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10 December 1982

WEST EUROPE REPORT

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RECORD ON SPAIN'S EXTRADITION REQUESTS REVIEWED

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 13 Nov 82 p 22

[Article by Alfredo Relano]

[Text] In six cases the French Government ignored its courts' favorable report. The Spanish Government has submitted a total of 30 requests for extradition of presumed etarras [ETA members] to the French Government in the last 3 years without success in any case. On six occasions the Spanish request received a favorable report from the equivalent French court, despite the fact that the government of the neighboring nation did not agree either in these cases. Two weeks ago the Spanish Council of Ministers decided to deny extradition of 18 common law offenders requested by France.

The extradition agreement in force between Spain and France dates from 14 December 1877 and was supplanted by a new accord on 9 April 1969. The agreement sets forth an accord between both countries for the extradition of individuals sought by justice, with the exception that no person shall be handed over if the offense for which the extradition is requested is considered a political offense or committed in connection with this type of offense. Until democratic reform came about, extraditions had not been a source of friction between the two countries. As for cases involving common law offenders, extraditions were granted without any problems in either direction, and as regards presumed etarras the subject did not even arise.

Beginning with the establishment of democracy in Spain, the Spanish Government considers no motives of a political nature exist that justify any consideration for etarras other than that of common law offenders. According to that criterion, the Spanish Government in 1977 asks France to extradite Miguel Angel Apalategui, "Apala," accused of taking part in the abduction and assassination of Javier de Ybarra. A court in Aix-en-Provence examines the petition while Apala is going on a hunger strike and the case arouses much popular indignation. Before deciding if the extradition is to proceed or not, the court grants temporary freedom to Apala who escapes, whereupon the case is brought to a halt.

In 1979 the Spanish Government presents a bloc extradition demand for 14 presumed etarras. The French reply was discouraging to Spanish authorities. On Jose Ramon Martinez de la Fuente Inchaurregui and Juan Maria Otegui Elicegui

there is no reply and on Juan Jose Aristizabal Cortajerena, Angel Maria Galarraga Mendizabal, Ignacio Maria Gabirondo Agote, Miguel Angel Goyenechea Fradua, Angel Maria Lete Echaniz, Juan Lorenzo Lasa Michelena (head of the ETAm special commandoes), Emilio Martinez de Marigoita and "Toxomin" Iturbe Abasolo ("Number Two" in ETAm) the reply is "has not been located".

Only the extradition for Martin Apaolaza Azcargorta and Miguel Angel Goikoetxea Elorriaga is being considered, for whom the court in Aix-en-Provence, where they are being detained, an examination as to whether or not there exist reasons concerning the activities imputed to both by the Spanish police. Robert Badinter, who acts as defender for etarras, today is the minister of justice in the socialist Government of France. The judge decides that the offenses they are charged with (assassination of two civil guards and armed robbery) are not offenses under common law: "The infractions with which the two men are charged have been perpetrated within the framework of a struggle carried on by a part of the Basque population for the purpose of gaining their police autonomy." As a consequence, the French Government denies the extraditions. They remain free, but are immediately detained again in order to consider a new extradition demand by Spain, which now denounces three assassinations of policemen, several robberies and a bomb attempt on the headquarters in Lemoniz. The decision of the judge is the same: it is not concerned with common law offenses.

In the spring of 1981, Spain tries its luck again and files another petition; this time for 15 etarras. On that occasion, only one of them, Ignacio Aranceta Garcia, is answered "not located". In the cases of Jose Ramon Alcorta Chasco, Alberto Maria Aldana Barrena, Francisco Imaz Martiarena, Antonio Perez Iniguez de Heredia, Juan Luis Zuzuarregui Redondo, Eneko Alegria Ayerdi, Felix Garcia Rodriguez and Jose Maria Lara Fernandez the equivalent courts send out unfavorable reports, but in the six remaining demands, the courts think they involve common law offenses and, consequently, they give favorable reports on extraditions. The six etarras involved in this case were Juan Carlos Arruti Azpitarte (accused of participating in five assassinations), Miguel Angel Aldana Barrena (10 assassinations), Eugenio Barrutiabengoa Zabarte (four assassinations), Tomas Linaza Echeverria (eight murders, participating in the well known Ispaster attack where six civil guards died), Juan Miguel Arrugaeta San Emeterio and Jose Agustin Achega Aguirre. The judges' decision puts the French Government in a difficult posture which finally decides to deny the extradition. Linaza, Arrugaeta and Aldana, together with two etarras against whom no extradition demand was pending, are confined to Yeu island, 16 kilometers from the French coast.

According to sources in the Spanish Ministry of Justice, the reason for the announced change in attitude of the French Government regarding these subjects would not be simply related to the change of government in Spain, but could be the consequence of several cases that should have been acted upon jointly with the French Government. Among them, and always in accord with this version, would be the denial agreed upon in the Spanish Council of Ministers 2 weeks ago in granting 19 demands for extradition presented by France to Spain on as many other common law offenders, among them two accused of assassination.

The decision which, according to an outstanding official, was not made public at that time because it would be less than elegant to do so in the midst of a political campaign, was highly argued and needed a vote against the minister of foreign affairs, Perez-Llorca. In order to justify the refusal, the Spanish Government invokes the principle of reciprocity and cites the background of the six named etarras, whom the French courts qualified as common law offenders.

This would have joined a strong offensive against the minister of justice and interior in the socialist government on the part of the French press, who blame lack of vigor in combating city dweller insecurity. And, lastly, France is now faced with the Italian demand for the extradition of Oreste Scalone and Maria Grazia Barbierato, members of the Potere Operaio organization, accused of assassination and illicit possession of arms. Last 21 October, the appropriate French jury rendered a favorable report. For France it would be hard to turn these terrorists over to Italy and to continue denying handing over etarras requested by Spain.

Robert Badinter recently proposed, without success, in a meeting of the ministers to the EEC (European Economic Community) the creation of a community penal tribunal that would intervene in these cases which would have helped France solve these problems without suddenly resenting its tradition as a paradise for political refugees.

9908

CSO: 3548/31

BRIEFS

OIL NATIONALIZATION DENIED--The government does not plan to nationalize the foreign consortium of United States, West German and Canadian interests drilling for oil in the North Aegean, Energy Minister Evangelos Kouloumbis said yesterday. While denying press reports that the government sought a majority stake in the North Aegean Petroleum Company (NAPC), he said it did want to re-examine the 1975 agreement setting a 65 percent public share in NAPC's daily output of 25,000 barrels. NAPC's main shareholder is Denison Mines Limited of Canada, with 68.75 percent. The government has rejected an NAPC bid to raise the price of oil charged to the state-owned Aspropirgos Refinery from the 27.50 dollars a barrel set in the first half of this year. Mr Koloumbis, asked about likely state crude oil imports in 1983, said it planned to go on buying abroad under existing government-to-government agreements. This, he said, might mean a less favorable price than otherwise available but guaranteed supplies and in return created outlets for Greek agricultural exports. Last year Greece imported 112 million tons of oil under long-term contracts with Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the Soviet Union. [Text] [NC262042 Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 25 Nov 82 p 4]

CSO: 3500/308

TRADE DEFICIT GROWS IN 1982

Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 21 Oct 82 p 10

Text Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry President A. Avraamidis said at a press conference that during the first half of 1982 our exports declined while imports increased and that this trend will continue for the remaining year thus causing an increase in the trade deficit. During this period the exports of industrial goods increased by only 15.3 percent compared to the corresponding 1981 period when the increase was 24.3 percent.

Avraamidis added that the most disturbing thing is the drop in the increase rate of domestically processed industrial products. Specifically these exports increased by only 6.7 million pounds or by 12.7 percent during the first 1982 6-month period compared to 11.4 million pounds or 27.5 percent during the same period in 1981.

Increase in Imports

Avraamidis said that by contrast the rate of increase of imports was much higher due mainly to the imports of consumer goods. Thus, during the first half of 1982 the imports of good for local consumption increased by 28.5 percent compared to the corresponding 1981 period when the increase was only 2.2 percent compared to the same period the previous year.

Deficit Increases

He also said that this rate of increase in imports on the one hand and the decrease in the rate of exports on the other during the first half of 1982 is expected to continue during the rest of the year and therefore a greater increase in the trade deficit should be anticipated compared to 1981.

Responding to a question on the economic outlook for 1983 Avraamidis said that the international economy is expected to improve slightly but that 1983 also will be a difficult year and that Cyprus should take measures for increasing its exports and improving its economy. He added that during the first 6 months of 1982 the Arab countries absorbed 44.7 percent of our exports, EEC 40.3 percent, the socialist countries 8 percent and the other countries 7 percent.

7520

CSO: 3521/74

DECREES CONCERNING END OF PRICE FREEZE PUBLISHED

Paris LE MONDE in French 31 Oct-1 Nov 82 p 12

[Article: "The New Pricing Schedule After 1 November"]

[Text] Four decrees, which form the framework for ending the price freeze, were published in the "Official Bulletin of Competition and Consumption" of Saturday, 23 October. These decrees set forth the timetable and methods for ending the freeze in industry, services and commerce.

Production Price of Industrial Products

Article 1. As of 1 November 1982 and until 31 December 1983, production prices of industrial products, including prices of the agricultural and food industries and of transformed products, will be set by firms when "agreements for fighting inflation" have been reached for those products*...

Article 2. If no agreement has been approved, firms cannot impose prices (all taxes included) higher than those that resulted from the statutory provisions which were effective as of 14 June 1982.

In the case of non-adherence to approved agreements, prices or the change in prices will be set by decision of the minister of economy and finance...

Article 3. The pricing schedule of newly manufactured products is defined in the agreement for fighting inflation of each branch or firm. If there is no agreement or provision regarding these products, then their prices or sales conditions must be filed with the general office of competition and consumption...

Article 4. As an exception to the provisions of articles 1, 2 and 3 of the present decree, production prices of industrial products can be freely set as of 1 November 1982 for products manufactured on an estimate basis...

* When an agreement reached by representatives of a professional branch has been approved, it applies to the entire branch, with the exception of firms subject to specific agreements. When an agreement reached by a firm has been approved, it applies only to that firm.

Article 5. Industrial products at the stage of production specifically targeted by the pricing schedule of 14 June 1982 remain subject to these statutory provisions, as well as to those which modified or were added to them later.

(The freeze will continue to apply as long as an agreement has not been reached. Freeing the prices of the various industrial sectors will occur for each of them during 1983 if it appears that the conditions set forth by the agreements have been fulfilled and if there is no fear of inflationary pressure in the sector in question.)

Price of All Services

Article 1. As of 1 November 1982 and until 31 December 1983, lawful prices of all provisions of services can be increased only under the conditions set forth in the following articles.

Article 2. For the provisions of services included in the list in the appendix (see end of article), the change in prices will be determined by regulatory agreements or by agreements for fighting inflation*...

Article 3. As of 1 November 1982, prices (all taxes included) of provisions of services not mentioned in articles 2 and 5 which have not been the subject of a decree from the government's representative can be increased a maximum of 2.5 percent in relation to prices lawfully applied 31 October 1982, on the condition that the total increase of these prices during 1982 does not surpass 10 percent.

The lawful prices thus determined can be increased by 3.5 percent as of 1 January 1983, then again by 3 percent as of 1 July 1983...

This provision concerns services that are not very exposed to competition or those that are not in a position to sign agreements.

Article 4. When their pricing schedule is not defined in a regulatory agreement or in an agreement for fighting inflation, the price and sales conditions of newly rendered provisions of services must be filed with the general office of competition and prices....

Article 5. The provisions of services which were specifically targeted by the pricing schedule of 14 June 1982 remain subject to these statutory provisions as well as to those which were added later. Specific pricing schedules resulting from decrees published since 14 June 1982 remain applicable.

(Like in industry, the freeze continues to apply as long as agreements have not been reached. Certain provisions of services that had their prices frozen by the law of 31 July 1982 (water, some transportation, certain liberal professions) will be able to end the freeze with regulatory agreements.)

* See footnote on previous page.

Distribution and Import Margins

Article 1. As of 1 November 1982 and until 31 December 1982, margins (exclusive of value-added tax) on the sale of all imported products and at all stages of distribution cannot be higher, in relative value and product by product, than the lawfully applied margins as of 15 October 1982 or, if this does not apply, as of the closest date prior to 15 October.

Article 2. As of 1 January 1983 and until 31 December 1983, margins (exclusive of value-added tax) on the sale of all imported products and at all stages of distribution cannot be higher, in relative value and product by product, than the margins lawfully applied as of 11 June 1982 or, if this does not apply, as of the closest date prior to 11 June, less 1 percent.

Article 3. For products newly offered for sale, import and distribution firms cannot apply margins that in relative value are higher than the lawful margins applied to comparable products. Lacking this, the prices must be filed with the office of competition and consumption...

Article 4. The provisions of articles 2 and 3 do not apply to firms that have concluded a regulatory agreement approved by decision of the minister of economy and finance or by the government representative from the department where the firm is headquartered and which includes, at the least, the following provisions: during the fiscal year begun as of 1 July 1982, the average gross margin in relative value (exclusive of tax) realized by each firm cannot surpass the reference margin (which is that of the last fiscal year completed before 1 July 1982) decreased by 2 percent*
....

Article 7. The provisions of articles 1 through 4 do not apply to products which are the subject of a particular pricing schedule or which have a margin determined by decree, nor to accounts subject at all stages of production and distribution to the system of agreements for fighting inflation...

(The general principle that the government has set is that price increases recorded at the distribution stage be at most equal to the price increases authorized at the production stage. Only firms having detailed accounting sections--thus primarily large stores--can choose the system of stabilizing the overall annual margin exclusive of taxes.)

A final decree concerns firms which have concluded agreements in the public or private sector with price variation clauses. These can again operate normally as of 1 November, but with two types of limitations which will allow the freeze provisions to be extended until the end of 1983.

* The decree provides a means for calculating the average gross margin in relative value.

Services Covered by Article 2

The services covered by article 2 are as follows: public restaurant service; group restaurant service; sales of drinks; automatic distribution of drinks; hotel business; food service on trains; campgrounds and trailer parks; transportation of individuals; rental of industrial vehicles; rental of spaces in commercial garages and public parking lots; travel agencies; engineering; data processing services and consulting; services related to contracting; legal and accounting consulting services; advertising; mailing services; temporary work; security services; real estate services; rental of bags and covers; rental and upkeep of water meters; automobile, motorcycle and moped rental; television, video recorder, stereo and home computer rentals; sports equipment rental; educational and continuing education expenses; driving schools; clinics not associated with the national health service; veterinary medicine and surgery; retirement homes and other non-state approved social and medical-social establishments; rugby and football tickets; movie theaters; ski lessons; laundry and drycleaning; hairdressers; fitness establishments; photography and photo studios; building cleaning; provision of services between professionals related to the distribution of petroleum products; services accompanying the provision of chemical products; mechanical and electrical construction services; services related to data processing hardware; telephone industry services; repair and maintenance of elevators; printing; landscape maintenance; repair and maintenance of mopeds and motorcycles; repair and maintenance of automobiles; repair and maintenance of agricultural machinery; road repairs and towing of automobiles on normal roads; repair and maintenance of household electrical and electronic equipment and of individual or group heating; jewelry and watch service.

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CS0:3519/123

MAUROY SPEAKS ON BUDGET AUSTERITY, UNEMPLOYMENT

Quality Emphasized

Paris LES ECHOS in French 5 Nov 82 pp 2-5

[Excerpts from statement given by Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy at a press conference on 4 November 1982]

[Text] Austerity

Austerity is our rule. Austerity in keeping our promises and honoring our commitments. Austerity to ensure a new division of income and greater social justice. Austerity in keeping our large economic balances. Austerity in managing social budgets.... To meet the challenges, we need healthy firms capable of developing.

We will give ourselves the means to do so...but the administration's policy is first of all oriented toward the French men and women who work and derive their income from this work. We are constantly concerned with maintaining their interests ...and it is because they know this that they accept the time constraints. They realize that the policy we are implementing can save their jobs, maintain their purchasing power and guarantee their social protection.

Economic Policy

Has the administration changed its policy? I simply want to point out that if there has, in fact, been a change in our economic policy, it is because of the continuation of the international crisis.... Our advance is certainly continuing along a narrow path, but our steadfast objective remains to achieve maximum possible growth within the context of the current crisis.

Foreign Trade

The energy bill which we must pay is nothing like that of 1976-1980. At that time, a barrel of oil was worth \$17.60 on the average. Today it costs \$35.00.

Because of this, our energy bill will increase by 8 percent in value in 1982 despite a 2 percent decrease in the consumption of primary energy. It must be understood that every 10 centime increase in the dollar worsens our trade deficit by 200 million francs per month.

Other, more deep-seated reasons for the decline in our foreign trade have also appeared. The penetration rate of the domestic market by imports has not stopped increasing since 1978, irrespective of the trends in household consumption. Exports, however, have remained stable recently.

By maintaining a growth rate that is as high as possible, reducing the inflation differential with our trading partners, intensifying research and innovation and reinforcing the industrial and commercial infrastructure, France has the means to gradually and durably reestablish a solid trade balance.

Our trading partners have been surprised by our desire not to passively accept too great a penetration of our domestic market. But when faced with the attitude of some EEC partners, this penetration cannot remain immobile.

This is the meaning of France's actions in the Council of Communities for the preparation of the GATT ministerial session. We want to reach a ruling on the current commercial claims and the implementation of a more dynamic trade policy with the United States and Japan.

Freeing trade actually has no meaning unless it is based on reciprocity. Europe is the most open market in the world but in the long term it cannot live in a situation of imbalance.

Our goal is to decrease the deficit in the current balance of payments by about 30 billion in 1983.

...This is, therefore, the urgent task awaiting businesses, and not only those in the public sector or large private firms but also, and especially, small- and medium-sized firms.

This is why we want the large firms and banks to lead them onto foreign markets, notably by letting them take advantage of their commercial networks.

Employment

Deflationary policies as they are practiced around us have as their first and immediate result a rapid deterioration of the job market and, therefore, a surge in unemployment.

Between September 1981 and September 1982, unemployment increased by 42.9 percent in the FRG, by 36.7 percent in the United States and by 12.3 percent in Great Britain. During the same period, the increase in France was held to 9.8 percent

The truth forces us to say that we are doing better than elsewhere in the area of fighting unemployment and that we have chalked up points against prices. Polemical intent should not cloud reality; since the beginning of summer, the number of unemployed in corrected figures has stabilized at slightly above 2 million.

These positive results are the consequence of a number of measures that we have taken. First of all, solidarity contracts: by the end of September, 12,424 contracts had been signed, which should create 187,000 jobs either through retirement or job sharing. In the course of the last 12 months, some 80,000 jobs were created in industry, commerce and services.

Purchasing Power

For months the change in purchasing power has caused mistaken comments. Considerable effort was made the last 18 months on behalf of the lowest incomes. I have heard of those "disappointed by socialism." Well, let's talk about all those who have benefited from the change that occurred; let's talk about the winners from the change.

I would put all those receiving the minimum wage in the front ranks of those who have benefited. From May 1981 to September 1982, the minimum wage increased by 29.2 percent, which is considerable, while at the same time price increases reached 15.8 percent. In the last 18 months, therefore, the purchasing power of the minimum wage increased by 11.6 percent. In 1982, the minimum wage has already undergone three increases and two "shoves" which mean that its purchasing power has already increased by 2.2 percent for the current year. I would like to remind you that the minimum wage should be increased a fourth time at the beginning of December, and at that time we will be assured of a new increase in purchasing power.

The elderly have also benefited from the change. The minimum old-age pension for a single person increased by 50 percent since May 1981. For a household it increased by almost 40 percent. In terms of purchasing power, the growth in the minimum old-age pension comes to 30 percent for a single person and 20 percent for a household. I should also point out that 1.5 million elderly persons or widows are exempt from the housing tax and 800,000 from the television fee.

Retirees should also be listed among those benefiting from the change. In fact, they have seen their pensions increase by 21.7 percent since May 1981 and their purchasing power gain by more than 5 points in 18 months.

Lastly, from May 1981 to January 1983, the purchasing power of family benefits will increase by 10 percent. The 2.7 million families with two children will have especially benefited from this advance because the increase in their purchasing power was 40 percent.

For the whole of 1981 and 1982, the growth in purchasing power of household income can be estimated at 4 percent because of the success of the price freeze. During the same period, it decreased by 1.5 percent in the FRG, by 3 percent in the United Kingdom and by 7 percent in Belgium.

It is not accurate to say that the purchasing power of salaried workers has decreased. The freeze did cause losses in purchasing power during the second half of 1982 but the goal of the government is that this lag be made up by the end of 1983.

Large-Scale Public Works.

The first portion of the special fund for large-scale public works will enable a 4 billion franc loan to be issued. This will ensure the completion of 11 billion francs of works which will substantially support the activity of the building and public works sector.

Energy savings, which, as everyone knows, help rebalance our foreign trade, will benefit from half of the funds collected--2 billion francs. The total amount of works will reach 6.7 billion francs. These projects will be devoted to developing heating networks and energy conservation in public housing and government buildings. A subsidy of 1.1 billion francs has already been committed, which corresponds to 3.7 billion francs in investments.

The transportation infrastructure will also receive 2 billion francs from the fund. An especially large effort will be devoted to developing mass transit--750 million francs in subsidies and 2 billion francs of work. The remainder, 1.25 billion francs, will be devoted to the highway infrastructure and especially to urban roads, which will enable a total of 2.3 billion francs of work to be financed.

In the same vein, I will confirm that the government has recognized the satisfactory nature of the high speed Atlantic train developed by the SNCF [French National Railroad Company]. It has therefore authorized the national firm to begin the process leading to the declaration of public utility. This project, which will be accomplished in stages over the coming years, represents almost 8 billion francs in work and almost 4.5 billion in equipment.

Industrial Investment

On the eve of their nationalization, the industrial companies had just experienced a long scarcity of equity. I will mention only two figures which adequately emphasize the scope of the phenomenon. Between 1977 and 1981, these firms received 1.5 billion in shares of equity from their stockholders. They distributed 4.3 billion in dividends to them while the crisis worsened and competition became fiercer in unprecedented proportions.

Beginning with the first half of this year, the state demonstrated its willingness to reverse this trend by mobilizing almost 10 billion francs (including 3 billion in capital subsidies by the state and 6 billion in resources from the national banks) for the benefit of the public sector. Almost 5.5 billion was only for the firms nationalized in February.

Social Security

In November 1981, measures for savings and for new receipts for 1982 were decided. A few weeks ago, new measures were taken. Thanks to them, the 1983 accounts have been balanced without placing new burdens on firms. I will add that, for all of next year, we have committed ourselves to not increasing the employer's share of social security. This is a commitment that confirms and continues the one that I made last April. Large-scale reform of this service, however, remains to be made.

Measures To Help Industry's Debts

Paris LES ECHOS in French 5 Nov 82 p 3

[Article by H.A.: "Selective Relief"]

[Text] "Strengthening the competitiveness of the productive infrastructure" and reducing firms' taxes also have an effect on indebtedness. We know the government is committed to this and yesterday the prime minister explained himself by immediately mentioning the problems resulting from the recent deflation encountered by firms "which got into debt at high interest rates over the course of the last few years."

Of course, most of the debt contracted by firms was at variable rates, P. Mauroy pointed out.

Which means under conditions that can be modified on the basis of the money market and the prime rate, which has been gradually declining "to an extent compatible with the situation in the foreign currency market," and the defense of the franc.

The very recent lowering of the prime rate corresponds to a reduction of 4 to 5 billion francs in financing charges for firms during a full year. P. Mauroy is obviously hoping for a new decline in the prime rate "soon," which in all would, therefore, merely by the decrease in interest rates, "neutralize" the 7 billion francs the firms will have to pay for the increase in UNEDIC [National Union for Employment in Industry and Commerce] contributions.

The lowered inflation is therefore causing difficulties for long-term debts with fixed interest rates of over 12 percent.

The government has announced an arsenal of relief and financing measures under four headings:

--A procedure to be established before the end of the year, "which will take into account the attempt by firms to strengthen their equity and increase their investments by leveling off interest charges or by spreading out capital repayments, will be managed" by specialized institutions. These are currently the National Credit Bank, the CEPME [expansion unknown], the Regional Development Societies and the Cooperative Credit Bank. This is the famous "delayed payment" that will, for the leveling off of the contracted rates, in the end be charged to the state budget, like any guarantee.

This a posteriori moderating action will obviously be selective and the 12 percent limit, which should be expressed as an average rate of indebtedness at a fixed rate by each firm, seems to indicate that no guaranteed investment credit in the near future should be more expensive than 12 percent. In any case, this is one assumption.

--This leveling off will be accompanied by an increase in credits at guaranteed rates and participatory loans for firms "wanting to finance new investment programs," said Pierre Mauroy. In this respect, amounts for guaranteed loans for investment should, it seems, at least be consolidated in constant francs in 1983.

The law on savings, currently under discussion before Parliament, will give public and private firms "new means for strengthening their equity or consolidating their debts": priority dividend shares without the right to vote, participatory securities, investment certificates. A provision for a savings booklet "specifically directed toward financing industry" could also be added to the law. This idea has already been announced by the minister of the economy, Jacques Delors.

The government will "encourage certain large systems, particularly the Deposit Bank and the Agricultural Credit Bank, to expand their activity with industry, while taking into account their specific natures."

9720

CSO:3519/112

BRIEFS

RHONE-POULENC IN ELECTRONICS--Supported by the government in the area of fine chemistry, the Rhone-Poulenc firm is increasing its investments in products designed for the electronics industry. For 15 years the firm has been providing a line of highest-purity chemical products. After installing a gallium plant (10 tons/year) and a hydrofluoric acid distillation plant (1,000 tons/year), a new fluoboric acid plant and a new acid mixture plant commenced operations at Salindres in September. The investment hit 1 million francs. At the same time, Rhone-Poulenc Chemical Specialties is preparing to set up a sales group for specialists in the FRG, where the firm is encountering very fierce competition in the market for pure products for electronics, and in Japan, where its principal clients are on the gallium market. In France it is reinforcing its cooperation with the Soprelec firm, a medium-sized firm that can meet the specific needs of the clientele of all the electronics industries thanks to recent sizable investments. [Text] [Paris LES ECHOS in French 15 Oct 82 p 9] 9720

DOMESTIC AUTO MARKET IMPROVES--It was already known that September was a good month for the French automobile market (LES ECHOS 11 October). Preliminary figures released by the trade union show a 13.2 percent increase in sales of new vehicles in September in comparison to the corresponding month of last year (139,370 units compared to 123,148). Foreign firms increased their sales in France almost twice as much as their French competitors (+19.5 percent compared to +10.4 percent), but their share of the French market, which climbed to the exceptional level of 42.5 percent in July, fell to 32.3 percent in September. For the first 9 months of 1982, vehicle registrations in France increased by 10.5 percent with 1,473,623 units compared to 1,33,613 [as published] in 1981 and foreign brands took 30.7 percent of the market with a 23.9 percent increase in sales, or almost 100,000 units (452,817 compared to 365,402). In September Peugeot, which has 10.26 percent of the market, recorded the best advance (+19.7 percent). Renault kept its first place with 40.8 percent of sales (an increase of 18.5 percent over September 1981). Talbot registered a slight increase (+2.4 percent) and holds 3.6 percent of the market. Lastly, Citroen, while awaiting the "BX effect" (1,000 orders taken at the automobile exposition), has reverted to 10.6 percent of sales while recording a 17.9 percent decrease in its registrations. [Text] [Paris LES ECHOS in French 14 Oct 82 p 9] 9720

BANK INVESTMENTS ABROAD INCREASE--For several years now French Banks have made a big effort to invest abroad. This phenomenon, revealed by a recent study of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, has resulted in a tripling of such investments from 1975 to 1980. In 1979 and 1980, the amount of direct investments abroad by French banks reached and then surpassed the amount of direct foreign investment in France in the banking sector. In 2 years, 1979 and 1980, French banks have opened 30 branches, 11 subsidiaries, 48 offices and took shares in 10 foreign banks, among other things. French banks' foreign network is now ranked second in the world. The French bankers' association emphasized that the expansion of activities handled by this network has compensated for the moderate development of activity in France itself. Thus, during the period 1976-1981, average annual increase in activity abroad was 42.6 percent, compared to 20 percent for activity in France and abroad combined. Bank investments abroad primarily involved the EEC countries (Benelux especially) and the United States, which in all received 40 percent of the investments of the French banks. [Text] [Paris LES ECHOS in French 4 Oct 82 p 9] 9720

MATRA, GCA IN SEMICONDUCTORS--By signing a temporary agreement, Matra and the firm GCA [expansion unknown], world leader of photorepetition maskers, have announced their intention of founding a joint firm for developing, manufacturing and marketing high technology equipment needed to produce semiconductors. This temporary agreement was signed so that development activities could begin while awaiting final signature for founding the joint company. This joint company, based in France, will market high technology equipment in Europe for producing semiconductors. Outside of Europe, the equipment developed by the joint company will be marketed by GCA. In addition, the joint society will market in Europe the products developed independently by GCA. It should be pointed out that Matra has a subsidiary, Euromask, which is also responsible for developing photorepeaters. [Text] [Paris ELECTRONIQUE ACTUALITES in French 8 Oct 82 p 1] 9720

JEUMONT-SCHNEIDER PROJECTS--The industrial electric equipment division of Jeumont-Schneider, which has sizable development resources available, is not lacking projects in the area of energy conversion and in the area of all the factors needed to implement them. Jeumont-Schneider recently concluded an agreement with SNIAS [National Industrial Aerospace Company] to develop high power plasma torches (from 1 to 10 MW). This will undoubtedly have applications in heating the blast of blast furnaces, in the refractory industry, in chemical synthesis and in cement furnaces. The last example shows the possible scope of this promising technique. At the same time, the industrial electric equipment division is studying the induction market for processing metals, where few French firms are now established. As for heating by resistance, which holds an important place, it needs thyristor regulators which are well within the range of its skills. Planned development envisions using high temperature resistances which, unfortunately, are not yet manufactured in our country. Heating through direct conduction, which has applications in the glass industry, in semifinished metal products and in concrete (accelerated setting), is also one of the goals. The industrial electric equipment division does not want to be a "supplier of bricks," but rather, because of its substantial resources which enable it to deliver very large complete units, well intends to become one of the leaders in the area of making the necessary transformations so that industrial procedures will make greater use of electricity. [Excerpts] [Paris ELECTRONIQUE ACTUALITES in French 8 Oct 82 p 5] 9720

FRAUD ALLEGED IN TRADE UNION ELECTIONS

Madrid ABC in Spanish 4 Nov 82 p 45

[Text] Madrid--The publication by the Mediation, Arbitration and Conciliation Institute (IMAC) of the results of the trade union elections which took place between 1 January 1982 and last 15 October has again raised the topic of "election fraud." Specific cases of this have been being reported since September, but until now not on the Confederation level.

However, after a meeting of the CC00 [Workers Commissions] Confederational Secretariat, and in view of the "irregular procedures" of the IMAC--according to the above-mentioned union--in not holding a meeting to settle what methods and what time period should be used for holding the elections; and in view of the wide-spread and specific accusations, the Confederation went on to state that it "would not want to join in," because when all is said and done they believe that the union movement is being harmed.

Therefore, the above-mentioned union is going over the union elections results meticulously, starting from the assumption that not all the irregularities which may have taken place could be classified as fraud.

They characterize as fraudulent cases like those companies where no vote at all was taken, as well as the padding of electoral rolls so as to obtain more delegates, falsification of records, computation of delegates by different methods than those which are really shown.

One of the basic reasons for the CC00's complaint, after the IMAC's publication of the partial results (the Basque Country is not counted, nor are the results in Catalonia after 30 June) is for the very reason that they were released just when the internal IMAC circular had barely come into effect. This laid down the regulations for the computation of the elections, and stipulated a series of conditions aimed at eliminating irregularities--such as not counting those records where there exist "reasonable" indications of fraud, or if there are accusations by one of the parties--until such time as these difficulties are legally verified or made good.

It has become clear from this inspection that the greatest area of fraud, as was to be expected, was in the companies of less than 50 workers, work centers in which there is hardly any union presence; where therefore fraud is

difficult to control. Supplying suitable documentation and notarized records, the CCOO has produced reports of fraud in 294 companies for the Magistracy and the Court. These took place over a period of time which runs from the beginning of September to 15 October, with a total of 470 fraudulent delegates, of whom the great majority belong to the UGT [General Union of Workers].

The sectors most prone to fraud are the hotel business and commerce, as well as the food industry. The CCOO hopes that the IMAC internal circular and its clauses against fraud will check this tendency, and that the introduction and counting of false data which has been done especially by the UGT will be substantially curtailed. Also "it will be a guarantee against the deterioration of the unions' image, which would be seriously affected if the fraud continues."

The subject of fraud is not a new one, and has been brought up in connection with previous union elections which were held in 1978 and 1980. Among other reasons for it was the lack of a standard list of companies, which makes it difficult to check up on the process, and limits it in the case of the small company with more than six workers, whose trickle of delegates is fundamental when it comes time for the final count to find the winner. Here is precisely where the battle lies, and not in the medium-sized or large company, where there is a greater union presence and there is no option of fraud.

The UGT on its part also has an extensive list of CCOO delegates whose "election" involved irregularities, especially on ships, and it appears that recently a wide profusion of records "with indications of fraud" are being detected which have been presented by the USO [Workers Trade Union].

8131

CSO: 3548/27

CHANGE IN BONN-U.S. RELATIONS VIEWED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 18 Nov 82 p 3

[Article by Jan Reifenberg: "Washington-Bonn Climate Has Changed"]

[Text] Washington, 17 November—The bitterness has gone out of German-American relations. Washington and Bonn are talking to each other in a reasonable and civilized manner again as close allies and equal partners. "I like him," President Reagan said about Helmut Kohl as he proposed a toast during the final dinner, a small and private affair held in the family dining room upstairs at the White House. That was no doubt meant sincerely. "The change in scenery, in the atmosphere, in the conduct of the talks—all that was surprisingly different from what it used to be," said Secretary of Defense Weinberger, certainly one of the most frequent and most vehement critics of some aspects of Bonn policies since Reagan came into office. After a long day that did not permit him to get over the jet lag, the chancellor himself said he thought there had been "some movement." He feels he was largely responsible for this because of the way he handled himself and openly discussed all the issues.

More likely, however, the explanation for the good rapport between Reagan and Kohl can be found in the similarities of the two men. Both are unshakably convinced of the rightness of their actions and their basic assumptions; both are capable of not burdening themselves down with technical details and of reducing the big picture to simple formulas and both are above all able to interrupt the seriousness of affairs of state with a good laugh and to take time out for a bit of humor. Most Americans do not like to be told things schoolteacher fashion and the President was delighted to see that the new chancellor agrees with him on "talking to each other but not about each other."

To be sure, Reagan's decision to lift the American sanctions against European firms involved in the Siberian pipeline deal removed one of the few real sticking points in his meeting with Kohl. And equally, the change in the Soviet leadership made it incumbent on both heads of government to perform a sober joint analysis of their main task in foreign and security policy—the future of East-West relations. Kohl suggested to Reagan more than once to meet with Yuri Andropov as soon as an appropriate period of time has passed.

Washington sources said such a meeting might actually be held in late spring in a neutral country—that is to say prior to the deadline set for implementation of the NATO resolution, if the Geneva talks on limiting medium-range missiles in Europe do not succeed. The fact that Kohl firmly supports the resolution certainly helped make that part of the meeting go easier. According to American sources, the chancellor managed to make both the special situation of divided Germany extremely clear to the President as well as the responsibility for concern about the fate of the 17 million citizens of the GDR.

The fact that both Reagan and Kohl are agreed that the Soviet Union under Andropov must show a readiness for accommodation—ranging from Afghanistan and Poland to Vietnam and above all to the two rounds of negotiations on arms limitation in Geneva—before there is any sense of holding a summit meeting made this particular portion of their talks go easier. With regard to the summit, the President is caught betwixt and between. If he is to remain true to his convictions and if he is not to disappoint his conservative Republican supporters, he must avoid giving the impression of bowing to Soviet pressure in any field. On the other hand, Congress will probably cut some aspects of his defense budget—though not the strategic core of it—and the nuclear freeze movement has just now gotten new support as a result of similar considerations on the part of the Catholic bishops of the United States. The President will not budge from his view that negotiations with Moscow can only be conducted from a position of strength. Neither he, nor Kohl will go chasing after the illusion of détente. But the chancellor's words do have some effect and in this sense the White House has lent an ear to a European voice that is not suspect ideologically speaking in favor of a meaningful and effective reduction of tensions.

Just the same, differences of opinion on substantive issues and certain political and economic nuances in the assessment of the major problems of our time did not disappear overnight. Often enough, this reporter has received different assessments of visits by German chancellors from German and American sources after they were over—and for good reason. The FRG remains a middle-sized European nation and the United States remains a world power with its corresponding responsibilities. Since the days of the Adenauer journeys to Washington, both have assumed a more distinctly national character and both must above all find ways of coping with major economic issues. Nonetheless, Kohl repeated in his friendly and firm way what his predecessor had tried to pound into the Americans' heads, thereby irritating them. The FRG is a partner, he said, and not a blind follower. Reagan would be the last person to reject this position.

The President wants to have independent partners, viewing this as a strong point for the West. He was happy to have Kohl discuss this subject with him in a relaxed and positive way. The future will show whether the curve that rises and falls on the basis of their fundamental consensus will flatten out—to the advantage of both nations. Perhaps the upcoming economic summit in Williamsburg next May will provide some initial concrete indications. For now, the important thing is that the climate has changed; the matter-of-fact-

ness of the German-American relationship and its priority status in German foreign policy have been restored. This is of value to the entire Atlantic alliance. It is of value as well to East-West relations, an area in which Reagan and the new man in the Kremlin will have to decide when they wish to resume the dialogue at the summit again--living as they do in the shadow of the atomic age.

9478

CSO: 3620/102

EURO-AMERICAN POLL ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, DEFENSE

Commentary on Poll

Paris LE MATIN in French 25 Oct 82 p 17

[Article by Guy Claisse: "Europe-United States: The Misunderstanding"]

[Text] A broad international poll taken in seven European countries and the United States reveals the points of disagreement between Europeans and Americans, Frenchmen and Germans.

For the past three years relations between the United States and its European allies have been going through a crisis no government denies. It has been particularly sensitive since the Ottawa summit of July 1981, when newly elected French president Francois Mitterrand for the first time directly broached the question of American interest rates and erratic fluctuations of the dollar.

But this crisis has multiple causes, linked to the attitude the West should adopt toward the Soviet Union and organization of European defense.

On the French side, the new president strove in the first months of his seven year term to reassure the United States, which could be concerned by the coming to power of the Left, with Communist ministers present in the government. On several occasions he reaffirmed the adherence of France to the Atlantic alliance, giving substance to that resolve by approving installation of American Pershing II missiles in Europe. But that bright interval in Franco-American relations was to be clouded with normalization of General Jaruzelski's rule in Poland. While Ronald Reagan talked of economic sanctions against the USSR, the Europeans confirmed their decision to build the gas pipeline which would permit them to import Soviet gas. Its consequence was retaliatory measures by the Washington government against several European firms bound by contracts with the Soviet Union, which firms are affiliates of American companies or dependent on them for essential supplies.

Deterioration of European relations with the United States was to worsen after the Versailles summit of June 1982, which was at first presented as a

success, but which very soon proved to rest on a monumental misunderstanding: a bargain was thought to have been reached for intervention on the exchange market by the Americans and adoption by the Europeans of a firmer attitude in their trade relations with the USSR. In the end, neither side modified its position. France, for its part, has since been content to freeze its relations at the highest level with Moscow--there has been no Mitterrand-Brezhnev meeting since the Left came to power--while maintaining normal diplomatic and commercial relations, as is witnessed by visits of numerous ministers to the Soviet Union.

The final subject of friction between Paris and Washington is the Middle East: while Ronald Reagan offered a plan to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, France openly showed its preference for the Fahd plan. The invasion of Lebanon by the Israeli army finally gave France the opportunity to impose itself as a full partner in the Middle East by participating in the intervention force at the express request of the PLO. It thus regained lost ground in the Arab camp--a turn of events which could have aroused mixed feelings in Washington.

Signs of discord appeared at the same time between the United States and the other European partners. The rise of pacifist pressure in West Germany has for the past year prevented settlement of the Pershing II question. A still stronger surge of pacifism arose in the Netherlands. In the quarrel over steel the Europeans ended by adopting a common position in the face of the Reagan administration's protectionist measures. And France's European partners gradually drew closer to its point of view on monetary questions, particularly so in the case of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's Federal Republic of Germany.

Without going so far as to talk of divorce, it could be held that the elements of a crisis between the United States and Europe were then at hand. The purpose of the poll published by LE MATIN today is to try to ascertain whether that crisis among governments is echoed by public opinion in the allied countries. It is an enquiry without precedent, for it was conducted under the auspices of a private French association, the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, with the cooperation of the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE and eight other major European media, in seven European countries and the United States. The polls were taken (see data on polls) by specialized institutes in each country and coordinated by Louis Harris Institute France.

Crisis or divorce? No one will be surprised to note that the answer to this question is far from clear. Very appreciable differences will be observed, however, between the reactions of French and American opinion: the first giving prominence to the threat posed by American interest rates and emphasizing the economic aspect of problems, while the latter seems more concerned by domestic problems in the United States--unemployment and crime--and by questions relating to defense. But above all this enquiry reveals the great absence of reciprocal illusions on the part of Europeans and Americans as to the effectiveness of the alliance in defense of common interests.

More than symptoms of divorce or crisis, it is in the end the emergence of a relative indifference by the partners to each other that marks the results of this poll. If there is a threat to the alliance of Europe with the United States, it arises more from that skepticism than from the depth of their differences, though we cannot exclude the possibility that the former may be the consequence of the latter. Could Europeans and Americans be very slowly learning to live apart? We are not there yet, but the trend exists. Protectionist temptations born of the persistent international economic crisis are likely to strengthen them in the years to come unless the governments call a halt to them. But do they wish to?

Poll Results

Paris LE MATIN in French 25 Oct 82 pp 18-19

Data on Polls

Enquiry conducted in collaboration by the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, and the Louis Harris Institute, with the cooperation of the following media: LE MATIN (France), FINANCIAL TIMES (UK), FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (FRG), IL SOLE 24 ORE (Italy), NRC HANDELSBLAD (Netherlands), EL PAIS (Spain), AFTENPOSTEN (Norway), and West Deutsche Rundfunk ARD (West German Radio).

<u>Country</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Institute</u>	<u>Number questioned</u>
France	9/17-23/82	Louis Harris-Fr	1,021
FRG	9/13-18/82	EMNID	966
UK	9/23-29/82	Louis Harris Group	941
Norway	9/10-20/82	NOI	1,014
Spain	9/20-30/82	SEFEMASA	1,007
Netherlands	9/13-18/82	NIPO	1,340
Italy	9/16-30/82	DOXA	904
USA	9/26-30/82	Louis Harris & Assoc.	1,252
		Total	8,405

Questions

1. What frightens you: with which of the concerns below are you most pre-occupied, both for yourself and for your country, at present?

	FRANCE	RFA	G.B.	NORVEGE	PAYS-BAS	ITALIE	ETATS-UNIS	ESPAGNE
Les menaces de guerre.....	42	25	28	37	32	42	23	42
La crise de l'énergie.....	22	24	11	6	10	22	13	17
L'inflation.....	50	32	28	20	9	46	34	34
L'insuffisance des moyens de défense.....	5	12	9	5	5	7		7
Le chômage.....	69	75	68	50	70	61	42	75
Les inégalités sociales.....	22	32	15	12	19	25	15	
L'ordre et la sécurité publique.....	33	38	40	16	45	62	35	32
Les armes nucléaires.....	18	32	28	40	49	21	18	27
L'excès des dépenses de l'Etat.....	18	41	10	7	20	16	24	18
La médiocrité du gouvernement.....	18	20	24	8	17	26	26	11
Sans opinion.....	1	2	3	1	3	1	6	1

FRG UK Norway Neth Italy USA Spain

Note: Each person questioned could give several answers.

Key to answer options, Table 1:

- War threats
- Energy crisis
- Inflation
- Inadequate defense
- Unemployment
- Social inequalities
- Public order and safety
- Nuclear arms
- Excessive government spending
- No opinion

Of all the threats hanging over Europe and the United States, it is not the danger of a world war which most preoccupies citizens of the Atlantic alliance's member countries. It is unemployment--and by quite far. That is true everywhere, but more especially in West Germany and Spain (75 %), the Netherlands (70%), and France (69%), with Great Britain coming just behind (68 %). It is in the United States, the home of free enterprise par excellence, that unemployment is best accepted, although it is proportionally higher there than in most European countries.

If inflation comes second for the French (50%), the threat of war and concern for public safety (except in Norway, a calm country) come practically on a par with fear of nuclear arms, which dominates in Norway and the Netherlands. It is noteworthy that the French and Americans (18%) who are the least fearful of those arms. Perhaps because they each have an autonomous defense allowing them complete self-reliance. It is clear, in any case, that the fewer nuclear arms a country has, the more it fears them.

One curious fact is the hostility of the Germans (41%) to excessive government spending, a problem which hardly bothers other peoples, and especially not the French (18%!). Could this be one explanation for the troubles of German socialists?

Governments, at all events, have every reason to rejoice: their public opinions do not judge them to be too mediocre, for only 26% of Americans and Italians, and 18% of the French are troubled on that score. Norwegians, with only 8% adverse judgments, most esteem their leaders. They come just ahead of Spaniards, with 11%, which proves that beyond the Pyrenees democracy has become a precious acquisition--unless those peoples have become a bit blasé, and reached the conclusion that the scale and gravity of present problems are such that the quality of their governments is, after all, but secondary?

2. How can we live in security: in your opinion, which of the following objectives are most important to insure the future security of the West?

	FRANCE	RFA	G.B.	NORVEGE	ESPAGNE	PAYS-BAS	ITALIE	ETATS-UNIS
Maintenir un équilibre des forces militaires avec l'URSS	18	37	24	28	7	23	15	21
Promouvoir une coopération efficace entre l'Europe et les Etats-Unis	25	53	25	24	12	21	27	36
Améliorer les relations avec le tiers monde.....	27	21	22	19	22	17	16	25
Renforcer l'unité économique de l'Europe.....	42	35	16	14	44	20	30	20
Poursuivre le dialogue et les contacts avec l'URSS	15	33	19	28	12	22	16	25
Engager des conversations sérieuses sur le désarmement.....	37	36	21	34	21	49	23	21
Accroître la collaboration des pays de l'Europe de l'Ouest en matière de défense.....	21	26	22	5	16	10	29	24
Sans opinion.....	15	2	13	6	19	7	10	13

Key to answer options, Table 2:

Maintain balance of military forces with USSR.
 Promote effective cooperation between Europe and the United States.
 Improve relations with the Third World.
 Strengthen economic unity of Europe.
 Pursue dialogue and contacts with USSR.
 Begin serious disarmament talks.
 Increase defense cooperation among countries of western Europe.
 No opinion.

Economics--always economics. For the French, strengthening European economic unity is the leading answer (42) to insuring future Western security. The West is severely hit by the crisis, with unemployment and inflation, and our countrymen, who are echoed in this by Spaniards (44) and Germans (33), it is important for Old World countries to back each other better so as to keep their heads above water. The limits of EEC action are known, as are the difficulties encountered for 25 years by its member countries in finding grounds for agreement at the community level. Remembered in that connection is the quarrel which last spring opposed the British to their partners on the question of agricultural prices, and ended in a sharp admonition by Francois Mitterrand to Margaret Thatcher. Nevertheless, for the French, therein lies salvation. At bottom, our countrymen have more feeling for Europe, and it is significant that English respondents, for their part, showed but little eagerness (16) to tie themselves firmly to Europe.

Europe, Europe! de Gaulle used to say with disdain. True, the old leftist dream of a European political federation is not yet ready to take form, but it is interesting to note that 1982 gave Paris, Rome, London, and Bonn occasion to adopt common attitudes on overly high American interest rates and Reagan's embargo against the Siberian gas pipeline.

A reading of the poll results shows the Germans (35) are not far behind the French in wishing greater European economic unity, although they would by far (53) prefer more effective cooperation between Europe and the United States. The umbilical cord linking Bonn and Washington is not cut, but it should be noted that a number of Germans (33) attach importance to pursuing a dialogue with the USSR, which for the French (15) is the least of concerns.

Must European countries cooperate more in defense matters? Apparently that is not the major preoccupation of people questioned, who on the other hand wish in a general way for serious disarmament talks to be initiated.

Excluded from the Soviet-American START negotiations on strategic arms reduction, Europeans hardly appreciate being caught in the superpowers' pincers, and hope this world will become less dangerous.

3. How are Americans doing their part: of the following adjectives, which in your opinion best describes the way in which the United States fulfills its role in defense of Western countries' interests?

	FRANCE	RFA	G.B.	NORVEGE	ESPAGNE	PAYS-BAS	ITALIE	ETATS-UNIS
Fondamental Fundamental....	4	46	23	33	5	32	25	18
Efficace Effective.....	5	22	11	12	5	6	16	8
Arrogant Arrogant.....	18	19	15	13	19	16	12	8
Naïf Naïve.....	4	6	6	4	6	7	2	12
Ce qu'il faut Adequate.....	10	18	8	16	7	10	12	17
Incohérent Incoherent.....	14	9	18	7	13	13	7	27
Insuffisant Insufficient.....	17	5	8	9	14	*	11	12
Interventionniste Interfering.....	22	11	18	18	17	30	20	18
Sans opinion No opinion.....	30	2	17	8	25	11	13	8

* Non demandé. -- Not asked

Three countries stand out for their views on this question: Germany, France, and Spain. Germans are by far (46%) the most numerous in considering as "fundamental" the role of the United States in the defense of Western interests. Perhaps their view, in this case as in many others, should be taken as wishful thinking. By contrast, Spaniards responded only 5 times in the same terms, and Frenchmen only 4 times. Those same peoples consider--and indeed with logic--that the United States is hardly effective.

It appears in fact that the judgments of Europeans on their great ally are disparate: there is neither fundamental reproach of nor marked satisfaction with American conduct. At most it can be said that their perception of it is vague. The French best exemplify that state of mind, since 30% of them do not even have an opinion on that question. They are either uninformed or utterly indifferent. The two attitudes are not naturally incompatible. Still, it is worth noting that the reproach of arrogance addressed to Americans makes but a middling score.

As for Americans, they mostly (27%) consider themselves "incoherent" in their relations with Europe--a dig at Ronald Reagan.

4. How are Europeans doing their part: of the following adjectives, which in your opinion best describes the way in which western European countries fulfill their role in defense of Western interests?

	FRANCE	RFA	G.-B.	NORVEGE	ESPAGNE	PAYS-BAS	ITALIE	ETATS-UNIS
Fondamental Fundamental.....	2	35	11	23	5	27	20	9
Efficace Effective.....	5	21	10	10	5	7	14	5
Arrogant Arrogant.....	2	10	2	2	3	3	3	9
Naïf Naive.....	6	9	6	7	10	10	6	12
Ce qu'il faut Adequate.....	13	22	17	26	10	18	13	14
Incohérent Incoherent.....	9	7	14	6	19	26	9	24
Insuffisant Insufficient.....	29	11	23	22	25	*	27	24
Interventionniste Interventionist.....	2	13	2	4	3	3	4	12
Sans opinion No opinion.....	40	1	23	12	27	16	17	11

* Non demandé. -- Not asked.

Clearly, the French take little interest in questions of European defense: 40% of them have no opinion! Conversely, we note the extreme awareness of the Germans, of whom only 1% declined to state an opinion. Only 29% of the French emerge from their indifference to consider that Europeans fall short of fulfilling their role in Western defense. In view of French responses to other questions, the odds are great that they take that attitude in part for economic and not alone for military reasons--if we leave out the last fanatical partisans of close military cooperation with the United States.

The most satisfied are, here again, the Germans. But as in the case of the previous question, we are faced here with both diffuse and contradictory judgments. Manifestly, European public opinion no longer has any very clear idea how things stand in relations with the United States. It does, however, consider Europeans clearly less arrogant than Americans.

Ronald Reagan's countrymen, for their part, are but 9% in considering the Europeans' role as fundamental, and still fewer of them (5%) believe the Europeans are effective. They reproach Europeans, as they do themselves, for incoherence, to which they add the charge of inadequacy. In a word, they give the impression of being rather disillusioned with their European allies.

5. The European share of financial costs: by and large, do you think European countries pay rather too much, or their just share, or rather not enough, of the cost of defending Western security?

	FRANCE	RFA	G.-B.	NORVEGE	ESPAGNE	PAYS-BAS	ITALIE	ETATS-UNIS
Plutôt trop Rather too much.....	7	14	8	5	38	14	13	11
A leur juste mesure Just share.....	29	59	31	58	21	51	40	14
Pas assez Not enough.....	36	23	42	30	18	24	29	68
Sans opinion No opinion.....	28	4	19	7	23	11	18	7

This question has long been debated within NATO between the United States and the European nations belonging to the military organization of the

Atlantic alliance (which France left in 1966). Americans have always reproached their European partners for not making enough of an effort for defense, while they themselves generally consider they are doing quite enough. In this regard American responses are eloquent, since 68 out of 100 Americans questioned consider that their European cousins should take a greater part in the common defense. It is of interest to note that by a comfortable majority (59) the Germans, who are particularly uneasy--and with reason--over Soviet military power, consider Western efforts sufficient.

The French (36) and British (42) disagree, and we must note that those responses were recorded in countries having deterrent forces, which proves that the nuclear fact has given them a greater feeling of responsibility.

6. And the American share: by and large, do you think the United States pays rather too much, or its just share, or rather not enough, of the cost of defending Western security?

	FRANCE	RFA	G.-B.	NORVEGE	ESPAGNE	PAYS-BAS	ITALIE	ETATS-UNIS
Plutôt trop.....Rather too much	22	17	23	14	53	23	21	66
A leur juste mesure.....Just share	20	61	33	57	14	47	40	23
Pas assez.....Not enough	24	20	24	21	14	16	22	8
Sans opinion.....No opinion	34	2	20	8	19	14	17	3

In general, NATO countries consider the American effort in defense of Western security as satisfactory, and particularly the Germans, who are in the front line and take satisfaction in the presence on their soil of American troops and tactical nuclear missiles. That satisfaction is likewise felt by Norwegians (57) and in lesser degree by Dutchmen (47) and Italians (40). Americans, on the other hand--and this follows logically from the foregoing question--consider by an overwhelming majority (66) that Europe relies too much on the United States to provide for Western defense, and that the burden they must bear is too heavy.

7. Whose fault is it: in your opinion, which of the following factors are most important in explaining present international tensions?

Key on following page	FRANCE	RFA	G.-B.	NORVEGE	ESPAGNE	PAYS-BAS	ITALIE	ETATS-UNIS
L'accroissement du potentiel militaire soviétique	21	55	33	57	23	38	37	27
L'accroissement du potentiel militaire américain	14	39	15	28	26	24	20	11
Les taux d'intérêts américains et le rôle du Dollar.....	45	28	7	4	18	11	19	19
L'extension de l'influence soviétique dans le monde	19	28	19	13	7	24	16	22
Les activités des superpuissances dans le tiers monde	29	26	16	28	31	17	15	17
L'insuffisance de l'unité européenne	26	36	17	8	27	20	24	18
L'attitude trop conciliante des gouvernements européens à l'égard de l'URSS.....	8	16	9	4	4	6	5	19
La politique américaine d'agressivité envers l'URSS	15	28	24	14	30	22	26	10
La montée du neutralisme et du pacifisme dans l'opinion publique en Europe	10	10	9	6	6	10	5	16
Sans opinion.....	17	3	15	5	14	9	12	16

Key to answer options, Table 7:

- Growth of Soviet military potential.
- Growth of American military potential.
- American interest rates and the role of the dollar.
- Extension of Soviet influence in the world.
- Insufficient European unity.
- Over-conciliatory attitude of European governments towards the USSR.
- Rise of neutralism and pacifism in European public opinion.
- No opinion.

Beware of Soviet military power, say the Germans (55) and Norwegians (57), who put the USSR far ahead in terms of responsibility for world tensions. But there are those, particularly in West Germany, who place part of the responsibility on American military policy.

Also worth noting are the responses of the French. For them the origin of tensions is not in fact military, but above all economic, since 45 out of 100 persons questioned blame American interest rates, which are considered too high, and the rise of the dollar, two factors which severely affect the Western allies of the United States. This proves that the message of the French president and government has been received.

Analysis of European Issues

Paris LE MATIN in French 25 Oct 82 p 20

[Article by Alfred Grosser: "There is no Homogeneous Europe"]

[Text] A university professor, Alfred Grosser has taught at the Institute for Political Studies in Paris since 1956. Considered the foremost French specialist on Franco-German questions, he has published this year a work entitled "Les Occidentaux, les pays d'Europe et les Etats-Unis depuis la guerre" (le Seuil, "Points" collection), which sheds prior light on the poll taken for nine major international newspapers and radio. He comments on it for LE MATIN.

Here is a poll full of lessons--perhaps because of its starting point. It could, indeed, have sought to ascertain whether the old French neutralism, which placed the two evil superpowers on the same footing, was still lively, or whether the new neutralism, based essentially on fear of atomic war, was really surging over Europe. The authors of the poll preferred to start from the idea that a Western world does in fact exist, as has constantly been asserted by the governments of all countries in the Atlantic alliance, France included. That approach does not prevent clear presentation of specific and strong attitudes. Such are those of the Norwegians and Dutch, who are much in the forefront in their fear of nuclear arms, and particularly reticent concerning increased defense cooperation among Europeans.

Do the answers reveal a growing divorce between the United States and Europeans? True, American irritation is strong, though hardly new: 68% feel Europeans do not bear their share of common costs, and 66% deplore that the United States has to bear too heavy a share! But the transnational homogeneity of the answers is rather striking, even though this or that theme has greater importance in a particular country, as do crime in Italy; government spending in Helmut Schmidt's Germany, where he is attacked by the opposition on that point; and excessive American interest rates in France, where that reality was proclaimed with particular force before and after May 1981.

If unemployment looms as a central threat, that was expected. More surprising is the sharpness of the distinction made between defense and the threat of war. On neither side of the Atlantic do people feel particularly badly defended. The risk of seeing a general war break out is clearly perceived as more diffuse, more multifarious. No question was asked on the Middle East, but it may justly be considered that fear of war, particularly in France, is not felt solely in terms of a possible confrontation in Europe.

Is there a Europe based on common reactions and sensitivities? The responses leave room for serious doubt, in view of differences from country to country. The two most interesting cases are those of West Germany and France--and not solely because they are the two countries (together with a Spain desirous of restored international respectability and of development) wanting a strengthened European economic unity.

The German case is all contrasts. No other country is as solidly anchored in the alliance, as satisfied with the state of military cooperation. Answers follow each other in very coherent order: security rests first on cooperation between Europe and the United States; the United States' role is fundamental, but Europeans also have an essential role in the common defense; costs and responsibilities are equitably apportioned; growth of Soviet military potential is the major cause of tensions. What Atlanticist wisdom! What fidelity to the fifties and sixties! Where, then, is the Germany eroded by neutralism and anti-Americanism?

It, too, is there, even if less massively than the other, and with the same coherence: in third place for fear of nuclear war; in second for denouncing America's aggressive policy toward the Soviet Union; and clearly in the lead for advocating dialogue with the USSR and attributing tensions to growth of American military potential. Yes, German responses show there is a conflict in the Federal Republic, and because there is confrontation, there is intensity of interest, as shown by the mass of varied answers to semi-open questions.

The French particularity is the opposite. What most sharply differentiates the French case is not the responses, but the non-responses! If we except the first question (and who has no preoccupations?), the French lead in "no opinion" answers to five questions out of six, and brilliantly for three of them! How is our astonishing peculiarity to be interpreted? Certainly as

lack of passion for or even interest in questions of defense: for decades now there has been no mobilization of opinion on one side or the other. But also, no doubt, in terms of the "European" formulation of the questions. All Fifth Republic governments have spoken more strongly of national defense than of Western security. Must we really believe that for 98% of the French people our nuclear force does not play an essential role, and for 95% not even an effective role, in defense of Western interests? Or is the connection not made between "Western" and "French"?

But is there a homogeneous French entity, or must we note marked cleavages, particularly between Right and Left or between Communists and others?

Let us leave aside the sharpest cleavage: if the opposition did not question the capacities of leaders in office, how could it campaign vigorously against them? The importance ascribed to social injustice is more selective than the desire to be in dialogue with the Soviet Union. The Left, however, is clearly more concerned with arms limitation and less favorable to development of cooperation between Europe and the United States. The position of PCF sympathizers is in many respects less articulated than that of the party leaders. True, the specificity is clear in answer to the last question: extension of Soviet influence does not affect tensions, while American rearmament and aggressiveness towards the USSR is stressed. But on the whole, we hardly perceive echoes of the virulence in so many party declarations.

Of course, interpretations could be hazarded. It could be said that the cleavages would no doubt have been sharper before 1981 when there was not yet a President Mitterrand to proclaim vigorously the existence of a Western world and the need to defend it--and also when the Polish crisis had not yet shown many leftist voters that clearly, even if the politics of blocs had to be overcome, there did indeed exist a camp in which liberty was denied!

But it is better to see the poll as it is: a divorce between Europe and the United States is not taking place, if only because there is no Europe but rather a group of countries in the same economic situation, but with very different political cultures.

Economic Aspects Analyzed

Paris LE MATIN in French 25 Oct 82 p 20

[Article signed J.-G. F.]

[Text] Is it really surprising that the economic crisis and the havoc it brings should traumatize public opinion? Major fears are unemployment and amputation of purchasing power through an inflation which no large industrial country has yet succeeded in stifling. Those two concerns--we might even say obsessions--loom far larger in the minds of persons questioned than do other factors of anxiety by which they feel "concerned." Only the rise in criminality, or let us say more simply the growing insecurity which affects

industrial societies, inspires apprehensions to the same degree, since in each of the eight countries at least a third of those questioned consider themselves involved by that factor.

But unemployment makes a much more spectacular "score." In Germany and Spain 79% of the people, for example, consider themselves more or less confronted by this problem of loss of employment. And it is the number one specter of 70% of the Dutch, 69% of the French, 68% of the British, 61% of the Italians, and 42% of the Americans. The reasons for the extent of German fears are easy to determine: long aloof from employment problems, Germany has borne the fullest brunt of them for 18 months. In a year the unemployment rate rose 100%. And the country is about to join the ranks of those with over 2 million unemployed: Britain and France. In the United States, which now has over 11 million unemployed, the problem is also the leading preoccupation, and by far. By contrast, fear of a new world war or defense shortcomings--two topics readily said to "haunt" Americans--directly concern but 23% and 18% of them, respectively.

Inflation, the twin sister of unemployment, is the other major fear in Western countries. Apart from the Netherlands, where significant successes have been achieved on that front, most countries continue to think rising prices and their ineffectiveness in combating them are subjects of very great concern to them. With all the logic in the world, the French are the most numerous in so thinking. Has not our country met with the most disappointments on this ground for the past year? In any case, 50% of the French people feel directly concerned by this profound evil which has undermined our economy since 1945. Nor are our countrymen alone in massively dreading for themselves and their country the effects of that morphine. The same analysis is made by 34% of Americans, 46% of Italians, and 32% of Germans. This suggests that here again the Germans, "preserved" up till now by the power of their currency and a certain economic-social consensus, are in their turn discovering the pangs of stagflation, that blend of stagnation and inflation already familiar to their neighbors.

First among the concerns of public opinion in major Western countries, economic problems are also considered to be in part responsible for present international tensions.

In France and Germany soaring interest rates and the hegemony of the dollar are thus violently denounced. American monetary policy is directly accused by 45% of the French, and 26% of Germans also directly criticize a selfish economic strategy as ruinous to western economies as a third oil crisis, since it prevents investment and dangerously deepens trade deficits.

The fact that 45% of the French people denounce greenback imperialism and the disastrous consequences of monetary dogmatism by Ronald Reagan and his Californians also indicates that the mobilization campaign begun as early as May 1981 and the Ottawa summit by the Socialist government has been a success, which moreover has crossed the Rhine.

The pattern of responses on that topic likewise shows that a majority of the French people agrees with the government's analysis. The proof is that 47% of workers and 45% of managers are convinced, in the same proportion, of the responsibility of American economic policy.

As for the opposition parties, they share approximately (43%) the same feelings as the PS and PCF (respectively 51% and 54%).

6145

CSO: 3519/91

LACOSTE REPLACES MARION AT DGSE; SIGNIFICANCE EXAMINED

Paris LE MONDE in French 12 Nov 82 p 10

[Text] Replaced by Squadron Vice-Admiral Lacoste, Marion leaves DGSE management after only 17 months in office.

If a release from official sources is to be believed, barely 17 months after his nomination as head of the Directorate General for External Security (DGSE), Pierre Marion requested to be discharged from his duties as "boss" of the French intelligence services. He was replaced by Squadron Vice-Admiral Pierre Lacoste who was originally scheduled to become inspector general of the national navy following Philippe de Gaulle's departure as reserve cadre.

This decision was taken at the end of the council of ministers of 10 November (see our last issue) while the office of the president issued a public statement lauding Marion's brilliant qualities as reorganizer. It was immediately specified that Marion had been called to new and important duties. His successor is not an intelligence specialist, at least not as it is usually understood in a secret service. However, between 1975 and 1980, when he was with the military cabinet of Minister of Defense Yvon Bourges, then with Prime Minister Raymond Barre, Vice-Admiral Lacoste had the opportunity to study the files which, at the time, were prepared by Alexandre de Marenches who headed the Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service (SDECE), former name of the DGSE.

A polytechnician, a tireless worker who even had special radio equipment installed aboard his sailboat anchored in a Corsican port in order to remain constantly in touch with his services during his short rest periods and famous for his temper, as sudden as it is violent, Marion had been recommended in June 1981 to François Mitterrand by the minister of defense, Charles Hernu, who is the administrative authority over DGSE and a long-time friend of the former director of Air France and the National Airspace Industrial Company (SNIAS).

An Industrial Structure

The new director general's task was to reorganize the former SDECE, marked by de Marenches' strong personality who, between 1970 and 1981, had held the post of director of the intelligence services, the longest mandate since its creation in 1946. Obviously, after Marion's nomination, de Marenches' close associates, such as

Michel Roussin, Yves Beccuau or René Delmas, had to leave the service at the same time as scores of civilian and military employees. They were replaced by 82 young officers recruited in July 1982 and a few employees of the national police.

However, two of the main operational officials of SDECE, Brigadier-General Jacques Sylla Fouilland, intelligence director, and Colonel Jean-Albert Singland, former head of counterintelligence, remained at their post with more important missions directly under Marion.

Perhaps one of the errors of the new director general was to pattern DGSE on organizational and command structures too close to those of an industry. The organization adopted had the disadvantage of placing the director general too much up front, in the limelight, by concentrating on him all the powers he had not delegated, thus running the risk of being the first to be "spattered" in case of "splashes," inevitable in this type of service.

Furthermore, the government had asked Marion to redirect the activities of the new DGSE toward an increase in offensive missions and to show a greater independence vis-à-vis the allied services which had to furnish information to France, because they are in a better position toward the East, in exchange for other data gathered by French agents.

Lack of experience

The intelligence service--approximately 1,500 persons--was thus requested to gather all political, scientific, economic, technical, military or industrial data by "manipulating" sources abroad which were not discreet enough, at least in two specific cases. They aroused enough attention from local services to cause an allied country worried over such doings, to demand an explanation from France.

As for the counterintelligence service, it was requested to infiltrate foreign services and terrorist networks. To achieve this goal, it was given a larger number of employees going from some 200 employees to some 350. They were taken from the other divisions of DGSE which, not counting the personnel from so-called related units, employs a total of 2,800 people divided in almost equal number between civilians and military. The "action" division was also reorganized and its head, General Georges Grillot, was replaced.

All these upheavals, including in the service's HC network, the so-called "honorable correspondents," naturally taxed the quality of DGSE "production." It was sometimes accused of giving to the authorities--and essentially to the chief of state who, every Tuesday evening, receives a weekly information bulletin--too many synthesis and evaluation notes--likened to literature--and not enough operational data, precise, directly exploitable and regularly updated, concerning the targets under surveillance. The more so that DGSE had been requested to furnish information in a field, the anti-terrorist fight, in which its experience was still small.

Marion's partisans believe too much was expected, and too soon, from a service which the government itself had demanded be reorganized and which, after all, is only another tool among other sources of information. Next 18 November, the minister of defense will preside over the transfer ceremony between Marion and Squadron Vice-Admiral Lacoste. Hernu will undoubtedly ask him, as part of the participation of

the armed forces in the fight against international terrorism, to emphasize the operational characteristics of the "action" division entrusted with specific operations.

[Born on 23 January 1924 in Paris, Pierre Lacoste enlisted in the navy in May 1943 after escaping from France through Spain where he was imprisoned for a while. He was admitted to the Naval Academy in April 1945 and then assigned to Indochina in 1949.

After assuming several positions onboard war ships, he entered the Naval War College from which he graduated; he then assumed several positions in the general staff office. In November 1962 he took command of a rapid escort vessel, le Provençal, and in December 1967 of the squadron escort vessel Jaureguiberry. He then served in the evaluation and overview center of the ministry of armed forces where he was entrusted with programming and budgetary planning.

In 1971 he commanded the 8th squadron escort vessel division and the escort vessel Maille-Brezé.

Nominated deputy chief of Yvon Bourges' military cabinet in 1975, Pierre Lacoste is promoted to the rank of rear admiral in 1976 and commandant of the Naval War College. In October 1978, he becomes chief of Prime Minister Raymond Barre's military cabinet and is promoted to the rank of vice-admiral in December 1979. In September 1980 he is appointed commandant of the Mediterranean squadron; he was promoted to the rank of squadron vice-admiral last February.

It is the first time that a navy man will head the intelligence services since the creation of SDECE in 1946, but it is the fourth high-ranking officer to do so after Generals Paull Grossin (October 1957-January 1962), Paul Jacquier (February 1962-December 1965) and Eugene Guibaud (January 1966-October 1970).]

6857

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BONET REPLACES CHALET AT DST; SIGNIFICANCE EXAMINED

Paris LE MONDE in French 12 Nov 82 p 10

[Article by Laurent Grailsamer: "Nomination of a Prefect to Head DST"]

[Text] On Wednesday, 10 November, Yves Bonnet, age 47, was appointed director of territorial surveillance (DST) during the council of ministers; it is one of the services of the French counterintelligence. This prefect whose last position was that of governmental representative in Mayotte, replaces a policeman, Marcel Chalet, who had served his whole career in the DST which he headed from 1976 to 7 November 1982.

DST--two of its deputy directors are to be appointed in the near future--was temporarily headed for a few days by Armand Marimbert, deputy director of the administrative service. The other DST services are counterintelligence and security (subversion, anti-terrorism and technical installations).

The appointment of a prefect to head DST renews with tradition. However, it runs the risk of offending a service used to living in close circuit, under the "secret-defense" seal.

Counterspies

During good years, some 50 new recruits join the territorial surveillance directorate. Fifty young men, just out of police academies, who enter a counterintelligence career as others enter a religious order. Most of them listened with interest to a few courses on DST, given precisely to arouse their interest. They went to see their professors, requested the privilege of joining DST and showed their credentials. Their candidacies were reviewed and they were chosen. On what standards? "Secret-defense."

When, for the first time, they enter the DST premises they are ordinary policemen. The fourth subdirectorate which has already carefully studied their past will assume their training. They soon will be real counterspies, certified professional secret agents. It will be a new generation of defenders of the French republic, one and indivisible; a new wave of freedom fighters. It is so for DST has always felt it is one of the stronger ramparts of our society. His founder and first director,

Roger Wybot (1944-1958), thought it was the "watchdog of the republic." Its last boss, Marcel Chalet (1976-1982) liked to define it as "the SAMU [rescue squad] of the national community." In short, it is a sort of very serious scouting with "always ready" inspectors and commissioners.

With its tradition and methods, DST is undoubtedly a possessive master. It is well known that it is imbued with a strong "in-house spirit." One guesses that life in it is somewhat monastic. Out of 100 policemen who go through their first skirmishes under it, 93 will remain for their whole career, certain to have made the right choice, convinced that, there, they are serving better than anywhere else. DST operates within its own brand of police, supercentralized and escaping administrative ponderousness. Counterspies answer only to their chiefs for their activities. As for the director, he only answers to the minister. Conclusion: "No prefect can say: 'I have my DST'." No high official interferes with DST activities.

With our empire gone and Algeria independent, opportunities for assignment are now simple. Over 50 percent of the personnel (a total of 1,300 people) work in Paris in the central office; less than 50 percent are located in province and the DOM-TOMS [Overseas Departments and Territories]. To be sure, most of them will not know the investigations and shadowing which make amateurs of spy novels and movies chiver. The largest services are the technical branches where sophisticated installations try, for example, to capture the "enemy's" radio messages.

Nevertheless, at his level and according to his mission, each DST agent fights the opponent. The young policeman is given the explanation that he must fight against espionage, state terrorism and some forms of subversion. Drawing from their archives, the old-timers discuss concrete cases with the young people, explaining the difficulties and risks of an investigation, the ropes and tricks of a job learned in practice. In short, it is a simple business! Either we are attacked or we defend ourselves. Due to a question of means, DST essentially chose to defend itself.

This stems from the fact that spies--especially those "coming in" from the cold--are giving a hard time to our counterspies. In the face of an all-out espionage--particularly in scientific laboratories and key industries--France is somewhat deprived. Under those circumstances, counterintelligence chose to set up a "security belt" around the large industrial companies and some research centers. Discreet investigations and counterinvestigations are conducted there. In other words, DST waits for its opponent in his inevitable hunting ground. DST leadership believes that "such a defensive network hinders him."

In a larger context, the policemen who enter DST discover an outfit which, for several years now, has banked on its intelligence and sensitive missions. Technicians, engineers and scientists who must know "top secret" data, travel or live abroad are regularly warned about possible dangers. Numerous conferences--close to 15,000 people are involved every year according to Chalet--are given before these cadres. It is the task of an entire service. If specialists are to be believed, it is a needed service, French society usually ignoring--either from failure to realize, or because of a typically national ironic trait--the scope and nature of espionage activities practiced on our territory or exaggerating them.

A Political Dimension

A DST which pretends to practice defensive measure, a DST aware of its means, such would be the sign of a change began years ago. An example: Wybot loved his "manipulation" service above all else. As for Chalet, he gave his attention to the creation of a service devoted to intelligence and sensitive areas. In the 50's, DST was obsessed with "the subversive activities of the Communist Party;" today, DST concentrates on counterintelligence. In other words, granting some continuity, DST has changed. It is said that close to 60 percent of its men have been at their jobs for less than 10 years.

Does it mean that investigations against communists presumed a priori to be spies, the fight against OAS [Secret Army Organization] lost soldiers and the surveillance of leftists "manipulated by foreign agents" are forgotten? Does it mean that all these struggles are now part of a past which has ended? Undoubtedly not. Too many missions had recently little to do with counterintelligence or subversion. It is enough to recall the unfortunate and clumsy escapade of the "plumbers" who placed microphones in the premises of the LE CANARD ENCHAINE weekly (1973); to speak about the infiltrations in Breton, Corsican and Basque autonomist movements; and to remember the search for free radio stations (1979-1981).

In most of those cases, DST paid, so to speak, for its good services record. The previous authorities could not resist taking DST out of its usual hunting grounds despite the fact that they were all defined by texts and a 1964 decree. Today, it is readily asserted that DST--disciplined and loyal--becomes what is made of it. Illegal orders would therefore make DST a nest of "farfetched coups." On the other hand, missions within the scope of this intelligence service's functions would make it "the most republican of all the services."

It remains that many affairs handled by DST naturally have a political dimension, regardless of what is being said or thought. It was true at the time of the "generals' scandal" (1949) and of the leaks (1954-1956). It was also true during the Roger Delpey affair (1980) when DST arrested Bokassa's confidant and Valery Giscard d'Estaing's sworn adversary as he was coming out of the embassy of Libya. It is a political, obvious and troublesome dimension difficult to avoid. It reappears constantly even when least expected. Some counterintelligence officials substantially deplore this fact. Most of the cases which are made public do not give an account of the work involved. Even the "organized kidnaping" of the Romanian writer Virgil Tanase, to which he owes his life, is atypical (1982).

What then? Then DST work would be something else, devoting 80 percent of its activities to pure counterintelligence, a crafty, patient counterintelligence assessed at its true value, whose "important coups" would remain unknown to the public at large. In other words, an organization for initiates, for DST lives, works and retaliates under the "secret-defense" cover. It is under cover of that rampart that it has gradually taken on the aspect of a fortress, a state within a state. We can become indignant over this state of affairs; as recommended by Jean-Michel Belorgey, PS [Socialist Party] deputy of Allier and author of a report on the police, we can legitimately hope that high officials with the highest "secret-defense" clearance be in a position to control, when they deem it necessary, DST activities. It can be done. But it seems that it will not be done. As though DST nature is to foster suspicion without always being able to tell whether rightly or wrongly.

For lack of something better, Chalet finally had to admit this burden of suspicion. Meanwhile, the last representative of the counterintelligence pioneers, after the Liberation, regrets that he was unable to free of this suspicion both the DST of the 80's and its future young counterspies.

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QUALITY OF KARAMANLIS-PAPANDREOU RELATIONS ANALYZED

Daily Reviews Spectrum of Relations

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 7-8 Nov 82 pp 1, 3

[Article by Stamos Zoulas: "How 'Harmonious and Excellent' Are the Karamanlis-Papandreou Relations?"]

[Text] The invocation recently by A. Papandreou of his "excellent" personal relations with the president of the republic and of his "absolutely harmonious" cooperation with the chief of state, is causing a great deal of thinking among many political personalities as well as in a considerable section of public opinion. This thinking refers first of all to the essence of the assurance--that is, to what extent do the premier's statements correspond to reality--and secondly, to the reasons behind this claim which recently has been stressed often and persistently. Of course, harmony in the relations between the president and the premier is desired by the great majority of the Greek people since the smooth functioning of the political system depends on it. The questions rise from the fact that the references to the "harmonious cooperation" are tied to statements that Karamanlis "comes from a different ideological area than that of PASOK," that he is not opposed to the implementation of the government's socialist program and that he does not seem to be prepared to use the "super powers" given him by the constitution.

All these findings could also be viewed as preconditions which--according to Papandreou--are being observed by the president of the republic, with the result that their cooperation is "frequent, absolutely harmonious and always useful for the promotion of our national interests." It is also worth noting that the "excellent relations" are emphasized only by the premier, while Karamanlis has deliberately avoided any references to this subject and all his speeches contain only indirect suggestions or admonitions but not praise for the government. This idyllic picture of the Karamanlis-Papandreou relations assisted by a few arbitrary dashes of color by the pro-government press, may lead a small and possibly politically less mature sector of the public to the conclusion that the president of the republic not only approves but cooperates and is jointly responsible in the implementation of the PASOK governmental policies. Or, at the very least, that the "harmonious cooperation" between the two officials is due exclusively to concessions or giveaways by the president of the republic...

However, elementary judgement or knowledge of facts and personalities is enough to reject this picture as misleading and a distortion of reality. The relations

between the president of the republic and the government are regulated by the constitution and depend exclusively on the policies and choices of Papandreou.

The premier, by noting Karamanlis' "strong personality and his impressive presence and contribution to the country's political life," gives himself the true dimensions of his relationship to the chief of state. Because he admits that these relations could be disturbed only in the event his government would shift to questioning or overturning Karamanlis' "contribution." This contribution consists of a specific policy and fixed views or choices of the present president of the republic which have shaped the international position and the country's domestic affairs during most of the postwar period.

It must be considered a certainty that the president and the premier must have had a critical and decisive discussion immediately after PASOK's victory in the election of 1981. There is no doubt that the discussion must have touched on all the differences between the two political leaders on the crucial issues of foreign and domestic policies. This is because a possible implementation of PASOK's campaign theses on most foreign policy issues--mainly the threat to take Greece out of the EEC--would mean an immediate breach between the president and the premier. All other issues, such as our countries' participation in NATO, the future of the foreign bases, the conditions for a dialogue with Turkey, the policy on Cyprus, the multi-dimensional foreign policy, etc., are subject to controversial handling and two-sided declarations between the possible and the desirable--a tactic adopted by the government without having differentiated its policies sufficiently from the policies of its predecessors.

Domestic Issues

Domestic issues which could lead to an immediate breach between the chief of state and the government may include a possible partisan intervention in the armed forces or in the judiciary, and especially the questioning of fixed institutions of the political system attempted by the government, either by violating the constitution or by setting in motion the process of constitutional revision announced by PASOK before the election.

Adjustment of PASOK

During the 12 months the government has been in office it has not shown any intention or at least has not moved to implement the policies which were known to be opposed by the president of the republic. In fact, Papandreou lately has revised his statements concerning the modification of the constitution saying that the procedure will take a long time and that the existing constitution does not hinder the implementation of the government's socialist party. PASOK's adjustment to "more realistic theses" on vital issues of domestic and foreign policy no doubt has averted a breakup so far between the president of the republic and the premier. However, there are many other particular or secondary issues that fall exclusively within the responsibility of the government's policy, on which there are disagreements without leading to conflict. In any event, something of this sort would indicate a tendency toward confrontation and not a desire toward conciliatory between the two officials. Yet, from such issues which seriously hurt individuals, groups or classes of citizens rises the question: "What is

Karamanlis doing?" This is a question which indicates a desire for presidential interventions, or--in certain cases--a despairing cry for help following "an arbitrary action by the government."

Government's Responsibility

Those who raise this question--many of them belong to the latest crop of new PASOK voters-- forget that the present government is supported by a strong popular majority and that it can invoke the confidence of 48 percent of the Greek people not only on what it does but also on what it avoids doing in spite of its declared campaign theses.

In any event, as some have observed, any question regarding the "correct use" or "abuse" of the public support is premature at the end of the first quarter of the government's term. For many, of course, the result of the municipal elections indicated disapproval of PASOK not on basic choices of its governmental policies--which, in any event, have not yet materialized--but on specific actions or tendencies with a purely partisan character and which negate the premier's assurance on the night of 18 October about "a government of all the Greeks," which make a mockery of the declarations about meritocracy and promote a deep divisive gap at the popular base.

It is almost certain that Karamanlis intervenes with advice in many governmental decisions or intentions. But he does not consider it proper from a formal and political standpoint to intervene in a preventive sense on specific issues on which there is disagreement. We may add that often the government--and personally the premier--seeks in advance the views of Karamanlis before it reaches a decision on which it is thought that the chief of state may have a different view. It must be emphasized, however, that even in such cases, as we can tell from the political practice so far, Karamanlis' intervention has only corrective and not decisive character.

By all indications, the relations of the president with the premier have developed so far along these lines more or less. If the characterization of these relations as "excellent" or "absolutely harmonious" correspond to reality, this in the last analysis is a subjective matter. But what is important is the reason behind the premier's references to his relations with Karamanlis. It is obvious that these references annoy the major opposition party which has avoided so far any involvement of Karamanlis in its political conflict with PASOK. The displeasure of New Democracy derives from the suspicion that the image of the idyllic relations between the president and the premier is designed to exploit Karamanlis's prestige and to reassure the more conservative part of PASOK voters on the government's policies and intentions.

Regardless of ND's reactions, the fact remains that the premier's praise of the "excellent relations," the personality, and the contribution of Karamanlis, is received with displeasure by the Left which suspects that this tactic prepares the ground for PASOK's more steady rapprochement with the area of the Center. Nevertheless, in all these assessments one must bear in mind that a sudden idyll tends to be short and unstable, especially when the reciprocity and sincerity of the passion is uncertain...

Rightist Maneuvers Suspected

Athens I AVGI in Greek 9 Nov 82 p 5

/Text/ The first page story published in Sunday's I KATHIMERINI regarding the relations between President of the Republic Karamanlis and Premier Papandreou cannot pass unnoticed because it poses a problem critical to the country's political life. It puts it in such a way as to cause anxiety and raises many questions with regard to those who inspired it and to their objectives.

The article seems to present various suppositions but it implies that the relations between the president of the republic and the premier have reached a point where anything can happen. The author of the article makes a basic point: The relations between the president and the premier could be upset if the government started to question or undermine "specific policies" and "fixed theses" of Karamanlis "which shaped the country's international position and internal affairs during most of the postwar period." But this position threat comes into conflict with the principle of popular sovereignty which is recognized and sanctioned by the country's constitutional charter whose faithful observance is the president's responsibility. When the people are called to select the country's government they are absolutely free to side in favor of or against (in whole or in part) the policies followed up to that time. Consequently, how is it possible for the policies followed by Karamanlis during most of the postwar period to become a limiting framework within which the people's choices have to stay? What interpretation of the constitution can support this novel view? The elections of 18 October 1981 reflected the popular majority view for a profound change; a change against the Right and its policies in all sectors. Which constitutional clause--even those which refer to the president's super powers--can question the people's right and will which was so panegyrically expressed? And what is the objective of such an article which portrays the president as prepared almost to oppose the popular will?

The I KATHIMERINI article reveals indirectly the intentions of certain circles of the Right to resort to anti-parliamentary and unconstitutional solutions, pointing out the exceptional powers of the president of the republic and the ostensible need for his intervention against the parliamentary and popular majority. It also shows an effort to imply some conflict between the president and the premier to facilitate the indirect recruiting of Karamanlis' name in the efforts to reorganize the Right. And all this with the simultaneous hope that there will be pressure on the legitimate government to stay "within the framework" and that the popular majority will be intimidated.

This article is a direct blow, therefore, against the constitutional norms in an effort to involve the president of the republic in the partisan feuds with exceptionally deliterious effects on the political system itself. It must be made clear to all those who care about political normalcy that it can only be safeguarded by the unlimited respect for the popular will. The recent history of this country must be a lesson for all.

Comments on Papandreou's Abrupt Change

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 4 Nov 82 p 7

Text For 11 months there has been a "hidden" crisis in the relations between the government and the chief of state because of the attitude of the former. This is because the government:

- a. Never missed an opportunity to attack the previous governments which for 6 years were led by Karamanlis. There were also very frequent attacks by the state radio and TV against the 8 years of ERE.
- b. The news about the activities of the president was regarded as third-rate and was ignored or presented in a way which was insulting for the institution.
- c. Speeches and messages by the president were ignored, undervalued or contradicted indirectly but clearly (speech in Ioannina, speech to the Greeks from Australia, the message of 25 March).
- d. The arrivals and departures of the president passed almost unnoticed in striking contrast to those of the premier. Suddenly, 12 days before the municipal elections there occurred a "shifting of the years." The PASOK leader has been transformed into a passionate "Karamanlist." Why?

1. Background of the "Shift"

4 October: Speaking to PASOK's parliamentary group Papandreou mentioned Karamanlis as "the inexhaustible source of precious experiences and knowledge."

13 October: Speaking in the Chamber of Deputies the premier said that "the democratic institutions function well in Greece because the president of the republic strictly observes the constitution."

14 October: In a "confidential" talk to the political reporters, Papandreou praised Karamanlis and predicted his reelection to the presidency.

Immediately after the first round of the municipal elections and while the Chamber of Deputies is debating the "abolition of the individual preference vote," Papandreou on 19 October presents himself as the man who carries on Karamanlis' foreign policy, forgetting his beloved phrase "for the first time" (press conference with foreign correspondents).

2. Improper Behavior

The over-publicized "shift" is improper in form and in substance because:

- a. The chief of state does not need the premier's medals of good behavior.
- b. The "leak" was obviously planned. In general, if the 11-month-long undervaluing of the role of the president (and the indirect attacks against him) was improper, then the present phase of flattery is equally improper.

3. Untimely Prediction

With regard to the prediction that Karamanlis will be reelected, the least one can say is that it was untimely. Because:

- a. The election of the president is 2½ years away.
- b. It is not yet certain that Karamanlis wants to have another term.

4. Objectives of the "Shift"

Papandreou does not say or do anything without ulterior motives. Behind his words or deeds there is always some hidden objective. In this case he wants:

- a. To influence the voters on the eve of the municipal elections. His message was: My relations with the president are excellent. Therefore Karamanlis is not worried. Why, then, should you worry?
- b. To reassure the Americans, NATO and EEC with the same argument.
- c. To "flatter" Karamanlis in the hope that he will tone down any objections to various issues: relations with EEC, attacks against the "Right," persecutions in the judiciary, abolition of the individual preference vote, and others.
- d. In general, to reassure the "bourgeoisie" that "Karamanlis is with me. He will remain president. I don't want the office. Therefore, there is no question of changing the constitutional structure. Karamanlis' guarantee does exist and will continue to exist."

5. Conclusions

The belated embrace of Karamanlis reveals the worries and the fears of Papandreou. The reasons:

- a. The failure of the government during the first year.
- b. The loss in public support and the end of public toleration of the "Change" (see results of the election).
- c. The pressures on him to form a "popular front" with KKE and its increasing pressure to impose on the government its own choices.
- d. The crisis within PASOK (Petsos, Panagoulis, Bouloukos, Khondrokoukis).

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WARNING ISSUED ON PASOK'S ALLEGED TENDENCY TOWARD RIGHT

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 6 Nov 82 p 4

[Article by V. Filias: "A 'Peculiar' Political Climate Is Emerging"]

[Text] One cannot easily ignore the most significant political event of the week, namely, the premier's interview with an afternoon newspaper and KKE's reaction to the interview without committing the serious crime of ostrich-like hypocrisy. This crime has become the hallmark of an overwhelming sector of the pro-government press whose mission is thereby shrinking morally and politically.

Papandreou's interview comes after 1 year of PASOK's governing the country and immediately after the municipal elections at a crucial time with regard to the government's choices on key domestic and foreign problems. Above all, it comes now to give form and to make official a simmering crisis in the relations of the two basic parties of the progressive area.

We are not the ones to act as accusers but neither are we prepared to resort to "advice," appeasement and pain-killers. The issue is too serious and that is how the people view it, as they ponder over the deeper causes for the clash and its probable effects.

What we must openly say, however, is that at this moment there is a feeling in public opinion that a new political climate is emerging which is in contrast and radically different from the political climate in which the October 1981 general election was conducted.

True, in that election the people gave a self-sustaining majority and their confidence to PASOK, but they entrusted the cause of Change as a responsibility of all progressive forces whose unity in pursuing its realization was undoubtedly a guarantee in the eyes of the masses.

This unity appears so shaken now that the people wonder whether the very content, the very essence of Change which the people have seen as a deep, structural change, is in danger. This deep, structural change was to have as its spokesmen and promoters PASOK's left wing which after the recent developments appears to be weakened because of the gap which deepens increasingly in the direction of KKE.

The nonparticipation of KKE in the government is one thing, but its exclusion as a participant in shaping the overall framework and the goals of change with a more creative dialogue and exchange of views is something much more important and, no doubt, is in conflict with the meaning of the popular mandate given in the election of October 1981. In that election the last thing the progressive forces in the electorate would have wanted to see would be KKE "in the doghouse"--a policy which objectively revives a view of the political game the progressive forces fought for 30 years to overcome.

There is no doubt that the use of the term "bipolarity" in the premier's interview strengthened this view and left the impression that the dynamic of political confrontations is limited to the two major parties, PASOK and New Democracy.

But in practice what else could this signify but an overall "shift to the Right" and at the same time the strengthening of the role and of the influence exercised by the center-right forces within PASOK.

If by this shift the PASOK leader wants to forestall the emergence of center-right factions and to preempt that area he should not deceive himself--we are not deceived either--that the inevitable effect would be a qualitative change within PASOK. It will be a qualitative change because the nature, objectives and direction of a political party determines in the last analysis the composition of its electoral following.

The concern of the masses in the progressive area--beyond and independently of KKE--signifies a fear that PASOK will become "more conservative," thereby reducing, if not negating altogether, its commitment to Change. This worry was heightened by the fact that the premier's interview touched, probably for the first time, on ideological and political line problems such as the issue of dogmatism, the cases of Poland and Afghanistan and so on, not in the framework of PASOK's theses and views but in order to criticize KKE directly.

This is a new element, considering that such criticism had been avoided in the past. Naturally it has become the subject of many comments, interpretations and questions. Questions such as: "Does the premier want in this way to limit as much as possible the probability of intervention by the Left on critical political issues? And why does he do it now and not earlier? What are the reasons behind the choice of time for this frontal attack?"

These questions--no matter whether they are justified or unjustified--start and relate mainly to the fact that at this very moment the question of the American bases is being discussed and, by extension, the increase and consolidation of NATO's influence in our country.

It is certainly proof of the great sensitivity of the progressive forces in and out of PASOK that they show a widely spread concern about the unexpected developments in the last week regarding this issue. More generally, one could say without hesitation that in the last few days a climate of uncertainty and disappointment prevails; a climate which is not only displeasing but is also undermining and destroying the confidence of the truly progressive people in the cause of Change.

These people begin to believe that the recent events foreshadow a bad future. It would be commonplace to say that a slippery political ground is coming into view which at this moment is not beneficial. But we must say it, not as a personal view, but as an expression of a clearly painful popular feeling.

PAPANDREOU'S VIEW OF KKE'S 'MOSCOW DEPENDENCE'

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 4 Nov 82 p 3

[Article by Giorgos Delastik: "Who Is Dependent on Imperialism?"]

[Excerpts] Marx was....a British agent. Lenin was....a German agent. After the creation of the proletarian state in the Soviet Union, all the perennially wandering communist agents of all continents gained a permanent employer, the "red bear" in the Kremlin. KKE has been since its birth passionately dependent on Moscow. The history of KKE's dependence on Moscow is well known, bloody and dirty--dirty with regard to the goals it always served and to the people who participated directly in their realization.

All those who expressed from time to time the interests of the ruling class in our country spoke of KKE's dependence. Now it seems that PASOK's turn has come [to criticize KKE]--a new phase of a very old ideological attack against the communists.

True Dependence

It is good for the country to have a discussion on the subject of dependence. First of all, because, no doubt, before we can talk about the issue of communist "dependence" there must be a discussion of the decisive issue of our country's dependence on imperialism. This is the problem of problems as seen earlier by Papandreou.

Now PASOK is in office. Thus, the problem of imperialist dependence affects deeply the character of governmental policy. "The government, free from any decision-making centers abroad, both east and west, sets firm foundations for an independent Greece, a Greece belonging to its people," to quote the words of the government spokesman last week.

It is very difficult to believe that the government spokesman intends to declare the country's independence by announcing the closing of the bases, withdrawal from NATO, EEC, etc! In anyevent, until these things happen, and on the basis of what A. Papandreou said, the country continues to be suffocatingly dependent on imperialism. As long as this situation continues--in spite of what Maroudas says--the government remains dependent on the policy charted by the "decision-making centers" of imperialism since its policy moved steadily within the context of the Atlantic ideology, that is, of the general imperialist line.

A. Papandreou was always very hard in his assessments of every aspect of Atlantic Alliance policy. He did not simply call it "dependence." His words were cutting, as when he said, for instance in early September 1977 while speaking to PASOK's Central Committee and castigating New Democracy's Atlantic policies: "Karamanlis' basic choice with regard to the country's foreign orientation is decisive. It necessarily contains all these consequences and because these consequences are the price of the country's dependence."

"Dependence," KKE's Fundamental Principles

PASOK's government and not KKE is accountable, therefore, to the people for its dependence on the policies of imperialism as long as our country remains tied to its wagon. With regard to KKE, A. Papandreou in his momentous interview with TA NEA on Monday defined very clearly what in his view constitutes KKE's "dependence": the "obsolete ideological dogmas" as he called them and specifically the dictatorship of the proletariat, the proletarian internationalism, KKE's "rigid support" of the countries of applied socialism, the theory of anti-imperialist and socialist revolution!!! These are basic principles that Papandreou wants KKE to abandon, no less! By what right? Unfortunately Papandreou is knocking on the wrong door. KKE's members, cadres, followers and friends will never revise their attitude toward the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. They are not going to be removed from KKE's program no matter how much the ruling class may dream of their removal. The communists are deeply proud of these principles which they have honored even with their blood. KKE's unswerving "dependence" on the principles of Marxism-Leninism is a precious title of honor for all Greek communists.

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ETHNOS' ALLEGATION ON ARMS FIRM'S ACTIVITIES DENIED

Government Spokesman's Statement

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 4 Nov 12 p 1

[Excerpt] A government spokesman told the press yesterday that the front page story in ETHNOS under the title "Fraud in the Purchase of Weapons" is untrue. The story implied that the general director of the Greek Weapons Industry [EVO], Dim. Kokkinos, had been removed or forced to resign as the "brain of all the strange affairs" including showing to Iraq a group of weapons manufactured by the German factory of Hekler and Koh.

The government spokesman (Deputy Minister for Press D. Maroudas is away in Bucharest and he has been replaced by Press Secretary General S. Kostopoulos) said that today Deputy Minister of Defense P. Zakolikos will fully update the newsmen on defense questions. The major point is that the contract with the German company Hekler and Koh grants--he said--the right to the Greek government (meaning EVO) to manufacture such weapons in Greece. Therefore, the government spokesman underlined, the story is untrue.

Defense Official's Denial

Athens TA NEA in Greek 5 Nov 82 pp 1, 10

[Text] "There is no evidence that Kokkinos--until recently director of the Greek Weapons Industry [EVO]--is involved in economic irregularities as reported by the newspaper ETHNOS. This statement was made by Deputy Minister of National Defense P. Zakolikos who added: "The resignation of Director General D. Kokkinos--who was appointed to that position by the New Democracy and stayed on after PASOK came to power--resulted from a disagreement over the management of the company. D. Kokkinos wanted to act without reporting to anybody. So he disagreed with Arsenis and resigned."

Weapons to Iraq

With regard to the display of weapons in Iraq, the deputy minister of national defense was clear: "The story is untrue. There is no fraud. EVO simply has a contract with the German company Hekler and Koh which provided the know-how for the manufacture of the weapons HK21, HK33, MP5 and PS9. Having the right to

produce them under the contract, the EVO conducted a market survey before starting production. In the context of this market survey and search for prospective buyers the company conducted a weapons show in Iraq in February 1982. The weapons would be of Greek and not German manufacture.

With regard to the part of the story on bayonets, Zakolikos underlined that there is no "hanky-panky" in this either. On the contrary, the Greek state benefited from the price reduction received from the Bauer Co. Hekler sells the G3 together with the bayonet but at too high a price. So the EVO, following a decision of its board of directors, intervened for their procurement from Bauer thereby achieving a 51 percent reduction in the overall price of the bayonet.

With Figures

During yesterday's briefing of the military reporters, Zakolikos mentioned every point of the ETHNOS article (already refuted by Marcoudas). About the contract with ELINTA, he said that following competitive bidding this company was awarded the manufacturing of the G3 loading mechanisms. "There is no study saying that they may be made for 100 drachmas each," Zakolikos went on. Then, after refuting several other points of the article by giving specific figures, he emphasized that as soon as he assumed his duties he sent a circular letter to all armaments industries and to all private enterprises financed by the government, in which he underlined the necessity to inform the government in advance on their every action. Because of this, it is not possible to sign agreements for the purchase of sale of weapons with foreign governments without the knowledge (and approval) of the government.

"The enterprises do not make policy. Policy is determined by the Ministry of National Defense and the government," the deputy minister concluded.

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GESTSSON, GRIMSSON BATTLE IN PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE VIEWED

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 19 Nov 82 p 24

[Editorial: "Time for Svavar Gestsson and His Friends to Provide Some Answers"]

[Text] Half a month from now the Social Democratic Party convention will open. After that the discussions of the Social Democrats with the government will end. In a week the Progressive Party convention begins. After that the Progressives will be in favor of elections any time after 1 December. At present the People's Alliance Party Council is in session. There is no doubt that many noteworthy subjects are being discussed there, and much explaining done.

These last few weeks have seen People's Alliance members claiming to be the most in favor of Althing elections as soon as possible. There is no doubt that Party Chairman Svavar Gestsson and his friends are being asked for their views on the dissolution of the Althing now that the Social Democrats have made their rejection and the Progressives are fleeing the coalition. Olafur R. Grimsson, chairman of the People's Alliance Althing delegation, and his friends have sought to gain a better position in the party than Svavar Gestsson since the losses suffered by the communists in local elections this spring. Grimsson first tried to advance this case in an article in THJODVILJINN shortly after the elections. He addressed Svavar Gestsson and the People's Alliance ministers in the government in his article. A week before the meeting of the party council Grimsson published another article in THJODVILJINN to show that everything had turned out the way he had predicted in May. In the article he attacked the ministers in the government, Gunnar Thoroddsen in particular. Is Svavar Gestsson in agreement with Olafur R. Grimsson?

The following are the major political questions that Gestsson will have to deal with: drastic loss of purchasing power, the Helguvik issue, aluminum and the various "campaign issues." Some responses on the questions will have to be forthcoming at the party council meeting. Also to be discussed is the question whether or not the council agrees with THJODVILJINN's statement that no peace movement has been founded in Iceland. It is to be expected that there will be a party position on this. However, the members of the council will be concerned with more than political policy. They also have to bear

professional responsibility for their actions in their respective areas of concern. The largest part of public taxes goes to the other ministry of Svavar Gestsson, that of Health and Social Security.

Halldor Blondal, member of the Althing, stated in an article published in MORGUNBLADID on Saturday that Svavar Gestsson, minister of Social Affairs, deceived the Althing when he answered Blondal's inquiry on payments of the Ministry of Social Affairs to lawyers on account of state guaranty of wages in cases of bankruptcy. Gestsson named several lawyers who had received such payments from his ministry but failed to mention the name of Arnmundur Backman, his assistant for a short period of time, even though the payments requests of the Ministry of Social Affairs to the state purser were for payments to Blondal and not to the two lawyers named by Gestsson on Blondal's staff. Since Halldor Blondal's explanations have been published in an article, no one has come forward with a word of explanation, least of all the minister of Social Affairs who should answer. He should answer and explain why he reported wrongly on the facts of the case to the Althing.

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'NIKIFOROS' MILITARY EXERCISE DESCRIBED

Nicosia 0 FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 5 Nov 82 p 1

Excerpts The final phase of the military exercise "Nikoforos 82" was successful. The performance of all men and weapons was excellent. This was the biggest exercise ever performed by the National Guard. It started 1 November and 2,300 men participated. During its last phase yesterday live ammunition was used and almost all weapons acquired by the National Guard recently were used successfully.

The "Nikoforos 82" exercise started out from Limassol and Larnaca and defensive plans were used in the Maronios-Skarinos area. Subsequently, sections of the men and weapons advanced toward the Observation Post outside the village of Alethriko. This advance, however, was "checked by strong enemy fire."

The Attack

The order "take the heights with the enemy's positions" was given at 0930 hours yesterday. A hail of fire followed which impressed those at the Observation Post and for a whole hour the area was transformed into a fiery hell. The attack was dreadful and the area was shaken by the Milan missiles (two were fired) and the new remote control weapons proved to be very accurate. In a few seconds they had turned the targets on the hill into ashes.

There was a rain of shells--36 every minute--from the "Katioussa" rocket launchers which are fast firing and very accurate. At the same time, there was tremendous firing from the antiaircraft guns, the artillery and other weapons. There was a dreadful roar which satisfied and impressed the observers.

In a short while the order for a general attack was given. While the guns fired continually and the surrounding hills were on fire, columns of our new Brazilian EE9 tanks started out to capture the hills, stopping occasionally to shoot at enemy positions. At the same time, personnel carriers unloaded tens of men while columns of infantry advanced from various points carrying their banners. The tanks, followed by soldiers, were soon rolling through a ravine and advancing toward their targets. A short while later all was over. Our flags fluttered on all hills.

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CHANGES MADE TO TORNADO WEAPONS SYSTEM

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Sep 82 p 44

[Article by Friedrich Schwarz and Helmut Slawinger]

[Text] The type of escort TORNADO was presented in WEHRTECHNIK 3/81 as an instrument of the military consumer from the special air force command for arming and equipping. Named as one of its most important tasks was the control and evaluation of industry modification requests for aircraft and systems. Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich Schwarz (engineer) from the type escort TORNADO is, along with head construction advisor and engineer Helmut Slawinger and another official of the BWB (Federal Office for Military Technology and Procurement), in charge of performing the duties of authorized project representative for modifications to the TORNADO weapons system at MBB (Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm GmbH in Ottobrunn.)

As is the case for all weapons systems, the TORNADO system is subject to a modifications service from the time of introduction into the troop until it is removed from service. Changes in the material and the documentation of the weapons system software, as well as in the ground service and testing systems and in training equipment and simulators, are necessary for the most varied reasons. For example, in order to eliminate recognized errors and deficiencies, to assure flight safety, to fulfill operational requirements and to maintain the technical level required to assure readiness for action. Special prerequisites for the modifications system result from the particular circumstances in regard to definition, development and use of the trinational TORNADO project.

A new institution involving all of the partner states participating in the program is the office of the authorized project representative for changes to the TORNADO weapons system, known in the project language as Project Office Nominated Official (PONO), directly with the national partner companies of the principle contractors and having the function of continuous and immediate on-site testing and evaluation of modification proposals and requests.

The TORNADO Production Modification Procedure (PMP) is in effect for the period of series production (1976-1990), which since 1980 has run parallel to the service phase. Prerequisite for a modification is a defined and approved construction standard (baseline build standard) representing a contract basis.

A modification is defined as a modification of the construction documents (drawings, circuit diagrams, specifications, test documentation, etc.) requiring approval, affecting the baseline build standard agreed upon and affecting at least one of the following parameters: Mission readiness, safety, reliability, ease of maintenance, customer costs, schedule or additional armament after delivery, weight changes exceeding 0.1 kg, interchangeability, parts number or NATO supply number, authorization/qualification and main computer software.

Deviations from the baseline build standard not involving any of these parameters are improvements (amendments) within the decision authority of industry and brought to the customer's attention under total modifications (RPO = record purpose only).

A TORNADO modification comes about either through the customer or through the industry. The system-responsible partner firm or one of the principal contractors is always responsible for providing a modification. Every modification must be presented to the PONO for testing and evaluation before it is turned over to the decision groups.

The Production Modification Review Board (PMRB) of the TORNADO management organization NAMMA (NATO MRCA Management Agency) considers all modifications presented and is supported by industry and PONO.

It decides in the framework of the assigned authorization, which is limited in accordance with the type and cost magnitude of the modification, or it sends the modification, along with a recommended decision, to the NAMMO PMCB (Production Modification Control Board). The PMCB is the central location for the rejection or acceptance of all modification proposals and requests.

Under the chairmanship of NAMMA and advised by industry and PONO's, the decision is finally made by the representatives of Great Britain, Italy and Germany, the three nations participating in the project. The nations' written decision represents the contractual approval to carry out the modifications. It includes all important determinations, such as, for example, the classification (installation priority), categorization (price justification), installation modalities, need for the flow of additional armament assortments, the preparation of technical instructions, as well as all characteristics for construction condition control.

Despite its complexity, the trinational TORNADO modifications procedure has shown itself to be suitable, dependable and relatively fast. To date over 2,500 modifications have been presented, processed and decided.

The PONO, as the official representative at a national subcontractor (for example, MBB) of a principal contractor (for example, PANAIA) named by the respective national project bureau in the Defense Ministry, is responsible for modifications. By order of the NAMMA/NAMMO decision groups, it examines and evaluates modification requests for all three partner countries. The PONO continues to be the link between the respective national project bureau on the one hand and the NAMMA, the industry and the other nations on the other hand. Casually the PONO duties for Germany are the responsibility of the principal department for armaments in the Federal Defense Ministry.

The prerequisite for completing the PONO assignment is TORNADO program experience, as well as the concomitant knowledge of the weapons system and insight into the organization and procedures of NAMMA, industry and nations. The project language is English. In 1976, at the start of the production phase, the required know-how could be found especially with the type escort, which beginning in 1977 also included officers having several years of service with the NAMMA. Thus, the PONO task for the MBB construction work was transferred through the general for air force armament to the respective representative of the leader of the MRCA type escort. In June 1979, the PONO headquarters was moved directly to MBB in Ottonbrunn near Munich.

It is a peculiarity of the PONO office at MBB that it is proportionally made up of representatives of the BWB and the consumers air force and navy. In this way it is possible to consider the various aspects arising from development, procurement and use in association with the evaluation of TORNADO modifications and to provide coordinated decision assistance. Professionally the members of the PONO office at MBB are directly under the authorized system representative of the air force operations staff in the Defense Ministry.

For the already-named NAMMO/NAMMA organizations PMRB/PCMB the PONO

- checks and evaluates all modification proposals, especially according to technical, mission-related, cost-relevant and logistical viewpoints,
- presents its written decision recommendation to the representatives of NAMMA, nations and industry,
- decides on modifications involving cost-free facilitation of production,
- for the NAMMA it evaluates requests for construction variations.

For the national program bureau (SBWS MRCA) the PONO performs work and provides support in all questions involving the TORNADO modifications procedure and configuration management.

The PONO collects and immediately transmits all important information resulting from the evaluation of modifications. It transmits information, findings and PMRB decisions (abbreviated records) and takes part in national talks preliminary to the PCMB. It handles the national supplementary procedure to the trinational TORNADO modifications procedure and includes in its evaluation the commentary of German offices and agencies.

The course of evaluation is determined by the complexity of the weapons system and the multiplicity of the TORNADO organization. It includes discussion of modifications with the technical departments at MBB and the other PANAVIA partner firms. Modifications are tested directly at the equipment manufacturer, at the point of final assembly or on system test stands and simulators. There is coordination and consultation with the responsible German offices and agencies, especially general for air force armament, the air force materiel office and BWB (testing site, model test site, quality test site). There is also close working contact with the first airborne TORNADO units, the trinational TORNADO training center in Cottesmore (Great Britain), the type escort (field testing) and the first air force supply regiment (weapons school/sluice). There is a regular exchange of experience between the PONO's and the partner firms BAe and Aeritalia, as well as Turbo Union (engine) and Mauser (gun/ammunition).

In 1981, the Defense Ministry assigned new tasks to the PONO office at MBB. Included are evaluation of modifications in regard to special weapons safety, cooperation in the work group TORNADO additional armament/new armament and evaluation of all urgent modifications proposals from the combat units.

9746

CSO: 3103/685

✓ MOVEMENTS OF 'ORAGE'

Paris COLS BLEUS in French 13 Nov 82 p 18

[Text] The TCD (landing-ship) "Orage," following in the wake of "Jeanne d'Arc" and "Doudart de Lagrée", is on her way around the world. Putting out from Brest in early November, she stopped to take on cargo at Cherbourg, then put in at Fort-de-France. From there she will pass through the Panama Canal, make a brief stop off Clipperton, and reach Polynesia in late January. Next ports of call are Nouméa and Surabaya. From there, she will proceed to the Indian Ocean, calling at La Réunion, the Comoros, and Djibouti. She is due back home in France in April or May, shortly after the "Jeanne" arrives. What a splendid trip for Capt Gelez and his crew!

On 27 October "Orage" stowed the Polynesia-bound supply tender (BSR) "Chamois" into her dock, where she still had room for the tug "Marabout," consigned to Fort-de-France. That was not one of your everyday operations. It was in fact a "first": never yet had "Orage" accommodated a "quillard" [slang: large ship] the size of "Chamois." In the course of the docking maneuver, the TDC saw her displacement, which is nominally 8,000 tons, 6,000 tons of it water ballast, rise to 14,000 tons. In addition to "Chamois," "Orage" carries one landing barge taken on at Lorient, plus two more newly completed landing barges picked up at Cherbourg, an airport tractor, an unmanned weather station bound for Clipperton, and a considerable quantity of miscellaneous equipment.

Hers is of course a transport mission, but it is also a support mission. "Orage" will open her dock to careen an EDIC (infantry- and tank-landing device) and assorted small craft at Mayotte and Djibouti. In addition, "Orage" will take part in landing exercises planned in French Polynesia and New Caledonia before she sets out on her homeward course to Brest.

6182

CSO: 3519/134

DEPUTIES DEBATE 1983 DEFENSE BUDGET, HERNU RESPONDS

Paris LE MONDE in French 14-15 Nov 82 p 7

✓ [Article by "L.Z."]

✓ [Text] LE JOURNAL OFFICIEL dated 18-19 October printed an order from the Budget Minister cancelling 13.4 billion francs' (1982 budget) worth of orders for military equipment and withdrawing from the armed forces a portion of funds appropriated to pay for it, totalling 3.2 billion francs (LE MONDE, 23 Oct). As special reports for the finance commission, M Le Drian (SP deputy from Morbihan) protested the minister's move. The principle of the cancellation order, he said, seemed "questionable," and it would have "untoward" effects on defense. The finance commission, he emphasized, had approved the 1983 budget(') "on the understanding that budgetary regulations would have no adverse impact during the year on the defense effort." These appropriations seemed to him, however, to be in compliance with the initial commitments, which called for 3.89 percent of the gross internal commercial product. It is, he said in conclusion, a budget combining "rigor" with "postponement."

Several opposition speakers protested the cancellation. M Daillet (UDF, Manche) said: "This is an action without precedent under any government prior to 10 May that, quite properly astonished, not to say indignant at a move that says a great deal about the government's difficulties, a delegation of elected representatives of the majority should ask the prime minister for an explanation." And he added: "What you have here is a political decision, no more, no less, but it is a decision which you persist in denying you have taken because, quite obviously, it flies in the face of your good intentions, your past commitments." In conclusion, M Daillet said:

"We have never accused you of selling out our armed forces. We are merely pointing out that you are doing them lasting harm by impoverishing them and throwing them out of kilter. Given the international context of which you are well aware, this is certainly not the time to do that! To put off a second time in 1983, after the 1982 cancellations, buying what our armed forces need is nothing more or less than lowering France's guard. (...) The

entire Assembly should vote down this dangerous budget. The UDF, in any case, will for the first time refuse to vote for the military appropriations, because it could never be any part of this assault on the nation's security."

M Nilès (CP, Seine-Saint-Denis) voiced regret at the inadequacy of some special measures which would benefit, among others, active and retired personnel, as well as the paltry soldiers' loan which, in his view, ought to be pegged to the Interoccupational Minimum Growth Wage (SMIC). Referring to the obligatory service reforms the prime minister wants, M Nilès had harsh words for what he referred to as an "army à la carte," which he said would tend to create two armies: one of career men, well trained, and the other made up of conscripts, "cut-rate orderlies."

Speaking of the nuclear deterrent, the communist deputy said emphatically that it is vital that the nuclear weapon "must be consonant" with "a national concept of deterrence and defense." He added: "In no case must it tempt us to over-arm."

M Lancien (RPR, Paris) wondered what was the sense of a debate like this, since the commitments the national government makes to the Assembly are not always honored. In his view, the government is "more than cavalier" in its attitude toward the nation's elected representatives. M Lancien voiced surprise at the fact that the cancellations were made on the basis of a 1959 regulation permitting cancellation of appropriations which "become unnecessary during the fiscal year for which they were made."

Would it indeed be needless for the air force to order planes, or the ground forces to order guns? he asked. The RPR deputy, without challenging the need for tight budgeting, did question the decisions that had been taken in its name. The defense budget, he argued, now stands at 15 percent of the national budget, whereas the target set in the military planning bill called for 20 percent.

Citing the possibility of a limited war in Europe, M Gatel (SP, Vaucluse), asked another question: "Would certain opposition political leaders rise in support of these views, which run counter to all thinking about the defense of France for the past 20 years?"

M Bigeard (app. UDF, Meurthe-et-Moselle) pointed out, among other things, that "I have occasion to meet with the top leaders of our armed forces as well as with cadres on lower levels. Rest assured, Mr Minister, that there is great anxiety there; they seem to be at a loss, and they are wondering what is going to happen. They have nothing against you, personally, but again I would ask you: tell them frankly and quickly just what you are planning to do."

M Fillon (RPR, Sarthe) observed: "It took us less than 10 years to launch six missile-launching nuclear submarines, and it's going to take you more than 13 years to launch just one!"

M Mestre (UDF): "Less Talk and More Guns!"

Referring to the defense minister's appearance before the finance commission on 7 October, M Mestre (UDF, Vendée) deplored the "disagreeable nature" of M Hernu's "silence" before the committee (in connection with the cancellation of appropriations), and added: "We were profoundly shocked by this behavior, in which the withholding of information comes very close to lying by omission." Taking aim at what he called the government's "inconsistent and extravagant policy," M Mestre, addressing M Hernu, cried: "If you please, give us less talk and more guns!"

Speaking of France's status as a nuclear power, Mr Hernu retorted emphatically: "We are armed for what is necessary, not, as the super-powers are, for an impossible war." The defense minister went on to point out: "In implementation of the government's decisions, there will be a regulation reserve in 1983. It will be proposed and managed by the defense minister, who will be solely responsible, and who will be required to manage it on the basis of his findings as to the economic situation."

The minister went on: "For the future, I can tell you today that preparatory work on the design of the fighter plane that will be going into full-scale production starting in 1995, is moving ahead expeditiously. The goal of all this work is to master the basic technologies that can be used in building that aircraft."

"Demonstration work has begun on the future engine, the new radar, and the major components of the system. So has design work on an experimental aircraft whose completion is indispensable to holding down further development costs. (...) This phase will be completed shortly, and will lead, during the first quarter of 1983, to a start on production of the ACX (experimental combat aircraft). I am very hopeful that the future program can be handled on a cooperative basis. As of now, I am suggesting to our foreign partners that we conduct the experimental phase together."

Going on to speak about ground forces missions, M Hernu pointed out:

"Defense of our borders demands a solid battle array based on updated armored units deployed on both banks of the Rhine. Its mobility must be increased by enhanced air-ground capability. This is why I have asked, first, the strategy planning and study group, and then the general staffs to consider the soundness of this concept. Although no final decisions have yet been taken, some advanced studies are nearing completion in connection with formation of an anti-tank helicopter force that would bring together assets that are currently somewhat scattered."

"In any event, the task of surface defense of our national territory must be more equitably shared between the armed and uniformed

police (gendarmerie) and the ground forces. The gendarmerie would be responsible for intelligence, protection of installations, and coping with infiltrating commando units. The ground forces would be used in battle. Larger units would be responsible for repelling invasions in depth of the national territory."

In reply to a question from Mme d'Harcourt (app. RPR, Hauts-de-Seine) about the "à la carte army," M Hernu said:

"Article L84 of the national [military] service code permits young people who have completed their mandatory service to enlist as volunteers for a period which, in my view, could be anywhere from 4 months to a maximum of 12 months, renewable thereafter up to a maximum of 3 years including their period of mandatory service. Several of the services' needs could be met with more efficacy, be they trained cadres, utilization for a period longer than 12 months of specialists whose training is both long and costly, or retention of personnel at sea or serving overseas, of auxiliary gendarmes, attached to some alpine troops. In exchange, the pay might be increased as of the start of military service, if those concerned make their intentions known; it could be increased by half during the first 6 months, and subsequently multiplied by 2.5. A special leave system would be instituted, and the Armed Forces Assistance Office would do everything in its power to make sure that no volunteer would find himself out of work on his return to civilian life. For 1983, I am expecting some 10,000 young men. Let me repeat here: I am talking about long service, which is quite another thing from voluntary enlistment."

The Assembly then passed two government-sponsored amendments: the first would establish 500 NCO positions in the gendarmerie in 1983 (the cost is to be covered by a redeployment of positions and operating appropriations); the second would transfer 1,268 additional draftees to the gendarmerie (these auxiliary gendarmes would be assigned to guard duties in public buildings, but not embassies, and would be officered by career gendarmes).

FOOTNOTE

- (1) This budget was analyzed in LE MONDE for 2 October. [For translation of this article, see JPRS 82244 No 2060 of this series dated 16 Nov 82 pp 47-48, and FBIS Western Europe Daily Report dated 12 Oct 82 Vol VII No 197, p K3.]

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CSO: 3519/134

FIFTH ENGINEERING REGIMENT BUILDS BRIDGES, RAILWAYS

Paris TAM in French 14 Oct 82 p 15

[Article by Y. Le Jeune: "On the Right Track"]

[Excerpts] While the 5th Regiment of the Army Corps of Engineers does not have the monopoly of bulldozers or tractor-loaders, it is the only unit to train "locomotive" specialists and to maintain or build railroads.

All operations and projects take place under the watchword or safety.

Based at Satory near Versailles, the 5th Regiment of the Army Corps of Engineers has a twofold function. First, it is an armored division regiment (RGDB) intended to support the units of the 2d Armored Division. To do this it has two armored combat companies, one mechanized combat company, and one support company whose support capabilities range from the "tank-dozer"* to the self-propelling auxiliary bridge, the famous PAA.

During their initial 2 months of service the draftees are initiated into the use of mines and explosives and take careful note of the safety rules, especially strict, given to them. Where crossing over water is concerned, safety is taught "in the field" at Poissy. The drivers discover the fine points in the handling of some road monsters and the precautions which they must take in using these pieces of equipment. Periodically, films relating to safety on the road or in the workshop are shown in the companies, with the feature "The Old Track" now seeming to lead in popularity.

10,000 Bolts on the Isere

Its originality stems from the second aspect of the regiment: the 155th Specialized Army Engineers Group [GSG] which includes two companies:

The 14th Base and Instruction Company has as its mission to train the drivers of locomotive tractors and bridge-railroad track specialists.

*The Patton M47 tank equipped as a bulldozer.

Among its more recent achievements: the dismantling, at Montmelian, of a 190-meter-long Bonet-Schneider bridge* spanning the Isere River, for the SNCF [French National Railroads], the entire bridge structure weighing 770 tons and containing 10,000 bolts. The dismantling progressed at the rate of 57 centimeters a minute, albeit with numerous halts to check the alignment.

As in the American Far West

The other company of the 155th GSG, the 10th, is more specially charged with the maintenance, renovation, and building of railroad tracks. After laying 18 km of track in the Larzac area, they are now working to rebuild the network of an ammunition depot. As in the golden years of the trans-Pacific railroad, the offices, workshops, kitchens and accommodations are distributed among about 50 coaches. A warehouse of ground leveling equipment, each larger than the other, completes this rolling inventory.

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*Type of metallic railroad bridge.

SECOND COMMAND, SUPPORT REGIMENT AIDS 2D ARMORED DIVISION

Paris TAM in French 14 Oct 82 pp 18-19

[Article by Christian Domergue: "Prevention in the 2d Command and Support Regiment"]

[Excerpts] How to prevent accidents in a support regiment which carries out year in and year out, day and night, many very specific missions in the interest of an armored division?

At the Satory camp near Versailles, the 2d Command and Support Regiment described to us a solution which has proved successful for it.

An Elementary Precaution

From the Satory camp the 2d Transportation Squadron insures supplies in ammunition, provisions and fuels for all the regiments of the 2d Armored Division whose command is in Versailles. Constantly on the move along the roads, the Berliet trucks and tank-trucks of the regiment are not immune from collision. Thus, the commander of the 2d RCS [Command and Support Regiment] under whose jurisdiction the unit falls has sought to maximize its chances to prevent accidents. The first precaution is that vehicles should be entrusted only to good drivers. From this viewpoint there is no problem since the unit itself undertakes to train the drivers.

Maintenance of Vehicles

However, to have good drivers is not enough for the command. "A badly maintained vehicle can cause accidents," the commander, chief of technical services, opines.

Thus, the 2d RCS makes sure that each driver is able to maintain his truck himself. Before leaving on a mission the driver must check all the major elements of his vehicle: brakes, transmission, tire pressure, the various gauges, and so on.

"If a breakdown is more serious it will be repaired in the regiment workshops or within the 2d Armored Division Repair Group, a specialized body."

In these various workshops where special equipment and essential tools are available, personnel take no chances with safety. "If the head of the workshop sees us not wearing goggles at a work station where they are mandatory, he immediately calls us to order," a young mechanic confessed, "so that we pay attention to these things. But these precautions become natural reflexes in short order."

Safety on the Roads

Tested drivers and vehicles maintained in good working order. These are two appreciable defenses against accidents. There remains safety on the roads guaranteed by the 2d Traffic Squadron which maps out routes, facilities movements, and controls all travel.

"Before each mission we check all our equipment, especially items with reflector characteristics--belt, helmet, signal panel and so on. We constantly carry with us a map with the telephone numbers of the gendarmerie units and hospitals located on our itinerary and a document listing what we should do in case of an accident," Sergeant Devautour, chief of patrol, explained to us.

Antiskid Mat and Protective Gloves

But the 2d Command and Support Regiment of Satory must also fulfill an important mission which calls for a lot of care: To insure the flow of all communications enabling the general commanding the 2d Armored Division to lead his division.

Sergeant Patrick Szuwalski, who was inducted in October 1981, is a radio operator in the 2d Communications Company which is part of the regiment.

"A station includes two vehicles and a power generating unit. Our first precaution is to ground all such equipment since we work with 220-volt power. Our trucks are adequately equipped with safety devices. A single example is the antiskid mat on the roof of the vehicles where we are obliged to climb to manually take down an antenna consisting of a single piece over 7 meters long," he noted. The communications personnel also wear protective gloves to handle the electric generator.

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FUNCTIONS OF CAZAUX AIRBASE, ITS SUPPORT SECTION

Paris TAM in French 14 Oct 82 pp 20-21

[Article by Christian Domergue: "Cazaux Airbase"]

[Excerpts] Located on the territory of the 3d Air Region, Cazaux Airbase has several missions as follows:

- Firing range and aerial bombardment center for combat squadrons;
- Testing base of the CEV [Flight Testing Center] at Cazaux and annex of the CEAM [Military Aviation Testing Center] of Mont de Marsan;
- Strategic nuclear base with the Bretagne 02/091 bombing squadron equipped with Mirage 4 aircraft;
- Base for fighter aircraft, air combat training, and firing range with the Saintonge 1/8 Squadron and the Nice 2/8 Squadron making up the 8th Fighter Squadron equipped with Alpha-Jet aircraft;
- Base for the Pyrenees 01/067 helicopter squadron, equipped with Alouette-2, Alouette-3, and Puma craft and entrusted with liaison, rescue and medical evacuation missions;
- Instructional base with the technicians; instruction center of the No 308 Safety Unit entrusted with fire safety, nuclear safety, and nuclear, biological and chemical protection;
- Ground-to-air defense instruction center 00.953;
- Regional ammunition warehouse 04.653;
- Water-landing and ocean-rescue training center;
- Supply and support airbase of the Landes testing center.

Safety, Fire, and Rescue Section

The prevention of fires occupies 70 percent of the scheduled time of the fire-fighters.

Nuclear Prevention

The Cazaux airbase serves as support for the Bretagne 02/091 bombing squadron equipped with Mirage-4 aircraft and which falls under the jurisdiction of the Strategic Air Force. From the time of the slightest handling or as soon as a Mirage-4 activates its engine, the firefighters at the base are present. Three foam-carrying vehicles and their crews are constantly ready to intervene.

Aircraft Fire Prevention

At Cazaux airbase the overall movement of aircraft is comparable to that at Orly airport. During operational activity, to prevent aircraft fires in case of accident, the SSIS [Safety, Fire, and Rescue Section] sets up a "large capacity" complex with its crews collected around the foot of the control tower. This complex includes the following:

- A rescue assistance vehicle containing equipment intended to insure rescue on an aircraft--especially, a rod to extricate the pilot from his cockpit;
- A diversified fire-extinguishing heavy vehicle (VLEP) using powder as extinguisher with a carrying capacity of 5,500 kg of powder which the vehicle can spray in 1 minute and 8 seconds. This enables it to control a fire of any size within seconds;
- A diversified fire-extinguishing heavy vehicle (VLEP) using foam of which it can spray 47 cubic meters in 1 minute and thereby check a fire.

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BRIEFS

SHIPS AT BREST IN NOVEMBER--We can't possibly report everything, but we mustn't forget anything important. In short, we can say that on 21 Nov Capt Merveilleux du Vignaud of the "Jeanne d'Arc" awarded National Defense medals in a ceremony aboard; that the dispatch-boat "E.V. Jacoubet," which reached Brest on 23 Nov, has been assigned to the Atlantic Fleet; that a Dutch submarine, the "Toninjn," made a brief unscheduled technical call on 21 and 22 November; that another practice towing operation on a super-tanker (this one the "Thermidor," leased by ELF, carrying 251,000 tons of crude oil and experiencing fictional steering problems) was performed by the "Abeille Flandre" on 25 November -- an unannounced test that went off without a hitch; that Army Gen Gourlez de la Motte, commandant of the 4th Military Region, on 27 November inspected the VAE "Brac de la Pierre"; that the Standing Test Commission (CPE) came to inspect the installations aboard the "Var" prior to her long-term cruise, and to take delivery of the BE "Panther." All this news may well merit reporting in greater detail. Sorry about that. [Text] [Paris COLS BLEUS in French 13 Nov 82 p 19] 6182

AVISO 'JACOUBET' TO ATLANTIC FLEET--Dispatch ship "Enseigne de vaisseau Jacoubet" sailed from Lorient on 22 October bound for Brest where it is assigned, beginning with its entry into active service on that date, to the light vessel division of the Atlantic Fleet (FLOLANT). Launched in September 1981, commissioned for testing on 15 May 1982, she was equipped after sea trials in June and July for her long-range cruise on 3 September. "Jacoubet" called at Ponta Delgada, Fort-de-France, and Halifax, among other ports, before returning to Lorient on 8 October. Adoption ceremonies by the city of Toulouse, where Ens André Jacoubet was born, took place when the dispatch ship put in at Bordeaux from 14 to 17 October of last year. [Text] [Paris COLS BLEUS in French 13 Nov 82 p 21] 6182

PORT CALL IN TUNISIA--The squadron escort "Guepratte" made a call at the port of La Goulette in Tunisia from 12-16 October 1982. On that occasion, a number of meetings took place. On the first night of his visit the commander of the "Guepratte," who was received by the chief of the general staff of the Tunisian Navy and was invited by the [French] consul general, gave a cocktail party on board ship which was attended by the French ambassador. Contacts could thus be established between French and Tunisian officers--a sign of cooperation between the two navies. Among the deck officers was a Tunisian ensign in training on the "Guepratte." Later, a luncheon on board ship and then a reception hosted by the military attache made it possible to extend these initial contacts. [Excerpts] [Paris COLS BLEUS in French 23 Oct 82 p 16]
2662

CSO: 3519/85

'PRICE SHOCK' CONFUSES DECISION ON HAWK BASE-DEFENSE MISSILE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 4 Nov 82 p 12

[Article by Knut Falchenberg: "Hawk Still No More Expensive"]

[Text] The price offer on American Hawk rockets is still no higher, measured in dollars, than what the United States had explained in detail to the Norwegian authorities during the negotiating meetings in April. It is therefore wrong to assert that the Americans have raised the price surprisingly, AFTENPOSTEN is told by military sources from both the United States and Norway. The supposed price increases that caused Norwegian authorities to look around for a "Swedish Hawk solution" were based in part on misunderstandings due to insufficient contact between the government agencies in Oslo.

The choice of antiaircraft rockets for Norwegian airfields is getting more and more complicated, and even the military men involved are beginning to lose their grasp of the issues.

It was at a meeting on Friday 15 October that the chiefs involved met at Huseby and went through the steaming fresh price offer on American Hawk rockets. The offer had been brought from Washington by courier exactly a week before. After they had worked their way through the thick bundle of documents it looked as if the price had quite unexpectedly gone up. The idea was brought up, almost like a motion from the floor, of sending a delegation to Sweden to see whether a Swedish Hawk solution would come out at a more reasonable figure.

The day after the meeting the morning edition of AFTENPOSTEN carried a report that the Norwegians had been surprised to find that the Hawk in the version and the numbers Norway had been planning for would be beyond the limits of the budget. New solutions would be sought. Later, in the evening, Minister of Defense Anders C. Sjaastad confirmed the price increase in an interview in DAGSREVIYEN.

So that the Americans would not be surprised that Norway would go to Sweden, that same Friday contact was made with the American Embassy in Oslo, and from a high military quarter there was a telephone call direct to the United States to warn of the development in Norway after the supposed price increase.

NORWEGIAN FIRM OFFERS OWN PLAN FOR AIR-BASE DEFENSE SYSTEM

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 2 Nov 82 p 8

[Article by Knut Falchenberg]

[Text] The selection of an antiaircraft system for Norwegian airfields, as uncertain as ever, has again taken a new turn, as the Kongsberg Våpenfabrik [Kongsberg Arms Factory] is now putting out proposals for a fifth possible package solution, following the proposals concerning the European Roland, the British Rapier, the American Hawk, and lastly a Swedish reduced version of the Hawk. The "Norwegian" solution consists of Norwegian fire control, choice of radar, and "Sparrow" rockets, according to AFTENPOSTEN's information.

The proposals that Kongsberg's technicians have been working under pressure the last few weeks to finish are now being evaluated by the Air Force procurement command at Kjeller and at Defense headquarters. They were submitted last week.

"I can confirm that we have worked out proposals for a system that we think can compete both in price and operatively if the defense leadership still wants a system with greater range than the Roland and the Rapier," Jens Charles Width, division head at the Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk, tells AFTENPOSTEN.

"It is Defense itself, of course, that must define its needs, but if it is desired first to have an intermediate solution between area defense with Hawk and point defense with Roland/Rapier, that intermediate solution can just as well be built up in Norway as in Sweden. If the components are to be 'cut and pasted' into a weapons system, we can do that on our side of the mountains," says Width. As is already known, in recent weeks Defense has been studying whether the costs can be reduced by leasing or buying "half" rocket batteries with Hawk rockets from the United States and completing them with Swedish radar and other electronic gear.

Kongsberg's sketch can also use Swedish radar if desired, and the concentration there was on a newly developed version of L.M. Ericcon's "Giraffe" radar that is still only in the prototype stage, the so-called "Super Giraffe Mark III." It is newer than the one that the Swedes are using in their Hawk installations.

Kongsberg's sketch further includes a fire-control system based on equipment that the firm has already developed for Defense.

The Defense Ministry's own newspaper, FORSVARETS FORUM, wrote later that the American offer came as a shock to Defense. "Not only have the Americans made fools of the Norwegian authorities for months by not making a reasonable offer. When the offer came, it was found to go beyond all thinkable bounds," the paper wrote; it is expected to moderate its expressions in its next number.

From the U.S. side there has been no price increase, American sources tell AFTENPOSTEN. Col Halvor Ketilsson, head of the materiel division at Defense headquarters, confirms that apart from the rise in the dollar exchange rate the final price offer by the United States is practically identical with what the parties agreed on in April. The commander in chief of the armed forces is sticking to his recommendation in favor of Hawk, and even though study is being given to whether some Swedish components can be used if Norway selects Hawk, a purely American solution except for Swedish radar is still a possible alternative, Ketilsson tells AFTENPOSTEN.


"It is still clear that a considerable misunderstanding occurred somewhere in the system," Erik Senstad, an office head in the Defense Ministry, said in a comment to AFTENPOSTEN.

"Is it the ministry that made a miscalculation?"

"No, that would be blaming the wrong party. When we were surprised in the Ministry, it was because our basis for comparison when the offer came was the background material we got with the commander in chief's recommendation back in the summer. It was only afterwards that the discrepancy was discovered between the defense chief's recommendation to the ministry and the estimate the Air Force procurement command worked with. That discrepancy was due to the fact that the defense chief in his recommendation had taken a number of items out of the agreement package to make the price lower, and the Air Force procurement command had not. We were therefore comparing Hawk estimates that were not comparable," says Senstad. He says that if the misunderstanding was due to inadequate contact, it must be that between Defense headquarters and the Air Force procurement command on what the "package" would include and what it would cost.

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A model of the land-based "Sparrow" rockets involved in Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk's package offer for close defense of Norwegian air-fields.

"The rockets themselves will be of the 'Sparrow' type, which exists in several NATO navies and also in a few land-based systems. The objection to these rockets for use on land has mostly been their somewhat sluggish maneuverability in flight, but the latest version, code designation AIM-7 M, is greatly improved," Width emphasizes. He says it is impossible to give exact price offers on the basis of today's proposal, but indicates that the required number of firing units can be delivered for about 1 billion kroner on the same assumptions as were used in appraising the Roland and the Rapier. Production runs can be made 2 to 3 years after the orders are placed, Width says.

"If the Defense chief wants a system that goes beyond a mere point defense, we think our solution is a good alternative. It is not a question of uncertain technological advances, but of putting together components that already exist and have been tested. The range of the Kongsberg system is estimated at ca. 20 km."

Proceedings have not gone far enough yet that anyone in the Ministry of Defense is willing to give AFTENPOSTEN an opinion on whether the "Norwegian" solution has any chance. Industrially, the state enterprise Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk wants to get a bigger disbursement for its solution than is in prospect in case of cooperation with the producers of the Roland. It appears that the Rapier has been out of the picture for some time as far as the decision-makers are concerned. A choice of a Hawk solution will probably give least compensation for Norwegian industry, and, as previously reported, the Improved Hawk from the United States is also considerably more costly than the administration in Norway had been hoping until recently.

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ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WORRIED OVER MATERIEL SHORTAGES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 2 Nov 82 p 8

[Text] "Failure to get expected appropriations has led to the Armed Forces' having had to abandon high-priority purchases of materiel at a time when we have had a steadily increasing pile-up of postponed projects," Sven Hauge, commander in chief of the armed forces, said Monday in the Oslo Military Society. The speech, which was to have been a status report on military defense, focused strongly on shortage of money. In reality the growth in this year's budget will hardly exceed 1 percent.

General Sven Hauge took as his starting point what the Defense Committee recommended as necessary, an annual real growth of 4 percent for the 1979-1983 period. The reality has turned out somewhat different, with a growth of 2.8 percent and 2.2 percent the first 3 years. With regard to this year, the government has reduced the level of aspiration to 2.5 percent.

"What the real growth will be in 1982 it is still somewhat early to say, but with the price rise we have had so far this year there is reason to assume that it will hardly exceed 1 percent," said Hauge.

Compared to the growth the Defense Committee took as a basis, this year's current budget is 1.3 billion kroner too low, and the cumulative shortfall for the 1979-1982 period has risen to about 4 billion kroner.

"To illustrate the consequence of this shortfall in relation to the committee's growth plans, I might mention that these 4 billion kroner would be sufficient to procure modern rocket antiaircraft defense for six airfields and complete equipment for two brigades."

The price increase is also creating difficulties for defense planners, and General Hauge said that in comparison to the government's plan in 1980, the accumulated loss of purchasing power for those 3 years is fully a billion kroner, and this is due entirely to inadequate compensation for inflation. "When undercompensation can lead to such a large accumulated loss over such a short period, it is easy to understand that this creates an almost impossible situation for our planning," the commander in chief said.

He also pointed out that even if wages and salaries are compensated for, that is not the case when, in accordance with the working conditions law, a man gets more money for doing the same job. Since the labor agreement pursuant to the working conditions law was introduced into the armed forces, it has led in 1982 to cumulative extra outlays of about 140 million kroner. That is nearly 1.5 percent of the whole defense budget, and is not compensated for, Sven Hauge said in his lecture.

"Because of the budget shortage, the F-16 project has accounted in recent years for 72 percent of the materiel appropriations, as against the 58 percent assumed by the Defense Committee. Naturally enough, that has forced the Army's and the Navy's investments down to a hopelessly low level, with constant postponements and cutbacks of projects as a consequence. What is particularly worrisome is that modernization of the army and replacement of outdated naval vessels are being delayed in time."

Of the major materiel projects expected to be put off until the beginning of the 1990's, Hauge mentioned completion of the F-16 procurement, six or possibly eight new submarines, nine new turret guns for the coast artillery, and antiaircraft rockets for defense of six priority airfields, as well as short-range antiaircraft rockets for about half of the country's mobilization brigades.

"These purchases will provide a badly needed improvement in our defense capability, but will not solve the fundamental problems of modernization of our materiel. It is against this background that my recent proposal for operating reductions of 1.5 to 2 billion kroner must be viewed. Only by savings in operations is it realistically possible to increase our materiel procurement possibilities," said Hauge, who said that he did not expect the planned rationalization measures to bring any weight to bear for at least 5 years.

In the shadow of these gloomy prospects, Sven Hauge said that he was not in agreement with the government's decision to consider the Coast Guard as a part of the total Defense budget. "I do not think it is very reasonable for any expansion of the Coast Guard's operations, for example by the introduction of double crews on its vessels, to take place at the expense of military defense. If I lay such great weight on this, that is because experience with the rescue service is frightening. Contrary to the Storting's clearly expressed intention, Defense is being obliged to cover the rescue service's operating expenses within the ordinary limits of the budget. Those expenses run to about 60 million kroner a year," said Commander in Chief Sven Hauge, who concluded by emphasizing that from now on the defense debate must not be concerned solely with what Defense did not get, but also with the utilization of the large sums that, in spite of everything, are available.

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RETIRING NATO NORTH FORCES CHIEF: USSR COULD USE GAS IN NORWAY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Nov 82 p 7

[Interview with Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley by Knut Falchenberg]

[Text] "Personally I believe the Russians may very well come to use chemical weapons even in an early phase of a conflict. Chemical weapons are also much 'better suited' to Norwegian terrain than atomic weapons," Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley, head of the NATO command at Kolsås, tells AFTENPOSTEN. His staff is trained in directing the use of atomic weapons, but he says it is unthinkable that the United States or other allies can sneak atomic weapons into Norway the back way against the Norwegians' wishes. The Russians have moderately increased their fire-power on the Kola Peninsula.

Sir Anthony has no need to slam the door when he leaves the position of head of the North Forces this month after 3.5 years. He has managed to put his views forward during that time without coming into conflict with any of the three countries that belong wholly or in part to Kolsås in the event of war--Norway, Denmark, and the FRG, where Schleswig-Holstein and adjacent coastal areas belong to the "north flank." Insofar as can be determined, the general is also popular with the rank and file.

Now a life in retirement awaits him, in which Sir Anthony will continue his writing; he will write the official version of Britain's participation in the Korean war, in which, by the way, he himself took part and was decorated after having fought, been captured, and escaped six times. That will be his ninth book.

Kola Reinforced

Even though the threatening picture, as NATO sees it, has not changed dramatically while Sir Anthony has been at Kolsås, there have been changes in the immediate vicinity of Norway.

"The Soviets' northern fleet has continued to grow. We have seen the battle cruiser "Kirov" taken into service, and we see that the gigantic "Typhoon" submarine is completing its test period. We expect that there will be several ships of the "Kirov" class.

"In the air we see that the Russians' plane program has continued at a little higher level as concerns reinforcements for the Kola Peninsula, and we are also observing more southerly flights by reconnaissance planes and by bombers of the 'Backfire' type.

"The land forces on Kola have been strengthened recently, more in the sense of stronger units than increase in the number of men. In the field artillery each battery has been increased from six guns to eight. The army has also increased its battalions and brigades by approximately four companies of mechanized infantry and four tank companies.

"The antiaircraft has gotten rid of its old guns and replaced them with modern rocket batteries and new artillery. The land forces have also increased their helicopter strength considerably, in part by introducing assault helicopters.

"We must be cautious about interpreting the development dramatically. Since the Soviet Union undertook the much-talked-of but highly symbolic withdrawal of nine divisions from Central Europe, they have instead increased the striking power of the one division left. That moderate modernization is taking place throughout their armed forces, and has actually reached Kola relatively late."

[Question] But surely Norway and NATO have also been busy the last 3 years?

"Yes, we have definitely become stronger here in the north, but let me point out an important difference: Our improvements are almost all purely defensive in nature, and I should like to emphasize our air defense capability and better warning as our greatest steps forward. When it comes to the Russians, we are talking primarily about strengthened attack capability. That is the difference.

"Actually I should like to emphasize that Norway's ability to deter an attack is considerably strengthened by our determined efforts over several years. Now the profit comes in the form of the squadrons of F-16 pursuit planes that have been declared operative. Soon NATO's warning plane, NAEW, will come in, with a base at Ørland. Then we shall no longer be vulnerable if our radar station on the hill is shot to pieces in the first few hours of a conflict. A decision on rocket antiaircraft defense is imminent. I am not sure that everybody quite understands how much Norway's defense posture has been improved by these investments."

In addition to Norway's own air force, Sir Anthony is counting on approximately 250 allied planes of various types being dispatched here in wartime. Of land forces he counts on getting between 300,000 and 400,000 men in uniform placed at his disposal, including support units. With the heavy investments that the U.S. Marines are making with advanced stationing of costly equipment in Trøndelag, even the skeptics among the officers are counting on it that the Americans, too, will provide reinforcements.

Private Atomic War Absurd

Sir Anthony regrets that the debate on atomic weapons appears to be stimulated by misunderstandings.

"Again we have heard it suggested that atomic weapons can be brought into Norway, either by NATO's doing it behind the Norwegian authorities' backs or by the United States doing it in concealment from all of us other allies. Such speculations are based on ignorance or are perpetrated in spite of knowing better.

"Let us take a U.S. Air Force squadron that comes to North Norway. It will have its own American squadron commander. The squadron will operate at an air base where all activity is under a Norwegian station commander. All activity will be carried on within the North Norway Tactical Air Force, which is under the command of a Norwegian, a Norwegian major general. He in turn is responsible to a Norwegian, the supreme commander of all air activity in the Nordic Command, who is Norwegian. Over him here am I, the first foreigner. The idea that the Americans or other foreigners would break out of the NATO chain and wage their own atomic war is too absurd to describe in words," says General Farrar-Hockley.

[Question] But on paper Norwegians are also training for atomic warfare at Kolsås?

"It is true that we are taking part in what are called paper maneuvers. If we did not do that, NATO's atomic deterrence would not be credible. We must know how we are to do it if the Norwegian authorities and the rest of the member countries of NATO should agree on readying atomic weapons for use here in the Nordic area. That is an enormously complicated process of inquiries, proposals, clarifications, and orders. Since I know the procedures, I can assure you that this cannot be conducted as a solo performance. All of the 15 countries must be in agreement on this, and no atomic charge will be set off by error. If the Norwegian authorities should ask for atomic weapons, the use would be controlled through this NATO headquarters, *not* via any separate American chain of command or any other country's. Norwegian and allied control prevails here.

"Within the Kolsås command's area there is also need for the use of tactical atomic weapons in the field, but that is being done exclusively in Schleswig-Holstein, not in Norway or Denmark. It concerns the German 6th Division, which can use American artillery shells with nuclear charges, and which is being trained in the handling of such weapons as a part of its regular exercises. In such exercises the actual warhead is never taken out of its 'cage,' which can be opened only by Germans and Americans jointly."

[Question] Purely practically, as the officer looks at it in the field, are atomic weapons practical in Norway?

"The probability that a need for atomic weapons will arise any time soon in Norway is much less than in the open land areas in Europe. In this country mountains and the terrain create targets of such a type that the defenders will hardly feel a need of such weapons. Much the same applies to an attacker, although in the very first phase of a conflict atomic weapons, from a purely military point of view, would have an effect over a harbor or an airfield where troops are arriving, e.g. in Trondheim or Bodø or the like. But from the point of view of security policy it is not very credible; it is precisely the use of atomic weapons that NATO is trying to deter.

"Actually I believe the danger of chemical warfare is far more serious. The Soviet forward units are equipped to go into areas that they have ruined by the use of nerve gas, and I believe it is quite conceivable that the Russians can use chemical weapons without hesitation in the opening phase of a conflict. That can be done against harbors, airfields, and troops in open terrain. Just a drop of nerve gas on the skin is lethal, and the advantage to the attacker is that all installations remain intact and can be taken over for his own use."

[Question] If the Soviet soldiers are equipped to fight in chemical surroundings, is that perhaps because they for their part are afraid of NATO?

"There is a paradox here. The truth is that NATO has no chemical weapons. The United States has some that were produced in the 1960's, while the British and the rest have gotten rid of their chemical capability. We can learn lessons from this, for what has happened while the NATO countries were unilaterally destroying their capability for chemical warfare? Why, during the same period the Soviet Union has increased its capacity, with more factories to produce poisons, more ways of delivering it, and more equipment for chemical warfare. They have multiplied their capacity as a response to our unilateral, unconditional reductions in the west!

"Now, in Norway and the rest of NATO, we must see to it that all of our soldiers who operate outdoors get their personal protective clothing to withstand nerve-gas attacks. We are already in the process of doing that," Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley tells AFTENPOSTEN.

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GENERAL

CYPRUS

BRIEFS

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH VENEZUELA--It has been officially announced that the governments of the Republic of Cyprus and the Republic of Venezuela have decided to establish diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level. [Text]
[NC012306 Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek 1000 GMT 1 Dec 82]

CSO: 3521/89

GENERAL

GREECE

BRIEFS

BUS SERVICES FROM TURKEY--Scheduled bus services between Istanbul and Athens began today. A first bus with 14 passengers left Istanbul today for Greece in accordance with an agreement reached between the Turkish and Greek transportation ministries. Seven scheduled bus runs are expected to begin in December between Istanbul, Salonika and Athens to be operated by three Turkish bus companies. [Text] [TA011046 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1000 GMT 1 Dec 82]

CSO: 3554/72

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