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SELECTED SOVIET MILITARY TRANSLATIONS

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Following are translations of selected articles taken from various issues of the Russian-language newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), and the two periodicals Sovetskaya Yustitsiya (Soviet Justice) and Sotsialisticheskaya Zakonnost' (Socialist Legality). Specific source data is given under individual article headings.

## I. OFFICERS' WORKING DAY

Krasnaya Zvezda

Editorial

5 July 1960

Page 1

"Dear Editorial Board!

It is well known that our Party has attached great significance to the matter of lessening the working day. Quite recently the fifth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a law on the completion during this year of the shifting of all workers and employees to a 7 or 6 hour working day. We warmly approve this most important measure of the Party and the Soviet Government which is directed at improving the lives of the Soviet people.

This makes it rather strange that in our unit no one is occupied with regulating the working day of officers. In response to questions on this subject the senior commanders unfailingly answer that under the present conditions it is impossible to implement such a program.

Understand this correctly; this is not a complaint on the severity and deprivations of military service; however, it is frustrating when valuable time is spent without any purpose. The officer must work systematically to improve his military and political knowledge and to broaden his cultural horizons. Without a doubt, this is to the advantage of the service since we all know that the quality of any given instruction depends to a considerable degree on the training of the person who is in charge. However, there is not sufficient time for the officer to increase his own knowledge. Furthermore, one cannot go far with the theoretical learning which one receives at a school. Life moves ahead inexorably; each day poses more serious demands on the officer."

We have cited this extract from a letter which came to the editorial board just recently. Unfortunately such letters are not unique. They point to shortcomings in many units and on ships with respect to normalizing the working day for officers and therefore, they cannot help but produce some justifiable anxiety. Actually, can we consider it in normal situation when a number of commanders and leaders in the Army and Navy disregard the working day which has been established for officers and when junior officers in

particular are often given tasks which they are not supposed to perform, when they are forced to do the work of sergeants and when they are kept in the camps under various pretexts from reveille to retreat?

We cannot admit that it is proper for some commanders and leaders to refer to the unusual nature of military service. We do not deny that the duration of the working day is not limited during tactical, summer, and special tactical exercises, during combat firing, and when ships put to sea. However, in such cases the senior commanders must give the officers the necessary time for rest afterwards. However, this is by no means done everywhere. What is more, in a number of places and during the course of daily training, the officers spend much more time in their units than is necessary for the service. If officers are kept in their units without necessity, their commanders deprive them of the opportunity of working to increase their military and political knowledge, to visit cultural affairs and to devote sufficient time to their families, to raising their children and to relaxing.

Is all this necessary for the interest of the service as some people try to explain this overloading of the officers? It would seem not. Commanders who are guilty of such thoughts have a one-sided understanding of their task and forget about the person and it is on the person that high combat preparedness depends.

This is not all. If we speak forthrightly, we must say that anyone who cannot establish normal working conditions for his officers and cannot attain strict observance of the proper duration of the working day is guilty of personal ineffectiveness and an inability to establish proper internal order in his unit or on his ship.

The experience of leading units and ships indicates that in places where the commanders seriously and thoughtfully train their non-commissioned officers and trust them and where the training and the checks on its conduct are handled properly, the problem of having a normal working day for officers has long been solved. The problem is that in some places people are only talking about normalizing the working day whereas it is time to stop talking and start doing something about the senseless and exhausting excess time spent by officers in their units. For this it is particularly essential to establish strict control over the proper planning and purposeful utilization of working time by the officers and to adopt measures to intensify the working day and to make the work more practical and better organized.

The commanders and leaders at all levels but especially the regimental commanders must not permit their officers to spend time needlessly in their units before and after training. The free time must be completely at the disposal of the officers in order that they may raise their military and political knowledge and their cultural level and spend more time with their families and in

educating their children.

We must face this problem decisively; this is the duty of the political organs and of the Party organizations. They render enormous assistance to the commanders in perfecting the combat training of the units and in strengthening military discipline. However, the problem of regulating the working day for officers sometimes escapes from the view of some political organs and Party organizations. The problem now is how to correct this situation. It is important that the unsatisfactory state of the working day for officers becomes a subject of discussion at Party meetings and sessions of Party bureaus so that the political organs would boldly enter this field and together with the commanders and leaders establish the required system.

Concern over people and over their training, service, culture and daily life is one of the most important responsibilities of the commanders, political organs and Party organizations. The strict and exact observance of the routines and rules for military life as established by the manuals and orders must become our indisputable law. If, for example, regulations require that the period between meals should not, as a rule, exceed 7 hours, we must act accordingly. If it is stated that the daily schedule should provide for 8 hours of sleep at night, this must be done. In the same way we must not disregard the established working day for officers.

We should always remember the words of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev from his speech at a reception in the Kremlin for graduates of the Military Academies of the Armed Forces of the USSR. In speaking to the officer graduates, he said that "...the Soviet warrior should always stand in the center of our attention. When we demand much from our subordinates, we must at the same time be fair and tactful with them and must always show a fatherly concern for them."

As is known, starting the first of November, all military units, ships, military schools and offices will begin a 7 hour working day. The introduction of a 7 hour working day for officers is one of the manifestations of the concern of our Party and of the Government for the Armed Forces. A strict observance of the established length of the working day for officers will beyond doubt facilitate a further strengthening of the combat readiness and capability of our units and ships.

## II. ABILITIES OF SOLDIERS (MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY)

Krasnaya Zvezda  
5 July 1960  
Pages 2-3

Lt. Col. M. Korobeynikov,  
Candidate of Pedagogical  
Sciences

The firing had just finished. The results of the firing were the reason for a hot conversation between a young, impetuous platoon leader, Lieutenant Korneyev, and a company commander, Captain Shurkov. The fact is that Private Nikishov from Lieutenant Korneyev's platoon had again fired poorly and this aroused the ire of the company commander. The captain was putting the blame for the poor firing training of the soldier on Lieutenant Korneyev.

"That's the way he is. One cannot teach him how to shoot. He simply is incapable of mastering it," the lieutenant claimed.

The captain could not agree with such a conclusion.

"In my opinion you are not evaluating Nikishov's capabilities properly," he answered. "That's it. You are wrong! There are none nor can there be any incapable people or soldiers. In general I do not feel that any special abilities are needed in the army for successful training. Ability and talent are nothing more than work--knowing how to work diligently and persistently. It's clear that you are requiring little of Nikishov; you yourself are not working with him enough."

"How can this be, comrade captain," said Korneyev as he persisted in his point of view, "How can one deny the role of natural ability? Every person from birth has his capabilities and his limits which he cannot surpass. It by no means is possible for all servicemen to become experts."

"No, comrade lieutenant," the captain concluded the talk, "In referring to the lack of ability of the soldier you shed responsibility for his training and place all emphasis on objective conditions. This is not correct. You must inject yourself more decisively and the soldier will change and all his 'lack of ability' will disappear. In order to prove this to you, I will help Nikishov myself."

Several months elapsed after this conversation. Captain Shurkov taught Private Nikishov patiently and persistently; however, the matter did not progress particularly. The soldier continued as in the past to show uneven results. At times he would perform the exercises and then again he would not.

"What is the reason? Can it be that the lieutenant is right and Nikishov actually has no aptitude for shooting?" mused Captain Shurkov.

Let us examine this case and try to analyze the conclusions of the two officers. Can we agree with the opinion of Lieutenant

Korneyev that a person's abilities are inherited at birth and cannot be changed? Or, as Captain Shurkov was demonstrating, can the abilities of a person be developed and perfected thus making it possible for a person to achieve better results in practical activities?

The science of psychology of course tells us that we cannot deny the existence of abilities in a person. On the contrary, they are one of the most important aspects of the human makeup. They constitute the sum total of the persistent psychological qualities and they enable a person more easily or more quickly to master and perfect an activity. The abilities of a person can be very important in specific fields such as in military affairs.

One can frequently observe what happens when a young officer arrives in a unit along with other graduates of a military school. It would seem that he is like all the others. However, in the course of his daily work it becomes noticeable that he stands out from among the others and masters the methods and organization of the training of his subordinates much more quickly than his comrades and without any apparent effort. It seems that everything comes easily to him. He masters any skill as easily as though it were a game. Similar cases speak of abilities being psychic qualities of a person which are one of the most important conditions for successfully training him in a given activity.

The changing nature and content of a given activity requires new abilities from a person in comparison with the old ones. For example, in connection with the fundamental changes which have taken place in aviation, the concept of "flying ability" is now much different from what it had been. Very recently a fighter pilot still aimed the weapons on his plane at a target by pointing the plane itself at the target. Now the conditions of flight have changed sharply. The enormous increase in speed has forced the pilot to use mechanical means in regulating flight and searching out targets because to do such things using old means is beyond the capability of man. Where the pilot formerly had before him a visual image of the enemy plane, he now has before him on his instruments only an indirect reflection of the enemy equipment and only an index of the performance of the enemy airplane. It is natural that the changed nature of the activity of a flyer requires that he possess the corresponding abilities. There are many such examples.

Lieutenant Korneyev is wrong in the example quoted above because he believes that abilities are inherited and immutable qualities of man. A person is born only with various instincts; these are the anatomical and physiological characteristics of the organism. Of greatest importance is the type of nervous system plus also the nature of the thinking process and the emotional conduct which are characteristic of a given person. In the same

unit one may find soldiers who are bright, very receptive, inventive, observant and crafty in their movements while along side them there may be others who lack some of these qualities to various degrees. However, each person has his own instincts. These instincts are like a seed. As the plant grows from the seed so do various abilities develop from the instincts.

Many believe that each ability has a corresponding instinct. This is incorrect. Instincts are very important. Each instinct may bear many abilities. Depending on what a person does and how he lives, many abilities may develop from a single instinct.

The existence of instincts is not enough in order for a person to possess great abilities. It is not enough to be born with good instincts; they must be developed persistently. Our Armed Forces are equipped with complex military equipment. The enlisted men and officers, depending on their branch of service, may be concerned with armored equipment, radios, electronics, jet aircraft and all kinds of rocket weapons. Each military serviceman has before him rich opportunities to develop all his abilities and to utilize his strength. But what does it mean to create and develop abilities? How are instincts developed and adapted to a given activity?

Each person is rich in that he possesses instincts. However, they are somewhat hidden. The task of the commander, teacher or leader is to uncover them and to develop them into abilities and on this basis to attain the best results in concrete forms of military activities. The knowledge of the commander of this important requirement of teaching and psychology will help him to avoid mistakes in evaluating the abilities and potential of his subordinates.

Experience has shown that leading commanders who take into account this law of psychology obtain the best results in training and educating their soldiers. Here are several examples. Captain Chereshnev, the commander of a training unit, approached his superior with a request to drop students Il'in and Semenov from the roles inasmuch as they had not demonstrated any ability to drive a tank properly. The captain, however, did not cite any convincing arguments. The superior recommended that he observe the students more carefully and study their individual capabilities more deeply in order to help them to overcome their negative traits and to develop their positive qualities. A short time passed. The effort which was exerted proved to be justified. Il'in was among the first to fulfill the exercises successfully in driving a tank at night and passed the course; Semenov in time passed the test for a driver, first class.

In the company which was commanded by Captain Vybornov, Platoon Commander Senior Lieutenant Krayevoy was considered to be an incapable officer. Krayevoy was transferred to another unit.

Captain Perevertkin, the new company commander, handled him tactfully and with great interest. This officer in new company literally was reborn. Soon he was promoted to the rank of captain. Now Captain Krayevoy is justifiably considered one of the best officers in his regiment and is commanding his company successfully.

This means that in order not to be mistaken, the commander must examine his subordinates carefully and must not give in to his first impression which often may be incorrect; he must carefully seek out and develop the aptitudes and abilities of his men and must guide them in the right direction. A capable teacher always develops in the students an inclination for the subject which he is teaching. The greater is the interest of the soldier in a given specialty, the greater will be its hold on him and the more successful will be the training. The development of their abilities always proceeds in unison with this process. A persistent interest in a given military specialty helps the soldier more easily to master the training subjects and to develop the necessary abilities. If the soldier loves his work, gives fully of himself and firmly and persistently studies his specialty, he will be in a position to improve even his lagging abilities.

It is especially important for soldiers whose abilities are not yet sufficiently well-defined that they benefit from a constant and tactful encouragement of their interests and inclinations. From the combat training of troops there is a mass of examples of how, by firm and persistent labor and by painstaking attention to oneself, it is possible for soldiers to reach the heights of combat skill. Often soldiers who initially showed rather weak abilities have progressed because of their diligence and purposefulness to join the ranks of the outstanding in their combat and political training and have become specialists and masters.

Commanders and political workers have a decisive role in the conscious, directed improvement of insufficiently developed traits of soldiers as they train and instruct their troops. The example at the beginning of this article of Private Nikishov performed his firing exercises in an unsure and uneven manner even after receiving careful attention. Patient observation and analysis of the mistakes which the soldier was making enabled Captain Shurkov to establish their cause. The reason was the insufficient development of the soldier's muscular-motor sensations. It is these things which are necessary in order to master the firing of weapons. Captain Shurkov developed special exercises and through systematic training enabled the soldier to eliminate this shortcoming. The "incapable" soldier was able to become a good marksman and subsequently performed all the exercises with success.

The science of psychology provides a number of requirements with respect to the development of abilities in a soldier. The following requirements are most important: abilities are developed

only in the process of the activity for which they are necessary and are activated in due course. For example, in order to develop the ability to observe, one should be taught while performing any task to observe attentively something definite which is related to the given task. In order to master the technique of operating any complex piece of machinery, it is important to develop coordination of movement which can be attained by special exercises. It is possible to bring the training conditions closer to the actual conditions of modern combat; the elimination of any type of simplification is important not only for developing the knowledge and skills of the soldiers but also in shaping their abilities.

In developing a person's abilities, an especially important role belongs to the manner in which the serviceman acts toward people, his comrades and his commanders. Only with his group can a person fully unveil his abilities. This places special responsibilities on the commander. He must imbue his personnel with confidence in their strength while developing in them a feeling of personal worth as well as modesty, self-criticism, fastidiousness and an ability to evaluate properly one's own qualities. It is important for soldiers never to rest on their laurels but to seek to attain still more.

Sometimes a serviceman may appear unable to master some specialty not because he is incapable but rather because he has not acquired the necessary knowledge and skills. Therefore, the commander should always differentiate between the abilities of the soldier and his level of training. Knowledge and skill develop much more rapidly than ability which is called the sum total of knowledge and skill. How easily and rapidly the soldier acquires the necessary knowledge and skill depends on the level of development of his ability.

The most important method of helping to develop ability is socialist competition. In organizing a socialist competition in his unit, the commander must always weigh in a logical manner the ability of each subordinate in order to know the capability of the unit and to be able to accept obligations which can be fulfilled. A proper calculation of the abilities of the men guarantees against any artificial inflation or underestimation of what can be pledged. Knowing the ability of each of his subordinates, the commander will be able by word and deed to render the necessary support and aid to them and to draw them into broad participation in the struggle for the expansion of the ranks of class specialists and masters of military affairs.

The limits of a newspaper article do not allow one to examine in detail all the various methods of developing the abilities of soldiers during the process of their training and instruction. There can be no doubt about one thing. Knowledge on the part of commanders and political workers of the basic requirements and

principles of Soviet military psychology may have a very fruitful effect on the solution of the problem of combat and political training and will increase the degree of skill of commanders and political workers in training and indoctrinating their soldiers.

### III. AUTOMATION MUST NOT PRODUCE STEREOTYPY (AUTOMATION IN COMBAT TRAINING)

Krasnaya Zvezda

6 July 1960

Page 2

Lt. Col. A. Sinev

For the tankers it is a time of toil. Day and night there is the rumble of the tank guns firing and the crack of machine gun bursts. The soldiers are working persistently to improve their firing skill.

We are on a tower from which Senior Lieutenant Petrakov, the company commander, is directing the firing. Here there is a control panel with many levers and buttons. Through the wide window can be seen the slightly rolling field. The officer gives a command over the radio and the tank commanded by Lieutenant Biryukov moves forward. With a light push on a button a target appears for a short time where a deep road has been cut by the tracks of the tanks. Biryukov hits the target without a miss. The company commander presses another button and at the very crest the next target begins to appear. The lieutenant makes a short stop and again hits the target.

The firing is well organized and proceeds quickly -- almost like a conveyor belt. The person directing the training controls the targets with movements of his fingers; one crew follows another; and each time the results are better.

"Automation is an important matter," says Lieutenant Colonel Rongovoy. "Two or three years ago we spent much more time on firing. Also we had many pit personnel who were spending their training time without any benefit! Now, however, we can say that not a single minute is being lost. The manpower needed for the operation of the range has been almost completely eliminated through automation."

Yes, the automation of the firing range has produced considerable benefits. The training is better organized. The training time is more productive and less time is lost. However, the "Conveyor system" in a number of instances has large minuses. Stereotypy is introduced to some extent. The situation has been simplified. The "battleground" often becomes a sport range where the task of the firer involves only hitting the target under clearly delimited conditions.

At least this is the way it was at the training of which we are speaking. Each time the targets appeared in the same places, faced in the same directions and moved with the same speed. It was somewhat more difficult for the first firer, because the appearance of the targets was to a degree unexpected. However, the first person to take his place in a tank was an experienced firer -- the

company commander. He handled the situation in excellent fashion thus giving a good example to his subordinates. Afterwards things went more simply and soon the element of surprise and unexpectedness was gone.

It was not by accident that we stated that the element of surprise when the targets appeared was a relative matter for Lieutenant Petrakov. This officer had already traversed the road several times in performing preliminary test runs and the targets were in approximately the same state. It is true that the shape of the targets had been changed as had the period of time for which the targets appeared; however, the distances and the locations were actually the same; they were established when the rails were laid.

The road along which the tanks moved was also the same. Many tankers after traversing it several times knew every knob and depression. And naturally it became easier each time to hit the targets. Thus we have a situation where instead of each exercise becoming more difficult in accordance with the course for firing, they become easier.

The night firing on the range where we had just been was even more simplified. About 2 years ago the targets were lighted with the help of bonfires. Major Brener recalls that it was extremely difficult to perform the exercises at night because the light was uneven and flickering. Smoke rose from the bonfires and from time to time hid the targets. Try to find your target when, as in combat, there is a flickering here and there from fires and shell bursts.

Well, what now? The person in charge of the firing pressed a button; an electric light glowed near the target; the tanker fired. The button was pressed again. The light went out. Unfortunately, even good instructors such as Senior Lieutenant Petrakov have become accustomed to this and do not see anything artificial about this. The senior lieutenant shows us the 12 volt light.

"It burns brightly and lights the target remarkably well. The only problem is that they often are put out of action when a shell pierces a target," he complains.

He should not be complaining about this but rather about something else. Is it good that this light burns brightly? Will the enemy furnish us with light in the same way? This is what we should think about.

I recall another firing range at which I was present about 2 years ago. The lighting was not controlled by buttons but rather the targets were lighted with headlights from trucks. At the direction of the officer in charge, Officer Daitrichenko, the headlights were dimmed and then were turned on and off. At first many tankers fired inaccurately in the dim and unsteady light and received low scores. However, this did not frighten the officer.

He finally was able to teach his subordinates how to fire without missing even when the targets were illuminated only slightly and for short periods. Of course, there is no sense in returning to headlights; however, we should think constantly about how to make the situation complicated.

Together with Lieutenant Colonel Rongovoy we went to the tank course. Here also mechanization was being employed extensively.

"Soon the officer in charge without even glancing at the tank course will be able to determine from the signal lights on his control panel whether or not the tank driver has properly overcome a given obstacle," says Comrade Rongovoy. "This is especially important under conditions of limited visibility. Our experts are also working on many other innovations."

All this of course is necessary and worthwhile. However, it must be noted that the tank course has only 2 trails. One of them is more complex for tank drivers who have substantial experience. The other is for those who are only learning to drive their tanks. Both trails are well equipped with sturdy concrete obstacles. Many drivers have already learned how to overcome these obstacles in excellent fashion and have become well accustomed to the course after having gone through it many times. Well, and further?

The tank course is located in a very rough area which abounds in natural obstacles and rises and descents of various degrees of steepness. However, these obstacles are unfortunately not used in training. On this broad hilly field you will nowhere find any trace of the tank tracks except along the regular trails. Why is this so? The answer is simple; these obstacles are not equipped, are not mechanized, and are not travelled over.

Sometimes the following situation results. The tank driver is well trained to overcome the particular obstacles on the specially equipped tank course as he follows a familiar and well travelled route; however, when he goes out for tactical training, he selects the most level terrain without regard to the fact that he is exposed to the gaze of the enemy or, if he enters an area with rough terrain, he becomes lost.

How can this be? Should we give up the idea of the automation and mechanization of firing ranges and tank obstacle courses? Definitely not. Automation at a training center brings many benefits. However, it would seem that it is time for our innovators to proceed further and direct their creative efforts against stereotypy and routine patterns. Is it not possible, for example, to install a rheostat on the control panel in order to regulate the degree of illumination of the targets? It is possible and indeed necessary to make many other adaptations which will make it possible for the officer in charge to make the training exercises more complex

and varied and changeable, i.e. to simulate battle conditions as closely as possible.

As a rule, a training center has several firing ranges and each firing range has several trails along which the tanks move in the direction of the targets. In some places attempts are made to make them uniform. In our opinion, this is wrong. Let them all be different from each other. Here is where the creative ability of our innovators can receive full play. The greater are the variations in the construction of the ranges and the more different devices which are used, the more possible it will be for units to conduct firing under varied conditions.

The same thing is true of the tank obstacle course. Why should the drivers be limited to a single trail? Why are the natural obstacles not utilized extensively?

Finally, in our opinion we must not forget the proven but less mechanized methods of training such as firing by the bursts of rockets, by the light of bonfires or with light from search lights, etc., i.e. under conditions which approach those of actual combat. This should be done not only when training on combat courses but also on ordinary firing ranges and courses.

There is still one more thing. We have been able to be present at many tank firing ranges for the actual firing. In almost all cases the exercises did not have a tactical character. The officer in charge, as a rule, does not supply any new data. It seems to us that this is a clear retreat from the requirement of training the troops in situations which are as close as possible to combat.

Perhaps some comrades will find the questions which have been raised in this article to be arguable. However, there can be no doubt about one thing. Such a definitely positive thing as the extensive introduction of automation should not lead to stereotypy in training our troops. Automation should be directed pointedly against stereotypy.

IV. THE REAL AND THE PREARRANGED  
(REALISM IN COMBAT TRAINING)

Krasnaya Zvezda  
8 July 1960  
Page 2

Lt. Col. V. Morgunov,  
Motorized Rifle Bat-  
talion Commander

Perhaps I would not have picked up my pen if it had not been for one conversation. It took place among us commanders after some recent training which had been very interesting and instructive but which also had a not unimportant "but". It was about this "but" that we spoke.

The matter was as follows. The unit which I was commanding was defending an important height behind which was located a small inhabited point. In evaluating the situation, especially when I put myself in the place of the "enemy", I came to the conclusion that he would not attack the height frontally because a swampy area was located in front of our position and a stream flowed almost parallel to our front line. This means, I decided that the enemy would try to by-pass the hill to the left where the terrain was most favorable for an attack and would hit the unit adjacent to mine.

I, therefore, arranged the combat disposition of my unit in such a way so that if the enemy were to penetrate the defense of my neighbor on my left, I would be able to disperse the attacker with a counter attack. For this purpose I selected the tank unit under the command of Officer Savel'yev and the motorized infantry unit commanded by Officer Sorokin.

The decision was adopted and was approved by the senior commander. But how would the battle develop? Would it develop as I had supposed or would the enemy find another bolder and more original solution and place me and my subordinates in a difficult position?

To my satisfaction the "battle" began as we had expected. There was fighting along the entire front; however, my neighbor on the left soon reported that the enemy had penetrated his battle position. We were ready for this. Officers Savel'yev and Sorokin were well prepared for the counter attack. In addition, the senior commander supplied some of his own forces for this purpose when the situation was reported to him. As soon as the enemy exited from the woods, the counter attack struck him in the flank.

Of course, training is not the same as real combat. However, if in this case we were to compare all the pros and cons, it would appear that our side had an advantage in the surprise of the attack and also to some extent in the disposition of the forces at the moment of the counter attack. Even if we suppose that we would not have been able to defeat completely the enemy forces which had made the penetration, in any case after this blow he would not be able

in real combat to move forward rapidly and without hindrance. The enemy would have to bring up reserves and reorganize his forces.

Unfortunately, during training everything was almost insultingly simple. The umpire with the commander of the attacking forces could find nothing better for his instructions than to give approval for the further advance of the attacking force as though the counterattack had never taken place. Thus the training which had begun so instructively for us was no longer so interesting to us commanders.

These instructions from the umpire with the "hut" in the training and served as a topic of conversation among us commanders. Perhaps not everything in our thoughts was beyond debate; however, let the reader judge on this matter, especially with respect to the instructions from the umpires. I would like in this letter to tell briefly about what we spoke and thought, where possible citing examples.

The nature of combat and the nature of training, we said, of course are not identical. No matter how one tries, it is never possible in training to create a realistic combat situation; the training is always to some degree artificial. However, it is the task of the officer in charge of training to minimize the element of artificiality and to inject the maximum amount of realism into the training.

Is everything being done along this line? No, not everything. Very often the instructions from the umpires suffer especially from artificiality. In another case they are poured upon the commander as though from the horn of plenty. It is good when the instructions help to intensify the situation and make the commander employ counter measures in keeping with the situation. However, they often do not attain this goal.

For example, what is instructive about this situation as it was developed by the officer in charge of training?

Two units were advancing in an approach march formation after penetrating the defenses of the enemy; they were advancing along parallel roads toward a water barrier. The mission was to arrive simultaneously at the river and to force it with a hasty crossing. Our advance, unfortunately, was not simultaneous. As we still were approaching the water barrier, the unit on my left under the command of Captain Golovin lagged considerably. However, the person in charge of the exercise felt that it was essential for us to arrive simultaneously at the river line. I then received the following information. Reconnaissance reported a concentration of up to one regiment of enemy infantry on my right flank; tank movements were also noted.

It is obvious that it is, to say the least, very risky to move forward when the enemy has larger forces on your flank. It was necessary to stop my unit and to shift from the approach march

formation to a combat formation. Just as I began to check the missions for my subordinate commanders, new information came from the umpire. The enemy was beginning to retreat.

I wanted to yell at the person in charge: "What sort of a stupid enemy are you manufacturing for me? I have not done anything to force him to retreat! After all, he does have superior forces." However, as it became clear to me, this very contrived situation was necessary so that the unit commanded by Captain Golovin could draw parallel with me while I was preparing to repel an attack.

Once I witnessed such an episode. A unit was pursuing a retreating enemy. In order to get the commander to react quickly to an unexpected tank attack on his flank, the person in charge announced that up to 15 tanks had appeared on the right.

The commander could see that indeed a tank is moving along a road passing through a swampy area; this he understood to represent the enemy attack. Orders were issued; the officer acted correctly; and the person in charge was satisfied.

Then after the exercise, this officer told me:

"When I saw the tank my first thought was whether or not the person in charge of the training would actually attack with tanks along a narrow road through a swampy area. He probably never would. Nevertheless this was the information that he supplied."

Very often after they receive such information, the commanders wonder what is instructive about the exercise. The answer is nothing. They do not produce an active response. Everything is clear; one does not have to think hard for a solution. Is this not why we frequently ask each other "What, another counterattack?" when the umpire stops our unit. Or we ask, "Oh, is the area again mined or has the bridge across the river been blown up again?" Such information would cause surprise because it is very contrived and is not in keeping with the nature of modern combat.

We touched on other problems in our conversations after training. What commander has not received instructions which appear to be a penalty? The question can be asked whether or not it is right. If not, how should the person in charge or the umpire act if he sees that a commander has made a mistake? How should he penalize him?

It happens, for example, that an officer has allowed his men to bunch up; the umpire eliminates part of his forces or his weapons; the officer understands his mistake, however, he retains the personnel and weapons. Would it be like this in combat? Of course not. Mistakes in combat are not forgiven by the enemy as they are by the umpires. Why therefore, do we have this forgiveness during our training exercises?

The response is that if such an action were to be taken, the commander who had acted poorly would not have the necessary equipment,

weapons or soldiers in order to accomplish the training mission and that after this it would be necessary to stop the training. However, we must not permit mistakes to go unpenalized. How should we act in such cases?

Another thing. We know that as he is preparing the training plan the person in charge of the training or his assistants develop a situation and plan the information which will be given to the participants. No one, of course, objects to a planned beginning for the exercise; however, it seems to us that we should not have to follow this plan blindly. We should retain the central idea of the plan throughout the course of the exercise. After all real combat seldom develops as we want it to. The enemy always introduces his changes into the situation. Why in such a case is the plan considered to be dogma for our training? For the sake of the plan and the prepared instructions, the development of the events can be shuffled and all sorts of unplanned instructions can be given. This is especially bad because they do not develop because of the situation which results from the actions of the opposing sides but in accordance with the desires of the person in charge and the umpires to get the sides to act in accordance with the prepared plan. It is planned, for example, that the defending forces will counterattack at a certain line; the person in charge of the training and all his personnel exert their every effort in order to lead the advancing forces into a situation which is suitable for a counterattack. Should we not reject the idea of giving such planned instructions and limit ourselves to giving only those things which are necessary and which flow from a situation which has developed?

We said a great deal that day to each other. Most of us agreed that something is necessary in order to avoid having contrived instructions during our training exercises. Such contrived instructions extinguish the creative fire in the commanders, whereas they should help to develop in the officers the ability to analyze a tactical situation and to handle their unit properly. In other words, the information which is furnished during training exercises should be as realistic and as close to a combat situation as possible. We have spoken of umpires and of the incorrect practices which they employ as they lack contact with the person in charge and make decisions on their own which are improvised and very absurd and have only the saving grace that they direct the action of the unit along the lines envisaged in the plan. We touched on matters of emotion; we spoke of the methods of marking an area which has been contaminated with radioactive substances; etc. But how can we do this? All of this we of course could not solve ourselves. We have spoken mainly of shortcomings and of instances where the instructions supplied by umpires during training exercises were not successful or were unrealistic.

In this connection, it seems to me, it would be worthwhile

to continue this discussion which we commanders began on the pages of this newspaper; we should discuss how it is possible to supply instructions which will correspond to those situations we might encounter in actual combat; what should be the nature of these instructions? These are problems, it seems to me, which disturb many officers.

V. TEN THOUSAND SUGGESTIONS  
(INNOVATION MOVEMENT IN PVO TROOPS)

Krasnaya Zvezda

8 July 1960

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It. Gen. A. Mitenkov

The antiaircraft defense forces of our country are equipped with complex and powerful combat equipment. Our scientists, inventors and workers in industry in fulfilling the instructions of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government have achieved great successes in creating means of defense against enemy air attack. The destruction by a single rocket of the American U-2 reconnaissance airplane which had flown at a great height over the territory of our Motherland is a convincing example of the growing fire power of our antiaircraft defense weapons and of their high combat effectiveness.

It is known that the development of military equipment is based on the latest achievements of science. The modern weapons of the antiaircraft defense forces are the fruit of remarkable victories on the part of Soviet scientific thought. Nevertheless, the further perfection of these weapons and of the methods of their combat employment and exploitation still involves a broad field for the manifestation of activity on the part of troops who possess initiative and have that valued feeling for things which are new.

This quality is characteristic of many servicemen in the Moscow antiaircraft defense district. Considerable work is being conducted in units of all branches in improving training material, in preserving combat techniques and in saving materiel. A confirmation of this has been the continuous growth in the number of improvement suggestions and inventions developed by the personnel of the military district.

Here are a number of eloquent figures. In the last 5 years the number of personnel who have worked on improvements has increased by 8 times; the number of proposals which have been adopted in practice has increased by 6 times. During 1959 and 6 months of this year the soldiers offered more than 10,000 suggestions.

The improvement movement today has many notable features. In contrast to past years, for example, we now have groups rather than individuals which have proposed a large number of innovations especially in connection with the improvement of combat equipment. This is completely natural. Modern weapons, as a rule, are very complex and may contain electronic apparatus or automatic equipment. It is difficult for one person even though he may have had a good engineering background to solve the many sided problems which occur in developing a given proposal. It would seem that such collective efforts should be encouraged in every way possible

in order to avoid having individuals working alone in fruitless attempts to solve complex problems.

Another characteristic aspect should be mentioned. This is the mass scale of the movement for improvements. Today the person who suggests an improvement is not a single person who is attempting to develop some improvement at his own risk. In many units the majority of the personnel participate in the solution of problems of improving equipment, of creating a training aid base and in developing methods of exploiting materiel.

In the aviation unit where Captain Rodnev is the secretary of the Komsomol Bureau, Komsomol members decided before the end of the year to submit 40 proposals for improvements. They had some basis in making this responsible pledge. Every sixth Komsomol member in the unit had already done something in suggesting improvements in the field of technology. They are keeping their promise well. By the end of last year 82 suggestions had been received by the commission for improvements and inventions from the Komsomol members. Of these 55 were put into effect.

The military council of the district for merit valued the patriotic initiative of the young innovators and recommended to the commanders, political organs and Party and Komsomol organizations of the units that they adopt these ideas.

It is clear that success in these matters is not achieved by appeals alone. Much organizational work is necessary in order to mobilize the creative effort of the personnel to solve the real problems of improving equipment and the training process and to attract people to work for the further improvement of the combat readiness and combat capability of the forces. Commanders with initiative are acting properly when they develop equipment for the personnel working on innovations, organize consultations for them with specialists and render aid to the soldiers in accomplishing their creative plans.

This is the way the matter stands in the commission on inventions and improvements of which Lt. Col. Zamyatin is the chairman. Here a room has been set aside in which the personnel can obtain the necessary tools and materials for preparing models of their inventions; here they will find everything necessary for making drawings. If consultation is necessary, the engineer who is on duty in the room can provide it.

Similar rooms have been created in a number of other units. Experience has shown that moderate expenditures for equipping such rooms (they are not so great as one might expect) give a complete return.

Recently an exhibit was arranged in the district showing the work of the innovators. Over 1600 valuable original exhibits were present thus showing the remarkable creative efforts and abilities of their authors who were able to solve complex technical problems.

This was especially apparent from the exhibits at the display of the commission on improvements and inventions which is headed by Col. Privezentsev. Good conditions had been created for the work of the innovators and the results of their labor were apparent.

Here, for example, was an instrument for checking various aspects of the technical condition of vehicles and for selecting the most economic system for their utilization. This instrument is regarded by specialists as being a most valuable and original invention. The author, Engineer Captain Suvorov, received a patent for it.

There was also an instrument which had been built by Engineer Major Stelletskiy. Engineer Captain Gal'chenko contributed several things. Of them, the device for controlling the heating system of an artillery prime mover is of especial interest.

The authors of the above mentioned suggestions are military engineers. It is natural that these specialists who have studied technology so thoroughly and who are closely interested in the utilization of equipment should participate actively in developing inventions and suggestions. However, they by no means are monopolizing this field. The lists of military men who have been recognized for their valuable improvements and inventions contain quite a few commanders, political workers, sergeants and soldiers and workers of the supply and medical services as well as representatives of all the military professions.

One would like to mention here Junior Sergeant Vetrov who is a Komsomol member. He has served only a comparatively short time in the Army; however, he has already shown himself to be a person with an inquiring mind who knows his military specialty very well. He has already made 5 valuable suggestions.

We attach particular importance to suggestions designed to effect savings of various materials. Here the innovators have a broad field of activity and, as experience has shown, they are able to marshal hidden reserves to effect economies.

In particular, the work of Major Komarevskiy and Sergeant Bryukhovskiy has been evaluated very highly; they found a method of effecting savings of non-ferrous metals in performing various construction tasks. The savings obtained from this lies in the fact that large quantities of valuable materials are freed for other needs. The works of Majors Shurkin and Odintsov, Lt. Col. Popov and many others have already made a substantial contribution and will continue to do so.

The exhibit also provided a look at the accomplishment of our innovators and inventors. Their activities received high praise from Marshals of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, M. V. Zakharov and S. S. Biryuzov and General of the Army F. I. Golikov who saw the exhibits.

The successes which have been achieved cannot but please us. However, we clearly see our shortcomings. It should be mentioned that along with the units where innovations and inventions receive constant attention from the commanders, political workers and Party and Komsomol organizations, there are also units where this important work receives no support.

The flow of technical information between units is poorly organized. Local radio stations and newspapers are not used sufficiently for propagandizing the achievements of our innovators. Compilations of technical data are sometimes circulated with considerable delays and are often side-tracked in the staffs where they do not find large numbers of readers. All this hinders the full utilization of these valuable innovations on a broad scale.

VI. OPEN ROAD TO MILITARY COMPETITIONS •  
(TROOP TRAINING COMPETITIONS)

Krasnaya Zvezda  
10 July 1960  
Page 4

Col. T. Dzhangarov, Col.  
V. Solodukhin, Lt. Col.  
A. Bratsev and Lt. Col.  
L. Veydner-Dubrovin

Lately military type sports have become more widespread among the troops. This has not been an accident. They consist of various exercises and movements taken from the combat training program. Regular participation in competitions involving military type sports helps to develop skills among the servicemen in performing the combat movements for their military specialty.

Unfortunately, military competitions have not yet acquired the position which they should have among the troops in the overall system of sports activities. It is no secret that in many units they either are not practiced or are conducted very rarely. We can say that military type sports at the present time are a stepchild in the Armed Forces.

What is the reason for this situation in which military competitions have not yet attained their proper mass character.

Experience shows that much depends on the initiative and ingenuity of unit commanders, sports committees and komsomol organizations. Although much depends on the desire and initiative of the commanders and sports groups, this is by no means all. In our opinion, there are other factors which hinder the development of military competitions among the troops.

First we should point to the unequal position of military competitions among the troops when we compare them with the competitions in other kinds of sports. When he participates in a competition such as in track, the soldier can perform the class norms of the single All Union Sports Classification and can qualify as a sportsman. If he participates in a military competition, he, as a rule, cannot receive a class for the simple reason that there are no classes.

In 1959, many participants at the Armed Forces championship in the military triathlon showed excellent results both in the various aspects of the triathlon and in their total number of points. Pfc. Syuzev had the high score. However, even this difficult and honored victory at such an important competition did not give him the right to become a sportsman 3rd class in the military triathlon.

It is not by accident, therefore, that the soldiers, sergeants and officers who participate in military competitions have less interest than when participating in competitions involving the classical types of sports.

It would of course be a crude mistake to contrast military

competitions with regular sports competitions and to suppose that the broad expansion of military competitions would hinder the broad development of the classical types of sports. Sports competitions are very popular among the troops and have a mass character. Just as military competitions, they also contribute to raising the combat training of the troops. In our opinion the problem is not to curtail the regular sports but rather to develop them more. At the same time, we must develop military competitions in every possible way.

At the present time the single All-Union Sports Classification does not satisfy the increased demands for sports work in the Armed Forces because an absolute majority of the military type sports which are broadly practiced in the Army and Navy are not reflected therein. The Central Council of the Union of Sports Societies and Organizations of the USSR is for some reason very reluctant to expand the sports classification through the introduction of military type sports.

All this indicates that it is now time to create such a sports classification which would contain norms for the basic types of military competitions and which would give the right to award classes and for the most important and complex types of sports to award the title of master of sports. The creation of such a classification is called for by life itself. Military servicemen should be awarded appropriate classes and a title of master of sports for attaining good results in completing obstacle courses, running cross country in ordinary uniform and in performing in the military triathlon and in the soldiers and officers all-around combined competitions.

A second and not unimportant reason for the backwardness of applied military sports is the lack of rules for their conduct. As is known, each sport for which there is a classification has carefully developed rules of competition which have been approved by the appropriate organs. Unfortunately, there are no rules for military competitions. Therefore, competitions in the same sport may be conducted differently in various units and the organization of many championships suffers from serious shortcomings; also the work of the commanders in conducting competitions is made difficult. Obviously it is time to develop uniform rules for competitions in the most important and valuable types of applied military exercises and skills.

In this one must keep in mind that some unit commanders and sports groups of units still do not have the experience in preparing and conducting military competitions. Also the conduct of such competitions is coupled, as a rule, with more significant organizational and instructional difficulties than is the case in conducting ordinary sports competitions. If there are few good training aids for use in instruction, training, and conducted competitions

in various types of sports for the troops, there is nothing available along these lines for military competitions. It seems to us that it is necessary to develop and produce various training aids for military competitions which will be suitable for all members of the Armed Forces or will be suitable for the various branches and for some military specialties.

Finally, it should be kept in mind that the number of applied military sports which have championships for military districts and for the Armed Forces is extremely small.

It is probably time to expand the program of military competitions for the championship of military districts, fleets, and bodies of troops and in some cases to have championships for the Armed Forces. It is also necessary to record official records for military competitions.

Of course, it is not so simple to solve all these problems. However, the interests of combat training require that a system of military competitions for the troops be established in the near future.

VII. ANSWERS TO READERS' QUESTIONS  
(BENEFITS FOR DEMOBILIZED SERVICEMEN)

Sovetskaya Yustitsiya  
No. 5, 1960  
Pages 73-74 (excerpts)

Unsigned article

In connection with the adoption of the law on the new cuts in the Armed Forces of the USSR, readers of this magazine have asked the editorial board to explain the privileges which have been established for individuals who have been released from the Armed Forces of the USSR.

The answers of the editorial board to the readers are based on the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated 20 January 1960 and bearing the number 74, "On the labor rehabilitation and material provisions for military servicemen released from the Armed Forces of the USSR in accordance with the law on new significant cuts in the Armed Forces of the USSR".

Question. What rules have been established with respect to resituating military servicemen who have been released from the ranks of the Army and Air Force?

Answer. Soldiers, sailors, sergeants, master sergeants and officers who have been released from the Armed Forces of the USSR must be relocated in new jobs not later than 1 month after arriving in their place of residence and this work must be in accordance with whatever specialty or experience they have.

Question. In what order will officers and career soldiers who have been placed in the reserve or retired be provided with living quarters?

Answer. The Council of Ministers of the Union Republics and the executive committees of the local soviets will provide officers and career soldiers who have been placed in the reserve or retired with living quarters (regardless of the field in which they are working) as soon as possible but not later than 3 months after arriving in an area for residence which has been selected in accordance with the appropriate registration requirements.

The executive committees of the local soviets must register personnel who have been placed in the reserve or retired together with the members of their families for all cities and inhabited points except that in the cities of Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev this will be done when they have living quarters or when they live permanently in these cities prior to entering military service.

The officers and career soldiers who have been placed in the reserve or retired and their families will be registered without restrictions such as the sanitary norm for living space when the quarters are occupied by the parents of the serviceman or by his wife or children.

Question. What assistance can be given to officers who have been placed in the reserve in acquiring a production specialty?

Answer. For the purpose of rendering aid to officers who have been placed in the reserve in order that they might acquire a production specialty, the heads of ministries and branches, of sovnarkhozes, of enterprises, of construction sites and of organizations must give them preference in entering schools of the FZU type and in entering courses for studying appropriate professions. During the period of study, the officers who have been placed in the reserve will be paid a stipend equal to 75% of the monthly salary for the specialty for which they are preparing except that it will be not less than 400 rubles per month for all individuals other than those who are receiving a pension.

Question. What privileges have been established for officers who have been released from the Army and Navy in accordance with the law on new substantial cuts of the Armed Forces of the USSR with respect to entering higher and secondary special schools?

Answer. The officers who have been released from the Armed Forces of the USSR will be accepted in higher and secondary special schools during the 1960/61 and 1961/62 school years without taking entrance examinations.

For this entrance without examination will be allowed:

for the initial and succeeding courses at higher schools for officers who have partially or fully completed their higher education;

for courses in preparation for entry into higher schools and which are especially organized for this purpose and consist of up to 10 months of study without cost and while receiving a stipend for officers who have completed 10 grades of secondary schooling;

for initial and subsequent courses at secondary special schools for officers who have completed secondary military schooling;

for initial courses at secondary special schools for officers with an education of not less than 7 years of school.

The reception of such officers into schools will be in addition to the number which it is planned to receive in the given higher or secondary special school during the course of the school year and will depend on the arrival of the officers to their permanent place of residence.

Students attending higher and secondary special schools during the day and students attending courses in preparation for entering higher schools who are officers who have been released from the Armed Forces without the right to a pension will receive stipends if they have satisfactory marks.

Question. What privileges are established for military servicemen who have been placed in the reserve and who have concluded work agreements?

Answer. Military servicemen who have been transferred from the Armed Forces into the reserve and who have concluded work agreements have the following privileges:

a) they are paid the cost of the trip to the place of work and receive a daily sum of 15 rubles per day if going to the North, the Urals, Siberia, the Far East and the Kazakh SSR and 10 rubles if going to other areas;

b) persons who have signed work agreements to work in the areas of the North, the Urals, Siberia, the Far East and the Kazakh SSR for a period of not less than 2 years and who have arrived at their place of work are given a one-time grant of 600 rubles; if it is to the Donbas, they receive 500 rubles, while to other areas it is 300 rubles.

Persons who come to enterprises or construction sites which entail a large one-time grant on the basis of the decisions of the government of the USSR receive their grants in accordance with these decisions.

c) persons who have signed work agreements on working at construction sites and enterprises and in organizations located in areas of the Far North and in various remote areas similar to the areas of the Far North will be given grants and daily payments and will receive various privileges and advantages in accordance with the existing law on privileges for persons working in these areas and locales;

d) officers and career enlisted men who have been separated from units or offices located in remote areas and who have concluded work agreements within 3 months after separation from the service to work in remote areas similar to those of the Far North have the time of their uninterrupted military service in the remote areas counted in their work service record in connection with the receipt of an additional sum of money in their pay and other privileges as provided for by current legislation;

e) they are given advances of up to 7000 rubles for the construction of individual housing with the loan to be repaid over a period of 7 years beginning with the second year after the granting of the loan;

f) they are given loans of up to 1000 rubles for home purchases with the loan to be repaid over a period of 1½ years;

g) expenses connected with the travel of members of the family to the place of work are paid if the travel occurs before a period of 2 years from the signing of the work agreement has elapsed; also the cost of transporting baggage to a total of 240 kilograms for the worker himself and 80 kilograms for each member of his family is paid;

h) building materials needed for the construction of living quarters are sold and assistance is given in transporting these materials by vehicle (for an appropriate sum).

Question. What privileges are granted to military servicemen who are placed in the reserve or who are retired and who express a desire to go permanently to the kolkhozes or sovkhoses in the

virgin or fallow lands of the RSFSR and the Kazakh SSR?

Answer. They are given a one-time cash payment for household purchases to the amount of 1000 rubles for each worker; they are given credit for the construction of a home together with outside buildings to the amount of 20,000 rubles per family with 50% of the loan being absorbed by the government; a credit is given for the purchase of cows or other livestock to the amount of 1500 rubles per family. In addition, a whole series of other privileges and advantages is established for them.

Material benefits for military servicemen who have been placed in the reserve or who have been retired and who have entered a school for driver personnel in agriculture is provided at government expense; upon the completion of this school they remain to work on sovkhozes located in the virgin lands of the RSFSR and the Kazakh SSR.

VIII. RESPONSIBILITY OF ORGANS OF THE NONDEPARTMENTAL  
EXTERIOR GUARD SERVICE

Sotsialisticheskaya Zakonnost'  
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Pages 72-73

Ya. Shtutin, Docent, and M.  
Byalik, Senior Consultant  
of the State Arbitration  
under the Council of Ministers

It is known that in order to protect socialist property from plundering, economic organizations turn over the responsibility for protecting their installations such as stores, warehouses, etc. to organs of the nondepartmental exterior guard service. This is done on the basis of agreements. Relations between the parties involved are regulated in accordance with a model agreement as coordinated with the Ministry of Trade of the USSR. According to this agreement the organs of the nondepartmental exterior guard service are responsible in cases of theft of goods and material from the installations which are being protected when it involves malefactors who break into premises or burglarize locks, bolts, ordinary windows or show windows if the fact of burglary is established by investigation or judicial organs (para. 11 of the model agreement). Indemnification of the cost of the stolen goods is performed by the organs of the nondepartmental exterior guard service upon presentation by the economic organization of double-checked bookkeeping data or upon presentation of the conclusions of an investigative organ or of the sentence of a court. In paragraph 16 of the model agreement is given a complete list of the circumstances under which an organ of the nondepartmental exterior guard service can be relieved of responsibility for any loss resulting from the theft of goods or material.

In practice the question has arisen as to whether or not the nondepartmental exterior guard service should be responsible when indemnification for the loss which has been suffered is charged under a legally binding sentence of a court to the malefactors. The arbitrating body sometimes considers that the organs of the nondepartmental exterior guard service should not be responsible in such a case.

The following case would be an example. One of the interblast offices brought a suit for state arbitration against the directorate of the nondepartmental exterior guard service in order to obtain indemnification for the loss suffered from the theft of goods and material worth 184,230 rubles. After collating the figures and examining the stolen goods and material which were discovered in the possession of the individuals who were tried, the amount of the suit was reduced to 35,634 rubles. After examining the case, the arbiter rejected the suit. The basis for his decision involved two factors: the loss which was suffered was already adjudged in favor of the party bringing suit by the sentence of the court which

had legal force and involved indemnification from the guilty parties; and the act of execution for the forced exaction of the loss from the malefactors was given to the suitor in fulfillment of the sentence and should be considered as a real indemnification for this loss.

The erroneousness of such reasoning is obvious. The arbiter did not take into account that a sentence of the court which is in legal force in a criminal case is binding for the arbitration body as well as for the court only with respect to establishing the fact of the occurrence of the crime and the fact that a given individual had committed it (article 13 of the Criminal Procedural Code of the RSFSR and corresponding articles of the criminal procedural codes of the other union republics). What is more, in point 7 of the decision of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR dated 28 May 1954 "On court practice in indemnifying material loss", it is indicated that a court, which examines the matter of exacting indemnification from the persons who were judged to have criminally caused the loss, itself establishes the amount of the loss even though the amount may differ from the amount fixed during the criminal proceedings. The court which examines the matter of exacting indemnification in a civil proceeding must in this case inform the appropriate responsible individual about checking the supervision of the sentence of the criminal court. All this can be handled as appropriate by the arbitration organs.

The other reason for rejecting the suit was also incorrect. The receipt by the oblast office of the act of execution for indemnification from the persons who were found to have caused the loss (on the basis of the sentence of the court) cannot be considered as actual compensation for the loss. The act of execution provides only the right to indemnify the loss; however, until actual indemnification is accomplished, this right has no practical meaning. It is not by accident, therefore, that point 112 of the instructions of the People's Commissariat of Justice dated 28 September 1939 on the order of executing court decisions gives as the basis for stopping the execution of a proceeding the impossibility even with the implementation of all possible steps, of accomplishing complete indemnification in accordance with the act of execution.

The arbiter did not consider that in the course of the criminal proceedings as civil suit against the malefactors was examined but without the guard service participating as an interested party.

Therefore, this sentence cannot prevent the office from bringing a suit against the nondepartmental exterior guard service because the suits are not identical. In general, it is not permitted to bring identical suits (i.e. suits involving the same persons and the same objects and having the same basis<sup>1</sup>).

<sup>1</sup>See the decision of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR dated 7 April 1924 (protocol No. 9).

All this makes it possible to conclude that the arbiter did not have sufficient grounds when he freed the organs of the non-departmental exterior guard service from the responsibility which they held under the agreement.

The arbiter should have satisfied the suit of the office. Considering, however, that the amount of the loss according to the sentence of the court also was to be taken directly from the convicted persons, in order to avoid "groundless enrichment" (articles 309-402 of the Civil Code of the RSFSR) the arbiter should, by his decision, have required the office to turn over the act of execution for indemnification from the persons who caused the loss to the organ for the nondepartmental exterior guard service.

Some people express the opinion that acts of execution cannot be transferred with an endorsement. Actually the act of execution, along with other data, does indicate the creditor and the debtor. However, this by no means signifies that the document cannot be transferred with an endorsement. We assume that such a transfer would be in accordance with the general rules under article 124 of the Civil Code of the RSFSR and the corresponding articles of the civil codes of the other union republics.

Article 124 of the Civil Code of the RSFSR allows an abatement of the demands of a creditor on another person to the extent that it does not conflict with the law or any agreement or if the demands are not related to the person of the creditor. In this case, none of these conditions were infringed upon. The law (the Civil Legal Code and the instructions on the manner of implementing court decisions, dated 28 September 1939) does not speak of forbidding the transferral of acts of execution from one person to another.

With respect to the permissibility of an abatement of the demands of an act of execution, the instructions of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR on 7 May 1928 (protocol No. 8) are an example. The Plenum explained that the transferral of an act of execution must be accomplished in writing by signing on the act of execution itself or with another statement. The signature of the person making the transfer should be verified by a people's judge, a notary, or an office which has the right to verify the authenticity of a signature. Similar information is given in the letters of the State Arbitration Board attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated 14 October 1958 and 13 January 1959.

In accordance with these explanations, trade organizations are not deprived of the right of making demands on the organs of the nondepartmental exterior guard service concerning the indemnification of the value of the loss from the perpetrators of the crime. If these demands are refused by the organs of the nondepartmental exterior guard service, the trade organizations are within their rights to file suit with the arbitration organs for

a period of 1½ years from the time that an official account of the theft was furnished. The official account should be compiled immediately after the theft has been detected. The State Arbitration Board attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR also touched on the permissibility of trade organizations transferring to organs of the nondepartmental exterior guard service the right to exact indemnification according to the acts of execution of the legal organs for the cost of the stolen goods from the persons who had been found guilty of the theft by the court.

However, from that which has been said one should not presume that there is no need to consider measures designed to improve the method resolving these disagreements. The fact is that in a criminal process it is not the organs of the nondepartmental exterior guard service which figure as the civil plaintiff seeking indemnification from the malefactors but rather trade organizations as the parties who have suffered directly from the crime. From this, flow all the consequences: two series of controversial legal relationships and two types of solutions and other related legal complications. All this could be avoided if the organ of the nondepartmental exterior guard service figured in the criminal process as a civil plaintiff and also if the sums to be indemnified from the convicted persons should be placed at the disposal of the nondepartmental exterior guard service rather than the trade organization which suffered the loss. Such a system would cause an improvement in the conduct of the parties according to the agreements; it would eliminate unnecessary arbitration controversies between trade organizations and organs of the nondepartmental exterior guard service; it would bar the necessity of having the trade organizations transfer the acts of execution to organs of the nondepartmental exterior guard service; and it would eliminate possible differences between sentences of the court and the decisions of arbitration boards.

It would be desirable for the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR to give an explanation and guidance on this matter.

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