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**GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT –
THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME**

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THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME

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ABSTRACT

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The primary question this paper seeks to answer is, "Has the U.S. military embraced, and developed a coherent approach to, the concept of engagement consistent with the evolution of the National Security Strategy from a policy of containment to engagement?" This work traces the evolution of the National Security Strategy from containment to engagement and evaluates how well this policy is implemented at the national, Department of Defense and regional Combatant Commands. It also provides recommendations for a more efficient and effective implementation of the National Security and National Military Strategies by U.S. Armed Forces.

A significant portion of this paper focuses on the Department of Defense and the U.S. Armed Forces, with particular emphasis on the new requirement for regional Combatant Commanders to produce Theater Engagement Plans. In short, the paper contends that to more effectively implement the NSS and NMS, significant changes need to be made in national security strategy formulation and implementation, and to Theater Engagement Plan development and implementation processes.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The end of the Cold War and the dominant U.S. position in world affairs affords the United States a unique opportunity to change the direction and execution of its global relations. No longer driven by the need to contain communist aggression, the United States is free to pursue the spread of democratic ideals on a much broader international canvas.

The U.S. National Security Strategy reflects this shift in emphasis by moving from Containment to Engagement. Likewise, the National Military Strategy has evolved to support the new direction in national security policy. But, while policy and national security strategy have evolved the methods and tools of policy implementation have not made commensurate adjustments. Many argue that global international relations are being directed and pursued in the same manner as we have since World War II. While our paper focuses on engagement by the U.S. military – those activities that mold the security environment – it is important to understand that engagement is ultimately the tool of U.S. leadership in the post-Cold War world and encompasses more than just military activities.

The main argument of our discussion is that the world situation has changed dramatically and, while the U.S. military has long been involved in “engagement” activities, it is time to think in new and deliberate ways about global military engagement.

One of the more dramatic changes in recent years was the implementation of the Theater Engagement Planning (TEP) process, developed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). This process requires that the regional military commanders – CINCs - develop strategic concepts and plans to shape their respective regions in support of the new focus articulated in national security strategy. Ultimately resources would be allocated to support plans, which have been reviewed and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

A review of regional activities reveals that while CINCs are responsible for developing and executing military policy in the regions, they have very little direct control over the numerous diverse engagement activities in their theater. The type and level of engagement in the CINC area of responsibility (AOR) also varies with the type and availability of resources each CINC has available to him to pursue engagement activities. The CINCs' approach to the

developing TEP process and their ongoing activities are indicative of their concerns, commitments, and ability to pursue an aggressive engagement strategy.

Engagement is not a new concept or mission for the U.S. military. Historically, when not fighting the nation's wars, all branches of the military services have vigorously conducted engagement activities. With engagement emerging in importance in the National Military Strategy, providing the CINCs who implement the plan with proper guidance is vital for successful implementation. Fundamental concepts such as precisely defining engagement, discussing how and why engagement differed in the post-Cold War environment and explaining the nuances of why engagement was being elevated in the National Security Strategy were not provided to the CINCs and their staffs. Consequently, CINC planning staffs viewed the new reporting requirement with apprehension. Developing an engagement plan crossing agency and service boundaries requires extensive coordination and a common vision. If OSD and the Joint Staff desire new thoughts and new approaches to theater engagement, new and deliberate guidance is necessary.

Not everyone associated with the national security interests of the U.S. is enamored with the increased importance of Engagement in the National Military Strategy. Increased peacetime engagement activities require forces to be in more places simultaneously. These requirements increase the operational rotation of units to conduct engagement missions and reduce training and maintenance periods, causing degradation in the material condition of equipment and combat skills of military forces. Critics argue that reduced military threats abroad relate to a reduced military and that what is really needed is an increase in the non-military instruments of Engagement.

The engagement strategy is the right strategy, providing the ability to best shape the international environment. U.S. Engagement is critical to world stability and interdependency. Engagement is the leadership role the United States must play and the time is now for bold leadership.

To make the engagement strategy more effective, there must be a Global Engagement Plan, which would be integrated and coordinated across regional Areas of Responsibility, prioritizing U.S. efforts around the world. A coherent, globally integrated strategic approach permits a more efficient expenditure of national resources in support of Engagement.

The Secretary of Defense must support the global prioritization of effort through the development of Prioritized Regional Objectives. Supporting the global engagement plan in a constantly changing world, with limited resources, requires a program of continual monitoring, feedback, and evaluation of activities to insure the most return for limited engagement resources. The regional CINCs must have clear and adequate guidance, based on a coherent global strategy, ensuring that their prioritized engagement activities are being conducted to shape the international environment in support of U.S. interests.

Consolidation of funding streams for Engagement is required if the CINCs are to be given proper control over engagement activities. The current process is inefficient and does not provide the resource predictability required by a CINC in the development and execution of his Theater Engagement Plan.

Current conditions and attitudes are right for fortifying the Engagement pillar of U.S. national security. CINCs and their staffs, as well as interagency representatives, are actively and innovatively working engagement issues. This momentum must be maintained if engagement is to remain the focus of the National Security Strategy.

GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT- THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME

"My dear Rick, when will you realize that in this world today, isolationism is no longer a practical policy?"

*Signor Ferrari to Rick Blaine in the Café Americain
Casablanca, Warner Bros., 1943*

I. INTRODUCTION

Sovereign nations will, and should, seek policies and relations that serve their best interests. International engagement seeks to develop and strengthen those bonds between nations that create shared interests and goals, thereby reducing the possibility of conflict and increasing global stability. While our paper focuses on engagement by the U.S. military – those activities that mold the security environment – it is important to understand that engagement is ultimately the tool of U.S. leadership in the post-Cold War world and encompasses more than just military activities.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Cold War ended and a new period of American international relationships began. No longer committed to a strategy based on containing the spread of communist influence and ideology, the United States was faced with a New World order. Instead of a simplified international stage with well-defined interest groups and clear roles and obligations for the United States, America was faced with a situation so turbulent and ill-defined that a clear definition of the period has yet to be articulated. Terms like mono-polar, multi-polar and Pax Americana have been discussed in an attempt to define and bring structure to the post-Cold War global situation. The proper definition and structure of world politics is not the concern of this paper; we are satisfied to recognize that the world situation has changed dramatically and are concerned with the opportunities and role the United States military can and will play in shaping the new global environment. The central question for discussion is, "Has the U.S. military embraced, and developed a coherent approach to, the concept of engagement consistent with the evolution of the National Security Strategy from a policy of containment to engagement?" The main argument of our discussion is that the world

situation has changed dramatically and, while the U.S. military has long been involved in “engagement” activities, it is time to think in new and deliberate ways about global military engagement. Central to our discussion of the topic is a review of the national policy decisions leading to a policy of engagement, discussion of the current state of engagement planning and execution and a discussion of the steps ahead if we are to sincerely pursue this policy.

As mentioned, engagement has as many interpretations. The Joint Staff definition found in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual CJCSM 3113.10, published 1 February 1998 defines engagement as, “all military activities involving other nations intended to shape the security environment in peacetime”. This broad definition of the term engagement may be an indicator of the complexity of the issue. Engagement was not defined until the CJCS manual on Theater Engagement Planning was published in 1998. However, some would argue the U.S. military has been pursuing engagement since its inception. Indeed, engagement in this context would seem to envision the military in more non-traditional roles and missions, i.e. earthquake, flood and other humanitarian relief; building and maintenance of roads and physical plants; and peacekeeping and peace enforcement. If engagement roles and missions are now of equal importance in the military security strategy triad with Prepare and Respond, then are we dedicating the training, resources, and doctrinal assets necessary to support this increased emphasis, or is the military merely carrying on in their traditional efforts and calling their activities engagement within the broadest sense of the term? We will review the military’s commitment to engagement and the risks and trade-offs necessary to insure we are supporting the National Security Strategy.

II. ENGAGEMENT AND THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

This section will deal with the evolution of engagement, its underlying philosophy, the major documentary basis upon which it relies, and the resultant process by which the military gives force to this initiative.

A. EVOLUTION OF ENGAGEMENT

Engagement has been conducted by the United States military throughout its existence. In one way or another, the various services have been involved in the process of engagement in military-to-military contacts and initiatives. From attendance at military schools to observation of, and participation in, military exercises, Engagement has been a long-standing feature of American military strategy.

As noted above, the watershed event of recent times has been the evolution of engagement from a footnote in American military strategy to one of parity with the military's ultimate goal of warfighting. In the recent process involving the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the resultant National Military Strategy, and the development of Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs) by the unified commands (CINCs), engagement has been elevated to equivalency in the evolving military strategy of SHAPE, RESPOND, PREPARE NOW.

B. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act mandates that the President of the United States develop an annual national security strategy discussing at a minimum: vital global interests and objectives; proposed short and long term use of all elements of the national power to achieve U.S. objectives; and the commitments and defense capabilities required to deter aggression and implement the strategy while achieving a balance among all elements of power.¹ The National

Security Strategy of the United States has received significant criticism since its inception from within and outside the executive branch. Outsiders complain the document frequently lacks substance and significance, while the administration complains that in a fast paced, media-based world, with a constitutionally mandated State of the Union presentation, no President would want to be tied to an annual static strategic vision.² Criticism aside, the National Security Strategy provides the foundation for discussion throughout the government of the administration's vision, goals, and resourcing requirements to meet the nation's security needs. Additionally, the annual machinations necessary to generate the report provide a forum for reaching a consensus within the administration on foreign and defense policies. In fact, a review of the National Security Strategy over the years reflects the evolution from the emphasis on the military instrument of power of the 1987 and 1988 Cold War documents, through the 1990 to 1993 Bush administration documents focusing on the deliberate transition from containment to "collective engagement"³. Even as President Clinton rode into office on the "It's the economy, stupid!" plank, the follow-on National Security Strategy proposed a policy of engagement and enlargement, stating that, "While the Cold War threats have diminished, our nation can never again isolate itself from global developments."⁴

Concerns that President Clinton's lack of international relations expertise and preoccupation with domestic affairs would precipitate an isolationist security strategy were put to rest with a continuing concern for the global interrelationships necessary for the United States to prosper and grow in the coming millenium. Engagement emerged as the defining concept in international relations.

In October 1998, the White House published the document entitled "A National Security Strategy for a New Century". In that document, the national security establishment recognized the importance of engagement in referring to it as "The Imperative of Engagement". The document calls for increased focus on engagement and states:

American leadership and engagement in the world are vital for our security, and our nation and the world are safer and more prosperous as a result.

The alternative to engagement is not withdrawal from the world; it is passive submission to powerful forces of change—all the more ironic at a time when our capacity to shape them is as great as it has ever been . . .

Underpinning our international leadership is the power of our democratic ideals and values. In designing our strategy, we recognize that the spread of democracy supports American values and enhances both our security and prosperity. Democratic governments are more likely to cooperate with each other against common threats, encourage free trade, and promote sustainable economic development. They are less likely to enter into conflict or abuse the rights of their people. Hence, the trend toward democracy and free markets throughout the world advances American interests. The United States will support this trend by remaining actively engaged in the world. This is the strategy to take us into the next century.⁵

C. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

The United States military has been an important contributor and supporter of the policy of engagement since the end of the Cold War. The 1992 National Military Strategy supported the National Security Strategy by changing its focus from the global containment policy of the Cold War to the regional approach of forward presence instead of forward defense. While nuclear deterrence remained a cornerstone, forward presence sought deterrence and reassurance for Allies through the active engagement of U.S. forces by way of deployments and exercises.⁶ Since this initial commitment to engagement as a major role and function of the U.S. military, the scope and expectations of the policy of engagement have evolved to their current state, whereby engagement is expected to shape the international environment as one of the primary pillars of the Shape, Prepare, and Respond foundation of the 1997 National Military Strategy.

The National Military Strategy is based upon the principles contained in the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Security Strategy. The Executive Summary of the National Military Strategy states:

The National Military Strategy provides the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commander on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces over the next three to five years. In formulating the 1997 National Military Strategy, the CJCS derives guidance from the President's 1997 National Security Strategy and from the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report prepared by the Secretary of Defense.⁷

The strategy contained in this document consists of three elements: Shaping the International Environment, Responding to the full spectrum of crises, and Preparing Now for an Uncertain Future. The engagement component of that theory is the notion that the international environment can be shaped. The document speaks for itself:

US Armed Forces help shape the international environment through deterrence, peacetime engagement activities, and active participation and leadership in alliances. Critical to deterrence are our conventional warfighting capabilities and our nuclear forces. Deterrence rests on a potential adversary's perception of our capabilities and commitment, which are demonstrated by our ability to bring decisive military power to bear and by communication of U.S. intentions. Engagement activities, including information sharing and contacts between our military and the armed forces of other nations, promote trust and confidence and encourage measures that increase our security and that of our allies, partners, and friends. By increasing understanding and reducing uncertainty, engagement builds constructive security relationships, helps promote the development of democratic institutions, and helps keep some countries from becoming adversaries.⁸


The Quadrennial Defense Review is the primary process for the review of defense strategy and programs, including force structure, force mix, and readiness and modernization. Put succinctly, the QDR provides the "front end planning guidance" upon which the national defense program is built.⁹ It has been suggested that the increased emphasis on engagement was to legitimize the shaping activities in which the U.S. military has been involved actively for years. The Department of Defense sought to "operationalize" the emphasis of engagement by articulating Prioritized Regional Objectives (PROs), through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), to the CINCs for use in the development of formalized Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs). This was the initial effort to prioritize regional objectives and to date they are not prioritized on a global scale. In theory, the TEP is meant to be a tool for looking across regions and then to view them globally. Some unified commands have interpreted that they must do more because of the TEP process, whereas the intent of the TEPs was to encourage the CINCs to be more selective in engagement activities.¹⁰

D. THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLANNING

The combatant commanders in chief are charged with the responsibility to develop theater engagement plans. These plans will provide the framework in which the theory of engagement will be translated into the spectrum of activities in which the notion of engagement will take concrete form. CJCSM 3113.10 governs theater engagement planning. The purpose of that document is to set forth the guidelines and procedures by which the geographic commanders in chief (CINCs) and Executive Agents will develop their individual theater engagement plans. As Figure II - 1 indicates, this document outlines the planning and review process, as well as detailing the format and content of Theater Engagement Plans.

The TEP requires the CINC to establish his Strategic Concept for his Area of Responsibility (AOR) and all pursuant engagement activities for the next five years, pursuant engagement activities being defined for TEP purposes as "all military activities involving other nations intended to shape the security environment in peacetime".¹¹ The CINC's Strategic Concept and the resultant plan are based upon the Prioritized Regional Objectives the CINC receives in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). While these plans are to be reviewed by the Joint Staff, OSD, the Services and others, the CINCs retain final approval authority for their plans.¹² Once the approved plans are submitted to the Joint Staff, they are bundled into a "family of plans" by the J-7, JCS. Ultimately, they are provided to the CJCS and DOD for reviews (See Figure 1). This entire initial process was required to take about seven months and in most cases has resulted in a 500-page document.¹³

Figure II -1. Theater Engagement Planning Process
 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3113.01, p A-3



the regional commanders (CINCs) with much more authority and autonomy in the direction and execution of their engagement activities. The importance of CINC efforts and their autonomy is reflected in the recent development of the Theater Engagement Planning (TEP) process and reporting requirements. As illustrated in the diagram above, each CINC region is unique in its makeup, military presence, and engagement requirements, necessitating that each CINC approach the planning and execution of his theater requirements in a different manner.

While the only requirement for an activity to be listed by a CINC as a part of his TEP is, "whether or not it is planned by the CINC to have a significant engagement role in the theater strategy,"¹⁵ there are categories of activities which are required to be reported as part of the TEP process. These categories include¹⁶:

- 1) Operational Activities: Routine and continuing operations to which U.S. forces are committed for the long term, whether they began as a scheduled activity or are the result of ongoing operations, i.e. Bosnia, Macedonia, and Sinai troop participation, sanctions enforcement, and counter-drug operations.
- 2) Combined Exercises: Bilateral and multilateral exercises conducted by Service components with foreign military forces.
- 3) Other Foreign Military Interaction:
 - a) Combined Training: Unit and individual training activities not covered in combined exercises. Normally of smaller scale, i.e. Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET).
 - b) Combined Education: Education of foreign defense officials by U.S. institutions.
 - c) Military Contacts: The broad range of small interpersonal activities and exchanges between militaries, i.e. Staff Talks, counterpart visits, port visits, regional conferences, and defense cooperation working groups.
 - d) Security Assistance: DOS controlled and funded activities under the Foreign Military Funding (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Enhanced International Military Education and Training (E-IMET), and Excess Defense Articles (EDA) programs.
 - e) Humanitarian Assistance: Activities executed with specifically allocated humanitarian assistance funds.

- f) Other Engagement: Activities resulting from arms control treaties, obligations, or on-going negotiations.

It is important to note that while this list appears extensive and varied, the number of activities is limited over which the CINC has direct control. As Table III - 1 illustrates, operational activities are long-standing and normally directed by higher authority. While they certainly contribute to the shaping of the theater, the ability of the CINC to modify and direct the actions of the operations is minimal. Perhaps the biggest advantage to ongoing operational activities is the fact that additional forces assigned may be used to conduct engagement activities when not directly involved in ongoing operations. Certainly, without the ongoing nature of Sanctions Support in the Persian Gulf and Counterdrug Operations in the Caribbean, the number of activities carried out under Combined Training and Military Contacts by CINCENT and USSOUTHCOM would be dramatically reduced.

Table III - 1: Engagement Activities and Support Elements

ACTIVITY	ACTIVITY SPONSOR	CINC INPUT	EXECUTION	FUNDING	EXAMPLES
Operational Activities	Various USG and International Organizations	Planning and Execution	CINC Forces	Normally steady and well defined.	Peace Ops Humanitarian Relief Counterdrug Sanctions Support
Combined Exercises	CJCS CINCs Services	Planning and Execution	CINC Forces Assigned	Identified Exercise Funds	Bright Star Cobra Gold RIMPAC
Combined Training	CINC Component Normally	Oversight	Component Forces	CINC Exercise Funds	JCET MITT*
Combined Education	CINC Service DOD	Recommendation and limited selection	School sponsors	Executive Agents	Marshall Center* War Colleges* Sgt Majors Academy
Military Contacts	Agencies throughout DOD	Limited to informal coord in most cases where CINCs are not Sponsors	Responsible Agencies	Host Agency Normally	Senior Officer Visits Counterpart Visits Staff Talks Conferences*
Security Assistance	DOS with DSAA Support	Recommendations through interface with Country Team	Services and School Sponsors	DOS Budget	Weapons Sales War College Weapons Sys Train
Humanitarian Assistance	DOD	Request	CINC Forces	DOD Budget	Normally in conjunction with operations and exercises


* Activities which may be funded and approved under formal Security Assistance programs.

Activities covered under Security Assistance involve the development of foreign military infrastructure and training associated primarily with the purchase of weapons systems. The host nation must request these services and while the Country Team processes the request and counsels the host nation, the CINC is not free to structure the requests on his own terms as part of his deliberate theater plan. Additionally, Combined Education is normally overseen by the agency or Service sponsoring the formal schooling. For example, most U.S. War Colleges have a limited number of positions each year for foreign students. These positions are normally awarded on a rotational basis and are not related in any way to PROs or requests by the CINCs based on their theater development priorities. Two exceptions to this policy are Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) and CINC sponsored, regionally focused, schools such as the Marshall Center and the School of the Americas, but these are the exception rather than the rule.

Perhaps the most extensive and unstructured category is that of Military Contacts. These activities run the gamut from a visit by the CINC Public Affairs Officer to a host nation to formal bilateral military relations working group between defense ministries. These activities can run easily to the hundreds and are frequently carried out with little or no knowledge of the CINC or regional Executive Agent.

A recent study by the Center for Naval Analyses on Navy Staff international activity highlights some of these problems. A quick review of the Naval Staff engagement activities revealed a less than balanced approach. Of approximately 4800 events, 3200 were with USEUCOM, 600 were with USPACOM, while USACOM brought up the rear with 140. Clearly CINC requested support was not the driving focus of effort. In fact in a review of the guidance/authority for activity JSCP accounted for only 3% of activity. SECNAV - CNO correspondence accounted for the largest portion of engagement activity. This is indicative of the success of military contacts. Visits and relationships result in activities between services and staffs, which are typically beyond the purview of CINC planning activities.

Figure III - 2 Guidance/Authority for OPNAV Engagement
 OPNAV International Activities: Final Results, CNA Washington D.C. Slide 8



Multiply this activity by four for the other service staffs, throw in an extensive Coast Guard activity list, and the many activities of the Joint Staff and OSD, one can rapidly see that a large amount of activity is regularly executed with little oversight/knowledge or coordination by the CINC. The extensive review process for CINC TEPs affords the opportunity for Services and Agencies to insure their activities are in concert with CINC and Executive Agent goals and desires. Activities added during the review process are provided more as a means of collecting a complete picture of activity rather than a concerted execution of a well-defined national policy.

What is clear is that while CINCs are responsible for developing and executing military policy in the regions, they have very little direct control over the multitude of engagement activities in their theater. In fact, those CINCs without a permanent forward presence are at a serious disadvantage in the ability to execute their vision in the theater relying solely on rotational forces to help execute combined training and military contacts, the two areas of true CINC control and flexibility.

The differing CINC approaches were highlighted in a Government Accounting Office (GAO) Report on Overseas Presence completed in June 1997.¹⁷ While the purpose of the decision model used to generate the table was to, “solicit and record the views of CINC officials on the relative importance of presence objectives and approaches”¹⁸, the table highlights the differing nature of CINC regional concerns.

Table III - 2: Objectives And Approaches That CINC Officials Consider To Be Most Important¹⁹
United States General Accounting Office, Overseas Presence, p.6

	USACOM	CENTCOM	EUCOM	PACOM	SOUTHCOM
Objective					
Initial crisis response	X	X		X	
Deterrence	X	X	X	X	
Reassurance				X	X
Influence				X	X
Approach					
Forward-based forces			X	X	
Routinely deployed forces		X			
Temporarily deployable forces	X				
Prepositioning		X			
Exercises					
Military interaction			X		X
Foreign military assistance					

It is not surprising that the CINCs with the most forward-based forces (USPACOM and USEUCOM) would find these forces to be their preferred approach to meet their primary objectives of deterrence and crisis response. Military interaction would be of prime importance for USEUCOM given the central location of their forces in their area of responsibility (AOR) and their ongoing support for Partnership for Peace, Joint Contact Team Program, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and an increasing international exercise program. All these requirements having been assumed by USEUCOM during a period when forces in theater have been reduced from 318,000 at the end of FY 88 to 108,000 at the end of 1996. Military interaction would be of lesser impact in the maritime USPACOM AOR as forward-based forces, primarily located in Japan and Korea, are geographically isolated from the rest of

the theater. USCENTCOM, having responsibility for the region of the world where the most recent conflicts have been fought would naturally be most concerned with crisis response and deterrence relying on routinely deployed forces and prepositioned equipment to meet these regional security objectives. USSOUTHCOM, concerned with Central and South America and the Caribbean, does not face the immediate threat of regional conflict, but concentrates on drug trafficking, refugee migration, and strengthening regional democracies. These regional concerns are reflected in their focus on reassurance and influence through the use of military interaction. USACOM's Atlantic AOR is largely devoid of any real threat or international concern. However, as the responsible CINC for most of the U.S. forces based in the United States, USACOM is required to support other CINC requirements for forces supporting their regional concerns. This rationalizes the USACOM priorities of initial crisis response and deterrence facilitated by temporarily deployable forces.

One of the issues complicating the GAO study, and the table of CINC priorities, is the GAO supposition that presence encompasses the national security objectives of deterrence, crisis response, reassurance and influence. The GAO view of the overriding nature of presence left it with the conclusion that DOD did not routinely consider whether more cost effective alternatives existed to meet presence requirements. It went further to explain that, while DOD's efforts to address the engagement activities aspect of presence (TEP process development) are important, they believe that DOD should integrate and analyze information on all presence approaches.²⁰ This finding would appear to indicate a belief that presence is a National Security requirement in and of itself, rather than a means of meeting national security objectives. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) in concert with the Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) currently assess and resources forces based on warfare requirements. Based on the national security policy commitment to Engagement, the DOD effort to integrate requirements for CINC engagement activities into DOD's strategic planning and budgeting systems through the TEP process would appear to provide the necessary avenue for regional CINCs to receive National Command Authority (NCA) guidance and resource support for engagement. The type and level of engagement in the CINC AOR also varies with the type and availability of resources each CINC has available to him to pursue engagement activities. The

CINC's approach to the developing TEP process and their ongoing activities are indicative of their concerns, commitments, and ability to pursue an aggressive engagement strategy.

IV. THE CURRENT STATUS OF ENGAGEMENT

This section highlights the ongoing efforts of all the regional CINCs to pursue engagement in their respective theaters, while discussing their concerns and unique approaches to the newly developed Theater Engagement Planning process.

A. UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND (USEUCOM)

Encompassing Europe, Central Europe, the Balkans and the majority of the African continent, no other CINC has felt as keenly the immediacy of the changes wrought by the end of the Cold War that USEUCOM has encountered. The front line of defense in the Cold War is now the engagement model for the Joint Staff and the other regional CINCs.

The end of the Cold War marked the end of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and the rise of nationalism and an embracing of the West by formerly isolated nations. The success of Desert Storm only served to increase the desire to remake the militaries of the newly independent states into models of the American system. USEUCOM embraced its role in assisting the restructuring of the Central and Eastern European militaries. This task was assumed as the forces in Europe were being drawn down by more than 210,000 personnel from 1988 to 1996.

In 1992 USEUCOM implemented the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP). This program involved the assignment of small teams of military personnel to work with the Ministries of Defense in Central and East European countries to help facilitate formal assistance in reshaping their militaries to western style institutions responsible to democratically elected governments. Beginning with three countries, the program now encompasses 15 nations from Estonia to Albania and has become so successful that a primary concern of the program managers is how to terminate the program without upsetting the host nation or the embassy country team.

Partnership for Peace (PfP) has become a cornerstone of the expansion of NATO. Countries wishing to join NATO are expected to participate and demonstrate their readiness to

join NATO. USEUCOM, as the U.S. military presence in NATO, naturally took a major lead in the support and direction of the Pfp process. Most NATO members focused their support on those countries of immediate concern, i.e., Czech Republic and Poland for Germany. Only the U.S., and USEUCOM, as its representative, took a balanced view of support for all interested countries, from Albania to Estonia.

The multitude of efforts and interests in the newly emergent former Soviet States also provided new financial appropriations. Pfp and the JCTP each had separate funding lines and commensurate limitations on activities. With an eye toward reducing the spread of nuclear weapons from the members of the former Soviet Union, Congress appropriated funds for cooperative threat reduction – more commonly known as Nunn-Lugar funds. While USEUCOM was the lead command for execution, most of these programs were managed and directed by DOD, with many of the activities in the theater being executed by people and agencies outside the purview of the CINC.

It is easy to see where these many national programs could both support and undermine ongoing USEUCOM efforts in theater. In an era of reduced assets, increased program responsibilities, and changing national priorities of effort, it was clear that a process was necessary to coordinate all the various initiatives in theater, insuring the many support and assistance programs in theater were working together toward a common theater vision.

Enter the Theater Security Planning System (TSPS). TSPS was designed to implement the USEUCOM regional vision articulated in the Theater Strategy of Engagement. Both were generated simultaneously under the direction of General Shalikashvili, SACEUR, in 1994. The theater strategy is updated annually with the current Strategy of Readiness and Engagement being dated April 1998. As the title implies, readiness is the primary focus of the Strategy, while equal emphasis is placed on shaping the security environment through engagement. Indeed a clear emphasis is placed on efforts that support both pillars of the regional strategy²¹.

USEUCOM firmly believes that readiness and engagement activities are closely linked and the accomplishment of one is not detrimental to the other. Engagement activities promote democracy and civilian control of the military and are primarily financed through a variety of military and federal agencies. Readiness activities prepare forces for the full spectrum of combat

from peacekeeping to armed conflict and are resourced primarily through the service components.

Readiness activities are easier to understand and conceptualize than the more ill-defined engagement activities. Readiness activities encompass specific objectives; advance planning is not only possible, but also frequently required; activities are bounded in space and time; resource lines are clear and well defined; and you know when you're done. Engagement activities, while JSCP directed, are not typical tasks. They amount to thousands of activities a year that are under continuous execution, have varied and dynamic planning horizons, have resource stovepipes associated with individual program objectives, and have the difficult problem of assessing when building democracy and civil-military relations are succeeding.

Training and exercises straddle the readiness/engagement line. While preparing forces for their military roles, exercises provide excellent opportunities for other militaries to promote interoperability and interact with a democratically responsible military.

USEUCOM views its strategic challenge as controlling these extensive and diverse activities, with their separate funding streams, through a tailored, strategically effective, program – an aimed bullet, not a shotgun blast.²² TSPS was developed to marry strategy and resource elements of activities in the USEUCOM AOR.

Theater policy is developed through a series of conceptual layers developed to review and refine theater strategy. The theater strategy is written by the CINC and links the theater to the National Command Authority guidance in the national military and security strategies. The USEUCOM Chief of Staff chairs a quarterly Synchronization Steering Group (SSG), composed of flag officers from the service components, to further refine and direct regional priorities. Regional Working Groups (RWG), chaired by the policy planners on the USEUCOM staff, gather the focused expertise from the staff, country teams and federal agencies to assess and prioritize USEUCOM efforts by region. If necessary, a Functional Working Group (FWG) may be initiated to address a specific issue of concern, i.e., preparation to join NATO. All planning and direction culminates at the Country Desk Officer (CDO), the person responsible for the integration of activity within a country.

Key to the coordinated and focused efforts is the documentation generated to support and justify activities. Regional Campaign Plans based on USEUCOM constructs of policy

commonalities, i.e., Western Europe, NATO, Central Europe, NIS, Middle East/North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa, are generated for CINC signature by the RWGs. These are then used in the generation of the approximately 75 Country Plans, which require ambassadorial approval before final approval by the Deputy Commander in Chief (DCINC), and execution oversight by the CDOs.

Realizing that coordination is the key to insuring strategy and activity synergy in over three thousand activities, the TEP Management Information System (TEPMIS) – a database listing all activity – was developed. On a common, linked, computer system the CINC and action officer (AO) have the same access to information about all activities throughout the theater. Information about training and exercises, the George C. Marshall Center, Security Assistance programs, Special Operations Programs, Joint Contact Team Programs, among others, is now available for constant review and update.

Now that policy and resources had a visible nexus at the TEPMIS system, assessment and feedback was necessary to insure an ongoing, living, and developing program, with the flexibility necessary to be responsive in the dynamic post Cold War European theater. The assessment process is used to reprioritize resources and efforts. Individual measures of effectiveness are sent to the RWG members prior to their meeting with a request to bring their assessment to the RWG. Discussion of the measures of effectiveness at the RWG provides the assessment. Emphasis during these discussions is on the qualitative judgement of the regional experts assembled, not the quantity and level of activities – number crunching exercises are discouraged. The assessment then generates new requirements, which are fed back to the resourcing for the development of activities. As the TEP process matures, USEUCOM hopes to fully integrate resource requirement into the Program, Planning and Budget System (PPBS) and Service POMS for resources in the out-year plans.

USEUCOM's TEPMIS process was adopted as the basic model for the Joint Staff TEP process. USEUCOM supports the process, but realizes this effort is tremendous, and unlike deliberate planning, needs constant review and updating to remain viable. Theater engagement development and execution is a very labor-intensive process.

B. UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND (USCENTCOM)

USCENTCOM's AOR includes 25 countries from the horn of Africa, through the Middle East, Central Asia and South East Asia to Pakistan. The scene of ongoing conflict during the entire post Cold War period, the command is naturally focused on responding to the immediate threat while reducing future sources of conflict. Regional sources of conflict include; border disputes, rapid population growth, low economic growth rates, limited resources, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and aggressive militant regimes and terrorism.

USCENTCOM is unique among the other regional CINCs for a number of reasons. USCENTCOM maintains a focus as a warfighting CINC, having the only headquarters that is completely deployable. Cultural intricacies and differences throughout the region make it difficult to develop long term relations in the region. USCENTCOM has no written alliances in the region upon which to build and develop relationships. USCENTCOM's theater strategy highlights its concerns and limitations, emphasizing the need to, "closely coordinate its programs with other U.S. and coalition government, non-governmental and international agencies to enhance synergy and efficiently achieve desired goals."²³

The CINC's guidance was to focus on shared interests and shared threats - a concept that relates well to the Moslem culture. Further, divide the AOR into sub-regions based on common policy interests in the region, i.e., Arabian Peninsula, Horn of Africa, and Northern Red Sea. Activities with other CINCs and U.S. government organizations need to be closely coordinated with a view toward sharing limited resources. Personal relationships, both political and military should be strengthened through the aggressive use of professional schooling and personal visits throughout the region on a continuing basis.

Utilizing the CINC guidance, the USCENTCOM Theater Strategy was developed incorporating sub-regional annexes. Emphasis was placed on developing an umbrella plan for USCENTCOM encompassing all the existing functional and campaign plans; demining campaign plan, exercise campaign plan, war plans, and security assistance plan. Ultimately, USCENTCOM would also like to incorporate the Department of State Mission Performance Plans (MPP) for each country in its region into this plan.

The USCENTCOM staff developed country goals and objectives policy planners in coordination with the embassy country teams. Regional Functional Working Groups developed the functional plans (Humanitarian Assistance, Security Assistance) for inclusion in the strategy. Theater Strategy Working Groups, with participation by all the component commands, insured the plans being developed met theater strategic requirements. The Synchronization Steering Group resolved conflicting issues arising in the development of the various sub-plans and activities throughout the sub-regional areas. Integration with the Department of State occurred as the country desk officers and country team work together to develop and refine the country plans.

USCENTCOM, like USEUCOM, felt it was critical in the development of its plans to emphasize a sub-regional focus. Use of a sub-regional focus allows discussion and activity development within a framework of policy commonality. Efforts in South Central Asia are dominated by Iran and the threat for tomorrow, while the Arabian Peninsula focuses on the ongoing Iraqi conflict, and the Horn of Africa emphasizes peacekeeping, humanitarian support, promotion of military professionalism and development of the African Center for Strategic Studies.

USCENTCOM, having no real forces forward deployed to the theater, and consumed by ongoing conflicts, is still refining its planning process. Currently, it is working on further developing its supporting plans, refining its assessment process, and setting up its Home Page for components and country teams to use in monitoring and maintaining an ongoing activity dialog.

At the current time, USCENTCOM is accomplishing its goals in the region. If more resources were made available, the current priority would be to increase its support of demining and humanitarian assistance. The command is committed to supporting the TEP process and placing activities in the out-year TEP plans as placeholders and resource guides for future support. The USCENTCOM staff is also waiting to see if the tremendous time and effort placed in the support of the TEP process will be rewarded with increased support in the out-year budgeting process.

C. UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND (USSOUTHCOM)

United States Southern Command's recent rapid growth coupled with diverse changes in the region make this theater one of the most vibrant and challenging for U.S. national security interests. Traditionally a land-focused and primarily Spanish speaking Area of Responsibility (AOR), the theater has undergone a rapid expansion to include all waters around South and Central America as well as all Caribbean Nations. This expansion has altered the focus and culture of USSOUTHCOM to a command that now has vast maritime and space responsibilities while adding the European and African cultural focus of the Caribbean.

Historically, the focus of U.S. national security interests has been Eurocentric with recent inclusion of Asia as the economic importance of that region continues to grow. South and Central America have been justifiably "neglected" in the national security sphere when compared to Europe and Asia. Traditional links to Europe, NATO and the Cold War coupled with Asia's emergence in economic and strategic importance have placed USSOUTHCOM at the bottom of the National Security priority list. It has been very difficult to justify allocating a shrinking number of resources to a region that has neither the visibility nor the political and economic importance of Europe and Asia. However, recent trends indicate that more resources may have to be committed to USSOUTHCOM's growing AOR.

The region has been marked by political and economic instability for many years. There has been difficulty in attracting any kind of foreign investment into the region due to the instability and corruption of national governments. Drug production and shipment have been ongoing problems in the region for years. It is difficult for the U.S. government to commit resources and people into an unstable region marked by corruption and drugs.

Although fragile, the region has been steadily progressing over the last twenty years. In 1978, seven of the region's 32 countries were marked as having "functioning" democracies, today; the number is 31 of 32 with Cuba being the lone holdout.²⁴ U.S. efforts assisted the region in becoming more stable, but it is difficult to measure the exact impact in moving the region towards democracy.

An important nuance of the region is that most governments draw their bases of power from a strong military. In some cases, military officers or former military officers are the heads

of state. This becomes an important factor in dealing with the governments of Latin America and the Caribbean because they are comfortable dealing with senior leaders and respect the position that the CINC holds in carrying out U.S. national policy.

In USSOUTHCOM's "Strategy of Cooperative Regional Peacetime Engagement" General Charles Wilhelm, USMC, CINC USSOUTHCOM, has stated that he has two primary missions in the region - conduct theater engagement and counterdrug activities. Both are carried out by promoting regional stability, rapid and proper military response when required and capitalizing on future opportunities. Theater engagement is the focus of the CINC and his staff in carrying out national policy in the region.

The recent relocation of USSOUTHCOM headquarters to Miami from Panama was the start of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Panama. U.S. military forces must be withdrawn from Panama to conform to the turnover of the Panama Canal to Panama in 2000. This has caused the CINC to be geographically removed from the AOR while assigned forces have been relocated to various locations throughout the United States. It is difficult for a CINC and his staff to conduct engagement activities from outside the region.

USSOUTHCOM bills itself as the "economy of force" theater and it is difficult to dispute that statement.²⁵ The assignment of forces to USSOUTHCOM is unique with force providers such as CINCLANTFLT (Navy) and FORCECOM (Army) shared with U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM), who is also the force provider for European Command (USEUCOM). This relationship automatically puts USSOUTHCOM in direct competition for resources from USACOM, which must support USEUCOM as well as USACOM unique force requirements.

General Wilhelm has correctly identified where he must direct his efforts and that is toward engagement activities in the region. Limited force structure and a lack of permanent bases in the region make traditional military missions difficult. As engagement increases in importance, USSOUTHCOM is leveraging limited resources by finding ways to engage countries to bring stability to the region.

Deliberate planning to include all facets of the engagement puzzle into a coherent and workable plan has marked developing USSOUTHCOM's Theater Engagement Plan. This has manifested itself in many ways. The first logical step taken was the development of a Theater Strategy for Engagement, a process that was underway prior to the direction from OSD to

prepare a Theater Engagement Plan.²⁶ The development of this strategy involved all parties with engagement concerns in the region. Ambassadors, Security Assistance personnel, Office of the National Drug Control Policy, State Department, and service component commanders were all involved in the process of developing a viable Theater Engagement Strategy for CINC's approval. This is done through a series of regional conferences held by USSOUTHCOM where the regional players gather to develop and then refine this strategy on an ongoing basis.

The second step in the process was developing goals and priorities, which supported the strategy. This was necessary to deconflict and prioritize USSOUTHCOM's efforts. Many factors affect this prioritization with limited budget dollars and national level priorities being the biggest factors. Counter-drug (CD) efforts are a major concern for USSOUTHCOM and the fact that another governmental agency, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is a big player in the region with its own budget, makes prioritization in this area difficult.

Lastly, the most difficult part of the engagement process has been funding. Although Engagement is the newest pillar of the National Security Strategy, there has not been a corresponding increase in funding for engagement activities. The solution is that many diverse "funding streams" must be tapped in order to conduct engagement activities.²⁷ A single engagement activity such as a military exercise can draw funding from five or six diverse sources. Should one of the source funding levels be cut by bureaucrats in Washington, the entire exercise could be cancelled due to lack of funding.

USSOUTHCOM is trying different ways to solve the funding problem. Making engagement a single line item in the budget could solve most of the funding problems, however, until, the "funding streams" can be condensed into a single manageable entity and services and other agencies relinquish budgetary control, this will prove difficult.²⁸

ONDCP provides USSOUTHCOM with money and assets to conduct CD operations. Many of these CD operations are also engagement activities. Training teams for military police, formal schools for military and government officials, infrastructure improvements are all dual purpose activities which USSOUTHCOM can use funding from ONDCP to further stability while conducting counter-drug operations.

It is extremely difficult to assess the success of engagement activities. There are no easy measures of effectiveness and even harder to define what is successful. By making engagement

the foundation of the National Security Strategy, the level of interest in engagement activities by DOD, State, the Administration and Congress has been raised and the CINC must be able to articulate his engagement activities and their success.

Pragmatically, the increase in democratic governments in the region to 31 of 32 countries could be considered a validation of USSOUTHCOM's engagement efforts in the region. While U.S. engagement efforts played a vital role, it would be difficult to specifically assess while factoring in the vibrancy of global economic markets, the demise of the Soviet Union, as well as the maturation of the democratic process in those countries.

USSOUTHCOM's funding initiatives for "fencing" engagement dollars are a step in the right direction. However, DOD must bring the Theater Engagement Process (TEP) into the PPBS budgetary cycle used in developing the Defense Budget. This would permit engagement activities to be included in budget line items and consolidate the myriad of diverse funding streams CINCs are required to use in funding engagement activities in their regions.

The Theater Engagement Planning (TEP) process is viewed by USSOUTHCOM as a tool in developing engagement.²⁹ The original TEP was viewed by planners as a report not as a plan and that the report was being used as an accounting tool for existing engagement activities, not as a planning document for future engagement activities. Top-down guidance required by military planners was not provided and with the non-alignment of the TEP process with the PPBS budgetary cycle it made the development of a viable TEP difficult.

USSOUTHCOM planners embrace the TEP process as a viable method in deliberately developing an engagement plan and are recognized by OSD and JCS as being out in front of the TEP process.

D. UNITED STATES ATLANTIC COMMAND (USACOM)

USACOM's Area of Responsibility (AOR) is the most stable of all the geographic combatant commands. With the transfer of the Caribbean region to USSOUTHCOM, North America and the North Atlantic Ocean to the coastlines of Europe and Africa comprise the geographic boundaries of USACOM. Iceland and the Azores are the most important nations in the North Atlantic region with Mexico and Canada the most prominent in North America.

Comparing USACOM's engagement responsibilities to those of USSOUTHCOM and USPACOM, it is clear that Engagement does not enjoy the importance that it does in all other geographic commands. While USACOM conducts engagement activities, they are not at the top of the priority list for the CINC.

The mission of USACOM is unique amongst the geographic commanders: "... maximize future military capabilities through joint training, total force integration, and providing ready CONUS-based forces to support other CINCs, the Atlantic Theater, and domestic requirements."³⁰ The command structure is configured in order that USACOM can be trainer, integrator, and force provider for continental U.S. (CONUS) based forces.

Being tasked with multiple conventional military missions coupled with the lack of major foreign powers in the region, USACOM's efforts have been rightfully directed toward fulfilling the "trainer, integrator, and force provider" roles.³¹ Spending scarce resources to conduct engagement activities with the Azores and Iceland would not be effective use of dollars and resources.

Another competing requirement for the CINC is the fact that he is also Supreme Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) under NATO. Despite having a separate staff, the dual tasking of the CINC divides his time and focus and can cause an overlap of staff functions to occur. This is especially true since the SACLANT AOR encompasses all of the USACOM AOR and the difficulty that staffs and foreign countries have in discerning whether the CINC is wearing his SACLANT or USACOM hat. It is imperative that the engagement activities conducted by SACLANT are viewed as NATO activities, not just those of the US. Conversely, USACOM engagement activities on behalf of the U.S. government must be perceived and viewed as U.S. specific activities.

Two of USACOM service component commands also have dual roles. The Navy commander, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) and the Marine commander, Commander, Marine Forces Atlantic (COMMARFORLANT) are also the service component commanders for USSOUTHCOM. This divides staff efforts between the two CINCs and at times has two geographic CINCs competing for common assets.

Like USSOUTHCOM, USACOM participates in counter-drug operations in cooperation with ONDCP, the Coast Guard, and law enforcement agencies. Interaction with foreign

military personnel and foreign governments is a necessary part of the CD strategy with many of the activities being similar to engagement activities. Although not a major piece of the USACOM pie, these types of efforts further U.S. engagement with other countries in the region.

USACOM is the force provider for all CINCs. As aptly described in its command brief, the focus for USACOM is to be the trainer, integrator and force provider for CONUS based forces. Although engagement with Mexico and Canada are justifiable concerns, present engagement activity in the AOR is minimal and will remain that way into the near future.

E. UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND (USPACOM)

Pacific Command's (USPACOM) area of responsibility is the largest of all the U.S. combatant commanders. Containing 50 percent of the earth's surface and 56 percent of the world's population, USPACOM's ability to successfully conduct engagement activities throughout the region is the key to U.S. foreign policy in Asia.³²

The region is diverse with 43 countries, 20 territories and possessions as well as 10 U.S. territories. This group of countries runs the gamut from small underdeveloped nations to major powers such as Japan and China. Cultural and religious diversity also present unique challenges to the CINC and his staff to create a peaceful and secure relationship with all countries in the region.

From a military engagement standpoint, there are two very important demographics that must be considered. First, the region contains the six largest military forces in the world: China, US, Russia, India, North Korea and South Korea. Secondly, five of the seven worldwide U.S. mutual defense treaties are with partners in the region.³³ These are key factors in developing national level strategy in the region and ensuring the region remains stable, militarily and economically.

USPACOM has been a historic and traditional presence in the Pacific. From conducting military operations since the Second World War to rebuilding the Philippines after the war, U.S. forces have been heavily involved in engagement activities in the region. The emergence of the Asian region has increased the importance of U.S. engagement efforts. USPACOM has articulated three goals in its strategic concept for the region: "First, in peacetime, we want to

make conflicts and crises less likely. Second, in times of crises, we aim to resolve specific situations on terms that advance U.S. interests. Third, in war, we want to win quickly and decisively, with minimum loss of life and resources".³⁴

Engagement is at the forefront of the CINC's efforts in the region. In his Strategic Concept, Admiral Joseph Prueher, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command states:

Today, we put the preponderance of our resources into engagement and preparedness, which are the two ways we make conflicts and crises less likely. Engagement is our security dialogue with nations in the region and allows us to resolve security concerns before they erupt into crises or conflict.³⁵

USPACOM has put "teeth" in its commitment to Engagement. High level visits and conferences in which the CINC participates demonstrates to each country in the region that the U.S. is a full partner. A first time conference of the top military officials from 13 Asia-pacific nations was hosted by USPACOM to discuss regional security, political and economic issues.³⁶ Concurrent with this conference was a lower level meeting of Defense Attaches and military deputies discussing issues of modernization, interoperability and multilateral cooperation. Efforts such as these are the first step in establishing long term relationships with regional countries and their leaders. This is especially important in a region where most national leaders are serving in the military or the military has strong influence on the political leaders of a country. Conducting parallel meetings on differing levels of leadership ensures that USPACOM's engagement efforts touch all levels in the military structure of participating nations.

An equally important step has been taken by USPACOM in keeping engagement a priority. Establishment of the Engagement Working Group (EWG) is the first step in formalizing all engagement activities in the region. The EWG membership consisting of USPACOM staff, Department of State representatives, as well as other interested U.S. agencies meets at the "action officer" level formulating a pragmatic approach to engagement in the region.³⁷ This is especially important in the USPACOM AOR whose vast geographic area and diversity of populations and cultures require an integrated approach to all engagement activities. Results from these meetings are then factored into the TEP process enabling USPACOM to formulate and execute a realistic engagement strategy in the region.

It is imperative that USPACOM get its arms around Engagement in the region. A large permanently assigned military force, over 304,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines coupled with an aggressive engagement strategy requires focused management of those military assets in order that the engagement activities do not severely decrement USPACOM's ability to fight and win major conflicts in the region when necessary. Stretching the force thin due to engagement activities would adversely affect the readiness of personnel and equipment to respond to conflict. Unlike USEUCOM, USPACOM has the complication of maritime movement and logistics for virtually all of its engagement activities, thereby increasing costs and increasing time and effort to reconstitute its forward based forces in the event of an emerging conflict.

As with other CINCs, funding Engagement is a complex issue. The burden falls squarely on the Service component commander to find funding in tight budgets provided by the Service staffs in Washington. Added to this is the fact of the large military force structure in place in the region. U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula as well as forward-deployed forces in Japan must be kept at the highest state of readiness. These concerns coupled with the myriad of governmental and non-governmental organizations operating in the region make it difficult to consolidate all of the engagement funding streams in the region.

One of the biggest engagement successes has been USPACOM's military engagement with the People's Republic of China. The efforts by Admiral Prueher have enabled the U.S. to make inroads in dealing with the People's Liberation Army (PLA), as well as the Chinese government. During a November 1998 speech at Fudan University, Shanghai, China, Admiral Prueher captured the developing relationship between the two nations.

... Our military and political relationship evolved, from a low point with no communication between our military leaders in March 1996, to where it is today—good and improving at a steady pace. General Zhang Wannian described this relationship as a treasure, not easily won, but of great worth. ... Finally, in a more general way, our two nations should strive to increase engagement at all levels of society—governmental, non-governmental, business, military, religious, and private—again at a proper pace.³⁸

USPACOM's long range strategic plan for engagement has also taken into account the dynamic nature of engagement. Disaster and humanitarian relief are two areas which can suddenly change the focus of engagement planners. No one can predict what natural disasters will occur two to five years in the future. Yet, when these occur, the CINC is called upon to

provide relief to those nations suffering this devastation. USPACOM planners "hedge" their bets when developing Theater Engagement Plans, by building "what if" scenarios into plans. Doing this in conjunction with the Engagement Working Group permits a regional focus on the action that will be taken should humanitarian or disaster efforts be required. More importantly, it permits equipment, personnel and funding to be quickly allocated to permit rapid responses in those situations.

Innovation and aggressiveness have marked USPACOM's engagement strategy. From the Commander to the staff, Engagement has been placed at the forefront of strategic thinking in the theater. This attitude coupled with the skill in conducting engagement activities in the region give strength to Engagement as a third pillar of the National Military Strategy.

V. ASSESSING THE ENGAGEMENT PROCESS

When looking at the engagement process we must determine exactly where we stand in the pursuit of a comprehensive and aggressive engagement plan. We will discuss the pitfalls the TEP implementation process, the common concerns about an increased emphasis on engagement, and the need to maintain the engagement emphasis.

Engagement is not a new concept or mission for the U.S. military. Historically, when not fighting the nation's wars, all branches of the military services have vigorously conducted engagement activities. However, the formalization of a planning process for engagement by the Department of Defense is proving to be a challenge for policy makers on the national level as well as the combatant commanders and their staffs who are implementing this new process. Assessing the Theater Engagement Planning process is critical in the validation of Engagement as a third pillar of the National Military Strategy. In order to provide a meaningful assessment of the TEP process, the following areas must be examined: Initial implementation of the TEP process, developing a global engagement plan, oversight of the TEP process, and funding and managing engagement.

A. INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION

Initial implementation of the TEP process required each CINC develop a plan in the format provided by the Joint Staff in CJCS 3113.10, TEP Manual in just seven months.³⁹ Michele Flournoy, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, stated that there was a need to "operationalize" engagement in order to legitimize the shaping activities conducted by the U.S. military translating strategy articulated in the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and the QDR into a viable standardized engagement plan for all CINCs.⁴⁰ Defense leaders were willing to accept costs and problems connected with a condensed implementation of the TEP process.⁴¹

As with most new and formidable undertakings, OSD and the Joint Staff knew that the perfect was the enemy of the good. Getting a significant new program like the Theater

Engagement Planning process off the ground with the complete agreement of the CINCs, the Joint Staff and the relevant Department of Defense (DOD) branches would take years. The decision was made that the most efficient method to initiate the process was to implement the program, get the initial feedback, and rectify flaws in the process.

A logical question to ask is "Why was there a rapid requirement to make CINCs develop a Theater Engagement Plan if it is not to be a part of larger overarching Global Engagement Plan?" The answer is "We needed to get shaping on the radar screen and the next step was to go for quality and results."⁴² Clearly, the time is here to begin to assess and refine the TEP process.

Clear and concise guidance is absolutely necessary when implementing a new concept and resulting plan. With engagement emerging in importance in the National Military Strategy, providing the CINCs who implement the plan with proper guidance is vital for successful implementation. OSD and the Joint Staff did not want to give "too much guidance" thereby inhibiting the innovation and independence required by the CINCs who would be implementing this revised strategy.⁴³

Interestingly, some CINCs held another view of this rapid implementation process. Instead of "too much guidance", there was no detailed strategic "top down" guidance to the CINCs about the TEP process.⁴⁴ Fundamental concepts such as precisely defining engagement, discussing how and why engagement differed in the post-Cold War environment and explaining the nuances of why engagement was being elevated in the National Security Strategy were not provided to the CINCs and their staffs. The Prioritized Regional Objectives (PROs) developed by OSD, and provided in the JCSP for use by the CINCs in developing their TEPs, did not reflect the new focus and level of effort expected of the CINCs in developing their plans. Additionally, the CINCs would retain the right to approve their own plans. Consequently, CINC planning staffs viewed the new reporting requirement with apprehension. Left to fill in the reasons for the new requirement, staffs viewed the TEP as either micromanagement or justification of their activities, or an opportunity for OSD and the Joint Staff to justify realignment of scarce resources.

Military planners are well versed in working with the deliberate planning process, which provides commander's guidance and intent as well as feedback during the development of a plan.

Giving broad-brushed guidance does not fulfill the necessary vision required by subordinates in plan development. Developing an engagement plan crossing agency and service boundaries, requires extensive coordination and a common vision. In attempting to overcome the bureaucratic inertia in implementing this new program, the CINCs were not provided adequate strategic guidance and feedback during the initial development and implementation of the TEP process. If OSD and the Joint Staff desired new thoughts and new approaches to theater engagement, new and deliberate guidance was necessary. CINCs had been pursuing Engagement; a new requirement needed to delineate new reasoning and benefits to the CINCs if new approaches and actions were to be expected.

B. DEVELOPING A GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT PLAN

Successful global engagement in a period of limited resources requires a coordinated approach for all engagement activities conducted by the U.S. Government. Many government agencies, State Department, individual Services, and individual Department of Defense support staffs have ongoing regional programs, many of which are not coordinated with the regional CINC.⁴⁵ This sets up a situation where a promise of money, services, or equipment has been given to a foreign government and the CINC is neither aware nor is able to carry out these commitments. When the services, equipment, or money is not delivered this sets up “failed expectations” on the part of the foreign government and the CINC is left to deal with the dissatisfied foreign government.

During the initial formulation of the TEP process, OSD never intended to implement a “global” engagement plan by taking inputs from each CINC and establishing an overarching prioritized list of engagement activities,⁴⁶ even though the Joint Staff Theater Level Planning Instruction 3113.01 states:

“The national level plan review ensures that planned engagement activities in the aggregate support national objectives. A second major purpose of the national review process is to ensure that engagement activities in the various theaters are, from a global perspective, sustainable”.⁴⁷

The foundation of the TEP development process was to provide Prioritized Regional Objectives (PRO) for each CINC and then to "flesh out" these objectives into a viable TEP meeting the reporting requirements in the TEP Manual.⁴⁸ Every CINC conducts engagement activities, and will continue to conduct engagement activities, whether they are tasked to do so or not. If they are to get the most return on their engagement dollar, they need to know that other agencies and government entities with interests in their region are receiving the same guidance as well as pursuing the same goals.

PROs need to receive the kind of review process that is required of the CINCs. As the foundation of CINC engagement planning, PROs need to have the requisite level of approval and oversight that reflects the priority of effort expected in the region. If the goal of the TEP is to structure and focus CINC and executive agent activities in their AOR, then the vision and focus provided to the CINC needs to be commensurate with the level of effort expected in their pursuit of that vision. More importantly, their efforts need to support, and be supported by, all other efforts in the region.

CINCs were originally given seven months to develop initial TEPs for submission to the Joint Staff and OSD for review and comment. Final approval authority resided with the CINC. So, the process was for the CINC to develop a TEP, submit it to the Joint Staff and OSD for comment and review, have it returned to the CINC for approval and then sent back to the Joint Staff and OSD for inclusion in a "family" of plans.⁴⁹ Even with the new planning horizon aligning the TEP process with the PPBS cycle, this is a formidable reporting requirement.

This process for TEP development is cumbersome and is a significant bureaucratic undertaking. If there was never an intent to provide a Global Engagement Plan, then requiring the CINCs to develop a TEP in a detailed reporting format would lead to the conclusion that the TEP requirement was in fact nothing but a bureaucratic reporting requirement placed upon the regional CINCs.

C. OVERSIGHT OF THE TEP PROCESS

Permitting the CINC to retain approval authority indicates a lack of commitment to Engagement as in the foundation of the National Security Strategy. Without oversight and

coordination from National Command Authorities and absent a significant commitment of resources to Engagement, the TEP process is viewed as a process without any real reward. Final TEPs are lengthy documents containing many intricate and seemingly small details of engagement activities. The initial step in the TEP process was the submission of a Strategic Concept by each CINC. The concept provided a broad description of the CINC's goals and regional specific engagement strategies. Every CINC has produced an outstanding document outlining his theater strategies and how they will be accomplished.⁵⁰ These documents tend to be manageable, with sufficient detail for policy makers and policy implementers to accomplish the CINC's goals. The inclusion of a myriad of tables and charts make the TEP voluminous and difficult to review.

Policy experts at the Joint Staff and OSD can effectively review a CINC's Strategic Concept. However, reviewing a CINC's 500 page TEP is difficult to do and is an almost impossible task for a limited staff to accomplish. CINC staffs have created engagement shops of 4-8 people out of already overextended staffs and when they are combined with the staffs of service component commanders, this result is a staff of 12-20 people to produce and review a TEP.⁵¹ The plans from the five theater CINCs are then submitted to the Joint Staff and OSD, where a staff of 4-6 people total, review these five 500 page documents and provide comment. Subject matter experts (regional specialists and budget analysts) are called on to assist but the tasking falls primarily to a small group of people who work in the Strategy Divisions at the Joint Staff and OSD.

D. FUNDING ENGAGEMENT

Much of the data contained in the TEP is also provided by other means to OSD. This is primarily done between service components (CINCLANTFLT, US ARMY EUROPE) in theater and the parent service staff (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps). Because engagement activities are conducted by many agencies and have a myriad of funding streams, it is difficult to "bundle" engagement activities in a neat box to determine exact funding levels. By forcing the CINCs to include detailed charts and other information in the TEP, it makes it easier for policy and budget analysts to go to the TEP to obtain data. However, this results in a

complicated TEP that is at times unwieldy for those reviewing and using the TEP as the basis for decisions on engagement activities.

Engagement was made the increased focus of National Military Strategy without a corresponding increase in funding levels for engagement activities.⁵² Making Engagement of equal importance to Prepare and Respond missions assigned in the National Military Strategy, places funding of Engagement in direct competition for scarce defense dollars with traditional military programs (force structure, quality of life, etc.).

Historically, CINCs have used a variety of means to fund engagement. CINC's Initiative Funds, passing funding requirements to service components, using other Cabinet Departments (State Department, Commerce Department, Office of National Drug Control Policy) funds are just some of the ways that CINCs "cobble" together funding to do engagement. A relatively simple bilateral military exercise may have four or five funding streams associated with the exercise. Cancellation of one of the funding streams can cause the entire exercise to fail. A program that is considered small and inconsequential by budget analysts in Washington may be the only engagement activity scheduled for a small country. Cancellation or reduction of funding by the Service Staff or OSD could result in the activity being cancelled, thereby, leaving the CINC to deal with the "failed expectations" of a small country which lost its only opportunity to deal with the U.S. military.

CINCs are trying to overcome the lack of dedicated funding for engagement. USSOUTHCOM's attempt to "fence" funding for engagement is a common sense step in the right direction. USPACOM's Engagement Working Group is a forum where funding and policy issues come together for resolution. If the CINCs are to be tasked to conduct engagement activities, consolidation of funding streams is required. Additionally, the CINC should be given the flexibility and latitude to simplify funding and target funds in support of the Theater Engagement Strategy.

Simplifying the funding for engagement provides the CINC with the ability to translate engagement to force structure with the Service Staffs. Compared to equipment and personnel procurement, engagement is inexpensive, garnering "more bang for the buck."⁵³ Procuring one less multi-million dollar fighter or one less multi-million dollar ship frees enough funding to pay for the entire engagement budget for all of the CINCs. Senior decision-makers must weigh the

consequences of buying more Engagement at the expense of decrementing readiness and the corresponding ability to respond.

E. MANAGING ENGAGEMENT

As previously mentioned, CINCs have been conducting engagement activities for years. During the Cold War, the containment strategy consisted of engagement activities with countries to contain the spread of Communism and to spread democratic values. These activities continue today. Humanitarian assistance, military-to-military contacts, visits by U.S. military to a country, foreign military sales, and disaster relief are just some of the activities in which U.S. military forces are involved. These diverse activities come under the control of multiple agencies and Cabinet level departments and must be included in the TEP process if they are to be given proper priority and visibility.

All CINCs have taken steps to "get their arms around" the myriad of activities. USSOUTHCOM convenes conferences for each region (Latin America and the Caribbean) which invites the participation of the Deputy Chiefs of Mission (DCM) for each country (representing the U.S. Ambassador for that country) as well as other agencies which are conducting activities using or affecting U.S. military forces. USEUCOM conducts a similar conference. USPACOM has established an Engagement Working Group to incorporate inputs from all the participants in the region.

Despite the CINCs efforts, there are still problems with getting control over all the activities in a region. High level visits from Department of Defense and Service (Army, Navy, Air Force, and USMC) officials often result in commitments or promises outside the CINC's purview. This leaves countries with certain expectations that the U.S. military will make well on these promises. Because of his regional responsibility, the logical executor for the U.S. is usually the CINC. The receiving country deals with CINC and his staff on a frequent basis and expects that the CINC will honor promises made by high authority. Should the CINC not be informed of U.S. commitments made by officials outside the CINC's span of control, the potential for "failed expectations" exists.

U.S. military engagement activities are important to recipient states. A seemingly small activity such as a ship visit has great visibility in small country. The prestige of having a U.S. Navy ship visit plus the thousands of dollars garnered by the local economy is a windfall for many small underdeveloped nations. Should this be promised by officials outside the CINC's span of control without the CINC's knowledge, the commitment has been made for the CINC to fulfill. If the CINC and his Naval Component Commander do not schedule the port visit, then the U.S. has in fact had a "failed expectation" in the eyes of the host nation.

This small example demonstrates the difficulty for the CINCs in getting their arms around all of the engagement activities in an AOR. Although, the CINC may not know what has been promised from outside his AOR, he is held responsible by the countries within the AOR for delivering on all U.S. commitments regardless of what agency made them.

VI. DEBATING ENGAGEMENT

Not everyone associated with the national security interests of the U.S. is enamored with the increased importance of Engagement in the National Security Strategy. This section will examine arguments made by opponents of increasing the importance of Engagement in the national security arena.

The most common indictment of engagement is that the military was established to “fight and win” America’s wars and anything detracting from that mission is dangerous for National Security. Peacetime engagement activities have provided direct competition for scarce defense dollars to maintaining the ability to fight and win two major theater wars near simultaneously.

Current Defense budget debates on Capitol Hill reflects the tension between proponents and opponents of engagement. The principle argument made against getting more actively engaged is that to do so would be detrimental to the military’s ability to maintain readiness. Increased peacetime engagement activities require forces to be in more places simultaneously, increasing the operational rotation of units to conduct engagement missions and reducing training and maintenance periods, causing a degradation in the material condition of equipment and combat skills of the military forces.

In a recent Navy Times article a synopsis of recent readiness problems were provided. “Here’s what the service chiefs say the president’s planned defense budget will buy; diminished combat readiness; old, less reliable equipment; deteriorating housing; a sinking Navy fleet; and empty personnel billets”.

This gloomy forecast is directly attributed to the increase in overseas operations and the inability to forecast what will come next. In the same article Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak stated that “near term readiness is putting a severe strain on future readiness. Our equipment is old, it breaks down more often, spares are in short supply and they’re expensive.” Additionally, the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson stated “that readiness on forward deployed ships remains high but readiness at home is too low” and that “funding of Navy operations overseas may be inadequate.”⁵⁴

Another argument against embracing Engagement is that its elevation in the National Security Strategy was a reflex reaction by the administration to placate Congressional concerns about frequent U.S. involvement overseas. There was never any intention on behalf of the administration to build a comprehensive engagement plan or the provision for additional funding streams for engagement activities. This lack of commitment on the part of the Administration clearly demonstrates that they were not fully committed to a more encompassing engagement strategy.

Engagement is difficult not merely for the military but for American policy makers as well. Recent public debates on the proper response to terrorist attacks in Africa and U.S. military support ground operations highlight some of these concerns. The embassy attacks raised questions on both policy and military fronts. Are our embassies properly protected? Do we need all our current embassies? Did the military respond with the proper force? Should we have sent in Special Forces to insure the terrorist threat was reduced, or was the relatively sterile cruise missile campaign sufficient? These questions highlight the issues underlying continued U.S. Engagement and the need for the administration to insure its commitment to the policy of engagement is well voiced to the American people and not just in the aftermath of international incidents, but as the basis for American involvement globally. The lack of American consensus can be seen in the feeling among many in government that if we just ride out this fad a new administration may very well set a new agenda.

Engagement is a difficult political issue. No one in government is elected for their commitment to foreign affairs. Foreign affairs are easy political targets. They lack a constituency, expend funds outside the borders of the U.S. on problems we have internally, - drugs, famine, education, crime - and frequently have so many diverse issues associated with them that finding a counter-argument is relatively easy. As the budget deficit rose, monies expended on international programs and military budgets were among the first to realize substantial cuts, indicating their relative priority in the domestic agenda.

A withdrawal from Engagement will make it all the more difficult to reengage on the world stage, creating global uncertainty in our motives and commitments. Once forces have been withdrawn, will the U.S. remain committed to a strong military, or begin to reevaluate the

size and shape of forces necessary to meet an isolationist agenda? Can we expect other nations to support security interests and concerns if we withdraw and neglect theirs?

There are those who argue that reduced military threats abroad relate to a reduced military and that what is really needed is an increase in the non-military instruments of Engagement. No one who believes in foreign affairs believes that the current level of support is sufficient. Increases in funding for the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), support to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Peace Corps and all other foreign support budgets should be increased and developed in concert with a U.S. global engagement policy. The weakness of this argument is that without a direct constituency these programs are tenuous in the long run. When faced with educational and medical reform, Congress will sacrifice the programs providing funds outside the border with no direct return to the citizen taxpayer. Not only is military engagement critical for the reasons expressed earlier, but also dollars spent on defense support American industries and American personnel – two factors that will affect continued Congressional support for engagement activities.

Increasing the importance of Engagement also has the potential to diminish the roles of the Service Chiefs and their individual services. Service Chiefs are required by Title X to “provide, equip, and train” which means they are responsible for readiness. “The Services continue to focus institutionally on the possibility of future wars, whatever the current situation in the world and engagement of U.S. forces day-to-day therein.”⁵⁵ With a relatively fixed defense budget, increasing funding for Engagement will impact funding for readiness. This will cause a tension between the regional CINCs and the Service Chiefs.

A strong feeling exists that the recent multitude of smaller scale military operations diverts resources away from our real national security needs – fighting and winning our nation’s wars. These operations deflect the military from its task of establishing a division of responsibility with allies in which they engage in the smaller scale stability operations, while we provide the defense against larger threats. These arguments arise during discussions of both force readiness and the need for more focus on homeland defense. The underlying concern centers on resource availability – not just hardware, but personnel resources. Increases in the military budget to rectify hardware shortfalls, the follow-on proposed pay increase, and military bill-of-rights also are all steps in the right direction. Recognition now needs to be made that long-term smaller

scale operations require more resources than planners have historically allocated. Open-ended commitments require open-ended funding. Further, to support allies' small-scale operations while being prepared to step in the face of a larger, or escalated, threat necessitates U.S. interoperability with foreign forces and a comprehensive understanding of foreign military capabilities. This understanding can only be gained first hand through exercise and operational observation – through Engagement with foreign militaries. It is not reasonable to assume that regional access will be granted for a major regional threat when the U.S. has not been engaged with allies in the region while responding to lesser threats.

One of the difficulties with Engagement is measuring its effectiveness – the return on our investment. Regardless, the successes of Engagement are numerous. Our cooperation and outreach to Russia and China may not preclude global competition in the future, but recent support of the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs has helped stem the spread of nuclear technology and removed nuclear weapons from the Former Soviet Republics. The friendships and open communication developed at the Marshall Center are building relationships that transcend U.S. involvement, but not interests, in the region. US-Japanese relationships are as strong as ever. China increasingly seeks cooperation over confrontation and even amid the economic turmoil of the Pacific Rim, the U.S. remains the ally of choice. Democracy in Latin America is at an all time high even as narco-terrorism remains a major regional concern. Even Africa, the traditionally ignored continent is receiving the benefits of engagement with the initiation of the African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) and the Bilateral Cooperation Committee between the U.S. and South Africa and chaired by the Vice Presidents of both countries. The continued support of Egypt for U.S. efforts in the Middle East cannot be ignored and is clearly a result of a continual program of support and Engagement on many levels.

Many argue that post-Cold War military interaction would seem to emphasize cooperation avenues contrary to the human rights, economic and environmental concerns which should be the impetus of our international relations. These are all legitimate concerns, but a stable environment is absolutely necessary prior to the implementation of other agendas. Relations with China would be vastly different had Kissinger and Nixon not opened discussions during the Cold War. If Brazil were practicing genocide on its neighbors, discussions of rain forest devastation would not hold its position of preeminence in global environmental discussions.

Military engagement is essential to building the cooperative and peaceful world in which our values and interests can thrive.

Critics of Engagement feel there too many competing requirements for scarce defense dollars. For each dollar spent that is not spent on building a building and maintaining a capable fighting force, there is a significant decrement to the readiness of personnel and equipment. We cannot permit this to happen if we are to maintain our main role in fighting and winning our nation's wars.

With the passing of containment, the alternative to engagement is isolationism. Some make the argument that the U.S. should simply set itself apart from the international stage, bring our forces home and wait for the 911 call that energizes our national conscience. No amount of engagement will forestall all the global conflicts possible in the coming years. Let the rest of the world focus its efforts on peacekeeping and stabilization actions; the U.S. will remain the preeminent military power on the planet deterring extended conflict through the promise of swift and devastating retaliation. This presupposes the United States remains strong, playing a leading role in international relations because no other nation can remotely match our military and economic vitality. In fact – taken in isolation the United States would lose a major part of its ability to lead and influence events. A large part of the international power America wields is due to international recognition that our leadership is essential to building and maintaining stable regional environments.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The engagement strategy is the right strategy, providing the ability to best shape the international environment. The 1998 National Security Strategy begins by underlining the "Imperative of Engagement"⁵⁶ by the United States in the world, establishing the vision of an America that is "exerting leadership abroad" to deter aggression, foster the resolution of conflicts, strengthen democracies, open foreign markets and tackle global problems such as protecting the environment.⁵⁷ United States interaction on the global stage is critical to the well being of the nation in the future. Only by engaging with foreign governments and international organizations can the United States take an active role in the development and maintenance of the governments and institutions insuring the continued security and stability of the vital interests of the United States.

Increasingly these relationships are interconnected and cannot be viewed and exercised in isolation. China benefits from the stability our presence brings to Asia. Continued support of the Middle East Peace process and Egyptian - Israeli relations maintains U.S. presence in the Middle East. U.S. presence in the Middle East protects China's largest oil supply. We rely on China's cooperation to prevent war in Korea, to help halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction and build an environment of stability in the former Soviet central Asia. Only global leadership through superpower action can develop and reinforce the international relationships, which provide the needed world stability.

The United States military, as in the past, will play a fundamental role in achieving this vision. The goal is to shape and interact with all aspects of society and the military's role is one of primacy due to its daily interaction with foreign militaries and governments through its forward presence and international commitments. Additionally, in times of rapidly developing international events, the military has the ability to rapidly project the resources necessary to influence events.

The situation in world affairs is so unique that the time is right for bold steps in international Engagement. The corollary is that bold steps incur greater risk, and the risk assumed in military operations is expressed in the loss of American lives. A rallying cry of the

post-Cold War military is, “No more Task Force Smiths” recalling the hollow and unprepared force that initially responded to the North Korean invasion of South Korea. This rallying cry is useful in maintaining focus on force readiness, but should not prevent the force from exploring new avenues of global security when the opportunity presents itself. General Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his forward to the National Military Strategy, while embracing the “imperative of engagement,” speaks of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous wars as our foremost task.

In the post-Cold War world, Engagement requires leadership on the global stage, an active enterprise of shaping the international environment, not only for U.S. direct interests, but also indirect interests represented by our allies and organizational commitments. This requires a commitment to interoperability, developing effective allies, and relying on their support for regional conflicts. This commitment requires a commensurate willingness to seriously review future procurement decisions with an eye toward these goals. Reducing the latest fighter, ship or bomber buy in lieu of developing a rapidly deployable infrastructure support force – the restructured engineer or Seabee Battalion with a developed NGO coordination cell – or just not taking that technological leap that will make interoperability with our allies more difficult are the types of decisions necessary to inculcate Engagement in the national security psyche.

International decisiveness is another reason for U.S. engagement – Bosnia and Kosovo being excellent examples. The U.S. must play a leadership role if allies are to act decisively even though our national interests are not directly affected. A policy of greater burden sharing by our international partners frequently requires that we do more, or exercise our leadership by example.

Leadership on the global stage means persevering when friends and allies do not meet our expectations. It means realizing that burdens will not be fairly shared and countries will seek to reap the benefits of U.S. Engagement while shirking their costs, even though they have much more at stake in the issue. Indeed, as we saw in the recent reticence by Middle East nations to support air-strikes in support of U.N. sanctions violations in Iraq, the U.S. may find itself acting unilaterally while losing regional support.

Significant return on the “imperative of engagement” involves significant risk, but the risks can be reduced. Leadership requires a clearly articulated national position with identified

resources and responsible oversight. Boldness and risk requires national commitment by all national elements of power. This commitment must come "top down" from the President, providing vision and intent for conducting and accounting for engagement activities and must be consistent and coherent across all service and departmental boundaries.

U.S. Engagement is critical to world stability and interdependency. While the world is far from peaceful and in many ways more dangerous than during the Cold War, the opportunity to reap great rewards from bold Engagement steps is now. If we withdraw and wait for the call to support, the call will come. It will come soon and it will come often and not on our terms. Engagement is the leadership role the United States must play and the time is now for bold leadership.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

If the nation is to sincerely embrace the "Imperative of Engagement" and Theater Engagement Plans are to provide a positive method for achieving the results envisioned by this newly articulated strategy, several actions must undertaken.

The first and most important recommendation is that the President and National Security Council provide visible support for Engagement as a foundation of the National Security Strategy. This requires tangible political capital; a major address to the nation about what America's national interests are in the Post Cold War world; a call for increased spending in the foreign affairs accounts; the development of a global engagement plan with priorities and resource allocations; and a new structure within the government to oversee this new initiative.

To make the engagement strategy more effective, there must be a Global Engagement Plan, which would be integrated and coordinated across regional Areas of Responsibility, prioritizing U.S. efforts around the world. A coherent, globally integrated strategy approach permits a more efficient expenditure of national resources in support of Engagement.

Supporting the global engagement plan in a constantly changing world, with limited resources, requires a program of continual monitoring, feedback, and evaluation of activities to insure the most return for limited engagement resources. This requires a full time effort from a dedicated interagency staff. Government agencies actively involved in engagement need to establish primary duty offices and personnel to accomplish these tasks. Much like the framework adopted by USEUCOM, a structured hierarchy of interagency working groups needs to be established to oversee the execution of the global plan.

The regional CINCs must have clear and adequate guidance, based on a coherent global strategy, ensuring that their prioritized engagement activities are being conducted to shape the international environment in support of U.S. interests. Without guidance, each CINC will be left to extrapolate his own answers in executing the national strategy, resulting in a less coherent and efficient implementation.

The Secretary of Defense must support the global prioritization of effort through the Prioritized Regional Objectives. PROs need to be developed and coordinated through the interagency process and personally approved by the SECDEF. TEPs developed by the CINCs

to support the PROs need to be approved by the SECDEF, not simply reviewed. If global engagement is to remain viable, it will be necessary to reallocate resources among CINCs on a regular basis. Without CINC accountability to the SECDEF for understanding and support of the global plan, the CINCs become separate players, rather than players on a global team pursuing a coherent national strategy. Lacking guidance, there is no framework for prioritizing scarce resources that must be expended to achieve the vision. Clear, unambiguous guidance provides the foundation for efficiently pursuing and achieving the vision.

Concepts and guidance should flow "top down" with feedback coming from "bottom up". CINCs are experts on their region and engagement and their inputs are very important to the process. USSOUTHCOM, USEUCOM, and USPACOM efforts reflect the engagement initiatives that the CINCs are pursuing (Engagement working groups, meetings with Deputy Chiefs of Mission, Joint Contact Teams, etc.). The CINCs are now consulting other key players involved in planning and executing the strategy, but greater integration must take place. It is as important to know about other initiatives at the execution level as it is at the planning level.

Funding engagement will prove to be the most difficult obstacle to be overcome. Michele Flournoy stated the "TEP is used for evaluating/resolving resource issues." This cannot be properly done if the initial steps taken to align the PPBS cycle with TEP cycle are not brought to fruition. Additionally, due to the constantly changing nature of world affairs and the ongoing desire for engagement activities, there is a need for a source of funding set aside for emergent engagement activities. Like CINC Initiative Funds (CIF), these funds would be available on request for activities that do not align with the budgeting cycle. When Cuba opens up, or the next major environmental disaster occurs, a source of funding should be available immediately without curtailing previously approved activities in other theaters.

Consolidation of funding streams for engagement is required if the CINCs are to be given proper control over engagement activities. USSOUTHCOM's efforts to "fence" engagement funding under a single budget line item appear to be a step in the right direction. DOD must provide the means to consolidate funding from diverse sources (Service budgets, Department of State, ONDCP and others) and translate it to engagement activities within a CINC's AOR. CINCs should not have to cobble together disparate funding sources in implementing their

strategies. The current process is inefficient and doesn't provide the resource predictability required by a CINC in the development and execution of his Theater Engagement Plan.

Current conditions and attitudes are right for fortifying the Engagement foundation of U.S. national security. CINCs and their staffs, as well as interagency representatives, are actively and innovatively working engagement issues. This momentum must be maintained if engagement is to remain the focus of the National Security Strategy. However, the momentum will falter if the TEP process is not reformed. Development of the TEP is a huge administrative burden for all CINCs. Unlike deliberate war plans, in order to remain viable TEPs need to be constantly reviewed and updated. Currently, this work is being done as a collateral duty in most J-5 planning shops. This will produce the required document, but not the desired new approaches and dynamic engagement activities. New shops and new energies are required. In order for CINCs, Service Staffs and other government agencies to invest in new offices and personnel, there needs to be a commitment to provide a return on the investment. This return has to be tangible. It has to take the form of more input on the development of policy in the region, justification for forward presence levels and greater coordination among all government activities.

Failure to boldly implement the new engagement strategy will not destabilize the current world situation, or have long term adverse effects on U.S. national security. We, as a nation could proceed along in much the same manner as we have for the past ten years and remain secure well into the millenium. But business as usual will result in a missed opportunity. We argue that the time for bold action to insure security into the foreseeable future is now. The national level dialog and formal direction is promulgated – its time to implement the tasking.

Barring a commitment by at the very least the SECDEF to identify and resource global engagement, the administrative requirements placed upon the CINCs in CJCSM 3110.1M must be simplified. The TEP should consist of "fleshed out" strategic concepts. Specific budget data and other burdensome administrative requirements that are reported in other forum must be eliminated. In doing so, this makes the TEP a workable document, useful to policy makers in developing both regional and global visions for engagement. Costing and budget data should be dealt with separately. If the burdensome administrative requirements remain, the TEP process will become bogged down.

The tremendous investment in time and effort to produce the plan in the detail required is not justified without a commensurate level effort from OSD to support the plans. Without a commitment to support of long term planning and resourcing, the plan becomes just another way to monitor and comment on ongoing activities while adjusting resource allocations based on current crises rather than deliberate planning. Do it right, or do away with the TEP and leave the CINCs to pursue engagement as they have in the past. Ultimately, the commander on the ground has the best sense of what is necessary to accomplish the mission.

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