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11 October 1984

KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT

CONTENTS

INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

Korea: Its Security Matters, International Situation (ANJON POJANG, No 6, Jul 84).....	1
Korean Unification Proposals Analyzed (Ch'oe P'yong-kil; TONGIL NONCHONG, No 1, 1984).....	13
Shipment of Red Cross Relief to South (KCNA, 21, 22 Sep 84).....	38
'People Eager' KCNA Condemns 'Special Alert Order'	
Reportage on Chon's Trip to Japan (KCNA, various dates).....	40
Japan's Remarks Criticized RPR Denounces Chon's Trip South Korean People Said Critical Foreign Media Noted	
Daily Calls S. Korean Economy 'Crippled One' (KCNA, 19 Sep 84).....	43
Canadian Korean Paper Hits Japanese Aid (KCNA, 20 Sep 84).....	45
South's Workers Condemn U.S. 'Economic Domination' (KCNA, 21 Sep 84).....	46
South's Peasants Said Hit by Crop Prices, Taxes (KCNA, 20 Sep 84).....	47

Japanese Daily Cited on CHONGNYON Hierarchy (THE KOREA HERALD, 18 Sep 84).....	48
Korea-U.S.-Japan Alliance Worries USSR (Pak Chong-kun; HANGUK ILBO, 18 Jul 84).....	49
DPRK Red Cross Society Decides To Aid South (Various sources, various dates).....	52
Worker Welcomes Decision	
Authorities' Attitude Denounced	
Repercussions Noted	
South 'Slandering' Aid Offer	
Aid Goods Not Needed	
Editorial on Acceptance of Offer	
Chronological Review	
Blame for Breakdown of Talks	
North's 'Propaganda' at Talks Hit, by Chue Won-sok	
DKP Flays North	
North Hopeful of Early Delivery	
South Hails North's Offer	
South, North Minister's Meeting at UNGA Doubtful (YONHAP, 21 Sep 84).....	66
Briefs	
Antigovernment Unification Discussion	67
National Security Briefing	67

SOUTH KOREA

POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

Opposition DKP Said Sharpening Image for Elections (Kim Myong-sik; THE KOREA TIMES, 23 Sep 84).....	68
TIMES on Opening of Assembly Session (Editorial: THE KOREA TIMES, 21 Sep 84).....	70
DJP-DKP Conflict Regarding Political Bills Viewed (THE KOREA TIMES, 23 Sep 84).....	72
Briefs	
DKP on '85 Budget	74

ECONOMY

Briefs

Patent Applications Increase	75
------------------------------	----

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

New Venture for Big Business: Advanced Medical Appliances Industry (HANGUK KYONGJE SINMUN, 1 Aug 84).....	76
--	----

Subsidies, U.S. Tech Transfers Push Semiconductor Plans (WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE, 17 Aug 84).....	82
---	----

FOREIGN RELATIONS

HERALD Praises Ties, Amity With Gabon (Editorial; THE KOREA HERALD, 22 Sep 84).....	85
--	----

Briefs

Closer Ties With Allies	87
Japan in Fisheries Talks	87
Australian Visitor	87
Japan-ROK Relations Poll	88

FOREIGN TRADE

Overseas Construction Markets To Be Diversified (YONHAP, 20 Sep 84).....	89
---	----

Ministry Tally on Machinery Exports (YONHAP, 22 Sep 84).....	91
---	----

Briefs

Korea-Thailand Trade Talks	92
Kuwaiti Communications Minister	92

NORTH KOREA

POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

Kim Chong-il Revered as World Leader (NODONG CHONGYON, 28 Jul 84).....	93
---	----

Table of Contents for KULLOJA, September 1984 (KULLOJA, Sep 84).....	97
---	----

ECONOMY

KCNA Notes Development in Chagang Province (KCNA, 20 Sep 84).....	98
--	----

Briefs

Maize Harvesting Begins	100
-------------------------	-----

MEDIA AND THE ARTS

Briefs

Jilin Art Group	101
DPRK Journalists	101
Writers Union Group	101
Pyongyang Art Troupe	101
CHONGNYON Publishes 'Educational' Work	102

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Briefs

DPRK-Hungary Scientific Accord	103
--------------------------------	-----

KOREANS IN JAPAN

Anti-CHONGNYON Moves in Japan Criticized (KCNA, 19 Sep 84).....	104
--	-----

Briefs

Sports Meet of Koreans	105
Home-Visiting Koreans	105
Anti-CHONGNYON Actions Protested	105

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Daily Hits U.S. for Plan To Create Second 'Grenada' (KCNA, 19 Sep 84).....	106
---	-----

Reportage on North Korea's 36th Anniversary (KCNA, 20, 21 Sep 84).....	107
---	-----

Foreign Meetings Noted
Foreign Leaders Greetings
Foreign Papers Mark Anniversary

Daily Comments on Japan's Defense Paper (KCNA, 19 Sep 84).....	111
---	-----

Delegations Arrive for Bank Celebration (KCNA, 26 Sep 84).....	112
Briefs	
Teachers Visits	113
Meeting on Ethiopian Revolution	113
WPK Group to China	113
Foreign Visitors	113
UNESCO Official	114
UN Food Delegation	114
DPRK Ambassador to Norway	114
Hwang Chang-yop Meeting	114
East Europe, USSR Visitors	114
Message From Vietnam Leaders	115

INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

KOREA: ITS SECURITY MATTERS, INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

Seoul ANJON POJANG in Korean No 6, Jul 84 pp 14-20

[Article by the First Army Command: "Situations Around Korea and the Security of the Korean Peninsula"]

[Text] 1. An Outline

With the backing of the Soviet Union, the Cubans, North Koreans, and other communists are stirring up all sorts of trouble by various means, ranging from terrorist activities to the setting up of communist dictatorships all over the world, beginning with Afghanistan, Africa, the Middle East and Central and South America.

As American political scientist Hans J. Morgenthau said, the reality today is that "nations are only interested in power for their own interests." With no exception, the feeling of tension in and around the Korean peninsula is growing more than ever before, because Korea is surrounded by major powers such as the United States, the Soviet Union, Communist China, and Japan, whose interests in the area are all different. Tension is also growing because of the frequent provocations by the communist dictatorship of Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-il of North Korea, which exists in reality.

For this reason, college students like you, who should be peacefully and proudly immersed in your studies, are compelled to receive military training by taking the trouble to come all the way to this front. Accordingly, I would like to examine with you the situations surrounding the Korean peninsula, the chances of North Korean provocations, and to discuss with you our policy for that eventuality.

2. Situations Around Korea

a. Soviet Military Strategy

The Soviet Union is pursuing a strategy to make inroads, whenever possible, into areas where the U.S.'s political interests and military preparations are weak. They are doing this by, first of all, securing nuclear superiority over the United States, building up conventional war capabilities sufficient to achieve their objectives, and tightening up control over the military of the Warsaw Pact nations in Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Union has traditionally pursued a policy of southward expansion to obtain ice-free ports since the time of Tsarist Russia. Toward the end of the 1850's, Russia took over the lower regions of the Amur River, the maritime province east of the Ussuri River, and secured the strategic spot in the Far East, Vladivostok, an ice-free port, by extracting under duress the Aigun Treaty and the Treaty of Peking from the declining Ch'ing China. In consequence, Russia came to share a common border with our country, penetrated deep into the Korean peninsula via Manchuria, and finally touched off the Russo-Japanese War in 1904.

Following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the Soviet Union schemed for the communist takeover of the world and instigated bloody revolutions through Communist International. Furthermore, shortly before the end of World War II the Soviets ruthlessly seized territories, starting with East Germany, seven other East European countries, and in the Far East, North Korea, Sakhalin, the four northern Japanese islands, Kunashiri, Etorofu, Habonai, and Shikotan, and have continued to occupy them down to today.

If we examine the Soviet strategies a little more closely, the Soviet Union is trying hard to prevent the formation of a trilateral cooperative system against the Soviet Union between the United States, Japan, and the People's Republic of China. They are trying to weaken U.S. influence in Asia, isolate and encircle Communist China militarily and politically by keeping North Korea and the Indochina peninsula within its sphere of influence, bring about the abrogation of the U.S.-Japan Security System by seeking the neutralization of Japan, step up the penetration into the Middle East oil fields along the Persian Gulf, and furthermore, strengthen the ability to block the sea supply route to the Western nations.

b. Recent Soviet Military Activities

The fact that Russia could defend the Kremlin Palace in Moscow to the last against Napoleon's massive onslaught in 1812, and again against Hitler's invasion during World War II, even at the cost of 20 million civilian lives, was due to the fact that Russia possessed huge land forces. Until World War II, however, the Soviet Union had maintained a policy of only defending its own territory, but as its policy was changed to one of communist expansion throughout the world after the end of World War II, it has stepped up the expansion of its air and naval forces. Accordingly, its navy, whose role has been the defense of its coastal waters until World War II, has moved out into the ocean since the Great War. Particularly in the Far East, Soviet naval might has shown remarkable growth both in quality and quantity in such a short time.

The Soviet Far Eastern Fleet, based primarily in Vladivostok, has stepped up training and intelligence activities and its detective efforts of the tactical responses of U.S. and Japanese naval vessels, by passing at will the Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima straits as if the Sea of Japan belonged exclusively to the Soviets. The Russians have also established a submarine base and highly sophisticated electronic communication facilities at Petropavlosk on the Kamchatka peninsula; a naval base at Kolsakov on the

southern tip of Sakhalin; an air base, and a missile base with military division; and have deployed on the Sikhote mountain ranges, along the coast of the Maritime Province, 126 of the 351 medium-range SS 20 missiles, which have a range of 5,000 km, and is capable of hitting 3 different targets simultaneously. It has also deployed one infantry division at Petropavlosk on the Kamchatka peninsula, and two divisions in Sakhalin. By the end of 1982, the Soviet Union has enlarged the radius of tactical operations for its submarines by building a submarine base at the Buroton Bay of Samusil Island, located 200 km north of Etorofu Island and 1,200 km south of Petropavlosk.

The Soviet Union is not only capable of defending the Sea of Okhotsk by deploying strategic nuclear missiles against the United States, but is also capable of attacking the U.S. fleet easily by deploying its attack submarines. A good example is when the United States conducted a naval maneuver with the aircraft carrier Enterprise in the northern Pacific in October 1982. The Soviet Union conducted its own naval exercises and missile firing exercises to match the U.S. maneuver by mobilizing more than 140 Backfire strategic bombers and fighters, and even nuclear submarines. Thus, it resembled a real battle.

It takes 45 days for the Soviet's North Sea Fleet, based on the Kola peninsula north of Scandinavia, to reach Vladivostok via the Suez or Panama canal; however, if it employs the latest nuclear-powered ice-breaker vessels, it takes only 15 days. Therefore, its North Sea Fleet can now easily render tactical supports to the Far Eastern Fleet.

Judging from the activities, averaging more than 20 a month, of the Soviet naval vessels on the Sea of Japan and the Korea Straits for the past 10 years, it is clear that the activities of the Soviet vessels and aircraft have increased sharply in the Far East.

As has been stated, the Soviet Union is pursuing an encirclement policy against Communist China. Their relationship has always been poor because of the history of encroachments upon the Han people to the south by the aggressive Slavic people in the north, and also because of frequent clashes along the 7,200-km Sino-Soviet border. The armed clash at Damansky Island in 1969 is a typical example. Moreover, Sino-Soviet relationships have been very poor down to today as a result of Sino-Soviet ideological conflicts since the early 1960's.

Accordingly, for the purpose of encircling Communist China, the Soviet Union has invested \$2 billion to build advance bases for its air force, naval bases for its fleet, and electronic communication bases at Camranh and Danang in Vietnam, where the Baltic Fleet of Tsarist Russia once made a call enroute to invade the Far East. Especially, the Soviet's Backfire bombers are permanently stationed. With the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam in 1975, and the successful communist takeover of Indochina, the Soviet Union, for the purpose of dispersing the fighting power of the West towards the Far East, since the West's NATO and East Europe's Warsaw Pact are evenly matched, and in recognition of the strategic importance of the Far East, has

deployed in the Far East and in the Western Pacific one-third of its ground and naval forces and a quarter of its air power.

c. U.S. Military Strategy

On the assumption that the Soviet Union is the number one enemy, the United States is pursuing a military strategy to contain the Soviets and to prevent an outbreak of war, by continuously maintaining the ability to check a nuclear attack by possessing accurate and reliable nuclear weapons which are capable of penetrating the enemy defense, by maintaining a conventional combat potential which is capable of responding to the outbreak of conflicts in various regions simultaneously, and by improving the cooperative collective security system. Traditionally, the United States has given top priority to European defense and has regarded the defense of Asian regions as of secondary importance. But, when the fourth Middle East War broke out in October 1973, and the Arab oil-producing nations gave a crushing blow to the oil-importing Western nations including the United States by cutting off the oil supply, the strategic value of the Middle East became recognized by the United States as most important, next to Europe. Following President Nixon's 1969 declaration at Guam of the Nixon doctrine, which said that "nations must find their own solutions to their own defense in case of external invasions," events led to the U.S. troop withdrawal from Vietnam. Consequently, by taking advantage of the detente policy (relaxation of tension and rapprochement), the Soviet Union was able to bring three Indochina nations under communist rule, and converted the regimes in Zaire in 1975, Somalia in 1976, Ethiopia in 1977, South Yemen in 1978, and Afghanistan in 1979 completely into pro-Soviet governments by perhaps using the troops of Cuba, East Germany and North Korea. In various other regions of the world also, including Libya, Iran, and regions of Central and South America such as Nicaragua, and El Salvador, communists are rampantly stirring up trouble. Accordingly, it has now become necessary for the United States to recover the position of world leader, which it has lost, and to restore its credibility among the friendly Asian nations, which it had lost as a result of the fall of Indochina. To be able to do that, the American people elected Reagan, who advocated "a great America and a strong America" as president in 1980. He recognized the Republic of Korea, which is pro-American and the world's strongest anti-communist nation, to be such a country with which the United States could start to work to solve the problem of credibility. President Reagan of the United States has nailed down the U.S. troops in Korea by stopping the earlier plan for a three-stage troop withdrawal as ordered by President Carter.

On the assumption that a war comparable to World War I and II will break out in the West and that limited-scale regional wars will break out in other regions of the world, the United States developed the "1.5 strategy;" however, the assumption has been changed. It is that in the 1980's, a major war will break out in the Middle East and Asia. Therefore, the United States developed the "2.0 strategy." Such a shift in American strategy is viewed as a sign that the United States has come to recognize the strategic importance of the Korean peninsula.

d. U.S. Policy Toward USSR

For the past 10 years at least, Soviet military strength in the Far East has shown epochal development in terms of both quantity and quality.

Accordingly, the U.S. Seventh Fleet Command, based in the Subic Bay in the Philippines, has reinforced the Marines, and the Strategic Air Force stationed in Okinawa, and the Rapid Deployment Forces, which are capable of undertaking operations quickly in areas of conflict, have been increased from 20,000 to 56,000. Twenty-four Advanced Warning Air Control System planes (AWACS, E-3A) have been deployed at the Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa. In 1971, F-4 phantom planes, which were deployed at Japan's Mizawa and Yokota bases after World War II, were pulled out; however, because of the Soviet military build-up in the Far East, the United States again deployed 48 of the most advanced F-16's at Mizawa, on the main Japanese island, sometime in 1984, and in preparation for an outbreak of accidental war on the Korean peninsula, it has made plans to deploy the most advanced F-16's, and A-10's, the tank killers, at key airbases, starting in 1984. Also, the aircraft carrier Enterprise, belonging to the Pacific Fleet in the Far East, is presently based in Sasebo Harbor in Japan. The USS New Jersey, which has been reactivated after 15 years and is capable of carrying cruise missiles, is also scheduled to make a call to this harbor. The aircraft carrier Midway is also operating from Yokosuka in Japan.

In March 1983, through a nationally televised address, President Reagan said that the United States must develop space weapons which utilize the laser beam and particle beam. The United States is also to develop an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) which is capable of hitting 1,000 targets within 250 seconds, and in 10 years, that is, in 1993, its first test is to be conducted. It may take a huge budget of \$30 billion.

In this way, by spending a large sum of money for the research and development of weapons, the United States is responding to the Soviet arms build-up. Nonetheless, it is still behind the Soviet Union.

3. North Korean War Provocation

In mapping out a plan for military operations, the intelligence information is normally interpreted in our disfavor and judged in the enemy's favor. It is even more difficult for our side to diagnose the chances of starting a war by the enemy because of uncertain situations in the battlefield. But, when we trace back the history of men, the peaceful period of this earth was only for 150 years, but most of the time, wars were being fought everywhere.

Speaking of the cause of the war, if there is a 1 percent positive probability as opposed to a 99 percent negative probability, this means that the possibility of war still exists. Particularly, man can start a war by mistake or by an emotional urge. From such a point of view, I would like to examine the chances of North Korea's starting a war.

a. Politics

The North Korean Communist Party defined its army as the party army, but it degrades the army as a private army of Kim Il-song and his son. Kim Il-song, who arrived in Pyongyang via Wonsan on September 19, 1945, behaved within less than a month after his arrival, as a self-styled general, and proclaimed himself an anti-Japanese war hero at the "Kim Il-song Welcome Rally" held on 14 October. He was 34 years old then.

We were well aware of the fact that he could seize power and bring North Korea under communist control, because he was entirely helped by the Soviet army, and the reason he could start a war on 25 June, less than 2 years after the establishment of the North Korean puppet regime on September 9, 1948 was also because of the Soviet backing.

As the discontentment of the high-ranking officials, let alone the people, mounted as a result of purges at the slightest suspicion of opposition, regardless of status, in order to perpetuate the communist dictatorship, Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-il, the communist dictators, created an atmosphere of fear, and had even planned to attack the south to divert the feeling of discontentment among the people outward.

In order to consolidate a one-man dictatorship from the inception, Kim Il-song of North Korea employed the technique of using his opponents to execute or purge his other opponents, and eventually even those opponents whom he used were also purged. Starting with the purging of the powerful leader of the North Korean army, Mu Chong, by burdening him with the responsibility for the defense of Pyongyang during the Korean War, Kim Il-song executed a number of high-ranking officers of the North Korean Army, including Gen Kim Ung and Chong Pyong-san, under the charge that they plotted a coup d'etat in secret collusion with the Yenan faction. He also executed en masse more than 100 high-ranking officers, including Gen Huh Bong-hak, the leader of operations in South Korea. In early 1970, Gen Kim Kwang-hyop and several high-ranking cadres were purged. As the purging became rampant, the internal dissension also mounted. Then, Kim Chong-il became the party secretary in September 1973 and thus emerged as the heir apparent. The opposition of the senior generals of the army mounted in reaction. This was because the high-ranking officers, who had shared life, death, pain and pleasure with Kim Il-song for more than 30 years, could not possibly follow Kim Chong-il blindly.

Consequently, there occurred a military rebellion against Kim Chong-il throughout the areas of Yanggang Province and the North Hamgyong Province in April 1982, and scores of military officers, including high-ranking generals in the fields of equipment for military operations and technology, fled to Communist China and sought political asylum. In the same year, 12 high-ranking military officers were purged on the grounds that they were opposed to the hereditary succession of power to Kim Chong-il. There was also a report circulating among foreign diplomats in Beijing that in June 1982, during the visit to North Korea of Geng Biao, defense minister of the People's Republic of China, 32 North Korean military cadres sought political asylum in

the embassy of the People's Republic of China, and that they were helped to flee the country.

Thus, in order to maintain the communist dictatorship, they are, first of all, concentrating on the purging of antagonists in the military.

In 1977, Nam Il died under mysterious circumstances, and Yi Yong-mu, director of the General Political Bureau, was removed. It was learned that in 1980, Chang Jong-whan, vice minister of the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces, Pak Chol-gap, commander of the navy, Kim Kwang-chin, commander of the artillery (Ch'oe Hyon died in 1983), and Kim Chol, deputy chief of the general staff were all removed from duty.

Secondly, as the succession of power to Kim Chong-il became certain, provocations against the South have intensified. The assassination of the wife of the president on August 15, 1974, the barbaric ax-slaying incident on 18 August 1976, and the bombing incident at the Aungmye Cemetery in Burma on 9 October 1983, are examples of some of the provocations. These incidents pushed the situation to just one step short of war.

Therefore, the situation on the Korean peninsula is that the risk of a war provoked by North Korea is higher than at any time before, because of Kim Chong-il's effort to cling to power derived from the hereditary succession system.

b. Diplomacy

Since North Korea's assassination bombing incident in Rangoon, the Burmese government officially verified that the act was committed by North Korea. Consequently, North Korea has come to lose a place to stand in this world.

In the spring of 1982, Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang visited Pyongyang, and in the fall of the same year, Kim Il-song visited Beijing. Again in 1983, both Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-il visited Beijing. In spite of such a close relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang, Communist China, which was very unhappy about the Rangoon incident, was compelled to call North Korea to account. Consequently, the relationship between the two countries has turned into an uneasy one. In this situation, the Soviet Union came to the aid of North Korea. Accordingly, the prospect of North Korea's conducting an equidistance diplomacy with the Soviet Union and China has been growing. In the early 1970's, the North Korean diplomats stationed in Sri Lanka were expelled after their involvement in aiding the plot of young Sri Lankan dissidents to overthrow the government was discovered. In the late 1970's, they were also implicated in aiding the anti-government elements in India. The diamond smuggling activities of the North Korean diplomats were also discovered by the Indian government, and as a result, they are now treated shabbily by the Indian government. Also in Santiago, Chile, the North Koreans were suspected of involvement in creating financial chaos by means of undervalued sale of U.S. dollars. Two diplomats from North Korea, which had aided Egypt by dispatching fighter pilots during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, were expelled from Cairo on the charge of selling marijuana in Egypt in 1976.

Also, North Korea's relationship with Iraq, an important member of the non-aligned movement, was once very close; however, after Iraq found out that North Korea was the largest arms supplier to their enemy, Iran, they abruptly expelled the diplomats from Pyongyang in 1980. Besides these incidents, in 1976, North Korean diplomats were expelled from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Sweden, and Copenhagen because they were blackmarketing wine, cigarettes, and narcotics. As late as February 1983, while Johannes Wiettleleinen, then the speaker of the Finnish Parliament, was busy preparing for his birthday at his suburban farm, which was located 80 km from Helsinki, the North Korean ambassador to Helsinki, Yu Chae-han, called on him.

Yu Chae-han gave a bouquet to Wiettleleinen's wife and left the place. The next day, when the bouquet was opened, a bundle of \$5,000 in cash was discovered.

The fact of the matter was that the money was meant to be a bribe from Yu Chae-han to Wiettleleinen, who was then the president of the International Parliament Union (IPU), in the hopes of his blocking the decision to hold the next general meeting of the IPU in Seoul.

In this way, the North Korean embassies abroad have been habitually engaging in activities contrary to international law, and in consequence, their foreign relations have come to a dead end on the international stage. Particularly, their foreign relations have hit the wall as a result of the bombing incident at the Aungsan Cemetery in October 1983.

Accordingly, North Korea's brazen-faced behavior is rather a reminder that there is a risk of a North Korean attack on South Korea.

c. Economy

At the time of the Korean War, North Korean economic conditions were far better than those of South Korea; however, South Korea has surpassed the North since the mid-1970's. As of the end of 1982, the Republic of Korea's GNP was about four times as high as that of North Korea, and in terms of per capita income, the Republic of Korea is two or three times higher than that of North Korea, with \$1,671.

Therefore, since the gap of economic strength between North and South Korea would have widened even more by the year 2000, the risk of North Korea's starting a war before that time is growing.

d. Military

Frankly speaking, it is a fact that North Korea is slightly ahead of the Republic of Korea in military strength. On top of it, North Korea, along with other hardline communist states such as the Soviet Union and Cuba, keeps increasing the exporting of terrorism.

The countries to which North Korea has dispatched more than 300 of its military specialists are the following: Cuba in Central America; Libya,

Somalia, Guinea, Mozambique, Benin, Angola, Uganda and Zimbabwe in Africa; and Syria and Iran in the Middle East. North Korea also invites the military specialists to this country to provide them with guerrilla training.

As is already known through newspaper reports, more than 800 persons from Guyana, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Uganda and the PLO are being trained in North Korea.

Moreover, by declaring a quasi-war status, North Korea is checking war-preparedness, and by arousing a sense of crisis, it is maximizing the mobilization of labor of the people. The important fact is that North Korea has transformed its three army divisions into mechanized divisions, reinforced the tank units, replaced the anti-tank weapons with high-performance antitank weapons, and made a third of the entire artillery units independent. It has thus come to possess the ability to wage a quick and decisive war. Furthermore, in its military deployment, it has constructed airstrips even to the foremost points, and has deployed its military, offensive weapons, and mobile equipment all the way to the demilitarized zone.

Now, the sense of crisis is more acutely felt on the Korean peninsula than at any other time.

4. Building an Advanced Fatherland

We are still in difficult circumstances, under which we have to find a way to survive not only in the midst of the North Korean threat, but also with a sense of insecurity and uncertainty about the international situations surrounding Korea.

Moreover, the Fifth Republic, which has been marching forward under the banner of building an advanced fatherland since the beginning of 1980, has the great task of courageously shaking off the old, disorderly mentality and evils of the old days, and building at any cost an advanced fatherland of a glorious tomorrow.

In the international realm, by hosting the Asian Games in 1986 and the Olympics in 1988 successfully, we must display anew our image as a cultured people, and conduct independent and positive diplomacy. Politically, democracy must take root through the establishment of a "government for the people," "a government for service," "a modest government," and "a clean government." Economically, on the basis of technological innovation and improved productivity, a high-technology-oriented industrial society must be created through the establishment of entrepreneurial ethics and duty consciousness. Smooth capital labor relations must be established, and through the balanced income distribution and wide-ranging welfare facilities, the people must enjoy a peaceful and healthy life.

Also, socially, on the foundation of the firm and unshakeable consciousness of the master, a righteous society, where positive and progressive consciousness is advanced, where an orderly atmosphere is created, where law and morality are respected, and where proper remuneration and compensation

appropriate to the jobs and efforts of every citizen are awarded, must be realized. Culturally, all people must be given an opportunity to enjoy the benefits of culture and art in an atmosphere where traditional and modern cultures are blended, and on the basis of Korea's own unique cultural consciousness, cultural exchanges with other countries must be actively undertaken to display our superior culture. The international cultural solidarity must be reinforced.

By doing so, the generation which lives today must, with a clear sense of mission before our history and people and by advancing our consciousness as quickly as possible, keep our fire going to turn our country into an advanced nation.

5. Prospect

It is expected that North Korea will attempt to stir up a large-scale disturbance in the Republic of Korea by using a tiny group of anti-government elements.

The possibility is strong that North Korean will be engaged in provocations in any way possible to obstruct the reelection of President Reagan in the 1984 U.S. presidential elections, to stop the Pope's visit to Korea, and to disrupt the National Assembly election in South Korea.

With the intention of disrupting international events like the 1986 Asia Games and the 1988 Olympics, which are scheduled to be held in our country, North Korea will spread false rumors and instigate antigovernment struggles. Especially, to find an outlet from the international difficulty resulting from the incident in Burma, the chances that North Korea will undertake a military adventure appear to be increasing.

6. Conclusion

In the Far East, the Soviet military has sharply and unprecedentedly expanded its arsenal, starting with medium-range missiles and a variety of other strategic weapons and equipment. Particularly, because of the Soviet military's ruthless killing of 269 Korean Air Lines passengers in September of last year, the international situation surrounding the Korean peninsula has become precedently tense.

Besides, Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-il, who are engaged in the so-called father-son succession, which is unprecedented even in the communist countries, have misled the people for the past 30 years, saying that South Korea was preparing for an attack of the North. As a result of the rigidity of the succession system, a large number of high-ranking leaders in North Korea have been purged. Accordingly, the level of discontentment among the people in North Korea is unaccountably high.

Also, the life of the people in North Korea has been deteriorating due to the burden of excessive foreign debts and food shortage. Since this is the year of the U.S. presidential election and our National Assembly election, North

Korea is obstructing the reelection of President Reagan, who is the toughest anticommunist of all U.S. presidents, and is trying to disrupt our National Assembly election by stirring up trouble politically and socially. Therefore, the chances of North Korea's provocation of South Korea are greater than ever before.

Thus, we are at an important juncture. On the one hand, we face difficulty in preventing external provocations from materializing, and on the other hand, we have to carry out simultaneously the tasks of building our nation as an advanced one.

Accordingly, all the people in our country, from the farmers and workers to the president, must solidly unite and maximize the power of our nation. Especially, by reviving the lofty patriotic tradition that was established by the student volunteers who gave up their studies to defend the nation with their bare hands when our army was cornered in the south by the North Koreans during the Korean War, you, college students, must inspire yourselves with a sense of national security, and must take the leadership in realizing the unification of the fatherland, which is our long-cherished desire.

Case of Spy Infiltration

Spy infiltration into the Chojinri seashore, Hyon-nae myon, Kosonggun, Kangwon Province (15 May 1982): As a two-man armed spy team belonging to the North Korean Labor Party, infiltrated into the Chojinri seashore of Hyon-nae myon, Kosonggun, Kangwon Province at about 3:40 in the morning of 15 May 1982, for the purpose of scouting and photographing the front in preparation for a thrust under the cover of lush greenery, our sentry spotted them and shot one of them to death.

Armed spy infiltration into the Munsan River in Kangwon Province (19 June 1983): For the purpose of scouting the entire area of Seoul, developing a large-scale infiltration route, collecting information for carrying out escorted defections to the north, disrupting international events starting with the International Parliament Union meeting, and assassinating leaders, a three-man spy team, belonging to the North Korean Labor Party, attempted to infiltrate from underwater into the Imwol Bridge (Munsan River), located 200 meters southeast of Munsan, following the Imjin River during high tide, around 2:52 in the morning of 19 June 1983. They were discovered by our sentry who shot all of them to death.

Spy infiltration into the Kampo coast of Wolsong-gun, North Kyongsang Province (5 August 1983): As the three-man scouting team of the Reconnaissance Bureau of the North Korean Ministry of the People's Armed Forces attempted to infiltrate into the Kampo coast of Wonsong-gun, North Kyongsang Province under the direction of two underwater guides, for the purpose of scouting and destroying military and other important installations, they were spotted by our sentry, who fired at them. They fled to the sea, but all five killed themselves, including the two guides on the sea, 2 km away, at 6:10 in the morning of the same day, when they were unable to find their escape boat.

Sinking of a principal spy ship at Ullung Island (13 August 1983): As the principal and subsidiary spy ships belonging to the Investigation Department of the North Korean Labor Party were escorting agents from the Reconnaissance Bureau of the Ministry of People's Armed Forces, they were attacked and sunk along with 21 persons by our helicopter, which took off from our naval ship southeast of Docto Island at 11:00 in the morning, on 13 August 1983. They had infiltrated deep into our rear, to spy on, attack, and destroy our key installations, and to stir up social unrest to disrupt the International Parliament Union meeting.

Capture of spys infiltrated into Datepo, Busan, and the sinking of an armed spy ship (3 December 1983): As the two-man armed spy team, belonging to the Investigation Department of North Korea's Party Central Committee, attempted to infiltrate into Datepo Beach, Busan, under the cover of darkness at 10:40 pm on 3 December 1983, in coordination with locally based spys, with the intention of returning to the north after destroying key government facilities and stirring up social unrest, they were discovered by our sentry, lured into a close point, and two of them were captured after an exchange of gun fire. At the same time, a fleeing armed spy ship was sunk 9 km south of Yongdo Island at 11:00 pm by the joint operation of our naval ships patrolling the sea and the Air Force planes, which took off under emergency order.

Table: Present Status of Spy Infiltration as of 31 December 1983

계	83	82	81	80	79	78	77	76	75	74	73	72	71	70	69	68	(2)	구분	(1)
5				8	3	2	2			2	2	7	17	46	86	3	육(4)		
7																9	상	(3)	
4																9	해		
1																	수	83	
3	3	1		6	2	4	4	5	11	9	7	4	16	20	34	12	(5)	12	
8																	수	31	
36	1		3	1				1	1	1			7	13	8		중(6)	현	
																	재		
7																			
4	4	1	3	15	5	6	6	6	12	12	9	11	40	79	1	4			
8															2	1	(7)		
															8	1			

Key:

1. Category
2. Year
3. Number of infiltrations (case)
4. On land
5. On sea
6. Underwater
7. Total

12474

CSO: 4107/206

INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

KOREAN UNIFICATION PROPOSALS ANALYZED

Seoul TONGIL NONCHONG in Korean Vol 4 No 1, 1984

[Article by Ch'oe P'yong-kil, professor of public administration, Yonsei University: "An Analysis of Aspects of North Korea's Working Out of the North-South Dialogue"]

[Text] Table of Contents

- I. Introduction: North Korea's Method of Approach to Unification
- II. North Korea's Policy Toward the North-South Dialogue
- III. Seeking Material Gain in the North Korean Establishment and "the Tripartite Conference"

I. Introduction: North Korea's Method of Approach to Unification

The Korean peninsula was liberated 35 years after Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910; and after World War II it was artificially divided by the United States and the Soviet Union, which were great powers in the Far Eastern region. The capitalist and communist systems established themselves there; and almost 40 years have elapsed since then. The rehabilitation and division, not voluntarily chosen by the nation itself but chosen by others, which came as a result of Japan's unconditional surrender, planted roots of a communist political and social establishment deeply in North Korea and began to incorporate the political ideas of Marxism-Leninism.⁽¹⁾

"The Covenant of the Korean Workers Party" clearly sets forth that North Korea, a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and the PRC, a communist state, shall aim at the construction of a socialist, communist state in terms of its ideology and establishment, and that its intended objective shall be the

¹ Kim Il-song, the speech made at "the Pyongyang City Mass Rally to Welcome Kim Il-song": in a representative speech, the first ever made after the establishment of the divided state of North Korea of "the Korean Communist Party," he congratulated and cheered the Great Marshal "Stalin" of the Soviet Union and appealed for a seeking of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism.

communization of the Korean peninsula by holding fast to the purity of Marxism-Leninism.

The communization of the Korean peninsula is a fundamental objective of the North Korean regime. Therefore, the *raison d'être* of the party and the government organization is to establish the communist ideology and establishment there; and activities of the party dimension and of the organizations of the regime are to be recognized through the process of realizing the communization of the Korean peninsula. The method of approaching unification employed by the North Korean regime, which includes the party and government organizations, has been, since the very division of [the peninsula], consistent with the pursuit of material gains for the communist establishment: the unification through communization has been sought by means of the mass line approach, in which the line of a Bolshevik revolution has been pursued and a united front was formed as a subsidiary organization with the "KWP" as the nucleus.

On 14 October 1947, a minor general assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution calling for an election in South Korea alone, a region where holding an election was possible in the Korean peninsula--[a resolution proposing] a separate election and separate government. In opposition to such a separate election and separate government and in order to block the holding of a general election in the ROK, [North Korea] proposed, on 25 March 1948, to hold "a conference of representatives of political parties and social organizations of the whole of Korea," in the name of the central committee of "the Korean Democratic National Unification Front." The proposal included the calls for the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces and for the convening of a political conference of the whole of Korea.

The North Korean regime, moreover, closely imitated the tactics of "Lenin," who accomplished the Russian revolution under the leadership of "the Bolshevik" group and who elastically employed the method of approach of "the united front" that was ostensibly to include all strata and all circles. It tried to form a united force which was to include all political parties, all organizations, and even all individuals and staged symbolic manipulations designed to disguise the force as "a grand union of the nation." During the period from 1945 to 1950, in an attempt to form the united force, [the North Korean regime] tried to organize the following: "A Council of Representatives of Political Parties and Social Organizations of the South and the North," "A Council of Those Who Are in Charge of Governments of the South and the North," "A Conference of Representatives of the Peoples of the South and the North," and "A Committee of the Whole of Korea." As for the united force, during the period from 1950 to 1960, [the North Korean regime] suddenly proposed on 21 April 1964 to organize "A Joint Conference of Political Parties and Social Organizations of South and North Korea" taking advantage of the disorder that came about immediately after "the April 19 Righteous Uprising." During the period from 1966 to 1973, it proposed "a debate on political negotiations between the South and the North" for the purpose of launching the united front tactics; and it has been expanding the scope of organization [of the united force] to include political parties, social organizations, all circles and all strata, and

overseas Koreans by proposing to organize "a rally to accelerate the national unification," "a rally of the whole nation," etc.

A peculiar phenomenon is that during the period of the actual South-North Talks in which a very small number of persons in authority were to attend, [North Korea] sent a minimum of two and a maximum of six representatives to "the North-South Coordination Committee," "business talks designed to arrange a meeting of premiers," "talks on sports," and "Red Cross talks," and in the propaganda-oriented political talks, it has been proposing a conference of representatives of a sort of large-scale united front. Thus, in terms of actual talks, the characteristics of the dialogue and the method of approach to unification employed by the North Korean regime are such that it proposes small-scale closed meetings of elite elements at the level of government [authorities,] while, externally, it gives priority to a joint conference, aimed at political propaganda effects, of some kind of national united force that includes all political parties, social organizations, all strata and circles, and overseas Koreans. The strategy of dialogues employed [by the North Korean regime] thus has a double-faced two-pronged structure: in the process of actual talks, it employs a closed approach of sending a small number of elites, representatives of government [authorities]; and for the conferences of a mere form, it employs a "united front" method of putting up propaganda-oriented large-scale camouflage organizations.

Salient aspects of the North Korean regime's policy of seeking material gains toward the North-South dialogue and of North Korea's unification strategy during the past 40 years are seen in the formation of a united force characteristic of a political rally which are mainly a means of seeking a domestic propaganda effect and mass unity, whereas substantial dialogues, such as "the North-South Coordination Committee" which was held in the 1970's, were very rare, we may say. Therefore, it may be predicted that there may be substantial dialogues, which are very rare, after a propaganda confrontation that is a mere form, namely the formation of a political propaganda-oriented united force.

When seeking a unification dialogue through the mere form of the national united force, the North Korean regime puts up a very abstract conceptual unification plan; on the other hand, when dealing with actual North-South dialogues, it employs a gradual approach method of proposing an agenda designed to promote communization. Therefore, the agenda for the North-South dialogue, too, has been consistent with the two-pronged structure containing items for mere political propaganda use and the substantial discussion items.

A recent trend is that in addition to substantial exchanges related to the formation of the foundation for unification, the political propaganda-oriented unification plan has been a little more concrete and the two-pronged structure of the dialogue agenda has been simplified into one containing quasi-political propaganda-oriented and a quasi-substantive agenda. Namely, at the meetings of "the North-South Coordination Committee," the first North-South political conference ever held to seek the realization of

unification policies, the North Korean regime simultaneously employed, at the meetings of closed substantive talks, political propaganda-oriented agenda items as well as substantive ones. Thus it attempted to sound out the intentions of the ROK and to launch political propaganda.

II. North Korea's Policy Toward the North-South Dialogue

The North-South dialogue in the 1970's [came about in the following circumstances:] the detente between the east and west brought about summit talks among the United States, the PRC, and the Soviet Union; an understanding was reached between the Soviet Union and the PRC that North Korea's dialogue with South Korea would be in conformity with the interest of their establishments; and in 1972, a historical agreement came in the form of the North-South Joint Communiqué. Therefore, as for [the possibility of] a North-South dialogue from now on, unless a new sudden social change comes about in the already settled political order of northeastern Asia or unless the PRC or the Soviet Union makes a drastic change in the existing mode of diplomacy of North Korea, the external factors on the part of North Korea make continued dialogue probable. Thus a key to the dialogue can be found whenever North and South Korea respectively press for talks in accordance with their domestic policies and international conditions.

This fact was also shown in public opinion. In the surveys conducted in the period from 1977 to 1980 of opinions of "college students, industrial workers, high school students, and the general public," answers to the survey questionnaires regarding the method of realizing unification indicated that the dominating view was that the unification should be "a unification achieved as a result of a compromise between North and South Korea only" rather than one that might come about by means of "unilaterally depending on assertions of North or South Korea," "an arbitration of the United Nations," or the intervention of "the United States, Japan, the PRC, and the Soviet Union."⁽²⁾ Therefore, as to conditions for resuming the North-South dialogue, a sincere attitude or abandoning the strategy of communizing the south on the part of North Korea would carry great weight, whereas the international conditions affecting the United States, Japan, the PRC, and the Soviet Union would not carry any great weight. (Table 1, Table 2)

In this way, in order to deal with [the issue of] the North-South dialogue, it is imperative to examine policy changes in North Korea itself that would greatly affect the dialogue: and those policy changes may be found from analyses of contents of policy [documents] as revealed in the following: "Workers Party Summation Reports," "New Year's Messages of Kim Il-song," "Conferences of the Party Representatives," and "Foreign Ministry Memorandums," etc.

²Ch'oe, P'yong-kil, "Opinion Surveys Regarding the Communist Region and Unification and Security of the College Students, Industrial Workers, High School Students, and the General Public," government publications, 1977, 1978, 1980.

Table 1. Ultimate method of realizing unification

<u>Items</u>	<u>Sections</u>	<u>College Students (%)</u>	<u>Industrial Workers (%)</u>	<u>General Public (%)</u>
In accordance with North Korea's assertions		1.5	2.19	--
In accordance with the ROK's assertions		26.3	21.4	--
Arbitration of the United Nations		6.0	18.69	24.3
Compromise among the United States, Japan, the PRC, and the Soviet Union		10.4	8.62	16.8
Compromise only by North and South Korea		55.8	42.97	46.9
By means of a war		--	--	11.9

Table 2. Conditions for resuming the North-South dialogue

<u>Items</u>	<u>Sections</u>	<u>College Students (%)</u>	<u>High School Students (%)</u>
Sincere attitude of leading circles of North Korea toward the dialogue		34.64	34.12
Sincere attitude of leading circles of the ROK toward the dialogue		7.56	12.06
Suppression of excessive demands which seek unilateral interests		24.34	14.62
Arbitration of the United States, Britain, the PRC, and the Soviet Union		8.08	4.87
North Korea's giving up of warlike invasion of the south		25.36	32.70


In its early days following the foundation of the so-called "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" on 9 September 1948, the North Korean regime placed emphasis on strengthening its establishment--mainly on setting up a

material sovereignty, including the incorporation of the party ideology, the management of the party and government organization, positive establishment of foreign policy, and the establishment of national defense and public order. And in order to accomplish that, it launched the most intensive political indoctrination and mass mobilization.

As it entered the 1960's, the North Korean regime placed emphasis on economic development policies with main priorities in the fields of industry, agriculture and fisheries, transportation and communications, finance, and construction, while stressing the production field, including the development of production technology. And as it entered the 1970's, perhaps becoming concerned about the relations between North and South Korea, they began paying some policy-oriented attention to the social welfare sector--although at the [lower] level of North Korea--including social development, local regional development, education, culture, and living standards, although it could not bear comparison with that of western Europe or the ROK. If "Summation Reports of Party Conventions" are a policy manifestation in terms of the long-range policy prospect, we may call the New Year's messages of "Kim Il-song" short-range annual target plans. The [long-range and short-range] policies are mutually supplementary in their transition. In the 1980's, too, the economic development policies have shown a rising trend--although the rise was slow. In the field of welfare policies, too, attention has been paid to giving priority to the policies.

Table 3. Changes in policy priorities shown in the Party Summation Reports

〈표 3〉 黨總和 報告書의 政策優先權의 變化




KEY:

- (1) Establishment
- (2) Economy
- (3) Welfare
- (4) Propaganda and agitation
- (5) Management of technology

Table 4. Policy change rates shown in the New Year's messages of Kim Il-song

〈표 4〉 金日成 新年辭의 各 政策 變化率




KEY:

- (1) Policies to build up the establishment
- (2) Building up establishment
- (3) Economic development
- (4) Social welfare policy
- (5) Social development
- (6) Economic development policy
- (7) Year
- (8) 40's
- (9) 50's
- (10) 60's
- (11) 70's
- (12) 80's
- (13) Policy %
- (14) Establishment
- (15) Economy
- (16) Society

However, although the revolutionary cause, which is a spiritual compensation, can emphatically [help] the development of the establishment, the economic development and the welfare sector require as their bases the modernization of production control for improving efficiency in the extraction of resources, transportation, and production. Therefore, [the North Korean regime] is trying to give priority to the introduction of western European technology. However, the revolutionary cause and the material compensation are mutually contradictory in their functions. Thus there is a tendency in practice to give priority to political propaganda, etc again in order to intensify the revolutionary cause, and for that reason the pace of economic development is slowed. (Table 5)

Table 5. The rate of priority given to mass mobilization and management techniques

〈丑 5〉 群衆動員 與 管理技術政策の 優先度



KEY:

- | | |
|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| (1) Mass mobilization | (6) 1960's |
| (2) Management techniques | (7) 1970's |
| (3) Periods | (8) 1980's |
| (4) 1940's | (9) Mass mobilization |
| (5) 1950's | (10) Management techniques |

North Korea's foreign policy changes whenever policy changes occur in North Korea itself. Nevertheless, the fundamental characteristics of North Korea's foreign policy are: first, to strengthen the communist ideology and establishment in the Korean peninsula and to keep pace with the international communist movement in cooperation with the communist bloc, including the Soviet Union; second, to expand the foundation of international assistance for achieving the unification of the Korean peninsula through communization; and third, to isolate the ROK internationally. Meanwhile, such characteristics of North Korea's foreign policy are shown in a concrete form in conjunction with the issues related to the following: the communist bloc, nations in special regions, the United Nations, the ROK, the unification problem--in conformity with the North Korean regime's formulation of communist ideology and strengthening the establishment, policy changes within North Korea itself, and changes in the situation of international politics.

North Korea has kept pace with the international communist movement of communist nations, including the Soviet Union, since the establishment of its region. It has been active in establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the PRC, and east European countries. Such tendencies are clearly revealed in the analyses of the New Year's messages of Kim Il-song. In the 1960's, it even took a somewhat negative and critical diplomatic

posture against communist countries, as this affected its relations with the United States, the PRC, and the Soviet Union, in order to show a friendly attitude toward non-aligned nations. Such a development shows that it is seeking a multilateral foreign policy in consideration of the following: the primary ideological struggle, the 1960's economic cooperation designed to seek material gains, and [North Korea's] position in the United Nations.

While expanding its foreign relations network and allying itself with non-aligned nations, North Korea launched a multilateral diplomacy in the 1960's and 1970's, extending to Central and South America, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the United Nations, "the General Association of Koreans in Japan," and even to overseas Korean communities in the United States and Japan, taking advantage of the pluralization of international society. Thus North Korea has been seeking its own material gains and international isolation of the ROK. And in the 1980's, in addition to the multilateral diplomacy, North Korea combined the unification problem with propaganda diplomacy by proposing "the Grand National Conference," and "the System of the Federal Republic of Koryo." And the propaganda diplomacy was directly combined with the North-South dialogue.

North Korea's strategy for unification in the 1940's came to the surface when it proposed a conference in the form of North-South political negotiation in the name of "the Democratic Unification Front of Korea" on 25 March 1948, and when it proposed in Pyongyang on 14 April 1948 "a conference of representatives of political parties and social organizations of the whole of Korea." Not to mention attempts to block the ROK's general election held in compliance with a resolution of the United Nations, strategies designed to take the initiative in seeking a North-South unification, or the camouflage tactics launched in the "25 June" invasion of the South, such proposals of the North Korean regime as mentioned above represented the first plan ever shown of the approach to the unification through communization. Such a plan soon developed into proposing a general outline of [North Korea's] unification policy in the 1950's: on 27 April 1954, "Nam Il," foreign minister of the North Korean regime, announced a national unification plan at a "Geneva" conference.

"Nam Il's" proposal made at the "Geneva" conference included the following three problems: first, to elect national assemblymen and other representatives in a general election for a National Assembly, which shall be held, free from [differences] in political views, sex, religion, or individual propensity, under the circumstances in which there is no foreign intervention and freedom of speech and the press prevails; and to organize "a Korea Committee" and "a unified government" with those national assemblymen and representatives elected; second, to realize, as a prerequisite for national unification, the protection of national culture, freedom of trade, finances, accounting, transportation, economy, the people's travel and correspondence, and cultural and scientific exchanges; and third, to realize withdrawal of foreign troops. This outline was given in [an announcement], "A Way of Resolving the Unification Problem of North and South Koreas," made in the form of a "memorandum" of the North Korean regime dated 22 November 1963. The memorandum included the following proposals: participation of

North Korea's delegation in the United Nations, dissolution of the United Nations' organizations in the ROK, withdrawal of the U.S. forces, a general election of North and South Korea that shall be held on the basis of an independent peaceful democracy and free from intervention of foreign influences, and economic and cultural exchanges between North and South Korea for the purpose of accelerating the general election.

In line with this unification strategy, North Korea proposed the establishment of "the Federal Republic System" and the convening of "a Grand National Conference" in 1972 in the process of "the July 4th North-South Joint Communique" and the North-South dialogue. Through "the North-South Coordination Committee," North Korea proposed that a Grand National Conference be organized by representatives of all circles and strata, and that a conference be held for the unification of the North and the South. The number of representatives proposed was 1500 at its early stage and later it was reduced to 600.

On 20 November 1971, a secret contact meeting, the first ever held, to arrange high level political talk between North and South Korea was held, while meetings of "the North-South Red Cross Talks" were being held continuously from 12 August 1971. Four years elapsed from that day to 24 October 1975 when the "Pyongyang" side rejected the conference of vice-chairmen of "the North-South Coordination Committee." Two years and 11 months and 18 days were the length of the period of official conferences held from the time when the "Pyongyang Conference," which started when Yi Hu-rak, director of the Central Intelligence Agency at that time, made an unofficial visit to Pyongyang from 2 May 1972 to 3 May 1972, to the time when the final meeting of the conference of vice-chairmen of the Coordination Committee was held. During the period, meetings of the Secretaries Conference and the Business Workers Conference were also held.

In order to clarify the characteristics of the North-South dialogue, contents of a total of 21 policy statements, including "the policy theme statements or position papers" presented at "the Seoul Conference," "the Pyongyang Conference," 2 meetings of the co-chairmen conference of "the North-South Coordination Committee," 3 meetings of the talks of the North-South Coordination Committee, and 10 meetings of the conference of vice-chairman [of the Coordination Committee] and 4 communiques issued by Chairman Kim Yong-chu, are analyzed and weighed [in this article.] There are 19 basic policy variables established through the logical process and the verifying process in the analyses and weighing.

Numerical values in the measurement variables and the priority ranks in the basic policy variables always determine the policy of the North Korean side toward the North-South dialogue by means of statistical analyses; and explanations are given by means of the microscopic, medium scope, weighing pattern analyses. Results of analyses made on the details measurement variables are as follows:

(1) Justification for the dialogue

[Justification for the dialogue] is a basic policy variable which was constantly asserted throughout the whole process of the dialogue with the weight of the highest priority rank carried through the North-South Coordination Committee.

As for the details, the justification for holding the dialogue is set forth in terms of the objective of unification, humanism, and contribution to international peace. Since easing tension, etc, is only an ostensible [aim], even the principles governing the unification dialogue, such as the so-called "independence," "peace," and "grand unity of the nation," are merely ostensible slogans and are not substantively recognized.

(2) Unification principles

[Unification principles] carry the weight of the first rank among the dialogue policies set forth by the North Korean side at the meetings of the North-South Coordination Committee. They continuously arise throughout the whole process of the dialogue. However, the details policies, such as "independence," "peace," and "grand unity of the nation," asserted by the North Korean side are the assertions made at the level of [North Korea] itself. Perhaps because [the North Korean side] thought that those assertions were regarded by the ROK as concoctions made in the course of the talks, even the North Korean side itself tended to regard them as unrealistic and negative in regard to the realization of policy aims.

(3) Elimination of distrust

In conducting the dialogue and to clear the ground, North Korea placed emphasis on the elimination of distrust factors, such as "Stop sending spies!" "Stop reflecting on and discussing the June 25 Incident!" and "Transcend the differences in establishments and ideologies!"; and yet it regarded them as the real policy factors.

In an unconvincing contradiction North Korea, while holding fast to its own communist ideology and establishment, asked the ROK side to eliminate the distrust factors. Therefore, [this matter] constantly remained a key issue and drew unconverging lines in the North-South dialogue.

(4) Plans for Improvement in North-South relations

[This issue] came to the surface at the beginning of the talks but eventually lost importance as a policy-oriented strong point. The North Korean side attempted to employ a package settlement and a deductive approach as a plan for improving North-South relations. In the process of talks, however, it accepted the gradual approach method proposed by the ROK side. And the issue was never referred to in the itemized discussion. Kim Il-song himself, too, understood that "easily resolvable things must be settled first" in the course of talks. Therefore, the fact may have been

either that [North Korea] accepted, from the beginning of the talks, the gradual, practical approach method in reality, or that it was forced to accept the method [under the pressure of] assertions of the ROK side and of domestic and international conditions. Thus we can make an interpretation that there was a dialogue pattern that the North Korean side adapted itself to realities while holding fast to its own dialogue policy. Then it is necessary for the ROK side to assert strongly and push those policies which the North Korean side has no other alternative but to accept.

(5) Economic cooperation

A substantial economic exchange, including cooperation in heavy industry, light industry, agriculture and fisheries, and the development of resources, was discussed as an important issue when the proceedings of talks reached full development; but no further [development was seen on this issue]. The priority of this issue is very low. No consideration is given to this issue in the implementation of detailed policies.

(6) Social and cultural cooperation

The agenda items of language, research in history, art, and cultural exchange, were also discussed when the talks opened and when the talks reached full development; but no further [development was seen on this issue.] No policy consideration was given to this issue throughout the whole process of talks.

(7) Political cooperation

The weight of the issue of political cooperation, which was carried in terms of the policy priority rank pursued by North Korea in the process of the dialogue, was at the medium position compared to that of other policies. But North Korea consistently put forth this issue. The detailed policy of political cooperation proposed by the North Korean side was so conspicuously put up in terms of North Korea's package settlement approach formula that the ROK side did not accept it. In particular, as for the items of the detailed policy, North Korea thought it [appropriate] that political cooperation be pushed through the "North-South Coordination Committee," and that the following was the issue that could be pushed in reality: "confederal republic system," "a grand national conference," "political negotiations," and "political cooperation through exchanges of political party personages and national assemblymen."

(8) Cooperation in diplomacy

The weight of this issue carried in the process of talks is not great; and the issue is not discussed as important. However, it seems that North Korea will put forth this policy as an outpost operation for the realization of political cooperation, for obtaining overseas support of North Korea's policies in the process of the dialogue, and for the formation of the "confederal republic system" as a single country.

(9) Military cooperation

As in the case of the policy of cooperation in diplomacy, this issue does not carry great weight. However, it seems that the North Korean side regards it possible to realize the detailed policies, such as stopping the increase of armed forces, stopping the armament race, withdrawal of foreign troops, and a peace treaty with the United States, and that North Korea thinks that [the realization of the detailed policies], along with establishing favorable international relations, are those policies which the ROK has ultimately no other alternative but to accept. The ROK is in a defensive position at the talks as to military cooperation. It is necessary for the ROK to map out a positive alternate proposal. In particular, North Korea regards the following justification for the dialogue as unrealistic: the conclusion of a peace treaty with the ROK, easing of tension, independence, peace, and a grand unity of the nation. And it is trying to settle all the pending problems through a political conference. Therefore, the North Korean side's basic strategy in the dialogue seems to be that North Korea, in the North-South dialogue, turning its back on a peace treaty with the ROK, strongly calls for "a peace treaty with the United States" and withdrawal of foreign troops from the ROK, and holds fast to the formation of "the confederal republic system" under a single name for the north and the south.

(10) The organization and operation of "the North-South Coordination Committee"

An ulterior motive of North Korea in the dialogue makes North Korea not recognize the North-South Coordination Committee as a permanent window of the North-South dialogue. However, the priority that North Korea gives to the Coordination Committee is high; therefore, North Korea made very persistent efforts to implement the detailed policy. In other words, [North Korea] thought it possible to realize the following detailed policy of the North-South Coordination Committee: the operation of the conference of "the co-chairmen" and "the North-South Coordination Committee," the operation of "the subcommittees," contacts among spokesmen and business workers, the organization of government authorities of "the Coordination Committee," and the strategy for simultaneously holding the conference of "vice-chairmen" and "the Coordination Committee" and a conference for political negotiations. And North Korea consistently pushed the policy. However, the policy regarding the establishment and operation of "the secretaries conference" and "the joint secretariat," which are a necessary device in the operational aspect, is regarded as fundamentally unrealistic. The [policy] related to proceedings and operational aspects, including the conference site, opening time, and whether or not the conference is open to the public, is ignored and not discussed affirmatively. North Korea's policy regarding the organization and operation of "the North-South Coordination Committee" must be understood in terms of how the ROK's dialogue plans should be combined with the conference for political negotiations, such as "a grand conference of the nation."

(11) The subject of slander and vilification

[Slander and vilification] become the policy when the dialogue reaches stalemate. Such a negative agenda item as this comes up when [North Korea's] own interest has been accomplished to a certain extent in the process of talks and they think that [the talks] are being unilaterally utilized by the ROK. Thus slander and vilification are thrown at those specific ROK personages who entertain political views unfavorable to the North Korean side.

(12) The subject of rejection of the dialogue

A strong refusal to have dialogue with a specific person comes when a result of the dialogue is lined with political propaganda in the state of a stalemate of the dialogue. In general, refusal of a dialogue with the people who are taking part in the talks is not strong. However, since an action of refusing to have dialogue is chosen to be taken in accordance with the circumstances, the refusal is very liquid. Thus, such a policy as this may be taken as a signal that predicts a change in the proceedings of the talks. However, the policy itself is not to be taken as a factor that can decisively affect the progress of talks.

(13) Armed clash

An armed clash takes place at the stage of rebutting the dialogue. It has the characteristics of a negative and successive policy variable in the dialogue. The problem of an armed clash was first discussed at the first meeting of "the North-South Coordination Committee" because of a shooting incident perpetrated by North Korea at the line of demarcation. This problem was taken up vigorously when the talks came to a stalemate at the fourth meeting of "the conference of vice-chairmen" (7 February 1974). This policy has medium weight among the 19 position variables. Once discussion of it was started, it was given more and more emphasis. As for the detailed policy for this, the North Korean side always shifted responsibility on to the ROK for the following incidents: "the 15 August sniping incident," the southern invasion tunnel incident at the armistice line," and "the demarcation line shooting incident." [In implementing this policy, North Korea] took an offensive position in the dialogue. On the other hand, it utilized the policy in the cause of domestic cohesion in North Korea itself.

(14) Relations with foreign countries

[The policy toward relations with foreign countries] is a diplomatic strategy designed to improve North Korea's international relations while the dialogue is being carried on. In other words, under the pretext of carrying on the North-South dialogue, North Korea is trying to improve and maintain diplomatic relations, equal to those of the ROK, with those nations which have friendly diplomatic relations with the ROK, whereas it is employing a strategy designed to effect alienation, instead of improvement of relations, between the ROK and those nations which have amicable

relations with North Korea. The policy toward the relations with foreign countries is closely interrelated with the probability of the resumption of dialogue, we may say.

(15) Domestic circumstances of the ROK

[North Korea's] policy toward [the ROK's internal circumstances] is designed to seek gains on the part of North Korea when it points out for discussion the internal circumstances of the ROK in the process of the dialogue. This policy is a variable of the highest priority, along with those policies toward the justification of the dialogue and the unification principle, in terms of its priority or in terms of emphasis given to it. North Korea employed the following detailed policy as a means of effective propaganda designed to attack the ROK: the emergency martial law, the state of emergency, the southern invasion threat of "the June 23 declaration," stepping up the anti-communist policy, and emergency measures. As for the anti-government movement and the release of what they call democratic person-ages, North Korea indeed placed emphasis on them but with little result.

As for the ROK's introduction of foreign capital, North Korea objects strongly. Thus North Korea's ulterior motive, is on the other hand, to sieze the ROK's political dilemma and to enlarge as much as possible. However, the problems related to the internal circumstances of the ROK are the ROK's own problems and therefore, even when they are resolved, the settlement is to come by means of the ROK's democratic approach. North Korea knows that very well. So North Korea, for one, does not really think that the problem will be solved as it wishes. Such a policy is a political measure designed not so much to hold the ROK in check as to promote international propaganda and to hold the interior of North Korea itself in check. Thus, in order to cope with North Korea's employment of such a policy in the North-South dialogue, it is necessary for the ROK to deal reasonably with [such a practice] through the fortuity of the establishment.

(16) Military relations

North Korea regards the following detailed policy as feasible: to stop increasing the armed strength, to stop the armament race, to reduce the force of arms, to reduce the national defense budget, and to stop the military training. It shows strong resistance to "military cooperation" with the ROK or "the conclusion of a peace treaty" with the ROK.

(17) Internation circumstances of North Korea

This is a policy North Korea consistently practiced affirmatively in view of the fact that the communist nation's attitude toward negotiation is [in line with the proposition] that the result of diplomacy is to be directly affected by its propaganda effect. In the whole process of the dialogue, North Korea continuously emphasized that the cult of personality if Kim Il-song" is a voluntary product of the people, and that North Korea's communist establishment armed with "the chuche idea" enjoys superiority...

(18) Matters mutually agreed upon

This is a policy variable that has a great policy weight. It has been emphasized affirmatively in requesting that the matters agreed upon be recognized, implemented, or observed. However, there was also an occasion when [North Korea] denounced the ROK side for violation of the matters agreed upon in the dialogue and pressed the ROK side to observe the matters agreed upon.

(19) Evaluation of the dialogue

[The weight of this policy] comes next to that of the policy of justification of the dialogue. Its characteristics are that emphasis is placed on criticism of the prospects of the dialogue, and that a gloomy view is taken of its prospects. Next, reviewing the implementation of the policies discussed above, [the author of this article] will classify, according to each period, the characteristics of policy variables for each period and the models of "the process of the talks."

A. The period in which the talks were opened (2 May to 12 October 1972)

We may say that the initial stage of the talks began on 10 November 1971 when unofficial contacts began for opening the talks. However, the officially designated period of the talks began when "the Pyongyang talks" got under way in May 1972.

Table 8. Shifts in the Policy Priority Zone in Terms of the Justification of the Dialogue for Each Year (Basic documents)





Table 9. Shifts in the Policy Priority Zone in Terms of the Unification Principles for Each Year (Basic documents)



The characteristics of this period are that the emphasis given to and the priority of the implementation of the policy gradually rise in the case of those policies which show greater justification for holding the talks and which have a heavier political tinge, and thus discussion of the justification for the talks is taking place. While the following policies forcefully come up: the justification of the dialogue, the unification principles, the elimination of distrust, and the plans for improving North-South relations; agenda items of political dimension, such as "political cooperation," "cooperation in diplomacy" and "military cooperation," come to the surface as the talks progress. (Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11)

Table 10. Shifts in the policy priority zone in terms of the distrust factors for each year (basic documents)





Table 11. Shifts in the policy priority zone in terms of plans for improvement of North-South relations for each year (basic documents)




B. The period of maturity of the talks (2 November 1972--28 August 1973)

This is the period in which the North-South dialogue got on the right track, and in which the North Korean side put all its 19 policy items on the agenda and gave the highest priority to the implementation of the following policies--the cause of the justification of the North-South dialogue: the justification of the dialogue, the unification principles, the elimination of distrust, and the plans for improving North-South relations. In

particular, the talks reached the peak when the second conference of the cochairmen of the "North-South Coordination Committee" was held on 2 November 1972. At the conference, all the policies which could come up at normal diplomatic talks were discussed in a lively manner and the emphasis given to all the policies reached the zenith. When those policy variables related to "the five major cooperations," economic, social, cultural, political, diplomatic, and military cooperation, which was a major agenda item the North Korean side wanted to discuss at "the Coordination Committee," forcefully arose, the talks entered the period of maturity. The characteristics of these policies are that although their implementation is intentionally attempted by the North Korean side at "the North-South Coordination Committee," they are put up more strongly outside than within the official talks. However, as for political and military cooperation, strong emphasis was continuously given to them within the talks. Meanwhile, the policy designed to effect such a structure which would substantially carry out the agenda of the dialogue represents the policy variable for the organization and operation of the "North-South Coordination Committee." (Table 12) After all, the flow of this policy is of importance in that the policy becomes the yardstick for whether the dialogue carried through "the North-South Coordination Committee" becomes more substantial and realistic. On 28 August 1973, around the time when substantial agenda of the talks were to come to the surface rapidly at the stage of maturity of the proceedings of the dialogue, Kim Young-chu, "co-chairman" of the Pyongyang side, issued a statement and refused a dialogue with a specific personage. Thus the period of maturity of the talks gradually became suspended and then suddenly reached a stalemate.

Table 12. Shifts in the policy priority zone in terms of the organization and operation of the North-South Coordination Committee for each year (basic documents)



C. The period of stalemate (28 August 1973--3 July 1975)

The period of stalemate is a course in which the priority rank of the implementation of those policies related to the cause of justification for holding the dialogue, such as prospects of the dialogue, the unification principles, the elimination of distrust factors, and the improvement of North-South relations, begins to decline. Moreover, it is a stage at which the priority rank of the discussion of those policies, such as "the five

major cooperations," which have been the nucleus of superiority of the dialogue, begins to decline, and at which the emphasis given to the implementation of the policy toward the organization and operation of "the North-South Coordination Committee" begins to decrease tremendously.

Notable changes, which characterize this period, in the field of other policies are seen in the tendency for the North Korean side to just launch slander and vilification against the ROK, refuse to come to the dialogue, stage armed clashes along the frontline, take the offensive in foreign relations, and take a critical and negative attitude toward the prospects for the talks.

Such policies as these were not referred to particularly during the periods of opening, proceeding, and maturity in the process of the North-South dialogue held through "the North-South Coordination Committee." But from the moment when the talks entered the period of stalemate, they suddenly began to come up.

Table 13. Shifts in the policy priority zone in terms of the subject of slander and vilification for each year (basic documents)





Table 14. Shifts in the policy priority zone in terms of the subject of refusal of dialogue for each year (basic documents)



D. The period of suspension of talks (3 July 1976--)

This is the period in which the pursuit of policies for those policy variables which came up following the dialogue carries great weight, mainly

such policies as: slander, vilification, refusal to dialogue, the superiority of the establishment of North Korea, the intervention in the internal affairs of the ROK, military problems, armed clashes, pointing out violations of and requesting observation of the matters agreed upon in the dialogue, and the prospects for the dialogue. From the time when concern for the basic nucleus of the talks, various proposals, the policy of "the five major cooperations," and the justification for the dialogue began to disappear, the North-South dialogue carried through "the North-South Coordination Committee" reached the state of suspension. As a result, reactions of the North Korean side came as follows: in May 1975, a statement was issued to the effect that "the conference of vice-chairmen" be put off [indefinitely]; and in July 1975, the statement issued at the fourth anniversary of "the July 4 Joint Communique" suspended the North-South dialogue indefinitely. What came clearly to the surface throughout various periods of the North-South dialogue was the cause of justification needed for holding the dialogue. Those policies in which the cause of justification was played up concretely were represented by substantial problems, such as "economic cooperation." Thus, for either of the following reasons, the North Korean side used slander and vilification--the negative policy toward the dialogue--and suspended the dialogue up to the present time: either North Korea thought that it had achieved its attempted objectives, such as international recognition and finding out the ROK's intentions; or North Korea came to have a firm belief that through the talks the liberalization of North Korea had been accelerated and North Korea had been politically provoked by the ROK.

Table 15. Shifts in the policy priority zone in terms of the evaluation of dialogue for each year (basic documents)





Table 16. Shifts in the policy priority zone in terms of the subject of slander and vilification for each year (basic documents)



Judging from [the time elapsed] from 2 November 1971 when the businessmen began their contacts to 3 July 1975 when North Korea issued a statement to suspend the dialogue, the cycle for opening, proceeding, stalemate, and suspension took roughly 8 years. Therefore, a prognosis for a dialogue of the 1980's is that a North-South dialogue will proceed with a dialogue cycle of 8 to 10 years. (Table 17)

Table 17. A Model of Periods of the Dialogue

<u>Opening period</u>	<u>Maturity period</u>	<u>Stalemate period</u>	<u>Suspension period</u>	<u>New Contacts</u>
20 November 1971 - 12 October 1972 (one year)	2 November 1972 - 28 August 1973 (9 months)	27 August 1973 - 3 July 1975 (2 years)	3 July 1975 - January 1979 (3 years and 6 months)	(In 1979, North Korea agreed to hold a prime minister level talk for the first time since the suspension of the dialogue)
7 years and 3 months to 8 years ➔				A new dialogue cycle of the 1980's begins

An in-depth analysis of the prospectives provided by the above model is as follows. Policies representing the cause of justification for opening the dialogue in the early period of the talks are the justification for the dialogue, the unification principles, the elimination of distrust factors, and the plans for improvement of North-South relations. Among them, the policy toward the justification for the dialogue, the principal axis of which is in line with the desire for unification, humanism, and the easing of tension, has an adverse correlative relationship with the policy variable of slander and vilification and the policy variable of the internal situation of the ROK.

In other words, the more the justification for the dialogue is emphasized, the less slander and vilification arise (the coefficient of correlation: --0.47; the degree of attention: 99.9%). And the more the justification for the dialogue is played up, the more often the situation in which North Korea intervenes in the internal situation of the ROK prevails. (the coefficient of correlation: basic documents: --0.51). This fact indicates that during the early period of the talks and during the period of maturity (during the period of maturity (during the period in which the justification for the dialogue is emphasized), the policies, such as slander and vilification and the intervention in the internal affairs of the ROK, did not carry any weight.

It may be gathered from the above that [North Korea's] strategy for the talks is such that while the justification for the dialogue is greatly

emphasized, such things as the unification principles and "political cooperation" are played up. Among those policy variables which emphasize the cause of the justification for the dialogue, the policy variable of the North Korean side in terms of the unification principles has an affirmative correlative relationship with those politically tinged policy variables, such as "political cooperation" and "military cooperation." Thus, the more the North Korean regime puts forth the unification principles in the process of the dialogue, the more it emphasizes "the political, diplomatic, and military cooperation."

The policy variable of the elimination of distrust factors has an adverse correlative relationship with the policy variable of slander and vilification and the intervention in the internal situation of the ROK (--0.37). This means that the more policy intention [North Korea] has for the elimination of distrust factors, the less policy intention it has for slander and vilification and the intervention in the internal situation of the ROK.

The policy variable of the plan for improving North-South relations, too, has an adverse correlative relationship with [the variable of intervention in the internal situation of the ROK]: the more the North Korean side emphasizes [the policy variable of the plan for improving the North-South relations,] the more the North Korean side refrains from citing the internal situation of the ROK. (basic document: --0.39)

At the same time, when the talks enter the period of maturity and the plan for improving North-South relations is emphasized, this policy variable [the plan for improving North-South relations] has an affirmative correlative relationship with the variable of "the economic cooperation and the social and cultural cooperation," which is an agenda item that North Korea has pressed for discussion. (0.42, 0.53)

In the process in which the talks proceed, while the North Korean side greatly emphasizes the policies toward the justification for the dialogue, the elimination of distrust factors, and the plan for improving North-South relations, it refrains, to a certain extent, from intervention in the internal situation of the ROK and slander and vilification; but, on the other hand, in the other portion of the process of talks, while the North Korean side puts up the unification principles, it emphasizes the implementation of mainly "the political, diplomatic, and military cooperation." "The economic, social and cultural cooperation," which is an agenda item that North Korea has pressed for discussion, has a high correlative relationship. (0.95) Thus, when the North Korean side does not cite the internal situation of the ROK and the talks proceed smoothly, these policies continuously carry great priority.

Therefore, although the importance of "the political, military, and diplomatic cooperation," etc is recognized to a certain extent in the process of the dialogue, the policy variables of [the political, military, and diplomatic cooperation, etc] do not have any significant correlative relationship with other policy variables, perhaps because no responses have been made from the ROK side regarding these policy variables. In the

process in which the dialogue continues to be stalemated, the more the policies toward slander, vilification, refusal of a dialogue, and the intervention in the internal situation of the ROK are emphasized, the higher the political weight of [these policies] on both sides becomes; and [consequently] there will be intervention in the internal situation of the ROK, criticisms, and then eventually refusal of the dialogue. (0.60, 0.69, 0.38). Moreover, the North Korean side's intentions in armed clashes are strongly shown in its [attempts] to display the superiority of its own establishment and its own mobilization capability. (The correlative relationship between the policy variable of armed clashes and that of the internal situation of North Korea: 0.56). At the same time, North Korea attempts to display its own merits internationally and to intervene in the diplomatic order maintained by the ROK.

The products resulting from the dialogue come out in concrete form in the policy variable of the organization and operation of "the North-South Coordination Committee." It is of significance to analyze the correlative relationship between this policy variable and other policy variables in order to find out other variables which would affect "the North-South Coordination Committee." Among the policy variables, on the North Korean side, of the organization and operation of "the North-South Coordination Committee," there are those variables which have an affirmative correlative relationship and those which have an adverse correlative relationship. In other words, since the policy variable of slander and vilification has an adverse correlative relationship with the policy variable of the intervention in the internal affairs of the ROK (-0.37 , -0.25), the more the North Korean side intervenes in the internal affairs of the ROK and launches slander and vilification, the weaker North Korea's concern for the operation of "the Coordination Committee" becomes.

While the dialogue is going on, the cause of the justification for the dialogue is emphasized and various cooperations of a political nature and "the economic cooperation" etc are played up. However, once the dialogue reaches a stalemate, emphasis is placed on the implementation of policies of slander, vilification, refusal of the dialogue, and the intervention in the internal situation of the ROK, and the function of "the North-South Coordination Committee" is weakened and the prospect of the dialogue is made hazy.

Among the policies referred to in the North-South dialogue through "the North-South Coordination Committee," the very policy designed to organize and operate "the North-South Coordination Committee" is a concrete means of realizing the North-South dialogue. It represents the first achievement ever made in the North South dialogue. Therefore, it is of importance how often and how much "the North-South Coordination Committee" was referred to by the North Korean side and how much political weight the committee carried; but, even more importantly, it is an important concern of both North and South Korea whether "the North-South Coordination Committee" functions as a mechanism of conducting a dialogue of political dimension and grows to become an institution. However, the policy variables which govern how the North Korean side evaluates the matters agreed upon in the

process of the dialogue and how the North Korean side sees the ROK's attitude toward the dialogue can be regarded as a factor in determining how long the North-South dialogue would be carried on and how successful it would be. In particular, the policy variables of dialogue evaluation--expressions regarding whether the dialogue will be carried on efficiently from now on and whether we may take an optimistic view about the future course of the dialogue--may be regarded as a policy factor in suggesting the prospect of the dialogue.

Whether we take an affirmative or negative view of such a policy, these policy variables may be regarded as a sufficient expression of the North Korean side's concern for its policy toward the prospect of the dialogue. And, the policy variable of the organization and operation of "the North-South Coordination Committee" is, in most cases, viewed from an affirmative angle. Therefore, it is of significance to analyze the relationship between this policy variable and others.

It is an analysis of compound correlative relationship to take as subordinate variables the policy variable of the organization and operation of the North-South Coordination Committee" and the policy variable of the dialogue evaluation and to take other variables which affect these policy variables as independent ones.

To make the analysis easier, we will here make an analysis of the compound correlative relationship which takes the policy variable of the organization and operation of "the North-South Coordination Committee" as a subordinate variable; and we will then make an analysis which takes the policy variable of the dialogue evaluation as a subordinate variable. The analyses are as follows:

The analysis of the compound correlative relationship of the policy (subordinate variable) toward the organization and operation of "the North-South Coordination Committee" and 16 policies (independent variables) and the analysis of compound correlative relationship made by means of percentages of values which are carried by policy variables obtained through an evaluation of the contents of the North Korean side's policy statements (basic documents) announced by "the North-South Coordination Committee" are of significance in the following facts: as for the policy toward the organization and operation of "the North-South Coordination Committee" and those independent variables which affect this policy, the degree of attention stands at 0.05; and as for those strong independent variables whose rate of changes in the coefficient of compound correlative relationship is over 0.1, they are the policy variables of military relations, slander, vilification, rejection of the dialogue, and "political cooperation." Judging from the results of these analyses, it seems that North Korea has taken advantage of "the North-South Coordination Committee" by dragging the talks on and on while putting up succeeding policies of the dialogue on the following occasions: when the agenda items of a political nature are not carried on because the North Korean side puts up the policy toward the cause of the justification for the dialogue through the North-South dialogue; or when the political situation of the ROK becomes unfavorable to North Korean interests in the course of the dialogue.

The variables which represent the affirmative coefficient (+) and the negative coefficient (-) in the analyses of compound correlative relationship are those of "economic cooperation," the plan for improving North-South relations, foreign relations, the subject of refusal of the dialogue, and armed clashes. However, in fact, from the viewpoint of the gradual approach method employed at the early stage of talks, in which emphasis was placed on those policies easy to be implemented through "the North-South Coordination Committee," "the economic cooperation" may be regarded as a substantive, realistic policy agenda item. Throughout the whole process of the dialogue, the systematic mechanism designed to resolve actual substantive problems is "the North-South Coordination Committee." Thus it is crystal clear that the more substantive agenda items, such as "economic cooperation," are dealt with and resolved, the more it is assured that the *raison d'être* of such a mechanism as "the North-South Coordination Committee" will grow. The independent variables with coefficients which cause negative factors in the compound correlative relationship are those policy variables of the intervention in the internal affairs of the ROK, unification principles, "social and cultural cooperation," and the internal situation of North Korea. In a nutshell, when the unification or "the social and cultural cooperation," which is designed in line with desires of the North Korean side, is [somehow] combined with the internal situation of the ROK and fails to be played up as [North Korea] wants or causes reactions unfavorable to the maintenance of the establishment within North Korea itself, the talks reach a stalemate or suspension, and consequently the function of "the North-South Coordination Committee" is dulled.

7989

CSO: 4107/213

INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

SHIPMENT OF RED CROSS RELIEF TO SOUTH

'People Eager'

SK221119 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1029 GMT 22 Sep 84

[Text] Pyongyang, 22 Sep (KCNA)--People of all walks of life are eagerly waiting for the realization of the decision of the Central Committee of the Red Cross Society of the DPRK on sending relief goods for the South Korean flood victims to Inchon, Pukpyong and Pammunjom as demanded by the South Korean side, saying this is a humanitarian step for alleviating the sufferings of the flood victims at an early date.

Kim Yong-chol, chief of the international law section of the Law Institute of the Academy of Social Science, said: The head of the working-level delegation of the Red Cross Society of our side issued a statement announcing that relief goods would be speedily sent to the points demanded by the South Korean side. This is an expression of the unanimous desire of our people and a most just humanitarian step.

He stressed: Our relief goods carrying our people's compatriotism and humanitarianism must be delivered to the South Korean flood victims at an early date.

Yim Kyong-hwal, director of the cement production guidance department of the Ministry of Building-materials Industry, said: The South Korean side had better accept our sincere offer from a correct stand. We are fully ready to send the whole amount of cement any time.

Choe Che-yun, director of the State Committee for Quality Control, said: The goods carrying our warm compatriotic desire have been prepared on the highest level of quality. Kwon Hong-ki, director of the Samchon Automobile Enterprise, said: We are filled with the determination to carry relief goods in time by every means if we are assigned for the task of transporting them.

KCNA Condemns 'Special Alert Order'

SK210412 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0333 GMT 21 Sep 84

[Text] Pyongyang, 21 Sep (KCNA)--The Chon Tu-hwan military fascist clique issued a "special alert order" to the police stations in Seoul, crying that

that we might "infiltrate armed spy into the South" taking advantage of the delivery of the relief goods to the South Korean flood-victims, according to a radio report from Seoul.

The fascist clique ordered the police stations and all the police booths to strengthen "check-up and search" and "intelligence activities" everywhere during the month-long "special alert period" which will last till October 17.

The repressive order is part of the heinous attempts of the military fascist clique to bar the popular sentiments from being inclined to the northern half of the republic on account of our compatriotic and humanitarian step to send relief goods to the South Korean flood-sufferers and incite the consciousness of confrontation.

CSO: 4100/366

INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

REPORTAGE ON CHON'S TRIP TO JAPAN

Japan's Remarks Criticized

SK181031 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1020 GMT 18 Sep 84

[Text] Pyongyang, 18 Sep (KCNA)--MINJU CHOSON today carries a signed commentary denouncing the Japanese reactionaries for intensifying their subjugation of South Korea with the traitor Chon Tu-hwan's Japan trip as an occasion.

The Japanese Foreign Ministry authorities clamoured that Japan and South Korea "entered into firm relationship" with the traitor's tour of Japan as an occasion and, synchronizing with this, the Japanese reactionaries prattled that Japan and South Korea should make economic and trade relations brisk by pooling their strength like "real brothers" and build up their position as "leading force" in Asia. Referring to this, the paper says these jargons expose the sinister intention of the Japanese reactionary ruling circles to realize their wild ambition for reinvading South Korea with such Quislings as Chon Tu-hwan as a guide.

It further says:

The Japanese reactionaries revived and rearmed under the wings of U.S. imperialism are dreaming of building Japan into a "great military power" and restoring the old colonial empire by force of arms and taking South Korea as the first target.

The Japanese reactionaries hammered away at the poppycock that Japan, "joining strength" with South Korea, should "build up" its "position" as a "leading force" in Asia. This is a very dangerous cry.

This reminds us of the acts of the Japanese imperialist aggressors in the 1930s when they openly pursued the policy of national assimilation, occupying our country and clamouring that "Japanese and Koreans are of the same ancestry" and "Japan and Korea are one."

Expansion of "economic and trade relations" clamoured by the Japanese reactionaries means strengthening economic plunder of South Korea and

accelerating the militarization of the South Korean economy. Their talk about "leading force" in Asia, "position", "building up" and the like is nothing but a revelation of their design to open wide the road of reinvading South Korea with the traitor Chon Tu-hwan as a guide and to realize the old dream of the "greater East Asia coprosperity sphere" with South Korea as a bridgehead.

It is a futile attempt to use such human trash as the traitor Chon Tu-hwan who is unanimously denounced and rejected by the people at home and abroad and has become an international orphan in opening wide the road of reinvasion.

RPR Denounces Chon's Trip

SK210831 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0820 GMT 21 Sep 84

[Text] Tokyo, 19 Sep (KNS-KCNA)--The mission of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification in Japan published a statement on September 14 denouncing the so-called "joint statement" of South Korea and Japan, an offspring of traitor Chon Tu-hwan's Japan trip.

The statement recalled the RPR spokesman's statement issued on September 9 which had branded the South Korea-Japan "joint statement" rigged up through traitor Chon Tu-hwan's trip as a criminal document of aggression and treachery and declared it completely null and void.

The whole course of the puppet's Japan trip showed to the whole world that it was a sellout trip of a despicable colonial servant and a war trip of a war-maniac, the statement declared.

It said:

The traitor Chon Tu-hwan is a dual stooge of the United States and Japan to the marrow who cannot represent the will and interests of the people.

Through his trip to Japan Chon Tu-hwan and his group increased South Korea's dependence on Japan in all domains, political, military, economic and cultural.

Particularly, Chon Tu-hwan revealed his true color as a war servant of the United States and Japan by rounding off the South Korea-Japan military co-operation system, the last link of the United States-Japan-South Korea triangular military alliance.

South Korean People Said Critical

SK202357 Pyongyang KCNA in English 2201 GMT 20 Sep 84

[Text] Pyongyang, 21 Sep (KCNA)--South Korean people of all strata denounce the sellout Japan trip of traitor Chon Tu-hwan, according to Radio "Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification."

A worker in Inchon named Kim Se-pong expressed indignation at the drive of traitor Chon Tu-hwan about "economic cooperation of new dimension" during his Japan trip which he made despite the strong protest and denunciation by the people at home and abroad. New "economic cooperation" means, after all, "Japanization of the South Korean economy," the worker noted. Yi Song-sun, a university teacher in Seoul, said:

Traitor Chon Tu-hwan made a tour of Japan with the intention to consolidate the foundation of his "power" and prolong his office with the political support and economic and military assistance from the Japanese reactionaries by selling off the interests of the country and the nation to them, but this is a mistake.

Japan's support to the Chon Tu-hwan "regime" cannot outmatch the strength of our people opposed to it. As long as the people oppose, Japan's support and assistance cannot guarantee the "security" of his "power" or his long-term office, however big it may be.

Cha Ho-yong, a journalist in Seoul, said that the noisy talk of the puppets around the Japan trip of traitor Chon Tu-hwan boils down to that they "should join hands with Japan and share the same destiny with her." A mere word of this makes us shudder. Our people who lived a bitter life of colonial slavery as a ruined nation for 36 years in "common destiny" advertised under the motto of "Japan and Korea are one," determinedly reject "cooperation" with Japanese militarism.

Foreign Media Noted

SK220813 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0800 GMT 22 Sep 84

[Text] Pyongyang, 22 Sep (KCNA)--The traitor Chon Tu-hwan's Japan trip is under fire in the mass media of various countries.

The Yugoslav papers POLITIKA September 9 and 10, BORBA September 10 and TANJUG September 9 said Chon Tu-hwan's Japan trip was for accelerating the formation of the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul triangular military alliance.

The Bulgarian paper RABOTNICHESKO DELO September 13 noted that the United States was trying to realize its ambition for Pacific supremacy by rounding off an aggressive triangular military alliance.

The Polish paper ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI September 11 published an article titled "Trip for Political Adventure" and another paper of the country TRYBUNA LUDU September 7 an article headlined "Humiliating Japan Trip of Seoul Dictator," and ZYCIE WARSZAWY September 6 and 12 carried articles denouncing traitor Chon's Japan trip.

Articles denouncing his trip were published from September 6 to 12 by the Czechoslovak paper RUDE PRAVO, the Vietnamese papers NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, the Indian paper NATIONAL HERALD, the Bangladesh paper BANGLADESH OBSERVER, the Pakistani paper PAKISTAN TIMES, the Swiss paper DER BUND, Afghan Radio and the British paper THE TIMES.

INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

DAILY CALLS S. KOREAN ECONOMY 'CRIPPLED ONE'

SK191655 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1614 GMT 19 Sep 84

[Text] Pyongyang, 19 Sep (KCNA)--NODONG SINMUN today carries an article titled "Dependent and Deformed Economy" exposing the weakness of the South Korean economy.

The author of the article says:

The South Korean economy is a colonial dependent economy, deformed, lopsided and fragile.

This finds expression above all in the fact that it is an economy "depending upon foreign capital" which cannot keep it alive without foreign capital including U.S. and Japanese monopoly capital.

After occupying South Korea, the U.S. imperialists devastated the South Korean national economy through "free aid" first and fostered and strengthened "state-run enterprises" and comprador capital in order to seize the arteries of the South Korean economy. Since the 1960s, they have reorganized the South Korean economy to more thoroughly realize their direct domination through "loans" and direct investments.

The infiltration of Japanese monopoly capital under U.S. domination into South Korea has rendered the South Korean economy more dependent.

According to reports, foreign capital invested in South Korea in the period from 1959 to 1980 amounted to 26,398 million dollars, the overwhelming proportion of which is accounted for by the United States and Japan and the international banking organs under U.S. domination.

Inducement of foreign capital has been further strengthened in recent years. According to data made public by the puppet Finance Ministry, new investments by foreigners in 1983 showed an increase of 40 percent above the previous year.

The reorganization of the South Korean economy through "aid" and the course of the inducement of foreign capital in the form of "loans" accompanied by the

export of surplus goods and direct investments were precisely the course of making the South Korean economy a "crippled one depending upon foreign capital."

The evil consequences of this are enormous.

First of all, the South Korean economy cannot operate enterprises without importing 90-100 percent of major raw materials and supplies. And the proportion of foreign capital is more than 80 percent in investments in the equipment.

The indiscreet inducement of foreign capital has brought huge foreign debts to the South Korean economy. According to an announcement of the South Korean economic authorities, the principal and interest South Korea had to pay to foreign capitalists were Dlr\$ 5,600 million in 1981 and Dlr\$ 6,000 million in 1982 and are Dlr\$ 7,000 million this year. They will rise to Dlr\$ 7,700 million next year and Dlr\$ 8,500 million in 1986.

Such vicious cycles have brought the total amount of foreign debts of South Korea to nearly Dlr\$ 50,000 million.

The dependence, deformity and fragility of the South Korean economy also find full manifestation in that it is an economy "mainly dependent upon export," that is, an abnormal economy which cannot maintain its existence without export.

Today the dependence of the South Korean economy on export surpasses 40 percent.

The South Korean economy is subordinated to meet the military demands of the United States. This also shows its deformity and weakness.

While converting the important parts of South Korea into military strategic strongpoints, the U.S. imperialists have accelerated the militarization of the South Korean economy to produce and secure locally part of their weapons and military materials at cheap prices.

As a result, roads, ports and light industry and heavy chemical industry of South Korea have turned into a U.S. military appendage.

Though the South Korean puppets are these days loud-mouthed about their "economic strength," their talk is nothing but a deception to shirk the responsibility for having brought the South Korean economy to subjugation and bankruptcy.

CSO: 4100/366

INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

CANADIAN KOREAN PAPER HITS JAPANESE AID

SK201017 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1004 GMT 20 Sep 84

[Text] Pyongyang, 20 Sep (KCNA)--NEW KOREA TIMES, a Koreans' newspaper published in Canada, in its article September 1 stripped bare and ridiculed the deceptive "offer of aid to the North" obtrusively brought forward by the traitor Chon Tu-hwan in August.

The article said it is hard to understand how Chon Tu-hwan, the cold-blooded creature who seized power by massacring thousands of fellow countrymen in Kwnagju, could begin to "worry about the life" of the compatriots in the North.

It further said:

Saddled with foreign debts close to 50,000 million dollars, he unconditionally induces short-term foreign loans at high interest rate to pay the interests of foreign debts, and grant all privileges for the introduction of foreign investments. To whom does he say he would give "free aid", finding himself in such miserable state?

Under the cloak of earning foreign currency, the Chon Tu-hwan "regime" brings in foreign sensual tourists in an organized way according to the "government" plan. Worse still, it offers South Korean women to the Japanese gay quarters under the name of artistes and forces them into prostitution and shamelessly pockets the money earned by them on the flesh market. Does it mean that it would give "aid" out of this money?

The nation and the fatherland are nothing to the Chon Tu-hwan military fascist clique. They are only interested in permanent office and fortune-making. In the tricky "aid offer" the puppets seek a treacherous aim, stressed the article.

CSO: 4100/366

INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

SOUTH'S WORKERS CONDEMN U.S. 'ECONOMIC DOMINATION'

SK210829 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0814 GMT 21 Sep 84

[Text] Pyongyang, 21 Sep (KCNA)--The South Korean people are lifting up louder voices condemning the U.S. imperialists and the flunkeyist-traitors who have driven the economy into bankruptcy.

The "South Korean Workers Welfare Council," a fighting organization of the South Korean workers, in a declaration adopted at its inaugural meeting in March said that the national industry had gone bankrupt and the workers were leading an untold miserable life. It pointed out:

The collusion of political power, monopolies and outside forces have strengthened day by day the anti-popular economic policy of low wage, low grain-price and heavy taxes, denying the workers the least human life. Wages fall far short of the minimum living cost and working hour is the longest in the world and a sharply increasing number of workers suffer physical destruction from industrial disasters and occupation diseases.

The South Korean paper TONGA ILBO said that 66 per cent of the loans issued by the South Korean banking organs are concentrated on 50 big comprador business groups and the big business-oriented economic policy of the puppet clique inevitably leads the minor enterprises to ruin.

The South Korean magazine WOLGAN CHOSON pointed out that the Chon Tu-hwan puppet clique find themselves in a hopeless crisis, heavily weighed down with foreign debts.

The basic point in question, it said, is that debts are piled up in the form of foreign loans. Foreign loans are too large and a commensurate amount of products have to be exported to foreign countries. Therefore, it is very hard to hold out any longer.

A professor Seoul University surnamed Pak said that nearly 50,000 million dollars of foreign debts incurred by South Korea is a product of the anti-popular economic policy that has made the economy dependent upon outside forces.

CSO: 4100/366

INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

SOUTH'S PEASANTS SAID HIT BY CROP PRICES, TAXES

SK200843 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0806 GMT 20 Sep 84

[Text] Pyongyang, 20 Sep (KCNA)--The South Korean magazine SINDONGA carried an article by its journalist exposing the situation of the rural villages.

Noting that this year, too, South Korea failed in barley farming, its per-hectare harvest showing a 10-20 per cent drop below the annual average and a 30 per cent drop in Kurye area, South Cholla Province, known as barley producer, the author said that the peasants are hard hit, unable to recover the product on cost under the anti-popular low grain price policy of the Chon Tu-hwan puppet clique.

Noting that the 18,000 million won accumulated by Chong Nae-hyok, former "representative member" of the puppet Democratic Justice Party, through shady channels is enough to raise the purchase price of barley 10 per cent, the peasants are lifting up louder voices condemning the corruption of the ruling quarters and demanding measures for them, said the author.

No sooner had the South Korean peasants thrashed their grain than they were pressed with the urge to pay the land tax, irrigation tax and debts they had incurred for farming such as the prices of farm implements, with interests attached. Each household is saddled with more than 2 million won of debts, when debts to the "Agricultural Association" and private debts are added to them.

CSO: 4100/366

INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

JAPANESE DAILY CITED ON CHONGNYON HIERARCHY

SK180045 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English 18 Sep 84 p 1

[Text] Tokyo (YONHAP)--Han Tok-su will be replaced by Yi Chin-kyu as chairman of the pro-Pyongyang Korean residents federation in Japan (Chongnyon), the Asahi Shimbun reported Sunday.

Han, 77, has led Chongnyon for 29 years. Yi, 66, is the organization's first vice chairman.

The Tokyo daily reported that Kim Il-song instructed Han, who has been in Pyongyang since July, to step down from his post. The report said that his prolonged stay in Pyongyang is designed to smooth the way for Chongnyon's leadership change.

There were signs of an impending leadership change in Chongnyon in June, it said, adding that Yi, one of six vice chairman, was promoted to become first vice chairman at a Chongnyon general assembly held in the same month.

It said So Man-sul, general secretary of the organization, and Paek Chong-won, director general for international affairs, were also promoted to become vice chairmen at the meeting.

The reshuffle was made in line with Kim Il-song's plan to hand over his power to his son Chong-il, it said.

Yi, who led a Chongnyon delegation to Pyongyang to attend the senior Kim's birthday in April, was told by Kim to head Chongnyon, the daily said. It added that Lee met with Kim 12 and 24 April.

Kim's instruction was conveyed to Chongnyon officials at the 26 June meeting of chapter chairmen and heads of various Chongnyon organizations, it said.

CSO: 4100/362

INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

KOREA-U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE WORRIES USSR

Seoul HANGUK ILBO in Korean 18 Jul 84 p 3

[Article by Pak Chong-kun: "North Korea Will Not Get Sophisticated Weapons"]

[Text] The Soviet journalist whom this reporter met at the Basrah front in Iraq was very kind to this Korean reporter and showed great interest in Korean problems.

Igor Belayev is foreign policy director (Middle East region) of the monthly LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, (circulation 2.5 million) which is the organ of the Soviet writers' union. This Soviet journalist, who is a doctor and former professor and who became 61 this year, shook his head negatively in response to the question whether the Soviet Union is going to supply sophisticated weapons to North Korea. He reminded me of the fact that when Kim Il-song visited the Soviet Union not even a joint statement was issued, and he said, pointing directly at his fingernail, that interests that the Soviet Union has in North Korea are no bigger than a fingernail.

This reporter happened to sit next to Belayev on the bus going to the Basrah front on the morning of 13 July. After that, he and this reporter had an opportunity to share a lot of stories, accompanying one another for a day and a half until we parted in Baghdad on the afternoon of 14 July. He always got on the bus one step ahead of this reporter, gave the seat next to him to this reporter and said we were neighbors.

He said that he had come to Iraq after assignment in Syria and Kuwait for the last several months and had talked with the president of Iraq, Saddam Husayn, three times. With partially grey hair and blue eyes, he was very energetic, and the brightness of his eyes reflected light.

Igor Belayev, who can speak Arabic, English, French and German, often avoided answering, saying that because his specialty is the Middle East he did not know much about Far East problems, but his interest in Korea was high.

He asked what Koreans think about Kim Il-song of North Korea, who is called the "greatest leader" in the world, but in his words "the greatest leader" an intonation containing a sneer could be felt.

He nodded without saying anything to my response, "What should we think about a leader who abdicates his power to his son and erects tens of thousands of statues of himself?" To the question of whether he does not think Kim Il-song is carrying out a dexterous tightrope diplomacy between the Soviet Union and China, he said in return that if Kim's tightrope diplomacy is dexterous the Soviet Union cannot supply sophisticated weapons to North Korea just for that reason. It seemed that he bore in mind the possibility that sophisticated weapons could be used reversely by North Korea. About the issue of the Soviet Union's participating in the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988, he hinted at the possibility of the Soviet Union's nonparticipation by asking in return "Didn't Korea boycott the Moscow Olympic Games in 1980?" But he said the decision as to whether the Soviet Union would participate will be made in 2 years.

He showed great concern about a trilateral military alliance with the United States, Japan and Korea as the principal axis and about China's attitude, and he emphasized that the position of Korea is very delicate.

In his position of Middle East problem specialist he said very simply that the Soviet Union's military support to Iraq is intended to support the weak because Iraq is defensive, rather than from a political or ideological aspect.

About Korean workers dispatched in the Middle East, he pointed out that he knows that there are important problems in that the activity of Koreans is limited to working places, so they cannot penetrate into the countries in this region and the peoples of this region have the understanding that Koreans only make money and then leave. He said he had confirmed that the militarization of Japan is evident through talks with Japanese leaders when he visited there himself. He also said that Japan would not challenge China or the Soviet Union, but he sees some possibility for Japan to do that to weak and small countries in its vicinity.

About the shooting down of the Korean airliner, he said he has sympathy for the victims, but he spoke for the official position of the Soviet Union by saying that the accident seemed to be conspired by a third party.

Igor Belayev, who is going to go back to Moscow after completing his assignment in Iraq and then plans to return to Syria at the end of this year, smiled bitterly saying that he planned to visit Iran during his trip but his plan vanished because the Iranian Government refused to issue him a visa.

During the front assignment, he just listened, sitting in the back without saying anything and often wrote memos. When this reporter asked his opinion regarding some Western reporters who inquired intensively about the Soviet Union's supply of weapons to Iraq at a conference with an Iraqi military commander, he substituted his light smile for an answer.

In his black bag there was always a bottle of some beverage, which showed the delicate side of his character.

Handing a bottle of water to this reporter, he wiped the mouth of the bottle which his mouth had touched and said, "Sorry, there's no cup."

This Soviet journalist, who was smiling bitterly at the sight of Iraqi Government officials who were guides on the bus of the assignment team and were arguing that some refreshments which were stored inside the bus were missing, opened his bag and gave this reporter a glimpse of one can of cola which he had hid, and laughed ill-naturedly saying, "This is a first-class secret."

When this reporter made a joke saying, "Isn't it bad taste to make other people fight? The Soviet Union is a big power even on the bus," he said that on the way from Baghdad to Basrah, Iraqi guides themselves drank beverages intended for the passengers, and did not treat the guests.

When the topic of the Soviet physicist Sakharov was broached, he predicted that the Soviet Government would not release him because he knows too many things about the defense system of the Soviet Union.

Igor Belayev, who imparted that it was cool, around 20°C, in Moscow at that time of year, laughed aloud and clapped his hands saying, "So you thought only northern polar bears live there," to the remark that this reporter thought that there was only winter in Moscow, and he emphasized that a thousand hearings are not worth one seeing.

He imparted that research about Korea is very active in universities in the Soviet Union, and that it is possible to translate Korean publications easily.

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CSO: 4107/203

INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

DPRK RED CROSS SOCIETY DECIDES TO AID SOUTH

Worker Welcomes Decision

SK170212 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 0810 GMT 16 Sep 84

[Text] The decision of the DPRK Red Cross Society Central Committee to send relief goods to the flood victims in South Korea has aroused a great reaction among the working people in various places.

(Yi Un-mo), a worker at the Pyongyang General Printing Plant, said: [Begin recording] On 8 September, the Central Committee of the DPRK Red Cross Society adopted a decision to send relief goods to the flood victims in South Korea as a compatriotic measure to save (Kuhagiwihan) the South Korean compatriots.

In this connection, on 14 September, the South Korean Red Cross Society expressed its intention to accept this offer. Although nearly 40 years have passed since the country's division into North and South by the U.S. imperialist aggressors, this was the first time the South Korean said accepted a compatriotic offer from us. [sentence as received]

Indeed, the government of our republic has put forth several proposals concerning compatriotic and humanitarian measures to save the South Korean compatriots and brothers languishing in misfortune. This notwithstanding, because of the South Korean authorities' insincere attitude, these measures could not be realized.

By the way, the South Korean Red Cross Society has now accepted the offer of the Central Committee of the DPRK Red Cross Society for the first time. I am very glad to see this. In fact, we had sincerely hoped for this.

Because of the recent rains, the people in various areas in South Korea, including Seoul, suffered very grave damage. South Korean flood victims must have suffered grave misfortune in this respect. Thus, the Central Committee of our Red Cross Society has decided to send 50,000 sok of rice, 500,000 meters of cloth, 100,000 tons of cement, and medical supplies as relief goods to the South Korean flood victims.

This measure is an expression of brotherly love toward the compatriots who are suffering a calamity and originates from a humanitarian stand. It would be better and one would be happier if this measure is realized early on.

Whether it will be realized at an early date or not depends upon the sincerity of the South Korean side. If the South Korean side sincerely fulfilled the questions to be put forth, there will be no difficulty in realizing this measure.

This year, there is a prospect of bumper crops again in the rural areas in the northern half of our republic. At the moment, the plants and enterprises at various places are producing more cement, (?steel materials), cloth, and daily necessities with the spirit to save the compatriots in the South.

Our powerful self-reliant national economy is always prepared to recover the destroyed economy of South Korea and (?set in order) the ruined life of the South Korean working people.

We are expecting the relief goods to be delivered to the South Korean flood victims at the earliest possible date. At present, our side is waiting, making every preparation.

We sincerely hope that the talks between the representatives from the North and the South at Panmunjom on 18 September will be successful and our compatriotic measure will be surely realized. [End recording]

Authorities' Attitude Denounced

SK191423 (Clandestine) Voice of the RPR in Korean to South Korea 1000 GMT
19 Sep 84

[Text] The masses from all walks of life, denouncing the position and attitude of the delegates of the Korean National Red Cross [KNRC] at the working-level contact between the North and South Korean Red Cross societies to discuss the issue of delivering relief goods to flood victims, raised voices calling for prompt finalization of the working-level contact so that the relief goods can be delivered to flood victims at an early date.

A certain Pak, a flood victim residing in Uijongbu City, Kyonggi Province, said: I heard, on the radio, the six-point plan put forth by the North in the working-level contact between the North and South Korean Red Cross societies. This plan was filled with brotherly love. The proposal to designate Seoul, in which flood damages were most severe, and which is convenient for transport of relief goods, Sokcho, Inchon, and Pusan as the places for delivering and receiving the relief goods is a perfect plan because flood victims in the areas which were hit by flooding most severely are anxiously awaiting the relief goods.

However, the KNRC refused transport of materials to Seoul, where flood victims are concentrated, and wanted to receive them at Panmunjom. This is beyond my understanding. The North is going to send relief goods via land routes. Why should this be opposed? If the KNRC truly thinks of our flood victims and appreciates the North's steps, it should say: "Thank you. We welcome you."

I think the authorities' acts are preposterous actions aimed at hindering the delivery of the North's relief goods in the flood-stricken areas.

Furthermore, they preposterously slandered the North in the course of the contact with the North Korean Red Cross Society and kicked off frenzied anti-communist functions in Seoul. In view of this, they seem to be pursuing some other aims. The ruling authorities should make efforts so that the North's relief goods, filled with brotherly love, can be delivered into the hands of flood victims at an early date.

A certain Kim, a victim residing in Sokcho, Kangwon Province, said: I think that the KNRC should unconditionally accept the proposal of the North. It is quite natural to warmly welcome the brothers who bring the relief goods from the North. Refusing, in front of the gate, the brothers bringing the relief goods, rather than greeting them gladly, is not right.

Furthermore, the Chon Tu-hwan clique is waging anticommunist rackets against the North. This is indeed intolerable. The KNRC side should unconditionally respond to the sincere attitude of the North.

Repercussions Noted

SK170602 Pyongyang Domestic Service in korean 2310 GMT 16 Sep 84

[Text] The decision of the Central Committee of the DPRK Red Cross Society on sending aid to the South Korean flood victims is now still arousing great repercussions among people from all strata. Han Ik-pin, chief of the subwork team of work team No 8 of Taesong Cooperative Farm in Taesong District, says:

[Begin recording] The decision of the Central Committee of our Red Cross Society on sending relief goods to the South Korean flood victims is an extremely righteous step. All members of our cooperative farm think that the South Korean Red Cross Society's agreement to the offer of the Central Committee of our Red Cross Society calling for the former's cooperation for the early realization of the humanitarian and compatriotic step is indeed fortunate.

We, all members of the cooperative farm, ardently want the relief goods with the brotherly love of the brethren in the northern half of the Republic to be delivered to the South Korean flood victims at the earliest possible date so that these goods will be conducive to stabilizing their lives and to alleviating their sufferings, if even a little.

We, the people of the northern half of the Republic, have always thought of the South Korean brethren even when we built a plant or a power plant. It is indeed heart-rending that the South Korean brethren who have inherited the same blood are suffering disasters.

Today, under the wise leadership of the great leader and the dear comrade Kim Chong-il the people of the northern half of the Republic are leading a happy life to their hearts' content without worrying about food, clothes,

and house thanks to the superior socialist system and the powerful self-reliant national economy.

In particular, irrigation system has been completely introduced and the anti-erosion project to prevent flood and drought has been also properly completed in the northern half of the republic. As a result, the words, "damages caused by flood and drought" have already disappeared in the northern half of the republic.

We have had a heavy rain fall in the northern half of the republic this year. However, there is no one who suffered the damage caused by flood and cooperative farms throughout the country are enjoying a bumper year.

Our cooperative farm is also expecting a rich harvest this year again. Corn, fruit, and vegetables are abundant in our cooperative farm.

However, the people in South Korea are suffering the serious damages caused by the recent heavy rain. This is indeed heart-rending. For our brethren, who have lived together as a single nation throughout the whole course of our history, to live now divided into North and South is also heart-rending. Furthermore, we cannot remain indifferent to the fact that the brethren in the southern half of the Republic are suffering the damages caused by the recent heavy rain fall. Therefore, members of our cooperative farm will make all possible efforts to send relief goods.

We will further accelerate the current harvesting work with the spirit of expediting the day when the relief goods of the Central Committee of our Red Cross Society are reached [by] the South Korean flood victims at the earliest possible date so that these goods are used in alleviating their sufferings. [End recording]

South 'Slandering' Aid Offer

SK151320 (Clandestine) Voice of the RPR in Korean to South Korea 1000 GMT
15 Sep 84

[Station commentary: "Improper Attitude"]

[Excerpts] As is known to all, the Central Committee of the North Korean Red Cross decided to send, out of brotherly love, 50,000 sok of rice, 500,000 meters of fabric, 100,000 tons of cement, and medical supplies to the victims of floods that hit Seoul and other areas in South Korea. In connection with this, the Seoul Red Cross Society decided to accept the North's proposal.

Therefore, the North was pleased with this and decided to send five representatives to Panmunjom to discuss the delivery of relief goods to the flood victims as soon as possible. As all of you know very well, since national liberation, whenever the victims of calamities that took place in South Korea suffered various pains or difficulties, the North offered to send relief goods, proceeding from brotherly love and humanitarian spirit. The South Korean side, which ignored, each time, the North's proposals, made out of brotherly love, decided

to accept the North Korean Red Cross Offer this time. We can say that this is indeed a pleasing act [pankaun] which we should welcome. Many flood victims in Seoul and other areas are overflowing with thanks to the North's measures of brotherly love and earnestly desire the delivery of relief goods at an early date.

However, contrary to this, and to our regret, the present ruling authorities are running amok in a frenzy of slandering the North, abusing the North's proposal, made out of brotherly love, to relieve the pains and sufferings of the fellow countrymen. The Chon Tu-hwan clique is viciously making absurd and slanderous remarks, through various government mouthpieces and propaganda means, including Culture and Information Minister Yi Chin-hui, that the North Korean Red Cross offer is designed as propaganda, is far from (?feasible), and so forth. This shows that they are attempting to use the North's measures of brotherly love and humanitarian spirit for their impure political propaganda. What we should not overlook, in particular, is the Chon Tu-Hwan clique's remark that acceptance of the North's offer is based on superiority over the north in national strength.

Since the South Korean Red Cross decided to accept the North's proposal, it should take appropriate measures so that the relief goods offered by the North to relieve the pains of the sufferers reach the hands of the flood victims without any reservation.

Aid Goods Not Needed

SK141322 Seoul YONHAP in English 1250 GMT 14 Sep 84

[Text] Seoul, 14 September (YONHAP)--The materials North Korea has proposed to give the South Korean National Red Cross are in excess in South Korea.

The North Korean Red Cross Society on 8 September proposed to offer 7,200 tons of rice, 100,000 tons of cement and 500,000 meters of textiles as relief for South Korean flood victims.

In the case of rice, South Korea's rice yield last year surpassed that of North Korea by 5.4 million tons to 2.12 million tons.

Despite the recent flood that thrashed many parts of South Korea, the south will see a bumper crop this year with an expected crop of more than 5.54 million tons, well above the last year's production, according to government sources.

Furthermore, the government holds rice totaling more than 1.5 million tons in its warehouses, which could feed the whole South Korean people for 105 days.

Government officials said they worried if the government's warehouses will be in shortage to stockpile rice when the government starts purchase of rice from farmers in November.

South Korea is far superior to the North in the size of rice paddies. North Korea has 640,000 hectares of rice paddies, some 49 percent of South Korea's 1.3 million hectares.

The sources said North Korea produced 5.19 million tons of grain and potatoes in 1982, an amount insufficient for 18.9 million North Korean residents.

In the case of cement, South Korea produces the construction material 2.7 times more than North Korea's production.

South Korea produced cement 23.4 million tons in 1983 while the north only 8.6 million tons.

The South exported more than 5 million tons of cement last year and 1.83 million tons of cement were stockpiled in the warehouses at the end of August.

The sources said it is doubtful if North Korea has spare cement.

The same thing is true in the textiles. South Korea's textile production is some nine times more than that of North Korea.

The North produces 600 million meters of textiles annually, compared with the South's 5.6 billion meters.

South Korea exported 3.6 billion meters of textiles worth 1,788 million U.S. dollars in 1983 and has an export target of 1,970 million dollars for this year.

Meanwhile, North Korea is no match for South Korea either in terms of economic performance or industrial structure.

According to the statistics [word indistinct] the National Unification Board, gross national product (GNP) of South Korea amounted to 75.3 billion dollars in 1983, 5.2 times more than North Korea's 14.5 million dollars.

Per capita GNP was 1,840 dollars for the South and 765 dollars for the North for the same year.

The foreign trade volume of North Korea totaled 2.9 billion dollars in 1983, 1.4 billion dollars in exports and 1.5 billion dollars in imports. The amount represents only 7 percent of the South's trade volume of 50.4 billion dollars--24.2 billion dollars in exports and 26.2 billion dollars in imports, according to the statistics.

Editorial on Acceptance of Offer

SK150027 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English 15 Sep 84 p 4

[Editorial: "Accepting Pyongyang's Offer"]

[Text] The lingering tension on the Korean peninsula unquestionably involves issues that must be settled, considering all the potential dangers they entail. But solving them will be difficult because of the deeply rooted mutual distrust resulting from 4 decades of territorial division and, worse yet, the fratricidal Korean War.

Viable solutions will require gradual, sincere attempts at reconciliation. This republic has left no stone unturned to achieve such reconciliation.

Mindful of this, the Korea National Red Cross has done well to accept the offer of its North Korean counterpart to provide materials for victims of the recent devastating floods in South Korea.

In fact, however, the damage wrought by the flooding was repaired in a short span of time thanks to our people's concerted efforts. Thus, we cordially refused the offer of the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to provide aid to the flood victims because we knew we could repair the damage using our own resources.

Although we do not need help from others, our Red Cross has accepted the North's offer. As KNRC President Yu Chang-sun said in his statement, our acceptance is intended to pave the way for genuine, mutual and humanitarian assistance between the divided halves of Korea and improve inter-Korean relations.

It should be noted at this juncture that President Chon Tu-hwan expressed his willingness last month to provide North Korea with technological expertise and materials free of charge to help improve the lives of the northern people. His offer of daily necessities reflects the pure brotherly love and humanitarian spirit we feel for our northern brethern.

This, of course, is a manifestation of Seoul's resolve to open an age of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. But the Pyongyang regime, as it has done in the past, turned a deaf ear to our latest offer.

Suddenly, however, the northern Red Cross, in a radio broadcast 8 September, offered to supply us with 50,000 sok of rice, 500,000 meters of fabric, 100,000 tons of cement, and medicine.

Considering the poor economic situation of North Korea in comparison to the South, one cannot help suspecting that Pyongyang's latest offer is politically motivated. It seems aimed at improving Pyongyang's lowly image in international society as a terrorist clique, as well as a bid to slacken anti-communist awareness in the South.

Statistics show that the South's GNP amounted to \$75.3 billion last year compared with \$14.5 billion for the North--a gap of 5.2 to 1. In per capita GNP, the South recorded \$1,884 last year, 2.5 times the \$765 of the North. That gap is expected to grow wider still in view of the North's backward economic structure.

Whatever the real motives behind Pyongyang's offer, we hope Seoul's acceptance will make it impossible for North Korea to turn down our future offers. Seen in that context, our acceptance will hopefully establish a precedent.

There are many issues that must be solved if the South and North are genuinely eager to ease the tension between them, thereby firmly establishing peace for the eventual achievement of territorial unification.

In this vein, we believe, the acceptance by our Red Cross will prove to be a significant development toward reconciling the divided halves of the Peninsula--a necessary foundation if further progress in inter-Korean relations is to be achieved.

Seoul is sincere enough to have designated ports--Inchon and Pusan--to which Pyongyang may ship the offered materials. Goods offered by a Red Cross society are usually delivered through International Red Cross organs.

The KNRC also proposed to its Pyongyang counterpart that working-level Red Cross contacts be made at Panmunjom at the earliest possible date to discuss delivery procedures in detail. We hope that Pyongyang will not carp about minor issues as an excuse to back down on its offer. Our ardent desire is that his precious opportunity will not prove futile.

Furthermore, it is our genuine wish that North Korea does not seize upon this humanitarian motivation as a tool to mitigate anti-communist sentiments in the South or to propagandize its "economic might." Should North Korea harbor even a hint of ill design, the Seoul-Pyongyang relations would slink back to another spell of frustration and despair.

Chronological Review

SK180921 Seoul YONHAP in English 0907 GMT 18 Sep 84

[Text] Seoul, 18 September (YONHAP)--The following is a brief chronological review of Seoul-Pyongyang Red Cross talks:

--12 August 1971--South Korea National Red Cross (KNRC) President Choe Tu-sun's proposal to North Korea for direct talks on ways of arranging for reunion of separated family members living in the two sectors of Korea.

--20 September 1971--The first session of the inter-Korean preliminary Red Cross talks in the truce village of Panmunjom.

--22 September 1971--Establishment of a permanent liaison office in Panmunjom and [word indistinct] communication link between Seoul and Pyongyang.

--2 May 1972--South Korean Central Intelligence Agency Director Yi Hu-rak's visit to Pyongyang.

--29 May 1972--North Korean Second Vice Minister Pak Song-chol's Seoul visit.

--4 July 1972--Simultaneous announcement in Seoul and Pyongyang of the South-North joint communique, in which the two sides agree to a three-point principle for peaceful reunification of the peninsula.

--27 July 1972--The first working-level talks prior to the full-dress South-North Red Cross conference.

--12 August 1972--Closing of the 25th session of the inter-Korean preliminary Red Cross talks (conclusion of the preliminary talks).

- 18 August 1972--Installation of 20 telephone lines between the headquarters of KNRC in Seoul and the North Korean Red Cross (NKRC) in Pyongyang.
- 30 August 1972--The first historic full-dress South-North Red Cross talks in Pyongyang.
- 13 September 1972--The second full-dress Red Cross talks in Seoul.
- 24 October 1972--The third full-dress Red Cross talks in Pyongyang.
- 22 November 1972--The fourth full-dress Red Cross talks in Seoul.
- 20 March 1973--The fifth full-dress Red Cross talks in Pyongyang.
- 8 May 1973--The sixth full-dress Red Cross talks in Seoul.
- 11 July 1973--The seventh full-dress Red Cross talks in Pyongyang.
- 28 August 1973--The sudden, unilateral announcement by Kim Yong-chu, Pyongyang side co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, of discontinuation of the South-North dialogue.
- 28 November 1973--The first working-level inter-Korean Red Cross contact at Panmunjom.
- 29 May 1974--The seventh working-level Red Cross contact.
- 10 July 1974--The first working-level meeting of the South-North Red Cross Conference (SNRCC).
- 8 December 1977--The 25th SNRCC working-level meeting.
- 12 August 1982--KNRC President Yu Chang-sun's statement proposing to North Korea the unconditional resumption of the suspended SNRCC and declaring "a day for separated families" for South Koreans who have their hometowns in the North.
- 6 July 1983--KNRC President Yu's statement concerning the campaign for re-union of separated family members.

Blame for Breakdown of Talks

SK190239 Seoul YONHAP in English 0221 GMT 19 Sep 84

[Text] Seoul, 19 September (OANA-YONHAP)--The breakdown of the South and North Korean Red Cross talks at Panmunjom Tuesday has caused harsh criticism and indignation from all walks of life here.

Representative leaders in the country and many citizens said in unison that it was despicable for North Korea to exploit the "pains of compatriots" in their political propaganda scheme, but they said they expected such results in light of North Korea's past behavior.

The Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry commented that the breakdown of the inter-Korean Red Cross talks was no surprise. The North Korean side, it said was fully responsible for the meeting's rupture and deserves solemn condemnation from international societies.

The Federation of the Korean Industries, another private economic organization, said the breakdown of the meeting was because of North Korea's "unreasonable demand."

North Korea seemed to have no intention of ability to give the materials to South Korea, it said.

The Korean Traders Association also commented that the North Korean side was totally responsible for the impasse at the Red Cross meeting. It was another revelation of North Korea's "black intention" to use talks for their own propaganda purposes, it said.

Rep Chong Chae-chol of the ruling Democratic Justice Party said, in short, the inter-Korean Red Cross talks ended as "Kim Il-song's fiasco."

"I cannot suppress deploration and indignation over North Korea's impure scheme," he said.

Kim Chip, vice president of the Korea amateur sports association, said North Korea should not insist on its unreasonable demand concerning the method of transporting the materials if it really had the intention to donate them.

Prof Choe Tong-sik at Korea University also said North Korea betrayed the hope of the whole Korean people. In light of humanity and the International Red Cross spirit, North Korea's scheme to exploit "their brothers' pains for political propaganda" is even more despicable, he said.

Kang Yong-cha, a college coed, said she did not expect that North Korea would put into practice its proposal to pass on the materials.

She said she wonders why North Korea engaged in such "childish" conduct.

Kim Chan-hwan, a businessman in Seoul, said he did not expect the meeting to break apart in such a short period of time, although he believed that North Korea's proposal was nothing but hackneyed political propaganda.

North's 'Propaganda' at Talks Hit

SK190134 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 19 Sep 84 p 1

[By Chue Won-sok]

[Text] It was a premediated political ploy but a clumsily inhumane one.

The breakdown of the inter-Korean Red Cross talks at Panmunjom yesterday came as no surprise as such a consequence was widely expected in the South in light of the Northerners' past behaviors.

The whole affair was another exposure of the North Korean Communists' scheme to capitalize on a Red Cross forum as a vehicle for their propaganda purposes.

They insisted on internationally-unacceptable conditions for the delivery of materials they have offered for flood victims in the South.

By all indications, the Northern side's demand for direct transportation of materials to the Southern capital city of Seoul in their trucks stemmed obviously from their intention to stage an enormous "political show" in the heart of Seoul.

This is construed as a trick to alienate the Southern people from their government, thereby causing a social confusion, observers here viewed.

Unfortunately, the episode only worsened the deep-seated mistrust between the South and the North.

Observers here said that the Pyongyang regime conceived the idea of offering relief materials to the South in order to cover the responsibility of the Rangoon bombing incident when its first anniversary was approaching.

Noting that North Korea is driven into a corner following the most heinous terrorist act last year, they said that it made the deceitful offer to improve its down-trodden image in the international society.

In the early part of the Panmunjom meeting, the Southern delegation made some significant concessions from their original position.

They consented to adding the East Coast port of Pukpyong and border village Panmunjom as receiving points and allowed transportation of the North Korean cargo by automobiles.

Yet the North Koreans never budged from their insistence of bringing the materials to Seoul. They even asserted that they would hold transfer ceremonies in South Korean cities and "console" flood victims there.

While the Korea National Red Cross asked for finishing the procedural discussions in one session even by holding talks overnight, the northerners walked out of the conference room after unilaterally setting the date for the next contact.

"We will repeat our demand for the delivery of our supplies to Seoul [a] hundred times until you accept it," the Northern chief delegate said.

KNRC officials said this remark indicated that North Korea would never give up the condition should the two delegations meet again.

Now that the affair has gone down to another page in the frustrating history of post-war South-North contacts, observers in Seoul began pondering whether the North had ever expected the positive response from the South.

It was generally agreed that the Northerners had not anticipated that the South would accept their proposal. That was the reason why they were so specific about the quantities of the items they offered, the observers said.

Fact was that they had no intention whatsoever to share any little bit of grain with the unfortunate flood victims in the South. "They simply have no rice to share," the observers noted.

All these were obvious to the people in the South from the beginning. Yet they accepted the Northern offer from the sincere hope to find a clue to opening a dialogue with the North.

The effort was futile and the lesson thus earned was painful.

DKP Flays North

SK190723 Seoul YONHAP in English 0716 GMT 19 Sep 84

[Text] Seoul, 19 September (OANA-YONHAP)--South Korea's leading opposition Democratic Korea Party (DKP) denounced the North Korean Red Cross Wednesday as having "betrayed the national aspiration for resumption of inter-Korean dialogue."

In a statement on the broken-off inter-Korean Red Cross talks, DKP spokesman Rep Mok Yo-sang said the North once again revealed its wornout propaganda ploy. Lacking any real intention to provide the materials, it proposed "unreasonable preconditions, which interfere with the internal affairs of South Korea."

Rep Mok called on the North to carry out its early promise faithfully with real humanitarianism and brotherly love.

The minority Korea National Party (KNP) issued a similar statement that said the rupture in the Red Cross talks, "due to the North's ignorance of realistic rationality and Red Cross spirit," has disappointed all Koreans who are anxious for the establishment of an inter-Korean dialogue.

"If the North's offer is based on a purely humanitarian background, it should respect the principles and practices of the International Red Cross," KNP spokesman Rep Kim Yong-tae said.

The working-level officials' meeting between the South and North Korean Red Cross societies to discuss procedural matters related to the delivery and receipt of the materials the North offered to South Korean flood victims, was broken off Tuesday when the North Korean delegates unilaterally walked out of the conference room.

North Hopeful of Early Delivery

SK160951 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0933 GMT 16 Sep 84

[Text] Pyongyang 16 September (KCNA)--The decision of the Central Committee of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to send relief goods to the South Korean flood-victims has evoked wide-spread repercussions upon the people of all strata.

Pang Ae-son, chairman of the Management Board of the Unha Cooperative Farm in Unjon County, North Pyongan Province, said:

The decision of the Central Committee of our Red Cross Society to send rice, fabrics, cement and medicine as relief goods to the South Korean flood-sufferers is a humanitarian measure proceeded from the noble compatriotic love for the fellow countrymen who suffered from floods.

Having stored up a large quantity of food every year after eating our fill, we are prepared to deliver required food to the South Korean flood-sufferers anytime.

Saying that our compatriotic desire to help the South Korean flood-sufferers is growing more ardent with each passing day, labor heroine Chon Ok-hwa, a weaver of the Pyongyang Textile Mill, said: We are hastening textile production with earnest wish to clothe the flood-sufferers of South Korea linked with the North by the same view.

Kim Kyong-hwal, director of the Department of Cement Production Guidance of the Building Materials Ministry, said:

Our ministry has already produced the whole amount of cement to be sent to the South Korean flood-victims and packed them all. Now we are anxiously waiting for the day of its delivery.

Possessed of independent and modern cement industry, we not only satisfy the home demand for cement in economic construction but also export large quantities of it every year.

This year we will produce more cement than last year.

Ko Hwa-sun, teacher of the Hwangju Girl's Senior Middle School in North Hwanghae Province, said:

Our people think it fortunate that the South Korean Red Cross responded to our request for cooperating in an early realization of our humanitarian and compatriotic measure.

Now our educational workers and younger generations hope that the relief goods imbued with the compatriotic love will be quickly delivered to the South Korean flood-victims.

South Hails North's Offer

SK190821 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0812 GMT 19 Sep 84

[Text] Pyongyang 19 September (KCNA)--The decision of the Central Committee of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to send relief goods to the South Korean flood-victims has evoked wide-spread repercussions upon the South Korean population, according to radio "Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification."

A certain Kim, a resident in Mangwon-Dong, Mapo District, Seoul, said:

The decision of the Red Cross Society of the North to send large quantities of relief goods to us the flood-sufferers is a compatriotic step overflowing with sincerity.

When this land had turned into a mourner's house and over 200,000 flood-sufferers were crying for measures for thier living, the traitor Chon Tu-hwan, paying no heed to them, called on his Japanese master and signed a sellout document. How can we pardon this traitor?

We must overthrow such traitor as Chon Tu-hwan, if our people are to be freed from all misfortunes and sufferings.

A flood-sufferer in Kangdong District surnamed Han urged the Chon Tu-hwan military fascist clique to stop abusing the decision of the Red Cross Society of the North to send relief goods and take necessary measures for their early delivery to the flood-sufferers.

A certain Yi residing in Samrak-Dong, Northern District, Pusan, had this to say:

The Chon Tu-hwan group cracked down with the bayonet upon a demonstration of flood-sufferers in Seoul demanding compensation for the damages.

The Chon Tu-hwan group, he stressed, must accept the relief materials sent by the North at an early date, without any excuse or pretext, and make them reach the flood-sufferers quickly and exactly.

CSO: 4110/154

INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

SOUTH, NORTH MINISTER'S MEETING AT UNGA DOUBTFUL

SK210708 Seoul YONHAP in English 0700 GMT 21 Sep 84

[Text] Seoul, 21 Sep (OANA-YONHAP)--South Korean Foreign Minister Yi Won-kyong will visit the United Nations during the 39th UN General Assembly session, which opened Tuesday, for talks with more than 30 foreign ministers concerning the Korean issue.

The South Korean minister will leave here for New York 25 September on a 14-day visit to the United Nations, a South Korean Foreign Ministry official said Friday.

During his stay in New York, Yi will meet with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe, UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar and other friendly member nations' foreign ministers. They will discuss simultaneous entry by South and North Korea into the world organization, as well as ways to ease tension on the Korean peninsula, the official said.

Yi will also attend a conference of foreign ministers of nonaligned countries, called the "77 group," 27 September to deliver an address on closer cooperation among developing nations, he added.

According to an informed UN source, North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam will visit the United Nations during the General Assembly session.

Kim's visit to the United Nations is the second by a North Korean foreign minister, following Ho Tam's visit to New York in 1977.

Kim reportedly will participate in the 27 September nonaligned nation meeting.

Touching on a possibility of contact between Yi and Kim, a South Korean Government source said, "It is our basic position to meet any North Korean official, if the northern side proposed to us such a contact.

"However, there will be no possibility that the northern side offers us such a contact during the UN General Assembly session," the source said.

CSO: 4100/364

INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

ANTIGOVERNMENT UNIFICATION DISCUSSION--Pyongyang, 20 Sep (KCNA)--THE ROAD TO DEMOCRATIZATION, the organ of the Youth Federation of the Movement for Democratization, an anti-"government" struggle organization in South Korea, No 3 carried an article titled "Bridge to Unification", according to MINJOK SIBO, a newspaper of Koreans in Japan under the influence of the "ROK Residents' Association in Japan" (MINDAN). Noting that "the July 4 North-South joint statement is a cry negating division," the article stressed that "the three principles of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity are an expression of the earnest desire of the whole nation." In South Korea "the three principles of national reunification are ever more wantonly violated," it noted, and said: "The effort for unification cannot be a monopoly of the 'power' but a duty and right of the entire people." First of all, the democratization of discourse on unification must be ensured. The democratization of discourse on unification is a unification bridgehead which must be secured without fail by the movement for democratization. We must not fail to prevent discourse on unification from being used by political power. [Text] [SK202350 Pyongyang KCNA in English 2151 GMT 20 Sep 84]

NATIONAL SECURITY BRIEFING--Views on current national security and economic affairs were reported by ranking government officials to 1,000 community leaders of Seoul at the Sejong Cultural Center Main Hall yesterday. Prime Minister Chin Yi-chong attended the session. The annual series of security economy explanation meetings at major cities started Thursday in Suwon, Kyonggido, to be continued until 2 October. In his address delivered before the session, Premier Chin said, "We, foreseeing their political sub-plots, accepted the North Korean offer of flood relief goods out of the genuine hope to see a breakthrough in the strained south-north relations and pave the way for national reconciliation." [Text] [SK220447 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 22 Sep 84 p 1]

CSO: 4100/364

S.KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

OPPOSITION DKP SAID SHARPENING IMAGE FOR ELECTIONS

SK230135 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 23 Sep 84 pp 1, 4

[From the column "News in Review," by political editor Kim Myong-sik]

[Text] As the yet undated general elections draw nearer, the Democratic Korea Party is trying hard to make itself look like a truly fighting opposition.

Rep Yu Chi-song and other party leaders are making harsh protestations against the ruling camp in growing frequency these days. Their slogans often include calls for constitutional change to reintroduce direct presidential election.

No matter how fantastic it may sound at the moment, the strong appeal of such a message is precisely what party strategists need to arouse public recognition of the party's opposition character.

Since its inauguration four years ago with a name confusingly similar to that of the ruling party, the DKP has earned various unflattering nicknames.

Some refer to it as "2d Company" to imply its relation to "1st Company," alias the Democratic Justice Party, while others like to call it "the created (by the creator)" to stress the peculiar process of its formation.

The record of the DKP's opposition activities "within the system" of the Fifth Republic has not been so impressive as to dispel worries about such derogative titles.

A sense of crisis grew these past months with the emergence of systematic activities of dissidents, most prominently those of the "Democratization Promotion Council," and the move to form a new party, proclaimed to be a "real opposition force."

The party, which has 81 out of the total 276 National Assembly seats, mounted a determined campaign during the last extraordinary house session with politically important bills.

Yet, such efforts were overshadowed by its maneuverings concerning the change of the parliamentary election system, which neither earned it chances for increased seats nor an image as a fighting opposition.

In the three-sided negotiations with the DJP and the minor opposition Korea National Party, the DKP unsuccessfully tried to create new constituencies which would have assured it of additional lawmakers.

The regular house session which opened Thursday is the last chance for the DKP to do anything that can help improve its image through parliamentary actions.

Aware of this, party strategists tabled a host of tough motions, ranging from a demand for the sacking of Cabinet ministers for various recent administrative faults to revision of the Basic Press Law to broaden press freedom.

In the course of the 1985 budget deliberations, the DKP will also try to show the true form of the opposition by seeking to cut big chunks from tax revenues.

Worried about possible revival of the traditional opposition style of "extreme struggle," ruling party leaders are dispensing warnings and appeals for "reasonableness."

On the other hand, significant efforts will be made outside the assembly floor to reshape the party. It will be done through the planting of "clean figures" in the course of nominations for the next election.

Some reformist members call for a "second inauguration" so as to go into the election with a totally new face and stance. They demand relentless replacement of incumbents who lack "the opposition character."

Already, 20 former prominent members of the disbanded New Democratic Party, including 11 ex-lawmakers, have been admitted to the party after they were freed from the political ban last February.

The special committee for organizational reinforcement will be put into action to examine situations at individual chapters and settle internal struggles.

These matters are never easy tasks for party leaders, whose hierarchical authority is hardly as firmly established as that of their ruling camp counterparts.

Rumors of "endorsement by the other side" were prevalent during the previous elections in 1981. No one is quite sure just how much the climate has changed this time.

The coming election will show the division of political support in this country but the true opposition power, either internal or external, will be tested long before the voters go to the polls.

CSO: 4100/363

S.KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

TIMES ON OPENING OF ASSEMBLY SESSION

SK210103 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 21 Sep 84 p 4

[Editorial: "A Political Season Opens]

[Text] The 123d regular National Assembly session opened yesterday, marking the last legislative sitting for the incumbent 11th-term Assembly.

Keeping in mind the next general elections for the 12th National Assembly to be held before long, the ruling and opposition parties are expected to deal with various legislative matters, including the national budget bill for next year, possibly through an unavoidably fierce confrontation.

During the 90-day session, the ruling party will be confronted with tough offensives from the opposition camp, particularly over the so-called political bills.

We will thus be closely watching the brisk legislative performance in efforts to reflect the public voices, on the part of both the ruling and opposition camps.

Of all, a crucial question seems to be how the parliamentarians, regardless of their partisan affiliations, will be able to make the current legislative session a productive one to suit the final stage of the incumbent National Assembly.

Since the overall assessment of the legislative performances during the present Assembly will be immediately indicative of a mid-term achievement under the Fifth Republic, the ruling party politicians are called upon to do something decisive and productive in the concluding phase of the current assembly, specifically reminding the people of their political pledges made at the outset of the four-year legislative term.

Among the controversial political bills to be debated on the legislative floor is an amendment to the Basic Press Law which affects the function of mass media.

Other legislative bills to be heatedly discussed include the one on the enforcement of the local autonomy system by means of reinvigorating the Local Autonomy Law.

The ruling party politicians reportedly plan to lay major stress on managing social and economic bills, which are closely connected with the living standards of the general public. Such legislative matters as those immediately related to the people's livelihood should of course be given priority.

The ruling party is also said to be determined to pass the government-proposed budget bill in its original scale, which envisages a 11.9 percent increase in revenue and a 9.7 percent rise in expenditures.

Prior to the forthcoming general elections, the government party may tend to show "goodwill gestures" in the course of the budget deliberation.

Yet, they are asked to closely study the contents of the government-formulated budget bill in a prudent way so that those affecting strategic state affairs may be given priority in meeting the overall national interests.

Even though the date for the general elections is yet to be decided, the people in urban and rural communities alike seem to be much concerned and are exchanging brisk views about the political season under way.

Both the ruling and opposition politicians are now called upon to pay closer heed to these voices, which constitute the very backbone of democratic politics in our society.

As they will be deliberating the budget and other key legislative bills during the current assembly session, the legislators should not overlook popular wishes and grievances, whether made public or not.

They are reminded of a plain truth that their respect for the people's voices as such is the most important of all, regardless of their respective partisan strategies under the present political circumstances.

CSO: 4100/363

S.KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

DJP-DKP CONFLICT REGARDING POLITICAL BILLS VIEWED

SK230125 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 23 Sep 84 p 1

[Text] The conflict between the ruling and opposition camps over the so-called "political bills" is likely to mar the operation of standing committees of the National Assembly.

The major opposition Democratic Korea Party is pressing for the deliberation of three political bills prior to all other bills and motions when the house standing committees go into session this week.

But the ruling Democratic Justice Party is bent on dealing with other current issues, such as the U.S. antidumping duties on Korean color TV sets and the aftermath of the recent torrential rains, and general bills initiated by the government.

The opposition-pushed bills seek to broaden press freedom, give definite schedule's for the introduction of the local autonomy system and make the administration require house approval for setting grain purchase prices through revision of relevant laws.

According to the house schedule the first session of all standing panels except for the Special Budget Settlement Committee will be held for seven days from Monday through October 2.

In meeting to discuss floor strategies on Thursday, the DKP decided to attend 12 standing committees as it is deeply concerned with the U.S. plan to impose heavy anti-dumping duties on Korean-made color TV sets and other current issues.

However, the DKP [agreed?] that the opposition-forwarded political bills should be deliberated over in relevant standing panels prior to other issues.

The DKP and the second opposition Korea National Party submitted again to the parliament, in modified forms, the three controversial political bills, which had paralyzed the operation of the last special house session.

The revisions to the Basic Press Law, the Grain Management Law and the Local Autonomy Law will be referred to Information-education, Agriculture-fisheries, and Home Affairs Committees, respectively.

Floor leaders of the three leading political parties met yesterday to narrow their differences over the bills but with no success.

Rep Im Chong-ki, floor leader of the DKP, threatened that if the political bills were not dealt with during the first session of the standing panels, his party would boycott preliminary deliberations of the budget bill.

The committee level budget study will go on from October 16 until November 1.

The DKP whip suggested that if the bills were adopted as agenda items of the related standing panels and sub-panels were organized to tackle them, his party would consider attending the 12 panels.

Meanwhile, Rep Yi Chong-chan, floor leader of DJP, insisted that various current issues such as the aftermath of the heavy floods and general bills forwarded by the government should be tackled ahead of the political bills.

Then, he proposed that the method to deal with the political bills should be decided on through close consultations between the ruling and opposition camps.

As they could not reach accord on the committee proceedings, the party floor leaders decided to hold another meeting Monday.

Regardless of Monday's meeting, they agreed to hold the session of other standing committees as scheduled.

CSO: 4100/363

S.KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

BRIEFS

DKP ON '85 BUDGET--The opposition Democratic Korea Party will seek to reduce the revenue portion of the administration's budget request [words indistinct] to below the projected 7.5 percent GNP hike, a party spokesman said yesterday. To this end, he said, the DKP plans to work out a set of amendments to the tax-related laws, especially those affecting low-income families and farmers. The job will be done by committee which will consist of over 20 DKP members who belong to the legislature's budget-settlement committee and the finance committee. The budget bill, announced by the government Thursday, envisages an 11.9 percent increase in expenditures. The budget scenario aims at a 7.5 percent real GNP growth. The main opposition party, according to the spokesman, regards the budget request as being "political-oriented," a reference to the upcoming National Assembly elections. The party, in this regard, will concentrate its efforts on the slashing of costs of the "projects aimed at vote-getting, numerous funds for public relations and Saemaul." Saemaul means the nationwide New Community Movement. [Text] [SK220441 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English 22 Sep 84 p 1]

CSO: 4100/363

BRIEFS

PATENT APPLICATIONS INCREASE--Seoul, 15 Sep (YONHAP)--Over 36,500 individuals applied for property rights at the South Korean Patent Office in the first 7 months of the year, up 10.5 percent vs the same period last year. The figure breaks down into 26,325 Koreans, up 7.6 percent, and 10,185 foreigners, up 18.8 percent, a patent official said Friday. While the number of foreign applications for rights to patent inventions was up 32.1 percent in the 7-months period, that for Koreans climbed by only 12.8 percent. Meanwhile, the number of Korean applications for rights to utility models rose 14.7 percent, compared with a 23.2 percent drop for foreigners in the same category. Foreign applications for new trademarks rose 18.1 percent, while those for Koreans inched up by only 1.3 percent, the official said. [Text] [Seoul YONHAP in English 0014 GMT 15 Sep 84 SK]

CSO: 4100/363

S. KOREA/SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

NEW VENTURE FOR BIG BUSINESS: ADVANCED MEDICAL APPLIANCES INDUSTRY

Seoul HANGUK KYONGJE SINMUN in Korean 1 Aug 84 p 1

[Text] Large business groups massively participate in the medical appliances industry; 66 firms, including Kumsong, Samsung, and Hyundai apply for special products designation for 210 appliances; local demand for high-priced appliances will be met; the industry will be geared toward export; development subsidies will be granted to designated firms; firms will be allowed 5 years' exclusive production.

Large firms, led by Kumsong and including Samsung, Daewoo, Hyundai, and Kolon, are participating in the development of advanced medical appliances.

According to the survey released on 31 July that the Ministry of Public Health and Social Affairs conducted during the past 15 days on the status of the registration for special manufacturing of medical appliances, a total of 66 firms, including already established medical appliances makers such as Kumsong Telecommunications, Samsung Medical Appliances, Taeyong Electronics and Kolon, have filed applications for the special development and production of various medical appliances, a total of 210 appliances.

Kumsong Telecommunications, which has already developed the nuclear magnetic resonance computerized tomography scanner (NMR-CT), has filed plans for the development of various radiotherapy devices, including the computerized tomography scanner. Samsung Medical Appliances, which is a joint venture established by Samsung Electronics and General Electric for the production of medical appliances, too, has applied for the special production of 11 appliances, including the radio therapy device, the isotope device, and the electronics device.

Taeyong Electronics, a division of Daewoo, too, has applied for the production of the radiotherapy device and the isotope device. Also, Hyundai Electronics Industry, which has newly joined the electronics industry, has participated in the production of the radiotherapy device and the isotope device.

The rush of local electronics firms to the participation in the development and production of medical appliances has been the result of the government

decision to actively support and nurture the production of local medical appliances for the purpose of meeting the rapidly growing demand for high-priced medical appliances. The rush is also interpreted as having been influenced by the fact that the development and production of medical appliances, particularly those with advanced electronics technologies, including semiconductor, has received the limelight as a promising industry.

In view of this, applying firms have applied for the designation for special production of high-precision most advanced medical appliances such as low-density X-ray machines which the Ministry of Public Health and Social Affairs has not quite designated as appliances for special production. Thus, the Ministry of Public Health and Social Affairs is studying measures for expanding the list of designated appliances after taking into consideration the production plans and capacity of these manufacturers.

In order to nurture the high-priced most advanced appliances that these firms have applied for not only for meeting the local demand but also for developing them as an exporting industry, the Ministry of Public Health and Social Affairs has decided to support in the future the designated firms with subsidies for development in accordance with the Science Promotion Law and to step up financial and taxation support by applying the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Law and the Machine Industry Promotion Law. The ministry has also decided to allow the designated firms to exclusively manufacture appliances for 5 years, to make uses of these appliances mandatory to local medical institutions, and to completely regulate the importing of similar appliances from overseas.

The Ministry of Public Health and Social Affairs will closely analyze by the end of August the business plans, financial capability, technical capability, manpower, and other capabilities of applying firms and will designate firms for special production by item.

Designated firms are required to receive within 2 years from the date of designation the permit for manufacturing and the permit for items of designated appliances. Firms that have not received permits within this time limit will be regulated to be excluded from the permission for manufacturing these designated appliances.

Current Status of Registration by Firms for Plans for the Special Production of Medical Appliances

<u>Name of Business Firm</u>	<u>Appliances Applied For</u>
Kumsong Telecommunications	Computerized tomography scanner, mobile X-ray generating device, cassette, and other appliances.
Samsong Medical Appliances	X-ray generating device for fluoroscopy (C-Arm), X-ray generating device for photography of the liver, mammal cancer

	photography machine, gamma camera, electromyogram meter, and other appliances.
Hylindai Electronics	Computerized tomography scanner, X-ray imaging device, heart-lung machine, fetal observation device, and other appliances
Taeyong Electronics	Computerized tomography scanner, X-ray generating device for fluoroscopy, gamma camera, sector accelerated treatment device, and other appliances
Kolon	Ophthalmoscope, and other appliances
Chungwoe Machinery	Computerized tomography scanner, X-ray generating device for fluoroscopy, mobile X-ray generating device, X-ray imaging device, X-ray generating device for photography of the liver, mammal cancer photography device, thyroid gland treatment machine, heart-lung machine, lung function measuring machine, Jaundice treatment machine, and other appliances
Nambuk Medical Appliances	Breast pump, oxygen tent, rotating bed for the prevention of ducubitus ulcer, operation table for urinary organs, and other appliances
Urim Precision	Oxygen tent, aseptic device for operations, and other appliances
Taeguk Engineering	Aseptic device for operations, and other appliances
Hanguk Precision	PH meter, flame photometer, spectrophotometer, and an electric freezing [as published] device
Taehwa Appliances	Jaundice treatment machine, breast pump machine, electric cautery machine, and other appliances
Kumsong Enterprises	Paraffin tub, hybrid tank, warm heat treatment machine, and other appliances
Iwon Engineering	Heart-lung machine, electromyogram meter, fetal observation device, pH meter, and other appliances
Hwasin Machinery	Spectrophotometer, and other appliances

Sehwa Company	X-ray generating device for fluoroscopy, X-ray imaging device, and other appliances
Sinch'ang Medical Appliances	Electric cautery machine, rotating bed for the prevention of ducubitus ulcer
Chuil Development	Other appliances
Anjon Enterprises	Electric cautery machine, electric freezing device
Tongbuk Company	Computerized tomography scanner, fetal observation device, and other appliances
Seoul Medical Appliances	Paraffin tub, hybrid tank, warm heat treatment machine
Sesin Industry	Other appliances
Yongin Science	Blood-sugar examination machine, urine analysis device, automatic biochemical analyzing machine, spectrophotometer, and other appliances
Yeil Medical Appliances	PH meter, blood-sugar examination machine, urine analyzing device, automatic biochemical analyzing machine, spectrophotometer
Solgo Industry	Laparoscope, breast pump machine, electric cautery machine, gypsum cutter, and other appliances
Pomjin Metal Machinery	Rotating bed for the prevention of ducubitus ulcers, operating table for plastic surgery, operating table for nerve surgery, operating table for urinary organs, operating table for dissection, and other appliances
Sinjin Electronics Medical Appliances	Blood-sugar examination machine, urine analyzing device, paraffin tub, warm heat treatment machine
Hwayong Precision Electronics	Lung function measuring machine
Noksipcha Medical Industry	Heart-lung machine
Hansong Industry	Rotating bed for the prevention of ducubitus ulcers, drug packing machine
Handok Appliances	Gas supply device, aseptic device for operation

Hanguk Sharp	Rotating bed for the prevention of ducubitus ulcer
Kukche Precision	Other appliances
Aju Company	X-ray generating device for fluoroscopy, X-ray imaging device, operating table for plastic surgery, and other appliances
Samson Manufacturing	Parraffin tub, hybrid tank, warm heat treatment machine, and other appliances
Chongwon Precision	Grids, cassettes, and other appliances
Cheil Precision	Fetal observation device, automatic biochemical analyzing machine, operating table for plastic surgery
Hanguk Samgong Industry	Aseptic device for operation, cleansing machine for operation, instrument cabinet for operation
Hyondae Medical Appliances	Electric cautery machine, gypsum cutter, rotating bed for the prevention of ducubitus ulcer, operating table for plastic surgery, operating table for nerve surgery, operating table for urinary organs, operating table for dissection, drug packing machine, cleansing machine for operation, instrument cabinet for operation, aseptic storage cabinet for endoscope, aseptic can for operation, and other appliances.
Hanbo Industry	Aseptic device for operation, cleansing machine for operation, instrument cabinet for operation, aseptic storage cabinet for endoscope, and other appliances
Segi Company	X-ray generating device for fluoroscopy, mobile X-ray generating device, X-ray imaging device, and other appliances
Oriental Industry	Mobile X-ray generating device, and other appliances
T'aedong Machine Industry	Cleansing machine for operation, instrument cabinet for operation
Hyundai Radioactivity	Mobile X-ray generating device, and an X-ray generating machine for photography of the liver

Kwangguk Radioactivity	Mobile X-ray generating device, and an X-ray generating machine for photography of the liver
Hanil Medical	Breast pump machine, and other appliances
Choson Appliance Trading	Gas supply device, and other appliances
Ch'onho Machinery	Aseptic device for operation, instrument cabinet for operation
Seoul Central Trading	Gas Supply device
Hwain Optical	ophthalmoscope
Sehyon Grids	Grids and other appliances
Hanguk Precision Tube	Spectrophotometer
Tonga X-ray Machine	X-ray generating device for fluoroscopy
Hyundai Pharmaceutical Industries	Automatic artificial respirator
Sinhung	Other appliances
Handok Medical	Other appliances
Kyerim Trading	Other appliances
H Brothers	Other appliances
Hapsan Technic	Other appliances
Yujin Medical Electronics	Other appliances
Songbong Trading	Other appliances
Jun Trading	Other appliances
Taeho Industry	Other appliances
Ihwa X-ray Machine	Other appliances

10372

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S. KOREA/SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

SUBSIDIES, U.S. TECH TRANSFERS PUSH SEMICONDUCTOR PLANS

Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 17 Aug 84 pp 84-85

[German economic journal reports on massive development effort in Korean microelectronics industry: "The Koreans Are Coming"]

[Text] Not only in shipbuilding and automobile manufacturing does South Korea wish to advance to the international forefront. There are ambitious plans afoot to turn the "land of morning stillness" into an electronics giant someday.

"The Koreans are years behind us," says Atshyoshi Ouchi, vice president of Japan's largest microchipmaker and leading electronics company, Nippon Electric Company (NEC), on the subject of the neighboring country's efforts to wage a surprise coup in the world microelectronics market--as it once did with shipbuilding and steel. Be that as it may, Korea's industry and government are making preparations to transform the country into an industrial state with hi-tech potential.

The Japanese competition already has an ideal of what is in store for it: "In 2 years there will be a hard-fought struggle with the South Koreans for the world market in highly integrated microchips," prophesied Japan's leading business newspaper, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, with apparent resignation.

The situation entirely justifies such resignation. In their dedication, South Korea's hi-tech plans appear to be a blueprint of the Japanese model for success which once shocked the established industrial states. South Korea's four dominant industrial conglomerates (Daewoo, Hyundai, Samsung and Lucky Gold Star) and the government are no longer interested merely in recreational electronics, where, together with Taiwan, the Japanese giant was long ago brought to a halt. South Korea's industrial policy for the embryonic industrial state has its eye on the day after tomorrow: the world of personal computers, computer hardware, digital telecommunications, optical-processing electronics and, above all, highly integrated microchips.

The Koreans are dedicating their particular energy to the microchip market, for this field is regarded in both Seoul and Tokyo as a symbol of high-tech power and, as such, the "oil of resource-poor countries."

At the beginning of the decade and with government subsidies, the Gold Star companies (the Lucky Group) and the Samsung and Daewoo conglomerates began to combine their electronics research in Korea and in the Korea Institute of Electronics Technology, which with its modest budget of 20 million U.S. dollars caused only a smile, especially in Japan. These three diversified companies are making every effort to concentrate the nation's research capacity on semiconductors, computers and electronic circuits. In this they are being supported by an army of state researchers. The government subsidies, too, reflect the national pride of the Koreans in breaking into the electronics duel between the United States and Japan. For the current 5-year plan, the Korean cabinet has made available subsidies totaling 160 million dollars. Along with considerable tax advantages, an addition 335 million dollars in credits are being issued to the government's pet project through 1988, as legislated in May 1983 in a bill titled "Plan for Strengthening the Semiconductor Industry." The goal of the plan itself is enough to encourage the industry: it envisions a monumental 3 billion dollars in sales for 1990 (1983 volume was 672 million dollars, up 35 percent over the previous year).

Korea's own research is not enough, though, to carry this crash program to the vanguard of hi-tech. Moreover, even the vigorous big four are shying away from the massive investment risks. The South Korean electronics industry is seeking strategic cooperation with leading groups abroad to complement its own developments and propel it to the threshold of the new position of primacy.

The Japanese giant has assumed a defensive posture and is denying outright any important transfer of electronics technology. For this reason, all four Korean companies not only established listening posts or production sites in California's Silicon Valley but entered into no fewer than 173 partnership agreements with almost exclusively American electronics firms between 1981 and 1983. Samsung subsidiary Tri-Star Semiconductor Inc in the Silicon Valley is already producing the first South Korean 64-kilobit DRAM chip (Dynamic Random Access Memory) whose technology is not dependent on foreign licenses. Hyundai has its California subsidiary, Modern Electro Systems Inc, concentrating on chip design.

For the time being, Gold Star is limiting itself to a liaison office in Sunnyvale, California, where, as Gold Star representative H. G. Lee frankly admits: "We are gathering technical details by the ton." But these bridgeheads are more than large listening posts at the pulse of electronic progress. Ten of Tri-Star's 15 electronics engineers are Koreans who received their training and doctoral degrees in the United States. The transfer back home of trained personnel who had emigrated is having an impact. In May, Samsung subsidiary Samsung Electronics in Suwon, an hour's drive south of the capital, managed to open its first production facility for 64-kilobit chips--chips that had been tested in California beforehand. Now producing 30,000 silicon microchips per month, the plant is still a dwarf but is scheduled to raise production to 150,000 chips by 1987.

Micron Technology of Idaho in the United States furnished technical assistance for the project, whose total investment will reach 200 million dollars. Rival Gold Star also intends to begin production this year of these 64-kilobit

chips--although only for in-house use at first. The Japanese clearly dominate the world market for this class of chip, registering 70 percent of the sales.

With assistance from AT&T, however, Gold Star considers this as just the warm-up for the most ambitious attempt to catch up to the vanguard in microelectronics: the mass production of 256-kilobit DRAM superchips--which despite all the fanfare is just now getting fully underway in the United States and Japan. To this end, Gold Star will invest 167 million dollars in R&D from 1984 to 1987 and is counting on the assistance of AT&T, which owns 44 percent of Gold Star subsidiary Gold Star Semiconductor, as well as on that of Exxon subsidiary Zilog, for which the South Korean company has been building the Z-80 central processor since June.

This has kept rival Samsung on its toes. Work has been underway here on plans to produce 256-kilobit DRAM chips and electronically eraseable programmable read-only memory chips (EEPROM) of this class. The Daewoo Telecommunications Co has plans to invest 100 million dollars between 1984 and 1986 in facilities for dedicated chips and computers for telecommunications and is also attempting to establish a foothold in the market for highly integrated chips with the support of cooperating partner Northern Telecom Ltd. of Canada.

The flagship of South Korean industry, the Hyundai Group, has also geared up for the major offensive on the electronics front. In late 1982, Hyundai announced a gigantic investment in electronics totaling 400 million dollars through 1987.

But the Koreans have all kinds of plans for hardware as well. For instance, 400,000 personal computers are expected to be sold on the domestic market alone by as early as 1985. Gold Star is getting help from Honeywell; Samsung is supported by Apple; Hyundai has a technology transfer agreement with the American Matheus Group.

Despite any misgivings about patent law, Hewlett Packard last February ventured the plunge into the hermetically sealed market by founding a joint venture arrangement with Samsung Electronics Co (furnishing 45 to 55 percent of the capital) for manufacturing computers and peripheral equipment. Hyundai Electronics Industries Co would like to distribute IBM personal computers, but the government is loath to allow them into the country and is making overtures to Big Blue to produce them locally together with Hyundai instead. While IBM is hesitating, Wang already has a word processor with the Korean Hangul characters and is looking about for a partner in the "land of morning stillness."

9992

CSO: 3620/441

S.KOREA/FOREIGN RELATIONS

HERALD PRAISES TIES, AMITY WITH GABON

SK220430 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English 22 Sep 84 p 4

[Editorial: "Boosting Korea-Gabon Ties"]

[Text] Gabon is a country known by Koreans for inspiring friendship between Korea and the African continent. Likewise, Gabonese President El Hadj Omar Bongo is known as the African leader who is largely credited with fostering that amity.

President Bongo arrived in Seoul yesterday on a three-day visit at the invitation of President Chon Tu-hwan. Our heartfelt welcome goes to President Bongo, whose visit will further the already close relations between Seoul and Libreville.

This is President Bongo's second trip to Korea. He first visited Seoul in 1975, opening a new chapter in relations between Seoul and Libreville at a time when the African continent was still regarded as remote region relative to the rest of the world.

In return President Chon visited Gabon in 1982.

Such high-level contacts have made relations between the two countries very close. The name of President Bongo inspires the Korean people to feel a genuine amity toward Gabon.

This year alone, two African heads of state have already visited Seoul--from the Gambia and Senegal. President Bongo's adds to the significance of Korea's ties with the nations of Africa. Seoul's warm relations with the African continent have resulted from President Chon's visit to the region two years ago.

Such increasing ties will solidify South-South cooperation. The expertise Korea has accumulated from its development efforts and the abundant potentials of African countries will prove the efficiency of cooperation between developing nations.

Presidents Chon and Bongo discussed ways to further promote cooperative relations between Seoul and Libreville. The two countries need to intensify bilateral relations in such a way as to complement each other's needs and strong points in all fields.

President Bongo's visit, we hope, will also serve as an occasion to inform more African countries of our peace efforts on the Korean peninsula. Seoul is now bracing itself to host the 1986 Asian and the 1988 Olympics.

The successful hosting of these international events will undoubtedly contribute to the welfare of the entire world society. Cooperation from the African continent will be necessary to make a success of these events.

A third of the UN member countries are in Africa and their opinions are heard in the international community. President Bongo has been playing a leading role in Africa's dynamic development.

Despite its ostensible equidistant stand toward South and North Korea, Gabon has actually developed policies favorable to Seoul. Since Seoul and Libreville established diplomatic relations in 1962, Gabon has supported our peace-oriented policies in the United Nations and at nonaligned countries' conferences.

South Korea and Gabon have made steady progress in their economic cooperation. For example, trade volume, which was less than \$5 million in 1981, rose to over \$15 million last year. Cooperative relations in many fields between our two nations will hopefully be further stimulated as a result of President Bongo's visit here.

Some 300 Koreans are now living in Gabon including 100 fishermen. Personnel exchange programs continue between the two countries for training and research purposes in addition to joint ventures. Relations between Korea and Gabon are now about to enter a more mature and substantial phase.

Korea and Gabon now need to work out practical ventures that will benefit both. A profound understanding of and sympathy for each other's point of view is necessary.

CSO: 4100/363

S.KOREA/FOREIGN RELATIONS

BRIEFS

CLOSER TIES WITH ALLIES--President Chon Tu-hwan yesterday called on the nation to cope wisely with the rapidly changing situations surrounding the Korean peninsula, saying this is the very way to "ensure our survival." He then urged the people and the government to pool wisdom and to be firmly united to meet unstable uncertain developments. Presiding over a national security conference at Chongwadae, the chief executive called for the promotion of close cooperation with friendly nations, including the United States and Japan. In so doing, the nation can prevent the recurrence of another war on the peninsula and lay a groundwork for the realization of peaceful reunification of the divided land, the president said. He instructed security-related officials to make in-depth study on the fast-changing situations and to work out proper countermeasures. The two-hour security meeting discussed the military situation in this part of the world in connection with the buildup of Soviet forces. The president was briefed on the military and political situations of North Korea. The meeting was attended by Prime Minister Chin Ui-chong, Deputy Prime Minister Sin Yong-hyon, No Sin-yong, director of the Agency for National Security Planning, security-related cabinet ministers and military leaders. [Text] [SK210058 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English 21 Sep 84 p 1]

JAPAN IN FISHERIES TALKS--Tokyo (YONHAP)--The Japanese Government had shown flexibility in allowing a North Korean delegation who would negotiate a private fisheries pact to enter Japan, the TOKYO SHIMBUN reported Tuesday. The daily newspaper, in a story from Beijing, quoted members of the Japan Socialist Party's delegation as saying that Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe, in recent meetings with Masashi Ishibashi, president of their party, had shown a positive attitude toward negotiations of a private North Korea-Japan fisheries pact and had said Japan would lift, contingent on North Korea's attitude, its sanctions imposed on North Korea in connection with the Rangoon bomb attack. The Japan Socialist Party delegation was in Beijing on the way to Pyongyang. [Text] [SK190143 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English 19 Sep 84 p 1]

AUSTRALIAN VISITOR--Seoul, 15 Sep (YONHAP)--Douglas McClelland, president of the Australian Senate, will arrive here Sunday for a 6-day visit at the invitation of Chae Mun-sik, speaker of the National Assembly. While here, McClelland is scheduled to meet with Chae, Prime Minister Chin Ui-chong and Foreign Minister Yi Wong-kyong to discuss matters of mutual concern. He

also will tour the nation's industrial complex and the truce village of Panmunjom in the demilitarized zone dividing the two Koreas. In addition, McClelland is expected to attend as observer the 20th general meeting of the Asian-Pacific Parliamentarians' Union, which opened here Saturday on a 6-day run. [Text] [SK170625 Seoul YONHAP in English 0604 GMT 15 Sep 84]

JAPAN-ROK RELATIONS POLL--Tokyo (YONHAP)--Seventy-five percent of the Japanese people surveyed in a recent poll said they felt the growing Korean-Japanese relationship should be continued. The poll was conducted in connection with President Chon Tu-hwan's recent visit to Japan, the influential MAINICHI SHIMBUN paper said Friday. In the poll of 5,524 Japanese men and women aged 20 years and over, only five percent of the respondents replied that the Seoul-Tokyo relationship should be downplayed or that the warming relationship is not advisable, the paper said. Japanese Foreign Ministry officials said that the 75 percent favoring the relationship was an unexpectedly high total, noting that nearly half (42 percent) of the respondents replied that the relationship should be strengthened. [Text] [SK220442 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English 22 Sep 84 p 1]

CSO: 4100/363

S.KOREA/FOREIGN TRADE

OVERSEAS CONSTRUCTION MARKETS TO BE DIVERSIFIED

SK210017 Seoul YONHAP in English 2359 GMT 20 Sep 84

[Text] Seoul, 21 Sep (YONHAP)--Korean firms are trying to diversify their overseas construction markets to overcome the limits of existing markets and to improve the balance of international payments through consistent construction exports, the Ministry of Construction said Thursday.

Ministry officials said that under a plan conceived by the ministry, Korean firms will try hard to keep the amount of construction exports at more than 2 billion U.S. dollars per year through the diversification of markets.

In Southeast Asian markets, the companies will enhance their activities to get orders via the establishment of joint ventures and to participate positively in resource development projects, the officials said.

They will also strengthen their construction diplomacy in the region through creation of more job opportunities for citizens of involved countries and through technical education.

In Africa, to get a quantity of orders, the Korean interests will not only improve the functioning of their market surveys, but also seek to engage in projects financed by international organizations, such as the African Development Bank (AFDB) and the International Development Agency (IDA).

In particular, they will try to advance into markets through joint ventures with Western enterprises, the officials added.

Meanwhile, in Latin America, Korean interests will seek to advance into the nations selectively while considering indigenous circumstances, especially to get orders on more technically intensive projects.

To this end, the government is also planning to seek membership in the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the officials said.

These regional measures accord with results the ministry obtained in recent analyses of regional market circumstances, the officials explained.

But, they point out there are problems. There are growing requirements for self-sufficiency in the construction field in Southeast Asia, and African countries are burdened by high inflation and political instability, the officials noted.

There are also problems in Latin America. Foreign exchange holdings are small and foreign companies are not encouraged from investing there, despite the demand for development, the officials said.

CSO: 4100/363

S.KOREA/FOREIGN TRADE

MINISTRY TALLY ON MACHINERY EXPORTS

SK220607 Seoul YONHAP in English 0602 GMT 22 Sep 84

[Text] Seoul, 22 Sep (OANA-YONHAP)--South Korea's machinery exports in the first eight months of the year reached nearly 3.5 billion U.S. dollars worth, up 22.4 percent vs the same period last year.

According to a Trade and Industry Ministry tally released Saturday, exports of transportation machinery exceeded 2.9 billion dollars, up 76 percent.

The ministry tally broke down the values into 123 million dollars for motor vehicles (up 114 percent), 11 million dollars for bicycles (up 105 percent), 2.8 billion dollars for ships (up 33 percent) and 17 million dollars for rolling stock (down 25 percent).

Optical machine exports were valued at 59 million dollars (up 62 percent), 20 million dollars went for lenses (up 61.4 percent), 14 million dollars for cameras (up 57 percent) and 25 million dollars for measuring instruments (up 228 percent).

Exports of precision machines exceeded the one billion dollar level (up 15 percent), while a value of 22 million dollars was registered for bolts and nuts (up 42 percent), 13.5 million dollars for bearings (up 85 percent), 11 million dollars for machines for heating devices (up 62 percent), 9 million dollars for pulp (up 94 percent), 8.8 million dollars for internal combustion engines (up 148 percent), 27 million dollars for refrigeration machines and air conditioning devices (30 percent of last year's eight-month level) and 12.9 million dollars for metal machine tools (93 percent of the 1983 figure).

Exports of machines for industrial use were valued at 35.7 million dollars (up 23 percent), while 23.6 million dollars went for textile and leather product processing machines (up 66 percent), 3.9 million dollars for farm tools (up 104 percent) and 8.2 million dollars for machines for chemical industries (up 23 percent).

Exports of loading and unloading machines, construction equipment and mining machines, however, were far below last year's eight-month level, according to the tally. Riding on the overall upturn, machinery exports this year should reach 5.3 billion dollars worth, 500 million dollars more than this year's target, a ministry official said.

CSO: 4100/363

S.KOREA/FOREIGN TRADE

BRIEFS

KOREA-THAILAND TRADE TALKS--Seoul, 21 Sep (YONHAP)--The seventh trade ministers talks between South Korea and Thailand were held Friday in Bangkok with Korean Trade and Industry Minister Kum Chin-ho and his Thai counterpart, Kosol Krairiksh, attending, officials of the Korean Ministry said. In his opening address, Kum called for Thailand to import more goods from Korea, including steel, fertilizer, electronic goods, machinery, electric appliances, railroad carriages, ships and industry facilities, the officials added. He stressed that both countries should improve the transfer of industrial technology and joint ventures. He also requested Thai officials to allow Korea to participate in the fifth economic development plan, which Thailand will inaugurate soon, the officials said. [Text] [SK210711 Seoul YONHAP in English 0657 GMT 21 Sep 84]

KUWAITI COMMUNICATIONS MINISTER--Seoul, 19 Sep (YONHAP)--Kuwaiti Minister of Communications al Mazidi arrived here Wednesday for a six-day visit at the invitation of the Korean counterpart, Kim Song-chin. During his stay in Korea, al Mazidi will meet with ministers of communications, foreign affairs and transportation to discuss telecommunications cooperation between the two countries, the possibility of Korean firms' advancement into the Kuwait market and air transportation. He also will visit Panmunjom and Chejudo, the southernmost island of Korea, as well as Korea telecommunication authority and other industrial facilities. [Text] [SK210711 Seoul YONHAP in English 0843 GMT 19 Sep 84]

CSO: 4100/363

N. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

KIM CHONG-IL REVERED AS WORLD LEADER

Pyongyang NODONG CHONGYON in Korean 28 Jul 84 p 42

[Commentary by CHOSON CHUNGANG TONGSIN: "Kim Chong-il, the Refined Leader in Revolution and Construction"]

[Text] Under the wise leadership of our dear leader, Comrade Kim Chong-il, revolution and construction in our country are advancing at an extraordinary pace.

Today, the revolutionary people of the world and noted figures in society and politics cannot repress their admiration and praise for our dear leader and comrade, who is leading the revolution and construction to a brilliant victory, and who is as refined a leader in revolution and construction as he is gifted.

The Cyprus newspaper I ELEVETHEROTYPIA pointed out the following in an article entitled, "The Brilliant Korean Leader, His Excellency Kim Chong-il, is a Sagacious Leader Who Makes Korea of Chuche a Proud Nation": "His Excellency Kim Chong-il, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party and Secretary of the Party Central Committee, is making Korea a chuche nation of pride by leading the overall tasks of the party and the state wisely.

"The dear leader, His Excellency Kim Chong-il, is a gifted person who is leading the revolution and construction to a brilliant victory.

"After having been elevated to the leadership of the Korean people, his contributions to the revolution and construction have indeed been great.

"He plans every project boldly, and wisely brings any project that he has decided to undertake to fruition, by organizing and mobilizing the masses.

"In recent years, in every field of socialist construction, the Korean people have been working miracles which surprise the people of the world.

"The chucheization, modernization, and scientification of the people's economy are making good progress, and industrial production is growing every year with greater speed."

Deliam Rando Delbino, a member of the Chuche Thought Study Unit of Latin American students studying in Geneva, Switzerland, pointed out the following in the article entitled "Dear Leader and Comrade Kim Chong-il, the Successor of the Great Revolutionary Task": "The dear leader and comrade Kim Chong-il has further expanded and enriched the great leader and comrade Kim Il-song's theories on revolution and construction. The battle of speed presented by him is the basic battle formula for socialist construction, which pushes for every project with lightening speed.

"The dear leader and comrade has further developed the Chollima movement, initiated by the great leader, and for the first time has presented the policy for the battle of speed."

"Thus, he has opened the most correct path for speeding up the socialist construction.

"The dear leader and comrade has also further expanded and enriched the theory on the three great revolutions in thought, technology, and culture.

"He defined the three great revolutions to be the basic strategic line for the socialist and communist constructions, and presented the policy for the movement for the capture of the red flag of the three great revolutions.

"In accordance with the policy that he has presented, the masses of the people are joining enthusiastically to carry out the three great revolutions with revolutionary fervor."

The Bangladesh newspaper HOLIDAY stated in the article entitled "The Energetic Leadership of the Dear Leader and Comrade Kim Chong-il": "Today, Korea is vibrant, and full of revolutionary spirit and fervor.

"Today, the giants in leadership bringing about a wholly new history are the great leader, Chairman Kim Il-song, and the dear leader and comrade Kim Chong-il, who is carrying on the chairman's great revolutionary task.

"He has embodied completely the outstanding art of leadership and the know-how of the leadership, and is providing wise leadership in order to make rapid progress and miracles possible by the hour in all areas of revolution and construction.

"His energetic leadership reflects an unparalleled stamina, indomitable will-power, extraordinary thinking faculty for solving the enormous amount of work instantly, vigorous enthusiasm for work, and an incessant and ever glowing passion."

Malagasy Radio said in its commemorative editorial entitled, "The Dear Leader and Comrade Kim Chong-il, Who Leads the Korean Revolution to Its Glorious Victory," that in Korea, which is vibrant with revolutionary spirit and passion, there is only continuous progress and advancement, without even a moment of stagnation, and went on to comment as follows:

"The dear leader and comrade personally goes out to the field and directs work unit tasks of all sizes--small or large--while he looks after the overall business of the vast and complex party and state. He guides the consultative meetings of workers in various fields, joins in the ranks of the toiling masses, starting with the workers and peasants, and discusses with them the affairs of the nation, and solves the pending problems.

"The dear leader and comrade is arousing the masses by calling for the creation of the new 'Speed of the 80's', which will surprise the people of the world."

Nada Takeshi, a member of the Liaison Consultative Meeting of the Shikoku Chuche Thought Study Institute in Japan, who visited our country many times, highly praised our dear leader and comrade, who is personally showing the art of leadership and the leadership method, and stressed as follows:

"The outstanding leadership of Comrade Kim Chong-il, who personally displays the art of leadership of Chairman Kim Il-song and who leads the revolution straight on the road to victory, assures the ultimate victory of the great tasks of chuche.

"The traits of the art of leadership and the leadership method of Comrade Kim Chong-il can be divided into three, as follows:

The first trait is his outstanding organizational skill, which is seen in his choice of slogans for struggle, which reflect the mature demand of revolutionary development and the direction of the masses accurately, and which motivate the people to achieve the objectives by arousing the creative enthusiasm of the people.

Among so many slogans that he has presented to us, ones such as "Ideology, Technology, and Culture, All in Accordance With the Call of chuche," "Let's Live by Our Own Way," "Let's give more power to the self-reliant revolutionary spirit," and "Everyone to the Battle of Speed," are moving the hearts of the masses, and giving powerful inspiration to them in their struggle for the revolution and construction.

The second trait of his art of leadership is that he is in uniform control over the overall business of the state, provides specific guidance, and leads the people to the continuous upsurge.

The third trait is that he plans every project boldly and grandly, and has the burning revolutionary fervor which drives him to finish what he has started.

At present, in Pyongyang a large number of monumental creative projects are being launched under his meticulous leadership.

An Egyptian journal AL-MAL WA AL-TIJARAH commented as follows, as it introduced the accomplishments that our people have made in revolution and construction:

"Presently in Korea, under the wise leadership of the dear leader and comrade, great miracles and changes are occurring in every field of revolution and construction, and immortal accomplishments, which will glow in history for a long time to come, are being made.

"At present, the Korean people are effectively executing the natural environment remolding project, making great progress in every area of the people's economy, starting with industry and agriculture, and constructing buildings one after another to last an eternity."

All of these achievements are the fruit of the wise leadership of our dear leader and comrade.

12474

CSO: 4110/141

N. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR KULLOJA, SEPTEMBER 1984

SK010731 Pyongyang KULLOJA in Korean Sep 84 p 1

[Text] On Further Developing Education Work.....	2
..... Kim Chong-il	
Let Us Learn the Art of Leadership of Our Party.....	21
The True Life of Revolutionary Which Shines for Its Loyalty.....	
..... Choe Hyok-ku.....	27
The Large-Scale Operation and the Spirit of Bold Offensive.....	
..... Sin Tong-hwan.....	32
The Key to Success Lies in Organizational Work.....	
..... Kim Ok-man.....	38
Let Us Further Enhance the Level of Functionaries' Guidance Over Economic Work.....	43
..... Choe Yong-nim.....	
The Chucheization of the National Economy and the Effective Utilization of Raw Materials.....	48
..... Chu Yong-sol.....	
Socialism Is the Powerful Fortress of Peace.....	
..... Kim Yong-nam.....	52
Imperialists Must Not Repeat the Mistake in History--On the 45th Anniversary of the Outbreak of the World War II.....	57
South Korean Agriculture in Serious Crisis.....	
..... Choe Chang-tok.....	62

CSO: 4100/318

KCNA NOTES DEVELOPMENT IN CHAGANG PROVINCE

SK201540 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1506 GMT 20 Sep 84

[Text] Pyongyang, 20 Sep (KCNA)--Chunggang County, Chagang Province, is a mountainous area on the bank of the River Amnok.

The county is a place associated with the glorious revolutionary history of the great leader President Kim Il-song. There he spent part of his childhood in 1919.

Before the country's liberation, the county had not an industrial establishment producing simple daily necessities. And most of its population were poor peasants and day laborers.

Since liberation the county has been turned into an area good to live in under the wise leadership of President Kim Il-song.

In September, 1964, 20 years ago, he visited the county in person. He looked after with deep care all matters from the problem of developing the economy to the problem of people's living and brightly indicated the road to be followed by it.

Today the county has a modern non-ferrous metal production base and textile, clothing, daily necessities, chemical and other local industrial factories which produce hundreds of kinds of daily necessities by use of rich local materials and raw materials.

The output of manufactured goods has grown 7.8 times over the past 20 years.

With the powerful acceleration of comprehensive mechanization and chemicalization of agriculture, the grain production has increased year after year.

This year the county foresees to harvest 1-1.5 more tons of rice and 1-2 more tons of maize from each hectare than last year.

Per hectare grain yield has increased 2.7 times (1.4 times in rice, 4 times in maize) as against 20 years ago.

Non-paddy fields account for more than 80 percent of the total arable land of the county.

Industrial plants are cultivated in large quantities mainly in the areas 800 meters above sea level.

Inexhaustible is timber resources in the county, nearly 80 percent of whose area is covered with forest.

Over 2,200 hectares of pine-nut forests created in the county are a reliable cooking oil production base.

A big town has been built along the River Amnok where straw-thatched huts were scattered here and there in the past days.

In the country there are mining and agricultural colleges and scores of senior middle and primary schools.

The county has also a house of culture, publications distribution office, library and other cultural establishments and scores of hospitals and clinics including the county people's hospital.

CSO: 4100/365

BRIEFS

MAIZE HARVESTING BEGINS--Pyongyang, 13 Sep (KCNA)--Maize harvesting has begun on cooperative farms in different parts of Korea. In a few days after the harvesting started amid the joy of bumper crops it surpassed 10 percent, taking the country as a whole. In particular, harvesting has been wound up in 40 percent of the entire maize fields in South Hwanghae Province. The agricultural working people in South Pyongan Province, Kaesong and Nampo and other places are daily expanding their success. Along with maize harvesting, the cooperative farms are taking effective measures to carry maize to thrashing grounds and dry it properly. [Text] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 1005 GMT 13 Sep 84 SK]

CSO: 4100/365

BRIEFS

JILIN ART GROUP--Pyongyang, 14 Sep (KCNA)--The Jilin provincial art troupe of China arrived in Hyesan on September 13 for a visit to Yanggang Province. In the evening the Yanggang provincial people's committee arranged a banquet for the art troupe. The delegation of Soviet youth publishing workers headed by Viktor Andriyanov, a department director of the Soviet paper KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA, left here for home yesterday. [Text] [SK140430 Pyongyang KCNA in English 2219 GMT 13 Sep 84]

DPRK JOURNALISTS--Pyongyang, 16 Sep (KCNA)--A delegation of the Korean Journalists Union headed by Kim Ki-nam, editor in chief of NODONG SINMUN and chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean Journalists Union, left Pyongyang on September 15 by plane to attend a meeting of the executive committee of the International Organization of Journalists to be held in India. It was seen off at the airport by Kim Yong-hak, director of the Workers' Party of Korea Publishing House, Choe Chil-nam, first deputy editor in chief of NODONG SINMUN, and Yun Kyong-taek, vice-chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean Journalists Union. [Text] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 0834 GMT 16 Sep 84 SK]

WRITERS UNION GROUP--Pyongyang, 20 Sep (KCNA)--A delegation of the Korean Writers Union headed by Kang Nung-su, vice-chairman of its Central Committee, left Pyongyang on September 19 for a visit to the Soviet Union and the home-visiting group of Koreans in Japan headed by Chon Ho-on and the home-visiting groups of Koreans in Japan headed by Kim Su-chong left here after visiting the socialist homeland. The delegation of the Czechoslovak Union of Cooperative Peasants headed by Ervin Zidek, secretary of the its Central Committee, the Indian scholars delegation for the study of the chuche idea, the Indian scholars delegation and Filippo Mazzonis, professor of Teramo University of Italy, left Pyongyang on the same day. [Text] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 2208 GMT 19 Sep 84 SK]

PYONGYANG ART TROUPE--Pyongyang, 19 Sep (KCNA)--The Pyongyang school children's art troupe left Athens on September 14 after its successful performances amidst enthusiastic acclamation of the audience in Greece. Functionaries of the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement, parliamentarians, mayors and other politician and public figures, men of the press and people of all walks of life, tens of thousands in all, saw the performances given by the art troupe. Mayors vied with each other in inviting the art troupe to their cities and more performances than had been planned were given everywhere in response to the earnest

request of the people. The performance was each time given to a full house and was acclaimed by the audience for its high ideological and artistic value and excellent skill. [Text] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 0823 GMT 19 Sep 84 SK]

CHONGNYON PUBLISHES 'EDUCATIONAL' WORK--Tokyo, 19 Sep (KNS-KCNA)--"On Further Developing the Educational Work", a letter to the attendants of a national meeting of active educational workers sent on July 22, 1984, by Comrade Kim Chong-il, member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau, and secretary, of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, was published in booklet by the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (CHONGNYON). Printed in the booklet is a portrait of dear Comrade Kim Chong-il. [Text] [SK220409 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0356 GMT 22 Sep 84]

CSO: 4100/365

N.KOREA/SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

BRIEFS

DPRK-HUNGARY SCIENTIFIC ACCORD--Pyongyang, 18 Sep (KCNA)--An agreement on scientific-technological cooperation between the Central Committee of the General Federation of Industrial Technology of Korea and the Council of the Federation of Scientific and Technical Associations of Hungary was signed in Pyongyang on September 17. It was signed by Sin Gi-chon, vice-chairman of the Central Committee of the General Federation of Industrial Technology of Korea, and Soos Gabor, vice-chairman of the Federation of Scientific and Technical Associations of Hungary and president of the Association of Agricultural Science. [Text] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 0346 GMT 18 Sep 84 SK]

CSO: 4100/365

N.KOREA/KOREANS IN JAPAN

ANTI-CHONGNYON MOVES IN JAPAN CRITICIZED

SK190841 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0827 GMT 19 Sep 84

[Text] Pyongyang, 19 Sep (KCNA)--MINJU CHOSON today carries a commentary playing a surprise raid on the Hall of the Central Headquarters of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (CHONGNYON) in Tokyo on September 14 by a hooligan of "Daigosha", a Japanese right-wing terrorists' group.

The paper says:

The repeated provocations of the right-wing terrorists group are a product of the hostile policy of Japanese authorities towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and CHONGNYON.

Raids of the reactionaries within and without on CHONGNYON were intensified further around the treacherous Japan trip of Chon Tu-hwan and, they are getting more vicious with each passing day, assuming outrageous nature. What cannot be overlooked all the more is the fact that Japanese authorities remain indifferent to such provocations of right-wing hooligans.

Unpardonable is the act of Japanese authorities in taking no measure against such crimes committed in broad daylight in Japan styled a "constitutional state."

Japanese authorities must discard their unfriendly attitude towards CHONGNYON, arrest at once all criminals who try to wreck the CHONGNYON organization and severely punish them, thoroughly probe into their background and take responsible steps to prevent the recurrence of such crimes in the future.

CSO: 4100/365

N.KOREA/KOREANS IN JAPAN

BRIEFS

SPORTS MEET OF KOREANS--Tokyo, 12 Sep (KNS-KCNA)--A central sports meet of Korean students in Japan was held in Tokyo for three days from September 5 to 7 in celebration of the 36th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In his opening address Yi Chin-kyu, first vice-chairman of the Central Standing Committee of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (CHONGNYON), called upon all Korean students to prepare themselves better to be successors to the chuche cause, workers of CHONGNYON who warmly love the socialist homeland and devote their body and soul to national reunification with the sports meet as an occasion. The meet was participated in by more than 3,200 students from Korean high, middle and primary schools in all parts of Japan. [Text] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 0801 GMT 14 Sep 84 SK]

HOME-VISITING KOREANS--Pyongyang, 16 Sep (KCNA)--Home-visiting groups of Koreans in Japan headed respectively by Yi Tong-chang, Hwang Chong-chin, Kim Yong-sik and Chu Chong-sam and a 69th short-term home-visiting group of Koreans in Japan headed by Pak Chun-su arrived in Wonsan on September 15 by the ship "Samjiyon" for a visit to the socialist homeland. [Text] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 0837 GMT 16 Sep 84 SK]

ANTI-CHONGNYON ACTIONS PROTESTED--Tokyo, 20 Sep (KNS-KCNA)--Susumu Ozaki, Kinju Morikawa, Shigeru Tokoi and other Japanese lawyers called at the Tokyo District Prosecutors' Office on September 18 to protest against the grave provocations committed by Japanese right-wing hooligans against the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (CHONGNYON). Roundly exposing the unpardonable criminal raid on the Hall of CHONGNYON by Japanese right-wing hooligans, they demanded the office to severely punish the criminals on charges of attempted murder and assault and thoroughly probe into its background. [Text] [SK220407 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0354 GMT 22 Sep 84]

CSO: 4100/365

N.KOREA/FOREIGN RELATIONS

DAILY HITS U.S. FOR PLAN TO CREATE SECOND 'GRENADA'

SK191027 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1018 GMT 19 Sep 84

[Text] Pyongyang, 19 Sep (KCNA)--The plan of the U.S. imperialists to swiftly deploy two new light infantry divisions to be activated in the "areas of disputes" caused by them reveals their aggressive design to create a second, a third "Grenada", remarks MINJU CHOSON today in a commentary.

The author of the commentary says:

Now Reagan is singing a "peace psalm" from the housetop to seize the presidential chair again in the coming November elections.

But this is a trick to delude others and his flowery words are a mere fig leaf for veiling his bellicose nature.

In a peace time, not a wartime, the U.S. imperialists, according to Reagan's bellicose doctrine, raised the U.S. military budget in a year to the astronomical figure of 300,000 million dollars and keep developing and producing mass destruction weapons of various kinds to deploy them in South Korea and various other parts of the world and hold large-scale provocative war exercises almost every day. Some time ago they worked out even a plan to turn outer space into a new theatre of the arms race, deciding to reorganize the special space flight command in the U.S. Airforce into an independent army staff in the near future.

Although they are craftily trying to fool the revolutionary and peaceloving people of the world with honeyed words, they will never be able to cover up their dirty nature as the ringleader of aggression and war and the vicious wrecker of world peace.

CSO: 4100/365

N.KOREA/FOREIGN RELATIONS

REPORTAGE ON NORTH KOREA'S 36TH ANNIVERSARY

Foreign Meetings Noted

SK201021 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1008 GMT 20 Sep 84

[Text] Pyongyang, 20 Sep (KCNA)--The 36th founding anniversary of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was celebrated in foreign countries.

Celebrations were held in New Delhi, India, and the Congo with portraits of the great leader President Kim Il-song and portraits of the heads of state of the host countries hung on the background of the platforms.

Letters to President Kim Il-song and dear Comrade Kim Chong-il were adopted at the meeting held in New Delhi.

On the anniversary day, papers of various countries carried articles and special writeups. Among them were the Bulgarian paper OTECHESTVEN FRONT, the Polish paper TRYBUNA LUDU, the Mongolian paper UNEN, the Syrian paper TISHURIN, the Nepalese paper GORKHAPATRA, the Finnish paper LAGENTAJA, the Peruvian paper LA REPUBLICA and the Rwandan paper IMWAHO.

The papers carried portraits of President Kim Il-song.

The Egyptian People Radio, Radio of Sudan, Zimbabwean Central Radio, Radio of Mali, Central Radio of Zaire, Central African Radio, Radio Aden of Democratic Yemen, Radio No 1 of Portugal and other radios of different countries aired special programs.

The Benin television, the ANTA of Madagascar, the PTI of India and televisions and news agencies of other countries screened the Korean documentary films and published special reports.

Papers, news agencies and radio of many countries introduced the proud successes and development gained by the Korean people under the wise leadership of President Kim Il-song and Comrade Kim Chong-il, and wished the Korean people new success in the struggle for the prosperity of the country and her reunification on the national day.

Foreign Leaders Greetings

SK211555 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1525 GMT 21 Sep 84

[Text] Pyongyang, 21 Sep (KCNA)--President Kim Il-song received messages of greetings from foreign party and state leaders on the occasion of the 36th birthday of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

They came from: Julius K. Nyerere, president of the United Republic of Tanzania;

Seyni Kountche, president of the Supreme Military Council and head of state of the Republic of Niger; Seewoosagur Ramgoolamvwn governor-general of Mauritius; Hissene Habre, president and head of state of the Republic of Chad;

Jose Eduardo dos Santos, president of the MPLA-Workers' Party and president of the People's Republic of Angola;

Ali Nasser Mohamed, secretary general of the Central Committee of the Yemen Socialist Party, chairman of the Presidium of the People's Supreme Council and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen;

Ali Abdullah Saleh, president, commander in chief of the armed forces and general secretary of the General People's Congress of the Yemen Arab Republic;

Manuel Pinto da Costa, chairman of the Liberation Movement of Sao Tome and Principe and president of the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe;

Kenneth David Kaunda, president of the Republic of Zambia;

Tabyarimana Juvenal, president of the Republic of Rwanda and president-founder of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development of Rwanda;

Jiame Lusinchí, president of the Republic of Venezuela;

Daniel Ortega Saavedra, coordinator of the Council of the Government of National Reconstruction of the Republic of Nicaragua;

Thomas Sankara, president of the National Revolutionary Council and head of state of Burkina-Faso;

John Michael Geoffrey Maningham Adams, prime minister of Barbados;

Bhumibol Adulyadej, king of Thailand;

Hassan oin Talal, acting king of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan;

Antonio Ramalho Eanes, president of the Republic of Portugal;

Paul Biya, president of the Republic of Cameroon;

Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla, president of the Military Committee of National Salvation and head of state of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.

Joao Bernardo Vieira, president of the State Council of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau;

E.M.S. Namboodiripad, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India (Marxist);

Ezekias Papaioannou, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus; and

V. Ratakul, leader of the Democratic Party of Thailand.

The messages extended warmest congratulations to President Kim Il-song and the Korean people on the occasion of the 36th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The messages wished President Kim Il-song a long life in good health and the Korean people new success in socialist construction.

Foreign Papers Mark Anniversary

SK210823 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0809 GMT 21 Sep 84

[Text] Pyongyang, 21 Sep (KCNA)--Publications of various countries edited special writeups and carried articles on the 36th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The Yugoslav paper DNEVNIK September 9 in its article titled "Correctness and Vitality of the Chuche Idea" noted that the chuche idea is the guiding idea of the Korean people and it is the foundation stone of all policies in Korea.

It said:

President Kim Il-song founded this great idea and Comrade Kim Chong-il, member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau, and secretary, of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, develops and enriches it.

It was not until Comrade President Kim Il-song created the chuche idea and founded the Workers' Party of Korea that the Korean people greeted the era of new change in their history.

The Lebanese paper AL ANWAR September 8, magazines SWABAH AL THAIR September 8 and BEIRUT ALSAI September 10 carried, together with special write-ups, the gist of the speech of the great leader President Kim Il-song at the banquet arranged in honor of the 36th anniversary of the DPRK founding.

Articles were published on this day by EL MOUDJAHID, organ of the National Liberation Front Party of Algeria, the Malaysian papers SIN CHEW JIT POH

and SIN PIN JIH PAO, the Lao paper PASASON, the Democratic Yemeni paper ARGATTASHARA OUKTOOBUR, the Indonesian papers MERDEKA and SUADESI, and other papers of different countries.

The publications carried portraits of President Kim Il-song.

They introduced the brilliant successes achieved by the Korean people in socialist construction under the banner of the republic and stressed that all these successes are the results of the wise leadership of the great leader President Kim Il-song and dear Comrade Kim Chong-il.

CSO: 4100/365

N.KOREA/FOREIGN RELATIONS

DAILY COMMENTS ON JAPAN'S DEFENSE PAPER

SK191019 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1013 GMT 19 Sep 84

[Text] Pyongyang, 19 Sep (KCNA)--NODONG SINMUN today says the "defense white paper for 1984" made public by the Japanese reactionaries is a program of the militarists for Japan's rearmament and conversion into a "big military power" and for its overseas expansion.

Recalling that in the "white paper" the Japanese reactionaries, referring to the world military situation, praised the "fruitful efforts" of the United States and other NATO member nations to "maintain and strengthen the reliability of deterrent power", and expressed support to the U.S. imperialists' frantic arms buildup, the author of the commentary says:

Such view of the Japanese reactionaries discloses that they are acting in accordance with the demand of the U.S. imperialists' global strategy.

In dancing to the tunes of the U.S. imperialists' arms buildup the Japanese reactionaries seek to legalize their arms buildup plan for Japan's rearmament and conversion into a "big military power."

This shows that the Japanese reactionaries try to turn Japan further into a nuclear attack base of U.S. imperialism, strengthen the Japan-U.S. military alliance and use it as an "axis" in realizing the U.S. imperialists' Asian strategy and their overseas expansion and increase on this basis their capacity for aggressive war and protracted war.

The "white paper" is not one for "defense" but an out-and-out aggressive arms buildup plan for realizing their old dream of the "greater East Asia coprosperity sphere". It shows that the Japanese militarists are taking one more step in their overseas expansion moves.

CSO: 4100/365

N. KOREA/FOREIGN RELATIONS

DELEGATIONS ARRIVE FOR BANK CELEBRATION

SK260402 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0346 GMT 26 Sep 84

[Text] Pyongyang, 26 Sep (KCNA)--Foreign delegations and delegates arrived in Pyongyang on September 25 to attend the Foreign Trade Bank 25th anniversary. Arriving here yesterday were: a Chinese Bank delegation headed by its vice-president Chang Yanqing; Matti Sikstrom, delegate of the Export Assurance Council of Finland and its president; Abdul Jabur Khan, delegate of the Habib Bank of Pakistan and its president; a Romanian Foreign Trade Bank delegation headed by its Vice-President Gheorghe Crainiceanu; a Japanese Ashikaga Bank delegation headed by its director Hisao Mukae; Zahid H. Khursheed, delegate of the National Bank of Pakistan and its vice-president; Vincke Christian, delegate of the Export Credit Assurance Department of Belgium and its vice-director; Teodor Giurgiu, delegate of the Anglo-Romania Bank and its general manager; Gabor Erdely, delegate of the Anglo-Hungary International Bank and its director; Luis Gil Das Neves, delegate of the Mozambican Bank and its general manager; Kifle Getachew, delegate of the Ethiopian National Bank and its director; Wolfgang Poecle, delegate of the Handel Bank of West Germany and member of its board; Hans-Juergen Junghenn, delegate of the Gemeinwirtschaft Bank of West Germany; a delegation of the [phrase indistinct] Michael James Newman, delegate of the Anglo-Havana International Bank and its director; Helmuth Modlik, delegate of the Austrian Credit Bank and its vice-manager; Klaus Alfred Heiliger, delegate of the Berliner Bank of West Germany and its director; R.Fd Jager Gerlings, delegate of the Algemeine Bank, Netherlands; Nils Ekblad, delegate of the Skandinaviska Enskilda Bank of Sweden; Lars Ellstrom, delegate of the Swedish Svanska Handels Bank; Gerhard Helmut Peter Lobing, delegate of the Dresdner Bank of West Germany; Ballot Eric, delegate of the Louis Dreyfus Bank of France; a delegation of the Japan-Korea Trade Settling Committee headed by its chairman Yoshihiko Nomura; a delegation of the International Monetary and Exchange Co. of Kuwait headed by its stock holder Hisham Amin al Rayes; and Essomba Omgba Christophe, delegate of the Development Bank of Cameroon.

A delegation of the Korea-Japan Import and Export Corporation headed by its director Yun Jae Su; a delegation of the Tongmyong Corporation Ltd. headed by its director Pak Chan-kyu; Kim Tong-uk, delegate of the Korean Industrial Stock Company Ltd. and its section chief; and a delegation of the Korean Special Products Sales Company Ltd. headed by its vice-director Paek Son-jong arrived in Pyongnang yesterday by air to attend celebrations of the 25th anniversary of the founding of the Foreign Trade Bank.

The delegations and delegates were met at the airport by Pang Ki-yong, president of the Foreign Trade Bank, and personages concerned.

N.KOREA/FOREIGN RELATIONS

BRIEFS

TEACHERS VISITS--Pyongyang, 11 Sep (KCNA)--A delegation of rectors of teachers colleges in Sierra Leone for the study of the chuche idea headed by Lenga Koroma, principal of Makeni Teachers College, Fall Sega Sech, director of the Normal College of Dakar University of Senegal, and Dr George Caren of the University of Sierra Leone, arrived in Pyongyang on September 10 by air. The delegation of the All-China Journalists Association left here for home yesterday by train. [Text] [SK110541 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0334 GMT 11 Sep 84]

MEETING ON ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION--Pyongyang, 11 Sep (KCNA)--A meeting was held on September 10 at the Chollima House of Culture on the founding congress of the Workers Party of Ethiopia and the 10th anniversary of the people's revolution in Ethiopia. Placed on the platform of the meeting hall were a portrait of the great leader President Kim Il-song and a portrait of Comrade Mengistu Haile Mariam, the outstanding leader of the Ethiopian people. The meeting was attended by Hwang Sun-myong, minister of general education, Yi Sok-yong, vice chairman of the Committee for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries and vice chairman of the Korea-Ethiopia Friendship and Solidarity Committee, personages concerned and working people in the city. Speeches were made at the meeting. [Text] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 0822 GMT 11 Sep 84 SK]

WPK GROUP TO CHINA--Pyongyang, 12 Sep (KCNA)--A delegation of the North Pyongan Provincial Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea headed by its chief secretary Kim Pyong-yol left Sinuiju on September 11 for a visit to Liaoning Province, China. It was seen off by Sok Kyong-mo, secretary of the North Pyongan Provincial Committee of the WPK, and personages concerned. [Text] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 2248 GMT 11 Sep 84 SK]

FOREIGN VISITORS--Pyongyang, 13 Sep (KCNA)--Philip Mangula, member of the National Executive Committee of the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania and vice principal of Ideological College of the party, arrived in Pyongyang on September 11. The delegation of Cuenca University of Ecuador headed by its President Mario Vintimilla Ordonez, the delegation of Quito Central University of Ecuador for the study of the chuche idea and the delegation of Kampala High School for the study of the chuche idea left here for home yesterday. [Text] [Pyongyang KCNA in English 2205 GMT 12 Sep 84 SK]

UNESCO OFFICIAL--Pyongyang, 15 Sep (KCNA)--V. Prakash, director of the regional office of science and technique for Southeast Asia of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), arrived in Pyongyang on September 14 by plane. [Text] [SK170629 Pyongyang KCNA in English 2228 GMT 14 Sep 84]

UN FOOD DELEGATION--Pyongyang, 15 Sep (KCNA)--S.S. Puri, assistant director-general of the UN Food and Agricultural Organization and regional representative for Asia and the Pacific, and his party arrived in Pyongyang on September 14 by air. They were met at the airport by Yi Hak-chol, vice-chairman of the Agricultural Commission, and Slobodan Ristic, representative of the UN Development Program in Korea. [Text] [SK170629 Pyongyang KCNA in English 2229 GMT 14 Sep 84]

DPRK AMBASSADOR TO NORWAY--Pyongyang, 18 Sep (KCNA)--Kim Yong-su, the newly-appointed ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of our country to Norway, presented his credentials to Olav the Fifth, king of Norway, on September 13. The ambassador conveyed cordial regards of President Kim Il-song to the king. The king expressed deep thanks for this and asked the ambassador to convey his heartfelt greetings to President Kim Il-song. The talk proceeded in a friendly atmosphere. [Text] [SK180625 Pyongyang KCNA in English 2207 GMT 17 Sep 84]

HWANG CHANG-YOP MEETING--Pyongyang, 18 Sep (KCNA)--Hwang Chang-yop, secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, on September 17 met and had friendly talks with Theam Jayanandana, advisor to the Thai Democratic Party and former deputy speaker of the House of Representatives, the delegation of the GDR paper NEUES DEUTSCHLAND headed by Dieter Bruckner, deputy editor in chief of NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, organ of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Indian scholars delegation headed by S.N. Srivastava, vice-chancellor of Kumaun National University of India, and on September 16 the Indian scholars delegation for the study of the chuche idea headed by Prof G.S. Mishra, former vice-president of the Lucknow University of India. [Text] [SK180625 Pyongyang KCNA in English 2209 GMT 17 Sep 84]

EAST EUROPE, USSR VISITORS--Pyongyang 18 Sep (KCNA)--A National Front delegation of the German Democratic Republic headed by Hvorst Schutze, member of the Standing Committee of the National Front Council of the Democratic Republic and vice-director of a department of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, and a scientific and technological cooperation delegation of Czechoslovakia headed by Pavel Majersky, first deputy chairman of the State Committee of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia for the development of science and technology and investment, arrived in Pyongyang yesterday. I.I. Liapin, editor in chief of the DETSKAYA LITERATURA Publishing House of the Soviet Union, and the press department delegation of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry headed by Georgi Popov, deputy chief of the department, arrived here on the same day. [Text] [SK180625 Pyongyang KCNA in English 2212 GMT 17 Sep 84]

MESSAGE FROM VIETNAM LEADERS--Pyongyang, 23 Sep (KCNA)--Comrade Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, received a reply message from Comrade Le Duan, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, and Comrade Truong Chinh, chairman of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The reply message dated September 14 reads: We express heartfelt thanks to you and, through you, to the Workers' Party of Korea, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the fraternal Korean people for your warm congratulations on the occasion of the 39th anniversary of the national day of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. We hope that the friendship between the Vietnamese and Korean peoples will be consolidated and developed with each passing day. We wish the fraternal Korean people many victories in the struggle for the cause of socialist construction and the independent and peaceful reunification of the country. [Text] [SK230856 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0832 GMT 23 Sep 84]

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