

**CONDUCT OF INFORMATION
OPERATIONS BY A U. S. ARMY
DIVISION WHILE PARTICIPATING IN A
STABILITY ACTION**

**A MONOGRAPH
BY
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Infantry**

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ABSTRACT

Conduct of Information Operations by a US Army Division while participating in a Stability Action

By Major Thomas C. Dovey JR, USA, 41 pages.

This monograph assesses the capability of a US Army Division conducting stability actions to plan and conduct Information Operations (IO) in accordance with the FM 100-6 coordinating draft, Information Operations: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (FM 100-6CD) and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) developed in recent stability actions. It identifies what IO tasks a US Army Division must be able to plan and execute in stability actions. It addresses what resources are required to conduct those IO tasks. The monograph then provides an assessment of the ability of the Division conducting stability actions to perform the required tasks.

The monograph concludes that the Division is capable of planning and conducting information operations while conducting stability actions. However, this answer assumes that the Division receives its habitual Psychological Operations (PSYOP) support element.

The monograph brings out shortcomings in current IO doctrinal methods, discusses new TTPs developed by divisions serving as TF Eagle in Bosnia Herzegovina and ends with recommendations for improving IO doctrine and input for FM 100-6 TTP CD.

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
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Section I. Overview

This monograph assesses the capability of a US Army Division conducting stability actions to plan and conduct Information Operations (IO) in accordance with the FM 100-6 coordinating draft, Information Operations: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (FM 100-6 CD) and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) developed in recent stability actions. It identifies what IO tasks a US Army Division must be able to plan and execute in stability actions. It addresses what resources are required to conduct those IO tasks. The monograph then provides an assessment of the ability of the Division conducting stability actions to perform the required tasks. The monograph brings out shortcomings in current IO doctrinal methods, discusses new TTPs developed by divisions serving as TF Eagle in Bosnia Herzegovina and ends with recommendations for improving IO doctrine and input for FM 100-6 CD.

Chapter two provides the theoretical background on Information Age warfare applicable to a US Army division conducting stability actions. Theory behind Cyberwar and concepts for conducting warfare in the Information age are discussed. The chapter then transcends from IO theory to IO Doctrine and its application to a stability action.

Chapter two also explains IO doctrine through a detailed explanation of Command and Control Warfare (C2W) Components. Those components are Psychological Operations, Physical Destruction, Electronic Warfare, Military Deception and Operations Security. Discussion of the C2W provides the answer to the first of the three supporting questions. What Information Operations (IO) tasks is a division required to conduct in stability actions?

Chapter three continues to develop the subordinate questions for assessing the capability of a US Army division conducting stability actions to plan and execute IO in accordance with FM 100-6 CD and TTPs from recent stability actions. These TTPs support the development and refinement of the functional aspects of IO Doctrine and provide the answers to the other two supporting questions.

- What assets are required by a division to conduct the above-identified IO tasks?
- What organic assets does a division have to conduct IO tasks in stability actions?

Chapter three also uses the answers to the subordinate questions described to assess the capabilities of US Army Divisions conducting stability actions to plan and conduct IO in accordance with FM 100-6 CD and TTPs from recent stability actions. The assessment is completed by looking at three situations where the answers to the three subordinate questions are verified based on the tasks, resources required, and resources available during that situation to

conduct IO.

The monograph concludes that the US Army Division is capable of planning and conducting IO while conducting stability actions in accordance with FM 100-6 CD and TTPs developed in recent stability actions. However, this answer assumes that the Division receives its habitual Psychological Operations (PSYOP) support element for the conduct of stability actions.

Chapter four also concludes that current IO doctrine is deficient in TTPs. While FM 100-6 CD lays out doctrine and fundamental principles, it fails to provide the TTPs necessary to conduct IO. This shortfall forces operational units to rapidly, and without a sufficient doctrinal basis, develop TTPs. These TTPs are often inadequate and fail to optimally support commander's needs.

Section II. Limitations

Three limitations are necessary to focus on the primary question-Division IO capability. First, IO is composed of three elements: Operations, Relevant Information and Intelligence, and Information Systems. The monograph is limited to examination of Operations element. The term IO for the purpose of this monograph means the Operations element of the functional area of IO.

Second, the US Army conducts IO by using three components: C2W, Public Affairs, and Civil Affairs. These components then establish a framework for C2 attack and C2 protect. This monograph

is limited to examining the five components of C2W and their application in the C2 Attack and C2 protect mode.

Third, the four actions that the US Army participates in are offense, defense, stability, and support. The monograph focuses only on stability actions.


Chapter 2. IO Theory-Doctrine

"The greatest difficulty facing the development of Information Warfare today is not technology but conceptual, because there is no common understanding or acceptance of what constitutes Information Warfare."¹

Section I. Introduction

This chapter examines the concept of "stability actions", the theory behind Information Operations (IO) and its doctrinal application to the Army at the tactical level.² The doctrinal application of Cyberwar theory is the term "Information Operations (IO)", defined as "continuous military operations within the Military Information Environment that enable, enhance, and protect the friendly force's ability to collect, process and act on information to achieve an advantage across the full range of military operations."³

IO consists of three elements: Operations, Information



E L E M E N T S O F I O

Figure 1. Elements of IO

Systems and Relevant Information and Intelligence. Operations are conducted in concert with the other two elements (Information Systems and Relevant Information) to achieve information dominance in one of four different types of military actions.⁴

This chapter thus crosswalks theory to application in doctrine and evolves into tasks, techniques and procedures. This crosswalk begins with the discussion of the doctrinal implementation of Command and Control Warfare (C2W) components for planning and executing IO Stability Actions.

The five C2W components are Psychological Operations, Physical Destruction, Electronic Warfare, Military Deception, and Operations Security. These five C2W components are further discussed later in this chapter in section V. TTPs develop from recent stability actions identify twenty eight tasks that may be used by a US Army Division to attack its adversary's Command and Control or protect its own Command and Control. These TTP and tasks are further defined in section V.

Section II. Stability Actions

The US Army conducts military operations to achieve one or more strategic purposes: defeat an enemy, compel an adversary, deter hostilities, impose order on deteriorating situations, support those in need, and reassure friends, allies and multinational personnel.⁵ The term Peace Operations provides doctrinal focus to a

division conducting Stability actions. Peace Operations is a broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations in support of diplomatic efforts to establish peace and maintain peace.⁶ This monograph remains at the "macro peace operations level" in a stability action.

The coordinating draft (FM 100-5) states that military action takes one of four general types: Offense, defense, stability, and support.⁷ It is assumed that peace operations are conducted throughout all four types. Stability actions as shown in figure two are defined as the application of military power to influence the political or civil environment, to facilitate diplomacy and to interrupt specified illegal activities.⁸ The purposes of stability are deter aggression; reassure allies and friendly governments/agencies and encourage a weak or failing government.⁹




Figure. 2 Actions¹⁰

Stability actions conducted in Bosnia Herzegovina provide the environment for studying the application of IO by TF Eagle.

Section III. IO Theory

The United States and Joint Community are enthralled with Information Age theories such as Cyberwar as evidenced by the recent plethora of articles and doctrinal manuals. NetWar and Cyberwar are two possible ways that attacks are conducted in the information age. This monograph addresses a small portion of the Cyberwar method as it applies to units operating in Bosnia Herzegovina.

Cyberwar is a comprehensive information oriented approach to battles that may be to the Information Age what blitzkrieg was to the industrial age.¹¹ This paradigm finds the United States Army conducting Cyberwar in 1998 just as the German Staff conducted blitzkrieg in 1939 without any theory.

What is the significance of Cyberwar to a stability action? In this case, Cyberwar, in the form of IO, enables the division commander to conduct stability actions utilizing non lethal means to attack the adversary's center of gravity (COG) while protecting one's own. In Cyberwar, what or where is the COG that focuses the attention of an adversary's attack?

The COG is commonly known as the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.¹² The enemy center of

gravity may be a physical feature or portion of the force which is key to enemy's defense or some other decisive aspect which, when controlled or destroyed significantly impacts the enemy's ability to continue the fight.¹³

Cyberwar identifies the COG in different forms. Cyberwar, from the PSYOP perspective identifies the COG, as the Former Warring Factions' (FWF) attitude to comply with the Dayton Peace Accords. Changing to the perspective of Physical Destruction, the COG is the Command and Control node of the FWF to alert the populace.

Study of Cyberwar shows that the traditional forms of warfare to attack the COG based on exhaustion and annihilation are not applicable in the conduct of a stability action. This fact was realized long ago, "Combat is the only effective force in war, its aim is to destroy the enemy's forces as a means to a further end. That holds true even if no actual fighting occurs, because the outcome rests on the assumption that if it came to fighting, the enemy would be destroyed."¹⁴

Cyberwar enables adversaries and, more importantly, US Forces the ability to conduct war in an asymmetrical manner. The concept of asymmetry creates a way of attacking which forces an opponent to shield against things for which he has no immediate

understanding, design or capability. It puts the enemy at a severe disadvantage.¹⁵

One theoretical concept for the conduct of war at the operational and/or tactical level is Cybershock. Cybershock is the systemic paralysis of an army through the loss of its ability to direct and control itself effectively.¹⁶ This concept elevates Cyberwar to the same level as maneuver and attrition.

Cybershock provides the basis for discussing the elements of IO in a stability action. It is applied as a form of C2 attack/protect in the conduct of Cyberwar in an asymmetrical battlefield. This theory allows US Army units such as those serving in Bosnia to apply US will on its adversaries with a minimum number of combat elements and shape the environment.

Section IV. Army IO Doctrine

The current Army Doctrine for IO, FM 100-6, Information Operations, is the principal IO doctrinal reference. As such, it provides fundamental principles that enable, enhance, and protect the friendly force's ability to collect, process and act on information to achieve an advantage across the full range of military operations.¹⁷

Leaders and US Army Doctrine writers bridged the gap from Operations to Tactics with FM 100-7, Decisive Operations, FM 100-20, Stability and Support Operations; and FM 100-40, Tactics.¹⁸ However, none of these manuals or FM 100-6 CD addresses the

specifics of planning and conducting IO in Stability actions at any echelon of command.¹⁹ FM 100-6 CD, stability section, states that US Army Divisions are responsible for planning and/or executing some portion of IO in domestic and foreign areas.²⁰

Divisions preparing for the unique action of stability actions find that the general doctrinal overview aspect of 100-6 does not provide adequate TTPs.²¹ TTPs are defined as:

- Tactics is the art and science of employing available means to win battles and engagements.
- Techniques are the methods used to perform assigned missions and functions.
- Procedures are the standards and details that describe how to perform a task.²²

In order to conduct stability actions in Bosnia, divisions developed TTPs as they planned and conducted the mission.

Obviously, the next step in IO is the doctrinal growth development of TTP to guide military action. MG Grange summarizes this thought, "Now that FM 100-6 has been published, CAC's next task is to develop IO TTPs. The forthcoming IO TTP manual will describe how to plan and execute IO at corps and division levels".²³

This complements the functional design of the current operational thought of the US Army. FM 100-5 Coordinating Draft, Operations, provides discussion of practical processes and structures employed as army forces conduct operations. This manual is overall descriptive in nature and provides much insight into the operational

level of war. It discusses seven overlapping and interlocking stages for conduct of operational war²⁴. These stages may not be distinct and can overlay each other.

Information Dominance is one stage and highlights the point that IO at the operational level involves achieving specific maneuver objectives.²⁵ Therefore a division IO planner may likely focus the IO plan to support the division's tactical tasks and in compliance with traditional maneuver principles.

Section V. C2W Doctrine.

“ IO applies across all phases of an operation, throughout the range of military operations, and at every level of war.”²⁶

IO applies to all levels of war and spectrums of conflict. However, all actions pertaining to IO are not executable at the tactical level of war because of resourcing limitations. Division Commanders are required to be intuitive and resourceful in order to conduct IO with their limited resources.

IO doctrine prescribes an integrating concept to pull together the various actions of IO into the holistic system for successful conduct of stability actions. “Employed as in integrating strategy, IO focuses on the vulnerabilities and opportunities presented by the increasing dependence of the United States and its adversaries or potential adversaries on information and information systems.”²⁷

In Army IO doctrine, FM 100-6 is a functional manual designed to complement army operations as discussed in FM 100-5. This train

of thought leads into the discussion of the components of IO, which enable the conduct of C2attack/protect based on functions of C2W.

The Operations component of IO consists of Psychological Operations, Physical Destruction, Electronic Warfare, Military Deception, and Operations Security (the five elements of Command and Control Warfare), Civil Affairs, and Public Affairs.

Command and Control Warfare (C2W) is the integrated use of five components mutually supported by intelligence to deny information, to influence, degrade, or destroy adversary C2 capabilities through C2 Attack while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against such actions through C2 Protect.²⁸

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.²⁹

PSYOP in stability actions amplifies the objectivity of the US Army Division and its mission, and promotes restraint on the part of the targeted audience. PSYOP supports IO by developing products that promote positive attitudes of the local populace toward the force conducting the stability action and help attain the objectives of the friendly force.³⁰

Physical Destruction (PD) is the application of combat power to destroy or neutralize enemy forces and installations."³¹ In stability actions, the commander accomplishes the mission through the application of lethal combat power to a tactical task and its application to an enemy information system and/or C2 node in order to achieve cybershock.

In stability actions, the principle of restraint and the neutrality of the stability force mean that lethal power is rarely the means to mission accomplishment.³² Of the five C2W components, the destructive element of PD is normally unacceptable for use in an operation where lethal force is used only as a last resort.³³ However, it is in the neutralization of adversary C² functions and processes that physical destruction is manifested in Stability actions.³⁴

Functionally, another aspect of PD is seizing and controlling access to adversary C³ and early warning facilities. This is a means of denying the FWF use of those capabilities and thus degraded C2. If the stability force cannot occupy the facility or control access to it, cutting off its power may provide a less-intrusive means of depriving the adversary use of the facility's functions.

Electronic Warfare (EW) is any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the Electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. The three major subdivisions are electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and

electronic warfare support (ES)³⁵. EA involves the use of electromagnetic, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability.³⁶ ES provides commanders the means to intercept, locate, and identify communications emitters used by FWF political and military leadership either for exploitation or for targeting.³⁷

The commander in stability actions directs his staff to plan EW for the contingency that friendly forces must act with force against FWF or other adversaries. The EW process is prepared to disrupt, degrade, neutralize, or decapitate adversary target acquisition, intelligence gathering, and C³ systems while simultaneously protecting friendly C³ systems from similar adversary actions.³⁸ Friendly EW capabilities are planned against targeted adversary C² systems to disrupt or destroy those systems when required.

Deception is defined as "those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests."³⁹ Throughout our military history, commanders traditionally "viewed deception only as a warfighting need," but deception is applicable in Stability actions.⁴⁰ Deception is more difficult to achieve in Stability actions where the operational level objectives have more diplomatic content than military significance.⁴¹ FM 100-7, Decisive Force: the

Army in Theater Operations, notes that most stability actions usually require little deception beyond normal OPSEC.⁴²

While military deception is a justifiable capability, the coalition and inter-agency flavor of stability actions entangles the deception plan as these elements are easily confused by deception efforts if not briefed on them in advance. Foreign Area Officers, Liaison Officers, and State Department personnel are used in the planning phase to ensure the messages sent to potential adversaries are perfectly clear.⁴³

In a stability action, the FWF may view it in their interest to practice deception aimed at either other FWFs or the stability action force.⁴⁴ The purpose is to cause adversary leaders to form inaccurate impressions about friendly force capabilities or intentions, misappropriate their intelligence collection assets, or fail to employ combat or support units to their best advantage.⁴⁵

The deception plan is often developed from a viable course of action not chosen during the concept development phase. The deception plan is therefore a viable branch that may be pursued if the actual plan is compromised -- therefore, at the operational level, the deception plan is as important as the real operation.⁴⁶ If deception is used, the deception plan is closely guarded, and this makes coordination difficult, but coordination is essential to ensuring success of the plan.⁴⁷

Operations Security (OPSEC) is a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to:

- Allow identification of those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.
- Determine indicators adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.
- Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.⁴⁸

OPSEC contributes to IO by slowing the adversary's decision cycle and providing the opportunity for easier and quicker attainment of friendly objectives.⁴⁹ When combined with other IO capabilities, OPSEC frames in a way favoring the friendly force, the adversary's knowledge and beliefs about friendly operations. OPSEC denies the adversary critical information about friendly capabilities and intentions needed for effective and timely decision making, leaving the adversary vulnerable to other offensive IO capabilities.⁵⁰

These C2W components are applied to the IO plan in order to accomplish tasks. The first subordinate question, "What Information Operations (IO) tasks is a division required to conduct in stability actions?" can be answered within this context. These tasks are derived from specific TTPs developed in stability actions based on the guiding principles in FM 100-6.

1. PSYOP tasks:⁵¹

- Support legitimacy of Stability Action.
- Transmit IO themes.
- Target the adversary's COG.
- Attack opposing FWFs and publicize benefits.
- Attack those opposed to the peace settlement, and publicize the beneficial reforms and programs being implemented as part of the peace settlement.⁵²
- Overcome possible communications disruptions with organic broadcasting and print production capabilities and experience in preparing products tailored to the warring factions cultural and educational backgrounds.
- Use local host nation stations to air live broadcasts of interviews with PSYOP soldiers.⁵³

2. PD tasks:⁵⁴

- Control access to facilities used by the adversary for C³ and early warning.
- Shut down power sources for C³ and early warning systems.
- Delay groups or individuals of the adversary's support base attempting to mass.
- Arrest or detain key individuals and instigators of the adversary support base to prevent them from fomenting disturbance at "hot spots."⁵⁵
- Use indirect fire to suppress neutralize or destroy C2 assets.

3. EW tasks:⁵⁶

- EA-Simultaneously attack and protect C3 systems
- ES-Intercept, locate and ID C2 emitter used by FWF for exploitation and targeting.
- ES-Create knowledge based battlefield advantage and provide a greater degree of force protection.
- ES-Monitor the movement of displaced persons and detect movement along friendly, secured routes
- ES-Monitor peace-terms compliance and provide early warning

4. Military Deception tasks:⁵⁷

- Conceal Friendly intentions, capabilities or disposition from FWF
- Cause FWF leaders to form inaccurate impressions about Friendly Force capabilities or intentions.
- Cause FWF leaders to misappropriate Intel collection assets.
- Cause FWF to fail to employ Combat or Combat Support units to the best advantage.
- Guard the Deception Plan
- Serve as the Tentative Plan if the original COA is compromised

5. OPSEC tasks:⁵⁸

- Force Protection by looking at health, morale, safety and fratricide avoidance.
- Coordinate with support agencies and external DOD departments for seamless OPSEC.

- Communications Security (COMSEC)
- Remain Neutral
- Prohibit Photos

Section VI. SUMMARY

This chapter examined theory behind IO and its doctrinal application to the Army at the tactical level. This chapter crosswalked cybernetic theory from the operational level of war to development of doctrinal tasks. IO Functional considerations for US Army doctrine and Stability action were explained to address planning considerations for a US Army Division. The doctrinal implementation of C2W components for planning and executing IO Stability actions was discussed for application in Chapter three. The chapter concluded with the identification of the required IO tasks that a division must be able to perform in a stability action. The next chapter will examine the division's ability to perform these tasks.

Chapter 3: Supporting Questions

Section I. Introduction

This chapter discusses the supporting questions used for assessing the capability of a US Army Division conducting stability actions to plan and execute IO in accordance with FM 100-6 CD and other TTPs developed from recent stability actions. Doctrine for IO and stability actions was applied continuously in Bosnia as US units conducted stability actions supporting the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA).

This chapter further elaborates on the TTPs listed in chapter two that were developed by US Forces in accordance with FM 100-6 CD and other doctrine. This elaboration of TTPs identifies required assets and methods that describe how to perform IO tasks in stability actions. Three vignettes bring out the necessary relationship between required tasks, resources, and methods to allow the reader to better understand the evolved IO TTPs.

Section II. Required Assets

This responsibility of planning and executing IO for a stability action depends on two variables: type of operation performed and level of command.⁵⁹ This monograph provides tasks by C2W Component that are performed in a stability action by a division. The first subordinate question: "What IO tasks is a division required to conduct in a stability action?" was answered in chapter two with TTP

developed. Seven PSYOP tasks, five PD tasks, five EW tasks, six deception tasks and six OPSEC tasks derived from research of lessons learned from soldiers conducting stability actions.

The second supporting question is “What assets are required by a division to conduct the identified IO tasks from question one?” Again, TTP from Bosnia help answer this question.

Those assets required by tasks are outlined below.

| | <u>Task</u> | <u>Required Assets(s)</u> |
|--------|---|--|
| PSYOP | Support legitimacy of Stability Operation | DPSE & TPTs |
| | Transmit IO themes | DPSE & TPTs |
| | Target the adversary’s COG | DPSE & TPTs |
| | Attack opposing FWFs and publicize Benefits | DPSE & TPTs |
| PD | Control access to facilities used by the adversary for C ² and early warning | IN BDEs Engineer Assets |
| | Shut down power sources for C ³ and early warning systems. | IN BDEs AN TRQ-32A |
| | Delay groups or individuals of the adversary’s support base attempting to mass. | IN BDEs |
| | Arrest or detain key individuals and instigators of the adversary support base. ⁶⁰ | IN BDEs DIV MP CO Host Nation Police |
| | Use indirect fire (DIVARTY) to suppress or neutralize or destroy C2 assets. | DIVARTY AVN BDE |
| EW- EA | Simultaneously attack and protect C3 systems. | AN TRQ-32A |

| | <u>Task</u> | <u>Required Assets(s)</u> |
|-----------|---|---------------------------|
| EWS | Intercept, locate and ID C2 emitter used by FWF for exploitation and targeting. | GSS |
| | Monitor peace-terms compliance and provide early warning. | GSS |
| Deception | Conceal Friendly intentions, capabilities or disposition from FWF. | DIV MDMP |
| | Guard the deception plan. | Staff action |
| | Serve as the tentative plan if the original COA compromised. | DIV MDMP |
| OPSEC | Coordinate with support agencies and external departments. | Staff |
| | Remain Neutral. | Staff |

The significant assets that support each C2W component are discussed in the following paragraphs. Echelons above Corps (EAC) support the division by providing a Tactical PSYOP Company that provides soldiers to man the Division PSYOP Support Element (DPSE) and support the organic Division PSYOP Staff Officer. The Tactical PSYOP Company deploys with a MSG-85B audiovisual package.⁶¹ The DPSE controls the attached Tactical PSYOP Company that plans and executes the PSYOP plan within the division. An aerial platform provided from EAC enables the DPSE to plan and execute Broadcasting and Leaflet Distribution. These assets are not organic to the division Table of Organization and Equipment.

PD is easily planned and conducted by the division commander and staff through organic subordinate elements such as infantry, armor and aviation brigades. Fixed Wing Aircraft and Theater Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) enable the division planners and operators to plan and conduct deep operations within this C2W component.

EW is resourced by a extensive list of equipment and personnel that allows the division to conduct EA and ES. Assets that support EA include:⁶²

- AN/TLQ 17A (V), Traffic Jam, a system that provides surveillance and jamming in VHF.
- Intercept systems that include An/TRQ-32A (Teammate) and AN/TSQ-138 (Trailblazer) soon replaced by Ground Base Common Sensor (GBCS).

Assets that support ES include:⁶³

- Ground Surveillance Systems (GSS) with ground surveillance radars (GSR) and remote sensors that track movement by acoustic, seismic, electromagnetic, or visual means.
- The AN/ALQ-15(V) 2 Quickfix IIB aircraft in the EH-60A receives, locates and jams VHF.
- Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) gather information through reconnaissance and surveillance.
- The MI BN also has AN/PPS-5B Radar Sets which are portable and enable the user to track moving ground targets.

EAC provide assets such as Compass Call and Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence terminal (SPIRIT) for enhanced ES.

Deception is resourced through the assets listed in Figure three. The division staff develops the best deception concept through proper execution of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). During the MDMP, alternate course of actions (COAs) are developed but not selected as the tentative plan by the division commander. Those alternate COAs provide the basis for the deception plan. Movement of subordinate elements in the execution of the assigned tasks supports the C2W component of deception. OPSEC is inherent in basic operations and easily resourced at division.

Figure three includes all assets required to conduct IO at division level. Those assets are found within the division and EAC. Clearly, PSYOP can not be executed in accordance with FM 100-CD when EAC does not provide augmentation. The information in

| Questions | PSYOP | PD | EW | Deception | OPSEC |
|---|--|---|---|---|--|
| What IO tasks does a US Army Division plan and conduct IAW with FM 100-6 CD? | 7* | 5* | 5* | 6* | 5* |
| What assets are required by a US Army Division to conduct IO tasks in a SO IAW with FM 100-6 CD? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •DPSE with MSG-85B AV sys •attached Tactical PSYOP CO with Lead SPKR SYS** •DS-EC 130 for Broadcast & Leaflet DISTRO** | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •IN & AR BDEs •AVN BDE •CAV SQD •DIVARTY •EN BN •CAS/AI •TLAM | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •AN/TLQ 17A(V) 2 Traffic Jam •GBCS •AN/ALO-151(V) 2 Quickfix (EH-60A) •AN/TRQ-32 (V) Teammate •AN/TSQ-138 Trailblazer •UAV •AN/PFS-5B Radar Set •Compass Call** •SPIRIT** | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •ALT COA •Passive: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Camouflage -ENGR BN •Active: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Smoke CO -EW Assets -Satellites** -UAVs -Strategic Aerial Recon** •Subordinate Elements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •CAV SQD •GSS (AN/PFS-5C) |
| Not part of DIV TO & E** | | | | | |
| TFE Lessons Learned* | | | | | |

Figure 3. Diagram of supporting question two^{64 65}

figure three answers supporting question two and sets the stage for answering question three.

Section III. Available Assets

The final subordinate question "Does the division have the required assets to conduct IO tasks in stability action?" is answered through analysis of three vignettes drawn from recent stability actions in Bosnia. The execution of TFE missions by 1st AD and 1st ID recorded several events using C2W components of IO in order to accomplish the tasks of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA). Three of those events or vignettes are described and then templated using the first two supporting questions.

The process for assessing each vignette follows. Briefly describe the overall situation featuring the C2W component, determine what resources were needed by answers for question three, discuss lessons learned, and TTPs for event which impact on ability of division to conduct IO in stability actions in accordance with FM 100-6 CD.

The answers to these questions answer the underlying question of "Can a US Army Division conducting stability operations, plan and conduct Offensive Information Operations in accordance with FM 100-6, June '98?"

Subsection IIIa. Bosnia

Task Force Eagle (TFE), a United Nations formed peacekeep-

ing coalition Joint Task Force, was established to conduct stability actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the imposed cease-fire. A total of twelve nations made up TFE: Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Poland, Denmark, Lithuania, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Russia, Turkey and the United States.

TFE occupied the northern portion of the Implementation Force (IFOR) Area of responsibility known as Multinational Division-North (MN-D). IFOR is a task-organized command that executes and enforces an international treaty or agreement.⁶⁶

TFE was tasked with successfully accomplishing the following tasks⁶⁷:

- Enforce the cease-fire between the FWF.
- Supervise the marking of boundaries and the zone of separation between the FWF.
- Enforce the withdrawal of the combatants and the movement of heavy weapons to designated storage sites.⁶⁸

In December of 1995, the US 1st AD, was ordered to Bosnia Herzegovina (B/H) as part of Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE). The Division transitioned to its TFE responsibilities on with UN forces at Tuzla.⁶⁹ In November 1996, 1st AD transferred authority for command and control of TFE to the 1st Infantry Division (ID). Simultaneously, 1st ID deployed as a covering force to allow the passage of 1st AD units back to Germany.

During this period of transition, the FWF challenged the effectiveness of TFE in conducting stability operations. Upon completion of the covering force mission, the 1st ID continued ensuring that the military aspects of the DPA were accomplished in an objective fashion.⁷⁰

In December 1996, the Implementation Force (IFOR) mission came to a successful end and 1st ID became part of a new stabilization force (SFOR). This transition brought the close of OJE and began Operation Joint Guard (OJG). OJG features TFE conducting stability actions in order to monitor the former combatants and provide a climate of stability in the war-torn land of B/H.

In October 1997, 1st AD conducted a relief in place and reassumed command of TFE from 1st ID. 1st AD as TFE sustained the secure and peaceful environment in its area (Multinational Division-North). In June 1998, the SFOR downsized in order to maintain a capable military force in B/H. Simultaneously, OJG ended and Joint Forge began. Operation Joint Forge will continue to build on the success of Operations Joint Endeavor and Guard.⁷¹

Subsection IIIb. Vignette #1

Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPT) in TFE's sector successfully used local radio shows as a means to execute IO during OJG to strengthen Information Campaign themes and provide TFE's position on developing events. The TPTs provided pre-taped shows to the

local radio stations. These shows consisted of popular music, interspersed with messages supporting IO themes and explaining the TFE mission. Most radio stations in the sector played the pre-recorded shows. Some stations required payment to play the pre-recorded shows⁷².

The PSYOP staff officer arranged radio interviews with local radio stations for battalion commanders and other officials. Before the interview, the PSYOP staff officer obtained the questions the interviewer would ask, and suggested issues important to the success of the stability action that the commander wanted to talk about. The radio stations were paid for conducting the interview after the show aired in order to ensure that the interviewer would not stray from the original plan.⁷³

Figure four depicts IO tasks to accomplish during this event, only the five PD tasks were not applicable for this situation. Tasks that were key to the success by C2W component were:

- PSYOP- Supporting the legitimacy of stability action.
- PSYOP-Transmit the IO theme.
- PSYOP-Air live broadcasts on host nation stations.
- EWS-Intercept, locate and ID C2 emitter used by FWF for exploitation and targeting.

Required assets are depicted on the figure by the stars. Available assets are also depicted. The division serving as TFE had the

| Questions | PSYOP RADIO SHOWS | | | | |
|---|--|---|--|---|--|
| | C2W components PSYOP | PD | EW | Deception | OPSEC |
| What IO tasks does a US Army Division plan and conduct IAW with FM 100-6 CD? (TFE Lessons Learned*) | 7* | 5* | 5* | 6* | 5* |
| What assets are required by a US Army Division to conduct IO tasks in a SO IAW with FM 100-6 CD? (Not part of Div TO&E**) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •DPSE ★ with MSG-85B AV sys •attached Tactical ★ PSYOP CO with Loud SPKR SYS** •DS-EC 130 for Broadcast & Leaflet DISTRO** | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •IN & AR BDEs •AVN BDE •CAV SQD •DIVARTY •EN BN •CAS/AI •TLAM | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Traffic Jam •GBCS •Quickfix •Team mate •Trailblazer •UAV •AN/PPS-5B Radar Set •Compass Call** •SPIRIT** | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •ALT COA •Passive: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Camouflage -ENGR BN •Active: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Smoke CO -EW Assets -Satellites** -UAVs -Strategic Aerial Recon** •Subordinate Elements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •CAV SQD •GSS (AN/PPS-5C) |
| What organic assets does a US Army Division have to conduct IO tasks in a SO IAW with FM 100-6 CD? | ✓ | N/A | + | + | + |

Figure 4. Assessment

required assets to achieve the desired result. PSYOP was done well. EW, Deception and OPSEC positively contributed to the outcome. No resources were required to accomplish these tasks. However tactical PSYOP could not have been accomplished without the attached TPTs from EAC.

This vignette brings out several lessons learned. Local radio shows were found to be an effective medium for conducting information operations aimed at the local population. Interviews with military leaders and pre-recorded programming were also found to

positively support Information Campaign and PSYOP themes in a convincing and effective manner.

Several TTPs derive from this vignette. Technique of detailed preparation of TF BN CDRs and other officials with local radio personalities was intensely time consuming to prepare and execute and should therefore be balanced with other aspects of the information campaign.

Another technique of using local stations was the translation of TFE policies and press releases then providing them to the local stations for broadcast. These press releases served as scripts for the local broadcasters who relied heavily on external news sources. The local populace then hears a recognized local newscaster giving the TFE press releases and thus supporting PSYOP themes. The advantage of this technique is that the radio-listening public is more likely to lend credence to the report when it is presented by a local radio personality.⁷⁴

Subsection IIIc. Vignette #2

During OJG, TFE PSYOP radio operations expanded influence into non-military information systems by building a commercial-style radio station to broadcast popular music and live shows with PSYOP themes interspersed within them.⁷⁵ The commercial -style radio station consisted of an FM transmitting tower and equipment belonging to the JPOTF (Joint PSYOP Task Force), supplemented

with civilian sound equipment housed in a building constructed by Brown and Root Services Company, and sound-proofed with locally-purchased materials.

Before the new station was built, the PSYOP elements were only able to transmit pre-recorded shows and lacked any facility from which to broadcast live, or to record interviews. The new facility allowed the PSYOP elements to conduct live broadcasting and subsequently transmit shows recorded in-house.⁷⁶

Figure five depicts the answer to the first supporting question, the five PD tasks were not applicable for this situation. Noteworthy tasks conducted during this event include:

- PSYOP-Transmit IO themes.
- PSYOP-Attack opposing FWFs and publicize Benefits.
- PSYOP- Overcome possible showstoppers.
- EWS-Monitor peace-terms compliance and provide early warning.
- OPSEC-Coordinate with support agencies and external departments.

Required assets are depicted on the figure by the stars. Available assets are also depicted. The division serving as TFE had the required assets to achieve the desired result. PSYOP was done well. EW, Deception and OPSEC positively contributed to the outcome.

Once again, there were no resources needed to accomplish these tasks. However tactical PSYOP could not have been accomplished without the attached TPTs from EAC. A civilian contractor, Brown and Root, was required to build the radio station on the post and supplemented resources needed to accomplish these tasks.

| Questions | PSYOP RADIO SHOWS | | | | |
|---|--|---|--|---|--|
| | C2W components PSYOP | PD | EW | Deception | OPSEC |
| What IO tasks does a US Army Division plan and conduct IAW with FM 100-6 CD? (TFE Lessons Learned*) | 7* | 5* | 5* | 6* | 5* |
| What assets are required by a US Army Division to conduct IO tasks in a SO IAW with FM 100-6 CD? (Not part of Div TO&E**) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •DPSE ★ with MSG-85B AV sys •attached Tactical ★ PSYOP CO with Loud SPKR SYS** •DS-EC 130 for Broadcast & Leaflet DISTRO** | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •IN & AR BDEs •AVN BDE •CAV SQD •DIVARTY •EN BN •CAS/AI •TLAM | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Traffic Jam •GBCS •Quickfix •Team mate •Trailblazer •UAV •AN/PPS-5B Radar Set •Compass Call** •SPIRIT** | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •ALT COA •Passive: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Camouflage -ENGR BN •Active: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Smoke CO -EW Assets -Satellites** -UAVs Strategic Aerial Recon** •Subordinate Elements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •CAV SQD •GSS (AN/PPS-5C) |
| What organic assets does a US Army Division have to conduct IO tasks in a SO IAW with FM 100-6 CD? | ✓ | N/A | + | + | + |

Figure 5. Assessment

This vignette brings out several lessons learned. US and Coalition Forces can expand their reach into the non-military INFOSYS of commercial radio by creating their own commercial-style FM radio stations equipped with the latest in broadcasting and sound-mixing technology. This expanded access can strengthen PSYOP within the station's broadcasting radius and improve the public perception of the US and Coalition Force and its objectives. Civilian contractors and non-governmental agencies play an important part in providing

support for the conduct of IO.

Subsection III.d. Vignette #3

On 27 August 1997, SFOR received information that Replubika Serpska (RS) police forces were trying to seize control of Police Stations in MND-N. These police forces were receiving combat equipment and using it for seizing the police stations thus changing their status.

The change in status determined that these "units" were to be treated as military units and conform to the military provisions of the Dayton Peace Accord (DPA) unless they were transformed into proper civil police units with a clear law-and-order mission.⁷⁷ The RS Police units decided not to change their organization and therefore fell under the military provisions of the DPA. This meant that TFE units could inspect their facilities, control their movements and training.⁷⁸

TFE forces supported an International Police Task Force (IPTF) in an inspection of the RS Police units in TFE sector. Malicious crowds hastily gathered to deter TFE forces around the targeted facilities even though the inspection started early in the morning. At approximately 0500, two civil-defense sirens sounded in one town, alerting the populace to mobilize.⁷⁹

These sirens were complemented with radio broadcasts, one of which aired at 0700 urging the "Serb people" to respond to the

"call of danger and call to all citizens to assemble in the center of town..."⁸⁰ TFE vehicles were damaged and soldiers were injured from attacks by the local populace throwing "Molotov cocktails," rocks, and bricks.

Figure six depicts the answer to what IO tasks are performed, all twenty-eight tasks were applicable for this situation. Noteworthy tasks conducted during this event include:

- PSYOP- Support legitimacy of stability action.
- PSYOP-Transmit IO themes.
- PSYOP-Target the adversary's COG.
- PSYOP-Attack opposing FWFs and publicize benefits.
- PD-Control access to facilities used by the adversary for C³ and early warning.
- PD-Shut down power sources for C³ and early warning systems.
- PD-Delay groups or individuals of the adversary's support base attempting to mass.
- PD-Arrest or detain key individuals and instigators of the adversary support base.⁸¹
- PD-Use indirect fires to suppress, neutralize or destroy C2 assets.
- EA-Simultaneously attack and protect C3 systems.
- EWS-Intercept, locate and ID C2 emitter used by FWF for exploitation and targeting.
- EWS-monitor peace-terms compliance and provide early warning.

- Deception-Conceal Friendly intentions, capabilities or disposition from FWF.
- Deception-Guard the Deception Plan.
- Deception-Serve as the Tentative Plan if the original COA is compromised.
- OPSEC-Coordinate with support agencies and external departments and Remain Neutral.

Required assets are depicted on the figure by the stars. Available assets are also depicted. The division serving as TFE did not have the required assets to achieve the desired result. They required:

- PSYOP aerial platforms to support Public address systems and leaflet drop.
- Improved situational "predictness" in order to prevent the sounding of sirens and massing of the FWFs.

All components of C2W were poorly planned and executed- especially PD. PSYOP, EW, Deception and OPSEC, all negatively contributed to the outcome.

Two tasks of the PD function of C2W were crucial but lacking toward resolving this vignette's tense solution:

- Shutting down all power sources for C³ and early warning systems.
- Delay groups or individuals of the FWFs support base attempting to mass.




Figure 6. Assessment

This vignette brings out several lessons learned. Although the sirens were very “low-tech” C2, their effectiveness is unparalleled in light of the timeliness and size of crowds assembled.⁸² RS Police refused to control the crowds and they achieved their objective of interfering with the IPTF Police site inspections.

TFE lost the initiative to the FWF leaders who orchestrated the demonstrators and controlled the situation. TFE lost situational dominance early in this event. Following the operation, it was evident to the TFE staff that in future operations, this warning and alert capability required neutralization in order to maintain the initiative and situational dominance.⁸³

Section IV. Summary

Can a US Army Division conducting stability operations, plan and conduct Offensive Information Operations in accordance with FM 100-6, June '98? Yes, a division conducting stability actions can plan and conduct IO in accordance with FM 100-6 CD as evidenced by the information in figure eight, by fully using all components of C2W. However, this assumes that the division receives the PSYOP slice from EAC. PD is at risk without a proper intelligence picture and situational dominance.

Can a US Army Division conducting Stability Operations, plan and conduct IO IAW FM 100-6?

| Questions | PSYOP | PD | EW | Deception | OPSEC |
|---|---|---|---|---|--|
| What IO tasks does a US Army Division plan and conduct IAW with FM 100-6 CD? (TFE Lessons Learned*) | 7* | 5* | 5* | 6* | 6* |
| What assets are required by a US Army Division to conduct IO tasks in a SO IAW with FM 100-6 CD? (Not part of Div TO&E**) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •DPSE with MSG-85B AV sys •attached Tactical PSYOP CO with Loud SPER SYS** | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •IN & AR BDEs ★ •AVN BDE •CAV SQD •DIVARTY •EN BN ★ •CAS/AI •TLAM | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Traffic Jam •GBCS •Quickfix •Team mate★ •Trailblazer •UAV •AN/PPS-5B ★ Radar Set •Compass Call** •SPIRIT** | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •ALT COA •Passive: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Camouflage -ENGR BN •Active: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Smoke CO -EW Assets -Satellites** -UAVs <i>•Sample Aerial Recon**</i> •Subordinate Elements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •CAV SQD •GSS (AN/PPS-5C) |
| Assessment | + | - | + | + | + |

Figure 7. Conclusion

Twenty-eight tasks and numerous lessons learned highlight the fact that units serving TFE, for the most part, overcame the challenges set forth in these three vignettes of a stability action.

An analysis of three vignettes validates the conclusion that a division conducting stability actions can conduct IO in accordance with FM 100-6 CD and TTPs developed from recent stability actions. Conclusions derived from the analysis are:

- In order to conduct stability actions, a US Army Division requires habitual attachment of PSYOP elements to the organization.
- In IO, the adversary's early warning system requires neutralization before Information dominance is realized.

This chapter provided three different vignettes of C2W functional component application in stability actions. Each situation was assessed based on three supporting questions. This assessment synthesized no less than twenty-eight tasks, which will enhance the stability section of FM 100-6 CD, at least at the division level.

Research concludes that the division is resourced to conduct required tasks.

CHAPTER 4: Conclusion and Recommendations

Section I. Summary

This monograph investigated the capability of a US Army Division conducting stability actions to plan and conduct Information Operations (IO) in accordance with the coordinating draft FM 100-6 CD and other TTPs from recent stability actions. It identified what IO tasks a US Army Division must be able to plan and execute in stability operations. It addressed what resources are required to conduct those IO tasks. The monograph then provided an assessment of the ability of the Division conducting stability operations to perform the required tasks.

The monograph concludes that the division can conduct IO in accordance with doctrine and recently developed TTP while conducting stability actions. It identifies twenty-eight tasks and the necessity for habitual PSYOP support as areas to emphasize in future IO doctrinal manuals.

Section II. Recommendations

Recommend that TTPs be included in FM 100-6 CD and PSYOP support continues to be habitually provided to divisions conducting IO. FM 100-6 CD currently does not provide TTPs. Recommend that the twenty-eight tasks included in this monograph at chapter two be considered for inclusion in the stability section of FM 100-6 CD.

Yes, a US Army Division conducting stability operations can plan and conduct IO by applying all C2W components and ensuring that each component is synchronized within the IO plan. Updates to FM 100-6 CD will benefit units at all echelons of command as they plan and execute IO in any type of action.

¹ Dan Kuehl, "Defining Information Warfare", *The Officer*, VOL LXXIII, (November 1997), 31.

²United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 100-6: [Coordinating Draft], Information Operations: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, (FT Leavenworth, KS: 1998), 1-19.

³ United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 100-6: Information Operations*, (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1996), 2-3.

⁴ United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 100-5: [Coordinating Draft], Operations*, (FT Leavenworth, KS: 1998), 2-4.

⁵*Ibid*, 2-3.

⁶ United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 101-5, Operational Terms and Graphics*, (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1997), 1-121.

⁷ *FM 100-6*, 2-4.

⁸ *FM 100-5: [Coordinating Draft]*, 2-30.

⁹ *Ibid*, 2-30.

¹⁰ Slide thirty-nine from FM 100-5 briefing to Operational Commanders, [CD ROM}, (SAMS/USA, CGSC, FT Leavenworth, KS: 1998).

¹¹ John Arquilla, *In Athena's Camp*, (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1997), 6.

¹² *FM 101-5*, 1-25.

¹³ United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 100-7, Coordinating Draft, The Army in Theater Operations*, (FT Monroe, VA: HQ TRADOC, 1991), 4-4 & 4-5.

¹⁴ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976.), 97.

¹⁵ *FM 100-5: [Coordinating Draft]*, 2-16.

¹⁵ *FM 100-6: [Coordinating Draft]*, 2-4.

¹⁶ James J. Schneider, *Cybershock: Cybernetic Paralysis as a new form of Warfare*, (SAMS/USA, CGSC, FT Leavenworth, KS: 1995), 2.

¹⁷ *FM 100-6*, 2-3.

¹⁸ *FM 100-5: [Coordinating Draft]*, p. XI.

¹⁹ *FM 100-6: [Coordinating Draft]*, 5-57.

²⁰ *Ibid*.

²¹ Stephen W. Shanahan and Gary Beavers, "Information Operations in Bosnia", *Military Review*, VOL LXXVII, NO. 6, (FT Leavenworth, KS: November-December 1997), 61.

²² *FM 101-5*, 1-151.

²³ David L. Grange and James A. Kelley, "Information Operations for the Ground Commander", *Military Review*, (FT Leavenworth, KS:, March-April 1997), 10.

²⁴ *FM 100-5: [Coordinating Draft]*, 4-3.

²⁵ Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication (JP) 3-13: [Preliminary Coordination Draft], Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, (28 January 1998), 1-2, quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special study[Coordinating Draft]: Peace Enforcement and Information Operations*, [CD ROM], (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, June 1998), 3- 22.

²⁶ *Ibid*, 1-1.

²⁷ Ibid, 1-2.

²⁸ FM 100-6: [Coordinating Draft], 3-2.

²⁹ FM 101-5, 1-125.

³⁰ United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 33-1, Psychological Operations*, (Washington DC:GPO 18 FEB 1993), 3-6.

³¹ FM 100-6, 3-5.

³² Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special study [Coordinating Draft]: Peace Enforcement and Information Operations*, [CD-ROM], (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, June 1998), 3- 22.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Dan Struble, "What Is Command and Control Warfare?" *Naval War College Review*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 3, (Summer 1995), 91, quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special study [Coordinating Draft]: Peace Enforcement and Information Operations*, [CD-ROM], (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, June 1998), 3- 21.

³⁵ FM 101-5, 1-59.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1994), 2-21, quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special study[Coordinating Draft]: Peace Enforcement and Information Operations*, [CD ROM], (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, June 1998), 3- 29.

³⁸ United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 71-100, Division Operations*, (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1996) 2-13. quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special study[Coordinating Draft]: Peace Enforcement and Information Operations*, [CD ROM], (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, June 1998), 3- 24.

³⁹ Although initially defined in JCS Pub 1-DOD, this is accepted by Army doctrine as the definition for deception. See AR 310-25, *Dictionary of United States Army Terms*, or FM 90-2, *Battlefield Deception*, for the same definition with reference back to JCS Pub 1-DOD quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special study[Coordinating Draft]: Peace Enforcement and Information Operations*, [CD ROM], (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, June 1998).

⁴⁰ United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 90-2, Battlefield Deception*, (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1988), 1-0, quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special study[Coordinating Draft]: Peace Enforcement and Information Operations*, [CD ROM], (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, June 1998), 3- 27.

⁴¹ United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 100-7, [Coordinating Draft], Decisive Force, The Army in Theater Operations*, (Washington DC:GPO 31 May 1995), 8-13. quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special study[Coordinating Draft]: Peace Enforcement and Information Operations*, [CD ROM], (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, June 1998).

⁴² FM 100-7, [Coordinating Draft], *Decisive Force, The Army in Theater Operations*, (Washington DC:GPO 31 May 1995), 8-3, quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special study[Coordinating Draft]: Peace Enforcement and Information Operations*, [CD ROM], (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, June 1998), 3-28.

⁴³ United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 100-8, [Coordinating Draft] Multinational Operations*, (Washington DC:GPO),3-15 quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special study[Coordinating Draft]: Peace Enforcement and Information Operations*, [CD ROM], (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, June 1998).

⁴⁴ United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict*, (Washington DC: USGPO, 5 December 1990), 4-7, quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special study [Coordinating Draft]: Peace Enforcement and Information Operations*, [CD-ROM], (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, June 1998).

⁴⁵ *JP 3-13, II-5*, quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special study[Coordinating Draft]: Peace Enforcement and Information Operations*, [CD-ROM]. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, June 1998), 3-28.

⁴⁶ United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 100-7, Coordinating Draft, Decisive Force, The Army in Theater Operations*, (Washington DC:GPO 31 May 1995), pp. 7-22 and 3-8, quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special study[Coordinating Draft]: Peace Enforcement and Information Operations*, [CD ROM], (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, June 1998).

⁴⁷ United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 100-15, Corps Operations*, (Washington DC: USGPO, 29 October 1996), 4-25, quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special study[Coordinating Draft]: Peace Enforcement and Information Operations*, [CD ROM], (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, June 1998).

⁴⁸ *FM 101-5, 1-116*.

⁴⁹ *Special study [Coordinating Draft]*, 3-31.

⁵⁰ *JP 3-13, II-4*, quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special study[Coordinating Draft]: Peace Enforcement and Information Operations*, [CD ROM], (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, June 1998), 3-28.

⁵¹ *Special study [Coordinating Draft]*, pp. 3-15 and 3-16.

⁵² Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication (JP) 3-53, Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations*, (Washington DC: USGPO, 10 July 1996), p. V-2, quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special study[Coordinating Draft]: Peace Enforcement and Information Operations*, [CD ROM], (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, June 1998), 3-15.

⁵³ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *B/H CAAT2, Initial Impressions Report – Operation Joint Endeavor – Continuing Operations*, ((Unclassified, Distribution Limited), Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, September 1996), 80, quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special study[Coordinating Draft]: Peace Enforcement and Information Operations*, [CD ROM], (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, June 1998), 3-16.

⁵⁴ *Special study [Coordinating Draft]*, pp. 3- 24 to 3-26.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 3- 28.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 3- 33.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 3-31 and 3-32.

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- ⁵⁹ *FM 100-6: [Coordinating Draft], 5-57.*
- ⁶⁰ *Special study [Coordinating Draft], 3-26.*
- ⁶¹ *FM 33-1, I-9.*
- ⁶² United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 71-100, Division Operations*, (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1996), 1-12.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁴ *FM 33-1, I-9.*
- ⁶⁵ United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 6-20-30, TTPs for Fire Support for Corps and Division Operations*, P. B-1 and *Fire Support Planning Factors*, C14, SEC V.
- ⁶⁶ *FM 101-5, 1-80.*
- ⁶⁷ TF Eagle history site on the internet Accessed 4 October 1998, See <http://www.tfeagle.army.mil/tfeagle.htm>
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁷¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁷² Center for Army Lessons Learned, *B/H CAAT2, Initial Impressions Report – Operation Joint Endeavor – Continuing Operations*, (Unclassified, Distribution Limited), (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: CALL, September 1996), 80.
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁶ See Deede Doke, "Radio Team Broadcasts Message of Peace," *Stars and Stripes*, Vol. 56, No. 89, 15 (July 1997), 17, quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special study[Coordinating Draft]: Peace Enforcement and Information Operations*, [CD ROM], (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, June 1998), 3-15.
- ⁷⁷ *Special study [Coordinating Draft], pp. 3-24 to 3-26.*
- ⁷⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁹ Press Release, Multi-National Division-North, Coalition Press Information Center, Operation JOINT GUARD, Release No. 0828-3, p. 1 quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special study[Coordinating Draft]: Peace Enforcement and Information Operations*, [CD ROM], (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, June 1998).
- ⁸⁰ Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, 1st Infantry Division, *Tuzla Night Owl*, (Vol. 2, Issue 241, August 29, 1997,

Eagle Base, Bosnia), 1. quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special study [Coordinating Draft]: Peace Enforcement and Information Operations*, [CD ROM], (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, June 1998), 3-15.

⁸¹ *Special study [Coordinating Draft]*, 3-25.

⁸² MND-N, CPIC, OJG, Press Release No. 0828-5, Eagle Base, Bosnia, 28 August 1997, quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Special study [Coordinating Draft]: Peace Enforcement and Information Operations*, [CD ROM], (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, June 1998), 3-17.

⁸³ *Special study [Coordinating Draft]*, 3-26.

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