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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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CONTENTS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- British Support for Palestinian Rights Discussed
(Muhammad Ma'tuq; AL-MAJALLAH, 4-10 Sep 82) 1

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

- Consequences of PLO's Dispersal Discussed
(Farid al-Khatib; AL-HAWADITH, 3 Sep 82) 5

EGYPT

- Sequestration Procedures, Objectives Explained
(Various sources, various dates) 9

Officials Discuss Sequestration Measures,
by Siham 'Abd-al-'Aal
'Ismat al-Sadat Property Sequestered, by
Husayn al-Habruk

- Causes of Widening Food Security Gap in 1970's Examined
(AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI, 6 Sep 82) 17

- Comment on Rapprochement Between Leftists, Religious Groups
(Muhammad Sa'd; AL-SIYASI, 12 Sep 82) 24

IRAN

- Iran-U.S. Trade Relations Analyzed
(Mohamed Mas'ud Tabataba'i; AL-DUSTUR, 6 Sep 82) 26

- Development of Cooperation, Close Ties With PDRK
(JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI, various dates) 35

Cooperation Welcomed
President Discusses Palestine
Korean Division Blamed on U.S.

IRAN

New Algerian Envoy in Tehran Interviewed on Important Issues ('Abdolhamid Aljali Interview; ETTELA'AT, 20 Oct 82)	42
Emigre Paper Analyzes Negative Role of Clergy (E'DAM, 15 Oct 82)	48
Risks to Gulf Oil Exports Discussed (A. H. Larnaka; NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, 15 Oct 82)	51

ISRAEL

Air Force Commander 'Ivri Plays Down War Successes (David 'Ivri Interview; DAVAR, 17 Sep 82)	53
General Maimon Promoted (MA'ARIV, 22 Sep 82)	62

MAURITANIA

Health Projects for Masses Supported (CHAAB, various dates)	63
Rural Health Projects Health Development Projects	

SYRIA

Economic Pressures, Difficulties Discussed ('Abd-al-Qadir Qaddurah Interview; TISHRIN, 17 Oct 82)	70
---	----

TUNISIA

Revision of Civil Service Statute Contemplated (M'hamed Ali Naffati, Habib El Beji; DIALOGUE, 11 Oct 82) ...	80
Unions Disturbed by Economy's Poor Performance (LE MONDE, 19 Oct 82)	85
Joint Discussions on Renewable Sources of Energy Held (Wajdi Saihi; DIALOGUE, 11 Oct 82)	87

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRITISH SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIAN RIGHTS DISCUSSED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 134, 4-10 Sep 82 p 27

[Article by Muhammad Ma'tuq: "British Assume Leadership Position in Steering European Public Opinion toward Support for Palestinian Rights and in Condemning the Invasion of Lebanon"]

[Text] Demonstrations and meetings condemning Israel's invasion of Lebanon and supporting the rights of the Palestinian people and their representative [body], the PLO, which took place in Britain in the past 3 months were an expression of the broad support that exists among the British people for the question of the Palestinian people and their right to establish their state. These demonstrations and meetings illustrated a shift in British public opinion away from the unlimited support for Israel. A poll conducted by the British (MURI) organization, which is well-known for the integrity and objectivity of its surveys, announced this shift in the figures it released last week. These figures revealed that a majority of the British support putting an end to the state of homelessness which the Palestinian people have been experiencing since the creation of Israel. The majority of the British support the hopes Palestinians have of having an independent state that would be established in accordance with the well-known 1947 Partition Resolution.

The results of the (MURI) poll showed that British public opinion was more interested in the affairs of the Middle East than western public opinion was in general, with the exception of France, which has not yet spoken in a similar popular poll. However, it is expected that France will provide Britain with tough competition for first place on the list of those who are interested in the political situation in the Middle East and in supporting the rights of Palestinians.

Whereas a poll conducted by the West German magazine QUICK showed that most Germans were neutral regarding the struggle in the Middle East and that their hostility toward Israel and toward its aggressive policy was growing, other polls in the United States showed that only 36 percent of the U.S. public were interested in what was taking place in the Arab region. U.S. polls showed that the shift away from support for Israel was hardly noticeable. The ratio of Americans who support the Palestinians has remained unchanged: it was 18 percent before the Israeli invasion, and it continued to be 18 percent after the latest cease-fire in Beirut and the agreement over the withdrawal of Palestinian forces.

The (MURI) poll was conducted between 14 and 17 August. [A total of] 1,061 adult Britons were questioned; 51 percent of them were men. Those who were polled came from 54 electoral districts all over Britain. The poll was conducted at the request and initiative of the director of the PLO office in London, Mr Nabil al-Ramlawi. This fact, however, did not affect the objectivity of the poll, as the organization itself declares and as principal British newspapers affirm. These newspapers had previously worked with the forementioned polling organization.

In a statement to AL-MAJALLAH al-Ramlawi stated that what caused him to request the public opinion poll on British attitudes toward Palestinians and their rights were the results of the contacts he had made with most British members of parliament in the conservative, labor and coalition parties--the liberals and the social democrats. Al-Ramlawi had also made contacts with the leaders of these parties and with numerous labor union councils. Al-Ramlawi added, "It became quite evident from these contacts that even Israel's supporters were opposed to the invasion of Lebanon. It became evident that political and trade union forces in Britain that have and exercise their clout were beginning to look at Israel differently than they did before.

The Results

Al-Ramlawi related a significant incident. On the day before the last cease-fire was announced--the day which had seen the most violent Israeli bombardment of Beirut--a British member of parliament contacted al-Ramlawi. That man had visited the Middle East area about 7 months earlier with a British parliamentary delegation. The British member of parliament told al-Ramlawi, "The voters in my district were very critical of me when I returned from my visit to Beirut and the West Bank. I felt that my political future was in danger. But now, the situation has turned around completely. Now my district supports me and you fully. This is a clear indication that British public opinion has shifted in your favor."

What can one find in the results of the poll?

The most notable fact about this poll is the fact that the highest ratio of those who were polled--39 percent--support the British government's recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This recognition has not yet been expressed [officially]. [The poll also showed that] a vast majority of British citizens--61 percent--support the PLO's participation in any talks that would be held in the future for a peaceful settlement.

Only a small percentage of British citizens--26 percent--accept the state of homelessness in which Palestinians have continued to live since the creation of Israel. Among those who were polled they outnumber Israel's supporters by one percent. However, this ratio declines to 22 percent when partition is the subject [of discussion] and to 21 percent when the subject is the establishment of a democratic state on all of Palestine. On the opposite side, 54 percent of British citizens are opposed to the notion that Palestinians continue to live as refugees in camps in other countries; 55 percent support the creation of a Palestinian and a Jewish state after the repartitioning of Palestine; and 60 percent support the creation of a state for Arabs and Jews whose citizens would have [equal] political and religious rights.

Results of the poll also indicate that the invasion of Lebanon led to increased sympathy for Palestinians among the British and reduced support for Israel. Thirty-four percent of those who were polled declared that they felt less sympathy with Israel after the invasion; and 23 percent indicated that since the invasion they felt more sympathy with the Palestinians.

The vast majority of British citizens--83 percent--oppose the blockade of food supplies and the interruption of electrical power and water supplies from West Beirut. Sixty-three percent of the people support the decision that [Prime Minister] Thatcher's government made last June to prohibit the sale of British weapons to Israel. The (MURI) organization observed that this decision was supported by a majority of the people who support the three principal British parties. The polling organization also said that one third of those who support Israel--37 percent--support the forementioned decision.

An indication of the shift that has taken place in British public opinion in favor of Palestinians is that the ratio of people who support the creation of two states, one Palestinian and one Jewish, on Palestinian territory has increased in the past 6 years. A poll conducted in 1976 showed that only 43 percent of those who were polled supported that solution. That ratio has now risen to 55 percent. However, the ideal solution for the majority of British citizens is the establishment of a democratic state, the state which Yasir 'Arafat, PLO chairman, had called for when he addressed the United Nations for the first time in 1973.

These figures indicate that the idea of a racist Jewish state is not attractive to all British citizens who support Israel. Sixty-five percent of those who described themselves as supporters of Israel support the establishment of a mixed democratic state.

The British labor party, which was and still is the most important deterrent to Zionist influence in the United Kingdom, was significantly ahead of the other two principal parties in its support for Palestinian rights and in its condemnation of Israel's invasion of Lebanon. The ruling conservative party, however, offered the largest ratio of support for Israel, compared with the other two contending parties. Labor party supporters who were polled were divided: 20 percent supported the Palestinians, and 21 percent supported Israel. In the meantime, Israel noticeably outdid the Palestinians in gaining support among conservatives--the difference in its favor was 18 percent--and among supporters of the coalition--the difference was 9 percent.

Results of the poll assume added significance because the time for holding the annual conventions of the principal parties is approaching; they will be held this month. All these conventions will have these results available to them when the time comes to determine the foreign policy stance of each one of these parties. These results will necessarily thrust themselves upon these conventions because, as al-Ramlawi said, they objectively illustrate British public opinion.

Al-Ramlawi also said, "After this probe the British government no longer has any excuse for not recognizing the PLO. If it does not recognize the PLO, it will be differing from the wishes of the British people."

Al-Ramlawi had some comments on the results of the poll. He thinks that these results have come at this time in particular and in this positive manner as a result of the steadfastness of the Palestinian people and the continued political and military battle they have been fighting. This has confirmed the fact that Palestinians will not abandon those principles until they achieve their objectives.

Al-Ramlawi added, "Our battle with Israel is progressing throughout the world and especially in western Europe. It is achieving success every day. We believe that the continuity of the action that was begun by the Palestinian Revolution and the action which the Revolution is still employing are proper and sound courses of action. Evidence for this lies in the fact that these results have been achieved in Europe and in Britain in particular, one of the countries of the world where bringing about a positive development in the question of Palestine and the rights of the Palestinian people was considered most difficult and most complex."

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CSO: 4404/673

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

CONSEQUENCES OF PLO'S DISPERSAL DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1348, 3 Sep 82 p 22

[Article by Farid al-Khatib: " 'Arafat Facing the Challenges of Maintaining Unity and Preventing Terrorism; Dispersal of the Resistance among Arabs Strengthens That Group's Independent National Decisions"]

[Text] When Mr Yasir 'Arafat left New York after delivering his address at the United Nations in 1974, he shocked New York Jews in a manner that his arrival in that city the previous day had not. A few hours after leaving the UN building to go to the Waldorf Astoria Hotel where he was staying, 'Arafat and his associates who were awake took off to Cuba. Americans woke up the following morning to find out from their television sets that 'Arafat had successfully completed his mission at the international organization and that he had left the country.

Enemies and opponents of the Resistance were similarly shocked when the Resistance protected itself from extermination and succeeded in breaking the siege which the Israeli army had imposed on West Beirut. The Resistance left West Beirut on its way to Europe and the Arab countries in the largest military, political and media parade since World War II. The shock was most evident on extremist Israeli rabbi, Eliahu Kahane who called for action to prevent the departure of the Resistance and exterminate [its members]. Kahane said that the Israeli government had made its first agreement with the PLO when it approved that departure.

The fighters who had entered Lebanon as guerillas left in their uniforms as regular soldiers: they left with their weapons and military operations. Their departure attracted the attention of foreign observers. The first group went to Cyprus because its president, Spyro Kyprianou, is a friend of the PLO. A few years ago he had offered the PLO a civilian airplane to carry the body of the [former] director of the PLO office in London, Sa'id Hamami after he was assassinated there. This was a dark hour for the PLO: most Arab airlines had refused to carry out this task.

The Resistance was moving from Beirut to Larnaca aboard Greek ships--and Greece is the second European country which fully recognizes the PLO. The Resistance was not moving from one Arab country to another, but it was rather moving from Arab soil to foreign soil. This move symbolized the tensions that existed between the Resistance and some Arab regimes. It was a move to the side of Europe where the Middle East problem has been setting its feet.

Some observers thought that dispersing the Resistance among several Arab countries would undermine and threaten its unity. However, this dispersal process, which has restored to the Arab countries their allies in the organization, will reduce the influence that pressures from Arab countries have on the "independent national decisions" [of Palestinians]. It will protect the decision-making process from the control of these countries, and it will enable the Fatah movement to practice more freely its leadership role in Palestinian action.

Nevertheless, maintaining the unity of the organization remains one of the challenges facing 'Arafat. In the past 'Arafat had proved his skill in that area. The organization had united the Palestinian people around their cause and had maintained its own unity amidst Arab divisiveness and division.

With regard to security, the fact that the Resistance will be dispersed in several Arab countries will enable the organization to put into practice the principle of "not putting all its eggs in one basket." This practice would protect the Resistance from the direct blows of the Israeli army, but it would not spare it the trouble of maintaining vigilance and caution from Israeli intelligence.

Some observers think that the dispersal of the Resistance in several Arab countries will encourage these countries to try using the Resistance groups they have to stir up Arab struggles. However, a member of the Central Committee of Fatah thinks that Palestinians are more capable of utilizing the Arab countries than these countries are capable of utilizing them. Ever since the forties Palestinians have been drawn toward the "power centers" in the area; it was not their preferences for one Arab country over another that attracted them to these areas.

King Husayn embraced the guerillas in al-Mafraq base and asked them to dismiss memories of the 1970-1971 events. It seems that Jordan, where the Palestinian people and Palestinian hills are located, is the natural place where some Fatah leaders can establish residence. However, diplomatic sources have indicated that Jordan is setting two conditions on the organization's freedom of action on Jordanian territory.

First, the organization would have to refrain from repeating the experiment that had taken place between the two parties during the seventies and that had ended in failure.

Second, the organization would have to refrain from any activities that would increase Israeli threats to Jordan.

The Arab country where the Resistance will concentrate its activity during the next phase will be determined on the basis of the principle, "Freedom before security." This indicates that the organization is prepared to tolerate threats to its security, provided it can preserve its freedom of action.

As it left Lebanon the organization had among its credits the fact that it had fought its first regular war with Israel, as Egypt had done in October 1973. It had increased its political clout on the international scene opposite Israel, and it had also defeated Israel in the media.

During the next session of the Palestinian National Council the function of the organization will be to calculate very carefully what it can claim to be its gains and to set guidelines for utilizing those gains in the coming months at the proper place and in the proper time on both the Arab and international scenes.

The world expects Palestinians at this stage to show a willingness to take political action by engaging in "political discussions." They would have to be more forthcoming, more specific and more candid in defining their needs. Their courage and their spirit of initiative would have to become evident in their coming political battle against Israel just as their courage and initiative did in their war against Israel. Therefore, some Resistance leaders have alluded to the possibility that a government in exile may be declared soon.

Some observers are presently calling for action that would make full use of the organization's gains from the war; these gains would be put to use in the proper place and not at a later date. This is because what Egypt and Syria gained from the first Ramadan war did not last long. Egypt squandered what it had gained, and Israel [sic?] consumed its gains. Those observers warn the organization against letting Israel take the political initiative as it did when it announced its willingness to put "autonomy" into practice for the purpose of aborting the historical opportunity of having the United States and the countries of western Europe prepare a new policy that would go beyond that of the Camp David accords and give the Palestinian people their right to determine their own destiny.

In the military area the Resistance pledged that it would continue its military operations against Israeli military positions on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Resistance leaders pledged that these operations will be carried out on all levels and in all directions. They did not say, however, that these operations would be launched from all Arab fronts.

At the same time Resistance leaders promised they would continue the armed struggle but would not resort to terrorism. Terrorism is an expression of despair and thus is not compatible with the organization's propaganda and with the political and military points that the organization has been able to score against Israel without "knocking it out" or throwing it to the floor. There is no doubt that Israel is hoping that at this time some Palestinians would carry out terrorist operations against its interests and against western interests. Such terrorist operations would whitewash Israel's ugly face, erasing the effects of the crimes and violations committed by the Israeli army during the war in Lebanon. Therefore, one of the principal challenges facing 'Arafat is that of preventing terrorism.

At the same time "hit-and-run" guerilla operations against the forces of the Israeli army in south Lebanon, in al-Jabal and in al-Biqa' Valley are continuing in what appears to be the "Vietnamization" of the environment of the occupation army.

Of course some Arab countries will try to impose restrictions on the Resistance. They will try to disarm the fighters, put some of them on trial and sentence some of them to prison terms. Ultimately, however, a giant cannot be put away in a bottle, as Israel tried to do [with the Resistance] in the war in Lebanon.

In fact, the steadfastness of the resistance for 79 days in the face of Israel's military machinery was followed by its forced withdrawal, due to the absence of Arab military opposition [to Israel]. The withdrawal of the Resistance "to save its own skin" was a result of the political support it received from some conservative Arab countries. This will have far-reaching and profound consequences on the Middle East area.

For example, 'Arafat had informed former French minister of foreign affairs, Jean (Sauvagnar) when the two men met at the French Embassy in Beirut in 1974 that among the results of the departure of the Resistance from Jordan in the aftermath of the 1970-1971 events were [the following]: in Syria, the fall of Lt Gen Salah Jadid and the rise of President Hafiz al-Asad to power; in Egypt, the death of President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir; he was succeeded by President Anwar al-Sadat; and the assassination of Jordan's prime minister, Wasfi al-Tall.

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SEQUESTRATION PROCEDURES, OBJECTIVES EXPLAINED

Officials Discuss Sequestration Measures

Cairo MAYU in Arabic 25 oct 82 p 3

[Article by Siham 'Abd-al-'Aal]

[Text] How does the office of the socialist prosecutor deal with 150 million pounds that are under sequestration? The purpose of sequestration is to protect society and ensure the safety of people. The reasons for sequestration are: abuse of position or job; fraud or bribery; and manipulation of people's livelihoods.

The sum of 150 million pounds was placed under sequestration during the past period. These funds belonged to persons who had sold out the people's livelihoods, trafficked in narcotics, traded currency on the black market, received key money that was not mentioned in lease agreements or accumulated wealth illegitimately.

The socialist public prosecutor issued numerous decisions sequestering the funds of a few corrupt individuals who accumulated wealth illegitimately. The Values Court endorsed many of the sequestration decisions to protect the public's wealth and to prevent the fortunes of a few from growing at the expense of other groups of people.

There are numerous and varied questions [about this matter], and they require unequivocal answers.

What is the purpose of sequestering the property of those persons? Why are sequestration decisions made? What does the office of the socialist public prosecutor do with these funds, and on whose behalf? How can the office guarantee those whose property is sequestered a reasonable standard of living? Why is a sign "under sequestration" placed on automobiles, real estate and stores that belong to those whose property has been sequestered?

Justice Hasan 'Abd-al-Hamid, property management director at the socialist prosecutor's office; Justice Mahmud al-Shirbini, deputy director of property management; and Justice Muhammad al-Shadhli, assistant socialist prosecutor sat around

the round table in the suite of the property management director on the 8th floor of the socialist public prosecutor's office.

At the beginning of the discussion Justice Hasan 'Abd-al-Hamid, director of property management in the office explained the purpose behind seizing the property and belongings of someone whose property is being sequestered. He said that that purpose is to prevent the harm that could befall a society as a result of the fact that the person whose property is being sequestered may take actions in society with a large amount of capital and harm others as a result of his dealings. Another purpose is to check the threat posed by the person whose capital is sequestered and to make it impossible for that person to manage his property.

"There is no doubt that this protects society and members of that society. However, when the property management department of the office manages sequestered property, it does so on behalf of those whose property has been sequestered. In return, it receives 5 percent of the revenues from this property. Sequestration orders designate this amount to cover expenses incurred by the Property Management Department in management operations."

Regulating the Imposition of Sequestration

The director of property management went on to say, "The illegal acts that call for the issue of a sequestration decree, as defined by Law No 34 for 1971 on regulating the imposition of sequestration and ensuring the safety of people, are [as follows]:

"Abusing one's position, job, parliamentary or popular capacities; using fraud, collusion or bribery in executing contract agreements, supply agreements, public works agreements or any other administrative agreement with the government, with public agencies or organizations, with the units that are affiliated with them or with any public legal person; smuggling or trafficking in narcotics; trafficking in contraband or on the black market; manipulating the livelihoods of people or tampering with medication; and unlawfully seizing public or private property that is owned by the state or by legal persons.

"In those cases the socialist prosecutor's office traces the ownership history of this property and compares its findings with the dates on which those actions were [allegedly] committed. This is what happened when Rashad 'Uthman's property was sequestered. The office traced the growth of his fortune from 1961 till the date on which he had committed those actions for which he was tried by the Court of Values."

Justice Hasan 'Abd-al-Hamid added, "Among actions that would also call for a sequestration decision are those which would undermine the country's security from abroad or from within; damage the economic interests of the socialist society or the socialist gains of farmers and workers; impair political life in the country; or endanger national unity." The justice indicated that in this case "the growth of a person's fortune does not become the object of inquiry. A person's fortune rather becomes the means he uses to help him commit these [illegal] acts. Thus, sequestering a person's fortune and tying his hands help ward off his threat to society."

How Are Fortunes Traced?

[Question] But how is information about sequestered property compiled?

Justice Hasan 'Abd-al-Hamid said, "The socialist prosecutor's office charges authorized investigating agencies with the task of compiling information about the property and possessions of the person in question, his wife and his adult and dependent children. Information is compiled by authorized committees in the office from facts revealed by the investigation, from facts uncovered by committees listing and compiling information about this property and from information received by the office from individuals who have dealings with the person in question.

"After a decision is issued by the socialist public prosecutor forbidding the person in question from disposing of and managing his real estate and his movable assets, the property management department sequesters this property and begins to manage it until a sequestration order is issued by the Court of Values. The socialist prosecutor's office tries to avoid having its management of the property cause harm to the person whose property has been sequestered. Thus property is managed in the context of its legal status at this stage. Authority to manage the property is temporary and contingent upon the fact that the court issue a decision to sequester or not to sequester the property. Therefore, care is taken that the rights of others are not affected by the fact that the court may decline to issue a sequestration order."

Managing Real Estate and Farm Land

The discussion around the round table continued, and Justice Mahmud al-Shirbini, deputy director of property management at the socialist prosecutor's office said, "As far as leased buildings are concerned, the office informs tenants that they are not to pay the rent that is due to the person whose property been sequestered. A group of collectors receives the rent and deposits it in the office's safe for the person whose property has been sequestered. This is what happened with people whose property was sequestered because they received key money above and beyond the provisions of the lease agreement. [The case of] Hasan Surur, a contractor in Hada'iq al-Qubbah, is an example of this. After hiding [from authorities] for a period of time, Surur recently came forward. He is presently seeking a loan from one of the banks to pay back the money he had received above and beyond the provisions of lease agreements. The amount of money he has in the bank is not enough to pay back what he had received from tenants.

"As far as farm land is concerned, the socialist prosecutor's office charges authorized land reform administrations with the task of managing and overseeing the land provided that these administrations submit a periodic statement to the office about the proceeds of the land. Cash and proceeds from property on hand in the office's safe are deposited in the state's national banks and invested in the interests of the state."

Justice Hasan 'Abd-al-Hamid [added] a comment and said, "There is property whose management needs certain kinds of individuals. If there is a factory, for example, the socialist prosecutor's office may appoint some specialists to manage it under the office's supervision. If this is not feasible, the socialist prosecutor's office may appoint the same person whose property has been sequestered

to manage the plant, if that does not violate any legal provisions regulating the imposition of sequestration. Mahmud Rashwan, a narcotics dealer, was charged with the task of managing his automobile repair shop provided that proceeds from the shop were to be deposited in the socialist prosecutor's office safe. The socialist prosecutor's office may also occasionally lease some of the property that belongs to a person whose property has been sequestered. This, however, does not take place during the period when the property is being held from its owner so that the legal status of commercial stores and furnished apartments, for example, is not affected when application is made to reject the imposition of sequestration."

Disposing of Property after Owner's Approval

It was once again the turn of Justice Mahmud al-Shirbini to speak. He said, "After a decision is made by the Court of Values to sequester property, and because a presidential decree had been issued charging the socialist prosecutor with the task of overseeing sequestration proceedings, the socialist prosecutor's office assumes the responsibility of managing sequestered property, and the period of sequestration is 5 years. That property may be limited further. It is not necessary for the Court of Values to sequester all the property whose sequestration was requested by the socialist prosecutor."

"The matter of selling some of this sequestered property may come up, so that certain obligations of the person whose property has been sequestered may be met. For example, some navigation equipment owned by Rashad 'Uthman was sold to pay back some of his debts to the state. Here, the property management department carried out the sale on behalf of Rashad 'Uthman. [In this case] the person whose property is sequestered must approve the sale and the sale price since the Property Management Department does not have the legal right to sell the property of those whose property is sequestered, unless the sale is being made at their request."

Confiscation of Property

[Question] Is property confiscated after the period of sequestration is over?

Justice Muhammad al-Shadhli, assistant socialist prosecutor said, "After 5 years of sequestration the property is returned to its owners, along with statements and documents about sequestration or property management activities that took place throughout the sequestration period. This is in accordance with the law. There are two cases.

The affairs of the person whose property is sequestered are considered. If he abides by the conduct of a socialist society and adheres to that society's economic and social interests, the socialist prosecutor does not request that that person's property be confiscated, and his property is returned. For example, in cases where key money is received outside the provisions of lease agreements, if the person whose property is sequestered returns to the tenants what is rightfully theirs, and if he does so during the sequestration period which is 5 years, his possessions and his property are returned to him after the matter is presented to the Court of Values.

The other case is when it becomes evident that the person whose property is sequestered continues to act against the economic and social interests of the socialist society. [In that case] the prosecutor presents an argument for confiscating that person's property to the Court of Values, and the court may accept or reject the request for confiscation. This happened in some recent cases, and the court agreed with the request to confiscate property.

Ensuring a Standard of Living

[Question] How can a person whose property is sequestered ensure a minimum standard of living for himself and for the members of his family?

Once again it was Justice Hasan 'Abd-al-Hamid who [replied and] said, "When the Court of Values issues its decision, it determines a monthly allowance for the person whose property is being sequestered. The allowance is disbursed to that person and to the members of his family from the returns of his sequestered properties, and it is commensurate with the requirements of living. But during the period when the property is held prior to sequestration, after the decision is issued by the socialist prosecutor to seize the property and when the Property Management Department discovers that the sequestered property does yield income, the socialist prosecutor determines temporarily that monthly allowance which is disbursed to the subject. However, determination of that amount is contingent first on the existence of revenues from this property and on the amount of those revenues."

Justice Hasan 'Abd-al-Hamid thinks that this notice of [sequestration] is necessary because it informs people that sequestration has been imposed on these properties, stores and automobiles so that others would know the legal status of the property and deal with the person in question accordingly. They would thus avoid violating the provisions of the law and avoid subsequent remonstrations to that effect made by those who did not know that sequestration had been imposed.

The Property and Possessions of Rashad 'Uthman

[Question] What is the status of the property and possessions of Rashad 'Uthman and Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy?

Justice Mahmud al-Shirbini explained the status of the property and possessions of Rashad 'Uthman and said, "Regarding the navigation equipment that Rashad 'Uthman owns, the socialist prosecutor's office entrusted management of that equipment to the Arab Company for Shipping and Unloading. The socialist prosecutor's office also auctioned off a few freight barges after Mr 'Uthman's approval was obtained to pay back monies that were due to the state. As far as real estate is concerned, rent is collected from tenants by authorized agents of the socialist prosecutor's office. But as far as the import and export firms and the lumber trade firms are concerned, these [businesses] are still closed. The socialist prosecutor's office has not received any appropriate offers for leasing them, and agrarian reform departments have been asked to manage the farm land that is under their jurisdiction.

"Managing the property of Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy--more than 200 outlets belonging to the ERIC Company in Cairo, Alexandria, al-Jizah, al-Mansurah, Mit Ghamr and Ras al-Barr--was entrusted to the two companies, the Nile Pyramids Consumer Stores

Company and the National al-Daqahliyah Food Security Company. They will manage the property under the supervision of the Ministry of Supply. Proceeds are collected every month and placed in the safe of the socialist prosecutor's office. As far as tractor trailer trucks and semi-trailers that Mr 'Abd-al-Hayy owns--[altogether] 15 vehicles--the socialist prosecutor's office is in the process of leasing them. The office is reviewing a few offers that have been made to lease apartments and administrative offices that are owned by Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy. Agrarian reform departments in Mit Ghamr have been entrusted with the task of managing the farm land owned by Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy."

'Ismat al-Sadat Property Sequestered

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 22 Oct 82 p 16

[Article by Husayn al-Habruk]

[Text] Inventory-taking committees in the socialist prosecutor's office began listing the property of 'Ismat al-Sadat, his wives and his children in seven governorates. These committees also began sending preliminary reports on the inventory-taking operations.

These committees--21 of them--were formed by [a committee] chaired by Justice Husni 'Abd-al-Hamid, director of Property Management; Justice Mahmud al-Shirbini; Justice Muhammad al-Shadhli; Hilmi al-Najdi; Ramadan Hasanayn; and Sana' Khalil. The committees were formed immediately after the socialist prosecutor issued the decision to seize the property of 'Ismat al-Sadat and the members of his family.

Preliminary listing operations that are part of the process of seizing property revealed that 'Ismat al-Sadat and his family owned numerous companies, buildings, apartments, stores and factories. In Cairo a committee went to the residence of 'Ismat al-Sadat on 8 Ahmad Riyad Turk Street in al-Hijaz Square where he owns a building where he and his children live.

Another committee went to a mansion in Ma'adi owned by Nadiyah 'Ismat al-Sadat. The mansion is number 13 on Street number 206; it is built on 2,200 [square] meters of land and has 54 rooms and 3 floors. It is centrally air conditioned and has a swimming pool attached to it. It turned out that the owner of the mansion does not reside in it and that she was able to get possession of the mansion by deception and falsification of documents and that the courts were still considering the dispute over this mansion.

The owner of the mansion was residing with her husband, Mustafa Ramadan al-Sadati, an accountant employed by 'Ismat al-Sadat's import and export firm. [The couple resided] in an apartment on Buqtur Square in Heliopolis. The apartment is in a building that her father used to own but that he sold in 1979.

A fourth committee went to 13 Saray al-Qubbah Street, a two-story house where Dr Fayzah 'Ali Hasan, the second wife of 'Ismat al-Sadat resides with her five children. This committee also went to 3 'Alish Street in Hammamat al-Qubbah where Nariman, 'Ismat al-Sadat's daughter resides. The committee seized the movable assets in the house and a Nasr 128 automobile.

A fifth committee went to building number 161 on Salim al-Awwal Street in al-Zaytun. That building is owned by Zaynab Salim, 'Ismat al-Sadat's third wife. The building consists of 20 apartments in addition to a pharmacy and two warehouses owned by 'Ismat al-Sadat and his children. One of them is associated with the Middle East Projects and Distribution Company and the other is associated with the Egyptian Company for Food and Furniture, NORA.

Justice Mahmud al-Shirbini headed eight committees and went to Mit Abu al-Kawm, al-Mahallah al-Kubra and Tanta where the NORA plant for noodles, owned by 'Ismat al-Sadat was seized. A textile plant and an automobile repair shop were seized. A 4,400 square meters garage attached to the repair shop was seized with the 20 trucks that were in it; preliminary estimates of their value exceeded 10 million pounds. [Other properties that were seized included] a building that comprised 8 stores owned by 'Ismat al-Sadat; 6 feddans of farm land on which a cattle farm for Frisian cattle, a dairy plant and a large house where 'Ismat stays when he comes to oversee the cattle farm are built; and a bakery.

In Tanta an automobile show room owned by 'Ismat al-Sadat and his son, Tal'at was seized; there were farm tractors in that showroom. The Universal Office for Shipping, Trade and Contracting and a 1,000 [square] meter warehouse were also seized. Irrigation machines in their cartons were found in the warehouse. It turned out that these machines, in addition to other farm tools and machines, had arrived from Alexandria a few days earlier.

In al-Mahallah al-Kubra a contracting company owned by Nadiyah 'Ismat al-Sadat was seized. A contracting company on al-Jala' Street and a warehouse for cement were also seized. The eight committees returned to Cairo to submit their report to the socialist public prosecutor.

Companies owned by 'Ismat al-Sadat were also seized. These are the Egyptian Company for Food and Furniture, NORA; the Middle East Company for Projects and Storage; the Arab-Swiss Company for Projects and Development at 30 Yusuf Murad Street in al-Nuzhah, Heliopolis; the Universal Office for Shipping, Trade and Contracts at 7 Sulayman al-Halabi Street in al-Tawfiqiyah; and the Universal Company for Marine Shipping and Supplies, at 22 Zakariyah Ahmad Street in al-Tawfiqiyah. It turned out that all these companies were import and export agencies. They were all sealed and declared off limits, and all outlets of these companies were sequestered until inventory is taken.

While examining papers Justice Mahmud al-Shirbini discovered that 'Ismat al-Sadat owned a Greek-Egyptian shipping company located at 15 (Afirdif) Street in Athens.

Three of 'Ismat al-Sadat's children came yesterday to meet with Justice Husni 'Abd-al-Hamid, director of property management at the socialist prosecutor's office. The meeting between them lasted more than 3 hours, after which they went to the office of the socialist public prosecutor.

In Alexandria Justice Sana' Khalil, assistant socialist public prosecutor oversaw the activities of the committees that were taking inventory. Maj Gen Mahmud 'Id, director of security for Alexandria and his deputy Maj Gen 'Abd-al-Tawwab Rashwan joined Justice Sana' Khalil in this task. The committees seized all the companies, homes and apartments that are owned by 'Ismat al-Sadat, his children and

his wives. The operation was led by Lt Col 'Adil Isma'il, director of the Criminal Investigations Department and Col Muhammad 'Abd-al-Fattah Salim, director of Public Property Investigations. [The following property] was seized: the Middle East Company for Projects located in al-Manshiyyah; the Universal Maritime Shipping Company located in al-Manshiyyah; the Universal Office for Shipping and Ship Supplies at Ibn Zinki Street in al-'Attarin; the Middle East Company for Chemicals in al-Raml; a contracting company and a warehouse for construction equipment on al-'Ajami Highway; the Middle East Shipping Company in front of Customs Gate 27 in Mina al-Basal; a house at kilometer 22 on the Alexandria-Marsa Matruh Highway; and another house at kilometer 21 on the same highway. Seized also were an apartment and two cottages in al-Ma'murah; one apartment on al-Hurriyah Boulevard in Sidi Jabir; an apartment on Kalid ibn al-Walid Street in Sidi Bishr; a third apartment near the Beau Rivage Hotel on the Corniche in Alexandria; and a vacant lot that is about 30 feddans in Sidi Karir.

An official source in the socialist public prosecutor's office stated that the committees that were taking inventory were still compiling a list of the rest of 'Ismat al-Sadat's property in the other governorates. He owns property in the governorates of Suez, Isma'iliyah and Port Sa'id.

The source added that the socialist public prosecutor's office will announce in the next few days the results of the investigation into the allegation that some officials joined 'Ismat al-Sadat in the actions he committed, actions which hurt the country's economic interests.

The source said that the public prosecutor's office had completed its investigation of about 30 reports made by a number of citizens about violations and excesses that 'Ismat al-Sadat [allegedly] committed. The socialist prosecutor confronted 'Ismat al-Sadat with these reports, and he has completed his investigation of 'Ismat al-Sadat regarding these reports.

8592

CSO: 4504/45

CAUSES OF WIDENING FOOD SECURITY GAP IN 1970'S EXAMINED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 714, 6 Sep 82 pp 18-21

[Article: "Agricultural Development Strategy in 1980's; Problem of Food Gap"]

[Text] The widening of the food gap at the rates experienced by Egyptian society in the 1970's is considered one of the negative characteristics of the economic policies of that period. It is also considered an extremely grave matter reflecting the increased food subservience and harboring a broad threat to Egypt's food security. This phenomenon is due to numerous factors, which can be summed up in consumption rates exceeding similar rates in the 1960's, along with stagnant agricultural production reflected in meager local production rates due to numerous factors resulting from the deep-seated traces of the obstacles of agricultural development. Therefore, efforts were focused on a policy of relying on importation as a main source to supply consumer needs instead of relying on the development of local production.

Widening Food Gap

The figures in Table 1 show local production, total needs and the volume of a number of main agricultural commodities imported in the years 1960, 1974 and 1980. In perusing these figures, it becomes evident that the requirements for these goods rose rapidly and extensively. This is evident insofar as wheat is concerned. Wheat needs rose from nearly 2 million tons in 1960 to more than double that in 1974 and then reached nearly 7.2 million tons in 1980, meaning that wheat requirements between 1974 and 1980--i.e., within 6 years--rose by nearly 2.7 million tons or 60 percent. Similarly, maize needs rose from 1.6 million tons in 1960 to 2.9 million tons in 1974 and to 4.2 million tons in 1980. As for sugar, whereas requirements totaled nearly 300,000 tons in 1960, we find it doubling to nearly 600,000 tons in 1974 and then doubling again to reach 1.2 million tons in 1980. This means that it took only 6 years for the consumption to double in the late 1970's whereas it had previously taken 14 years, from 1960 to 1974, for this consumption to double.

As for oils, a large-scale leap in needs was recorded between 1960 and 1974, considering that those needs rose from 131,000 to 410,000 tons. The latter figure is nearly equal to total oil needs in 1980, amounting to nearly 397,000 tons. The 1974-80 period witnessed a vast leap in animal product requirements. Whereas red meat needs rose from 250,000 tons in 1960 to nearly 300,000 tons in

1974 and to about 450,000 tons in 1980, the increase in requirements for poultry meat and dairy products increased at a greater pace. Poultry meat needs were estimated at approximately 56,000 tons in 1960 but jumped to about 111,000 tons in 1974 and then doubled in the last years of the 1970's to reach 212,000 tons in 1980. As for dairy product needs, they rose from 1.1 million tons in 1960 to nearly 1.8 million tons in 1974 and then to nearly 3 million tons in 1980.

Local production of the main agricultural commodities has not been able to keep up with the constant rise in requirements. This in turn was reflected in the form of increased imports of these products and in a decline in the self-sufficiency rate. Whereas the wheat self-sufficiency rate amounted to 70 percent in 1960, it declined to 42 percent in 1974 and then to 25 percent in 1980. Similarly, the self-sufficiency rate in maize dropped from 87 percent to 77 percent in 1980. The sugar self-sufficiency rate declined greatly. Whereas sugar production exceeded needs in 1960, it dropped to 96 percent of the needs in 1974 and to nearly 57 percent in 1980. As for oils, the 1960-74 period witnessed a large-scale decline in this commodity--a decline from nearly 95 percent of public requirements in 1960 to 36 percent in 1974 and then to 34 percent in 1980. Local meat, poultry, dairy and fish production has also failed to meet society's needs. Whereas this production achieved nearly full self-sufficiency in 1960, we find this production declining and meeting only a partial self-sufficiency, ranging from 85-99 percent in 1974 and then becoming clearly unable to meet the needs in 1980, with the self-sufficiency rate dropping to 75 percent for red meats, 64 percent for poultry meat, 62 percent for dairy products and nearly 54 percent for fish.

By closely examining the total need figures and similar figures pertaining to the per capita share, it becomes evident that these figures reflect the influence of economic forces other than those determining the human consumption of these goods. It is illogical for the individual's consumption of wheat and its derivatives to rise from 80 kilograms annually in 1960 to 123 kilograms in 1974 and 171 kilograms in 1980. At the same time, the per capita share of maize rose from 62 kilograms in 1960 to 80 kilograms in 1974 and nearly 99 kilograms in 1980. This enormous rise in the individual consumption of both wheat and maize cannot be attributed solely to the impact of real individual income, to the prices of the alternative or complementary goods or to preferential patterns. These factors together determine the demands on these two commodities, especially in light of the well-known meager flexibility of both income and price insofar as wheat and maize and their derivatives are concerned. Therefore, these figures can only be interpreted in the light of structural changes developing in the composition of the figures concerning wheat and maize needs. It is likely that the pricing policy and the insistence on subsidizing these two commodities and their derivatives have encouraged the rural inhabitants not to produce their own needs of these commodities. Rather, these people have turned to the urban supply centers to meet their needs. This becomes evident upon checking Table 3, which reflects a system different from the traditional system in calculating wheat consumption.

Whereas the conventional system of estimating wheat consumption relies on adding local production estimates to imports, while excluding exports, losses, stored quantities and the quantities set aside for seed--the so-called food-commodity

balance--the system reflected in Table 3 relies on the figures contained in family budget studies, which in turn depend on large numbers of individual consumption samples in the countryside and in urban areas in the years 1958, 1965 and 1975. The conventional system is faulted for transmitting all the elements of the error contained in the local production estimates, losses, stored quantities and seed to the consumption figures. These elements of error can be avoided by using the alternative system demonstrated in Table 3--a system whose estimates are compatible with sound logic. This system has been used in estimating separately consumption in the countryside and in urban areas of wheat and its derivatives. These estimates make it clear that the rural inhabitant's consumption of these commodities rose from 89 kilograms in 1958 and 71 kilograms in 1965 to nearly 120 kilograms in 1975. In other words, the late 1960's and early 1970's witnessed a sudden and big increase in the rural inhabitant's consumption of wheat and its derivatives.

The sudden and great increase in the individual's consumption of wheat and maize is attributed to numerous factors, including the pricing policy and the insistence on subsidizing wheat and its derivatives, all of which has resulted in making their prices low compared with other commodities. Moreover, the price of a unit of wheat has become lower than the price of a similar unit of straw or bran. Consequently, producers have turned to using wheat and its derivatives, such as flour and bread, to feed livestock and poultry. On the other hand, farmers have come to rely on wheat and wheat derivatives supplied at the urban centers, which is less costly than producing wheat. The farmers have thus turned to the urban centers to meet their needs. This is in addition to the constant migration from the rural to the urban areas and the subsequent change in popular preference patterns, as well as the rural population's shift from the use of maize and corn as human food to the use of wheat and its derivatives. By checking the figures in Table 3, it becomes evident that the local wheat production that used to find its way to feed the urban population during the period 1960-78 has undergone three stages that have been tested statistically, proving the difference in the patterns prevailing in 1969 and 1975. The Egyptian countryside was nearly self-sufficient in wheat and achieved a surplus in some years of that period that ranged from 200,000-300,000 tons of wheat, which was channeled to urban consumption. In the period 1970-74, the Egyptian countryside experienced a pressure that resulted in its contributing a volume ranging from 100,000-400,000 tons of wheat to feed the urban areas. But as of 1975, the Egyptian countryside has not been able to achieve self-sufficiency in wheat and has turned to the cities and the provincial capitals to get wheat and its derivatives to meet its needs. The urban areas' contribution to supplying the countryside's wheat needs amounted to half a million tons in 1975 and 1976, and this volume doubled to reach nearly 1 million tons in 1977 and 1978.

As for per capita sugar needs, they rose from 11 kilograms [annually] in 1960 to 16 kilograms in 1974 and 27 kilograms in 1980. In other words, the per capita sugar needs, which had risen by 5 kilograms in the period from 1960-74, nearly doubled in the 1974-80 period. Such a large-scale leap in per capita needs cannot be attributed to the rise in individual demand for that commodity resulting from changes in individual income, in the preferential pattern or in the alternative and complementary prices, especially in light of what is known regarding the estimates of sugar's income and price flexibility. Consequently,

such leaps in the per capita sugar needs can only be attributed to flourishing and expanding economic activities using sugar as one of the production elements, as in the case of the carbonated drinks industry, sugar dough industries, sesame seed meal or other industries and services using sugar as one of the ingredients. These activities flourished extensively in the late 1970's with the onset of the open-door economy and the encouragement of foreign investment.

As for the increase in society's oil needs in the period from 1960-74, an increase that has resulted in doubling the per capita share of oils, perhaps the emphasis should be the industrial development in the 1960's, which entailed importing needs for this development from abroad. Whereas the figures in Table 2 show that the per capita share amounted to 11 kilograms in 1974, we find that this share declines to 9 kilograms in 1980. As for the large-scale increase in the needs for animal products, especially poultry meats and dairy products, this is attributed to the increasing impact of real individual income and of popular demand for these commodities, in addition to the change in the preferential pattern resulting from emigration from the countryside to the urban areas and the high income levels achieved by [expatriate] workers in the Arab oil countries.

It should be noted in this regard that the prevalent economic policy during the 1970's relied on increased importation to meet the deficit between needs and local production instead of resorting to the development of local agricultural production. It is axiomatic that food import volumes will continue to rise in the future as long as the prevalent economic policy does not lead to developing Egyptian agriculture by securing the needed investments.

Factors Determining Width of Food Gap

The food gap is measured by the difference between total needs and local production of the various agricultural commodities. Consequently, the gap reflects the final outcome of the factors determining each of the total needs and local production. In the 1970's, local needs rose at rates far exceeding similar rates in the 1960's. This increase is attributed not only to the increasing immediate human demand for consumption but also to the expanded use of the commodities for other purposes, such as fodder and as ingredients in consumer industries, including starch, glucose and soft drinks. In other words, the increased use of agricultural commodities, especially of wheat, maize, sugar, oils and dairy products, as raw materials and semiprocessed components in the consumer industries that have accompanied the open-door economy and the extensive facilities given to foreign investment contributed greatly to the leaps in needs experienced between 1974 and 1980.

The impact of the economic policy prevalent in the 1970's was not confined to the increase in the importation of agricultural goods and their derivatives but was also reflected in a drop in the exportation of a number of staple crops, such as rice. Whereas rice exports totaled nearly 700,000 tons [annually] at the end of the 1970's, we find them declining and almost disappearing in the 1981-82 season. Dealing with the food gap requires the enhancement of agricultural production through the allocation of necessary investments, in addition to elimination of the obstacles and hindrances facing the march toward achievement of the desired goals.

Table 1. Development of Food Gap and Self-Sufficiency Rate in Egypt in Main Agricultural Commodities (in 1,000 Metric Tons)

Commodity	1960				1974				1980			
	Local production	Imports and exports	Total needs (1)	Self-sufficiency rate (2)	Local production	Imports and exports	Total needs (1)	Self-sufficiency rate (2)	Local production	Imports and exports	Total needs (1)	Self-sufficiency rate (2)
Wheat (including flour)	1,443	624	2,067	69.8	1,860	2,601	4,461	41.6	1,796	5,423	7,211	24.8
Corn	1,500	95	1,595	94.0	2,508	388	2,895	86.6	3,231	944	4,175	77.4
Broad beans	208	22	230	10.4	253	7	260	97.3	225	37	262	85.9
Lentils	48	4	52	92.3	56	10	66	84.8	7	69	76	9.2
Sugar	337	42	295	114	550	23	573	96.0	662	462	1,154	57.4
Oils	125	6	131	95.4	149	261	410	36.3	135	262	397	34.0
Red meats	239	14	253	94.5	302	1	303	99.7	336	112	448	75.0
White meats	56		56	100	110	1	111	99.1	136	76	212	64.2
Dairy products	1,054	85	1,131	92.5	1,612	138	1,830	92.5	1,865	1,148	3,013	61.9
Fish	120	7	127	94.5	110	19	129	85.3	150	130	280	53.6

Key: (1) Total need meant to indicate volume used for human, animal, industrial or other consumption.

(2) Self-Sufficiency rate calculated on basis of percentage of local production to total needs.

Table 2. Total and Individual Needs of Number of Main Agricultural Commodities in 1960, 1974 and 1980

Commodity	1960			1974			1980		
	Total needs	Individual needs	Individual needs	Total needs	Individual needs	Individual needs growth rate (%) 1960-74	Total needs	Individual needs	Individual needs growth rate (%) 1974-80
Population (in millions)	25.832			36.18			42.1		
Wheat	2,067	80	123	4,461	171	2.9	7,211	171	4.8
Corn [maize]	1,595	62	80	2,895	99	1.7	4,175	99	3.1
Broad beans	230	9	7	260	6	(1.7)	262	6	(2.2)
Lentils	52	2	2	66	2		76	2	
Sugar	295	11	16	573	27	2.5	1,154	27	7.8
Oils	131	5	11	410	9	5.4	397	9	(2.8)
Red meats	253	10	8	303	11	(1.5)	448	11	4.7
White meats	56	2	3	111	5	2.7	212	5	7.6
Dairy products	1,131	44	51	1,830	72	1.0	3,013	72	5.0
Fish	127	5	4	129	7	(1.5)	280	7	8.3

Notes:

Figures in parentheses represent negative values.

Population figures for 1974 and 1980 estimated on basis of annual growth rate of 2.3 percent between 1960 and 1974 and a rate of 2.7 percent between 1974 and 1980.

Table 3. Estimate of Egyptian Society's Consumption of Wheat and Wheat Products, Using Estimates of Family Budget Studies in Period 1960-78

Year	Rural consumption		Rural consumption		Rural consumption		Urban consumption	
	Local production, in million tons	Population, in millions	Consumption, in million tons	Local production, in million tons	Population, in millions	Consumption, in million tons	derived from countryside	Percentage
1960	1.5	16.2	1.4	93.33	9.9	1.3	100	7.69
1961	1.4	16.4	1.5	107.14	10.2	1.3	(100)	
1962	1.6	16.7	1.5	93.75	10.6	1.4	100	7.14
1963	1.5	16.9	1.5	100	10.9	1.4		
1964	1.5	17.3	1.2	80.00	11.3	1.7	300	17.65
1965	1.3	17.6	1.3	100	11.8	1.7		
1966	1.5	17.9	1.3	86.67	12.1	1.8	200	11.11
1967	1.3	18.3	1.3	100	12.6	1.9		
1968	1.5	18.6	1.3	86.67	13.1	1.9	200	10.52
1969	1.3	19.0	1.4	107.69	13.5	2.0	(100)	
1970	1.5	19.3	1.4	93.33	14.0	2.1	100	4.76
1971	1.7	19.4	1.4	83.35	14.4	2.1	300	14.29
1972	1.6	19.7	1.4	87.50	14.8	2.2	200	9.09
1973	1.8	20.1	1.4	77.78	15.3	2.2	400	18.18
1974	1.9	20.5	1.5	78.95	15.7	2.3	400	17.39
1975	2.0	20.9	2.5	125.00	16.1	2.4	(500)	
1976	2.0	21.4	2.6	130.00	16.8	2.5	(600)	
1977	1.7	21.7	2.6	152.00	17.1	2.5	(900)	
1978	1.9	22.2	2.7	142.00	17.8	2.6	(800)	

1. Calculated on basis that average per capita consumption of wheat and wheat products amounted to nearly 89 kilograms in 1958 compared with 71.2 kilograms in 1965 and 120.2 kilograms in 1975.
2. Calculated on basis that average per capita consumption of wheat and wheat products amounted to nearly 131.1 kilograms in 1958 compared with 147 kilograms in 1965 and 146.2 kilograms in 1975, according to the figures of the family budget studies.

COMMENT ON RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN LEFTISTS, RELIGIOUS GROUPS

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 12 Sep 82 p 6

[Article by Muhammad Sa'd: "The Leftist Party and Islamic Groups: They Accused Them of Fomenting Civil Strife and Defended Them When They Were in Detention Camps"]

[Text] AL-SIYASI has learned that the leadership of the National Progressive Unionist Grouping [NPUG] is making desperate attempts to contact representatives of religious factions to influence them and to draw them to their side.

In the past period the party's attitudes as well as its secret and public efforts revealed a blatant attempt to get the better of the crisis of Islamic groups. This crisis is being exploited by leftists [in an effort] to assert their good intentions, to draw moderate elements to their side and to take advantage of the attitudes of extremist elements.

The most recent of these attempts was that statement which was published by the leftist newspaper and attributed to what it called the Muslim Group. This statement is considered tantamount to veiled recognition by the party of these groups; it is considered an undisguised defense of its members who are being held in protective custody. Despite that fact the leftist party was the first among those who accused Islamic groups during the sectarian events that occurred at al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' and Shubra.

The saga of the left and Islamic groups is centered around struggle, notwithstanding continuous attempts by the NPUG to do away with the climate of conflict. These attempts were sometimes manifested in calling for an enlightened religious dialogue; other times they were manifested in advocating understanding for the ideas of Muslim Brothers, and still other times in calling for an alliance between the opposition and public action.

Suddenly the left's attempts to outwit the Islamic group were revealed, and leftist intentions were exposed. In less than 1 year NPUG altered its accusing posture and assumed one of defense. The adversary turned into a friend seeking to champion those who were being held in protective custody and making the rounds of courts and detention camps [defending them].

If we were to refer to the events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' and Shubra and if we

were to examine the statements and bulletins that were issued then by both the leftist party and Islamic groups, we would find out the extent of the vicious battle that was fought between the two adversaries. In their statements Islamic groups attacked communist designs in the area and called Marxists the enemies of Islam. These statements affirmed that the objective of Marxists was to distort the image of any Islamic community.

The leftist party's reply was more virulent. Secret party bulletins described the statements issued by Islamic groups as fanatic, intolerant and lacking objectivity. The bulletins accused the group of al-Shaykh Yusuf al-Badri in Hulwan of attacking citizens with thick canes. The bulletins stated that this attack caused the death of some people and the injury of others. The situation thus got to the point that the parties were making up charges against each other.

In its publications the leftist party defended the policies of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. It referred to questions about which the leftist party and Islamic groups disagree. Chief among these is the attitude toward the Zionist state and [the notion that] its people were to be seen as Jews.

For this reason the leftist party was not surprised to find out that Khalid Muhi al-Din and a number of Marxist leaders were on the hit list that was prepared by al-Jihad organization.

NPUG leaders resumed their rapprochement attempts after politicians who were being held in protective custody were released. From the very beginning leaders of the Muslim Brothers announced that they would reject any form of alliance, cooperation or coordination with Marxists. However, advice from Marxist theoreticians kept them from giving up. The advice was: "Muslim Brothers and Islamic groups are rejecting the left's attempts at rapprochement, but leftists are not to despair!"

Amidst the crisis in Lebanon and the Israeli attack on Palestinians and Lebanese, the left seized the opportunity and quickly invited opposition parties to form assistance committees. The left succeeded in strengthening relations with the Labor party, and it attracted the Liberal party to its side. But the left also failed in attracting to its side what it called enlightened religious factions. Not a single member of these factions joined the assistance committees despite assurances from the left about saving Lebanon from the threat of sectarian strife and despite numerous demonstrations and political conferences that were held in large mosques in Cairo and Alexandria.

Despite the failure of their repeated attempts, leftist efforts are still continuing, and leftist attempts to outwit Islamic groups are continuing [also]. However, these efforts are being met by nothing but silence and indifference.

8592

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IRAN-U.S. TRADE RELATIONS ANALYZED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 250, 6 Sep 82 pp 35-38

[Article by Mohamed Mas'ud Tabataba'i* : "Shift from Secret to Public Submission to the West; the United States Is Iran's Principal Trade Partner"]

[Text] The deterioration of Iranian-western relations followed by an improvement in those relations reveals a contrived routine designed to shift the decision-making powers to those who now have those powers in Khomeyni's Iran. Khomeyni retracts his decisions regarding the nuclear program, and foreign companies have gone to work to extract Iranian uranium.

The decision that U.S. President Ronald Reagan made to lift the official boycott on U.S. purchases of oil from Iran was tantamount to a green light given to all western countries and firms. It indicated that the policy of the United States toward Khomeyni's Iran had become a positive one. This decision did not mean that these countries and firms had not been dealing with Iran in some fashion. This decision rather firmly established the tolerance that the United States and the remaining countries of NATO had adopted as well as the relaxation of tensions that followed the successful efforts of Algerian mediators to persuade the government in Tehran to release the hostages at the U.S. Embassy early last year, in 1981.

The growing relaxation of restrictions in the field of politics and trade--and trade here means trade of all goods, and weapons are not excluded--indicates the fact that the official posture of the West on Iran's Islamic Revolution has become so unequivocal and "positive" that western propaganda against this "revolution" had to be retracted. The media and decision-making agencies in NATO countries had depicted this revolution in the past 3 years as "an Islamic ogre," replacing the "proletariat ogre" as a threat to the world.

The tables were gradually turned in relations between Iran and NATO countries: the intensity of the contrived tension was reduced; and the rhetoric both parties had been using against each other was softened. Consequently, it was not strange

* Mohamed Mas'ud Tabataba'i is the pen name of a well-known Iranian economist and scholar. This investigative report was an assignment given to him by AL-DUSTUR.

for a British magazine, funded by an Arab source with large resources and close ties to U.S. policy in the Middle East, to dedicate one of its issues to praise the Islamic Revolution in Iran. That Arab source in particular had many times repeatedly claimed that Khomeyni's version of Islam was not true Islam. At the same time sources of the Economic Cooperation and Development Organization--the organization for NATO countries--had published official statistics showing that the United States had returned to a principal position as Iran's trading partner. Two factors of international politics had thus converged: ideological acceptance, which is made evident by reading British and American newspapers, especially in the past few months; and trade, which constitutes the justification for ideological acceptance whether trade was the cause or consequence of that ideological acceptance.

It is a fact that an analysis of what happened in Iran during the past 10 years and the evolution of the profound relations that developed between Iran and NATO countries, chief among which is the United States, over the past 3 years do not justify the superficial conclusions that many writers have drawn and promoted in the past. Some of those writers have been naive, taken by the violence of these changes; and others have had ulterior motives and were working for western propaganda agencies.

A consideration of economic and social developments that followed the Islamic Revolution does not show a real break between Iran's actual material world and that world which existed before "the white revolution." The nationalization laws that followed the second revolution in Khomeyni's administration were a logical extension of the measures that Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi had taken in the first revolution. The regime that is being established now in Iran is one whose foundations had been laid previously. Both regimes are capitalist, attaching a developing Iran to the centers of production in the leading centers of production in NATO countries, especially by engaging in "unequal trade" practices. Both of them are capitalist systems in all their domestic relations of production and trade: this is evident at the simplest levels of setting wages and prices. If this had not been the case, the Islamic Revolutionary government of Iran would not have been able to abrogate the law that nationalized foreign trade and that which established collective farms. It had resorted to these two laws during the early days of "public anarchy" and "revolutionary rhetoric."

Accordingly, a consideration of military and political relations between Iran and NATO countries in the course of the Islamic Revolution and in the 3 years that followed this revolution does not show that there has been any real break between Iran's [present] and past material world. The deterioration of relations between Iran and NATO countries and the subsequent gradual improvement of those relations constitute nothing more than a political necessity to bring about the necessary transition of political and military powers from those who had the power to make decisions in the Shah's Iran to those who have those powers in Khomeyni's Iran.

This transition is confirmed by an analysis of the military steps that were taken in Iran after Khomeyni came to power. Following the collapse of the imperial army, which was brought about by the process of transition, and after the shut-down of U.S. listening posts on the borders between Iran and the Soviet Union--this was effected to confirm the superficial break that was required by the transition and to appease the Iranian masses who were demanding an

independent foreign policy for Iran--Khomeyni's government launched disciplinary campaigns against Arab, Kurdish and other ethnic minorities in Iran. Then it began to turn the attention of the Iranian masses toward foreign objectives whose achievement would be inconsistent with Iran's contrived neutrality policy in foreign relations. Khomeyni's government was doing that to rebuild Iran's army. First, it provoked Iraq in some of the border areas between the two countries. Then it stirred up aggressive actions inside Iraq and in the Gulf region in the name of the "exigencies of exporting the revolution." If Iraq were to launch a national war to defend itself against the new government in Iran and to forestall an organized expansionist plan, Khomeyni's regime would take pains to prolong this war so it can enable the new powers in Tehran to reorganize and re-supply the army with weapons. The new powers in Tehran could even supply the Iranian army with Israeli experience and equipment so as to achieve this foreign plan that has domestic objectives. Iran has therefore turned down all opportunities to negotiate an end to the war or to make an actual settlement on the disputed navigation rights in Shatt al-'Arab. It has turned down these opportunities even when it saw itself unable to occupy al-Basrah. Accordingly, Algerian mediation failed to find a solution.

The new powers in Iran mobilized the masses to create anarchy in the name of Islam. Members of Khomeyni's guards were implanted amidst the masses, and "revolutionary justice" played a role in superficial social purge operations. The new powers wanted to use these operations to justify the morals of the regime and its considerably arbitrary concern with insisting upon Islam's rejection of prostitution and drugs. The new powers were seeking thereby to distract the public from their wishes to reorganize the country's social system which was falling apart. The new powers also mobilized the masses to create anarchy in the name of Islam. Thousands of young men, women and children were thrown into the aggressive war against Iraq whose objective was not to export a social, economic and political revolution that Iran itself had failed to realize, but rather to expand Iran's national influence in Iraq and in the Gulf region on behalf of a socio-economic class that feared this revolution and found itself compelled to serve NATO interests in the West.

This was the role that the NATO Alliance assigned to any government in Tehran with which it would have ties. An analysis of basic relations linking Khomeyni's Iran with NATO countries, especially in the areas of trade and finance which constitute the backbone of any foreign policy, does not show that the revolution did bring about any structural change, despite the fact that in the past 3 years it did go through two periods of alienation and seeming hostility prior to the recent relaxation of tensions.

First, the phase of superficial alienation began on 4 November 1979. Oil workers in Iran were demanding that no oil be provided to the United States until it returned the Shah to Tehran to face "revolutionary justice." Students in Tehran occupied the embassies of the United States and Britain to protest a meeting between Dr Mehdi Bazargan, who was then prime minister of Iran and is still today a member of Iran's parliament, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security affairs adviser to the president of the United States. The two had met in a conference that was held in Algeria. The students also protested the fact that the Shah had not returned his fortune to Iran and that he had kept it in western banks. This political demonstration was followed by a trade and financial war in the course

of which Iran's funds were frozen in western banks and the United States imposed a boycott forbidding its firms and its citizens from purchasing Iranian oil. Then the United States attempted to land a number of U.S. paratroopers in East Tehran. That phase ended 444 days later when Mohamed Ben Yahya's mediation efforts succeeded and the U.S. hostages were released. Mohamed Ben Yahya was killed in the spring of 1982 while engaged in a new mediation effort to stop the war between Iraq and Iran.

Second, the phase of superficial neutrality began on 22 January 1981 with the release of U.S. embassy employees in Tehran. That was 4 months after the Iraq-Iran war began. This phase continued till January 1982 when U.S. President Ronald Reagan signed an administrative order ending the trade boycott that had been imposed by his predecessor, Jimmy Carter on direct trade between the United States and Iran. The U.S. Defense Department confirmed this relaxation in official relations between the two countries when a Defense Department spokesman affirmed during the last week of April 1982 that the government of the United States had decided to resume crude oil purchases from Iran (See AL-DUSTUR 3 May 1982).

However, the two phases of superficial hostility and alienation which preceded the recent normalization do not hide, in any accurate objective analysis, the fact that the profound relations that existed between the two countries before and after the revolution did survive. Accordingly, relations between Khomeyni's regime, with its contrived revolutionary appearances and the modern colonialist system with all its economic, social, political and intellectual ties have also survived. The fact that hostages were held at the U.S. embassy was useful in contriving this tension that was instrumental in the temporary creation of some "distance" between Iran and decision-making circles in NATO countries. This distance allowed the new decision makers in Qom to seize power from the former decision makers in Tehran and "to save" Iran from the consequences of the course it had been pursuing prior to the Islamic Revolution. Accordingly, they would save the common social and economic interests that exist between the ruling classes in developing Iran, with the crude oil and agricultural products they are exporting, and the ruling classes in the leading centers of production in major advanced NATO industrial countries, either by importing materials or investing in those countries.

Following the emancipative national revolution that was led by Dr Mohamed Mosaddeq and effected by the decision to nationalize the British-Iranian Oil Company on 1 May 1951--this revolution was foiled by a coup on 19 August 1953 that was supported by the United States and Britain and carried out by Col (Fazlullah) Zahedi leading the Iranian army and a band of unruly citizens--a Mosaddeq complex set in over western and local interests. This complex manifested itself in an intense anxiety [that developed] over the fact that the Middle East continue to revolve in the orbit of western politics and that western control over oil and other resources of this area continue. The West tried to remedy this anxiety by replacing the principle upon which the 1937 Sa'dabad Pact was based with a new principle on which the 1955 Baghdad Pact and the 1964 Central Treaty were based. By effecting profound domestic changes to bring about the objectives that had been set by the British Labor party for the countries of the area after World War II and to reinforce the foundations upon which the regimes in those countries were based, the Shah of Iran launched a broad campaign in 1963 of social and economic measures that later came to be known as the "White Revolution."

However, it was not the aim of the comprehensive changes that were carried out by the Shah to grant the people of Iran any political freedom. These changes tended to support the existing government and strengthen the common interests between the ruling class in Iran and the ruling classes in the West. The wealthy people of Iran had been establishing growing ties with the ruling classes in the West ever since Reza Shah, the late Shah's father, foiled Iran's previous national revolution during the period between the two wars. The broad range measures that were taken by his son, Mohamed Reza Pahlavi in the context of "the White Revolution" accomplished nothing more than reform agricultural relations, stimulate industry, give women the right to vote and [introduce] such aspects of modern life. In other words these measures did not lead to a real improvement in the people's social, economic or educational conditions. Instead, sharp differences developed between the incomes people earned in rural and urban areas, and the differences in their lots in life became sharper. Iran's expansionist role grew in the process of carrying out functions with which Iran was charged under what the Shah called "positive nationalism." Thus, military spending increased at the expense of social prosperity. With considerable historical arrogance the government of Tehran looked forward to the declaration it had made about "checking the changes that are occurring in the policies and conditions of the Middle East, particularly with regard to everything that has to do with Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq." That declaration which was made with considerable arrogance only suggested to the Tehran government that it become more presumptuous.

Such presumption, which was coupled with an iron-clad political fist, as well as the rule of local intelligence and regional espionage, both of which have close ties with NATO intelligence and its sabotage activities in the entire area, not to mention the commercial and financial prosperity that is confined to small populations groups, soon led to a dead end road in which the political alienation of the Shah's regime from the Iranian masses became greater. Traditional political extremism in Iran was such that all bridges were burned and an opportunity was created for a revolutionary situation that would threaten the common interests of those who had attached their destiny to the destiny of that administration and of financiers and chief businessmen in the leading centers of production in western industrial countries.

It was in this charged atmosphere which was about to explode that the national movement began to grow again, and poor Iranian people in particular responded to the fact that Savak was throwing thousands of people in jails and detention camps and terrorizing or killing others. Poor people formed many guerilla groups whose members had different social backgrounds, but [whose inclinations] were mostly populist. The guerilla movement endeavored to seek guidance from general guerilla activity in some developing countries like Vietnam, Latin America and particularly the Palestine Liberation Movement. Middle class people, however, who had an opportunity to travel abroad joined the army of "masked angry students." Before 1980 the number of students in western Europe and in the United States who were involved with that army was about 20,000. This army was one of the first victims of the new phase in Iran's unsettled history. Many of those students had been taken by the ideas of "The Fourth International Socialist Movement" which follows the teachings of Leo Trotsky. It was these teachings that provided Khomeyni's regime with one of the principal ideological handles on the situation and one of the organizational methods that would enable Khomeyni's regime to

repeat the outcome of Mosaddeq's emancipative national revolution and turn Iran away from the revolutionary course in which it was rapidly headed.

But even if such an operative or tool were not given to the West--such tools are known in political studies as agents provocateurs"--Iran was teeming with a full class of operatives and agents for such an occasion. It so happened that the seventies had seen the growth of a similar weapon in western and eastern Europe and in many other countries of the world as well. Poland was only the clearest example of that. Reactionary mullahs made themselves available for the same purpose, and they were chosen for their long history in resisting emancipative and progressive policies, not only because they took part in foiling Mosaddeq's national revolution in 1953, but also because they contained the national revolution that was launched by the Iranian people in 1921 when people rebelled against the addenda to the 1907 Agreement between the British and the Russians. That agreement had also put an end to Iran's neutrality in foreign policy matters.

And here the makers of innovative, long-term policies realized that there would be no turning back on the fact that the Shah's regime had reached a dead end and that revolutionary threats were emerging and threatening to bring down his regime and sever his structural ties with the West. This required that a safe alternative be found. But the deterioration of conditions, the fact that the possibility for finding such an alternative within the Shah's regime did not exist, the precipitous rush of events toward an ultimate break with western interests and perhaps toward a popular democratic revolution that would adopt positive neutrality in foreign policy or lean toward the socialist bloc, not to mention what Professor H.L. Huskins called "the political effect that is implied in the tendency that Iranian peoples have for extremism in their characters, their conduct, their moods and in their native countries," turned the Shah's regime into a "spent force" and laid the foundation for the need to replace that regime by a Ceasarean[?] procedure--or perhaps by a "Cyrusean" procedure, after Cyrus the Great. This procedure would be utilized to contain the fiery revolutionary element, and it would be utilized in what U.S. scholar Daniel Lermes called "extremist politics." Lermes is the American scholar who had analyzed the social situation in Iran after the fall of Mosaddeq. This analysis had been carried out for Columbia Office in the United States. Such extremist politics would turn the gathering clouds of revolution into a suicidal anarchic movement which would put an end to the socio-economic agenda that would have changed the foundations of the existing regime. That movement would hide its true identity behind the mask of the true Islamic religion to appease the idealistic and moral aspirations of the masses. It would titillate the public's patriotic sentiments by expressing its hatred of western interests in rhetorical terms without touching these interests in any real sense of the term. It would effect changes compatible with the process of transformation until the revolution is foiled and Iran is restored to its role as a subordinate to the existing international economic system and to its expansionist role, a role which protects western oil interests in the Arabian Gulf.

The mullahs led by Khomeyni set up this alternative regime and effected changes and alterations that would complement the previous administration socially, economically, politically and militarily without effecting much change in the political freedom granted to the masses and without really narrowing the differences that people have to live with in incomes and lots in life. The most that those mullahs have been able to accomplish was the elimination of the existing

alienation between the government and the defending public. The mullahs also mobilized the public in human suicidal missions.

To confirm the fact that Khomeyni's regime was reviving the expansionist policies of its predecessors, Iran decided in May 1982, that is, almost 3 years after the Shah's regime was accused of "following in the devil's footsteps," to revive the nuclear program that the Shah had set up. Shah Mohamed Reza wanted to build 20 nuclear reactors in Iran at a cost of about 30 billion dollars, or the equivalent of Iran's oil production for 2 or 3 years. This project required the utilization of the country's excellent uranium resources. Uranium was recently discovered at four sites in Iran. The project also required Iranian and foreign expertise; [such expertise was to be available] through the agreements that the Shah's government had signed before the revolution with French and West German firms. It was Khomeyni's first government that revoked these agreements in the course of its efforts to appear to be breaking the country's ties with the West and its efforts to try to get Iran out of its economic and military subordination to the leading centers of production in western industrial countries. It covered this nationalistic demonstration in religious terms when it described that nuclear program as "an atrocity committed by the devil." Suddenly, however, Khomeyni's present government revived this action when the need no longer existed for having the regime appear to be turning away from the West. In its 23 May 1982 issue THE SUNDAY TIMES of London stated that the legal dispute between the government of Iran and the firms that had undertaken the task of establishing this nuclear program was recently settled in a manner that would allow these agreements to be renewed. The newspaper explained that these agreements did not specify that these nuclear power plants would not be used in producing nuclear weapons. If it is confirmed that the Tehran government does not intend to use its nuclear bombs against Damascus or Beirut--and both are within the range of Israel's nuclear capability--what other Arab capital does Khomeyni's regime intend to choose as the target of the Islamic Revolution it would export via a nuclear weapon? Khomeyni's regime has not departed from the course of interpreting the role that the Shah's regime played in the Middle East as one that turned to the West, toward the valley of the Euphrates and Tigris and toward the Arabian Gulf. It was stated recently that the regime in Iran was turning toward the East to join Pakistan in manufacturing an Islamic nuclear bomb that would be used against Arabs.

Regardless of the answer to this significant military question, the development of economic relations between Iran and the West shows not only a kind of relaxation in conditions in the last few years, but it also shows that these relations were broken only in the "revolution's" propaganda and in the supporting propaganda the revolution was getting in the West. A cursory glance at the statistics of western industrial countries indicates that Iranian-western trade in 1980--the revolution's first year, the year during which the fact that the United States froze its trade with Iran and sent its paratroopers to invade Iran and liberate the U.S. hostages in Tehran, had positive and softening effects on Iran's trade. Trade between Iran and the West gave Iran a trade surplus of 3.03 billion dollars. Western industrial countries exported to Iran goods worth 7.77 billion dollars, and they imported from Iran goods worth 10.8 billion dollars. Iran's largest trade partners were Japan, West Germany, Britain and France. The United States exported to Iran goods worth 20 million dollars, but it imported from Iran goods worth 340 million dollars.

During the revolution's second year--the year of transition from outward hostility to seeming neutrality toward the West--the volume of exports to Iran did not change much. Exports to Iran amounted to 7.71 billion dollars, and Iran's principal trade partners were Japan, West Germany, Italy, Britain and France. U.S. exports to Iran rose from 20 million to 300 million dollars. Goods imported from Iran by NATO countries declined to about 6.99 billion dollars. This was because the Iranian economy was being burdened by the war, and it became unable to keep up the [levels of] production that had been realized during the first year of the revolution. Nevertheless, Japan, Spain, Italy and West Germany continued to occupy the principal positions in importing this group of goods from Iran.

Exports of Western Industrial Countries to Iran and Iran's Imports from These Countries (in Millions of Dollars)

The Country	Exports to Iran		Imports from Iran	
	1980	1981	1980	1981
Japan	1,580	1,850	4,240	1,940
West Germany	1,510	1,610	1,880	670
Italy	570	750	340	700
France	720	670	680	480
Holland	350	390*	320	240*
Britain	920	360*	250	50
Spain	330	340	1,060	1,350
The United States	20	300	340	60
The Netherlands	270	250	270	430
Switzerland	280	240	80	40
Total for Common Market	4,470	4,200	3,830	2,610
Total for western industrial countries	7,770	7,710	10,800	6,990
The Socialist Bloc	. . .	1,900	. . .	2,920

* For 6 months only.

The Source: THE FINANCIAL TIMES 21 May 1982, from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the embassies of the Organization for Economic Assistance.

The significance of these figures becomes evident when they are compared with the total volume of Iran's trade in 1981. In official statistics, for example, Iran's imports amounted to 12.1 billion dollars--an increase of 700 million dollars over last year. Industrial countries that are members of NATO sold Iran 63 percent of its imports, that is, three fifths of the goods that entered Iran. Eastern bloc countries, meanwhile, sold Iran less than one fifth of the goods that entered Iran; their share of Iran's imports did not exceed 16 percent. This shows how erroneous Iranian claims are that Iran is breaking its ties with the West, that it is adopting a policy of positive neutrality or establishing an Islamic regime that would restore to Iran its control over vital matters.

The survival of foreign economic relations in Iran is confirmed by the fact that international oil monopolies have been purchasing Iran's oil. Those purchases have not been affected by Iran's calculated position on the oil war that was

being launched by enemies of OPEC against it. Those enemies either adopt a hard-line position within the organization in setting prices, or they collaborate [with each other against Iran] outside the organization. Iran's export quota, which is set at 1.2 million barrels a day is exceeded and reaches 2 million barrels a day, and the sale price for oil, which is set at 34 dollars a barrel is exceeded by over 5 dollars.

Moreover, this was linked with the fact that Iran purchased its military materiel from "devilish" sources. On 21 May 1982 THE FINANCIAL TIMES of London estimated that in 1981 Iran's military purchases were between 2.5 and 3 billion dollars. Israel was one of the sources that supplied Iran with weapons. Israel had had close ties with the Shah's regime before the revolution, and it renewed those ties with Khomeyni's regime, the regime which replaced that of the Shah.

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IRAN

DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATION, CLOSE TIES WITH PDRK

Cooperation Welcomed

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 19 Oct 82 p 12

[Text] Mr Hwang Chang-Yop, speaker of the SPA of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, who came to Tehran three days ago as the head of a high ranking political and economic delegation, visited and talked with Hojjatoleslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Majlis, and described this visit as quite beneficial and satisfactory.

According to a report by our correspondent, in this meeting in which several of the representatives of the Majlis and the political deputy minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of our country were present, first, the speaker of the Parliament of North Korea referred to the visit of the delegation to the cemetery of the martyrs (Behesht-e Zahra), Iran National automobile factory, and the carpet museum saying: We had heard much about your country, but we were not familiar with your country first hand.

We have seen the Iranian people and nation who have been loyal to the revolution and have worked hard for the country. During our visit to the automobile factory, all the workers greeted us with the slogan, death to America. We were quite impressed and we felt that we had a trustworthy fellow combatant.

He added: This ideology on which you relied to overthrow the shah empty-handed and create this revolution shows that a human being is very important. I have generally sensed that all the Iranian people have realized the authenticity of their revolution and are loyal to it.

The speaker of the Parliament of North Korea added: I think that you have been victorious in both the war and in the revolution

and you will also be victorious in reconstruction. You have been very successful in creating a revolutionary people.

He then called his visit to Iran a successful one and, referring to the role of the trip of the speaker of the Majlis to North Korea in the relations between the two countries, he also considered his own visit instrumental in this relationship. He pointed out that he will inform the people and the leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of his observations. Referring to the meetings of the economic ministers of the two countries and the visit of a Korean economic and trade delegation to Iran and pointing to the economic weakness of the non-aligned developing countries, he emphasized the need for economic cooperation among these countries and proposed the establishment of a common monetary fund. He asked for a solution to the economic problems of the non-aligned developing countries through cooperation and the establishment of a south and south [as published] conference. The speaker of the parliament of North Korea referred to the 70th interparliamentary conference which will be held in Seoul, the capital of South Korea, and said: If the conference were to be held in that country, it was anticipated that many countries would not participate. Hence, we propose that another location be suggested as we, for instance, had moved the conference of the non-aligned countries from Baghdad to New Delhi. I think that the Iranian Majlis can play an essential role in this connection.

In conclusion, he asked for increased relations and exchanges of views between the parliaments and parliamentary delegations of the two countries. He said: Our visit to your country has been very short, but I am quite pleased with it.

According to the correspondent of JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI after the statements of the speaker of the parliament of North Korea, Hojjatoleslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani referred to the spirit of the people of our country and said: We now realize that our people prior to and after the victory of the revolution have made much progress. It is a political nation with sufficient growth and even the people of the villages and elementary school students understand the domestic and global political issues of today.

The speaker of the Majlis said: We advanced the political growth of our people based on ideology. The people are united on the basis of Islam and analyze the domestic and foreign issues on the basis of Islamic principles. In addition to radio, television, the press, and the theaters, our Friday prayers are large classrooms in which the people are educated about ideological and political issues. In our teachings, we make the people understand that the causes of the problems in the world are the superpowers and colonialists, headed by the United States. Imam Khomeyni has called the United States the Great Satan. In Islam,

Satan is the source and center of all evil. Our people consider the U.S. satellites as small Satans under the command of the United States. Therefore, when you hear the slogan of death to America, it is a conscious slogan and not an empty one. Undoubtedly, if you visit any factory, school, or any other gathering, you will hear the same slogan that you heard in the Iran National factory. No one provokes them, they move by their own will.

We are now certain that even without us, the people will continue their way. According to our correspondent, Hojjatolislam Hashemi-Rafsanjani agreed to the proposal of the speaker of the parliament of North Korea concerning the change of location of the interparliamentary conference from South Korea to another place. In regards to his other proposal concerning economic cooperation among the non-aligned countries and the establishment of the south and south conference, he said: Among our primary political convictions is the belief that if the oppressed people work together, they will create a great force which will defeat the oppressors. He added: We accept any sincere proposal made by any sincere country for cooperation between the non-aligned nations against the superpowers and we will cooperate. We proposed the common fund a long time ago in order to provide economic support for the oppressed nations against the great power.

Continuing his statements, the speaker of the Majlis agreed to the proposal for cooperation between the two parliaments and pointed out the essential difference between the Islamic Majlis and other parliaments in the world. He referred to some of the powers of the Majlis and said: In any case, let me expand on your proposal. We should cooperate in all political and economic areas and military resources with independent, revolutionary countries and not permit aggression by the superpowers. We should not permit the creation of countries such as Israel, nor one like Afghanistan where a nation is being slaughtered.

According to this report, the speaker of the Majlis said in conclusion: You are faced with the problem of the United States and South Korea and we are faced with the problem of the United States and Saddam. He expressed hope that the economic delegation of North Korea which will visit Iran in the future will be able to take greater steps to expand relations between the two countries.

At the end of this meeting, the speaker of the parliament of North Korea expressed gratitude and, referring to the importance of creating relations between the North Korean and Iranian parliaments, described the functions of the representative of the parliament of the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea.

President Discusses Palestine

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 18 Oct 82 p 11

[Text] The political service of JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI: President Hojjatoleslam Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i met with Mr Hwang Chang-Yop speaker of the SPA of the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea, who is visiting our country as the head of a high ranking political and economic delegation.

According to our correspondent in this meeting in which the minister of foreign economy, the deputy minister of the foreign ministry of North Korea, and a number of the officials of our country, including Dr Velayati, the minister of foreign affairs, were present, first the speaker of the parliament of North Korea referred to the success of the Iranian people after the victory of the Islamic revolution and said: The Korean people pay special attention to the victory of the Islamic revolution, its successes, and also the Iranian people and consider these successes as their own. He then referred to the struggle of the Korean people against global imperialism and the interest of the two countries in expanding their relations and said: We know that U.S. imperialism is continually conspiring against the Iranian revolution and engages in terrorism and aggression, but the Iranian people continue their struggle and have become victorious. We are quite impressed by this.

According to our correspondent, the speaker of the parliament of North Korea referred to the struggles of the Iranian people to defend the independence of our country and said: As a non-aligned country rallying behind anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism, we work to defend the goal of the non-aligned movement. Continuing, he said: We believe that the people and the country of Iran are committed to the principles and the goal of this movement as one of the members of the non-aligned movement and that they work to materialize this principle. In conclusion, the speaker of the parliament of North Korea informed President Hojjatoleslam Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i of the invitation by Mr Kim Il-song, the president of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to visit North Korea.

According to this report, Hojjatoleslam Khamene'i then emphasized the struggle against global oppression and said: This is a reality that the forces against global oppression must unite again and, hand in hand, discover all its deceptive methods and fight them. He added: In our foreign policy, we have established friendly relations with all countries that are seriously fighting the United States.

The president referred to the conspiracies of U.S. imperialism to suppress the sacred flame of the Palestinian revolution and, emphasizing the necessity of the support of the countries of the region for this revolution, he said: In our opinion, all those who follow the anti-oppression policy must be sensitive to the Palestinian issue and respond to it. Hojjatoleslam Khamene'i continued:

If the United States fails to put out the flame of the Palestinian revolution, it will be a great victory of the nations of the anti-U.S. front of the progressive countries against U.S. oppression.

The president condemned the policies of some of the reactionary governments of the region in following the policies of global oppression and said: Despite the fact that we have witnessed the domination of U.S. policies most strongly and violently in the region, we have preserved our revolutionary direction and, God willing, we will continue to do so.

Hojjatoleslam Khamene'i also said: None of the economic or political necessities or the various military threats could make us even lift an eyebrow and we remained unmoved in the face of the increasing aggressions of the United States. We feel that the vital weakness of the United States is the region of the Arabian Middle East and the Persian Gulf. God willing, if we succeed in defeating the U.S. policies in this region, we will have indeed inflicted a great defeat against global oppression.

According to our correspondent, in conclusion, the president expressed his delight with the visit of the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Iran and his satisfaction with the existing relations between the two countries.

Korean Division Blamed on U. S.

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 19 Oct 82 p 12

/Text/ Mr Hwang Chang-Yop, speaker of the SPA of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the delegation which accompanied him, who have come to Iran at the invitation of Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani, met and spoke with Mr 'Ali Akbar Velayati, the minister of foreign affairs, at noon yesterday at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of our country.

According to the correspondent of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY, in this visit in which the deputy for international affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr Zankeh, the

representative of the Majlis, and the ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Pyongyang were also present, relations between the two countries in connection with global issues, including the movement of the non-aligned nations, were discussed and both sides emphasized the necessity for persistent and effective struggle against U.S. imperialism and the implementation of a policy of neither Western nor Eastern by creating unity among the truly non-aligned nations.

First, the speaker of the parliament of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, referring to the friendship between the two countries, said: No country can defeat this friendship and unity; we must expand our relationship more than ever before.

He then referred to the change of location of the next conference of the non-aligned movement from Baghdad to New Delhi and said: The Islamic Republic of Iran played the essential role in this regard and we also cooperated with you because the change of location of the conference is a victory for Iran as well as other non-aligned countries.

Mr Hwang Chang-Yop then referred to the next interparliamentary meeting in South Korea and asked Mr Velayati to support North Korea in opposing holding the meeting in Seoul. In conclusion, he invited Dr Velayati to visit the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Then, the minister of foreign affairs of our country emphasized the common positions of the two countries and, referring to the continuous aggressions of the United States against the Islamic revolution, he said: Even though our country has been harmed greatly by the United States, the Islamic revolution of Iran is the greatest historical phenomenon to date.

Dr Velayati then remarked that the change of location of the conference of the non-aligned movement from Baghdad to New Delhi saved this movement from destruction. Thanking the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for its stance in this change of location, he said: If the conference of the non-aligned movement were to be held in Baghdad, a cruel dictator would have headed the movement for three years and would, in fact, have taken advantage of this position to stabilize his usurping rule.

Dr Velayati continued his discussions with the speaker of the Parliament of North Korea, supporting the reuniting of North and South Korea and considering the United States as the cause of the disunity and separation of these two countries. The representatives of the Majlis at the 69th interparliamentary congress held in Rome voted in opposition to the next meeting of this assembly in Seoul, the capital of South Korea.

He then emphasized the expansion of political, economic, and trade relations between the two countries and proposed the establishment of a common fund in the non-aligned movement with which to provide for the needs of the member countries and help them achieve independence.

At the end of this visit, the minister of foreign affairs of our country expressed his hopes to visit North Korea in the near future.

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CSO: 4640/21

NEW ALGERIAN ENVOY IN TEHRAN INTERVIEWED ON IMPORTANT ISSUES

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 20 Oct 82 p 3

[Interview with 'Abdolhamid Ajali, Algerian ambassador, by ETTELA'AT correspondent; date and place not specified]

[Text] Political service of ETTELA'AT: Algeria, as one of the countries closest to the Islamic Republic of Iran, has always occupied a special place among the authorities and our revolutionary and martyr nurturing nation. Nevertheless, it is only natural for the authorities of that country in their dealings with global issues and problems to sometimes have differing views and positions from those of the Islamic Republic. The participation of the government of Algeria in the Fez conference through the foreign minister of that country, on the one hand, and the arrival of the new ambassador of Algeria in Tehran, on the other, are reasons to speak with Mr 'Abdolhamid Ajali, the new ambassador of Algeria, concerning his views on various issues in the region. What follows is the detailed text of our interview with him, which we publish here in order to acquaint our dear readers with the views and positions of Algeria.

It must be mentioned that Mr Ajali has thusfar been in charge of the Algerian Embassy in Zaire, Brazzaville, the Congo, and Cameroon and for a while, he was general director of the Asia-Latin America section of the Algerian Foreign Ministry. Before coming to Iran, he was in Yugoslavia.

Results of the Fez Conference

Question; As you know, the conference of Arab leaders was held in Fez, Morocco. Since Algeria also sent its foreign minister to that conference, please tell us your views and those of your government concerning the results of this conference.

Answer: Since the beginning of the events in southern Lebanon, we have proposed a gathering of the Arab countries and we were ready to accept any kind of proposal. For this reason, we also participated in the gathering of foreign ministers in Tunis and in the Ta'ef conference as well as the Fez conference. And we will participate in any gathering of the Arab countries in this regard. Our aim in participating in the Fez conference was to support the Palestinian position. Quite truthfully, I must tell you that we do not

follow the empty chair policy. Anywhere there is a struggle, Algeria must be present and show that it is present. But why did we go to Fez? Because a previous conference had been held in Fez which had failed. Some of the countries determined that it would be better to have another conference in Fez in order to be able to follow up the issues which had been raised in the previous conference. In Fez, several issues were raised. Of course, the essential important and, on the whole, the main focus of the conference was the occupation of Lebanon and the issue of the Palestinians. In regards to the issues of Lebanon and the Palestinians, Algeria supported the position of the PLO and determined that if the PLO is satisfied with the results of the conference, we will also be satisfied. However, concerning other issues there, I must say that the position of Algeria is known and is not new.

Fez Conference and the Iran-Iraq War

In that conference, the Iran-Iraq war was also discussed. The Algerian delegation tried to prevent the ratification of a resolution which would have negative results on our stand, which is for peace, brotherhood, understanding, and cooperation among all the Islamic countries. In regards to an important issue such as the Iran-Iraq war, which has occurred between two brother countries, it was illogical and unnatural to ratify a resolution without the presence of both countries in the conference. Our aim is to help find a solution and attain a just, lasting, and honorable peace rather than taking positions against or for one particular country. For this reason, from the first day, we opposed the ratification of this resolution and when this resolution (concerning the Iran-Iraq war) was ratified, Algeria refused to accept it. Consequently, the resolution is not valid in the view of Algeria.

As during the Vietnam war we were against the Vietnamization of the war, as we have always opposed the Africanization of the confrontations in Africa, naturally, we oppose the Arabization of a war between two Muslim nations, two Muslim nations which must unite against their common enemy, U.S. imperialism and its follower in the region, Israel. Despite the various problems that exist, we are optimistic, especially at a time when we are witnessing every day the statements of the high ranking officials of the Islamic Republic that Iran is decisively seeking peace. Of course, an honorable peace, and by peace we mean this kind of peace and none other.

The committee which resulted from the Fez conference was made up of seven countries. Algeria and the PLO are both members of this committee. As I said, wherever the PLO determines that its presence is useful, we will follow.

Clear Position on Iraq

Question: In connection with the Fez conference, you referred to the imposed war and said that the concern of Algeria is with the preservation of neutrality and ending the war. Given the fact that the reactionary regimes of the region have not remained neutral and help Iraq with all their resources, could one not take a decisive stance in this regard?

Answer: In regards to the mutual relations between Iran and Algeria, I must say that we must see what we are and what we want. The Islamic revolution of Iran, in our view, is a revolution which fights imperialism and Zionism. It is a revolution whose direction is towards the progress, development, and freedom of the nation. Consequently, the two revolutions of Iran and Algeria are complements of one another because both have been inspired by Islamic teachings. Islam has been the primary mover of both revolutions. The goals of both revolutions are the economic and political freedom of their nations. Both Iran and Algeria are members of the Islamic conference, the non-aligned countries, OPEC, the 77 nations, and the United Nations. Both fight imperialism and Zionism. Consequently, we can say that Algeria is proud of the Iranian revolution. Algeria wants the Iranian revolution to succeed and achieve its results.

The Position of the Countries of the Resistance Front Regarding the Iranian Revolution

Concerning the position of the countries which are members of the resistance front which was held in Algeria in May of 1982, in the final communiqué of this committee, it was precisely stated that the Islamic revolution of Iran is the revolution of a friend and that the members of the resistance front hope to expand and develop more than ever before their relations with Iran. In the goals that both of our revolutions follow, there is a deep bond with the essential strategic policy of both revolutions against imperialism, Zionism, subjugation, racism, apartheid, and foreign aggression.

Question: Considering the increasing height of the conspiracies of the global oppressors and Zionism against the oppressed nations of the region, there is more than ever before a felt need for unity among the member countries of the resistance front. Also, we have observed that the member countries of the resistance front hold various positions regarding regional issues. Please tell us your views in this connection.

Answer: In the world as a whole, and in the Third World, the Arab world, in the non-aligned movement, and the developing countries, there exist a few minor differences which result from the history of these societies. The struggle to achieve unity has not yet been completed and still continues. Do not think that we are satisfied with the present situation of the Islamic and Arab countries. The Palestinian issues rose to such tragic dimensions because some of the Arab authorities found excuses in carrying out their duties and created an obstacle along the path of the common will of the Arab nations who all demanded with one voice and one heart a response to the aggressor; but, they refused to confront the main enemy. The resistance front is a permanent effort. It is an effort whose goal it is to attain the unity of action to which you referred. But it has not yet reached that stage. This effort continues and it must not be assumed that there are differences or gaps among the members of the resistance front. There are no differences between Syria, Algeria, Libya, South Yemen, and the PLO and we are advancing hand in hand. But much effort is necessary in order to be able to strengthen this unity more than ever before.

Question; Considering the fact that the conspiracies of the Zionists against the people of Lebanon and Palestine still continue, what is your position on ending these crimes and conspiracies? And what position should be taken towards Amin Jumayyil?

Answer: The events of Lebanon are only one side of the issue and not the whole problem. The main focus is the Palestinian issue and how we can strengthen the Palestinian nation in its just struggle. This struggle must be multilateral. It must cover economic, political, and cultural aspects. Also, this struggle must be completely coordinated, involving the countries of the Arab world, the Islamic countries, and the resistance front, on the whole, all the countries and nations which want justice and freedom. It must also be totally clear in regards to the struggle against Israel and all those who support Israel. This struggle cannot be at the level of the leaders and decision makers. As I said before, the essential issue is how we can help and strengthen the Palestinian nation on its path to freedom. We cannot desire the freedom of the Palestinian nation and the sacred lands and at the same time create disunity among the Palestinian people and decrease their representative power. Above all else, this issue concerns the Palestinian people and the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people is the PLO.

Election of Amin Jumayyil

In regards to Amin Jumayyil, I must say that he is the head of the government of a country. It is the Lebanese nation that must express its opinion about the leaders of its country. I am not in a position to express the thoughts of the Lebanese people for them. Every nation must itself give its opinion on its leaders. I can give my views on the policies of this or that country, but I cannot speak about a particular person. The policy that will be devised in Lebanon depends on what course of events will win over another. Certainly a movement which is supported by the people will be victorious. If a leader is not supported by his people, he will not be able to enact a positive and long term policy. Hence, I think that in Lebanon also, a policy which will be imposed by the people will be victorious. Whether in Lebanon or anywhere else, only a policy which has the trust and strength of the people can survive.

Membership of the Polisario in the Organization for African Unity

Question: Tell us your views and those of your country on the issue of the membership of the Polisario in the organization for African unity and the opposition of some of the African countries.

Answer: The aim of the Polisario is just and correct. I am happy that both Iran and Algeria defend this aim. The struggle of the Polisario, like all other liberating struggles in the world, is a long one which has faced many difficulties but it has also attained many victories.

Among the countries that opposed this membership, some were victims of Westernized ideas and influenced by certain legalities. In accordance with

the charter of the organization for African unity, this request for membership is quite legitimate and legal. But, some others have an actively antagonistic position. They are in direct contact with the imperialist plans. Their goal is to harm the Polisario movement as a liberation movement, to create gaps and disunity among the African countries, paralyzing the organization for African unity, and to postpone the process of the liberation of Namibia and South Africa. But we are hopeful for the future because the goal of the Polisario movement is just and correct.

Relations between Iran and Algeria

Question: As the new ambassador of Algeria to the Islamic Republic, how do you view the relations between the Islamic Republic and Algeria and what do you anticipate for the future?

Answer: The revolutions of Iran and Algeria naturally have in common stability of power and ability. This power stems from the reliance of both revolutions on Islam, non-alliance, progress, human freedom, support for just goals, and the fight against imperialism, Zionism, and racism.

Politically, Iran and Algeria both have joint goals, occupations, and objectives. We must take advantage of these relationships in other areas, such as cultural and economic areas. This exchange of political views must be preserved and we must coordinate the efforts of the two countries on the international level. We must make more constructive use of this situation to cover more grounds.

Question: As you know, the Algerian foreign minister was martyred in an air accident on his way to Iran. What is the status of the studies of the Algerian authorities concerning the cause of this accident?

Answer: First, I must take this opportunity to say that we respect your revolution very much and wish it complete success. Also, we thank the authorities of the Islamic Republic for their trust in our country, a trust which has been expressed publically many times. This trust was evident in the past in connection with the U.S. Embassy and at the present time, in connection with all the sincere efforts of Algeria to facilitate the establishment of a just, honorable, and lasting peace to a war involving two brother countries and Muslim nations.

Especially since we cannot forget that this war has pitted these two Muslim nations against one another, this is an issue which is on the minds of all Muslims. I said earlier that we want the stability and increasing success of the Islamic Republic. For this reason, we hope for a just, honorable, and lasting peace. We spoke about Palestine and Lebanon and the liberating struggles. In order for us to be able to advance this struggle on the united front and bring it to fruition, these parallel wars must not exist between Islamic nations. The Islamic people must be united and in harmony in order to follow common goals.

Results of the Investigation Concerning the Martyrdom of Benyahia

The martyrdom of Benyahia and his friends is part of all the sacrifices and tragedies stemming from the war. We know that martyr Benyahia was coming to Iran on an official visit hoping to expand relations between the two countries and help bring about peace. Only ending this war can ease the sorrow of losing martyr Benyahia. Let me tell you very truthfully that the results of the investigation are not yet known because of the numerous complicated technical aspects in connection with the crash of the airplane, which involve such things as chemical tests, aeronautics, the appearance of the crash site, and so on. On the other hand, our information comes from various sources and countries. This information must be combined in order to obtain more accurate data. Therefore, the results of the investigation are not clear as yet. However, what is important is for this martyrdom to become a stage, of course a very painful one, in attaining peace and understanding among Islamic nations.

Message to the Iranian Nation

Question: In conclusion, do you have a message for the Iranian people?

Answer: I would like to express the most brotherly and sincere message of the authorities of my country to the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the brotherly greetings of the people of Algeria to the Iranian people. Also, I would like to express my sincere wishes for the success of this great revolution, a revolution which is pivotal not only for the brother nation of Iran, but for all the Third World countries. Also, I would like to express hope that, both in regards to ETTELA'AT and in regards to other newspapers and mass media, I will find opportunities to provide the Iranian people with more information about the Algerian revolution. We must not forget that it is a revolution which a Muslim nation determined and brought to fruition, a Muslim nation that has been able to preserve its Islamic personality after one century of colonialism. With more than seven years of struggle, it was able to bring its revolution to fruition with the aid of an armed struggle in which one-tenth of its people were martyred. I am personally very happy and proud to be the Algerian ambassador to Iran and I hope that with everybody's help, I will be able to have even a small and insignificant role in expanding and developing the brotherly relations between the two countries. I wish a long and healthy life for the imam, the leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, success to all the authorities of the Islamic Republic, and luck, good fortune, and peace for the Iranian people.

My efforts in expanding the relations between Iran and Algeria will be along the general policies which the president of Algeria, Chadli Bendjedid, as well as our party, the FLN, and our government have determined. The aim of this policy is that we use all of the resources to strengthen and expand the brotherly relations between Iran and Algeria.

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CSO: 4640/23

EMIGRE PAPER ANALYZES NEGATIVE ROLE OF CLERGY

London E'DAM in Persian 15 Oct 82 p 4

[Text] First, let me point out one issue. Among all the treachery and all the crimes that Khomeyni and his gang have committed, one thing is quite apparent. It has been and is putting an end to the puppet show of the clergy and it has shown their faces as they really are. It must be said that Khomeyni awakened us from the negligent slumber of centuries and he is rescuing us from the pit of perdition in which we were entrapped. The Khomeyni conspiracy carded the warp and weft and the cotton of Islam in its mill and set it up for auction. The Iranians, who had accepted Islam by force and through families, did not know anything about it. Did you know anything about the Koran and Islam and what the Khomeyni conspiracy has brought about except that your parents were Muslims and you were also a Moslem by way of family ties? Certainly not. The same goes for me and others like us as well. Today the people have read and are reading the Koran to know what religion and instructions they are following. To see whether or not what Khomeyni does is Islamic? Khomeyni himself says that he follows the clear text of the Koran. Even the common people who are the public and who follow like four-legged animals are gradually turning away from Islam. By falsifying the truth, you cannot deceive anyone. If anyone should succeed in this manner, it would be short-lived. In the course of history, the clergy has spilled so much innocent blood and has worked to muddle the thoughts and minds of the society that it could fill the pages of hundreds of books. Molla Mohammad Baqer Shaf'ti who was at one time a source of emulation in Esfahan, committed the murders of many innocent people. It is said that the cleric personally cut off the heads of more than a hundred people as if it were nothing. It must be said that Islam has not remained free of unjust tampering from the very first moments at the time of the Prophet. Ambitious and materialistic efforts began at that time and the religion of Islam became an instrument for satisfying the wishes and desires of one person or another. Instead of the Islamic religion, murder, plunder, and aggression by the bloodthirsty Arabs were exported to the civilized world. Omar was one of those who engaged in plundering and destroying developed civilizations in the name of Islam and under the pretext of expanding Islam. He took the first steps to drag Islam into deviation. It is astonishing that despite so much injustice and all the oppression, murder, and tortures which are carried out in the name of religion, the Koran, and God by the clergy, there seems to be so little protest. Yes, it is really astonishing that they tolerate and do

not say word in protest. Well, this is another example of the clerical craftiness we are talking about. The clerics on the whole, and particularly Ruhollah Khomeyni, the Complete Cleric, have a great share in the misfortunes of the nation and the destruction of Iran. They consider the most essential and best grounds for their victory in dominating the people of Iran their ignorance, unawareness, and misfortune. This is the tragedy that this group has imposed on a large part of the Iranian people. Ruhollah Khomeyni, most shamelessly, calls himself the inheritor and successor of the Prophet of Islam. His writings in "Velayat-e Faqih" and his "Towzih ol-Masa'el" are not unlike claiming to be a prophet. He even engages in practicing medicine and writing prescriptions. He expresses his knowledge on matters including the virginity of girls, using toothpicks, curing diseases, and hygiene in the event of sexual intercourse with animals. With such writings and such statements made on the pulpits and with the actions that they have committed and are committing, the clerics have drained Islam of its content, polluted it with forgeries and superstition, dragged it to destruction and isolation, and have skillfully revived idolatry and have made of monotheists modern idolaters.

They have changed all the goals and wishes of the Iranian people to revive the past greatness and a certain perfect movement towards the future into a sad disappointment. They have set about to destroy and annihilate the monarchy, which from the beginning was the greatest and most useful form of protector for the people of Iran. They have enslaved the free people of Iran to the uncontrolled sword of the bloodthirsty terrorist Palestinian and Syrian butchers and neutralized the labor and suffering of 2,500 years of monarchy in constructing Iran. In order to destroy Iran and the Iranians, they have set the various colonialist powers against each other in rivalries and they themselves have become the foundation of religious differences. They have forced the people to fratricide and have caused the unjust spilling of much blood. They have placed Iran in such a position that there is fear of its being wiped from the face of the world map. Iran and the Iranians have not faced such tragedy ever before. Over the ages, Iranians have been part of a progressive, knowledgeable, and able nation.

At one time, Iran was several times the size it is today. It is one of the first areas of the world in which a thinking, hardworking, free, peace loving people live and in the course of time, they have created a high civilization and a great culture full of perfection and spirituality. It has a rich, long history full of events. It has always been in the path or the target of aggressions and conquests. Blessed with rich natural resources, Iran was about to achieve its economic and political position in the world, to be freed forever from the imposed captivity of the superpowers and to become a country which would be taken into account in the world. The Khomeyni conspiracy was imposed in order to prevent this situation and in order to make the Iranian people forever forget progress and perfection. What the Khomeyni regime imposed on Iran is total annihilation and destruction in order to return Iran to an age of slavery, backwardness, poverty, and misfortune. This is precisely the mission of Khomeyni the Foreigner and his friends. It was done with such sleight of hand, skill, and misleading propaganda that they have not only created doubts in the minds of the Iranian people, but also

caused the nations of the world outside Iran to be uninformed of the reality. The darkest and most effective part in each tragedy and the saddest chapters and scenes of the crimes and treacheries in Iran have been carried out either directly or indirectly by the clerics. It might be unimaginable to some people that all the misfortunes, backwardness, defeats, deprivations, humiliations, belittlings, and despair of the Iranian people are the consequences of the actions of the clerics. It might be imagined that others did not have a share in it and also, it is possible that the bitter truth may be unacceptable to some people that some men in religious garb, of whom nothing but piety and virtue is expected, are themselves the instigators and causes of so much crime, treachery and mischief. I ask, does this bitter and unimaginable truth exist? Yes, it does. If we look for the causes and the roots of the disparity of our country, Iran, we will see the truth, which is that the clergy and no one else is the cause of all the crimes.

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CSO: 4640/25

RISKS TO GULF OIL EXPORTS DISCUSSED

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German No 239, 15 Oct 82 p 4

[Article by A. H. Larnaka, correspondent]

[Text] Statements by Iranian Foreign Minister at UN

In a speech before the United Nations, Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati threatened that not a drop of gulf oil would reach the West if the export of Iranian oil were impeded in any way. The foreign minister then spoke of the guardian role that his country was playing at the Hormuz straits. In order to understand the significance of the allegations made by the Iranian foreign minister, whose speech was directed primarily against the United States, they must be considered in the light of the present Persian Gulf situation. Iranian oil exports are currently being hampered by Iraq. Iraqi fighter planes are occasionally bombarding tankers attempting to load oil in the port of the island of Kharq. They have also quite frequently bombarded the harbor installations of Kharq and an Iraqi military spokesman recently stated that 80 percent of the harbor was destroyed.

Intimidation and Encouragement Propaganda

The Iranian information media have to date tended to downplay the Iraqi attacks. In a kind of propaganda war, the Iraqis have attempted to intimidate shipowners and their insurance companies in order to prevent them from loading oil in Kharq, while the Iranians have tried to encourage them, promising compensation of damage and stating that the tankers were safe at Kharq. Foreign military experts have often been surprised that the Iraqi pilots tended to approach the Kharq harbor and the tankers hesitantly. For they feel that bombardment of the island would be an easy matter and the harbor could have been totally destroyed long ago if Baghdad had so desired.

The Iranian foreign minister's threat illustrates the political risks inherent in the hindrance of Iranian oil exports. This is probably one of the reasons for Iraq's rather hesitant approach to Kharq and the tankers. Closing of the straits by Iran would not directly affect Baghdad because Iraq has not been exporting any oil by sea since the beginning of the war 2 years ago.

However, oil from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the Arab Emirates and Bahrain must pass through the straits of Hormuz. These countries are Iraq's most important suppliers of funds. They are helping Baghdad to bear the immense costs of the war and it must consider them just for this reason.

For these reasons, the threat to close Hormuz, which a member of the Iranian government made in public for the first time, might influence Baghdad in the sense that its fighter planes will not use their total destruction potential against the island of Kharq, but will rather continue, as in the past, the mixture of actual bombardments and threats against oil exports while some Iranian oil will continue to transit. The purpose of the Iranian threats appears to be intimidation of the Iraqis against excessive action.

Hormuz as Goetterdaemmerung [Twilight of the Gods]

There appears to be a very large gap between the threat and actual closing of the straits, because Tehran realizes that this step would entail grave risks for Iran. The West would see itself compelled to institute countermeasures in order to safeguard its oil supply. However, the fact that the Iranian foreign minister for the first time made public mention of the possibility of such a closing and that he did so before the United Nations does merit emphasis. It indicates that the possibility of closure is in the minds of the Iranians--perhaps as a last desperate measure if all else fails.

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CSO: 4620/4

AIR FORCE COMMANDER 'IVRI PLAYS DOWN WAR SUCCESSES

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 17 Sep 82 Holiday Supplement pp 16-17, 20

[Interview with Air Force Commander David 'Ivri by Hanna Zemer and Amir Oren; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] The question of bombing civilian centers in Lebanon is certainly not original. How do you regard it, as natural, as provocative?

[Answer] As natural for Jews. I have not heard it asked in others' wars in which there were civilian casualties, also not recently in Afghanistan or the Falkland Islands.

[Question] As the commander of Jewish pilots, did you encounter this question also as a problem in the air force?

[Answer] We encountered it as in a point for discussion and in coping with that which was assigned to us in the most proper form. We did not encounter it as an operational problem. There was a policy in accordance with which we endeavored to operate and from which at times it was necessary to deviate. It does happen that there is only partial data at the time of the decision or the real situation changes. As a rule, targets were attacked only after careful consideration of possible harm to civilians or objectives which have an effect on the battle. For example, terrorist headquarters from which they ordered the terrorists who were fighting our forces not to withdraw. An attack on several targets of this type was cancelled at the decision-making level because the danger to civilians was high. A second and more difficult area is the front line when it is necessary to provide directed or close air support to our forces. On the front line the agonizing choice is between attacking civilians in an area from which our forces are being attacked and avoiding attacking such an area and creating the danger of many more casualties to our forces. It is also here that the data vary from place to place and battle to battle. There were officers with the advance forces who, under fire, said to the pilots, "Attack this and this house," and the pilots inquired and found that the target was not described for them initially and there were only partial data. There were exceptional cases in which our forces were besieged--such as the battalion which entered Tyre by mistake, was surrounded, and was being fired upon with RPG's, Katyushas, and everything else that it was possible to fire--and then there was an emergency

call to us to attack everything around it in order to extricate it. Except for cases of extrication, there were instances in which houses were attacked in order to permit the advance of our forces and to prevent casualties. It is difficult to know for sure, but I estimate that in most of the cases there were no civilians in the houses.

Other air forces that had launched attacks in battles in urban areas had used the carpet-bombing method. Even if, for example, they attacked factories in urban areas, they bombed the area in which the facility was located. As for us, when we went for a certain target, we considered every method of attack and armaments in order to hit only the target. This does not mean that casualties were not possible at a distance of 50 or 100 meters from there or that there was not at times a problem in the armament system. However, we did what was not done in any other air force in order to create a situation in which others outside the target would not be harmed.

[Question] Beyond the ability to pinpoint the attack, are you satisfied also with the result, the purposefulness?

[Answer] I don't know the result. In my opinion, no one knows. I know from the aerial photograph which target was hit, but not how many people were inside. The main mission was protecting our forces and not annihilating the enemy.

[Question] This question relates to the length of time in which the terrorists held out in Beirut and the fact that their most senior commanders were not harmed. Is this one of the criteria for the success of the various methods used against them, including also the operations of the air force?

[Answer] I cannot chase someone with a bomb. This is a very difficult question which, in my opinion, no one can answer. Was the effect of the bombings decisive or not? An accumulation of many factors influenced the decision. In my opinion, the bombings had a severe psychological effect beyond their actual damage.

[Question] You mentioned targets the attacking of which was cancelled by the decision-making levels over the air force. Is it possible to have a situation in which the delays and hesitations are from the air force in contrast to the opinion of the decision-making echelon?

[Answer] I estimate the damages that will occur in the surrounding area and detail the significance. I do not have a direct influence on the decision. Indirectly, the influence is by means of the professional recommendation which at times must be accepted. When less of a professional effort is made, the damage is greater. Some of the things which have been done in the world in terms of the damage to objectives in an urban area resulted from a smaller and less professional effort to achieve clean results from an excessive attack.

[Question] Did you conduct training in the bombing of targets in an urban area such as houses in Beirut as distinct from the refugee camps a long time before the bombing of Beirut in July 1981?

[Answer] It makes no difference what you put in the sight--a house, a small circle, or a red or green indicator in the range. Success depends upon the air force's sighting and attacking ability and not the nature of the target or the number of stories in a house or its form. It is not a matter of a method of sighting urban targets especially.

[Question] You said that there were no operational problems in the air force. Were there arguments or complaints?

[Answer] There were agonizing problems, but I did not hear complaints. Most of the air crews who participated in the current security actions against the terrorists in Lebanon even before the war understood that the air force policy was to minimize attacks on civilians as much as possible. The commanders definitely had an agonizing problem to the extent that they were able to explain to the lower echelons the changes and the deviations from the policy that resulted from a change in the data in the area. When you try to understand, for yourself and in order to be able to explain, you are troubled. We had commanders conferences daily to the extent that there was continuous communication. There was time for this because this wasn't such a difficult war. If there was a question at all, it was if at the lower echelons the first lieutenants and second lieutenants were able to accept that policy, that explanation. It is possible that here and there there was greater agonizing among the young pilots because of less communication. After the war I had many meetings with the pilots, for example in various courses, and I sensed in them a desire to understand. I know that I am subjective, but I sensed that they accepted the policy as a correct one perhaps even though from time to time there were deviations which they did not understand and at times they were under external pressure to explain what they were doing.

[Question] How do you estimate the effects of the success of the air force in the war in areas in which it had greater success than in previous wars such as the battle against the surface-to-air missiles?

[Answer] One of the reasons for the fact that I did not give many interviews is that our success is dangerous. Significant but dangerous. It is good to succeed, but in the long-term look ahead it is likely to be one of the first steps toward the next failure. After the Six Day War the feelings of success blinded those who had to prepare themselves for the next war--in general, in perception, not precisely in the air force. When you begin to applaud your success, you cut yourself off from the proper lessons because you are carried away in defending what you have already done, and eventually you yourself are convinced that it is correct and everything is all right. As the leader of a system, as a commander, you are likely to close the mouths of criticism of successes, real or imagined. The basis for the air force's quality involves the maintenance of the proper balance between successes and mistakes in the learning of lessons. We will not always attain such good conditions which we really exploited exceptionally this time. The complacency is radiated from the commander downward. We have also not ended the war. I do not think that the war has to continue, but I am not certain that

it will not do so, and if we begin with victories and praises, things start falling from the hands. Afterwards you get a slap in the face even in flight security. It is likely to penetrate the entire air force, even to the mechanic who permits himself to be less responsible. I believe that one of our achievements is precisely after the war, in maintaining the proper tension and responsibility and the rapid implementation of the debriefings. Right after the war we held discussions on a future war, addressing areas with which we did not cope in this war, so that the focus of attention will be forward and not backward. The publicizing of the successes is for the short term; basic and serious matters continue for the long term.

[Question] You are really the opposite of publicizing, but it is not possible that you do not have satisfaction from the fact that the success was during the period in which you were the air force commander.

[Answer] There is no doubt that it is much more pleasant to succeed in an operation than to go to a funeral. The question is how far ahead you look.

In the first 6 days of the war in Lebanon we conducted more sorties than in the major Six Day War. At that time we operated from Luxor in Egypt to H-3 in Iraq and this time in the Hadera-Haifa region. In no war in the world was so much air support, so concentrated, in such a small unit of time and area provided. In relation to the thousands of sorties, the number of mistakes was very small.

The inter-service cooperation was one of the most complex matters in the war.

[Question] Until now you have spoken about the firepower support of the air force, but the air force can also provide support by the sophisticated means which it has acquired since the Yom Kippur War.

[Answer] We are not autonomous. All of our intelligence was given to the IDF and distributed to the ground forces. The air force and I are not so self-centered that we would not give the material to the one who required it.

[Question] What in your opinion is the global significance of the air force's success in attacking the Syrian missile deployment?

[Answer] First, we balanced the relationship between aircraft and missiles even though the war was between total systems and it is only the public that is accustomed to relating to the battle of aircraft versus missile. A new balance has been created, perhaps even with a leaning to the other direction--that is to say, as if today the aircraft dominates the missile. This also is incorrect--we are somewhere in the middle. In this war we found ourselves at least one step in front of the air defense system. It is reasonable that we should continue to cope in this area also in the future, and the more we expose ourselves, the more difficult the next struggle will be. We are competing not only against the Syrians but against an

entire Soviet and eastern bloc concept in which surface-to-air missiles are the primary air defense. This is a formidable system in which billions have been invested, and it is not likely that it will collapse against the concept of a small country like Israel. Therefore, we must be on guard against what they are preparing for us in the Soviet system which cannot surrender or say to itself that it is bankrupt, something which would also be incorrect. They are sitting there, debriefing, and trying to provide an answer.

[Question] Do you estimate that the Soviets will prefer to give the Syrians operating crews if they decide to provide them systems which to date have not been deployed outside of the Warsaw Pact areas?

[Answer] Russian crews are a matter for a political decision because the Russians have no problem in training Syrian crews. If Russia wants to become involved, it will introduce Russian crews. This is a matter for deliberation. If tomorrow they come under strong pressure, it is possible that they will do this. From our standpoint, we are fighting against the same missile. It makes no difference who fires it.

[Question] In terms of the means which permitted the air force to destroy the missiles, when was the breakthrough?

[Answer] Since at the end of the War of Attrition in the summer of 1970 we had lost several aircraft and crews in a battle with the missiles in Egypt, we initiated at a significantly accelerated pace the development of a weapons system against surface-to-air missiles. At that time there were severe budgetary limitations. Every year we had more achievements, more developments, and more new training. The attack which we practiced in 1975 is completely different than that which we carried out in 1979 and that which we are now doing. And with those systems themselves, our achievements today, after 3 months of Operation Peace for Galilee, are much better.

[Question] Can one infer then that you are happy that the attack on the missiles which was about to be carried out in April 1981 was cancelled at the last moment?

[Answer] I don't know. I think that in April 1981 we would have achieved a similar success because most of the systems were available to us.

[Question] In talks with pilots there have been various answers to the question as to whether or not the destruction of the missiles has erased the trauma of the air force from the Yom Kippur War. Some claim that there was no trauma and some claim that there was. What is your opinion?

[Answer] It is mixed. There are those who come out of the Yom Kippur War in a trauma in regard to the air support and on other issues, not only from the trauma of the missiles. It was not only us but the entire country. There was much criticism and bad feelings despite the fact that in military terms (not strategic-political) it was a great and highly successful war.

[Question] What is the air force's degree of need, not to speak of dependence, for American aid?

[Answer] We are very much dependent on the Americans--for spare parts, modern aircraft, and some of the modern weapons systems. Good and effective systems have been developed in Israel, but a very large component is still dependent on the Americans. This is obvious.

[Question] Do you feel that sharing the lessons of the war with them can help in their attitude? Have you encountered interest on their part or on the part of other air forces?

[Answer] There is considerable interest, primarily in the area of technical curiosity. To the one who does not know exactly what you did, it appears much more magical than it actually is. And we have several excellent technical things that we did, weapons systems and methods which can be of interest, but publicizing them in every channel eventually brings them to undesirable places. One must also know how to apply the lessons correctly, and if we convey hurried or partial lessons we will get back many mistakes, for example from the industry which hastens to go into production before the overall picture has been drawn.

[Question] How are the lessons of the war, with all the restrictions and limitations, affecting the planned configuration of the Lavi?

[Answer] The concept underlying the Lavi is correct. One war does not determine a change in the configuration of an aircraft, but those who will be handling the Lavi are now aware of various lessons, some of which are not even in writing, in the areas of operating the aircraft, pilot functioning, and which system was more important. From the subconscious this then transfers to application in the configuration of the aircraft which you are producing. This is precisely our advantage over others who are doing this theoretically.

[Question] Has the war also led to conclusions regarding the need for changing the structure of the air force or the relationship between the types of aircraft and the other systems in it?

[Answer] The war in Lebanon was limited, and it is difficult to extrapolate from it to a general war. The air force was large for this war. The IDF was not fully utilized, and the air force certainly was not in a truly quantitative sense even though it achieved maximum quality in all of its missions.

[Question] In 5 or 10 years will the air force be different in its basic structure than the one of today?

[Answer] If it will not be different it will be a tragedy. The air force is changing all the time. Every year whoever goes abroad for 1 or 2 years does not recognize the air force when he returns to Israel. This also causes the "antiquation" of reservists which is a problem in the air force.

From every exercise, from every training program, from every period, we learn lessons and apply them, and afterwards we look back and see that it is not the same as it was.

[Question] Is there a dispute between schools in the air force? Is the struggle over the position of next commander of the air force only a personal one or is it also one between concepts?

[Answer] I do not believe that we have problems of schools. There are disagreements over the method of carrying out this mission or another, but not on the world-view of air force operations.

[Question] You said that this war was a little small for the air force, and some say that the country is a little small for the air force. The implication is that we are now beginning the first year for the deployment of the entire force in the small Israel, without the expanses of the Sinai. Doesn't this require a change?

[Answer] We are working on this as we had been doing already 2 years before the evacuation. The country is very narrow for an air force which wants to develop, to make operational range adjustments, and to conduct war game exercises. We are trying to find substitutes. Such a substitute in the operational area is, for example, the Hawkeye which compensates somewhat for the loss of early-warning space or other systems in which the investment of money, thought, and technology again extends the border which has come close to you. It is more difficult to compensate in the area of training. Here we are working more in simulations and in the condensation of the sortie. The more we improve the debriefing of the flights which we have carried out, the higher will be the level of quality to which we will bring the air force. The debriefing is the main instrument today and permits the analysis of every detail, not only the beautiful words. In the past, we would come down from a flight, and whoever shouted louder was the victor because he saw the situations which he wanted to remember. Today you must be more objective. There are systems which show exactly every detail and stage.

[Question] How satisfied are you with the new airfields?

[Answer] We are very satisfied. We have achieved models about which I could only have dreamed would be available in another 20 or 30 years, not for me but for the children. Thanks to the American grant and the pressure of time we dictated standards without having them haggling, cutting, and doing to us what they always do. The situation is such that in comparison with the airfields which we left in the Sinai, there is a quantitative loss here in infrastructure--as is also the case in distance and in other matters which are not related to the airfields--but we received good airfields.

[Question] Why were the results in the air battles in Lebanon so good? What is your explanation?

[Answer] I also received more than I estimated. There is also here the element of luck, and the process of exploiting success or more precisely the

exploitation of the collapse in the air area by the other side. Our success in the air battles had a cumulative effect. The successes in the Six Day War, which were not so great in air battles, brought a certain bonus to the Yom Kippur War because those who led and quit on the other side trained and continued to lead afterwards. In the Yom Kippur War the rate of kills was greater, and since then--even higher. There are also the factors of the type of aircraft, weapons systems, training, and command and control--all of these together lead to superiority. Our successes in the air battles in Lebanon in the last 3 years caused the Syrians to be concerned about entering into battle.

The beginning of the air war was very hesitant from their perspective despite the fact that we were flying only 3 to 5 minutes flying time from their airfields and our closest airfield was twice as far. Not only this but we also did not cross the line to Syria. We did not pursue. They patrolled along the line and the moment they wanted to they turned toward our forces where we operated far more aircraft in a unit of area and a unit of time than ever. It was a limited war primarily in terms of the air force, but nevertheless, the mission was accomplished because the Syrian pilots knew that one-fourth of their aircraft that penetrated into Lebanon did not return. There is a great psychological significance to the knowledge of a pilot that he has four sorties to live or to return home. The Syrian pilots are disciplined and carry out orders, but they had a morale problem which affected the form of the flight. There was a psychological collapse within 2 days. The destruction of the missiles and the major air battles were between Wednesday at noon and the cease-fire on Friday at noon. The digesting of the successes and failures on both sides was not so rapid, but it is a fact that in all of our actions since then there was an absolute air superiority. No one intervened and no one disturbed. It was a quintessential success in a short time. And I assume that 'Asad's background as a former air force commander influenced his decision to agree to a cease-fire.

[Question] You have virtually not mentioned the human factor at all.

[Answer] He is aware of them all. War today is already no longer between pilot and pilot. Whoever waits to see "the whites of the eyes" of the other side, in the style of World War II is doing something very stupid. Today the effort is one of a complete system which reads the battle map and extracts more from the aircraft. Professionalism and skill in operating the aircraft are greater today in the air force than in the past. The war in Lebanon was fought primarily by young pilots who had not yet fought in a Yom Kippur War, and it can be said that we succeeded in training them properly. One of my concerns is if we will succeed in training them also for a war of another kind, perhaps a more difficult one, a war in which we will suffer losses, against several air forces simultaneously or in the framework of a surprise. Our rate of losses this time was the lowest in any air war at any time also thanks to the outstanding operational discipline. This was one of the most electronic wars, a war of the eighties with rapid processes of warnings and responses, action and reaction on both sides.

[Question] What would you still want to provide during your period of service?

[Answer] The closest and most difficult step is the determination of lessons without fragmenting the resources into a thousand lessons but rather to concentrate on the main directions, in determining 10 or 20 lessons which would dictate the direction of development of weapons systems, combat doctrine, and exercises for the future.

[Question] What importance do you attach to the budget?

[Answer] Great importance, but manpower is even more important. In my opinion, the issue of the discharges of regular service personnel will soon be raised again. The training of personnel is the most precious and most important matter for the air force, its greatest strength. If flying time is cut, indirectly we are discharging also air crews because they will be taken out of an operational status earlier. It is intended for the air force to achieve air superiority to the extent that it will permit the mobilization of the reserves of the ground forces. After the evacuation of the Sinai, this mission is more difficult to implement because it is easier for the enemy to paralyze us. In my opinion, the country is unable to maintain a large regular ground force, tens of thousands of troops who constitute the best work force of the economy. The question is how to bring a great amount of firepower with a very quick reaction capability from a relatively small force. The answer is the air force with its regular force, and this concept has only been strengthened in the wake of the evacuation of the Sinai. I am not disturbed about the next 2 or 3 years in which the air force will be in reasonably good condition. Beyond that, I am very disturbed about the transition in various air forces in the Middle East to western equipment, to the F-15, the F-16, the French F-1, American training, command and control systems, and intelligence which they will receive from the United States. When they will have, let us assume, 2,000 aircraft and the battle will not be between an F-15 and an inferior MiG but between aircraft of the same quality, our situation will not be a simple one.

Ahi'az

Before the release of the pilot Aharon Ahi'az from his captivity, General 'Ivri relates that his captors took him around in Beirut and showed him the results of the air force attacks. "Indirectly, they told him that there were terrorists and their headquarters in all of the houses that we attacked. They were very surprised at the precision of the air force attacks."

5830

CSO: 4423/13

GENERAL MAIMON PROMOTED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 22 Sep 82 p 16

[Article: "Brigadier General David Maimon promoted to Major General"]

[Text] The commander of the Assistance Unit in Southern Lebanon, Brigadier General David Maimon, was promoted this month to major general.

David Maimon was born in 1920 in Rishon Leziyyon. In 1947 he volunteered for the Hagana. Afterwards he joined the IDF and served in the headquarters of the Gadna [Youth Battalion] where he served in command positions. He was the commander of the minorities unit and served in command positions in the south. In 1962-63 he was an officer in the General Staff Branch in the Southern Command. In 1964-65 he was a battalion executive officer in the Golani Brigade. He was subsequently appointed a brigade commander in the Gaza Strip. He took an active part in the war against the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip. In the Six Day War he served in combat positions in the Southern Command.

In the Yom Kippur War David Maimon served on special assignments in the division of Maj Gen Ariel Sharon. On 18 October 1974 he was promoted to brigadier general and in November was appointed commander of the Gaza Strip. From September 1978 he served as chief of the Staff Administration. David Maimon is a graduate of the Inter-Service Command and Staff College and the National Security College and has a B.A. in Middle Eastern studies from Tel Aviv University. He is married and the father of two girls and one boy. His son, a major, is serving in a command position.

5830

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HEALTH PROJECTS FOR MASSES SUPPORTED

Rural Health Projects

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 1 Oct 82 p 3

[Article: "Health: Objectives of the Fourth Economic and Social Development Plan: To Provide Some Form of Preventive and Mass Medicine in Rural Areas"]

[Text] A major national seminar on recurring operating and maintenance expenditures for development projects and programs was held in Nouakchott on 13-16 September 1982.

We are publishing below estimates of health-related recurring expenditures under the Fourth Economic and Social Development Plan, as presented by the Ministry of Planning and National Development.

The organization of health care in Mauritania meets with structural, human and financial constraints. The public health budget still remains very far behind international WHO standards. From 1978 to 1980, Mauritania spent on the average 3 to 4 percent of its national budget for public health, which is well below the 8 to 12 percent recommended by WHO. The rate of health coverage of the population is very low, 20-25 percent of the population. In addition, an excessive percentage of health care facilities are concentrated in Nouakchott which possesses 58 percent of all hospital beds for only 12 percent of the population. There is also a shortage of health services in rural communities where 80 percent of the population are living.

Personnel expenditures represent a major item in the health budget, and they restrict the efforts that could be made in rural areas, especially with respect to preventive medicine. These expenditures account for over half the budget allocated by the state.

The credits allocated for drug purchases have also been reduced, and this will slow down adequate distribution of health care.

Objectives of the Fourth Plan

Until recently, development strategy gave priority to curative care; the fourth health and nutrition plan is a plan that will ensure the transition

from an individualistic and curative type of medicine to a mass and preventive type of medicine primarily servicing rural areas.

In the short and medium term, the objective of the fourth plan will be:

- to provide additional support for existing units;
- to provide additional Ministry of Health support with respect to the technical aspects of health care planning and management;
- to ensure that primary care is available in all villages;
- to create a pyramid-shaped health structure with health cabins and village pharmacies at its base and the national hospital at the top.

To this end, the following specific operations will be undertaken during 1981-1985:

- 1) extension of health care facilities to cover 60 percent of the population by 1985;
- 2) development and widespread availability of preventive medicine;
- 3) obtention of optimum results from existing health-care facilities.

Table 4.2 provides a detailed listing of the working program prepared by local health authorities for the next plan period.

Assessment of Recurring Expenditures

In this part, we shall assess the recurring expenditures resulting from the various programs, from the preventive medicine program to the construction of hospitals.

Preventive Medicine Program

Generally speaking, preventive medicine operating costs are borne by the donors. The Mauritanian budget provides only for the payment of personnel expenditures and the cost of renting premises. The preventive medicine program includes four different categories of operations, including:

- 1) an expanded vaccination program;
- 2) primary health care;
- 3) hygiene and sanitation improvement efforts;
- 4) health education.

Expanded Vaccination Program

The objective of this program is to immunize all children against six diseases: tuberculosis, diphtheria, tetanus, measles, whooping cough and poliomyelitis. It will be expanded to all of the country and will require several inoculations of each subject. To carry out this program, 11 mobile teams have already been created, and 2 more will be created in 1983 to expand the program to all the country. Each team consists of five members, i.e.: one state-certified nurse, one certified nurse, one assistant nurse, one unskilled worker and one driver. However, the Ministry of Health is contemplating increasing the number of team members to eight in 1983 by adding three more state-certified nurses.

Apart from salaries and the rent for premises, the state budget will also provide for vehicle operating costs. Actually 16 additional all-purpose vehicles, representing a total investment of approximately 10 million uguyas, will be required to continue this program.

Primary Health Care

As far as primary health is concerned, the objectives of the program are:

- 1) to multiply training opportunities for community health agents;
- 2) to provide a more regular control of traditional midwives and community health agents;
- 3) to provide all villages and camps with better trained auxiliary midwives.

The program also provides for the training of 1,050 junior health technicians, the cost of which will be borne by USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development] and UNICEF. The junior technicians thus trained will be supervised by mixed mobile teams. Therefore, the cost of this supervision is already included in the budget.

However, provisions must also be made for local personnel working under this project, either in training others or in managing the project. This personnel includes nine state-certified nurses. If we take their annual salaries into account as well as the cost of renting premises, we arrive at Table 4.4 which gives the total expenditures resulting from the primary health care program. We should also mention that, under the program, the participation of the population involved is required. In fact, they must pay for operating costs, subsequent drug purchases, and the monthly salaries of junior health technicians.

Table 4.2 - Health Projects.. Fourth Economic and Social Development Plan.
1981-1985.

<u>Designation</u>	<u>Cost</u> <u>10⁶ UM*</u>	<u>Foreign</u> <u>Financing</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Domestic</u> <u>Financing</u>
- Kaedi hospital	121	121	EDF**	-
- Second Nouakchott hospital	70	70	Irak	-
- Psychiatric hospital	50	50	Irak	-
- Aioun hospital	70	70	EDF**	-
- Nema hospital	94	94	FSD***	-
- Five medical centers	60	60	Irak	-
- Construction of health centers	868	868	n.a.	-
- Construction of mother-infant centers and mother and infant protection centers	275	275	n.a.	-
- Health education, vaccination and school hygiene	730	730	n.a.	-
- Preventive medicine	630	570	n.a.	-
- Hospital equipment	900	300	EDF**	-
- Manufacturing of most common drugs	50	50	n.a.	-
- Veterinarian pharmacy	20	20	n.a.	-

Source: Ministry of Economy and Finances: Synthesis Commission, Draft of the
1981-1985 Fourth Economic and Social Development Plan, Orientations
and Programmed Operations, March 1982.

* Mauritanian uguas

** European Development Fund

*** [expansion unknown]

Table 4.4 - Recurring Expenditures*. Primary Health Care. In Thousands of
Mauritanian uguas. 1980

<u>Expenditures</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>
- Salaries	982	982	982	982	982
- Renting of premises	<u>49</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>49</u>
Total recurring expenditures	1,031	1,031	1,031	1,031	1,031

Source: Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs, Health Plan.

* To be added to disbursements.

Health Development Projects

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 14 Oct 82 p 3

[Article: "Seminar on Recurring Expenditures: The Health Development Program Will Require Over 300 Million Mauritanian Uguyas"]

[Text] We continue the publication of the document concerning Fourth Plan recurring expenditures. Today, we shall examine estimated health-care expenditures.

Hygiene and Sanitation Improvement

This will consist in assessing the work of health service agents after the communities involved have placed the necessary equipment, products and junior personnel at their disposal. Therefore, this program will not result in any additional expenditures for the state. Actually, its operation will be ensured by the communities' efforts, the role of the state being limited to placing at their disposal personnel that is already included in the budget for other functions. A number of hygiene and sanitation improvement operations will be undertaken under this program; for instance:

- rat extermination
- insect extermination
- decontamination of stagnant water bodies
- drinking water and food inspection
- sewage disposal inspection.

Finally, Nivaquine will be systematically distributed to two target population groups. The total cost of this program, based on 1980 prices, will be 67 million uguyas and will be entirely borne by UNICEF.

Health Education

Health education consists in implementing a permanent information network to demonstrate or illustrate certain health problems so people will become aware of the major problems involved in the organization of health care. Health information will use all available media, especially audiovisual media. Financing for the equipment required will be provided by the Aid and Cooperation Fund; it will amount to over 5 million uguyas.

Hospital Infrastructures

As far as hospital infrastructures are concerned, two operations will be carried out: the construction of new infrastructures and the rehabilitation of existing infrastructures.

Construction of New Infrastructures

A special effort will be made in favor of rural populations, to achieve one of the major objectives of the plan, namely to extend health coverage to 60 percent of the population. To this end, the authorities have prepared the construction program given in Table 4.6.

The adoption of this program will require considerable investments from the government and from donors. These investments will total 1.3 billion uguiyas in 1985, the last year of the plan.

As far as recurring expenditures are concerned, we have identified three major categories of expenditures resulting from these new infrastructures, namely: salary expenditures (including drivers' salaries), the operating costs of infrastructures and vehicles, the depreciation on vehicles and equipment, which will be written off over five years.

Table 4.6 - Construction Program. 1981-1985 Health and Nutrition Plan.

<u>Classification</u>	<u>Class</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>
- Health-care centers	A	2	2	1	--	--
- Health-care centers	B	3	3	3	--	--
- Health-care centers	C	25	30	45	25	18
- Mother/infant protection centers	B	3	7	7	5	--
- School medical centers	B	2	2	2	--	--
- Mother/infant centers	A	2	3	--	--	--
Total	-	37	47	58	30	18

Source: Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs, Health Plan.

Rehabilitation Program

The health and nutrition plan includes in its program the rehabilitation, to be completed by 1985, of 6 regional hospitals, 29 Class-B health centers, 25 Mother and Infant Protection centers, and 60 Class-C health centers. Rehabilitation of these facilities will require the financial participation of local communities and of the international community. New equipment will also be purchased for the 29 Class-B department health centers. Finally, 18 recovery and nutrition education centers will be created in the 25 Mother and Infant Protection centers. Each of these new centers will have an operating cost of about 320,000 uguiyas per year.

The recurring expenditures for rehabilitated infrastructures will be twofold. In fact, it is likely that rehabilitation will not result in additional salary expenditures for the state, since the rehabilitated facilities were already in operation before the start of the plan period. Therefore, we shall include among recurring expenditures only the operating expenditures and the expenditures resulting from equipment depreciation.

Drugs Requirements

The annual amounts provided for drug purchases vary widely depending on the type of health facility. Appendix 6 lists the expenditures for pharmaceutical products required for the proper operation of each health facility. These expenditures represent a non-negligible proportion of the total recurring expenditures. We have also included the expenditures for drugs to be provided to the preventive medicine program mobile teams. During the next 5 years, in order to achieve a 60 percent rate of medical coverage, the state will have to spend over 318 million uguiyas on drugs. Of course, the results involve only the expenditures corresponding to the operation of the new health facilities.

Hospital Management and Maintenance Service

In its effort to improve the effectiveness of its services, the Ministry of Health has included in the fourth plan the purchase of several vehicles and the recruiting of additional personnel. In 1981, the service operated with a national personnel of 11, and 16 additional people were scheduled to be recruited starting in 1982.

Other Investments

The Ministry of Health has also included in its development plan the purchase of some 100 vehicles required to operate existing services. This purchase will, in turn, result in recurring expenditures.

As a whole, the Mauritanian health development program will result in recurring charges for the treasury amounting to over 300 million uguiyas by 1985. Table 4.14 gives a breakdown of these expenditures by type of operation. The "r" coefficient of estimated recurring expenditures for this program will vary from 16 to 18 percent over the period 1981-1985.

Table 4.14 - Recurring Expenditures*. Health and Nutrition Program. Fourth Economic and Social Development Plan. Thousands of Mauritanian Uguiyas - 1980

<u>Category</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>
Total cumulative investment	414,130	977,351	1,448,768	1,685,286	1,861,748
Recurring expenditures:					
- Preventive medicine program	1,308	1,308	7,051	7,324	7,688
- Construction program	33,960	74,792	102,513	113,588	120,944
- Rehabilitation program	3,967	11,252	18,626	24,272	29,872
- Drug requirements	20,756	44,667	72,870	84,567	95,333
- Vehicles management and repair service	5,165	11,015	12,165	13,003	13,551
- Other expenditures	7,871	15,228	18,943	20,995	24,701
Total	73,027	158,262	213,225	263,749	292,089

* To be added to disbursements.

9294

CSO: 4519/42

ECONOMIC PRESSURES, DIFFICULTIES DISCUSSED

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 17 Oct 82 p 5

[Interview with 'Abd-al-Qadir Qaddurah, deputy prime minister for economic affairs by Samir Sarim: "It Was the Blood of This Country's Toilers That Caused Oil Prices To Rise; Our People Were Affected by this Price Increase: We Use the Subsidies We Get To Pay the High Prices;" date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] Reactionary forces exaggerate the power of the United States and Israel, nurturing the fear their citizens have of these two countries so they can hold on to their positions. Arab funds are being invested in Europe and the United States, strengthening the economies of those countries, while in our country they are used to fight small craftsmen. The decision to boycott American goods must be made by the people. We are optimistic about the future; this is why they conspire against us.

These circumstances that we have been made to experience involve kinds of economic pressures. We consider it a major victory that we made preparations for our needs and that we are meeting the demands of our people and our armed forces.

Plans To Provide Basic Needs

[Question] Have we prepared the plans that are necessary for increasing production capacity in case of an all-out war so that emergency needs of both citizens and fighters can be met?

[Answer] Every citizen in this country noticed over the more than 110 days that have gone by since the onset of the Nazi invasion of Lebanon, as the country moved closer every day to war with the Zionist enemy or his clients, that there were no bottlenecks anywhere in the routine areas of living.

Each citizen was stocking up on supplies. It is true that we did not have an all-out war, but we were and we still are capable of increasing the capacity of our production plants through the initiative of the workers themselves. Accordingly, we can hold out against [our enemies] by providing the people and the

military with capabilities for resistance. As I've indicated we made preparations for this in the areas of food, health and energy.

We feel comfortable about what we have, and we are all set on the domestic front: in the area of food supplies, health and economic action we are prepared to confront any aggression whenever that aggression might take place and no matter how long it lasts. I do not exaggerate at all in making this statement.

We are now setting a proper course for consumption, and we are attending to the effort to reduce waste. We are benefiting from the results of these activities in strategic food supply operations, in steadfastness operations and in confronting any emergency that may occur.

We began applying these plans, which are the subject of the question, in 1980. We took into consideration the fact that we are a confrontation country and that war could break out any time.

We started out [by assuming] that we had to be self-sufficient in some areas, specifically in strategic materials. I can say that we produce all the oil derivatives we consume except gas. We have achieved self-sufficiency in fertilizers, a strategic product and a basic one for agriculture, and we've achieved an acceptable level of self-sufficiency in grains, a basic product. Despite the fact that a black market for cement occasionally develops, we are moving toward expanding the self-sufficiency formula for this product and for the remaining strategic products as well. However, we cannot become completely self-sufficient since we cannot live in isolation from the world. We are now making plans to become 60 percent self-sufficient in pharmaceutical products by the end of this plan, and this would be good. We are making plans to become about 50 to 60 percent self-sufficient in sugar by the end of this plan, and we've also made the necessary plan to become self-sufficient in gas by the end of 1984.

Thus, the efforts we began before war broke out--efforts we are still continuing--are efforts that we've increased and speeded up when the likelihood that war would break out any time began looming on the horizon. We were likely to face economic pressures, and we were concerned about continuing to exercise our prerogative to make free and independent decisions. Therefore, we were being called upon--and we are still being called upon--to rely more on ourselves. Self-reliance actually became a slogan, and we began making an effort to achieve it. We should note that this is not an easy matter, but that it is also not impossible. Self-reliance is in fact possible, and figures that we have already mentioned are to be considered indicative of a qualitative leap. We used to import diesel oil and gasoline until 1979. Now we do not. Now we are making plans for utilizing the gas which has been found in our country in economic quantities. By early 1985 we will not have to import gas. Some of our economic projects will use gas for power; gas costs less compared to other oil derivatives.

Where Do We Stand on Food Security?

[Question] Food security is an extremely serious matter, especially under these conditions when imperialism is using food as a weapon against nations fighting [for survival]. What efforts are we making in Syria to achieve food security? What do you think are the probabilities for success in this matter? What technological systems and investment plans have we prepared for this success?

[Answer] We have had the necessary plan for food security ever since [our] 4th 5-Year Plan. For our food security we have prepared what are called mechanical means. Food security depends on the availability of foods, chiefly grain. To ensure the availability of these grains we've given farmers incentives to cultivate the largest area of land with grains. Last year we produced 2.2 million tons of grain.

Storage space, or what is called silos, is required for this grain. Silos are now scattered in all the governorates of the country. The grain [we have] has to be turned into flour. To do that, the mills that we now have can meet approximately 80 percent of our own needs. Mechanized bakeries have been built in various governorates, and districts and in some subdistricts.

In a few other products, we began, for example, by increasing beet production because sugar, as well as [vegetable] oils is part of food security. We started out with the statement that food security depends on developing the agricultural sector. Therefore, the 5th 5-Year Plan has devoted more attention to the development of the agricultural sector. This is being done through several means; among these are mechanization, paying attention to the farming sector, setting up [agricultural] societies and making requirements for agriculture, such as fertilizers, pesticides and tractors, available. We've also given agricultural guidance the attention it deserves, and we are trying to provide improved seeds. Our [beet] production last year amounted to 35,000 tons; in 1979 it did not exceed 10,000 tons. Syria is now considered one of the countries using good proportions of fertilizers. We've introduced new sweet potato varieties and new seasons for planting sweet potatoes. At the Seed Propagation Institute we are interested in sweet potato seeds that can be planted in the fall and in the spring. Since we are now in the beet season, let me say that we have devised a plan to mechanize all beet cultivation operations. Next year we will also begin the first experiment using machines to pick out beets in our farms.

At the same time we've devoted considerable attention to the desert. We've set up a few basic principles on how the desert can be utilized for grazing purposes. The subject of food security is fully linked with the development of both parts of the agricultural sector: animal and plant.

An examination of agricultural sector appropriations in development plans indicates that there has been a sharp rise in investments allocated for the development of that sector. Agricultural investments exceeded investments in the industrial sector in the 5th 5-Year Plan. Today the world is suffering from two basic problems.

The first problem is that of food security and the second is that of energy and renewable and new energy alternatives. We do not claim outstanding accomplishments in this area, but we are moving in the same direction in which the world is moving. In the agricultural sector, we are now trying to increase the size of our stock of sheep and cattle, and we are trying to increase the number of threshers and tractors. To do so we've said that anyone who has a thresher that was brought into the country on a temporary basis may keep it in the country on a permanent basis because it is a productive machine. We will sell tractors to cooperative societies below market prices so that the number of tractors in this sector can be increased. We will also sell an improved breed of cows to cooperative farmers

and cooperative societies. These cows will also be sold at prices that are below market prices; these are not bad prices.

We've also modernized dairy plants, and we began for the first time modernizing feed plants. Fertilizer plants have also been modernized.

I am affirming that during the present 5-Year Plan we will achieve qualitative and advanced progress in the agricultural sector. For example, we are not importing yellow corn; our present production is estimated at about 400,000 tons. Among the measures that we have taken, for example, is that of encouraging the cultivation of corn, a strategic product. We raised the price of corn for farmers; as a result, production rose from 10,000 to 20,000 tons.

We are now making plans for increasing corn production to 80,000 tons over the next 2 years. We will begin the experimental cultivation of corn in some recently reclaimed land. A decision has been made to cultivate 5,000 hectares of this land with corn. To put it briefly, we are now inclined [to favor] the growth of agricultural industries. What happened with regard to encouraging the cultivation of yellow corn also happened with regard to the cultivation of beets and the cultivation of cotton, but the growth of one strategic crop is not taking place at the expense of another strategic crop.

Land must be utilized, and [the ratio between] units produced and units of land must be increased. We have improved this ratio in some crops in some areas, such as beets in al-Ghab and in Aleppo. This was the result of several measures: the use of mechanization, the use of fertilizers, the use of irrigation, etc.

These plans that were adopted have had a positive effect in bringing about food security.

The Importance of Guidance Measures

[Question] A series of economic decisions have been made and are still being made in the areas of importing, exporting and guidance. How do you view these decisions in the context of building a confrontation economy?

[Answer] As I've already stated, the economy is an integrated unit. When one part or one area of that economy malfunctions, all other areas of that economy are affected. It is not enough to have the industrial sector operating in an ideal fashion or to put all the effective energies of workers to work. It is also not enough to take all reserve resources out of the land. The economy is an integrated unit that can be strengthened and invigorated only by a society that fully believes that production is its primary objective and consumption and prosperity the second objective. When we guarantee our citizens an acceptable level of income, good transportation, good housing, acceptable health services and acceptable educational services, and when we solve the fundamental economic problems our people have, we can then afterwards turn to the matter of luxury and prosperity. There are questions [to be asked]: What should have priority: food security or video devices? What should have priority: ensuring domestic [means of] transportation in a manner that would preserve citizens' dignity, or purchasing movies that are designed to convey a message?

Do we guarantee medicines for hospitals and health centers, or do we guarantee recreational vehicles that would be used by a few people for tourism?

It is such questions that made us consider the reality of our economy and get a handle on all its affairs and sectors. If it occurs to you to wonder about smuggling activities, about controlling smuggling activities to keep them from getting worse, let me say that we cannot say that we have done away with smuggling. Smuggling is a disease. To provide radical treatment for that disease, we [sponsored] a bill that would increase the legal deterrent to smuggling. I wish to refer here to the fact that with little leadership we were able to thwart smuggling operations. [Our small efforts] provided 800 million pounds in revenues for Syria's treasury last year. I am affirming that this follow-up on smuggling operations did not exceed 5 percent of the effort that should have been made. How would matters be then if we were to snuff out completely this spreading phenomenon? This would at least add to the treasury's revenues. If we were to ask what the parallel market has done, I would reply by saying that at one time the Syrian pound fell to 63, compared to the Lebanese pound. Then it began to go up.

The effect of the most recent jolt that took place in the world about 2 months ago on Syrian currency was less than that on the currency of oil countries. The effect of that jolt on Syrian currency was less than that on the West German Deutschmark, the French franc and the Swiss franc. Setting consumption on the right course is necessary and essential. We should not allow people to import anything they may wish to import; nor should we allow them to transfer funds wherever they may wish to transfer those funds. Public sector companies have to stop [allowing their offices to] carry millions of pounds when they travel abroad to make their purchases. Instead, they are to have a line of credit, and imports are to be regulated. The sources of our foreign currency revenues are well-known. Among these sources are aid from summit conferences and revenues from oil and trade transactions. If one of these sources falls short [in providing expected revenues], there would be a group of expenditures that would have to be met. Accordingly, we are obligated to set commercial transactions in particular on the right track. This is what we have done in a serious fashion throughout this year.

When people say we want to import decorative light bulbs, caviar or unlimited amounts of whiskey, we reply it is more important to import flour, medicines or a primary material that can be used to operate a plant. These things are always given priority; in our opinion this is the meaning and essence of setting consumption on the right track. People have said a great deal about this matter. At one time we were--in fact, we still are--[like] a store for consumers. Citizens found whatever they asked for even though some of the goods they found they did not always need. People used their liquid cash for various land, real estate and other speculations. Accordingly, all measures that we took--the free zones, temporary entry permits, the parallel market or development of a currency plan--were measures whose aim was to set our economic operations on the right track so as to serve our national economy and our citizens and strengthen our own capabilities. For example, Syria did not have a currency plan before 1980. Therefore, we began developing one that year. It is true that we were not able to apply that plan fully, but later, matters stayed on course as they should. We are now proud to say that the currency plan is working quite the way it should. This is what stabilized the value of Syria's currency. It also stabilized some prices.

The Shift to a Productive Society

[Question] Can we say that we have begun the shift from being a consumer society, with its numerous disadvantages, to being a productive society with its well-known and also numerous advantages? Can we say that setting consumption on the right track is the first practical step [in effecting that shift]?

[Answer] As a citizen I would say that we all talk about setting consumption on the right track and about reducing waste and staying away from the corrupt and corrupting aspects of luxury. However, we cannot stop this consumer mode at once, but we have begun. One can notice that the frequency of auditing and follow-up procedures is gradually rising. Now, for example, we do not allow perfumes and video devices to be imported through official import channels, and there are lines of credit for them. These goods are still smuggled, however, and with a few [more] measures to deal with smuggling, we will reduce [the number of such goods] entering the country.

[Question] The country's population is expected to be around 17 million by the end of this century. We now have about 5 million non-productive citizens. These citizens are children, people who cannot work or people who do not want to work. Is there a specific strategy for confronting this problem and preparing projects guaranteeing that resources would be commensurate with the number of people?

[Answer] The fact that development plans are continuing means that efforts to create employment opportunities and increase national revenues are continuing. This will provide income to new citizens--people who will become citizens through population growth. When development plans are upset or when no development plans are made, commotions may occur. Naturally, we took this into consideration. Each 5-Year Plan takes into account the rate of population growth and the rate of ensuring growth in revenues and in the GNP to cover this rate of population growth as I have already mentioned. In the past 10 years the country's population increased by 3 million persons. We have 18 years and three 5-Year Plans till the year 2000. If the rate of population growth, which we considered high, remains unchanged--and this is what we are seeking by means of family planning campaigns in the media, some of which have already begun--we will be able to guarantee in a normal fashion and without crises employment opportunities and food for new births. We are not talking here about people who came into the country as a result of specific national and well-known circumstances. Those people are above and beyond the number of people in our statistics. Although they take up several employment opportunities and part of the GNP, they do of course increase the size of the labor force, and they add to production. At the same time they receive [the fruits of] this production and this labor. Thus, the purpose of continuous and constant development plans is to ensure that the ever-growing needs of the country's present and future population are met and satisfied.

The October Anniversary

[Question] The economic consequences of the October war were positive. This war achieved a great deal especially for oil producing countries. Do you think that Arabs as a whole benefited from the outcome of this war?

Attempts have been made and are still being made to scuttle the consequences of

this war. These attempts have succeeded to a large extent. What do you think are the factors that helped in that? How do we stop the breakdown in these consequences at this point, and then how can we turn things around?

[Answer] At the opening of the last session of the People's Assembly I talked about the anniversary of the October War. I said that it was because of the blood of poor Arabs, specifically the poor people of this country who fought in the October War, that oil prices rose. Those who sacrificed their children in that war did not benefit from that price increase. Quite the contrary, when oil prices rose, we were affected by that rise, and the subsidy we used to get from here was taken away there by the oil price differences. This is what actually and clearly happened. The economic consequences of the October War went beyond the Arab world, specifically, the oil producing countries, to Europe. Funds received by oil countries were used and are still being used to help capitalist countries. These funds are invested in those countries and are used to extend loans to them. For example, West Germany was given a loan this year for 14 billion Deutschmarks. These Arab countries that offer loans to capitalist countries, even those that support Israel, did not offer us a single loan. What can we say when we know that the volume of Arab investments in the Falklands is 700 million dollars? Despite the easy economic terms we've made available to Arab capital, Arab countries made no economic and productive investments in our country.

We want industries and investments in areas of production which would not have a negative effect on the people who work in those areas. This imbalance that occurred in areas of the economy after the October war of liberation made us realize the importance and the need for self-reliance. We realized that it was necessary to operate our economic capabilities in an ideal fashion and to diversify the sources of our economy's strength.

Our Economy Is Not One-Sided

The Syrian economy does not depend on oil, agriculture or industry alone; nor does it depend on trade [only]. The Syrian economy depends on all these aspects [of the economy]. If one of them becomes deficient, the other aspects would step in to correct that deficiency. Consequently, the drop in oil prices and the existence of an oil glut in world markets had a negative effect on oil producing countries. We began hearing about budget deficits in those countries because their economies are one-sided and they rely on oil. When there was an oil glut in world markets as a result of high production [rates] that used to be close to 3 million barrels a day, these oil producing countries naturally had their own reserve of monetary investments. Therefore, the jolt suffered by their economies was limited. In the meantime, Syria's economy was unaffected. I am affirming that when oil prices rose in the eighties, the prices of goods that were purchased rose by the same ratio, about 25 percent. This was a result of the increase in oil prices. Nevertheless, we were able to overcome this by raising the utilization capacity of our agriculture and oil.

In all cases I can say that all the positive consequences generated by the October War for all Arabs brought no benefits to Syria [even though] it was Syria that made the October War possible. I am affirming that these oil countries achieved their wealth over the dead bodies of our children. Their voices have become louder as a result of the Syrians who gave up their lives. I am also affirming that these oil countries are now trying to suppress those who made

sacrifices for the cause. We are the ones who fought in October; we are the ones who are fighting now; and we are the ones who reaped the least positive and economic benefits from the October War. The only benefit of this war the oil countries did not want or will not want to utilize is that of liberating the will of Arabs. That would not serve their interests. Reactionary forces and bourgeois forces do not want Arab citizens to lose their fear of Israel. They rather want that fear to continue. But they do want oil prices to rise, and they want their political influence on the Arab and international scenes to grow. Furthermore, they conspire against Syria, against its steadfastness and against its pride. Everyone knows that Lebanon and the Resistance were not the target of what happened and is happening. The target of what has been happening is [the country] that is standing behind this Resistance and supporting it. The target of what has been happening is the wall that the Resistance has been leaning on. It is Syria, the country that protects the Resistance and is considered its principal and fundamental supporter. The target of what has been happening is the country that has been rejecting all initiatives and conspiracies complementary to Camp David.

Syria was the last stop for the enemy on his invasion of Lebanon. Accordingly, Lebanon was only a stepping stone to Syria. When the Israelis found out that [the conquest of Syria] would be difficult for them, they stopped; but they will not stop their aggression and their attempts to force the Arab area to give in to American hegemony. They will not be able to do this if they do not get the better of the socialist progressive regime in this country with its party, its leaders, its government and its people. Syria's decision to resist this conspiracy involves speeding up the rhythm of efforts further, calling for a greater sense of responsibility, advocating the best use of all aspects of the economy and reducing to a minimum manifestations of opulence and luxury. This is what would make our steadfastness stronger and more long lasting; it would make our decision more respected and more desirable. The stronger the national economy, the stronger will be the popular rally around the decision we make and the more influential and effective that decision will be.

[Question] As you mentioned, these countries do not want to liberate the will of Arabs. They do not want to help Arabs get rid of the fear they harbor of the myth of the Israeli and American monster. What role do we play as a Syrian, Arab country in liberating the will of Arabs, removing the fear they have of themselves and strengthening their confidence in their abilities?

[Answer] We are convinced that the public has to be steered in that direction. We have to tell the public the truth, and we have to prepare them so they can repeat once again the postures they always assumed when Arab countries were attacked, as was the case in Port Said and in other cities. In other words, the masses are the weapon. We have to revolutionize them and to urge them to take matters fully into their hands. It is at that time that other decisions on paper would become meaningless.

The Attitude on U.S. Goods

[Question] There is the subject of U.S. goods. Do you see a need for a boycott of these goods? Is there a tendency to boycott these goods in light of the U.S. position on the Arab cause?

[Answer] This boycott must be two-pronged. It is not enough to make a decision to boycott these goods, particularly since our imports from the United States make up no more than seven percent of our total imports. A decision may be made, and we can boycott all U.S. goods, but we want this to be a populist decision that is made by the people on the basis of their convictions. We are telling our people that the United States slaughtered our people in Lebanon; it conspires against us continuously; it helped and is still helping Israel in its aggression against the Arabs; and it is supplying Israel with the advanced machinery of war and destruction. Accordingly, the United States is the Arab nation's and Syria's principal enemy. Not only are we to boycott U.S. goods, but we must also boycott U.S. customs and traditions.

It is up to the masses to make the decision. They are the ones to carry it out; a decision is not enough.

The Future

[Question] How do you see the future in light of what we have available, what can become available, what is called for and what may be called for? And on what do you base this view?

[Answer] I am very optimistic about the future. By looking into the past and the present I find that the step we've taken from the past to the present have been good and qualitative. Who could have said that Syria could produce 3 million tons of cement when the cement we produced from 1968 to 1970 did not exceed 600,000 tons? Who could have said that Syria would become self-sufficient in oil derivatives? Who could have said also that Syria would be capable of providing employment opportunities for 3 million citizens that were added to the population after 1970? Fourthly, who could have said that Syria would be able to reach the Jabal al-Shaykh observatory and to plan that victory which enemies recognized, even before friends? I know quite well from reading foreign newspapers and reports that in the October War, had it not been for the American conspiracy in particular, and had it not been for the U.S. air-lift that Meir pleaded for with tears, the Israelis would not have been able to change any part of the war. This is how we were in 1973. Now, in 1980 we were also able to fight in Lebanon honorably and courageously. We shouldered the principal portion of the Resistance's battle and the battle of that fraternal country. However, western media agencies and reactionaries tried to impose a news blackout on this heroic posture. Many of our people lost their lives in Lebanon, and we offered many weapons in Lebanon, perhaps many more than other forces had offered. Certainly we offered more than any other Arab country. For about 115 days, ever since June, we have been offering our army everything they need so they can remain steadfast on the Lebanese Front. Our economy was not affected and did not go backward.

We are now living in a difficult situation, including our economy. We are facing a reactionary U.S. conspiracy and an Israeli aggression. Nevertheless, we are still loudly proclaiming our rejection of their conspiracies and their plans. On the basis of information I have at my fingertips, I am saying that our future is a rosy one. If this were not the case, the [Americans and Israelis] would not have conspired against us; they would not have tried to overthrow us. If they did not fear this future and the effect it could have on the popular level, they would not have conspired against us. Syria is actually a great country, even

though this regional sentiment is one that we as Ba'thists do not like for ourselves. But it was Syria that built the first university in the Arab homeland. Syria was the first country to introduce the idea of unity for all the Arab homeland. It was the one to introduce the slogan of unity, freedom and socialism. Regardless of circumstances and no matter how many distortions are attached to this slogan, it remains the hope of all Arabs. It was Syria that thwarted the Eisenhower doctrine and destroyed the Baghdad Pact in 1956. Syria was the country that was able to stop all Camp David crimes. It was Syria that said that the wolf and the sheep cannot walk together side by side. Syria knew what it was talking about. Proponents of peace in Egypt are now saying that Israel has begun changing its conduct in a way that can no longer support the illusions of those who have been calling for peace with that wolf. When Syria made that statement, it was the only country that made it. It is the only country making that statement until this moment. All evidence indicates quite clearly that there is no hope at all without the unity of the Arab masses. If these masses do not pursue this course, what befell our brothers who lost their lives in the Sabra and Shatila camps will befall them.

When we used to read about the tragedies of Dayr Yasin and Qabiyah--and information at that time was limited--we did not believe that such things could happen among people. But today we find that there are those who commit more horrible acts. This is the message to all Arabs: "If you do not become cogs in the American-Israeli wheel, we will slaughter you as we slaughtered the Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila."

Syria is the only country that is saying, "You will not be able to do this, and we will not allow you to do it." Therefore, Syria is paying the price. Our people must know that we are paying a high price as a result of this attitude. In Lebanon we paid thousands of billions of Syrian pounds in the past 3 months. This money was paid at the expense of feeding our people; it came from the tears they shed and the blood they lost. Syria is paying this price to keep its decisions independent and honorable.

8592

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REVISION OF CIVIL SERVICE STATUTE CONTEMPLATED

Tunis DIALOGUE in French No 423, 11 Oct 82 pp 18-20

[Article by M'hamed Ali Naffati and Habib El Beji: "The Necessary Reconciliation"]

[Text] As the leading employer and the leading investor, the public administration sector is essentially mainly responsible for the implementation and management of national development plans. Because of this, the government employee is the key element determining the success of any reform affecting this vast complex.

Thus it was expected that, during the drafting of the Sixth Plan, priority would be given the revision of the general civil service statute, as an essential aspect of the overall reform of the Tunisian administrative sector. And this in fact occurred.

The drafting of the general civil service statute, entrusted to the sectorial commission headed by the first president of the Administrative Court and including high officials and representatives of national organizations, was to pursue a complex and cautious process, with the preparation of a proposed revision which was submitted to the sponsoring ministry.

Then, and on the basis of this first draft, the minister attached to the prime minister for civil service and administrative reform, following a study in depth requiring the introduction of certain technical "improvements," sent the draft revision to the central trade union organization for its updated recommendations, prior to its submission to the Council of Ministers, and the Chamber of Deputies for approval.

The Council of Ministers, to which the draft was submitted prior to the vacation recess, postponed the study of the draft in order to obtain supplementary information.

Three months prior to 1 January 1983, the date on which the new outline law on sectorial collective agreements is to go into effect, what is the status of the draft revision of the civil service statute, to which the same deadline pertains?

Of the 111 articles contained in the general civil service statute, 36 are the subject of new recommendations by the UGTT [Tunisian General Confederation of Labor].

In the view of Mr Mustapha El Gharbi, the deputy secretary general of the trade union organization in charge of civil service matters, the revision of the statute is the result of industrious and profound work with a view to making possible the maximal development and advancement of civil servants, above all state workers. This is, moreover, the reason the first recommendation put forth by the UGTT deals with the title of the new statute.

"Office employees and workers in the public sector are above all agents of the state, and it is for this reason that we propose that the new name be 'General State Agents' Statute,'" Mr El Gharbi explains.

Where the other chapters are concerned, Mr El Gharbi, speaking on behalf of the UGTT, emphasizes the "goodwill" with which the sectorial commission prepared the draft revision.

However, some points of difference between the draft civil service statute and the recommendations of the UGTT remain, he says. These points have mainly to do with the following chapters: the disciplinary council, the temporary labor principle, the hiring of contract labor, and the recruiting and status of agents in category D.

In the view of the UGTT, in fact, the disciplinary council should no longer be limited to an advisory role, but on the contrary should have the power of decision. This recommendation is consistent with that put forth by the trade union organization for the status of disciplinary levels in the private sector (see DIALOGUE, No 422, dated 4/10/82).

With regard to the status of temporary workers hired by the administration, who may sometimes remain in this situation, regarded as precarious and provisional, for several years, the UGTT proposes that they be classified as established civil servants at the end of 4 years' service.

As to contract workers hired for a "determined task, limited in time," Mr Mustapha El Gharbi believes that it is "intolerable" for a Tunisian citizen to be a contract worker in his own country.

On the establishment of percentages for internal and external candidates during recruiting competition, the UGTT, for its part, proposes a division of 60 percent for external candidates in category A and 40 percent for internal candidates, instead of the present 70 percent and 30 percent.

Going much further, Mr Mustapha El Gharbi emphasizes that the competition structure for internal candidates should yield to vocational examinations, such as to favor the advancement of agents of the state to a greater extent.

Finally, with regard to the agents in category D, whose administrative status is deemed "ambiguous" by the UGTT, because in fact a number of them, recruited

with the rank of "chaouch," are entrusted with administrative tasks without being reclassified as a result, the trade union organization is demanding regularization of their situation.

"There are indeed other proposals pertaining to sick leave, maternity leave, the establishment of work schedules, protection for site foremen and revision of the pension system," Mr Mustapha El Gharbi added, "which we have put forward and which will be discussed in the course of our future meetings with the officials at the civil service ministry. Pending the establishment of a schedule of meetings, we believe that our joint work has advanced and that we will be ready for the discussions.

"This does not prevent us from pursuing our continuing contacts with a view to achieving results which will satisfy everyone.

"I can also specify to you that we have not yet undertaken negotiations on professional classifications and compensation, which represent a separate aspect," he said in conclusion.

"We will not adopt a new system on the American model, for example, nor totally alter the general civil service statute," Mr Slaheddine Cherif, director general of the civil service, explained at the outset, adding that "This revision is a matter of adapting the 1968 statute to the new dictates of the economic and social development of the country, responding to the legitimate aspirations of the agents of the state for better opportunities for professional advancement, improving the quality of the service, achieving greater respect for administrative discipline and facilitating the modernization of the administration.

"Thus no one should expect that the general principles underlying the 1968 statute will be overturned."

As to the new recommendations recently formulated by the UGTT, the civil service ministry, following study, has provided the following explanations.

--Whether the new statute carries the name "General Civil Service Statute" or "General State Agents' Statute," Mr Cherif believes that the question is purely formal. In fact, in the view of the ministry, the "compartmentalization" suggested by the UGTT does not exist, insofar as office employees and workers will in principle have the same rights and obligations. However, the special rules provided for the workers will be justified by the fact that they are men with a trade rather than administrative workers, and they are required, for example, not to compete through written tests, but vocational ones.

--An advisory body or a decision-making body? The civil service ministry believes that the disciplinary councils, if they were to acquire the power of decision, would reduce the authority of the administration. "Such a possibility," Mr Cherif said, "might well threaten discipline within the department. We see in the authority to penalize which the administration has not a means of "repression," but mainly a deterrent. Whoever holds the power of decision,

the minister, or his representative, under present circumstances, is an official invested with the confidence of the chief of state. He is the arbiter who passes judgment on each file, with the necessary objectivity and dispassion."

--On another level, the desire of the UGTT to sit on the disciplinary councils does not, in the opinion expressed by Mr Cherif, reflect a need, insofar as this level is above all a parity administrative commission made up of representatives of the administration and representatives of all of the bodies concerned. The representatives of the trade union have only to win the confidence of the personnel and get themselves elected to these commissions.

--The issue pertaining to temporary workers raised by the UGTT within the framework of its recent recommendations is also of concern to the civil service administration. A number of agents recruited as "temporary workers" and who have stayed on in this status for several years constitute administrative and social cases to which the ministry has decided to devote the necessary study.

Mr Cherif explained that "Nothing prevents a temporary worker, hired directly to fill the urgent needs of certain departments, from taking the vocational examinations, or participating, as an external candidate, in the recruiting competition. Some have done so and have become established civil servants, while others, who have remained a long time in the same jobs, either did not participate in the examinations and competition or else failed to pass. Thus to ask that a temporary agent become an established civil servant automatically at the end of 4 years' employment seems to us excessive, in that it might constitute a "shortcut" in conflict with the principles of equality and justice maintained by the administration, which regards the recruiting competition above all as a means of offering all candidates the same chances at the outset, while guaranteeing the administration a certain professional level.

"Automatic establishment of temporary workers after 4 years of service is even more irregular," Mr Cherif went on to say, "since a candidate, prior to being employed, has already participated in one competition. Thus he has been selected, and in addition at the end of 2 and sometimes 3 years of actual employment, he is either established or dismissed."

--The UGTT, with its proposal of 60 percent for external candidates and 40 percent for internal candidates as recruiting percentages, would thus like to increase the opportunities for promotion and advancement in civil service work. The present percentage, applicable to categories A and B, for example, is 70 percent for external candidates and 30 percent for internal candidates (competition and selection).

The civil service ministry went still further, in proposing a proportion of 50 percent for external candidates and 50 percent for internal candidates in the new statute.

"This percentage can be interpreted," Mr Cherif explained, "as a limitation on new recruiting, but experience has shown that in view of the relatively small

number of external candidates and the plethora of internal candidates, the juries are often forced to turn from the external level and to select from among the cream of the internal candidates."

In the view of the civil service ministry, the desire further to facilitate the advancement of state agents is paralleled by the need to safeguard the quality image of the civil service, by guaranteeing a constant rise in the professional level.

"Basic and advanced training and refresher courses are in our eyes the basic and determining elements for the improvement and advancement of the agents of the state," Mr Cherif stressed.

For the agents of the state, the administration's slogan might be: "Improve Your Performance and You Will Be Promoted."

--Another point raised by the UGTT was that of contract workers.

The legal provision which allows the employment of contract workers "for special missions of a limited duration" is "useful" and is "justified," because it makes it possible to achieve a double goal: first of all to meet the temporary needs of the administration, and secondly to offer a certain number of candidates for employment the possibility of working and gaining a certain experience.

--With regard to the employees who maintain records and the agents in category D involved in administrative tasks, the ministry admits that this is truly a blot on the administration, due basically to poor utilization of the cadre laws. With the promulgation of the new general civil service statute, a review of the special statutes and the cadre laws will be undertaken, and at that time the situation of these agents will be regularized.

Thus it appears that, at a very advanced stage in the drafting of the new general civil service statute, there are many more points of agreement than points of disagreement between the Ministry of Civil Service and Administrative Reform and the UGTT. Since the desire of both parties is above all to adapt the new statute both to the interests of an administration operating to serve the citizens and those of the agents which it employs, there can hardly be any major conflict here.

5157

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UNIONS DISTURBED BY ECONOMY'S POOR PERFORMANCE

Paris LE MONDE in French 19 Oct 82 p 44

[Text] Tunis--The main Tunisian economic indicators are in the red, according to the figures released by the Ministry of Economy for the first half of 1982. The trade balance deficit, which worries the majority of the officials, has deteriorated by 9.4 percent, with an increase of 30 percent in imports and a decline of 1 percent in exports. The situation falls far short of the estimates for the Sixth Plan, of which 1982 is the first year. They called for an annual increase of 3.8 percent for imports and 6.6 percent for exports.

The price index showed a rate of inflation of 12 percent, as compared to 8.2 percent for the first 6 months of 1981. The estimates for the year point to 13 percent, while the plan was based on an annual average of 8.5 percent. To this is added the decline in domestic production which points to a rate of growth of only between 2 and 3 percent, while the plan called for about 6.7 percent growth in the gross domestic product.

Where the three main sectors of the Tunisian economy, providing the basic source of foreign exchange income--that is to say oil, tourism and phosphates--are concerned, the results of the first half of 1982 were negative overall. Crude oil production declined 8.5 percent, while the estimates for the year called for an overall drop of 5.1 percent, i.e., 5.14 million tons as compared to 5.41 million in 1981. Income from tourism dropped 22 percent, because of the decline in the number of Algerian and European visitors, among other things. As to phosphate production, it dropped nearly 9 percent, but exports of processed phosphates have on the whole increased.

Loans

This poor performance is explained in Tunisian economic circles in terms of technical reasons, and above all the world recession which led to a deterioration in the terms of trade. Thus there is no great alarm, and it is noted that tourism picked up again during the third quarter of 1982, although it did not reach expectations. The grain harvest, for its part, reached the record figure of 12 million tons this year.

It is admitted, however, that the situation reflects the "errors of unbalanced growth," the mechanisms of which do not seem to have been mastered. It is

also believed in political circles that the government will without a doubt have recourse to foreign loans to get the economy going again. The minister of finance and plan is reported moreover to have suggested this possibility during a discussion within the finance commission of the Chamber of Deputies. Tunisian indebtedness is likely to total 40.6 percent of the GNP in 1982, but the foreign debt service will represent only 14 percent of current income. This, it is said in financial circles, leaves the potential for borrowing intact.

However, the newspaper DEMOCRATIE, the organ of the social democrats (opposition), speaks of economic and social "crisis" and reports "public and private economic institutions on the brink of bankruptcy as a result of poor management and waste." The trade unions, for their part, have issued a warning to the government. The executive bureau of the UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor] expresses the view in a communique that "the continuing rise in prices is in conflict with the assurances given the UGTT, and divests the consultation of the trade union organization on this matter of any meaning." As a result, the UGTT urges the government to take "energetic" steps to put an end to this increase, which is cutting into the purchasing power of the workers. The very day after the publication of this communique, President Bourguiba met with the interim president of the UGTT, Mr Habib Achour.

5157

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JOINT DISCUSSIONS ON RENEWABLE SOURCES OF ENERGY HELD

Tunis DIALOGUE in French No 423, 11 Oct 82 pp 40, 41

[Article by Wajdi Saihi: "Taking Advantage of the Experiences of Others"]

[Text] The various applications of energy sources (wind, solar, geothermic, or obtained from recycled products) constituted the central theme of the renewable energy study days, which brought out a willingness to make available the results of research.

Days of study on renewable energy sources took place from 29 September to 2 October at the Palace of Congresses of the city of Tunis. The meeting, jointly organized by the Organization of United Sites, the city of Tunis, and the Arab Organization for Solar Energy, was only moderately successful in terms of participation on an international level, since it turned out to be merely a Tunisian-French "friendly association."

Yet there was no lack of reasons for interest, either in research or execution, and several Arab cities should have participated, to take advantage of the experiences of other communities and the exchanges of information that took place during these sessions, like enlightened consumers, while waiting to become in their turn their own technology producers.

The central theme of the debate involved the different applications of energy sources other than coal, gas, and oil, in local communities and low urban concentration zones.

The issue was solar energy, wind energy, geothermal energy, or just the energy obtained from recycled products.

As concerns the solar source and its conversion into directly usable energy, research proved to be very advanced, but only at the laboratory level.

Indeed, even though the few field experiments have raised high hopes as to use of this resource, investment cost is still extremely high and collectors formed of voltaic lenses remain inaccessible for individual use. Therefore, efforts are currently directed toward research with a view to the reduction of installation costs and the possibility of storing this energy, which is not

available for the whole day, nor all year long. Pending the outcome of research in this area, it is essential to see to it that traditional resources are conserved, and that is to be done by replacing them with other energies, especially in the high concentration zones that are the local communities.

Garbage Incineration

The most original experiment presented in connection with energy conservation and environmental protection is that of the city of Nice. It involves the incineration of household refuse in three industrial units, of which the last was put into service in March 1982. The heat generated by the combustion of waste is used to produce steam at a pressure of 30 Bars and a temperature of 350 degrees Centigrade.

The steam is intended on the one hand to supply two city heating systems with an overall power of about 50 million kilocalories, and on the other to produce the electricity necessary to meet the plant's own needs and with a view to possible marketing with the French Electric Power Company.

During 1980, at which time only two furnaces were in service, the 165,900 tons of garbage incinerated made it possible to market 120,600 tons of steam and 15,600 megawatts per hour of electricity, of which 6,000 megawatts per hour were used for the facility's own needs.

On commonly accepted bases, the quantity of energy recuperated at the Nice incineration plant during 1980 amounts to 12,800 tons of oil equivalent.

In financial terms, energy recuperation appears absolutely positive. Indeed, again on the basis of the two furnaces existing in 1980, the annual installment of repayment on the portion of the installations necessary for energy recuperation amounted to 220,000 dinars approximately, whereas sales of steam and electricity amounted to 1 million dinars.

This process would gain by being better known and more refined in terms of adaptation to the diverse particular structures of the various large communities whose polluting wastes represent serious problems, so as to be applied toward better protection of the environment, energy saving, and profitability.

Wind Energy

One of the most ancient resources known to energy history is the wind, thus, wind mills and wind-driven pumps. This sector was featured in the forefront during the study meetings. The need for revision of energy objectives and the return to certain deserted sources were the subject of several papers, including those of G. Chiny and Jean Benoit concerning the contrivance of a self-activating multigenerator wind system with an accumulator for use in case of the absence of wind. There was also a very instructive paper by Abdelhafidh Chabbi on the experiment by the Association for Rural Activity and Development in Tunisia.

After recalling the important contribution of wind energy in the development of mankind, and referring to the important role played by air-driven pumps in

forming the land of Holland, Mr Chabbi proposes a program for the development of this energy, particularly since by comparison with other pumping costs, the use of wind power is by far the lowest, and at 1980 prices, would be around 11 millimes per cubic meter, whereas fuel oil costs 21 millimes per cubic meter.

In his action and popularization program, Mr Chabbi, who deplores the degeneration and loss of about 1,000 of the 1,200 units that formerly existed, proposes moving toward a new original model successfully tested in India and Srilanka....

After the necessary modifications for adapting it to our wind region and to the availability in our country of the materials necessary for manufacturing it locally, and to the state of knowledge of the few wind pump repairers who have not yet definitely given up the profession. The experimental area would be situated in a zone with almost equal distribution of winds over the four seasons, with generally higher speeds in spring (the region of Kairouan and Sidi Bouzid) (Please see extracts from this project, attached).

Geothermics

The other source mentioned is geothermics, of which the principle derives from extraction of the heat contained in water tables between 1,500 and 2,000 meters down, and of which the temperatures range from 55 to 80 degrees Centigrade.

The amount of heat recuperated depends of course on the volume and temperature of the water pumped. Invariability of both can provide advantageous operation of heat exchangers.

Certain experiments seem to substantiate this hope. The technique must however be considered very cautiously, in addition to the fact that since the facilities are small, it can apply only to groups of the equivalent of 2,000 dwellings.

Yet beyond the techniques presented, the study sessions in Tunis pointed up willingness for the sharing of research, a care for collaboration in energy matters, and perseverance in exchanges so that ideas may form a systematic process.

Tunisian Wind Energy Project.

The project was begun in 1978. Its experimental stage occurred in 1979 and 1980. What was involved was the testing of the prototype both as to techniques and performance. Several modifications were made to the first two prototypes. A workshop was set up at Hammamet, with a former wind pump repairer and some ASDEAR [Association for Rural Activity and Development] and CRGR [Rural Engineering Research Center] technicians with some Dutch technical assistance. There is nothing special about the workshop. Its equipment, certainly not complete, will have cost only about 6,000 dinars.

The second stage, now nearing completion, consists of manufacturing five more wind pumps and training five young men. Since the planned zone of action must be selected from among the disadvantaged areas, but those with a fair supply of surface wells, we thought of the Kairouan area as a first stage. That is why the youths to be trained were selected from among the graduates of the Kairouan Professional Training Center with special subjects in mechanics, soldering, and sheet metal work.

The project proposes to establish them in January 1982 [as published] at Kairouan in a wind pump construction and repair shop, where other young men will be trained and will constitute the nucleus of a third workshop.

This progressive action, which takes into account that training should precede equipping, and that it is indispensable to set up many small workshops before starting on mass production, must be appreciated not only in terms of the necessary prudence to be used in introducing a relative novelty into an agricultural setting, but also in terms of the need for parallel development of wind pump production and men capable of maintaining them. It is also, in a way, a form of decentralization of agricultural equipment production conceived before becoming widespread.

Prospects may be important. In absolute terms, we have seen that in the Kairouan area we have available about 150 kilowatt hours per cubic meter and per rotor, and we have the potential of extracting 10,000 cubic meters of water per year and per wind pump.

A minimum program of 190 wind pumps would permit an output of 1 million cubic meters per year, or the irrigation of about 150 hectares.

In practice, this wind energy must be combined with other forms of energy (including those of fossil origin) and particularly with solar energy, to be considered truly as a dependable source of energy upon which the development of agriculture can count in the long run.

12149

CSO: 4519/33

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