success of landing operations to a significant degree depends upon the winning of air supremacy in the area of the operation. This notion is also applicable under present-day conditions. The aviation of the fleets was also employed for carrying out tasks involving the supplying

of ammunition and food for the landed forces has occurred, for example, under stormy weather conditions at sea in the period of the Kerch-Eltigen Landing Operation.

The situation on the land fronts and the sea theaters largely determined the areas of the main efforts by our naval aviation. Thus, the particular importance of supporting the internal and external sealanes demanded that the Northern Fleet aviation focus its efforts on covering the ships and convoys at seas as well as the naval bases and ports against enemy air strikes (71 percent of the aircraft sorties). At the same time, the complex and taut situation on the flanks of our fronts adjacent to the Baltic and Black Seas forced the aviation of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to expend, respectively, 29 and 24 percent of the aircraft sorties for direct assistance to the ground troops.

As a whole, naval aviation during the war years became a main branch of naval forces and it was assigned a leading role in combating enemy combat vessels and transports; it was the most effective means of air defense for the fleet forces and installations.

The contribution of naval aviation to the victory over the enemy was highly regarded by the Soviet people: 57 of its units and formations were awarded orders, 25 of them became guards units, 259 naval pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union while 5 of them--A. Ye. Mazurenko, V. I. Rakov, B. F. Safonov, N. G. Stepanyan and N. F. Chelnokov--received this title twice.

In conclusion, it is essential to point out that the experience of employing naval aviation during the years of the Great Patriotic War helped in correctly defining the role and place of this branch of naval forces in modern armed combat at sea. It contributed to naval air development in the postwar period as one of the main branches of forces in the Navy.

The remarkable combat traditions of the Soviet naval pilots are an important source for forming high moral qualities in the personnel of modern naval jet aviation which has been outfitted with modern weapons and equipment.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 "Bojevoy put' Sovetskogo Voenno-Morskogo Flota" [The Campaign Record of the Soviet Navy], Voenizdat, 1974, p 537.
- 2 "Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika SSSR" [Soviet Aviation and Cosmonautics], Voenizdat, 1968, p 267.
- 3 [Not in text.]
- 4 VOENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 7, 1979, p 12.
- 5 "Istoriya voyenno-morskogo iskusstva" [History of Naval Art], Voenizdat, 1969, p 257.
- 6 "Voyevoy put' Sovetskogo...", p 264.
- 7 "Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika SSSR," p 277.
- 8 P. N. Ivanov, "Kryl'ya nad morem" [Wings Over the Sea], Voenizdat, 1973, p 174.

- ⁹ "Istoriya voyenno-morskogo...", p 268.
- ¹⁰ P. N. Ivanov, op. cit., p 184.
- ¹¹ Ibid., p 186.
- ¹² V. I. Achkasov, N. B. Pavlovich, "Sovetskoye voyenno-morskoye iskusstvo v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [Soviet Naval Art in the Great Patriotic War], Voenizdat, 1973, p 318.
- ¹³ "Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika SSSR," p 298.
- ¹⁴ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 5, Voenizdat, 1975, pp 258, 259.
- ¹⁵ "Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika SSSR," p 298.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., p 287.
- ¹⁷ V. I. Achkasov, N. B. Pavlovich, op. cit., p 152.

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MULTINATIONAL FEATURES OF SOVIET ARMY TRACED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 83 (signed to press 31 Jan 83) pp 38-42

[Article by Col M. Zhuravlev: "Loyalty to the Fraternity and Friendship of Peoples"; for the beginning of this series, see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Issues No 8 and 12 for 1982]

[Text] Foreign guests had arrived in the Guards Fighter Air Regiment imeni Leninskiy Komsomol. Even their first acquaintance with the life of the aviators evoked amazement in them. They were particularly struck by the national composition of the regiment. An elderly Swede constantly repeated every name that he heard, as if trying to remember it.

"Rozh-kov...Tikhe-nko...Kavda-ra-shvili...Khay-da-rov...De-gu-tis...," he said breaking each word into syllables and raising his eyebrows in surprise, asked: "How many nations are there here? A true international!"

"How many nations?" replied the deputy regimental commander for political affairs, Maj Yu. Stapanov. "Eighteen. And everyone, like brothers, is always ready to support one another."

The political worker first explained this idea by examples from the Great Patriotic War. He first mentioned the courageous son of the Ukrainian people, thrice Hero of the Soviet Union, Col Gen Avn I. N. Kozhedub, who inscribed many vivid pages in the regiment's history. Repeatedly Ivan Nikitovich [Kozhedub] covered his comrades in battle and they were representatives of the most diverse nationalities. The equal to him was the gypsy Hero of the Soviet Union, Capt A. Baklan. In one of the battles, in risking his life, the intrepid pilot saved the life of his wingman, the Belorussian Lt V. Matsiyevich.

The officer told how feelings of friendship of peoples are manifested in the present daily life of the regiment's personnel. And as if summing up, he concluded:

"Generally speaking, we are like one family."

"A family?" interrupted the same Swede with grey temples. "A family means a husband, wife and children. What sort of family is this?"

It is not hard to understand the perplexity of the guests. Much in the life of our military is unusual for them and does not fit in their views about an army. In the capitalist world,

national differences develop into national mistrust, reciprocal alienation and even outright hostility. Thus, in making out of its soldiers obedient murderers capable of any crimes, the command of the U.S. Armed Forces in the barracks instills a spirit of chauvinism and racism and cultivates disdain for the "inferior races." Racists from the Ku Klux Klan, "crazies" from the John Birch Society and Nazis are openly active in the U.S. Army.

How far the Soviet Armed Forces are from all of this ! The very flesh and blood of their people, they mirror those enormous changes which have occurred over the 60 years in the USSR. As was pointed out in the documents of the ceremony in the Kremlin devoted to the USSR jubilee, over these years the backward national borderlands have disappeared, a single Union-wide national economic complex has been formed, progressive qualitative changes have occurred in the social structure of the republics, a socialist multinational culture has flourished and socialist nations have been formed which now comprise a new historical community, the Soviet people.

Under the impact of socialist reality and the titanic indoctrinational activities of the Leninist party, a new, Soviet man has been formed. Inherent to him is a strong patriotic feeling for the great community of our 270-million-strong people who bring together more than 100 nations and nationalities.

Most alien to all Soviet people are ideas about the superiority of some races over others or national or racial exclusiveness. Internationalists in their essence, they relate to one another respectfully and without national differences. It could not be otherwise in a nation where not only moral, but also legislative standards establish the strengthening of friendship and fraternity among the Soviet peoples as one of the most important duties. "The duty of each Soviet citizen," emphasizes the Basic Law, "is to respect the national dignity of other citizens and to strengthen the friendship of the nations and nationalities of the Soviet multinational state."¹

This applies fully to the Soviet Armed Forces, too. This is why the word "family" acquires a completely specific sense under Army and Navy conditions. Broad-reaching and yet exact, this word fully expresses the essence of the relationships which have become firmly established in the military collectives. In speaking about these relations, L. I. Brezhnev commented: "Our army is a special army in the sense that it is a school of internationalism and a school for indoctrinating the feelings of fraternity, solidarity and mutual respect among all the nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union. Our Armed Forces are a single friendly family, the living embodiment of socialist internationalism."²

Under the conditions of developed socialism, all the nations and nationalities of our motherland are fully represented in the Soviet Armed Forces. For example, men from 60 nationalities are serving in the troops of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District. In the unit where V. Belogortsev is the party bureau secretary, the men from 26 nationalities represent 12 Union republics of our nation. Undoubtedly, at present no one would be surprised by such figures. This is how it should be as our army was founded and formed as a multinational one. Something else is more important, that is, the attitude toward carry-out one's duty to the Soviet fatherland. For each man, be he Russian or Ukrainian, Kazakh or Uzbek, Belorussian or Georgian, Lithuanian or Moldavian, for all the sons of the multinational Soviet state, in first place is the motherland, its happiness and security.

An inexhaustible feeling of patriotism causes the men, regardless of their nationality, to dedicate all their forces to carrying out the tasks of increasing combat readiness and to

do everything to ensure the secure defense of the nation and the great victories of socialism. This is why "our people," as was pointed out at the conference for the leadership of the Soviet Army and Navy, "love their Armed Forces and are confident of their constant readiness to defend their socialist motherland. They value the courage and self-sacrifice in carrying out their military duty."³

Under present-day conditions, the law of fraternity, friendship and mutual aid is manifested vividly and fully as during the years of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars. The heirs of the glorious traditions of the elder generations are totally loyal to this. Just take the socialist competition. It, like no other area of military life, is permeated with a spirit of collectivism, mutual aid and combat cooperation. This patriotic spirit is felt in the very names of many combat mottos in the competition. These include: "Having Become an Outstanding Man, Help Your Comrade," "All That I Know and Am Able to Do Is For You, Comrade!" "Have No Laggard Nearby!" and "A Leading Division Starts With You." In containing a great moral charge, these mottos have inspired and are inspiring thousands of men to partake in the competition, to aid their comrades and see to it that they become outstanding men in military and political training. Precisely due to such help from fellow servicemen, Pvt Ramis Ismailov became an outstanding man. His mother, Gulyum Ismailova, having learned of this, wrote to the unit: "May I express my sincere thanks for the good announcement that my son has distinguished himself. My thanks for it. But my main and greatest thanks are to our Soviet power. We owe it for all our successes and all our great victories. I would particularly mention the great friendship which has united us forever. I, an Azerbaijani mother, consider all the mothers of my Ramis's comrades to be my sisters and their sons have become my sons. I am confident that they consider me and my son in the same manner."⁴

During exercises, the Azerbaijani Sgt Rza Kayumov noted that the tank of his Ukrainian friend Sgt A. Krivko was stopped on the side of the road. He could have passed by as the breakdown should be fixed by the field shop and an advantage in the competition with this crew would have been ensured. Sgt R. Kayumov did not hesitate for a minute. "We do not need such 'advantage'," he decided. "A friend could fall behind. We must not allow this!" The two crews by their common efforts quickly located the problem and eliminated it. Soon they were moving forward. They succeeded in catching up with the company and attacking on time. As for the grade, it was high. Here was teamwork and close friendship among the men and because of this the company successfully carried out the combat task.

This is an ordinary, most mundane fact. Many such examples are known which convincingly show that the tradition of friendship among the frontline soldiers is being developed and enriched with new vivid manifestations of army fraternity. For example, very similar to the heroic deeds of the Kantemirovka veterans was the deed of their successor in the unit, the Komsomol group organizer Pfc Tashpulat Yuldashev.

...This occurred during exercises. Pfc Yuldashev, in attacking the "enemy" in an extended line of combat comrades, raised his arm to throw a grenade. At that instant his foot slipped on the wet grass. In falling down he realized that he had not thrown it properly. Jumping up, he saw that the grenade was lying just several steps away. And not far off ran Pvt V. Bogolyubov with whom he had a particularly close friendship. Then particularly loudly, in rising over the noise of the "battle" in full swing, the Komsomol group organizer commanded: "Hit the dirt! Bogolyubov, hit the dirt!" And he himself dove on the grenade. Thus, having sacrificed himself, Tashpulat Yuldashev saved the life of his friend and combat comrades. His feat was posthumously commended by the insignia of the Komsomol Central Committee "Military Valor."

The same decoration was awarded to the paratrooper, Guards Pvt Vladimir Pivovarov. In a difficult air situation, he did not lose his self-control and saved the life of a young man from Kirkhizia, Guards Pfc Yu. Altypov.

Officers also set an example of truly fraternal attitudes towards the men of different nationalities. They are paternally concerned for those who have come under the colors, they steadily teach them military affairs and temper them ideologically and physically. And if a danger hangs over one of them, they inevitably come to aid. This is precisely how the battalion commander, Maj Yu. Pyatkin acted. He was in a tank together with a soldier from Tajikistan, Pvt Nazhmidinov. When, in carrying out a planned exercise, the soldier was about to throw the grenade from the hatch, it suddenly fell from his hand and dropped back in the tank. In saving M. Nazhmidinov from inevitable death, the battalion commander covered the grenade with his own body. The motherland had high praise for this feat in the name of fraternity and friendship of peoples. By an Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Yuriy Aleksandrovich Pyatkin was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Star for courage and valor shown in carrying out military duty.

Indoctrinated in a spirit of internationalism, the Soviet military securely carry on the baton from those who during the years of World War II extended a helping hand to the European and Asian peoples enslaved by fascism. And their glorious deeds are very similar to the feats of the elder generations. Is it not noteworthy that in just 2 years (1979-1980), men from the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany carried out more than 100 noble deeds. They rescued 32 East German citizens from death, a majority of them being children. How similar are these deeds to those feelings which are evoked by the monument to the liberator soldier with a little girl in his arms.

And what a striking contrast against this background is the conduct of American servicemen who are in the immediate proximity of the frontiers of the Warsaw Pact countries. For example, for more than a year in West Germany the barracks of American soldiers have been considered the most dangerous centers of crime. In 1980 alone, the number of officially recorded criminal-type violations committed by U.S. servicemen was 95,000. These included theft, robbery, rape, bodily injury and drug dealing.

Soviet people, wherever they might be, always maintain a high loyalty to the traditions of internationalism. The men of the limited Soviet troop contingent in Afghanistan upon the request of the country's legitimate government have shown themselves to be true internationalists. For example, this is the tank crew of Junior Sgt Imran Abdulvagapov who was awarded the medal "For Valor" and the Diploma of the Komsomol Central Committee for courage in providing international aid to Afghan friends. Indicatively the small troop collective is also multinational. The commander himself comes from Checheno-Ingushetia, the tank driver Pvt Vasiliy Tsurkanu is a Moldavian, the loader Pvt Yuriy Chibotaru is also Moldavian, while the gunner Pvt Yerzhen Raimbekov is a Kazakh. The men from different nationalities, in having undergone the school of friendship and fraternity of peoples, show profound understanding for carrying out their military and international duty.

The bright and noble feeling of friendship and fraternity among peoples of different nationalities does not come automatically. It is the result of the extended and complex process of indoctrination. In all stages of its history, the CPSU has devoted enormous attention to this area of ideological activity. From the rostrum of the ceremony in the Kremlin devoted to the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, the patriotic and international indoctrination of the Soviet people was mentioned as a constant and permanent task. "This task," emphasized the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee,

Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, "must be carried out by all the party and Komsomol organizations, the soviets and trade unions and our Armed Forces which have always been a good school of internationalism."⁵

The process of indoctrination starts with the forming of a young person's character, his personality in the family, school and public organizations. Our Soviet way of life has an enormous impact on this. The Soviet Armed Forces have a special place in this process. With reason, they are recognized as a true university of proletarian internationalism and fraternity of peoples. They actually possess broad opportunities for this. "For indoctrinating the Soviet military in a spirit of fraternal friendship," emphasized the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "the Army and Navy have all the necessary conditions. First of all, this is the broad interest and responsibility of all the personnel to strengthen the defense of the socialist fatherland and the responsibility of each soldier and the troop collective as a whole for high combat readiness of the subunit, unit and ship. This is the joint military labor which brings together and unites the men of different nationalities, indoctrinates them in a spirit of true comradeship and mutual aid and contributes to their ideological, spiritual and cultural mutual enrichment. Finally, this is aided by the entire system of training and indoctrination, by the entire way of life in the multinational Army and Navy collectives and by all our Soviet reality."⁶

One of the most vivid manifestations of internationalism is the military cooperation among the Warsaw Pact armies. Born during the years of the joint struggle against Naziism, this has constantly developed and grown stronger. The joint troop and command-staff exercises and maneuvers are true schooling in fraternal friendship and military comradeship. During them, not only are the combat skills of the allied armies improved. The exercises and maneuvers contribute significantly to the closer spiritual solidarity of the men and to the multiplying of combat fraternity traditions. This was demonstrated completely by the exercises "Zapad-81" [West-81] and "Shchit-82" [Shield-82].

The commanders, the political workers and the party organizations are endeavoring to make maximum use of such good opportunities in indoctrinating the servicemen. First of all party concern is shown for more actively developing in the men a communist ideology and providing them with a profound understanding of Lenin's ideas on the nationality question. For example, everywhere in the units and VUZes of the Moscow Military District, theoretical conferences and colloquiums, Lenin and sociopolitical readings are being held on: "V. I. Lenin—The Founder of the Soviet Multinational State" and "We Are Internationalists!" Unified political days, special-subject evenings and magazine readings have been devoted to such subjects as "We Are Strong in Our Leninist Friendship," "In Close Unity to the Single Goal" and "By the Map of the Union Republics." The servicemen have begun to meet more often with literary and art figures as well as famous workers of the nation who are representatives of different nationalities. This has not only made the ideological and cultural life of the men more interesting and spiritually fuller, but has also significantly enriched them with the knowledge of the ideas of socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism. However, this is just one side of the coin. The other and equally important is to see to it that the ideas be turned into the convictions of each person and into a standard of conduct in daily life.

An analysis of troop indoctrination practices has shown that a moral guideline is extremely important for carrying out such a crucial task. This conclusion leads one to the idea of organizing a talk for the men the purpose of which might be described by the famous

phrase of the poet "What Is the Purpose?" Here use should be made of oral propaganda, visual agitation and the press. Meetings with veterans from famous formations and units, talks about the 24 Heroes of the Soviet Union who have been entered on the rolls of the district units in perpetuity and on the international crews, teams and squads which distinguished themselves in battle and movie evenings on "Eternally Living Heroes"—all of this should be practiced more systematically and purposefully.

It is well known that the soldiers and sergeants greatly value close contact with relatives, close friends and fellow countrymen, with the schools and labor collectives where they studied or were employed prior to induction in the army. Considering this, the party bureau headed by Maj A. Sakovich has organized special evenings devoted to the 12 republics where the men of the subunits have come. To virtually every evening they have invited famous persons who are fellow countrymen of the soldiers, including also the parents of some of them. Here also they maintain broad patriotic correspondence. For example, newspapers from more than 30 rayons of the nation were shown at one of the evenings. Materials on the outstanding men of the unit had been published in many of them. Speeches by veteran servicemen are given systematically. Their stories are frequently accompanied by the showing of photographs or amateur films and by the listening to tape recordings of appeals from parents to the men.

Similar opportunities are widely employed also in a number of units from the Guards Taman Motorized Rifle Division. If famous workers visit the VDNKh [Exhibit of National Economic Achievements] they are inevitably invited as guests of the servicemen. If there is an art week for one or another republic, its participants also meet with the personnel. Komsomol workers visit Moscow and they also call on the division. For example, recently the men of the Taman Division heard the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Komsomol Central Committee A. I. Korniyenko as well as highly placed Komsomol workers from Belorussia, Georgia, Lithuania, Tajikistan, Moldavia and other republics.

At present, international indoctrination of the men is being carried out even more actively and they are constantly searching for new ways to increase the effectiveness of this work. This is dictated by the difficult international situation and by the party's demands to maintain defense capability on the proper level.

These party demands are most closely tied to patriotic and international indoctrination. The more intensely this is carried out, the stronger friendship and fraternity will be and the closer and more monolithic the troop collectives. And the great and responsible tasks posed by the party for the armed defenders of the motherland will be carried out all the more successfully.

FOOTNOTES

¹ "Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) SSSR" [Constitution (Basic Law) of the USSR], Moscow, 1977, p 20.

² L. I. Brezhnev, "Aktual'nyye voprosy ideologicheskoy raboty KPSS" [Urgent Questions of CPSU Ideological Work], Vol 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 556.

³ PRAVDA, 28 October 1982.

⁴ "Ordena Lenina Moskovskiy voyennyi okrug" [The Order of Lenin Moscow Military District], Voenizdat, 1971, p 418.

⁵ PRAVDA, 22 December 1982.

⁶ D. F. Ustinov, "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 316.

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USE OF GLIDERS IN WORLD WAR II COMBAT DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 83 (signed to press 31 Jan 83) pp 43-46

[Article by V. Kazakov: "Gliders in the Skies of the War"]

[Text] The history of the combat employment of gliders is among the little-known pages from the history of the Great Patriotic War for many readers.

The idea of developing and employing heavy multiseat gliders for transport and assault purposes belongs to Soviet designers and pilots. In 1932, the young beginning aviation designer Boris Dmitriyevich Uralov, in following the idea of the inventor-pilot Pavel Ignat'yevich Grokhovskiy and under his leadership, figured out, designed and with a small group of young specialists developed the world's first G-63 assault transport glider.¹ No one had ever built such large gliders designed for the air transporting of personnel and cargo. The 16 compartments which could carry military gear or personnel lying down were located in the long, wide wings. The load per square meter of wing exceeded by 2.5-fold the greatest amount of load for all the motorless sports aircraft known at that time. The calculated weight-lifting ability (1,700 kg) was generally unprecedented, particularly if one considers that the glider was towed by a single-engine R-5 aircraft with a 550-hp engine.

After several test flights involving the pilots P. I. Grokhovskiy and V. A. Stepanchenok, a commission from the RKKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] Air Force Staff reached the unanimous conclusion that the tests conducted on the experimental towed airtrain confirmed the advisability and possibility of employing special gliders in airborne operations. It was shown that assault gliders could land on unequipped fields and this was an indisputable advantage over aircraft.

Thus, glidering began to develop. Many original designs were created. Our nation held a leading place in the work of developing transport gliders.

Upon a decision of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee and the Soviet government of 23 January 1940, a directorate for producing assault-transport gliders was established within the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry. This was to be headed by the chief V. N. Kulikov and the chief engineer P. V. Tsybin. The Central State Air Institute was involved in the research on aerodynamics. O. K. Antonov was instructed to work out the design of a 7-seat A-7 glider, V. K. Gribovskiy was to design the 11-seat G-11, D. N. Kolesnikov and P. V. Tsybin were to produce a 20-seat KTs-20 glider, while G. N. Kurbala was to design the KG heavy glider.²

Assault gliders began to be produced in the course of the war. The basic glider fleet was made up of A-2, A-7 and G-11.

For the training of glider pilots, the Military Aviation Glider School of the Airborne Troops was formed in Saratov. In August 1942, two training air glider regiments were organized with glider fleets and repair shops. In August 1943, these were transformed into separate air glider regiments.

In the system of airborne equipment, the transport glider became a dependable means for the silent ferrying into the enemy rear of assault subunits and large cargo and ensuring their comparatively compact landing and the rapid readiness of the assault troops for immediate action. Very important was the fact that the low landing speeds, the special skis and low 2-wheel landing gears made it possible for the gliders to land on dirt fields which were limited and little-adapted for aircraft landing in forested, mountainous and lake terrain.

From the very outset of the Great Patriotic War, individual aerorigs (the aircraft and glider) carried out flights in the aim of moving various cargo and equipment over friendly territory and across the front line. For example, flamethrowers and other weapons were transported to Stalingrad. The glider pilots V. Donkov and S. Anokhin flew to the Bryansk forests where the paratroopers of Gen N. Kazankin were fighting. Partisans from the Orel area also received the motorless transport aircraft.

The first group flight was made in November 1942. In the preparations for the offensive of the Soviet troops at Stalingrad, severe frosts struck suddenly. The tank formations ready for the counteroffensive were partially incapacitated as the water froze in the engines of the armored vehicles. Antifreeze had to be delivered immediately to the tank troops. Upon orders from the command, the tow pilots and glider pilots immediately began to prepare to take off. The rigs were quickly organized. Having loaded the A-7 and G-11 gliders with barrels with antifreeze, the aircraft and the gliders under the command of Lt Col D. Koshits secretly landed in the designated area. Here, having increased the group by aircraft and personnel from the Military Air Glider School, and having loaded up, the air rigs set off along the designated route. The group of air rigs were covered along the entire route by air defense fighters and then the duty flights of the Kacha Fighter Air School. Regardless that the flight was carried out under difficult weather conditions, the mission was accomplished.

At the beginning of 1943, after our troops had taken Velikiye Luki, a relative quiet descended in this area of the front. The Nazis, in using this for their own interests, repositioned several units and along with the police threw them against the Belorussian partisans in the regions of Nevel, Polotsk, Gorodacha and Vitebsk. The enemy was endeavoring by any means to split up the combat formations of the partisan area and destroy them. The partisans were experiencing an acute shortage of ammunition, weapons and food. Under the developing situation, they could only be aided by aviation which could deliver cargo. Then came the order from the Soviet Command to prepare the glider group under the leadership of Maj Gen A. Shcherbakov and Engr-Lt Col P. Tsybin for intense operations.

The operation started on the night of 7 March 1943 and lasted continuously until 20 March. It involved 65 A-7 and G-11 gliders. The partisans received 60 tons of combat freight, 5 printing presses and 10 radios, 106 men of leadership personnel were delivered, an assault force of guardsmen demolition troops numbering 150 men was landed while individual sabotage groups were dropped in the rear.

The partisans of the Polotsk-Lepel zone were given great help by the assault glider troops. The flights started at the end of April 1943 and continued until the spring of 1944. Along with the A-7 and G-11 gliders, the 12-seat heavy KT-20 gliders and the SB and II-4 towplanes were employed. Secretly hundreds of gliders were initially moved to staging airfields. They took off in groups. They lifted off approximately 30 minutes before dawn. They crossed the front line in darkness and reached the designated area at night. The aircraft, having released the gliders, returned to base before dawn.

Some 138 gliders loaded with the most essential combat gear were towed to a landing field in the enemy rear.⁵ The personnel, sabotage groups, medicines and food products which the partisans needed greatly were dropped. These flights were difficult for the glider pilots. They crossed the front line on dark nights, at times coming under the fire of enemy aircraft batteries or patrolling pairs of fighters. Traps awaited them and on the ground the Nazis set out bonfires at false fields which looked like the partisan ones.

Once the glider of the Komsomol member Sgt Yuriy Sobolev spontaneously released from the aircraft some 60 km away from the partisan field at a low altitude. Below was a forest. In the deep darkness one could scarcely spot bright patches of lakes. Sobolev did not lose his head. In remembering that there are almost never any large trees on the shores of lakes, he headed the glider toward the water. The landing lights picked up a gently sloping shore overgrown with low brush. There was the land...a crack, dull bumps and the glider stopped. It had landed on enemy-occupied territory.

The glider pilot unloaded the glider and concealed the military gear in a deep pit which he dug during the night. When he was filling it in and camouflaging it he reached the end of his strength. Having crawled under a small spruce, he rested his head on his automatic and instantaneously fell asleep. The enemy did not spot the noiseless glider. Having awakened, Sobolev got his bearings and went to find the partisans. He encountered their patrols and reached the positions of the brigade of Hero of the Soviet Union Vladimir Lobanek. The next night a group of partisans on horses transported all the cargo hidden by the pilot to the brigade. Komsomol member Yuriy Sobolev was awarded a combat order.

Many glider pilots participated in fierce battles against the enemy as men in the partisan groups and detachments.

In September 1943, an assault group consisting of the 3d and 5th Airborne Brigades was dropped on the Voronezh Front with the task of assisting the troops of the front in capturing a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnepr River. The paratroopers landed over a large area and this impeded their assembly. There were more than 40 separate paratrooper groups in the region from Rzhishchev to Cherkassy. Being in an exceptionally difficult situation, they acted boldly, in attacking the nearby enemy lines of communications, its garrisons, staffs and reserves. But day after day there were fewer and fewer of them.

The thinned subunits, having made several night marches, made their way to a forest adjacent to the Dnepr. They stole food from the enemy. Their ammunition had run out. They did not have enough medicines to treat the numerous wounded. Anxious radio messages flew through the airwaves.

Soon air transports began to fly in to the new camp of the assault troops dropping bags with ammunition and food. Gliders loaded with supplies, weapons and medicines slipped silently across the Dnepr.

After the Great Patriotic War, a stele was erected at one of the airfields. A metal model of a A-7 glider was erected on it. This was a monument to the feat of the glider pilots who perished in the war years.

Thus, during the years of the Great Patriotic War, experience was acquired in the multi-purpose employment of towed gliders in carrying out various missions. The air glider units made a contribution to the overall cause of fighting the enemy and inscribed many glorious and heroic pages in the history of the Air Force and Airborne Troops.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ N. Bobrov, "Zemlya vnizu" [Land Below], Leningrad, 1935, pp 130, 131.
- ² AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA, No 5, 1975, p 35.
- ³ [Not in text.]
- ⁴ [Not in text.]
- ⁵ A. Tikhonravov, "'Gribovskiys' in the Air," KRYL'YA RODINY, No 10, 1969, p 37.

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DEVELOPMENT OF RADAR, ECM IN WORLD WAR II REVIEWED

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[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences, Engr-Col V. Nazarenko: "Certain Questions on the Development of Radar and ECM Equipment and Procedures in World War II"]

[Text] The rise and development of radar dates to a later prewar period in comparison with radio communications. Nevertheless the armies of the Nazi bloc, England, the United States and the Soviet Union by the start of World War II had various types of radars which were used primarily for air defense. Thus, in the German air defense system, early warning radars for air targets were employed including Freya (a range up to 200 km) and the Great Wurzburg (a range up to 80 km) as well as anti-aircraft artillery gun radars such as the Little Wurzburg (range up to 40 km). Somewhat later stationary radars of the Wasserman type (range up to 300 km) were put into use. The presence of this equipment made it possible by the end of 1941 to create a rather ordered air defense radar system consisting of two belts. The first (external) started at Ostend (110 km to the northwest of Brussels) and stretched to Cuxhaven (100 km to the west of Hamburg). The second (inner) one ran from the northeast of the French border along the German-Belgian border and ended at Schleswig-Holstein.

With the delivery of the anti-aircraft fire control radar of the Manheim type (range up to 70 km) in 1942, additional posts began to be established between these two belts. As a result by the end of 1943, a solid air defense radar field was formed.

In the course of the war, England built a network of stations along the South Coast and then along the entire East Coast. Thus arose the Chain Home Line. However, German intelligence soon detected not only the position, but also the basic parameters of this network. In particular, it was established that the directivity patterns of the English radars form a certain angle in relation to the surface of the earth (sea), forming blind zones in the detection system. In using this, the Nazi aviation approached the English coast at low altitudes. The English had to create an additional radar line which provided a low-altitude field.

Due to the system created and which operated in close cooperation with other types of intelligence, the English were able to promptly detect the enemy aircraft, to scramble the fighter aviation and ready the anti-aircraft artillery weapons. Here there was no need for continuous air patrolling, and as a result of this the interceptor fighters were used with greater effectiveness. Losses of the Nazi aviation increased rapidly. Thus, on 15 September 1940 alone, the Germans lost 185 aircraft out of the 500 participating in the raid. This forced them to convert basically to night raids.

At the same time a search was started on methods and equipment which would impede the detecting of aircraft in the air by enemy radars. A solution to this problem was found in the use of passive and active radar jamming by aviation.

Passive jamming was employed for the first time by English bomber crews in the raid on Hamburg during the night of 23-24 July 1943.¹ Metalized ribbons (aluminum foil) which were named "Window," packed in special containers (bales) were dropped from the aircraft and these "cluttered" the screens of the enemy radars. As a total during the raid against Hamburg, approximately 2.5 million canisters with 2,000 strips in each were used. As a result, instead of the 790 bombers involved in the raid, the German operators counted thousands of aircraft, being unable to distinguish the true targets from the faults. This disrupted fire control at the anti-aircraft batteries and the operations of the German fighter aviation. The effect of the interference was particularly effective against the anti-aircraft artillery radars. After the start of the wide-scale employment of passive jamming, the overall effectiveness of German air defenses declined by 75 percent.² In turn, the losses of English bombers declined by 40 percent.³

For distracting and wearing down the air defenses, aviation sometimes simulated false massed raids against false targets by using passive interference. For example, during the night of 18 August 1943, in a raid against the rocket center at Peenemunde, the English attempted a diversionary maneuver: several Mosquito aircraft employing canisters of passive interference simulated a massed raid against Berlin. As a result, a significant portion of the fighter aviation from German and Dutch airfields was raised to meet the jamming-setting aircraft. At the same time the aircraft proceeding against Peenemunde encountered virtually no resistance from enemy air defenses.

The means of passive interference were constantly being improved. Thus, for setting interference for aircraft radars, anti-aircraft artillery shells tipped with passive reflectors were employed. The ground and ship radars were neutralized using rockets equipped with "Window." Sometimes, instead of canisters with foil, the airplanes towed special metal nets which appeared as false targets for the operators of the fire control and air guidance stations.

German aviation first employed passive interference in August 1943 in raids against English objectives and ships off the coast of Normandy.

The next stage in the development of anti-radar equipment was the use of active interference by the belligerents, that is, special electromagnetic radiation which neutralized the radar receivers.

Aircraft jamming transmitters of the Carpet type were first employed by Anglo-American aviation in October 1943 in raids against Bremen. By the end of the same year, onboard active jamming transmitters had been installed on all the heavy B-17 and B-24 bombers from the 8th and 15th American Air Armies fighting in Western Europe. Only 10 percent of the English bomber aviation had such transmitters. In truth, the English had, in addition, special jammer aircraft which were used for group cover of aircraft detachments. According to data in the foreign press, German air defenses consumed an average of around 800 anti-aircraft shells for each bomber shot down before the use of jamming and under the conditions of the use of active and passive jamming against the radars, the figure rose to 3,000.⁴

Active jamming and angle reflectors together were most successfully employed against aircraft radar bombing sights (reconnaissance and precision bombing radars). For example, the Germans learned that in the night raids against Berlin, the bombers employed the Weissensee and Mugelsee located near the city as radar-contrast markers. After numerous unsuccessful experiments, they succeeded in altering the shore configuration of the lakes using angle reflectors located on floating crosspieces. In addition, dummy targets were created which simulated real installations and frequently Allied aviation bombed these. For example, in the radar camouflage for the city of Kustrin, the angle reflectors were placed in such a manner that on the screens of the aircraft radars they would see the characteristic blips of two "equal" cities the distance between which was 80 km.

The combat experience gained in the course of the war by the air defense troops and the air forces demonstrated that in conducting electronic warfare, the greatest effect is achieved with the surprise, massed and combined utilization of equipment and methods for neutralizing radar. Characteristic in this regard is the organizing of radio electronic countermeasures in the course of the Anglo-American landing on the Normandy Course in 1944. The German radar system was effected by the combined resources of the Allied air, naval, airborne and ground troops. For creating active interference, they utilized around 700 aircraft, ship and land (motor vehicle) transmitters. During the week before the landing of the expeditionary troops, a majority of the German radars which had been detected by all types of intelligence had been subjected to intensive bombing. During the night prior to the start of the landing, a group of aircraft with jamming transmitters patrolled along the English coast, neutralizing the German early warning radars. Directly before the invasion, air and artillery strikes were made against the radar posts and as a result of this, over 50 percent of the radars were knocked out. At the same time, hundreds of small ships and vessels in small groups left for Calais and Boulogne, towing balloons with a metalized cover and floating angle reflectors. The naval guns and rockets fired metalized strips into the air. Passive reflectors were dropped over vessels underway and a group of bombers under the cover of jamming simulated a massed raid against Berlin. This was done in the aim of disrupting the operation of the surviving radar observation system and confusing the German Command about the true place of the Allied troop landing.

In the main sector of the landing area, English bombers with jamming transmitters neutralized the German radars and dropped smoke charges in order to impede enemy visual observation. At the same time air strikes were made against the major communications junctions in the landing area while diversionary groups destroyed many wire lines. Jamming transmitters were installed on 262 vessels and ships (from the landing barge to the cruiser inclusively) and on 105 aircraft; these virtually paralyzed the operation of all types of German radar.

With the conducting of active offensive operations by the Anglo-American troops, the need arose to use radar for organizing cooperation between the ground troops and aviation. The difficulty was that the radios, rockets, air-ground signaling panels, tracer shells and other devices by which cooperation was provided in the first period of the war could ensure coordinated operations between the ground forces and aviation only under the condition of good visibility. Yet the technical capabilities of aviation at that time made it possible to employ it in virtually any time of the day or season, under any weather conditions, but only with the appropriate navigation equipment.

The first attempts at the partial use of radar to ensure continuous coordination between the ground forces and aviation were undertaken by the Americans during the operations

in North Africa. However, they were able to create a system of radar coordination only by the beginning of the invasion of the European Continent.

In organizational terms, such a system was formed by using a group of radars which performed various functions depending upon their type. It included one MEW early warning radar (a range up to 320 km), three or four TPS-3 close detection radars (a range up to 150 km) and several SCR-584 radars for guiding aircraft to ground targets (range up to 160 km). The MEW station, as the operations information center, was provided with radio, telegraph and USW radio links with all the radar and visual observation posts as well as with the aviation staff the function of which included the taking of decisions according to the existing air situation and the leadership of the air units. The SCR-548 radar brought the aircraft directly to the region of the object and due to this the search for the target was substantially simplified. In addition, each radar of the system had an USW radio for communicating with the aircraft in the air.

A more difficult task than the use of radar to provide coordination between the ground forces and supporting aviation was to utilize radar for detecting enemy ground targets and firing artillery (mortar) batteries. The basic difficulty was in the very operating principle of radar, that is, the reflecting of the sent electromagnetic energy from all the objects encountered on the path of its propagation. Nevertheless, the Americans succeeded in adapting the SCR-584 fire control radar for observing the battlefield. These were incorporated in the overall artillery observation system and provided for the reconnaissance of moving ground targets on medium-rugged terrain to a depth of up to 15-20 km. The ground radar detection, for example, in corps artillery was responsible for around 10 percent of the total number of identified targets and in the divisional 10-20 percent of them.

The concealed artillery and mortar positions were detected for the first time with the aid of radar in the course of the battles on the beachhead in the area of Anzio, Italy, in 1943. The use of radar for these purposes was a more effective method than the sound ranging and visual observation, particularly under the conditions of intense shelling and rugged terrain. In fixing the trajectory of the shell's flight on the radar indicators from several directions, it was possible to determine the enemy firing positions with an accuracy of 5-25 m and organize counterbattery bombardment. Initially the SCR-584 and TPS-3 radars were employed and then a modified version of the latter, the TPQ-3.

The relatively successful employment of radar by the Americans in conducting ground reconnaissance was explained primarily by the fact that the Germans did not assume at all that the enemy could use this equipment for the designated purposes. For this reason they did not take the necessary countermeasures, although they did have experience in conducting radio electronic warfare in the air defense system, the air force and navy.

In the Soviet Armed Forces, radar and EDM equipment was employed by the air defense troops, the aviation and the Navy. In the ground forces radio reconnaissance and radio jamming equipment was primarily employed.⁵

The first radar for the detection of airborne targets in the air spotting troops was the RUS-1 radar (Reven') introduced in September 1939 and first employed in the Soviet-Finnish War. By the start of the Great Patriotic War, 45 sets of the RUS-1 had been manufactured and these were subsequently used in the air defense system of the Transcaucasus and Far East. During the war against the Finns, on the Karelian Isthmus the early warning radar RUS-2 (Redut) was tested in combat and this was introduced in the air defense troops in July 1940.

It should be pointed out that the RUS-2 radar possessed high performance for those times, but in tactical terms did not fully satisfy the needs of the troops as it used a two-antenna system and had cumbersome and complicated rotating drives. For this reason, only an experimental batch was received by the troops figuring that a single-antenna model for this radar known as the RUS-2s (Pegmatit) was undergoing field testing and should be serially produced.⁶

In the development of Soviet radar, the creation of radars of the RUS-2 type in comparison with the RUS-1 was a significant step ahead and this fundamentally influenced the effectiveness of air defense. In obtaining data on the air situation (range, azimuth, speed of flight, group or single target) from several radars, the command of an air defense zone (region) had an opportunity to assess the enemy and make optimum use of the weapons.

By the end of 1942, two experimental models of a gun laying radar had been developed under the name SON-2 and SON-2a, and in 1943 their series production was started. The SON-2 radars played a very positive role in the combat operations of the anti-aircraft artillery. Thus, according to reports of the I, III, IV and XIV Corps and the 80th and 90th Air Defense Divisions, in firing using these radars, 8-fold less shells were expended for each enemy aircraft shot down than without the radars.

In terms of simplicity of design and reliability in work, in terms of production costs and transporting conditions as well as in terms of set up and take-down time, the Soviet radars surpassed the German, English and American ones developed at the end of the 1930's and the beginning of the 1940's.

The formation of radio technical [radar] units started with the organizing of the first radar subunit at Leningrad in the autumn of 1939. In May 1940, the 28th Radio Regiment was formed in Baku, in March-April 1941, the 72d Radio Battalion at Leningrad and the 337th Radio Battalion at Moscow.⁸

Radar equipment was successfully utilized not only in the air defense of Moscow and Leningrad, but also in defending Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Sevastopol, Odessa, Novorossiysk and other cities.

In 1942-1943, the so-called "altitude" attachments (VPM-1, -2, -3) were developed for the RUS radars for determining the altitude of targets as well as instruments for identifying air targets according to the "friend-foe" system. This provided an opportunity to utilize them for guiding fighter aviation to enemy aircraft. In 1943 alone, using radar data, the number of fighter guidances in the air defense troops covering front installations rose from 17 to 46 percent.⁹

A major accomplishment of Soviet radar was the development of aircraft radars of the Gneiss series for detecting and intercepting air targets. In 1943, these radars were installed on the aircraft of the first division of heavy night interceptors in the history of World War II. The Gneiss-2m radars were successfully used also on the torpedo planes of the Baltic Fleet.¹⁰

In parallel with the development of the aircraft interception radars, development of radar sights was also carried out. As a result, interception and sighting radars were developed (abroad there were only interception radars) for air targets as well as a radar bomb sight which made it possible to carry out precision bombing against ground objectives under any conditions, not only during the day but also at night.

In striking enemy objectives, the aircraft of our bomber aviation employed passive radar jamming for neutralizing the enemy aircraft early warning radars, the target designation radars, as well as the radars for guiding anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aviation to the aircraft. As a result of the mass employment of radar by the enemy in the anti-aircraft artillery and on the night fighters, the losses of our bombers rose. This required the organization of countermeasures against the enemy radar system. In approaching the radar detection zone, our aircraft shifted to low altitudes, using the "openings" in the enemy radar polar diagrams. In the target area they climbed to the designated height and changed heading and speed. Such a maneuver, as practice showed, led to the disrupting of the calculation data in the fire control instruments of the anti-aircraft batteries and to the aborting of attacks by enemy fighters. With the approach to the radar zone, the bomber crews dropped metalized strips which created passive jamming for the enemy radars. In each air regiment, two or three aircraft were assigned for setting the jamming and these flew above and in front of the strike groups. As a result, the released strips, in descending, concealed the latter from radar detection.

The ongoing development of radar and ECM equipment and procedures during the years of World War II had a substantial impact upon the methods of combat operations and the effectiveness of the air defense troops, the air forces, navies and ground forces of the belligerents. In the course of the war, there was a constant rise in the scope of utilizing ground, ship and aircraft radar equipment and jamming devices, while the tactics of their combat employment was developed and improved. These processes were characterized by a double-edged struggle of the belligerents which abroad in the postwar period came to be called a "radio war," "airwaves war," "radar warfare" and "radio electronics warfare."

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ "Radiolokatsionnaya voyna" [Radar Warfare], Moscow, Sovetskoye Radio, 1946, p 21.
- ² FUNK-TECHNIC, No 24, 1958, p 837.
- ³ FLYING REVIEW, June 1963, p 27.
- ⁴ FLIGHT FORCES, August, 1947.
- ⁵ See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 3, 1975; No 5, 1977.
- ⁶ M. M. Lobanov, "Nachalo sovetskoy radiolokatsii" [The Beginning of Soviet Radar], Moscow, Sovetskoye Radio, 1975, p 145.
- ⁷ [Not in text.]
- ⁸ VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 1, 1976, p 75.
- ⁹ A. D. Tsykin, "Ot 'Il'i Muromtsa' do raketonostsa" [From 'Ilya Muromets' to a Missile-Carrying Aircraft], Voenizdat, 1975, p 155.
- ¹⁰ VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 1, 1976, p 77.

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PARTY WORK IN WORLD WAR II PARTISAN FORMATIONS EXAMINED

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[Article by Docent, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col (Ret) B. Chertok: "Party Political Work in the Partisan Formations"]

[Text] One of the important military-political factors which ensured the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War was the broad struggle of partisans and the members of the underground in the rear of the Nazi troops. In operating over all the temporarily occupied territory of the USSR, they created intolerable conditions for the enemy and its supporters and actively assisted the Soviet Army in routing the Nazi invaders. The mass partisan movement clearly showed the ardent patriotism of the Soviet people and this was and remains a great victory of the socialist social system.

The successful actions of the Soviet partisans during the years of the Great Patriotic War, their tenacity and mass heroism were largely determined by the party political work which was well organized in the partisan formations. The VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee, the local party committees, the command and party organizations in the partisan formations as well as the military councils of the fronts and armies undertook enormous ideological and organizational activities among the partisans and local population, involving them in an active struggle against the Nazi occupiers.

In being under difficult conditions, the partisans, as is known, operated in isolation from the unoccupied territory and did not always have reliable information concerning the situation on the fronts and in the Soviet rear. At the same time, the enemy using a specially organized widespread ideological system conducted active anticommunist propaganda, in endeavoring to break the will of the Soviet people to resist and to sap their moral and spiritual forces. To oppose Marxist-Leninist views to the bestial Nazi ideology, to strengthen the patriotic spirit of the people, to even more widely raise them to the struggle against the Nazi invaders and to instill in the Soviet people confidence in the inevitability of a rapid defeat of Nazi Germany—these were the main goals which were set by the Communist Party in its work among the partisans and population on the temporarily occupied Soviet territory.

The partisan detachments were organized by the party and soviet bodies, and sometimes also upon the initiative of the masses. They consisted of persons from different professions, age, sex and political views. A majority of the local inhabitants did not have military training. The task was to unite all of them into a single military collective and to instruct them in fighting the enemy using the specific methods of partisan warfare.


The local population was the rear of the partisans and the basic source for their recruitment and logistical support. However, this population itself experienced great difficulties and was subjected to the cruelest terror by the occupation authorities for the slightest aid to the partisans. Explanatory work among the local inhabitants had to be undertaken everywhere. It was important to persuade them of the need to make certain sacrifices for the sake of the sacred goals of fighting against Naziism. At the same time, the partisans were indoctrinated in a spirit of respect for the population, any instances of illegality were decisively checked since the scope and effectiveness of the partisan struggle depended upon the population's attitude toward the partisans.

In organizing party political work among the partisans, the party relied on its entire years-long experience in indoctrinating the workers as acquired both in the revolutionary times as well as in the period of the Civil War and during the years of building socialism. The profound socioeconomic and cultural changes carried out in the nation, the creation of a strong socialist economy, the moral-political unity of Soviet society and the friendship of the Soviet peoples created all of the necessary prerequisites for defeating the aggressor. "They will never conquer that people," said V. I. Lenin, "in which the majority of the workers and peasants have realized, felt and seen that they are defending their own Soviet power, worker power, and that they are defending that cause the victory of which will provide them and their children with the opportunity of benefiting from all the cultural goods and all the creations of human labor."¹

The basic areas for party political work among the partisans were determined by the directives of the SNK [Council of People's Commissars] and the VKP(b) Central Committee "To the Party and Soviet Organizations of the Front Areas" of 29 June 1941 and the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army of 19 August 1941 as well as the order of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense of 5 September 1942 "On the Tasks of the Partisan Movement." The last document, in particular, drew attention to the organizing of active political work among the Soviet citizens on occupied territory and to the necessity of publishing newspapers, leaflets and other printed materials. It was recommended that using specific examples the false Nazi propaganda be unmasked and hate for the Nazi enslavers instilled in the population.²

Instructions on the areas of party political work among the partisans on the spot were issued by the party obkoms and raykoms which were active both in the Soviet rear and on enemy occupied territory. For example, here is what the former partisan member of the Smolensk Partisan Formation T. A. Logunov writes about this: "A major event in the life of our formation was the decisions of the plenum of the Smolensk party obkom held in April 1942. These decisions were aimed at the further development of the partisan movement and the improving of party political work among the partisans and population of the occupied rayons. The decision pointed to the necessity of creating party organizations in the partisan detachments. Soon after the plenum, we were visited by the secretary of the party obkom Vladimir Ivanovich Ivanov. He visited all the detachments, he spoke at party meetings there, he talked with the commanders and became more closely acquainted with the combat life of the partisans."³

The party and Komsomol organizations as well as the party-political apparatus of the partisan formations were the immediate organizers of party political work among the partisans. Party organizations existed in all the detachments, brigades and formations. The primary party organizations worked under the immediate leadership of the commissars.



Structure of Party Bodies and Party-Political Apparatus in Partisan Formations

The structure of the party-political apparatus in the partisan formations (see the diagram) basically corresponded to the army one. In the partisan detachments, the detachment commissars and the political leaders of the companies (platoons) were appointed while the secretaries of the party and Komsomol organizations were elected. In the partisan brigades there was an assistant commissar for Komsomol work. The secretaries of the underground party raykoms were often appointed brigade commissars. They were the direct executors of the party line in the detachments and formations. In their work they relied on the party organizations. In a number of large partisan formations (brigades, divisions) political sections or party committees were organized and these directly led the primary party organizations and were concerned with the question of increasing party and Komsomol membership. In Belorussia and the Ukraine, many secretaries of the underground party obkoms were simultaneously commanders of partisan formations.

The main content of party political work among the partisans was: the maintaining of the high combat readiness of the detachments, brigades and formations, the strengthening of the political-moral state of the partisans, the maintaining of high aware discipline, the mobilizing of the personnel to master the weapons, the successful carrying out of combat tasks and the indoctrinating of steadfastness, courage, combat activeness, a high offensive drive and confidence in the victory over fascism.

The commanders and political workers informed the personnel of the partisan formations and the local population of the appeals of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, the summaries of Sovinformburo [Soviet Information Bureau] as well as the directives of the superior party and state bodies which set the combat tasks for the partisans and the underground organizations and explained the just aims of the war of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders. At the meetings and assemblies conducted in the partisan formations, partisan vow-resolutions were adopted and these urged a heroic and courageous struggle against the aggressors and the defense of the socialist fatherland. The text of the partisan vow (oath) in the "For a Just Cause" Detachment in Novgorodskiy Rayon stated: "I vow that I would rather die on the battlefield in fierce battle than surrender myself, my family, my comrades and my people in slavery to bloody Naziism."⁴

The party political work among the partisans had its particular features. In the first place, in the enemy rear it was essential to combine operational, combat and political leadership in observing the strictest secrecy among the party bodies. Secondly, the personnel of the partisan formations was heterogeneous. Along with party and Soviet workers who were acquainted with one another and who had remained specially for the partisan struggle on the temporarily occupied territory, soldiers and officers from the Soviet Army who had ended up on occupied territory volunteered for the partisan movement as well as a large mass of various categories of the local population. Thirdly, party political work had to be conducted under the conditions of constant contact and communication with the local population. All of this demanded on the part of the commanders and political workers high political training, great flexibility in placing the forces and the able use of the knowledge of the servicemen who joined the partisan movement.

The commanders, political workers, the communists, Komsomol members and agitators conducted party political work with the personnel efficiently and directly, considering the specific features of partisan operations and the particular traits of each detachment or fighting group and their personnel. In individual and group talks and by personal example in combat, they instilled high moral-combat qualities in the partisans.

Party political work comprised an essential element in the preparation and conduct of partisan operations and battles. For example, in party political work and the training of partisans a great place was assigned to demolition work. Communists, Komsomol members and experienced mine specialists were usually assigned to demolition groups. Communists and Komsomol members were appointed the group commanders or party and Komsomol organizers or agitators. Political exercises were conducted with each group of scouts, mine specialists and sappers. The agitators of the squads, platoons and the party and Komsomol aktiv were given the task of conducting party political work in the course of carrying out the combat missions. They were aimed at ensuring a vanguard role for the communists and Komsomol members in combat. Particular attention was given to the maintaining of high combat readiness in the subunits, detachments and formations.

One of the important areas in party political work among the partisans was ideological indoctrination. In conducting this, extensive use was made of the most diverse forms and

methods, including: lectures, reports, group and individual talks, the reading of newspapers, leaflets and Sovinformburo summaries and other agitation-propaganda materials, the viewing of documentary and artistic films, the organizing of amateur activities and so forth. For example, in examining the questions of party leadership over mass political work among the partisans and population in Navlinskiy Rayon for July 1943, the first secretary of the Orel party obkom A. P. Matveyev wrote to the secretary of the Navlinskiy underground party raykom A. R. Safronov that the plan of lectures, reports and talks had been correctly worked out and a broad circle of the party aktiv was to be involved in the work. For increasing the level of agitation and propaganda work, it was recommended that the okruzhkom⁵ set up a group of agitators consisting of 7-10 men the work of which should be directed by the party okruzhkom and raykoms.⁶ With the organizing of agitator groups, political indoctrination became noticeably more active and this was of important significance for increasing the combat activity of the Orel partisans during the Kursk Battle.

The underground press played an important role in explaining the situation and the pending tasks. The Communist Party adopted decisive measures to increase the output of printed materials for the partisan both in the Soviet rear and on the other side of the front line. During the years of the Great Patriotic War, at least 400 underground newspapers were published in the enemy rear.⁷

In the printed propaganda, a prominent place was given over to leaflets which were published by the party central committees, by the local party bodies and the Soviet Army political bodies specially for the partisans and the population in the occupied regions. The leaflets informed the population of the domestic and international situation of the USSR and events on the fronts, it urged them to thwart the military and political measures of the occupation authorities and popularized the heroes of the partisan struggle and the experience of the most successful combat operations of the partisans.

Cultural and educational work among the partisans was a component part in the mass political work. For the personnel of the partisan formations, radio broadcasts were organized, where possible films were shown and collectives of amateur artistic activities were organized. For example, in the Vileyka formation there was a song and dance ensemble. The partisans read artistic literature and they had their own poets whose verses were used for partisan songs.

Party organizational work was conducted regularly in the partisan formations. There was continuous growth of the party ranks in the detachments. The party admitted the best partisans who in battle had demonstrated their loyalty to the motherland and the people. Here is a characteristic example. The Party Regiment "Thirteen" in Smolensk Oblast in October 1943 was engaged in heavy exhausting battles against the Nazis. The personnel, fatigued by the continuous moves and battles, for many days had eaten nothing except raw horse meat and were falling down from fatigue. At this critical moment, the party bureau secretary A. Kardash was approached by the partisan A. Starikov and he was given 11 requests from partisans to consider them communists. In their requests which were written on the backside of a German leaflet urging that they surrender, the fighters vowed to serve the Soviet Union selflessly and wholeheartedly.⁸

The numerical growth of the party organizations in the partisan formations was observed over the entire war. Thus, during the enemy occupation of Belorussia, more than 10,000 persons were admitted to the party ranks and in the Ukraine some 4,600 up to the start of 1944.⁹

For discussing the most important problems in the life and combat activities of the partisans, party conferences were organized in the enemy rear. Thus, the party conference of the Partisan Area of Leningrad Oblast held in the Serbolov Forest on 18 June 1942 had a great impact on improving party political work among the oblast's partisans. This was attended by 55 delegates who represented the party organizations from the partisan regiments and detachments of the 1st, 2d, 3d and 4th Partisan Brigades as well as 15 party organizations from the rural soviets and kolkhozes of the region. The commissar of the 2d Partisan Brigade, S. A. Orlov, in a report summed up the results of party political work by the region's communists and the combat activities of the partisans.¹⁰ The conference urged the communists and all the partisans to strengthen the struggle against the invaders and outlined a specific program of struggle for the immediate future. In the delegate speeches and in the conference decisions particular attention was given to initiating combat activities on the enemy lines of communications and here it was pointed out that the communists should play the vanguard role in conducting the sabotage.

Party organizational work was conducted in a diverse manner in the partisan formations, for example, of Orel Oblast. In carrying out the decree of the party obkom bureau of 30 May 1943, the VKP(b) raykoms held meetings for the party aktiv of the partisan formations where they discussed the urgent questions of improving the effectiveness of the struggle in the enemy rear. Then party meetings were held in the primary organizations on the question of the vanguard role of the communists in partisan combat operations.¹¹ Analogous measures were conducted in 1943-1944 in other oblasts, too.

The questions of Komsomol leadership held a significant place in the organizational work of the party organizations from the partisan formations. From the very first days of the war, the leading party bodies drew attention to the need to set up strong, militant Komsomol organizations in each partisan detachment. Thus, upon the instructions of the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party, the secretaries of the Belorussian Komsomol Central Committee, M. V. Zinyanin, S. O. Prityskiy, K. T. Mazurov and F. A. Surganov for a long time remained in the enemy rear and took an active part in organizing the work of the Komsomol organizations in the partisan detachments and formations. They also carried out great work in the Moscow Komsomol Detachment imeni N. Gastello, which in the summer of 1942, in crossing the front line, made a 50-day march through occupied Belorussian territory in organizing Komsomol work. In traveling more than 1,200 km through the enemy rear, the detachment then took an active part in combat operations as part of the Minsk Partisan Formation. Also in its ranks were the famous courageous Muscovites, the women Komsomol members Galya Kirova and Nina Makarova.

The first Komsomol conference was held on 10 November 1942 in the formation of A. F. Fedorov which was located in the Kletnya Forest. Participating in it were 51 delegates from the Ukrainian partisan detachments. The conference urged the Komsomol members to fight actively against the enemy. After this, in Komsomol meetings of the detachments they discussed the questions: "On the Tasks of the Komsomol Organizations in the Partisan Detachments," "On the Vanguard Role of the Komsomol Members in Combat" and "On the Work with New Recruits" as well as the letter from the secretary of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee, N. A. Mikhaylov, to the partisans and so forth.¹²

The diverse and effective party political work, in being conducted among the partisans by the party and Komsomol organizations, produced positive results. The partisan detachments became active assistants of the Red Army in defeating the enemy. Their personnel excelled in high moral and combat qualities. In combat the partisans demonstrated bravery, courage, an unbending will, they acted as unified combat collectives and employed diverse

forms of struggle which brought them to victory. This was recognized not only by our friends throughout the world, but also by the enemies.

The effectiveness of party political work in the partisan formations can be seen from the fact that for bravery and courage shown in the struggle against the Nazi occupiers in the enemy rear, over 184,000 orders and medals were presented to the participants of the partisan movement, 234 partisans were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and 2 of them S. A. Kovpak and A. F. Fedorov, received this title twice. A large number of communists was among those awarded.¹³

The party political work carried out by the commanders, the political workers, the communists and Komsomol members united the partisan detachments and formations and gave a profound ideological content to the entire partisan movement.

The experience of party political work in the partisan formations during the years of the Great Patriotic War is of enormous theoretical and practical significance for indoctrinating the Soviet people.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 38, p 315.
- 2 "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [The History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 5, Voenizdat, 1975, p 288.
- 3 T. Logunova, "O dnyakh partizanskikh" [About the Partisan Days], Moscow, Politizdat, 1969, p 86.
- 4 "Partarkhiv Novgorodskogo obkoma KPSS" [Party Archives of the Novgorod CPSU Obkom], folio 260, inv. 1, file 97, sheet 38.
- 5 On the occupied territory of Orel Oblast, okruzhkoms [district committees] were organized and these included two or three rayon party organizations.
- 6 "Partarkhiv Orlovskogo obkoma KPSS" [Party Archives of the Orel CPSU Obkom] (PAOO), folio 71, inv. 1, file 7, sheet 13.
- 7 "Istoriya KPSS" [History of the CPSU], Vol 5, Book 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p 488.
- 8 N. I. Moskvina, "Partizanskimi tropami" [Along the Partisan Paths], Moscow, Izd-vo DOSAAF, 1971, p 258.
- 9 "Istoriya KPSS," Vol 5, Book 1, p 496.
- 10 "Sovetskiye partizany" [Soviet Partisans], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1963, p 54.
- 11 PAOO, folio 71, inv. 1, file 3, sheets 12, 12a.
- 12 TsPA IML pri TsK KPSS [Central Party Archives of the Marxism-Leninism Institute under the CPSU Central Committee], folio 17, inv. 88, storage unit 1008, part 1, sheets 128-129.

¹³ "Istoriya KPSS," Vol 5, Book 1, pp 651-652.

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LAST VOLUME OF WORLD WAR II HISTORY REVIEWED

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[Review by Army Gen M. Kozlov of the book "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" (History of World War II of 1939-1945), Vol 12, Results and Lessons of World War II, Voenizdat, 1982, 496 pages]

[Text] The last salvos of World War II died out more than 37 years ago. This major event of world history is the subject of the important work "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945] prepared by the Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense together with the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee, the Institute for General History and the Institute of USSR History of the USSR Academy of Sciences with the participation of a large collective of historians, philosophers, economists, diplomats and military leaders. The 12th and final volume has recently been published. It sums up the sociopolitical, economic and military results of World War II and discloses its lessons and the fundamental changes in the balance of forces in the world during the postwar years. The given factual material, the theoretical generalizations and conclusions should make people, and particularly the younger generation, aware of the great feat carried out by the Soviet and other peoples, they should help in understanding its enormous historical significance and draw the necessary conclusions from the experience of the last war.

Structurally, the reviewed volume is divided into four parts which successively examine the sociopolitical and economic results of the war, the armed forces and military art in World War II as well as the state of the world after the war. Each of these parts is devoted to a certain subject, but here a common task is carried out, that is, of showing the results and lessons of World War II in their relationship to modern times. Although the volume and nature of the material in the parts of the volume are not all of the same importance, they are united by the unity of the overall concept and goal.

Of significant interest are the sociopolitical results of World War II and this is the subject of the first part of the volume. It thoroughly discloses the sociopolitical conditions and factors for the victory over fascism, the historical mission of socialism and the vanguard role of the CPSU in the struggle against fascism and militarism. It is convincingly shown that in the uncompromising struggle against fascism, the Soviet social and state system born out of the Great October Socialist Revolution clearly confirmed its viability and invincible strength. The socialist state was that social force which was capable of mobilizing the material and spiritual resources to defend the motherland and to save the peoples of Europe and Asia from fascist slavery.

The section analyzes the struggle against fascism by the masses of people, the Resistance Movement and the activities of the antifascist underground. The actual contribution of the countries in the anti-Hitler coalition to the common cause of victory over the enemy is shown and the experience of coopeation among states with different social systems within one coalition is disclosed. The lessons of the postwar period are also taken up. In this regard, particularly pertinent are Lenin's assessments of imperialism as the source and guilty party of wars. These were actually confirmed by the experience of the pre-history of World War II and by the development of events in its initial period. In disclosing the fundamental reasons for World War I, V. I. Lenin pointed to the desire of the capitalist monopolies and states to partition the world. And the basis for the establishing of spheres of influence and colonies was, as he pointed out, "consideration...of socioeconomic, financial, military and other strength."¹ This trait of imperialism was clearly apparent in the 1930's under the conditions of the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism and the growing threat of a new world war. A unique feature in the situation on the eve of World War II was the splitting of the capitalist world into two hostile groupings (the bloc of fascist states and the coalition of bourgeois-democratic nations). They were separated by acute contradictions, but both these groupings more often openly and sometimes covertly were aggressive on the anti-Soviet, anticommunist level. Out of this grew the policy of "appeasement" and the Munich Agreement as well as the "phony war."

The experience of the struggle to prevent war and to create a system of collective security and the experience of organizing and uniting all the antifascist forces were not in vain. The pre-history of World War II teaches that war can be prevented only by the collective efforts of nations and peoples. The divisions among the peace-loving forces in the West at that time as well as in Germany itself made it possible for the Nazis to start the war. And in our times, the events on the eve of the last war are an instructive lesson. These show the need for all the progressive forces of the world to be vigilant, to be united, and for a broad action by the masses of people against the preparations of the imperialist powers for a new war. Of important significance are the unmasking of the aggressive intrigues of imperialism, the thwarting of its plans, the organizing of a rebuff to dangerous actions and an active struggle against the ideology of war and anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. The policy of aggression and military adventures, regardless of the forms this assumes, should be given a decisive and firm rebuff.

From the basic ideas in the first part of the volume, of the greatest significance is the demonstrating of the crucial role of the USSR in the victory over the Nazi coalition employing factual materials. In the difficult clash of the two strong coalitions, the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces were in the vanguard of the struggle against fascism. The historical truth is that precisely the Soviet people led by the Communist Party blocked the path of German Naziism to world domination, they shouldered the basic burden of World War II and made the decisive contribution to the achieving of victory.

The second part of the volume takes up the economic results of the war between the USSR and Nazi Germany and shows the decisive role of the Soviet economy in achieving victory. Clearly brought out is the indisputable superiority of the socialist economic system over the capitalist economic one. The Soviet economy provided the Armed Forces with everything necessary for the successful waging of armed combat on strategic fronts of enormous length. In an unprecedentedly intense clash, the USSR economy sustained a decisive victory over the economy of Nazi Germany which drew upon virtually all the economic

¹ V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 27, p 417.

potential of the European countries seized by it. Of great interest in this light is the analysis of the main reasons for the economic defeat of Germany and Japan in World War II.

Using extensive documentary materials, the volume reflects the diverse titanic activities of the Communist Party and the Soviet people to ensure the economic victory of the USSR in the war against Nazi Germany. This victory was won due to the more advanced economic organization of the socialist society and the more efficient utilization of the material and human resources. This made it possible in the process of the war to organize a more intensive growth for the production of military equipment and weapons than the enemy could.

The historical experience of reorganizing the Soviet national economy to a wartime footing, its functioning and reconstruction during the war years and the postwar period has maintained its pertinence now. Much from the experience of the last war can be extracted and employed in solving the questions of improving production management, strengthening labor and executive discipline, in more fully utilizing the inner reserves, improving the quality indicators as well as in implementing the other tasks formulated in the documents and decisions of the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

During World War II which was fought as a coalition war, of particular importance was an evaluation of the military-economic potentials of the states and their efforts. In this regard it is pointed out that the economic efforts by the nations in the anti-Hitler coalition must be viewed not simply by the achieved production volume and by the scale of the produced weapons, but primarily from the effectiveness and purposefulness in utilizing the material and human resources by one or another country in the course of combat operations.

The course and outcome of the war indicate that the Soviet military economy was the most effective and determining factor in the victory. Precisely the Soviet military equipment during the crucial periods of the war was effectively and widely employed against the strongest and most dangerous enemy.

A significant place in the volume is given over to the third part devoted to an analysis of the armed struggle and to the development of military art. It includes previously unpublished generalized data on the scope and results of the armed struggle on the Soviet-German Front as a whole, for the theaters of war and its periods. Particular attention has been given to showing the superiority of Soviet military organization and Soviet military art over the military organization and military art of the bourgeois countries. The bankruptcy of the military doctrines and strategy of the Nazi-bloc states is starkly shown.

World War II which was prepared and initiated by the most reactionary and aggressive circles of imperialism, in terms of its scale and fierceness, human losses and material expenditures has no equal. It involved armies of millions of people armed with an enormous amount of then-modern weapons and military equipment. In September 1939, the armed forces of the states entering the war had 10-13 million men, 60,000 guns and mortars, 8,000 tanks, 12,000 combat aircraft and by 1945 the armed forces of the coalitions now numbered 50 million men, 360,000 guns and mortars, over 50,000 tanks and around 120,000 aircraft. However, the degree of utilizing the armed forces of the various states in the theaters of war differed. The USSR Armed Forces fought most intensely against the enemy. The Allies in the struggle against Nazi Germany did not commit more than a third of their armed forces to the cause. As they would admit, they waged a "no-contact war," thereby endeavoring to conceal the political essence of their inactivity or weak combat activeness.

In the course of combat operations, there appeared such prominent trends as the increased spatial scope, the coalition nature of actions on the continental and sea theaters, the increased role of the surprise factor and the technical equipping of the armies. These trends have maintained their importance under present-day conditions.

One of the characteristic traits of World War II was the participation in it of the USSR Armed Forces, a new type of army, as well as the people's liberation armies of the People's Democracies and the armed forces of the bourgeois states which opposed the fascist bloc. In their aggregate these were the Allied forces of the anti-Hitler coalition. They were opposed by the armed forces of the fascist-militaristic bloc, and here the basis of military might was the Nazi army of Hitler Germany (the Wehrmacht).

The Soviet Army and Navy were the decisive force in the struggle against the Nazi aggressors. A major contribution to the joint struggle over the common enemy was also made by the armies of the People's Democracies which had set out on the path of socialist development. In the course of World War II, their combat association arose and this underwent further development in the Warsaw Pact.

The armies of the bourgeois states in the anti-Hitler coalition reflected class capitalist positions and were the carriers of the common qualities and trends inherent to an exploiting society. Under certain conditions these armies were capable of fighting for progressive, democratic goals.

The German Army of the fascist bloc was the most reactionary, aggressive and misanthropic army. The experience of World War II confirmed that an army conducting a predatory, unjust war, no matter what technical might it possesses, cannot endure the hardship of a war and ultimately is doomed to defeat. Adventurism in policy and strategy, a rapid, reactionary ideology and the wagering on fear and violence collapse when opposed by the joint forces of the freedom-loving peoples and liberator armies.

The USSR Armed Forces fought with the greatest intensity and activeness against the enemy and they shouldered the basic burden of the fierce struggle. This was conducted almost continuously on the Soviet-German Front. Active combat operations comprised a large portion of the time, some 93 percent. On none of the other fronts was there such an intense and fierce struggle.

During the entire war, the Soviet-German Front tied down a predominant share of the most battleworthy divisions of Germany and its European allies. Thus, in April 1942, 219 divisions were on the Soviet-German Front, and 11 on the other fronts; in November 1942, respectively, 266 and 12.5, in April 1943, 233 and 14.5, and in January 1944, 245 and 21. Even after the Allied Normandy Landing (June 1944), this ratio remained uneven (239.5 and 85).

During the various periods of the struggle, on the Soviet-German Front, the enemy army groups North, Center, South, Don, Northern Ukraine, Southern Ukraine, A, B and Vistula were defeated (p 218). These included many field and tank armies, separate army, tank and motorized corps, divisions and other troop formations. All in all, the Nazi army lost over 73 percent of the total casualties in the battles and engagements with the Soviet Army. The casualties suffered by the Wehrmacht on the Soviet-German Front were 4-fold greater than in the Western European and Mediterranean theaters of war taken together, and in terms of the number of killed and wounded 6-fold more. The basic portion

of the enemy military equipment was also destroyed on the Soviet-German Front with up to 75 percent of the total losses of tanks and assault guns, over 75 percent of all the aviation and 74 percent of the artillery pieces.

During the entire war, Japan kept the most battleworthy and technically equipped land troop grouping, the Kwantung Army, along the Far Eastern frontiers of the USSR. By August 1945, it had over 1 million soldiers and officers, more than 6,600 guns and mortars, more than 12,000 tanks and over 1,900 combat aircraft. The victorious conclusion of the war with Japan depended to a decisive degree upon the outcome of military operations in the Manchurian Strategic Operation. The defeat of the Kwantung Army was the largest defeat of Japan in the war.

The data given in the reviewed volume eloquently show the decisive contribution which was made by the Soviet people and their Armed Forces to the cause of victory over the Nazi militaristic bloc.

The leading trends in strengthening the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces were the continuous rise in their technical equipping, the growth of the combat skill and moral-political qualities of the personnel. The changes in military equipment and weaponry involved natural changes in the organizational structure, in the combat and numerical strength of the troop formations, in the methods of organizing and conducting combat operations and in the system of troop control.

Also interesting is the section "The Development of Soviet Military Art." Useful in it are the generalized materials on the development of Soviet military strategy in the years of the Great Patriotic War. Complete conformity to CPSU policy, purposefulness, profound scientific foresight, a decisiveness of goals and plans and flexibility in the choice of the types, forms and methods of strategic operations were embodied in the nine campaigns and more than 50 operations of the front groups conducted by the Soviet Armed Forces during the various periods of the war.

The volume examines in detail the characteristic traits of Soviet strategy manifested in the course of the strategic defensive and defense and it analyzes the questions of the scope of the campaigns and operations, the lessons of the initial period of the war, strategic planning and cooperation and the employment of the strategic reserves.

In the course of examining these difficult questions of Soviet strategy during the war years, the authors give as examples the individual, most important operations of the Soviet army, evaluating their specific role and importance in one or another stage of the struggle. The given examples show that the operations with decisive goals, in being the largest in the history of World War II and the most effective in terms of results, were conducted precisely by the Soviet Army.

The creative spirit of Soviet military art which was fully apparent in the last war was embodied in the outstanding examples of envelopment operations, in the conducting of successive offensive operations, in the art of organizing and conducting an intentional defensive and counteroffensive, as well as in the new forms of troop coordination on all levels. These examples of military art arose on the foundation of the Soviet military school which embodied all the most advanced and progressive from the Russian and other military schools and widely utilized the experience of the revolutionary wars.

A separate chapter in the third section is devoted to the problems of leading an armed struggle. It points out that in the course of the war, the progressive views of Soviet strategy and operational art were brilliantly embodied in actuality as a result of the activities of Headquarters Supreme High Command [Hq SHC] and the military councils of the fronts and armies. Hq SHC was the designer of the campaigns and the strategic operations of the front groups, it ably maneuvered the strategic reserves and logistically supported each operation.

Over the entire war Hq SHC was led by I. V. Stalin. But the decisions taken by Headquarters were not the result of the individual creativity of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. From the materials of Chapter XIV, one can see how widely the commanders and military councils of the fronts were involved in elaborating the strategic decisions. The overall concepts and specific plans for conducting the operations were finally set only as a result of a thorough discussion. All of this contributed largely to the success of the operations and excluded miscalculations.

The CPSU was the wise politician and strategist, the organizer and inspirer of the struggle and the victories. It strengthened the ideological and political unity of society, it brought together the people and the army, and instilled in them such high qualities as courage, heroism, Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism. More than 80 percent of all the communists were concentrated in the Armed Forces and national economic sectors directly linked to meeting the needs of the front. The party headed the struggle against the enemy and brought it to a victorious end.

The lessons of the last war and the experience in the development of military affairs during the postwar period confirm the exceptional importance of anticipating ahead of time the nature of a future war and determining in accord with this the focus for preparing the USSR Armed Forces and those of the other socialist nations. Under the conditions of the increased aggressiveness of imperialism, this is the guarantee for their constant readiness to repel aggression and decisively defeat the enemy under any situational conditions.

The fourth part of the work is devoted to the changes in the postwar world under the effect of the results of World War II, social changes and the scientific-technical revolution.

World War II left a profound trace in the awareness of people. Millions of people were permeated with a hate for fascism and militarism which had brought about the death of millions of people and enormous destruction the consequences of which are still felt in many countries.

The main result of the war was the victory of the USSR and its Allies over the fascist-militaristic bloc of states. The defeat of the shock forces of imperialism showed that their drive for world hegemony and domination over other peoples and nations was ultimately doomed to defeat. Imperialism not only did not achieve its goals of destroying socialism in the war, but could not also maintain its previous, prewar positions.

The victory over the fascist-militaristic bloc accelerated profound social and economic changes in the world and largely determined the further development of mankind, having created favorable conditions for an acceleration of revolutionary progress and advancement of democracy, socialism and the cause of peace. It became one of the manifestations for the basic patterns of the modern world.

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people, in being the main component part of World War II, showed the invincible strength and might of the socialist social and state system and the superiority of the Soviet military organization and military art. The victory of the USSR in the war was a triumph for the forces of peace, democracy and socialism and it taught the aggressors a harsh lesson.

The reactionary political circles and bourgeois historians in the West and East are endeavoring to conceal from the world community the responsibility of international imperialism for unleashing World War II and to cover over the profound tie between monopolistic capitalism, fascism and militarism. They have intentionally distorted the reasons for the rise, the nature, course and outcome of World War II.

The main goal of the present-day ideologists of anticommunism and revanchism is to prevent recognition of the crucial role of the USSR in achieving victory and to show that the defeat of Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan was supposedly fortuitous. They have endeavored to create distorted ideas of Soviet foreign policy and of our people and their army and to ideologically establish the necessity of strengthening NATO and the other aggressive blocs. They are propagandizing revanchist ideas for a forceful repartitioning of the political map of Europe and the world.

In the struggle of the peoples to prevent a new war, the historical experience of World War II and the Great Patriotic War is of permanent significance. The events of the postwar years confirm that in the policy of the most aggressive imperialist circles there is a growing desire to erect barriers on the path of progressive changes in the world and they are willing to wager the vital interests of all mankind for the sake of their class goals. They have overtly made claim to interfering in the affairs of other nations and peoples.

At the basis of the aggressive policy of imperialism lies a desire by any means to weaken the positions of socialism, to suppress the national liberation movement of peoples, to prevent the struggle of the workers in the capitalist countries and to check the irreversible process of the fall of capitalism. In order to maintain and strengthen the system of exploitation and suppression and to recover the lost positions, monopolistic capital has repeatedly put into action the powerful military machine created by it. Just since World War II, it has initiated scores of local wars and major military conflicts and hundreds of aggressive actions have been carried out in various regions of the world.

Imperialism continues to create dangerous centers of tension in various regions of the world and thereby bring the world to the brink of war. Recently, the U.S. administration has initiated an unprecedented arms race, in endeavoring at any price to achieve military superiority over the USSR. The aggregate might of the socialist nations and their high defense capability are the guarantee for preventing a new world war along with the active struggle of peoples for peace. In relying on these, the socialist nations, on the one hand, check imperialism and limit its possibilities of exporting counterrevolution and, on the other, provide economic, political and other aid to the peoples struggling for liberty and independence, peace and security.

"In the difficult international situation," emphasized the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Yu. V. Andropov, "when the forces of imperialism are endeavoring to force the peoples into a path of hostility and military confrontation, the party and state will unswervingly defend the vital interests of our motherland and maintain high vigilance and a readiness to deal a crushing rebuff to any attempt at aggression."²

² PRAVDA, 16 November 1982.

The merits of the reviewed work are indisputable and it will be received with interest by the readers. It has utilized documents of the USSR Central Statistical Administration, numerous archives, materials from various scientific organizations and institutions and contains photographs and geographic maps.

The book as a whole will be an important guideline and starting point for understanding and interpreting many aspects in the history of war. Under the present-day conditions of the acute ideological struggle, it is difficult to overestimate the task of evolving a unity of views and establishing Marxist-Leninist assessments for such a phenomenon as World War II.

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WORKS OF MARSHAL TUKHACHEVSKIY RECALLED ON HIS 90TH BIRTHDAY

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[Article prepared by Ya. Sergeev: "Mar SU M. N. Tukhachevskiy (on His 90th Birthday)"]

[Text] Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevskiy (born 4 (16) February 1893, died 11 June 1937) can rightly be considered among the galaxy of outstanding military figures who arose under the leadership of the Communist Party and V. I. Lenin. In commanding armies and fronts during the years of the Civil War, M. N. Tukhachevskiy evidenced great organizational abilities and an outstanding talent as a military leader. A number of successful operations were carried out by armies and fronts under his leadership.

The military art of M. N. Tukhachevskiy was founded on a profound understanding of the particular features of the Civil War and was marked by particular flexibility. He skillfully employed various forms of operational maneuver, he ably determined the axis of the main thrust and concentrated superior forces on it. Possessing the remarkable gift of quickly and correctly assessing a situation, M. N. Tukhachevskiy was able to anticipate its development and rapidly utilize the favorable conditions developing in the course of an operation for achieving success.

In the postwar period, M. N. Tukhachevskiy made a major contribution to the technical re-equipping of the Red Army, to improving its organizational structure and to the development of aviation, the mechanized and airborne troops.

This outstanding military figure also played a great role in the establishment and development of Soviet military theory, particularly in working out Soviet military doctrine and military art, the problems of troop control and their training under the new conditions.

The works of M. N. Tukhachevskiy are a treasure trove of Soviet military science. The value of his military theoretical works is determined not only by the breadth of generalizing various questions of military art, but also by a newness of approach to their examination. In mastering Marxist-Leninist methodology well, M. N. Tukhachevskiy correctly understood the laws of armed conflict, he objectively assessed the experience of battles and engagements in previous wars and he creatively approached the solving of various questions of military theory. His views, as a rule, were in advance of the practice of military affairs and thereby contributed to its development and improvement.

In the exercises and maneuvers conducted by M. N. Tukhachevskiy, troop operations were very dynamic and instructive. Participation in them was a great school for the command personnel, the staffs and the troops.

Many ideas voiced by M. N. Tukhachevskiy have had a significant impact upon the development of the theory and practice of military organizational development during the prewar period and were confirmed in the course of the Great Patriotic War.

VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL has already described in detail the life and activities of Mar SU M. N. Tukhachevskiy and his contribution to Soviet military science; it has also published a portion of his works.¹ In the given issue we are publishing a selection of individual statements by M. N. Tukhachevskiy on certain problems of strategy, operational art, tactics as well as on the questions of troop combat training.

"Modern strategy means a struggle for the balance of armed and economic forces."

M. N. Tukhachevskiy, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya"
[Selected Works], Vol 1, 1919-1927, Voyenizdat,
1964, p 256.

"...A war which is drawn out over years and is fed by all the juices and all the resources of the nation should not be viewed by us as an unchanged whole. A war during its development sharply alters its character."

Ibid., p 250.

"The forms of war also change depending upon the tasks, nature and goals of the war."

Ibid., p 244.

"The first period of a war should be correctly foreseen even in peacetime, correctly assessed even in peacetime and correctly prepared for."

Ibid., p 261.

"The conduct of a war in the modern age has ceased being a concern for one military strategist and has shifted into the hands of the government."

Ibid., Vol 2, p 4.

"The plan of a war encompasses all the elements of preparation for it ensuring the achieving of its goals by the employment of the armed forces reinforced by all favorable economic and political measures."

Ibid., p 4.

"The experience of war shows that the correct balance of politics with the operational activities of a nation's armed forces in the process of their carrying out of the particular tasks and goals of the war is the guarantee for victory in modern warfare."

Ibid., p 6.

¹ See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 7, 1961, pp 45-55; No 2, 1962, pp 62-77; No 2, 1963, pp 107-114; No 4, 1963, pp 64-78; No 12, 1963, pp 51-56; No 2, 1964, pp 37-49; No 9, 1964, pp 94-101; No 5, 1967, p 108; No 2, 1969, pp 44-46; No 2, 1973, pp 79-83.

"A war consists of a series of successive operations which ultimately should lead to the final elimination or defeat of the enemy armed forces and to the capturing of its economic sources which feed the war and its territory."

Ibid., p 23.

"The art of destroying the enemy armed forces is the basic condition for the economic and successful conduct of a war and we should constantly improve ourselves in this art, as in all the art of strategy."

Ibid., Vol 1, p 2 61.

"Each army should correspond to the economic capabilities of a nation, for only from these capabilities can it realistically develop its armed strength and achieve those combat results which are desired by the strategy of the politician."

VOYENNY VESTNIK, No 28, 1924, p 26.

"...The means of reconnaissance require the same concentration of one's efforts in the crucial sector, as is done for organizing combat."

M. N. Tukhachevskiy, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya,"
Vol 2, p 83.

"No operational skill can compensate for those severe consequences which can occur out of neglect or the shortcomings of an intelligence service."

(TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 25896, inv. 9, file 461, sheet 77).

"The person who is able to fully utilize all the equipment of military engineering and show a flexibility of mind and military inventiveness is always able to confront the enemy with unexpected events and unexpected dimensions of the defeat dealt it."

"Voyna klassov" [Class Warfare], Articles 1919-1920,
Moscow, GVIZ, 1921, p 133.

"Confronting all of us in the area of tactical training is the task of the greatest possible rise of mobility in troop operations. Mobility, decisiveness, boldness and initiative—these are the basic qualities which should be precisely strengthened in each of us."

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of the Leningrad Military
District, 6 April 1929.

"...A fighting revolutionary spirit and class self-awareness are the crucial factors in a revolutionary war, but revolutionary spirit alone without the necessary equipment cannot be victorious in modern war."

M. N. Tukhachevskiy, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya,"
Vol 2, p 27.

"The practical work of organizing command and control is entrusted to the troop and operational staffs. For this reason, the task of selecting the personnel and the combat training of the staffs is one of the crucial ones in preparing an army for war."

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 15 February 1962.

"It is essential not only to study the experience of the past, but also to find new scientific methods which would serve to strengthen the defense capability of the Red Army."

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of the Leningrad Military
District, 14 March 1930.

"Around our regulations a public opinion should be fostered which would ensure not only their formal fulfillment, but also their assimilation as convictions. The entire leadership and the political bodies through the entire system of their indoctrinational impact and by the entire system of party political leadership should provide the Red Army with a knowledge of the techniques of modern combat affairs and the firm strengthening in the social awareness of our army of those methods and provisions which have been established by our regulations."

M. N. Tukhachevskiy, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya,"
Vol 2, p 108.

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