Securing the U.S. Defense Information Infrastructure: A Proposed Approach.
Abstract
This report addresses the survivability and assured availability of essential U.S. information infrastructures, especially when they are under various forms of "information warfare" attack. To the best of our knowledge, the term "minimum essential information infrastructure" (MEII) was coined by one of the authors (Mesic) as part of the planning for a series of "Day After. in Cyberspace" information warfare exercises conducted from 1995 to the present under the direction of our RAND colleague Roger Molander. The idea is that some information infrastructures are so essential that they should be given special attention, perhaps in the form of special hardening, redundancy, rapid recovery, or other protection or recovery mechanisms. Players in the "Day After" exercises were intrigued by the MEII concept but asked: Is this concept feasible? Is it practical? For what portions of the Department of Defense and U.S. infrastructure is the concept relevant? What would such infrastructures look like? How effective or useful would they be? This report documents the findings of the first year of a study of the MEII concept, attempting to formulate some initial answers to these questions-or, if these are not the right questions, to ask and answer better ones. This report should be of interest to persons responsible for assuring the reliability and availability of essential information systems throughout the U.S. defense establishment, the U.S. critical infrastructure, and other organizations. Its findings and recommendations are relevant at all organizational levels, from small units to major commands.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1999
- Accession Number
- ADA365673
Entities
People
- Brian Houghton
- Phillip M. Feldman
- Richard Mesic
- Robert H. Anderson
- Scott Gerwehr
Organizations
- RAND Corporation