

**Retaining the Initiative in Peace Operations –
Tactical Negotiations and the Joint Military
Commission**

**A Monograph
By**

**Major Peter L. Jones
Infantry**



19990804 059

**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

First Term AY 98-99

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.


1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED MONOGRAPH	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <i>Retaining the Initiative in Peace Operations — Tactical Negotiations AND THE Joint Military Commission</i>				5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) <i>PETER L. JONES MAJOR, INFANTRY U.S. ARMY</i>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027					
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027					
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) SEE ATTACHED					
14. SUBJECT TERMS <i>PEACE OPERATIONS Tactical Negotiations Joint Military Commission</i>				15. NUMBER OF PAGES <i>74</i>	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED				16. PRICE CODE	
				20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED	
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED		19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED			

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Peter L. Jones


Title of Monograph: *Retaining the Initiative in Peace Operations--Tactical Negotiations
and the Joint Military Commission*

Approved by:




James J. Schneider, Ph.D.

Monograph Director



LTC Robin P. Swan, MMAS

Director, School of Advanced
Military Studies



Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate Degree
Program

Accepted this 16th Day of December 1998

ABSTRACT

RETAINING THE INITIATIVE IN PEACE OPERATIONS –TACTICAL
NEGOTIATIONS AND THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION by MAJ Peter L.
Jones, USA, 69 pages

Today's forces operate in the ever shifting and complex environment of intra-state and ethnic conflict. Marked by excessive violence and rising anarchy due to the disintegration of governing mechanisms, these conflicts pose new challenges to today's civilian and military leaders. In these conflicts, military leaders face the challenge of securing a peace between numerous factions in the absence of a fully recognized or functioning governmental structure.

The monograph addresses the new environment of failed states and "how the tactical commander retains the initiative in peace operations" in the midst of ethnic conflict. The focus of the monograph is on the role and effectiveness of tactical negotiations in maintaining the tactical commander's initiative as he executes his mission and strives to achieve the desired end state.

The monograph initially considers the strategic, operational, and tactical environment in which today's peace operations are conducted and the challenges they present to military leaders. Subsequently, the monograph examines Joint and Army doctrine as they pertain to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), the conduct of stability and support operations (SASO), and the role of tactical negotiations. Negotiation principles and roles are also examined to assist in analyzing the effectiveness of negotiations in relation to the principles of MOOTW and SASO. An analysis of U.S. participation during the initial stages of Operation Joint Endeavor and the use of negotiations by tactical commanders are evaluated in relation to the MOOTW principles.

The analysis of Task Force Eagle's use of tactical negotiations outlines the circumstances and methods in which negotiations are successful or unsuccessful. This case studies highlights the ability of commanders to use tactical negotiations in the role of facilitator, mediator and arbitrator as a way of retaining the initiative in peace operations through the reinforcement of the operating principles of MOOTW.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. Introduction.....	1
II. Changing Strategic Environment.....	2
III. Cause and Characteristics of Ethnic and Intra-State Conflict.....	5
IV. Doctrine Concerning MOOTW & Peace Operations.....	9
V. Tactical Environment and Ethnic Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina	17
Geographic and Cultural Aspects of the Balkans.....	17
Ethnic Conflict and the Break-up of the Yugoslav Republic.....	19
The Conflict in the Bosnia-Herzegovina	24
Negotiations and Operation Joint Endeavor.....	28
VI. The Effectiveness of Tactical Negotiations in implementing the GFAP..	37
VII. Conclusion.....	45
Appendix: Glossary of Acronyms.....	47
Endnotes.....	48
Bibliography.....	62

Negotiations is the name of the game in peace keeping and peace enforcement operations...¹

I. Introduction

Throughout the Cold War, the United States and other nations participated in numerous peacekeeping operations. These operations normally occurred under United Nations auspices and in an environment of inter-state conflict. As a result, military forces normally deployed after some measure of peace had already been achieved through negotiated agreement between the warring states. Today, in the post Cold War world, these traditional peacekeeping operations have become the exception rather than the norm.

Today's forces operate in the ever shifting and complex environment of intra-state and ethnic conflict. Marked by excessive violence and rising anarchy due to the disintegration of governing mechanisms, these conflicts pose new challenges to today's civilian and military leaders. Additionally due to the corresponding breakdown in the governmental support structure, these conflicts have become more susceptible to both natural and humanitarian disasters and thus a focus of world media attention and concern.

This monograph addresses the new environment of failed states and "how the tactical commander retains the initiative in peace operations" in the midst of ethnic conflict. The focus of the monograph is on the role and effectiveness of tactical negotiations in maintaining the tactical commander's initiative as he executes his mission and strives to achieve the desired end state.

In order to address this issue, the monograph initially considers the strategic, operational, and tactical environment in which today's peace operations are conducted.

This analysis highlights the environmental challenges posed by ethnic conflict and the resultant requirements it causes for tactical commanders. Subsequently, the monograph examines Joint and Army doctrine as they pertain to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), the conduct of stability and support operations (SASO), and the role of tactical negotiations. Negotiation principles and roles are also examined to assist in analyzing the effectiveness of negotiations in relation to the principles of MOOTW and SASO. The resulting evaluation criteria are used in examining tactical negotiation in the complex environment of Bosnia-Herzegovina and role of negotiations during Operation Joint Endeavor. The focus of this case study is on analyzing the cause and effect of both successful and unsuccessful tactical negotiations. This analysis highlights the ability of commanders to use tactical negotiations as a way of retaining the initiative in peace operations through the reinforcement of the operating principles of MOOTW.

II. Changing Strategic Environment

Almost ten years after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. continues to wrestle with an ever changing and increasingly more complex international environment. While the world has always been affected by numerous factors, either political, economic, informational or military, three simultaneous revolutions in information, government and in the geostrategic environment are shaping today's world.²

In the last decade, the information revolution and its corresponding technology have brought numerous changes. First, information has transformed the richest nations of the world from industrial-based to information-based economies and consequently changed the global economic system. As a result of this change, there has been a

concomitant increase between economic interdependence among nations and an increase in cultural and political awareness among different societies. Through CNN and other media, the problems of the world are shot electronically from one corner of the globe to another. Finally, computer technologies are changing the face of warfare by increasing the precision, lethality and survivability of emerging combat systems.³

In conjunction with the information revolution, a revolution in government is also occurring. After centuries of increasing centralized government, the power and emergence of central governments is on the decline. Today, governments are increasingly more susceptible to external pressures from other governments, regional economic and political organizations, major international businesses, and well-organized interest, religious and ethnic groups.⁴ Government institutions, even in “developing nations,” are no longer closed systems.

Along with the governmental and information revolutions, a geostrategic transformation has occurred. Geostrategically, the bipolar superpower apparatus that existed during the Cold War has been replaced by an asymmetric multipolar world with the U.S. as the sole remaining superpower. While other powers, such as Russia and China, cannot be ignored due to their position on the UN Security Council and their regional military and economic might, they do not have the capability to project sustained power (diplomatic, information, military, or economic) globally. As a result of this geostrategic revolution, today’s world can be divided into three categories: (1) states that are successfully implementing market democracies; (2) states attempting to transition to market democracies but which may be thwarted due to politicized economies or

authoritative political systems; and, (3) troubled or failed states unable to produce a viable economy or government due to ethnic, religious or secessionist extremism.⁵

In analyzing this complex international environment, the U.S. has identified three major threats to its national interests. First, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses the greatest threat to the U.S. and global security. Second, transnational threats, such as terrorism, arms trafficking, organized crime, illegal drug trade, refugee migrations and environmental damage, pose a threat both directly and indirectly to American interests. Finally, regional or state-centered threats such as the rise of regional hegemony possessing offensive military capability to include nuclear, biological or chemical means which continue to pose a threat to U.S. interests and its allies. In this same category, “unstable nations, internal conflicts or failed states may threaten to further destabilize regions where we have clear interests.”⁶

As a result of this threat analysis, the U.S. has determined that it must maintain the capability to deter and if necessary defeat aggression in two theaters, while maintaining the ability to conduct smaller scale contingencies. Since the end of the Cold War, such contingency operations as humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, disaster relief, no-fly and maritime exclusion zones have become more pronounced. These small-scale contingencies increasingly take the preponderance of the military’s time and resources – particularly in the realm of peace operations.

During the Cold War, the United States participated in numerous military operations short of war.⁷ Traditional peacekeeping normally occurred under United Nations auspices once hostilities between belligerents had ceased. As a result, military forces responsible for the conduct of peace operations usually deployed after some

measure of peace had been achieved through negotiation and agreement with the warring states. In today's changing world, these types of traditional peacekeeping operations have become the exception rather than the norm. These operations are increasingly being conducted in troubled or failed states embroiled in intra-state conflict fueled by ethnic diversion or extreme nationalism. Ethnic and failed state conflicts contain characteristics and internal dynamics that have changed the face of peace operations.

III. Cause and Characteristics of Ethnic and Intra-State Conflict

While ethnic and intra-state conflict is not a new phenomenon, many such conflicts laid dormant during the Cold War either "...suppressed by the Soviet empire or overshadowed by the ideological competition of the Cold War, whose protagonists demonstrated unwarranted optimism about their ability to defuse ethnicity and ethnic conflict."⁸ This optimism was not only based on the zero sum game of global superpower politics but on competing ideologies that underestimated the power of ethnicity and the power of their own ideologies to erode ethnic bonds:

Capitalism presumed that modern economic development—through education, urbanization, and the formation of a middle class—would bring people together and make them more alike. A modern person, it was thought, would naturally shed his ethnic or 'tribal' identity. Marxism, by comparison, maintained that ethnicity would be replaced by allegiance to a higher utopian ideal, a stateless society in which there would be full equality. If there were no class divisions, it was thought, there would be no need for group rivalry. Thus, a fundamental tenet of both ideologies was the assumption that economic change would lead to ethnic harmony.⁹

The previously mentioned revolutions along with numerous factors, both cyclical and historically unique, are the causes behind the failed nation-state phenomenon, which appeared following the demise of the Soviet Union. Cyclical trends facing governments,

such as economic scarcity, environmental degradation, and demographic shifts, have dramatically affected the ability of nation-states to satisfy the security and economic needs of their citizens. These trends, coupled with violence spurred by previously suppressed national, ethnic, and religious convictions, have increasingly marked the process of dissolution of nation-states. Historically unique trends such as global communication and economic linkage, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and unprecedented population, industrialization, urbanization growth, also affect today's international security environment.¹⁰

Ted Gurr, in *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*, estimated that in the 1980s, there were 233 groups in the world that “were targets of discrimination or were organized for political assertiveness or both.... Taken together the groups involved more than 900 million people, or one sixth of the world’s population.”¹¹ In 1993, an article in *The New York Times* listed 48 states, ranging from Bosnia to Brazil, in which ethnic conflicts were a source of political conflict.¹²

No consensus has yet been reached as to why these nations fail. Martin van Creveld opines that failed states occur when warring factions seize the legal power of the military and the government from official hands and thus create an environment in which there is no distinction between war and crime or anarchy and governance.¹³ Others view state collapse as the cause of ethnic conflict:

Ethnic nationalism, in short, is a pathology of the state. The process by which this occurs... starts with deterioration of the center. This leads to fractionalization as societal loyalties shift from the state to more traditional communities that are closer to the people and that offer psychic comfort and physical protection. Unless the process is reversed, it may result in communal violence, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. The further a state disintegrates, the more potential there is for ethnic conflict to spread.¹⁴

Whether these ethnic conflicts are “primordial”, endemic to a society or people, or “instrumental”, a product of elite manipulation, the fractionalization of the state occurs as the government apparatus loses control over its ability to meet the needs of its populace. As a consequence of this fractionalization, people seek familiar or historic identities. These ethnic bonds— whether based on nationality, religion, origin, language, race, class, clan, or caste—become the basis in which people seek security and attempt to advance their interests in the resulting anarchy.¹⁵ As witnessed in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Sudan, Liberia and Chechnya, this situation provides ample opportunities for “ethnopoliticians” to pursue power by championing group interests, fears, and loyalties through the guise of nationalism.¹⁶ As a result of this fractionalization, numerous groups may appear in the conflict who possess competing interests and seek conditions favorable to their political goals and objectives. So instead of seeking resolution and working with recognized states or identities, military forces involved in peace operations today must now deal with several disjointed factions who may or may not adhere to any prearranged UN or negotiated mandate.

This proliferation of combatants and conflicting interests groups is just one characteristic of operating in ethnic conflicts. The other consideration is how the use of force is viewed in this environment. According to Larry Cable in “Getting Found in the Fog: The Nature of Interventionary Peace Operations”:

...all environments of armed domestic political turbulence constitute arenas in which the contest focuses upon the first part of that hyphenated term, ‘politico-military’ in that the real battle is between the political wills of two or more clashing entities with military operations, lethal or otherwise, being of importance only in so far as they directly and materially affect the political will of one or

another competitor. As a result the terrain upon which the operation is conducted constitutes not so much the physical geography of the venue as the human topography represented by the minds not only of the contending entities but also of the vast uncommitted population which owes no unswerving or deeply rooted allegiance to any of the belligerents.¹⁷

The supremacy of politics in these altercations extends not only to the nature of these conflicts but also to the forces involved. These forces are "...first and foremost political in nature with direct military utility coming in second or third priority." As a result, the chains of command in these organizations are fluid and are liable to change based on the internal political dynamic of the organizations as well as the larger political considerations of the conflict. Additionally, these forces rarely possess an established code of conduct, and order may be based predominately on internal mechanisms or the personal dynamics of the commander or leader present.¹⁸

Due to the lack of governing institutions, intervention in these conflicts has forced the U.S. to deal with these competing actors not only at the strategic and diplomatic level but also at the operational and tactical military level as well. In many cases, these competing actors, at all levels, view U.S. or UN intervention as illegitimate and a threat to their interests, even when general approval of U.S. military presence has been secured. Additionally, this new operational environment poses several specific requirements for the U.S. military, which include:

- maintaining sufficient forces to meet anticipated peace support missions while maintaining the ability to respond to major regional contingencies
- coordinating with both governmental organizations, private volunteer organizations (PVOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) which can

act as force multipliers during these military operations other than war (MOOTW)

- developing doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures to address the fluid missions and environmental conditions in which MOOTW is conducted.
- tailoring leader development and training programs to include: regional orientations, root causes and patterns of ethnic conflict, nature of peace operations, and, negotiating skills for officers and NCOs.¹⁹

These requirements for operating in the new operational environment pose growing issues concerning U.S. doctrine, training, and operations.

IV. Doctrine concerning MOOTW & Peace Operations

The changing environment outlined in the previous section has posed numerous questions concerning the role of military power in achieving political objectives in failed states and ethnic conflict. Just as the environment is changing so too is U.S. and NATO doctrine towards the conduct of such operations and the challenges they present. This section examines evolving U.S. doctrine concerning peace operations and its operational tenets.²⁰ Furthermore, planning considerations to include the use of non-lethal alternatives will be examined, particularly the doctrinal role of negotiations and mediation as it pertains to peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

U.S. Joint Publication 3-0 outlines the fundamental principles, which govern the conduct of both joint and U.S. participation in multinational operations. Additionally, it outlines the range of military operations, which the U.S. military conducts in order to meet various challenges, protect national interests and achieve strategic aims. These

operations range from war to military operations other than war (MOOTW). MOOTW encompasses the use of military force to demonstrate U.S. resolve in operations involving and not involving armed conflict.²¹ MOOTW covers a wide range of activities where the “...military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war.” These operations range from arms control activity, humanitarian assistance, and peace operations to strikes and raids.²² Typically, MOOTW bolsters and supports the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of power in pursuit of national objectives.²³ In most of these operations, “...the objective of applying military force will not be to gain territory or to defeat an enemy per se, but to achieve a more subtle or specific political objectives. In such operations, military tactics, techniques, and procedures will be driven more by political requirements than by traditional military rationales and logic.”²⁴

The primacy of the political objective is echoed in JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*. It states that “political objectives drive MOOTW at every level from strategic to tactical.”²⁵ As a result, all military personnel must understand the political objectives and potential impact of their actions. At the same time, commanders must remain aware of changes not only to the operational environment but also to political objectives.²⁶ Recognizing the political nature of MOOTW, JP 3-07 delineates six MOOTW principles: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. Three of these principles are derived from the principles of war while the other three pertain specifically to MOOTW.²⁷ Along with JP 3-0’s range of military operations between war and MOOTW, these doctrinal principles and tenets help

commanders organize, train, equip and lead by focusing on certain operational characteristics which deserve careful consideration during planning and execution.

While FM 100-5, *Operations*, embraces the range of military operations, principles of war and MOOTW contained in JP 3-0, the Army presently sees itself conducting operations in three diverse environments – peacetime, conflict, and war – with operations other than war (OOTW) being conducted during both peacetime and conflict. During peacetime, the U.S. attempts to influence events through routine actions between nations. While involved in conflict, the Army may undertake operations in a hostile environment in order to secure strategic objectives. At the upper of spectrum of conflict, war, the Army conducts combat operations against an armed enemy.²⁸

While such categorizations may seem trivial, David Fastabend argues that how we categorize conflicts and types of operations “...can lead to disparate judgments and conclusions” and greatly influence our perceptions and actions as we seek to define our mission, end state, and success criteria.²⁹ Since doctrine is supposed to provide a common basis for understanding and provide guidance for the conduct of specific operations such confusion can be misleading, not only to members of the military but also to civilian leaders. This over simplification of what constitutes conflict, war, and the use of force can be “seductive.” As former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon Sullivan remarked:

Categorizing ‘war’ as separate from all other uses of force may mislead the strategist, causing him to believe that the conditions required for success in the employment of military force when one is conducting ‘war’ differ from the use of military force in ‘operations other than war.’³⁰

Throughout its history, the U.S. Army has wrestled with the problem of categorizing and effectively labeling non inter-state conflict. During the Cold War, the Army introduced the concept of contingency operations in the 1982 version of FM 100-5. These operations dealt with urgent situations and crises that occurred below the level of general war but required armed force to support national security objectives.³¹ Following Desert Storm and the outbreak of numerous intra-state conflicts, the Army proposed a “continuum of military operations” to characterize its actions from peacetime engagement through hostilities short of war to war itself. “Hostilities short of war,” the forerunner of modern day MOOTW, occurred in a conflict environment in which the U.S. sought to deter potential enemy actions through a show of force or if necessary compel an adversary through raids or strikes. These operations could occur sequentially or simultaneously throughout the area of operations or theater of war.³² Many found “hostilities short of war” and its follow-on term “OOTW” as insufficient to address the blurring distinction “...between war and operations other than war”.³³ Additionally, many argued that this distinction did not address non-trinitarian warfare, which the Army was confronting in the post-Cold War era.³⁴

Due to the seductive nature of categorizing both conflict and operations, the Army in the latest draft of FM 100-5 made two major changes in relation to its categorization of conflict and military operations. First, no distinction is made between war and conflict. Rather war is seen as the most violent form of conflict. Military actions and results are now evaluated in terms of their effect on the physical, moral, and cybernetic dimensions of conflict. This evaluation eliminates the contradictions inherent in defining war in relation to OOTW/MOOTW. As a result, activities previously categorized as occurring

during war and/or OOTW are now incorporated into the four types of military actions: offense, defense, stability and support.³⁵ These actions are not mutually exclusive and can occur sequentially or simultaneously throughout the theater or area of operation and are aimed at achieving one of the four strategic purposes – to compel an adversary to do your will, deter potential adversaries, reassure allies and friends, and to support domestic authorities.³⁶

Stability and support operations (SASO) encompass those missions formally categorized under OOTW. Stability missions apply military power to influence both the political and civil environment, facilitate diplomacy, and disrupt specified illegal activity. Stability missions range from peace operations and combating terrorism to nation assistance and show of force. Stability missions seek to achieve a secure environment for civilian authorities to operate and may require both offensive and defensive activities and developmental and coercive actions to defeat rogue elements seeking to thwart U.S. efforts.³⁷ Support missions, on the other hand, seek to relieve suffering and assist civil authorities in responding to humanitarian and natural disasters. Normally, support missions lack an active opponent to military actions.³⁸ While doctrine for SASO is still being revised pending the release of FM 100-5, it is envisioned that the principles of MOOTW mentioned in JP 3-07 will continue to serve as operating imperatives for success in the appropriate stability or support missions.³⁹ Consequently, this monograph will focus on the present approved doctrine and how it relates to peace operations as a component of OOTW and stability operations.

According to the '93 version of FM 100-5, *Operations*, the Army's success in operations throughout the spectrum of conflict "...depends on its ability to operate in

accordance with five basic tenets: initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility.”⁴⁰ These tenets apply to both war and OOTW. While all five tenets carry equal emphasis, due to the today’s complex strategic environment, emerging operational concepts and requirements of conducting decisive operations, *initiative* receives particular attention.⁴¹

FM 100-5 defines *initiative* in combat operations as the commander’s ability to set “...the terms of battle by action and implies an offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations.”⁴² In OOTW and SASO, *initiative* “...implies controlling the environment rather than letting the environment control events.”⁴³ In relation to the conduct of peace operations, exercising initiative requires commanders to anticipate potential belligerent actions and use all available means to forestall, preempt, or negate acts that do not further the commander’s mission.⁴⁴ The 1998 Draft FM 100-5 expands the concept of seizing and holding the initiative in terms of “...gaining influence over factions, separating belligerents, establishing conditions conducive to diplomatic or political solutions, and disrupting illegal activities.”⁴⁵ Thus, the aim and operational design of these missions focus on creating environments that contribute to the success of political and diplomatic activities rather than the military defeat of a belligerent. The success of peace operations can be measured in relation to two basic criteria: “...how well an operation deterred or prevented violent conflict in its area of deployment; and how much it facilitated ‘resolution of the disagreements underlying the conflict.’”⁴⁶ While not specifically broken down into these two criteria, FM 100-23, Peace Operations, sees

...settlement, not victory, is the ultimate measure of success, though settlement is rarely achieved through military efforts alone. Peace operations are conducted to

reach a resolution by conciliation among the competing parties, rather than termination by force. Peace operations are designed principally to create or sustain the conditions in which political and diplomatic activities may proceed.⁴⁷

In order to achieve these objectives, the development of a campaign plan is essential for linking the mission to the desired end state. This plan outlines a definable and clear path to the end state and assists both military and political leaders in visualizing the mission's operational requirements. The proper use of military force and alternatives to force is inherent in the campaign plan and subsequent operations orders at the tactical level. Possible alternatives to the use of force outlined by FM 100-23 include deterrent measures, population and resource control, rewards and penalties, warnings, the restrained use of non-lethal force, and mediation and negotiation.⁴⁸ The Oxford English Dictionary defines mediation as the act of "...intervening (between parties in a dispute) to produce agreement or reconciliation."⁴⁹ Negotiation is defined as "...conferring with others in order to reach a compromise or agreement."⁵⁰

While FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, identifies mediation and negotiation as helpful in "...reconciling differences among belligerent parties," it sees these activities as being primarily conducted by specially organized negotiation teams rather than by commanders.⁵¹ Conversely, joint doctrine sees commanders as playing not only the role of commander but also as negotiator, mediator, or even arbitrator at some point during the mission. These roles correspond with the role of "intervenor" in terms of negotiation and mediation theory and processes. As a third party involved in a conflict, U.S. forces in peace operations can behave as facilitators, mediators, arbitrators, and rules manipulators, based upon the environment and desired end state.⁵²

While Army doctrine sees the commander or special negotiation teams as fulfilling these roles, joint doctrine recognizes that "...leaders at all levels conduct negotiations in a peace operation."⁵³ While battalion, company, and platoon leaders and sergeants may find themselves negotiating and communicating with potential belligerents and faction leaders over such activities as roadblock passage and the conduct of cordon and search operations, ultimately their interactions with these potential belligerents serve broader goals. First, negotiations assist in translating political agreements into actions on the ground and possibly fill in areas not sufficiently covered in the mission's mandate. Second, tactical negotiations act as a mechanism to resolve disputes and seek conflict de-escalation. Finally, these interactions assist in building peace between the formerly warring factions by building confidence among the players that peace is obtainable and gives the factions a sense of ownership in the process.⁵⁴

Measuring the effectiveness of tactical negotiations should be done in light of these objectives and in its ability to reinforce the operational principles of OOTW – objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, and legitimacy. Based on these objectives and principles, the ability of tactical commanders in retaining the initiative through the use tactical negotiations can be evaluated in the following terms:

- Objective
 - Did the use of tactical negotiations further the accomplishment of military provisions of the operation's mandate? To what extent?
- Legitimacy
 - Did tactical negotiations further the peace forces' claim to legitimacy with parties that opposed their mission and its supporting mandate?
- Restraint
 - Did tactical negotiations allow commanders to successfully apply combat power prudently at the decisive time and place without causing escalation?
- Unity of Effort

- Did tactical negotiations facilitate the commander's ability to focus all available means and combat power towards achieving the objective/end state? Did it support economy of force operations?
- Perseverance
 - Did tactical negotiations effectively demonstrate to the belligerents U.S., and/or NATO resolve towards a cessation of hostilities and implementation of the mandate?
- Security
 - Did tactical negotiations enhance the peace force's security and contribute to force protection? To what extent?

In the subsequent section, this evaluation criteria will be used to examine tactical negotiations during Task Force Eagle's deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina from December 1995 to November 1996 during Operation Joint Endeavor, NATO's peace enforcement operation in support of the Dayton Accords. The focus of this case study will be in analyzing the cause and effect relationships of both successful and unsuccessful tactical negotiations. This analysis highlights the ability of commanders to use tactical negotiations as a way of retaining the initiative in peace operations through the reinforcement of the operating principles of MOOTW.

V. Tactical Environment and Ethnic Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina

In order to examine the role of tactical negotiations during Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE), the environment, in terms of physical, cultural, historical and political factors, must be examined along with a basic understanding of the causes behind the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These factors not only make up the operating environment in which NATO forces found themselves in December 1995, but they also greatly influenced the Implementation Forces' (IFOR) actions and those of the former warring factions (FWF) who continued to pursue divergent political and military objectives. These objectives weighed heavily during the formation of the Dayton Accords (officially

known as General Framework for Peace – GFAP) and their reconciliation will ultimately determine both the tactical and strategic success of IFOR and its mandate.

Geographic and Cultural Aspects of the Balkans

Geographically, the Balkans, which means mountain range in Turkish, is a peninsula fragmented by three major mountain chains that crisscross the region.⁵⁵ These chains not only fragment the region physically but also ethnically and nationally in two ways. First, this physical compartmentalization has hampered the growth of a single cohesive ethnic or national identity. Second, this division prevented the growth of a single large power in the region. As a result, the Balkans has traditionally consisted of a number of smaller states.⁵⁶ These smaller states have throughout history competed with each other for territory and influence in the region. While physically fragmented, the Balkans does serve as the geographic link between Asia Minor and the Mediterranean Sea to the heartland of Europe. Consequently, the Balkan Peninsula throughout its history has served as the

...crossroads between Europe, Asia, and Africa. Here the peoples and cultures of three continents have met and mingled, or clashed and conquered. The major powers of each historical epoch have made their influence felt here and left their marks upon the peoples. The great imperial powers of the past-Greeks, Romans, Turks, Venetians, Austrians, Germans, French, British, and Russians – all in their turn have dominated or sought to dominate this area.⁵⁷

As a result of both the linkage and compartmentalization of the region due to its geography, a unique mosaic of several different linguistic, religious, ethnic and cultural elements have survived in the Balkans. Linguistically, Albanian, Greek, Romanian, Turkish, and Serbo-Croatian constitute the five major language groupings. Several

dialects also exist throughout the region as well as the recognized use of German, Hungarian and Italian among some scattered minorities.⁵⁸

Along with the diverse mix of languages, religious diversity is another characteristic of the Balkans. Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy (subdivided into Serbian, Greek, and Eastern), Islam and several Protestant sects are actively practiced and have served as a basis for defining ethnicity and subsequently nationality.⁵⁹ Bosnia-Herzegovina forms the southern portion of Samuel P. Huntington's "Velvet Curtain" – the division between Western Christianity (in the west) and Orthodox Christianity and Islam (in the east). In Huntington's view, this line constitutes one of the major fault lines in modern civilization along which conflict will occur.⁶⁰

As a result of migration and the expansion and contraction of the Ottoman Empire, ethnic diversity possesses the most problematic division within the Balkans, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Prior to the outbreak of conflict in 1991, minorities in the former Yugoslavia Republics of Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia, represented less than 20 % of the total population.⁶¹ Bosnia was the most heterogeneous of the former republics with Muslims forming 44% of the population, Serbs 31%, and Croats 17 %.⁶² Additionally, prior to 1991, 30 to 40% of the marriages in Bosnia-Herzegovina's urban areas were mixed between the three communities.

This mix of various cultures consisting of different languages, alphabets, religions and corresponding ethnic origin has produced a society in which individuals and groups are labeled at birth – a label that can not be transcended nor overcome. These cultural labels coupled along with an acute sense of history that focuses on conflict between the various groups make up another aspect of the environment in which peace forces operate.

Ethnic Conflict and the Break-up of the Yugoslav Republic

Twentieth-century history came from the Balkans. Here men have been isolated by poverty and ethnic rivalry, dooming them to hate. Here politics has been reduced to a level of near anarchy that from time to time in history has flowed up the Danube into Central Europe.⁶³

History and its legacy permeate the Balkans and inextricably bind the present to the past and the future to the present. As Winston Churchill once noted, the Balkans has a penchant for "... producing more history than it can consume."⁶⁴ Throughout history, the Balkans has been embroiled in both internal and external conflict sparked by ethnic, national, or European balance of power competitions. The violence of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the First (1912) and Second (1913) Balkan Wars, World War I and World War II all significantly marked the political and geographic landscape of the Balkans.⁶⁵

During WWII, the nations of the Balkans, especially Yugoslavia, again found themselves embroiled in both external and internal conflicts. Externally, the Yugoslav Army was defeated in less than a week by the Axis Powers who then had to combat the irregular forces of numerous resistance groups representing divergent ethnic and political factions. These factions not only fought the Axis but each other. Croat fascists (the Ustashe) controlling the Axis fostered Independent State of Croatia, which had incorporated portions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, fought Serbian nationalists (the Chetniks). Communist led Partisans, under Marshal Josip Tito, fought the Chetniks, Ustashe, and the Axis. Brutal fighting along religious and ethnic lines marked this internal conflict and claimed 1.7 million "Yugoslavs" out of a population of 16 million. Even the conquest of

Germany by the Allies in 1945 did not end the civil war in the Balkans until Tito consolidated his power in 1947.⁶⁶

In the aftermath of his victory, Tito sought to establish a true Yugoslav federated state. Tito organized the nation into six federated republics, two semi-autonomous regions, and officially recognized all ethnic and nationalist groups, including the Bosnian Muslims in 1971. Within this federated framework, Serb political power remained stronger than the other republics but was nowhere near the dominant level it exercised prior to WWII.⁶⁷ Tito's solution for a viable Yugoslavia rested on establishing a genuine federation; operating a decentralized but regionally integrated economy and providing cultural autonomy to the various cultural factions within Yugoslavia. As long as the Communist Party, with Josip Tito as the final arbiter, effectively controlled this complex system the growth and viability of the Yugoslav state was assured.⁶⁸

Collisions of both cyclical and historical unique trends are responsible for the disintegration of Yugoslavia as a viable nation-state. By 1989, Yugoslavia's economy was marked by skyrocketing inflation, high unemployment, a huge foreign debt, and a serious food shortage. Salaries had dropped an estimated 24 percent and living conditions plunged to mid-1960's levels. This poor economic showing was due to poor investment decisions at both federal and regional level as well as an inability of the national leadership to adjust to a changing world economic situation and resolve its mounting international debt. Indecisiveness led to plummeting economic growth rates, fractured financial mechanisms, and a down turn in exports.⁶⁹ This failing economic situation became coupled with a burgeoning sense of ethno-regional nationalism as one

republic or autonomous region blamed the other republics and the ruling communist elite for the poor economic situation.⁷⁰

Historically unique trends both externally and internally also pulled Yugoslavia apart. Internationally, the end of Cold War shifted attention away from such pivotal nations as Yugoslavia. Previously, Yugoslavia had enjoyed a privilege position as leader of the non-aligned movement and had received generous aid grants from the West due to its key political and geographical position.⁷¹ The end of East-West tensions saw the end of western foreign aid and a loss of prestige and position in the international community. Where previously Yugoslavia's citizenry "... could simultaneously hold separate ideological and regional identities and share in the prestige of Yugoslavia's international role," this loss of international identity, coupled with an economic crisis, forced the "Yugoslavians" to seek a more stable identity both individually, regionally, and internationally.⁷² Internally, Yugoslavia faced a historically unique situation imposed by Tito's death in May 1980. While many disagree whether Yugoslavia was held together solely through Tito's charisma, observers acknowledge that he failed to establish an effective governing mechanism. The convoluted system outlined in the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution with its revolving presidency and mixed electoral privileges proved too difficult to operate. As Slobodan Milosevic remarked... "Even before his death the system didn't function, Tito functioned. After his death, nothing has functioned, and nobody has been able to reach agreement on anything."⁷³ This inability to resolve the economic situation and the growing political struggle within the framework of the 1974 Constitution led to the "balkanization" of the Yugoslav nation as competing groups sought control over various regions and resources. Minorities within these regions and

autonomous provinces feared for not only for their political survival and but as violence erupted feared for their physical survival. As the Yugoslavia disintegrated, the use of ethnicity in the conflict was both primordial and instrumental.

‘What happened here yesterday?’ you ask the ‘cleansers’ who took over the ruins. ‘Well, in 1389...’ explains a Serb irregular fighter while waving a gun. ‘No, not in 1389: yesterday,’ you interrupt.... ‘Under the Ottoman Empire...’ he tries again. ‘No, please! What happened yesterday?’ You get impatient. ‘Because in 1921, they...’ You cannot give up, of course, so you sigh and try again, until you get his version of the events.⁷⁴

Many view the conflict in the Balkans as a classic example of a never-ending primordial ethnic conflict. The young soldier’s comments above illustrate the deep interwoven fabric of history and ethnicity. In his eye, the current struggle is an extension of historical animosity between the competing ethnic groups. The struggle, which had been suppressed during the Cold War, has now reemerged as the continuing battle between Catholicism and Orthodoxy, Rome against Constantinople and the legacy of the Habsburg Austria Hungary against that of the Ottoman Turks.⁷⁵

Others argue that “...that the history of Bosnia in itself does not explain the origins of this war.”⁷⁶ Rather, “...it is a result of the politics of transforming a socialist society to a market economy and a democracy.”⁷⁷ These proponents argue that the ethnic dimension of the conflict is really a product of manipulation by ruling elites seeking to achieve their political goals. In the case of the breakup of Yugoslavia, Milosevic is seen as the main aggressor and user of ethnicity to fuel the conflict between competing regions. Upon assuming control of Serbia and the presidency of Yugoslavia, Milosevic sought to maintain Serb domination of the Yugoslav Republic initially through the existing structures of the Communist Party and the federal government. As Slovenia and

Croatia continued to seek greater independence, Milosevic sought to achieve his political goal by carving out a new entity, an extended Serbian territory. In the process of seeking Serb regional domination, Milosevic radicalized the Serb population both within Serbia and the other regions through a non-stop bombardment of misinformation and fear mongering. This disinformation campaign painted the Croatian government of Franjo Tudjman in the same light as the feared "Ustashe" of WWII. Milosevic then fabricated incidents that provided justification for the Serb control Yugoslav Army to intervene and provided an excuse to arm the Serb minority in the contested territory.⁷⁸ The ability to inflame racial hatred was recorded by Ambassador Zimmerman in his memoirs:

While history, particularly the carnage of World War Two, provided plenty of tinder for ethnic hatred in Yugoslavia, it took the institutional nationalism of Milosevic and Tudjman to supply the torch.... Yugoslavia may have a violent history, but it isn't unique. What we witnessed was violent-provoking nationalism from the top down, inculcated primarily through the medium of television.... An entire generation of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims were aroused by television images to hate their neighbors.⁷⁹

These observations portrayed ethnic hatred not as primordial but as an effective instrument for acquiring and building political power.

Whether the ethnic conflict in the Former Yugoslavia is viewed as either primordial, instrumental or both, the dissolution of Yugoslavia was marked by three wars – a war of regular forces in Slovenia in 1991, a war of ethnic nationalism in Croatia from 1991-1995, a war of ethnic expulsion in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992-1995.⁸⁰

The Conflict in the Bosnia-Herzegovina

On 6 April 1992, in the wake of a UN negotiated cease-fire between Serbia and Croatia, the European Community (EC) recognized Bosnia as an independent state.

Violence, which had been sweltering in several Bosnian towns, such as Banja Luka and

Mostar, now erupted as Serb paramilitary and military forces entered Bosnia. The escalation of violence occurred because of the perceived threat that an independent Bosnia would threaten Serbian inhabited areas of Croatia. Consequently, Serbian nationalists influenced the Bosnian Serbs to declare their own independence from Bosnia-Herzegovina and seek the formation of a separate Serb Republic.⁸¹ While Bosnian Muslim and Croat military contingents were being mustered during the first six weeks of the war, a combined offensive conducted by Federal Yugoslav forces and Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces proved decisive as Serbian troops gained control of more than 60 percent of the newly recognized nation. In early May, the Federal Yugoslav forces withdrew and remaining Bosnian Serb forces were placed under the command of General Ratko Mladic. Mladic, along with Radovan Karadzic, the political leader of the Bosnian Serbs, sought the annexation of Bosnian Serb controlled areas and the formation of a separate Serb Republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁸²

Fighting would continue in Bosnia-Herzegovina for over 3 more years as Western diplomatic initiatives sought a peaceful resolution to the conflict. During this period Bosnian Croat, Muslim and Serb forces fought for territory and instituted a pogrom of ethnic cleansing to ensure control of conquered areas.⁸³ Western military forces, in the form of UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), played an emerging role from the very start of the conflict.⁸⁴ During the initial stages of war, between April 1992 to June 1993, which was marked by Serb offensives, UNPROFOR's role consisted primarily of providing humanitarian relief, operating the Sarajevo airport, protecting land convoys, and monitoring the no-fly zone from the ground. Between June 1993 and February 1994, the conflict expanded as Croat forces launched attacks against Moslems, and Serbs

intensified the strangle hold on Muslim enclaves. Correspondingly, UNPROFOR's missions expanded to include providing humanitarian relief for roughly 2.7 million people and extending protection to the six designated safe areas. Additionally, UNPROFOR worked out procedures for the use of NATO air power in support of ground operations. Between February and October 1994, the Bosniacs slowly began to turn the tide of war in their favor. With the emergence of a U.S. brokered Muslim-Croat federation in March, the military situation reached a relative balance and the level of violence began to recede. UNPROFOR expanded its missions to include the monitoring of locally negotiated cease-fires (especially between Bosniac and Croat forces), heavy weapons inspection, anti-sniping enforcement, and protection of civilian movement.⁸⁵ These missions continued during the spring of 1995 as Croatian and Bosnian forces went on the offensive against Serb held areas. While UNPROFOR's performance has received mixed reviews, it effectively facilitated humanitarian assistance but was unable to provide adequate security to the designated safe areas. This task proved untenable due to the lack of resources.

While the results of UNPROFOR and UN involvement are mixed, their operations highlighted three operational characteristics which intervening forces had to contend with while operating within the framework of failed states and ethnic conflict such as Bosnia. First, the dynamics of conflict tended to be highly localized. UNPROFOR found that local commanders enjoyed and utilized a great deal of flexibility and initiative. Consequently, command and control of warring factions was not readily apparent. In fact, on several occasions, generals from one or another faction had to go to the front lines to ensure that their orders were being carried out. Second, the "grassroots"

character of the conflict gave paramilitary groups and criminal elements a major role in fighting and controlling local areas. These elements would fill the power vacuum created by chaotic fighting and the subsequent withdrawal or demobilization of organized armed factions. Finally, ethnic conflict tended to polarize communities between indigenous populations and displaced people of either the same or diverging ethnic groups.⁸⁶ These operational characteristics did not disappear with the removal of UNPROFOR and the deployment of IFOR. In fact, almost three years since the initial deployment of NATO forces, Stabilization Force (SFOR) commanders noted that the "...military is operating in an environment complicated by the competing agendas of three internal factions, all in turn subject to external influences."⁸⁷

The summer of 1995 saw renewed fighting between the factions. Croatian forces sought to gain control of the Krajina region. In conjunction with this offensive, Bosniac forces attempted to push their way to the Bihac Pocket and thus evict Bosnian Serb forces from western Bosnia. Serbian forces, in the mean time, renewed mortar attacks against Sarajevo and began to intensify their strangle holds on three isolated Muslim enclaves –Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde. These events coupled with the increased use of NATO air power against Bosnian Serb forces set the conditions in which the U.S. led a diplomatic effort to seek peace in the Balkans during the summer of 1995.⁸⁸

As U.S. diplomatic efforts pushed the leaders of the warring factions to Dayton, Ohio, the negotiators faced three leaders who sought diverging objectives.⁸⁹ The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) which emerged from the 20 days of negotiating in Dayton, while general in some areas, satisfied many of these competing goals and laid down specifics in eleven areas. The GFAP solidified the 5 October cease-fire into a

viable peace between Bosnia-Herzegovina and its neighbors. The agreement, signed by Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic, contained eleven articles and annexes. These annexes contained the specifics of the accord's implementation and covered areas ranging from regional stability to the conduct of elections and the governing framework of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁹⁰ Of particular importance was Annex 1A – Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement – which laid the framework for a multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) and outlined its authority and military tasks. The commitment of this force was termed – Operation Joint Endeavor.

Negotiations and Operation Joint Endeavor

The concept for a NATO Implementation Force predated the actual negotiations at Dayton. On the same day that cease-fire was announced, 5 October, the NATO Defense Ministers were meeting in Williamsburg, VA. With surprising little difficulty, the ministers approved the concept for the first peacekeeping force in NATO history. The force would consist of approximately 60,000 soldiers from contributing nations operating in separate American, French, and British zones.⁹¹ While NATO nations had provided numerous forces, both under NATO and UN auspices during the conflict, this was the first time that U.S. ground troops would be committed.⁹² The U.S. force commitment centered around the 1st Armored Division (1AD) providing the nucleus of Task Force Eagle (TFE), the Multinational Division – North. In this role, TFE was one of three multinational divisions in IFOR, under the command and control of the NATO Allied Ready Reaction Corps (ARRC), operating out of Sarajevo.⁹³

In accordance with the GFAP, NATO saw IFOR as responsible for the following military tasks:

- Ensuring continued compliance with the cease-fire;
- Ensuring the withdrawal of forces from the agreed cease-fire zone of separation back to their respective territories, and ensuring the separation of forces;
- Ensuring the collection of heavy weapons into cantonment sites and barracks and the demobilization of remaining forces;
- Creating conditions for the safe, orderly and speedy withdrawal of UN forces that have not transferred to NATO-led IFOR;
- Controlling the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁹⁴

Additionally, Annex 1A, Article VIII, called for the establishment of Joint Military Commissions (JMCs) which would serve as the central body for resolving military issues between IFOR and the former warring factions (FWF), exchanging information, resolving disputes, and, serving as a means for the implementation of confidence building measures between the parties.⁹⁵

While detailed conceptual planning for potential operations within the Former Republic of Yugoslavia had began by NATO forces in September 1991, a key component in the planning process had been missing – namely the political end state. As a result, the normal staff planning relationship throughout all the headquarters had become distorted and resulted in isolated and disjointed planning processes, bottom-up planning, unilateral planning and continuous “what if drills.”⁹⁶ The signing of the GFAP provided NATO with the desired political end state for the operation. Consequently, TFE saw the implementation of the requirements of the GFAP, specifically those in Annex 1A, as constituting the desired military end state. As its tactical objectives, TFE operations centered on verification of faction compliance with the GFAP and its established timeline. The ability of the TFE to get the FWF to comply with the provisions of the

GFAP would serve as measures of success for the unit as well as monitoring the civilian population's return to "normal" activity.⁹⁷

The JMC process established under Annex 1A, Article VIII, served as the main tool in articulating these tactical objectives to the FWF. First, the JMC served as a mechanism for instructing the factions on the agreement and the TFE commander's intent. Second, it provided a forum for clarifying and developing interpretations on how to execute the clauses contained in the GFAP. Finally, the JMC was a negotiating mechanism in which commanders could serve as facilitators, arbitrators, and mediators in solving problems and settling disputes.⁹⁸ While the conduct of the JMCs were to codify agreements between the FWF and IFOR, the key to success in the JMCs and in achieving the tactical objectives was the bilateral negotiations and agreements reached by IFOR commanders with each faction commander prior to entering the JMC. As a result, for every formal JMC executed, IFOR commanders conducted nearly five "informal" bilateral discussions.⁹⁹ From the outset of OJE, these bilateral negotiations and JMC meetings were critical to the commanders' ability to retain the initiative and achieve success.

Even before forces began crossing the Sava River into Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 31st of December 1995, IFOR commanders crossed into Serbian controlled territory to lay the groundwork for TFE's deployment and the execution of the GFAP. On the morning of 20 December, MG Nash, COMEAGLE, assumed control of the sector from Norwegian BG Haukland, the departing UNPROFOR commander in Tuzla. Within six hours, MG Nash visited the three corps commanders of all three factions (Muslim, Croat, and Serb) who were operating within the strategic Posavina Corridor which constituted a major

portion of TFE's sector and would be divided virtually equally between the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Muslim-Croat) and the Srpska Republika. All three commanders agreed to restrain their troops, pull back from the "zone of separation" (ZOS) outlined in the GFAP and allow IFOR unrestricted access to establish camps and patrol the area.¹⁰⁰

At the same time MG Nash was contacting his counterparts, his subordinate commanders were establishing contact with the some of their counterparts within the FWF operating in their areas of operation.¹⁰¹ While they received the same assurances, one colonel noted, "We'll see. Talk is cheap. They've all promised this sort of thing before."¹⁰²

In addition to gaining the acquiescence of the FWF in the area to TFE's deployment, the actions by the senior commanders of TFE on 20 December accomplished several things. First, it gave them a first hand look at the river-crossing site across the Sava. Second, it provided them an opportunity to evaluate the conditions of the primary Task Force MSR (Route Arizona). Most importantly, MG Nash came to the conclusion that the FWF were eager for the arrival of TFE, and his counterparts were ready to begin the implementation of the GFAP. In order to retain the initiative and take advantage of this receptive attitude, he directed the accelerated deployment of key command and control (C2) elements of the elements. This required extraordinary measures to include the air deployment, via Belgrade of the 2d Brigade assault command post. With these key C2 nodes in place, TFE began contacting their FWF counterparts and establishing the JMC as the mechanism for communicating and coordinating the FWF's implementation of the GFAP.

As the U.S. component of IFOR began to cross the Sava River in ever increasing numbers, TFE seized the initiative through an overt show of potentially overwhelming

combat power coupled with the ability to maneuver anywhere under harsh winter conditions. This ability to maneuver established a positional advantage – both physical and psychological – over the FWF. This maneuver was not only enhanced by mobility operations to clear obstacles and increase road trafficability but also the execution of JMCs and supporting bilateral discussions with the FWF.¹⁰³

As TFE established a bridge crossing across the Sava River, MG Nash held his first JMC with representatives of the FWF concerning the implementation of the GFAP. The first major task of GFAP was the establishment of Zone of Separation (ZOS) and the withdrawal of FWF to their respective sides NLT D+30.¹⁰⁴ The ZOS snaked over 1,000 miles of war ravaged countryside containing millions of mines, thousands of bunkers and hundreds of miles of trenchlines.¹⁰⁵ At the first JMC, on 27 December, MG Nash provided FWF officials, corps commanders or chiefs of staff from all three factions, with detailed maps delineating the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) and the Zone of Separation (ZOS), information concerning IFOR elements which would be operating in their area, and copies of the treaty itself.¹⁰⁶ While Nash's counterparts may have received the necessary information concerning the IEBL, many of the FWF commanders at division and below did not receive the information from their higher headquarters. Consequently, TFE brigade commanders had to supply common maps with the ZOS overprinted to ensure common understanding among all commands.¹⁰⁷ The brigade commanders then undertook a series of bilateral discussions with the FWF commanders concerning each faction's planned movement across the ZOS, storage of heavy weapons, and disposition of minefields and bunkers. As plans were finalized, brigade and battalion level JMCs were conducted with all parties present to coordinate and codify the

agreements reached bilaterally. Both the bilateral meetings and the JMCs provided the FWFs with a level of assurance that all groups were adhering to the provisions outlined in the GFAP. This operational transparency also reinforced other confidence building measures aimed at reinforcing IFOR impartially in monitoring FWF compliance with the GFAP.¹⁰⁸

In some cases, IFOR had to demonstrate resolve in forcing FWF to move to their respective zones or permit inspection of heavy weapons sites established during the initial JMCs. After an IFOR aircraft had flown one of the FWF's senior generals accused of war crimes to The Hague, one of the FWF brigades broke off relations with TFE. On the day this armored brigade was to move, 1st BCT positioned Bradleys, Apaches, and high performance aircraft within striking distance, while one of the battalion S3s discussed with the FWF brigade leadership whether the brigade was going to move on time. The positioning of these assets during the bilateral discussion demonstrated that TFE was going to enforce the provisions agreed to at the JMCs and persuaded the FWF brigade to comply.

On another occasion, the Commander of the 2nd BCT, was denied access to a heavy weapons site near Hans Pijesak. In response, COL Batiste wrote a letter to the commander stating that:

In contravention of the Articles of the Peace Accord, my movement was impeded and I was denied access to your facilities. I will not tolerate such violations of the peace accords by anybody...Make no mistake about my resolve. I will inspect these facilities in accordance with the peace accord, with or without your consent.¹⁰⁹

After providing time for the Serbian general to translate the letter and consider its meaning, COL Batiste politely arrived with about two dozen soldiers and an ABC News

team to inspect the facility. Not lost to the Serbian commander was the positioning of two battalions of artillery within range of the site, tanks and Bradleys in a reserve position, and the movement of fixed and rotary wing aircraft in the vicinity.

While most of the military provisions of the Annex 1A of the GFAP were completed within the first six months of OJE, settlement of economic and political issues continually lagged behind. This placed an additional burden on IFOR as it attempted to ensure a safe and secure environment for resolution of contentious issues. In some cases, the resolution of these issues clearly fell within TFE's purview and others were necessary in terms of helping to "...create secure conditions for the conduct by other agencies of tasks associated with the peace settlement..."¹¹⁰ As a result, the leadership of TFE soon found itself not only interacting and negotiating with the military leadership but also the civil and political leaders of all three factions.

Preventing and responding to violent confrontations between civilian groups became a major dilemma for IFOR. The right of free movement by civilians of all ethnicities across the IEBL to visit or return to former homes was outlined in the country's new constitution and guaranteed by the GFAP.¹¹¹ In order to satisfy this requirement, TFE set the conditions for peaceful crossings by coordinating with key players through JMCs prior to the event and ensuring that local police, military and political authorities understood their role and accepted responsibility for the security of people conducting the cross IEBL movement.¹¹² Additionally, TFE would position units at key points throughout the area to conduct searches, patrol, monitor movement, and react to any disturbances.¹¹³

When these elements of prevention failed, military leaders had to quickly assess the situation, locate the decisionmakers, identify their interests and then seek a mutual understanding. In August of 1996, 3-4 Cavalry was faced with rising tensions as a crowd of Serb civilians from the village of Mahala began moving to the site of a confrontation between Moslem civilians (who had transited the IEBL) and Serb Interior Police. While the squadron commander handled the situation between the police force and the Moslems, the troop commander went to defuse the growing crowd headed to the area. By first placing vehicles along the crowd's route of march, the troop commander delayed and dispersed the crowd as they stopped to talk or yell at the soldiers. Once the leader of the group was identified, the troop commander approached him, separated him from the crowd and ascertained what his concerns and interests were in being there. Once the troop commander determined that the Serb civilians were worried about the safety of the Serb Police, he arranged for a Serb policeman to break away from negotiations with the squadron commander and meet the crowd. Once the Serb policeman reassured the crowd that the situation was under control, the troop commander got the leader of the crowd to move back and avoid further confrontation.¹¹⁴

Negotiations during OJE were not only aimed at securing a stable and peaceful environment through compliance with the GFAP but also developing trust between divergent ethnic elements within the civilian populace that had suffered through years of fighting. TFE commanders found themselves attempting to find ways to further the intent of the GFAP by not only assisting other agencies but also supporting interaction and conflict resolution between the different ethnic groups. LTC Tony Cucolo, Commander of 3rd of the 5th Cavalry, found himself in the unenviable position of

attempting to bring “peace” to the explosive civilian situation in Brcko. Due to the lack of any local government, LTC Cucolo found himself as the only major authority figure able to transcend ethnic boundaries and mediate disputes. He confronted a broad spectrum of issues raised by Bosniac, Serb and Croat leaders. These points of contention ranged the gamut from which flag would ultimately fly in the town each day to the de-escalation of tensions raised by the return of Moslems to the Serb dominated village.¹¹⁵ While lacking the authority to solve many issues, particularly concerning property ownership, LTC Cucolo instituted weekly meetings between the factions. His goal during these meetings was to keep the sides talking and seek agreement on small issues while postponing the major issues till international agencies responsible under the GFAP for their resolution arrived.¹¹⁶

In another instance, COL Fontenot, Commander of the 1st BCT, with the assistance of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) came up with a way to stimulate the local economy and get the now demobilized soldiers focusing on rebuilding their communities. With agreement of the Bosniacs and Serbs, he established a market right in the middle of the ZOS dubbed the “Arizona Market.” Here you found Serbs, Croats, and Muslims buying and selling all the essentials of life – from pigs and sheep to vodka, cigarettes, and blue jeans.¹¹⁷ Additionally, all member of TFE nominated projects for funding. The subsequent grants were distributed evenly among both the Federation and the Republic of Srbska with 65% of work going to former soldiers. These projects produced several effects. First, they built up goodwill between the IFOR and the different ethnic groups. Second, these actions demonstrated US and NATO will and perseverance to bringing normalcy back to the region. Finally, they provided an area of

mutual interest and developed economic ties between the different ethnic groups.¹¹⁸

According to COL Fontenot, the keys to succeeding in this form of negotiating was to separate local leaders, who wanted to solve problems, from their recalcitrant senior political leaders, identify areas of overlapping interests, and provide avenues for mutual gain.¹¹⁹

These interactions with the civilian population increased, especially prior to the September 1996 elections. JMCs, pre-election coordinating meetings, joint planning meetings and Civil Military Seminars were used to establish responsibility, resolve differences, and coordinate support for the conduct of the elections. Like the first series of JMCs which covered implementation of the provisions of Annex 1A, successful execution of other provisions contained in the GFAP required not only the formal meetings but numerous bilateral discussions in order to resolve differences and seek mutual gains between the factions. The subsequent JMCs and pre-election coordination meetings allowed TFE to establish a strategy for effective conflict resolution – isolate, contain and involve the civil authorities.¹²⁰

VI. The Effectiveness of Tactical Negotiations in implementing the GFAP

As shown, tactical negotiations in the form of both bilateral discussions and the execution of JMCs were all used throughout the conduct of Operation Joint Endeavor. Acting as facilitators, mediators, arbitrators, and rules manipulators, IFOR commanders effectively used tactical negotiations as an indispensable tool in achieving the provisions of the GFAP. More importantly, the use of tactical negotiations provided a means, other than the use of force, for commanders to control the environment and thereby retain the

initiative. Additionally, tactical negotiations reinforced and supported the conduct of the peace operation in terms of the six operational principles of OOTW – legitimacy, security, objective, restraint, unity of effort and perseverance.

As IFOR crossed the Sava River, it possessed a certain level of legitimacy due to the authority it received as outlined in the GFAP. Initially, the GFAP provided not only IFOR legitimacy from the operational to the tactical level but also provided a mechanism in the JMC to conduct “principled negotiations” with the FWF.¹²¹ There are four basic steps involved in the execution of “principled negotiations”: negotiators must first separate people from the problem (eliminating any conflict due to personalities); focus on interests, not positions; invent options for mutual gain; and insist on using objective criteria for evaluation. These steps were taken repeatedly by IFOR commanders as they dealt with the FWF during bilateral and JMC discussions in assuming negotiating roles of facilitators, arbitrators, mediators, or rule manipulators. With the provisions contained in Annex 1A of the GFAP serving as the objective criteria for evaluation, TFE commanders focused their negotiating efforts on devising implementation concepts with the FWF that provided mutual value to the all parties concerned. As the means for achieving each successive objective were ironed out between TFE and the FWF through some form of negotiations, the legitimacy of NATO forces and the agreement itself were continually reinforced. As a result, TFE commanders retained control of the environment during the implementation of the GFAP.

After the initial deployment of IFOR into sector, negotiations played a key role in securing the initial objectives of establishing the ZOS and the separation of the FWF. During this engagement, IFOR commanders acted as both facilitators and mediators. As

facilitators they provided a common base of understanding concerning the provisions of the GFAP and established a mechanism for resolving conflicts through the JMC. During the first bilateral discussions leading to the first series of JMCs, the brigade commanders acted as mediators in helping each faction devise plans for separating the forces and establishing the ZOS. This was done through educating, coaching, and discussing with the various factions the key components necessary for ensuring a safe and efficient establishment of the ZOS. Additionally, since the plans were devised during bilateral discussions between IFOR and the FWF elements, IFOR commanders could deconflict any items prior to all factions seating down together. The effectiveness of the negotiating process in establishing these plans centered on the IFOR commanders' ability to manipulate a combination of political power and interests, cultural values, personalities and perceptions of success within the FWF leadership.¹²² Two key principles were maintained throughout this process. First, integrity was essential. TFE commanders never lied or exaggerated the requirements or consequences concerning implementation of the GFAP. Additionally, they made sure that all factions understood precisely what would happen if they failed to comply. Second, TFE commanders went into the JMCs with the assumption that factions wanted to make the GFAP work – even when problems with compliance existed. The mechanisms of the JMC ensured that faction leaders up and down the chain of commands understood the requirements of the treaty and issues could be elevated if not solved at the lowest possible level of command.¹²³

This dual role of facilitator and mediator accomplished several things. First, it ensured that the factions understood their role in implementing the accords and TFE's position in terms of compliance. Second, the FWF's gained "ownership" of their plans as

they related to establishing the ZOS. This lessened the perception that TFE was going to mandate everyone's actions. Third, it ensured that at subsequent JMCs, relating to other subjects and provisions of Annex 1A, issues could be addressed and resolved. The effective execution of JMCs provided for not only the resolution of problems but also established a level of transparency concerning the military actions of the three factions. This served as a confidence building measure and lessened suspicions and animosity among the FWF. Additionally, the recognition of a particular faction by a brigade commander in the JMC due to the faction's exceptional performance in accomplishing certain tasks was an effective tool used by commanders. Recognition of success fed on itself and led to even higher levels of cooperation between TFE and the recognized faction. While TFE commanders acted effectively as facilitators and mediators, they had also devised their own plans for accomplishing the objectives of the GAP and were prepared to act as arbitrators and rules enforcers if the FWF had failed to comply.¹²⁴ However, the use of incentives and disincentives through "power mediation" proved highly effective in getting factions to accomplish the objectives.¹²⁵ The tenets of power mediation were used in achieving several other key objectives of the GFAP – establishment of heavy weapons sites, identification and clearing of minefields, demobilization, movement and monitoring of the FWF into their respective zones, and establishing freedom of movement in Bosnia. The rapid achievement of these objectives in less than a year demonstrated TFE's ability to retain the initiative and shape the battlespace.

Additionally, negotiations and the leaders' ability to act as arbitrator enhanced TFE's ability to exercise "restraint" through the prudent application of combat power.

Restraint in terms of the use of force was initially accomplished by decreasing tensions between the FWF's through confidence building measures and demonstrated impartiality in the JMC process. The synchronization and demonstration of combat power during JMCs, coupled with IFOR's declared intent to use force to compel compliance, ensured that the FWF understood that impartiality would be observed throughout the operation even if force was necessary to enforce the accord's principles.¹²⁶ If elements of the FWFs sought to obstruct implementation of the accord, it would be resolved through the negotiating process or raised to next higher JMC command level. This threat of escalation to the next level of command put pressure on the faction commander who had probably initiated the violation. As illustrated by COL Batiste's inspection of weapons sites, combat power would be effectively shifted and massed to ensure compliance while MG Nash informed his counterpart of his subordinates refusal and possible consequences. This support provided the necessary linkage between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of operation and intent.¹²⁷ The escalation of negotiations occurs along two dimensions: the level at which the negotiations are taking place and the corresponding level of implied force. This escalation of negotiations can be effective but depends on time and distance. Time can work against peaceful resolution due to the resultant time lost as disputes are passed from level to level. Long distances and resultant communications difficulties often leave isolated junior leaders little scope to escalate, particularly if the peace force is spread throughout the area.¹²⁸ In terms of responding to civil disturbances, restraint was exercised in terms of the appropriate levels of force used to seek conflict de-escalation. Increased conflict between TFE soldiers and the populace had serious ramifications in terms of IFOR-civilian relations and international

perceptions of impartiality. TFE soon learned that the most effective means for preventing or de-escalating potential conflicts was through negotiation and coordination with the factions.¹²⁹ As shown by 3-4 Cavalry's handling of the civil disturbance in Mahala, the effective placement of combat power, both leaders and weapon systems, coupled with principled negotiations can effectively lessen tensions and prevent confrontation. In these situations, the crucial steps of identifying the competing interests and potential options for mutual gains between the parties are essential to successful conflict de-escalation. In both military and civil situations, tactical negotiations coupled with the requisite combat power in terms of vehicle placement and use of attack helicopter provided a synergism that allowed commanders to solve the problem without using extensive force.

The JMCs and bilateral discussions also provided "unity of effort" by facilitating the commander's ability to focus his available combat power towards achieving the objectives and the end state. As a result of successful bilateral and JMC meetings, the ZOS was established with minimum troop strength thereby allowing commanders to focus combat power on other implied tasks such as increasing mobility or shifting forces to encourage recalcitrant FWF elements to act. The JMCs use as a mechanism for monitoring compliance also freed up combat power from blanket monitoring to selective inspection at key decisive points within the sector. In latter operations, such as the support of the September elections, negotiations between the parties delineated responsibilities between the parties. This allowed commanders to exercise economy of force and focus his combat power on deterring civil disturbances and ensuring freedom of movement to the election sites.

The use of tactical negotiations to enhance TFE's security and contribute to its force protection level was exercised even prior to crossing the Sava River. MG Nash's discussion with elements of the FWF operating in his sector produced guarantees that the operation would not be hindered. Even though these assurances were given, TFE still conducted a deliberate river crossing. The 1AD soldiers crossed the Sava astride tanks and Bradleys wearing Kevlar helmets and body armor for force protection. While these measures seemed excessive by FWF elements and even some U.S. allies participating in OJE, this demonstration convinced all parties that US IFOR elements could protect itself if the need arose.¹³⁰ Bilateral discussions and the JMC process was effective in gathering information on one of the greatest threats to TFE soldiers – mines. In terms of civil disturbances, the inherent ability of negotiations as a tool for de-escalating the conflict provided an additional measure of security for TFE soldiers as long as they were proactive in identifying the leaders and their interests prior to outbreak of hostilities. Negotiations were instrumental in demonstrating TFE's perseverance in not only resolving military aspects of the GFAP but also civil. The use of bilateral discussions and the JMCs were a key component in effective execution of the elections. Additionally, the use of principled negotiation by LTC Cucolo and COL Fontenot to create solutions of inherent value to all sides provided a method of resolving issues and also developing economic ties and cooperation between the factions. The development of "normal" relations between the factions is a main component of the GFAP. While these measures were not specified in Annex 1A, the perseverance displayed by these commanders in advancing the intent of the mandate through negotiations demonstrated TFE's initiative towards resolving the conflict.

While negotiations proved effective in achieving initiative in most circumstances, not all negotiations with the FWF were successful. If the IFOR representatives promised something outside of his purview or in contradiction of the provisions of the GFAP, it lessened the tactical commander's legitimacy and his ability to impartially execute the provisions of the GFAP.¹³¹ Once established as the means of measuring the impartiality of negotiations, concessions made outside the purview of the GFAP lessened not only the agreement but also the leaders' future negotiating position with the FWFs. The leaders negotiating role as an intervenor can also be jeopardized if he shows partiality to one side versus the other, especially in terms of allocation of necessary resources. Probably the most dangerous negotiating role a tactical commander can assume is that of a rules manipulator. The GFAP and higher commander's intent define the rules in which the tactical commander must operate. Tactical leaders normally do not have the authority to change provisions of the agreement nor the established mechanism for enforcement. Breaking of this linkage will decrease the legitimacy of the tactical commander and his actions in the eyes of FWF. In surrendering his legitimacy, the tactical commander losses not only his position in future negotiation but also the initiative.

VII. Conclusion

I haven't trained for any of this. I spend a lot more time negotiating and assessing people's willingness to be cooperative that I do on traditional military tasks.¹³²

While this monograph focused on the use of negotiations at the tactical level, the distinction between the different levels of war and role of negotiations during stability operations can be deceiving, especially when operating in environments of failed and ethnic conflict. As GEN Shinseki, former SFOR commander noted:

Negotiation and leverage is what all of us had to learn to do in Bosnia – an artform. Remember that the clear distinctions between tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war don't exist quite as clearly in stability operations. And in Bosnia, those levels can pancake down in an instant where the merging of tactical, operational, and strategic objectives creates confusion and could cause the loss of momentum if not understood...¹³³

The key is in understanding the linkage between all three levels and the inherently political nature of stability operations in failed states. As shown in Bosnia, the ability to retain the initiative through negotiations during peace operations provides a means to maintain that linkage and insure synergy between actors operating at all three levels.

Effective negotiations not only provide linkage between these levels but also provide commanders with a valuable technique for controlling the environment and demonstrating initiative in peace operations. This is accomplished through the re-enforcement of the six operational principles of OOTW – legitimacy, objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, and perseverance. Impartial third party negotiations based on a viable mandate further the peace force's legitimacy. Legitimacy is enhanced throughout the operation as tactical leaders effectively facilitate the accomplishment of objectives as facilitators, mediators, arbitrators or rule enforcers. By establishing consensus and confidence between the factions, tactical commanders are able to exercise restraint and achieve unity of effort in the prudent use of his combat power without causing escalation. Finally, negotiations aimed not only at resolving military issues but also social and economic provide a means of demonstrating the peace force's commitment towards achieving a lasting resolution to the conflict. Due to the volatile nature of ethnic conflict and the economic, political and social scars it leaves on a region, the demonstration of

perseverance by an impartial third party can serve as a catalyst for achieving a lasting peace – the ultimate criteria of success in peace operation.

Appendix: Glossary of Acronyms

ACFL: Agreed Cease Fire Line. The geographical boundary between the FWF denoted by the GFAP

BCT: Brigade Combat Team

COMEAGLE: Commander, Task Force Eagle

FWF: Former Warring Faction; the forces of the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, and Croatian National factions.

GFAP: General Framework Agreement for Peace. The official title of the peace plan brokered in Dayton, Ohio and signed in Paris. Also referred to as "The Agreement" or "The Dayton Accords."

IEBL: Inter-Entity Boundary Line. The line agreed upon by the General Framework Agreement for Peace that separates the FWF. It is normally commensurate with the ACFL, but was adjusted in some cases on D+45.

IFOR: Implementation Force. The name given to the military forces implementing the General Framework for Peace.

JMC: Joint Military Commission. A forum for negotiating, coordinating of work and implementation of the GFAP between leaders of the FWF and IFOR.

MOOTW: Military Operations Other Than War.

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NGO: Nongovernmental Organization.

OJE: Operation Joint Endeavor.

OOTW: Operations Other Than War.

PVO: Private Volunteer Organization.

SASO: Stability and Support Operations.

TFE: Task Force Eagle

UNPROFOR: United Nations Protection Force

ZOS: Zone of Separation; the two-km zone on either side of the agreed cease fire line.

ENDNOTES

¹ U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Bosnia Contingency Planning and Training* (Fort Leavenworth, KS, December 1995), 20.

² These three revolutions are outlined by Hans Binnenkijk, ed., *Strategic Assessment 1997* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997), 1-3.

³ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 2. Additionally, Graham H. Turbiville Jr., William W. Mendel, and Jacob W. Kipp cited these as threats in their article "The Changing Security Environment," *Military Review* (May – June 1997): 8-9.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1-2.

⁶ William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), 5-6.

⁷ In fact, Lawrence A. Yates in his article, "Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns and Recurring Themes." *Military Review* (July- August 1997): 51, points out that the "...U.S. military has engaged in these nontraditional, unorthodox operations throughout its history, far more often that it has waged conventional warfare." While Yates list is not all inclusive, he estimates that the U.S. military has taken part in at least 10 traditional wars (both total and limited), 13 expeditions/ contingency operations, and over 28 nontraditional military operations since the American Revolution.

⁸ William Stofft and Gary L. Guertner. "Ethnic Conflict: The Perils of Military Intervention," *Parameters* (Spring 1995): 30.

⁹ Pauline H. Baker and John A. Ausink, "State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model," *Parameters* (Spring 1996): 30.

¹⁰ Stofft, *Ibid.*, 30, summarized these cyclical and historical trends. These trends also form the foundations of Robert Kaplan's view of conflict as portrayed in his article "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly* (February 1994) and his book *The Ends of the Earth* (New York: Random House, 1996). Additionally, Samuel P. Huntington in his article, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993): 22-49, uses the re-emergence of cyclical trends to establish fault lines between competing civilizations. The Tofflers in *The Third Wave* (New York: Bantam Books, 1989) outline the historical uniqueness of the on-going transition from industrialized to information based economies.

¹¹ Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 5.

¹² "As Ethnic Wars Multiply, U.S. Strives for a Policy," *The New York Times*, 7 February 1993, 1.

¹³ Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 197-207.

¹⁴ Pauline H. Baker, and John A. Ausink, "State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model," *Parameters* (Spring 1996), 22.

¹⁵ In defining ethnicity, this monograph will use Donald Horowitz's working definition of ethnicity outlined in his paper "Ethnic Conflict: The Known and the Unknown," DIA, (Washington, D.C., 23 June 1992), pp.5-6, as outlined by William Stofft and Gary L. Guertner. "Ethnic Conflict: The Perils of Military Intervention," *Parameters* (Spring 1995), 30. Horowitz defined ethnicity as "...a narrow self-identification and basis for affiliation, loyalty, and action, but elastic enough to embrace groups differentiated by race, color, religion, language, regional origin, tribe, or nationality."

¹⁶ Baker, *Ibid.*, 21.

¹⁷ Larry Cable, "Getting Found in the Fog: The Nature of Interventionary Peace Operations," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 7, (Spring 1996) 98.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 101-102

¹⁹ These requirements were compiled from Stofft, *Ibid.*, 30; Douglas Scalard in "People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough," *Military Review* (July – August 1997) 4-11, and Lieutenant General G.M. Reay, "Building Peace in the Age of Fragmentation.," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (March 1994). The one common leader skill which each of these authors deemed essential for operating in this new peacekeeping environment was negotiation skills.

²⁰ While numerous definitions of "peace operations," are floating around both the military and academic communities, see for example William J. Durch, *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 3. This monograph defines peace operations in terms of Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations* (Washington D.C.: HQ Department of the Army, 1994), 111, as an "umbrella term that encompasses three types of activities; activities with predominately diplomatic lead (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace building) and two complementary, predominately military, activities (peacekeeping and peace-enforcement). The overall purpose of these operations is to "create and sustain the conditions necessary for peace to flourish." (p. iv). Of particular concern in this monograph is the definition of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. According to FM

100-23, peacekeeping involves military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerent parties. These operations are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement (4). PE is the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions. The purpose of PE is to maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. PE may include combat action. In such cases, missions must be clear and end states defined. The distinct between peacekeeping and peace enforcement concerns the level of *consent, use of force, and impartiality*.

²¹ Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995),

²² Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Military Operations Other Than War* (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1995), III-1, lists 16 types of operations, which generally encompass MOOTW. They include: arms control, combating terrorism, DoD support to counterdrug operations, enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations, enforcing exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities, nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency, noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations, protection of shipping, recovery operations, show of force operations, strikes/raids, and support to insurgency.

²³ *Ibid.*, V-1

²⁴ Jennifer Morrison Taw and John E. Peters. "Operations Other Than War: Implications for the US Army," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 6 (Winter 1995), 377.

²⁵ Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Military Operations Other Than War* (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1995), I-2.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, II-1 – 5. JP 3-07 defines these principles in the following way: Objective – Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective; Unity of Effort – Seek unity of effort in every operation; Security – Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage; Restraint – Apply appropriate military capability prudently; Perseverance – Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.

²⁸ Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (Washington D.C.: HQ Department of the Army, 1993), 2-0.

²⁹ Fastabend, David. "The Categorization of Conflict," *Parameters* (Summer 1997), 76.

³⁰ James Dubik and Gordon Sullivan, "Land Warfare in the 21st Century," *Military Review* (September 1993) 20.

³¹ Robert Bunker, "Rethinking OOTW," *Military Review* (November-December 1995), 34, and FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington D.C.: August 1982), 16-1 to 16-4.

³² Edward E. Thurman, "Shaping an Army for Peace, Crisis and War," *Military Review* (April 1992), 28-32.

³³ Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, "War in the Information Age," Landpower Essay Series No. 94-4 (Arlington, VA: AUSA, May 1994), 7.

³⁴ Bunker, *Ibid.*, 37.

³⁵ Michael McCormick, "The New FM 100-5: A Return to Operational Art," *Military Review* (September-October 1997). 8. McCormick examines the development of the 1998 Draft FM 100-5 and identifies four major changes: (1) The inclusion of war as a form of conflict; (2) introduction of tactical functions; (3) Revamping of the existing operating systems; and (4) Integration of war and OOTW into the four different categories of operations. Draft FM 100-5, *Operations*. Washington D.C.: HQ Department of the Army, 6 April 1993, p. 2-5 to 2-14, outline the effect of military actions on the will of the competing groups to further their interests.

³⁶ Draft FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington D.C.: HQ Department of the Army, 6 April 1998), 2-22.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 2-31 to 2-32.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 2-22.

³⁹ Fastabend, David. "The Categorization of Conflict," *Parameters* (Summer 1997), 84.

⁴⁰ Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (Washington D.C.: HQ Department of the Army, 1993), 2-6. These five tenets are defined in FM100-5 in the following: *Initiative* sets or changes the terms of battle by action and implies an offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations. *Agility* is the ability of friendly forces to react faster than the enemy and is a prerequisite for seizing and holding the initiative. It is as much a mental as a physical quality. *Depth* is the extension of operations in time, space, resources, and purpose. *Synchronization* is arranging activities in time and space to mass at the decisive point. *Versatility* is the ability of units to meet diverse mission requirements.

⁴¹ Presently, the draft version of FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington D.C.: HQ Department of the Army, 6 April 1998), focuses on establishing doctrine for operational-level warfighting and contingency operations and the resulting conduct of decisive operations. Consequently, Draft FM 100-5 does not outline any overall tenets of Army

operation as they able to conduct of tactical operations. However, synchronization, in terms of arranging activities in relation to time, space, and purpose, is discussed as necessary for directing actions and effects towards an achievable purpose (2-53). Initiative is described in the chapter concerning *Command in Operations*, as “a subordinate’s assumption of responsibility for independent actions when his commander’s concept of execution no longer applies or when an unanticipated opportunity leading to the accomplishment of the commander’s intent presents itself” (3-10). While this is not explicitly stated in the approved version of FM 100-5 it is implied. This monograph will use the current approved definition.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations* (Washington D.C.: HQ Department of the Army, 1994), 19.

⁴⁵ Draft FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington D.C.: HQ Department of the Army, 6 April 1993), 6-17.

⁴⁶ Durch, Ibid., 17, devised these criteria in terms of evaluating traditional peacekeeping operations and discussed further in Paul F. Diehl’s analysis of peace operations in *International Peacekeeping* (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 34, 37.

⁴⁷ Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations* (Washington D.C.: HQ Department of the Army, 1994), v-vi.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 33-34.

⁴⁹ Judy Pearsall and Bill Trumble, ed. *Oxford Encyclopedia English Dictionary* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 898.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 970.

⁵¹ FM 100-23, Ibid., 34

⁵² Howard Raiffa, *The Art & Science of Negotiation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 22-24. Raiffa outlines the functions of third parties in negotiations and defines a facilitator as “...a person who arranges for the relevant parties to come to the negotiating table....The facilitator may choose not to get involved in the actual process of negotiation, but he may play a facilitating role in implementing the agreement.” A mediator is “...an impartial outsider who tries to aid the negotiators in their quest to find a compromise agreement. The mediator can help with negotiation process, but does not have the authority to dictate a solution.” Conversely, an arbitrator will act a s mediator in attempting to devise solutions to the process but “...if these

preliminary actions fail, the arbitrator has the authority to impose a solution.” Finally, a rules manipulator “...is given the authority to alter or constrain the process of negotiation – or, put another way, to modify the rules of the game.”

⁵³ *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Joint Warfighting Center, 16 June 1997), IV-15.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, IV-21 -- IV 23. While these objectives are outlined in the *JTF Commander's Handbook* as applying mainly to the operation of Joint Military Commissions, I believe they hold true for negotiations in general both in terms of the JMCs and bilateral discussions.

⁵⁵ William T. Johnsen, *Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy*. (Pennsylvania: Carlisle Barracks, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), 10. The Carpathian, Balkan, Rhodope, Pindus Mountains and the Dinaric Alps all converge in the Balkans. Additionally, for the purposes of this monograph, the Balkans encompass the nations of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (which includes both Serbia and Montenegro), and the European portion of Turkey. This monograph considers Volvodina and Kosovo to be part of Serbia.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* Additionally, George W. Gawrych in "Roots of Bosnian Realities," *Military Review* (July-August 1997), 79, describes these as outcomes of the geographic makeup of the Balkans.

⁵⁷ Charles and Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 4.

⁵⁸ Johnsen, *Ibid.*, 25 –26, and Gawrych, *Ibid.*, 80.

⁵⁹ Johnsen, *Ibid.*, 27. Primarily Croats and Slovenes practice Roman Catholicism. Greeks, Bulgars, some Serbs, and Orthodox Romanians follow the Patriarch in Constantinople. Additionally, some Serbs recognize their own Christian Orthodoxy. While the Turks during Ottoman rule over the Balkans practiced considerable religious toleration, economic and civil discrimination drove many convert to Islam, especially in Albania and Bosnia.

⁶⁰ Huntington, *Ibid.*, 29-35, describes a line running between extending from Russia and Finland to the Baltic States and Russia down through Belarus, the Ukraine, and into the Balkans along a line which separates Slovenia and Croatia from the rest of the Balkans as the “Velvet Curtain of culture.” It signifies the cultural division between Western Christianity (in the west) and Orthodox Christianity and Islam (in the east). In Huntington's view, the fundamental source of conflict will no longer be primarily ideological and economic but rather cultural (22). As a result, cultural “...fault lines

between civilizations are replacing political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed.” (29)

⁶¹ Figures based on 1991 census data portrayed by Johnsen, *Ibid.*, 31.

⁶² *Ibid.* and Gawrych, *Ibid.*, 85-86.

⁶³ Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghost: A Journey Through History*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), xxiii.

⁶⁴ Churchill quoted by Brooke Unger in “Survey: The Balkans – Europe’s roughest neighborhood,” *The Economist*, January 24, 1998, 1.

⁶⁵ Johnsen, *Ibid.*, 16-19, and Gawrych, *Ibid.*, 81-83.

⁶⁶ Gawrych, *Ibid.*, 84-83. Jozo Tomasevich, “Yugoslavia During the Second World War,” in *Contemporary Yugoslavia*, Wayne S. Vucinich, ed. (Berkeley: California University Press, 1969), 116-118. While Tito was ruthless in hunting down and killing many people who opposed him and the Partisans. Tomasevich cites several reasons for the Partisans’ victory and Tito’s ability to forge a united Yugoslavia. First, they were resolute and uncompromising in fighting against the armies of occupation. Second, by implementing a truly federalist policy for solving Yugoslavia’s national problem during the war, the Partisans convinced a large proportion of population that they had a stake in the Yugoslav State. Third, the Partisans were inclusive in terms of recruiting men and women of any ethnic or religious background. Finally, they possessed the political and military leadership that took advantage of the mistakes made by the competing ethnic based factions and the armies of occupation.

⁶⁷ Gawrych, *Ibid.*, 85. The country was organized into six federal republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, along with the autonomous region of Vojvodina with less than a quarter Magyar population and the autonomous province of Kosovo-Metohiya with its Albanian majority (90 percent). Five nationalities were officially recognized: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins and Macedonians. By the census of 1971, Tito's state permitted Bosnian Muslims to identify themselves as a separate nationality, Bosnian Muslim, as distinct from Bosnia's Croats and Serbs.

⁶⁸ Dennison Rusinow, “Yugoslavia: Balkan Breakup?” *Foreign Policy*, Issue 83, (Summer 1991), 146. Susan L. Woodward in *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 21-22 outlined the same criteria for success of the Yugoslav State but discounted Tito’s personality. Additionally, Woodward saw Yugoslavia’s role in the international systems, specifically the non-aligned movement and the resultant foreign aid that Yugoslavia received from the West, as another key component of Yugoslavia’s survival between 1945 and 1991.

⁶⁹ Lenard J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), 45. Woodward, *Ibid.*, 1-81, sees the economic crisis and federal governments inability to solve this dilemma as the primary reason for he failure of Yugoslavia to survive as a viable state.

⁷⁰ Cohen, *Ibid.*, 45-50.

⁷¹ Woodward, *Ibid.*, 22-29.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 29.

⁷³ Milosevic made this comment in an interview, which appeared in the 12 July 1989 *Le Monde Magazine* quoted by Cohen, *Ibid.* 53. In the article, Milosevic claims that the 1974 constitution was one of Tito's late initiatives and that "he was unable to imagine the extent to which such a system would destroy the country."

⁷⁴ Anna Husarka, "No End of Troubles in the Balkans," *The Washington Post, Book World*, November 1, 1992, 5.

⁷⁵ Kaplan, *Ibid.*, 7. Kaplan's book, *Balkan Ghost*, articulated the deep emotions that were felt throughout the region. While he never claims that his portrayal of the region was meant to show that this deep seated animosity could not be overcome, many who read his book felt that the Balkan problem could never be solved. According to Richard Holbrooke in his book, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998), 23, Kaplan's book had a profound impact not only on President Clinton and members of his foreign policy team but also on members of Congress. Susan Woodward felt that this portrayal was inaccurate and that the ethnic conflict being witnessed in Bosnia was really a case of Serbian aggression masterminded by Milosevic.

⁷⁶ Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1994), xix.

⁷⁷ Woodward, *Ibid.*, 15.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 215-217.

⁷⁹ Warren Zimmerman, *Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers* (New York: Times Books, 1996), 151-153, quoted by Holbrooke, *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁸⁰ David C. Isby categorized these conflicts in "War Returns to Europe – Military Aspects of the Conflicts in Yugoslavia, 1991-1993," *Command Magazine*, Issue 23, (July-August 1993), 28.

⁸¹ Adolf Carlson, "No Balm in Gilead: The Employment of Military Force in the War in Former Yugoslavia and Prospects for a Lasting Peace," in *Yugoslavia's Wars: The*

Problem From Hell, Stephen J. Blank, ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), 96.

⁸² Malcolm, *Ibid.*, 234-252.

⁸³ Prior to Ambassador Holbrooke's shuttle diplomacy and the resultant Dayton Accords, five major proposals for overall settlement of conflict were put forward by outside international actors. For an outline of these plans, see Steve L. Burg's article, "Negotiation a Settlement: Lessons of the Diplomatic Process," in *Yugoslavia's Wars: The Problem From Hell*, Stephen J. Blank, ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), 47-86.

⁸⁴ UNPROFOR had been initially deployed to monitor the UN brokered cease-fire in January 1992 between Croatia and Serbia. The force of approximately 14,000 soldiers was assigned the traditional peacekeeping role of monitoring this agreement within four sectors established within Croatia. Carlson, *Ibid.*, 95.

⁸⁵ The breakdown of UNPROFOR missions is outlined in James A. Schear's article, "The Conflicts of Bosnia: Assessing the Role of the United Nations," in *Yugoslavia's Wars: The Problem From Hell*, Stephen J. Blank, ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), 29-45.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 31-32.

⁸⁷ David L. Grange and John S. Rovegno, "Setting the Stage: Peacekeeping Operations Demand Unconventional Military Approaches," *Armed Forces Journal* (March 1998), 44.

⁸⁸ Holbrooke, *Ibid.*, 60-75, outlines the events leading up to his diplomatic mission. While five previous diplomatic efforts had failed, Holbrooke realized that "...the success of the Croatian (and later, in similar circumstances, the Bosnian-Croat Federation) offensive was a classic illustration of the fact that the shape of the diplomatic landscape will usually reflect the balance of forces on the ground. In concrete terms this meant that as diplomats we could not expect the Serbs to be conciliatory at the negotiating table as long as they had experienced nothing but success on the battlefield." (73) This change in the balance of military power coupled with the use of air power to reinforce U.S. diplomatic initiatives gave Holbrooke an negotiating leverage with Milosevic that previously had not existed. (94-111, 145-146)

⁸⁹ Holbrooke, *Ibid.*, 105, outlined the numerous goals of many of the players in the conflict. Milosevic acquired from the Bosnian Serbs the right to represent them at Dayton and throughout further negotiations. The "Patriarch Paper" signed by Karadzic, Mladic, Milosevic and other major Serb players created a joint Yugoslav-Republika Srpska delegation with Milosevic as its representative (105). While the Bosnian Serbs sought to maintain their control over conquered areas, Milosevic's greatest concern was

the lifting of economic sanctions against his country. In terms of Bosnia, he sought a quick agreement, which would freeze the contending armies in place (thereby insuring a Serbian Republic in Bosnia), while leaving the political provisions ambiguous and thus limiting the power of any central government. Tudjman sought: first, to regain eastern Slavonia; second, to create an ethnically pure Croatia; and third, to maintain maximum control over the Croat portion of Bosnia. The objectives of Alij Izetbegovic, the Muslim President of Bosnia-Herzegovina, were and still are difficult to quantify. While re-establishment of multi-ethnic nation with strong central government seemed to be his primary focus, the establishment of a geographically viable nation was his major at Dayton. (96-98, 169-170).

⁹⁰ The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), also known as the Dayton Accords, was signed on 21 November 1995 in Paris. The agreement contained the following numbered annexes which contained the specifics of the settlement and the negotiated agreements on: 1A – Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement; 1B – Regional Stabilization; 2 – Inter-Entity Boundary and Related Issues; 3 – Elections; 4 – Constitution; 5 – Arbitration; 6 – Human Rights; 7 – Refugees and Displaced Persons; 8 – Commission to Preserve National Monuments; 9 – Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations; 10 – Civilian Implementation; and, 11 – International Police Task Force. *Summary of the General Framework Agreement*, Fact Sheet released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, November 30, 1995, available from [<http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-summ.htm>], Internet, and *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, November 31, 1995, available from [<http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-fm.htm>], Internet.

⁹¹ Holbrooke, *Ibid.*, 203.

⁹² *NATO's Role in Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia*, NATO Basic Fact Sheet #4, March 1997, available from [<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/bpfy.htm>], Internet, outlines the numerous activities undertaken by NATO in the pursuit of peace in Bosnia. NATO maritime operations during Operation SHARP GUARD were undertaken in support of UN authorized arms embargo initiated in July 1992. NATO aircraft monitored and subsequently enforced the no-fly zone established in October 1992 during Operation DENY FLIGHT. Additionally, NATO aircraft provided close air support to UNPROFOR, under UNSCR 958, and conducted air strikes, authorized under UNSCR 836) in the defense of previously established Safe Areas. Throughout this conflict, NATO conducted contingency planning covering a broad range of options to include: establishment of relief zones; efforts to prevent the spread of violence to Kosovo and Macedonia; monitoring of heavy weapons; and, protection or possible extraction of UNPROFOR. With the passage of UNSCR 1031, NATO received the desired UN mandate for implementing the military aspects of the GFAP. All NATO nations contributed to IFOR. Additionally, eighteen non-NATO nations, including several Partnership for Peace countries and Russia, provided forces for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.

⁹³ U.S. Army Combined Arms Command. Center for Army Lessons Learned. *Operation Joint Endeavor: Task Force Eagle Initial Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: May 1996), ix. The U.S. contribution to OJE augmentation of the ARRC headquarters, a National Support Element (NSE), comprised o element of USAREUR and V Corps in Hungary and Croatia, and air and naval assets working throughout the AOR. TFE would eventually consist of over 23,000 soldiers in 14 brigades, 42 battalions from 11 nations. Stanley F. Cherrie, "Task Force Eagle," *Military Review* (July-August 1997), 66.

⁹⁴ *NATO's Role in Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia*, NATO Basic Fact Sheet #4, March 1997, available from [<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/bpfy.htm>], Internet.

⁹⁵ *Annex 1A – Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, November 31, 1995, available from [<http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-an1a.htm>], Internet. Articles V and VIII. The term, Joint Military Commission, describes formally established bodies in which local representatives of different parties in the conflict meet under IFOR supervision to make decisions, be informed of IFOR intentions, and resolve disputes. The JMC process was developed by UNPROFOR and adopted by IFOR. U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned. *Operation Joint Endeavor: Task Force Eagle Initial Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: May 1996), 85.

⁹⁶ U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned. *Bosnia Contingency Planning and Training*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: December 1995), iii, 2-5.

⁹⁷ U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned. *Operation Joint Endeavor: Task Force Eagle Initial Operations*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: May 1996), 85-86.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, and Cherrie, *Ibid.*, 71.

⁹⁹ *Operation Joint Endeavor: Task Force Eagle Initial Operations*, *Ibid.* pp. 88-89.

¹⁰⁰ Rick. Atkinson, "U.S. Sector Commander Meets Bosnian Counterparts." *The Washington Post*, 21 December 1995, A38, and U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned. *Operation Joint Endeavor: Task Force Eagle Initial Operations*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: May 1996), x.

¹⁰¹ Hollis, Patrecia S. "Peace Enforcing: Never Let Them See You Sweat – An Interview with COL Gregory Fontenot, Cdr., 1BCT, 1AD, TFE," *Field Artillery Journal* (January-February 1997), 10.

¹⁰² Atkinson, *Ibid.*, A38.

¹⁰³ *Operation Joint Endeavor: Task Force Eagle Initial Operations*, *Ibid.*, 127-133.

¹⁰⁴ D= date of Transfer of Authority (TOA) from elements of UNPROFOR to IFOR. That was accomplished on the 20 December 1995.

¹⁰⁵ Fred Johnson, *Establishing A Zone of Separation (ZOS)* U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned Bulletin. Fort Leavenworth, KS: July-August 1996, available on [<http://call.army.mil/call/nftf/julaug96/chap3.htm>], Internet. At D+30, All parties were required to withdraw all their forces to their respective side of the Agreed Cease Fire Line (ACFL) and remove all mines, unexploded ordnance, explosive devices, wire obstacles and fortifications. By D+45 the IEBL came into effect and withdrawing forces must completely vacate and clear the areas transferred to IFOR to include the final removal of mines, demolitions and unexploded ordinances.

¹⁰⁶ Atkinson, Rick. "Rival Bosnian Commanders Meet." *The Washington Post*, 28 December 1995, A20.

¹⁰⁷ U.S. Army Combined Arms Command. Center for Army Lessons Learned Observations #10000-74976, "Common Maps," supporting *Operation Joint Endeavor: Task Force Eagle Initial Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: May 1996).

¹⁰⁸ Hollis, Patricia S. "Peace Enforcing: Never Let Them See You Sweat – An Interview with COL Gregory Fontenot, Cdr., 1BCT, 1AD, TFE," *Field Artillery Journal* (January-February 1997), 10.

¹⁰⁹ The contents of the note sent by COL Batiste was quoted by MG Nash in "The Year of Living Creatively – Reflections on the Army's First Year in Bosnia," *Armed Forces Journal* (November 1997), 40.

¹¹⁰ *Article VI, 3a, Annex 1A – Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, November 31, 1995, available on [<http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-an1a.htm>], Internet.

¹¹¹ Fred Johnson, *Responding to Civil Disturbances in Bosnia*. U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned Bulletin. Fort Leavenworth, KS: September -October 1996, available on [<http://call.army.mil/call/nftf/sepoct/chap3.htm>], Internet.

¹¹² Fred Johnson, *Synchronizing the Response to Civil Disturbances (Task Force Eagle's Staff Coordination)*. U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned Bulletin. Fort Leavenworth, KS: November-December 1996, available on [<http://call.army.mil/call/nftf/novdec/chap3.htm>], Internet.

¹¹³ Johnson, *Responding to Civil Disturbances in Bosnia*, Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Robert Ivy, "A Cavalry Experience In Bosnia," *Armor* (May-June 1998), 28.

¹¹⁵ William L. Nash, "The Year of Living Creatively – Reflections on the Army's First Year in Bosnia," *Armed Forces Journal* (November 1997), 42.

¹¹⁶ Mike O'Connor, "Arbitrators for Bosnians: Diplomats' in G.I. Gear." *The New York Times*, 7 July 1996, p. 9.

¹¹⁷ Thomas E. Ricks, "All's Quiet on the Bosnia Front – So Far." *The Wall Street Journal*, 12 June 1996, A13.

¹¹⁸ Nash, *Ibid.*, 43.

¹¹⁹ O'Connor, *Ibid.*, 9.

¹²⁰ U.S. Army Combined Arms Command. Center for Army Lessons Learned. *BiH National Elections, Volume 1*. CALL Newsletter No. 98-18, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: September 1998), 11-12.

¹²¹ Roger Fisher and William Ury, *Getting to Yes – Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In* (New York: Penguin Books, 1981), p. xii, defines "principled negotiations" as a negotiating method in which issues are decided based on merit versus a haggling process focused on what each side says it will and won't do. This method focuses on looking for mutual gains wherever possible, and that where interest conflict, parties insist on a fair independent standard. IFOR used this method successfully using the provisions of Annex 1A as the standard. David M Last in "Peacekeeping Doctrine and Conflict Resolution Techniques," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Winter 1995), 199, also discusses the effectiveness of principled negotiations in peace operations. In his view, this technique is "...applicable to every level at which negotiations occur. The difficulty for the peacekeeper is to determine the objectives of the negotiation, and the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). He or she cannot do this in isolation, and must have clear guidance from the operational level about the aims of the negotiations."

¹²² Johnson, *Establishing A Zone of Separation (ZOS)*, *Ibid.*

¹²³ Patrecia S. Hollis, "Peace Enforcing: Never Let Them See You Sweat – An Interview with COL Gregory Fontenot, Cdr., 1BCT, 1AD, TFE." *Field Artillery Journal* (January-February 1997), 10.

¹²⁴ Hollis, *Ibid.*, 10.

¹²⁵ O'Connor, p. 9. In many cases, Serb reluctance to clear minefields was met by TFE hesitation to man checkpoints desired by Serbs in the Brcko area. Use of manning checkpoints as incentive proved very effective by troop and company commanders in

persuading Serb forces to cooperate. Additionally, the implied use of force was seen as disincentive to force or modify faction behavior.

¹²⁶ U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned. *Operation Joint Endeavor: Task Force Eagle Initial Operations*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: May 1996), pp. 89-90, 96. Hollis, *Ibid.*, 10.

¹²⁷ Last, *Ibid.*, 200, analysis of the use of principled negotiations in Cypress by UNFICYP, which had a similar JMC mechanism, demonstrates the support and linkage between the three levels.

¹²⁸ Lieutenant General G.M. Reay, "Building Peace in the Age of Fragmentation." *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (March 1994), 9.

¹²⁹ Johnson, *Responding to Civil Disturbances in Bosnia*, *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ Walter E. Kretchik, "Force Protection Disparities," *Military Review* (July-August 1997), 74.

¹³¹ Nora Zamichow, "Captains courageous enough not to fight," *Los Angeles Times*, 23 January 1996, A1.

¹³² Rick Atkinson, "Warriors without War: U.S. Peacekeepers in Bosnia adjusting to new tasks – Arbitration, Bluff, Restraint," *The Washington Post*, 14 April 1996, A22.

¹³³ Personal correspondence between the author and GEN Shinseki, e-mail dated 25 November 1998, 0854 hrs.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books and Documents

- Annex 1A – Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, November 31, 1995, [www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-an1a.htm].
- Berdal, Mats R. *Whither UN Peacekeeping?*. Adelphi Paper No. 281. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993.
- Binnenkijk, Hans, ed. *Strategic Assessment 1997*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997.
- Blank, Stephen J. *Yugoslavia's Wars: The Problem from Hell*. Pennsylvania: Carlisle Barracks, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. "The Contribution of Expected Utility Theory to the Study of International Conflict." in *The Origin and Prevention of Major War*, edited by Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Clinton, William J. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1997.
- Cohen, Lenard J. *Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition*. Oxford: Westview Press, 1993.
- Cordy, Brigadier Roderick. "UN Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina." *Peacekeeping Challenges for the Future*. Canberra: Australian Defense Force Academy, Australian Defense Studies Center, 1993.
- Creveld, Martin van. *The Transformation of War*. New York: Free Press, 1991.
- Durch, William J. *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.
- Fisher, Roger and William Ury. *Getting to Yes – Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*. New York: Penguin Books, 1981.
- General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, November 31, 1995, [www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-frm.htm]

- Gurr, Ted Robert and Barbara Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994.
- Holbrooke, Richard. *To End a War*. New York: Random House, 1998.
- Jelavich, Charles and Barbara. *History of the Balkans, Vol. I, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Johnsen, William T. *Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy*. Pennsylvania: Carlisle Barracks, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995.
- Johnsen, William T. *Pandora's Box Reopened: Ethnic conflict in Europe and Its Implications*. Pennsylvania: Carlisle Barracks, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994.
- Kaplan, Robert D. *The Ends of the Earth*. New York: Random House, 1996.
- Kaplan, Robert D. *Balkan Ghost: A Journey Through History*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
- Mackinlay, John. "Defining a Role Beyond Peacekeeping." *Military Implications of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, McNair Paper Seventeen*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1993.
- Malcolm, Noel. *Bosnia: A Short History*. New York: New York University Press, 1994.
- Moodie, Michael and Perry, Charles M. "Proliferation and Ethnic Conflict: A Highly Combustible Mixture." *Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for US Policy and Army Roles and Mission*. Pennsylvania: Carlisle Barracks, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994.
- Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. *National Military Strategy of the United States*. Washington D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1992.
- Office of the Secretary of Defense. *National Security Strategy of the United States*. Washington D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1992.
- Pearsall, Judy and Bill Trumble, ed. *Oxford Encyclopedia English Dictionary*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Petit, Michael. *Peacekeepers at War*. Winchester, MA: Faber and Faber, Inc., 1986.

- Pillar, Paul R. *Negotiation Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983.
- Quinn, Dennis J. "Peace Support Operations: Definitions and Implications." *Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military*. Washington D.C.; National Defense University Press, 1994.
- Summary of the General Framework Agreement*, Fact Sheet released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, November 30, 1995, [www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-summ.htm]
- Raiffa, Howard. *The Art & Science of Negotiation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982.
- Renner, Michael. *Critical Juncture: The Future of Peacekeeping*. Worldwatch Paper 114. Washington: Worldwatch Institute, 1993.
- Tharoor, Sashi. *Peacekeeping: Principles, Problems, Prospects*. Research Report 9-93. Newport: US Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Strategic Research Department, 1993.
- Thomas, BG Trent N. "Global Assessment of Current and Future Trends in Ethnic and Religious Conflict." *Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for US Policy and Army Roles and Mission*. Pennsylvania: Carlisle Barracks, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994.
- Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. *The Third Wave*. New York: Bantam Books, 1989.
- U.S. Army Combined Arms Command. Center for Army Lessons Learned. *Bosnia Contingency Planning and Training*. Fort Leavenworth, KS, December 1995.
- U.S. Army Combined Arms Command. Center for Army Lessons Learned. *Operation Joint Endeavor: Task Force Eagle Initial Operations*. Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 1996.
- U.S. Army Combined Arms Command. Center for Army Lessons Learned. *Operation Joint Endeavor: RSOI, Title 10 Sustainment and Force Protection*. Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 1996.
- U.S. Army Combined Arms Command. Center for Army Lessons Learned. *Joint Military Commissions* CALL Newsletter No. 96-8. Fort Leavenworth, KS, September 1996.

U.S. Army Combined Arms Command. Center for Army Lessons Learned. *Operation Joint Endeavor: Task Force Eagle Continuing Operations*. Fort Leavenworth, KS, September 1996

U.S. Army Combined Arms Command. Center for Army Lessons Learned. *Drawing a Line in the Mud*. CALL Newsletter No. 96-5. Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 1996.

U.S. Army Combined Arms Command. Center for Army Lessons Learned. *BiH National Elections, Volume 1*. CALL Newsletter No. 98-18. Fort Leavenworth, KS, September 1998.

Vucinich, Wayne S. Ed. *Contemporary Yugoslavia*. Berkeley: California University Press, 1969.

Wilson, Brigadier John B. "Lessons from Operations in Yugoslavia." *Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future*. Canberra: Australian Defense Force Academy, Australian Defense Studies Center, 1993

Wilson, Brigadier John B. "Observations on Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in the Former Yugoslavia." *International Peacekeeping, Building on Cambodian Experience*. Canberra: Australian Defense Force Academy, Australian Defense Studies Center, 1994

Woodward, Susan L. *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*. Washington D.C.; The Brookings Institute, 1995.

Zimmerman, Warren. *Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers*. New York: Times Books, 1996.

Monographs

Brinkley, Phillip L. *Requirements for Peacekeeping Operations*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1986.

James, Thomas S. *Big tank Little Bridge: Is there a Position on the Peace Operations Team for Heavy Armor*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996.

Lau, Jeffrey D. *Seeking Order in the Confusion of Bosnia: Does Center of Gravity Apply*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996.

Last , David M. *Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-escalation in Peacekeeping Operations*. . Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1995.

Stewart, Michael D. *Protecting the Force in Operations Other than War*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1995.

Periodicals

"As Ethnic Wars Multiply, U.S. Strives for a Policy," *The New York Times*, 7 February 1993, p. 1.

Atkinson, Rick. "Rival Bosnian Commanders Meet." *The Washington Post*, 28 December 1995, A20.

Atkinson, Rick. "U.S. Sector Commander Meets Bosnian Counterparts." *The Washington Post*, 21 December 1995, A38.

Atkinson, Rick. "Warriors without War: U.S. Peacekeepers in Bosnia adjusting to new tasks – Arbitration, Bluff, Restraint." *The Washington Post*, 14 April 1996, A1.

Baker, Pauline H. and Ausink, John A. "State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model" *Parameters*, Spring 1996, pp. 19-31.

Bergstrand, Brad. "What do you do when there's no peace to keep?" *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, March 1994, pp. 25-30.

Blodgett, John Q. "The Future of UN Peacekeeping." *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 14. Winter 1991, pp. 207-220.

Bremmer, J. S. and Snell, J.M.. "The Changing Face of Peacekeeping." *Canadian Defense Quarterly*, Vol. 22. August 1992, pp. 6-11.

Bunker, Robert J. "Failed-State Operational Environment Concepts." *Military Review*, September-October 1997, pp. 90-92.

Bunker, Robert. "Rethinking OOTW." *Military Review*, November-December 1995, pp. 34-41.

Cable, Larry. "Getting Found in the Fog: The Nature of Interventionary Peace Operations" *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 7, Spring 1996, pp. 97-111.

Cherrie, Stanley F. "Task Force Eagle." *Military Review*, July-August 1997, pp.63-72.

- Dobie, Charles. "A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping." *Survival*, Vol. 36. Autumn 1994, pp. 121-148.
- Dubik, James and Gordon Sullivan. "Land Warfare in the 21st Century," *Military Review*, September 1993, pp. 13-32.
- Fastabend, David. "The Categorization of Conflict." *Parameters*, Summer 1997, pp. 75-87
- Fisher, Ian. "G.I.'s moment of Truth: Face to Face with Serbs." *The New York Times*, 21 January 1995, p. 1.
- Gawrych, George W. "Roots of Bosnian Realities." *Military Review*, July-August 1997, pp. 79-86.
- Gelb, Leslie H. "Quelling the Teacup Wars." *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 73, November-December 1994, pp. 2-6.
- Goldman, Jan. "A Changing World, A Changing UN." *Military Review*, VOL. LXXIV, No. 9, September 1994, pp. 1-50.
- Grange, David L. and John S. Rovegno. "Setting the Stage: Peacekeeping Operations Demand Unconventional Military Approaches." *Armed Forces Journal*, March 1998, pp. 44-45.
- Haekkerup, Hans. "Peacekeeping: A Danish Perspective." *International Defense Review*, December 1995, p. 103.
- Haaglund, Gustav. "Peacekeeping in the Modern War Zone." *Survival*, Vol. 32., Number 3, May- June 1990, pp. 233-240.
- Hollis, Patrecia S. "Peace Enforcing: Never Let Them See You Sweat – An Interview with COL Gregory Fontenot, Cdr, 1BCT, 1AD, TFE." *Field Artillery Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 1, January-February 1997, pp. 10-11.
- Hollis, Patrecia S. "Task Force Eagle in Operation Joint Endeavor – An Interview with MG William L. Nash, CG TFE." *Field Artillery Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 1, January-February 1997, pp. 6-9.
- Host, Johan J. "Enhancing Peacekeeping Operations." *Survival*, Vol. 32., Number 3, May- June 1990, pp. 264-275.
- Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 72, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49.

- Husarka, Anna. "No End of Troubles in the Balkans," *The Washington Post*, Book World, November 1, 1992, p. 5.
- Isby, David C. "War Returns to Europe – Military Aspects of the Conflicts in Yugoslavia, 1991-1993." *Command Magazine*, Issue 23, July-August 1993, pp. 28-34.
- Ivy, Robert. "A Cavalry Experience In Bosnia." *Armor*, May-June 1998, pp. 26-28.
- Johnson, Fred. *Establishing A Zone of Separation (ZOS)* U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned Bulletin. Fort Leavenworth, KS: July -August 1996, (<http://call.army.mil/call/nftf/julaug96/chap3.htm>)
- Johnson, Fred. *Responding to Civil Disturbances in Bosnia*. U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned Bulletin. Fort Leavenworth, KS: September -October 1996, (<http://call.army.mil/call/nftf/sepoct/chap3.htm>)
- Kaplan, Robert D. "The Coming Anarchy." *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994, pp. 1-17.
- Kretchik, Walter E. "Force Protection Disparities." *Military Review*, July-August 1997, pp. 73-78.
- Lehner, Charles. "Task Force Eagle's Armor and Cavalry Operations in Bosnia." *Armor*, May-June 1996, pp. 45-47.
- Mackenzie, Lewis. "Military Realities of UN Peacekeeping Operations." *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 138, February 1993, pp. 21-24.
- McCormick, Michael "The New FM 100-5: A Return to Operational Art," *Military Review*, September-October 1997, pp. 3-15.
- Munro, Sir Alan. "A New World Disorder? Crisis Management Post-Cold War." *The RUSI Journal*, February 1995, pp. 17-21.
- Nash, William L. "The Year of Living Creatively – Reflections on the Army's First Year in Bosnia," *Armed Forces Journal*, November 1997, pp. 38-43.
- O'Connor, Mike. "Arbitrators for Bosnians: 'Diplomats' in G.I. Gear." *The New York Times*, 7 July 1996, p.9.
- Reay, Lieutenant General G.M.. "Building Peace in the Age of Fragmentation." *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, March 1994, pp. 6-10.

- Ricks, Thomas E. "All's Quiet on the Bosnia Front – So Far." *The Wall Street Journal*, 12 June 1996, A13.
- Ricks, Thomas E. "U.S. Brings to Bosnia Tactics that Tamed Wild West." *The Wall Street Journal*, 27 December 1995, A7.
- Roberts, Adam. "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping." *Survival*, Vol. 36., Number 3, Autumn 1994, pp. 93-120.
- Rose, Lieutenant General Sir Michael. "A Year in Bosnia: What has Been Achieved." *The RUSI Journal*, March 1995, pp. 21-24.
- Rusinow, Dennison. "Yugoslavia: Balkan Breakup?" *Foreign Policy*, Issue 83, Summer 1991, pp. 143-159.
- Scalard, Douglas. "People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough." *Military Review*, July – August 1997, pp. 4-11.
- Stofft, William and Gary L. Guertner. "Ethnic Conflict: The Perils of Military Intervention." *Parameters*, Spring 1995, pp. 30-42.
- Taw, Jennifer Morrison and John E. Peters. "Operations Other Than War: Implications for the US Army" *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 6, Winter 1995, pp. 375-409.
- Toscano, Roberto. "Peacekeeping in the New International Situation." *International Spectator*, Vol. 28, January- March 1993, pp. 47-60.
- Turbiville, Graham H. William W. Mendel, and Jacob W. Kipp. "The Changing Security Environment." *Military Review*, May –June 1997, pp. 5-10.
- Unger, Brooke. "Survey: The Balkans – Europe's roughest neighborhood," *The Economist*, January 24, 1998, pp. 1-18.
- Uruquhart, Brian. "Beyond the 'sheriff's Posse'." *Survival*, Vol. 32., Number 3, May- June 1990, pp. 196-205.
- Yates, Lawrence A. "Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns and Recurring Themes." *Military Review*, July- August 97, pp. 51-61.
- Zamichow, Nora. "Captains courageous enough not to fight." *Los Angeles Times*, 23 January 1996, A1.

Zolper, Peter and Mike Isacco. *The Joint Military Commission – A Potential Decisive Point*. U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned Bulletin. Fort Leavenworth, KS: January-February 1996, [http://call.army.mil/call/nftf/jan_feb.96/chap3.htm]

Manuals

Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*. Washington D.C.: HQ Department of the Army, 1982.

Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*. Washington D.C.: HQ Department of the Army, 1993.

Draft Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*. Washington D.C.: HQ Department of the Army, 19 June 1998.

Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*. Washington D.C.: HQ Department of the Army, 1994.

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995.

Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Military Operations Other Than War*. Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994.

Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations. Fort Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 16 June 1997.

Interviews and Personal Correspondence

Personal correspondence between the author and GEN Shinseki, e-mail dated 25 November 1998, 0854 hrs.