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SELECTED SOVIET MILITARY TRANSLATIONS

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
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## SELECTED SOVIET MILITARY TRANSLATIONS

(Materials on the Soviet Navy)

/ Following are translations of articles taken from several issues of the Russian-language newspaper Sovetskiy flot (Soviet Navy), Moscow, Vol. 23. Individual issue numbers, dates, names of authors, and page numbers are given below./

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1944  
1945

STANDARD GOVERNMENT PRACTICES

(Listed in the order of)

Following is a list of the various  
standard government practices which  
have been developed by the various  
agencies of the Government and  
which are being used by the  
various agencies of the Government.

1.  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
6.  
7.  
8.  
9.  
10.

- I. Standard Practice of the (1944)
- II. Standard Practice of the (1945)
- III. Standard Practice of the (1946)
- IV. Standard Practice of the (1947)
- V. Standard Practice of the (1948)
- VI. Standard Practice of the (1949)
- VII. Standard Practice of the (1950)
- VIII. Standard Practice of the (1951)
- IX. Standard Practice of the (1952)
- X. Standard Practice of the (1953)

I. TACTICAL TRAINING OF AIRCRAFT CREWS  
( SUBMARINE SEARCH)

No. 78, (6099), 1 April, Major A. Kiklevich  
1960, page 2

No matter how high a flight crew's state of training in the technique of piloting, the crew cannot fulfill its combat task completely if it is unable to evaluate correctly the situation that has developed, and to use the most effective tactical procedure. The training of tactical elements must be an organic part of the over-all training of the flight crew. This provides for harmonious growth in the officer's training. When organizing such training, it is necessary to take into consideration the level of training and the individual peculiarities of the crew members.

A good form of training is detailed tactical critiques of the fulfillment of each flight. These permit the entire flight crew to consider the shortcomings of their comrades and to assimilate advanced experience more rapidly. We made a detailed analysis, for example, of the flight made by the crew in which Senior Lieutenant Chayka is navigator. The crew had been given the mission of searching, together with ships, for an "enemy" submarine. The mission did not present any special difficulties for the crew. The necessary data for preparation for flight arrived in time. And both the pilot and the navigator already had experience in carrying out exercises under complicated weather conditions, far from shore.

The flight began successfully. The crew arrived at the zone of operations in plenty of time. Communications were established immediately with the cooperating ship. In general, everything looked as if the training mission would be fulfilled without any special difficulty.

But then the first hypothetical situation was introduced: the aircraft radar set began to act up. The crew's confidence in the accuracy of fixing the location of the flying boat and the cooperating ship was shaken. And visual observation was precluded because of the complicated weather. Then another instrument was supposed to fail. Lacking the proper knowledge of the tactics of joint operations in such conditions,

the crew ceased to fulfill their training mission and returned to the airfield.

Did the aircraft commander make the correct decision under the conditions that had been created? Did the crew really have no other way out of the situation? Of course the decision was incorrect! There was a way out. In the situation that developed, the pilot and navigator were supposed to use the radar equipment of the cooperating ship for purposes of orientation. The partial failure of an instrument also would not have exerted a very strong influence if the crew had shown more initiative and had been tactically experienced. Even if it was defective, it could have been used to solve the task, since the task was being fulfilled not independently, but in cooperation with a surface vessel.

Thus, even in that complicated situation the crew should have continued to search for the "enemy." It did not do so only because it lacked sufficient knowledge of the tactics of joint operations and of the possibilities of shipboard equipment.

Subsequently, when proper attention was devoted in the subdivision to the use of shipboard radar facilities in a joint search for the "enemy," the pilots and navigators began to use that method successfully for solving similar tasks under complicated meteorological conditions and at night.

Another time the same crew was again unable to complete its mission because of its poor state of tactical training. As in the first instance, the crew arrived on the spot in time, established contact with the cooperating commander, and began to conduct observation. But, carried away by that observation, the crew failed to notice that the established intervals were not being kept. Interference developed. Instead of correctly observing the tactics of operations and restoring the intervals, the pilot and navigator took another, very primitive, path. Their decision produced only a temporary effect and then the interference returned. And that took a considerable period of time. Naturally, this only helped the "enemy."

These and other instances in the practice of operations at sea vividly showed our weak areas in the training of individual crews. Certain measures were developed and carried out to improve the crews' tactical training. These measures yielded good results. The

quality of fulfillment of similar exercises rose noticeably.

One time the crew that Captain Sapunenko commands was given the mission of intercepting, jointly with a ship, an "enemy" submarine. Although the situation was not completely known to the crew and they were given only a short period of time in preparation for the flight, the pilot and navigator nevertheless performed in an exceptionally clear-cut and confident manner. Captains Sapunenko and Levit quickly and correctly evaluated the situation and, taking the peculiarities of the area into consideration, selected and used the most effective tactical procedure that permitted them to make complete utilization of the possibilities of the equipment on the aircraft and the cooperating ship. The "enemy" was discovered and the aircraft directed the ship firmly to him.

The increasing of the tactical training of our crews and the rapid elimination of shortcomings in carrying out joint operations with surface vessels have been greatly helped by personal contacts between the pilots and navigators and the ship commanders. Exercises conducted jointly with sailors, as is sometimes the practice, have also demonstrated themselves well, particularly joint training in the fulfillment of training exercises. Exercise critiques held jointly with the officer personnel of the ships participating in the joint operations also had their beneficial influence upon increasing the tactical training of the flight personnel.

In order not merely to maintain the achieved level, but to increase the crews' skill still more, it is necessary to have regular exercises on tactics in classrooms, during the course of ground training. Unfortunately, all commanders of subdivisions are not able to make wise use of exercises on the ground for purposes of improving the tactical training of their subordinates. Feeling that the best training is practice flights, these comrades have recently shown less attention to such a form of tactical training as unannounced quizzes. In some subdivisions they have begun to be held infrequently, and their content is impoverished.

Experience tells us that unannounced tactical quizzes that are well prepared and skillfully carried out not only help to increase the flight crew's

training, but also contribute to developing new methods of operations, the more effective use of new combat means. Unannounced tactical quizzes are a very effective form of training, since they are concrete and close to the practical tasks that the crews fulfill. True, for this purpose it is necessary for the persons directing the exercises to create a real, and acute, situation when preparing and carrying out the unannounced quiz, and for them to force the officers to show initiative in their actions, to make decisions that anticipate the use of all the possibilities of present-day technology for achieving the goal.

In our view, the tactical training of subordinates is the concern chiefly of the commander himself. The carrying out of exercises should not be entrusted to other persons. If the commander wants his subdivision to be distinguished by a high level of tactical training, he must not only direct the course of instruction, but also personally prepare and conduct the exercise.

II. PAPER FAIRYLAND  
( RED TAPE IN THE AUXILIARY FLEET )  
Colonel V. Maksyuk

No. 78 (6099), 1 April  
1960, page 4

The program of the Moscow circus contains an unusual number. It is called "Water Fairyland." The audience is surprised to see cascades of water suddenly pour onto the ring from offstage. The water seethes, bubbles, and noisily fills the circus ring.

This kind of fairyland can be seen not only at the circus, but also in certain fleet installations. But the workers there replace the stream of water with paper.

Some character sits somewhere in an office and, by the sweat of his brow, invents various memoranda, report forms, and so on and so forth. Day and night he wracks his brain inventing a form that is just a little bit more involved, and making sure that it will contain as many different paragraphs and subparagraphs as possible. He is less interested in having that memorandum be of any use. The main thing is to have it look just a little bit more solid, a little bit more voluminous.

We have in front of us a document put out by the Administration of the Auxiliary Fleet of the KBF / Krasnozhamenny Baltiyskiy Flot -- Red Banner Baltic Fleet / for 1959. It is a thick tome of 183 pages. It took 2½ months to prepare it. How much effort and how much energy was expended! How much paper was used in writing it!

This document contains a section that is supposed to give information on the command personnel of ships. It covers no more and no less than 34 unfolded pages the size of huge bedsheets. In addition to the ordinary information, the following columns have to be filled in for each person: the naval academies from which he was graduated; the kind of diploma he has, and its number; whether or not he has a seaman's passport, and, if so, its number; the important towing operations he has engaged in; how many miles he has sailed with and without towing; length of service in the auxiliary fleet and the positions he has filled on sea-going vessels; whether he is allowed to stand watch at sea; knowledge of the theater and areas in which he

has sailed; how he keeps the ship; ability to train his personnel; whether he manifests any shortcomings in his work; whether he deserves a promotion.

This information was supposed to be submitted to Moscow.

"Who needs all this?" I asked Captain 2nd Rank Tskitishvili.

"That's hard to say," he answered. "Probably nobody. But that's supposed to be required according to the list of periodic reports. You can't do anything about it. It's the system."

The most interesting thing about it is the fact that during the 2½ months the report was being prepared, it had become essentially obsolete. Some of the comrades listed in it are no longer working on auxiliary vessels. Some have been released and others have gone to training establishments.

They say that when this voluminous work was finally completed, the people in the Administration of the Auxiliary Fleet began to breath easier and a joyful smile appeared on the officers' faces. At last the load was off their backs! But the "calm" did not last long. Soon they were all back at their memoranda.

No matter when you drop into that installation you will inevitably encounter the combined clatter of typewriters. From morning until late at night the fountain pens scratch untiringly in the offices. During 10 months of last year alone, 3,969 incoming documents were registered here. The workers of the UFF / Upravleniye vspomogatel'nogo flota -- Administration of the Auxiliary Fleet / were no slouchers either. They sent out 3,152 memoranda during the same period. What is this if not a paper fairyland?

The paper flood is continuing unabated in 1960. In 2½ months, more than 900 different documents arrived at the Administration of the Auxiliary Fleet and 500 left.

But the workers of the UFF can scarcely hope to take first place in the paperwork race. They have serious rivals in the fleet. Last year, for example, more than 4,000 (four thousand!) different documents arrived at the staff of the "X" ship formation. Many of them bore the magical words, "report execution." In answer, the staff sent more than 2,000 documents to higher echelons and to ships.

Cruiser X. was returning from a long trip. After the most important affairs had been completed, the executive officer, Captain 3rd Rank Krasnov, prepared to go ashore. Just then there was a knock on his cabin door and the ship's yeoman placed a thick bundle marked "Incoming" on his desk.

The officer took off his coat, sat down in an armchair, and became engrossed in reading the correspondence that had arrived. . . . for purposes of maintaining steadfast well-being and preventing the development of infectious diseases among table-of-supply service animals and hogs kept in galleys, I recommend. . . ."

The captain 3rd rank rubbed his eyes. "What kind of gobbledygook is this, anyway! Am I dreaming, or what?" he thought. Reading on, he became more and more perplexed. The 10-page mimeographed directive outlined in detail the measures of combatting glanders and tetanus in horses, erysipelatous diseases in hogs, and hoof-and-mouth diseases in cattle. Detailed recommendations were given for conducting a campaign to combat those diseases.

The reader may naturally ask the question: How do all these diseases of hogs and cattle concern the crew of a combat vessel? We asked that question of Colonel Vasil'yev of the veterinary service, whose signature was at the bottom of the directive.

Comrade Vasil'yev threw up his hands and said, "I can't understand myself how that document got on a combat vessel. It probably got sent out by the wrong distribution list.

It seems that certain administrative workers sometimes are completely uninterested in where the documents that they prepare and sign are sent. Then standard distribution lists go into effect. So, as a result, the staffs and administrations shoot out flocks of papers that make their way to the ships, units and subdivisions. That is how a ship happened to receive a 13-page directive on organizing classes on their specialty with workers in the motor transport service, as well as other general instructions and directions that have nothing to do with the crew's work or living conditions.

"We must admit," Captain 3rd Rank Krasnov says, "that as soon as the ship sets out to sea, we get a rest from these documents. But as soon as we get back

to base, it starts all over again. There's no let-up in it. You can judge for yourself by knowing that this year we have already received about 600 documents. That's quite a little number, don't you think?

Quite a little!

The problem of cutting down the amount of paper correspondence has been discussed at very important conferences. It has also been mentioned at a fleet Party conference. Appropriate decisions have been made repeatedly.

And still the paper fairyland continues.

### III. INDEPENDENCE WILL INCREASE RESPONSIBILITY

(WATCH OFFICERS)  
No. 85 (6106), 9 April 1960, page 2  
Senior Lieutenant V. Dvorkin

After reading Rear Admiral A. Aistov's article, "A Watch Officer's Responsibility," which was published in the 16 March issue of Sovetskiy flot, I decided to express my thoughts on the subject dealt with by the author.

How can one fail to agree with Comrade Aistov that a watch officer must be completely trained and must fulfill in an exemplary manner the demands required of him by the regulations? One of these demands is that he must act independently in situations where delay is impossible. But this means that the watch officer must know how to maneuver in simple situations and in complex ones, that he must know how to moor his ship, how to anchor it, or moor it to mooring buoys. Let me cite an example.

A ship was the last one in a line along the pier. The senior officer on it at that time was officer Barinov. The ship that was the first in the line cast off its mooring lines and departed. The stern of the ship on which Barinov was located started to swing away from the pier. The commander and the executive officer were nowhere nearby.

Barinov's problem was, should he wait for the commander to arrive, or should he moor the ship himself? Just imagine that picture. The officer on the bridge was one who had served on the ship for 3 years and he was mulling over the question, "What should I do? Should I show independence? But if I do, I might 'catch it' from the commander. Yet it doesn't make sense to wait..." The officers standing on the mooring encouraged him, "Hey, Barinov, do something!"

The officer successfully coped with the task, and moored the ship properly. But his fears were justified: the commander arrived and gave Barinov a strict reprimand. The gist of it was, "Don't take on duties that aren't yours."

It is not difficult to understand the commander's action: Barinov had not moored the ship before, and he might have made a mistake that might have cost the ship dearly. But who is to blame for

that? Why have the watch officers never been given training either in docking, or in mooring to mooring buoys? Situations might arise in which one of the officers might have to take the ship away from the pier without the commander's help -- for example, in the event that there is a fire on the pier.

What I have said suggests the conclusion: officers must be trained for independent actions! And here we approach the chief topic of Comrade Aistov's article -- the topic of the high responsibility of the watch officer for the duties entrusted to him. Who can object to the statement that it is only when actions are independent that one can feel complete responsibility for them, a responsibility that is shared with no one? Hence it turns out that the responsibility and the independence of the watch officer are concepts that are very closely inter-related. If the officer is independent, his responsibility will also increase.

#### IV. BEFORE GOING TO SEA

##### (CRUISE TRAINING PLANS)

No. 85 (6106), 9 April  
1960, page 2

Captain 1st Rank V.  
Zagorodny, Staff  
Officer

The time when a ship is at sea is the most valuable time for training the crew. And in order to have that time used fruitfully, it is necessary to have all cruises, regardless of their importance and duration, carefully planned and prepared at the base.

The planning of combat training in general, and training at sea in particular, is a complicated business that requires a creative approach and the consideration of many factors. Each plan must be a real one and must regulate the crew's actions in maintaining their place and time.

In our unit, graphic plans for ship departures have become widespread. They are simple to prepare. Preliminary plottings are made on a chart of the navigation region, and notations are made of the training exercises that are being carried out in any of the sectors that the particular crew is supposed to proceed through. Obviously, in addition, specific plans for each measure are also prepared. The virtue of such a plan is its graphic clarity. By noting the position of the ships on the chart, the leader immediately sees what measure each of them must carry out at a particular time. The graphic plan helps to prevent the carrying out of certain exercises in regions where they are not authorized or where they would be undesirable.

The graphic plan also indicates the intensity of training of the particular crew at each stage of the cruise. It used to happen frequently that the fulfillment of a single task would be planned for the entire cruise, for example, artillery firing or submarine search and attack. And this shortcoming somehow did not attract attention because, formally speaking, everything was included in the plan, departure from the base, voyage into the area, fulfillment of the exercise, and return to base. But that kind of plan does not direct the personnel to

active training, to the fruitful use of every mile of the cruise.

In order to have training plans conform to the high requirements of today's situation, they must become the subject of special concern on the part of staff officers, ship commanders, their executive officers, and the commanders of ship subdivisions. A well-prepared plan evokes in the seamen a burning desire to fulfill in an exemplary manner all the tasks assigned to them.

The crew on a certain destroyer achieved good scores in combat and political training. The achievements were especially noticeable in the subdivisions of mechanical engineer Radetskiy and navigator Valyunin. The ship fulfills its training tasks with very good results. The successes of the destroyer are explained to a large extent by the careful planning of the combat exercise. An over-all written and graphic plan is prepared for each departure here, and the commanders of the subdivisions also have well-developed plans. Prepared in detail, they discipline the officers and men executing the assignments, and facilitate checking on their actions. All this leads to a situation in which each mile of sailing is used fruitfully for improving the men's training.

The plan for each cruise can be considered complete only in the event that it is sufficiently flexible. Combat training at sea requires various means of support. Is it infrequent that a ship arrives at the region where it is supposed to fire at an aerial target, and the aircraft is not there because of unfavorable weather conditions? If the plan does not provide for this exigency, there will inevitably be a hitch: before it is decided what the ship is supposed to do next, a certain amount of time will pass and fuel and motor time will be wasted. But it is a different matter when alternate procedures for the crew's actions have been planned. No time will be wasted then.

Once one of the destroyers set out to sea in order to fulfill a routine training task. Suddenly there was a sharp change in the weather and the supporting forces did not arrive at the assigned area on time. The ship did not waste time waiting for them, but fulfilled the alternate assignment that had been provided for by the plan. A ship-wide exercise on

damage control and a radio-rangefinder exercise were carried out. The cruise proved to be very fruitful.

Some commanders think out their departure plans carefully when the ship is leaving to fulfill ship's-course assignments, but they do not bother to do any planning if the ship is departing to provide support for the combat training of other ships. A certain destroyer was used for a long period of time as a support vessel. Could not the ship, in addition to supporting combat training, also carry out many of its own tasks? Of course it could! The staff specialists and the Communist Party members on the ship saw this incorrect situation. But for some reason they did not become alarmed at the abnormal state of affairs. Of course such situations are very rare. But they should be completely nonexistent.

Each departure plan should provide for a critique: a detailed analysis of the actions of the officers and their subordinates. Detailed critiques of departures contribute to having everything valuable and advanced that the subdivisions and the individual specialists can contribute, become general property. In addition, the critiques help to plan the next cruises better.

Planning is one of the important prerequisites providing for high quality of combat training. This must always be remembered.

V. RADIOMEN ARE LEARNING IN A NEW MANNER  
No. 85 (6106), 9 April Captain A. Mordasov  
1960, page 2

What has to be done to have cadet radiotelegraphers master their equipment more quickly and more rapidly? This question was asked of the instructors in our subdivision at the beginning of the training year. The proposals made were varied. The proposal that evoked special interest and animated discussion was that the young sailors should become acquainted with radio equipment from the very beginning of their training, without waiting for their theoretical courses, or their study of the working principles of the receivers and transmitters, to be completed.

"But how will the sailors handle them?" the opponents of this proposal asked. "They'll twist the dials and burn out the tubes..."

"Can't a student turn on a radio receiver or television set at home, and even tune it in?" the adherents of the new method answered.

"What about the time it will take?" the first would ask, unconvinced. "Won't that change the training plan?"

"It wouldn't have to be changed," they were told. "You could use the sailors' hours of unorganized training, and the evening hours. The principal thing is to get the sailors' interest, and then they will try to spend every free moment near the equipment."

Summing it up, everyone agreed that the theoretical and practical training of the specialists should be carried out simultaneously.

\* \* \*

In the breaks between combat assignments, cadets would frequently ask the platoon commander, officer Vavilin, "When will we be able to get into the training lab? We want to look at the equipment."

Finally the day arrived when the spacious, comfortable laboratory, equipped with the most up-to-date radiocommunications facilities, took on its first

shift. The sailors were dazzled by the abundance of varied equipment.

After setting up the shift, Vavilin told the men about the aim of the exercise and the procedure for carrying it out. Then he assigned the cadets to their posts. They were shown how to handle the equipment.

Commands rang out: "Switch on rectifier power supply!"

"Switch on anode voltage!"

Midshipmen Lapshin and Ostapenko help the instructor. They watch the sailors attentively and correct them. After all the receivers have been put into operation, a new command follows:

"Tune to your frequency!"

First one cadet, then another, then a third, hears the telegraphic-code slash mark, which is already familiar to him.

"Numbers!" one of the sailors cries.

"Copy them!" orders Major Vavilin.

That is the way they transcribe their first message. The joy it brings to the cadets! Each of them feels that he is becoming a real radiotelegrapher.

At subsequent classes Vavilin not only acquainted the cadets with the rules for operating the equipment, but also carried out training exercises in receiving radiograms, and taught his subordinates to maintain the watch documents and to observe radio-traffic rules. The laboratory technicians, Captain Ryabinin and midshipmen Lapshin and Ostapenko, rendered a great amount of assistance to the instructor. They equipped the combat posts to be exactly like ship-board ones, and prepared a number of visual aids that facilitate training the radiomen.

The innovators proposed using magnetic tape recorders in their training exercises. Formerly a low-power transmitter was set up in the room next to the lab, and the instructor sent the training texts by key. Now the necessity for that has disappeared. Before the classes, the necessary texts are recorded on magnetic tape. The tape recorder is switched onto the transmitter and the cadets receive the messages by tuning to the assigned frequency. The use of the magnetic tape recorder spared the instructor much tiresome work and made it possible to create at the

classes an atmosphere that is as close as possible to actual conditions.

Two months later the results were tallied up. Officer Bakuntsev, company commander, noted that the training of the personnel by the new method had yielded good results. Officer Vavilin's platoon was noted especially. Many soldiers in that platoon got "Outstanding" ratings. The cadets quickly acquired work habits for handling the equipment and stand training radio watches with self-assurance.

## VI. WE ARE WAITING FOR YOU IN THE FAR EAST

(DISCHARGED SAILORS)

No. 87 (6108), 12 April 1960, page 1  
S. Luk'yanchenko,  
Party Committee Secretary

The Soviet Union's foreign-trade links are expanding with each passing year. The role of the sea-going merchant fleet is also increasing steadily. The ships of the Far Eastern Maritime State Steamship Agency are delivering cargoes to ports of brotherly China and the Korean People's Democratic Republic, and to India and Indonesia. We sail to ports of Japan, Canada, and other countries.

The ships of our steamship agency also carry cargoes that are important to the national economy to ports of the Soviet Arctic, distant Chukotka, and the Kamchatkan Peninsula, and maintain regular communication with ports on the Sea of Okhotsk, the island of Sakhalin, and the Primorskiy Kray littoral. Our ships also sail to ports of the Black and Baltic seas, and make continuous sailings over the Northern Sea route.

The Far Eastern Steamship Agency has large, modern ships, mechanized ports, and ship-repair and other enterprises. A large contingent of sailors, port workers, ship-repair workers, and construction workers works selflessly here. They have successfully fulfilled the state plan for the first year of the Seven-Year Plan.

Large tasks confront the steamship agency. By the end of the Seven-Year Plan the volume of shipments in coastal shipping will almost double, and foreign shipments will increase by more than 2.3 times! In 1960 our fleet will be augmented by 18 modern ships with a total load capacity of more than 80,000 tons. They will include tankers, a passenger liner, coal ships, icebreakers, and other ships. Ports and ship-repair enterprises will receive further development.

The sailors in the steamship agency were greatly pleased to hear that a large contingent of servicemen who had been discharged in accordance with the Law Concerning the New Considerable

Reduction in the Armed Forces would join the ranks of the workers in the national economy.

Immediately after the Fourth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, from dozens of ships on distant voyages the crews sent radiograms stating that they were ready to receive the discharged servicemen cordially. On many ships the crews pledged themselves to shower concern and attention on the servicemen arriving in the fleet, creating the best conditions for their most rapid mastery of their chosen trades. These pledges were made, in particular, by the crews on the "Yenisey" diesel electric ship, the "Tsiolkovskiy" steamship, and other ships.

Excellent prospects are opening up before the discharged servicemen who had expressed a desire to work in our steamship agency. Let me cite an example. Several years ago, Petty Officer Neshchadimov arrived at the Far Eastern Steamship Agency after being discharged from one of the ships in the Pacific Ocean fleet. The young sailor worked well and also studied at the same time. Soon he finished his courses and was assigned the duty of third navigator. But the Pacific Ocean lad did not stop at what he had achieved. Instead he continued to improve his knowledge. He worked as the second, and finally the senior navigator, and finally was promoted to the rank of ship captain. Last year Reserve Petty Officer Neshchadimov was graduated from the Vladivostok Higher Engineering Academy, and received the rank of engineer-deck officer. At the present time he has been assigned the post of captain of a large ship that is being constructed for the Soviet Union in a Danish shipyard.

A large number of officers who were discharged from the Navy and from the Soviet Army are working in the Far East basin. Some of them are sailing on ships as captains or their executive officers. For example, Comrade Borisov is working successfully as navigator on the "Mikoyan" icebreaker. Just 2½ years ago discharged officer Muratov joined us. At the present time he is sailing as second navigator. Discharged political workers are also working well on ships of the steamship company. Many of them are working as mates for political affairs, or in the apparatus of the Party Committee of maritime transport.

Recently a group of discharged officers began

to work at our place. Fleet political workers comrades Drovovoz and Khamatov were assigned to the post of first mates, and reserve officer comrade Kotelkin was assigned to the post of the chief of the radio section.

As a result of the fact that the merchant fleet is being augmented with new ships, and as a result of the development of ports and ship-repair plants, we have a great need for cadres. Diesel engineers, engine-room specialists, sailors, and other specialists are needed for work on ships. We also need mechanizers, deck officers, ship's engineers, machinists, and stokers. Our construction organizations can take on a large contingent of specialists.

The discharged servicemen accepted for work at the steamship agency will continue to receive instruction by the individual-brigade method immediately at their place of assignment, and will receive their new specialty rating in 5 or 6 months. They will be greatly aided in this by experienced sailors. In Vladivostok and other ports there has been created a network of correspondence secondary and higher institutions specializing in naval training, where the discharged servicemen will receive their new technical training.

At the present time, by decision of the Soviet Government, the steamship agency is changing over to the 7-hour workday and to the new system of payment for labor, which anticipates an increase in the sailor's wages.

The many thousands of workers in the Far East basin are working in close solidarity. A socialist competition has started with new strength in the fleet, in the ports, and at the ship-repair plants, among the construction workers. This is a guarantee that the greater tasks of the second year of the Seven-Year Plan will be successfully fulfilled. In the solution of these tasks a worthy contribution will also be made by discharged servicemen.

VII. NON-T/O GUN CREWS CONDUCT FIRING  
No. 88 (6109), 13 April 1960, page 2 Senior Lieutenant  
L. Shillis

The idea of creating non-T/O, double-up, artillery crews on board our ship did not come to us accidentally. It was suggested to us by senior comrades who had participated in the Great Patriotic War. During the war double-up antiaircraft artillery crews had operated successfully on ships. Their creation was dictated by the striving to keep the ship in a state of combat readiness even when the basic complement of the crew had been put out of commission.

That is why we decided to introduce the war experience into the practice of peacetime combat training, to create non-T/O artillery crews on our ship too. The personnel supported this suggestion.

The responsibility for training the second crews of antiaircraft gunners was entrusted to Communist Party member Senior Lieutenant Nazarov. A very large number of men wanted to take part. The men striving to achieve a second specialty included machinists, stokers, electricians, torpedomen, and torpedo and artillery electricians. It was decided to train them all. Classes began. They were held on definite days, strictly at the established time.

Then the day came when our new artillery men were supposed to take a practical examination, to show what they had learned, to show how they had mastered their second specialty.

The ship was preparing to set off to sea. The crews checked their equipment and prepared their ammunition. Their actions were checked by petty-officer specialists. In "combat" the personnel of the double-up artillery crews showed that they had been excellently trained. The sailors worked smoothly, harmoniously, self-assuredly, and opened fire at the proper time. The firing was carried out without any flaws. The crews headed by petty officers Abashev and Khokhrov performed excellently.

At night, before a formation of the personnel, all the sailors in the new crews were declared to be a combat replacement for the T/O artillerymen.

The creation of non-T/O artillery crews has



VIII. NAVAL HARDENING  
(NORTHERN FLEET SUBMARINE TRAINING)  
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Captain 1st Rank V. Palastrov

The cadets at the Higher Naval Academy of Submarine Sailing imeni Lenin's Komsomol are at the height of their practical training on ships of the Northern Fleet. This is a very important period in the training of future officers serving on submarines.

The practical training runs smoothly -- it was well prepared. As far back as January a council at the academy to which a fleet representative was also invited carefully discussed the results of last year's practice. Then the academy officers went out to the formations and locally clarified all the questions linked with the cadets' forthcoming time with the fleet. The information obtained on the ships made it possible, while the cadets were still in the academy, to divide them into groups, and to assign the Party's forces in a well-thought-out manner. A Komsomol organizer was assigned in each group.

All this preliminary work contributed to having the practical training begin without a hitch, immediately after the cadets arrived at the fleet.

But most of all the success of the practical training is explained by the fact that the submarine officers of the Northern Fleet sense a responsibility for training the cadets, and eagerly communicate their knowledge and experience to them. And the good example of senior commanders played an important role here. The formation commander personally met the cadets, explained to them the situation in which their training on the ships would be held, and advised them as to where they should concentrate their main efforts.

Officer Yevseyev organized the practical training for the cadets in an exemplary manner. A former submariner, he personally directed, on one of the submarines, exercises to train the cadets in damage control, in controlling the horizontal rudders, and in trimming the ship. Another time comrade Yevseyev set out to sea especially with the cadets in

order to help them get training in a number of problems involved in servicing operating equipment. On the long voyage the cadets doubled up as watch officers. In this exceptionally important work, the cadets were again helped by the senior comrade's valuable advice and comments.

The cadets were distributed among the submarines in such a way that the people assigned to each ship, to each combat unit, for practical training would be from the same class. Their training is approximately identical, and this facilitates working with them, and helps the officers to set up classes that will be most interesting for all of them and will teach them all something new.

The cold stormy weather and snowstorms create conditions in which the future officers get well hardened. They understand that these are the real conditions under which the submarines operate in the North, which is where many of them will have to serve after graduation from the academy. Therefore the cadets steadfastly overcome the difficulties of winter-time sea voyages and become accustomed to the northern latitudes. Communists Brovkov, Panteleyev, and Kulagin zealously assimilate the complex specialty of submariner. Comrades Antonyuk, Kuprin, and others performed excellently in the sea voyages. They not only are studying successfully the machinery in the compartments to which they are assigned, but also work actively in the ships' Party and Komsomol organizations.

The unit commanders keep an attentive watch to see that the cadets have fulfilled their individual assignments during the period of practical training, chiefly their assignments in navigation. If, for some reason, the submarine has not gone to sea for a long time, the cadets assigned to it participate in cruises of other submarines.

Timely, careful preparation for practical training, the high sense of responsibility that the ship officers show to it, and the diligence of the cadets themselves give one justification for assuming that the future officers will derive great benefit from the spring months on ships of the Northern Fleet.

At the same time, even now it is important to

extract certain lessons linked with the holding of practical training in March and April. For this was the first time that this was done, and a change-over to new procedures does not always occur without omissions. The training plan according to which the classes were held in the academy anticipated that the practical training would be given at the end of the school year, rather than in the middle. The cadets were sent to the fleet before having an opportunity to study a number of topics at the academy. Therefore, when solving practical problems, they often felt an acute sense of gaps in their theoretical knowledge. It is completely obvious that the training plan must be revised to conform to the new procedure of holding practical training.

There is another circumstance that is very important to note. The months of March, April, and May, during which the cadets will have their practical training from now on, do not provide for thorough training in navigational astronomy in the Northern Fleet. In the North, the month of March is characterized by poor visibility and by multi-layer overcast. The accuracy of observation of the stars is not great. In April there is less overcast, but it is a month of continuous twilight. May sees the beginning of the polar day, when it becomes impossible to obtain a fix from the stars or the planets.

What is the way out of this situation? The way out, obviously, is to hold navigation cruises elsewhere than in the Northern theater.

The shortcomings linked with the change in the time for holding the practical training are easy to eliminate. On the whole, however, the practical training is much more successful than that of former years.

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