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No. 9, September 1982

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NEED FOR CONSTANT COMBAT READINESS EMPHASIZED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 82 (signed to press 30 Aug 82) pp 3-12

[Article by Maj Gen A. Shurygin, Doctor of Historical Sciences and Professor, and Col A. Dremkov, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences and Docent: "High Combat Readiness--The Main CPSU and Soviet People's Requirement of the USSR Armed Forces"*)]

[Text] The Soviet people and their Armed Forces are greeting the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR in a climate of great political and labor enthusiasm. The nation is confidently following the course outlined at the 26th CPSU Congress, which thoroughly analyzed the most important trends and world development and defined ways and methods of fighting to prevent war, to restrain the arms race and consolidate detente. "There is presently no more important task at the international level for our party and our people, for all the peoples of the planet," Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stated, "than to defend peace."¹ Leonid Il'ich stressed this idea once again in his message to the second special session of the UN general assembly, declaring that "concern for peace is the dominant concern in the policy of the Soviet Union."²

The CPSU and the Soviet Government's devotion to peace is merged into one with their concern for defending the conquests of socialism. V.I. Lenin instructed us to accompany our steps toward peace with the maintaining of constant military preparedness. He stated in 1920: "We have now taught a large number of powerful states not to engage in war with us. We cannot guarantee that this will last for long, however. We have to be prepared for the event that, with the slightest change in the situation, the imperialist predators will set upon us once again."³ It was precisely because of this that he demanded "a serious attitude toward the nation's defense"⁴ and called upon the party: "...be on the alert, guard the defense capability of our nation and our Red Army as a priceless treasure, and remember that we do not have the right to permit a weakening even for a second with respect to our workers and peasants and their conquests."⁵ The party and the Soviet people steadfastly follow this precept.

* Material for a seminar on this subject.

THE 26TH CPSU CONGRESS ON THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE MILITARY-POLITICAL
SITUATION AND THE NEED TO ENHANCE THE COMBAT READINESS OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES

Describing the contemporary international situation, the 26th CPSU Congress noted that events presently occurring in the world demonstrate the intense struggle under way between the two trends in world policy. On the one hand is the "course toward the restraining of the arms race, the strengthening of peace and detente, the protection of the sovereign rights and liberties of peoples,"⁶ which is being actively followed by nations of the socialist commonwealth, led by the USSR; and on the other, a course "toward the undermining of detente and stimulation of the arms race, a policy of threats and interference in the affairs of others, and suppression of the liberation struggle."⁷ The imperialist states are adhering to the latter.

Imperialism's aggressiveness, first and foremost that of American imperialism, has increased sharply at the contemporary stage. The adventuristic actions of the United States and its accomplices, aimed at retarding the course of world history, preventing the development of socialism and suppressing the national liberation movement of peoples, have increased tensions on the planet. Imperialism's aggressive circles have set themselves the goal of placing a barrier on the path of progressive change, of regaining their role as masters of destinies. This is reflected in all areas of the foreign and domestic policy of the imperialist states: in the strengthening of the positions of the military-industrial complex; in the growth of militarization and in the arms race; in increasing military outlays; in the activization of the military-bloc policy; in the creation of hot-beds of military dangers; and in attempts to destroy the strategic military parity existing between the USSR and the United States.

Imperialism's growing aggressiveness at the contemporary stage is manifested in stepped-up material preparations for war, militarization of the capitalist economy and an unprecedented growth of its military preparations. The imperialist states are spending enormous sums on armament. Rapid growth of military outlays is a characteristic feature of the budgets of capitalist nations. In 1970, for example, direct military outlays by the NATO states amounted to 104 billion dollars, whereas they had reached 254 billion dollars in 1980. In accordance with new programs recently adopted, the military outlays of those countries are to increase even more during the next few years. During the past decade they spent more than 1.6 trillion dollars for military purposes.⁸

The greatest danger to the cause of peace is posed by the plan for "completing the armament" of NATO with nuclear missiles, which calls for the additional deployment of around 600 new American medium-range missiles in Western Europe. Implementation of the plan will destroy the balance existing in Europe and create a serious threat to the security of the USSR and its allies. The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact nations can understandably not permit the existing balance of power to be changed in favor of the United States and NATO, and are striving to see that the principle of equality and identical security for the sides is strictly observed.

Imperialism's aggressiveness is growing, and its bloc strategy is becoming more active. NATO occupies the leading place among the military-political blocs of the imperialist countries. The trend toward expansion of its functions and its sphere of activity is manifesting itself more and more clearly.

The United States is attempting to create new blocs, namely a Pacific Ocean association, South Atlantic, Near East and other military blocs, in addition to its existing military-political alliances. It is also encouraging the rebirth of Japanese militarism. Japan's outlays for military purposes have increased sharply in recent years. The budget for the period ahead indicates a trend to increase them by at least 10 percent annually. According to a forecast by the magazine GUNDZI KENKYU, this will permit Japan to increase the numerical strength of its "self-defense forces" to 2-2.5 million men by 1985, to have up to 60 divisions of ground forces and up to 2,000 combat aircraft in the air forces, and will make it possible to equip the army with nuclear weapons.⁹

The Beijing leadership is an active accomplice of imperialism's more militant forces. Taking advantage of its latent anti-Sovietism, the United States is expanding military-political ties with the PRC, and a strategic alliance is being scraped together between the American imperialists and the Beijing hegemonists.

The imperialists hope to restrain the development of the world revolutionary process by means of the aggressive blocs and various alliances, and to save the capitalist system. The cutting edge of all the imperialist blocs is directed against the socialist nations, and primarily the Soviet Union.

Imperialism's aggressive nature is manifested in the efforts of the United States to expand its network of military bases. There are presently more than 1,500 American military bases and facilities located on the territories of 32 states. In recent years the United States has achieved agreements to create or expand its military bases in Israel, Egypt, Oman, Saudia Arabia, Kenya and Somalia. They are all springboards for aggression, at which more than a half million U.S. servicemen are concentrated. Nuclear weapons are being accumulated at many American military bases and facilities. For example, more than 7,000 U.S. nuclear warheads are deployed in Western Europe, around 1,500 nuclear warheads are located in the Pacific Ocean zone, and more than 7,000 are located on ships and floating bases of the Atlantic and Pacific fleets.¹⁰

Centers of tension are being expanded, and armed conflicts are being incited. The United States is interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states in almost all areas of the planet. Just since the war more than 140 wars and military conflicts have occurred through the fault of imperialism.¹¹ More than 30 of the 60 armed conflicts have grown into local wars. Total victims in only 36 of them have reached approximately 20 million people.¹² The blame for this lies with imperialism.

Imperialism's aggressive policy has not changed today. The United States is heating the explosive situation in the Near East, stepping up its outfitting of

bands invading the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and applying military pressure against socialist Cuba. Antipopular regimes are holding on by means of its money and weapons in El Salvador and Chile. It is crudely interfering in the internal affairs of socialist Poland, turning Pakistan into the Pentagon's main base of operations in Southwest Asia and encouraging Israel's acts of banditry in Lebanon. American imperialism's strategic military concepts are a dangerous indicator of its growing aggressiveness. For many years the arms race and aggressive intrigues were conducted under the stamp of the strategy of so-called "massive retaliation." The "flexible response" concept was then developed, and there was the "realistic restraint" strategy. The new strategy of so-called "direct opposition" proclaimed by the United States sanctions the most barbarian methods of conducting war, using all types of weapons for the mass destruction of people (nuclear, neutron, chemical and others). The substance, the nature and the trend of all these concepts demonstrate the arrogance, the hegemonism and the extreme aggressiveness of imperialism's plans, which lead to the undermining of detente, the exacerbation of tensions and confrontation.

Ideological preparations for war have been stepped up in recent years in the imperialist nations and in China. The proponents of these preparations advance one false story after another about a "Soviet military threat," about our homeland as a "center of international terrorism" and so forth. There is a clearly defined trend toward the organized conduct of "psychological warfare" against the USSR and other nations of the socialist commonwealth. In the United States, for example, all of the ideological centers and services have been placed under state control. They are directed by the International Communication Agency. The subversive activities of the West's radio stations have been stepped up markedly. The main purpose of the acts of ideological diversion is to weaken the moral-political unity of peoples of the USSR and the fraternal socialist nations, to hinder socialism's advance by any means. The ideological brainwashing of personnel in the NATO armies and China's army has also been intensified. And so, the policy of militant imperialism, headed by the United States, resulted in a situation in which the serious danger of war hung over all nations of the world by the beginning of the 1980's. This is why Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR minister of defense, stated in his report at the May 1982 sixth All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations that "it would be an unforgivable error to underestimate the real danger posed by the imperialist forces. We cannot ignore the fact that they have impressive resources and rely upon modern, thoroughly outfitted armies."¹³

In this situation the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, while countering imperialism's aggressive course with a high level of vigilance and firmness and approaching the urgent problems of today from a realistic position, are steadfastly and constantly pursuing a course toward the restraining of the arms race and the expansion of international detente, toward the strengthening of peace and security of peoples. Taking concrete steps in this direction, the USSR has bilaterally made a formal commitment not to be the first to employ nuclear weapons.

Our nation proceeds from the belief that the basis for strengthening peace lies in preserving the existing equality, systematically weakening military confrontation and reducing the armed forces and armaments, while assuring equal security

for the parties. Proposals of the USSR, presented by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in a message to the second special session of the UN general assembly were directed toward this.

At the same time, the developing international situation demands that the CPSU and our government maintain the Soviet Union's military might "at a level assuring the decisive and total routing of any enemy which might be bold enough to encroach upon the Soviet homeland."¹⁴

The need to enhance the combat readiness of the Armed Forces has been and remains an objective necessity, one of the most important conditions for the successful building of communism and the preservation of universal peace.

THE ESSENCE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE COMBAT READINESS OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES: THE CPSU'S DEMANDS WITH RESPECT TO THE COMBAT READINESS OF THE TROOPS AND NAVAL FORCES

Combat readiness is that state which defines the degree of preparedness of the troops and naval forces to fulfill the tasks assigned them, their ability to repel and thwart aggression at any time, no matter where it might originate, to inflict a devastating defeat upon the enemy.

In the strategic sense, combat readiness also means that state of the Armed Forces, which provides reliable security for the nation in peacetime and the successful execution of missions during a war.

In the tactical sense it is the ability of subunits, units, ships and formations to enter into battle with the enemy within the shortest possible period of time and to successfully execute the missions assigned them under the most difficult conditions.

In the political respect constant combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces means the fighting men's infinite devotion to the cause of communism and irreconcilability with the enemies of the homeland, especially imperialism, and an awareness by the personnel of their great historic responsibility to the CPSU and the Soviet people for the safety of the nation and other states of the socialist commonwealth.

On the moral-psychological level it means a constant inner state of moral and psychological mobilization on the part of the servicemen and an ability to maintain their self-control and steadfastness, to demonstrate courage and heroism in critical situations of modern combat.

Combat readiness is a multifaceted and complex concept. Therein, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has stated, "as though under focus, are concentrated the enormous efforts of the people and their material expenditures on the outfitting of the army, the awareness, combat training and discipline of all the servicemen, the art of the command staff in controlling the troops, and a great deal more. In the final analysis, it is the crowning point of the combat skill of the troops in peacetime and the key to victory in a war."¹⁵

In various phases of history the substance of combat readiness has changed in accordance with changes occurring in the political goals of wars, the level of development of armies and weaponry, methods of conducting it, and other conditions. Modern strategic weapons make it possible to carry out strikes against any target, no matter where it is located. The most important demand made of the combat readiness of today's troops is therefore to maintain a high and constant capability on the part of all units and formations of the army and navy to conduct combat operations, regardless of where they are located or the missions they are performing.

With respect to time, the combat readiness of the troops today is defined in hours, minutes and even seconds. Experience has taught us that imperialism always attempts to carry out a surprise attack. The time factor is especially important in the case of unexpected use of the latest means of destruction by the enemy. Because of this another extremely important requirement is that all the forces, especially those on alert duty, and the weapons be ready to carry out a retaliatory strike against the enemy within the shortest possible period of time.

Today the Soviet Armed Forces must be ready, as the CPSU demands, to engage in war and rout any aggressor. Furthermore, it is not enough simply to protect our country and other countries of the socialist commonwealth. It is essential to totally destroy the aggressor. "We mean," Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov, chief of the general staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and first deputy USSR minister of defense, "to be able not simply to defend ourselves, to counter the aggressor with appropriate passive means and methods of defense, but to deliver devastating retaliatory strikes and rout the enemy in any situation which develops."¹⁶

These are the most important demands made of the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces in today's situation. "Combat readiness," Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and minister of defense, stated at the sixth All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, "cannot be a temporary or seasonal thing or stagnate at a certain level. It must be constantly increased and improved. The efforts of all personnel of the Armed Forces must be directed toward this goal."¹⁷

The state of combat readiness is determined by numerous factors. They include a high level of communist ideological conviction, selfless devotion to the cause of the party and the people, firm military discipline on the part of the personnel, their combat training, psychological preparedness and physical conditioning; the outfitting of the army and navy with modern weapons and combat equipment, and maintaining them in a state of readiness for employment; a high level of political, military and special training on the part of command cadres and the capability on their part to skillfully direct the troops and organize uninterrupted material support; and the preparedness of political organs, party organizations, of all the communists, to inspire and lead the fighting men to carry out the combat missions.

A high level of combat readiness for the army and navy is impossible without skillfully organized mobilizational preparedness on the part of the troops, which assures that they can promptly switch from peacetime status to a war footing.

The officer cadres have the decisive role with respect to maintaining the troops and naval forces at the level of today's demands. "They organize and direct the training and indoctrinational process and the military work of the personnel," states Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense. "The successful accomplishment of the missions facing the subunits, units, ships and formations, and in the final analysis, the combat readiness level of the Armed Forces, are directly dependent upon their precise functioning, their ideological maturity, professional training and pedagogical skill, upon their ability to unite and lead the masses of fighting men."¹⁸

Constant combat readiness is a concrete concept. It involves precise calculations, performance standards and time limits, which must be strictly observed. For the personnel being in a state of combat readiness means skillful handling of the weapons and combat equipment, having a high level of field, air and naval training, maintaining discipline and organization, and possessing good moral qualities and fighting efficiency. All of this is acquired through persistent, daily combat and political training, skillful organization of the lives and living conditions of the fighting men and proper organization of the process of indoctrinating them. The officer cadres, primarily the commanders, political workers and staff officers, are assigned the decisive role in the accomplishment of these tasks. Thanks to the skillful work of many of them we are achieving good results in the training and indoctrination of the personnel, the strengthening of military discipline and the maintaining of the units and ships in a state of constant combat readiness. An example of this attitude toward the job is being set by commanders of those units which initiated socialist competition in the army in honor of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR, which has the slogan "For the Peaceful Labor of the Soviet People--Reliable Protection!"

A high level of party principle, demandingness of themselves and their subordinates, firm will and persistence and skillful reliance upon the party organizations and the military collectives--all of this is helping the officers in charge to successfully maintain the combat readiness of the units and ships at a level meeting today's demands.

THE COMBAT POTENTIAL OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES AND THE MAIN TRENDS WITH RESPECT TO STRENGTHENING THE COMBAT READINESS OF THE ARMY AND NAVY

A constant high level of combat readiness on the part of the troops and naval forces is the greatest indicator of the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces. It reflects the capabilities achieved for the given period of time for the armed forces with respect to conducting warfare and performing the missions assigned to them.

The 26th party congress added to military theory by revealing the substance of combat potential. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev defined the essence of this concept in the following manner: "A strong alloy of good technical equipment, military skill and indestructible morale...."¹⁹

The Communist Party has always devoted and continues to devote a great deal of attention to improving the technical equipment of the Armed Forces. The advantages of the socialist system permit us to make the most efficient use of all sectors of the national economy in the interest of national defense. We know that at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the industrial base possessed by fascist Germany surpassed the Soviet base by more than 2-fold, and that this lead subsequently became even greater as the result of the occupation of a number of regions. Thanks to its great vitality, however, the Soviet economy passed the unprecedented tests. Despite the fact that the USSR produced less than half as much steel as Germany and the countries it occupied, we surpassed the enemy in the manufacture of weapons and combat equipment. In 1944, for example, the Soviet Army received 29,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 40,000 aircraft and more than 120,000 guns.²⁰

As a result of the Communist Party's concern the materials and equipment base of the army and navy is developing in full conformity with the growth of developed socialism's economy and the need to reliably defend it.

The party teaches us that in a situation in which the United States and its NATO allies are directing their efforts toward the creation of new types of weapons and combat equipment, and the focus in the arms race is shifting toward their qualitative improvement, it is very important to vigilantly follow the development of the imperialist armies and maintain our weaponry at a level measuring up to modern demands.

The military skill of the personnel, the 26th party congress noted, is the most important element in the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces. No matter how great the technical military capabilities of the army and navy, their main strength lies in the people handling the weapons and combat equipment. "Man has been and remains the decisive force in a war,"²¹ Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, stresses. Personnel of the army and navy were marvels of good military skill in the "Zapad-81" exercise, a large scale undertaking for preparing the troops and naval forces.

In the interest of enhancing the combat skill of the fighting men, it is essential to further intensify the combat training process, to perfect its forms and methods and improve the field, air and naval training of the personnel.

The morale of the personnel is an organic component of the combat potential of the Armed Forces. F. Engels noted that in order to correctly assess an army's combat capability, one has to have an idea of its degree of discipline, its steadfastness in combat, its ability and its willingness to withstand the hardships of war and "especially its morale...."²²

The awareness of the fighting men and their morale depend upon their political, moral, legal and other views and feelings. The political views and feelings are especially important. Military personnel assess the causes of a war and its objectives through the prism of these. And the "recognition by the masses of the goals and causes of a war," V.I. Lenin said, "is of enormous importance and assures victory."²³

All the components of the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces are closely united dialectically, are inseparably linked together and interact. The CPSU and the Soviet Government therefore demonstrate their constant concern for outfitting the army and navy with the most modern weapons and combat equipment, and make great demands of the combat training of the troops, of their ideological conditioning and psychological preparedness.

The combat capabilities of the troops and naval forces are realized and they are maintained at a constantly high level of combat readiness thanks to the purposive and persistent work of commanders and political workers, staff officers and technical military specialists, party and Komsomol organizations of the Armed Forces.

The high level of combat readiness is inseparable from the fighting men's ideological conviction, their selfless devotion to the cause of the party and the people, from firm discipline and organization and psychological preparedness on the part of the personnel. An extremely important area of work for command and political personnel, party and Komsomol organizations therefore lies in instilling good moral-political and psychological qualities in the fighting men.

The task of steadily enhancing the combat readiness of the army and navy is directly dependent upon the degree to which the personnel have mastered the combat equipment and weapons. Another important area of the work therefore consists in constantly concerning ourselves with the technical military preparation of the troops, the training of the fighting men and the military collectives to make maximum use of the combat capabilities of the modern weapons.

Firm and aware military discipline on the part of the personnel is exceptionally important with respect to maintaining the troops at a high level of combat readiness. "Without firm discipline," Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustionov, USSR minister of defense, tells us, "there is no combat readiness. This is an axiom... Its proof has been tested by history."²⁴ The role of discipline has increased drastically in the contemporary, complex situation. A persistent effort to strengthen discipline, organization and order in the forces is therefore becoming increasingly important among the main areas of the work to enhance combat readiness.

Indoctrinating the fighting men in a spirit of great political and military vigilance has always been and remains one of the most important tasks in the work performed with personnel of the army and navy. Every serviceman of the Soviet Armed Forces must possess such qualities as the ability to expose the aggressive intrigues of the homeland's enemies, a knowledge of the procedures and methods

used by the enemy for its diversionary acts, the ability skillfully to perform alert duty, guard and internal service, to strictly guard state and military secrets.

In order to maintain the troops and naval forces at a constantly high level of combat readiness, commanders, political organs and staffs must give constant attention to the organization of the personnel's combat training and service, to the provision of essential living conditions for them and to the performance of purposive party-political work to indoctrinate the servicemen.

The party-political work performed in the army and navy is a powerful means of further enhancing the combat potential and assuring a high level of combat readiness for the Armed Forces of the USSR. Assessing the importance of this work, Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev has stated: "Party-political work with the personnel and their ideological conditioning have always been and remain a powerful weapon of our army. The strength of this weapon has been tested in the fire of battles. It still frightens our enemies today."²⁵

Party-political work affects all aspects of combat readiness. How well it is performed and the degree to which commanders, political workers, staff officers and other categories of military cadres participate in it determine not only the morale of the troops, but also the level of combat training of the subunits, units, and ships, the degree of preparedness of commander, political organs and staffs, their ability to direct the troops, the state of military discipline and organization, the service of the troops and alert duty, the skillful mastery of the weapons and combat equipment by the fighting men, and so forth.

The main task of ideological and political-indoctrinational work at the present time is one of thoroughly studying, actively and persistently implementing decisions coming out of the 26th CPSU Congress. In his report at the sixth All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, Army General A. A. Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, stressed the following: "It is important that all the ideological work provide the fighting men with a clear understanding of Lenin's concepts with respect to protecting the socialist homeland, create conviction as to the correctness and the invincibility of socialism, react promptly and effectively to acts of war by the imperialist states and their accomplices, and take into fuller account the increased demands made of the moral-political and psychological conditioning of the personnel."²⁶

As they build up the morale of the fighting men, commanders, political organs and party organizations also take into account the fact that the ideological struggle has intensified sharply in the international arena. Imperialist propaganda is continuously conducting a fierce offensive against the minds of the Soviet people and attempting by means of the most refined methods to corrupt their consciousness with the slander against our reality, to disgrace socialism and make imperialism appear good. The party demands that we perform substantiated and aggressive ideological work aimed at exposing bourgeois ideology, instilling hatred for the

class enemy, publicizing the advantages of the Soviet system over the bourgeois system, and explaining the sources of strength of the Soviet State and its Armed Forces.

Thoroughly demonstrating the triumph of the Lenin national policy in the USSR helps to expose the class enemy's malicious slander against socialism and to strengthen the morale of the fighting men. The sons of all our homeland's nations and ethnic groups serve shoulder to shoulder in the combat ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Preparations for that important anniversary, the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR, have opened up new possibilities for intensifying the patriotic and international indoctrination of army and navy personnel, for developing in every fighting man a profound conviction as to the correctness and the invincibility of socialism and communism, a high level of revolutionary vigilance and readiness to protect the socialist conquests.

The infinite love of Soviet fighting men for their multinational homeland is combined with a sense of fraternal friendship for the peoples and armies of nations in the socialist commonwealth, of solidarity with all peoples struggling for their liberation. Our army's history is rich in brilliant examples of altruistic international assistance extended to those fighting for freedom and independence. The traditions of patriotism and internationalism are passed on from one generation to the next. And the fighting men today are continuing those traditions in a worthy manner.

The complexity and contradictoriness of the international situation and imperialism's stepped-up aggressiveness demand that we work tirelessly to strengthen the Soviet State's defense capability and its Armed Forces, while consistently defending the cause of peace. The Communist Party has never made a secret and is not now making a secret of the fact that the Soviet Union has modern Armed Forces. Their strength and their constant combat readiness are a factor effectively restraining imperialism's aggressive aspirations and providing a reliable defense for the conquests of socialism.

FOOTNOTES

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: THE 4TH GUARDS ARMY IN THE BUDAPEST OFFENSIVE

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 82 (signed to press 30 Aug 82) pp 13-19

[Article published under the heading "Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War" by Col S. Alferov: "The Offensive of the 4th Guards Army in the Budapest Operation"]

[Text] The complete motorization of the forces and the great effectiveness of the weapons, especially nuclear weapons, require that the troops under today's conditions conduct highly maneuverable combat operations in a complex and rapidly changing situation. Creative use of the extensive experience from the Great Patriotic War, particularly that of the 4th Guards Army during its participation in the Budapest Operation, can help substantially to prepare for such operations. Prior to their commitment to battle units and formations of this army were removed from the Ukraine and regrouped in Romania. They then made a 6-day march, forced the Dunay without making any sort of halt, penetrated a prepared defensive position in the depth of the enemy's tactical order of battle and repelled powerful counterthrusts.

On 12 November, after the army's first two Guards rifle divisions (Colonel I.N. Moshlyak's 62d and Major General A. Ye. Yakovlev's 80th) had arrived at the station of Timisoara by railway, a directive from headquarters, 3d Ukrainian Front, assigned the field force the mission of concentrating at least six divisions to the northeast of Sombor by 26 November (see diagram).

The army commander made the decision to carry out the march in six night moves along two routes (170 kilometers long for Major General N. I. Biryukov's 20th Corps and 190 kilometers long for Lieutenant General P. I. Fomenko's 21st Corps); to move out the rifle divisions subordinate to the army (Major General P.I. Bunyashin's 84th and Major General I. A. Gorbachev's 252d) over separate routes behind the corps.

The corps commanders gave each division around 2 days to unload the trains, make preparations for the march and form up the march columns. The 62d and 80th Guards Rifle Divisions began to move out on 13 November, without waiting for the concentration to be completed. On 19 November they were concentrated in the new areas.

During the march Lieutenant General I. V. Galanin, commander of the 4th Guards Army, received a new mission: by 1 December to move the main forces up to bridgeheads captured by Lieutenant General M. N. Sharokhin's 57th Army on the western bank of the Dunay, to develop an offensive on the northwestern axis and to seize a line running from Lake Velencey through Szekesfehervar to Lake Balaton by 10/11 December.

The forcing of the Dunay. During the concentration of the 4th Guards Army the 31st Guards Rifle Corps (commanded by Major General S. A. Bobruk) was transferred to it from the 46th Army operating in front of it. The latter, consisting of the 4th, 34th and 40th Guards Rifle Divisions, occupied a defense on the eastern bank of the Dunay along a strip 95 kilometers long. That same day the commander and the army staff (Major General K.N. Derevyanko, chief of staff) began working out the operation plan.

It should be noted that the forcing of the Dunay presented a great deal of difficulty. The terrain along its gently sloping eastern bank, with the river ordinarily 800-1000 meters wide, was flooded in many places as a result of abundant fall rains. The approaches to this bank were clearly visible and were being shelled from the higher western bank, where there were enemy trenches, fire points, barriers and areas of mine fields. The higher command therefore supported the 41st Division's initiative to capture a bridgehead. A small defense sector captured by the 3d Rifle Battalion of the 126th Guards Rifle Regiment (Major M. S. Belik, battalion commander) 2.5 kilometers southeast of Mohacs was increased to 6 kilometers along the front and up to 4 kilometers in depth during the first day of the battle. The division's main forces had reached there by 26 November and joined up with forces of the 57th Army, which were expanding a bridgehead in the area of Batina. The front commander assigned six 16-ton ferries on 27 November to accelerate the army's crossing to the western bank of the Dunay, and ordered two divisions and artillery of the 20th Corps to be sent across in the zone of an adjacent field force on the left.

In view of the situation which had developed, the army headquarters worked out and the commander approved a new operation plan by 30 November, which called for the development of an offensive on the western bank of the Dunay and the capture of a line running from Lake Velencey through Szekesfehervar and Mohacs to Vershberen' by 10 December. To implement this plan the 20th and 21st Corps continued the offensive on the western bank of the Dunay, while the 31st Corps forced the river at 2145 hours on 30 November with forces of the 40th Guards Rifle Division (Colonel L. Sh. Bransburg, commander), and captured a bridgehead in the area of Mardocs. On the morning of 1 December the 252d Division's 928th Rifle Regiment and the 83d Naval Infantry Brigade crossed the Dunay on vessels of the 1st Armored Launch Brigade of the Dunay Flotilla (Vice Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, flotilla commander). They battled their way to capture Ger'yen and joined forces with the units of the 21st Corps.

Special aspects of the forcing of the Dunay included the fact that for purposes of surprise, the crossing by the first echelon of troops was carried out under

cover of darkness and smoke screens, with strict observance of sound masking measures and without artillery preparation. The 31st Corps Artillery did not open fire until the enemy had detected the infantry subunits on its own bank. Effective fire from the artillerymen suppressed the enemy's fire points and made it possible for the sappers to neutralize connected and mined floating fascines and antipersonnel mine fields laid on the bank, and provided support for the infantry attack against the enemy's front-line trench.

At the army commander's order mobile detachments consisting of a rifle battalion an artillery battalion, a sapper company and a reconnaissance platoon were sent out in vehicles at dawn on 1 December to develop the offensive. These detachments enveloped or blockaded the fascists' strongpoints, reached the enemy's rear and inflicted perceptible losses, contributing to the offensive from the front by the main forces.


By the end of 1 December army forces had advanced up to 17 kilometers on the left flank and up to 12 kilometers on the right. By the 20th they had reached a line running from Lake Velencey to Lake Balaton, after heavy fighting, where an attempt to penetrate the "Margarita" prepared defense line from the line was unsuccessful. The field force switched to a defense.

The slow pace of the offensive and its ultimate diminution were due in the first place to the fact that after the troops had forced the river, they frequently engaged in battle as separate units and were not always provided with adequate ammunition and other materiel. In the second place, the enemy offered stiff resistance and fought for every hill, every inhabited area and every building, and especially frequently carried out counterattacks with the strength of a battalion and tanks against a company, committing new subunits and units to the battle.¹ Between 26 and 30 November alone the enemy command moved the Hungarian 55th Jaeger Battalion, the 5th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, the 26th Construction Battalion and the 50th Sapper Battalion into the army's zone. During the first half of December new subunits and units of the Hungarian 2d Infantry Division and the German 1st and 23d Tank Divisions entered the combat operations against the army.

In an attempt to hold the capital of Hungary, the enemy command reinforced its defenses between lakes Velencey and Balaton. The first zone, which had a depth of 5 to 8 kilometers and was totally occupied by enemy troops, had a well developed system of trenches and fire points linked together by communication trenches and protected by wire entanglements and tank ditches.

On 12 December in accordance with a directive issued by Headquarters, Supreme High Command, the commander of the 3d Ukrainian Front assigned the 4th Guards Army the mission of penetrating the enemy's defense and occupying a position running from Patka through Szekesfehervar to Polgard' (see diagram) no later than the second day of the offensive, of supporting the commitment to the battle of mobile formations of the front (the 18th Tank Corps and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps) 12 kilometers from the forward edge, utilizing the results of their

operations to reach a line between Saar and (Verteshkozma) on the third or fourth day, and by the end of the sixth day, reaching the line of the operation's ultimate goal, 68 kilometers from the starting point, cutting off withdrawal routes to the west for the enemy's Budapest grouping. Lieutenant General I.I. Shlemin's 46th Army advanced on the right, the 57th Army on the left.



Operations of the 4th Guards Army in the Budapest Operation

[Key on following page]

Key:

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Budapest | 18. 152d Rifle Division |
| 2. Saar | 19. 5th Guards Cavalry Corps |
| 3. Bischke | 20. (Ger'yen) |
| 4. 4th Guards Army | 21. Units [of the] |
| 5. (Verteshkozma) | 22. (Shashd) |
| 6. Patka | 23. Bajmok |
| 7. Szekesfehervar | 24. Mohacs |
| 8. Lake Velencey | 25. Batina |
| 9. (Nad'valdash) | 26. Sombor |
| 10. 31st Guards Rifle Corps | 27. (Toryants) |
| 11. 18th Tank Corps | 28. Drava River |
| 12. 10th Guards [Rifle Corps],
37th Rifle Corps | 29. Apatin |
| 13. Dunafoldvar | 30. Operations of the 4th Guards Army in
the Budapest Operation |
| 14. Madocsa | 31. Situation as of: |
| 15. (Polgard') | 32. Arrived in the area |
| 16. Lake Balaton | 33. Baja |
| 17. 41st Guards Rifle Division | 34. 6th Guards Airborne Division |

Army General G.F. Zakharov, who replaced ailing General I.V. Galanin on 29 November, made the decision to effect the breakthrough with five divisions from three corps² on a sector with a front of 13.2 kilometers, making the main thrust toward Szekesfehervar; to commit the 41st Division in the 21st Corps to the battle to develop the success following the capture of the first position, and to use the remaining formations to break up the enemy's defense on the left flank; to have in the second echelon, Major General Tank Troops F. G. Katkov's 7th Mechanized Corps³, in the army, one division each in the rifle corps, and one rifle regiment in the commander's reserve in the 21st Corps. The divisions were to be in a battle formation of one echelon, the regiments in two. The commander granted 4 days for regrouping the forces, and 2 days for occupying and setting up the forming-up site.

During the preparatory period live firing exercises were arranged in most rifle subunits on training fields created by their own personnel, and in the rear areas two or three command posts exercises were conducted for the staffs at the corps-division-regiment level. They worked out the procedure for penetrating the defense and for troop interaction in the offensive.

A regrouping of army forces was carried out prior to the offensive. "On the night of 12 December," recalled General N.I. Biryukov, "the 20th Corps turned over its zone to the 21st Corps and then moved at night parallel to the front, covered 80 kilometers and had converged in the area of (Sharashd) by the morning of 16 December...."⁴ In order to mislead the enemy the entire radio network of the 20th Corps continued to operate in the previous area throughout the regrouping process. A total of 150 tank mock-ups were placed in that area, dummy fire positions for 90 guns were set up there, and the movement of tanks and motor vehicles

was simulated. Diversionary offensive actions were carried out twice in the area of (Polgard').⁵ As a result the enemy command was unable to determine the nature of the regrouping, the axis of the main thrust or the time at which Soviet forces would switch to the offensive.

The staffs planned the forthcoming offensive. On 17 December, after carefully working out all the measures involved in executing the operation, the army commander's decision was issued in the form of a combat order, excerpts from which were sent to the formation and unit commanders. The operational timetable compiled by the army staff defined the main phases of the operations for each corps in great details to the depth of their immediate mission. Fire support measures for the attack were worked out with special thoroughness. The artillery of the rifle corps was combined into corps artillery groups. The antitank artillery units were mainly attached to the 20th Corps, ahead of the front of which tanks of the enemy's 23d Tank Division were buried in the ground to serve as fire points. The greatest density of artillery and mortars per kilometer of breakthrough sector was also there (see table).

Stable troop control was assured primarily by strictly coordinating the duties of those in charge to assure round-the-clock functioning of the control posts. This involved, among other things, the grouping of officers--those of the army staff's operations section, for example (Colonel G.F. Vorontsov, section chief)--according to the specific nature of their duties: a planning and an information group, and the group of executive officers, with one officer assigned responsibility for organizing the work of control post elements, their distribution, relocation, defense and guard arrangements.

Special attention was given to reducing the time needed to gather information on the situation and work out the battle documents. Bringing the command posts closer to the battle formations of the units and strictly adhering to the established sequence and procedure for transmitting the texts of the documents through the lines of communication helped to achieve this.

During preparations for the operation a great deal of party-political work was performed to maintain a high level of aggressive spirit in the formations and units and to explain to the personnel their liberating mission and their international duty, as well as the ways in which they were to interact with the population.

At 1015 hours on 20 December, in accordance with a procedure and a schedule refined the day before, army troops switched to an offensive, following 60 minutes of artillery preparation which brought 7500 tons of metal down upon the enemy, and burst into the enemy's defense from the march. Resistance grew as they advanced, however. The defending enemy troops were reinforced by withdrawing subunits. The enemy carried out counterattacks with its second echelons and reserves. Just 2 hours after the offensive was begun, for example, counterattacks by two infantry battalions had been repelled in the zone of the 20th Corps on the left flank of Major General P. I. Afonin's 5th Guards Airborne Division, and then by a tank regiment of the 23d Tank Division and infantry on the right flank of 80th Guards Rifle Division (Colonel V. I. Chizhov, commander).

Корпуса (1)	135 ск (2)	20 гв. ск (3)	31 гв. ск	
Дивизии (4)	252 сд	80 гв. сд	5 гв. влд (5)	40 гв. сд 4 гв. сд
Фронт прорыва, км (6)	4,3	2,2	2,2	2,0 2,5
Артиллерия сд (7)				
82-мм	66	48	45	58 52
76-мм ПА (8)	12	12	11	4 8
76-мм ДА (9)	20	24	24	25 29
120-мм	18	18	18	11 10
122-мм	12	12	12	9 10
Артиллерия усиления сд (10)		42 иптабр—70 (11) 851 минп—30 (12) 103 габр—70 (13) 23 габр—70 (14) Арт. 84 сд—143	521 иптабр—24 (15) 252 иптабр—12 (16) 148 минп—34 (17) Арт. 34 гв. сд—29 (18) 127 (19)	26 лабр—46 (16) 488 минп—34 (17) Арт. 34 гв. сд—29 (19)
Артиллерия группы ДЛ (20)		115 пабр—35 (21)	123 пабр—36 (22) 105 абр—12 (23)	127 пабр—18 (23)
Всего стволов (24)	128	532	404	234 109
Стволов на 1 км (25)	30	242	184	117 44

Key:

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1.. Corps | 13. Antitank Artillery Regiment |
| 2. Rifle Corps | 14. Antitank Artillery Battalion |
| 3. Guards Rifle Corps | 15. Howitzer Artillery Brigade |
| 4. Divisions | 16. Light Artillery Brigade |
| 5. Guards Airborne Division | 17. Mortar Regiment |
| 6. Breakthrough front | 18. Artillery, 7th Airborne Division |
| 7. Rifle Division Artillery | 19. Artillery, 34th Guards Rifle Division |
| 8. Field artillery | 20. Artillery, Long-Range Group |
| 9. Division artillery | 21. Gun Artillery Brigade |
| 10. Reinforcement artillery for rifle division | 22. Artillery Brigade |
| 11. Antitank Artillery Brigade | 23. Gun Artillery Regiment |
| 12. Mortar Regiment | 24. Total barrels |
| | 25. Barrels per kilometer |

During the second half of 20 December the enemy command brought up the 3d Tank Division from the operational reserve, which carried out a counterthrust at the boundary between the 20th and the 21st Corps. Repelling the counterthrust, army forces had generally penetrated into the enemy's defense along a 15-kilometer front and to a depth of up to 9 kilometers by the end of the day. During the night they advanced as much as 9 kilometers on certain axes. At 1100 hours on 21 December, following a 15-minute artillery strike, they renewed the offensive. By the morning of the 22nd they had reached the ancient Hungarian capital of Szekesfehervar.

The city was taken by carrying out a frontal attack with 20th Corps forces and with crucial support from the 31st Corps to the east and the 135th Corps to the west.⁶ Assault groups ordinarily consisting of 10-25 riflemen and submachine-gunners and 3-5 sappers equipped with explosives operated successfully in the forces. They had two-three 45mm guns, two-three mortars and several light and medium machine guns. Each of the groups was assigned the mission of capturing a separate building or several small houses.

With the capture of Szekesfehervar and the commitment of the 7th Mechanized Corps to the battle, army troops developed the offensive in the enemy's operational depth. Toward 1900 hours on 26 December the 4th Guards Rifle Division (Colonel K.D. Parfenov, commander) reached the southern bank of the Dunay near Esztergom behind Major General P.D. Govorunenko's 18th Tank Corps. The remaining army forces had reached there by the 28th. Between 20 and 28 December army units and formations captured 151 inhabited areas, killed 17,600 people and took 5,792 prisoners. During that time the enemy lost 295 tanks, 192 guns, 80 armored personnel carriers, 12 aircraft and 362 machine guns in the zone of operation of the field force.

On 31 December, at the front commander's order, the 4th Guards Army switched to a defense at its current position, where from 2 to 26 January 1945 it repelled powerful enemy counterattacks carried out for purposes of routing Soviet forces west of the Dunay and lifting the blockade of Budapest.

The combat operations of 4th Guards Army forces in the Budapest Operation added to our experience with the entry of a combined-arms field force into a battle from the march, following a lengthy regrouping, the forcing of a large water barrier, the penetration of a prepared enemy defense and the creation, jointly with tank and mechanized formations, of an outer perimeter of envelopment. The army played an exceptionally important role in the repelling of enemy troops attempting to raise the blockade at the outer perimeter of envelopment and in the destruction of its Budapest grouping. Soviet operational art had new examples of the skillful organization and conduct of combat operations against a combined grouping of enemy forces.

In the operation the army used a variety of methods of combat operations most in keeping with the developing situation. Particularly, during the entry of formations into battle from the march, the greatest success was achieved as a result of the unexpected forcing of the Dunay by advanced detachments on improvised means, their capture and retention of bridgeheads and the subsequent expansion of these jointly with the main forces of the formations.

The forcing of the river on a broad front misled the enemy command with respect to the axis of the army's main attack and forced the enemy to use its reserves and second echelons in parts, which considerably reduced the effectiveness of their counterattacks.

FOOTNOTES

1. The following were operating ahead of the 4th Guards Army's front: General Keshe's group (a composite regiment, the 10th, 12th and 74th Artillery Battalions), units of the 7th and 23d Infantry Divisions, the Dunay Flotilla's 1st Brigade and the 16th Border Detachment (Hungarian); the 31st Infantry Division, the 44th Training Regiment and the 4th and 38th Police Battalions of the Soviet Union (ours)--a total of 19,370 people.
2. Of these, the 84th and 252d Rifle Divisions were placed under the control of the 135th Rifle Corps (Major General P. V. Gnedin, commander) upon arriving in the army.
3. It was planned to commit this corps to the battle following the capture of Szekesfehervar.
4. "Osvobozhdeniye Vengrii ot fashizma" [The Liberation of Hungary from Fascism], Moscow, Nauka, 1965, p 121.
5. T.F. Vorontsov, N.I. Biryukov, A.F. Smekalov et al, "Ot volzhskikh stepey do avstriyskikh Al'p (boyevoy put' 4-y gvardeyskoy armii)" [From the Volga Steppes to the Austrian Alps (The Combat Path of the 4th Guards Army)], Voenizdat, 1971, pp 131-132.
6. The following took part in the storming of Szekesfehervar: the 20th Guards Rifle Corps (5th, 7th Guards Airborne Divisions, the 80th Guards Rifle Division); the 135th Rifle Corps (the 84th Rifle Division, part of the 252d Rifle Division); the 40th Guards Rifle Division of the 31st Guards Rifle Corps; the 9th Breakthrough Artillery Division (the 23d Howitzer Artillery Brigade, the 115th Gun Artillery Brigade, the 10th Mortar Brigade); the 42d Antitank Artillery Brigade; the 123d Gun Artillery Brigade; the 64th Mortar Brigade and the 1440th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment of the 7th Mechanized Corps; the 366th Guards Heavy Assault-Gun Regiment; the 58th and 61st Guards Mortar Regiments; the 189th Ground-Attack Air Division and 288th Fighter Division of the 17th Air Army.

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WARTIME EXPERIENCE IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARMORED CORPS

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[Article published under the heading "Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War" by Col N. Kireyev, Candidate of Military Sciences and Docent, and Col N. Dovbenko: "From the Experience of the Employment of Advanced Detachments of Tank (Mechanized) Corps"]

[Text] The use of forward detachments of various branches of troops was covered by our regulations long before the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Specifically, the Temporary Field Service Regulations of 1936 stated that forward detachments are designated and employed for forestalling the enemy at advantageous positions and for capturing important areas and objectives in the enemy's rear.¹ Operations by forward detachments were called for only during that period when the sides were drawing together and at the beginning of the encounter.

Forward detachments began to be used most extensively during the years of the Great Patriotic War, especially after the Soviet Army had switched to decisive offensive operations. The importance attached to forward detachments can be judged from the following. During preparations for the Sandomierz-Silesian Operation, Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev, commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, who was in the 3d Guards Tank Army, asked for detailed information about the preparation of the detachments, talked with their commanders and gave them specific instructions.²

We know that the timely fulfillment of their assigned combat missions by the formations and field forces of armored and mechanized troops depended in great part upon their rapid advance and extensive maneuvering of forces and equipment in the operational depth. This made it necessary to have adequately powerful, highly mobile forward detachments out front (separated from the main forces), which could perform missions such as capturing operationally and tactically important areas and objectives in the depth of the enemy's defense and holding them until the main forces approached, capturing enemy airfields, bridges and crossings over water barriers.

It should be pointed out that advance detachments operating in isolation from the main forces ordinarily did not engage in battle with superior enemy forces, since this would have retarded their movement, led to unjustified losses and jeopardized the fulfillment of the main mission, that of capturing an advantageous line or other important objective in good time and reliably defending it until the main forces approached. If, however, bypassing the enemy would require a great deal of time due to terrain conditions and if the enemy forces were small, then the forward detachments entered boldly into battle. They also sometimes entered into meeting engagements with enemy reserve units moving up from the operational depth.

In making a decision as to the designation of a forward detachment the commanders and staffs of tank mechanized corps primarily considered the substance of the combat mission which the forward detachment would have to perform, the condition of the units and formations to be sent out as forward detachments and the experience of their commanders and staffs. The detachments were ordinarily headed by experienced and resolute commanders. As an example, reknowned and fearless commanders of forward detachments such as A. Kha. Babanyanian, V. M. Garelov, I. I. Gusakovskiy, D. A. Dragunskiy, O. A. Losik, A.M. Temnik, D.G. Sukhovarov, S.F. Shutov, I.I. Yakubovskiy and others, became well known during the war years. Many of them subsequently became prominent Soviet military leaders.

One of the important factors directly influencing the success of a forward detachment's operations was the establishment of optimal composition, which would make it possible to successfully fulfill the assigned combat missions in isolation from the main forces. A detachment had to have great maneuverability, adequate fire and striking power, and mobility for operating in the enemy's defensive depth. Let us take a look at the composition of some forward detachments detailed from tank and mechanized corps. A study of Table 1 shows that the composition of forward detachments underwent substantial changes during the war years. In the offensive operations of 1942 subunits ranging from a reinforced company to a battalion were used as forward detachments in the tank corps, whereas primarily reinforced tank (or mechanized) brigades were sent out for this purpose after August of 1943. This was due to the fact that the detachments had to perform a number of combat missions, diverse and sometimes fairly complex. For purposes of reinforcing them, they sometimes included up to a regiment of self-propelled artillery and a subunit of antitank and antiaircraft artillery, up to a battalion of rocket launchers and as much as a battalion of combat engineers, as well as motorized infantry. In those cases in which the forward detachments were to penetrate powerful enemy defense lines in the rear, they were reinforced with a subunit of mine-clearing tanks, heavy tanks and self-propelled artillery guns. The forward detachments had aircraft gunlayers for maintaining continuous interaction with the aviation.

Table 1. Composition of Forward Detachments in the Most Important Offensive Operations of the Great Patriotic War

No. in sequence	Name of operation, when conducted	Tank army number	No. of tank or mechanized corps	Composition of forward detachments	
				Main forces	Reinforcements
1	2	3	4	5	6
1	Counteroffensive near Stalingrad (encircling operation, November 1942)	5th Tank Army	26th Tank Corps	Two motorized rifle companies	Five tanks, two armored vehicles
2	Belgorod-Khar'kov (August 1943)	1st Tank Army	6th Tank Corps	Tank battalion	Motorized rifle battalion, self-propelled artillery battery, antiaircraft artillery battery, mortar battalion, antitank artillery regiment, air defense regiment
		5th Guards Tank Army	3d Mechanized Corps	49 tank brigades 32 tank brigades	
3	Belorussian Operation (June-August 1944)	5th Guards Tank Army	29th Tank Corps	31 tank brigades	Light assault-gun regiment, artillery battery, antiaircraft artillery regiment, heavy tank company, combat engineer battalion, omts [separate motorcycle battalion?], two self-propelled artillery batteries, combat engineer company
			3d Guards Mechanized Corps	9 Guards mechanized brigades	

[Table continued on following page]

[Continuation of Table 1]

No. in sequence	Name of operation, when conducted	Tank army number	No. of tank or mechanized corps	Composition of forward detachments	
				Main forces	Reinforcements
1	2	3	4	5	6
4	L'vov-Sandomierz (July-August 1944)	1st Guards Tank Army	11th Guards Tank Corps	44 Guards tank brigades	Two self-propelled artillery batteries, antiaircraft artillery battery, mortar battalion, combat engineer company, self-propelled artillery battery, two combat engineer companies
		3d Guards Tank Army	9th Mechanized Corps	69 mechanized brigades	
5	Iasi-Kishinev (August 1944)	6th Tank Army	5th Guards Tank Corps	20 Guards tank brigades	Self-propelled artillery battery, antiaircraft battery, combat engineer company
6	Vistula-Oder (January 1945)	3d Guards Tank Army	6th Guards Tank Corps	52 Guards tank brigades	Self-propelled artillery regiment, separate rocket launcher battalion, combat engineer battalion (minus a company), self-propelled artillery regiment, company of mine-clearing tanks, bridge-building company, self-propelled artillery battery, self-propelled artillery regiment, motorized rifle battalion, artillery battalion, two batteries from gun artillery regiment
			7th Guards Tank Corps	51 Guards tank brigades	
				54 Guards tank brigades	

[Table continued on following page]

[Continuation of Table 1]

1	Name of operation, when conducted	2	Tank army number	3	No. of tank or mechanized corps	4	Composition of forward detachments		5	Main forces	6	Reinforcements
7	Manchuria (August 1945)		6th Guards Tank Army		5th Guards Tank Corps		21 Guards mechanized brigades					Antiaircraft artil- lery regiment, self-propelled artillery regiment, separate rocket launcher battalion
					10th Mecha- nized Corps		72 mecha- nized brigades					

The reinforcements assigned to the tank and mechanized brigades for operating in a forward detachment were distributed so as to give all the elements of the detachment's battle formation the adequately high level of autonomy essential for them to operate successfully in the enemy's operational depth.

During the war as a whole, and especially in the final period, forward detachments were designated both at the very beginning of and during operations. When a tank or mechanized brigade was designated in advance (that is, prior to the beginning of the operation) to act as a forward detachment, its preparation was carried out in a planned manner. An entire group of various measures were conducted during the preparatory period in the units and subunits of forward detachments.

The sequence of the work performed by the commander and staff of a forward detachment and the extent of that work during preparations carried out prior to the beginning of an operation had been thoroughly worked out by the end of the war. When the commander of a forward detachment received the combat mission, he would begin studying it thoroughly. At that time, at the corps commander's order, the units and subunits designated as reinforcements were moved to a designated area, selected so that they could be placed promptly at the disposal of the forward detachment's commander.

After assessing the situation, the commander of the forward detachment adopted his decision for the forthcoming operations and after reporting the gist of the decision to the corps commander, assigned the mission to his subordinates. A written combat order was then issued, in accordance with which purposive, all round preparations were made for the combat operations, and mobile rear services were created with the necessary quantity of supplies. Special attention was given to organizing control of the units and subunits in the forward detachment

and to working out matters pertaining to interaction among them, with adjacent forces and with the aviation. This work was ordinarily done on a mock-up of the terrain and on maps. Artillery and engineer support for the combat operations, antiaircraft and antitank defense were simultaneously organized, and CW protection measures were outlined. During the preparatory period the commander and staff of the forward detachment constantly monitored preparations for the combat operations and provided the units and subunits with necessary assistance.

While we are discussing the specific preparations for forward detachments sent out during the development of an offensive, we should point out that the number and the substance of measures involved in those preparations depended upon the amount of time allocated for the preparations, from the receipt of the combat mission to the commitment to battle, the state of the brigade and its location prior to the assignment of the combat mission. In the combat situation, however, there was very little time for preparing the forward detachment. In many cases, when the brigade was part of the first echelon, there was practically no time at all (Table 2), and the forward detachment would immediately begin carrying out its combat mission.

When the combat mission was assigned to a forward detachment, the corps commander would provide brief information on the enemy, the detachment's mission, the time for its fulfillment and the axis of operations, as well as define the line or the departure area from which the forward detachment was to operate. Sometimes, when the commander and staff of the forward detachment had very little time, the superior commanders who were sending out the detachments would explain not only the nature of the combat mission, but also the methods to be used for performing it. When a brigade designated as a forward detachment was in the second echelon or the reserve, as was the case in the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 6th Tank Army in the Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy Operation, they were moved, at the army (or corps) commander's instruction, along with reinforcements, by a designated time to an area ordinarily located on the axis of the impending operations. In order to concentrate the reinforcement personnel and means in time (they might be located at different places in the corps or army's zone of advance), army (or corps) staff officers were sent to the reinforcement units and subunits to lead them to the designated area and turn them over to the commander of the forward detachment. The gathering of the reinforcement personnel and equipment for the forward detachment of the 6th Tank Army in the Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy Operation was organized and carried out in this manner, for example.³

The organization of reconnaissance, which the forward detachments were forced to conduct simultaneously on several axes, but especially thoroughly on the axis of the main objective (line) to be captured, was one of the most important measures. The commanders and staffs of the corps from which the forward detachment was to be sent out took on a significant part of the mission of conducting reconnaissance for the forward detachment. Aircraft were extensively employed for obtaining reconnaissance data for forward detachments during the concluding operations of the last war.

Table 2. Time Allocated for Preparing Forward Detachments During the Development of an Offensive

Sequence	Operation, front, army	From whom forward detachment sent out	Forward detachment	Receipt of combat mission	Time	
					Beginning of opera- tions for forward detachment	For orga- nizing combat operations
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	Counteroffensive at Stalingrad (encircling opera- tion), South-West Front, 5th Tank Army	26th Tank Army	Composite detachment	1500 hours 21 Novem- ber 1942	At onset of darkness	3-4 hours
2	Korsun'- Shevchenkovskiy, Second Ukrainian Front, 5th Guards Tank Army, First Ukrainian Front, 6th Tank Army	5th Guards Tank Army 6th Tank Army	25th Tank Brigade 233d Tank Brigade	1500 hours 28 Janu- ary 1944	At onset of darkness	2-3 hours
				1700 hours 26 Janu- ary 1944	300 hours 27 Janu- ary 1944	10 hours (mainly at night)
3	Zhitomir- Berdichev, First Ukrainian Front, 1st Tank Army	8th Guards Mechanized Corps	1st Guards Tank Brigade	1600 hours 8 Janu- ary 1944	At dawn, 9 Janu- ary 1944	13-14 hours (mainly at night)
4	Shaulayay, First Baltic Front	3d Guards Mechanized Corps*	8th Guards Mechanized Brigade	1900 hours 29 July 1944	2230 hours 29 July 1944	3.5 hours
			9th Guards Mechanized Brigade	2245 hours 27 July 1944	2400 hours 27 July 1944	1 hour 15 minutes

* The corps was subordinate to the front.

[Table continued on following page]

[Continuation of Table 2]

Sequence	Operation, front, army	From whom forward detachment sent out	Forward detachment	Time		
				Receipt of combat mission	Beginning of opera- tions for forward detachment	For orga- nizing combat operations
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5	Vistula-Oder, First Belorussian Front 1st Guards Tank Army, First Ukrainian Front, 3d Guards Tank Army	11th Guards Tank Corps 6th Guards Tank Corps	44th Guards Tank Brigade 52d Guards Tank Brigade	Part of corps first echelon 1900 hours 29 Janu- ary 1945 Part of corps first echelon 1700 hours 17 Janu- ary 1945	Immediately upon receiving mission	During combat opera- tions

A special effort was made to secure the flanks and the rear of a forward detachment operating in the enemy's defensive depth. Advance, march flank-security and rear security detachments were created for this purpose.

Forward detachments were permitted to battle under various circumstances. When the detachment was designated in advance (during preparations for the operation), when the rifle formations began the offensive it advanced directly behind their combat orders in a state of readiness to take part in the completion of the breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defense zone and a rapid advance into the depth. Those subunits and units which had been the most successful were ordinarily used for this purpose, however, when the forward detachment was sent out during the development of the offensive.

In operations carried out during the concluding period of the last war forward detachments of tank and mechanized corps were most frequently committed to action during the first day of the operation at a depth of 4-10 kilometers from the former forward edge. In order for the forward detachment to break away from the main forces as rapidly as possible, artillery and ground-assault aircraft reliably suppressed the enemy in the zone and on the flanks of the line at which it was to enter into combat.

It should be noted that during the war there was a clearly defined trend to increase the distance from which the forward detachments were separated from the main forces. While the forward detachment of the 26th Tank Corps conducted combat operations at a depth of up to 25 kilometers in the operation to encircle German fascist forces at Stalingrad during the capture of a crossing over the Don, for example, the depth was increased two-fold in subsequent offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War.

As we mentioned before, forward detachments performed various combat missions during the development of an offensive. They were most frequently used, however, for capturing large communication centers, the loss of which would have deprived the enemy of a number of advantages, and retaining them until the main forces approached. The combat operations of the 53d Guards Tank Brigade, a forward detachment of the 6th Guards Tank Corps in the capture of the city of Radomsko during the Vistula-Oder Operation, is worth looking at. In order to perform the above mission the brigade was reinforced with light artillery and self-propelled artillery regiments. It began combat operations at 1016 hours on January 1945. The brigade knocked out an enemy covering subunit from the march, began advancing swiftly, reached the area of Bugay, Dmenin, Zakshev Vel'ke by 1300 hours, routed the withdrawing enemy there and, covered by a flank guard, continued to advance. At 1500 hours the forward detachment surprised the Hitlerites by rushing the eastern edge of Radomsko and routed enemy subunits defending the city with a total strength of up to 1,000 men, destroying two armored trains. By 1600 hours it had captured that railway junction and switched to an all-round defense, holding the junction until the main forces approached.⁶ The capture of Radomsko cutoff the fascists' routes of withdrawal to the southwest and accelerated the approach of adjacent units to the river Pilitsa.

During the development of success in the enemy's defensive depth tank and mechanized corps frequently had to overcome water barriers, which were an extremely serious obstacle on the path of the advancing forces and were used by the enemy command as extremely important lines of defense. The forward detachments also played a large role in the rapid forcing of rivers. They were the first to reach the water barriers, crossed them in the face of direct enemy action, captured and held bridgeheads, thereby creating conditions beneficial to the main forces. It should be noted that they usually forced rivers from the march or after a brief period of preparation. The former was the most effective. Something can be learned in this respect from the operations of a forward detachment of the 25th Tank Corps in the L'vov-Sandomierz Operation. The formation's 175th Tank Brigade was assigned the mission of rapidly developing the offensive, forcing the river San, liberating Yaroslav by the end of 22 July 1944 and assuring successful operations by the main forces. Knocking out small enemy groups, it covered 70 kilometers, forced the river from the march by midday and switched to pursuit of the enemy.⁷ As a result, the main corps forces crossed the San rapidly, and the assigned mission was completed in good time.

Forward detachments also frequently captured bridges intact. In the Vistula-Oder Operation, for example, the 61st Guards Tank Brigade of the 10th Guards Tank Corps took advantage of the surprise factor and captured an intact bridge over the Vartu, thereby making it possible for the main forces to force the river from the march.

The highly dynamic and determined nature of operations carried out by the detachments in the pursuit of an enemy can be judged from such factors as the distance to which they became separated from the main forces and their average rate of advance. In 1942/43 the forward detachments were separated by 15-25 kilometers and they advanced at an average rate of 25-30 kilometers per day, whereas these figures had increased to 30-40 and 40-50 kilometers respectively in the main operations of 1944/45.^{7a} The forward detachments were separated from the main forces by as much as 80-90 kilometers or more on some days in operations of the third period of the war. During their pursuit of the enemy the forward detachments essentially deprived the withdrawing enemy units and reserves of the possibility of occupying prepared defense lines or advantageous defense areas. The rapid rate of pursuit was achieved primarily because the detachments did not become involved in drawn-out battles for enemy strongpoints or centers of resistance, but maneuvered extensively from one direction to another and advanced in columns, as a rule, with good reconnaissance and powerful security forces. The speed of pursuit was also directly dependent upon its continuity. The timely replacement of the forward detachments was extremely important in this respect. The forward detachments in the 3d Guards Tank Army's 7th Guards Tank Corps were replaced five times between 14 and 24 January 1945 in the Vistula-Oder Operation, for example. The tank (or mechanized) brigade in a forward detachment operated continuously 2-3 days.⁸ Forward detachments in the 2d Guards Tank Army's 1st Mechanized Corps were replaced six times between 18 and 30 January.⁹

The forward detachments pursued the enemy especially successfully at nighttime. During the Vistula-Oder Operation, for example, the 47th Guards Tank Brigade, forward detachment of the 9th Guards Tank Corps, captured the city of Grujec with a surprise night attack and engaged in battle for Sochaczew at 2300 hours on 16 January 1945, cutting off the enemy's routes of withdrawal from Warsaw to the west. It captured the airfield in the area of Sochaczew on 17 January.¹⁰ The brigade then fought its way over a distance of around 90 kilometers in 24 hours.

The operations of a forward detachment of the 5th Guards Tank Corps in the Iasi-Kishinev Operation are an example of continuous and successful night pursuit. The 22d Guards Tank Brigade, reinforced with a self-propelled artillery regiment, an artillery brigade, combat engineer and mortar companies, was operating as a forward detachment. On the night of 26 August 1944 it was in rapid pursuit of the enemy, deploying only insignificant forces to destroy rear guard enemy subunits, with its operations preventing the enemy from creating a defense on the approaches to the city of Rimnicu Sarat.¹¹

When forward detachments were used by formations and field forces of armored or mechanized troops, the operations of the former were characterized by a high degree of independence in the performance of their combat missions, the element of surprise, great mobility and maneuverability and extensive striking power, took advantage of nighttime, had well organized reconnaissance, smooth control and interaction among the units (subunits) in the detachment. The extensive employment of forward detachments in offensive operations of the last war was a new development in the practical combat employment of armored and mechanized forces, especially for operations in the operational depth of the enemy's defense. This

extensive combat experience is of great importance both with respect to developing the theory of the employment of tank units in an offensive under contemporary conditions and for the practical training of the troops during the combat and political training.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Vremennyy Polevoy ustaf RKKA 1936 (PU36)" [Temporary Field Service Regulations of the Workers and Peasants Red Army, 1936 (PU36)], Voenizdat, 1936, p 90.
2. I. I. Yakubovskiy, "Zemlya v ogne" [Land on Fire], Voenizdat, 1975, pp 515-517.
3. Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, fnd 339, inv 5179, fl 80, shs 10-11.
6. Ibid., fnd 315, inv 4440, fl 706, shs 52-53.
7. Ibid., fnd 3594, inv 409341, fl 1, shs 106-107.
- 7a. Ibid., fnd 619, inv 107127, fl 1, shs 74-76.
8. Ibid., fnd 307, inv 4148, fl 308, shs 277-294.
10. Ibid., fl 188 sh 18.
11. Ibid., fnd 339, inv 5179, fl 16, sh 223.

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WARTIME EXPERIENCE IN TACTICS OF NAVAL COMBAT

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[Article published under the heading "Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War" by Capt 1st Rank A. Gakkel', Candidate of Naval Sciences and Docent, and Capt 1st Rank A. Zamchalov, Candidate of Naval Sciences and Docent: "Some Aspects of the Tactics of Naval Combat"]

[Text] By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the Navy had a sufficiently fully developed theory of the tactics of naval combat. The main principles of that theory were reflected in the temporary Navy Combat Regulations of the Workers and Peasants Red Army, BUMS-37, the Regulations on the Conduct of Naval Operations and the 1936 Field Service Regulations of the Workers and Peasants Red Army. The main demands set forth in these documents were that the forces demonstrate activeness and determination in combating the enemy in a complex combat situation.

The war experience confirmed the correctness of these principles. The practice of employing naval landing forces underwent extensive development during the war.

During the first period of the war, an extraordinarily difficult time for us, the fleets landed more than 30 naval landing forces with a total numerical strength of around 60,000 men.¹ The fighting to accomplish the landings was characterized by determination and purposiveness of the forces in the performance of their assigned missions and mass heroism on the part of the personnel, particularly those in the first waves. Due to the rapidly changing situation, combat decisions for the landings were made within exceptionally short periods of time.

Outstanding examples of successful fighting for a landing at the beginning of the first period of the war include the landing of a group (the 3d Black Sea Naval Infantry Regiment) near the village of Grigor'yevka on the night of 21 September 1941 during the defense of Odessa. In order to achieve maximum secrecy and surprise the landing was carried out during the night, and not at dawn, as recommended in prewar documents. This permitted the ships to approach and drop anchor only 15 cables from the shore, which made it possible to carry out the landing at an adequately rapid rate. A 10-minute shipboard artillery preparation was conducted to suppress the enemy's defense against landing forces (PDO). Smooth and correct control of the forces on the part of Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, commander of the forces executing the landing, contributed to the success.

During that period of the war, however, battles for landing operations were not always adequately well organized and had a number of deficiencies. The latter include ineffective artillery and air preparation for the landing and support for the landing forces on shore, or the absence of such, and poor coverage of the landing area by the aviation.

During the second period of the Great Patriotic War the constantly growing strength of the enemy's defense against landing operations, on the one hand, and the development of our fleet's forces and facilities and the acquisition of combat experience, on the other hand, made it necessary to seek new tactical procedures for performing the missions involved in the battle to set a landing force ashore. The destruction of enemy fire points located at the waterline with torpedoes from torpedo boats, for examples, was first done during the battle to land a group at the port of Novorossiysk. A total of 19 torpedo boats were assigned to this mission. Their torpedoes destroyed up to 10 of the enemy's most active fire points. Furthermore, an artillery grouping consisting of 208 guns of the fleet and the 18th Army were employed to assure a successful landing, for securing the landing group on shore and for the performance of its mission. During the fighting for the landing the coastal artillery alone conducted 113 firings, expending around 6,000 76-152mm shells,² and 262 firings, expending more than 10,000 shells of the same caliber³ in support of the landing group on shore.

Around 700 artillery guns of the Black Sea Fleet and the North Caucasus Front were detailed to provide artillery preparation and support in the landing of a group on the Kerch' Peninsula in November of 1943.⁴

During the third period of the Great Patriotic War the process of perfecting the art of combat for a landing operation was closely linked to an increase in the quantity of aircraft taking part in it. While 148 of our army and navy aircraft took part in the landing of a group at the port of Novorossiysk in September of 1943,⁵ and 389 aircraft in the Kerch'-El'tingen Landing Operation of 1943,⁶ more than 700 aircraft participated in battles fought to land groups on islands in Vyborg Bay in June of 1944.

The "Manual on Joint Operations by Ground Forces and the Navy and Military River Flotillas," issued in 1943, contributed to a significant degree to the development of the art of landing naval forces. It covered with greater thoroughness and completeness all aspects of preparations for and the conduct of this kind of combat than did the prewar documents. The war experience demonstrated that in the situation of increased possibilities for defending against landing operations and the extensive employment of aircraft for combating landing operations, the following were the most important factors assuring success in the battle for the landing operation: powerful artillery and air preparation and support for the landing operations; the creation of a powerful forward detachment for rapidly penetrating the zone of the defense against landing operations and for capturing a landing base; speeding up to the maximum the landing of the landing group as a whole and the forward detachment particularly; rapid altering of the directions of the landing for purposes of concentrating forces on the crucial sector, where

the enemy's defense had been successfully penetrated; assuring communication between the landing group and command and the ships and aircraft supporting it; continuous interaction of the landing group with fire support forces, from the beginning of the landing operation to the completion of the assigned mission; taking into consideration the actual capabilities of each type of combat means employed in the dynamics of the battle for a landing operation and as the landing group advanced on shore; and having a reserve available.

Operations against the enemy fleet included the following: disruption of the enemy's lines of communication, strikes against ports and naval bases, the laying of active mine fields and the securing of our own military shipments.

These operations were conducted systematically, and there was practically not a single day of the war which did not bring success to our fleet in the accomplishment of this important mission. By constantly perfecting their methods of employing the forces and of carrying out the strikes and by employing them in various combinations, the ship and unit commanders made it extremely difficult for the enemy to organize counteraction. Our experience with the combat operations to disrupt naval communications added many new things to the employment of submarines and aircraft for the accomplishment of these missions. Although various forces of our fleet engaged in fighting on the lines of communication, the greatest success was achieved by the naval aviation and submarines, which accounted for 53 and 33 percent respectively of the enemy's transport tonnage destroyed during the war.⁷

It should be noted that during the first period of the war, when the main fleet forces were involved in assisting forces of the fronts, submarines were essentially the only branch of naval forces operating against enemy naval communications.

The military-geographic conditions of the Baltic and North Sea theaters permitted the Hitlerite command to make extensive use of coastal communications for its shipments. This made it considerably easier for the enemy to organize the defense of its shipping and made possible the large-scale use not only of surface ships, including the very smallest, but also mines, net barriers and other positioned and coastal means. The destruction of enemy transports therefore involved considerable difficulties.

Despite this, the trend toward increasing the effectiveness of submarine operations, like those of other naval forces, to disrupt enemy communications in view of the constant development and perfection of their tactics during the war, constantly gained strength. The quantity of enemy tonnage destroyed for each submarine lost by us, for example, increased from 4,000, gross registered tonnage, in 1941/42 to 73,000 in 1945.

During the first period of the war, and especially in the very beginning, submarines employed mainly the positional method. Its shortcoming was a low probability of detecting enemy ships and vessels.

Submarines destroyed an insignificant number of targets at the beginning of the war, since the tactic of firing torpedoes in single shots was little effective. This is why at the end of 1941 the submariners switched to firing interval torpedo salvos.⁸ The spread of target interception increased as a result, as did the percentage of hits.

The very first months of the war demonstrated the need to expand the range of initiative for submarine commanders by granting them authority to go outside the bounds of a position to attack an important target, that is, to switch to cruising the area. This method made the target search considerably more active.

The development of submarine tactics then went from cruising to the positional maneuvering method (maneuvering among positions designated in advance) and the hovering screen method. This was brought about, on the one hand, by continuously increasing enemy counteraction, and on the other, by the development of means of supporting submarine combat operations and the improvement of their equipment and weapons, as well as the organization of submarine control and combat training for the submariners.

The positional maneuvering and hovering screen methods constituted a variation of group operations, in which submarines carried out a number of systematic strikes against a single target, without engaging in tactical interaction.

The hovering screen method became possible following the organization of reliable reconnaissance of enemy communications and considerable improvement of communications with submarines located at periscope depth. It essentially consisted of the following: Submarines would deploy in designated waiting areas located 25-30 miles from the coast, beyond the outer border of German mine fields. Before receiving information on the movement of enemy convoys they would form a screen over a specific sector of coastal communications. Upon receiving information on the movement of an enemy convoy, the submarines would move onto its course. Each submarine commander was given the initiative to maneuver for intercepting and attacking the enemy. Simultaneous attacks on a convoy by several submarines were possible. This method was first employed in the Northern Fleet in January/February of 1944.⁹

The group, maneuvering use of submarines made their operations more effective, made it possible to echelon the forces in the attacks and reduced the possibility that the enemy would detect and destroy them. The threat of submarine attacks spread over vast areas of the theater.

After improved gyroscopic instruments and mechanisms allowing for gyroscope settings to be changed during a torpedo attack were installed in torpedoes in 1943, the submariners switched to the more effective method of firing salvos in a "sheaf." The outfitting of submarines with a device for bubbleless firing and arming them with electronic torpedoes contributed greatly to the secrecy of attacks.

The tactics of the naval aviation underwent considerable development. Its use on lines of communication progressed from cruising flights ("free hunting") by single aircraft and small groups of identical aircraft to operations by large groupings of heterogeneous forces, which made successive or simultaneous strikes against convoys.

The pinnacle in the development of naval aviation tactics was reached with concentrated strikes against enemy convoys and vessels at sea and at their bases, with torpedo-bombers, bombers, ground-attack aircraft and fighters taking part. All-round support for the grouping's main attack provided the foundation for interaction among the forces. A battle fought by Northern Fleet aircraft against an enemy convoy near the cape of (Kibergnes) on 17 June 1944 provides a typical example of these tactics. A group of 18 bombers with an escort of 10 fighters made the first attack against the convoy (10 transports and 19 escort ships) around 0900 hours. A tactical group consisting of 6 ground-attack aircraft made another strike 10 minutes later. The convoy's formation was broken up as a result, and favorable conditions were created for operations by the main forces--88 aircraft, which organizationally a part of 10 tactical groups, including 2 groups each of low-flying torpedo-bombers, ground-attack aircraft and high-altitude torpedo-bombers, and 4 groups of fighters. The high-altitude torpedo-bombers made it difficult for the enemy to evade the attacks of low-flying torpedo-bombers and the torpedoes dropped by them, and the ground-attack aircraft pinned down the convoy's security force, already disorganized by preliminary strikes. The Hitlerites lost 6 ships and 11 aircraft, and a transport and a minesweeper were damaged.¹⁰ The massing of forces and the speed of the operations predetermined the success. Suffice it to say that the main attack lasted only a minute.

The number of aircraft supporting the main strike increased drastically during the war as a result of the continuous reinforcement of the anti-aircraft defenses of convoys, ports and bases against which the air strikes were carried out. At the beginning of the war the ratio of aircraft taking part in the main strike to support aircraft was approximately 1:1, whereas the ratio had grown to 1:5 or even 1:10 at the end of the war.

Torpedo boats were extensively used for disrupting the enemy's naval communications. The methods used for combating the enemy underwent substantial changes during the war. Attacks by single boats or small groups were replaced by group attacks against convoys simultaneously from several directions, in tactical interaction with aircraft--and not just at night, but in the daytime as well. All of this was new in naval tactics. In the battle near the cape of Kibergnes on 18/19 August of 1945, for example, 14 Northern Fleet torpedo boats routed an enemy convoy proceeding toward Varanger Fjord in a swift attack.¹¹ A characteristic feature of that battle was the organization of interaction between the group (five boats) carrying out the main strike and its covering force (four boats) and two other support groups (of two and three boats). The covering force was charged with supporting the assault group's approach to the convoy and its achievement of a torpedo attack position. One of the support groups was to retard the convoy's movement by laying a mine cluster on its course, while the other was to perform final reconnaissance of the enemy and direct the assault group to it.¹²

A second characteristic feature of that battle was its speed. The routing of this large convoy took 37 minutes,¹³ the main strike lasting only 7 minutes. The commander of a torpedo boat brigade directed all of the tactical groups from a command post on shore.

During the last war there were many encounters with enemy ships, mainly in the coastal areas. These were mainly meeting battles, primarily at night, by small homogeneous groups of light surface forces, in many cases supported by aircraft from one or both sides. In the heroic epic at Malaya zemlya, for example formations of torpedo boats and escort vessels of the Black Sea Fleet repeatedly frustrated enemy attempts to carry out attacks from the sea and disrupt naval communications. Strikes against enemy ships with rocket weapons were carried out for the first time in the history of naval art in those battles. As early as July of 1942 our industry had produced an M-13 rocket launcher for mounting on boats. Soon after that the Black Sea Fleet had the first detachment of torpedo boats equipped with these launchers.¹⁴ And although they were designated primarily for use against coastal targets, this awesome weapon permitted the torpedo boat crews to successfully combat German artillery barges and escort vessels.

On the night of 24 August 1943, for example, four torpedo boats armed with rocket launchers detected six enemy boats in the area of Malaya zemlya. Our boats fired a missile salvo at them and rushed toward the enemy, showering it with machine gun fire and simultaneously reloading their rocket launchers. The crews of two of our boats, having reloaded part of the rockets, fired them against the withdrawing enemy, and two other boats carried out a missile strike from a short distance (3-4 cables) against a group of enemy boats which had appeared from another direction. The enemy lost two boats in that battle, and the others were damaged.¹⁵

And so, in methods of conducting naval combat by naval forces for purposes of disrupting enemy communications, there emerged a trend to switch from single attacks to group operations and from strikes by homogeneous forces to joint operations by various branches of forces. The art of massing forces grew, and the organization of interaction improved. Control of the forces was improved, and it became more centralized.

Party-political work was one of the important factors favorably affecting the development of these tactics, as well as naval art in general. It put the sailors in a good political-moral state. It increased their awareness and their devotion to the homeland, and they began to work more creatively with respect to the use of naval personnel and equipment and to the continuous improvement of the main form of tactical operations by naval forces, naval combat, and methods of conducting it.

The Great Patriotic War experience brought out a number of important trends in the development of naval tactics, which have not lost their importance today.

The enemy's increased defense capabilities required that heterogeneous naval forces be used for the successful accomplishment of combat missions, a fact which indicates the importance of interaction both among various branches of forces and

within each of them, and the increased complexity of organizing such interaction. At the same time, the war experience demonstrated the increased role of the aviation, which frequently constituted the main striking force in naval battles.

The massing of personnel and equipment for the main strike became increasingly important. It was achieved by concentrating both homogeneous and heterogeneous naval forces against important enemy targets, forces which carried out simultaneous and successive attacks against the enemy from various directions.

The briefness of naval battles, the suddenness of their beginning, the relative brevity of the strikes, their decisiveness and great dynamism indicate a trend toward increased swiftness for naval battles, as well as for combat operations at sea in general.

Our navy's combat experience in the last war was extremely multifaceted. "This... experience, obtained at such a dear price and under such difficult conditions, in combat operations on land, at sea, under the water and in the air, of unprecedented fierceness and determination, is the possession not just of the Navy, but of the Armed Forces as a whole. Its influence is still felt today and will continue to make itself felt for a long time in the organizational development and the combat training of the Armed Forces as a whole and in the Navy in particular."¹⁶

FOOTNOTES

1. TsVMA [Central Naval Archives], fnd 6, fl 11242, sh 33324.
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STALINGRAD BATTLE -- 40TH ANNIVERSARY MARKED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 82 (signed to press 30 Aug 82) pp 34-41

[Article by Maj Gen V. Matsulenکو, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor:
"The Battle on the Volga"]

[Text] The word "Stalingrad" is a sacred and precious word for many people on our planet. It is associated with the great victory achieved by the Soviet people and their glorious Armed Forces, under the leadership of the Communist Party, over the German fascist invaders on the banks of the mighty Volga. This victory was the beginning of a basic turning point not just in the course of the Great Patriotic War, but for the entire World War II. The mass expulsion of the Hitlerite occupiers from the territory of our homeland began at the walls of Stalingrad.

The Stalingrad Battle can be broken down into two periods: the defensive period (17 July-18 November 1942) and the counteroffensive (19 November 1942-2 February 1943).

The Defensive Period

By the summer of 1942 a temporary calm had settled over the Soviet-German front. Inspired by the routing of German fascist forces at Moscow and by the success of the winter offensive, the Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, were successfully completing the conversion of the national economy to a war footing. The Soviet Army began receiving more armaments, especially tanks, aircraft and artillery equipment, and ammunition.

The Soviet Union's international position improved. In January of 1942, 26 nations signed a declaration, which committed them to apply all their forces and means to the struggle against the aggressive states. Antifascist forces throughout the world became more active, especially in the nations occupied by the fascists.

The German fascist command considered the Soviet-German front to be the main front of World War II and sent more and more troops there. By May of 1942, taking advantage of the absence of a second front in Europe, the Hitlerites had concentrated 217 divisions and 20 brigades against the Soviet forces, leaving only about

20 percent of their armed forces in the other theaters of military operations. On 28-30 June the German fascist command began extensive offensive operations on the southwestern axis. The plan was to rout Soviet forces west of the Don, capture the oil-producing areas of the Caucasus and reach the Volga on a line between Stalingrad and Astrakhan.

During 2 months of fierce fighting the enemy occupied the Donbass, reached the great bend of the Don and created an immediate threat to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus. Withdrawing troops from the Southwestern and Southern Fronts found themselves in an extremely difficult situation. Army Group "A" moved rapidly toward the North Caucasus. Army Group "B" was advancing on Stalingrad. Its main strength lay in the 6th Field Army of select troops with extensive war experience in Europe and on the Soviet-German front. By 17 July it included 13 divisions (around 270,000 men, 3,000 guns and mortars and around 500 tanks). They were supported by aircraft of the 4th Air Fleet (up to 1200 combat aircraft).

Headquarters, Supreme High Command, moved the 62d, 63d and 64th armies from its reserve to the Stalingrad axis. The Stalingrad Front was created on 12 July, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko (by General V. N. Gordov after 23 July). It included, in addition to the above armies, five combined-arms armies, weakened in previous battles, and one air army. The Stalingrad Front was assigned the mission of defending in a zone 520 kilometers wide and preventing the enemy from advancing further. The front began this mission with a total of only 12 divisions (160,000 men), 2200 guns and mortars and around 400 tanks. The 8th Air Army had 454 aircraft. In addition, 150-200 long-range bombers and 60 fighters from the 102d Air Division were operating there. The enemy had a 1.7-fold superiority over Soviet forces in men, 1.3-fold in artillery and tanks and more than 2-fold in aircraft.

The main efforts of the Stalingrad Front were concentrated in the great bend of the Don, where the 62d and 64th armies were defending, to prevent the enemy from forcing the river and penetrating to Stalingrad by the shortest route.

The VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee, the GKO [State Defense Committee] and Headquarters, Supreme High Command, gave constant attention to Stalingrad. The Soviet military and political leadership focused all the efforts of the people and the army on halting and then routing the enemy on the banks of the Volga. Defense lines were set up on the distant and the near approaches to Stalingrad. In the city itself all possible steps were taken to increase the production of tanks and to fortify the approaches to the city. All human and military defense resources were mobilized to meet the needs of the front.

Ignoring losses, however, the enemy pressed on toward Stalingrad, attempting to cut the Caucasus off from the nation's central regions. It was essential to halt at any price the continued advance of the German fascist forces. On 28 July the people's commissar of defense issued order No. 227. "Not one step back"--this was what the order demanded of the troops, demanded that they defend every position, every meter of their land, stubbornly, to the last drop of blood. The order played a large role in the course of the armed conflict.

The growing resistance of the defending troops forced the German fascist command to transfer the 4th Tank Army from the Caucasus to the Stalingrad axis. The 4th Air Fleet was also re-deployed there. The fighting on the approaches to Stalingrad was becoming increasingly more fierce. The fascist grouping had a 4-fold superiority over the Soviet forces in tanks, and more than a 2-fold superiority in artillery and aviation. On 23 August formations of the enemy's 6th Army broke through to the Volga north of Stalingrad. That same day a massed German air raid caused enormous damage to the city. The onslaught was growing. In determined battles fighting men of the armies of Generals R. Ya. Malinovskiy, K. S. Moskalenko, N. I. Krylov, V.I. Chuykov and M.S. Shumilov were inflicting heavy losses upon the fascists, fighting to defend every inch of native land.

From September to November fighting went on in the city itself. Fierce battles were fought for every street, every house. Night battles were extensively employed, and assault groups and snipers operated skillfully. The railway station changed hands 13 times, and the legendary Pavlov House, Zabolotnyy House and Mill No. 4 became impregnable fortresses. A tank brigade of people's militiamen from the Tractor Plant, as well as detachments of workers' militiamen from the Barrikady and Krasnyy Oktyabr' plants, performed heroically in the fighting.

Despite the fierce fascist attacks, the plants never stopped operating for a minute but continued to provide the front with weapons and combat equipment. And when the Hitlerites would reach the enterprises, the workers would fight together with the troops for every plant building, for every shop. Stalingrad was a battling city. "There is no land for us beyond the Volga," said Vasiliy Zaytsev, famous sniper and former foundry worker in Kolomna, when he entered the party at the height of the fighting for the city. Those words became well known to the defenders of the Volga stronghold. The Stalingraders held out. Unshakable courage and heroism were demonstrated there by fighting men of the 13th, 37th and 39th Guards Divisions of Generals A. I. Rodimtsev, V.G. Zholudev and S.F. Gur'yev; the 95th, 112th, 138th, 284th and 308th Rifle Divisions of Colonels V. A. Gorishniy, I. Ye. Yermolkin, I.I. Lyudnikov, N.F. Batyuk and L.N. Gurt'yev; Colonel D. N. Belyy's 84th Tank Brigade; units of Colonel S. F. Gorokhov's group, and others. The naval infantrymen fought selflessly, and the ground forces also received active assistance from sailors of the Volga Flotilla under the command of Rear Admiral D.D. Rogachev. During the 2 months of fighting in the city Soviet troops repelled around 700 enemy attacks and inflicted heavy losses.

Fighting men of many of our nation's nationalities fought in Stalingrad. The garrison at the Pavlov Home, for example, which consisted of 22 soldiers of the 33d Guards Rifle Division, included Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, a Kazakh, an Uzbek, an Abkhazian, a Tajik and a Tatar. They personified the inviolable friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

The defensive period of the Stalingrad Battle ended on 18 November 1942. During that period around 700,000 of the German fascist troops were killed or wounded, and they lost more than 2,000 guns and mortars, more than 1,000 tanks and assault guns and more than 1400 combat and transport aircraft. The Hitlerite command's plan, which was based on the rapid capture of Stalingrad, was frustrated, as was the plan for the entire 1942 summer/fall campaign.

The Stalingrad defense, like the defense of Moscow, graphically demonstrated the steadfastness, courage and heroism of Soviet fighting men and the good military art of the generals and officers. The entire world became convinced of the viability and the invincibility of socialism.

The Counteroffensive

As a result of the enormous organizational work performed by the Communist Party and the selfless labor of the Soviet people, a smoothly functioning, rapidly growing military economy had been created in the nation by the end of 1942. The Soviet Army was being improved organizationally with the ever increasing quantities of military equipment it was receiving. All of this created the actual prerequisites for the strategic offensive operation at Stalingrad planned by the Supreme High Command.

The plan of Headquarters, Supreme High Command, called for forces of the Southwest, Don (created on 28 September) and Stalingrad Fronts under the command of Generals N.F. Vatutin, K.K. Rokossovskiy and A.I. Yeremenko to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping between the Don and the Volga. During preparations for the counteroffensive, which were launched at the beginning of October, the Soviet command created powerful offensive groupings. The forces of the two sides had essentially been equalized. The three Soviet fronts had 1,106,000 men, 15,500 guns and mortars, 1,463 tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces and 1,350 combat aircraft. They were opposed by the German 6th Field Army and 4th Tank Army and the Romanian 3d and 4th Armies of Army Group "B" (commanded by General-Field Marshal M. Weichs), which numbered more than 1,011,000 men, 10,290 guns and mortars, 675 tanks and assault guns, 1,216 combat aircraft. By massing personnel and equipment on the axes of the main strikes Soviet forces had double or even triple superiority over the enemy. Preparations for the counteroffensive at Stalingrad and the concentration of the assault groupings were conducted with such secrecy that their switch to the offensive was totally unexpected by the enemy forces. A week before the high command of the German ground forces had reported to Hitler that "the enemy does not have adequate forces for launching extensive operations" on the Don.

At 0730 hours on 19 November 1942 volleys from thousands of guns heralded the beginning of the gigantic counteroffensive by Soviet forces, launched over an enormous territory between the Don and the Volga. On the very first day the assault grouping of the Southwest Front rapidly broke through the enemy's defense and penetrated 25-35 kilometers into the 6th Army's rear area. The Stalingrad Front was advancing to meet them from the southeast. On 23 November mobile formations of these fronts came together in an area near the community of Sovetskiy. A total of 22 divisions and 260 separate units of the German fascist grouping, numbering 330,000 men, were encircled.

In an attempt to save the encircled forces no matter what, the German fascist command hastily created a new army group, the "Don," commanded by Field Marshal Manstein and consisting of 30 divisions. Its mission was to break through the Soviet front and relieve the encircled forces. On 12 December the Hoth tank group, a part of the "Don" group, switched to an offensive from the area of

Kotel'nikovo toward Stalingrad. In 4 days of fierce battles the fascists managed to advance only 48 kilometers at a cost of enormous casualties. On 16 December, at the order of Headquarters, Supreme High Command, forces of the Southwest Front and the left wing of the Voronezh Front made a powerful attack against the enemy in the area of the Middle Don, broke the fascists' resistance on the Chir and Don rivers, routed the Italian 8th Army and the left wing of the "Don" group and threatened the left flank and rear of the Hoth grouping. It was halted from the front by forces of the 2d Guards Army and the 51st Army at the Mushkova River. At the end of December Soviet forces carried out a powerful attack against the Hitlerites from that line, routed their Kotel'nikovo grouping, and captured the city of Kotel'nikovo on 29 December. An attempt by the German command to relieve the encircled forces ended in failure. The outer perimeter of envelopment went back 120-160 kilometers from the army of Paulus.

It was now time for the next mission, that of eliminating the encircled the enemy grouping. Headquarters, Supreme High Command, assigned the mission to forces of the Don Front. Considering the fact that the situation of the enemy forces was hopeless, the Soviet command gave them the opportunity to surrender on 8 January 1943. The enemy refused, however.

On 10 January, following powerful artillery and air preparation, Soviet forces switched to an offensive. Breaking the enemy's resistance, they moved successfully forward, drawing the ring the encirclement tighter with each day. General I. M. Chistyakov's 21st Army, General V. I. Chuykov's 62d Army and General P. I. Batov's 65th Army operated swiftly. The enemy forces were experiencing starvation, and all their supplies of ammunition and fuel were exhausted. There was a shortage of medicine in the hospitals overflowing with wounded.

During the fighting between 10 January and 2 February 1943 Soviet forces destroyed the encircled German fascist divisions and imprisoned 91,000 men, including more than 2500 officers and 24 generals, headed by General-Field Marshal Paulus and his staff, and captured an enormous quantity of equipment and weapons. The Stalingrad Battle ended in victory for the Soviet Armed Forces and the defeat of the 330,000-men grouping of fascist forces.

"Mankind remembers... the Stalingrad heroes," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, has said. "They came here from all parts of the nation, however, and our entire nation was behind them. Soviet people came at the call of the homeland, the call of the party, to defend the freedom and honor of their people, to protect the conquests of Great October. Had the sons of Russia and the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic Area, the Caucasus and Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia not stood shoulder to shoulder in the trenches of Stalingrad, there would have been no Stalingrad victory. If plants of the Urals and Siberia had not worked day and night, if the workers on the kolkhoz fields had not performed their seemingly unnoticed feat every day, there would have been no Stalingrad victory. The homeland did everything to make it possible for the heroes of Stalingrad to fulfill their duty with honor."¹

Many bourgeois scholars, publicists and writers of memoirs try to belittle the role of the Stalingrad Battle in World War II. They place the Soviet Army's victory on the same level with less significant events occurring in other theaters of military operations, particularly at El Alamein in North Africa. The engagement at El Alamein undoubtedly had a serious effect upon the course of military operations not only in North Africa, but throughout the entire Mediterranean theater of military operations. The outcome of the war was decided on the Soviet-German Front, however, where the bulk of the German fascist forces were concentrated. Rommel's army at El Alamein had only 12 divisions, for example, numbering 80,000 men. During the fighting there German and Italian forces lost only 55,000 men, 320 tanks and around 1,000 guns, while 50 enemy divisions were operating at Stalingrad during the counteroffensive period alone. Wehrmacht losses there exceeded 800,000 men, 2,000 tanks and assault guns, more than 10,000 guns and mortars, 3,000 combat and transport aircraft.²

Our victory at Stalingrad was a natural development. It demonstrated to the entire world the invincible might of the Soviet State, the progressive nature of Soviet military art, the iron steadfastness, skill and mass heroism of the Soviet people, their infinite love for their socialist homeland. The defeat of the Hitlerites resulted from their weakness, from overestimating the capabilities of their forces and underestimating the power of the Soviet Army and the strength of the socialist system, of the socialist nation. The battle at Stalingrad was gained by all the Soviet people with their military feats at the front and their selfless labor in the rear.

The battle at Stalingrad was the most important military-political event of World War II. Stalingrad signaled the decline of fascist Germany. The mass expulsion of the Hitlerites from Soviet territory began. The strategic initiative had gone over to the Soviet command. Stalingrad constituted a triumph for the strength and power of Soviet weapons. The victory on the Volga was heard as a death knell in fascist Germany. A 3-day period of official mourning was announced there for the destroyed German fascist 6th Army. "The defeat at Stalingrad," former Hitlerite General Westphal acknowledges, "brought terror both to the German people and to their army. Never before in Germany's entire history had there been an instance of such a large number of troops dying such a terrible death."³ There appeared major symptoms of crisis for the Hitlerite leadership.

The great feat performed by the Soviet people and their Armed Forces at Stalingrad under the Communist Party's leadership will remain forever in the memory of mankind. A victory of worldwide historical importance was gained there at the walls of the legendary heroic city, a victory which altered the course of World War II in favor of the peoples of states in the antifascist coalition. "The entire world followed with bated breath the battle on the Volga," L. I. Brezhnev has said. "In Washington and London, in Paris and Belgrade, in Berlin and Rome--people everywhere sensed and understood that the outcome of the war was being decided there. This was clear to both our enemies and our allies.... It was more than just the smashing of select Hitlerite troops in that battle. The aggressive spirit of fascism, its morale, expired there."⁴

Stalingrad produced disorder and vacillation in the fascist bloc. The loss of Italian, Hungarian and Romanian forces had a sobering effect upon the leaders of those countries. Romanian dictator I. Antonescu was forced to admit that "the fascist state began to reel following the Stalingrad Battle."⁵ Italy found itself on the brink of a military and political catastrophe. Internal political dissent intensified in Hungary and Romania. Finland sought an excuse to withdraw from the war, and Japan and Turkey were forced to refrain from attacking the USSR.

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government gave fitting recognition for the heroism and valor demonstrated by Stalingrad's defenders. A total of 55 formations and units which distinguished themselves in the fighting were awarded orders, 193 were awarded the "Guards" title, and 44 were given honorary names. Thousands of fighting men received state awards, and 112 of them were made Heroes of the Soviet Union. The city was awarded the honorary title "Hero-City." The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet established the medal "For the Defense of Stalingrad," which was awarded to more than 700,000 defenders of the Volga stronghold. In 1967, to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the battle on the Volga, a grand monument-complex was unveiled at the Mamayev Mound in the heroic city in honor of the great victory.

From the military point of view the battle at Stalingrad, which is unequalled in world history, was the most important achievement of Soviet military art, a demonstration of its superiority over the military art of fascist Germany.

The timely and skillful accumulation, distribution and commitment to battle of strategic reserves was the most important factor behind the success of our counteroffensive at Stalingrad. Between 20 November 31 December of 1942 alone Headquarters, Supreme High Command, transferred to the fronts 20 rifle divisions, 6 tank corps, 4 mechanized corps, 7 separate tank brigades and 25 artillery regiments.⁶

The counteroffensive at Stalingrad was the first successful strategic operation by a group of fronts to encircle and destroy a large enemy grouping, accomplished with the sides actually equal. Surprise of operations was achieved in it, and a more decisive massing of personnel and equipment, especially artillery and tanks, was carried out. The latter made it possible to create significant superiority on the axes of the main strikes. A full artillery offensive was conducted for the first time in that counteroffensive.

Artillery divisions made their appearance for the first time in the battle on the Volga, and the artillery density was approximately twice that of the counteroffensive at Moscow. In commemoration of the artillerymen's combat merits, our homeland annually notes the beginning of the counteroffensive, 19 November, as Missile Troop and Artillery Day. In the operation we gained our first experience with the successful organization of an air offensive and of interaction between air armies and mobile (tank) troops, air supremacy was achieved and a successful air blockade of encircled enemy troops was conducted, during the course of which an attempt to supply the enemy grouping by means of aircraft was frustrated. In the process, Soviet airmen destroyed more than 700 Hitlerite aircraft. Tank and

mechanized corps were used for the first time in concentration as army mobile groups for encircling the enemy. The Volga Military Flotilla took an active part in the battle at Stalingrad. It assisted the troops with fire from ship-based artillery and conducted numerous transport operations. During the counteroffensive alone flotilla ships hauled 38,000 soldiers and commanders, evacuated 47,000 wounded and hauled up to 10,000 tons of various types of cargo across the Volga.⁷

The Communist Party was directly in charge of the entire enormous project of mobilizing the efforts of the people and their Armed Forces to rout the German fascist occupiers. Its appeals "Hold Out to the Death!," "Not a Step Backward!" and "Death to the Fascist Occupiers!" made a deep impression on the heart of every fighting man. There was not a single company without its party organization at Stalingrad, and some battalions consisted entirely of communists and Komsomol members. The communists were always out front. With their fervent word and their personal example they led the other soldiers into battle. The frontline fighters considered it a great honor to enter the party in the situation of fierce fighting. Between September and November of 1942 4600 soldiers and commanders were accepted into the ranks of the VKP(b) in the 62d Army alone. In all 14,400 people became communists on the Stalingrad Front during that time.⁸

An appeal from participants in the defense of Tsaritsyn to fighting men of the 62d Army did a great deal to increase their steadfastness in combat. In October of 1942 the communists of that field force initiated a mass sniper movement. The army and frontline press gave extensive coverage to the combat activities of snipers Vasilii Zaytsev, Viktor Medvedev, Gil'fan Avzalov, Anatolii Chekhov and others, who destroyed more than hundreds of Hitlerites than one. There were 400 snipers in the 62d Army alone. By the end of the defensive operation they had destroyed more than 6,000 fascists.⁹

The victory achieved by the Soviet people and their Armed Forces over the German fascist invaders at Stalingrad was a victory of socialism over capitalism. It was achieved due to the guiding and organizational work of the Communist Party, which led the defense of the socialist homeland, raised up the entire Soviet people for the war of liberation, inspired the Soviet people to perform feats and selfless labor in the rear area, mobilized the nation's economy for the defeat of the enemy and skillfully directed the armed conflict.

The lessons gained from the Stalingrad Battle, like those of the Great Patriotic War as a whole, demand that all peoples exercise great vigilance with respect to the enemies of peace. "We consider the lessons of the past and are doing everything possible to see that no one takes us by surprise," L. I. Brezhnev stresses. "And if there should be madmen who would dare to encroach upon the security of the Soviet Nation and that of our allies, the Soviet people would not flinch. No matter where such encroachment should originate, from the north or the south, from the west or the east, the aggressor would encounter the devastating might of our glorious Armed Forces.... Let everyone know that in an encounter with any aggressor the Soviet Nation will gain a victory worthy of our great people, worthy of the homeland of October!"¹⁰

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [On a Leninist Course], Vol 2, Moscow, Politizdat, 1973, p 69.
2. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [A History of World War II, 1939-1945], Vol 6, p 217.
3. Z. Westphal, et al, ibid., p 210.
4. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom," Vol 2, p 68.
5. Quoted from the book by Wolfgang Bleyer, et al, "Germany in World War II (1939-1945)," translated from Germany, Voenizdat, 1971, p 231.
6. "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuz 1941-1945. Kratkaya istoriya." [Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945: A Brief History], Voenizdat, 1965, p 227.
7. Ibid., p 227.
8. "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuz 1941-1945" [A History of the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945], Vol 2, Voenizdat, 1961, p 451.
9. Ibid., Vol 2, p 448.
10. L. I. Brezhnev, "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma," Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 158.

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BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON MARSHAL SHAPOSHNIKOV

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 82 (signed to press 30 Aug 82) pp 54-57

[Article by Col Gen (Ret) N. Lomov, Professor: "Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov (On the 100th Anniversary of His Birth)"]

[Text] Boris Mikhaylovich Shaposhnikov, a colonel with the General Staff, was among the first officers of the old army to voluntarily enter the Red Army ranks. The Soviet public celebrates the 100th anniversary of his birth on 2 October this year.

Boris Mikhaylovich's memoirs, which he titled "Proydennyy put'" [The Path Traveled], recollections of his contemporaries and his scientific military works¹ make it possible to conditionally divide the life of this remarkable military leader into four periods. During each of them basic changes occurred in the nation, the army and in B. M. Shaposhnikov's own social situation, which actively affected the development of his outlook on life.

The first period (1882-1901) included his childhood (in Zlatoust) and youth. Those years were the same for him as for the majority of those his age. Finances were the crucial factor with respect to determining the path in life of this boy from the family of a white-collar worker at that time, however. Their shortage forced Boris Shaposhnikov's parents to send their son for training to the Krasnoufimsk Six-Year Industrial (non-classical) School, where the training was relatively inexpensive compared with the Ufa Secondary Educational Institution, which was located closer to his home.

The education he received at the school gave him the right to enter one of the higher educational institutions, but the young man chose a military career. This decision was made in 1901. It was dictated not by any deep interest in military affairs, not by any romantic motivations or any keenly-felt attraction for the brilliance of military service, but by difficult family circumstances, which created in the youth a firm resolve to provide material assistance for his family. Having made his final decision, however, he set about mastering the basics of military science and military art with great seriousness and responsibility and retained this attitude throughout his life.

The second period of B. M. Shaposhnikov's life covered his service in the old army, from his first days as a student at the Moscow Military School to his service as a colonel with the General Staff and his discharge in March of 1918 for reasons of health.

He accepted the victory in the Great October Socialist Revolution as a natural development and he immediately announced his recognition of the new authority. This announcement was most graphically confirmed by his voluntary entry into the Red Army ranks in May of 1918. This was the beginning of the third period of B. M. Shaposhnikov's biography (to 1928).

As first assistant chief of staff for the Ukrainian People's Commissariat of the Navy (beginning in March of 1919), assistant section chief of the operations directorate of the republic's Higher Military Council (as of May 1919), chief of intelligence section and then, of the operations directorate (October 1919-February 1921) of the RVSR [Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic] Field Staff, B. M. Shaposhnikov personally worked out and helped to work out plans of operation for the Red Army and assured that they were implemented.

In February of 1921 B. M. Shaposhnikov was appointed first deputy chief of staff of the RKKA [Workers and Peasants Red Army]. In November of 1922 he was appointed military expert with the Soviet delegation to the Lausanne Conference (1922-1923).

After the civil war the party and the people faced great new tasks involving not just peacetime construction, but also the organization of continuing protection for the socialist homeland's revolutionary conquests. At the February 1924 Plenum of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)] Central Committee the decision was adopted to carry out a military reform in 1924/25. M. V. Frunze, people's commissar for military and naval affairs and chief of staff of the RKKA, was charged with overseeing the development of a program for this reform and plans for its implementation. He was aware of B. M. Shaposhnikov's good performance and made the latter his assistant.

In May of 1925 Boris Mihaylovich was appointed deputy commander and soon thereafter, of the Leningrad Military District and then the Moscow Military District. During this period he worked on his major work "Mozg armii" [The Brain of an Army], which summarized the experience of general staffs of various nations in the preparation and conduct of World War I, and discussed problems pertaining to the possible nature of a future war, its relationship to the nation's foreign and domestic policy and the national economy, the General Staff's role and place within the system of state and military control, and the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces. These problems covered by the author, as basically formulated, have not lost their validity today.

The work "Mozg armii" was especially important for Boris Mikhaylovich himself when he served as chief of staff of the RKKA (beginning in May of 1928).² The fourth period in the life and work of B. M. Shaposhnikov began at that time. His name is linked with extremely important measures to improve the structure and substance of the higher military directorate's work, as well as measures pertaining to direction of the combat and operational preparation of forces and staffs and to the indoctrination of soldiers and commanders.

On 28 September 1930 B. M. Shaposhnikov submitted his application for membership in the Lenin party ranks to the party cell of the RKKA staff. He wrote in the application: "For 13 years I have worked hand in hand with the All-Union Communist Party, steadfastly conducting the party line in all parts of my life during that time and fighting with the party on the civil war fronts for Lenin's cause. If I am found worthy I request that I be accepted into the ranks of the All-Union Communist Party, in order to the end of my life to defend the cause of the proletariat in its iron ranks with my work and my blood."³ By decision of the Secretariat of the VKP(b) Central Committee, Boris Mikhaylovich was accepted into the party in October of 1930 without undergoing the candidate's probationary period.

Beginning in April of 1931 B. M. Shaposhnikov commanded the Volga Military District. From April 1932 to October 1935 he served as chief and commissar of the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze. Expressing his opinion on the tasks of that educational institution, he wrote that the academy "should, on the one hand, turn out a combined-arms and staff commander armed with a knowledge of the contemporary theory of military art, and on the other, summarize and develop practical questions pertaining to military affairs.... The study of military technology and of the technical branches of troops and the ability to properly utilize these under combat conditions comprise the most important training department at the Military Academy."⁴ Boris Mikhaylovich then became commander of the Leningrad Military District again, and in May of 1937 he was made chief of the RKKA General Staff and deputy USSR people's commissar of defense.

Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov was appointed deputy people's commissar of defense in August of 1940. He was charged with directing the building of a border defense. Boris Mikhaylovich applied every effort to complete the construction program to the fullest possible degree within the shortest period of time.

At the very beginning of the war Boris Mikhaylovich was sent to the Western Front, where to the extent of his capabilities he assisted the command of the fighting forces as chief of staff of the Western Directorate. In July he was reappointed chief of the General Staff. This appointment was received with great satisfaction by broad groups of the field army's command personnel and by workers of the people's commissariat of defense.

In the situation which developed during the first months of the war Boris Mikhaylovich made a significant contribution to the achievement of our impending victory over the enemy. It was precisely this period which brought out his talent as a military leader and his outstanding organizational abilities. The Smolensk engagement, the counteroffensive at Moscow and the general winter offensive of 1942 were planned and conducted with his immediate participation. The extreme exertion of effort resulted in the deterioration of his health, however, the state of which was already cause for serious concern.

In May of 1942 for this reason B. M. Shaposhnikov requested the State Defense Committee to relieve him of his duties as chief of General Staff and transfer him

to another area of the work. Satisfying his request, the State Defense Committee charged him as deputy people's commissar of defense with overseeing the review of old Red Army regulations and manuals and the compilation of new ones, taking the combat experience of the Great Patriotic War into account, as well as organizing the writing of a history of the Great Patriotic War and helping the military academies with the study of that experience. He was not permitted to work more than 5 or 6 hours a day.

Boris Mikhaylovich served as chief of the General Staff Military Academy from 25 June 1943 to the final day of his life. His life ended on 26 March 1945, but his memory remains as an important and outstanding military leader, a highly educated individual and a theoretician with a profound understanding of military affairs, an intelligent and skilled teacher and a steadfast communist, infinitely devoted to Lenin's cause, the cause of the Communist Party.

Everyone who had the opportunity to work with Boris Mikhaylovich recalls him as a charming individual of good spiritual qualities. During the Great Patriotic War I delivered reports to him on temporary-duty assignments to Moscow from the Far East. Those meetings made a profound impression and were not soon forgotten. Boris Mikhaylovich courteously received everyone who came to see him, despite his illness and his age, and went to greet the visitor. If the situation and time permitted, he began the conversation by inquiring about the life and the work of the troops, commanders and staffs. He knew how to draw out the interest of those with whom he talked in a specific topic, and his suggestions and recommendations were concrete and beneficial.

Boris Mikhaylovich was always polite and proper. When talking with subordinates he would tap a pencil on the desk in a non-irritating manner and frequently insert a "my dear" into his speech, and he skillfully made his demands with respect to a specific issue fully and correctly understood. Highly disciplined and highly demanding of himself, B. M. Shaposhnikov also instilled these qualities in his subordinates. As he himself put it, he always tried: "To be, more than to appear to be."

A fond memory of Comrade Shaposhnikov as a fervent patriot and loyal son of our homeland will be sacredly preserved by the Soviet Army and by all our people.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Vospominaniya: Voenno-nauchnyye trudy." [Memoirs: Scientific Military Work], Voenizdat, 1974; "Kon'nitsa" [Cavalry], Moscow, 1923; "Na Visle" [On the Vistula], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1924; "Mozg armii" books 1, 2 and 3, Moscow, VOYENNY VESTNIK, 1927-1929; "Varshavskaya operatsiya" [The Warsaw Operation], Moscow, 1933; "Proydenny put', 1882-1915gg." (manuscript published in part in VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL: Nos 6-9, 12, 1966; Nos 1, 3, 6, 1967). In addition, B. M. Shaposhnikov is the author of more than 30 articles published in military journals during the period 1918-1936. The first major work (three volumes) on the Moscow Battle was published under his editorship in 1943.

2. Reformed as the RKKA General Staff on 22 September 1935--Editor.
3. M. V. Zakharov, "Uchenyy i voyn" [Scholar and Soldier], Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, pp 105-106.
4. PRAVDA, 18 January 1934.

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MILITARY DISTRICTS: ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OUTLINED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 82 (signed to press 30 Aug 82) pp 62-67

[Article published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information" by Col A. Babakov, Candidate of Historical Sciences: "Soviet Military Districts (On the History of Their Organizational Development)"]

[Text] The development and implementation of principles for distributing the troops so as to provide them with the conditions necessary for their daily lives and work and for the performance of their missions to protect the territorial integrity and state interests of the USSR has a leading place in the theory and practice of organizational development for the Soviet Armed Forces. The military districts constitute a concrete system of distribution, one which has justified itself historically. They comprise the basis for the military-administrative division of the nation's territory, which take into account its geographic features, economic zoning, possible theaters of military operations and axes of operations.

The military districts are territorial, combined-arms groupings of formations, units, military educational institutions and various local military installations. Their missions include measures involved in preparing the nation and the Armed Forces to protect the homeland, providing a flexible and convenient system of centralized control of the troops and their materiel support, purposive organization of the combat and political training of the personnel, the efficient and precise conduct of mobilization measures, the formation and deployment of reserves, and so forth.

Military districts were first formed in Russia in 1860's. Their creation was a part of the military reform conducted under the leadership of War Minister D. A. Milyutin. Subsequent military organizational development demonstrated the expediency of this kind of division. There were 12 military districts in the territory of Russia by World War I: the Petersburg, Vilenskiy, Warsaw, Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, Caucasus, Turkestan, Omsk, Irkutsk and Amur districts. A district was headed by a commander with an administration consisting of a military district council, a staff and the following directorates: artillery, engineer, quartermaster, military medical and others.¹

Following the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution the Bolshevik Party headed by V. I. Lenin destroyed the old state apparatus and the army, a component of that apparatus. Creation of the system for a new, socialist state and the organizational development of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Republic was immediately begun, including the organization of a new system for dividing the nation into military-administrative districts. On 23 January 1918, by order of the people's commissar for military affairs, the military district councils for the military districts of former tsarist Russia were eliminated, and the military departments of local soviets of workers, soldiers and peasants deputies began to perform their functions. This was the first step toward the creation of a territorial military control apparatus closely linked to the new organs of power and close to the working masses, the source of personnel for the army and navy.

At the same time a search was made for better forms of military district division and control. On 17 March 1918 the Higher Military Council submitted to V. I. Lenin in the Council of People's Commissars a plan for reorganizing the military-administrative system and for creating local military control agencies. It took into account historical experience in the organizational development of Russia's military districts, the revolutionary initiative and the creativity of the masses and their suggestions made during the formation of the first Red Army units. The plan was approved by the Soviet Government on 25 March.

The Petrograd Military District was already functioning at that time. Created on 20 March 1918, it was the first Soviet military district. It immediately began the large project of forming volunteer Red Army units, preparing reserves, mobilizing forces for the struggle against conspiracies and revolts by counterrevolutionary forces, and guarding important state and industrial facilities. On 31 March the Higher Military Council, following instructions from the SNK [Council of People's Commissars] announced the establishment of six new military districts: the Yaroslavl', Moscow, Orel, Belorussian, Ural and Volga districts.^{1a} The Petrograd District was eliminated, and its staff was turned into a commissariat for military affairs of the Petrograd Labor Commune (guberniya), which was subordinate to the Yaroslavl' Military District.²

On 8 April 1918 the SNK passed a decree establishing volost, uyezd, guberniya and district commissariats for military affairs, which replaced the military sections of the soviets.³ Each local military organ was headed by a board consisting of two military commissars and a military director. The senior member of a board was one of the commissars, who was appointed by the higher council as the volost, uyezd, guberniya or district military commissar. The party and organs of Soviet power appointed the most experienced military workers to the posts of commissar, as a rule communists. Noting their prominent role in the organization of the Armed Forces of the Republic, V. I. Lenin stated the following: "Without the military commissar we would have no Red Army."⁴

All of the district military units, the directorates, installations and educational institutions of the war department were under the district commissariat for military affairs. A standing conference was established to discuss extremely important

administrative matters in each district. It consisted of the district commissar, delegates from the guberniya soviets, the chief of district staff and representatives of the district directorates.

The organizational development of military districts and local military control agencies was launched simultaneously and was an essential element in the creation and reinforcement of the Soviet state apparatus in the difficult situation of civil war. For this reason the SNK issued a decree on 4 May 1918 increasing the total number of military districts to 11, an addition of 5 to the 6 districts already established: the West Siberian, Central Siberian, East Siberian, North Caucasus and Turkestan districts. That same decree, as well as orders issued by the Higher Military Council, ordered that guberniya, uyezd and volost military commissariats be created immediately in all the districts.⁵ The composition of the guberniyas territorially a part of the military districts and the locations of the military district directorates were defined at the same time. The main principle observed when breaking up the territories of border military districts was that it provide for the reliable deployment of the troops and their rear services and supply over a prolonged period of time and using local resources. The existence of extremely important railway lines and highways was also taken into account. The interior military districts, on the other hand, were regarded as state bases of supply and replenishments of everything essential to the field army and the border military districts.

The Petrograd Military District and the district commissariat for military affairs were recreated on 6 September 1918.

Implementing the program for military organizational development outlined at the eighth VKP(b) Congress the Party Central Committee and the Soviet Government took steps to further strengthen the system of military district division and control. The Statute on the District Military Commissariat went into effect on 30 September 1919.⁶ Under this statute a commissariat was headed by one military commissar appointed by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and subordinate to the All-Russian Main Staff. The local soviets, which had formerly been authorized to appoint one of the military commissars, as a result of which they intruded in the district's operational functioning, were now relieved of that duty.

The military district commissar was the direct chief of all troops, military directorates, installations and institutions and had the authority of army commander with respect to them. The changes made in the organization of the military districts represented a new phase in the Red Army's organizational development and an increase in the authority of its command cadres and was an important step toward the establishment of one-man command and intensified centralization of control over all the Armed Forces of the Republic.

Changes were repeatedly made in the military-administrative division of the nation during the years of civil war and foreign intervention. This was necessitated by the operational-strategic situation, the course of combat operations and the liberation of territories from the white guard and foreign interventionists. Toward

the end of the war the directorates of the district military commissariats were reorganized into (made a part of) the military district directorates.

Revolutionary military councils were created in the military districts to make the direction of their forces a more collective process. In July of 1921, for example, the Petrograd Guberniya Committee of the RKP(b) submitted a proposal to the Organizational Bureau of the Party Central Committee that a revolutionary military council be created for the Petrograd Military District. This proposal was accepted.⁷ And so, a tested revolutionary organ began to function for the first time within the system of military districts, one whose work embodied the Leninist principle of unified political and military leadership of the forces.

The army's transition to a peacetime footing, its drastic reduction in size and preparations for the establishment of the territorial militia system made it necessary to reorganize the nation's division into military districts. The number of military districts was reduced. Only six remained at the end of 1923: the Moscow, Petrograd, Volga, West Siberian, North Caucasus and Ukrainian districts.⁸ The organization and the tasks of the districts were determined by the need to conduct demobilization of the army, to reorganize the formations and units and to assist in the struggle against counterrevolution.

The structure and functional duties of the district administrative apparatus were defined more precisely during the military reform of 1924/25. In accordance with an order issued by the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR on 15 April 1924 "On the Reorganization of District Administrative Systems of the RKKA," the military district was headed by a revolutionary military council. Its executive agencies were a staff and directorate in charge of administrative affairs, an inspectorate and a supply organization. Experience proved that this structure was not without shortcomings, however. In 1926, by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, the directorate was combined with the staff, and the inspectorates were replaced by chiefs of branches of troops.⁹

As a result the military districts were restructured on the basis of function, which made it possible to concentrate all the most important matters pertaining to the life and work of the troops located within the territory of the districts in independent agencies of the district system. In addition, their organization was considerably simplified and the number of personnel was reduced. A district was headed by a commander and a revolutionary military council. The staff consisted of the following sections: operations, military communications, training, drill, mobilization and manning, personnel and intelligence. There were the following chiefs of branches of troops: artillery, engineer, communications and chemical. There were also the following district directorates: political, air forces, medical, veterinary and supply.¹¹

The system of military districts underwent certain changes in the course of the military reform. The Western Military District was recreated on 14 April 1924. On 12 July the West Siberian Military District was renamed the Siberian Military District, and all forces and military installations located in Siberia and the

Far East were placed under its jurisdiction. On 4 June 1926 the Turkestan Front was transformed into the Central Asian Military District. On 2 October the Western Military District was renamed the Belorussian Military District. This organizational reform conformed to the goals and tasks of the territorial development and existed almost without change until the mid-1930's.

The growth of militarism in the capitalist countries and the increased danger of aggression against the USSR by the fascist states demanded that we convert to the unified cadre principle for the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces. It became necessary to further improve the nation's division into military districts. Consideration was given to the increased complexity of the military equipment, the increased demands made of the mobilizational and combat readiness of the forces and the increased numerical strength of the army and navy.

The 17th VKP(b) Congress in 1934, which discussed the matter of party and soviet development, pointed out the need to further strength one-man command.¹² Accordingly, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and the revolutionary military councils in the military districts were eliminated in June of 1934, and the chiefs of political directorates of the military districts became deputy commanders for political affairs.

Our experience in military organizational development, however, had demonstrated the need to restore the board-type directing organs, the military councils, in the military districts. They were established by a 10 May 1937 decree passed by the VKP(b) Central Committee and the USSR SNK and consisted of the district commander and two members of the military council.¹³ The Statute on District, Fleet and Army Military Councils was approved on 16 May 1937. In July of that year the secretaries of oblast, kray and republic party committees became members of the military councils. Commanders of the district air forces became members in December of 1938.

For purposes of breaking down the eight military districts in existence in the USSR and creating better conditions for controlling the forces, the Far East, Transbaykal, Transcaucasus and Ural districts were created and the Ukrainian District was split up into the Kiev and Kharkov districts on the basis of an order issued by the People's Defense Committee on 17 May 1935. The Arkhangelsk, Odessa, Orel and Baltic military districts were formed during the prewar years, and the Belorussian Military District was renamed the Western Military District.

As the danger of a military attack against the USSR increased it became necessary on 28 July 1938 to transform the Far East Military District into the Far East Front. At the same time, due to their location on the border and their important tasks of defending the homeland, the Western and Kiev Military Districts began to be called "special" districts. The Baltic Military District also became a "special" district in August of 1940.

So there were 16 military districts on the territory of the USSR by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War: the Baltic, Western and Kiev (special), Leningrad, Moscow, Odessa, Arkhangelsk, Volga, North Caucasus, Transcaucasus, Central Asian, Ural, Siberian, Transbaykal, Kharkov and Orel, as well as the Far East Front.

The organizational development of the military districts was an especially dynamic process during the Great Patriotic War: their territories and names were frequently changed, the military district directorates were transformed into front directorates and vice versa. On the very first day of the war, for example, the Baltic, Western and Kiev Special Districts were reformed respectively as the Northwestern, Western and Southwestern Fronts, and on 24 June 1941 the Leningrad Military District was changed to the Northern Front. An enormous amount of military mobilization work was launched in the other military districts, the main objective of which was to prepare reserves for the field army and the fleet.

The number and composition of the military districts underwent further changes during the war, depending upon where the line of the Soviet-German front lay. Due to the temporary loss of some territory the Orel, North Caucasus, Kharkov, Leningrad and Odessa Districts were disbanded, and the Stalingrad, Steppe and South Ural Military Districts were created. The Transbaykal, Transcaucasus and Steppe Military Districts were expanded into fronts.

Following the liberation of USSR territory there were at first 14 military districts: the White Sea, Belorussian-Lithuanian, Kiev, Lvov, Moscow, Odessa, Orel, Volga, North Caucasus, Siberian, Central Asian, Ural, Kharkov and South Ural. Following the defeat of fascist Germany the number of military districts was increased considerably, in order to reduce the army and convert it to a peacetime footing rapidly and in an organized manner. District directorates were formed out of the directorates of fronts and certain armies. The following new districts were created from July to September 1945, for example: the Baku, Baranovichi, Voronezh, East Siberian, Gorkiy, Don, West Siberian, Kazan, Kuban, Leningrad, Minsk Special, Baltic, Carpathian, Smolensk, Stavropol, Steppe, Tavricheskiy, Tbilisi, Turkestan and others. During that same time certain military districts were eliminated or renamed (the Siberian, Belorussian-Lithuanian and others). There were a total of 32 military districts on USSR territory by 1 October 1945.

Two air defense districts, the Baku and Moscow districts, were created at the beginning of 1946. Like the fleets and flotillas, however, these are special formations and do not have a large number of those functions performed by the regular military districts (directing the work of the military commissariats, organizing the regular military call-ups, conducting mobilization measures within the district, and so forth).

Due to the fact that the Armed Forces of the USSR began fulfilling commitments stemming from the alliance it became necessary to form new territorial groups of Soviet forces. Units and formations of the USSR Armed Forces temporarily stationed on the territory of foreign states were combined into groups of forces in mid-1945.

Certain military districts were also eliminated as the Soviet Armed Forces were reduced. By the end of 1946 there were 21. Alteration of the district borders and the reduction in their number were carried out so as to reliably protect the security of the USSR and the people's democratic nations. Three districts were created in the Far East in September and October of 1945, for example: The Maritime Military District was created out of the first Far East Front, the Far

East Military District out of the second Far East Front and the Transbaykal-Amur Military District out of the Transbaykal Front. In May of 1947 the Directorate of the Commander in Chief of Far East Forces was formed out of the Directorate of the Transbaykal-Amur District. He had command over the Far East, Maritime and Transbaykal Military Districts, the Pacific Fleet and the Amur Military Flotilla. A single district, the Far East District, was created in the Far East in April of 1953. In July of 1951, the White Sea Military District was renamed the Northern Military District. It was eliminated in March of 1960 by a directive of the USSR minister of defense. The bulk of its territory was turned over to the Leningrad Military District, and part to the Ural Military District.

There are presently 16 military districts in the USSR: the Leningrad, Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Odessa, Transcaucasus, Turkestan, Central Asian, Moscow, Kiev, North Caucasus, Volga, Ural, Siberian, Transbaykal and Far East Military Districts.

The military districts are headed by commanders. The most important issues pertaining to the life and work of the district forces are resolved by the military councils, whose work is governed by the Statute on Military Councils approved by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on 17 April 1958.¹⁵ A military council includes the commander, who is the chairman, and the following members: the chief of the political directorate, the secretary of the republic's communist party central committee or the obkom (kraykom) secretary, the first deputy commander and the chief of staff.

The staff is the main agency of control of the military district's forces. It has various directorates and departments. Direct leadership of the formations and units, branches of troops, special troops and services which are a part of it is exercised by the corresponding chiefs of branches of troops and services. Each district has a political directorate, which organizes and directs the party-political work in the formations and units, military educational institutions and installations. A district's rear services include supply agencies and direct all the administrative work and see that the materiel requirements of the troops are met in accordance with official tables of organization, standards and schedules.

Combat and political training is organized in the military districts for all the forces which are a part of them, ideological-political and cultural-educational work is carried out among the personnel, and military-patriotic indoctrination of the population is conducted in the districts.

Government awards have been conferred upon all the districts by ukases issued by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet for their extensive contribution to the job of strengthening the Soviet State's defense capability and for their successes in the combat and political training. The Order of Lenin has been awarded to the Moscow, Leningrad (1968) and Transbaykal (1974) districts, and the Order of the Red Banner has been awarded to the Belorussian, Kiev, Odessa, North Caucasus, Turkestan (1968), Baltic, Carpathian, Volga, Ural, Siberian (1974) and Central Asian (1975) Military Districts. On 17 June 1967, by a decree passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, orders of the Red Banner, which were awarded

to their predecessors, the Red Banner Caucasus Army and the Separate Red Banner Far East Army, were turned over for posterity to the Transcaucasus and Far East Military Districts.

The organizational development of Soviet military districts is closely linked to other elements in the theory and practice of organizational development of the Armed Forces--their manning and equipment, the organization of military service, personnel training, the creation of reserves and mobilization supplies, the maintaining of combat readiness and other matters.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [The Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 2, Voenizdat, 1976, p 271.
- 1a. TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], fnd 11, inv 5, fl 400, sh 44.
2. "Istoriya ordena Lenina Leningradskogo voyennogo okruga" [A History of the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District], Voenizdat, 1974, p 38.
3. "Dikrety Sovetskoy vlasti" [Soviet Decrees], Vol 2, Moscow, Politizdat, 1959, pp 63-70.
4. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 41, p 148.
5. "Dikrety..." op. cit., Vol 2, pp 235-236.
6. TsGASA, fnd 4, inv 3, fl 53, sh 249.
7. "Istoriya..." op. cit., p 110.
8. I. B. Berkhin, "Voyennaya reforma v SSSR (1924-1925 gg.)" [Military Reform in the USSR (1924-1925)], Voenizdat, 1958, p 160: TsGASA, fnd 4, inv 3, fl 2665, sh 25.
9. Berkhin, op. cit., p. 161.
11. Ibid., p 162.
12. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK" [The USSR in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee], 8th edition, amended and enlarged, Vol 5, Moscow, Politizdat, 1971, p 158.
13. "Sbornik zakonov i rasporyazheniy Raboche-Krest'yanskogo Pravitel'stva SSSR" [Collection of Laws and Instructions Issued by the Workers and Peasants Government of the USSR], Moscow, Politizdat, 1937, p 126.

15. "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza. Dokumenty 1917-1981."
[The CPSU On the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union: Documents, 1917-1981],
Voenizdat, 1981, p 361.

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MILITARY INDOCTRINATION: TRADE UNIONS' ROLE DESCRIBED

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[Article by Maj (Res) R. Akchurin: "The Trade Unions and Military-Patriotic Indoctrination of the Youth"]

[Text] Defense of the socialist homeland and the continuous and thorough training of the working masses, especially the youth, for that is one of the most important functions of socialism's political system, a system in which, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated at the 17th Congress of Trade Unions of the USSR, "trade unions occupy an important place...."¹

Under CPSU leadership and together with state agencies, Komsomol and various public organizations, military units, military commissariats and DOSAAF, the trade unions take an active part in the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth. Their work is aimed at helping the Communist Party and the Soviet State to increase the economic and defensive strength of the USSR, to develop in Soviet citizens, first and foremost the youth, the good moral-political qualities essential for successfully defending the homeland, and indoctrinating them in a spirit of selfless devotion to the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, to communist ideals, in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism.

The most important aspect of military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth is that of developing in the young Soviet men and women the good moral-political qualities of a defender of the socialist homeland.

In accordance with decisions adopted at the 26th party congress and the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On the Continued Improvement of Ideological, Political and Indoctrinational Work," military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth is performed by trade-union organizations as an integrated process of such key areas as ideological-political, labor, moral, military and physical development. Trade unions take an active part in the development and implementation of comprehensive plans, which call for coordinated, joint efforts on the part of party, soviet, economic, trade union, Komsomol and other organizations in the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth, of all the workers, in the improvement of basic training and the preparation of specialists for the Armed Forces, in the

enhancement of the general education level of the predraft youth, the development of physical culture and sports, the betterment of medical and health-improvement work, and so forth.

For purposes of linking patriotic indoctrination more closely with labor indoctrination and instilling communist ideals in the youth, using the heroic deeds of the older generations, the communists, trade union and Komsomol activists at many enterprises have launched extensive competition for prizes inscribed with the winner's name and for mementos of the military and labor valor of the older generations. A total of 585,000 young workers and 3600 Komsomol/youth brigades are now taking part in this movement.²

Since 1978, 40 Komsomol/youth brigades of Amur Oblast have been accepting socialist commitments to fulfill the daily production norm for a comrade serving in the Armed Forces. Commitments in military-patriotic work, for example, are a part of the competition at many industrial enterprises of Tula Oblast. At the Tula Machine-Building Plant all predraft youth are involved in basic military training exercises and are mastering the technical military types of sports.

Taking part in the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth, of all the workers, the trade unions are performing extensive and diverse cultural and educational work and furthering the development of mass physical culture and sports, including the applied and technical types of military sports and tourism.

The main purpose of indoctrinational work has been and remains that of developing in the young men and women selfless devotion to the party cause and to communist ideals, love for the socialist homeland and proletarian internationalism.

The trade unions organize lectures, reports and talks with the youth on military-patriotic subjects in clubs, houses and palaces of culture, libraries and Red corners, conduct evening discussions on special subjects, readers' conferences, meetings with war and labor veterans, and show films. Lecture series on military-patriotic subjects are presented in special lecture halls: "Lenin On the Defense of the Socialist Homeland," "The CPSU--Leader of and Inspiration Behind the Soviet People's Victories During the Great Patriotic War" and others. Communist labor schools run by trade unions, which have more than 14 million students, also engage in the military-patriotic indoctrination of the workers and the student youth.³

Veterans of war and labor and of the trade-union movement, army and navy officers, retired and reserve workers in the military commissariats take an active part in the military-patriotic work conducted by the trade unions among the youth. They generously share their extensive experience in life with the young citizens and teach the latter patriotism with their own personal examples. Veterans from the Moscow section alone have spoken at meetings of labor collectives more than 80,000 times during the past three years. More than 150,000 museums and combat glory rooms have been set up in the nation with the help of veterans.⁴

Tutorship is becoming an increasingly effective means of providing the youth with communist indoctrination of giving them professional skills and indoctrinating young men and women in the glorious revolutionary, combat and labor traditions of the Soviet people.

Today around 3 million of the best workers and kolkhoz workers are sharing their knowledge, skill and experience in life with the youth.⁵

The development of mass physical culture and sports is an important part of the military-patriotic work conducted by the trade unions among the youth and aimed at the physical and spiritual conditioning of the upcoming generation, at preparing it to perform highly productive work and to defend the homeland. Trade-union organizations and volunteer trade-union sports societies (DSO) with a membership of more than 40 million workers and student youth are taking an active part in this. During the past five-year period 15,000 new physical culture groups were created in the volunteer sports societies, and more than 50 million TSO [Ready for Labor and Defense] badge-holders were produced.

More than 4,500 new sports facilities have begun functioning since 1977.

All-Union trade-union/Komsomol cross-country races are conducted annually. Trade unions are active in the organization and conduct of winter and summer Spartacades of Peoples of the USSR, All-Union competitions in the GTO all-round competitions for prizes offered by the newspaper TRUD, student sportacades, the sports games for children "Starts of Hope," the military sports games "Zartnitsa" and "Orlenok," in which Young Pioneers and school children, students of vocational and technical schools and tekhnikums take part.

The trade unions promote the development of technical and applied types of military sports. Thousands of young sportsmen trained in this manner do a better job of mastering their military specialties upon being drafted into the Armed Forces.

This matter is still not receiving proper attention in some oblasts and republics, however, as a result of which the number of individuals engaging in motorcycle, automobile and radio sports is increasing too slowly.

During the past five or six years activities involving tours and excursions conducted by the Central Komsomol Council for Tourism and Excursions and its local agencies among the youth and the population as a whole have become more oriented toward the ideological-political and the indoctrinational. Current tasks having to do with the further development of tour and excursion work, which has become an effective means of propagandizing the conquests of Great October and the successes achieved in the building of communism, and important means of indoctrinating the youth and improving their health, were defined in the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers and the Komsomol on 31 October 1980: "On the Further Development and Improvement of Tour and Excursion Activities in the Country."

Trade-union organizations take an active part in the All-Union Tour of Sites of Revolutionary, Combat and Labor Glory; the training of predraft and draft-age youth to serve in the Armed Forces; traditional weeks and months of mass defense work, Memory Watches, mass military-patriotic holidays devoted to important dates in the history of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, and lessons in courage; in military-sponsorship work, the establishment and reinforcement of close working ties with military units, and so forth.

Guided by decisions of the 25th and 26th CPSU Congresses and the decree passed by the Komsomol Presidium on 28 May 1974 "On the Further Strengthening of Ties of Sponsorship Between Trade Unions and the Armed Forces of the USSR," the labor collectives and military units compile and implement plans of joint action, engage in correspondence, exchange representatives and so forth.

The trade union committee of the production association "GAZ" (in the city of Gorkiy), for example, has sponsored one of the military units for a long time now. It has become a tradition there for the most prestigious and respected people from the plant and winners of socialist competition to address the fighting men, and a committee for working with draftees is successfully functioning there. The young people's vital links with their collective do not end when they leave for the army. The shops send letters of greeting to the soldiers on holidays. A special challenge prize has been established at the plant, which is awarded to the best military subunit of the sponsored unit at the end of the regular tactical exercises. It is presented to the soldiers in a formal ceremony. The best soldiers, as recommended by command, receive valuable gifts from the plant. The plant folk song and dance ensemble and other amateur performing groups frequently appear in the subunits.

One interesting kind of military-sponsorship ties are the unified political education days held in the military units and formations. Party, trade union and Komsomol workers and labor heroes from the sponsoring labor collectives, rayons and cities take part in them. One such unified political education day devoted to decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress was successfully conducted in the summer of 1981 in the Guards Motorized Rifle Sinel'nikovo-Budapest Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy Division imeni V. I. Chapayev in the Red Banner Kiev Military District.⁸

Cultural sponsorship of the Armed Forces is an important form of indoctrinational work performed by the trade unions among the youth. The Central Commission for Cultural Sponsorship under the Central Committee of the Cultural Workers Trade Union directs and coordinates activities in this area. Its members are representatives of trade union organizations, culture and art institutions, the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, the Komsomol Central Committee, the DOSAAF Central Committee, the Soviet War Veterans Committee and others. Representative commissions for cultural sponsorship have also been created locally.

The trade union organizations regularly conduct an All-Union month of cultural sponsorship over the fighting men and All-Union public reviews of this work. As part of their work to propagandize political, scientific and technical information among the servicemen, the sponsorship commissions, together with commanders and political workers of the Armed Forces, schedule lectures and reports, Lenin readings, evenings of discussion on special subjects and creative reviews for the fighting men. Theater and entertainment establishments schedule tens of thousands of shows, concerts and evenings of leisure time activities for them.

In light of the tasks defined at the 26th CPSU Congress with respect to strengthening the nation's defense capability, it is important for us to further improve and develop scientific and practical research in the area of military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth and with respect to the enhancing the effectiveness of participation by trade unions and other organizations in this work. There are still numerous unresolved questions.

The 17th Congress of USSR Trade Unions pointed out that trade unions and organizations under them, together with Komsomol and DOSAAF committees, must devote greater attention to the technical and applied types of sports and to the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth.

FOOTNOTES

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HISTORIOGRAPHY OF LENIN'S MILITARY HERITAGE

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 82 (signed to press 30 Aug 82) pp 71-74

[Article by V. P. Pavlov, Candidate of Historical Sciences: "On the Historiography of Lenin's Military Heritage"]

[Text] The study and propaganda of V. I. Lenin's heritage of military theory is one of the important areas of the science of military history. Historiographic outlines and surveys help to orient oneself in the large number of books and articles making up Lenin's military legacy (leniana).¹

This article represents an attempt at historiographic summarization of books and other publications coming out in the 1920's and the first half of the 1930's on V. I. Lenin's military-theoretical and practical work in the revolutions of 1905 and 1917. A study of this literature permits us to conclude that the most important of Lenin's ideas on matters of armed rebellion and the revolutionary army were already being discussed in the first Soviet historiographic works.

The works of M. N. Pokrovskiy, Ye. M. Yaroslavskiy, V. A. Bystryanskiy, S. I. Gusev and others pointed out the enormous service performed by V. I. Lenin in the defense and the creative development of basic Marxist tenets concerning the uprising, and summarized his conclusions on the tasks and ways of preparing an armed uprising.² The authors' attempt to show the sources used by Vladimir Il'ich for developing the question of the armed uprising is instructive.³

The largest contribution to the study of V. I. Lenin's role as theoretician and leader of the armed uprising was made by Ye. M. Yaroslavskiy, one of the prominent organizers of the party's combat work.⁴ Assessing the study of the armed uprising as an important part of V. I. Lenin's heritage, he was the first in literature to draw attention to Lenin's tenets on the importance of military science and military knowledge in the proletariat's class struggle.

Summarizing the proletariat's experience in armed warfare, V. I. Lenin provided theoretical substantiation for partisan warfare as one of the effective forms of struggle by the working class against superior enemy forces.⁵

Based on a scientific study of V. I. Lenin's works the remarkable Soviet military leader M. V. Frunze concluded that Leninism was important as the strategy and tactics for the proletariat's class struggle in the Russian revolutions. He saw therein the key "to many questions of a purely military order."⁶ Speaking of the armed uprising, M. V. Frunze pointed out Vladimir Il'ich's concrete-historical approach to its employment as the most severe means of struggle, his skillful definition of conditions making it necessary for the workers to take action and his exact determination of the time and place for conducting it, and the axis of the main strike, the correctness with which the forces were distributed, his substantiation of the offensive tactics, the thoroughness and precision with which the question of the headquarters for the uprising was worked out, and so forth. These problems were also discussed in the works of other authors.⁷

Certain authors, who were members of the Military Organization under the RSDRP(b) [Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolsheviks)] Central Committee, stated that V. I. Lenin more than once criticized those representatives who, reflecting "leftist" attitudes, did not take into account the balance of power and insisted on an immediate uprising right then, during the days of the July crisis.⁸

Many referred to V. I. Lenin's articles and letters (September-October 1917) and documents of the Party Central Committee, the VRK [Military Revolutionary Committee] and the Military Organization of the RSDRP(b) Central Committee and discussed Lenin's ideas on the armed uprising in Petrograd, which were subsequently incorporated into clear and precise strategic military directives and plans.⁹

Military historians also noted such requirements set forth in Lenin's plan as the creation and proper distribution of the assault combat forces, determination of the most important strategic points to be captured first of all, combined operations by the three main forces of the revolution, and a surprise offensive at that moment when the enemy forces were dispersed.¹⁰

And so, Soviet literature from the 1920's to the mid-1930's discussed not only the political, but also the political aspects of Lenin's works on the armed uprising, which M. V. Frunze assessed as brilliant examples of strategic and tactical art.¹¹

V. I. Lenin's tenets regarding the revolutionary army are inseparably linked with his teachings on the armed uprising. The slogan for the uprising was one of resolving the matter with physical force, which in the contemporary society is the military organization.¹²

An important service performed by the historiography of the first period lies in the fact that it demonstrated the ways and forms used by the Bolshevik party under V. I. Lenin's leadership to create the armed forces for the revolution. Basing their studies on Lenin's ideas and the experience of the largest committees (the committees of Petersburg, Moscow, the Urals and others), the authors demonstrated that in the struggle to create a revolutionary army V. I. Lenin and the Bolsheviks first performed extensive agitation and propaganda work among the workers, educated them politically, then taught them military affairs, armed

them, created combat detachments and brought revolutionary-minded soldiers and sailors of the old army into the Bolshevik military organizations. The selection and indoctrination of leading cadres for the revolutionary army detachments and the creation of special technical combat groups in the party committees were highly important. A. S. Bubnov stated that this work "embraced all aspects of military affairs."¹³

During the years of the first Russian revolution Vladimir Il'ich closely followed the armament of the combat detachments, their practical training, their acquiring of experience in the tactics of street fighting and the improvement of those tactics.¹⁴ Bearing in mind Lenin's instructions on the revolutionary army's ideological conditioning, those in charge of the party's military combat work saw to it that the Marxist preparation of members of the combat detachments was up to the level of their military training.

Valuable information on V. I. Lenin's work to create the party combat center essential for organizing the arming of the proletariat and for working out a plan for the armed uprising and for directing it is contained in collections on the Combat Group under the RSDRP(b) Central Committee and in articles and memoirs by active participants and leaders of that group.¹⁵

Another service performed by historians of the 1920's lies in the fact that they began studying the important matter of V. I. Lenin's role in the preparation of command cadres for the revolutionary army. The works of M. V. Frunze, I. S. Unshlikht, A. S. Bubnov, K. Ye. Voroshilov, A. V. Lunacharskiy, N. I. Podvoyskiy and others clearly expressed the idea that the backbone of the revolutionary army's command personnel lay in the professional revolutionaries, that our party took the organizers and commanders of the revolutionary detachments from its own members, from among the best proletarians.

The effort to bring units and subunits of the tsarist army over to the side of the revolution occupied an important place in the work performed by the Bolsheviks to create the revolutionary armed forces. The authors of articles and books dealing with the three Russian revolutions have noted V. I. Lenin's role in the theoretical development of this problem and in the leadership of the Bolsheviks' military work during the first Russian revolution and in 1917.¹⁶ The amount of factual material published on the scientific level was not great at that time. That information pertaining to 1905 was contained in the works of Yem. Yaroslavskiy, and in 1917 in the publications of N. I. Podvoyskiy. Summing up the party's military work experience and Lenin's role therein, Yem. Yaroslavskiy wrote that "no one demonstrated the importance of the army in the revolution more completely and correctly than Lenin." He delved into every detail of the organization of "our military work."¹⁷

A study of works on the October Armed Uprising shows that it was precisely during the period of preparations for and the conduct of the crucial assault that V. I. Lenin's genius as a military leader was manifested most fully. Not a single question pertaining to the uprising was resolved without Vladimir Il'ich.¹⁸ During October, M. V. Frunze wrote, V. I. Lenin showed himself to be

not just a strategist and a tactician/politician, but also a strictly combat leader-and-operator.¹⁹ His directives contained all the elements of victory, from the organization of supplies to the moral-psychological preparation of the revolution's armed forces, which was a "significant element in any war."²⁰

V. I. Lenin's ability to grasp the fine points of military affairs amazed his contemporaries.²¹ During meetings with leading workers of the party and the Military Organization he checked out and refined all aspects of the preparations for and implementation of the armed uprising, down to the smallest details.²² Describing the essence of Lenin's style of leadership, V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko wrote that it was exemplary with respect to planning and scope and embraced the immediate organizational and technical tasks.²³ Describing V. I. Lenin as an unsurpassed organizer and leader, VRK member K. A. Mekhonoshin stated that during the days of the October Revolution Vladimir Il'ich was "the only individual with a complete picture of the course of the struggle at any moment. All reports from the sites just naturally went to him, as to the center, as a result of which he always managed to give the most valuable instructions at the right time, to promptly spot danger at this or that place."²⁴ Immediate participants in the events stated that he was the real strategist and leader of the October Armed Uprising. They noted the fact that Vladimir Il'ich had not served in the army and had not studied military science in the narrow, professional sense of the term, but, as P. N. Lepeshinskiy wrote, "his heart and his mind were in full possession of those qualities of which any military leader could be proud."²⁵ V. I. Lenin became an expert in military affairs as a result of tireless self-education. His "military academy," Yem. Yaroslavskiy wrote, "was the great experience of three Russian revolutions."²⁶

The attempt to reveal Lenin's tenets regarding the succession of the Bolshevik Party's combat and military experience and its utilization in the organizational development of the Soviet State's Armed Forces. The Red Army's creation was inseparably linked with and is still linked with V. I. Lenin's name, with his persistent struggle during the pre-October period to arm the proletariat and revolutionize the tsarist army. V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko wrote that the fighting forces of October and the Red Army grew "from two roots nurtured so attentively by Vladimir Il'ich, the party's military organization and the plant combat detachments."²⁷ "All the characteristic features of the future Red Army," were clearly evident in Lenin's teachings on the revolutionary army, I. Unshlikht pointed out.²⁸

It is apparent from what has been stated that the study of V. I. Lenin's military work was begun in the 1920's. The first authors on the subject of "Lenin's Military Heritage" were V. I. Lenin's companions-in-arms and students, active participants in the Bolshevik Party's military and combat work. The facts and assessments which they placed into scientific circulation were used in the 1950's-1970's by scholars continuing the research work in this field.

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REVIEW OF BOOK ON RUSSIA'S ROLE IN KAZAKHSTAN HISTORY

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[Review by Zh. Kasymbayev, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Docent, of book "Kazakhstan v sostave Rossii v XVIII-nachale XX vv.: Istoki velikogo sodruzhestva" [Kazakhstan as Part of Russia From the 18th to the Beginning of the 20th Century: Sources of the Great Concord] by B. S. Suleymenov and V. Ya. Basin, Alma-Ata, 1981, 248 pages]

[Text] Kazakhstan voluntarily joined itself to Russia 250 years ago. This important historic event was the result of many centuries of development of economic, political and cultural ties between them, an expression of a mutual desire for the union. The book by B. S. Suleymenov, corresponding member of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, and doctor of historical sciences V. Ya. Basin tells about the common destinies of the Russian and the Kazakh peoples and the sources of their great concord.¹

Nomadic Kazakh cattle breeders and settled Russian farmers have long interacted. The main factor drawing the peoples together was the danger that Kazakh land would be seized by the Dzhungar Khanate, a danger which grew particularly at the beginning of the 18th century.

Many centuries of expansion by China and Persia, feudal-patriarchal fractionation and internecine dissention of the Bays brought Kazakhstan to political, social and economic decline.

Petitions for Russian citizenship were the main concern of Kazakh ambassadors to Russia and the subject of Russian-Kazakh diplomatic correspondence. Russian archives contain numerous documents from Kazakh diplomats dated as early as the 16th century, in which their rulers requested annexation to Russia. This matter is well illustrated in the book being reviewed. The culminating point in the resolution of this matter was the arrival of an official Kazakh delegation in Moscow in September of 1730. It requested that the Kazakh people, their land and property be taken under protection against Chinese and other invaders. On 19 February 1731 the document was signed which annexed Kazakh land to Russia,

and on 30 April a special Russian delegation left for the Kazakh steppe to convey the joyous news (p 30). On 10 October 1731 the parties signed an international legal document and drew up Kazakhstan's oath of allegiance to Russia (pp 41-42). "This historic document," said D. A. Kunayev, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee, "was the turning point. It established for all times the unity and the common destiny of the Kazakhs with those of the great Russian and other peoples of Russia."² Thanks to this voluntary alignment, the Kazakh people spared themselves enslavement and extermination by aggressors, and their unique culture from total destruction. The inclusion of the Kazakhs as part of the Russian state opened up broad possibilities for the revival and development of their economy. Conditions were created for the transition from patriarchal to higher forms of management and for Kazakhstan's access to the All-Russian market. The backward feudal foundations of the khans' power were eliminated. S. Engels wrote about this matter in a letter to K. Marx dated 23 May 1851 that "Russia's rule is playing a civilizing role for the Black and Caspian seas and Central Asia...."³

The alliance with Russia contributed to the flourishing of the national culture. Kazakhstan is rightly proud of its educators-and-democrats: Chokan Valikhanov, Ibray Altynsarin, Abay Kunanbayev and others.

The Kazakh people became acquainted with the progressive Russian culture, which subsequently played a positive role in the development of the unique Kazakh culture. This was expressed beautifully by Abay Kunanbayev and Ibray Altynsarin. "The most important thing," stated an appeal by Abay, "is to learn Russian science. Science, knowledge, abundance, art--the Russians have all of this.... The Russians see the world. If you know their language--your eyes too will be opened to the world...."⁴

The authors have demonstrated that real development of the fraternal ties between the Russian and Kazakh peoples has only occurred since the Great October Socialist Revolution, when the Kazakh people, with the aid of the great Russian and other fraternal peoples and led by the Communist Party, created the sovereign Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, which entered the USSR as an equal among equals. The united fraternal family of peoples of the USSR has traveled a path leading to the building of communism for 60 years now, successfully frustrating futile attempts by the enemies of socialism to retard this great progressive movement.

FOOTNOTES

1. B. S. Suleymenov and V. Ya. Basin, "Kazakhstan v sostave Rosii v XVIII-nachale XX vv.: Istoki velikogo sodruzhestva" [Kazakhstan as Part of Russia from the 18th to the Beginning of the 20th Century: Sources of the Great Concord], Alma-Ata, 1981, 248 pages.

2. KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 5 February 1981.
3. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 27, p 241.
4. A. Kunanbayev, "Izbrannoye" [The Chosen], Moscow, 1945, p 286.

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WARTIME UNDERGROUND AND PARTISAN NEWSPAPERS AS HISTORICAL SOURCES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 82 (signed to press 30 Aug 82) pp 76-78

[Article by G. Peregontseva, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Docent: "Underground and Partisan Newspapers of the Great Patriotic War Period as a Historical Source"]

[Text] By the fall of 1942 the fascists occupied a part of our nation's territory on which around 45 percent of the USSR's population had lived prior to the war.¹ Despite the large-scale evacuation around 60 million Soviet citizens found themselves in occupied areas. In addition to terror and intimidation the Hitlerites engaged in extensive propaganda among the population, attempting to impose their ideology upon the people.

The Communist Party was well aware of the danger of the enemy's treacherous plan, which could lead astray the unstable members of the population. The press had to perform the function of collective propagandist, collective agitator and collective organizer.² It was by means of the newspapers that the party was able to speak to the Soviet people behind the front line, to assign their missions, to inspire them for the struggle. For this reason the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee, party and soviet organizations and Red Army political organs attached prime importance to the printed word.

Around 400 newspapers were printed during the war for partisans and for the population of temporarily occupied Soviet territory.³ They are now preserved in the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, in republic, kray and oblast party archives, and are an important source for studying the history of the partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War.

A party press began to be created in the enemy's rear when the partisans (narodnyye mstiteli) were first becoming active. The tasks of printed propaganda became more complex as the national struggle gained strength and expanded in the enemy's rear.

Newspapers, magazines and leaflets were printed in Russia proper, as well as in underground and partisan printing works in the enemy's rear. During the very first weeks of the war the Main Directorate for Political Propaganda (renamed the Main Political Directorate on 17 June 1941) of the Red Army organized printed propaganda among the partisans in the population through the front and army political organs. The newspapers VESTI S SOVETSKOY RODINY and FRONTOVAYA ILLYUSTRATSIYA began to be published in August of 1941. Editorial offices were set up in the front political directorates for publishing special newspapers in accordance with an order issued by the People's Commissariat of Defense on 30 July 1941 "On Newspapers for the Population of Occupied Soviet Areas": ZA SOVETSKUYU UKRAINU, ZA SOVETSKUYU BELORUSSIYU, ZA SOVETSKUYU MOLDAVIYU, ZA SOVETSKUYU LATVIYU, ZA SOVETSKUYU LITVU, ZA SOVETSKUYU ESTONIYU.⁵ The Union republic communist party central committees published special republic newspapers: the Ukrainian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Central Committee--RADYANS'KA UKRAYINA and KOMMUNIST; the Belorussian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Central Committee--SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA and PARTIZANSKAYA DUBINKA (a supplement to the newspaper ZA SOVETSKUYU BELORUSSIYU); the Estonian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Central Committee--the GOLOS NARODA and MSTITEL'.⁶

A study of the contents of the first newspapers issued in Russia proper for the populations of the nation's occupied areas revealed certain deficiencies. The main oversight was ordinarily the absence of specific information on the situation in the occupied territory. This could only be corrected by organizing the publication of newspapers in the enemy-occupied territory itself. Steps were taken, and this problem was rapidly resolved. At the end of 1941, for example, only one newspaper (GDOVSKIY KOLKHOZNIK) was published in the occupied territory of Leningrad Oblast, but in January/February of 1942 underground newspapers began to be published in the three southeastern rayons of the oblast. These were the first newspapers published by party underground rayon committees. The first issue of the underground newspaper ZVYAZDA, which was the central organ of the Belorussian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Central Committee, came out in occupied Minsk on 18 May 1942.

An order issued by the People's Commissariat of Defense on 5 September 1942 stressed the fact that all forms and means of political work, including the press, had to be used for mobilizing the popular masses for partisan warfare. This document provided the basis for expanding the scope of the party underground and partisan press. A total of 23 newspapers were being printed in the Bryansk partisan area by the end of 1942, for example.⁸ The Smolensk Obkom of the VKP(b) devoted a great deal of attention to underground publications. A total of 96 underground and partisan newspapers were published in occupied territory of the RSFSR at various periods between 1941 and 1944.¹⁰

The illegal Ukrainian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Central Committee devoted a great deal of attention to the development of the underground press. A decree issued by it on 10 December 1942 on the state of the work of underground party organizations of the Ukraine and measures to improve leadership of the partisan

movement listed specific measures aimed at increasing press-disseminated propaganda among the occupied territory's population.¹¹ A total of 68 underground and partisan newspapers were published in the Ukraine.

The most extensive underground press system was in the territory of occupied Belorussia. A total of 162 partisan newspapers were issued there. Underground newspapers were also published in the occupied territories of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

The size of the underground newspapers was ordinarily one-fourth or one-eighth of a printed sheet, from 250 to 500 copies being printed, and sometimes more. The number could not be increased due to certain difficulties such as shortage of printing equipment and paper.

At the end of 1942 underground party organs arranged for printing equipment and paper to be delivered to partisan areas and zones and to underground organizations through the Central Headquarters of Partisan Movement (TsShPD), republic and oblast partisan headquarters.¹²

Correspondents for the underground and partisan newspapers were mainly party workers, partisans and local citizens. This enhanced the importance of the party press as a center for political work in the enemy's rear area. The underground newspaper gave the call for armed struggle against the invaders. The party devoted serious attention to the selection of editors for creating a dependable underground press. A large contribution was made by editors of underground and partisan newspapers M. P. Korotkov in Orel Oblast, M. G. Abramov and I. V. Vinogradov in Leningrad Oblast, I. I. Beskromnyy in the Ukraine, N. Ye. Dostanko and T. V. Buday in Belorussia and many others.

The entire party underground press in the Hitlerites' rear area had two main areas of focus: 1. ideological-political indoctrination and agitation among the local population and partisans; 2. propaganda of the forms and methods to be used by the Soviet population for combating the German fascist occupiers and their accomplices. These focuses also determined the contents of the partisan and underground press, which involved explaining to the population the just, liberating nature of the Great Patriotic War. This noble objective was achieved by publishing party and government decisions and materials from the Soviet Information Bureau and the central press, as well as instances of plundering of the private property of Soviet people by the occupiers of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, state enterprises and establishments, and the destruction of cities and workers settlements, towns and villages in territory temporarily held by the enemy. Extensive coverage was given to the murderous acts of the Hitlerites and the forceable herding of Soviet people off to fascist Germany.

In the enemy's rear area the press functioned as a military propagandist, teaching the masses ways and means for the people to combat the enemy army. It motivated the personnel to study military affairs and perfect their military skill, to improve the combat training of the partisans. It published general materials

on the employment of various tactical means and methods for combating the enemy: surprise raids, ambush operations, the organization of sabotage.¹⁵ While placing the stress on propagandizing armed warfare against the enemy, the partisan newspapers stressed the fact that success in the struggle would be determined by firm discipline, organization and order. The partisan newspaper wrote the following on this subject: "We partisans are fighting men, the same as the Red Army men, the only difference being that we are in the enemy's rear area. And this demands even greater discipline, order and vigilance."¹⁶

Press propaganda played an especially great role when the partisans were conducting the "Railway War." The main task was one of demonstrating to the fascists that the partisans were in control of the railroads.

It can be stated from a study of the underground and partisan newspapers that the press also contributed greatly to the development of the partisan struggle. The Leninist principle of good ideological content, party-mindedness, truthfulness, conviction and clarity of presentation was the main element defining its style and language. All newspapers genres were successfully employed. The printed word's impact derived from the fact that it was based on the Leninist principle for the communist press, the main feature of which was aggressiveness, truthfulness in the presentation of facts and events and that it provided a decisive rebuff of the enemy's ideology.

This makes it possible for scholars to use the underground and partisan newspapers as a source for illuminating problems of the national struggle in occupied territory during the Great Patriotic War, which was led by our glorious Communist Party. Underground press material is used extensively in the military-patriotic indoctrination of the Soviet people today. This material should also be regarded as documents exposing fascism, revealing its antihuman nature. It gives us a keen weapon for combating those who are presently attempting to whitewash German fascism's past, to conceal its crimes, to distort the historical past and the USSR's role in the victory gained over fascism. The experience in publishing newspapers in the enemy's rear area is also highly important for peoples and parties combating reactionary and colonial regimes today.

FOOTNOTES

1. N. Voznesenskiy, "Voyennaya ekonomika SSSR v period Otechestvennoy voyny" [The USSR Military Economy During the Patriotic War], Moscow, OGIS [Association of State Publishing Enterprises], 1947, p 157.
2. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 5, Moscow, Politizdat, p 11.
3. "Partizanskiye i podpol'nyye gazety v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny. Ukazatel'" [Partisan and Underground Newspapers During the Great Patriotic War Years: A Guide], Moscow, Kniga, 1976, p 5.

4. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], fnd 32, inv 920, 265, fl 3, shs 100, 102; fnd 32, inv 795436, fl 1, shs 189, 215; fund 32, inv 795436, fl 3, sh 350; fnd 32, inv 795436, fl 5, sh 196.
6. At the beginning of October 1943 newspapers published by the front political directorates were placed under the jurisdiction of the corresponding communist party central committees, kraykoms and obkoms of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) (TsAMO, fund 32, inv 795436, fl 5, shs 669, 724).
8. Party archives of the Bryansk Obkom of the CPSU (BPA), fnd 1650, inv 1, fl 12, shs 23, 25.
10. "Partizanskiye..." op. cit.
11. "Sovetskaya Ukraina v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945. Sbornik dokumentov" [The Soviet Ukraine During the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945: A Collection of Documents], Vol 2, Politizdat Ikraiyny, Kiev, 1980, pp 208-211.
12. Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU Central Committee, fnd 69, inv 1, fl 1078, shs 2-5, 20; BPA, fnd 1550, inv 1, fl 12, shs 23-25; Party Archives of the Institute of Party History of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, fnd 5, inv 47, strg unit 10, shs 162, 163, 164.
15. ZVYAZDA, 10 sakovika 1943; NARODNYI MSTITEL' (Vitebsk Oblast), 8 August 1943 (Party Archives of the Institute of Party History of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee).
16. Newspaper of Leningrad Oblast's 8th Partisan Brigade, January 1944 (LPA [Leningrad Party Archives], fnd 0-116, hand-written newspapers).

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REPLIES TO READERS' QUESTIONS ABOUT WARTIME EVENTS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 82 (signed to press 30 Aug 82) pp 79-80

[Replies to readers' questions published under the heading "You Ask--We Answer"]

[Text] Lieutenant Colonel (Res) I.I. Parashin of Saratov asks about the mission of Soviet forces moved into Iran during the Great Patriotic War. Do the benefits established by Decree No 907 passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on 10 November 1978 apply to the servicemen who were in Iran?

A tense situation was created in Iran in the summer of 1941. German agents occupied leading posts in Iran's state institutions. They were having a powerful influence upon the Iranian government's foreign and domestic policy. The Hitlerite diplomats launched a vigorous effort to involve the country in the war against the Soviet Union. On three occasions (26 June, 19 July, 16 August) the government of the USSR directed the attention of the Iranian government to the danger posed by the espionage, diversion and subversive activities of German agents both for Iran and for the Soviet Union, and demanded that the hostile activities be halted immediately. The shah's government remained deaf to these demands. On 25 August 1941 the Soviet Government sent a new note, which stated that since Iran's ruling circles were not putting an end to the disturbances and riots organized by German agents, the government of the USSR was forced "to take necessary steps and immediately exercise the Soviet Union's right under Article 6 of the Treaty of 1921 to send its troops temporarily onto Iranian territory for self-defense purposes." Soviet forces entered Iran that same day. Simultaneously, by agreement between the governments of the USSR and England, British forces entered the southern part of the country, and American forces arrived somewhat later.

Units of Soviet forces in Iran did not engage in combat operations and were not a part of the field army. Servicemen of those units are veterans of the Great Patriotic War, but the benefits established by Decree No 907 passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government on 10 November 1978 and Decree No 175 passed on 21 February 1980 do not apply to them.

V.P. Smirnov (Post Office Sukhobezvodnoye, Gorkiy Oblast), A. K. Kulish (Pyatigorsk) and others ask when during the Great Patriotic War the honorary names were established for the units and formations. Approximately how many units were given the honorary title "Berlin" at the end of the war?

The first orders conferring the titles upon formations which had excelled in battles fought during the Great Patriotic War were issued in January, those awarding the titles to units in March, of 1943.

On 27 January 1943 the USSR People's Commissar of Defense signed the order "On the Conferring of Titles to Tank and Mechanized Corps which Especially Distinguished Themselves in Battles Fought for the Homeland." It stated the following:

"Titles are conferred upon the 1st, 2d, 3d and 4th Guards Tank Corps, the 3d, 4th and 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and the 4th Tank Corps, which especially distinguished themselves in battles fought for the homeland against the German invaders, which will henceforth be called:

- 1st Guards Don Tank Corps,
- 2d Guards Tatsinskiy Tank Corps,
- 3d Guards Kotel'nikov Tank Corps,
- 4th Guards Kantemirovskiy Tank Corps,
- 3d Guards Stalingrad Mechanized Corps,
- 4th Guards Stalingrad Mechanized Corps,
- 5th Guards Zimovnikovskiy Mechanized Corps,
- 4th Stalingrad Tank Corps."

The following titles were conferred upon the 73d Guards Rifle Division and its regiments by an order issued by the People's Commissar of Defense on 16 March 1943 for outstanding service in the liberation of Stalingrad and Stalingrad Oblast:

- 73d Stalingrad Guards Rifle Division,
- 209th Abganerovskiy Guards Rifle Regiment,
- 211th Basarginskiy Guards Rifle Regiment,
- 214th Voropanovskiy Guards Rifle Regiment,
- 153d Urazovskiy Guards Artillery Regiment.

The title "Stalingrad" was conferred upon the 7th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade by the same order.

The title "Berlin" was conferred upon more than 180 formations and units of all branches of troops, which had distinguished themselves in fighting to capture fascist Germany's capital, the city of Berlin, by orders issued by the Supreme Commander between 4 and 11 June 1945.

Ye. D. Sokolovskiy (Saratov), S. K. Stepanenko (Chita) and others ask about the signing of Japan's unconditional surrender. By what authority was that document signed for the USSR by General K. N. Derevyanko?

When it was learned that Japan was prepared to surrender unconditionally, the question arose as to the appointment of a supreme commander of allied armies in the Far East. He was to accept the general surrender of the Japanese military forces. On 12 August the U.S. government recommended General D. MacArthur for that position. The Soviet Government agreed to this suggestion and on 12 August appointed Lieutenant General K. N. Derevyanko as representative of the Supreme Command of Soviet Armed Forces at the supreme command of the allied armies. The ceremony in which Japan signed the document of unconditional surrender took place on 2 September 1945 on board the American battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay.

General D. MacArthur conducted the entire ceremony so as to give the impression that Japan had been defeated almost entirely by the United States of America. Representatives of the United States, Great Britain, the USSR, France, China, Australia, Canada, Holland and New Zealand sat at a large desk on the upper deck of the battleship.

The Japanese delegation (Foreign Minister Shigemitsu represented the government, and General Umezu the imperial general headquarters) was delivered on board the battleship by the American destroyer Landsdowne.

General D. MacArthur made a brief introductory speech, after which the Japanese delegation signed the surrender document. The document was then signed by representatives of the allied nations: by General D. MacArthur, supreme commander for all the allied nations, Admiral C. Nimitz for the United States, General Hsu Yung-chang for China, Admiral B. Fraser for Great Britain, General K. N. Derevyanko for the USSR, General T. Blamey for Australia, General J. Leclerc for France, Admiral K. Helfrich for Holland, Vice Marshal of Aviation L. Isitt for New Zealand and Colonel N. Moore-Gosgrove for Canada.

The signing of the surrender was also attended by Soviet Major General of Aviation N.V. Voronov and Rear Admiral A. M. Stetsenko.

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DEVELOPMENT OF ARTILLERY MANUFACTURE AND EMPLOYMENT

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[Article by Mar Arty P. Kuleshov, Hero of Socialist Labor: "Our Artillery is 600 Years Old"]

[Excerpts] Thanks to the constant attention of the Communist Party and the heroic efforts of Soviet scientists, the qualitative improvement of artillery weapons continued during the Great Patriotic War. In 1942, for example, the active army received the new 45mm antitank gun and the 1942 model of the 76mm battalion gun. Development of the SU-76 self-propelled gun and the SU-122 self-propelled howitzer was begun in October of that same year. New 57mm and 100mm antitank guns, a 160mm mortar, a 152mm howitzer, the powerful BM-31-12 rocket launcher, the 76mm, 85mm, 100mm, 122mm and 152mm self-propelled artillery pieces and an 85mm antiaircraft gun were also created and received by the forces during the war.

A significant contribution to the creation of high-quality artillery weapons was made by the design bureaus headed by V. G. Grabin, I. I. Ivanov, F.F. Petrov, B. I. Shavyrin and others. Industry mastered the production of improved ammunition, including hollow-charge shells and projectiles with time fuses. Techniques for the combat employment of artillery were also improved. During the years of the war we went from artillery support for a battle to the artillery offensive. The parallel barrage, which assured reliably suppression of the enemy, began to be used in February of 1944 in offensive operations with artillery attack support.

During the war great importance was attached to the massing of artillery. In the most important operations of 1943-45, for example, artillery density on breakthrough sectors reached 200-300 guns and mortars per kilometer of front. The Communist Party and the Soviet Government placed great value upon the skill, courage and military feats of the artillerymen. More than 2,000 artillery units and formations were awarded orders, around 1200 received honorary titles and many of them were given the title "Guards." Around 2,000 artillerymen were awarded the great title Hero of the Soviet Union, and A.P. Shilin and V. S. Petrov were awarded the title twice. An order issued by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 21 October 1944 established 19 November as a holiday, Artillery Day (Rocket Forces and Artillery Day since 1964).

Since the war the Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, have outfitted their Armed Forces with first-class combat equipment. Among other kinds of equipment, the Soviet Army is now armed with 85mm and 130mm guns; 122mm, 152mm and 203mm howitzers; the 152mm gun-howitzer; 82mm, 160mm and 240mm mortars; 57mm, 85mm and 100mm antitank and antiaircraft guns; rocket artillery combat vehicles for firing 122mm, 140mm and 240mm rocket projectiles; guided antitank rocket projectiles. The power, range, armor-piercing ability and other tactical-technical features of the modern artillery systems are considerably better than those of the Great Patriotic War. The artillery now has improved means of optical, sonic and radar reconnaissance, radio and line means of communication, fire control instruments and other fire support means.

Despite the existence of nuclear missiles artillery continues to have an important role in the conduct of combat operations.

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CIVIL DEFENSE: 50TH ANNIVERSARY ARTICLE BY ALTUNIN

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[Article by Army Gen A. Altunin, USSR Civil Defense Chief and Deputy USSR Minister of Defense: "The 50th Anniversary of USSR Civil Defense"]

[Text] The establishment and development of the USSR Civil Defense is inseparably linked with the work of the CPSU and the Soviet Government to reliably protect the conquests of the October Revolution and to strengthen the socialist homeland's defense capability.

The foundation for our civil defense began to be laid during the first years of Soviet power. During the civil war V. I. Lenin told us that "a strong and well-organized rear area is essential in order to really conduct a war."¹ Taking into account the ever increasing capability of enemy aircraft to deliver strikes at targets in the rear area, the urban populations in our nation began to be involved, along with active air defense measures, in the protection of people and national economic facilities against air attacks and for mopping up after air raids. This resulted in the creation of local air defense (MPVO), the first activities of which were carried out in Petrograd at V. I. Lenin's instruction in March of 1918 following the bombing of the city by German aircraft. The organization of protective measures in other large cities, should the danger of air raids arise, was also begun at that time.

The Soviet Government subsequently issued a number of decrees requiring that air defenses be strengthened in the border zone and along the railways and that air and chemical defense be provided for the territory of the USSR. Under the "Decree on USSR Air Defense," passed by the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs in 1928, we began organizing the training of the population in protection against air and chemical attack within the Osoaviakhim [Society for Assistance to the Defense Aviation and Chemical Industry] and the Soviet Red Cross system in which hundreds of thousands of activists received training.

On 4 October 1932 the Council of People's Commissars passed the "Statute on Air Defense for the USSR Territory." That day is considered to be the beginning of the founding of the MPVO, transformed into the USSR Civil Defense in 1961. This date is traditionally commemorated by the USSR Civil Defense each year.

Prior to the war the main efforts of the MPVO focused on organizing a system of protection for the population and extremely important national economic facilities which might be subjected to strikes by enemy aircraft in case our nation should be attacked by aggressors. The necessary forces were created for this purpose at the most important administrative and industrial centers: military units (MPVO regiments and battalions) and MPVO formations--district teams on the rayon scale and teams at individual industrial facilities. Self-defense groups were organized in the housing administrations. By 1940 the number of these primary formations had reached 20,000.

Overall leadership of the MPVO, like that of the entire National Air Defense, was exercised by the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense: directly by the Air Defense Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, and within the territories of the military districts by the commanders and agencies of Soviet authority. Beginning in 1937 the city soviets of workers' deputies were charged with responsibility for conducting the civil defense measures in the cities. The chairman of the ispolkoms were the MPVO chiefs for the cities. Special MPVO headquarters were created in a number of large cities (Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Baku and others), and the positions of deputy gorispolkom chairmen for MPVO were established. Regular Red Army commanders were appointed to the latter. The creation and training of various MPVO services was completed later. Because of the growing military danger from fascist Germany and the need to focus the efforts of the People's Commissariat of Defense on the organization of armed defense, the MPVO was placed under the USSR NKVD [People's Commissariat of the Interior] in 1940.

Political leadership within the USSR's local air defense system was exercised by the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee through the political directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, and through local party organs, which appointed MPVO political instructors for the rayons (districts, facilities). The latter were ordinarily the secretaries of party organizations at enterprises and establishments.

The decree passed by the USSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] on July 1941 "On Compulsory, Universal Training of the Population for Air Defense" (men between the ages of 16 and 60 years, women from 18 to 50 years: they were all required to belong to self-defense groups) and the decree passed by the Komsomol Central Committee on 9 July 1941 "On the Participation of Komsomol Organizations in the Training of the Population for Air Defense" played a decisive role in the mobilization of the MPVO for the successful accomplishment of its tasks during the Great Patriotic War. A total of 200,000 Komsomol members were sent to Osoaviakhim schools as instructors in air and CW defense. Eighty-five million people were trained with their assistance to carry out MPVO measures. Komsomol fire units and subunits were created in 20 large cities.

Considerable attention was devoted to building up the existing MPVO formations and creating new ones. The total numerical strength of its formations exceeded 6 million by the spring of 1942. MPVO military units were created out of the

district teams in 49 especially important cities. The measures carried out by the party and the government to build up the MPVO fully justified themselves. Demonstrating mass heroism, its fighters cleaned up after more than 30,000 fascist air raids, prevented more than 32,000 major accidents at national economic facilities in the cities and neutralized more than 430,000 aerial bombs and almost 2.5 million shells and mines. MPVO formations and units put out 90,000 fires and blazes which could have resulted in fires.²

The party and government demonstrated proper appreciation for the MPVO's important contribution to the achievement of victory over fascist Germany. A total of 2,000 MPVO fighters and commanders were awarded combat orders and medals, and around 300,000 people received medals for their defense of heroic cities. Leningrad's local air defense was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

After the Great Patriotic War ended, MPVO personnel, together with all the people, took an active part in the restoration of industry and the urban economy in the liberated regions, continuing their work of neutralizing and destroying aerial bombs, mines and other explosives.

Between 1946 and 1971 alone explosives experts of the civil defense units neutralized or destroyed more than 656,000 unexploded aerial bombs, 1,622,000 bombs and shells, 2,162,000 landmines and other explosive objects.³

The postwar development phase was primarily one of shaping the MPVO into a system of national defense measures, relying upon the Great Patriotic War experience. Its tasks and organizational structure were refined in 1949. The national MPVO chief was the minister of internal affairs, and the republic, kray and oblast MPVO chiefs were the ministers and chiefs of the directorates of internal affairs respectively. The old structure was retained at the lower level. The organizational structure of the MPVO was improved and its tasks refined significantly in 1956 due to the constant improvement of the means of air attack of likely enemies. The position of first deputy minister of internal affairs for MPVO was established, and a national MPVO headquarters was created under the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and headquarters were set up in the republics, krays and oblasts. General supervision of the MPVO was assigned to the republic councils of ministers and the ispolkoms of local soviets of workers' deputies, and within the ministries it was assigned to the ministers.

The MPVO was converted into the USSR Civil Defense (GO) in June of 1961. This was the beginning of a qualitatively new phase in the development of civil defense. A USSR Civil Defense Headquarters was created, as well as a number of directorates and independent departments. The territorial-production principle was taken as the basis for its organization. Territorially it began to rely upon the existing structure of Soviet organs, and in the area of production, on ministries, departments, enterprises, establishments, institutions and other organizations.

In order to implement a common policy in civil defense preparations, to link civil defense measures more closely with other defense tasks and to assure smooth interaction between state and military agencies, the party and government charged the USSR Ministry of Defense with directing civil defense. USSR Civil Defense tasks were defined and expanded in this phase. They are subdivided basically into three groups. The first group includes tasks involved in providing the population with immediate protection. The second group consists of tasks to enhance the operational stability of the national economy in wartime. The third covers tasks involved in mopping-up operations after an enemy has employed weapons of mass destruction. Civil defense also plays an important role in the struggle against natural disasters.

Fulfilling decisions coming out of the 26th CPSU Congress on the need to constantly strengthen the nation's defense capability, we are devoting prime attention to the fulfillment of that noble task of protecting the population against modern weapons, in order, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has stressed, to guarantee "the primary right of every individual--the right to life."⁴ In a half century the USSR Civil Defense has become a significant factor with respect to protecting the socialist conquests and the great achievements of the Soviet people.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 35, p 408.
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3. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 4 October 1972.
4. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [26th CPSU Congress Materials], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p 5.

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