The Battle of the Bulge Intelligence Lessons for the Army After Next
Abstract
Some argue that military intelligence can no longer be a doctrinally-based organization. Technological changes occur so fast that "technology will drive and doctrine will spin, our intelligence operations." This paper examines Third Army intelligence operations, primarily from September through December 1944, leading up to the Battle of the Bulge, for lessons learned. The paper identifies ten historic lessons that provide the basis for some of our intelligence doctrine today and that can serve as cornerstones for intelligence doctrine and operations in the Army After Next. It then argues that technology should not drive intelligence operations. Rather, well-trained intelligence professionals, who have studied history and understand doctrine and the intelligence battlefield operating system, will deliver intelligence that commanders can use.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 1999
- Accession Number
- ADA364412
Entities
People
- Michael D. Rosenbaum
Organizations
- United States Army War College