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EQUIPPING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

BY

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Senior Services College Fellowship Research Project

EQUIPPING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

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ABSTRACT

The Army National Guard is part of the Reserve Component (RC). The RC, along with the Active Component (AC), makes up the Total Army as we know it today. A case can be made that the process that provides for the equipping of the Total Army should apply equally to both the Components. This paper discusses some of the many aspects of the vastly complicated and interrelated process that the Army uses to structure and equip its forces. Much emphasis is placed on discussion of the historical development of the relationships between the AC and RC that influence the way today's Army operates. Some of the key aspects of the Army's equipping process are addressed with the purpose to establish a better understanding of how this process impacts the Army National Guard. Reference is made to the need for the Total Army to recognize the valuable benefits associated with properly embracing and managing the unified strengths that are offered by both the AC and RC.

Table of Contents

I.	Introduction/Scope	1
II.	Purpose	2
III.	Background	
	A. Origin of the Structured Total Army	3
	B. Wide Spectrum of Army Equipment	6
	C. National Defense Act of 1916 (NDA-1916)	7
	D. National Defense Act of 1933 (NDA-1933)	7
	E. World War I, II, Korea, and Desert Shield/ Desert Storm	8
IV.	Discussion of Process	
	A. Force Structure Development, Alignment, and Execution	
	1. Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)	9
	2. The Army Plan (TAP)	10
	3. Total Army Analysis (TAA)	10
	4. Army Force Packaging Methodology (FPM)	12
	5. Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES)	12
	B. Resourcing	
	1. The Army Modernization Plan (AMP)	13
	2. Recapitalization	14
	3. Army Acquisition Object (AAO)	14
	4. National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA)	15
	C. Equipping Drivers	
	1. Authorized Level of Organization (ALO)	15
	2. Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL)	16
	3. Out-of-DAMPL Sequence	17
	4. Army Order of Precedence (AOP)	18
	5. NGREA	19
	6. Army Equipping Policy (AEP)	20
	D. Distribution/Fielding Methods	
	1. New Service Procurements	21
	2. Redistribution/Cascading	21
	3. Total Package Fielding (TPF)	22

V.	Conclusions/Recommendations	
A.	Minimize Turbulence	23
B.	Consider Military Operations Other-Than-War (MOOTW) in Equipping Process Decisions	24
C.	Maximize Synergism among Army AC and ARNG Resources	25
	Endnotes	26
	Acronym List	27
	Bibliography	29

I. Introduction/Scope.

This paper is a result of research into some of the many aspects affecting the process of how the Army National Guard (ARNG) is equipped. There are many different factors and issues influencing the equipping process. Historically the Guard has been considered to be a force that is available in time of war to supplement the fighting forces with combat (CBT), combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) units. The role of the Guard and the Reserve Component (RC) in general has changed as to how they are considered in the force structure and how they are expected to perform as members of the Total Force Concept. Such things as a declining defense budget, the end of the cold war, the growing emergence of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), and major military conflicts have influenced the dynamics of these changes. A vast and complicated process controls the way the Army structures its forces and plans for and executes the resourcing for these forces. The many elements of the process are very much integrated and often overlap during the planning phases. This situation magnifies the complexity of the process. The Army National Guard is one of the recipients of the outcomes resulting from this very important process. The Army Guard can no longer tolerate playing a passive role in the equipping process and just reacting to the outputs. It must become a proactive partner with the Active Component (AC) helping to derive and defend Army requirements that are the foundation

of the Total Army's mission. The Total Army, as one of the services, must learn to speak with a common, unified voice in order to benefit from the synergism available through the ties congressional members have with the states represented by the Army National Guard.

This paper will examine and discuss some elements of the many facets of the Army process that affect equipping of the Army National Guard. As a traditional Guardsman I have not experienced firsthand knowledge of many of the routine actions that impact on and result in how we are allocated and receive equipment. I, like many of my contemporaries, tend to take for granted that we will receive the proper equipment at the proper time without our acknowledging any real appreciation of how the system is designed to work. This research went a long way toward increasing my understanding of a portion of the process and giving me a better and more confident appreciation thereof. It, however, does not capture the shear magnitude of the complicated planning process that results in the structuring and resourcing of today's Total Army.

II. Purpose.

This paper discusses some of the issues that have been foreign to my understanding throughout my career, and I'm confident that the same applies to many of my fellow National Guardsmen. In writing this paper I wanted to capture some of the major routine aspects of the equipping process and discuss them in terms that are easily understood

by the traditional Guardsman. My main interest is in identifying and discussing how some things can influence the equipping process and to develop a better understanding of how both leaders and members of the Army National Guard can become more proactive players in the total equipping process.

III. **Background.**

A. Origin of the Structured Total Army.

The Army RCs in general have taken on a greater role in terms of fighting the nation's wars than has been obvious to the general public and to many armed services personnel. This was very evident during the Desert Shield/Desert Storm war with Iraq. The RCs played a vital role in both the combat support and combat service support arenas. There have also been variations on the story of why the 48th Armor Brigade was not deemed ready for deployment. This decision sparked many debates about the Army Guard's combat role in America's wars. It has been argued that the decision to not deploy the 48th was a ploy by the AC leadership in order to bolster their case for protection of AC units during anticipated further cuts in the Army Force Structure. The AC leadership maintained that the 48th was not ready for deployment based on their performance at the National Training Center.

The very fact that the Army AC is losing structure tends to support the argument that the RC will play an even greater role in the future. The senior AC leadership

readily acknowledges the greater role needed from the RC. The initiation of the formal role played by the RC in today's Army began in the early 1970s. It was in 1973 that the Army leadership recognized the need for many types of RC units for early deployment. The Affiliation Program was initiated to improve the mobilization and deployment readiness of selected RC units and to provide added combat power earlier in the execution of contingency plans. Execution of this program resulted in RC combat battalions and brigades being selected to "round out" AC divisions that did not have their full organizational structure. In a similar manner some RC combat battalions and brigades were designated to "round up" AC divisions as additional structure. "Roundout units were accorded the same resourcing priority as the parent unit, were scheduled to deploy with the parent unit, or as soon as possible thereafter, and entered into close planning and training associations with the parent unit to improve readiness."¹

During the mid-to-late 1970s, the Army initiated several other programs to support the added structure and missions given the RC and to address higher training readiness levels. The AC/RC Partnership Program aligned selected major combat and Special Forces units, the Counterpart Program aligned ARNG attack helicopter units with AC counterparts, and the Corps and Division Training Coordination Program (CORTRAIN) provided the framework for Corps command post exercises involving both AC/RC units.

These programs expanded the opportunity for AC/RC unit leaders and soldiers to work together to share knowledge and to work toward the common goal to improve the Total Army's capability for wartime mission accomplishment.

In 1979, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) approved a Forces Command (FORSCOM) initiative called CAPSTONE. The program name was changed to WARTRACE in 1994. WARTRACE established a structure for managing the Total Force by organizing all AC/RC units into a wartime organizational structure to meet threats in a European, Southwest Asia, or Pacific contingency. Units assigned to operate the Continental United States (CONUS) sustaining base were included also.

WARTRACE provides the framework for planning and training associations directed to enable units to focus on specific wartime missions by training in peacetime with the organizations they will operate with during wartime. Army Regulation 11-30, first published in 1983, brought the aforementioned training programs within the framework of the WARTRACE program (CAPSTONE before 1994) which allowed for consolidated management. As will be addressed later in this paper, wartime alignments have been the essence of the equipping policies developed and executed throughout the history of the modern Army equipping process.

B. Wide Spectrum of Army Equipment.

The Army provides ground support to the other armed services and is required to provide the foundation of sustained land warfare. "Army equipment covers a wide spectrum, from sea-going tugs and landing craft, to several types of fixed and rotary wing aircraft, to the multitude of combat weapons and support equipment systems required for sustained land warfare."² Therefore, the scope and diversity of equipment owned by the Army makes its equipping challenges more unique and formidable. Also, large quantities of equipment are needed to perform even simple tasks.

The actions to downsize and restructure the Army have impacted the equipment status of the ARNG. Because of the Guard's configuration primarily as a CBT and CS force, it has benefited greatly from the redistribution of available in-service equipment with improved capabilities. However, the CSS units in the Guard have been plagued with the same problems as in the United States Army Reserve (USAR), whose impact is much larger because of their high composition of CS and CSS units. In the past, less CSS type equipment has been made available from redistribution actions and it was also older model, less-capable equipment. Also, with the exception of trucks, in the past decade the Army has not invested heavily in procurement of new CSS equipment, which dampens the prospect of downstream improvements in RC CSS unit readiness.

C. National Defense Act of 1916 (NDA-1916).

The NDA-1916 established the official name "National Guard" (NG). The act expanded the role of the NG in national defense even though it remained a state force. Increased federal oversight and assistance of the NG was a direct result of the act.

The act increased the number of times a NG unit was brought together for training drills. It also authorized units to perform fifteen consecutive days of paid annual training, paid for the drill periods, and increased overall federal spending. "The NDA-1916 also required NG units to be organized like Active Army units, established federal standards for commissioning officers in the Guard, and gave the President authority to mobilize the NG in case of war or national emergency."³

D. National Defense Act of 1933 (NDA-1933).

This act resolved some questions that arose after World War I (WW I) concerning the NG's status and existence. It created a new Army component, the National Guard of the United States, which was identical in personnel and units to the States' NG. This new component was part of the Army and could be ordered into federal service by the President when Congress declared a national emergency. The NG by statute is the primary reserve force for the Active Army. "At the same time, the Guard provided the state governors a force for disaster relief, maintaining public peace, and a force

to be utilized during state and local emergencies in the several states and territories, when in a State Status."⁴

E. WW I, WW II, Korea, and Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

"The NG has made significant contributions to the Army's combat power throughout this century. It provided 17 of the 43 divisions in the American Expeditionary Force in WW I. During WW II total mobilization was ordered and NG units were some of the first to fight. Eighteen NG divisions fought in WW II. The first division to deploy overseas, the 34th Division, was a NG division. During the Korean War the NG was partially mobilized with 138,000 soldiers coming from eight infantry divisions and three regimental combat teams. Two of these divisions served in Korea, two went to Europe, and four remained in the U.S. to help reconstitute the strategic reserve. During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (DS/DS), RC units were on active duty within days after the invasion of Kuwait. The majority of the Army's CS and CSS units were in the RC. In total, 62,411 ARNG personnel were ordered to active federal service of which 37,848 deployed to Southwest Asia."⁵

Today the ARNG contains over half of the Army's combat force structure. The ARNG is structured with eight combat divisions and fifteen separate combat brigades. The fifteen separate brigades are referred to as Enhanced
→ Readiness Brigades and receive additional federal resources

in structure, funding, personnel, equipment, and training. They are allocated to warfighting in support of the AC. The ARNG also has the only two RC Special Forces Groups that are part of the Special Forces Command. The ARNG is also structured with CS and CSS units. Many of these units are considered high priority and allocated to support AC forces.

IV. Discussion of Process

A. Force Structure Development, Alignment, and Execution.

The ARNG is part of the Total Army. In order to better understand impacts to the Guard, it is necessary to discuss some of the influencing factors affecting how the Total Army structure is developed, aligned, and executed.

1. Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) uses guidance contained in the National Military Strategy (NMS) and further develops it into the DPG that contains specific parameters for the armed forces. For FY 96 and beyond, the DPG directed the Active Army specifically to have the number (ten) and type (one airborne, one air assault, two light infantry and six heavy) of divisions. It established the Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) at which those divisions were to be built and an end-strength of 495,000 spaces. It further defined the two nearly simultaneous Major Theater Wars (MTWs). "With additional information provided on separate brigades, armored cavalry regiments, and special forces groups, this guidance

identifies the "above the line" force structure."⁶ This force is also referred to as the Army Fiscally Constrained Force that represents the combat forces that constitute the start point for force structuring activities.

2. The Army Plan (TAP).

The Army Plan, prepared each odd year, is the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) document counterpart to OSD's DPG that defines the types and quantities of units within the divisions. It guides programming, budgeting, and execution and serves as the source document for Army planning and priorities. Initiatives and policies of senior Army leadership are documented in the TAP. It also reflects Army long-range planning and the Army Modernization Plan. The TAP identifies combat force requirements derived from planning scenarios and for each program year develops a force that meets projected mission requirements within expected end strength, dollar, and equipment levels. The TAP provides the basis for Army Major Commands to prepare their inputs to the Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM) that presents the Army's proposal for a balanced allocation of its resources within specified constraints.

3. Total Army Analysis (TAA).

The TAA, prepared each even year but titled for the upcoming odd year, uses input from the TAP to develop the Army's program force. It uses computer modeling to generate the "below-the-line" tactical support forces and

the general-purpose forces necessary to support the above-the-line divisional and nondivisional combat forces contained in the Army fiscally constrained force. The below-the-line forces are composed of CBT, CS, and CSS units at echelons above divisions and echelons above corps. The TAA is the basis for the Army POM development and establishment of the initial POM force.

The TAA is a biennial process consisting of four phases: force guidance, quantitative analysis, qualitative analysis, and leadership review. Force guidance comes from the DPG and TAP, which provide the NMS, threat data, and resource assumptions and priorities. Quantitative analysis determines tactical support requirements through a series of computer simulations. One of the outputs of this phase is input to the time-phased force deployment list (TPFDL). The TPFDL is a major tool used by the unified commanders to request forces to support their operation plans. Qualitative analysis develops the initial POM force, within end-strength guidance, for use in the development of the POM. The computer-generated requirements from this phase are validated through a series of analyses, reviews, and conferences. During the leadership review phase the Vice-Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) chairs a force program review to resolve any issues resulting from the previous three phases prior to briefing the CSA for decision. This phase culminates in the TAA base force that represents the force structure for POM development and

includes all authorized structure for all components through the POM years.

The product of the TAA and POM processes is the approved force structure for the Total Army. It is divided for resources management purposes into four components: the active Army (COMPO 1), the ARNG (COMPO 2), the USAR (COMPO 3), and required but unresourced units (COMPO 4). Three other components, direct host nation support (COMPO 7), indirect host nation support (COMPO 8), and logistics civil augmentation (COMPO 9), comprise force structure offsets guaranteed by host nation support agreements.⁷

4. Army Force Packaging Methodology (FPM).

The FPM is used by the TAP to establish force packages for procurement and distribution. This methodology states that those forces most critical in the early stages of a conflict receive the highest priority and receive resources at a higher percentage than later deploying forces. This is in line with the force's relative position in the TPFDL. The FPM permits decisionmakers at all levels to compare issues against command criteria and ultimately to aid in defending those issues to the Army, OSD, and to Congress.

5. Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES).

The PPBES is the Army's primary resource management system. It develops and maintains the Army's portion of the DoD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting

System (PPBS), and it supports program development and budget preparation at all levels of command. It also supports execution of the approved program and budget by both headquarters and field organizations. During execution, it provides feedback to the planning, programming, and budgeting processes. "The PPBES ties strategy, program, and budget all together. It helps build a comprehensive plan in which budgets flow from programs, programs from requirements, requirements from missions, and missions from national security objectives."⁸

B. Resourcing.

1. The Army Modernization Plan (AMP).

The AMP is a product of the requirements determination process and is a key document that details the Army's modernization vision for the future force. It translates vision into a strategy for near-to-mid-term force development, modernization, and long-term evolution of the Army. The AMP reflects the modernization objectives that serve as a tool for prioritization at HQDA. The first publication of the AMP was in 1991. Updates are published annually to support the budget and POM. The next publication, 1999 update, will cover years near term 99-04, mid term 05-11, and far term 12-21 and is expected to expand on the AC/RC integration thrust. Additional emphasis affecting ARNG equipping will be in the areas of Total Army Fielding vs. Cascading equipment, Contingencies, and Force Package Alignment. The ongoing activity in digitization of

the Army is one example of the results implemented from the AMP process.

2. Recapitalization.

Recapitalization is a program to guard against obsolescence and the high cost of maintaining old equipment and systems. This program helps maintain and extend the usefulness and effectiveness of old equipment. It can be achieved through replacement, extended service programs, preplanned product improvements, depot rebuild, or technology insertion. Recapitalization is often neglected but it remains a critically important area of modernization that must have a steady flow of resources to prevent capability gaps in reliable go-to-war systems.

3. Army Acquisition Object (AAO).

The AAO is the quantity of an item of equipment required to equip and sustain the approved U.S. Army force and selected allied forces in wartime for a period specified in the DPG. It can be thought of as the total amount of equipment by individual line item number that the Army is required to have to execute both peacetime and wartime missions. A computer program called Force Builder is used to develop the AAO. It utilizes data from many other data base sources. When the AAO computations are complete, the requirements are analyzed to assist in the development of the procurement plan phased throughout the Army budget cycle.

4. National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA).

The NGREA was previously called the Directed Procurement Program (DPP). It consists of programmed funding from Congress dedicated to procurement of equipment specifically for the NG and USAR. It serves a purpose of being a readiness enhancer for the RC because it supplements equipment shortcomings that will not be covered elsewhere in the normal Army funding allocation process. Many times funding provided through the NGREA has political strings attached. Procurement of equipment or weapon systems may be driven more by the geographical region producing the items as opposed to using the funding for the most critical needs that are more in line with the RC readiness needs. More will be discussed about NGREA in the following section concerning other influences on the equipping process:

C. Equipping Drivers.

1. Authorized Level of Organization (ALO).

Assignment of an ALO is the way the Army identifies the level of readiness to which a unit is resourced and maintained. Determination of the ALO assigned is indicative of a unit's primary mission and required availability date based on war plans. A unit assigned an ALO of "1" is expected to exhibit a higher level of readiness than a unit assigned an ALO of "2". This is one system that the Army uses to optimize the costs associated

with readiness and response times to war plans. The Army is the only service that uses the ALO system.

2. Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL).

The DAMPL is the second way the Army identifies the level of readiness to which a unit is resourced and maintained. It prioritizes units according to their deployability sequence as depicted in the TPFDL. Equipment and personnel are then normally distributed in DAMPL sequence. Early deploying units are at a higher status because of the inherent constraints placed on available resources. "This 'First to Fight, First to Resource' procedure is the current Army policy for distribution of resources. This ensures that units in both the AC and RC that are early deploying units will be resourced in a priority manner." However, the problem arises because the DAMPL is based solely upon primary wartime missions to support the MTWs and does not consider Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). The RC is becoming more heavily involved with deployments in MOOTWs such as Bosnia in which the RC is required to operate with other AC units in the operation. Because of the DAMPL equipping sequence, most RC units are not equipped as early in the process as AC units because they are lower in the DAMPL sequence. This causes two types of problems. One, the RC does not already have the latest and most efficient version of equipment that their sister unit in the AC would

possess. Two, and probably the most critical, is the disparity of equipment between the two operating components sometimes poses a compatibility problem that must be solved before or during actual deployment. This leads into one way that the Army addresses this problem.

3. Out-of-DAMPL Sequence.

This is a process allowed by Army policy as an exception to the normal DAMPL priority system. The purpose of the logistics system is to replace equipment shortages in units in order to sustain required readiness levels. When specific units fall below established readiness standards, the logistics system temporarily assigns them a higher precedence than normally found within DAMPL priority sequence to correct the shortages. Even though this seems to be a reasonable adjustment, it may improve the readiness of a lower-DAMPL-priority unit at the expense of retaining a shortage in a unit with a higher DAMPL priority.

Another example of an exception possibly involving a RC unit would be to divert equipment to a unit that is lower in the DAMPL sequence to allow it to be compatible with the requirement to perform a mission. An application of this nature would arise when a RC unit is directed to deploy on a MOOTW mission in which it needs updated equipment to be compatible with the operation of its supported AC unit. It is a one-time fielding and usually involves only one type of item or system. This equipment fielded to the RC would make it compatible to the AC in

principle, but many times the equipment is made available just prior to deployment and time for training on it may not be sufficient to attain an appropriate level of readiness.

One other example of an exception to the DAMPL fielding sequence involves "interchange" equipment. This activity involves items provided from one acquisition project to another to ensure that a specific system is complete for fielding.¹⁰ An example of this process would be to divert HMMWVs from the normal DAMPL sequence to support fielding of communications and intelligence systems that require the HMMWVs as mounting shelters. The logistical system also adds demands for equipment outside the DAMPL priority system. Examples are equipment assigned to Operational Readiness Floats or major units to maintain readiness of critical pacing items and Repair Cycle Floats to support the operation of theatre or depot-level maintenance facilities.

4. Army Order of Precedence (AOP).

The AOP is another process that represents an exception to the normal DAMPL priority system. As discussed earlier, the DAMPL process is based on unit deployability sequence as depicted in the TPFDL. However, some major items, both new and in service, have distinctly different distribution plans to serve purposes different from those of the DAMPL process. The AOP is one method used to integrate new equipment into the force. This is demonstrated in training institutions that have a low priority in the DAMPL

because they do not deploy in operational missions, but they do need equipment early enough to prepare and operate training courses for soldiers that could affect force readiness. A similar example to this could be seen at the National Training Center in which the units of the Opposing Force may be issued more modern equipment to enhance their ability to be on equal par with the units undergoing training.

5. NGREA

As noted earlier, this appropriation helps the RCs improve their near term readiness status in some cases by either supplementing shortages or upgrading to more modern equipment. Since Fiscal Year 1982 (FY82), Congress has provided unrequested funds to support the Department of Defense (DoD) procurements earmarked specifically to buy NG and USAR equipment. During discussions with various RC personnel, it appeared that the general feeling was that all services have become accustomed to having these unrequested resources available to address RC equipping needs. As a result, the services appear to discount their support for these same needs within the normal budget and resourcing process. Likewise the RC has become reliant on the NGREA to help manage their readiness problems. This assistance, although helpful, has only provided approximately 8% of the RC equipping needs.¹¹ One way NGREA is limited in its capability to fully address shortages is because, unless there is a joint AC procurement of the same items, the small

amount of available NGREA funds cannot be used as efficiently without a larger quantity procurement. In fact it might not even be possible to initiate an acquisition with the small amount of funding. The amount of funding available from NGREA has been declining consistently over the past six years as evidenced by the fact that it has gone from \$399M in FY93 to \$20M in FY99.¹² Another threat to the future of NGREA is the line-item veto because these funds are not part of the official administration budget request and may alter resource priorities set within the executive branch.

6. Army Equipping Policy (AEP).

"The DoD Directive 1225.6, 'Equipping the Reserve Forces' requires the military departments to 'procure, distribute, store, and maintain sufficient equipment . . . to the Reserve Components . . . to satisfy training, operational requirements, and mobilization readiness.' (DoD, 1992, pp. 2-3.) This directive requires that 'Reserve components of each Military Department will be equipped to accomplish all assigned missions . . . ' and establishes the DoD long-range goal 'to fill the wartime equipment requirements of the Reserve components in accordance with the Total Force Policy.' (DoD, 1992, p.1.)"¹³

The AEP is the principal policy that addresses equipment matters for the Total Army. It applies to all three components and integrates modernization initiatives with

unit readiness. It also provides guidance on initial distribution and redistribution of equipment.

D. Distribution/Fielding Methods.

1. New Service Procurements.

There are basically two types of army equipment, new and in-service. New equipment is procured with service appropriated funds. The ARNG is a recipient of a portion of the RC's share of the Total Army procurement. This is based on the equipping factors and influences discussed earlier. As a total the RC receives approximately 13% of its equipment through new procurements with service funds.¹⁴

2. Redistribution/Cascading.

Redistribution and Cascading provides about 79% of RC equipment.¹⁵ There are three common ways that in-service equipment can be redistributed or cascaded to the ARNG. Modernization of an AC unit or higher priority RC unit can free up older model equipment that is then made available to the ARNG in the same priority system as would be applied to a new services procurement. Sometimes, in this situation, the subject equipment may have gone through a depot overhaul or a service life extension program before being delivered to the Guard. An AC unit can be deactivated which in effect creates the same effect of freeing up equipment for redistribution. A third way equipment gets cascaded to the ARNG could possibly be through a release from logistic stocks or war reserves. Since the end of the

Cold War the AC has been downsized, which has resulted in unit ^{"N"}deactivations and reorganizations. "During the period 1991-1996, the Army downsized the active force by approximately 30% and the RCs by over 10%, while reconfiguring the composition of the total force."¹⁶ Also, a change in the strategic deployment of U.S. forces has reduced the need for the large war reserves built and maintained during the Cold War. These situations have helped the ARNG increase its readiness in the combat and combat support unit arenas because much of the equipment made available from AC ^{"N"}deactivations and stock reductions was of the more modernized nature. However, the same cannot be said about combat service support equipment because modernization of this type of equipment has taken a "back seat" to that of the other two equipment types, thus creating a smaller pool from which to draw. Also modernization in general in the Army has taken a hit in the 1990s as the Army has concentrated its dwindling resources more toward readiness, sustainment, and force structure.

3. Total Package Fielding (TPF).

"The TPF method provides the gaining commands significant relief from much of the initial burden associated with force modernization fielding."¹⁷ The TPF method is preferred for receiving equipment in the ARNG because it is consolidated into fielding packages that include some funding and training allocations for the new equipment that would not normally be included with any of

the other methods of equipping the Guard. Also, it results in a more structured and planned process that allows the receiving unit more time to prepare for the fielding. This is in contrast to examples of where the Guard may receive upgraded equipment through the normal requisition process and may not have any prior notice of such. When this happens it places a tremendous burden on the receiving command because resources already programmed elsewhere may have to be diverted to support training and other activities associated with the surprise equipment upgrade. In order for TPF to succeed, all parties involved in both the TPF and material acquisition processes must understand each other's roles and missions. The TPF method also requires resources from the Program Management Office, Material Fielder, National Guard Bureau (NGB), and the gaining unit to be successful.¹⁸

V. Conclusions/Recommendations.

A. Minimize Turbulence.

The Army requirements process is very complicated with many factors affecting the system. "Discussions with modernization staff officers indicated that requirements in total and, more specifically, among priority groups, such as the designated force packages, were altered in significant ways at least three times each year as the output of systemic requirements processes."¹⁹ These changes ripple through the RC units, and the effect is often turbulent and chaotic causing significant changes in equipment

requirements, priorities, and distribution schedules. This is an area where the Army could help with the Guard equipping challenges by recognizing the impacts and trying to minimize nervousness in the equipping process by better stabilizing requirements placed on the Guard.

B. Consider MOOTWs in Equipping Process Decisions.

The current process of equipping units in DAMPL sequence is heavily weighted toward giving priority to units in the sequence that they are aligned to support two MTWs conducted almost simultaneously. This procedure results in many ARNG units that are low in the DAMPL being relatively removed from the timeliness of equipment upgrades. This situation poses a problem when these ARNG units are identified for deployment during MOOTWs such as Bosnia, Haiti, and other humanitarian missions. The units that get involved are often CS/CSS units that are later deploying wartime units and are thus further down the equipping curve under the DAMPL guidelines. In order to be compatible with the AC supported, the CS/CSS unit may require an Out-of-DAMPL Sequence fielding resulting in insufficient training time prior to deployment. These type units need to be identified in the equipping process and so aligned for these contingencies to better ensure that they have appropriate equipment and time to become proficient with it. This should minimize compatibility problems between the components in these situations and maximize overall mission effectiveness.

C. Maximize Synergism among Army AC and ARNG Resources.

The Total Army is trailing the other services in the apportionment of the Defense Budget as evidenced by the lower percentage assigned to the Army. This is aggravated by the fact that the Army, because of the sheer nature of its organizational structure, carries the largest burden in the multitude of global mission deployments. The AC and ARNG can no longer afford the perceived mutual deception and mistrust concerning how best to structure and resource the Total Army. The Army can learn from the successes demonstrated by its sister services through integration of common goals. Each component has strengths that can be brought to bear on the problems facing the Total Army of a dwindling Defense Budget. Each must recognize the need to unify their strengths and work together toward the betterment of the Total Army, because continued disharmony between the two components will continue to work to the detriment of the Total Army.

ENDNOTES

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- ¹ How the Army Runs - A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 1997-1998, pg. 7-21.
- ² Equipping the Reserve Components of the Armed Services. A RAND Documented Briefing, 1997, pg. 27.
- ³ How the Army Runs - A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 1997-1998, pg. 7-2.
- ⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵ Ibid., pg. 7-2,3.
- ⁶ Ibid., pg. 5-20.
- ⁷ FM 100-11, Force Integration, Chap. 6 - Structuring the Force, pg. 7.
- ⁸ How the Army Runs - A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 1997-1998, pg. 9-11.
- ⁹ Ibid. pg. 8-5.
- ¹⁰ Equipping the Reserve Components of the Armed Services. A RAND Documented Briefing, 1997, pg. 21.
- ¹¹ Ibid., pg. 13.
- ¹² National Guard Bureau Senior Leaders Conference for 1999 - Briefing Package on Equipping.
- ¹³ Equipping the Reserve Components of the Armed Services. A RAND Documented Briefing, 1997, pg. 16.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., pg. 13.
- ¹⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., pg. 24.
- ¹⁷ How the Army Runs - A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 1997-1998, pg. 12-38.
- ¹⁸ National Guard Bureau Senior Leaders Conference for 1999 - Briefing Package on Equipping.
- ¹⁹ Equipping the Reserve Components of the Armed Services. A RAND Documented Briefing, 1997, pg. 73.

ACRONYM LIST

AC	Active Component
AEP	Army Equipping Policy
ALO	Authorized Level of Organization
AMP	Army Modernization Plan
AOP	Army Order of Precedence
ARNG	Army National Guard
CBT	Combat
CONUS	Continental United States
CORTRAIN	Corps and Division Training Coordination Program
CS	Combat Support
CSA	Chief of Staff, Army
CSS	Combat Service Support
DAMPL	Department of the Army Master Priority List
DoD	Department of Defense
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
DPP	Directed Procurement Program
DS/DS	Desert Shield/Desert Storm
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FPM	Force Packaging Methodology
HQDA	Headquarters Department of the Army
MOOTW	Military Operations Other-Than-War
MTW	Major Theater War
NDA	National Defense Act
NG	National Guard
NGREA	National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation

NMS	National Military Strategy
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
PPBES	Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
RC	Reserve Component
TAA	Total Army Analysis
TAP	The Army Plan
TPF	Total Package Fielding
TPFDL	Time-Phased Force Deployment List
USAR	United States Army Reserve
VCSA	Vice Chief of Staff, Army
WW	World War

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