

**FORCE PROTECTION AND COMMAND
RELATIONSHIPS: WHO'S
RESPONSIBLE?**

**A MONOGRAPH
BY
Major James H. Moller
Special Forces**

**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff
College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

First Term AY 98-99

Approved for Public Release Distribution is Unlimited

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

19990804 077

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE 17 December 1998	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Monograph
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Force Protection and Command Relationships; Who's Responsible		5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJOR JAMES H. MOLLER		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) SEE ATTACHED		
14. SUBJECT TERMS COMMAND Chain of Command Command Relationships OPCON ADCON TACON FORCE PROTECTION Support		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 51
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED		16. PRICE CODE
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED		20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED
19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED		

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major James H. Moller


Title of Monograph: *Force Protection and Command Relationships: Who's Responsible?*

Approved by:




COL Michael L. Findlay, MA

Monograph Director



LTC Robin P. Swan, MMAS

Director, School of Advanced
Military Studies



Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate Degree
Program

Accepted this 16th Day of December 1998

ABSTRACT

FORCE PROTECTION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: WHO'S RESPONSIBLE? By MAJ James H. Moller, USA, 47 pages.

This monograph investigates the role of command relationships in delineating authority, responsibility, and accountability for force protection during the execution of joint force operations. It assesses the effectiveness of these relationships in protecting the joint force and the effect that different command and/or support relationships have on enhancing or degrading force protection.

This monograph analyzes the joint force protection program by investigating the terms: command, chain of command, command relationship, and how these terms authorize and empower a commander to implement this program across the joint force. Through operational art and the design of campaigns and major operations, combatant commanders accomplish assigned missions in support of national objectives. Application of the tenets of operational art provides the campaign planner the greatest means of protecting the force at the strategic and operational levels. By incorporating or accounting for the capabilities and limitations of both friendly and enemy forces, campaign designers are able to quickly achieve national objectives with minimal loss of life and resources.

Through an analysis of command and the chain of command the moral and legal responsibility of the commander to protect the force is established. Command relationships determine the authority level of each commander. The command relationships of OPCON, TACON, and Support provide the commander the authority and the means to implement the joint force protection program. The monograph concludes that command relationships form the basis of the authority and responsibility of the commander and are effective in protecting the force

In this age of smaller forces with constrained resources, commanders are morally and legally responsible for the effective and efficient use of the resources entrusted for the defense of the Constitution of the United States. At the joint and service levels, programs have been designed and implemented to assist the commander in protecting the force for use at the proper time, space, and purpose to accomplish assigned missions. Terrorist incidents like the one that occurred June 28, 1996 at Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia remind us that our force may come under attack by adversaries not only in combat operations, but also in stability and support operations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
1. Introduction.....	1
2. Definition of Terms.....	4
Force Protection.....	4
Command Relationship.....	6
Relationship between Force Protection and Command Relationship.....	14
3. Evaluation Criteria.....	18
Paradigm Characteristics.....	18
Command Relationship Scenarios.....	20
Criteria.....	21
4. Analysis.....	22
Scenario One.....	22
Scenario Two.....	27
Scenario Three.....	30
Scenario Four.....	32
5. Conclusion.....	37
Summary.....	37
Conclusions.....	38
Recommendations.....	40
Endnotes.....	42
Bibliography.....	48

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This monograph investigates the role of command relationships in delineating authority, responsibility, and accountability for force protection during the execution of joint force operations. It assesses the effectiveness of these relationships in protecting the joint force and the effect that different command and/or support relationships have on enhancing or degrading force protection.

The public holds military leaders accountable for the effective and efficient use of these resources. When lives and equipment are lost there is a natural tendency to try and determine was the loss worth the gain? A recent example of such a loss was the bombing of U.S. military personnel at Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia. Khobar Towers served as the headquarters for the 4404th Wing (Provisional) and housed U.S. military service members in the area. Terrorist detonated a fuel truck killing nineteen and injuring 260 U.S. citizens. This incident prompted an investigation to answer the questions which commander was responsible for the loss and what could have been done to prevent the bombing. An easy answer to these questions is to blame the theater commander. The combatant commander is responsible for all military actions or misfortunes that occur within his area of responsibility and therefore he's responsible for force protection.

Perhaps it is the service departments; they have the responsibility for training, equipping, and providing forces to the combatant commander.

Prior to 1990, force protection was viewed as a safety officer function handled at the service level.¹ However this concept changed as the United States faced the reality that its forces were targets of opportunity for attack by adversaries not only in combat operations, but also in stability and support operations that have emerged in the 1990's.

The purpose of this monograph is to analyze the effect that command relationships have in determining which commander is responsible for force protection. The significance of this investigation is expressed in the following quote from Joint Publication 1 on the future of joint operations:

“The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team...The resulting team provides joint force commanders the ability to apply overwhelming force from different dimensions and directions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents... Joint warfare is essential to victory.”²

This monograph investigates and answers the research question through a five-chapter process. This chapter introduces, explains the problem, and describes its relevance for future operations. Chapter two researches and examines the doctrinal definitions of two primary terms, force protection and command relationship. This chapter also defines and examines the four types of command relationships used in joint operations. Chapter three introduces and defines the analysis criteria used in chapter four of the monograph. The criterion are based on the linkage established in chapter two between command relationship and force protection, and is based on the definition of command as defined in the Department of Defense Dictionary. Three key concepts contained within the definition of command are:

1. Authority: "The authority that a commander in the Armed Forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment."³

2. Responsibility: "The legal and ethical obligation a commander assumes for his actions, accomplishments, or failures of a unit. He is responsible for the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of personnel as well as the equipment of his command. In wartime, the commander assumes responsibility for taking and saving human lives."⁴

3. Accountability: "Is the requirement for the commander to answer for his actions to a superior."⁵

Chapter four of the monograph examines the four joint command relationships to determine the level of authority, responsibility, and accountability to develop and implement force protection measures. Chapter five summarizes the analysis and concludes that command relationships adequately delineate authority, responsibility, and accountability for force protection as part of the joint operational concept. Chapter five also contains several recommendations to improve force protection and the understanding of the effect command relationships has in protecting the force.

The monograph has two limitations. First this monograph is based primarily on joint doctrine. If joint doctrine is not fully developed, then by default Army service doctrine is used to provide doctrinal guidance. Second, this monograph only applies to U.S. forces and does not take into consideration employment within a multinational environment such as the U.N. or NATO.

CHAPTER 2

DEFINITION OF TERMS

This chapter examines, defines, and establishes the relationship between the joint terms force protection and command relationship. It first examines the joint terms individually to determine where they fit in the overall framework of joint force operations and what purpose they serve. It then determines if force protection and command relationships overlap within the framework and what, if any relationship exists between the two.

Force Protection

The first term subject to examination and discussion is force protection. The following questions form the basis for examination.

1. What is the definition of force protection?
2. What are the components of force protection?
3. How do joint force commanders execute the components of force protection?

The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia defines force protection as a “security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security

programs.”⁶ The purpose of this program is to conserve the fighting potential of the joint force for application at the proper time and space to achieve mission success. The program has four sub-components, which are:⁷

1. Protection from the enemy’s firepower and maneuver.
2. Health, welfare, morale and maintenance.
3. Safety.
4. Prevention of fratricide.

Joint force commanders provide protection from the enemy’s firepower and maneuver by making personnel, systems, and units difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. Operations security and military deception are key elements of protection.⁸

The second component of force protection: health, welfare, morale, and maintenance is accomplished by keeping personnel healthy and maintaining their fighting spirit. The joint force commander accomplishes this task by ensuring that systems are in place to maintain soldiers health and that equipment is rapidly repaired or replaced.⁹

Safety is the third component of force protection. “Sustained, high-tempo operations put personnel and equipment at risk. Command interest, discipline, and training lessen those risks. Safety in training, planning, and operations is crucial to successful combat operations and the preservation of combat power.”¹⁰ Joint force commanders take safety into account determining operational reach, tempo of operations and objectives.

The last component of force protection is the prevention of fratricide. “The primary mechanisms for limiting fratricide are command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination among component commands, rehearsals, and enhanced

situational awareness.”¹¹ Joint force commanders prevent fratricide by establishing appropriate boundaries and control measures.

Joint commanders operating at the strategic and operational level are responsible for designing campaigns and major operations to accomplish assigned missions. The methodology used by joint force commanders to design campaigns and major operations is called operational art. Joint Publication 1-02 defines operational art as “the employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.”¹² Operational art is the combatant commander’s greatest means of influence over force protection. Joint Pub 3-0 identifies fourteen fundamental elements of operational art of which nine directly pertain to force protection.¹³

1. Synergy - “Combatant commanders seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various dimensions to attain assigned objectives in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties.”¹⁴

2. Simultaneity and depth – Combatant commanders attempt “to bring forces to bear on the opponents entire structure in a near simultaneous manner.”¹⁵ The concept of depth and simultaneity contribute to force protection by destroying enemy potential before its capability can be realized or employed.¹⁶

3. Anticipation – Combatant commanders avoid surprise by monitoring and maintaining situational awareness, which allows prediction of opportunities or challenges.¹⁷ This contributes to force protection by allowing commanders and staffs to anticipate or predict risk, hazards, or threats to friendly forces.

4. Balance – Balance contributes to force protection by maintaining unit’s capabilities and ability to maintain freedom of movement. A combatant commander effects balance by designating priority of efforts and establishing appropriate command relationships.”¹⁸

5. Timing and tempo - The combatant commander conducts operations that “dominate the action, remain unpredictable and operate beyond the enemy’s ability to react.”¹⁹ This contributes to force protection by frustrating enemy commanders while buying time to build a decisive force or to tend to other priorities within the theater.²⁰

6. Operational reach - Operational reach is the distance over which military power can be concentrated and employed decisively.²¹ This contributes to force protection by placing forces in a position outside of the enemy’s ability to deliver attacks on components.

7. Forces and functions – Combatant commanders when designing campaigns account for friendly force capabilities as well as enemy capabilities.²² This contributes to force protection by ensuring that friendly forces are employed within the capabilities for which they were designed. Additionally it contributes to force protection by targeting enemy forces and functions which destroys enemy balance and ability to attack friendly forces.

8. Arranging operations – Combatant commanders determine the best arrangement of major operations to achieve the desired endstate quickly and with the least cost to personnel and equipment. Combatant commanders accomplish this by phasing operations, determining decisive points, identifying enemy and friendly centers of gravity, and planning for branches and sequels to operations.²³

9. Culmination – Combatant commanders identify when friendly or enemy forces can no longer attack or defend.²⁴ This contributes to force protection by knowing when to preserve the force or when to employ the force.

Command Relationship

The second term subject to examination and discussion is command relationship. Critical to understanding the term command relationship is understanding the two terms, command and chain of command. Command relationship is a nested concept with these two terms. The following questions form the basis of examination.

1. What is the definition of joint command?
2. What is a chain of command and how is it established within the U.S. armed forces?
3. What is a command relationship; what does it accomplish and how many types are there?

By answering these three questions a framework can be established that defines command relationship and places it within the concept of joint operations.

Joint Publication 1-2 defines command as:

“The authority that a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.”²⁵

Key points contained within this definition are the concepts of authority, responsibility, and accountability that are inherent to the commander. Authority is the right and freedom to dictate and enforce compliance in respect to the organization, allocation of resources, and employment of joint forces in the accomplishment of

assigned missions. Responsibility is defined as the “legal and ethical obligation a commander assumes for the actions, accomplishments, or failures of a unit.”²⁶

Accountability as explained in U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, is the “requirement to answer to a superior and ultimately the American public for the effective and efficient use of delegated responsibility, authority, and resources.”²⁷ Joint Pub 3-0 states that control is inherent in command.²⁸ To control is to monitor, direct, and coordinate the actions of assigned forces and functions prior, during, and after the execution of assigned missions. Control of forces and functions helps commanders and staffs determine requirements, allocate resources, coordinate and synchronize efforts. Control helps commanders assess the status and effectiveness of forces and functions in the execution of the mission and assists in determining if changes in organization, function, or additional resources are required to fulfill mission requirements.

The term joint is defined as activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which two or more military departments participate.”²⁹ This term fits within the joint framework of Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). The concept of Unified Action Armed Forces was created by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to fulfill the requirement as established by Congress over a period of 38 years to establish policy and provide doctrinal guidance governing the unified direction and action of U.S. armed forces.* Joint Publication (JP) 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) serves as the

* These requirements and policies were established under the following acts; The National Security Act of 1947, as amended in the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 and the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

capstone document for Unified Action Armed Forces and serves as the doctrinal guidance for command relationships and other authorities directed by law.³⁰

Unity of effort, unified military action, and unity of command are three key and nested tenets or concepts developed in Joint Pub 0-2 that characterize and describe the basis by which joint forces are established, provided direction, and commanded.

Unity of effort is the national strategy to achieve national goals and objectives through coordination and synchronization of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic activities of governmental and non-governmental agencies towards a commonly recognized objective.³¹

To achieve the military aspect contained within the tenet of unity of effort, the concept of unified military action was developed. This concept supports the national strategy of unity of effort by developing the doctrine under which joint forces are established, assigned a mission or objective, forces are assigned or attached to the joint force, and the joint force commander is empowered to accomplish the assigned military mission.³²

To support the concept of unified military action, the principle of unity of command as developed in The Principles of War was incorporated.* This principle supports unified military action by directing and providing the means by which all forces operate under a single commander, with the appropriate authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.

* The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia states that “ The Principles of War represent the best efforts of military thinkers to identify those aspects of war that are universally true and relevant.”

Through the development of these three tenets military joint doctrine was able to establish the concept of a joint force, under a single joint commander to achieve national objectives and goals.

The next step in the examination of command relationships is to examine what is a chain of command and how is it established. Joint Pub 1-02 defines chain of command as “the succession of commanding officers from a superior through which command is exercised.”³³

The chain of command is formed by the “National Command Authority who exercise authority and control of the armed forces through a single chain of command with two distinct branches.”³⁴ The first branch is the operational branch. This branch is used to provide operational direction of all military operations and activities conducted in support of national interests and objectives. This branch runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of combatant commands for missions and forces assigned to their command. “The second branch, used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the combatant commands runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments.”³⁵ The military departments organize, train, equip and provide forces for assignment to combatant commanders. The purpose of this branch is to prepare military forces prior to their assignment to combatant commanders and provide administrative and logistical support to forces assigned to combatant commanders.³⁶

The next step in the examination of command relationships is to examine what is a command relationship, what does it accomplish and how many types are there?

FM 101-5-1 defines command relationship as “the degree of control and responsibility a commander has for forces operating under his command.”³⁷ The level of authority that a commander has is based on the level of responsibility, mission assigned, or the degree of control required. JP 1-02 defines and describes seven levels of authorities; four of which are designated command relationships, and three are designated as authorities.

Four levels of authority designated as command relationships in descending levels of authority are: combatant command (COCOM), operational command (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and support. JP 0-2 defines and describes each command relationship in two parts. Part one defines whom or what may direct the command authority and at which level a commander may exercise the command authority. Part two describes the authority vested in the commander to perform the functions of command over the assigned forces.

Combatant command (COCOM) is defined as:

“the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the commanders of combatant command by title 10, U.S. Code section 164 or as directed by the President in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and cannot be delegated or transferred. COCOM is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, giving authoritative direction, joint training and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.”³⁸

The combatant command commander normally exercises COCOM through commanders of subordinate organizations.

Operational Control is defined as:

“the command authority exercised by commanders at or below the level of combatant command. OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the authority to perform those functions of command over

subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command.”³⁹

The combatant commander has OPCON of all forces located within his geographical area of responsibility however he normally exercises OPCON through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders.⁴⁰ OPCON normally provides authority to organize forces, assign missions, designate objectives and priorities, direct joint training, and give authoritative direction. “It does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.”⁴¹ The combatant commander must specifically designate these elements.

Tactical control is defined as:

“The command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks.”⁴²

TACON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders below the level of combatant command. TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for joint training. “TACON is typically exercised by functional component commanders over military capability or forces made available to the functional component for tasking.”⁴³ Within the “joint community” there is some confusion whether TACON authorizes a commander to assign missions or designate objectives. This confusion arises because the definition of TACON is subject to interpretation. The definition does not spell out what “...limited to the detailed and usually local direction

and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks”⁴⁴ means. Commanders tend to take the most liberal interpretation of the definition depending upon the situation and their point of view. For the purpose of this paper, TACON authorizes commanders to designate objectives within a unit’s designated mission capability to accomplish.

The joint community identifies support as a command relationship. “A support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force.”⁴⁵ Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. The purpose of support command relationships is to designate priority of efforts during planning and execution of joint operations.⁴⁶ The support command relationship is established through an establishing directive. This directive designates the supported and supporting commander, the purpose of the support, the degree of support required, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken.⁴⁷

JP 0-2 defines and describes four categories of support.⁴⁸

1. General Support – The action that is given to the supported force as a whole rather than a particular subdivision thereof.
2. Mutual Support – The action that units render each other because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other, and their inherent capabilities.
3. Direct Support - A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force request for assistance.
4. Close Support – The action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force.

The three levels of authorities not defined as command relationships are Administrative Control (ADCON), Coordinating Authority, and Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLUTH).

“ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, and discipline and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.”⁴⁹ ADCON is associated with administration and support responsibilities identified in Title 10 US Code. This is the authority necessary to fulfill Military Department statutory responsibilities for administration and support. “ADCON may be delegated and exercised by commanders of Service forces assigned to a combatant command.”⁵⁰

“Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the same Service.”⁵¹ Coordinating Authority is normally exercised by commanders at and below the level of COCOM, and normally is established by a directive.

“Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH) is that authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command.”⁵²

Relationship between Force Protection and Command Relationship

Command relationships specify the authority and responsibility of the joint force commander to protect the force and the amount of control he has in directing the forces under him to accomplish his assigned mission.⁵³ Table 1, *Command Relationship Authorities*, provides a quick summary of the levels of authorities each command relationship provides to a commander.

Command Authorities	OPCON	TACON	Supported CDR	ADCON* ADCON is not a command relationship
Assign Missions	Yes	No	No	No
Task Organize	Yes	No	No	No
Local Direction and Control Movements or Maneuvers	Yes	Yes	No	No
Designate Objectives	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Establish Battlefield Control Measures	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Establish or delegate Command Relationships	Yes	No	No	No
Risk Management	Yes	No	No	Yes
Direct Joint Training	Yes	No	No	No
Direct Service training	No	No	No	Yes
Provide Service Equipment and Materiel	No	No	No	Yes
Provide Health, Morale, Welfare, and Maintenance Services	No	No	No	Yes

Table 1. Command Relationship Authorities

The following examples of authorities conferred by command relationships highlight the ways a joint force commander protects the force:

1. Assignment of mission, task or operation based on unit capabilities.
2. Assignment of forces based on mission, task or operation requirements.
3. Obtaining and providing to subordinates the necessary assets to control risk or hazards.

4. Position forces in such a manner as to allow mission accomplishment yet minimize the effects of enemy firepower and maneuver.
5. Establish priority of effort to those enemy systems that can directly effect the joint force.
6. Establish battlefield control measures such as areas of operations and boundaries.⁵⁴ Providing clear guidance on when, where and what risk to accept.
7. Designing command relationships that ensure clarity of effort and a simple chain of command.
8. Direct joint mission training. Plan, direct, and evaluate mission required training including rehearsals.
9. Provide protective clothing, mission equipment, safety and security devices.
10. Provide health, morale, welfare, and maintenance services to maintain forces with the appropriate mental, emotional, and physical capabilities.
11. Risk assessment. Responsible for conducting a risk assessment and evaluation prior to mission execution.
12. Designating whom must account for the injury, destruction of equipment, loss of life, or mission failure.

As the above examples illustrate, force protection is fully incorporated within the authorities given to the joint force commander to influence the outcome of campaigns and major operations. The joint force commander attempts to maximize the total combat power available to achieve strategic aims as rapidly as possible while saving lives, minimizing costs and achieving success.

CHAPTER 3

EVALUATION CRITERIA

This chapter describes the methodology and evaluation criteria for analysis of the effect that joint command relationships have in determining who is responsible for force protection. A joint force organizational paradigm is the basis of the analysis and facilitates a clear visualization of the effects that different command relationships have upon force protection. The paradigm uses four different command relationship scenarios and by manipulating changes in the command relationships it is possible to assess the changes in authority, responsibility, and accountability as it relates to force protection. Chapter four then analyzes the paradigm which brings out the ways a joint force commander influences the outcome of campaigns and operations and how different command relationships effect the authority, responsibility and accountability a commander has for force protection.

Paradigm Characteristics

This paradigm contains a notional unified combatant command with a “broad continuing mission which requires single strategic direction with execution by significant forces of two or more Military Departments”⁵⁵ within a geographic area of responsibility which includes all associated land, water areas and airspace. The combatant commander receives his strategic direction from the National Command and is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for accomplishment of assigned missions. The combatant

commander exercises the command relationship of combatant command (COCOM) over all forces assigned and OPCON of attached forces within his area of responsibility or theater. The combatant commander has elected to exercise COCOM through three service component commanders (Army, Air Force, and Navy) and a subordinate Joint Task force (JTF). The combatant commander then directed the transfer of forces and delegated OPCON to their appropriate service component commanders and the JTF .

The JTF has a specific limited objective and requires execution of responsibilities involving a joint force. The JTF will be dissolved once the limited objective has been achieved. The JTF commander has organized his command into two service force commanders (Army and Navy) and the Air Force commander is dual hatted as the service force commander and a functional component (JFACC) to provide centralized direction and control of air operations. Administrative and logistical support is provided components that exercise Administrative Control (ADCON).




Figure 1. Theater Organization

Command Relationship Scenarios

Four different command relationship scenarios within the joint organizational paradigm are used in the subsequent analysis in chapter four:

1. Scenario one depicts an infantry battalion stationed at Fort Anywhere, U.S.A. receiving orders attaching the battalion for a limited time period to a overseas geographic combatant commander who exercises COCOM through the Army service component commander.

2. Scenario two depicts the infantry battalion transferred by the combatant commander OPCON to the Joint Task Force (JTF), who attaches the battalion to the Army force commander OPCON. The Army Service Component exercises Administrative Control (ADCON) through the Army force commander for the infantry battalion

3. Scenario three depicts the infantry battalion attached OPCON to the JTF, who transfers the battalion OPCON to the Army force commander, while delegating TACON over the battalion to the Air Force commander, for the conduct of airbase defense.

4. Scenario four depicts the infantry battalion transferred by the combatant commander OPCON to the Joint Task Force (JTF), who attaches the battalion to the Army force commander OPCON. The JTF commander directed the Army force commander to support the Air Force commander in conducting an air base defense. The Army force commander decided to fulfill his supporting commander responsibility by directing the infantry battalion to support the Air Force commander.

Criteria

The evaluation criteria used to conduct the analysis is based on the definition of command as described in U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5 and contains three parts:

1. Authority: "The legitimate power that a commander in the Armed Forces uses to direct subordinates or to take action within their level of responsibility".⁵⁶ Specifically in this monograph authority is used to ascertain who has the authority to assign missions, task organize, designate objectives, direct movements, and designate further command relationships.

2. Responsibility: "The legal, or ethically duty of the commander to account for the welfare and care of military forces".⁵⁷ Specifically in this monograph authority is used to ascertain who is responsible to direct training, provide logistical support, provide administrative support, and conduct a risk assessment.

3. Accountability: "The legal and ethical obligation a commander assumes for his actions, accomplishments, or failures of a unit".⁵⁸ It is the requirement for the commander to answer for his actions to a superior. Specifically in this monograph authority is used to ascertain who must account for injury, destruction of equipment, loss of life, or mission failure.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

This chapter contains the analysis of the effect that joint command relationships have in determining which commander is responsible for force protection. This analysis is conducted in four scenarios.

Scenario One

Scenario one depicts an infantry battalion stationed at Fort Anywhere, U.S.A. receiving orders attaching the battalion for a limited time period to a overseas geographic combatant commander who exercises COCOM through his Army service component commander.




Figure 2. Scenario One

This scenario focuses on the authority, responsibility, and accountability of the combatant commander exercising COCOM through the Army service component commander who exercises OPCON over the infantry battalion and the effect these command relationships have on force protection. "Combatant commander's

may directly control the conduct of military operations or may delegate that authority and responsibility to a subordinate commander".⁵⁹ In this scenario the combatant commander has assigned a mission to the Army service component commander and is supporting the operation with forces and resources. This type of relationship is referred in joint publications as a two tiered system and is currently in effect in all theaters.⁶⁰

In executing a two tiered system, combatant commanders are responsible for unified actions planned and conducted in accordance with the guidance and direction received from National Command Authorities and combatant commanders ensure that these actions are synchronized in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces and non-military organizations.⁶¹

By exercising COCOM authority through service component commanders the combatant commander has created an efficient and streamlined chain of command. The combatant commander has authorized the Army service component commander to assign missions, task organize, designate objectives, direct movements and determine further command relationships with regards to the infantry battalion. This two tiered system allows service tactical and operational groupings to function generally as they were designed.

Title 10, of the United States Code (Title 10, USC) states that Military Departments are responsible for the training, logistical, and administrative support of their forces assigned to combatant commanders. The two tiered system reinforces the intent of Title 10, USC by designating the service component commanders responsible for training, administrative, logistical and communications support for service units assigned or attached to the theater.

In this scenario the combatant commander has delegated the authority for conducting military operations to the Army service component commander while retaining the responsibility for the design of the campaign. The combatant commander still retains accountability for force protection based on the principle of command that states while you can delegate authority you may never give away responsibility and accountability. The combatant commander is charged with the responsibility and accountability for all military actions that occur within his area of responsibility.

In this scenario the Army service component commander has OPCON of the attached infantry battalion. By definition, OPCON gives the commander the authority to assign missions, task organize, designate objectives, direct movements, determine risk level, direct joint training, and impose further command relationships of OPCON, TACON or Support to the infantry battalion. OPCON does not give the commander authority to direct unit training nor does it provide authoritative direction for logistics or administration. However in this scenario the OPCON commander and the Army service component commander are the same and do have legal responsibility for unit training, administration, and logistics. This scenario depicts the most efficient and simplest chain of command for the infantry battalion. The chain of command is clear and concise as to who assigns missions and who is responsible for administration and logistics.

The authority and responsibility for force protection is clearly spelled out for army commanders in FM 100 – 14, *Risk Management*, which states that: “ARFOR commander/leaders must continuously employ risk management approaches to effectively preclude unacceptable risks to personnel and property, including protecting forces preparing for or enroute to combat.”⁶²

Through the authority granted by the definition of OPCON, the commander can fulfill his responsibility for force protection by:

1. Assigning missions, tasks, or operations within the capabilities and the limitations of the infantry battalion.

2. Determining the task organization based on a mission analysis of the mission, task, or operation ensuring that the unit has the capability to achieve mission success without causing unacceptable losses in life or equipment. If the unit does not have the capability to complete the mission the commander has the responsibility to obtain or provide the necessary assets to control risk or hazards.

3. Designating objectives, establishing priorities, positioning forces, and directing movements as authorized within the definition of OPCON. These authorities allow the commander to accomplish his mission yet account for and minimize the effects of enemy firepower and maneuver. The commander uses these methods to provide force protection by attacking those enemy systems that directly effect the joint force and in controlling the battlefield to prevent fratricide.

4. Conducting a risk assessment of current and future operations. The Army service component commander is responsible for implementing and ensuring compliance with all Army regulations which includes the Army force Protection Program as outlined in U.S. Army Field Manual 100-14, *Risk Management*.

5. Directing training. The OPCON commander may direct joint training and in his dual role as the Army service component commander may direct unit training to increase a units capability to reduce risk with the ultimate goal of preventing or limiting the loss of friendly life or equipment.

6. Directing further command relationships of OPCON, TACON, and Support.

The purpose of further delegating authority is to ensure clarity of effort and the establishment of a clear chain of command. This assists in force protection by clearly identifying the commander responsible for determining and specifying when, where, and what risk to accept.

7. Providing logistical and administrative support in his role as the Army service component commander. This includes protective clothing, mission equipment, safety and security devices as well as the responsibility to provide health, morale, welfare, and maintenance services to maintain forces with the appropriate mental, emotional, and physical capabilities.

This scenario depicts the simplest and clearest line of responsibility for force protection. The combatant commander is responsible for campaign design within the theater and the protection of the forces assigned and attached to the theater. The combatant commander executes this responsibility by transferring forces and delegating authority to the Army service component commander who plans and executes army operations and missions within the theater and is also responsible for army administration and logistics. The Army service component commander is responsible for the implementation and monitoring compliance with army service regulations, which includes force protection and shares with the combatant commander the responsibility and accountability for protecting the force.

Scenario Two

Scenario two depicts the infantry battalion transferred by the combatant commander OPCON to the Joint Task Force (JTF), who attaches the battalion to the Army force commander OPCON. The Army Service Component exercises Administrative Control (ADCON) through the Army force commander for the infantry battalion




Figure 3. Scenario Two

The analysis during this scenario will focus on the authority, responsibility, and accountability of the Army force commander who exercises OPCON and the Army service component commander who exercises the ADCON level of authority through the Army force commander over the infantry battalion and the effect these relationships have on force protection. The roles of the combatant commander and the JTF commander are not discussed during this analysis as they remain the same as previously analyzed.

In this scenario the Army force commander has OPCON over the attached infantry battalion. By definition, OPCON gives the commander the authority to assign missions, task organize, designate objectives, direct movements, determine risk level, direct joint training, and impose further command relationships of OPCON, TACON, or Support to the infantry battalion. OPCON does not give a commander authority to direct

unit training nor does it provide authoritative direction for logistics or administration.

The OPCON commander in this case has the same authority and responsibility for force protection as outlined in scenario one.

In this scenario the Army service component commander exercises ADCON through the Army force commander is responsible for supporting the infantry battalion. As part of the support function the Army service component commander is responsible for:

1. "Recommending to the combatant commander the proper employment of Army component forces."⁶³ In this role the Army service component commander recommends to the combatant commander the composition and structure of the ARFOR within the JTF based on a mission analysis of upcoming operations and the capabilities required to accomplish the mission. This relates to force protection as this assists the combatant commander in determining the proper mix of joint forces to accomplish the mission without unacceptable loss of life or equipment.

2. "Selecting and nominating specific Army units for assignment to theater forces."⁶⁴ In this role the Army service component commander selects units for assignment to the JTF based on unit capabilities, level of training, readiness of equipment, and availability. This contributes to force protection by ensuring that all ARFOR units assigned to the JTF are properly trained and equipped to accomplish their assigned mission.

3. "Conducting army specific functions such as administration, logistics, unit training, and Army intelligence matters."⁶⁵ The Army service component

commander is responsible for ensuring that ARFOR units attached to the JTF adhere to all Army service policies and regulations which includes force protection.

4. Ensuring signal interoperability with other joint forces.⁶⁶ In this role the Army service component commander is responsible for ensuring that ARFOR units attached to the JTF have the capability to communicate with the required headquarters. This relates to force protection as it ensures that commanders can communicate with superiors and command and control subordinates.

This scenario depicts a four-way responsibility for force protection between the combatant commander, the JTF commander, the Army force commander and the Army service component commander. The combatant commander is responsible for campaign design within the theater and for providing direction to the JTF Commander. The JTF commander is responsible for campaign design within the Joint Operations Area and like the combatant commander contributes to force protection by considering the fundamentals of operational art when designing a campaign plan. The Army force commander executes army operations and missions within the Joint Operations Area, and executes force protection measures through the authority granted by the command relationship of OPCON. The Army service component commander, through his ADCON level of authority provides trained, equipped and ready Army forces to the JTF commander. He fulfills his force protection responsibilities by ensuring that Army forces adhere to Army policies and regulations and ensures that the Army force is prepared to accomplish its assigned mission.

Within the realm of force protection, authority and responsibility for force protection may overlap between the Army force commander and the Army service component commander. This overlap is resolved in at least two ways:

1. By doctrine, the Army force commander is responsible for the conduct of operations and the Army service component commander is responsible for supporting Army operations. OPCON is a command relationship versus ADCON, which is a level of authority. The OPCON commander has the authority and responsibility for force protection and will be held accountable for failure.

2. The Army service component commander in his role as an advisor for Army operations to the combatant commander can ensure that Army units are employed correctly and in a manner for which they were designed.

Scenario Three

Scenario three depicts the infantry battalion attached OPCON to a JTF, who transfers the battalion OPCON to the Army force commander, while delegating TACON over the battalion to the Air Force commander, for the conduct of airbase defense.




Figure 4. Scenario Three

The analysis during this scenario focuses on the authority, responsibility, and accountability of the Army force commander who maintains OPCON of the infantry battalion and the Air Force commander who exercises TACON and the effect these command relationships have on force protection. The role of the combatant commander, JTF commander, and the Army service component commander are not discussed during this analysis, as they remain the same as previously analyzed.

Under an OPCON relationship, a commander is authorized to assign missions, task organize, designate objectives, direct movements, determine risk levels, direct joint training, impose further command relationships, and direct communications links. Upon delegation of authority to the Air Force commander, the OPCON commander gives up some of his OPCON authority. He gives up the authority to designate objectives and direct local movements and maneuvers to accomplish assigned missions. He retains the authority to assign missions, task organize, determine risk levels, and direct joint training.

The OPCON commander is responsible for ensuring that the infantry battalion TACON to the Air Force commander, is prepared and equipped to accomplish the assigned mission based on service doctrine. During the planning phase the OPCON commander is responsible for conducting a risk assessment to determine the level of risk and the amount of acceptable risk. If the risk exceeds the acceptable risk level the OPCON commander must apply additional resources or change employment techniques to reduce the risk or ask for relief from the JTF commander. During the conduct of the mission the infantry battalion keeps the OPCON commander informed on the status of the mission.

The TACON commander has the authority to designate objectives and direct movements that are within the capability of the unit to execute, within the assigned mission of the TACON unit, and within the acceptable risk limitations established by the OPCON commander during the planning phase of the operation. If a conflict arises between the unit and the TACON commander concerning the tactics and techniques used to conduct the mission; the unit has an obligation to inform the OPCON commander to resolve the issue.

During the conduct of this mission, the OPCON commander retains the authority for mission direction, and will be held accountable for force protection. The TACON commander is not responsible for force protection as he cannot designate objectives and movements that are outside the units acceptable risk level as established by the OPCON commander. The use of TACON as a command relationship is not fully defined in joint publications which can lead to confusion as which commander is responsible for force protection.

Scenario Four

Scenario four depicts the infantry battalion transferred by the combatant commander OPCON to the Joint Task Force (JTF), who attaches the battalion to the Army force commander OPCON. The JTF commander directed the Army force commander to support the Air Force commander in conducting an air base defense. The Army force commander decided to fulfill his supporting commander responsibility by directing the infantry battalion to support the Air Force commander.




Figure 5. Scenario Four

The analysis during this scenario will focus on the authority, responsibility, and accountability of the Army force commander who exercises OPCON and the Air Force commander who exercises the command relationship of a supported commander over the infantry battalion and the effect this command relationship has on force protection. The JTF commander has designated the Air Force commander as the supported commander for airbase ground defense and the Army commander as the supporting commander.

Other authorities that can be contained within the directive are:⁶⁷

1. Forces and other resources allocated to the supporting effort.
2. Time place, level and duration of the supporting effort.
3. Priority of the supporting effort.
4. The degree of authority to modify the directive by either the supporting or supported commander.

The Army commander determined that he will satisfy the Air Force requirement by directing the infantry battalion to conduct an airbase defense.

Unless limited by the establishing directive, the supporting commander determines the “forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications used during the support.”⁶⁸ The supported commander, unless limited by the establishing directive,

may “designate and prioritize targets or objectives, timing and duration of support and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.”⁶⁹

Under an OPCON relationship a commander is authorized to assign missions, task organize, designate objectives, direct movements, determine risk levels, direct joint training, impose further command relationships, and direct communications links. When an OPCON commander directs a subordinate unit to support another headquarters, he gives up some of his OPCON authority within the limits of the establishing directive. The authority he gives up is the authority to designate or prioritize objectives, the timing and duration of the support, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency. The authority he retains is the authority to assign missions, task organize, determine risk levels, direct joint training, and direct communications links.

The OPCON commander is responsible for ensuring that the unit conducting the support is prepared and equipped to accomplish the assigned mission based on service doctrine. During the planning phase the OPCON commander is responsible for conducting a risk assessment to determine the level of risk and the amount of risk that is acceptable. If the risk exceeds the acceptable level that the OPCON commander is willing to take he must apply additional resources to reduce the risk or ask for relief from the directive from the JTF commander. During the conduct of the mission the infantry battalion establishes communications links and keeps the OPCON commander informed on the status of the mission.

The Supported commander has the authority to designate or prioritize objectives, determine the timing and duration of the support, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency. If a conflict arises between the supported commander and

the supporting commander on the tactics and techniques used to conduct the mission; the supported commander has an obligation to inform the supporting commander to resolve the issue. If an agreement between the commanders is not possible the supported commander raises the issue with the JTF commander.

During the conduct of the mission, the OPCON commander is responsible for force protection and will be held accountable. The supported commander is not responsible for force protection. He cannot designate objectives nor issue instructions outside the supported mission parameters.

The use of Support as a command relationship is fully defined in joint publications. However in execution joint commander's rarely issue instructions beyond the basic designation of supported and supporting commander's. This leads to confusion as to the authorities that each commander has and can lead to confusion as to force protection responsibilities.

Through an analysis of the joint organizational paradigm and the four command relationship scenarios contained within the paradigm, the following conclusions are made:

1. Command relationships provide the authority and delineate responsibility for force protection.
2. The means for implementing force protection measures are contained within command authorities such as: assigning missions, directing task organization, directing movements, establishing further command relationships.

3. The definition of TACON does not sufficiently define the level of authority that a commander may exercise. This causes confusion as to the authorities it grants a commander.

4. The Support directive rarely states instructions beyond the basic designation of supported and supporting commanders. This leads to confusion as to the authorities that each commander has and can lead to confusion as to force protection responsibilities.

5. Command relationships and ADCON overlap within risk management responsibilities and can cause confusion in determining force protection authorities and responsibilities.

Table 2, *Scenario Summary* provides a graphic summary of the levels of authorities that each command relationship authorized based on the four command relationship scenarios.

	OPCON	TACON	Supported CDR	ADCON
Scenario One Infantry battalion OPCON to Army Service Component Commander.	-Assign mission -Task organize -Direct/control movements -Est. C ² -Risk Mgmt -Joint/unit tng. -Logistics & Admin	NA	NA	Same CDR as OPCON
Scenario Two Infantry battalion transferred to JTF, OPCON to Army force commander	-Assign mission -Task organize -Direct/control movements -Est. C ² -Risk Mgmt -Joint tng.	NA	NA	-Risk Mgmt -Joint/unit tng. -Logistics & Admin
Scenario Three Infantry battalion transferred to JTF, OPCON to Army force commander, TACON to Air Force commander	-Assign mission -Task organize -Est. C ² -Risk Mgmt -Joint/unit tng.	-Assign obj. -Local direction and control	NA	-Risk Mgmt -Joint/unit tng. -Logistics & Admin
Scenario Four Infantry battalion transferred to JTF, OPCON to Army force commander, Army force commander designated supporting commander, Air Force designated supported commander for airbase defense	-Assign mission -Task organize -Direct/control movements -Est. C ² -Risk Mgmt -Joint tng.	NA	-Designate obj. -Timing & duration	-Risk Mgmt -Joint/unit tng. -Logistics & Admin

Table 2. Scenario Summary

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This chapter summarizes the analysis, establishes a conclusion, and provides recommendations on the role command relationships play in delineating authority, responsibility, and accountability for force protection during the execution of joint force operations.

Summary

This monograph analyzes the joint force protection program by investigating the terms; command, chain of command, command relationship, and how these terms authorize and empower a commander to implement this program across the joint force. Joint force commanders, through operational art and the design of campaigns and major operations accomplish assigned missions in support of national objectives. Application of the tenets of operational art provide the campaign planner the greatest means of protecting the force at the strategic and operational levels. By incorporating or accounting for the capabilities and limitations of both friendly and enemy forces, campaign designers are able to quickly achieve national objectives with minimal loss of life and resources. Through an analysis of command and the chain of command the moral and legal responsibility of the commander to protect the force is established. Command relationships determine the authority level of each commander. The command relationships of OPCON, TACON, and Support provide the commander the authority and

the means to implement the joint force protection program. Table 3, *Command Relationship Authorities* summarizes the level of authority each command relationship authorizes.

Command Authorities	OPCON	TACON	Supported CDR
Assign Missions	Yes	No	No
Task Organize	Yes	No	No
Local Direction and Control Movements or Maneuvers	Yes	Yes	No
Designate Objectives	Yes	Yes	Yes
Establish Battlefield Control Measures	Yes	Yes	Yes
Establish or delegate Command Relationships	Yes	No	No
Risk Management	Yes	No	No
Direct Joint Training	Yes	No	No
Direct Service training	No	No	No
Provide Service Equipment and Materiel	No	No	No
Provide Health, Morale, Welfare, and Maintenance Services	No	No	No

Table 3. Command Relationship Authorities

Conclusions

Through an analysis of the joint organizational paradigm and the four command relationship scenarios contained within the paradigm, the following conclusions are made:

1. The Joint Force Protection Program is not fully developed. The concept of the program is explained within four paragraphs of Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, and consists of the four tenets:

1. Protection from the enemy's firepower and maneuver.
2. Health, welfare, morale and maintenance.
3. Safety.

4. Prevention of fratricide.

No single source document explains the authority and responsibility of the commander or how to implement these concepts. A search of the official Department of the Defense home page, *Defense Link*, produced documents relating to protection from terrorist attacks, but did not address force protection across the full spectrum of conflict. U.S. Army doctrine on force protection is more developed and documented excellently in FM 100-14 *Risk Management*. The Army program is based on risk management and integrates risk management into all phase of training and operations, allowing the appropriate commander to make the risk decision at the appropriate level.

2. The command relationships of COCOM, OPCON, TACON, and Support provide the authority and responsibility for the commander to evaluate risks, properly employ forces, and take appropriate measures to prevent the wasteful loss of life or resources. These relationships are the basis of the authority of the commander and are effective in the implementation of the joint force protection program. Additionally, command relationships form the basis for the moral and legal accountability of a commander for his actions.

3. The means for implementing force protection measures are contained within command authorities such as: assigning missions, directing task organization, directing movements, and establishing further command relationships. These authorities are inherent in the command relationship of OPCON. The OPCON commander has the authority and the responsibility for force protection and will be held accountable for failure.

4. The command relationship of TACON is poorly defined and subject to interpretation by commanders. TACON is defined differently within joint publications which leads to confusion. This causes problems in the execution of force protection as commanders may not understand or even know the authorities and responsibilities the TACON relationship provides.

5. The command relationship of Support is very clear and concise. A key component to Support is the establishing directive. This directive designates the supported and supporting commander, the purpose of the support, the degree of support required, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken.⁷⁰ Unfortunately, in execution joint commanders rarely go beyond designating the supported and supporting commanders and miss an opportune time to clearly delineate authority and responsibility.

6. Command relationships and ADCON overlap within risk management responsibilities and can cause confusion in determining force protection authorities and responsibilities.

Recommendations

Three recommendations are the result of the analysis.

1. Establish a single source joint document for force protection that encompasses all levels of conflict. This document should address the authorities and responsibilities that joint commanders have for force protection and provide implementation guidance.

2. Re-write the joint definition of TACON in clear and concise terms that eliminates misinterpretation by commanders.

3. Explain in joint doctrine the importance of Support Directives that specify the supporting and supported commander, the purpose of the support, the degree of support required, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken.⁷¹

In this age of smaller forces with constrained resources, commanders are morally and legally responsible for the effective and efficient use of the resources entrusted for the defense of the Constitution of the United States. At the joint and service levels, programs have been designed and implemented to assist the commander in protecting the force for use at the proper time, space, and purpose to accomplish assigned missions. Terrorist incidents like the one that occurred at Khobar Towers remind us that our force may come under attack by adversaries not only in combat operations, but also in stability and support operations.

ENDNOTES

¹U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-14, *Risk Management* (Washington, D.C.: April, 1998), iii. Hereinafter, FM 100-14.

²Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), i.

³Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994), 84. Hereinafter, JP 1-02. Hereinafter, JP 1-02.

⁴U.S. Department of the Army, FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, May, 1997), 1-1. Hereinafter, FM 101-5.

⁵*Ibid.*, 1-1 and 1-2.

⁶Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997), 295.

⁷Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), IV-7. Hereinafter, JP 3-0.

⁸*Ibid.*, IV-6.

⁹*Ibid.*, IV-6.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, IV-6.

¹¹*Ibid.*, IV-6.

¹²JP 1-02, 314.

¹³JP 3-0, III-9 to III-23.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, III- 9.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, III-11.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, III-11.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, III- 12.

¹⁸Ibid., III-13.

¹⁹Ibid., III-15.

²⁰Ibid., III-15.

²¹Ibid., III-16.

²²Ibid., III-17.

²³Ibid., III-20.

²⁴Ibid., III-22.

²⁵JP 1-02, 84.

²⁶FM 101-5, 1.1.

²⁷Ibid., 1.1 – 1.2.

²⁸JP 3-0, II-17.

²⁹JP 1-02, 230

³⁰Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), preface and i. Hereinafter, JP 0-2.

³¹JP0-2, I-4.

³²Ibid., I-5.

³³JP 1-02, 68.

³⁴JP 0-2, I-7.

³⁵Ibid., I-7.

³⁶Ibid., I-7.

³⁷U.S. Department of the Army, FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Graphics* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, September, 1997), 1-35. Hereinafter, FM 101-5-1

- ³⁸JP 0-2, III-5.
- ³⁹Ibid., III-8.
- ⁴⁰Ibid., III-8.
- ⁴¹Ibid., III-8.
- ⁴²Ibid., III-9.
- ⁴³Ibid., III-10.
- ⁴⁴Ibid., III-9.
- ⁴⁵Ibid., III-10.
- ⁴⁶Ibid., III-11.
- ⁴⁷Ibid., III-10 to 11.
- ⁴⁸Ibid., III-11.
- ⁴⁹Ibid., III-12.
- ⁵⁰Ibid., III-12.
- ⁵¹Ibid., III-12.
- ⁵²Ibid., III-12.
- ⁵³Ibid., II-16.
- ⁵⁴FM 100-14, 2-15.
- ⁵⁵JP 3-0, II-11.
- ⁵⁶FM 101-5, 1-1.
- ⁵⁷Ibid., 1-1.
- ⁵⁸Ibid., 1-1.

⁵⁹JP 3-0, II-11.

⁶⁰Ibid., II-11.

⁶¹Ibid., II-11.

⁶²FM 100-14, 3-7.

⁶³U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, May, 1995), 2-24. Hereinafter, FM 100-7.

⁶⁴Ibid., 2-24.

⁶⁵Ibid., 2-24.

⁶⁶Ibid., 2-24.

⁶⁷JP 0-2, III-10.

⁶⁸Ibid., III-10.

⁶⁹Ibid., III-10.

⁷⁰Ibid., III-10 to 11.

⁷¹Ibid., III-10 to 11.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

- U.S. Department of the Army. FM 100-5. *Operations*. Washington, D.C., 14 June 1993.
- U.S. Department of the Army. FM 100-7. *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*. Washington, D.C., 31 May 1995.
- U.S. Department of the Army. FM 100-14. *Risk Management*. Washington, D.C., 23 April 1998.
- U.S. Department of the Army. FM 101-5. *Staff Organization and Operations*. Washington, D.C., 31 May 1977.
- U.S. Department of the Army. FM 101-5-1. *Operational Terms and Graphics*. Washington, D.C., 30 September 1997.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia*. Washington, D.C., 16 July 1997.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. JP 0-2. *Unified Action Armed Forces*. Washington, D.C., 24 February 1995.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. JP 1. *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*. Washington, D.C., 10 January 1995.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. JP 1-02. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington, D.C., Amended through 12 January 1998.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. JP 3-0. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associate Terms*. Washington, D.C., 1 February 1995.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. JP 3-07. *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*. Washington, D.C., 16 June 1995.

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Joint Chiefs of Staff. JP 5-0. *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*. Washington, D.C., 13 April 1995.

MONOGRAPHS

Hanley, James N. *Force Protection of Strategic Airlift Forces in the Operations Other Than War Environment*. Monograph, School of Advance Military Studies, U.S. Army CGSC, 1995.

Lindner James F. *Force Protection: A Critical Function During Operations Other Than War*. Monograph, Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, 16 May 1995.

Pangman, Dale I. *Can the U.S. Adequately Protect its Forces?* Monograph, Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, 13 Jun 1997.

Stewart, Michael D. *Protecting the Force in Operations Other Than War*. Monograph, School of Advance Military Studies, U.S. Army CGSC, 1995.

Thurman, John L. *A methodology for Evaluating Force Protection During a Computer aided Exercise*. Monograph, Naval Postgraduate School, September 1996.

Winstead, Michael D. *Force Protection as a Battlefield Operating System*. Monograph, School of Advance Military Studies, U.S. Army CGSC, 1995.

STUDIES

Durell-Young, Thomas. "Command in Coalition Operations." In *Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations*, edited by Thomas J. Marshall, with Phillip Kaiser and Jon. Kessmeire, 23-48. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997.