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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

GDR LEADERS' CABLE THANKS TO ROMANIANS

AU311318 Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 29 Oct 83 p 5

[Text] To Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, RCP secretary general, president of the Socialist Republic of Romania; to Comrade Nicholae Dascalescu, prime minister of the government of the Socialist Republic of Romania:

Esteemed comrades: On behalf of the SED Central Committee, the State Council, the Council of Ministers, and the people of the GDR, we want to convey to you, to the RCP Central Committee, the State Council, the Government, and the people of the Socialist Republic of Romania cordial thanks for the greetings and congratulations sent on the 34th anniversary of the establishment of the GDR.

Like you, we are confident that the friendly relations and cooperation between the SED and the RCP, between the GDR and the Socialist Republic of Romania will further develop and expand, for the benefit of both our peoples and in the interests of peace and socialism.

We wish the Romanian working people new successes in building the comprehensively developed socialist society, and to you, esteemed comrades, health, working power, and personal happiness.

Erich Honecker, secretary general of the SED Central Committee, president of the GDR State Council

Willi Stoph, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers

CSO: 2700/38

WESTERN CONCEPT OF GERMAN-GERMAN RELATIONSHIP CRITICIZED

East Berlin STAAT UND RECHT in German Vol 32 No 10 Oct 83 (signed to press 25 Aug 83) pp 808-817

/Article by Dieter Bolz and Dr Roland Meister, members of the Jurisprudence Section of the Friedrich Schiller University in Jena: "Bourgeois Positions on the Law of Nations and the Basic Treaty"/

/Text/ For the longest time German-German relations have been a sensitive indicator in the struggle for peace and detente, security and cooperation in Europe. At the same time they have been the testing ground for the value of peaceful coexistence by countries with different social systems. This has been all the more true since, upon the conclusion of the treaty on the bases of the relationship between the GDR and the FRG of 21 December 1972, the generally mandatory principles of the law of nations have been definitely reaffirmed as the basis of international relations between the two states.¹

As a result of the basic treaty, historic reality assumed a state of normalcy in German-German relations and did so in both meanings of that term. As far as bourgeois scholars were concerned, the treaty was apt to turn into a means of perception because it represented the legal image of a reality; in any case it was bound to challenge them to deal with reality. This is not a matter of the factors of the treaty's historic effects, because these are necessarily alien to the bourgeois interpretation of the law; instead it is a matter of the clear and unambiguous content of the treaty text. This is easily accessible even to positivism--the basic type of bourgeois theoretical consciousness. And in that regard, with a view to the respect for or denial of the reproduction or deformation of the treaty text, the basic treaty has become the touchstone of FRG scholarship in the law of nations.

A specific aspect is also assumed here by the diversity of bourgeois theories; these are gaining importance because they correspond to the nature of international law (as the law of agreements between states) and its trends: The science of bourgeois international law is confronted not only with a new quality of international relationships, it also needs to deal with mandatory reflections of social progress in the guise of the principles of general-democratic international law--something that proceeds in an extremely differentiated manner.

Nevertheless it seems quite unmistakable to us--at least from the aspect of the basic treaty's subject matter that is important for peace--that those forces still

dominate the FRG's doctrine of the law of nations, who seek not to interpret reality (in their manner) but to obfuscate and circumvent it. Indeed, in the wake of conservative tendencies, they have even gained new impetus. The "thinking against the age" is then coupled with arguments against compelling principles of international law.

Modern bourgeois doctrine of the law of nations has few examples of such nebulous mysticism, such scurrilous designs as those exemplified in the attempts to deprive the GDR-FRG relationship of the normalcy of orderly international relations. Ridder's (Marburg) writings in reference to the Federal Constitutional Court's verdict on the basic treaty are largely characteristic of the FRG's international legal doctrine on this topic: We are confronted with a wide "terrain of ideological confusion and legal gambols."² Often bourgeois writings on the basic treaty reflect personal unease with the flaws of such designs; in the case of other authors we encounter the mere apologia of a revanchism that a priori seeks to mobilize against the system of European security and cooperation.

As to the position of the conservative forces in the FRG, we are reminded of Friedrich Engels' accurately aimed polemic against Bismarck's approach to the foundation of the Reich--he declared Germany a Prussian protectorate in order to unite it under the spiked helmet: "He put himself in the wrong in terms of the law of nations and could only rescue himself by applying his favorite barroom interpretation to international law."⁴

The basic treaty was realized in conformity with the principles of the general-democratic international law of the present time and as an element of the system of treaties between socialist states and the FRG, oriented to European security and cooperation. It opened the way to a policy of peaceful coexistence, beneficial for both sides. For the realistic and sensible forces among FRG rulers it proved the "way out of the dead end," in which FRG foreign policy had become entrapped since the Hallstein doctrine became a blunt-edged weapon and began to turn upon its authors.⁵

Following the conclusion of the basic treaty, good neighborly relations were to develop between the two states on the basis of equality (Article 1). These were to take their cue from the goals and principles of the U.N. Charter, "in particular the sovereign equality of all states, respect for independence, autonomy and territorial integrity, the right to self-determination; the observance of human rights and absence of discrimination" (Article 2). Explicitly reaffirmed was the inviolability of the national borders between the two neighboring states now and in future (Article 3), and pointed out once more was the reciprocal independence and autonomy of each of the two states and the restriction of the respective sovereign powers to their respective national territory (Article 6). It is characteristic for the dialectic of the class conflicts in international relations between the GDR and the FRG, that these general truths required (and still require) explicit emphasis, and that the imperialist partner state has not yet fully assimilated the process of learning assigned it.

At the same time the treaty proposes that the goal of the two states' responsibility for the maintenance of peace be a contribution to detente and security in Europe

and cooperation for the welfare of the people of both states (preamble). Of particular importance in this context is the reciprocal obligation to cooperate for the benefit of security and cooperation in Europe, especially the reduction of armed forces and arms on the basis of reciprocity and equal security (Article 5).

All of this is crystal clear. Equally clearly did Erich Honecker state: "The GDR party and government fully endorse the contractual bases for GDR and FRG cooperation as well as the agreed goals and principles."⁶ A typical example is the GDR's readiness--in conformity with corresponding proposals by the USSR and Sweden and coupled with the observance of the principle of equality and equal security--to offer its entire territory for a nuclear free zone in Central Europe.⁷

The unity of word and deed is quite evident here. It is the declared goal to keep whatever has been achieved and, on this basis, to contemplate new positive developments. All this is verifiable. Occasionally fictions may serve comprehension: It would be absurd to imagine that the GDR could oppose its own "catalogue of interpretation" to the text of the treaty; precisely this perception is likely to result in thoughtfulness and comparison. After all, even critics of the GDR assume its treaty fidelity as a matter of course--incidentally they are right.⁸ By contrast the FRG's relationship to the law of nations is demonstrably false.

Representative of the many opinions and theories regarding the basic treaty, that run counter to the law of nations, is their close textual relevance to the BVG /Federal Constitutional Court/ verdict of 31 July 1973. As a rule they are derived from that Karlsruhe verdict--some directly, others indirectly. It is a verdict appealed to in all attacks by FRG revanchist circles on equal relations of good neighborliness. Within the system of the forces that seek to undermine the basic treaty, it exercises a basic function. Wherever GDR sovereign rights and the legal status of its citizens are questioned, this verdict is cited.

One odd fact is characteristic for this verdict and the interests underlying it: Though its voidance petition against the basic treaty was formally rejected by the verdict of 31 July 1973, the Bavarian Land government was able to consider itself the political victor.⁹ The conservative forces it represented thought that the tricky court verdict was the best of all possible solutions.¹⁰

This result came about because the court--not for the first time--exceeded its wide ranging powers even in formal terms: Not only the tenor of the verdict, the "reasons for the verdict," too, are to be mandatory on all FRG organs. The text of the reasoning demonstrates the extent the law was stretched, because it infringes the treaty text--alone mandatory--point by point. The BVG "exposition" thus stands revealed as an act of "reinterpretation by supreme judicial breach of contract."¹¹

At the center of the attempts to retain in this present age the relics of the failed Adenauer policies is the doctrine of the "special relationships," or--as formulated by the BVG verdict, the "special legal closeness" of the two German states. FRG writing on international and political law over and over confronts us with the conscious fallacy of "special German-German relationships." Such theories are invented and suitable to disturb and endanger the normalization of GDR-FRG relations, initiated by the basic treaty. There are no such "special" interstate relations. In the

present age interstate relations, that is relations in international law, are based on the principle of the sovereign equality of states (Article 2, U.N. Charter and Article 1 basic treaty). Collaboration between states proceeds only on such a basis --including conflict settlement--however varied and diverse the collaboration may be. Not that the respective special historic, political, economic, geographic or ethnological features are to be overlooked by the states involved--in particular when they are neighbors. Indeed they are presumed.¹² In general we may assert: If "special" is interpreted as an accommodation of general and particular considerations, there are as many special relationships as there are relationships between countries. Still, all these relationships refer to that which is generally valid, that is the standards of general-democratic international law, mandatory on all states. On the other hand, anyone seeking to prevent the consistent application of the law of nations in international relations, thereby formulates attitudes designed to serve as pretexts for present and future actions violating international law, such as are expressed in the interventionist exercise of the "Salzgitter collection point" and the pronouncements by the Federal Constitutional Court and the Federal Supreme Court that encourage and "legitimate" such practices.

Despite the realities and the respective principles of international law, a group of conservative FRG international law experts persists in the construct of an "all-German roof" said to span both German states, because such a conception "necessarily creates a special relationship between the states living under that roof."¹³ Seeing that the contradiction to reality is all too obvious, others seek for constructs that they--erroneously--aver to "be closer to reality," though the "establishment and expansion of special relationships" is again described as the target of such speculations. Influential champions of this trend, for example, sometimes mention the concept of the "shrunk state," in which the German Reich is said to persist.¹⁴ Once again we note the impossibility of forcing into the straightjacket of unrealistic legalistic models the reality of the existence of two sovereign and equal German states. We can understand that adjustment process within FRG political science and international legal scholarship only as the result of the effect of these real relationships and the corresponding principles of the law of nations that guarantee their quality. Consequently, bourgeois authors reflecting different trends and motives gradually abandon mythological and speculative positions in the course of a long and contradictory process. This includes the fact that the same or similar legal constructs are formulated with totally different goals. Quite definitely, though, the beginnings of a differentiated approach demonstrate that process of erosion to which the unrealistic and internationally illegal doctrine of the continued existence of the German Reich and the subsequent legal-political pretensions are increasingly exposed.¹⁵ This merits note.

As for the assumptions of the opponents of equal international relations between the GDR and FRG, their fundamental interests are obvious and often quite frankly affirmed. An entire group of conservative theoreticians had, so to speak, anticipated the position of the Karlsruhe judges and found itself confirmed in the BVG verdict. Though there are some differences and modifications in their various approaches, they represent a group and include Kewenig, Blumenwitz, Mahnke, Kriele and Rauschning.¹⁶ W. Kewenig, especially, attempted quite early on to adapt the old dicta to new international conditions. In 1970 the treaties of Moscow and Warsaw as well as the treaty negotiations between the GDR and the FRG served him as

an indication that the FRG's usurping preemption of sole representation "could no longer" be maintained "in this form."¹⁷ A little later, after the conclusion of the basic treaty and in total disregard of the principles of general-democratic international law explicitly acknowledged as fundamental to this treaty, he constructed a "particularly close and atypical relationship" between the treaty partners to be distinguished by "qualitatively better than normal international relations."¹⁸

The BVG verdict adopted this tenet of the "special legal closeness."¹⁹ Others appeal to the precept of the "need to keep open the German question" and champion the same or similar constructs.²⁰ The goals and motivations for this arbitrary handling of the law of nations and historic realities are quite obvious. In fact the term "legal closeness" may at best have some meaning where consonant or reciprocally approaching social interests are reflected in the adjustment of internal legal systems. Common imperialist interests may turn up among the FRG and its NATO and EEC partners or crumble in the contradiction of imperialist crises. Common socialist interests are proving their value in the community of socialist states, that is on the historically fixed road on which the Soviet Union has been advancing for the past 60 years.

On the other hand, no closer than international relations can possibly exist between the socialist GDR and the FRG that is dominated by monopoly capital. The only acceptable way to the normalcy of a regulated and practical intercourse of the two German states in the interest of the maintenance and security of peace is not the "legal closeness" of contrasting social systems but cooperation for mutual profit and in the interest of European cooperation as a whole on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.²¹ Revanchist demonstrations constantly remind us what is meant by closer than international legal relations, and so do supreme judicial verdicts that make the inappropriate attempt to legitimate the actions of internationally illegal interference in the internal affairs of the GDR. The existing national border between the GDR and FRG has been explicitly and solemnly reaffirmed in the basic treaty as being inviolable now and in the future--as it was earlier confirmed in the treaties between the USSR and the FRG as well as between the People's Republic of Poland and the FRG and the final communique of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The systematic challenge to this border burdens and impedes the normalization and peaceful cooperation championed by the GDR on the basis of general principles and actual treaties.

The BVG verdict of 26 November 1980 holds the key to the constructs that obstruct detente. The court set out to provide an "appropriately functional" interpretation of the concept of the homeland: The function to destroy the foundations of the basic treaty and interfere in the GDR's legal system. This is explicitly done by appealing to the BVG's interpretation of the basic treaty, according to which the German Democratic Republic belongs "with Germany" and therefore cannot be "regarded as a foreign country in its relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany."²²

While the BVG cannot touch the internationally binding nature of the treaty,²³ its verdict is distinguished by the fact that it serves as the basis and point of reference for revanchist doctrines and the corresponding practices running afoul of international law. We do not intend to forget that this verdict has by no means been universally applauded in the FRG's legal literature--nor, incidentally, the daily

(grand bourgeois) media. Indeed, hardly any other BVG verdict has aroused so many reservations, so much unease and even contraction within the ruling class, too. Evidently the court--assigned and assuming the task of turning political disputes into allegedly pure issues of law--has overstepped its boundaries. That is why the grand bourgeois mass media called it a scandal and talked of self-delusion.

In this meaning Scheuner spoke of an "indigestible conceptual mush" served up by the court in its verdict.²⁴ The system immanent criticism with regard to the inclusion of the reasons for the verdict and the binding effect claimed for it by the court, goes somewhat further.²⁵ It is to be welcomed that the verdict promptly met with outright rejection by FRG experts in political and international law. Ch. Tomuschat described the verdict as a "flight from history" and regretfully stated that it "had left debris behind." He warned compellingly of the dangerous illusion "that everything was going on as before, and that the artfully embalmed legal entity 'all-Germany' (German Reich) might be able to continue existing like Snowwhite, regardless of the reality of the two German states."²⁶

The influence of such positions may have increased in the course of the polarization of political forces in the FRG. In any case, democratic lawyers in the FRG have clearly taken against the "ruling doctrine" and the ensuing policy of legal arrogance and interference in the internal affairs of the GDR and other socialist countries.²⁷ The committed democratic attorney E. Eisner hit the bull's eye when he accused the Karlsruhe justices of reinterpreting the basic treaty by a "supreme judicial breach of treaty" and ascribed no more value to the legal relevance of the verdict than to any newspaper article.²⁸ Indeed, the various legal attitudes to the basic treaty--and, conversely, the BVG verdict on the basic treaty--fairly accurately reflect the various and contrasting political forces and tendencies in the FRG with regard to the basic issues of foreign policy and, especially, an orderly and good neighborly relationship with the GDR.

Although it occurred some years ago, a single event appears to be indicative for the present also. At a symposium in honor of the conservative political and international jurist H. Krueger (Hamburg), H. Schneider (Heidelberg) strongly defended the BVG against its domestic critics. Concerning Scheuner's phrase of an "indigestible conceptual mush," he opined that, in such a case, it would be necessary to keep one's stomach empty. The BVG had certainly been more astute than the diplomats, because the court's interpretation left "open all kinds of possible definitions": "After all, it is useful to have an ample coat and adjust it when the particular need arises."²⁹ Arbitrariness was here elevated to a system in order to justify and promote an expansionist and, therefore, internationally illegal goal.

Th. Oppermann considered this the summing up of the symposium he headed: He was in raptures because the almost lost "all-German" state had--vision-like--risen again on the horizon. Maybe this outburst conveyed more than was intended: We tend to snatch at mirages, at phantasms in order to deceive ourselves and others about the realities and their inevitable consequences.³⁰ A few years later J. Hacke (Cologne) deduced from just this function of the BVG verdict an "integrating and even conciliatory effect" in the meaning of the organization of FRG political and international legal scholarship on the basis of the BVG's verdicts.³¹ We see very clearly where a policy leads, that is devoted to such mirages, when GDR claims insisting on³² respect for its sovereignty are branded as attacks on the last "all-German links."

FOOTNOTES

1. See H. Wuensche, "Respect for GDR Sovereignty--Duty in International Law," NEUE JUSTIZ, 1981, p 6.
2. See H. Ridder, "'German' Citizenship and the Two German States," "Gedaechtnis-schrift fuer Friedrich Klein" /Memorial Publication for Friedrich Klein/, Munich 1979, p 447.
3. In this meaning the preface to the German edition of R. Coudenhove-Kalergi's "World Power Europe," Stuttgart 1971, p 7, describes the resolutions and treaties oriented to European security and cooperation as "a new mortal danger to Europe."
4. K. Marx/F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol 21, Berlin 1962, p 438.
5. See F.R. Allemann, "The Way Out of the Dead End," "Die Neue Gesellschaft" /The New Society/, Bielefeld/Bonn/Bad Godesberg 1973, p 922.
6. "Bericht des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands an den X. Parteitag der SED. Berichterstatter: Genosse Erich Honecker" /SED Central Committee Report to the Tenth SED Congress. Reporter: Comrade Erich Honecker/, Berlin 1981, p 28.
7. See "The GDR Government's Reply to the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden of 27 January 1983 and "Letter from the Chairman of the GDR Council of State to the FRG Federal Chancellor of 4 February 1983," both NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 9 February 1983, p 1.
8. See SED Central Committee Report, as before, p 20.
9. It may be debatable whether the initiators considered a decision in favor of the application possible in the given circumstances; the political compulsions arising from the trends of European state relations and, especially, the admission to the United Nations of the two German states, imminent at the time, certainly counteracted such a decision..
10. See German Bundestag, stenographic report, 208 Session, Bonn, 20 March 1980, p 16625. The two prior court verdicts are also to be understood by the result of the final verdict, that is with a view to the decision and its function. On the one hand this applies to the rejection of the application by the Bavarian Land government for a preliminary injunction to prevent ratification of the basic treaty before the final court verdict, on the other to the challenge to Judge Rottmann on account of (presumed) partiality. This was of great importance for the composition of the senate. This presumption of partiality by conservative politicians and jurists is easily understood when we remember that Rottmann interpreted the treaty exactly according to its unambiguous text--that the two German states confront one another as entities in international law, and that their relations in law are settled exclusively by the rules of international law. There is no need to comment on the alleged impartiality of the senate majority which, in complete conformity with conservative FRG forces, elevated the "continued existence of the German Reich" to an assertion underlying the verdict and denied the international nature of a national border to the border between the GDR and the FRG.

11. See E. Eisner, "On the Legal and Political Significance of the Karlsruhe Verdict on the Basic Treaty," *BLAETTER FÜR DEUTSCHE UND INTERNATIONALE POLITIK* (Cologne) 1973, p 957.
12. Already at the time the basic treaty was in preparation, Willi Stoph, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, had pointed this out when he rejected the formula of "special German-German relations" as an attempt to subject the GDR to tutelage: "The FRG's relations with the Austrian Republic or Switzerland, for example, have their special features and are thereby distinguished from FRG relations with the French Republic, for example. That applies to relations between all countries. The basis of relations between sovereign and independent states is always represented by the generally valid standards of the law of nations." (*DOKUMENTATION DER ZEIT* 1970, No 10, p 16).
13. W. Kewenig, "The Significance of the Basic Treaty for the Relationship of the two German States," *EUROPA-ARCHIV* (Bonn) 1973, p 43. See also the same author, "Searching for a new Germany Doctrine," *DIE ÖFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG* (Stuttgart) 1973, pp 799f; in a similar vein D. Rauschning, "Verträge und Andere Akte zur Rechtsstellung Deutschlands" /*Treaties and Other Acts Relevant to the Status of Germany*/, Munich 1975, p 12; M. Kriele, "Einführung in die Staatslehre" /*Introduction to Political Science*/, Hamburg 1975, p 78 (Kriele here advocates a "partial order science" that textually corresponds to the "roof construct" (the same author, "Legitimitätsprobleme der Bundesrepublik" /*Legitimacy Problems of the Federal Republic*/, Munich 1977, p 211; see also H.P. Schwarz, "Do We Need a new German Political Concept?", *EUROPA-ARCHIV* 1977, pp 328 ff; in a similar vein E. Klein, "Topical Significance of the Germany Treaty," *AUSSENPOLITIK* (Hamburg), 1980, p 397; see also J.A. Frowein, "German Borders from the Aspect of International Law," *EUROPA-ARCHIV* 1979, pp 596 ff.
14. See W. Kewenig, "Searching for a new...", as before, p 798; for some considerable time past R. Bernhardt, in K. Strupp/H.-J. Schlochauer, "Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts" /*Dictionary of International Law*/, Vol 2, West Berlin 1961, p 296.
15. This process is reflected in the fact, for example, that more recent manuals on international law in the FRG tend to eschew the statement about a so-called legal status of Germany (see A. Verdross/B. Simma, "Universelles Völkerrecht" /*Universal International Law*/, West Berlin 1976. It is even more obvious in the growing incidence of international jurists who reject the continued existence of the German Reich for various reasons (see W. Lehwald, "Germany's Legal Status in the Light of Contemporary History," *NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT* (Munich) 1981, p 856; the same author, "Die Deutsche Frage" /*The German Question*/, Frankfurt/Main 1980; the same author, "Germany's Legal Status in the Exchange of Letters among Rudolf Bernhardt, Walter Lewald and Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern," *OESTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT* 1982, No 32, pp 159-176; R. Quist, "Ostpolitik, Völkerrecht und Grundgesetz" /*Eastern Policy, International Law and the Constitution*/, Starnberg 1972, p 10.--Certainly resolute German scholars such as W. Abendroth, H. Ridder, G. Stuby and P. Roemer are among the consistent opponents of the Reich mythology (see, among others, H. Ridder, "'German Citizenship...', as before, p 444; G. Stuby, "The Commandment of Peace in the Constitution and International Legal Documents," in "Für den Frieden--Aufgaben der Philosophie und der Wissenschaften" /*For Peace--Tasks of Philosophy and the Sciences*/, Cologne 1982, p 127; the same author, "30 Years Potsdam

Agreement. Its Historic and Topical Relevance," *BLAETTER FUER DEUTSCHE UND INTERNATIONALE POLITIK* 1975, pp 251 ff; the same author, "30 Years Federal Republic in the 'East-West' Conflict," in "Geschichte der Bundesrepublik" /History of the Federal Republic/, Cologne 1979; P. Roemer, "The Duty for Peace in the Constitution" (*DEMOKRATIE UND RECHT* (Cologne) 1982, p 271.

16. See W. Kewenig, "Constitutional Problems of a Treaty Between the FRG and the GDR" in "Ostvertraege. Berlin-Status. Muenchner Abkommen. Beziehungen zwischen der BRD und der DDR" /Eastern Treaties. The Status of Berlin. Munich Agreements. Relations between the FRG and the GDR/, Hamburg 1971, pp 3-5; M. Kriele, "The Conflict Regarding Germany's Legal Status and the International Recognition of the GDR," *ZEITSCHRIFT FUER RECHTSPOLITIK* (Frankfurt/Main) 1971, p 261; H.-H. Mahnke, "Constitutional and International Aspects of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties," *RECHT IN OST UND WEST* (West Berlin) 1972, pp 153ff.
17. See W. Kewenig, "Germany and the United Nations," *EUROPA-ARCHIV* 1979, p 344.
18. See W. Kewenig, "The Significance of the Basic Treaty for the Relationship of the Two German States," *EUROPA-ARCHIV* 1973, p 43.
19. "BVG Verdict on the Basic Treaty of 31 July 1973," *DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT* (Cologne) 1973, p 688.
20. See P.J. Winters, "East Berlin's Change of Attitude toward Bonn," *EUROPA-ARCHIV* 1981, p 32.
21. See "SED Central Committee Report...", as before, pp 28, 13.
22. See E. Oeser/H. Luther, "The FRG's Broken Relationship to International Law," *NEUE JUSTIZ* 1981, p 343.
23. The legal principle of the international irrelevance in law of conflicting internal legal standards and legal disputes, adopted in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on Contract Law is indisputed (see H. Wuensche, es before).
24. See U. Scheuner, "The Constitutional Status of the Federal Republic," *DIE OEFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG* 1973, p 583; W. Kewenig, "Searching for a New...", as before, pp 797 ff.
25. The deceased constitutional judge Wiltrud Rupp von Bruenneck, for example, spoke up against a BVG competence-competence (see "Finis Germaniae?," Frankfurt/Main 1977, p 64); see also R. Zuck, "The Federal Constitutional Court as a Third Chamber," *ZEITSCHRIFT FUER RECHTSPOLITIK* 1978, +p 180 ff; the same author, "The Status of the Federal Constitutional Court within the Structure of the Constitution," *DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT* 1979, pp 383ff. Other remarks in the same vein may be found in, for example, W.R. Schenke, "The Extent of BVG Reviews," *NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT* 1979, especially p 1323.
26. Ch. Tomuschat, "Foreign Power and Constitutional Court Checks," *DIE OEFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG* 1973, pp 801, 804; see the same author, "The Legal Significance of

Four-Power Responsibility," in "Fuenf Jahre Grundvertragsurteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts" /Five Years Basic Treaty Verdict by the Federal Constitutional Court," Cologne/West Berlin/Bonn/Munich 1979, pp 75 ff. We also note definite intimations of realistic opinions, appropriate to international law, with R. Bernhardt (see "1979 Conference of the Union of German Constitutional Law Instructore," DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT 1980 p 45) and B. Simma (see "The Basic Treaty and the Law of International Treaties," ARCHIV DES OEFFENTLICHEN RECHTS (Tuebingen) 1975, pp 4ff). Despite many reservations we should also mention O. Kimminich (see "The Verdict on the Foundations of the Constitutional Construction of the Federal Republic of Germany," DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT 1973, p 661); see also W. Lewald, "The German Question--An Open Question?," BLAETTER FUER DEUTSCHE UND INTERNATIONALE POLITIK 1978, pp 1258ff.

27. See W. Daeubler, "Foreign Policy by the Federal Constitutional Court," in "Verfassungsgericht und Politik" /Constitutional Court and Politics/, Reinbek near Hamburg 1979, pp 119ff; U. Mende, "The Relic of all-German Citizenship," DEMOKRATIE UND RECHT 1978, p 23ff.
28. See E. Eisner, "On the Legal and Political Significance of the Karlsruhe Verdict on the Basic Treaty," BLAETTER FUER DEUTSCHE UND INTERNATIONALE POLITIK 1973, p 952.
29. H. Schneider, "From the Line of Demaraction to National Border?", in "Finis Germaniae?," as before, p 98.
30. Somewhere else Oppermann showed at least the rudiments of the ability to comprehend the new historic realities (see "Comment on the BVG Verdict," JURISTENZEITUNG 1973, pp 596 f).
31. See J. Hacker, "Five Years Basic Treaty Verdict...", as before, p 52.
32. For example A. Mertes, "Moscow Behind Honecker's Demands," DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV 1981, p 374; in the same vein Th. Waigel (CUS) in the Bundestag (German Bundestag, stenographic reports, fourth session, Bonn, 4 May 1983, p 101).

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PASTOR PROMINENT IN PEACE MOVEMENT STATES AIMS, PLANS

Hamburg STERN in German Vol 36 No 42, 13 Oct 83 pp 238, 242

[Interview] with Pastor Rainer Eppelmann by Dieter Bub, STERN staff editor:
"Politics of Detente from Below" date and place not specified

[Text] [Question] How will the East react to the deployment of new medium-range weapons in the West?

[Answer] In case of "catch up" arming in the West, I fear not only an immediate "catch up to catch up" arming in the East, but also a rapid deterioration of the foreign and domestic policy climate.

[Question] Do you consider nonviolent resistance against military installations possible in the GDR?

[Answer] I would consider that difficult. The rules regulating public events are very strict and narrow. For the church this means that anything that is not a religious service requires a permit. Of course, the question is always asked at the grassroots level: What more can we do? Letters, appeals, church services and actions, but also information and statements by church authorities have created a new awareness. But it is no longer enough to put our signature somewhere on a piece of paper. We are beginning to understand that peace is much more than just an anti-missile attitude.

[Question] What have you done in concrete terms, and what are your plans?

[Answer] For example, on September 1 we organized in my Berlin parish a parish meeting on the subject "Tell me about the war." Soldiers, refugees and survivors of the big air raids told young people what they had experienced and suffered, and how they had survived. For the "peace decade" of November 6-16 we have, like last year, an extensive program with many different religious events. The realization has grown that the period of information and discussion must be followed by actions. Many are willing to become actively involved. Many already are.

[Question] Can one speak in terms of a unified peace movement in the GDR?

Answer No, not in the sense of a unified organization. The spectrum is probably just as wide in the GDR as in the Federal Republic, only in other forms. In addition to the state-run official peace movement, there is the work for peace by church groups who do not see themselves as rival undertakings. But these church groups are definitely not a monolithic bloc. Diversity has the advantage that many aspects are taken into consideration and under discussion. It would be important that peace lovers of differing convictions and concepts deal with each other peaceably, respect each other and communicate with each other. There is much room for improvement in this respect. I would wish for such an improvement especially in the relations with the government-run peace movement.

Question Is the sew-on badge "swords into plowshares" still being worn?

Answer The badges have become rare. State and church authorities came to an agreement that production of the badges would be discontinued and that the few remaining people still wearing them would no longer be harassed and persecuted. I am convinced that this emblem and its statement has had its effect. Today there are other, and in part perhaps more intensive, forms of working for peace.

Question Are there concrete demands which, in your opinion, must be made by the peace movement in the GDR?

Answer The peace movement in the West must demand that "catch up" armament must be stopped. We in the GDR must demand that our government give up a possible "catch up to catch up" arming. But this would be only the first step. A further practical step to be demanded by both sides is the change-over of the armed forces in East and West from active to passive armies. Today the NATO forces and the Warsaw Pact forces are armed in such a way that they could carry out an aggressive war at any time. If they are capable only of defending themselves, the danger of an armed conflict will be reduced. I could imagine the Republic of Austria as a model for the structuring and arming of such an army. Perhaps the GDR should use her good contacts and relations with Austria for an exchange of experience in this area.

Question In recent months, there have been repeated and attention-getting demonstrations in Jena against the regime. How do you rate these demonstrations?

Answer There have been various groups which formed in individual cities and have called attention to themselves through demonstrations. There are the Dresden group for "social peace service," the peace forum in the Dresden Kreuzkirche, the initiators of the "berlin appeal" for disarmament in West and East, and the peace workshops in Berlin. These and other actions affected all over the whole country. But it has been rather detrimental to the peace movement. Many people in the GDR--since the emigration of almost all of the Jena friends--have gained the unfortunate impression that whoever had been working for peace there had first applied for an exit visa.

Question Did the type of action by the Jena people make the dialogue with the authorities more difficult?

Answer Yes. I don't know of any peace group which considers the "Jena way" worth copying. There was a solidarity movement with Roland Jahn, for instance, but only because the responsible authorities packed him off in such an unfair manner. In the context of the Jena events, we in the GDR must no longer ignore an important question: Why do many thousands of GDR citizens want to leave their country and start from scratch somewhere else? How much more humane and peaceable would conditions in this country have to be so that this desire would not even arise? To give all those people new hope and new confidence, that is the task and obligation--especially of the churches. And up to now, we have not seriously tried to cope with this task.

Question Does that mean that for some, the peace movement in the GDR is only a vehicle to get to the West as soon as possible?

Answer Indeed, a few people have taken part in the peace movement solely for the purpose of having their applied-for emigration expedited. Personally I can understand that, since the successful conclusion of such an application may take several years, but I do consider it egotistical to use other people for obtaining such purely personal gains. And I consider it very bad form if someone then profitably sells his past as a peace fighter "made in the GDR" in the Federal Republic.

Question What do the peace circles accomplish in the Protestant church?

Answer It is evident that many church members have become certain that they personally must, and can, do something for peace in Europe. And the conviction has grown among us that this commitment necessitates new ways. Part of it is independent and convincing actions by the church and by individual Christians.

Question Should not an "Internationale" of the peace movement be organized, in order to exert influence on politicians in West and East?

Answer In this year of threatened "catch up" armament I have realized time and again: allies are those who are affected, i.e., the intended victims in East and West in case of war. For example: The American, Japanese and West European citizen who, like us, tries to create peace without using force, who tried to forge "swords into plowshares," is closer to me than any politician or military man, even in my own country, who continues to support massive armament, deterrence, and premilitary education and training. Something very new is coming into being in Europe: a "policy of detente from the grass-roots," a solidarity which creates trust beyond the borders of the blocs. That is our hope.

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ILLEGAL CURRENCY TRADE DESCRIBED

Hamburg STERN in German Vol 36 No 42, 13 Oct 83 p 234

[Article by Dieter Staecker: "Miraculous Money Multiplication--How Representatives of Foreign Embassies in Berlin Evade GDR Currency Regulations"]

[Text] Every day, a lively currency trade takes place in the West Berlin train station at the Zoo. Diplomats in official cars drive up to one of the three nearby exchange offices, flash bundles of foreign currency and leave the "scene of the crime" with many more East marks than they would get in the GDR. In the GDR, the exchange rate between D-Mark and East mark is 1:1. In West Berlin, on the other hand, a 100 DM bill is worth 476 East marks.

The German-German currency trade by many diplomats accredited in East Berlin takes place discreetly in a "chambre séparée" if so desired and carries practically no risk. Under Western law it is legal, anyway. But the well-heeled money traders do not have to fear East Berlin's strict currency exchange regulations which threaten severe penalties for the illegal import of their own currency. With their diplomatic carnets they cross the well uncontrolled, preferably at the "Checkpoint Charlie" border crossing reserved for foreigners.

The advantage for the money changers with a diplomatic passport: thanks to high state subsidies and low wages, basic food items and services are quite inexpensive in the GDR. Through this exchange they become almost ridiculously low. For example, a kilo [2 lbs.] of beef--which costs between 10 and 16 East marks in the GDR, depending on quality--in this manner costs 4 DM at most. And so that butchers reserve scarce meat for them, diplomats help it along with a few DM, discreetly hidden in a plastic bag which is handed across the counter for wrapping the merchandise. Also helpful is an occasional donation of a kilo of coffee. Due to this exchange trick, some diplomats in East Berlin manage to save a large part of their expense allowance--which is paid in Western currency--for a little house back home.

Nobody can say exactly how big the East-West currency exchange volume has grown. The GDR complains about losses in the billions for their national economy. The Berlin exchange offices list the trade at almost 250 million marks per annum; experts calculate it as twice that high. All attempts by the Landeszentralbank [Land central bank] to compute statistical data on the

exchange volume have failed so far because of the resistance of the owners of the exchange houses. The gentlemen do not wish to put their cards on the table.

Now the Berlin SPD wants to spoil the game for the "exchange barons" and the money dealers. This week, the opposition party will introduce a bill in the house of deputies which would place such high levies on the East-West currency trade that it would no longer pay.

But the Social Democrats do not have in mind only the diplomats, but also the GDR government: East Berlin defends its high mandatory exchange quota--DM 25 per day per visitor--by pointing out, among other things, that the economic losses incurred through the illegal money exchange have to be balanced.

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WRITERS' UNION EXPERIENCES TENSION BETWEEN GENERATIONS

Budapest NEPHADSEREG in Hungarian 27 Aug 83 p 13

[Interview with Miklos Jovanovics, first secretary of the Hungarian Writers' Union, by Sandor Pusztay; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] You were active as a journalist and chief editor for a long time at ELET ES IRODALOM. For the past year, however, you have been the first secretary of the Hungarian Writers Union. No matter how important your "official" assignment, it appears you have become a bit isolated from "public life." Don't you miss editing?

[Answer] I believe this may be regarded as a personal matter. When I worked at ELET ES IRODALOM, I encountered the same literary, political and literary-political problems as I do at the writers' union. The difference is that now I must deal with all these things at a degree of greater responsibility because in the editorial office there was a staff of 15 persons while there are 600 of us in the writers' union.

[Question] Various rumors are circulating about the internal workings of the writers' union, its life and the debates that are being conducted. What is it all about?

[Answer] I can state without exaggeration that in some cases we are conducting serious debates at the writers' union. This means that various trends, views, ideas, groups and interests are obviously conflicting at elections, in the departments, and at various meetings of the writers' union. At these forums everyone can express his social, ideological and literary views. Naturally, extreme or exaggerated views generally stir up greater and more heated debate, and frequently these go beyond the walls of the building.

In many cases these debates have a generational color since it may happen that the young inadequately understand the older, or vice versa. I recall a period when certain young writers maintained that the older generation of writers had only books and not works. This was a harsh assertion that was not in accord with the facts. As a matter of fact, the recently deceased Gyula Illyes, Istvan Vas and Sandor Weores also belonged to the older generation, and I do not believe we have to protest to anyone about their importance. I believe that the view which was raised as an example was a sign of a flare-up, to which we must, of course, pay attention. Our literature is characterized today not by a generational differentiation, but rather the development of attitudinal groups.

[Question] We frequently hear today about the opposition of young writers. It is no secret that last year the operation of the Attila Jozsef Circle was suspended and then re-licensed. What is the explanation of all this?

[Answer] A unified political opposition among the young writers cannot be claimed. It is even a bad generalization to draw a parallel between the young writers and the Attila Jozsef Circle. Many young writers, for example, do not participate in the work of the Circle. Undoubtedly, however, when they appear together in judging certain political and literary questions, they may give voice to a view that "plays an oppositional role."

[Question] The present so-called generation of young writers was preceded by a great era, the "fire dancers." In looking at the situation of our literature, it appears that these artists who are now "in their manhood" are unable to find their place, and their recognition is also not the most appropriate. Can we say that the public-life poets are being forced into the background?

[Answer] After a very difficult historical period at the end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's, the "fire dancers" undertook a very important role. Many opinions have been voiced about these "fire dancers." There are those who maintain that they got their opportunity during a "vacuum" when others were not writing; others say opportunities existed for those who were by no means deserving.

Looking objectively at these creative people we must acknowledge that by and large we are speaking of poets--for example, Mihaly Vaczi, Gabor Garai, Mihaly Ladany--who have had an influence on our literature down to the present day. With their works they represent a very important committed branch of Hungarian lyric, and from an esthetic and quality point of view they are outstanding.

For some strange, inexplicable reason it appears that party-minded, committed literature is not "in style." This type of poetry--poetic attitude--merits greater respect and recognition, and it is my conviction that its objective value will continue to increase in the future.

[Question] In recent years there has been a significant decrease in the literary-cultural columns of daily and weekly newspapers. This has been accompanied not only by a decline in publication possibilities for writers and poets but also by a limitation of the literary information available to the readers. How do you regard this problem?

[Answer] The space given to literature in the daily press is undoubtedly inadequate. And yet we have very important traditions in this area. At the same time we can observe a very interesting phenomenon: more and more writers are publishing so-called public-life journalism. We can and must, I believe, make better use of this bent.

In respect to the other part of the question, the situation is a bit more reassuring. The interests of the writers' union required--and we may perhaps succeed in making our position prevail--that none of the existing 18 literary newspapers should be eliminated or combined. All this is taking place in the interest of the readers and contemporary Hungarian literature.

[Question] The competitions sponsored jointly by the Hungarian Writers' Union and the Ministry of Defense have enjoyed a 15-year-old past. What is your view of these exceptional competitions?

[Answer] This competitive system has proved successful, and as indicated by the volumes published by the Military Publishing House it has yielded a rich "harvest." Our writers and poets are participating in greater and greater numbers. I cannot say anything about the individual motives of the participants, but it is a fact that many writers have appeared here with high level works. It is worth noting that Ferenc Baranyi, Bulcsu Bertha, Gyula Csak, Istvan Csurka, Istvan Gall, Karoly Szakonyi and many others have written of soldiers and military life with profound artistic and human credibility.

The articles that are submitted year after year to the competitions also show that all the tiny vibrations of life are included in the closed life of the army, moreover it is concentrated in such a way that in "civilian" life it can be observed only through diffused and minute work.

The competitions are also fortunate because the Ministry of Defense does not set limits or subject boundaries when it advertises the annual competitions. It is only necessary to show the characteristic life of those belonging to the army and this affords thousands of possibilities to the creative workers.

[Question] What is your opinion of the patriotic and internationalist upbringing of the youth?

[Answer] In the great majority of our newspapers and periodicals we regularly find articles that deal with historical, political consciousness or questions of patriotism. And still there are certain people who are inclined to find serious shortcomings in this area.

In my opinion it is a basic task to clarify the concepts. That is, who understands what by patriotic education? Whoever demands that we should use the words homeland or nation more frequently is greatly mistaken. Such attempts have already been made, and we now know that they did not lead to the goal. What is at issue is that we must educate the growing generation to an appropriate social and national self-knowledge.

If this is what we mean by patriotic and internationalist education, then not everything is in order in this area. Our literary and historical academic teaching must develop much more, and for this it is our obligation to lend every possibility and support by using classical and contemporary literature.

PROVINCIAL PARTY ACTIVITIES REPORTED

Party Discusses Democracy, Centralism

Kielce SLOWO LUDU in Polish 23 Sep 83 p 3

[Article by Boguslaw Morawski: "A Review of the Ninth Congress: Democracy vs Centralism"]

[Text] Discussions of party matters are always reduced to the ultimate problem: should we have more centralism or more democracy? The problem is stated in such a way as to suggest only one answer: we should have more democracy if we want to see an improvement in the present situation.

Without mincing words, it is necessary to say outright that the question of whether there should be more centralism or more democracy in the party is an example of an incorrectly stated problem.

In order to give a correct answer to an incorrectly stated question, we would have to rely on chance, which is seldom the case. Even now, at many party meetings, people who criticize centralism extol "mechanisms which preserve democracy," which becomes a manifestation of gullible and therefore false thinking about political reality. Centralism has become a myth which remains like a tumor in people's heads and prevents an analysis of facts, phenomena, and processes.

Can we, today, find proof of violations of the principles of democracy in the practical activity of the Central Committee and of provincial and municipal echelons? Can we say that we have too little democracy now? Was there not enough democracy, or even much democracy, during the entire year of 1981--and what good came of it? Nevertheless, did we not overcome the party's numerous ailments as well as manifestations of the party's inertia? It turns out that democracy, in and of itself, so-called "pure democracy"--in the understanding of many--is by no means the most effective, longed-for and miraculous cure. We need to have something else besides democracy.

Meanwhile, let me say a few words about centralism. This accursed demon, this alleged root of all evil is, in reality, an object of either secret or subconscious affection. We might as well recall numerous voices that spoke of the need for strong authority, and recriminations toward the authorities for their lack of necessary firmness, for their tolerance of disorder and

[Question] Finally, would you tell our readers what long-term plans you have?

[Answer] In the future I would like to see the first secretary's position in the writers' union as a social office. That is, it should not be necessary for me to fill this position as a main occupation. According to my original profession I would like to be active on a newspaper, and in addition perform my tasks as first secretary in the writers' union with the same devotion and responsibility. As for my individual and literary plans, I recently agreed with the Szepirodalmi Publishing House to do a book. In this volume I will publish my special articles, sketches and notes regarding my meetings with foreign and domestic writers.

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anarchy, for their tolerance of lawbreaking, etc. Because centralism is the internal logic of all authority that determines the necessary principles of subordination, dependence, and compliance of institutions and people.

Even a family cannot function without such principles, let alone structures and institutions of state authority. When examining complaints about centralism we always encounter the same stereotypes of thought which provide quick answers and relieve a person of the need to think. According to them, centralism is "disregard for the masses," "replacement of elective organs by the party apparatus," "command method of governing," "the arrogance of the authorities," and so on. If these quick answers mean anything now, they indicate only an emotional attitude toward past methods of governing.

In order to understand centralism as the internal logic of authority, it is necessary to realize what main areas of political life it concerns. These are several such areas.

The most important area is, certainly, the decision-making process. It includes all the methods, ways, and procedures of decision-making. In conformity with the teachings of the classics of Marxism, collective discussion of main problems of public life in individual party echelons was to be the basic guarantee of democracy in general, including also intraparty democracy.

Deviations from this principle were manifested in various forms of apparent collectivity and, in particular, apparent discussion and coordination of future decisions. They took the form of the dominance of individuals over collectives during the period of the so-called personality cult; later, they took on the form of a cabinet-type method of governing which consisted in decision-making of very small groups of central and local authorities. During the 1970's, on the other hand, there was marked development of a bureaucratic technocratic model (of government), with elements of autocracy. At that time, collectivity was a facade, and concentration of functions was a principle. As a rule, local party secretaries were [also] chairmen of people's councils; Provincial Committee secretaries were also Sejm deputies and they headed provincial representative groups; provincial governors were assured membership in the Sejm and, sometimes, on the Central Committee, and, certainly, on the executive boards of provincial committees. Vast competences of individuals and small groups of people provided encouragement for interference in all areas of public life. They limited the activeness of individuals and collectives, and were the most important cause of passivity in the party. The negative results of the infringement of the leninist principle of collectivity are, certainly, [even] more extreme.

The second important area of the activity of every authority and every political party is the process of creation of authority and the cadre policy. Lenin was quite right in stressing that "in history, no class has gained power unless it has put forward its political leaders, its representatives who have been able to organize and direct a movement."

Centralism in decision-making had its impact, unfortunately also on the cadre policy. A resolution of the Ninth Congress puts it thus: "Limitation of the people's power, gradual liquidation of systems and institutions of self-government or their reduction to a semblance of functions, while real authority was being transferred to the executive apparatus--party, state, and economic--resulted in a progressively worsening cadre policy. This policy gave preference to submissive people, and hampered the advancement and activity of courageous and competent people."

The secret rules of cadres selection had to bring about definite political consequences. They resulted in a lack of confidence on the part of party members and society in [party] leadership and alienation of party leadership [from the masses]. They relieved party voting echelons and party organizations of responsibility for the condition of the cadres.

Centralism in decision-making and in cadre policy required concentration and control of information. In a hierarchical structure of leadership and management, information, as well as communication between the authorities and society and between the party's leading echelons and party members, are also centralized. A central leadership organ becomes the [main] source of knowledge and information. Intermediate echelons are only transmitters of information, adopting a passive attitude toward its content. Control of information is not based on permanent criteria--these depend on the whim of a [party] functionary, who bandies at will the meaning of such words as "of state importance," "the public good," and "of political significance." Forms of control of information are expanded: "for the aktiv," "for the select aktiv," "for internal use," "for party organizations," etc.

When instructions are the main source of knowledge, and when there is no respect for openness, and for the obligation to exchange information and to express opinions freely, disturbances in the functioning of the party are bound to occur.

Initiatives of party members encounter insurmountable obstacles; their sense of responsibility becomes distorted. Mistrust is born, along with a movement of insufficient information, rumor, gossip, and an interest in foreign radio broadcasts. Centralism in decision-making, in cadre policy, and in dissemination of information was bound to have only one result--a centralized system of directing our entire state and society. Command methods of work became a binding rule, while the principles of democracy became a declaration rather than a reality.

All that I have said about the areas of occurrence of centralism and about its effects is an authentic summary of views which were presented during the discussions at the Ninth Congress. At this point, it would be well to recall also an important statement of Wladyslaw Gomułka during a discussion at the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee in October 1956. After our first experience with centralism in the years 1948-1955, whose victim he himself had been, he said, "It will be necessary for us to make substantial changes in the practice of our party's work and in the methods of its action. Matters of clear separation of competences of the party apparatus and those of the

state apparatus, with simultaneous preservation of the leading role of the party, come to the fore. An arrangement has to be worked out to make everyone responsible for his own sphere of activity. Otherwise, no one is responsible, to the detriment of the interests of the party and the state. The principle that the party and the party apparatus does not govern but only directs, that governing is the competence of the state and of the state apparatus, must be expressed in the specific content and practice of [party] work and not only--as is the case even now--in words. This problem requires a detailed study, which should be one of the most urgent tasks of the party leadership."

Unfortunately, a "detailed study" of this problem was made only 25 years later, at the Ninth Extraordinary Congress of the PZPR.

A resolution of the Ninth Congress reminds us that the party must be founded on leninist democratic centralism: "The rights and duties of party members, the totality of the norms of intraparty life, and the limits of freedom to criticize and discuss, are determined by the leninist principles of democratic centralism--an organic union, in everyday practice, of broad democratism and of necessary guarantees which assure party unity."

It was only at that congress that, for the first time in our party, the principles and limits of the leading and directing role of the party were worked out, so that there would be no more centralistic abuses. These are:

The leadership of the party should be governed by laws, and should be implemented within the framework of the constitution, with respect for the constitutional prerogatives of state organs.

The leadership of the party should be implemented through democratic methods; it should be coordinated and advised about, and not imposed. A dialogue should replace a monologue.

The party directorate and leadership should guarantee the self-governance and independence of social organizations in matters of cadre policy, and in a specific direction of their activity, thus providing a much greater opportunity for rank-and-file initiative.

The leadership of the party should be a strategic leadership, not the giving of instructions, because the party cannot concern itself with specific problems for the resolution of which there exist separate organs and offices.

The leadership of the party should be of an ideological and political nature and be a result of the system of values, and intraparty democracy should generate models for state and social elements of public life.

In intraparty life, in conformity with the PZPR Statute, democratic centralism as a defense of democratism against centralist distortions should consist in strengthening the independence and responsibility of basic party organizations, on observance of the right to democratic election of party authorities and to rank-and-file control of their activity, on the implementation both of the rights and the duties of party members and of party organizations and echelons. Equally important is also the strengthening of central party authorities with the aim of affording them the opportunity to implement the wishes of party membership by effectively directing policy. We must strive to observe the principles of party ethics and morality while maintaining, among all our comrades, relationships which are characterized by straightforwardness,

directness, and sincerity--regardless of their party functions--and by honesty and truthfulness, civic courage, and mutual trust.

The Ninth Congress, which was being prepared during the crucial months of the 1981 political struggle, could not take up other, more specific but nonetheless essential problems concerning centralism and democracy. Now the party scientific cadres should begin to concern themselves with these problems. Thus, we still do not know to what extent infringements of democratic centralism are a consequence of subjective actions which resulted from the dominance of collectives by strong political personalities, and when and under what conditions they are a necessity which results from an objective situation of class and political struggle, economic difficulties, and international tensions. Or: to what extent the weakness of basic party organizations, which we now call "attitudes of indifference and waiting" of entire organizations and collectives are conditions which favor the dominance over the party by the executive apparatus and the latter's alienation from the former. Indeed, from here there is but a small step to a recurrence of error and distortions.

The experience of past years also teaches us something that is extremely important: people act correctly when the [party] policy line is correct; when the latter is not clear, ideological inspiration in the party diminishes, and the party apparatus drifts in the direction of economic and organizational pragmatism, as well as ostentatious rituals.

Nationwide Party Secretaries' Meeting

Kielce SLOWO LUDU in Polish 23 Sep 83 p 3

[Interview by Anna Orlicka with Alfred Mysior, secretary of the PZPR Plant Committee in the Iskra Ball Bearing Plant in Kielce]

[Text] The latest periodic conference of first secretaries of party plant committees from over 200 of the largest production plants was held at the PZPR Central Committee on 19 September. At the meeting, there were discussions concerning the socioeconomic situation, and the current problems of industrial plants, employee self-government and trade unions.

[Question] In what way will it be possible to utilize, in everyday sociopolitical activity, the material of this conference, and what experiences of other plants will it be necessary to transfer to our local Kielce area? I addressed these questions to a participant of the Warsaw meeting, PZPR Plant Committee [KZ] secretary in the Iskra Ball Bearing Plant in Kielce, Alfred Mysior.

[Answer] It is true that such meetings serve, first of all, the purpose of presenting opinions and views on matters of vital concern to workers. This is also an opportunity to exchange experiences and to observe how even the most sensitive problems, be they wage-related or social problems, are solved both in plants which are similar to Iskra and in larger plants.

[Question] The tone of the discussions was not conciliatory...

[Answer] Of course it was not; at such meetings this would be a jarring note, which no one needed. Indeed, we had gathered in order to inform not only ourselves but also representatives of the highest party authorities about the situation in the plants, the morale of the workers, and the needs of these forces. Not everything looks rosy everywhere; much bitterness is caused by often faulty mechanisms of the economic reform, by lack of raw materials and other materials, and by the "bungling" of co-producers. One example of this is furnished by the situation in the Iskra plant with regard to balls for bearings. At our intervention, a special government commission made an inspection of the Central Ball Factory in Krasnik. After that inspection, there was an increase in the number of balls delivered; even so, this was insufficient to enable us to meet the production needs for this year as stipulated in the plan. The best proof is furnished by the emergency deliveries of balls from Japan that our plant will receive by the end of this year. We have no way of knowing whether it will not be necessary to organize such deliveries in the future.

For truth's sake, I should add that during the discussion we heard some complaints, such as, "We are doing such good work, and [yet] we are not given preferential treatment, e.g., in the form of tax exemptions." Such complaints were quite unnecessary. Should self-governing enterprises appear in the role of "wronged innocent girls"?

On the other hand, there was the very heartening example of the Polam plant in Gostynin. All of a sudden, 700 employees had left their jobs there. The enterprise was faced with bankruptcy. But they neither broke down nor bemoaned their fate. A number of drastic budget reallocations (including, among others, discontinuance of providing transportation to part of the work force, which produced objections from those affected) made it possible to construct 400 apartments. The conclusion arrived at was a logical one: if there are apartments, the stability of the work force will be assured. And what has happened? The number of unfinished apartments has increased, but the Polam plant in Gostynin is no longer complaining about lack of people who are willing to work there.

[Question] There is also a manpower shortage at the Iskra plant, let alone the great instability of the cadres. Employees come to work, quit work, come back to work. In this situation, it is difficult to have any changes with lasting effects. But, indeed, has action not been initiated already to increase the stability of the Iskra work force?

[Answer] These are emergency measures. Out of a total work force of 5700 persons, only 1700 are so-called direct production workers. The management, after examining this structure, has singled out 300 persons who--after all, in conformity with the regulations--can be assigned to other types of work for a period of 3 months. This is an extremely delicate operation--a human being is not an object which can be transferred at will from one place to another. In general, however, people understand the purpose of these measures. A total of 180 employees have begun performing other types of work; there are cases in which these people want to continue performing these jobs permanently.

Moreover, in so-called auxiliary services it will be possible to eliminate many positions and thus to divide among the remaining workers the money which will thus have been made available. I will give you an example-- a person quits his or her job, and the department collective ponders whether to employ another person or whether it will be possible to perform the work with a reduced number of employees and to divide part of the money among those who will be performing both their own work and that of the person who is leaving.

[Question] However, in a plant there are also jobs in which, in general, there is a lot of "time margin"; nevertheless, they cannot be eliminated.

[Answer] Yes, it is so, for example, in the issuance of tools. This job is necessary; certainly I do not have to justify the need for its existence. The total of effective work in the toolroom is approximately 3 hours [per day]. A question arises whether women who work there (because the majority of toolroom employees are women), instead of having problems with managing their time, could, for example, glue abrasive disks together, for compensation, of course. In addition, white-collar workers have agreed to put in a total of 15 work days on production lines by the end of the current year. And this action--even if it is of an emergency nature--should bring results.

[Question] Comrade Secretary, however long might be our conversation about organizational action, it boils down to the question of what benefits a worker will derive from these actions. A clear majority of the work forces, and not only at the Iskra plant, is demanding decent wages for honest work. This position, indeed a logical one, should not surprise us.

[Answer] Of course, we need clear financial motivation which would make it possible to achieve greater productivity. The above-mentioned organizational actions aim precisely at this. But it is also necessary to overcome the fear of exceeding production quotas which has been rooted in people's minds for years. Neither an old nor a young employee will exceed his production quota, because at one time somebody pounded into his brain the idea that "if you, buddy, exceed your quota, they will raise it so much that you will not be able to breathe." And even if a good, skilled worker is able to operate one or two machines additionally, he does so unwillingly. Therefore, at the Iskra plant an agreement was made between employee self-government, the trade unions, and the management, which, among other things, stipulates the freezing of production quotas, that is, a guarantee that when an employee exceeds them they will remain unchanged.

[Question] This last example mentions two partners of management: self-government and the trade unions. The relationships between them were also discussed at the Warsaw meeting. These activities do not always mesh together smoothly. Sometimes there is a grinding noise there. In such an arrangement, a considerable role is also played by the party plant organization. What is the situation with regard to the Iskra plant?

[Answer] At the conference there was a clear enunciation of the thesis that party organizations should actively support the emerging trade union movement and employee self-government. This is a very delicate matter. The self-reliance and independence of these elements is a fact, but their sensitivity

to any attempts at inspiring them is allegedly excessive. At once voices are raised claiming that we again want to direct and manipulate them. But this, indeed, is not the point. The party will support professional representation for workers; therefore, party members cannot remain on the sidelines. The situation is similar with regard to employee self-government. We do not want to direct or straighten out anyone, but we will always be spokesmen for the interests of the working class. Employee self-government at the Iskra plant understands this problem well, which is a result of our striving for the same goals. For these reasons, no such controversies have been noted in our plant.

I should like to add that the Kielce province has been mentioned as one of those provinces in which the number of union organizations is the largest. The most prominent in this regard is the M. Nowotko Iron and Steel Works in Ostrowiec; but the self-governing independent trade unions at the Iskra plant are also a very active organization. Our union members demand, first of all, honest consultation, in order not to be presented by the authorities with faits accomplis, but to be consulted earlier about their opinion. It is not only the employees of the Iskra plant who want this. This demand was being made by our whole country, and it was mentioned in the discussion.

[Interviewer] Thank you for the interview.

Unions Should Serve Workers' Interests

Rzeszow NOWINY in Polish 23 Sep 83 p 3

[Article by Zbigniew Jurkiewicz: "To Better Serve Workers' Interests"]

[Text] One extremely difficult stage of the struggle to overcome the social and economic crisis in Poland is clearly approaching its end; another stage, no less difficult and complex, is beginning, and is posing new challenges. This was, in a nutshell, the main theme of a conference of secretaries of PZPR plant committees. The theme guided the reasoning of the 2 main speakers as well as 18 participants in the discussion, including Kazimierz Barcikowski, who summed up the proceedings.

The first stage--as virtually everyone stated-- had compelled us to concentrate all our forces on the task of creating, in our social and economic life, conditions for internal peace, stabilization, and activation of the entire production apparatus in cities and in rural areas. Considering the circumstances, of which no one in Poland needs to be reminded, this task had to be politically dominated and had to be implemented during a bitter and at times truly dramatic struggle against a well-organized and consistently foreign-supported adversary of the socialist system. Nevertheless, the above conditions were, in principle, attained at the very beginning of autumn 1983, although not to an extent which would warrant easy optimism, and this fact is of crucial importance for the future.

Thus, first of all, peace has returned to Poland, together with law and order--despite the fact that indeed there has been no cessation of the opposition's

efforts aimed at destroying this gain through the use of all possible means of destruction.

Next, we have witnessed the return of normalcy in political coexistence, together with a stabilization of social relations and an increasing feeling of confidence in our own strength. These are changes which, though they are still inadequate and impermanent, and are tested at every step by painful problems involving conditions of work and personal life, indeed make it possible for us to think already about overcoming the crisis through development and to forget our fears of continuing decline.

Thus, at last, we have broken the spiral of decrease in production, of progressive decay of entire areas of production capacity, and of disintegration of work processes. Thus, we have revised the crisis direction of processes in order to follow the path of growth, activation, repairing of mechanisms which direct our economy, as well as of a systematic, though yet only barely sensed by people, increase the scope of the present cautious tasks of economic improvement. And, as proven by the results that we have attained during the 8 months of the current year, this is already a firm trend whose rate is increasing and which is rooted, essentially, in the first effects of the operation of mechanisms of economic reform.

From this assessment of the initial period of our country's recovery from the economic crisis along the path charted by PZPR Ninth Congress, rather extensively based on the results of the conference, one might perhaps derive an impression that secretaries of party plant committees, who are leading our country in this historical operation, met on 19 September in the Central Committee building in order to assess our achievements. Nothing could be more erroneous than such a view. An assessment of the changes that make up the progress of stabilization that have been made, and of those which are being made, was here merely a starting point and an assessment of all the premises for planning the future, for concentrating all the forces of the party, of its allies, and of working people in general, on the tasks of tomorrow. And this, in our situation of a still unstable balance between chances for progress and mounting dangers, is always tantamount to a need to concentrate on difficulties, an obligation to discover the errors and weaknesses of the past and an imperative need to search for effective means to cope with the urgent needs of the future.

Such, precisely, was the dominant topic of the discussion of party activists which was comprehensive, meaningful, and clear with regard to emerging new tasks.

The conference gave, first of all, an expression to the party's conviction that along with the progress of stabilization the main thrust of the efforts of the entire party and, under the party's leadership, of all the forces which are involved in the restoration of socialism and in serving the interests of the working people, in moving from the political to the economic front. In his summation, K. Barcikowski, PZPR Central Committee secretary, urged the party membership to reorient their thinking and action in a direction which would be conducive to better organization of work and to the attainment of more effective results in managing the economy. In his presentation, Manfred Gorywoda concluded his extensive argumentation with suggestions on how this

can and should be done, along with a statement that the further course in the process of normalizing the situation in our country depends and will depend to an increasingly greater extent on qualitatively better economic results. The opinions of the discussants in this respect could be reduced to the position that here we--the party, trade unions, employee and local self-government, representatives of all the working people, and all citizens who are ready to act for the benefit of our country--are entering an equally difficult and just as important as the previous one but qualitatively new, period of struggle for the development of economic resourcefulness, labor productivity, and more effective implementation of the mechanisms of the reform. On the other hand, each one of these demands seemed to have two sides: the first, a critical one, showed the extent, the danger, and the origin of weaknesses which exist in industrial plants in every area of their economic activity; the second, a conceptual one, proposed specific solutions which would make it possible to achieve goals that are expected by the working people and to remove obstacles that are blocking our progress toward these goals.

What were the tasks which the conference placed at the forefront of the economic offensive? It is not easy to answer this question, in view of the great number of largely controversial matters involved. But, indeed, it seems that there were four problems which stood out above all the remaining ones.

The first problem was what to do in order not to disappoint the high hopes which the bulk of the working people place in the continuing and consistent implementation of the economic reform. The answer to this question consisted of two parts. First, it is necessary to overcome the bureaucratic resistance, prejudices, and also the impossibility of recovery under conditions of the reform exhibited by one part of the managerial cadre, and the ill will and inclination to management by command exhibited by the other part. Moreover, this task has to be regarded as a *sine qua non* for gaining the workers' confidence in and support for the reform. Here the discussion presented appropriate illustrations together with charges that the central administration tolerates and at times facilitates the above-mentioned practices. Next--and this is already the second problem--it is necessary to understand that the essential element of the whole reform consists in closely relating the principles of compensation to results and, as a consequence, relating the profit of enterprises to productivity. So, why is this essential element lacking? Here again specific accusations were directed against ministries and institutions that bear the responsibility for maintaining, after almost 2 years of implementation of the reform, a situation in which--as was pointed out in the discussion--wages are governed by capricious elements, and the discussion of a project which was submitted by the Ministry of Labor, Wages, and Social Affairs [MPPISS] is still far from being in a stage which would be suitable for implementation.

The third problem could be defined as a serious concern about the persistence of inflation and, more precisely speaking, about actions of production and trade enterprises which cause inflation. The consensus of the secretaries was that such practices bring about increases in the cost of living which are received by workers' families with a double protest--first,

as a financial burden, and, second, as a manifestation of drastic social injustice in dividing the cost of coming out of the crisis. In this context, critical assertions were made that the error of causing delays in acquainting the public both with the very project of new prices for food articles, and with the economic need for adjusting these prices to the cost of agricultural production, must be corrected. And all this was discussed in general relation with criticism of the central administration for the latter's tolerance of price paradoxes with regard to consumer goods.

Finally, the fourth dominant theme, both of the presentations and of the discussion, was that of problems of trade unions and, more precisely speaking, the place which they have already occupied in our life, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, obstacles which still prevent their full-fledged participation in the making of all the most essential decisions concerning industrial plants, economic sectors, and our country. This was probably the most thoroughly examined of all the discussion topics, having been introduced in a special report by Stanislaw Gabrielski; therefore, to do it justice would require a separate presentation. In our brief summary, it is only necessary to mention that the conference expressed the party's position on this issue in an assertion which was formulated by K. Barcikowski, namely, that the all-important task of party organizations is to realize the extent of problems and matters which should be of common concern to both the party and the trade union movement, since these two have a common duty to serve and to be governed by the interests of the working people.

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CSO: 2600/60

PZPR OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED ON CADRE POLICY

AU281930 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 25 Oct 83 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Tadeusz Dziekan, head of the PZPR Central Committee Cadres Department by Anna Pawlowska: "The Most Banal Truth: People Determine Everything"--date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Pawlowska] In a special resolution, the 13th Central Committee plenum has adopted the main principles of PZPR cadre policy on which consultations had earlier been held with various party circles and which had been preliminarily approved by the 10th plenum. So yet another ninth congress decision has become reality, and this is a decision concerning matters that perhaps cause the greatest amount of feelings and social criticism--both justified and unjustified. And yet I cannot refrain from asking: Will these principles be able to put a halt to the old truth, painfully confirmed in reality, that authority corrupts people?

[Dziekan] The principles themselves will not be able to do so. They are merely written instructions for implementing the kind of cadre policy that will effectively reduce the danger of corruption. But it is practice--in other words, people--that will be the determining factor here, as everywhere else.

[Pawlowska] But cadre practice is subject to more distortions than practically any other area.

[Dziekan] True. I would even say it is very subject to them. When are we more subjective than when assessing people? What kind of matters encourage more ability and more ambition? That is why there has been such a keenly felt social need for a clear and unambiguous system for selecting and evaluating cadres. Here I wish to state immediately that I do not think such a system can be merely a set of guidelines. Excessive stiffness is as dangerous as total flexibility. One cannot conduct a real cadre policy when one is tuned to searching for people who are ideal.

In any case, different positions require different qualities and characteristics. Even in the profession of enterprise manager, which seems a unified group at first glance, the qualities required, for example, in a head of a factory with

traditional production methods are different from the ones required for the head of a factory with brand new methods. The same applies to the head of a permanent work force and the head of a seasonal work force.

[Pawlowska] So how has it been at all possible to establish criteria for cadres which, of course, is what the "Main Principles" have done?

[Dziekan] We have merely tried to establish the qualities and characteristics that are required both by a minister and by the head of a rural parish, though of course not to the same degree. These comprise ideopolitical values resulting from our state's socialist nature as well as professional qualifications and the ability to put these qualifications into practice, without which it is difficult to imagine giving anyone a leadership post; organizational ability essential to control the work of others; and a very important ability to shape honorable and just relations with people inside a team. I need not add that one of the above criteria is, of course, general honesty and a feeling of responsibility toward the people under one's authority, for social property and for the tasks to be performed.

[Pawlowska] The question of recommendations, and above all the withdrawal of recommendations, causes a great deal of misunderstanding.

[Dziekan] Yes, even though the issue is extremely simple. A recommendation [for someone to occupy a leadership post] can be withdrawn by the person who has made it. In other words, a party cell or its elected executive body has the right to ask another cell to withdraw a recommendation, provided of course the arguments in favor of this are serious and justified. However, a party member who has lost his party recommendation has the duty, I repeat duty, to step down from his office. This is a feature of democratic centralism which is in force in the party without exception.

[Pawlowska] And what, Comrade Director, do you think of such mechanism as job rotation, competition for posts, and so on?

[Dziekan] Competitions are becoming widespread, which is advantageous both for the social climate and for the quality of cadres. These competitions objectively prove that the "best people" very often "belong to us." So far, party members have won 90 percent of the competitions for a post. I said that this is objective proof. But now I wish to correct this. I believe that not enough nonparty specialists are taking part in competitions. They still cannot believe competitions are really happening.... This state of affairs will change; it must do so. Publicizing our "main principles," which also constitute a party declaration on cadre affairs, should help change the above state of affairs in some way.

Job rotation is also a good and necessary mechanism. But we still do not know how to use it. Rotation, as the name itself implies, is the natural reallocation of cadres which prevents stiff routine and which also makes promotion possible. It is not a way of expelling and destroying cadres. Maybe we have even been rotating cadres too much. We have made 2,420 changes in leadership posts, of which 440 involved the following posts: deputy premiers, ministers,

voivodas, vice ministers, deputy voivodas, and editors-in-chief; 200 involved mayors and chief executives of cities and 650 involved heads of larger plants. In the party, however, 250 changes have occurred in the Central Committee apparatus and 6,840 changes among employees in the field.

[Pawlowska] Do envy on the one side and damaged ambition on the other effect cadre policy?

[Dziekan] Oh yes. These are unfortunately bitter elements of this policy. As a nation, we are experiencing an acute lack of ability to make self-assessments of ourselves, whether as an individual or as a group. This is one thing that can be taught and is worth teaching. It should be taught not so that it is easier to manage cadres, but above all so that it is easier to live one's life without destroying oneself with empty ambition and without destroying others with unjustifiable envy.

[Pawlowska] The cadre reserve is a concept that is regarded as a very loose one.

[Dziekan] On the contrary. It is a very efficient key to cadre policy. And it is also one of the guarantees for this policy's honesty.

The cadre reserve is also the fulfillment of the requirement to extend the base from which cadres are elected. The reserve should contain nonparty people, since these people's growing participation in the exercising of authority shows and tests the genuine nature of socialist renewal; it should contain workers, since our cadre policy is a class policy; and it should contain young people, since the natural growth of new generations requires this.

[Pawlowska] Unfortunately, we will not have time to deal more closely with that part of the 13th plenum resolution on cadre policy which refers to party employees, including the very important "PZPR Employees Code."

[Dziekan] This would entail another interview as long as this one. I can only say that all the principles about which we have been speaking also apply to cadre policy inside the party, only maybe to a greater extent. In the "Code," we are setting very high moral, ideological, political, and service requirements. We have been aiming to create the kind of model party employee with whom everyone of us should compare his conduct and whose standards everyone should aim for. Full-time employment in the party is a special service and has its specific quality. We want to extract this quality more and more clearly. I have already said how much the personnel structure of the party apparatus has changed. The changes exceed the number of posts in the party. There are very many young people working in the party--34 percent of the political employees are below 35, including 3 voivodship committee first secretaries and 28 secretaries.

[Pawlowska] There are people who are shocked by this.

[Dziekan] There are indeed. But these young people have not come to party work from some comfortable haven. They have come from battle. They have come from the most difficult battle--battle among people, in factories, and in rural areas. They have come equipped with recommendations from their organizations, of which they are, of course, still members. If I were to single out the most important transformation which the entire party apparatus has undergone, I would say this: Today, no party employee at any post, whether elective or nonelective, may cease to be a party member, equal to all the members of his primary party organization. I repeat that this is the only effective defense I see against the corrupting influence of authority.

CSO: 2600/167

RAKOWSKI SPEAKS ON CREATIVE COMMUNITIES' CONFLICTS

AU271628 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 22 Oct 83 p 3

["Authorized text" of speech by Mieczyslaw Rakowski to introduce discussion at his meeting with Krakow cultural community in the Culture Center in Nowa Huta on 8 October: "Temporary and Permanent Conflicts"]

[Excerpts] The party leadership's views on the role and tasks of creative people and cultural activists have been presented on several occasions in the past 2 years not only to the persons concerned, but also to the public. The most recent presentation was made by the premier during the 25 September session of the Council of Ministers, which was wholly dedicated to culture. In his speech summing up that session the premier spoke of democratism in culture and art and said: "We invariably profess the principle that the personality of creative people and artists must be respected and that they must be free to express their ideas, thoughts, and experiences in their own way." He also said: "The only line that must not be overstepped in our cultural policy is the state's overriding interest, which we view without nervousness, with due seriousness, and, which should be noted, with all the necessary consistency."

The formula "the state's overriding interest" has been interpreted in many different ways and has therefore produced many conflicts between representatives of the power apparatus and many creative people. That which--for example--I regard as harmful to the state's interests in general or at a given moment, may be regarded by a creative person as a manifestation of my desire to be on the safe side, of my excessive caution, of my attempt to curb creative freedom, and so on. A representative of the power apparatus may be right and so may be a creative person, but the question is: How should the conflicts that cannot be avoided be solved? It seems that the only effective method both sides should use is to engage in honest dialogue to exchange views and arguments, to be ready to openly present one's reasons, and to assume that no stone should be left unturned in searching for compromises. This is possible if both sides are ready to engage in such dialogue. As for the party and state leadership, it has proclaimed on several occasions that it is ready to conduct a dialogue with creative communities. What is more, we are conducting such a dialogue, despite various difficulties. Having said this, I should be prepared to hear the following commentary: "Let us assume that we should not doubt your intentions, but the thing is that the power apparatus

consists not only of the party and state leadership, but also of functionaries and officials of various levels, with whom we have to deal and not infrequently to accept from them their commands. We are able to cite examples to show that the power apparatus is not interested in our views, that it makes decisions for us, and so on." How can one respond to such a commentary? Well, if people feel that way then those who formulate the principles of the socialist state's cultural policy must respect these feelings most earnestly. It would be a disastrous political and human error to regard in advance these feelings as imaginary or as manifestations of opposition. I do not exclude the possibility that such wrong responses do exist in our practice.

But, speaking about the complications that continue to arise in these difficult times with regard to the correct approach to dialogue, is it possible to confine ourselves only to the shortcomings demonstrated by the power apparatus? I do not think it is. It is also necessary to have a look at the other side of the coin--at the creative communities. It is necessary to pose the question of what extent are they ready to participate in dialogue. In order to avoid possible misunderstandings it should be explained that the use of the term "community" here is an intended simplification because no creative community has ever been united in its views and evaluations of events. Since everyone knows about the conflicts and tensions that have arisen in the past 2 years between the PZPR and the government, on the one hand, and the creative communities, on the other, it has been assumed that such conflicts and tensions apply to all creative people and artists. This is a false assumption, which is inconsistent with reality. He who adopts it enters yet another world of myths. Let me add that this myth is being promoted by the subversive anti-Polish radio centers and by most Western media. This assumption is also being promoted by the residue of the Solidarity underground and its activists. This is natural because all these centers would have found themselves in lost positions the moment they declared that reality is something quite different. That is why they find it convenient to single out the so-called collaborators from the creative communities and to describe all others as irreconcilables. However, reality is different from what Radio Free Europe propagandists and ferocious oppositionists try to make of it. Reality is varied, varicolored, and much more complicated than the champions of the rigid treatment of reality seem to believe.

Let us return to the question whether creative communities are ready to participate in such dialogue. This readiness of some sections of these communities is insufficient or does not exist at all. In such communities there is no lack of influential individuals who often occupy important professional positions--theater directors, professors of artistic schools, and so on, for example--who accept the suggestions or recommendations from the state authorities with more or less discipline, but refuse to be drawn into discussions and make knowing winks to their coworkers to say: "You know, I have to cooperate with them."

To answer the question why it is that some sections of the creative communities are unwilling to participate in not so much dialogue, as in modeling cultural life together with the state protector, requires recalling certain facts from the recent past. After August 1980 creative and intellectual communities began

to develop views and attitudes which in the end produced rather profound contradictions between the leaders elected by these communities at that time and the leadership of the PZPR and the state. We should bear in mind that these contradictions arose from the soil of politics and not from some great differences in the evaluation of creative attitudes, works, and so on. The creative communities showed an obvious tendency to slight the real dangers to the Polish state, which began to increase at avalanche speed in 1981, and to cultivate a boundless admiration for Solidarity, especially for its leaders and advisors. The most vulgar evaluations of the motives of the authorities' conduct began to spread. In a word, a profound dissonance was created between those who professed such tendencies and those who ran the state and were responsible for its existence and for the survival of the Polish state.

The introduction of martial law dramatized these contradictions and opened a stage during which the most "irreconcilable" ones switched over to even more ferocious open or secret opposition. In times some creative people and artists who had succumbed to attitudes of irreconcilableness recognized that opposition is a sterile attitude. Others based their faith in the correctness of their behavior on the West's encouragement that they should keep up their resistance. Still others saw the Church as the bulwark of their withdrawal [emigracja wewnetrzna]. There are some who have taken the positions of neutrality, ridicule, and even cynicism. It is probably possible to assert that these sections of creative communities are in the grip of serious frustrations, no matter how obviously they continue to demonstrate their "irreconcilableness."

As for the division into pro and con, it does not assert itself with equal intensity in all communities and in all main centers of creative work and vigorous artistic activity. Those concerned are perfectly aware of this. Today the attitudes of opposition are determined in many cases by other reasons than those in vogue among many or some creative workers in 1981 or 1982, reasons which could be described as the basically wrong conception of the interests of Poland and Poles. Today the attitude of opposition is not infrequently determined by the irrational unwillingness to recognize reality in the same way as one cuts off one's nose to spite one's face; by devotion to some vague historical mission; by resentments; by heat; and by petty ambitions, all of which is shored up by the conviction that if one persists in one's opposition the power apparatus will have to make concessions. Asked what these concessions should mean, people most often indulge in generalities--that this should be so, that that should not be so, and so on, and so forth.

Another reason for the attitude of opposition regards the news beamed by Radio Free Europe as the main and authoritative source of knowledge about Poland. He who regards Radio Free Europe in this way does not take into account the fact that this subversive radio station, which stimulates hatred to socialism, continues to generally implement a non-Polish political program and supplies its listeners the materials that originate with the so-called underground press, that consist more and more of old writings taken out of various drawers, that are circulated in Poland in some scores of copies, and that are compiled, edited, and published by a single person owning a typewriter.

Still another reason for the attitude of opposition is one's personal shame that one has "launched" oneself in the wrong direction.

The social results of not only the existence of the division into support and opposition, but also of the maintenance of this division, which is often done consciously, are not favorable either to national culture or to the creative communities. The division weakens the mobility of creative communities and curtails their opportunities for developing the state's cultural policy and for modeling the structures of our culture and art. In the Poland of economic reform and of the deep changes in the ways of running the state and of influencing social development there exists a unique opportunity for devising the model of our cultural life that will meet the needs of culture and of creative people, whose participation in devising such a model is indispensable. That is why cultivating the division into pro and con should be abandoned, which does not mean, of course, that differences should be abandoned and that discussions should be dropped. Discussions are a necessity. If this does not take place it is obvious that the model of culture in the socialist state will to a great extent be developed by administration and by only those artistic people who are pro. The creative people occupying the opposition platform must themselves answer the question whether this platform is not advantageous for them and national culture. However, abandoning this platform requires one to drop that petty approach to reality and to see problems and affairs in terms of the years ahead.

Being still affected by the contradictions produced by August 1980, I would like to avoid being suspected of focusing my attention primarily on creative communities and citing their weaknesses, while mostly omitting to list the duties of the power apparatus, which has declared its readiness to conduct dialogue. At that 25 September session of the Council of Ministers Professor Hieronim Kubiak, PZPR Politburo member and chairman of the Central Committee Cultural Commission, said this about the issue: (I quote from a tape recording): [Kubiak's obviously garbled statement is translated as published]

"I think that in this connection we are faced with an enormously important predicament--the predicament of creative communities and the questions of the creative communities on the subject of what this 'no' is against. We must call this very clearly both in these communities and in all other communities. Without any prejudices, without any simplifications. I think that the index of this 'no' will enable us to easily conclude that it is also in part a 'no' against constitutional principles, and there is no need to hide this, because this is so, because such is the dramatism of Polish, present, but not only the present, because in the case of the countries born to revolution this is not only a predicament of our time or of this present time. We will not find a common language with those 'no's'; that is why there remains only the culture of mutual coexistence within a single state, but there is no reason to obscure the fact this is a difference of positions on constitutional questions. If we name this, then it seems that we will be able to determine how extensive is that 'no' and we will then be able to distinguish the 'no' on constitutional matters from the 'no' on the principles of policy implementation, the 'no' on individual people, the 'no' on individual situations, and the 'no' on the individual types of arguments. This is exceptionally important because I

assert that for the most part this is not a 'no' on constitutional principles, this is not a 'no' on the constitutional conditions for the stability and development of our people and state. If so, then we have to listen most carefully to all those 'no's' and to speak about them most honestly everywhere, not confusing these two planes of 'no.' I think that as a party we have every right to speak in exactly this way because we said it not under the pressure from our political adversary, not for tactical reason, not now, but on our own accord, at the Ninth Party Congress. 'No' for certain formulas of implementing socialism in Poland, and if so then at this moment, vis-a-vis, the creative communities, we must formulate once again, and once again, and once again an invitation to dialogue, to precisely such dialogue in which everything could be said honestly and in such a case, I think, we have this or that talk behind us, no matter how difficult it is, we are able to find that platform, that critical path along which most problems can be solved in the wisest way."

I think that this is a reasoning to which we should subscribe.

To clarify misunderstandings rather than the landscape of the battle, I think I should devote some attention to another contradiction, which is a permanent and age-old contradiction: the one between the world of politicians, rulers, and power apparatuses, on the one hand, and the world of creative people, on the other.

The former world is inspired in its conduct more or less by a realistic evaluation of the needs determined by the specific economic, social, and political situation of the country and abroad. The world of creative people is also inspired by a sense of responsibility, but it places its responsibility mainly in the area of morality, which is natural. The world outlook of an individual creative person determines what is and is not moral.

It is impossible to eliminate this age-old contradiction, nor should we seek to do so. What we can do is to tone down this contradiction and to jointly search for the theoretical and practical solutions that would make it possible to reconcile the requirements of policy with those of culture and art.

I am for a permanent dialogue, in which a majority and not a minority of communities should participate. I am deeply convinced that it is impossible to base the efforts to recover the trust and support for the credibility of party and government policy on the support of the minority. Constant dialogue with creative people and artists is the foundation of our cultural policy, whose principles are unambiguously stated by the Ninth Party Congress.

CSO: 2600/188

SWIRGON SPEAKS ON POLITICAL ROLE OF YOUTH MOVEMENT

PM261450 Opole TRYBUNA OPOLSKA in Polish 3 Oct 83 p 3

[Unattributed report on speech by PZPR Central Committee Secretary Waldemar Swirgon, delivered at 29 September Opole conference of party youth aktiv from Opole Voivodship: "Let Us Not Wait for Others--Let Us Begin Under Our Own Steam"]

[Excerpt] The time is long gone when the only methods of influencing people were words and propaganda campaigns. These days it is through fact and example that anyone can be persuaded about anything. And facts and examples can only be created by people--not those celebrated as press and television personalities, but those whom we encounter at workplaces, schools and in our own neighborhood. "On you and only we," the guest speaker said, "can persuade people to accept our party program, the program of the Ninth Central Committee Plenum--no one else can do it for us." [sentence as printed]

"This truth," W. Swirgon continued, "was adopted by our youth aktiv group representing the four socialist youth associations when we decided to call the PZPR youth aktiv conference--the first to be held in People's Poland's new history and the history of our party, in the 'Olivia' Hall, Gdansk. We did not do it," the speaker stressed, "for the sake of having yet another conference (I do not suppose this present conference has been called with this aim either). We organized it to make it clear to everybody--including ourselves--that during the time when Poland was suffering from a kind of social and political seizure, when we were absent from the European economic scene and did not keep up with the world in its technological progress, no one--neither our enemies nor our friends and allies--waited for us idly; they moved forward instead. Neither our immediate neighbors nor Europe in general wish to hang about waiting until we finally work through our quarrels and disputes, our mutual grudges and grievances to arrive at some accord and mutual understanding. Especially as our own history justifies the belief that it will be a long time before that happens. It is almost a natural condition of our national character and our political practice that they are characterized by dispute, struggle, and argument; the main concern, therefore, is to find a method of preventing our social and economic degradation and a lowering of our living standard despite our disputes and the general national debate, and of restoring to Poland its proper place and role in today's modern world.

"Young people," the Central Committee secretary stressed, "can play a major part in this process. Neither the party nor the youth movement has yet had any breakthrough potential as regards the chances of influencing the program or the decisions worked out by our political and state leadership. This was due partly to the wrong practice adopted at the time and subsequently renounced by the ninth congress and to the whole line in socialist renewal. And this is why--if they want to be able to exert the desired influence on their members and peers--the PZPR youth aktiv, as well as the youth aktivs of the four socialist youth associations, must be able to influence its own party, the shape of its program, and its leadership."

Speaking about the age structure of the young party members as a group, W. Swirgon said that there are 700,000 comrades under 35 and upward of 260,000 under 29. "If we are to measure a young communist's worth by the fact that he is able to realize his program and his ideology," the Central Committee secretary stressed, "while at the same time being able to secure support for that program and that ideology from people around him, in his workplace and neighborhood, who do not belong to the party, then if each of those 900,000 young PZPR members could win the support of 10 persons among his acquaintances, friends and workmates--without necessarily getting them to join the party or the youth movement--and then, together with them, do something useful that Poland and its young people particularly need, this would build up a force to be reckoned with not only in Poland. A force which could provide justification for our confidence in the future. Unfortunately, this is not how the situation stands today," W. Swirgon continued, "and when we talk about the need to restore close ties between the party and the masses, our first task and the main prerequisite of the moment is first of all to restore the ties between the party's leading aktiv and apparatus and the aktiv and apparatus of our youth movement."

Referring to those voices in the debate which referred to the current situation in Polish youth movement, the speaker stated that the new concepts adopted by that movement and involving the question of autonomy for our youth associations, with the latter all being equal within the law, independent of one another, and cooperating with the party and with the state authorities, are not of a temporary nature, nor are they purely technical maneuvers. Moreover, the main problem to do with youth movement today cannot be solved merely by seeking a correct model, and the persistently recurring cases of rivalry or mutual prejudice do not affect the main base of rank and file members. "It is only a certain proportion (and not too large at that) of the frustrated leading aktiv, employed and paid for full-time work in the top apparatus or belonging to the leading bodies of our youth movement," the Central Committee secretary emphasized, "who contend among themselves over their aspirations and their interests, to the detriment of the ordinary members of their organizations and without their consent. If this state of affairs were to continue at any length, then the party--which declared at both its ninth congress and its ninth plenum its readiness to accept criticism and which still remain open to it--would avail itself of its right to criticize phenomena, people, and occurrences that could harm the party itself and our youth movement." Secretary Swirgon stressed also that the union of Socialist Polish Youth [ZSMP] occupies first place among our youth organizations, which all have the same equal status, only because its groups together, or should

group together, young workers, young representatives of the working class. And this is another reason why the ZSMP should be responsible--to its own members and to the party--for making those young workers happy in its ranks, eager to continue with it, and able to realize their interests and their aims in life together with it.

"Today," the Central Committee secretary continued, "statistical indicators describing the youth movement are the least important of all the important indicators when it comes to our work with the young people. Any evaluation is determined first and foremost by the ability of the activists in the ranks of the ZSMP, the Polish Scout Union, the Rural Youth Union, and the Association of Polish Students to accomplish things that other young people consider essential. A stance which consists in waiting for more people to arrive on the scene and accomplish something better will always end in defeat. Let us not wait for others--let us begin under our own steam," W. Swirgon appealed to his listeners. "If we do not adopt this attitude and do not give account of the results of our work, we will be unable to move forward."

In the next part of his speech the speaker pointed out that it is a most deplorable and pitiful state of affairs when we have to regret lost opportunities. Today the aktiv of our youth organizations is presented with several opportunities that are not yet lost and that call for the application of some common sense before the damage is done. One such occasion is the coming party report-back and election campaign. Socialist youth organizations must find a place for their own representatives in this campaign, chosen on the strength of their work results and general personal qualities. That place will not be secured automatically within the election system: there will be no such mechanism in operation, as W. Swirgon emphasized. Another such occasion will be next year's campaign for the Sejm and people's council elections. "If our youth movement fails to take advantage of these opportunities," the Central Committee secretary said, "then for many years to come, we will have to answer to our successors for what happens."

Further, W. Swirgon commented on the work currently being done on the proposed youth affairs act. He said that the tenets of that act had taken long to prepare, the idea being to avoid making two fundamental mistakes. The first mistake would be to pass an act which was meaningless. There is already one such act, and it is one that is both justified and necessary from the legislative viewpoint. Everybody exclaimed at the time that it was politically important. This is the quality act: the trouble is that it remains a lifeless register of regulations, because the essential social conditions necessary for its implementation have been and remain absent. Second, the act must not be one that favors young people at the expense of the remainder of society. And there is considerable opposition to the passing of this act, the Central Committee secretary stressed, among the adult section of society. It is, moreover, by no means equitable to grant privileges to 35-year-olds some of whom will often have worked for some 15 years already, and deny them to those who have worked for more than 20 years and who started in far worse circumstances, or to give the former privileges which give them particular advantage over old-age and invalidity pensioners. Why should it be considered fair? Is that particular

group of people which is the youngest, the strongest, the best educated and the most numerous justified in any way in demanding special privileges? "We are, therefore, seeking to work out legislative provisions," W. Swirgon said at the conclusion of his speech, "which will offer the possibility of combining both aims, that is, creating a good legislative act that can meet all the requirements laid down at the ninth plenum and avoids infringing on the interests of any group within our entire society."

CSO: 2600/168

TOP OFFICIALS DISCUSS CULTURAL AFFAIRS

Minister of Culture on Culture Funds

Warsaw PERSPEKTYWY in Polish No 39, 30 Sep 83 p 24

[Interview with Prof Dr Kazimierz Zygulski, minister of culture and arts, by Irena Zmigrodzka: "The Most Difficult Thing Is to Change Mental Stereotypes"]

[Text] [Question] Mr. Minister, it is exactly a year since you took on the portfolio of the minister of culture and arts. After this trial period, how do you feel--please excuse this perhaps too personal question--as a scientist, a theoretician of culture, acting as a high state official who is largely responsible for the fate of Polish culture at a time that surely is not easy for it? After all, your former activities were completely different from your present ones.

[Answer] On accepting the office of the minister of culture in October of last year, that is, while the martial law was still under way, I realized the scale and diversity of the problems that will loom for a long time so far as culture in our country is concerned. It seem to me that my longtime scientific work, and especially sociological field studies relating to culture, were and remain helpful to the proper assessment of the situation and proper decision-making.

I don't believe either that there is any contradiction between the attitude of an empirical researcher in the social sciences and the tasks of an administrator and politician in the same field of culture. Otherwise, one would have to agree that engaging in the social sciences is of a Platonic, purely academic nature, divorced from the realities of everyday life. Such a thesis not only is indefensible, especially in a socialist country, but also conflicts with the worldwide practice in, above all, the developed societies.

[Question] Mr. Minister, how do you assess the current situation of culture? For many months a segment of the public has been greatly interested in and even concerned about problems of creativity, which represents the principal motive power of national culture and, as such, requires special care.

[Answer] The domestic situation has changed greatly in a year. We have left behind us the martial law era. We are carrying out deep economic, legal and

structural reforms. The process of the renewal of social life continues. It should be fully emphasized that it is precisely a /process/ [printed in boldface], and that it still will continue for a long time and hence requires patience and calm.

In the domain of culture this process, on the one hand, is linked to the general and especially the economic situation, but on the other displays special features of its own. As known, the sphere of culture--or at least many of its important elements beginning with creativity--is a particularly sensitive one. The effects of social crises, anxieties, frustrations and tensions in that sphere are sometimes more acute, particularly in the moral respect, and more lasting than in other domains. What is more, while in economics, for example, we quite rapidly forget the surmounted problems once we rebuild the rhythm of economic life, production and the market, in the domain of creativity it is precisely a crisis, a difficult period, that operates as a stimulus, attracts attention for a long time and even becomes in a sense perpetuated. This is a well-known cultural phenomenon and should not be wondered at. It concerns not just our society but any society that experiences shocks and anxieties.

Of course--as you said--creativity needs to be surrounded with special care and solicitude, which we will try to provide insofar as possible. I also believe that all creators and their works should be given a chance to develop, regardless of the location in our country in which these works are created. It is also indispensable to promote the creativity of young talented artists as well as of those who have not had so far, for various reasons, a chance to demonstrate their abilities. We are trying to provide the proper conditions for this.

[Question] We are currently carrying out economic reforms. In your opinion, what is their influence on the cultural situation?

[Answer] A major task facing the ministry of culture at present is adapting the entire sphere of culture to the mechanisms of the economic reform. But achieving this task also takes time, because these mechanisms are revealing themselves only gradually and their permanent influence on cultural life cannot yet be evaluated.

The introduction of the new principles of enterprise autonomy, which also affects enterprises producing for culture, such as typographical and musical establishments, cinematography and phonography, has posed to us with such topical questions as the problem of economically justified prices, market subsidies, the related obligations of the state, the protection of culture against excessive commercialization.

But the most difficult problem, which is a reflection of the reform besides, is changing the mental stereotypes perpetuated over dozens of years in our society as well as the associated judgments and expectations. This problem exists in a particularly acute form at cultural institutions such as theatre. Well, an economist's point of view differs more than ever these days

from the view and convictions of a cultural activist. I am convinced, however, that all the problems I mentioned, among many others, will be solved. But--I repeat yet again--this requires time, deliberation and discussion as well as the cooperation of the concerned institutions. It requires legislative solutions as well, but these cannot be expected soon now considering the current work burden on the Parliament.

[Question] But the Parliament has recently voted several decrees of importance to culture. Mr. Minister, how do you evaluate their significance?

[Answer] Of course, we succeeded in getting the Parliament to make several important decisions in its decrees. Here I refer primarily to the establishment of the Cultural Development Fund.

[Question] It would be interesting to know the proportion in which the funds thus allocated stand to the needs of culture.

[Answer] Contrary to general expectations, these funds do not and cannot meet the whole of the needs of culture. But the Cultural Development Fund has become an important instrument of cultural policy, serving to accomplish basic tasks in the domain of culture. By disposing of this Fund (which is divided into two parts: central and local, with the latter placed at the disposal of local authorities), we are able to meet the basic cultural needs of the society. We use it to finance the protection of our cultural heritage and the promotion and spread of creativity.

As regards recently undertaken activities, the National Cultural Council has started operating at the beginning of this year and is systematically expanding its activities. This Council has been legislatively endowed with broad opinion-shaping powers and entrusted with specific tasks. Its duties also concern such a socially sensitive mechanism as the disposal of public funds. An unusually important task--in my opinion--which may benefit cultural development, is the requirement that the Council publish an annual report on the state of culture. Thus, contrary to the pessimistic expectations of certain circles which claim that the Council is yet another organization of the decorative facade kind, it is worth noting that it represents in our cultural life an institution with a growing authority as an opinion-shaping and consultative body vis a vis the government.

And the recently voted parliamentary decree on local self-government is a major step forward in the direction of broadening the rights of local authorities, including their rights in the sphere of culture. Legal foundations have thus been provided for the division of tasks and responsibility in implementing socially important cultural tasks. But this requires, as in the solution of other problems, a change in habits of both thought and practical action. Yet, the belief that the central administration is responsible for all decisions relating to culture still persists and is also reflected in the press articles, even though the new legal provisions clearly define, as e.g. in the adopted decree on the office of the minister of culture and arts, the

nature and scope of his responsibilities and that of the responsibilities of the local organs of state authority.

Generally speaking, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the reform, the state's patronage over the arts, as exercised by the central administration, is only partial. In most cases this patronage is exercised by local councils and territorial self-governments.

[Question] Mr. Minister, do you perceive a chance for the rebirth of a really authentic and really self-governing cultural social movement?

[Answer] Of course. We observe a growing number of initiatives in that field. Among other things, the activization of cultural associations, which have such great traditions in Poland, is being considered. The administrative authorities should promote their development without in any case directing or supplanting their activities.

[Question] The cardinal problem of the role of the socialist enterprise in propagating culture is still a greatly discussed topic. How should the socialist enterprise promote under present conditions cultural activities in behalf of their workforces?

[Answer] I personally am convinced that the socialist enterprise may not be relieved of obligations of this kind. But only the future will show to what extent will the worker councils, and especially the nascent trade unions, are willing to undertake this kind of tasks which has for generations been an important domain of their activity and often the pride of the Polish trade-union movement.

[Question] Thank you, Mr. Minister, for the interview, from which I can conclude that, on viewing cultural matters from a year's vantage point, we perceive many positive changes in that field.

[Answer] And equally many problems to be resolved and settled.

Vice-Minister on Cultural Exchange

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish No 224, 21 Sep 83 p 3

[Interview with Wacław Janas, vice minister of culture and arts, by Janusz Cegiella: "The Permanent Presence of Polish Culture"]

[Text] /Cultural exchange is a major problem of cultural policy and one which attracts the special attention of society. In a situation in which the process of the restructuring of the unions of creative artists still continues, the state's arts patronage projects become even more significant. The nature and aspects of these activities at their present stage are described in the interview, published below, granted to a reporter of RZECZPOSPOLITA by Wacław Janas, vice minister of culture and arts./ [printed in boldface]

[Question] Following a tumultuous period of socio-political changes in our country the traditional model of cultural exchange has become somewhat destabilized. For example, our traditional good cultural relations with the socialist countries have weakened.

[Answer] I'm deeply convinced that our socialist partners have never doubted the expediency of cultural exchange with Poland, because it is needed by all parties. It is merely that the intensity of these contacts has temporarily diminished owing to restlessness among our creative artistic communities. But not only that: I wish to draw attention to a novel aspect of these relations, namely, the money-saving tendencies among us and our partners. This concerns chiefly the exchange of large artistic ensembles. This is a hugely attractive form of cultural exchange but also a highly expensive one. But that is a purely economic problem. It does not mean, though, that we are abandoning the exchange of theatrical and opera ensembles or symphonic orchestras. Recently we hosted such eminent ensembles as the Moyseyev ensemble from the USSR, an orchestra from Sofia, and the Hungarian theatre of Győr. Soon we will play host to the famed Rustaveli Theatre from Tbilisi and the Symphonic Radio Orchestra from the GDR. On our part we also present to our partners important ensembles such as the Polish Chamber Orchestra of Jerzy Maksymiuk in the USSR; the great Polish Radio and Television (PRiTV) Symphonic Orchestra in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, the Mazowsze Dance Ensemble in Bulgaria, the Wrocław Pantomime in Hungary, and so on.

An overall assessment of our cooperation with the USSR and the socialist countries indicates that, owing to the fruitful visits by Premier Gen W. Jaruzelski and Minister Prof K. Zygulski, relations with our partners have already entered upon a new road of development and the prospects for the future are good. But this is also a matter of time, because, e.g. books are not translated overnight and the organization of exchange in other fields also requires some lead time.

[Question] The question of cultural cooperation with the USSR is a problem that should be considered separately. Over many years we have become accustomed to the highest artistic level of that exchange, and the letters "USSR" under the name on the poster mean so to speak a guarantee of quality to everyone, even to the average consumer of culture in Poland.

[Answer] So we, too, are trying not to bypass this high hurdle. Recently, e.g. Krzysztof Penderecki performed at composer concerts in the Soviet Union. We desire to maintain an equally high level in other domains of culture.

[Question] Exchange of artists with the other socialist countries reveals, and not just since 1981 but since much earlier at that, a phenomenon which may result from the progressing commercialization of culture. The most eminent artists (I mean here especially musicians), who are accustomed to perform in the West where they get paid in hard currencies, somehow show no enthusiasm for performing in Poland. We in Poland are likely much more often to view performances by second-rank artists from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and the GDR.

[Answer] All have long abandoned the directive-type system in cultural exchange. The modest state of our foreign-exchange funds has also been a factor here. Even so, recently we have after all hosted outstanding artists. The world-famed Soviet pianist Svetoslav Rikhter has performed in Poland thrice this year. This year, too, we in Poland witnessed performances by his compatriot the renowned violinist Oleg Kogan as well as by Burghardt Glaetzner, the excellent oboist from the GDR, the pianist Marta Dejanova from Bulgaria and the famous ballet of Ivan Marco from Hungary. Our public has also greatly lauded the performances by Karel Gott of Czechoslovakia. The year 1983 is already somewhat richer, and 1984 will be still better.

[Question] In recent years some minor Western impresarios have been active in Poland, exploiting the mostly rather limited earnings of Polish ensembles and engaging them for tours abroad on extremely modest terms. If this goes on, after some time we will be represented in the West not by those who should represent us but by those who cost less.

[Answer] We are not being menaced by this, but the matter is more complicated than might seem at first glance. Of a certainty it is of concern to us that performances by Polish artists be sponsored by renowned and trustworthy impresarios, and that Polish artists be housed in good hotels and receive good meals.

On the other hand, these are commercial contracts concerning smaller Polish ensembles which figure rarely if ever in official intergovernmental agreements. Thus, this affords them--most often orchestras--a chance to perform abroad and--let us admit it--earn some modest foreign-exchange funds. In addition, these impresarios locate performances by these Polish ensembles in smaller centers within their own countries.

This is not such a menacing problem, and seen from the artistic point of view these occasions for competing with foreign ensembles may even prove advantageous and stimulating to Polish ensembles. Generally speaking, Polish culture is known abroad chiefly owing to our most eminent ensembles and artists. And the demand for them is huge.

[Question]...Since you've mentioned orchestras, the issue of their "export threat" cannot be overlooked. The exodus of musicians looking for jobs abroad has taken on alarming dimensions. It takes some 15 years to train a violinist, and the society spends substantial funds on this purpose. And yet a young artist who earns little in this country and lacks any real prospects for obtaining an apartment of his own avails himself of any opportunity that comes for him to perform abroad. There he is, to be sure, paid less than a native artist but, compared with what he can earn in this country, his foreign-exchange honorarium looks like a fortune to him. Unfortunately, this does not concern isolated instances. There are now so many Polish musicians working abroad that several first-class symphonic orchestras could be formed from them. When will be able to rebuild that organic substance of Polish music?

[Answer] As it happens, corrective measures to remedy the situation in this field have just been worked out. They consist in the recommendations by the minister of culture and arts, formulated in cooperation with the chairman of the Committee for Radio and Television, mandatory to all subordinate institutions. They define the conditions that must be met by an artist who intends

to sign a long-term contract for performing abroad. I wish to emphasize, however, that we do not view as a national misfortune the departure of an artist under a contract. We do not intend to close the frontiers to artists who shall propagate Polish culture in other countries while at the same time improving their own material situation. The only thing we desire is that this should be done sensibly rather than in such an "elemental" manner. It is worth noting that plastic artists, who exist in thousands and whose work is not salaried, live in much more difficult conditions than musicians. Should we forbid them to exhibit their works abroad? Let them exhibit and sell, let them collect press reviews and return with enhanced reputations to this country! Our policy on cultural exchange is characterized by openness. Many tensions have already been relieved, while others will be healed by time and our purposive actions. Few artists have permanently remained abroad, barely several, and really no one has remained there for political reasons. An overwhelming majority has returned or is returning home to Poland. Their place is here. May they fare the best they can.

Ministerial Council on Cultural Policy

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish No 229, 27 Sep 83 pp 1,2

[Article by Zdzislaw Zaryczny: "Following a Stable Course" under the rubric "The Cultural Policy of the Socialist State"]

[Text] /This was a novel aspect of the work of the Council of Ministers: for the first time it devoted an entire session to cultural problems. The agenda and the nature of the discussion as well as of the decisions taken by the government fully confirm the goals and directions of the cultural policy of our socialist state./ [printed in boldface]

This policy was and remains stable. Even in the most dramatic moments of the last 2 years, during the most difficult periods of political tension and economic deficiencies, the text of the resolution of the 9th Extraordinary PZPR Congress remained topical:/"Polish culture is developing in an atmosphere of the confluence of varied ideological and philosophical currents. This diversity and the interpenetration of cultural cross-currents have always borne positive fruit whenever a climate of toleration existed; that climate is a permanent value of the history of our nation. The party supports the continuation of this tradition. Socialist culture, which is an outgrowth of the entirety of progressive cultural accomplishments, represents the essence of national identity."/ [printed in boldface]

The declarations were accompanied by deeds. Consider just some of these. January 1982: the appeal of Premier Wojciech Jaruzelski for expanding book output by 25 percent. May 1982: plenary deliberations in the Parliament on the subject of culture, the enactment of the decree on the National Cultural Council and the Cultural Development Fund, as well as of the decree on the Office of the Minister of Culture and Arts. January 1983: the National Cultural Council launches its activities.

The actions of the leadership of the state during that period demonstrate that it does not treat culture as a superfluity that can be given or taken away. While combatting the acute economic crisis, culture has not been relegated to

a secondary plane, and the Marxist concept of the individual--which convinces that he contributes to his labor not only his skills but also his imagination and emotions, that is, features inherent in culture--has not been impoverished. The quality of these features, their social scope and prestige, is largely decisive to the success of the economic reform.

The reform is abruptly changing the traditional and seemingly perpetuated status quo in culture. It forces creative artists to explore new forms of cooperation with the state and society as their patrons, while at the same time distinguishing between arts patronage and simple social services. The postulate of the autonomy and self-government of the unions of creative artists has to be reformulated nowadays in the sense of a more active recruiting of audiences for creative artists, and especially for contemporary authors.

As was stressed at the session of the Council of Ministers, new unprecedented threatening situations also are appearing: on the one hand, there is the commercialization of art as dictated by the laws of the marketplace and, on the other, the tendency to determine the tasks of state-run enterprises solely in the context of production and profits, without considering their educational and cultural functions. A painful matter--especially from the social standpoint--is the deteriorating material situation of a large proportion of creative artists as well as of the nearly 70,000 employees of the sphere of the propagation of culture--the personnel of libraries, houses of culture, museums, etc. The revisions introduced by the Council of Ministers in the principles for concluding contracts and rates of honorariums paid to playwrights, plastic artists, translators and writers will of a certainty produce tangible improvements in this field. But the most important factor is enacting and implementing a decree on the propagation of culture as soon as possible.

In the very near future--it was pointed out--many particular problems relating to, among others, the concept of the activity of the cultural administration, the status of the state- and plant-run houses of culture, and the introduction of implementing regulations for the already enacted decrees will also have to be solved. A need is arising for a rapid determination of the forms and methods of cooperation between the state and the Church in their capacity as arts patrons, consonant with the principles of the policy being implemented as regards religious denominations.

At the session of the Council of Ministers difficulties and dangers were discussed openly and candidly. Various arguments and views were presented with the object of drafting optimal regulations encompassing the complex problems of culture in the long run rather than just for the present, and in such a way that the standards formulated at present would not hinder future wise solutions. This requirement was repeatedly stressed during discussion of the draft decree on the propagation of culture, on acknowledging the necessity of a consistent expansion and refinement of all that which in that decree will refer to social activism and self-government.

The bureaucratized model for the propagation of culture, based on institutions and salaried positions, no longer corresponds to the logic and directions of present changes in this country. A maximum inclusion of social elements, in the sense of both the creators of culture and the persons who propagate culture, in the programming and implementation of the state's cultural policy is needed. The government has provided a good example by inviting to its session members of the National Cultural Council as well as representatives of the creative communities and carefully listening to their opinions. This practice of joint debates and consultations should be emulated at all levels of the functioning of the state administration.

In discussing culture and formulating postulates the realities of the late 20th century should be borne in mind. It is no longer possible nowadays to disseminate culture by means and methods with which the young authorities of the People's Poland had succeeded in eliminating illiteracy. Human enthusiasm and ingenuity have to be supported with extensive industrial potential working for the needs of culture: the typographical industry, cinematography, phonography, etc. For the time being, however, that industry is experiencing considerable difficulties, like the entire economy. This makes all the more important the Cultural Development Fund, which provides a solid and inflation-proof financial foundation. this year the related outlays will exceed 39.3 billion zlotys. This is an authentic yardstick of the efforts of the socialist state.

Culture cannot be "suspended" during the period of crisis until the wellbeing of the economy improves. The losses in human consciousness would be irreplaceable. Besides, culture and its creation and propagation know no pause. This is a dynamic process developing from the legacy of national history. The history of the 40 years of the People's Poland is also a history of further solid cultural enrichment endowed with new socialist values. We have distanced ourselves greatly from interpreting culture as an elite boon created by a few for a few. Great processes of the democratization of culture are an integral part of the social transformations which took place in Poland after 1944.

Universal access to culture and the democratism of culture are accompanied by the practice of cooperation on the rights of partners with creative milieux. Premier Wojciech Jaruzelski stressed in his speech at the session of the Council of Ministers that: **/"We firmly adhere to the principle of respecting the unique personality of the creative artist and his freedom to express in the manner proper to him ideas, thoughts and aesthetic perceptions."/** [printed in boldface] The limits of this tolerance are determined only by the need to defend the interests of national culture and by the artist's rejection of the socialist Poland. With all others, including those as well who temporarily occupy positions of negation owing to their opposition toward particular situations and individuals, but who support the People's Poland, the dialogue will be conducted patiently and without bias.

The continuing restructuring of the unions of creative artists provides grounds for optimism: in this country there are sizable and growing communities of creative artists who grasp the nature of the transformations

carried out following 13 December 1981, yet do not relinquish their autonomy and are taking an active part in helping the country to emerge from the crisis. Their activities are accompanied by the conviction that national culture will remain a mere corpus of nominal values unless these are reflected in human relations, at work and in governing. The identification and transmission of these values from the moral message of artistic works to civic consciousness and attitude is a social obligation of culture.

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CSO:2600/95

PARTY IDEOLOGICAL TRAINING PROGRAM OUTLINED

PM301931 Katowice TRYBUNA ROBOTNICZA in Polish 10 Oct 83 p 5

[Interview with Vladyslaw Loranc, head of the PZPR Central Committee Ideological Department, by Tomasz Persidok--date, place not given]

[Text] Persidok: A new year has just begun for the party ideological training program. To judge from the preparations made for it, and also from the curriculum, issues of ideological training have been given a higher status, and this is reflected both in the intensive character of the ideological education and in the quality of the many forms of training activities that have been envisaged. All the same, however, Comrade Director, would you not agree that a legitimate reservation can be raised here, namely whether it is right to "give a higher status" to something which by the nature of things ought to constitute the basis for the functioning of every political party? It thus becomes an indirect admission that this whole question has been suffering neglect in the past....

Loranc: Phrases referring to intensification of ideological training and to giving an appropriately higher status to that training manage to express in a very realistic way the necessity we are faced with at this moment. We have only had 1 year so far in which to rebuild and restore organized training action directed inward at our own party ranks, at all its members. For as things stood in the period from 1980 through 1981, any organized ideological work within the PZPR became, in fact, disrupted. This does not mean that party organizations did not convene, or that meetings did not take place--for instance, prior to the Extraordinary Ninth Congress--but they were all devoted to current, topical matters and the particularly urgent tasks facing party organizations.

Persidok: One task which consumed a lot of energy was that of carrying out an honest squaring of accounts with the past....

Loranc: Yes. There were the questions of squaring things up and, on the other hand, attempts to find answers to the following questions: Why did it all happen as it did, what were the origins of the crisis and what are the ways of emerging from it, and how to react to the adversary's attack.... It can be said that during that time party organizations were continuously busying themselves with tackling particular links of the same chain over and over again. In the face of the immediate problems of the sharp political struggle ideological training--that is, a study of the theoretical foundations of our movement, of the experiences of our own party and other parties--was discontinued in party organizations. We began the task of its restoration in the spring of 1982, by

preparing an appropriate program for the new training campaign planned for the 1982-83 season. We have ascertained--or, rather, the Central Committee Secretariat has ascertained--that the effects of that training were satisfactory. In the first year of the resumed training program 85 percent of party organizations held at least three out of the six planned ideological training meetings, while only 15 percent held less than three meetings or, in some cases, held no meetings at all.

Persidok: Yes, but can a statistical account of the ideological training meetings which were held constitute a measure of the effectiveness of that training? One meeting is quite unlike another and, besides, have we not, in the past, often witnessed cases where training sessions were merely "ticked off" on the basis of an unwritten agreement between the instructors and the participants...?

Loranc: If we consider the depth of the damage that was done to party awareness--and not only social awareness--then I think that it is not misleading to measure the progress of its restoration with statistical indicators: It demonstrates the degree to which the theoretical depth of the debate then carried out within the party became extended. It provides indirect information on the scale of the reserves of energy which the party found within itself to embark on organized action....

Persidok: You are now talking about the past, comrade, about the time a year or two ago. Could I ask you to go even further back for a moment and give me your assessment of ideological training throughout the entire history of socialist Poland? For was it not always the case that questions of ideological training were always given second-rate treatment, trailing at the tail end of work programs--devoted more often than not to the topical problems of the day--prepared for party organizations?

Loranc: It was different at different periods. This is not an answer designed to dodge your question, as I am now thinking back to the times I can remember from my own experience, that is, ideological work in the first postwar years. I was then active in the youth movement as I belonged to the United of Young Fighters [ZWM] and the Polish Scout Union [ZHP]. Ideological training work played an enormously important role then, and we--I mean people in my own age group--are to a large extent products of that training. For at that time school education did not yet acquire the same ideological function it was to take upon itself later. At that time a young person's personality was shaped by youth organizations and, indirectly, by the party. And later...it changed this way and that. With the emphasis placed on achieving the broadest possible range of influence, ideological training work entered a stage where the range of topics, the method used, and the analysis applied became somewhat superficial. The period I have in mind here is early 1950's. In the 1960's ideological training played a considerable role for the generation which was then entering the scene, especially when we remember the famous controversy about the ideological values of socialism. In contrast to that, I would be inclined to give a negative critical assessment of the 1970's. Not because it is now fashionable to express one's generalized disgust with the past decade (which, incidentally, it had done a lot to deserve), but because ideological

work was carried out in a particularly incompetent way. A number of incorrect political diagnoses were made, concerning both the realities of the international situation and our own sociopolitical reality. It was, for example, assumed that the policy of detente could change the real nature of our political adversary....

Persidok: That is, that the wolf that preaches the need for detente assumes the nature of a sheep, losing his natural instincts in the process!

Loranc: Precisely. It is an apt description--all the same, detente--which did indeed occur in international relations--could not possibly alter the nature of imperialism. We did not have to wait long for the evidence of that. And on the other hand, the 1970's were noted for taking noble intentions for existing reality. Against all the evident facts, the entire nation was proclaimed to be ideologically and morally unified. It would indeed be very fine and very satisfying if we all lived in Poland according to the old slogan of "Let Us Love One Another!" The trouble is that it all remains wishful thinking. When, in politics, we take our wishful thinking to be reality, then we begin to run up a serious overdraft on our--and not only our own--account. And, in the sphere of ideology, the 1970's accomplished just that.

Persidok: To go back to the question of ideological training, what circumstances and what factors are, in your opinion, conducive to people taking an interest in the training on the one hand and, on the other, to good results being obtained?

Loranc: In my opinion there are two highly favorable factors here. The first one will perhaps surprise you: I believe that the crisis we are going through--although the worst stage of this crisis is already behind us--provokes in a considerable proportion of our society a natural desire to understand its causes and the factors that brought it about. It is not only those who are professionally involved in politics, but also all the ordinary people who must surely return over and over again, in their own family and professional circles and even in their social conversation, to the question of the mistakes that were made.

Persidok: And to understand the mistakes is to understand the general principles and regularities?

Loranc: Naturally. It is a factor which greatly contributes toward people's interest in the theory of those things. To give you an example, Lenin's works, which are published in large numbers of copies, always sell out very quickly. They are not the sort of commodity that remains unsold for long.... The other factor is the gravity of the international situation. That gravity is perhaps not appreciated adequately enough by a considerable proportion of our public. But those who are more perceptive and better experienced than others--especially among the older generation--do appreciate the seriousness of the whole situation, and this constitutes another factor which propels them to take interest in

ideology and politics. They are looking for an answer to the question whether the chances exist for putting a check on the development of the situation which is taking place before our very eyes; what chances are there for incapacitating [as published] the policy of the arms race and the anticommunist crusade; or else, whether we are doomed beyond any help. These same questions are also asked by a part of our young generation--the generation which some of our professional colleagues suspect of a total lack of involvement as regards political issues. That also helps our ideological training work.

Persidok: What forms and methods of ideological training will be given preference in the current season of ideological training campaign?

Loranc: We will retain the format of holding ideological meetings at the level of primary party organizations.

Persidok: To judge by your published program, your ideological training will touch on the most topical, urgent affairs of the present day.

Loranc: The general theme is the key problems of party policy. The Central Committee Secretariat gave party organizations 11 subjects to choose from for the 6 ideological training meetings which they are expected to hold. Out of 11 subjects, 4 are compulsory: a party member's tasks to serve the strengthening of the PZPR's leading role; the role and function of the socialist state as seen against the experience of the recent past; social justice in socialism, with the preconditions necessary for its realization; and the genesis, sources, and role of the anticommunist crusade conducted by American imperialism. For organizations active in specific professional and other groups, especially among the intelligentsia, there are sets of other subjects to choose from--apart, of course, from the compulsory ones. Those reflect their everyday, professional interests....

Persidok: The main concern now is to have those subjects presented by the instructors in the most attractive form possible, so that all the participants would be encouraged to take part in the debate....

Loranc: We are preparing auxiliary materials for each subject, and those should provide a starting point for the person who will introduce and run the meeting. The materials are arranged so that they will also include some source texts. The thing is to stimulate the instructor to prepare the format of his training meeting in a nonstereotyped way....

Persidok: Thank you for the conversation.

CSO: 2600/169

NOWE DROGI POLEMIC AGAINST SOCIALIST PLURALISM CONTINUES

Pluralism Ignores Class Theory

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish No 6, Jun 83 pp 121-129

[Article by Boguslaw Ponikowski; see also article by J. Wawrzyniak in NOWE DROGI No 4, 1983 published under the title "Author Answers Criticism of NOWE DROGI Article" in JPRS 84084, No 2181 of this series, 10 August 1983, pp 59-63; article by Wawrzyniak in NOWE DROGI No 9, 1982 published under the title "Problems of Socialist Democracy, Party Role Discussed" in JPRS 82723, No 2100 of this series, 25 January 1983, pp 62-78]

[Text] I see no point in polemicizing with the polemic of Jan Wawrzyniak included in "Replies to More Than Just the 'Letter to the Editor-in-Chief'" (NOWE DROGI No 4, 1983) [see subslug], for it contains no new arguments of substance in support of the notion Wawrzyniak expresses in his article that the concept of the development of socialist democracy under the conditions of the building of socialism in Poland is actually a concretization of the Leninist concept of democracy. Moreover, in two of its leading articles (the October and December 1982 issues of NOWE DROGI), the editorial staff of NOWE DROGI has already distanced itself from the term "socialist pluralism" used by the author.

Consequently, if I undertake to criticize the views of J. Wawrzyniak once again, I do it because they are characteristic of, let us say, certain ideological-theoretical tendencies that flourished in the political thought of the 1970's and have not been conquered, as is demonstrated by the case of the author of "Replies...." I am interested in the various kinds of "adaptations" and "concretizations" of the Marxist-Leninist political theory of socialism, within whose framework this theory has become "more scientific" via bourgeois political science and the ideological justification has been created for the departure in political practice from the principles of scientific socialism. At that time, the idea of pluralism as a principle of socialist democracy resurged. Some of our sociologists and political scientists of the day argued the false view that our society is ceasing to be one of classes and is becoming layered by virtue of profession, that class conflicts are disappearing within it and are being replaced by conflicts of a socialist nature and finally that the state and democracy are becoming classless but nationwide. The rejection of the class theory became a common element of the thinking that surrounded

the fundamental questions of the socialist structure in Poland. This likewise was expressed in the conceptions of democracy that began to make their way into discussions following the August crisis.

Unfortunately, Wawrzyniak's ideas fall entirely within the framework of this type of tendency. They attest to his failure to comprehend the basic theoretical categories of scientific socialism, and thereby the political theory of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism as expressed by Lenin. The practical-political consequence of this is the obliteration of the principles of socialist democracy and the blurring of its class content and its opposition to bourgeois democracy.

Since it is very important ideologically that our party counter this type of tendency, I should like to take a closer look at the question of the relationship of democracy and socialism.

It should be noted that neither Marx nor Lenin treated democracy as an end in itself to be achieved through the seizing of power by the working class. On the other hand, they stressed many times that democracy is needed by the working class as a political tool for building socialism and that the attainment of this goal is indispensable to the development of the communist system. This is the meaning of the familiar thesis in the Communist Manifesto that says that "the first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to establish democracy,"¹ a thesis that is misinterpreted frequently in the spirit of "pure democracy." As is known, this first step does not amount to a campaign for seizing power, but in fact extends over the entire historical period of the transition from capitalism to socialism, over the period whose political superstructure Marx defined by the concept of the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. The views of the classical Marxists leave no doubt that the political ascendancy of the working class must be the essence of this new democracy that will enable the building of socialist society. The establishment of democracy refers to the development of the socialist state as an organization of the working class itself; through it is implemented the basic tenet that socialism is an act of the political activism of the workers themselves and of those groups of the working masses from other classes and strata that in politics assume the working class position. The basic criterion of the development of the socialist democracy is the direct participation of the workers themselves in governing the state at all levels of the exercise of authority. This criterion must be brought to mind continually since it is forgotten in Poland by the adherents of the so-called "pluralistic" interpretation of socialist democracy. They transform political pluralism created within the framework of bourgeois democracy into a hypostasis, saying that the idea of pluralism is a primary principle of democracy in general. J. Wawrzyniak, interpreting the "Leninist model of the leadership role of the party" according to this "primary principle," "discovers" that a necessary element of our Polish democracy should be the Marxist-Leninist party's performance of its "leading role" among cooperating partners."

Lenin, making reference to Engels' idea that "a consistent democracy on the one hand is transformed into socialism, while on the other hand, it necessitates socialism"² also stressed that it is not a question here of some sort of classless "pure democracy" whose ideals are to be fulfilled in the society that is building socialism. He wrote: "The development of democracy in full, the seeking out of the forms of this development and the testing of them in practice and the like--all of this is a component part of the tasks of the struggle over social revolution. Taken in isolation no democracy yields socialism, but in life democracy will never be taken in isolation but in combination, it will have its impact likewise on economics, it will hasten its transformation, it will influence economic development and the like. Such is the dialectic of living history."²

During the transitional period from capitalism to socialism, the transformation of democracy consists of the expansion of democracy for the vast majority of working masses. This requires transcending the form of parliamentary democracy. Of prime importance here is the development of that kind of representative system that enables the appointment of truly active workers that have real authority to worker self-governments, people's councils, the Sejm and all institutions of social and state control. Such a mechanism should be tested and instituted as would guarantee to those workers appointed by party, union and youth organizations universal and effective control over the work of professional officials of the state authorities and a share in the decisions passed by the authorities as well in the organization and implementation of these decisions. The historically tested foundation of such a system is democratic centralism that stands opposed to bureaucratic centralism as well as to all varieties of political pluralism.

The socialist democracy, as a working class authority, will become a "full democracy" when classes vanish, when the differences between the members of society from the viewpoint of their relationship to society's means of production are erased and, consequently, when the economic essence of socialism becomes a reality. Only then, stressed Lenin, will we have democracy with no exceptions. At the same time, however, the question of its atrophy, its defeat, will arise.

If the question of the development of socialist democracy does exist, it concerns the political superstructure of the society, still a class society, that is building socialism. Our ideological adherents of the "pluralistic" concept of democracy, even when they recognize the fact that classes and class differences among people do exist in our society, depart essentially from the Marxist theory of classes and class struggle. They justify this concept by making reference to the sociological character of social structure. And so they say that in our society there are: "differences in the interests of the various groups of working people," "social conflicts," "enormous class, occupational differences and differences in world view" and the like. Such terms are used often in our literature. But one is easily persuaded that we also encounter in our literature the overly frequent use of the thesis (not always expressed) of the so-called inapplicability of historical materialism, and especially of its theories of classes and class struggle, to societies building socialism.

While J. Wawrzyniak does not express this idea directly either, his vision of the "pluralistic" socialist democracy and its characteristic of social conflicts in our society fits right into the framework of the bourgeois sociology of the tendency towards conflict. At the same time, he sees no difference between the concepts "socialist state" and "socialist society." For example, he writes in one place that "in the socialist state...the class of the proprietors of the means of production is vanishing gradually, these means are becoming public property to a greater and greater extent" and "the interests of urban and rural working people are becoming more and more similar." Then, in the next paragraph, he is sure that "socialist society, however, will not become monolithic during the transitional period, but continues to be highly diverse and pluralistic."³

To identify the "state" and "society" in this way is not merely a slip of the tongue. Using these terms interchangeably is groundless on the basis of historical materialism, but totally justified within the framework of the various varieties of bourgeois legal ideology. Within the framework of this ideology, the state is perpetuated and is identified with the sphere of "public interest," with the "organization of social life" and with the "citizens' community" and society. At the same time, the use of the interchangeable concepts of the "state" and "society" adopts the erroneous assumptions from the viewpoint of Marxist theory that the state = the authority + society.

In this concept, the relationship between the state and social classes is replaced by the question of the relationship between the "authorities" and "society." As a consequence, many of our "party" ideologues instead of explaining the question of the structure of the state authority and the essence of the socialist state within the context of the need to strengthen the political rule of the working class, ponder over reconciling the structure of the authorities and society. The logic of these reflections is very simple: the basic requirement for the development of the socialist democracy in our country is that the state authority be pluralistic, since various "social groups" and various conflicts of interest exist in society, including classes and class interests. According to this logic, the fundamental task of the state authorities is to create the unity of society.

This is a key thesis in the concept propagated by J. Wawrzyniak. In the socialist democracy, according to him, the authorities are needed as an "ordering structure," since "whereas various kinds of interests exist in society, unity must be an outgrowth of their hierarchization and harmonization."⁴ This is a false generalization in the theoretical sense. The need for the dictatorship of the proletariat and the party's leadership role emanates from the fact that the building of socialism takes place within the class society in which class conflicts continue to determine all other conflicts.

During the transitional period, the major source of social conflict is the struggle between what is capitalist and what is socialist. This struggle does not go away along with the elimination of ownership classes that rule in the capitalist method of production. That is why the working class needs the kind of state that secures the process of the building of socialism against counterrevolutionary forces and broadens socialist relations upon the economic

base. In the society of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, social conflicts that arise on the basis of these two antagonistic social systems cannot be separated mechanically.

J. Wawrzyniak writes that "if the basis of conflict is interests of a socialist nature..." then "on the one hand, society ought to be organized into those organizations that express its parochial interests and, on the other hand, it should possess authorities that rule in the interest of the entire society, having become familiar with these interests and taken them into account, setting them up into a hierarchy and harmonizing them." This proposition makes a bungled reference to the Hegelian philosophy of the state. In the next sentence, however, the author shows that he is speaking of our present society. He writes: "It is possible to achieve this situation through the workings of pluralism. In other words, the model for the exercise of authority that has been in existence until recently, based primarily on reconciling the party apparatus and the state administration, should be replaced by a system of understandings and negotiations between the state and society." This is the entire political concept that derives from bourgeois ideology, long criticized by Marxism and rejected in practice by the revolutionary workers movement. Actually the first people to advance this idea recently in the political arena in our country have been the ideologues and leaders of Solidarity. According to their way of thinking, on one side there is the entire society and on the other side there is the state authority in opposition to society. If we maintain, however, that the society building socialism that exists currently in Poland is not homogeneous but is a class society, and if we understand this concept according to Marxist theory, we must draw conclusions stating what the class character of the state authority is to be and in what direction the development of the socialist democracy must go, as well as what and whom it is to serve. In spite of what is sometimes said in the name of "common sense" and "realism," it is impossible to analyze the problems of the development of socialist democracy honestly in isolation from the total shape of the ongoing class struggle.

If we ascribe to our society the Marxist concept of "class society," and if we take seriously the thesis of the theory of scientific socialism that the building of socialism is achieved through the class struggle of workers and their class allies under the leadership of the communist party, then we should recognize that during the transitional period, class conflicts and class interests are the foundation and the essence of all social conflicts. In this sense, mechanically differentiating antagonistic and non-antagonistic conflicts and assuming that the latter lose their class character during the current phase of the building of socialism in our country is sheer speculation. Moreover, such speculation performs a detrimental function politically, for it loses sight of a basic problem today: what should be done in order to move from government on behalf of the masses to government by the masses, i.e., so that the participation and political activism of workers would become a regular element of government in our socialist state.

Striving for innovation in the form of introducing pluralism as a basic component of socialist democracy does not solve this problem. This was

demonstrated by Social Democratic party practice that we attempted to implement in our country during the 1970's, if imperfectly. To reiterate what Lenin said, no democracy, no self-government and no civic rights taken in abstraction and in isolation from the class structure and the forms of the class struggle of the society of the transitional period will resolve the problem in question.

What does it mean then "to treat it in combination?" Lenin's answer to this question is contained in the work "The State and Revolution," in chapter five, entitled "The Economic Bases of the Atrophy of the State." The question of the link between politics and economics under the dictatorship of the proletariat has key significance in Lenin's concept of the relationship of democracy and socialism during the transitional period. It is a question that is muddled not only in bourgeois legal ideology, but in our current literature as well (which is influenced by the former). J. Wawrzyniak answers the charge that he questions the truth discovered by Lenin of the primacy of politics over economics during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism by saying that he does not propose any separation "of the workings of the two spheres--politics and economics--in the socialist state," since this would be incompatible "not only with Marxism" but likewise "with ordinary common sense." He also says that he writes "only of certain negative consequences of going to the other extreme--making economics contingent entirely upon politics."⁶

These words show that the author does not comprehend what the primacy of politics over economics means in Lenin's theory and what is meant by the determining of the political superstructure by the economic structure of society. The fact that some economics professors view this question in the same way may be of some moral consolation to J. Wawrzyniak. This lack of comprehension, however, is not merely a casual theoretical error. Despite the author's intentions, it is a rationalization of this practice in economic policy executed by our state during the 1970's that violates the primacy of socialist policy over economics.

It is not at all a question of the lesser or greater, the complete or partial "contingency" of economics on politics. At any rate, even if such a notion of the relationship of politics and economics is in accordance with common sense, it obviously clashes with dialectical reasoning. There is no room here to point out the viewpoint of Marx on this relationship in his works, particularly in "Grundrisse" and "Das Kapital," or to refer to the dialectical terminology used by Engels in his letter to Konrad Schmidt on 27 October 1890.⁸ Moreover, quoting the classical Marxists is looked upon askance by some of our scholars. It leaves one open to the charge of dogmatism. The question of Marx's understanding of this relationship is the subject of numerous theoretical controversies among contemporary Marxists. For example, let us note the discussion of Western Marxists on the subject of N. Poulantzas's thesis of the "relative autonomy" of politics from economics.

While I shall not recall the entire body of Lenin's arguments on the question of the primacy of politics over economics, I shall note those arguments that refer directly to the issues of the development of socialist democracy.

First, it is not a question of any sort of politics, but of socialist politics that implements the general interest of the working class as the ruling class. This primacy means that without such politics, the elements of socialism cannot be preserved and developed in the economic structure. In Lenin's understanding, this primacy means the departure from all varieties of economism in interpreting the process of the building of socialism. Second, this primacy means that the political activism of the working class in solving the conflicts that arise as the society develops in the direction of socialism is a necessary condition for resolving the economic tasks of the transitional period. They are the tasks of the class struggle between what is capitalist and what is communist in the economic structure of the society of the transitional period. During this transitional process, until what is communist wins out, all attempts at making the sphere of economic life autonomous from socialist politics, all limiting of the interference of these politics in the economic field will lead to crises that endanger the socialist state, and thereby the building of socialism in general. Moreover, belief in "automatic economic regulators" during the period of transition to socialism is an expression of commodities-monetary fetishism.

At the current stage of the building of socialism in Poland, the so-called economic self-regulators theorized by the adherents of "socialist pluralism" by their very nature engender capitalist relations and foster the preservation of existing class-economic structures. Moreover, one deludes oneself by imagining that the political conflicts and tensions of the process of the transition from capitalism to socialism can be restricted to the sphere of ideology and politics and need not impact directly upon the sphere of economic relations, from which they emanate, after all. Lenin explained the nature and sources of these illusions in the work "Economics and Politics During the Period of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." Stating that the transitional period from capitalism to communism combines the properties of both of these systems of social economy and that it is, of necessity, a period of the struggle between them, Lenin writes: "It is typical of petty bourgeois democrats to loathe the class struggle, to dream of avoiding it, to aspire toward appeasement and reconciliation, to take the edge off sharp corners. That is why such democrats either refuse totally to acknowledge the entire historical phase of the transition from capitalism to communism or consider it their task to conceptualize plans for reconciling the two struggling forces instead of directing the struggle of one of these forces."

It is easy to demonstrate that many such "democrats" have appeared in our party following the August sallies of the working class. In constructing their models of the "pluralistic" democracy, they could use the foundation of the theoretical and ideological base that was produced by the social sciences in the 1970's. Thus, instead of criticizing the violation of the principle of the primacy of socialist politics over economics, they offer anew a vision of the authority-as-arbiter. Within the framework of this vision, J. Wawrzyniak's imperative that "over the long term, the democratization of the socialist political system is impossible, or at least it is severely hampered, without a farreaching autonomy of the economics sphere from the sphere of politics, with the simultaneous basing of the operation of each of these spheres upon principles that are appropriate to each alone" becomes comprehensible.

We are dealing here with a clear reference to liberalist political concepts that originated in the ideas of Kant, Locke and Montesquieu.

A Marxist analysis of the sources and character of the crisis that erupted in August 1980 shows that without the hegemony of the working class, without the performance by this class of its political mission, without the primacy of socialist politics over economics, the bureaucratic deformation of the socialist state and the regression of socialist economic transformations and ideological social relations become inevitable. In this context, Lenin's thesis of the necessity of the leadership role of the Marxist-Leninist party becomes comprehensible. The question was posed in this way in the very title of a resolution of the Ninth Extraordinary Congress.

In contemporary discussions on the topic of the nature and development of socialist democracy during the transitional period, Marxists essentially do not clash over the idea that the problem of the role and the essence of the working class party is of key significance; on the other hand, they do disagree about what the role and essence of this party are. We cannot move from these differences of opinion to the agenda, dismissing the entire issue with the statement that there are "wrong" models of the party's role and there is a "right model." Designating a "Leninist model" that is at once opposed to the "administrative model," the "pragmatic model" and the like is likewise a gross oversimplification.¹¹ Lenin /did not/ [in boldface] create any "model" of the party, but a theory of the working class revolutionary party. And it is not merely a formal question to speak of a "model" rather than of a theory.

From the viewpoint of this theory and the practice of the workers movement that harks back to it, questions of the relationship of the communist party to the state authority and its apparatus (i.e., to the state) and of the relationship of this party to the working class are of basic significance. Theoretical controversies that surround these questions in the contemporary communist movement require separate analysis. In any case, the question of the leadership role of the Marxist-Leninist party is defined by these relationships. This is also how Lenin viewed the issue.¹² According to his theory, the communist party during the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat is not the partner either of the working class, of its other class organizations, of the apparatus of state authority or of other parties and social organizations of the nonproletarian working masses. In the post-August language of our party, the terms "partner" and "partnerly" perform a specific political function. The mechanical transfer of them into a theoretical analysis of the problems of the socialist democracy or the raising of these terms to the status of a category of Marxist political theory is not only a methodological error, but insinuates ideological confusion into the question of the party's leadership role.

I have merely suggested several problems of Marxist theory pertaining to the relationship between democracy and socialism that are being discussed and deliberated not only within our party, but throughout the entire contemporary communist movement. As a part of the dialectic of living history, these issues are of direct practical-political importance today. Hence, the Marxist

analysis of theoretical politics assumes special ideological importance. Consequently, the neopositivist idea that sets as a prerequisite for the "honest presentation of the problems of socialist democracy" the consistent "separation of theory and practice, the postulate state from the actual state, the normative concept from the descriptive concept" is inadmissible. On the basis of Marxist philosophy, these kinds of distinctions are treated as elements of mystification, real bourgeois ideology.

I have attempted to point out (although more extensive analysis is needed) that based on Marxist theory, there is no room for the concept of "democracy in general" or for separating democracy as a means to a specific end from democracy as "a spontaneous objective of the aspirations of man." As is known, Lenin, and Marx and Engels before him criticized this kind of speculation, doing battle in the workers movement with ideologists designated by the term "petty bourgeois democrats." The democracy that the working class achieves and creates in the revolutionary process is not its goal but merely a political means. The debate over democracy as an objective in the categories of basic human values was treated both by the classical writers of the theory of scientific socialism and by all of the chief theoreticians of the revolutionary workers movement as an expression of the blurring of the class character of democracy by bourgeois ideologists and as an element of the ideology of class peace and the cooperation of the classes. Today, all of the opponents of proletarian socialism are emerging with the idea of the democratization of societies building socialism in the name of the implementation of democracy as a goal of the aspirations of man. The general interest of the working class, as the ruling class coincides with the building of socialism as the basis for the development of the communist society. According to the theory of scientific socialism, this direction of development poses the question of "overcoming the state in general, and thus democracy as well." In the words of Engels, this is the "ultimate political goal" of the communist party.

Perceiving these problems allows us to understand why Marxist-Leninist parties are opposed to all classless concepts of democracy and the state, and also why they struggle for the development of socialist democracy and for the strengthening of the working-class character of the state during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.

FOOTNOTES

1. K. Marx, F. Engels, "The Communist Manifesto" in K. Marx, F. Engels, "Works," vol 4, Warsaw 1962, p 535.
2. V. I. Lenin, "The State and Revolution" in "Works," vol 25, Warsaw 1951, p 487.
3. J. Wawrzyniak, "The Dialectics of the Leadership Role of the Party and the Socialist Democracy," NOWE DROGI, No 9, 1982, p 124.
4. Ibid, p 125.

5. Ibid, p 126.
6. J. Wawrzyniak, "Replies to More Than Just the 'Letter to the Editor-in-Chief'," NOWE DROGI, No 4, 1983.
7. See J. Kaleta, "Economics and Politics," ODRA No 11, 1982.
8. K. Marx, F. Engels, "Selected Correspondence," Warsaw 1951, pp 553 and ff. The following words of Engels are very topical: "For all of those men there is no dialectics above all. They always see only that the cause is here and the effect is there. The fact that this is a hollow abstraction, that in the real world such metaphysical poles of opposites exist only during periods of crisis, that, on the other hand, the entire great process takes place in the form of the mutual interaction of forces, however unequal, among which the economic movement is unquestionably the most powerful, most innate and most decisive force, that nothing here is absolute, but everything is relative--they absolutely do not see this," p 557.
9. V.I.Lenin, "Economics and Politics During the Period of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" in: "Works," vol 30, Warsaw 1957, p 94.
10. J. Wawrzyniak, "The Dialectics....," op. cit., p 129.
11. Ibid., p 130.
12. Lenin wrote: "Democracy has enormous significance in the struggle that the working class wages with capitalism over its liberation. But democracy is in no way a boundary that cannot be transcended, but only one of the stages on the road from feudalism to capitalism and from capitalism to communism." "The State and Revolution," loc. cit., p 508.

Marxism, Pluralism Incompatible

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish No 8, Aug 83 pp 115-123

[Article by Tadeusz Wrebiak]

[Text] Boguslaw Ponikowski was right when he said, in the June issue of NOWE DROGI, that Jan Wawrzyniak, in his article entitled "Replies to More Than Just the 'Letter to the Editor-in-Chief',"¹ did not advance any new arguments in support of the thesis that the variant of the development of democracy in Poland that he outlined is actually a concretization of the Leninist concept of socialist democracy. But was not the author of "Replies..." simply suffering from a lack of substantive arguments on this issue, if he rejected all of our observations and reservations concerning the theoretical basis for his concept of "socialist pluralism," for the most part using arguments of a formal nature, and was completely silent on the negative position of the editors of NOWE DROGI regarding the preceding concept.²

In his reply, J. Wawrzyniak accuses me of polemicizing with "a shadow and not with the real text of his article."³ He did not--as he claims--intend to introduce into the political system of the PRL [Polish People's Republic] under the guise of "socialist pluralism" "the mechanism of the free play of political forces"; he wished only to implement such a pluralistic system as would enable the various social groups to articulate honestly their interests and for these same interests to be taken into account in the decisionmaking of the central authorities.

One can only sigh and say: if all human plans, convictions, definitions and apriori claims had such a salutary effect upon the successful tempo and direction of socialist transformations in our country as some people think they do, would we be condemning voluntarism with such consistency as we now do?

Is "Socialist Pluralism" Possible Without the Mechanism of the "Free Play of Political Forces"?

It seems that there are various answers to this question. The propagators of political pluralism in socialism are truly united in their belief that the pluralist system is not an illusory but a real guarantee of the proper direction of the development of democracy in real socialist countries; they are not of one mind, however, with regard to the characteristics of this system that will be present in socialism.

Some believe that in no system (and this includes the socialist system) can the pluralistic system be separated from the mechanism known commonly as the "free play of political forces." On the basis of these premises, they postulate--like the communist parties from the circle of the ideas of so-called eurocommunism--the adoption from capitalism and the application to socialism of the pluralist system, including the mechanism of the "free play of forces." At any rate, these do not harbor any illusions, nor do they transmit to society any illusions that political pluralism would be possible in socialism without the rivalry of groups and political parties.⁴

There are others that believe that the essence of the pluralist system can be molded freely according to people's wishes. They suggest the view that political pluralism, in the strict sense, will rid itself of the inherent mechanism of the "free play of forces" as if with a wave of a magic wand and will operate according to the principle of the partnerly cooperation of allied forces that recognize the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist party. At this time it will be called and defined a priori "socialist pluralism," "organized pluralism" or "allied pluralism."

J. Wawrzyniak expresses the views of this second group of promulgators of the pluralistic political system. He is one-sided, if not biased in his characterization of his pluralistic concept. He describes extensively its virtues and he extols "socialist pluralism" because it will make possible the real, i.e., the unfettered appearance of the various kinds of group social interests. However, he is silent about the fact that what he assesses as a positive phenomenon must, by nature, also lead to an increase in parochial and immediate interests among people at the expense of long-range interests and

the interests of the entire society. Consequently, the sphere of intergroup rivalry, which is unfavorable for the socialist society, thereby must expand.

The author of the concept of "socialist pluralism" likewise claims that the center of power, enriched by such pluralism, will have to correct this previously caused "tilt," harmonizing and setting up a hierarchy of the particular group interests according to specific criteria for all of society. At the same time, however, he does not explain how the same system that engendered the "tilt" will be able to balance it, despite its pluralist nature. Nor does he explain which element of the pluralistic system will be used to "brake" the operation of the mechanism of the "free play of forces," for the argument that this mechanism cannot appear in socialism after the profiteering classes are eliminated is simply not convincing.

In his outline of this concept of pluralism, full of vagueness and inconsistency, J. Wawrzyniak is also equivocal about the operation of the Leninist party in the system of "socialist pluralism." In none of his articles does he answer the basic question: as the Leninist party, how does the PZPR act according to his pluralist concept? Will "socialist pluralism" expressed in the party program arouse the entire party ideologically and politically to work to motivate workers, peasants, tradesmen and the intelligentsia in the direction of joint, primary, national and class interests? Will it also work in the opposite direction and begin to awaken parochial interests among party members, increasing group feelings and decentralizing tendencies within the party itself?

Within the context of his idea of "socialist pluralism," the author of "Replies..." likewise raised the question of the Polish experiences of the 1970's. In his opinion, these experiences confirm the need to enrich the socialist democracy with political pluralism. In the articles that he published last year he argued that the lack of pluralism in the operation of the socialist state in our country was a cause of the limiting of democracy and of deformation in public life. In the text of "Replies..." he returns to this issue and rejoins that the thesis he stated in these articles is not unfounded. Unfortunately, he fails again to prove that he is right with any sort of documentation. And so, since I am once again forced to give an opinion on this question, I shall quote the argument of my opponent in full:

"In the light of this (i.e., in the light of the assumptions of "socialist pluralism" --parentheses mine, T[adeusz] W[rebiak]), is it really that difficult to find examples of acting that is out of kilter with pluralism? And do I really invent other causes for the crippling of democracy than those given by the Sixth KC [Central Committee] Plenum and the Ninth Congress? Everyone must agree with the view that one of the causes of the crisis was the operation of the political system as though moral-political unity were a fact.

"In this context, I see pluralism as one of the methods leading to the perception of social life as it is, changing it into what we would like it to be and leaving it unchanged."⁵

Personally, I find the text of this rejoinder quite frivolous. What can we conclude from J. Wawrzyniak's idea that "everyone must agree with the view

that one of the causes of the crisis was the operation of the political system as though moral-political unity was a fact?" I think that what emanates from it is what it says and no more. The author of the rejoinder suggests, however, that one may deduce from the text, moreover, another truth, that the poorly functioning political system during the last decade is likewise an example of "acting that is out of kilter with pluralism."

It is a strange method of demonstrating a truth--not to document the validity of this second thesis that he suggests. Nor did I find any supporting statements in the documents of the Sixth KC Plenum and the Ninth Congress of the thesis that the lack of a pluralistic element in the PRL political system was the cause of the limiting of democracy in the 1970's and one of the causes of the present crisis. Thus, I maintain my accusation that J. Wawrzyniak makes unfounded references in his substantiation of the concept of "socialist pluralism" to the political events in Poland.

Moreover, let us point out that the quoted fragment of the rejoinder uses the term "pluralism" in two ways--as a pluralistic designation of the pluralistic system and as the counterpart of one "of the methods leading to the perception of social life as it is...." It is pluralism as a method of perception, recognized in this way as correct, since it aids in the perception and appreciation of the qualities of "socialist pluralism." In my opinion, this is a quite telling illustration of the interdependency that exists between the consciously selected pluralist method of perceiving social reality and the postulated ideal of political pluralism in socialism; we shall return to this interdependency later, since the pluralistic view of certain Polish political scientists requires some further discussion.

Marxism and Pluralism

When the polemic with J. Wawrzyniak on the subject of the validity of his pluralistic concept began several months ago in the columns of *NOWE DROGI*, if I am not mistaken, he was then the only Marxist to popularize the system of political pluralism applied to socialism in Polish periodical publications. Soon others started to voice this idea publicly in periodicals. At the same time, the advocates of political pluralism in socialism demonstrated amazing activism in proliferating new definitions and concepts of this system in Poland. During the crisis period, in the past several months we have added at least three definitions of the "socialist pluralist system."⁶

This harvest of ever new definitions of the pluralist system in our country is only ostensibly surprising, for if we look closer, the soil for this harvest is a common ground. These initiatives very closely resemble that presented by Stanislaw Ehrlich in the book entitled "Oblicza pluralizmow" [The Faces of Pluralisms] (PWN [Polish Scientific Publishers], 1980). The connection between S. Ehrlich's book and the later work of the propagators of the pluralistic system in Poland is quite evident; the thoughts contained in this book have been popularized in various publications.

A journalist writing in PRAWO I ZYCIE under the pseudonym "Lexis," in a text entitled "Pluralism" located in the "PiZ [PRAWO I ZYCIE] Little Encyclopedia" column, pointed out 2 years ago (31 May 1981) the ideological-political meaning of the book "Oblicza pluralizmow," stating the following:

"Notabene, there are more and more discussions (e.g., S. Ehrlich, J.J. Wiatr) of the pluralistic elements within Marxism itself and likewise of their presence within the practice of the socialist structure (such as NEP [New Economic Policy], multiparty structures and Yugoslavian pluralism). It is also emphasized that the communist parties of Italy, France and Spain officially make use of the expression "the pluralistic program of the development of society" to define the manner of peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism. This is tied in with the abandonment of the radical formula of the dictatorship of the proletariat from the previous period, in support of the maximum democratization of the system or the increased nationalization of the means of production--now primarily in support of the municipalization and development of the various form of cooperatives and self-government."

The most worthy of consideration, however, was the popularization of Marxist thought undistorted. Hence, S. Ehrlich demonstrates in his book that one can find pluralistic elements in the works of Marx, Engels and the other Marxists.⁷ And so, in discussing the quarrel with the anarchists, he argues the view that Marx and Engels, in their polemic with Bakunin, accepting the necessity of the state during the transitional period, wished to base it upon a communal, i.e., decentralized system, wished to reconcile the state organization with its decisionmaking center with the communal organization, seeing in this the guarantee of democracy during the transitional period. The author of the book "Oblicza pluralizmow" concludes this demonstration in the following way: "Marx and Engels countered anarchistic pluralism with organized pluralism that they conceived of as democratic centralism."⁸

After S. Ehrlich, Jan Wawrzyniak and Janusz Tereszynski reiterate this conclusion in a somewhat modified form, spreading the false view that Marx and Engels allegedly were in favor of some sort of specific pluralistic system.⁹ The magic of pluralistic ideology is evidently stupendous, if it leads Marxists to reconcile Marxism with pluralism.

Obviously, Marx and Engels did not create a theory of scientific socialism that was in any way close to pluralism, as is suggested by the advocates of political pluralism in socialism. When J. Wawrzyniak speaks out for pluralism "as one of the methods leading to the perception of social life as it is..." (as I have already mentioned), he seems not to notice that Marxism advises the examination of social life from all angles, in the dialectical union of the unity and the diversity of forms of existence of social daily life. Thus, Marxism differs quite fundamentally from pluralism in its method of analyzing reality.

I believe that it is appropriate here to mention the ideas of the Soviet philosopher A. Sorokin concerning this subject. In his opinion, non-Marxist monism, which is not in a position to take in all of the diversity of the forms of existence of reality with all of its specific characteristics, and

"pluralism, that in turn is not in a position to grasp the internal unity of the forms of existence of reality are two polarized ways of expressing the same, internally opposed relationship of unity and diversity."

He continues that "the mutual exclusion of unity and diversity is the real foundation for the antinomy of monism and pluralism" and then that: "Marx created a concept of monism that resolves this antinomy." He concludes by saying that "the resolution of this problem by Marx based upon the political economy of capitalism enables us to understand the real source of the various errors related to the dialectic of unity and diversity that have been and are being made in philosophy."¹⁰

Apparently J. Wawrzyniak fails to discern all of this, since in the text of "Replies..." he objects to the examination of the question of political pluralism in conjunction with the meaning that the term "pluralism" has acquired in Marxist philosophy. At the same time, I get the impression that both his idea that one finds various pluralistic elements in Marxism and the view that there is no connection between pluralism as a philosophical category and pluralism as a category in political science are derived from a lack of understanding of the role of Marxist philosophy as an essential, integral part of Marxism, as well as from the errant belief that Marxism may be freely divided into separate, unrelated parts.

Philosophical Pluralism and Political Pluralism

In the specific instance discussed previously, J. Wawrzyniak supports the view of S. Ehrlich, who says in his book "Oblicza pluralizmow" that "there is no necessary link between philosophical pluralism and social and political pluralism" (p 14). The author of "Replies...", based on the same assumptions as those of the author of "Oblicza pluralizmow," claims that the political and the philosophical are two different planes of consideration, saying that "the first answers the question: What is the ontological nature of the world--pluralistic, dualistic or monistic?, while the second considers the mechanisms of authority in the state. At the same time, these mechanisms may take shape within the framework of pluralistic or centralistic rules, apart from the way questions on the essence of the world have been resolved on the philosophical plane."¹¹

I believe that this polemical statement identifies the operating mechanisms of state authority and the thinking of political scientists on the subject of these mechanisms. Of course, one may accept and examine theoretically the mechanisms of state authority as autonomous entities functioning outside the human consciousness. Given such an assumption, it is clear that these mechanisms can be molded, and when they have taken shape, they can also function according to various rules, pluralistic ones as well, apart from the philosophical resolutions, both the ontological ones pointed out by the author of "Replies..." and the more "pedestrian" ones that are part of historical materialism's theory of the economic system.

Are the considerations of political scientists and thus their views, like the mechanisms under discussion, also free from the influence of the various

philosophical doctrines, pluralistic doctrines included? If this were so, then political scientists certainly would be the only group of scholars free from world view determining factors. The author of "Replies..." does not decide whether this is so.

Please do not misunderstand me. In my opinion, the meaning of the term "pluralism" that is lent it by modern Marxist philosophical thought should be taken into account likewise by Marxists in political science. This does not mean, however, that I deny the separate character of the subject of political science research, thereby minimizing the autonomy of this scientific discipline. In the study of the question of pluralism, in political science as well, the concept of pluralism should and can be enriched by new content from the viewpoint typical of this scientific discipline. The Marxist political scientist, however, must not forget that Marxism and pluralism are different and not mutually complementary theories and research methods and that this essential methodological advice should not be forgotten in his theoretical considerations and scientific research on pluralism.

Yet another basic observation. J. Wawrzyniak, in his polemic with me, is more consistent in his defense of the thesis that "there is no essential link between philosophical and political pluralism" than the author of the book "Oblicza pluralizmow." S. Ehrlich makes numerous exceptions to this idea. For example, in the chapter entitled "From Ontological to Group (Social and Political) Pluralism," in discussing the assumptions of American pluralism he argues convincingly that there is a close link between the pluralistic philosophy of James and his pluralistic views on the society and the state. Meanwhile, when he characterizes the views of his adherents he says that from the perspective of a half-century, the works of some of them provide for us a necessary bridge between the ontological pluralism of James and the concrete pluralism of political sociology.¹²

In the chapter where he treats the assumptions of English pluralism, he also makes an exception for the philosophy of Russell, substantiating this with the following words: "it has been said that there is no junctim between ontological and social and political pluralism (...) But in Russell, the revision of views caused by a disinclination toward the logical foundations of monism (...) and the shift to a position of "absolute pluralism" combines harmoniously with its social and political pluralism."

Obviously, all of these deviations from S. Ehrlich's thesis refer only to extreme forms of philosophical pluralism that totally negates the existence of the category of unity and stresses solely and exclusively the diversity of aspects of existence of social life: this extreme form of philosophical pluralism is not universal. Of greater universality is the view that does not negate but minimizes the role and significance of unity in diversity, as a result of the underestimating or the false interpretation of the mutual link between the unity and diversity of the existence of social life that occurs in objective dialectical reality (as is pointed out, for example, by the Soviet philosopher I have quoted, A. Sorokin).¹³

Is this view also not deserving of the name pluralistic in the philosophical sense? And should not this aspect of philosophical pluralism, in spite of the fact that it manifests itself somewhat differently than and does not occur in such an extreme form as in the philosophy of James and Russell, likewise be taken into consideration by J. Wawrzyniak (and S. Ehrlich) in his thoughts on the subject of the relationship of philosophical and political pluralism?

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In conclusion, one general reflection. Obviously, if we paraphrase the words of J. Wawrzyniak quoted at the beginning of this article and, at the same time, if we take them out of their pluralistic context, we can say that the point of departure of all politics, if it is not to be voluntaristic politics but corresponds to the real status quo, must be the perception of social reality as it is and not as its creators and actualizers would like it to be. The Polish reality is marked by a wide divergence of class and strata interests, a diversity of views on the issues, from economic to political-systems-type issues, a multiplicity of world views and the like. If the political system of the PRL is to be a system that harmonizes with the expectations of working people, it must clearly take into consideration this diversity that is manifested in our public life. There is no need to further justify the fact that the current efforts of the PZPR KC aim in this very direction, to enable the political system to fulfill these conditions in the best way possible. Likewise PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth], as a new plane uniting people with different beliefs, opens broad possibilities for the development of democracy in Poland hitherto not taken into consideration at all or taken advantage of only partially. This is only the beginning. Certainly, we will gradually have to set in order our electoral practice: eliminating the possibility of the manifestation within it of the mechanism of the "free play of political forces," we must ensure the citizens of our country conditions for the optimal selection of representatives to the organs of the local and legislative authorities.

There are still many such issues to be resolved. They must be discussed and we must find new solutions to perfect our class, socialist system of democracy. I do not share the view, however, that perceiving social life in its diversity (pluralistic aspects) means that we must also praise the pluralistic political system in the form of "socialist pluralism," "organized pluralism" or "allied pluralism" and I do not believe that the Marxist-Leninist party has to reach for the help of some sort of "socialist political pluralism" to perfect the system of socialist democracy. Only the social diversity that exists objectively in our society can strengthen and enhance such a system. Jan Muszynski, in his book entitled "Dyktatura proletariatu" [Dictatorship of the Proletariat], notes this very problem in these words: "(...) socialist democracy differs from bourgeois democracy in the sphere of political relations by not recognizing political pluralism to be ostensibly the most adequate manifestation of democracy. The purpose of democracy is to eliminate all social divisions and the things that cause them, while political pluralism means not only social and class differentiation, but it also leads to its preservation."¹⁴

I believe that these words express very succinctly why the idea and the practice of the building of socialism cannot be reconciled to the idea and practice of political pluralism.

It is for these same reasons that, 15 years ago at the Fifth PZPR Congress, our party came out decisively against the use of the concept of political pluralism in Poland. In a paper presented at that congress, Wladyslaw Gomułka said on the subject that "the creation of any sort of political structure that is antagonistic to the working class party and the working masses is nothing more than the anarchization of social and economic life and a waste of society's energies, and it opens the legal door to reaction and counterrevolution."¹⁵

Likewise for these same reasons, at the last (12th) KC Plenum of our party, PZPR KC first secretary Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski, speaking on the issue of political pluralism, stressed unequivocally that the taking into consideration of the differences that really exist in the approach to the many different national issues "(...) cannot have anything in common with so-called political pluralism, a concept that has been particularly in vogue during the past few years."¹⁶

FOOTNOTES

1. NOWE DROGI No 4, 1983.
2. Ibid., No 10, 1982, p 12 and No 12, 1982, p 155.
3. Ibid., No 9, 1982, "The Dialectic of the Party's Leadership Role and Socialist Democracy."
4. In a letter to the editor of NOWE DROGI published in last year's December issue, I spoke out against transplanting the pluralistic political system onto socialist soil, since it expresses the essence of bourgeois individualism and would introduce into the public life of socialism the rule of the "free play of political forces" corresponding to the large, intermediate and small owners of capital.
5. NOWE DROGI No 4, 1983, p 148.
6. J. Wawrzyniak has his merits, to be sure; in TU I TERAZ No 14, 1982, in an article entitled "On the Issue of Pluralism," he was the first to disseminate the concept of so-called socialist pluralism. And moreover, in a form that was somewhat modified by the editors, he also presented his idea in an article entitled "The Dialectic of the Party's Leadership Role and Socialist Democracy," in NOWE DROGI No 9, 1982.

Four months later Janusz Tereszynski, in the columns of POLITYKA, in an article entitled "Tolerant Thought and Compromise," 8 January 1983, brought into public circulation the following term, so-called organized pluralism, based ostensibly on the science of Marxism-Leninism, without which--as he claims--the process of socialist transformations, both economic and social, is impossible.

Two months after that, Mariusz Gulczynski, in an extensive two-part article entitled "How to Govern a Dissatisfied Society," TU I TERAZ, 2 and 8 March 1983, speaks in turn in favor of "allied pluralism, as a property of our political system."

7. See: the chapter entitled "Marxism and pluralism, pp 208-265 and the chapter entitled "On Certain Pluralistic Elements in the Socialist Reconstruction of Society," pp 266-345.

It is also characteristic that S. Ehrlich defines the perception of so-called pluralistic elements in Marxism as a "vital intellectual trend, capable of transmitting new content (...)," while he classifies the negative associations that are aroused in the Marxist community by the suggestion that political pluralism be transplanted onto socialist soil as dogmatism. "Oblicza pluralizmow," pp 264-265.

8. Stanislaw Ehrlich, "Oblicza pluralizmow," Warsaw, PWN, 1980, p 226.
9. And so: J. Wawrzyniak in NOWE DROGI No 9, 1982, p 122 claimed that the situation with which we have had to deal in Poland is an excellent illustration of the validity of the thesis "expressed" (?) by Marx and Engels in the quarrel with Bakunin over the need to distinguish organized pluralism from anarchistic pluralism and over the need to develop the former as a guarantor of democracy...

Meanwhile, Janusz Tereszynski, in POLITYKA, 8 January 1983, wrote that Marx and Engels "studied" [zajmowali sie] (?) the problems of pluralism, differentiating so-called organized pluralism from anarchistic pluralism.

10. Collected edition entitled "Historia dialektyki marksistowskiej" [A History of Marxist Dialectics], chapter 10, "The Substance and the Principle of Monism in Das Kapital," A. Sorokin, KiW [Book and Knowledge (publishing house)], 1977, pp 378-379.
11. NOWE DROGI, No 4, 1983, p 149.
12. Stanislaw Ehrlich, "Oblicza pluralizmow," PWN, 1980, pp 155-156, 161.
13. Ibid., p 14.
14. Jerzy Muszynski, "Dyktatura proletariatu," [Dictatorship of the Proletariat], PWN, 1981, p 302.
15. PZPR Fifth Congress. Materiały i dokumenty, KiW, 1968, p 188.
16. TRYBUNA LUDU, 3 June 1983.

8536

CSO: 2600/19

ROMANIA

LEAVE WITHOUT PAY, UNEXCUSED ABSENCES DEDUCTED FROM VACATION TIME

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 74, 5 Oct 83 p 5

[Council of State Decree Amending Law No 26/1967 on Vacation Leave for Workers]

[Text] The Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Sole article -- Article 9 of Law No 26/1967 on vacation leave for workers is amended and will read as follows:

Art. 9 -- (1) Leave without pay can be granted only under the conditions and for the period stipulated by law.

(2) For workers who benefitted from leave without pay which amounted to more than 30 days, during the 12 months prior to the granting of vacation leave, the vacation leave is reduced by the time which exceeds this period.

(3) The provisions of paragraph 2 do not apply in cases where the leave without pay was granted as a result of temporary reduction of the activity of the unit.

(4) Unexcused absences are deducted from the legal period of leave without pay.

(5) The management of the unit has the obligation of posting, on a quarterly basis, the names of the persons and the number of days which are deducted from their vacation leave because of leave without pay and unexcused absences.

NICOLAE CEAUSESCU

President of the Socialist
Republic of Romania

Bucharest, 10 September 1983
No 338

CSO: 2700/39

ROMANIA

LENGTH OF SERVICE REDUCED BY LEAVE WITHOUT PAY, UNEXCUSED ABSENCES

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 74, 5 Oct 83 p 6

[Council of State Decree Amending Law No 3/1977 on State Social Security and Social Assistance Pensions]

[Text] The Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Sole article -- Article 9 of Law No 3/1977 on state social security and social assistance pensions is amended and will read as follows:

Art. 9 -- (1) The length of service in a job which is taken into consideration in determining pensions for work executed is the time that a person has been employed on the basis of a labor contract.

(2) Unexcused absences and leave without pay are totalled up annually and are deducted from length of service.

(3) The management of a unit is obliged to post the names of the persons and the number of days which are deducted from their length of service for unexcused absences and leave without pay.

(4) Proof of length of service in a job, for the purpose of retirement, is given by means of the work card, drawn up in accordance with the law.

NICOLAE CEAUSESCU

President of the Socialist
Republic of Romania

Bucharest, 10 September 1983
No 339

CSO: 2700/39

DATA ON PRESS CIRCULATION, 1982-1983

Belgrade NASA STAMPA in Serbo-Croatian Jul-Aug 83 p 9

[Article by M. Danilovic: "Demand Less Than Supply"]

[Excerpts] The basic characteristic of trends in the circulation of newspapers in the first half of this year in comparison with the same period last year is the continued growth of total printed circulation, but also the percentage of the number of copies unsold--remainders.

In the first 6 months of this year a total of 585.8 million copies of newspapers were printed, i.e. about 3.3 percent more than in the same period in 1982. About 512.8 million copies were sold, i.e. 3 percent more than in the same period last year, with average remainders of 12.48 percent.

Growth in Circulation of the Sunday Review Press

The circulation of the Sunday issue of the Ljubljana DNEVNIK, the NEDELJSKI DNEVNIK, the newspaper with the highest circulation of the members of the community from Slovenia, showed a 5 percent increase in comparison with the same period last year, and achieved a circulation of 240,000 copies per issue. The other two Sunday issues of daily newspapers showed a decline in printed circulation: NEDELJNE NOVOSTI in Belgrade (1 percent) and NEDELJNA DALMACIJA in Split (11 percent).

The data on trends in average printed circulation for the other groups of newspapers cover titles whose circulation per issue is more than 100 copies.

According to this information, the circulation of the political and informational newspaper KOMUNIST is at last year's level.

Three news weeklies showed a decline in average printed circulation this year in comparison with the same period last year, i.e. SVIJET in Sarajevo (10 percent), NIN in Belgrade (7 percent), and DANAS in Zagreb (2 percent).

All of the Sunday review newspapers show an increase in printed circulation for the first half of this year in comparison with the same period last year, except for ILUSTROVANA POLITIKA.

Table 1: Average printed circulation in the January-June period,
1982 and 1983

<u>Naziv lista</u> ⁽¹⁾	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>Indeks</u> ⁽²⁾
AS--Sarajevo	84.757	215.159	254
ARENA--Zagreb	229.154	235.194	103
VIKEND--Zagreb	154.109	159.137	103
NOVOSTI 8--Beograd	103.015	116.900	113
ILUSTROVANA POLITIKA--Bgd.	295.123	289.074	98

Key:

1. Name of paper

2. Index

Table 2: Average printed circulation for the period January-June

<u>Naziv lista</u> ⁽¹⁾	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>Indeks</u> ⁽²⁾
Svijet--Zagreb	206.815	259.172	125
Nada--Beograd	330.5554	354.820	107
Bazar--Beograd	280.569	332.298	118
Prakticna zena--Beograd	100.838	99.903	99

Key:

1. Name of paper

2. Index

Table 3. Comparative Overview of Average Printed and Sold Circulation

Naziv lista ⁽¹⁾	Štampani ⁽²⁾			Prodani ⁽³⁾		
	1982	1983	Ind.	1982	1983	Ind. ⁽⁴⁾
SR BIH ⁽⁵⁾						
OSLOBODENJE	83.869	81.688	97	72.114	71.054	99
VEČERNJE NOVINE	18.169	34.679	191	15.117	24.750	164
GLAS'						
SR CRNA GORA ⁽⁶⁾						
POBJEDA	22.411	22.503	100	19.760	19.986	101
SR HRVATSKA ⁽⁷⁾						
VJESNIK	87.327	90.666	104	70.630	72.766	103
VEČERNJI LIST	319.884	339.145	106	289.733	306.673	106
SPORT. NOVOSTI	165.324	159.352	96	139.084	130.261	94
SLOBODNA DALMACIJA	75.360	75.057	101	67.430	69.658	103
NOVI LIST I GLAS ISTRE	74.471	78.745	106	68.088	71.417	105
GLAS SLAVONIJE	14.616	15.007	103	12.960	10.489	104
LA VOCE DEL POPOLO	4.137	4.161	101	2.901	2.862	99
SR MAKEDONIJA ⁽⁸⁾						
NOVA MAKEDONIJA	28.426	29.455	104	24.070	24.964	104
VEČER	33.058	37.012	112	28.055	31.619	113
SR SLOVENIJA ⁽⁹⁾						
DELO	102.374	104.888	102	97.842	99.297	101
DNEVNIK, Ljub.	54.641	53.822	99	51.951	51.081	98
VEČER Marib.	59.016	59.790	101	55.499	56.404	102
SR SRBIJA BEZ TER. SAP ⁽¹⁰⁾						
BORBA"	48.544	44.966	93	35.519	32.043	90
VEČER. NOVOSTI	380.315	379.074	100	336.666	340.178	101
SPORT	119.310	115.687	97	86.176	96.482	112
POLITIKA	274.477	280.397	102	242.136	249.084	103
EKSPRES	305.284	292.051	96	272.828	257.308	94
NARODNE NOVINE	8.163	8.349	102	7.199	7.789	108
PRIVREDNI PREGLED	16.306	14.643	90	16.306	77.254	44
SAP KOSOVO ⁽¹¹⁾						
RILINDA	43.851	45.684	104	38.128	40.809	107
JEDINSTVO	9.497	4.917	52	7.543	2.724	36
SAP VOJVODINA ⁽¹²⁾						
DNEVNIK	34.819	36.233	104	30.203	32.182	107
MAGYAR SZO	29.582	30.276	102	25.862	26.391	102

⁽¹⁾Tiraz 1983.--štampani--12.178⁽¹³⁾

prodani--8.824

⁽²⁾redovno izdanje + dvobroj⁽¹⁴⁾

[Key on following page]

Key:

- | | |
|------------------|---|
| 1. Name of paper | 10. Serbia without autonomous provinces |
| 2. Printed | 11. Kosovo |
| 3. Sold | 12. Vojvodina |
| 4. Index | 13. Circulation in 1983;
12,178 copies printed,
8,824 copies sold |
| 5. Macedonia | 14. Regular issue and
double issue |
| 6. Montenegro | |
| 7. Croatia | |
| 8. Macedonia | |
| 9. Slovenia | |

Of the 15 daily review newspapers, only INTERVJU in Belgrade showed an increase in circulation this year in comparison with the same period last year, by 31 percent. A decline in average circulation was shown by DUGA in Belgrade (1 percent) and START in Zagreb (16 percent).

The review radio and television papers showed a 2 percent increase in printed circulation in comparison with the same period last year. These included STUDIO in Zagreb (4 percent) and RTV REVIJA in Belgrade (3 percent), while the TV NOVOSTI review in Belgrade showed a decline of 1 percent.

The children's papers, whose circulation approached or exceeded 100,000 copies per issue, showed a high growth in average printed circulation in the first half of this year in comparison with the same period last year: the Belgrade KEKEC (30 percent), the Sarajevo MALE NOVINE, the Belgrade papers POLITICKI ZABAVNIK (18 percent) and MALI ZABAVNIK (16 percent), the Sarajevo paper VESELA SVESKA (11 percent), DECJE NOVINE (10 percent), and TIK-TAK (5 percent)--Gornji Milanovac, while the circulation of the children's paper ZEK, G. Milanovac, fell by 2 percent in comparison with the same period last year.

The supply of the papers intended for women and families in the first half of the year was increased by a total of 14 percent in comparison with the same period last year. All of the papers showed a growth in circulation, except for the Belgrade PRAKTICNA ZENA, whose circulation fell by 1 percent.

The only Sunday paper from this group of papers, the Ljubljana paper JANA, showed a 3 percent growth in printed circulation, and in the first half of this year achieved an average circulation of 138,326 copies.

The growth in the circulation of puzzle papers also continued in the first half of this year. The percentage of the increase in printed circulation was 24 percent. The data also indicate a larger supply of paperbacks and comic books in comparison with the same period last year.

9909

CSO: 2800/7

STATISTICS ON RELIGIOUS PRESS

Belgrade NASA STAMPA in Serbo-Croatian Jul-Aug 83 p 10

[Article by Miódrag Simic: "The Religious Press in Yugoslavia"]

[Excerpt] Constitutional Provisions and the Religious Press

The religious newspapers and journals are the organs of the religious communities whose establishment and regulations are derived from Section 1, Article 174 of the SFRY Constitution, which reads, "Profession of a religion is free and is a person's private business." This constitutional principle also guarantees the freedom of the religious press. This type of press in Yugoslavia is founded and issued by the religious communities that are grouped around the above-mentioned churches in our country.

The religious press in Yugoslavia, however, differs substantially from the public information media here, since the editorial boards of the religious publications do not have organs of the SAWPY, as is the case with the public information media in the SFRY. We can state--we must even emphasize--that religious publications have been issued freely since 1945. We can include among these certain newspapers and journals that were founded before World War II. We must stress for the sake of completeness that 10 religious publications⁴ were issued on the territory of Yugoslavia before the beginning of the April 1941 war. In 1957, only seven religious newspapers were published on the territory of the SFRY, in 1978 25 newspapers⁵, and in 1981, 115 newspapers⁶.

On the territory of the SFRY, eight religious communities publish their own newspapers and journals. In addition to the three leading churches, the Serban Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Islamic religious communities, organs are also published by the following religious communities: The Macedonian Orthodox Church⁷, the Reformists, the Evangelists, the Baptists, the Adventists, etc.

The frequency of publication of the religious press is divided into weekly, biweekly, bimonthly, quarterly and aperiodic. The largest number of religious newspapers and periodicals is published by the Roman Catholic Church (16), with considerably fewer being published by the Serbian Orthodox Church (4), while the other religious communities publish only one newspaper each⁸.

The territorial distribution could be described as follows: there are 10 newspapers published in Croatia, 4 in Serbia proper, 4 in Slovenia, 4 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one in Macedonia and two in Vojvodina⁹.

The data cited on the number of newspapers published by religious communities on the territory of the SFRY are from 1978. In 1981 and 1982 we were not able to establish exact data, but it is evident that their circulation has increased. Certain religious publications do not exceed a circulation of 50 copies, and so these were not analyzed. They are produced on a mimeograph and distributed to believers when religious services are conducted.

According to the data presented, we can state with complete certainty that the main religious centers are at the same time also the centers for religious periodicals, i.e. Zagreb, Ljubljana, Belgrade and Novi Sad.

The religious periodicals are financed from the funds of the religious organizations themselves and from voluntary contributions from the believers. Considerable financial resources are poured into the coffers of the religious organizations through assistance from foreign religious organizations, and to a lesser extent through the well-organized sales network for religious publications.

Certain religious periodicals have large circulations. A considerable number of periodicals, however, especially those reproduced on a mimeograph, have small circulations and are distributed gratis to the believers during services in religious places of worship.

The highest circulation was observed in 1973 with the newspaper GLAS KONCILA, which had a circulation of 130,000 copies per issue¹⁰. It is followed by the largest of the Ljubljana weeklies, DRUZINA, whose average circulation per issue in 1973 was 121,000 copies. PRAVOSLAVNI MISSIONAR, which is published in Belgrade as a bimonthly, had a circulation per issue of 48,000 copies in 1973.

We can note that religious newspapers are showing an expansion of publication through a comparison of the following data: in 1977, 79 newspapers were published by religious communities, societies, associations and churches with the following frequencies: weekly, biweekly, monthly and aperiodic. In 1977, by the time of publication and the publisher, there were 55 periodicals with the following frequencies: monthly, bimonthly, quarterly and sporadic. The circulation of newspapers in 1977 was 3,639,000, and the circulation of periodicals was 3,052,000 copies¹¹.

In 1981 a total of 115 newspapers were published with the same frequency, with a total circulation of 13,713,000 copies. In the same period, 46 periodicals were published with a total circulation of 8,714,000 copies.

In fact, when we compare the circulation of religious periodicals in 1977 and 1981, we observe a strong trend in publication, which is reflected in the following data: the number of newspapers in 1981 had increased by

10,074,000 copies since 1977, which is 376.83 percent. The number of periodicals increased by 5,622,000 copies, which is 285.52 percent.

The number of newspapers in 1981 increased by 36, an increase amounting to 145.57 percent, while the number of periodicals was reduced by 9, a decrease of 16.36 percent.

Major Newspapers of Religious Organizations in Serbia

PRAVOSLAVNI MISIONAR [Orthodox Missionary], the periodical of the Episcopal Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church. It is published as a bimonthly. The circulation in 1973 was 48,000 copies.

PRAVOSLAVLJE [Orthodoxy], the newspaper of the Serbian patriarchate. It has been published since 1967 with an average circulation of 30,000 copies.

VESNIK [Gazette], the organ of the Association of Serbian Orthodox Priests, which is published biweekly with a circulation of 3,500 copies.

Major Newspapers of Religious Organizations in Croatia

GLAS KONCILA [Voice of the Council], a newspaper published by the Archiepiscopal Consistory in Zagreb as a biweekly. In 1968 it had a circulation of 170,000 copies, in comparison to 1973, when its average circulation was 130,000 copies.

MALI KONCIL [Small Council], issued by the same publisher as a monthly with an average circulation of 50,000 copies per issue.

GLAS EVANDJELJA [Voice of the Gospels], a bimonthly published by the Baptist Alliance of Churches in the SFRY in Zagreb, with 5,000 copies in 1973.

Major Newspapers of Religious Organizations in Slovenia

DRUZINA [Family], a newspaper published by the Slovenian Bishopric in Ljubljana as a weekly with a circulation of 120,000 copies per issue in 1973.

OGNJISCE [Hearth], a newspaper from the Apostolic Administration for the Slovenian coast. It is published in Koper and is intended for youth, with an average circulation of 80,000 copies in 1973. It is published as a monthly.

Major Newspapers of Religious Organizations in Bosnia-Hercegovina

GLASNIK VRHOVNOG ISLAMSKOG STARJESINSTVA U SFRJ [Organ of the Supreme Islamic Elders in the SFRY], a newspaper published as a bimonthly and issued by the Supreme Islamic Elders in Sarajevo. The average circulation per issue in 1973 was 15,000 copies.

Conclusion

In proportion to the development difficulties of our self-managing system, many forces of an anti-self-management nature are attempting to undermine our self-managing social order. We see that the most reactionary part of the clergy of various religious communities is also involved in subversive activity against our system. Recently we have observed increasingly more intensive activity by individuals who are trying to use the religious press to spread various ideas foreign to our self-managing socialist society.

We must also add to this the anti-Yugoslav propaganda that is being directed from abroad with respect to our country. The clergy is actively participating in this anti-Yugoslav campaign, along with individual church organizations, church missions and individuals. Particularly dangerous is the activity of these church circles with respect to our citizens temporarily working abroad. These groups are creating their own church organizations, which through various activities are trying to inspire our citizens.

These religious organizations abroad which are directed toward our citizens are becoming an increasingly more evident and significant political factor that particularly has to be taken into account, since there are frequent cases in which individuals from these centers make an alliance without extremist emigres and foreign intelligence services.

FOOTNOTES

4. Zivorad K Stojkovic, "Stampa naroda i narodnosti u SFRJ 1945-1973" [The Press of the Peoples and Nationalities of the SFRY 1945-1973]. Yugoslav Institute for Journalism, Belgrade 1975, p 294.
5. "Leksikon novinarstva" [Lexicon of Journalism], Savremena administracija [Modern Administration], Belgrade 1979, p 349.
6. Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia (further SGJ), BIGZ, Belgrade, August 1982, p 378.
7. The Macedonian Orthodox Church publishes the "Sluzbeniot list na Makedonska pravoslavna crkva" [Official Gazette of the Macedonian Orthodox Church] in Skopje with a monthly and bimonthly frequency. It also publishes an annual calendar in the Macedonian language. There are no aperiodic publications.
8. Leksikon novinarstva, p 349.
9. Ibid., p 349.
10. In frequency, GLAS KONCILA is a biweekly newspaper.
11. Leksikon novinarstva, pp 380-381.

RILINDJA NOTES TETOVO MEASURES TO REDUCE POPULATION

[Editorial Report] RILINDJA, the Albanian-language daily published in Pristina, on 28 September 1983, page 7, reports "six conclusions" aimed "against the birthrate" issued by Tetovo Opstina in Macedonia. It cites the Tetovo report as saying that according to 1981 data 163,567 persons live in this opstina, or 8.5 percent of the republic's total population, i.e., 160 persons per square kilometer, compared to the republic average of 75 per square kilometer. This high population density is attributed to a high birthrate, as well as immigration. An average of 4,000 births and 1,000 deaths are recorded here annually. The Tetovo Opstina Assembly therefore issued conclusions at its last meeting aimed at checking the "rapid increase in the population." The "conclusions" point out that both natural population increase, as well as the arrival of mechanics [from outside the opstina] have intensified educational, public health, and employment problems; measures will be taken to prevent an increase in the number of mechanics shops not "organized by or incorporated into associated labor." RILINDJA inserts an exclamation point after the statement that rights to social welfare allowances for children will be limited for families with more than three children. The Tetovo medical center is to increase its involvement with birth control measures, and "all organs and organizations, SAWP and the LC, and enterprises are to take concrete action aimed toward lowering the birthrate and limiting immigration into the opstina, as well as increased action in support of family planning.

CSO: 2100/9

END