



**STRATEGY
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**ACTIVE COMPONENT/RESERVE COMPONENT INTEGRATION
A SLOW REALITY**

BY

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Active Component/Reserve Component Integration:

"A Slow Reality"

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ABSTRACT

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Today's global security environment has caused America's military to make many adjustments and changes. It has caused us to relook our National Defense Strategy and devise a methodology commensurate with today's threat. The Army in particular is undergoing a complete overhaul. They are taking advantage of this peacetime era to renovate our components, the Active Army, Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. After 29 years, this renovation is slowly taking shape through a total integration program initiated as a result of the Total Force policy issued by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, in August 1970.

This policy specifically identifies the Reserve Components as the principle augmentation of active forces in emergencies. It was designed to offset reductions in the defense budget and to increase reliance on the Reserve Component forces. The policy directed consideration of the Total Force, Active and Reserve in planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing Guard and Reserve Forces.

This initiative was further pushed forward by the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Dennis J. Reimer in his White Paper entitled "One Team, One Fight, One Future." Recognizing the inevitable consequences lurking on our domestic front as well as throughout the world due to a lack of a Seamless Army General Reimer began to take

giant steps toward expediting the integration program. His goal is not just an "Integrated Army" but a true, "Seamless Army" for America.

Though some may feel that this is about supplementing or replacing active forces with reserve soldiers, it isn't. Total Army Integration is a process of combining the unique characteristics of all three components to create the force our Nation needs and deserves. It is about combining and employing our most qualified personnel --- ensuring we have the best mix of forces available to get the job done....meeting our National Defense Strategy.

To accomplish this end the Army is finally making strides. The leadership from all components realizes that "Total Integration" is the only way to do business. They are working diligently on a variety of initiatives and actions that clearly demonstrate the tremendous effort being applied towards creating the fully integrated Total Force.

Many of these initiatives which form the groundwork for fulfilling this objective as well as some possible obstacles which may impede the progress are discussed in this paper.

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Active Component /Reserve Component Integration

A Slow Reality

The Active Component (AC), Army National Guard (ARNG), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) equals One Team, One Fight and One Future. Since the end of the Cold War it has become quite evident that in order for our nation to meet the challenges of our National Defense Strategy there has to be a merger of these three components. America's Army must become seamless! The journey to a Seamless Army, a much dreaded journey in the past, is a bumpy ride. Nevertheless, it is a ride needed if we are to grow an Army capable of fighting and winning the nation's wars with the Army of year 2025. Bumpy ride or not, we have embarked upon the challenge and are making a Seamless Army a slow reality.

Reasons for the delay, initiatives being explored for implementation and some possible obstacles to accomplishing this monumental task are examined in this paper. Also, a definition of the three components to include their purpose and function are identified to lend clarity and structure.

The Total Army

The Total Army is an integrated, cohesive organization of the active component (Regular Army), reserve components (Army National Guard and Army Reserve) and civilian employees which are the fundamental building block of our National Security. The Regular Army, consisting of 46 percent of the total force, provides the forces to support forward presence and provides initial forces for rapid worldwide deployment. The Army National Guard, consisting of 34 percent of the total force and the Army Reserves, consisting of 20 percent of the total force, provides trained individuals for

active duty in time of war or other emergency and provides reinforcements for contingency operations.

The Reserve Components

The Reserve Components (RC) include the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. There are three reserve categories--- the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve and the Retired Reserve.

The Ready Reserve is comprised of the members of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve units, Individual Mobilization Augmentees, Active Guard/Reservist, Individual Ready Reservist, and members of the Inactive Army National Guard. The total strength of the Ready Reserve at the end of FY98 was approximately 576,000 personnel.

The Standby Reserve consist of individuals who have completed their active duty and reserve training requirements, or who are unable to maintain membership in units.

The retired Reserve is composed of individuals who have completed 20 years of qualifying service for retirement.¹

“Members of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve units are required to participate in 48 drills and two weeks of active duty training annually. Individual Mobilization Augmentees are assigned to wartime positions in units or headquarters. They perform two weeks of active duty training each year. The Individual Ready Reserve is made up of officers and enlisted soldiers with prior military service, who are completing their eight-year military service obligation, or who are not assigned to units. The majority of these personnel have no annual training requirements.”²

The Army National Guard

The Army National Guard is as old as the militia that fought in the French and Indian Wars (1756-1763). Unlike the Reserve Component, the Army National Guard has a dual state and federal mission. When not on active duty, Army National Guard units are under the command of their respective state governors. The Army National Guard provides 55 percent of combat, 46 percent of combat support as well as 25 percent of combat service support, for the Active Army. Currently, 63 percent of the Army's field artillery support is provided by the Army National Guard. It is predicted that by the end of FY99 this will increase to 80 percent.³

The Army Reserve

The Army Reserve was formed in 1908. After World War I, the National Defense Act of 1920 established the Organized Reserve Corps, which included both units and individuals. Many of the divisions activated during World War II belonged to the Organized Reserve Corps. During the Korean War, more than half of the reservist recalled to active duty were members of the Army Reserve. Today, the Army Reserve provides 47 percent of the combat service support units, 20 percent of the combat support units and 98 percent of the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations, for the Total Army.

Because of the high level of support the Army Reserve provides the Total Army they have become a new organization. They have completed a reorganization of its command and control structure to improve training and mobilization readiness. The regional Army Reserve Commands have been replaced with Regional Support Commands, and Army

Reserve institutional training and exercise divisions have been realigned to support U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Total Army School System.

The three Army components (AC, ARNG and RC) have three major missions; (1) deterrence (the capability to fight and win if deterrence fails); (2) power projection; and (3) Operations Other Than War (OOTW). In order to accomplish these missions, the army must have the forces to maintain a forward presence in critical areas and to provide rapid response or reinforcement when necessary. The army must be prepared to fight and win if deterrence fails and have the capability to rapidly expand the force in times of national emergency. Therefore, to support these missions America's Army can no longer afford to be integrated in theory only. Total Force Integration must become a reality.

Why Total Force Integration Now?

There is no better time than now to integrate our force. In fact the time to fully integrate the Reserves into the Active Force is long overdue. If we had a blueprint to follow this mission would be complete. The process is not an easy one and the blueprint doesn't exist, so the struggle goes on. The struggle today has taken on new steam for reasons forced upon us by a change created by the diminishing of real world threats from our competitive superpower, Russia. The end of the cold war has caused a change in our National Security Strategy and budget allocations. Thus, in peacetime maintaining an active force large enough to achieve victory in a major regional conflict is financially self destructive. The maintenance of a large Active Army when there are no active hostilities is a very expensive proposition. However, as we continue to draw down our forces we cannot allow our standing force to become hollow. We must be ready to act if a clear conventional threat to National Security emerges, or if we continue to call upon our

Army to regularly deploy in OOTWs. The Reserve Components must round out our Total Force. By reducing the standing force and building up our reserves we are able to train the three components to a standard that is commensurate with our mission for the 21st century.

It is critical this move is not viewed as an opportunity to replace AC soldiers with RC soldiers or to save the taxpayers billions of dollars. Instead it should be viewed as an opportunity to prevent or even shorten wars or conflicts by enhancing the total force as well as the funding for our underfunded modernization program. This saving should be seen as a life insurance policy against incalculable loss of life and resources.

The current drive to integrate the three components as one, creating the "One Army" concept, is by no means any new attempt to accomplish this mission. Since 1970 each Secretary of Defense has focused on forming a One Army Concept. Though all the Secretaries defined policy to integrate the AC and RC there was no bold attempt to do so. The subject was avoided as carefully as possible: perhaps because no one wanted to attempt such a project that was not viewed favorably by either component or perhaps there was fear of each component losing "their" culture, or identity. Perhaps it is this very uniqueness and culture, which must be preserved, of each component serving under different constitutional laws and codes, that has caused the Army to gradually crawl rather than walk or run to this end; the creation of a "Total Force, A Seamless Army." The process is an extremely slow, tedious and painstaking one, at times taking one step forward and two steps backwards.

Whatever the reason for the delay, today we are closer to accomplishing this mission than ever before. The circumstance handed us as a result of the end of the Cold War era

is forcing us to be diligently dedicated in making changes to our Army. These changes caused us to create a type of Cold War of our own. The most significant changes are in missions, budgeting and force structure. A change in our National Defense Strategy, the downsizing, the attrition rates and the inability to attract and recruit people into today's Army have taken their toll. The downsizing, though badly needed, compounded by growing attrition has adversely affected our Army's profession of arms.

Though committed for the long haul, retirement, our personnel are suffering low morale as they question their career choice as a soldier. Many seem to have lost the four key ingredients: commitment, morale, attitude, and behavior, the ingredients needed for a cohesive Army, an Army that can withstand the rigors of conflict. The loss of spirit or mistrust is due in part to a heightened uncertainty of the Army's culture. The growing shortage of personnel, most recently due to attrition (people leaving the army for a better profession, with more financial security, less OTEMPO, and definitely a more attractive retirement) has left the army in a hollow state. Unfortunately, the future is no brighter, as this year, FY99, we will downsize approximately another 13 thousand more personnel.

All these obstacles and consequences have weakened our Active Army and left doubts of its ability to meet taskings in the 21st century. Time and technology have also brought about changes for our forces. Today, our fighting region is not the woods at the edge of the field but instead it is the air above us and the seas around us. The danger is the same, only the weapons have changed.

All around the globe we are engaged in keeping the peace and at any time any one of these operations could erupt into a large scale conflict. A deterrent of such a conflict is, not just the military strength of the free, but also, the amount and quality of men, women

and equipment it has ready for defense. Personnel are the key ingredient, without them our most advanced and sophisticated technology will not deter aggression. An object is just an object and will remain defenseless unless it is put into action by a well trained soldier. If we are to remain the world's superpower we can't afford to become or be viewed as hollow. Steps must be taken to prevent this reality and perception. We are forced even more to focus dramatically on creating a Total Army, a Seamless Army. A Seamless Army will consist of the three components coming together as one, training and fighting as one and ultimately being funded as one.

The Total Force Policy

The Total Force Policy, issued by then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in August 1970 has brought us a long way. This policy states the Reserve Components would be the principle augmentation of active forces in emergencies. "It was designed to offset reductions in the defense budget and to increase reliance on the Reserve Component forces. The policy directed consideration of the Total Force, Active and Reserve, in planning programming, manning, equipping, and employing Guard and Reserves Forces." ⁴ Although, each Secretary of Defense, since Secretary Laird (Schlesinger, Weinberger, and Perry similarly issued policies designed to further integrate Active and Reserve Forces, the adoption of the Total Force policy in August of 1970 was the beginning of a yet undefined Total Army. The policy was not adopted without dissent. Military leaders, including General William C. Westmoreland, thought the Total Force Policy decision placed too much reliance upon part-time Reserve Components soldiers. "Since 1908, members of the Army Reserve have taken on responsibilities greater than those required of most citizens, for they have given of their weeknights, and weekends

and summertime leisure to learn, train and prepare for the day when their country might call upon them in time of war or national emergency.”⁵ The reserves have upheld this policy not only in wartime, specifically in Operation Desert Shield/Storm but also in humanitarian and peace-keeping operations around the world such as: Haiti, Bosnia, Kuwait, Panama and Somalia and most recently back in Central America to name a few.

Although the goal of the “Total Force Policy or Seamless Army” is not to replace Active Component personnel with Reserve Component personnel, one can argue, that is exactly what’s happening when the Reserve Components comprise more than fifty percent of the total force. We can argue that we are making this replacement when we deploy our Reserve and National Guard personnel around the world to perform missions that at one time were performed by Active Component personnel. It is clear since the late 1980s the Army Reserve has borne unprecedented levels of responsibility in protecting our vital national interest. “They have been assigned missions vital to both the warfighting capability and sustainability of the United States Army; and many of their units are expected to deploy on as tight a timetable as active units.”⁶ It is a fact the Army’s ability to conduct military operations without involving the reserve components is extremely limited. The intent of the integration program in theory is not to replace Active Component soldiers, however, in many instances we are in fact doing just that.

Implementing The Total Force Policy

The implementation of the Total Force Policy increased speed when SecDef, William S. Cohen, described a seamless Total Force that “provides the National Command Authority the flexibility and interoperability necessary for the full range of military operations.”⁷ The Secretary called for an environment that eliminated “all residual

barriers” to effective integration within our Total Force. Secretary Cohen signed a memorandum, “Integration of the Reserve and Active Components,” into action on 4 September 1997. At this time the army had already recognized the need to meet the challenges of becoming truly integrated as a Seamless Army and therefore, pressed for a dedicated effort from each component. General Dennis J. Reimer, Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), recognized the consequences, lurking on our domestic front as well as throughout the world due to a lack of a Seamless Army and, began to vastly implement the integration program. His goal is not just an “integrated Army” but a true, “Seamless Army” for America.

After taking a long hard look at the nation’s national security requirements, it became prudent we can no longer afford to maintain a three component army. Realizing that “Total Integration” is the only way to do business, a variety of initiatives and actions are undertaken in this effort. The foundation of these initiatives are embedded in the SecDef’s four basic principles for integration, which are summarized as:

“Responsibility:---Clearly understood responsibility for the ownership of the Total Force by the senior leaders throughout the Total Force;

Mission---Clear and mutual understanding on the mission for each unit-Active Guard and Reserve-in service and joint/combined operations. During peace and War;

Resources---Commitment to provide the resources need to accomplish assigned Missions;

Readiness---Leadership by senior commanders – Active, Guard and Reserves – To ensure the readiness of the Total Force.”⁸

Responsibility And Communication

In his White Paper, “One Team, One Fight, One Future,” General Dennis J. Reimer, Chief of Staff of the Army, recognizes that responsibility for the Total Army concept can

only be taken through energetic leadership and effective communication. He describes attempts being made by the Army to move aggressively to improve communications. "One such attempt is his small-group meetings of the State Adjutant Generals ensuring close coordination between the National Guard and the Army's most senior leadership.

In addition, the Secretary of the Army has established an Army Forum on Integration of the Reserve and Active components to embed total army leadership involvement in integration issues. At the same time the Vice Chief of Staff has re-energized the Reserve Component Coordination Council to address tough policy and resourcing issues. Together these efforts have immeasurably improved communications among the Army's three components. These steps are predicated on the belief that for leaders to take ownership of the Total Army they must routinely work together, know one another, and understand the unique qualities and contributions of each component.⁹

Initiatives

Leadership

The foundation of several initiatives currently underway to integrate our forces is leadership. The key initiative in response to the SecDef's memorandum is new leadership at the very top of the Reserve Components, Office, Chief of Army Reserve, (OCAR) and Army National Guard, (ARNG), Chief, of Joint Chief of Staff Advisors for the Army National Guard. In his White Paper, the CSA points to the long history of promoting the integration of Reserve Component leadership within the Army Staff and Major Commands. The 3rd Medical Command is just one example. Although composed primarily of Army Reserve soldiers, the command's Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff and 26 staff officers are from the Active Army."¹⁰ This integration extends to the

individual levels; we have Army Guard Reserve (AGR) personnel serving in traditional Active Component positions such as the Deputy, Department of the Army Chief of Staff for Logistics and Chief, Logistician for the U.S. Army Pacific.

Active and National Guard Leadership Division Study

The Active and National Guard Integrated Division Study initiative has resulted in three Enhanced Separate Brigades (ESB) under a non-deployable division headquarters. The division headquarters would provide training, readiness and oversight to the brigades, which would include conducting both pre-and post- mobilization training. Once prepared, individual ESBs would deploy but the division headquarters would not. On 2 December 1997, the Secretary of the Army approved establishing a heavy division headquarters at Fort Riley, Kansas (with a forward element at Fort Jackson, South Carolina and a light division headquarters at Fort Carson, Colorado). The heavy division headquarters will have 145 personnel assigned, 20 of whom will be stationed at Fort Jackson under control of an Active Component Brigadier General, while the light division will have 140 personnel. The ESBs selected for the heavy division are the 30th Mechanized Infantry Brigade of North Carolina, the 48th Mechanized Infantry Brigade of Georgia and the 218th Mechanized Infantry Brigade of South Carolina. The Light Division ESBs include the 39th Infantry Brigade of Arkansas, the 41st Infantry Brigade of Oregon and the 45th Infantry Brigade of Oklahoma. The dedicated division headquarters will provide command and control and training readiness oversight to the three ESBs, ultimately improving their readiness and deployability. The Integrated Division concept will achieve greater integration and cooperation between the AC and the RC.

Multiple-Component Unit Initiative

A Multi-Component (Multi-Compo) unit is one which on a single authorization document is authorized personnel from more than one Army component. The intent of this initiative is to maximize integration of Active and Reserve Component resources (personnel, equipment, and funding) and core competencies. Multi-Component units have unity of command and control similar to that of a single-component unit. "In composite units, the Active Army element generally deploys earlier, with the follow-on Army Reserve segment bringing the unit to full mission capability shortly after mobilization. A Good example of a multi-component unit in operation today is the 3rd Medical Command in Decatur Ga., which has 29 active component soldiers, 27 full-time Reservists and 188 drilling troop program unit soldiers. In FY99 military intelligence, signal, dental and combat stress companies will be similarly integrated."¹¹

The 4th Infantry Division (ID) is another multi-component unit with an Active Component flag and is organized with AC, ARNG and USAR soldiers. The headquarters for the division is located at Fort Hood, Texas. In addition to integrating the ARNG and USAR soldiers directly into the ranks of subordinate units, the division has ARNG units that are dual or single missioned. This initiative is testing the Preamble – State/Federal Relationship and Dual Status of the individual State Militias, the National Guard.

In a Memorandum of Agreement between; Commanders, Forces Command; U.S. Army Reserve Command; Director, Army National Guard; Commanders, III Corps; 4th Infantry Division (4th ID) and The Adjutant Generals of Texas and Wyoming, the creation of a Multi-Component unit is a reality. This memorandum covers critical issues in forming Multi-Component units. It states that the "Constitution of the United States

establishes a system of national defense that recognizes the importance and distinct character of both the individual State Militias and a standing Federal Army. The system created by the Constitution, Title 32 of the United States Code, relies on a combination of the State Militias and a standing Federal Army 'to provide for the common defense.' The Constitution recognizes distinct roles for the State and Federal governments with regard to the Militia and the standing Army."¹²

Throughout our history the distinct character of the State Militias and the standing Army has been steadfastly maintained. The distinction is fundamental to our form of government. At the same time, laws and policies have regularly been enacted to ensure the continued ability of these organizations to meet the challenges of the prevailing national security environment. While always maintaining the distinct character of the State Militia, those laws have sought to ensure an effective integration of the Army and the Militias when necessary. The 'dual-status' of the Army National Guard is a product of this evolutionary legislative process. Under 'dual-status,' each member of the Army National Guard has both State and a Federal status. When acting as a member of the Army National Guard, the soldier occupies a state status under Title 32, of the United States Code, but meets the standard of training and discipline prescribed by federal authorities. When ordered to active duty as a member of the Army National Guard of the United States (a Reserve component of the United States Army) the soldier occupies a Federal status under Title 10, of the United States Code."¹³

The MOA sets forth the structure and basic operational procedures by which the 4th ID will function. This MOA implements the Headquarters, Department of the Army policy for establishing the 4th ID as a multiple component Modification Table of Organization

and Equipment (MTOE) unit. Provided in this MOA are responsibilities for the following elements: mission statement, command and control and communications, legal, personnel, funding, training, logistics, mobilization and unit status reporting. The Total Army analysis 2005 (TAA-05) has established a two phase process for implementing the Multi-Component MTOE initiative.

The two phases of the process are outlined in an information paper dated, 8 September 1998, "Establishing Multiple-Component (Multi-Compo) Modification Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) Units."

During Phase One of this process 12 "initial" Multi-Component MTOE units, will be established with activation dates in FY 1999 and FY 2000. The Army, this year, will work with these units to develop and incorporate in its regulations a set of procedures that will enable Multi-Component MTOE units to function effectively. In the meantime the Army is identifying interim procedures in memorandums of agreement among the affected units. There will be only one memorandum of agreement per Multi-Component Unit. In June 1998, the Army finished building the authorization documents for the 12 initial units. "By prior arrangements, the AC will command 8 of the units, most of which are combat support or combat service support, and the ARNG will command two each."¹⁴

During Phase Two additional Multi-Component MTOE units will be identified and documented. Unlike phase one, this phase extends indefinitely. Total Army Analysis 2005 directed the establishment of specific Multi-Component MTOE units in FY 2000 and beyond. During applicable documentation windows, major Army commands will propose a resourcing mix for each of these units and others yet to be nominated. The documentation window for a given year is governed by the Army's Annual Command

Plan process. For example, the window to build authorization documents for units with FY 2001 activation dates occurs during the "FY 2001 Command Plan," which runs from June 1998 to June 1999. The approval authority for Multi-Component nominations is the Director of Force Programs, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans.

All Army MTOE units are technically "eligible" for Multiple-Component resourcing. Readiness implications, mission requirements, efficiencies to be gained, unique component capabilities and limitations, and the ability and willingness of each component to contribute the necessary resources will impact this decision.¹⁵ Further, the Army has begun to work on a Multiple-Component policy for Table of Distribution and Authorizations units.

The Study Plan For Reserve Component Employment-2005

The Study Plan for Reserve Component Employment—2005 is another ongoing initiative to support the integration program. The purpose of this study is to assist in "developing insights and potential alternatives for employing the RC forces in support of the defense strategy, from homeland defense and smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs) through Major Theater Wars (MTWs). Inevitably the study is a review of opportunities to enhance the integration of the RC within the scope of their Total Force mission. The RC Employment Study – 2005 addresses four specific objectives:

Review the full range of combat and support RC roles in current operational plans and assess currently planned employment.

Identify and assess potential RC missions in the continental United States (CONUS) and outside CONUS (OCONUS) in peacetime and across the full spectrum of conflict, including the RC's role in the strategic reserve.

Develop and assess alternative RC employment roles and force-mix concepts including an evaluation of costs, benefits, and risks for each option.

Assess RC resourcing for current and recommended requirements.”¹⁶

It is proposed the benefits derived from this study, if implemented, will retain AC readiness and their availability to fill other shortfalls, reduce peacetime costs, provide increased training for the RC and relieve AC TEMPO. Many of the missions being considered are not new to the RC.

The possibilities of missions range from the forming of composite units that could augment or replace other forces to identifying new missions that the Reserve Components could assume within their existing force structure. The creation of “dual-mission capable” units that not only have the potential to perform traditional combat missions but also meet a range of requirements is one such possibility.

Crisis management and crisis consequences is an area of natural involvement for the Reserve Components. For example, the Reserve Components are prominent figures in the Domestic Preparedness/Homeland Defense of our nation. These components, particularly the National Guard, are involved in the states’ emergency management programs. Since many of the adjutant generals have responsibility for emergency management programs, it is only practical that they be included in the Army plan to respond to a terrorist attack in the United States involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). This is a \$49-million plan to create ten new, 22 member National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams. This began as “first-responder training conducted by the Technical Escort Unit and others out of the United States Chemical and Biological Defense Command at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Now they are going back and doing sustainment training which is being conducted largely by the Reserve Components.

Another possibility is the Security at Special Events, such as the Olympics. This is a mission if viewed properly fits directly under the domestic emergency response which is and has been an ARNG function.

A proposed 25 percent increase in RC participation in logistics/transportation management is yet another employment possibility. "With 47 percent of the Army's combat support service units the RC is the Army's primary logistical element. The Theater Support Command (TSC) is an example of the new structures that will support the Army of the future. The TSC will centralize support operations and enhance battlefield distribution and velocity-managed logistics initiatives."¹⁷ With this proposal there will be an increased surge capacity to move the force in peacetime at minimum cost.

The Reserve Component Employment—2005 Study Plan also explores the possibility of a Strategic Reserve and Strategic Reserve Forces. "The Strategic Reserve will provide a strategic hedge against uncertainty, providing a means to mitigate risks in areas from Homeland Defense to SSCs to MTWs. The Strategic Reserve Forces will serve as a reservoir of forces prepared to support a wide range of requirements from the start of a major conflict. Forces whose basic capabilities are available from the first day of mobilization, and increase to full divisional combat capability as the conflict escalates. These Forces may be drawn from the Strategic Reserve as emerging requirements dictate. Prioritization decisions will identify specific forces for earlier commitment. If not employed early, they will remain on track to full Division-level readiness."¹⁸

The study explores the pre-and post mobilization training requirements of ARNG Divisions. It focuses on a plan for mobilizing ARNG Divisions in the event of a full two-

MTW deployment scenario. When combat capable, ARNG Divisions can execute missions across the spectrum of conflict. A division can reinforce a MTW, participate in post-conflict operations, participate in homeland defense, protect critical infrastructure, guard against WMD crisis management, provide military support to civil authorities, and enhance mobilization support. This is another basis for the continued expansion of America's Army.

As stated by Major General (retired) Max Baratz, past Chief of Army Reserve, "our unit personnel possess skills and talents that are not duplicated anywhere. By combining civilian-acquired skills with army values and hard military training, the Reserve Component personnel provide prime support to Army operations around the world."¹⁹

Reserve Association Support Program (RASP)

The sixth initiative discussed in this paper is the Reserve Association Support Program (RASP). "RASP is a three-year pilot program that the USAR started in March, 1998. It is designed to enlist 100 non-prior service soldiers into the USAR Tier 1A Force Support Package combat and combat service support units."²⁰ "Soldiers who enlist through the RASP completes basic training and attend a skill producing school, then are attached to an Active Army Unit for the remainder of a two-year active duty obligation. After completing 24 months on Active Duty for training these soldiers will serve a minimum of four years in a high priority Army Reserve unit as a drilling reservists."²¹ Like any "jump start" program, this program has its flaws. The program is limited to 100 participants and funding is temporary. The bonus is \$5000 from the reserves and an additional \$5000 from the AC. Also, the skills targeted for the pilot program do not

match those needed for the most important billets, such as combat medics, that must be filled.”²²

Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA)

The final and most important initiative, because “soldiers are our credentials,” is the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA). The Reserve Component personnel, not unlike the AC personnel, are looking for a career in their organization. They too, are searching for a career path that will lead them to being the best trained and the best qualified soldiers for our Army. Therefore, ROPMA is deemed the most critical initiative to the success of a Seamless Army. This could make or break the total integration system, for receiving the best from soldiers at each level of their career ladder is the true yardstick in which we measure the quality of our Army. ROPMA is a step in the right direction, however, it is by no means without flaws. The two components, AC and RC must examine their needs and what they determine to be the best career path for their soldiers, noncommissioned officer and officers in order to train and educate their personnel to that end. This examination must reflect the needs of our Army for the 21st century. After the examination, appropriate steps must be taken to ensure that all components are allotted the training seats in our schools commensurate with what they deem necessary. This will lead to better opportunities for promotion for our most deserving soldiers.

POSSIBLE OBSTACLES

Total integration of the Reserves into our Active Army will enable our Army to be sized and staffed for the 21st century and Army After next. Mobilization delay may become a thing of the past, and the worry of employing outdated equipment and inadequate

trained personnel will be unfounded. This is the end objective for our Total Integration Program. Obstacles and concerns that could have an adverse impact on the program or impede the progress must be overcome.

The retention of our professional soldiers is our greatest concern. As CSA has stated many times "our soldiers are our credentials." Without them, our army will be nonexistent and without the highly skilled ones, we will be ill trained and not able to fulfill our mission to fight and win the nation's wars. Our worldly committed Army is grossly under resourced in all areas. We must provide our soldiers with the necessary morale builders which will enable them to use their skills and their equipment courageously. We must commit to taking care of our men and women through providing them with a professional climate that eliminates those sources of anxiety and uncertainty which make our army career increasingly unattractive and stressful. We must not only make our Army more attractive to the current soldiers but it is important that we be able to attract, recruit, and maintain a younger generation of soldiers. The budgetary pressures which precipitated dramatic personnel cuts have also led to reduced retirement, health benefits and a heightened anxiety these benefits will continue to decrease. We must focus on fixing our pay, creating a more attractive retirement program and improving the quality of life for our soldiers. Today, recruiting for the Reserves is no easier than for the Active Component. A Sergeant on recruiting duty in Ohio described the challenge this way: "The attitudes, values, and beliefs of today's youth are changing. A recruiter is constantly trying to bridge the generation gap by selling yesteryear ideas at yesteryear's wages. Today's starting wages and benefits at fast food restaurants are competitive to starting wages in the Armed Forces. We are asking today's youth to leave home, deploy

at a moment's notice and give their life for their country for the same pay as a fry cook." The FY99 budget provides for a 3.6 percent pay raise with an agreement for FY 2000 and FY2001 pay raise to be at or above 4 percent per year. This effort will began to close the civil-military pay gap. However, we must not stop there. We must ensure that the retirement and medical benefits for those committing to a career in the military are available to them.

Besides the financial strain upon our soldiers, the numerous open-ended commitments and OTEMPO are taking their toll. Our professional soldiers, who have committed to a career in the Army, have committed themselves because of their desire to serve. "They are a distinct breed who have answered a very special calling. They continue to serve because of a shared commitment even they have trouble defining. However, if given the opportunity, they will tell you the real reason they are leaving the profession. They'll tell you they're fed up with serving in open-ended commitments that erode their basic warfighting skills. They'll say that they're tired of spending way to much time standing at checkpoints in Bosnia, performing peacekeeping/humanitarian operations, controlling borders and providing support groups. They'll also tell you they are tired of trying to "make do" with outdated, antiquated equipment. Surely, they'll gladly accept a pay raise but only for the remainder of their service obligation." ²³

Given the above response from a warfighter, whose primary profession is warfighting, will we receive the same response from the RC warrior, whose secondary profession is warfighting, but is often called upon to serve in the same capacity as the AC warfighter? The Total Integration program will bring some OPTEMPO relief for the AC warrior but it won't fix the open-ended commitments in which we are involved.

Oddly enough, insufficient pay, open-ended commitments and OTEMPO are major concerns but are not the primary issue of keeping our Army strong and ready. Readiness both short term and long-term is the primary issue.

When we as soldiers, whether AC, NG or RC are called in harms' way we know that we are defending our own homes, our own land, and government. However, to defend these precious items we must provide our men and women with the most modern equipment and training possible. "Warfare today is simply too complicated, and weapons systems are too sophisticated for the United States to depend upon an ad hoc system like the one that served so well in the colonial period."²⁴ The greatest challenge facing a Seamless Army is balancing today's readiness and tomorrow's modernization requirements with limited resources.

Major budget reductions since the end of the Cold War have left the Army with a strong challenge of maintaining technological superiority with its weapons and equipment. "The Army's procurement budgets declined almost 60 percent in real terms between FY88 and FY96 (from \$18.7 billion in FY88 to \$7.7 billion in FY96 in FY97 dollars). As a result, more than 60 major Army modernization projects previously programmed were either cancelled or extended into out years. This is a major area of concern for the Army if it is to maintain clear technological superiority into the next century." Though President Clinton proposed to boost military spending by \$112 billion over the next six years the Army's share is \$67.2 billion for FY00. According to an article in the Armed Forces Journal International, entitled "Making Ends Meet," dated March, 1999, the one thing on the CSA's wish list he didn't get funded in FY00 is force modernization. We will not see a real change in our modernization program until we get into the out years

when the bigger increases began to be realized. The CSA told congress "that to alleviate his service's numerous readiness problems, the Army requires \$5 billion more each year than was budgeted last year (FY99)." ²⁵ In FY99 the Army was budgeted for \$65.3 billion.

Finally, it's all well we are beginning to actively integrate the Army components, however, these good deeds may go punished instead of rewarded. While it is exciting, the integration program could be a slow death for the RC. If back fills aren't made quickly for those positions left vacant by soldiers participating in the multiple component program, the RC personnel will begin to feel the pinch. Also, having more missions, and an increase in OTEMPO could possibly lead to the issue of limited employer support and a loss of reserve personnel. The question may become: are we robbing Peter to pay Paul by implementing this program?

CONCLUSIONS

AC/RC Integration, A slow Reality: What ever the rationale for the delay, in integrating our Army Components, today we are closer to making this a reality than ever before. The circumstances handed us as a result of the Cold War has forced us to make many changes to our forces. Changes that have somewhat caused us to create a Cold War of our own. The most significant changes are in missions, budgeting and force structure. A change in our National Defense Strategy, the downsizing, the attrition rates and the inability to attract and recruit people into the Army today, have taken their toll.

The inability of our AC, with its decreased population, to fight and win our nation's wars has caused us to dust off and implement the Total Force Policy. This policy stipulates that the Reserve Components are the principle augmentation of active forces in

emergencies. It is designed to offset reductions in the defense budget and to increase reliance on the Reserve Component forces.

This new reliance on the RC forces has taken shape through many initiatives to make our Army a Seamless Army. These initiatives begin at the top with the leadership in all components. More and more we are integrating our Senior Reserve Components leaders into Major Commands and the Army Staff. We have also integrated our Army Guard Reserve (AGR) personnel in traditional Active Component positions. Other initiatives are:

- (1) The Active and National Guard Integrated Division Study which resulted in three Enhanced Separate Brigades (ESB) under a nondeployable division headquarters. The division headquarters would provide training, readiness and oversight to the brigades, which would include conducting both pre and post mobilization training. Once prepared, individual ESBs would deploy but the division headquarters would not.
- (2) The Multiple-Component (Multi-Compo) Unit initiative which authorizes personnel from more than one Army Component to serve under a single authorization document.
- (3) The Study Plan for Reserve Component Employment-2005 which has identified several potential alternatives for employing the RC in support of the Defense Strategy, from homeland defense and smaller-scale contingencies through major theater wars.

Integrating the Army components definitely does not mean a way of saving money. In essence this integration is becoming very costly. We need additional funding to recruit

and retain young men and women into our Army. We must focus on fixing our pay, creating a more attractive retirement program and improving the quality of life for our soldiers. We must also acquire funds for our modernization program, if we are to remain technologically superior to other nations. "Army deployment missions have gone from an average of one every four years during the Cold War, to 14 every four years in the post-Cold War Era. Maintaining the delicate balance between requirements and resources is increasingly difficult. Funding must be adequate, sustained, predictable and synchronized to meet the readiness, force structure and endstrength, quality of life and modernization requirements of today and an uncertain future."²⁶

ENDNOTES

¹ Association of The United States Army, "Section III, Purpose And Composition Of The Army." (Profile Of The Army, February 1997), 9-13.

² Ibid., 9-18.

³ Ibid., 9-18

⁴ William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, "Integration of the Reserve and Active Components." (Memorandum, 4 September 1997), 1.

⁵ Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, Twice The Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1983. (Office of The Chief, Army Reserve Washington, D.C. 1984), XIV.

⁶ Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufmann, U.S. Army Guard And Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks. (The Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C. 1989), 18-19.

⁷ Cohen, 3.

⁸ Ibid., 2

⁹ Dennis J. Reimer, General, USA, "One Team, One Fight, One Future." (One Team, One Fight, One Future, Total Army Integration, Fall 1998), 11-14.

¹⁰ Ibid., 12

¹¹ Thomas J. Plewes, Major General, USAR. "Army Reserve: A True Partner In America's Army." (Army; Army Magazine, October 1998), 103-111.

¹² "Memorandum of Agreement between Commander, Forces Command and Commander, U.S. Army Reserve Command and Director, Army National Guard and Commander, III CORPS and Commander, 4th InFantry Division (4 ID) and The Adjutant General of Texas and The Adjutant General of Wyoming." (8 September 1998), 3.

¹³ Ibid., 5

¹⁴ David T. Fautua "How the Guard and Reserve Will Fight in 2025." (Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Spring 1999), 127-149.

¹⁵ Headquarters, Department of The Army, Office of DAMO-FDF, "Establishing Multiple-Component (Multi-Compo) Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) Units." (Memorandum, 30 June 1998), 1.

¹⁶ "Study Plan; Reserve Component Employment - 2005," (Office of Department of The Army, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, September 1998)

¹⁷ Plewes, 108

¹⁸ "Study Plan; Reserve Component Employment - 2005,"

¹⁹ Max Baratz, Major General, "Ready and More Relevant Than Ever: A Restructured Army Reserve." (Army; Army Magazine, October 1996), 97-107.

²⁰ Fautua, 138.

²¹ Plewes, 108.

²² Fautua, 138.

²³ John G. Gross, "What Price Professionalism? A Hefty Pay Raise Won't Solve The Services Retention Woes." (Armed Forces Journal International, March 1999), 2.

²⁴ Crossland and Currie, 267

²⁵ Gross, 12

²⁶ Robert M. Walker, Honorable, and Dennis J. Reimer, General, "A Statement On The Posture of the United States Army Fiscal year 1999." (United States Army Posture Statement FY99, February 1998), IX.

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13. Walker, Robert M., Honorable, and Reimer, Dennis J., General, "A Statement On The Posture of the United States Army Fiscal year 1999". United States Army Posture Statement FY99, February 1998.