Three Essays on the Economics of Military Manpower
Abstract
Three separate areas of military manpower are analyzed: the effects of retirement pay on quits, and of military service on lifetime earnings; and the quantity-quality trade-offs in the market for recruits. Coupling the 1986 change in military retirement pay with the Army's delayed entry program makes a natural experiment with individuals entering active duty during the same period governed by retirement systems whose generosity differs by as much as 20%. Focusing only on Army enlistees, lower bounds for the elasticity of retention with respect to retirement pay are 0.80 for two-year and 0.00 for three and four-year enlistees. With simple assumptions and ignoring additional costs in recruiting, this analysis suggests the costs of the new retirement system exceed the benefits. We analyze the effect of changes in quantity demanded on the supply of quality. Using data on military recruiting over an eight-year period in the 1990s provides sufficient variation in economic conditions and demand to estimate this relationship.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 01, 1999
- Accession Number
- ADA366417
Entities
People
- David C. Trybula
Organizations
- University of Texas at Austin