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JPRS-UFE-85-002

22 February 1985

USSR Report

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 2, Apr-Jun 1984

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22 February 1985

USSR REPORT

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 2, Apr-Jun 1984

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language journal PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA published quarterly in Moscow by the Far East Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.

CONTENTS

* Imperialist War Preparations in East Asia and Soviet Policy (pp 3-17).....	1
* Tikhvinskiy: History Shows Soviet Peaceful Intentions to China (pp 18-28) (S. L. Tikhvinskiy).....	16
* Kapitsa Reviews History of Indochina Conflicts After 1954 (pp 29-41) (M. S. Kapitsa).....	27
* PRC Economic Problems Blamed on Past Mistakes (pp 42-51) (V. I. Akimov, S. S. Yemel'yanova).....	40
* Japan in U.S. Nuclear Strategy (pp 52-62) (D. V. Petrov).....	50
* Youth Movement in Asia and the Pacific (pp 63-74) (A. G. Georgiyev, A. S. Krasil'nikov).....	61
* Japanese Worker Participation in Management Belittled (pp 75-85) (V. N. Khlynov, A. B. Orfenov).....	73
* Characteristics of the Origins and Evolution of Law in the PRC (pp 86-96) (L. M. Gudoshnikov).....	84
* Imperialist and Reactionary Intrigues Against People's Kampuchea (pp 97-109) (D. M. Pospelov, Yu. M. Ryakin).....	95
Administrative Traditions in PRC Political Culture (pp 110-123) (L. S. Perelomov, P. M. Kozhin, G. F. Saltykov).....	108

* Translation taken from English-language FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS No 3, July-September 1984.

CONTENTS (Continued)

Problems in the Translation of Ancient Chinese Philosophical Works (pp 124-134) (V. F. Feoktistov) (not translated)	
Biography of Formerly Persecuted PRC Writer (pp 135-142) (S. A. Toroptsev).....	124
First Chinese Alphabet (pp 143-150) (M. V. Sofronov) (not translated)	
* U.S. Policy on China in 1949 Critiqued (pp 110-120) (A. M. Malukhin).....	138
* Chinese Press Cited on 1983 Economic Developments (pp 121-127) (V. P. Fetov, V. Ya. Matyayev).....	149
* Chinese Press on Latin American Problems (pp 128-134) (I. O. Ural'tsev).....	156
Book Reviews	
* Review of 'The East. The Beginning of the 1980's. Newly Liberated Countries in Today's World' (pp 135-136) (V. A. Vasil'yev).....	163
* Review of 'Ethnic Chinese in the United States and American-Chinese Relations at the Present Stage' by V. I. Biryukov (pp 137-139) (A. I. Borisova).....	166
* Review of 'Analysis of the Economy of Contemporary South Korea. Political Economy of Developing Countries and Contemporary Asia' (in Japanese) by Watanabe Toshio (pp 140-143) (D. Mun).....	170
Review of 'Modern History of Chinese Periodical Press' (in Chinese) by Fan Hanqi (pp 181-183) (S. R. Sergeyev) (not translated)	
Review of 'White Paper on Crime' (in Japanese) (pp 183-186) (Yu. N. Argunova) (not translated)	
Extended Session of All-Union Sinologists' Association Board Presidium (pp 187-188).....	174
International Science Conference on Peace and Security Issues in Far East (p 189).....	177
15th Conference of Young Scholars of USSR Academy of Sciences Far East Institute (pp 190-191).....	178

* Translation taken from English-language FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS No 3, July-September 1984.

PUBLICATION DATA

English title : PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST
No 2, 1984

Russian title : PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA

Author (s) :

Editor (s) : M. I. Sladkovskiy

Publishing House : Izdatel'stvo Progress

Place of Publication : Moscow

Date of Publication : Apr-Jun 1984

Signed to press : 5 June 1984

Copies : 12,372

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IMPERIALIST WAR PREPARATIONS IN EAST ASIA AND SOVIET POLICY

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 84 pp 3-17

In the late 1970s—the early 1980s the international situation began deteriorating rapidly to become very complicated and at times quite tense today. Adventurist actions by the aggressive imperialist forces constitute the source of tensions. The present American administration has set itself the task of tipping the existing military-strategic balance in favour of the US gaining world dominance, and imposing its will on other peoples by relying on force. The policy of the insane arms race and crude pressure, including the use of weapons against sovereign states, is designed precisely to attain this goal. The deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, which has sharply worsened the general international situation, the development of the rapid deployment force in the northwestern part of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, the invasion of Grenada, flagrant interference in Nicaraguan affairs, constant pressure on Cuba, the invasion of Lebanon and complicity in undeclared wars against the People's Republic of Afghanistan and the People's Republic of Kampuchea are but a few facts that prove the point.

The US is forming in the Pacific a second front to combat world socialism. The Japanese newspaper *Mainichi* pointed out that "the US wants to turn the northwestern part of the Pacific into a forefront similar to the one it has in Europe and is in every way strengthening military ties with Japan and South Korea".¹

An analysis of concrete US action in the region shows that it is underpinned by variations of the policy which went bankrupt in the "cold war" years. Again it is a matter of "showing the US potential", cobbling together new aggressive military-political blocs and alliances and strengthening old ones, encouraging militarist ambitions in Asian countries, which are often ready to follow the US to the detriment of their own national interests, and working out and implementing military and political undertakings above all of anti-Soviet character.

In the global military system of imperialism, which is being formed by the US, the Western Pacific and East Asia have become one of the three areas of the forward deployment of systems of "first strike" weapons, along with Western Europe and Southwest Asia, the Indian Ocean. Noteworthy is the shifting of "the centre of gravity in US foreign policy towards the region of Asia and the Pacific", the "inauguration of the Pacific era" and so on.

BUILDING UP ITS MILITARY POTENTIAL

While livening up its activities in the Western Pacific and East Asia, the Reagan administration above all has undertaken to strengthen the armed forces of the US and its allies there, the second largest grouping aboard after Western Europe, considerably expand and speedily modernise the US armed forces in that region, equip them with new types

¹ *Mainichi*, Nov. 13, 1983.

of nuclear weapons, revamp numerous existing military bases and installations and build new ones.

The past two or three years alone have seen the strength of US forces in Asia and the Pacific increase by nearly 30,000 to reach almost 150,000 servicemen. The US Seventh Fleet deployed there is constantly getting ever new vessels. The ultramodern aircraft carrier *Karl Winson*, the battleship *New Jersey*, which has become notorious after large-calibre shelling of Lebanon, the latest atomic submarines *Ohio* and *Michigan*, which carry Trident nuclear missiles, have all been transferred there. Plans have been made public to install about 500 Tomahawk cruise missiles on Seventh Fleet vessels, with one-third of them carrying nuclear warheads.

The US is obviously intent on drawing its armed forces, including medium-range nuclear missiles, closer to Soviet territory in the Far East and on the "southern flank", the same as in Europe, in the hope of reducing delivery times of nuclear warheads to targets, and correspondingly raising the "sudden attack" factor. The press in some countries has disclosed that Washington is preparing plans for deploying medium-range Pershing-2 missiles in Alaska and ground-launched cruise missiles in the area of straits used by the Soviet fleet.

In the autumn of 1982, a decision was made, with the approval of the Japanese government, to deploy 48 American F-16 fighter bombers, with longer range and capable of carrying nuclear weapons, at the Misawa naval base, northern Honshu. Neither Washington nor Tokyo tries to conceal the fact that this serves the aim of "changing the alignment of forces in the Far East in favour of the West" and that these fighters can also strike at the Soviet Maritime Territory and Sakhalin. The US now demands that Japan should give it an aerodrome for US Seventh Fleet combat planes. A new base is not merely a portion of Japanese territory enclosed by American barbed wire but an instance of Japan's further involvement in aggressive US activities in East Asia.

When military spending for 1985 was debated at the US Congress in early 1984, Admiral Crow who commands the US armed forces in the Pacific, has claimed that the Pacific Ocean constitutes a potential zone of confrontation, and has urged the strengthening of the US armed forces in that region by equipping them with new arms systems and modernising the strategic nuclear weapons. This reasoning is said to underlie the new decisions to build up the US military potential in the Pacific.

A US naval force is ever more frequently carrying out large-scale manoeuvres in the vicinity of the Soviet Far Eastern coast with undisguisedly provocative purposes. Major US task groups with aircraft carriers have twice been detected close to Kamchatka in the Northern Pacific. For the first time since the war a US amphibious force with marines has been dispatched to the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan. Aircraft carriers of the US Seventh Fleet have been making frequent and far from innocuous calls in the Sea of Japan. In the spring of 1983, an armada of 16 US warships, which had taken part in the joint US-South Korean manoeuvres Team Spirit-83 of an unprecedented scale and duration, passed through the Sangar Strait from the Sea of Japan to the Northern Pacific, rehearsing en route the blocking of international straits.

Nevertheless the Reagan administration thinks that, as distinct from Western Europe where the US has NATO to rely upon, the Far Eastern flank is still "not strong enough." For that reason, along with building up its own armaments in the Western Pacific and East Asia, the US is working to step up war preparations by Asian states tied to it by treaty commitments, and pushing them to pursue a policy of pressure and direct military confrontation with respect of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries.

Special emphasis is laid on the development of military and political cooperation with Japan and a more active and concrete involvement of that country's considerable economic and growing military potential in the global strategy of US imperialism.

That section of the Japanese ruling elite which has long been nurturing plans to pass from "creeping militarisation" to the restoration of the imperial military potential, has been happy to grasp the chance to speed up Japan's turning into a military power. Immediately the reigns of power were handed over to a government headed by the politician who had long been advocating a buildup of the Japanese military muscle. An Australian newspaper has remarked that "Japanese military hawks are flying ever more high and Nakasone's coming to Prime Ministership power is more a token of their power than a reason of their emergence."² At the same time, Japanese government officials are making quite a few hypocritical statements to the effect that Tokyo's military policy would be restricted by the Constitution, according to which the Japanese people have forever renounced war and the threat of using armed force as well as to form their armed forces and other means of war. This is nothing but camouflage, however, intended to allay the fears of the Japanese public and other Asian nations, who still remember the tribulations caused to them in the past by Japanese militarism and who therefore show justified concern over different bellicose statements ever more frequently made by senior Japanese officials.

During his official US visit in January 1983, Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone stressed that Japan should become a strong military state—an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" capable of counteracting Soviet strategic aviation, blocking the La Pérouse, Sangar and Korean Straits used by the Soviet fleet as an outlet from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific, be able to check the Soviet Union from the sea and, finally, "defend" the area in a range of 1,000 sea miles from the Japanese shores in the air and at sea.³

The Japanese government's plans to build up the military potential are already under way. Japan ranks fourth among the US allies in its naval ships, fifth in submarines and sixth in the numerical strength of its air force. Its armed force is numerically roughly the same as that of Great Britain. By 1988, the Japanese navy is to get in addition 178 warships and 185 planes, including 72 R-3S anti-submarine aircraft, while its ground forces are to be supplemented with 1,314 tanks and 418 aircraft and other weapons.⁴

The US and Japanese navies ever more frequently conduct joint manoeuvres of greater scope, in the course of which operations are rehearsed to block the straits of the Japanese Archipelago and to patrol the sea lanes in the Northwestern Pacific.

By claiming that areas hundreds of miles away from Japan's territory, including the coastal waters of the Soviet Far East, Sakhalin, Korea and Taiwan and in fact the entire coast of continental China are of "vital importance to Japanese security", Japan is in fact copying the imperial policy of Washington, which tries to declare vast regions on the globe as "zones of US interests".

It is even contemplated to send Japanese armed forces to other countries under the guise of a "UN force". It may be of interest to learn to what areas of conflict, current or future, the strategists of the National Defense Agency are planning to send them.

² *Australian Financial Review*, May 3, 1983.

³ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 16, 1983.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

Units of the US Seventh Fleet with nuclear weapons on board are ever more frequently reported to make calls at Japanese ports. The Japanese government claims that it complies with the three non-nuclear principles: to abstain from producing, possessing and bringing nuclear weapons into the country. Nevertheless, the Japanese public have more than once revealed, including in Parliament, facts showing that nuclear weapons have been brought into the country and stockpiled at US bases on Okinawa. This has also been confirmed in statements made by US representatives well-informed in this respect and also by official US documents.

Japan's leaning towards stepped-up war preparations, its ever more active role in the Japanese-US military-political alliance and greater contribution to "defence jointly with the US" in the Far East attest to Tokyo's ever more definite interaction with NATO, which has found expression in the doctrine of the "indivisible security" of NATO and Japan, set forth by the Japanese at the Williamsburg conference of heads of the leading capitalist countries held from May 27 to June 1, 1983.

Tokyo has shown its readiness to contribute to strengthening the positions of imperialism in the global, strategic plane by proposing that a standing committee be organised of Japanese and NATO representatives to work out a single policy on the problems of "ensuring security in the West" and coordinating their policy towards the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. This proposal has been welcomed by Washington, which is all too eager to convince its NATO partners that the formation of such a body would be expedient, and exchange of military-political information between Japan and NATO should be organised already at the present stage.

Despite official statements by Japanese representatives to the effect that contacts with NATO will not be extended to the military field, such contacts have already been made. According to press reports, representatives of the Japanese Self-Defense Force command regularly hold consultations with the NATO headquarters in Brussels. Since 1980, Japanese warships have been taking part in the Rimpac naval manoeuvres jointly with the naval forces of some NATO countries. Discussions have been held on the problem of making the Japanese armaments conform with those of the US and West European countries.

"NEW" ASPECTS OF US EAST ASIAN POLICY

US politicians and scientists are paying ever more attention to working out in detail the concept of "balanced containment", according to which three imperialist centres—the US, Western Europe and Japan—should team up and coordinate their efforts to make the Soviet Union split its forces to cover three fronts, European, Southern and Pacific.

During his visit to Japan in November 1983, Ronald Reagan strongly urged Tokyo to shoulder a greater "portion of the burden" of the joint military effort, this in an obvious bid to extend the functions of this Far Eastern ally. The Japanese side reiterated its loyalty to the "spirit of Williamsburg", that is, to the policy of involving Japan in the global military system of imperialism. These calls have met with a response in Tokyo because they are in accord with the task of militarising Japan. Addressing the Diet in February 1984, Nakasone pointed out that Japanese-US cooperation in the field of "defence" was a military alliance and that Japan was determined to exercise control over sea communications on the basis of the "international division of labour", in keeping with which the US serves as the spear and Japan as the shield.

By becoming a component of the general military system of imperialism, Japan is taking a step in a rather dangerous direction, as it is becoming involved in a policy which has nothing to do with its security

or national interests. As a result, any conflict involving NATO members and located thousands of kilometres from Japanese territory may have far-reaching negative consequences for the destinies of the Japanese people.

The strengthening of the US-Japanese alliance and Japan's involvement in a global coalition of imperialist states serving US interests do not at all mean that there are no bitter contradictions between the US and Japan, so characteristic of the imperialist system.

Now that it ranks second in the capitalist world for its gross production, which amounted last year to \$1,150 billion, Japan is increasingly elbow US monopolies not only from the world market but also from the US. Despite the protectionist measures taken by the Washington administration, the US trade deficit with Japan reached the record figure of about \$22,000 million in 1983, almost one-third of the entire US foreign-trade deficit. Colour TV-sets and computers, cars and steel, rice and textiles and many other products exported by Japan to the American market sharpen the competition in trade and economic relations between the two leading capitalist states. For example, more than 30 per cent of the car sales in the US belong today to such famous Japanese companies as Toyota, Nissan and Honda. Yet, according to Nomura Research Institute forecasts, very high rates are to be expected this year in the growth of Japanese exports of science-intensive goods, including computers, video tape recorders, up-to-date integrated circuits and so on, which surpass even car exports.

Under the circumstances, Washington is bringing stronger pressure to bear on Tokyo. During the latest round of trade talks, the US delegation under Deputy Secretary of State Wallis demanded that Japan should above all reduce restrictions on farm imports. Besides, *Nihon keizai* has pointed out, the US has imposed strict requirements with respect to banking interest rates, investment operations, boosted purchases of short-term government bonds and also products of the petrochemical and pulp-and-paper industries.⁵

Well-informed analysts have noted that persistent calls on Japan to spend more on armaments may be economically motivated: the Americans would like thus to weaken to some extent their economically powerful rival. Characteristically enough, Tokyo is willing to make concessions to the Washington administration, as far as their military-strategic partnership and the revival of Japanese militarism are concerned, but resorts to tough bargaining on the issue of foreign economic ties, making vague promises to consider US complaints during the forthcoming rounds of talks.

Nevertheless, class considerations are given priority and the imperialist powers put aside their economic differences and act jointly in their opposition to world socialism and the revolutionary movement.

Striving for strategic superiority in Asia and the Pacific, the US looks upon South Korea, along with Japan, as a "strategic staging post".

The White House is clearly interested in maintaining tension in the Korean Peninsula so as to build yet another springboard for nuclear aggression in the vicinity of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The 40,000-strong US army stationed in South Korea is equipped with more than 700 nuclear warheads. Ground-launched cruise missiles are also to be brought in (to be followed by Pershing-2 missiles in the future), while F-16 fighter bombers have already replaced planes stationed in South Korea. E. Meyer, former US Army Chief-of-Staff, has said that the American armed forces in South Korea will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if need be.

⁵ *Pravda*, March 3, 1984.

America's growing military presence in South Korea and nuclear blackmail go together with the unconditional support for the repressive, dictatorial regime and greater military aid to it.

The Reagan administration wants Japan to become ever more involved in the "Korean problems" and is working to form a de facto US-Japanese-South Korean military-political structure, short of formalising it de jure.

In November 1983, Reagan visited Seoul where he made verbal attacks at the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and praised the murderous regime of Chun Doo Hwan. The key issue at the talks was the buildup of the US occupation force potential in South Korea and the formation of a triple alliance between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul. Assessing the results of his talks in Tokyo and Seoul, Reagan intimated that he pinned hopes on the further strengthening of ties between the US, Japan and South Korea and the involvement of the US Far Eastern allies in Washington's policy of global confrontation.

Viewing Taiwan as another "unsinkable aircraft carrier", the US has violated certain agreements with China, and continues and even boosts arms supplies to the Taipei authorities (Washington plans to send Taiwan weapons to the tune of \$ 760 million in 1985), in fact creating a situation of "two Chinas". At the same time, insistent attempts are being made to involve China in a "strategic partnership". In 1980, Chinese and US leaders repeatedly spoke of a "strategic partnership" and "strategic interaction" between China and the US. Though the two countries' representatives speak of mutual understanding and similar stands in respect of the events in Afghanistan and Kampuchea, and though Peking seems to ignore imperialist war preparations in the Western Pacific, even justifies them, as is attested by the issue of *Renmin ribao* of March 10, 1984, and during President Reagan's visit to China in April 1984, and kowtows to the US on the issue of the deployment of US missiles in Western Europe, Peking stresses its independent policy, avoids partnership statements, demands that the US should stop arming Taiwan, and levels criticism at the activities of US imperialism in Central America, the Middle East, South Africa and Korea. The problem of a "strategic partnership" was raised by Caspar Weinberger during his Peking trip in September 1983, by Schultz during his talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xiueqian in Washington in October 1983, and by Reagan during his talks with Zhao Ziyang, Premier of the PRC State Council, held in January 1984. In his interview by the CNN TV company on January 12, 1984, Zhao Ziyang said that China held views identical with those held by the US on certain international problems; at the same time there were differences on other issues. Under the circumstances, comprehensive strategic partnership was impossible. Nevertheless, he also said, "Our policy is not a policy of equidistance". His reasoning boiled down to the conclusion that China was closer to the "Western powers" than to the socialist community.

When President Reagan was in China on a trip, which was conceived as a pre-election show and during which Chinese officials did their utmost to help him secure reelection, Reagan declared that the sphere of agreement between the two countries was much wider than that of their disagreement. This time the Chinese leaders were not abashed by this conclusion that American imperialism and socialist China shared common interests. According to the Chinese press, Deng Xiaoping in his turn said that China and the US had similar views on international problems.

The Japanese government was enlisted to influence China in the same direction. During the visit Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, paid to Japan in November 1983 and in the course of

Yasuhira Nakasone's trip to China in March 1984, the latter sought to impress upon the Chinese leaders the idea of the "growing Soviet threat". He proposed that Japan and China should hold consultations and exchange opinions on the issue. Peking agreed to regularly exchange opinion with Japan on the "Soviet military potential in the Far East" and in fact supported the thesis of the "threat posed by Soviet missiles".

A component of US war preparations in the Pacific and East Asia is the conversion of Palau, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands into "associated states" as a result of the farcical plebiscite conducted by the US administration on February 10, June 27 and September 7, 1983, respectively, in violation of the UN Charter. The US now runs the islands as if they were US reservations, using them as naval and air bases.

Resorting to economic and military pressure, Washington is pushing the ASEAN states towards confrontation with the Indochinese nations and towards turning that organisation into a kind of military-political formation to serve US interests. The calculations of Washington and some other foreign forces are quite simple: a continuing confrontation between the ASEAN countries and Indochina would result in their mutual weakening and, as a consequence, guarantee the schemers' dominant positions in the region. It is obvious that such calculations pose a danger to the ASEAN countries above all.

Not satisfied with the extension in June 1983 of the agreement on two US bases on the Philippines (the Subic Bay naval base and the Clark air base, which is the USA's largest), Washington is working to reestablish its bases in Thailand and impose new arms supplies upon the ASEAN countries in a bid to create strongholds, particularly weapons dumps on Thai territory, regarding these measures as a step towards turning the ASEAN into a military-political organisation. Commenting on reports about the forthcoming supplies of modern US military materiel to Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines, the Jakarta-based newspaper *Merdeka* emphasised that the "strategic scheme" of the White House stands behind the implementation of these plans. *Merdeka* believes that the deliveries of F-16 fighter-bombers to three ASEAN countries, along with sending AWACS planes to Singapore, have nothing to do with the actual defence needs of these developing countries. These plans have been worked out by Washington and were not initiated by the ASEAN members, the editorial reads. It is impossible to believe that Singapore needs AWACS to ensure its defence capacity. *Merdeka* has pointed out that the "US military umbrella" over the ASEAN countries contravenes the idea of creating a zone of peace and neutrality there, an idea put forward by Association members, and fraught with danger to their security.⁶

The US is intent on extending the functions of ANZUS, a military bloc formed by the US, Australia and New Zealand on September 1, 1951. There are about 40 American bases and other military installations on Australian territory. US nuclear submarines call at the harbours of Freemantle and Cockburn Sound. In 1981, the Pentagon was granted the right to use Australian airfields in Darwin, Perth and Learmond for strategic B-52 bombers. The Australian military potential is also being built up. Washington and Canberra have reached an understanding on sharing the commitments to "defend" the region of Asia and the Pacific and step up Australia's military operations in the Indian Ocean.

The "new" American policy in Asia and the Pacific further jeopardises the security of Asian countries and can lead to dangerous consequences, not only in this region but throughout the world.

⁶ *Merdeka*, March 1, 1983.

To cloak its aggressive plans, the US is trying to intimidate the Asian countries with the mythical "Soviet threat", while justifying its war preparations by claims that the Soviet Union is allegedly "building up armaments in its Far Eastern regions".

The Soviet Union has never threatened nor is threatening anybody, either in Europe, Asia or any other part of the globe and is doing nothing besides what is absolutely indispensable from the point of view of ensuring its security. It has in the Asian part of its territory just as many armaments, including medium-range nuclear missiles, as is necessary to counteract similar armaments, which are directed against it and situated in areas adjacent to the Soviet Union in Asia and the Pacific.

The Soviet Union is firmly convinced that, in the complex international situation today, it is as never before important to double and even triple efforts to counteract the policy of war preparations, curb the arms race, and strengthen mutual trust. All this fully applies to Asia. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Konstantin Chernenko pointed out in his election speech that "curbing the nuclear arms race, of course, is of key significance for peace and international security. The stand of the USSR on this issue is clear. We are against rivalry to build up nuclear arsenals. We have been and remain advocates of the prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons. We have long since tabled our proposals to this effect, both at the UN and the Geneva Disarmament Committee, but their discussion is being blocked by the United States and its allies."⁷

Peace is indivisible, and therefore the most important Soviet peaceful initiatives have a bearing on all the regions of our planet.

Motivated by a profound concern for the future of peace, the Soviet Union has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Should other nuclear states make similar commitments, there would be neither first nor second nuclear strikes to speak of.

A proposal made by the Soviet Union together with other socialist states, members of the Warsaw Treaty, to the NATO countries to conclude a treaty of mutual non-use of military force and maintaining peaceful relations envisages the possibility for any other state, irrespective of its geographical position, to join that treaty. Peace in Asia and the Pacific would be ensured in earnest if East Asian countries join this treaty.

Other Soviet initiatives designed to restrict the activities of navies and spread confidence-building measures to seas and oceans, especially to the areas of busy sea lanes, are directly relevant to the region of Asia and the Pacific. It is easy to imagine how much calmer the situation in the Pacific would be if an understanding on these measures were reached.

The proposal to hold talks on confidence-building measures in the Far East, made by the 26th CPSU Congress, has lost none of its topicality. The Soviet Union is ready to conduct such talks both on a multilateral and bilateral basis with all countries interested in specific measures to create an atmosphere of trust in political and military fields. Confidence-building measures in the Far East, at least initially in the form they have been carried out in Europe in accordance with the Helsinki Act, and their extension to seas and oceans would help create a new atmosphere in relations among states, put an end to suspicion and anxiety, and foster trust.

Big opportunities for stronger peace might be opened by signing a convention on mutual non-aggression and the non-use of force in rela-

⁷ *Pravda*, March 3, 1984.

tions between the states in Asia and the Pacific, as has been proposed by the Mongolian People's Republic. Two major seats of international tensions could be eliminated with the implementation of the proposal made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that US troops should be withdrawn from South Korea and a declaration of security should be worked out between North and South Korea, and of the Indochinese countries' proposal to normalise relations with the ASEAN states and create a zone of peace, goodneighbourliness and co-operation in Southeast Asia.

The Soviet Union develops its relations with the countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia to bring about the domination of an atmosphere of peace, cooperation and trust in the region.

Complete mutual understanding and common views on problems of building socialism and international development are characteristic of Soviet-Mongolian relations, which are based on the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic signed in Ulan Bator on January 15, 1966. Today's relations are determined by the further strengthening of friendship and cohesion between the CPSU and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and the Soviet and Mongolian governments and peoples, by the developing inter-party and inter-state contacts and the tangible expansion of economic cooperation.

The meeting between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Konstantin Chernenko and Yumjaagiyn Tsendenbal, General Secretary of the MPRP Central Committee and President of the Presidium of the Mongolian Great People's Khural, held in Moscow on February 17, 1984, was a landmark in Soviet-Mongolian relations. Soviet and Mongolian communists reiterated their determination to further promote friendship and cooperation.

In their economic cooperation the Soviet Union and Mongolia actively coordinated their five-year and annual economic and cultural development plans, have direct contacts between the two countries' ministries and departments, and set up joint enterprises and so on.

The two sides hold consultations and jointly map out measures to accomplish the foreign-policy tasks set by the 26th CPSU Congress and the 18th MPRP Congress, coordinating their practical efforts for peace and socialism. During the aforementioned meeting, Konstantin Chernenko and Yumjaagiyn Tsendenbal, confirmed their completely identical positions on the fundamental problems of international politics, including the situation in Asia.

Our relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are becoming ever more diverse. Relying on the international principles of equality, mutual aid and strict observance of each other's interests, the Soviet Union and socialist Korea are extending the foundation for their trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation, working towards the cross-fertilisation of their cultures and broadening mutual contacts at all levels.

It is only natural that the two countries are of the same opinion on international developments, the need for a concerted rebuff to the encroachments on the future of peace in the Far East, Europe or any other part of the globe. US war preparations in South Korea evoke protest in the DPRK and put up fresh difficulties to the reunification of Korea. The Soviet Union fully supports people's Korea's persistent efforts to create favourable conditions for the settlement of the Korean problem by peaceful means, without any interference from without. These conditions include, above all, the withdrawal of US armed force from South Korean territory and the elimination of the nuclear arsenal there. In speaking out in favour of Soviet foreign policy initiatives, the DPRK

press shows justified concern for world peace. *Nodon sinmun* has regarded the measures declared by the Soviet leaders in response to the realisation of NATO's decision to deploy US medium-range missiles in Europe as a justified step in ensuring the security of the USSR, the other socialist countries and of Europe. People's Korea urges enhanced efforts to thwart the aggressive policy of US imperialism and its plans to unleash a nuclear war.

People's Korea described the talks between Reagan and Nakasone as aiming to build up the reactionary onslaught against the progressive forces of the globe, relying on a policy from "positions of strength". Japan and South Korea are turning into seats of a new war, a nuclear war.⁸ "The government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Korean people," the DPRK government said in its statement of November 15, "resolutely condemn Reagan's journey to South Korea as a criminal act jeopardising peace in Korea, Asia and throughout the world and as an act of defiance towards the entire Korean nation and other peaceloving peoples."⁹

During a friendly visit to the USSR on May 23-25, 1984, the Party and government delegation of the DPRK, headed by Kim Il Sung, the Soviet and Korean leaders paid special attention to promoting security in the Far East and in the Pacific. This was necessitated by intensified military preparations of the US and its allies in the region, and the mounting revenge-seeking trends in the Japanese ruling circles' policies. The two sides came out for wider contacts between the CPSU and the WPK, the USSR and the DPRK to exchange opinion on burning international issues and on socialist construction. Also discussed were measures aimed at extending and deepening cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

In the conditions of brotherhood and friendship relations with the Indochinese nations are expanding and becoming ever more diverse.

From the political point of view, of paramount importance are meetings between the Soviet and Vietnamese leaders held in 1982-1984, in particular talks between Yuri Andropov and Le Duan on December 23, 1982 and July 29, 1983. A graphic manifestation of the two countries' developing relations was a visit paid to Vietnam by the Soviet party and government delegation headed by Geidar Aliyev, Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers (from October 27 to November 4, 1983), for taking part in the celebrations of the fifth anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed on November 3, 1978, and the signing, during that visit, of a long-term programme of economic development and scientific and technological cooperation between the USSR and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

The two states have concluded more than 300 different treaties and agreements encompassing many areas of cooperation. The USSR has been rendering aid in designing, building and carrying out other types of work on more than 300 economic projects and schemes, above all those connected with power engineering, the coal and chemical industries, non-ferrous metallurgy, machine-building, metalworking, the building materials industry, transportation, communications, agriculture, geological prospecting, the health services, and the training of personnel. About 200 economic projects have already been built and put into operation.

December 1982 saw a meeting in Moscow between Yuri Andropov and Kayson Phommvihane, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party and Chairman of the Council

⁸ See *Nodon sinmun*, Nov. 13, 1983.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Nov. 15, 1983.

of Ministers of the Lao People's Democratic Republic. A little earlier, in April 1982, a CPSU delegation headed by Grigori Romanov, Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, took part in the work of the 3rd LPRP Congress.

The Soviet Union takes pride in having helped the revival of Kampuchea, which threw off the terrorist Pol Pot regime in 1979. The two countries maintain active political contacts at various levels. The Soviet Union has helped overcome food shortages, restored the Kampuchean-Soviet friendship hospital, the Higher Technological Institute, where 600 would-be engineers and agronomists are being trained at present, and an agricultural institute; it is rebuilding thermal power station No. 2, bridges, and bringing back to life hevea and cotton plantations. The Soviet Union is now training 1,500 Kampuchean students. It helps strengthen Kampuchean defence capabilities in the face of unceasing provocations by the Pol Pot forces entrenched on Thailand's territory.

The USSR and the Indochinese nations hold common views on international problems and interact in their efforts to strengthen the cohesion of the socialist states and the unity of the world communist movement, to avert wars and to promote disarmament and detente. The Indochinese countries denounce US war preparations in East Asia, attempts to create new military blocs and the desire to exacerbate tension close to the socialist countries' borders.¹⁰

Peace and stability in Asia and the Far East are largely affected by the state of relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, the two major neighbouring socialist countries.

In the past 18 months or so, certain positive trends have emerged in relations between them. The two sides have made some steps towards the resumption of a political dialogue and the gradual stimulation and expansion of contacts in some specific areas of inter-state relations. The situation all along the Soviet-Chinese border is calm on the whole.

In keeping with the resolutions of Party congresses developed and specified in documents adopted by the plenary meetings of the CPSU Central Committee, and writings and speeches by leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government have invariably and consistently been advocating better Soviet-Chinese relations and continue to seek ways of advancing them towards good neighbourliness and friendship. With these aims in view, the Soviet side has made many constructive proposals which, taken together, constitute a comprehensive programme of reliably improving bilateral relations. What is meant here is, for instance, the proposal to conclude an agreement on principles of mutual relations between the USSR and the PRC, a non-aggression treaty (or on the non-use of force), to consider the problem of working out confidence-building measures in areas along the Soviet-Chinese border, and some other proposals. The February 1984 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee reiterated the immutability and continuity of the Leninist foreign policy of principle pursued by the CPSU and the Soviet state.

Statements have of late been made in China, including at the highest level, in favour of broader business contacts, economic, scientific, technical and cultural relations, exchanges between public bodies and raising the level of the dialogue with the Soviet Union. It has been stated that the elimination of abnormal Soviet-Chinese relations would meet the fundamental interests of the two nations and also help strengthen peace and security in Asia, the Far East and throughout the world. It goes without

¹⁰ See *Quan Doi nhan dan*, Nov. 17, 1983.

saying that the Soviet Union is not indifferent to such pronouncements. It is to be hoped that they are not prompted by fleeting considerations but reflect a genuine desire to work seriously towards the establishment of mutual understanding and trust between the USSR and the PRC, two great neighbour states.

The Soviet Union is fully aware that serious differences remain in the Soviet and the Chinese approaches to several key international problems and individual states. China continues attacking many aspects of the peaceable Soviet foreign policy, albeit on a somewhat lesser scale, distorting as before certain facts of the history of relations between the two countries, including the unending speculation on the utterly invented "territorial-border problem". The facts are irrefutable however, and it would be absolutely wrong to ignore them.

The Soviet Union pursues an honest and frank line and deems it inadmissible in principle that the Chinese side should interfere in Soviet relations with third countries; the Soviet Union cannot ignore the Chinese authorities' provocative activities against Vietnam and other Indochinese countries. The USSR is not going to disregard continuing unfriendly propaganda. At the same time, this country invariably and firmly proceeds from the fact that long-term interests of the Soviet and the Chinese peoples are not contrary to each other but are similar, as far as the struggle is concerned against the growing danger of a nuclear conflict and a "crusade" against socialism (for which the aggressive imperialist elements are responsible), and for peace and the security of nations, for peaceful conditions more favourable for the successful implementation of grandiose economic development plans. It is only natural that the USSR and the PRC, with their dynamically developing economies and rich cultural life, should have ample opportunities for large-scale mutually advantageous cooperation.

Soviet-Chinese trade was on the upswing in 1983 and 1984. According to an agreement signed early in February 1984, it is to grow by nearly 60 per cent in the current year to amount approximately to 1,000 million roubles. The Soviet Union will supply China with machinery and other equipment, including different types of cars, mining equipment, ferrous rolled stock, cement, chemicals, timber, fertilizers and other types of industrial products. In turn, China will send the USSR products of the mining industry and agricultural produce, as well as textile wares and various consumer goods. Certain regions in the Soviet Far East and North Eastern provinces of China conduct cross-border trade. Under discussion are problems of resuming economic cooperation, which can in future include Soviet participation in reconstructing enterprises and building new projects in China. Plans have been coordinated for 1984, envisaging mutual visits by delegations of representatives of science, technology, sports and culture, of the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies and the Chinese People's Friendship Society and the Soviet-Chinese and Sino-Soviet Friendship Societies. There are growing exchanges of students and visiting researchers and resumed exchanges in the field of culture. Beginning with the autumn of 1982, political consultations between special representatives of the Soviet and the Chinese governments at the level of deputy foreign ministers have been held between the two sides on problems of normalising Soviet-Chinese relations. Exchanges of opinion on international problems are also becoming regular.

Recent developments have shown that the process of improving Soviet-Chinese relations is at its inception. Even though progress in tackling important political issues is so far quite modest, the recent period has seen sensible steps in the right direction. The very atmosphere of a dialogue has a positive effect against the general background of the complex international situation.

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Konstantin Chernenko has said: "The role of socialism in international affairs could be further advanced, of course, by the normalisation of relations with the People's Republic of China. We consistently speak out for such normalisation. Political consultations show, however, that there are still differences on a number of major issues. In particular, we cannot accept any agreements which are against the interests of third countries. However, the exchange of opinion is continuing and we find it useful. The Soviet Union is in favour of raising the level of these contacts to an extent acceptable to both sides.

"The gradual revival of mutually beneficial contacts in economics, culture, science and other spheres is also a good thing. This is clearly resented by those who would have liked to capitalise on the deterioration of relations between the USSR and China. But this benefits our two countries and helps ameliorate the general situation in the world".¹¹

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to its relations with Japan. The myths that are being spread in Japan to the effect that the Soviet Union allegedly underestimates that country are groundless. Relations between our countries have been adversely affected by the growing negative trends in Japanese policy, including Japan's further involvement in the global anti-Soviet strategy of the US, the continuing buildup of the Japanese military potential, the country's greater role in the US-Japanese military-political alliance directed against the USSR, the inflated propaganda campaign around the thesis of the so-called Soviet military threat carried out to justify the buildup of its own military might and more active military cooperation with the US, and the mounting campaign of claims to the Soviet territory. In pursuing the so-called sanctions policy towards the Soviet Union, the Japanese side has continued restricting political contacts with our country, and restraining trade and economic cooperation, exchanges and contacts in the field of science and technology. The Japanese side has responded negatively to Soviet proposal to hold talks on confidence-building measures in the Far East, and has passed in silence another proposal to conclude an agreement on guarantees, that is, to formalise in a corresponding treaty, the Soviet commitment not to use nuclear weapons against Japan and the Japanese commitment to adhere to the non-nuclear status: to refrain from producing, purchasing or bringing to Japanese territory nuclear weapons. Japan adhered to the declaration by the leading Western countries, which was made in Williamsburg in 1983 and approved the deployment of new US missiles in Western Europe, and subsequently more than once confirmed its loyalty to the "spirit" of that declaration. Following US line, Japan has voted at the UN against some important Soviet initiatives on disarmament problems, including that against the resolution denouncing nuclear war and a resolution on freezing nuclear armaments. By supporting the US stand at the talks on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe, Japan in fact facilitated the collapse of these talks. Holding virtually a destructive position on all the aforementioned issues, Japan itself has made no initiative to improve the international situation, especially in the region of Asia and the Pacific.

The Soviet Union is aware of the growing negative tendencies in Japanese policy. The statement to the Japanese government made by the Soviet side on February 4, 1983, gives a principled assessment of Japan's policy of increasing war preparations and extended military-strategic cooperation with the USA. It was stressed that Japan's neighbours cannot but draw the appropriate conclusions from the fact that militarist ten-

¹¹ *Pravda*, March 3, 1984.

dencies have sharply grown in the Japanese government's policy, and would have to take the proper measures to ensure their security.

At the same time the Soviet Union consistently wants to maintain good relations between the two countries and not to lose opportunities for their improvement in the future when, from the Japanese point of view, the conditions are favourable for that. In June and September 1982, the Soviet and Japanese foreign ministers twice had meetings during the UN General Assembly sessions in New York. In February 1984, Japanese Foreign Minister Abe was received by Andrei Gromyko on a visit to Moscow for the funeral of Yuri Andropov. In 1982, 1983 and 1984, consultations between the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the Japanese Foreign Ministry were held respectively in Moscow, Tokyo and Moscow again at the level of Deputy Ministers. The Japanese side proposed that the practice of exchanging film festivals should be resumed between the USSR and Japan on an inter-governmental basis. Talks are under way to put an end to the double taxation of incomes and property.

The measures restricting trade and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, taken by the Japanese government in 1980, have caused certain damage to Soviet-Japanese relations in that field. In 1983, Soviet-Japanese trade shrank by 18.5 per cent, as compared with the previous year, from 3,682 billion to 3 billion roubles. Moreover, the so-called economic sanctions against the USSR, introduced by the Japanese government, have weakened the positions of Japanese companies on the Soviet market. Some promising contracts have gone to West European countries. Japan, which until quite recently ranked first or second in our trade with developed capitalist countries, is now only fourth or fifth in this field.

Scientific and technological cooperation between the Soviet Union and Japan has been practically frozen in the past few years because of the negative attitude of the Japanese side. The intergovernmental commission on scientific and technological cooperation has stopped operating. The Japanese government has been raising barriers in the way of scientific and technological cooperation through private companies.

Cooperation in fishing remained the most stable element of Soviet-Japanese relations in general. Every year intergovernmental talks have been held on mutual fishing rights in the 200-mile zone, and Japanese salmon fishing in the open sea in the North-Western Pacific. In 1983, the Japanese side agreed for the first time to allow Soviet fishing vessels to call at one of the Japanese ports. February 1983 saw the resumption of consultations between the Soviet and Japanese Fisheries Ministers. Soviet Minister V. Kamentsev visited Japan, while his Japanese counterpart received an invitation to repay a visit to the USSR.

Every year contracts are signed with private Japanese companies and cooperative societies for the holding of joint Soviet-Japanese expeditions for fishing sea products on a commercial basis in the Soviet 200-mile zone. In the past few years, the Soviet side has given Japanese fishermen an opportunity to extract sea kale in Soviet territorial waters near Signalny Island.

The Soviet side has posed to the Japanese the problem of setting up a mixed fishing company.

Japan occupies the foremost position among the leading capitalist countries in its cultural contacts with the Soviet Union. Despite the general worsening of Soviet-Japanese relations in the past few years, there have been fairly active cultural exchanges between the two countries through private organisations. Some large-scale cultural events have taken place in Japan, including the festival of Russian and Soviet art (the autumn of 1983) with the participation of some leading Soviet performing companies.

The Soviet Union has maintained calm relations with the ASEAN countries through contacts between Parliaments and Foreign Ministries. The USSR has in every way encouraged cultural cooperation and trade and showed readiness to help these countries in building industrial enterprises. There is some similarity in the positions adopted by the USSR and the ASEAN countries on the main problem of our day: how to preclude a nuclear catastrophe and to curb the arms race. They differ, however, in their attitude to the events in Kampuchea. The Soviet Union has repeatedly pointed out that the present-day position of the ASEAN countries was in the interests only of the forces which have their own plans for Southeast Asia, and that it would be in these countries' interests to put an end to confrontation with the Indochinese countries, to reopen a dialogue with them by recognising the real state of affairs and turn Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, goodneighbourliness and cooperation.

The Soviet Union has shown understanding of the concern Southeast Asian nations, including the ASEAN countries, feel for the future of peace in the region, jeopardised by US war preparations and the militarisation of Japan. This concern, which frequent US visitors and high-ranking Japanese officials (Prime Minister Nakasone during his trip to some of the ASEAN countries in April and May 1983) are trying to dispel in every possible way, is quite justified. It is caused, not only by the fact that the Southeast Asian nations remember only too well what the Japanese "sphere of co-prosperity" created during the Second World War brought them but also by a sober analysis of the existing situation. For example, Reagan's talks in Japan and South Korea have evoked noticeable concern in Indonesia, according to Indonesian press reports. "Additional responsibility for regional security that Reagan had persuaded Japan to commit caused serious concerns here about reemergence of Japanese militarism... Military buildup of Japan and South Korea—two American allies in Asia—became a cause of concern among Southeast Asian nations striving to create a regional zone of peace and security."¹²

The Philippines, too, are showing grave concern over the militarisation of Japan.

An approach to international relations, similar to the one adopted by the Soviet Union, would open up prospects for the alleviation of tensions in the Western Pacific, the Far East and Southeast Asia and be the only reasonable and effective alternative to the militarist course pursued by the US and its allies. The Soviet Union will continue following such a course. Andrei Gromyko said in his election speech on February 27, 1984, that "our country would cooperate in full with all states that are ready in practice to help lessen international tensions and create an atmosphere of trust in the world".¹³

Imperialist war preparations in the Western Pacific, the Far East and Southeast Asia are worsening the international situation, extremely complex as it is, and raising the danger of a world nuclear war. The peoples, not only those that live in East Asia but all the others in the world, should understand that no matter whether it starts in Europe or Asia, a nuclear war would spare no one. It is necessary to double and even treble efforts to halt the aggressors.

¹² *Jakarta Post*, Nov. 28, 1984.

¹³ *Pravda*, Feb. 28, 1984.

TIKHOVINSKIY: HISTORY SHOWS SOVIET PEACEFUL INTENTIONS TO CHINA

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 84 pp 18-28

[Article by Academician S. L. Tikhvinskiy: "The First Soviet Treaty with China (Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the Soviet Union and China)"]

The year 1924 saw a large-scale recognition of the Soviet Union by many bourgeois states. At the 1922 conferences in Genoa and the Hague the imperialist powers tried to settle their relations with Soviet Russia on fettering terms, without diplomatic recognition of the young state of workers and peasants, born by the October revolution, and impose upon it the status of a semi-colony. But their plans misfired. The Soviet Republic patently demonstrated that it is not one to be spoken to from positions of strength, in the language of threats and diktat. Under the guidance of V. I. Lenin Soviet diplomacy frustrated the attempts to create a united anti-Soviet front of imperialist powers. A treaty with Germany based on the principles of equality and mutual advantage was signed already in Genoa. Despite the obstacles created by the imperialists, the Soviet government continued to strive undeviatingly for the development of businesslike cooperation with capitalist countries proceeding from the premise that this cooperation is needed not only by Soviet Russia but also by the capitalist states.

The collapse of the attempts to destroy the Soviet state by military force, the failure of the policy of threats and blackmail of the type of the notorious "Curzon ultimatum" of 1923, the economic upsurge achieved by the Soviet Union following transition to the New Economic Policy, the interest of the business community in capitalist countries in developing mutually advantageous economic and trade ties, the growth of the Soviet Union's popularity among the working masses—all this compelled the ruling circles in Western countries to grant the Soviet Union *de jure* recognition.

The constantly worsening economic situation in the leading European countries—Britain, Italy and France—also pushed the West to the path of normalising relations with the Soviet Union. Besides these states, the governments of Norway, Austria, Sweden, Greece, Denmark, Albania, Mexico and Uruguay also recognised the Soviet Union *de jure* in 1924 and established diplomatic relations with it. Much interest in establishing political and economic ties with the Soviet Union was displayed in 1924 by Japan (diplomatic relations were established in January 1925) and a number of other countries.

The year 1924 started diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and China. The Soviet government attached much importance to the development of normal relations with its great Far Eastern neighbour. "Soviet Russia and China are natural allies and the future belongs to friendly policy between them", it was said by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR Georgi Chicherin in 1922. "Soviet Russia is

the only big state ready to give every support to China's full independence in every respect and the full flourishing of its independent development."¹

Despite mutual interest of the two countries in normalising relations, the talks between Soviet Russia and China, started late in 1921, were not a success right until May 1924 because of the constant pressure put by the imperialist powers on the Peking government.

The agreement on general principles for the settlement of issues between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Chinese Republic was signed in Peking on May 31, 1924. It was the first ever equal treaty signed by semi-colonial China with another state, which breached a gap in the economic and diplomatic blockade of the young Soviet state organised by world imperialism in the Far East.

Under this agreement normal diplomatic and consular relations between the two countries were restored immediately upon its signing. All treaties, agreements and other acts concluded by the tsarist government and any third party and concerning China's sovereign rights were declared void.

The USSR renounced all special rights and privileges enjoyed by tsarist Russia in China, including the rights of extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction; the Russian part of the "Boxer contribution" was handed over for the needs of education in China. The governments of the USSR and China agreed to verify the borders between the two states "and prior to the said verification to adhere to the existing ones". The Chinese Far Eastern Railway (CFER) was declared a purely commercial enterprise jointly managed by the two countries on the basis of parity. On the initiative of the USSR, both countries agreed to exchange diplomats in the rank of ambassadors, this emphasising once again the equality in relations between the two nations, whereas the imperialist powers, treating China as a semi-colony, had in Peking diplomatic representatives only in the rank of envoy or charge d'affaires.

The Soviet-Chinese agreement of May 31, 1924 was of a preliminary nature: it was intended to convene within a month's time a conference to draft and conclude detailed agreements on all questions in accordance with the principles formulated in the agreement. But this conference was never convened because of the militaristic internal strife in North China, the mounting of the revolution and commencement of the civil war in China. So the agreement of May 31, 1924 actually acquired the importance of a treaty regulating Soviet-Chinese relations and retaining its validity right to the signing of the Soviet-Chinese treaty of 1945 and the treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance of February 14, 1950.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and China was a major international event and an important milestone in China's modern history. It was preceded by Soviet diplomacy's persistent work to restore relations with the neighbouring state based on the Leninist principles of foreign policy: genuine equality, respect of sovereignty and independence.

It was already in November 1917 that the Soviet government offered China to enter talks on the invalidation of the unequal treaties with tsarist Russia and the replacement of them with a new treaty based on full equality and mutual respect. But the reactionary Peking government, reflecting the interests of national feudal and militaristic forces and imperialist powers, ignored the Soviet proposals. More than that, it took part

¹ G. V. Chicherin, *Articles and Speeches on Questions of International Politics*, Moscow, 1961, p. 223 (in Russian).

in the economic blockade of the young Soviet Republic and the military intervention of 14 powers against it.

In furtherance of its efforts to establish friendly relations with China, the Soviet government issued on May 25, 1919 an appeal of the Council of People's Commissars to the Chinese people and the governments of South and North China, containing a clear and precise formulation of the principles of Soviet Russia's foreign policy with respect to China. Despite all the attempts by the internal, Chinese, and the external, imperialist, reactionaries to ignore and distort the meaning of this historic document, the appeal reached the Chinese people and evoked a friendly response from it: starting with the spring of 1920, the movement for friendship with Soviet Russia, for the recognition of Soviet Russia became a most important element of the mass anti-imperialist and anti-feudal movement that was mounting in China after the events of May 4, 1919 which had followed news about the imperialist partitioning of China at the Versailles peace conference.

The movement for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia united various sections of the Chinese society. Coming out for the recognition of Soviet Russia were workers and intellectuals, representatives of the national bourgeoisie, some prominent politicians. The outstanding writer and democrat Lu Xin, President of the Academy of Sciences Cai Yuanpei and others were among those who campaigned for normalising relations with the Soviet Republic.

Under heavy public pressure, the Peking government was compelled in 1921 to open talks with representatives of Soviet Russia. Peking, however, made maximum use of the tactics of procrastination, subterfuges and the raising of questions concerning not relations between Soviet Russia and China, but third countries.

The so-called Mongolian question was one of them throughout the almost three years of the talks.

Since the White Guard bands, that had been driven out of the territory of Soviet Russia and the Far Eastern Republic, entrenched themselves in Manchuria and on orders of imperialist powers were constantly raiding Soviet territory and the territory of Mongolia, the Soviet government introduced its troops into Mongolia on its government's request. In the process it repeatedly stated that it respected Mongolia's sovereignty, did not interfere in its internal affairs and that the Soviet troops would leave Mongolia as soon as this was possible.

But the Peking government wanted the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia to be a preliminary condition for the opening of Soviet-Chinese talks in Peking in the autumn of 1922. To this the representative of Soviet Russia, A. Ioffe, stated in his note of October 14, 1922 that the singling out of the Mongolian question was unexpected and unacceptable. He also explained the reasons for the presence of Soviet troops in Mongolia and stressed that "the best part of the Chinese people, which is struggling for its national liberation, fully share the viewpoint that the immediate withdrawal of the Russian troops from Outer Mongolia is not only impossible from the position of Russian interests but would also drastically contradict the genuine interests of the Chinese people".²

The progressive Chinese public correctly evaluated both the position of the Soviet government and the position of the reactionary Peking government. The outstanding Chinese revolutionary and democrat Sun Yatsen, for example, stressed in January 1923 with respect to the presence of Soviet troops in Mongolia, which was used by the North China militarists as a pretext for holding up the normalisation of relations with the

² Quoted from A. N. Kheifetz, *Soviet Diplomacy and the Peoples of the East. 1921-1927*, Moscow, 1968, p. 147 (in Russian).

USSR, that he "does not consider the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Outer Mongolia to be either urgent or serving the true interests of China, especially in view of the present Peking government's inability to prevent the resumption of intrigues and hostile actions by the White Guards against Russia in the event of such a withdrawal..."³

Rejecting the slander against the USSR over the "Mongolian question" Sun Yatsen stated: "They hold that Russia exerts a big influence on the Mongolian People's Republic. So much the better, it is wonderful that there is Russia's influence there. We know how much Mongolia has suffered from the Chinese militarists, from Ungern and the rest. Let it be a free country."⁴

Just as consistent was the Soviet stand in the question concerning the CFER, which took into consideration and protected in equal measure the interests both of Soviet Russia and China from encroachments by the imperialists of Japan, the United States and France.

The imperialist powers wanted to establish their control over the CFER and tried, at the Washington Conference, to get through a proposal on the "internationalisation" of the railway and implement it in one form or another.

When proposing to expel foreign imperialists and their White Guard agents from the CFER and establish a joint Soviet-Chinese management of the railway, Soviet diplomats protected not only the interests of Russia but also those of the Chinese people.

The new Extraordinary Plenipotentiary of the USSR, L. Karakhan arrived in Peking in September 1923 in conditions of the intensified militaristic infighting, unstable political situation and mounting anti-imperialist revolutionary movement. Taking into account the experience of the previous diplomatic missions of A. Paikes and A. Ioffe, when the Peking government, pursuing its tactics of procrastination, set to the fore the discussion of questions of secondary importance and those connected with third countries, the Karakhan mission set itself the aim to press first of all for the restoration of official diplomatic relations between the USSR and China.

In the course of talks in February 1924, L. Karakhan agreed to the Chinese proposal to conclude a preliminary agreement establishing official diplomatic relations between the USSR and China and formulating the general principles of relations between the two countries while leaving the settlement of other questions to a subsequent official Soviet-Chinese conference.

Understanding on the wording of the text was reached and on the morning of March 14, 1924, L. Karakhan and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Peking government Wang Zhengting initialled the agreement on the general principles for settling issues between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Chinese Republic and the documents supplemented to it. But under the pressure from representatives of foreign powers later on the same day the Peking government declared void the agreement to which it had consented and which had already initialled.

From the very outset the imperialist powers strove to impede Soviet-Chinese contacts and talks. Already at that time their representatives in Peking intimidated the Peking government with the "Soviet threat" in every way. Thus, early in 1922, during the stay of the Paikes mission in Peking, US envoy tried to scare the Peking government's foreign minister Yang Huiquing with talk about the "threats and dangers" that are

³ S. L. Tikhvinsky, *Sun Yatsen. Foreign Policy Views and Practice*, Moscow, 1964, p. 268 (in Russian).

⁴ A. N. Kheifetz, *Soviet Diplomacy...*, p. 289.

"fraught in the talks with Soviet Russia". In October of the same year, the Japanese newspaper *Shuntinag ribao*, published in China, wrote that "China should keep its guard up all the time because Russian diplomacy is of a threatening nature".⁵

The pro-imperialist newspapers and magazines stepped up the anti-Soviet campaign on the eve of Karakhan's arrival in China. Foreign diplomats stated that if the Peking government dared recognise Russia, they would risk the Western powers' worsened attitude to it. As reported by the newspaper *Peking—Tientsin Times*, the French envoy had openly threatened the Peking government with an interference by the powers in Chinese affairs in the event it recognises the USSR.⁶

US envoy, who pointedly made a trip along the CFER late in 1923, stated that China could not decide on the question of the CFER without a permission of the powers. He demanded that the railway be under the control of the imperialist powers because Russia supposedly had "vanished" in terms of international relations and nobody had taken its place.⁷

The moment the representatives of the imperialist powers had learned about the initialling of the Soviet-Chinese agreement on March 14, 1924, they immediately took still more resolute measures to pressure the Peking government into frustrating the agreement. On March 14, the Chinese government was handed to a note of the French government containing the threat of interference by the powers in the event the existing situation on the CFER was changed, and setting forth their own totally ungrounded claims to the CFER.

Pressure on the Peking government was also exerted by the US and Japanese embassies which resorted to outright financial blackmail.

According to the Japanese press, the diplomatic corps was planning to demand that the Peking government should repay loans without security, settle accounts on all outstanding debts, and also threatened China with a suspension of all financial assistance till the repayment of all foreign debts.

The Peking government was frightened by the pressure exerted by the powers, began to manoeuvre, offer the Soviet side to continue the talks and introduce amendments into the already agreed-upon texts of the documents. Foreign Minister Gu Weijiong was charged with the continuation of the negotiations.

The imperialist powers were quick to celebrate their success: on March 20, 1924, *The New York Times* wrote that it appeared that the Soviet-Chinese talks had finally collapsed.⁸ But the imperialists underrated both the firm position of the Soviet diplomats, who insisted on the observance by the Peking government of the norms of international law, and the strength of the popular movement for friendship and diplomatic relations with the USSR.

The flouting of national interests, the obsequiousness of the Peking government to imperialism and the interference of imperialist powers in China's affairs caused indignation in all sections of society: mass meetings and demonstrations took place in Peking and other cities; student organisations were preparing to stage mass actions modelled on the 1919 "Movement of May 4"; Peking's stand was criticised by MPs, businessmen and even some militarists in Central and South China, opposed to the Peking government.

⁵ R. A. Mirovitskaya, *The Struggle for the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between Soviet Russia and China in 1917-1924*. Historical Notes, Issue 65, Moscow, 1959, p. 19 (in Russian).

⁶ A. N. Kheifetz, *Soviet Diplomacy...*, p. 138.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 284.

⁸ A. N. Kheifetz, *Soviet Diplomacy...*, p. 298.

Sun Yatsen contributed greatly to the establishment of relations between Soviet Russia and China.

He actively worked for the speediest conclusion of the talks on the normalisation of relations with the USSR, that were under way in Peking, and corresponded on this question with Chicherin and Karakhan. It was back on September 17, 1923, that he wrote in a letter to Karakhan: "...I say that no criticism of the ideology which you profess can prevent and will prevent me from holding together with you that the true interests of our countries require the formulation of a common policy which would give us the possibility to live in conditions of equality with other powers."⁹ In the same letter Sun Yatsen offered Karakhan, should his talks with Peking end in failure, to study the expediency of coming to Guangzhou for talks with his government.

In his final, sixth lecture on the principle of nationalism which was delivered by Sun Yatsen to Guomindang activists in Guangzhou on March 2, 1924, he said: "If China after the restoration of its might follows the same road with foreign imperialists, this will be baneful for it."¹⁰ Sun Yatsen regarded the road of joint anti-imperialist struggle by Russia and China as the only possible road for his country.

In these circumstances the Peking government had no option but to sign the Soviet-Chinese agreement of May 31, 1924.

Soviet journalist A. Ivin, who had witnessed the developments, wrote in his book *China and the Soviet Union*: "The May 31 agreement was signed not only contrary to US envoy but also without his knowledge. This, of course, was not a chance happening, especially considering that the Waijiaobu [foreign ministry—S. T.] is headed by a former envoy to Washington known for his total pro-Americanism. The ineluctable course of events, the iron logic of objectively forming circumstances turn out to be stronger than any sympathies or antipathies and make even such an essentially anti-Soviet government as the Peking one to sign, contrary to its will, agreements with the Soviet Union."¹¹

As it is rightly pointed out by Soviet researchers studying that period of China's history, the main reason that finally made the reactionary Peking government establish diplomatic relations with the USSR and conclude the Soviet-Chinese agreement was the scope of the revolutionary-democratic movement in the country. But one should not ignore the fact that nationalist feelings were alien by far not to all of the then Peking rulers. They understood the importance and advantages to China of the terms of that agreement which placed a semi-colonial country dependent on world imperialism in the position of a sovereign partner of such a great power as Soviet Russia. That appears to be yet another reason why they dared nonetheless to sign the agreement despite pressure by the imperialist states.

The Soviet government knew well that the Peking authorities did not represent the Chinese people. It was back in February 1922 that the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR Chicherin wrote to Sun Yatsen: "All our sympathies are, of course, with the popular, progressive, liberation forces of China. But the Peking government, whatever it is like, is the official government of the Chinese state and we strive to establish normal relations with it."¹² Such relations were established in May 1924.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the 1924 agreement. Expanding the number of countries that had recognised the Soviet Union

⁹ A. N. Kheifetz, *Soviet Diplomacy...*, p. 280.

¹⁰ S. L. Tikhvinsky, *Sun Yatsen...*, p. 301.

¹¹ A. Ivin, *China and the Soviet Union*, Moscow, 1924, p. 47 (in Russian).

¹² A. N. Kheifetz, *Soviet Diplomacy...*, p. 143.

by then, it bolstered the USSR's international prestige and facilitated the stabilisation on the USSR's Far Eastern border and a change in the situation in the Far Eastern region. It opened a new stage in relations between the two neighbouring countries by creating a good basis for their further ties on conditions of equality, sovereignty and mutual advantage.

Quite naturally, the imperialist press received the Agreement of May 31, 1924 with vicious anti-Soviet attacks, calling it "a new treaty of Brest-Litovsk" and a "violation of the Anglo-Soviet agreement". Charges were even made that it had resulted in a loss of sovereign rights by China.

But the Chinese democratic public at large thought high of the agreement. Even Chinese personalities with little fondness for Soviet Russia were compelled to admit its great importance for China. While not always objectively and correctly outlining the history of the conclusion of this agreement in his article "The History of the Restoration of China's Diplomatic Relations with Russia" (the magazine *Dongfang zazhi*, 1924, No. 13) Chang Xingsheng could not but recognise that it had opened a new era in the history of Chinese diplomacy.

Sun Yatsen responded to the event with a special Appeal to the Guomindang Party on the Occasion of the Sino-Russian Agreement. He wrote: "In the course of the revolution, Russia most resolutely dismantled the imperialist policy of the tsarist despotic regime: it clearly told China of its desire to renounce all the privileges and abrogate all treaties detrimental to China's sovereignty. Were the Peking government at the time not been seized by militarists and bureaucrats it could have, representing the will of the people, meet with Russia with an open soul and a new treaty would have long been concluded and diplomatic relations established. But the militarists and bureaucrats constantly usurped power for their selfish purposes totally disregarding the interests of the state... For the signing of the agreement between China and Russia took place only because Russia had renounced its former privileges in China and abrogated the former treaties that had violated China's sovereignty. All this was done by Russia voluntarily, proceeding from its revolutionary principles and not at all because the unlawful Peking government had supposedly achieved all this in the course of the negotiations... Our party holds that the Chinese people should express deep gratitude to Russia for the conclusion of the Sino-Russian agreement. The peoples of both states should mutually understand each other in order to cooperate in the cause of respecting sovereignty and rendering assistance to each other."¹³

The newspaper *North China Star* wrote in connection with the signing of the agreement: "May 31 is a day of Renaissance because on this day China accepted the USSR's extended hand. Impotent fury is all that the enemies of China have got. China has entered into an agreement with its powerful neighbour. By its advantages this agreement exceeds China's most daring dreams."¹⁴

The conclusion of the agreement dealt a blow at the imperialist powers and the diplomatic corps in Peking, facilitated the strengthening of China's international position since it put on record the renunciation by a great power of its system of unequal treaties with which imperialism had fettered China. At the same time it consolidated China's economic positions.

Questions related to the CFER (Article 9 of the agreement) were solved with due account for the interests of the Chinese people. Abandonment of CFER by Soviet Russia would have meant abandonment of it

¹³ *Narody Azii i Afriki* (Peoples of Asia and Africa), 1966, No. 5, pp. 143-144.

¹⁴ I. A. Rubinshtein, *Foreign Policy of the Soviet State in 1921-1925*, Moscow, 1953, p. 503.

not in favour of the Chinese people but in favour of internal counter-revolutionary forces and foreign imperialists (the agreement frustrated plans for France, the US and Japan to seize the railway and subsequently, for a definite period of time, served as a factor restraining the Japanese aggression in Manchuria). In those conditions the joint Soviet-Chinese administration of CFER guaranteed the preservation of the railway for the Chinese people.

The question of the Russian part of the "Boxer contribution" was also solved in the interests of the Chinese people.

It was during the talks on the conclusion of the agreement (November 1923) that representatives of Peking's establishments of higher education had sent a letter to Karakhan describing the financial straits of these institutions and requesting the USSR to renounce the Russian part of the "Boxer contribution" for the development of education in China even before the formal opening of the talks. The Soviet government accepted this proposal, and Karakhan sent an appropriate memorandum to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It followed from a declaration supplemented to the Agreement of May 31, 1924 that all the money of the Russian part of the "Boxer contribution" would be spent to create a fund for improving the education system for the Chinese people. It was also stated that a special commission consisting of representatives of the Chinese and Soviet governments would be formed to administer this fund. Chinese public organisations undertook to check that this money would really be spent on educational needs.

The importance of the Agreement of May 31, 1924 is also great for the further growth of the revolutionary movement in China: after its conclusion mass actions under the slogan of "Down With Unequal Treaties" attained the greatest scope.

The USSR's policy was in stark contrast to the policy of the imperialist powers which stubbornly continued to cling to their former colonial privileges seized by means of force in China. Thus, the newspaper *Jing bao* wrote: "Chinese should compare the international treaties and compare international relations. If we are to hold that the USSR, Japan and Britain are one and the same thing, why then neither Britain nor Japan want to make even the smallest concessions in what has been given away by the USSR. The difference is explained by the fact that they are imperialists while the USSR is not an imperialist."¹⁵

The agreement dealt a strong blow at the positions of the imperialists in China and this had to be admitted even by the bourgeois press. For instance, *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* wrote on June 8, 1924 about the agreement: "Its importance is all the more greater since the United States has done everything to block it." *The China Weekly Review* also noted: "He who attentively follows the events in China will agree that the guiding role in China's affairs is by far no longer in the hands of those who had manipulated the Washington Conference... Nobody can now question the tremendous role that is already being played by the Russian-Chinese agreement in the Chinese national movement."¹⁶

The English-language Chinese newspaper the *Peking Leader* wrote after the signing of the agreement that never before had China succeeded in concluding an agreement with a foreign power that would so completely embody the principles of equality and reciprocity. From now on the other powers will be forced to choose between the alternative of either conducting talks with China as with an equal state or accepting the fact

¹⁵ *Voprosy istorii* (Questions of History), 1957, No. 12, p. 115 (in Russian).

¹⁶ A. Ivin, *China and the Soviet Union*, p. 59.

that China will increasingly turn away from them and go over to the side of the USSR.¹⁷

The Soviet-Chinese agreement of May 31, 1924 accorded with the fundamental interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples and gave much support to China's national-revolutionary forces in the liberation struggle. This correct assessment of the agreement was made both by Soviet researchers of the period of the 1920s and by PRC historians who wrote on problems of China's modern history in the 1950s.

The entire course of history shows that the two countries have always benefited from normal goodneighbourly relations between them. As a wise Chinese saying has it, "both benefit from being together, and both lose from being apart". The absence of diplomatic relations between the USSR and China from July 1929 to December 1932, resultant of the conflict at the CFER by the Chinese reactionaries and foreign imperialists, substantially worsened China's international standing and facilitated Japan's large-scale offensive in Northeast China.

The Soviet Union was the first to come to China's assistance when the war against the Japanese invaders began in 1937. It gave the Chinese government loans on easy terms to purchase arms and means of transportation and during the blockade of the Chinese coast by Japan in 1939 concluded with China a trade treaty enabling the latter to get a number of vitally important commodities for continuing the resistance to the Japanese aggressors. Widely known are the exploits of Soviet volunteer pilots who defended the skies over China from the Japanese aggressors, and of the Soviet military instructors and advisers who had come to the assistance of embattled China.

The rout of militaristic Japan by the Soviet Army in 1945 with the participation of the armed forces of the MPR, Korean guerrillas and the People's Liberation Army of China became one of the decisive factors of the triumph of the Chinese revolution. The Manchurian revolutionary base served as the military-strategic bridgehead for China's revolutionary forces, from where they launched an offensive against the anti-popular Guomindang regime in 1946 and scored victory in 1949.

Allround economic, political, diplomatic and cultural ties developed between the USSR and China in the 1950s: the Soviet people gave the PRC fraternal internationalist assistance in socialist construction.

The policy of the PRC's cooperation with the USSR and other socialist countries, its active participation in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism helped people's China win great prestige on the world scene in the 1950s.

China's diverse economic and political cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries predetermined its successes in the sphere of foreign policy and facilitated the creation of favourable external conditions for socialist construction. It also was of paramount importance for the creation of a favourable economic and social situation inside the country.

Starting with the late 1950s, negative tendencies began to grow in Soviet-Chinese relations through no fault of the USSR and then developed into a vicious anti-Soviet campaign that became a part of the then Peking leadership's great-power, hegemonic course. By way of cruel repressions the rabid anti-Sovieters tried to erase from the memory of the Chinese people good feelings for the homeland of Lenin, for Soviet people.

The visit to the PRC in October 1983, after an interval of more than twenty years, by a specialised tourist group of activists of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship with Foreign Countries and the Central Board of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society showed that the Chinese

¹⁷ *Izvestia*, June 4, 1924.

people remembered the fraternal, internationalist support given by the USSR to China during the first difficult ten years of the PRC's existence and hoped for a restoration of friendly relations with the USSR.

Certain positive changes in Soviet-Chinese relations have been noted of late. The Sino-Soviet trade agreement on commodity exchange and payments in 1984, signed in Peking on February 10, 1984, provides for a 60 per cent increase in the volume of trade as compared with the previous year. Cultural and scientific ties are being revived. "This goes against the grain of those who would like to benefit from an aggravation of relations between the USSR and China," as it was noted by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Konstantin Chernenko. "But it is for the good of our countries and the cause of improving the situation in the world".¹⁸

Just like American diplomats 60 years ago, representatives of the Reagan Administration are trying to drive a wedge into the friendly relations between the USSR and China. They are resorting to the threadbare myth about the "Soviet threat" to China, about the impossibility to reach agreement with the USSR. Thus, a US official Brown stated recently that basic changes in Sino-Soviet relations were hardly possible since the USSR continued to present a real threat to the People's Republic of China. The Chinese should know, better than many other peoples, what the history of relations with the Soviets was teaching one. Peace with Moscow, he went on to say, without any definite counterbalance to its military might, could be achieved only on Soviet terms.¹⁹ Trying to teach others by referring to lessons of history, Brown totally "forgets" how US imperialism, in a bid to aim the Japanese militarists' aggression against the USSR and in pursuance of the policy of "appeasing" the aggressor, facilitated the seizure by Japanese troops of a considerable part of China's territory, supplied Japan with oil, scrap steel and other strategic raw materials right till the outbreak of the war in the Pacific. He forgets how the United States engaged in armed intervention in China during the years of the 1946-1949 civil war, refused to recognise the People's Republic of China for almost 20 years and to this day pursues a "two Chinas" policy. Moreover, Brown displays total ignorance in the field of the history of Soviet-Chinese relations and the USSR's policy with respect to the PRC. The USSR's position on the question of Soviet-Chinese relations is utterly clear.

The principled stand of the CPSU and the Soviet state on Soviet-Chinese relations is that the Soviet Union has not sought and is not seeking confrontation with the People's Republic of China. The USSR follows the course charted by the 24th, 25th and 26th Congresses of the CPSU and would like to develop ties with the PRC on a goodneighbourly basis. The Soviet proposals directed at normalising relations with China are still on the table.

Although the USSR has been openly criticising many aspects of the Chinese leadership's policy (especially foreign policy) as not conforming to the socialist principles and norms, it has never tried to interfere in the internal life of the PRC. The USSR has not denied and does not deny the existence of a socialist social system in China.

The Soviet Union has never supported and does not support in any form the so-called concept of two Chinas, has fully recognised and continues to recognise the PRC's sovereign rights to Taiwan.

The USSR has not posed and is not posing any threat whatsoever to the People's Republic of China. It does not have any territorial claims to the PRC and is prepared at any time to continue talks on existing que-

¹⁸ *Pravda*, March 3, 1984.

¹⁹ See *Department of State Bulletin*, 1984, vol. 83, No. 2081, p. 14.

stions with the aim of achieving mutually acceptable solutions. The USSR also is prepared to discuss possible measures to strengthen mutual trust in the area of the Soviet-Chinese border.

The Soviet Union has never viewed as normal the state of hostility and alienation between the USSR and the PRC. This country is prepared to negotiate, without any preliminary conditions, over measures acceptable to both sides to improve Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of mutual respect for each other's interests, non-interference in each other's affairs, mutual benefit and, of course, not to the detriment of third countries.

An enlivening of Soviet-Chinese relations and an improvement of their atmosphere started in 1982. Understanding of the need to search for mutually acceptable ways of normalising Soviet-Chinese relations was expressed in the course of four rounds of Soviet-Chinese consultations.

Being true to its policy, the Soviet Union strives in every way to strengthen the positive tendency that has manifested itself in Soviet-Chinese relations, to promote its development.

At the November 1982 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Yuri Andropov stressed: "The CPSU and the Soviet state sincerely wish a development and improvement of relations with all the socialist countries. Mutual good will, respect for each other's legitimate interests, common concern for the interests of socialism and peace should prompt correct decisions also in areas where for various reasons there still is no necessary trust and mutual understanding. This applies also to our great neighbour, the People's Republic of China."

As it is evidenced by official statements of Chinese leaders and materials in the Chinese mass media, in the PRC, alas, they have not yet departed from the erroneous understanding of the main principles of Soviet foreign policy and quite often continue equating the peaceable Soviet foreign policy to the aggressive, hegemonic policy of US imperialism. As it was in the past, during the talks of 1921-1924, the Chinese side illogically links the further improvement of Sino-Soviet relations with questions concerning the interests of third countries (today it has in view Mongolia, Kampuchea and Afghanistan).

The Soviet Union is for a continued political dialogue between the PRC and the USSR, for a further improvement of relations with China and for higher level of contacts on a mutually acceptable basis.

Objectively, the USSR and China have quite a few common interests and an improvement of relations between them at the present stage, just as it was during other periods of history, will undoubtedly benefit the peoples of both countries, the cause of peace in the whole world.

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KAPITSA REVIEWS HISTORY OF INDOCHINA CONFLICTS AFTER 1954

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 84 pp 29-41

[Article by Professor M. S. Kapitsa: "Thirty Years of the Geneva Agreements on Indochina"]

The 30th anniversary of the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers falls due this year. This Conference, held from April 26 to July 21, 1954, as well as the accords signed as a result of it were a major international event and an important milestone on the road of the countries of Indochina to independence. The author of this article took part in the Geneva Conference and was witness to many other crucial events that occurred during the past thirty years in the countries of Indochina.

The conference in Geneva had the following pre-history. The peoples of Indochina made their contribution to the struggle against the Japanese invaders who seized Indochina in 1940. The rout of militaristic Japan was their victory as well. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the first state of people's democracy in Asia, was proclaimed on September 2, 1945. A provisional government that proclaimed the independence of a unified Laos, which became known as Pathet Lao—Land of Lao—was formed on October 12, 1945. In the course of a plebiscite in Kampuchea in 1945 the overwhelming majority of the population declared for independence.

France did not accept this choice made by the Vietnamese, Kampuchean and Laotian peoples. Troops were sent to Indochina in order to restore French colonial rule by force. France was supported by the US imperialists who hoped to get a foothold in Indochina. The peoples of Indochina responded with the launching of a massive national liberation movement which had the support of the Soviet Union and People's China.

In the autumn of 1950 the French expeditionary corps suffered a number of major defeats in Vietnam despite US assistance which was increased after the beginning of the war in Korea. Indochina held an important place in Washington's plans of expansion in Asia. Through John Foster Dulles the United States declared Southeast Asia a sphere of its "interests". He set forth the ill-famed "domino theory" as the conceptual basis of Washington's policy in that area of the world. The United States interfered ever more actively in the war in Indochina and increased allocations to France to wage it; US aid for these purposes amounted to \$300 million in 1952 and already to \$1,000 million in 1953-1954.¹

Speaking at a convention of US governors in Seattle on August 4, 1953, on the war in Indochina, President Eisenhower said that US government voted for the cheapest way to prevent events that might have horrible consequences for the US, for its security, its power and opportunity to get all it needs from the riches of Indochina and Southeast Asia.

He announced the allocation of \$400 million as aid to France to conduct that war.² In 1954 the United States paid 78 per cent of the expenses incurred by the war in Indochina.

US involvement in Indochina acquired an ever more aggressive and dangerous nature. Thus, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee had even worked out plans of giving France three atomic bombs to lift the siege

¹ See M. S. Fairley, *United States Relations with South East Asia. With Special Reference to Indochina*, New York, 1955, p. 4.

² *New York Times*, Aug. 5, 1953.

of Dienbienphu, the biggest French defence centre. Farsighted politicians in France could not but understand that French bayonets were merely clearing the path for the establishment of US domination in Indochina.

The question of convening a conference of Foreign Ministers from a number of countries to study the problem of a peace settlement in Korea was discussed in January-February 1954 at the Berlin meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Britain, the USSR, the United States and France. The French Foreign Minister Bideau voiced the opinion that the question of a settlement in Indochina should be discussed at it as well. After preliminary consultations with the DRV and the PRC the Soviet Union supported this idea. Geneva was chosen as the venue for such a conference.

On the initiative of the CPSU Central Committee, a meeting of V. M. Molotov, Ho Chi Minh and Zhou Enlai was held in Moscow early in April 1954 in connection with the forthcoming talks in Geneva. Describing the situation in Indochina Ho Chi Minh noted that at present it favoured Democratic Vietnam but a still greater involvement of the Americans in the war in Indochina could create serious difficulties.

When making his evaluation of the situation, Zhou Enlai said that in the absence of a serious US interference in Vietnam's affairs the People's Army of the DRV would be able to liberate the entire northern part of the country, including Hanoi and Haiphong, in two years. There would be a simultaneous growth of the guerrilla movement in the South, in Cambodia and Laos. But it is difficult, he said, to count on winning two more years because the United States was accelerating its interference. At first Washington helped France with aviation, then it took an active part in training Bao Dai's troops. It is possible that in the future it will take some new steps, he said.

Zhou Enlai stressed that in the event of a large-scale US intervention, China would not be able to give the DRV direct assistance. "The question will arise," he said, "whether China will take action or not if the Americans invade the territory of Vietnam. This question troubles the Americans, remains unclear and mysterious to them. The comrades from Vietnam believe that China could openly take part in hostilities on the territory of Vietnam. But the CPC CC holds that it is impossible for the Chinese army to take part in operations on the territory of Vietnam because this would oppose China to the other peoples of Southeast Asia and give the Americans the possibility to create a bloc stretching from India to Indonesia."

At the next meeting Zhou Enlai stated that US interference makes the war much harder and difficult and creates even more sinister prospects. The Vietnamese comrades hope, said he, that if with US support France puts on pressure and approaches the borders of China, the latter will definitely interfere and come to Vietnam's assistance. But they do not take into account the circumstance that under no conditions can China come out openly. The Vietnamese and Chinese comrades have some differences over this question.³

The delegations of the PRC and DRV approved the proposals drawn up by the Soviet delegation and reached agreement on the stand to be taken by the socialist countries at the Geneva Conference. Its essence was to press for recognition of the independence of Vietnam and other countries of Indochina, prevent an expansion of the war and compel France to stop hostilities; to secure maximum favourable conditions which would make it possible eventually to ensure the total liberation of Vietnam.⁴

³ See *Archives of the USSR*.

⁴ *Archives...*

Before the Geneva Conference J. F. Dulles tried to organise a major military and political adventuristic action in Indochina. In March 1954 he came up with the idea of creating in Southeast Asia a bloc that could serve as a legal substantiation of armed interference in the war in Indochina. Balancing on the "brink of war" the US State Secretary urged the West to take "joint actions" in Indochina and launch an aggression against the PRC. He tried to force on London and Paris a declaration designed to torpedo the Geneva Conference and start the "joint actions" of the colonial powers against the peoples of Southeast Asia and the Far East. Dulles openly called on Britain and France to take part in a "big war" in Asia. For a number of reasons the British and French governments refused to take part in the joint venture. They had domestic problems of their own and also feared that a fulfilment of the Dulles plan could intensify the liberation struggle of the Asian peoples.

The discussion of the question of restoring peace in Indochina began at the Geneva Conference on the next day after the crushing defeat suffered by the French colonial troops in Vietnam: the surrender of the garrison of the fortress of Dienbienphu, which shocked the public opinion in France. Life itself forced the French government to seek an agreement.

The Conference was attended by representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and of the five great powers: the USSR, the PRC, the USA, France and Britain. The patriotic forces of Laos and Kampuchea in the person of the Lao Liberation Front (Neo Lao Itsala) and the Khmer Patriotic Front (Khmer Issarak) were not represented because of objections by the Western powers. Representatives of the royal governments of Kampuchea and Laos turned up at the Conference as well as a representative of Bao Dai, the puppet "emperor of Vietnam".

It was the first appearance of the People's Republic of China at an important international conference as a great power. True, this was clearly not to the liking of some of the participants. Thus, the head of the US delegation pointedly refused to shake hands with the PRC Premier Zhou Enlai.

Already on the first day of the Conference the French delegation submitted proposals that sidestepped political aspects of the problem and emphasised purely military measures (in Vietnam—concentration of regular army units in regrouping zones, disarmament of units not belonging either to the army or to security forces, etc; in Kampuchea and Laos—evacuation of Vietnam's forces, disarmament of units not belonging either to the army or to security forces, etc.). In other words, the French government's main concern was to give a respite to its expeditionary corps.

The DRV delegation presented its proposals on May 10. It demanded of France recognition of the sovereignty and independence of the three countries of Indochina and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from there. It was intended to hold elections in the countries of Indochina without any external interference whatsoever. Military measures included the ending of hostilities in Indochina and a subsequent withdrawal of foreign troops.

The DRV's proposals were supported by the Soviet delegation; V. M. Molotov, who headed it, stressed that the war in Indochina and first of all in Vietnam was not a civil war. For France it was a colonial war while it was a war of national liberation for the peoples of Indochina struggling for their freedom and independence from colonial domination. The head of the Soviet delegation insisted on the solution first of all of the question of the recognition by France of the sovereignty and independence of the countries of Indochina.

The US delegation impeded in every way the attainment of agreement. It put constant pressure on France alternating between tantalising

but mythical prospects of a military victory and threats to shoulder France out of Indochina by holding direct talks with representatives of the royal governments of Kampuchea and Laos and the Bao Dai regime. The US tried to move the discussion of the question of Indochina to the United Nations and, just as in the case of Korea, to smuggle resolutions suitable to it.

After the first speeches by the delegations painstaking work began in the lobbies. Frequent meetings of heads of delegations took place at the Palais de Nations, where the Conference was held, in the house where V. M. Molotov was staying, at Hotel Métropole where members of the Soviet delegation lived and worked, at the villa on the shore of Lake Geneva, where the Vietnamese delegation stayed, at the Hotel Beau Rouvage, the villa of the Chinese delegation, at the villa where the head of the French delegation lived. A vigorous process of working out the agreement was in progress. Deputy Premier of the DRV Pham Van Dong displayed marvelous flexibility and diplomatic talent.

After a complex diplomatic struggle agreements putting an end to the 8-year-long war in the countries of Indochina were signed on July 21, 1954. This was an important success of the peoples of Indochina, of the socialist states coming out against aggression, for respect of the right of peoples to shape their own destiny themselves, without imperialist interference.

In accordance with the agreement on ending hostilities in Vietnam, a temporary demarcation line was established along the 17th parallel and the timetable for the full withdrawal of the troops of the belligerents to the north and south of this line was determined. The Geneva Conference noted: "The military demarcation line is temporary and cannot be interpreted as being in any way whatsoever a political or territorial boundary."

The agreement prohibited the entry into Vietnam of foreign troops and foreign military personnel and also the delivery of any kind of weapons and munitions. The creation of military bases of foreign states in the regrouping zones of both sides was ruled out, and the sides undertook to see to it that their allocated zones did not belong to any military alliance and were not used for the resumption of hostilities or in the pursuance of an aggressive policy (Article 19 of the final declaration).

The Geneva Accords also provided for a political settlement in Vietnam on the basis of respect for the "principles of independence, territorial unity and integrity" (Article 7) by way of holding general free elections in July 1956.

In their relations with Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam the conference participants undertook "to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial unity and integrity of the above-mentioned states and to refrain from all interference in their internal affairs" (Article 12). In their turn, the governments of these countries undertook to pursue a policy of non-alignment and to guarantee all citizens a free participation as voters and candidates in general elections by secret ballot.

The governments of socialist countries stated their readiness jointly with all interested countries to ensure the full implementation of the Geneva Accords. The Soviet government stated on July 23, 1954 that by facilitating the easing of international tension the agreements reached in Geneva on the cease-fire and restoration of peace in Indochina create thereby favourable conditions for the settlement of other important outstanding international issues concerning not only Asia but also Europe.⁵

⁵ See *Pravda*, July 23, 1954.

The Geneva Accords did not mean a final solution of the Vietnamese, Kampuchean and Laotian questions. It was yet necessary to carry out a number of measures for their implementation and first of all to hold elections in the three countries so as to put an end to the temporary division of Vietnam and clarify political life in Kampuchea and Laos. Another extremely important task was to ensure total non-interference from the outside in the affairs of the countries of Indochina.

In accordance with its plans Washington concentrated on wrecking the Geneva Accords. Soon after the 1954 Geneva Conference, and contrary to the agreements concluded at it, the United States began a steady buildup of its military potential in South Vietnam, openly replacing France. On October 28, 1954 President Eisenhower sent a letter to Ngo Dinh Diem, who was appointed "prime minister" of South Vietnam in July, informing him that the United States would help South Vietnam directly, and not through the French as had been the past practice. On February 12, 1955 the Saigon authorities announced that henceforth the training of their troops would be supervised not by French but by American instructors. Late in April 1956 the French expeditionary troops left South Vietnam and the resultant "vacuum" was filled by the Americans. The US military mission directly supervised South Vietnam's military machine and the conduct of "psychological war", dealt with the organisation, arming and training of the Saigon troops. Strategic roads were built in South Vietnam with the direct participation of the United States and US military bases were being set up there.

In response to its political defeat in Geneva the United States rapidly began to knock together the SEATO military and political aggressive bloc which declared the whole of Southeast Asia a sphere of its operation.

With the support of the United States Ngo Dinh Diem busied himself with the creation of a "state" in the south of Vietnam. As a result of a "referendum" in October 1955 emperor Bao Dai was removed from power. The "Republic of Vietnam" was proclaimed on October 26, 1955 and Ngo Dinh Diem became its "president". Diem established a regime of ruthless terror in the south of Vietnam.

In accordance with the Geneva Agreements the DRV repeatedly made concrete proposals on the holding of general elections with the aim of unifying Vietnam. On February 4, 1955 the DRV government offered the Saigon authorities to normalise relations between the North and South of the country and to create favourable conditions for the holding of free elections. On June 6 and July 19, 1955 the DRV sent notes on the convocation with this purpose of a consultative conference. The DRV systematically came out with such proposals both before and after the expiry of the deadline for the unification of Vietnam set in Geneva (July 1956). On March 7 and December 22, 1958 the DRV offered Saigon to hold a meeting to discuss measures with the aim of ensuring the country's speediest unification.

But the Saigon authorities ignored the DRV's proposals. Already on July 16 and August 9, 1955 they stated their "non-recognition" of the Geneva Accords and rejected the convocation of a consultative conference and the holding of general elections in Vietnam. The United States encouraged Saigon's stand in every way. President Eisenhower admitted that were general elections held in Vietnam, as provided for by the Geneva Agreements, then 80 per cent of the population might well have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh.⁶ The US ruling circles tried to prevent this.

⁶ D. D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change. The White House Years 1953-1956*, New York, 1963, p. 372.

The people of South Vietnam had to take up arms. The National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLFSV) was created in December 1960. It united broad sections of the population and various patriotic organisations, and set the task of struggle for a democratic, peaceful, neutral and flourishing South Vietnam. The question of the unification of both parts of Vietnam was to be solved by the Vietnamese people itself without outside interference. The NLFSV created a regular army, guerrilla forces and a local militia. Relying on the people and performing functions of government institutions, the Front's administrative organisations ensured proper order in the liberated areas, this standing out in sharp contrast to the chaos and rightlessness existing in territories administered by Saigon.

This seriously alarmed the US ruling circles and prompted them to take the necessary measures: Ngo Dinh Diem was killed during a coup on November 1, 1963. When secret Pentagon documents were published in 1971 it became known that the coup in South Vietnam was staged with the knowledge of the United States which decided to bank on a military junta.

But Diem's overthrow did not bring any stabilisation in Saigon. On the contrary, one military coup followed another. In November 1963 power was seized by a military junta headed by General Duong Van Minh. General Nguyen Khanh became the dictator in 1964. Then a military junta headed by generals Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ki came to power in 1965 with the support of the United States. The United States increasingly had to involve itself in the struggle against the liberation movement. This was evidenced first of all by the constantly growing number of US servicemen in South Vietnam: from 5,500 in June 1962, to 16,700 in October 1963 and already 27,000 early in 1965.⁷

Expanding its armed interference, the United States unleashed an outright aggression against the DRV which was preceded by a provocation engineered by Washington. On August 2, 1964, in accordance with Washington's scenario the US destroyer Maddox entered the Gulf of Tonkin, violated the DRV's territorial waters and opened fire at its patrol boats. The latter opened fire in self-defence and chased the destroyer back into the open sea. Two days later Washington announced that Vietnamese naval vessels had allegedly attacked the destroyers Meddox and Turner Joy in international waters.

Using the provoked incidents as a pretext, the United States shelled and bombed the DRV's coastal areas on August 5, 1964. On August 10 the US President approved the law passed on August 7 at a joint sitting of the House of Representatives and Senate of the US Congress. This so-called Tonkin Resolution sanctioned the adoption by the US President of the necessary measures to repulse any armed attack on US armed forces and to avert further aggression.⁸

Thus began the US imperialism's heinous war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

When starting its massive bombings of DRV territory the US government declared that it was attacking only military targets. But in reality US planes bombed roads, ferries, ports, factories, towns and villages. The zone of air raids was steadily pushed northwards. Hanoi and Haiphong were bombed on June 29, 1966. At the same time the United States expanded its armed intervention in the south of Vietnam. The number of American soldiers in South Vietnam rose from 70,000 early in June 1965

⁷ See Yu. Y. Mikheyev, *Indochina: Road to Peace (Indochina Problems in the Light of Contemporary International Law)*, Moscow, 1977, pp. 70, 88.

⁸ *Congressional Records*, Vol. 110, August 7, 1964, p. 18471.

to 184,000 at the end of 1965, about 400,000 late in 1966 and to about 500,000 late in 1967. By the close of 1968 the United States had concentrated about 550,000 troops there.⁹ The operations of the US army were supported by the US 7th Fleet.

From the very outset of the US aggression the Soviet Union firmly sided with embattled Vietnam. Already on August 6, 1964, in connection with the anti-Vietnamese provocation engineered by the US destroyer Maddox, a statement was made in the USSR to the effect that "the aggressive actions of the United States in the Gulf of Tonkin, which lead to a dangerous intensification of the already tense situation in Southeast Asia, are resolutely condemned in authoritative Soviet circles".¹⁰ In connection with the military incident provoked by the United States in the Gulf of Tonkin on September 18, 1964 it was stated again: "The American interference in the affairs of the Vietnamese people might lead to very dangerous consequences, the entire responsibility for which will be borne by the United States."¹¹

On November 27, 1964 the Soviet Union lodged a resolute protest in connection with the intrusion of US military aircraft into the DRV's airspace. The actions of the US military, it was noted in a TASS Statement, are fraught with dangerous consequences for the cause of peace in Southeast Asia and in the whole world. In his telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRV Xuan Thuyi the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. A. Gromyko pointed out that "the Soviet Union, being loyal to the principles of proletarian internationalism, will not be indifferent to the fate of the fraternal socialist country and is prepared to give the DRV the necessary assistance should the aggressors dare encroach on its independence and sovereignty".¹²

Agreement on concrete measures to strengthen the DRV's defence potential and to hold regular consultations on this question was reached during the talks conducted by a Soviet delegation headed by the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin with Ho Chi Minh and other DRV leaders (February 6-10, 1965). Agreements on greater cooperation between the two countries were signed during the visit. On instruction of the CPSU CC and the Soviet government the Soviet delegation reiterated the Soviet Union's readiness to help safeguarding in every way the security of the fraternal socialist country and to give it the necessary assistance. The Soviet side voiced its full support for the just heroic struggle of the population of South Vietnam under the leadership of the National Liberation Front for independence, democracy, peace and neutrality.¹³

The Soviet Union stated an emphatic warning to the United States when US aviation started bombing the DRV territory. On February 9, 1965 the Soviet government stated that together with its allies and friends the USSR would be compelled to take further measures to protect the security and enhance the defence capability of the DRV. "Let no one have any doubt," the Statement noted, "that the Soviet Union will do this, that the Soviet people will fulfill their internationalist duty in respect of a fraternal socialist country."¹⁴ On March 4, 1965 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. A. Gromyko made a statement to the US Ambassador in Moscow stressing that the American side should

⁹ See Yu. Y. Mikheyev, *Indochina: Road to Peace*, p. 88.

¹⁰ *Pravda*, Aug. 6, 1964.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1964.

¹² *Combat Solidarity, Fraternal Assistance. Collection of Key Foreign Policy Documents of the USSR on the Vietnamese Question*, Moscow, 1970, p. 28.

¹³ See "Joint Statement of the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and a Delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam", *Pravda*, March 11, 1965.

¹⁴ *Pravda*, Feb. 9, 1965.

realise the far-reaching consequences for the international situation in general and for Soviet-American relations in particular of the development of events in Vietnam, should the United States further adhere to the aggressive course.¹⁵

As a participant and co-chairman of the Geneva Conferences of 1954 on Indochina and of 1962 on Laos, the USSR offered Britain to send a joint message of the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conferences condemning the aggressive actions of the United States in Vietnam, which are a flagrant violation of the Geneva Accords, and demanding an immediate end to these actions. The message contained a call to all countries participants in the 1954 Geneva Accords to come out with similar demands. Despite the British government's obstructionist position the Soviet Union, utilising its prerogatives of co-chairman, continued constantly and actively to come out in defence of the inalienable rights of the Vietnamese people, for the preservation of the effectiveness of the Geneva Accords.¹⁶

The Soviet Union and the DRV protested more than once the use of toxic chemicals by the US brass hats in South Vietnam. On March 26, 1965 the USSR government sent a note to the US government saying that "the use of chemical weapons against the population of South Vietnam is a most flagrant violation of generally recognised norms of international law, a flouting of elementary principles of human morality and humaneness".¹⁷

In the correspondence between the head of the Soviet government and the US President through the USSR Ambassador in the USA A. F. Dobrynin, during meetings of Soviet leaders with US representatives, in particular, during Alexei Kosygin's meeting with Lyndon Johnson in Glasborough in June 1967 the Soviet representatives called on the US administration to show common sense and to refrain from actions capable of leading to an expansion of the conflict and seriously affecting Soviet-American relations. Soviet diplomacy resolutely demanded an end to the aggression and first of all to the bombing of the DRV, the withdrawal from Vietnam of the troops of the United States and its allies and respect for the right of the Vietnamese people to solve their affairs themselves without outside interference.

Serious warnings were made to Japan because its territory and material resources were being used by the United States in waging the aggressive war in Vietnam.

The Soviet Union supplied embattled Vietnam with arms, munitions and material means and was prepared to take other measures too to repulse the US aggression. The Soviet government proposed to station fighter units at airfields in southern China (there were no adequate airfields in the DRV) which would reliably protect the DRV's territory. The PRC government did not consent to the deployment of such units. Moreover, the Chinese authorities obstructed the transit carriage through the PRC of arms and other military materials that were being sent to Vietnam by the USSR and other socialist countries. During the "cultural revolution" freight trains with arms for Vietnam took months to pass through China.

The Chinese leaders rejected all the proposals of the USSR and other socialist countries to join efforts in rendering assistance to Vietnam. They refused to issue a joint declaration on the US aggression against Vietnam either, although at the beginning, when Alexei Kosygin suggested this idea to Zhou Enlai during his stopover in Peking on the way to

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, March 5, 1965.

¹⁶ See M. P. Isayev, A. S. Chernyshev, *Soviet-Vietnamese Relations*, Moscow, 1975, pp. 187-188.

¹⁷ *Pravda*, March 27, 1965.

Hanoi in February 1965, the PRC leadership promised to treat it favourably.

But this position of the PRC did not prevent the vigorous actions of the USSR and other socialist countries in support of Vietnam and the mounting in the whole world of a powerful movement of solidarity with its struggle against the aggression.

The Vietnamese people dealt US imperialism a military and political defeat as a result of which Washington had to consent to the signing of the well-known Paris Agreement in 1973. The United States withdrew its troops from Vietnam but continued to give Saigon massive military and material assistance, urging it to continue the war. But the puppet regime collapsed under the powerful blows of the patriots. On April 30, 1975 the armed forces of the patriots liberated Saigon and the total liberation of South Vietnam was completed in May 1975.

The war against US imperialism required tremendous efforts from the Vietnamese people and its leadership and great sacrifices. As regards the strongest imperialist power, it brought it a serious defeat and for many years generated the "Vietnam syndrome" in the United States.

Consisting of deputies elected both in the North and the South, a session of the National Assembly adopted decisions on July 2, 1976 that completed the process of Vietnam's unification and proclaimed the creation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. When outlining the country's foreign policy the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam Le Duan stated that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam would march shoulder to shoulder with the socialist countries and the peoples of the whole world conducting a tireless struggle for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism. "United Vietnam", Le Duan said, "comes out for the establishment of relations with all countries regardless of their social system, on the basis of respect for independence, sovereignty, equality and mutual advantage. The Vietnamese people, together with the fraternal countries and all progressive forces, will wage struggle against the aggressive policy of imperialists headed by US imperialism, make an active contribution to the cause of strengthening peace and security in Southeast Asia and in the whole world."

A Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was signed in Moscow on November 3, 1978. It outlines the principles and directions of cooperation between the two countries. Article 6 of the Treaty says: "...Should one of the countries become the object of attack or threat of attack, the USSR and the SRV shall immediately initiate mutual consultations with the aim of eliminating such a threat and adopting appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries."¹⁸ The Treaty is an effective instrument of ensuring the SRV's security, of defending the socialist gains of the Vietnamese people and an important factor of peace in Southeast Asia.

Proceeding parallel to this was the difficult struggle of the peoples of Laos and Kampuchea for strengthening independence, for the democratic road of development.

Washington viewed Laos as an important stronghold in Southeast Asia. As a result, the United States tried to impede the attainment of accord between the Prime Minister of Laos Prince Souvanna Phouma and representatives of the Liberation Front of Laos on a political settlement. Souvanna Phouma resigned in September 1954. The Katai Sasorit go-

¹⁸ *Pravda*, Nov. 11, 1978.

vernment, which rallied the reactionary forces behind it, began to toe Washington's line. It flung open the doors for US "aid" which was used as an instrument of pressure against the patriotic forces of Laos. Early in 1955 the right-wing forces staged a military provocation in the northern provinces of Huaphan and Phongsali against the patriotic forces which were present there in accordance with the 1954 Geneva agreements.

At talks with a delegation of the Katai Sasorit government, that began in January 1955, the delegation of the Liberation Front of Laos demanded first of all an end to the hostilities and the commencement of a study in special commissions of questions related to the unification of the country and the inclusion of the Front's representatives in the government. The delegation of Sasorit's government stated that it could discuss only the question of the Front's surrender. When the Front's representatives rejected this demand the delegation of the Katai Sasorit government walked out of the conference.

A procrastinated civil war began in the country. During this war numerous ceasefires were concluded and short-lived agreements worked out, including the one on forming a coalition government adopted at the Geneva Conference on Laos in 1961-1962. The US imperialists together with the right-wing forces in Laos strove to weaken the left-wing forces to the maximum and to put the neutralist forces under their control.

In connection with the expansion of the aggression in Vietnam Washington decided already in the summer of 1964 to switch to vigorous actions in Laos. On April 1, 1965 President Lyndon Johnson of the United States issued an order on the stepped up bombing of Laotian territory controlled by the armed forces of the Patriotic Front.¹⁹ The right-wing grouping in Laos was being supplied by US arms and munitions from Thailand and South Vietnam in ever growing amounts. More and more US servicemen were operating in Laos under the guise of "advisers" and "specialists". The US aviation bombed areas controlled by the PFL. By the end of 1968, 400-500 sorties were made daily. Early in 1971 US planes dropped 3,000 tons of bombs a day.²⁰

As a co-chairman of the Geneva Conference on Laos the Soviet Union closely watched the situation in that country. Soviet diplomacy took the necessary steps to ensure strict observance of the Geneva agreements, cut short the US intervention and prevent the Vientiane authorities from departing from the positions of neutrality. The Soviet Union cautioned the United States government against bringing troops into Laos and spreading war to the territory of that country, and demanded an end to the intervention and respect for the neutrality of Laos.

In February 1971 the US-Saigon troops launched a big military operation in Laos. The Pentagon hoped to cut the communication lines of the liberation forces and drastically change the military situation in the Indochina Peninsula. In its statement of February 26, 1971 the Soviet government strongly protested the intrusion of US-Saigon troops into Laos. The operation ended in March 1971 in a total rout of the intruders.

The Vietnamese people's victory, the general collapse of imperialist policy in Indochina made the further democratic development of Laos possible. The right-wing forces were paralysed. The peaceful transition of power to the Laotian people became an objective possibility in these circumstances. The People's Revolutionary Party, the party of Laotian Communists, played a big role in the consistent development of the revolutionary process in Laos, in the success of the revolution and the victory

¹⁹ In January 1956 the Liberation Front of Laos was transformed into the Neo Lao Haksat—the Patriotic Front of Laos (PFL).

²⁰ See Yu. Y. Mikheyev, *Indochina: Road to Peace*, p. 178.

of the patriotic forces in the country. On December 2, 1975 the National Congress of People's Representatives proclaimed Laos a People's Democratic Republic. The struggle conducted under the guidance of the People's Revolutionary Party (in the period from 1954 to 1972 it was called the People's Party of Laos) was crowned with the creation of organs of people's revolutionary power, the establishment of genuine peace and the attainment of the unity in Laos. Souphanouvong was elected President of the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly of the LPDR, while the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party of Laos Kaysone Phomvihane was appointed Prime Minister.

This event of historic significance in the life of the friendly Laotian people in their struggle against imperialist aggression and local reaction for independence, peace, democracy and social progress was welcomed with deep satisfaction in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union offered assistance to the Lao People's Democratic Republic. A party and government delegation of the LPDR headed by Kaysone Phomvihane visited the USSR in April-May 1976. The talks revealed the full unity of views of the USSR and the LPDR both on questions of bilateral relations and on pressing problems of contemporary international life. A trade agreement, an agreement on trade turnover and payments, an agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation, a protocol on Soviet assistance to Laos in creating a state geological service were signed during the Laotian delegation's stay in the Soviet Union.

The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the LPDR and the SRV, signed in July 1977, became a guarantee of the young republic's security.

The 1954 Geneva Accords, however, failed to protect Kampuchea from foreign interference as well. Capitalising on the internal strife in Kampuchea and its financial straits the United States forced on it a treaty of "military assistance" in May 1955. The SEATO bloc placed South Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea under its "protection". Through official and unofficial channels Washington offered the Kampuchean government to join SEATO. Kampuchea's refusal was penalised by economic repressions by the United States. Following Washington's instructions Thailand and the Saigon authorities closed the borders and established an economic blockade of Kampuchea.²¹

Relentless pressure by the United States and its SEATO allies forced the Kampuchean government to take certain steps to develop relations with socialist countries. The latter gave it economic assistance and moral support in the struggle in defence of national sovereignty. This support was of special importance for Kampuchea early in the 1960s when the United States sharply intensified aggressive actions in South Vietnam and Laos.²²

Acting through the reactionary circles in South Vietnam and Thailand, the United States provoked military-political conflicts with Kampuchea. When the armed struggle of patriots in South Vietnam began, the Saigon regime also increased pressure on Kampuchea. Saigon charged that the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam was using Kampuchean territory in its guerrilla struggle. US advisers in Saigon claimed that NLF units escaped from pursuit to the territory of Kampuchea and then returned to South Vietnam.

²¹ See *History of Kampuchea. Brief Essay*, Moscow, 1981, pp. 173-174.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 181.

Kampuchea demanded that the United States restrain its allies from provocations. Since this was not done, it held the United States responsible for the incidents. On November 12, 1963 the Kampuchean government announced its rejection, starting with January 1, 1964, of US economic and military "aid" and demanded the departure of the US military mission. In response the United States and the local reactionary pro-imperialist forces again stepped up pressure on the government of Kampuchea, pressing for a reorientation of its domestic and foreign policy. By achieving the latter Washington hoped for a serious change of the military and political situation in Indochina in its favour.

Right-wing forces that had the support of US imperialist circles staged a coup in Pnompenh on March 18, 1970. The then head of state Norodom Sihanouk who was on a trip abroad, was overthrown, and the government was headed by General Lon Nol who immediately started getting lavish US aid, including military hardware.

Under the pretext of "searching" for troops of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam the US-Saigon troops intruded into the territory of Kampuchea with Lon Nol's consent late in April 1970. The US aviation bombed the country while the navy sealed off its coast. Many populated localities were hit and some of them were totally destroyed. At a press conference on May 4, 1970 the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin read out a special statement of the Soviet government condemning the coup and the aggression against Kampuchea, and firmly stating the Soviet Union's support for the liberation struggle of the patriotic forces of Kampuchea.²³

The intrusion of US troops into the territory of Kampuchea and the flouting of its neutrality were condemned in the whole world, even by America's allies. On finding itself politically isolated the US government was forced to withdraw its ground forces from Kampuchea by July 1, 1970, but a part of the Saigon armed forces remained on its territory till January 1972. The people's armed forces of national liberation of Kampuchea waged a difficult struggle against the Lon Nol troops supported by the US air force and navy. Washington made repeated attempts to open talks with the patriotic forces so as to save the Pnompenh regime under the shingle of a "compromise settlement". The patriotic forces ignored these manoeuvres and steadily built up their military offensive against the Lon Nol regime.

The reactionary regime finally collapsed in mid-April 1975 when the liberation of South Vietnam was being completed. Speaking in Congress on April 10, 1975 President Ford admitted that it was too late to do anything to save the Pnompenh regime.²⁴ The situation was totally hopeless and the United States at long last stopped giving assistance to the remnants of Lon Nol's supporters. The troops of the patriots entered Pnompenh on April 17, 1975.

But after the victory of the patriotic forces power in the country was seized by extremists who oriented themselves on China. They established in Kampuchea a regime that began literally to decimate the nation. Moreover, it started an undeclared war against Vietnam.

The national-patriotic forces launched a resolute struggle against the criminal clique. It was headed by the United Front for the National Salvation (UFNS) of Kampuchea, which was formed in December 1978. The Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime collapsed in January 1979 and its ringleaders fled the country. The People's Republic of Kampuchea was proclaimed in Pnompenh. Its security is protected by units of Vietnamese volunteers and the armed forces of People's Kampuchea.

²³ *Pravda*, May 5, 1970.

²⁴ See *Ibid.*, April 12, 1975.

The Soviet Union welcomed the victory of the revolutionary-patriotic forces of Kampuchea. A telegram sent by Soviet leaders to the Chairman of the People's Revolutionary Council, Chairman of the Central Committee of the UFNS of Kampuchea Heng Samrin stressed that the USSR would further develop and strengthen traditional relations of friendship and cooperation with Kampuchea, give the Kampuchean people support in the construction of a peaceful, independent, nonaligned Kampuchea advancing along the road to socialism.²⁵

The collapse of the regime of genocide in Kampuchea caused an extremely negative reaction in the PRC. The latter is giving the Pol Pot men allround material and political support.

The Geneva Conference was an amazing diplomatic tournament which reflected complex international processes. One can state with full confidence that had the agreements worked out at the conference been carried out, there would have been no long wars in Indochina and the tremendous sacrifices would have been unnecessary. But imperialism failed in its bid to retain the countries of Indochina in the sphere of its domination. It was confronted by the resolve of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea to achieve independence and progress, by the solidarity with them of the USSR, the other socialist countries and many other peoples, time itself was against it.

Thirty years after the Geneva Conference, in February 1984, the author again visited the countries of Indochina. Kampuchea has not yet fully recovered from the tremendous material and especially manpower losses resultant of the Pol Pot regime's crimes. At the same time the fact is indisputable that the people of Kampuchea are living better with every year and feeling more confident despite provocations by the Pol Pot men.

The wounds left by the war on the land of Vietnam have not yet healed, there are still many economic problems, for the country had to wage war for several decades. But a marvelous bridge already spans the Red River, big power stations and plants have been built, and platforms are appearing off the shore near Hochiminh City to carry out exploratory drilling of oil. These projects are a symbol of Soviet-Vietnamese friendship.

Big progress is noticeable in Laos. The first industrial enterprises, hospitals and new educational establishments have appeared. The ancient country, until recently very backward, is making its first steps towards socialism.

But external forces do not want to leave the countries of Indochina in peace. They are using Pol Pot men and other scum entrenched in the territory of Thailand to wage a real war against Kampuchea. Cut-throat detachments are also being infiltrated into Laos. Crude pressure, including armed provocations, is being employed against Vietnam.

But the choice made by the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea is irrevocable. This is beginning to be increasingly realised in the ASEAN countries as well. The call by the countries of Indochina for an end to confrontation, for dialogue, for the creation in Southeast Asia of a zone of peace, security and cooperation is being received with growing understanding there.

²⁵ See *Pravda*, Jan. 10, 1979.

PRC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS BLAMED ON PAST MISTAKES

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 84 pp 42-51

[Article by V. I. Akimov, doctor of economic sciences, and S. S. Yemel'yanova, candidate of economic sciences: "Dynamics of Chinese Economic Development"]

The problem of growth rates and proportions in the national economy occupies a special place among a host of economic problems which have been discussed by the Chinese press during the past few years. The People's Republic of China has begun to publish extensive statistics characterising the dynamics of the country's economic growth and the development of its key industries, and also structural changes in the economy, which makes it possible to analyse the economic development of the PRC throughout its history from this point of view.

Economic growth rates and branch improvements are essential to the national economic development of any country. In the PRC these problems have been approached in different ways and tackled on the basis of socio-economic and political development concepts which have been revised on more than one occasion. We believe that even a cursory review of the dynamics and structure of the national economy of the PRC at every stage of its history will help to give a more accurate analysis of the current state of the Chinese economy and the prospects for its growth. Here it should be borne in mind, however, that statistics released in the PRC, as Chinese sources themselves point out, far from always correctly reflect the actual situation.

DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

The problem of economic growth rates acquired priority economic and political significance in the economically backward country with a huge population that China was at the time of the 1949 Revolution. The choice of the socialist way of industrialisation during the PRC's early years predetermined extremely high economic growth rates and substantial structural changes in the national economy. The general line for the period of transition, developed by the Party in 1952, envisioned socialist industrialisation as one of the major tasks to be implemented. It was noted in the General Line theses, which were approved in late 1953: "The main task of our Party and the entire people after the victory of the revolution is... to turn the economically backward and poor agrarian country into a socialist power."¹ The course of socialist industrialisation in the period of transition presupposed the priority development of heavy industry, which was called upon to produce essential technology for industry as a whole, transport and agriculture. Great emphasis was laid on the planned development of consumer industry, agriculture, cottage industries, transport and other sectors. The overall task was the planned and harmonious development of all branches of the economy on the basis of the accelerated development of heavy industry so as to raise the living standards of the mass of the working people. It was planned that socialist industrialisation would be completed during roughly three five-year-plan periods beginning in 1953.

The implementation of the Party's general line was preceded by a period of rehabilitation of the national economy (1949-1952), which was

¹ See *Modern China: Socio-Economic Problems*, Moscow, 1972, p. 119 (in Russian).

characterised by exceptionally high and predominantly stable rehabilitation and economic growth rates. Between 1950 and 1952 the aggregate gross output of industry and agriculture together was rising by an average of 21.1 per cent a year (of industry by 34.8 per cent and of agriculture by 14.1 per cent), and freight turnover on transport grew by 44.2 per cent. During this period capital investments increased by 280 per cent and the national income grew averagely by 19.3 per cent a year.² The rapid rehabilitation and development of the productive forces were promoted by major socio-economic transformations, the establishment of a national financial and economic system, patriotism and enthusiasm of the mass of the population for work, and by the large-scale and diverse assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The CPC's General Line in the period of transition was embodied in the drafting and fulfilment of the PRC's First Five-Year Plan of economic development (1953-1957). During that time, when socialist industrialisation was consistently being implemented, the national economy was also developing at a fast pace: the average annual increment in the national income was 8.9 per cent, in the gross output of industry and agriculture together 10.9 per cent, (of industry 18 per cent and of agriculture 4.5 per cent), in freight turnover on transport 19 per cent, and in the volume of capital investment about 26 per cent. China led most of the world in the growth rates in industry, transport and capital construction. At the same time individual branches of material production were developing unevenly, fluctuating markedly from one year to another.

Certain mistakes and miscalculations were made in economic development during the First Five-Year-Plan period: for instance, industrialisation was unduly intensified in 1956 while the share of capital investment in and assistance to agriculture were reduced; the role of Shanghai, Tianjin and some other old industrial bases was underestimated, etc. Nevertheless, the foundations of socialist industry were effectively laid with the help of the USSR and other socialist countries, the efficiency of social production improved considerably, and the living standards of the mass of the working people were being raised.

The national economy fell on hard times during the period of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960), which the PRC's official press now openly discusses. Economic growth rates were artificially pushed up under the course of "superindustrialisation" with its emphasis on the iron-and-steel industry, particular stress being laid on small-scale production and backward conventional technology.

That period was characterised by dramatically growing imbalances in the development of individual economic branches. In 1958 industry registered a 54.8 per cent increase in production, the highest in the entire history of the PRC, including 78.8 per cent for heavy industry. But already the following year the increase was cut back by almost a third and in 1960 by more than two-thirds over the previous year. In 1960 the output of light industry shrank markedly—by 9.8 per cent—for the first time since the establishment of the People's Republic. It is common knowledge that industry produced vast quantities of shoddy, substandard products during the years of the Great Leap.

As a result of errors in agricultural policy, the gross agricultural output decreased in 1959-1960 on average by 13 per cent, and the volume of agricultural output in 1960 was 3.6 per cent below the 1952 level. The increment in capital investment in the economy stood at 93 per cent in 1958, 29.1 per cent in 1959 and 11.4 per cent in 1960. Huge resources—almost 100 billion yuan³—were invested in the national economy, but a

² See *Weidadi shinian* (The Great Decade), Peking, 1959, p. 18.

³ See *Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1981*, Peking, 1982, p. 295.

large part of them were used irrationally. Freight turnover in transport was growing rapidly—by roughly 35 per cent a year—in 1958 and 1959. But despite these high indices, the performance of the national economy during those years was poor; moreover, according to Chinese economists, the losses of the three years of the Great Leap totalled 100 billion yuan of the national income.⁴

Resulting from excessive strain on the economy and difficulties in agriculture, industrial production dropped, capital construction was curtailed and freight turnover diminished in 1961-1962; in 1961 there was further decrease of farm output (gross output dropped by 2.4 per cent over the year), and it was not until 1962 that farm production began to grow. During the same period production was curtailed at tens of thousands of factories and many smaller factories were abandoned. Between 1958 and 1962 the national income was decreasing by 3.1 per cent a year,⁵ and in real terms, the national income generated in 1962 exceeded the figure for 1957 by a mere 1.8 per cent in comparable prices.

Industrial and agricultural production and transport were being rehabilitated and capital construction developed in 1963-1965. By the end of the "readjustment" period the situation in the economy had been improved through great effort and some of the consequences of the Great Leap had been removed. In 1965, however, the volume of industrial production had not yet reached the 1959 figure, particularly in heavy industry, freight turnover on transport was below the 1960 level, and capital investments were only half of those in 1959. During that time the gross output of agriculture increased by 37 per cent and the national income by 50 per cent.

A very grave economic situation arose in China during its Third Five-Year Plan of economic development (1966-1970). That plan was never fulfilled because of the "cultural revolution", which, as the Chinese press admits, "inflicted grim privations upon the Party, the state and the peoples of different nationalities".⁶

In spite of the "cultural revolution", which was gaining momentum at the time, economic development throughout almost the whole of 1966 continued in accordance with the policies laid down during the last two years of the "readjustment" period. This explains the high growth rates in the national economy (for instance, gross industrial output expanded by almost 21 per cent and agricultural output by 8.6 per cent). During the next two years, however, industrial output decreased, and in 1968 gross industrial output fell below the 1965 level.

In agriculture the growth rates of gross output in 1967 and 1969 were below the average annual population growth, while in 1968 production declined by 2.5 per cent. As a consequence, gross farm output in 1969 was still at the 1966 level. During the five-year period only in 1970 there was a considerable increase of 11.5 per cent in production.

Investments in capital construction were reduced in 1967 and 1968. The volume of investments in 1968 was 20 per cent smaller than in 1965. In real terms capital investments of 10.4 billion yuan were substantially below the 1956 figure of 14.8 billion yuan, and exceeded the 1966 level only in 1970.

Chinese economists believe that the draft Fourth Five-Year Plan of economic development (1971-1975) included the erroneous idea of another Great Leap with emphasis on the iron-and-steel industry (steel production, for instance, was planned to be brought to 35-40 million tons from 13 million tons in 1969).⁷ Domestic political tensions during those

⁴ See *Renmin ribao*, April 9, 1981.

⁵ See *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 21, 1981.

⁶ See *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 30, 1982.

⁷ See *Zhongguo shehui kexue*, 1980, No. 3.

years had an adverse effect on the growth of production: the average annual increment in industry was 9.1 per cent (with the maximum rise of 15.1 per cent registered in 1975 and the minimum rise of 0.3 per cent in 1974), while in 1974 production in heavy industry even shrank.⁸

The average annual increment in the gross farm output during that period stood at 4 per cent. In 1971 the increment was 3.1 per cent, the following year it declined slightly and in 1973-1975 it was above 4 per cent (with the peak figure of 8.4 per cent registered in 1973).

The most unstable growth rates of all material production sectors were found in capital construction. The highest capital investment growth figures were registered in 1971 (9 per cent) and 1975 (7.7 per cent). In other years the figures were as follows: 1972—a drop of 2.7 per cent, 1973 and 1974—a rise of 1 and 3.7 per cent, respectively. Freight turnover on transport grew in 1971, 1973 and 1975 by roughly 11 per cent a year, in 1972 by 7 per cent and in 1974 by a mere 0.3 per cent.

During the Fifth Five-Year-Plan period (1976-1980), the growth rates of material production were not stable, either. The worst year was 1976, when the annual production increment in industry was 1.3 per cent and in agriculture 2.5 per cent. Investments in capital construction shrank by 8.3 per cent and freight turnover on transport dropped by 5 per cent. According to the Chinese press, the national economy was on the brink of catastrophe by 1976.

In 1977 and 1978 strenuous efforts were made to fulfil the ten-year economic development programme (1976-1985) and, as Chinese experts conclude, industrial production was unduly expanded (gross output rose by 14.3 and 13.5 per cent, respectively). In 1978 the scope of capital construction rose steeply as capital investments were increased by 31.6 per cent.

After the slump of 1976, freight turnover on transport was growing rapidly—by 11.5 per cent a year—in 1977 and 1978.

It should be stressed, however, that these achievements only seem impressive against the background of the crisis which hit the country in 1976 (for instance, in that year the national income dropped by 2.7 per cent). Subsequent growth, therefore, was explained to a large extent by rehabilitation processes in the economy rather than by its substantial restructuring.

The fulfilment of the ten-year plan showed that many of the economic targets included in it had been set without due regard for the actual economic situation. Addressing the second session of the Fifth National People's Congress in June 1979, Yu Qiuli, Chairman of the RPC's State Planning Committee said that "serious imbalances have not yet been put right in the national economy, or chaos and disorder removed from production, construction, the services and distribution."⁹ The country has again adopted a course of economic "readjustment," which was initially planned for a three-year period. Under that policy stringent restrictions were imposed on the growth of capital investments (the rises in 1979 and 1980 were 4.2 and 7.9 per cent, respectively). The growth rate in industrial production was slowed (8.5 and 8.8 per cent), while consumer industry was outpacing heavy industry (9.6 and 18.4 per cent against 7.7 and 1.4 per cent respectively). Gross farm output grew by 8.6 per cent in 1979, while the 1980 rise of 3.9 per cent was far smaller. Moreover, the high 1979 figure was largely due to a rise in purchasing prices, which averaged 22.1 per cent, and to higher production growth rates in rural industrial plants and subsidiary economic units, whose

⁸ See *Zhongguo jingji* 1981, Peking, 1982, p. VI-13.

⁹ *Renmin ribao*, June 29, 1979.

output is counted as a part of the gross farm output. The national income in 1979-1980 was rising by roughly 7 and 6.1 per cent a year respectively.

According to Chinese statistics, the national economy of the PRC is generally developing at a high rate. Between 1953 and 1982 the aggregate gross output of industry and agriculture together expanded 10.3 times, (21.2 times for industry and 3.1 times for agriculture), and the national income rose 5.8 times.¹⁰ At the same time, as the figures cited above indicate, the development of the Chinese economy is not stable, with periods of high growth more than once followed by recession and stagnation. Moreover, economic growth has been characterised by bad imbalances.

STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

The dynamics of the economic growth rates manifest themselves in the structural patterns of the national economy. Even at a macro economic level a review of these patterns makes it possible to identify the regularities and peculiarities of the entire reproduction process.

First and foremost we shall examine proportions between individual branches of the national economy. These are represented best of all by the structure of the generated national income:¹¹

	1952	1957	1978	1982
Industry	19.5	28.3	46.8	42.2
Agriculture	57.7	46.8	35.4	44.6
Construction	3.6	5.0	4.1	4.6
Transport and communications	4.3	4.3	3.9	3.1
Trade	14.9	15.6	9.8	5.5

These figures show that, on the whole, individual sectors were developing in the right direction, which first made itself felt in a considerable growth of the share of industry and a reduction in that of agriculture. At the same time, those changes were uneven in individual periods. For instance, during the rehabilitation period and the First Five-Year-

Plan period the Chinese economy was overcoming the imbalances between the branches, inherited from the old China, at a faster pace than it did during the next 20 years or so. The improvements in branch balances that accompanied the quantitative economic growth during the first eight years contributed in their turn to raising the efficiency of the national economy as a whole and to speeding up economic growth, but that period was not enough to completely resolve the structural problem of the national economy.

The slowing of economic growth rates after 1957, particularly in industry, put a brake on rearrangement of branches in the national economy. Moreover, while industry's contribution to the national income during the 1970s exceeded that of agriculture, the early 1980s already saw the emergence of a reverse tendency. Despite industry having a sufficiently high share, the structure of the Chinese economy cannot be considered industrial even today. The fact is that industrial growth in the PRC is ensured to a considerable extent by small-scale local (cottage and semi-cottage) industries, which account for up to 50 per cent of gross industrial product. In addition, we should bear in mind price discrepancies, favouring industrial production, which artificially inflate the contribution of industry to the generated national income. Chinese agriculture with its weak material and technical base still forms a high proportion of the economy as compared with industrialised countries (for instance, in the CMEA countries agriculture generates 8-20 per cent of

¹⁰ See *Zhongguo tongji nianjian* 1983, Peking, 1983; *Jingji guanli*, 1982, No. 1, p. 4.

¹¹ See *Zhongguo tongji nianjian* 1983, p. 24.

the national income). As for the aggregate contribution of industry and agriculture to the national income, far from declining, as is characteristic of industrialised countries, it grew considerably from 75 per cent in 1957 to 86 per cent in the early 1980s. The other material production branches today account for a considerably smaller share of the national income than even in 1952, when that figure was 23 per cent. All this indicates deep imbalances in the economy, which will take a lot of time and effort to remove. The growth of industrial and agricultural production should be backed by adequately developed construction industry, trade and procurement systems, material and technical supply, and communications and infrastructure. But it was precisely in these branches of the Chinese economy that the situation was found to be least satisfactory and serious attention has recently begun to be paid to them.

The overall result of the PRC's policy concerning the economic structure is the striking predominance of production as compared with the non-production sphere, which is also holding back national economic development. As a rule, the proportion of employment in retail trade and the services continues to grow along with economic growth, but the PRC has been displaying an opposite tendency. As Sun Shangqing, a notable economist, has pointed out, the number of workers and employees had grown by 150 per cent by the end of 1977 as compared with 1957, the trade agencies had expanded by a mere one-third. The ratio of labour employed in trade to the country's total workforce was 1:8 in 1957 and 1:12 in 1977, while the number of customers per employee in retail trade grew by 45 per cent.¹²

The attitude of the Chinese leadership to the non-production sphere has changed drastically in the last few years. It is pointed out, for instance, that the development of trade, banking, the services, science, culture, education, etc., will contribute to the improvement of the living standards and to the development of production; moreover, it will become a major means of resolving the employment problem. In 1982 the country already had 3,299,000 shops, canteens and other service centres, representing a 150 per cent increase over 1978, while employment in the services had risen by 73.2 per cent.¹³ At the 12th CPC Congress Hu Yaobang stressed the growing importance of the performance of retail trade and the dependence on it of both industrial and agricultural production and the life of the people as a whole. It is symptomatic that as much as 71 billion yuan was invested in the non-production sphere between 1978 and 1982, which is about 75 per cent of the aggregate investment in this sphere between 1950 and 1982.

The facts show that the prolonged chase after high growth indices with the emphasis on heavy industry resulted in acute branch imbalances and led the economy as a whole into a grave crisis. It became perfectly clear that only the removal of these numerous imbalances could ensure the stable and dynamic growth of the national economy. Small wonder that this problem is the main concern of the Chinese leadership today.

Economic imbalances, it is pointed out in China today, were caused first and foremost by an irrational correlation of accumulation and consumption in the national income. An analysis of economic growth since the emergence of the PRC shows that Chinese leaders have been taking diametrically opposite approaches to proportions between accumulation and consumption. Accumulation to consumption ratios were rational and well justified in 1949-1957 and during the "readjustment" period (1963-1965), when the accumulation rate was close to the optimal figure (an average of 24.2 and 22.7 per cent, respectively) as it ensured a suffi-

¹² See *Jingji kexue*, 1980, No. 1.

¹³ See *Renmin ribao*, May 27, 1982.

ently high rate of growth of the national income and constant improvements in the living standards of the population. For instance, during the First Five-Year-Plan period consumption was growing by an average of 8.3 per cent a year, or 6 per cent in per capita terms. The average wages and salaries of factory and office workers rose during that period by 42.8 per cent, and were rising by 10 per cent a year between 1963 and 1965.¹⁴

At all other times in the history of the PRC emphasis was laid on maximising the accumulation rate even to the detriment of consumption in order to speed up economic growth. Official Chinese statistics, however, show that a higher accumulation rate in no way ensured an appropriate increase in growth rates. Instead of intensifying economic growth the maximised accumulation rate in the national income slowed and even halted the growth rates. These processes were characteristic of the period of the Great Leap and the entire decade of the "cultural revolution", when the accumulation rate exceeded 30 per cent, even reaching 43.8 per cent in 1959.

Analysing the practice of economic construction, official agencies in the PRC today openly admit that the encouragement of high growth rates by reducing people's consumption and maintaining a very high accumulation rate has not justified itself, and that a dear price has had to be paid for the consequences of that practice. The consequences of the low living standards caused by the high accumulation rate, have proved so grave that the Chinese leadership today has to face the need to raise the living standards as a major precondition for further economic progress. This problem was discussed at the 12th CPC Congress and at sessions of the National People's Congress and continues to be debated on a large scale in Chinese newspapers and journals. Xue Muqiao and other Chinese economists believe that it was precisely inordinately high accumulation rates that were the decisive factor of imbalances and setbacks in the national economy after 1958.¹⁵ In China today emphasis is naturally being laid on the need to work out the optimum balance between consumption and accumulation and the sensible equilibrium of the First Five-Year-Plan period is held as a model of the "golden mean". The reduction of the accumulation rate to 25 per cent was considered the primary task of "readjustment" and a guarantee of successful economic development in the future, and certain steps were taken to achieve that end. Between 1978 and 1981 the consumption fund was raised by a total of 46 per cent, while the national income grew by 29 per cent, and the accumulation rate dropped from 36.8 per cent in 1978 to 28.5 per cent in 1981. It is symptomatic that from 1979 to 1981 87.1 out of the 87.4 billion yuan of the aggregate increment in the national income (in these three years) were used for personal and public consumption,¹⁶ while total spending on employment schemes, on raising the incomes of the urban and rural population, on housing, etc., totalled 140 billion yuan during the same period, or 31 per cent of state revenue.¹⁷ In addition to direct spending on the improvement of living standards, a large share of accumulated resources began to be used for the same purpose through stimulation of the non-production sphere. As a result of all these measures, the incomes of farmers more than doubled in comparison with 1978 and those of factory and office workers rose by 38.3 per cent.¹⁸

¹⁴ See *Renmin ribao*, May 15, 1980.

¹⁵ See *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 7, 1979; Oct. 13, 1981; *Hongqi*, No. 23, 1980, pp. 11-15; *Jingji yanjiu*, No. 2, 1981, pp. 25-31.

¹⁶ See *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 5, 1982.

¹⁷ See *Renmin ribao*, March 22, 1982.

¹⁸ See *Beijing ribao*, Aug. 15, 1983.

Pursuing a policy of augmenting the consumption fund, the Chinese leadership at the same time points out today that improvements in living standards through the spending of accumulation in the past few years have had a "rectifying nature", and been caused by the need "to repay piled up debts", and cannot continue for any protracted period of time. Specialists point out that the development of production, which necessitates the growth of accumulation, can be the only solid basis for raising living standards. It is symptomatic that in 1982 the accumulation rate, instead of declining, as everyone expected, rose to 29 per cent, that is, to the target set only for the end of the five-year period.

The tasks of national economic development of the PRC and of raising the living standards of the population are therefore in constant contradiction, which makes the problem of the accumulation to consumption ratio very complex. The main reason for this situation is the low level of economic development: the PRC generates about one forty-sixth of the national income of the USA and one thirty-seventh of that of Japan in per capita terms.¹⁹ Demographic tensions, for their part, have an adverse effect on the national income, narrowing possibilities for reallocating it.

The ratio between the national income and the state budget plays an important role in national economic development.

In the early years of the PRC, huge material and cash resources had to be tapped to rehabilitate the national economy and to industrialise the country. Accordingly, the share of the national income contributed to the state budget grew from 15 per cent in 1950 to 27.6 per cent in 1952 and reached virtually the maximum possible value for the given development stage during the First Five-Year-Plan period, preserving the average level of 33.6 per cent.²⁰ The attempt to speed up the economic growth rate during the period of the Great Leap also made itself manifest in the dramatic growth of resources concentrated by the state: between 1958 and 1962 the average figure was 38.6 per cent of the national income. Even that increase, however, was artificial and entirely groundless because the economic machinery as a whole was not prepared for such a swift change of attitude both to the mobilisation of resources and their efficient use. The unexpectedly steep rise of the share of resources appropriated for the state budget was one of the excesses of the Great Leap policy, which threw the entire economy into disarray. During the "readjustment" period (1963-1965) state budget revenue amounted to 34.2 per cent of the national income and in 1966-1978 to 33.5 per cent, even reaching 37.2 per cent in 1978 in an apparent relapse to the Great Leap policy.²¹ However, the attempts to readjust that ratio in subsequent years led to another excess, namely, a dramatic plunge in state budget revenue and the share of the national income redistributed through it, which in 1982 was a mere 25.5 per cent. This was actually the lowest figure in the PRC's history.

It is symptomatic that the decrease in state budget revenue was accompanied by a steep rise in extra-budgetary resources: in the four years between 1979 and 1982 these grew by 75 per cent to reach 65 billion yuan in 1982 as compared with 37.1 billion yuan in 1978. Extra-budgetary resources reached 50 per cent of the budgetary ones in comparison with 20 per cent during the Second and Third Five-Year-Plan periods and a mere 7 per cent during the First.²²

¹⁹ In *Beijing Review*, 1983, No. 1, p. 16.

²⁰ See *Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1981*, p. 21.

²¹ See *Renmin ribao*, July 15, 1983.

²² See *Jingji yanjiu*, 1981, No. 11, p. 11.

As resources are dispersed, control of the overall volume of capital construction and the growth of the consumption fund is impossible. Naturally, the 12th CPC Congress, sessions of the National People's Congress and the press emphasised the need to tighten state control of economic development, of production and financial discipline, to concentrate a certain share of resources in the hands of the state so as to direct them into weaker economic sectors and to ensure the priority construction of major projects. Chinese experts believe that, unless these problems are resolved, faster economic growth in the PRC will be impossible in later years. In this context Finance Minister Wang Bingqian has stressed the need to raise the share of the national income, redistributed through the state budget, to 28-30 per cent.²³ This goal will be pursued by the reorganisation of the entire financial system, which has been planned by the PRC's State Council to last three years. The official view is that the dovetailing of that system with the planning of capital construction, material supply and price formation should help to comprehensively balance the national economy.

PROPER BALANCES AND GROWTH RATES

According to the Chinese press, economic imbalances are the main brake on development and their removal is considered the priority task of the current "readjustment" period. The problem of economic growth rates has in a sense been pushed into the background. The size and extent of economic imbalances have made it necessary to extend the "readjustment" period to 1985 and to fix for that period lower growth rates (4 per cent) than average for 1981-2000 (7 per cent). Although on the whole the growth rates of major economic indicators in 1982 and 1983 were higher than the plan targets, the situation in the Chinese economy is still tense. Economic efficiency is still inadequate, energy and raw materials supply problems have not been resolved, acute imbalances between branches of industry persist and transport does not cope with the tasks set before it. In addition, as Yao Yilin, Deputy Premier of the State Council, has pointed out, high growth rates hide the narrow-oriented drive for gross output, while improvements in quality and savings of material resources are ignored.²⁴ The overall economic development of China does not follow the approved plans to the letter, and, at the same time, the plans themselves do not meet today's requirements because of China's poor scientific and research potential.

As for economic development during the current "readjustment" period, the opinion is voiced in the People's Republic of China that economic growth rates depend on economic patterns, the readjustment of industries, managerial reform and other factors and admit that a slowing of economic growth is inevitable. They justify this, on the one hand, by the predominance of the task of comprehensively balancing the economy, which requires a lot of time and effort, and on the other, by the lack of effective incentive to production in the country during the "readjustment" period of the 1960s (intensive growth of oil output). High growth rates (10-20 per cent) during the "readjustment" period after the setbacks of the "great leap" were also explained by the rehabilitation of the national economy. The "readjustment" of the 1980s does not have such a character because rehabilitation processes were for the most part completed before 1980. In this situation the possibility to speed up economic growth is linked first and foremost to raising the efficiency of the national economy and to obtaining real results instead of blindly chasing high indi-

²³ See *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 26, 1982.

²⁴ See *Renmin ribao*, June 25, 1983.

ces. Chinese scientists believe that if balances are observed, progress will be obvious with an average economic growth rate of 5-7 per cent a year.²⁵

Practice shows that since 1976 the Chinese leadership has been displaying a more realistic view of the national economy and its possibilities. *Renmin ribao* wrote in an article entitled "High Growth Rates Can Only Be Achieved Through Proper Balances" that the drafting of economic development plans called for a considered and cautious approach with due regard for the harmonious development of different economic branches and precluding "outrunning practice". Deviation from that principle, in the period between 1958 and the early 1960s and during the "cultural revolution", the article continued, brought about a situation in which the economy seemed to be developing "quickly" while the real state of affairs was very different.²⁶

At the same time high-ranking Party, government and economic management officials in China have a critical view of the excesses and mistakes of the past, while speaking highly of planning and economic development during the First Five-Year-Plan period.

It is common knowledge that any economic development plan is viable only if it is accurately balanced and is in full accord with the resources available in a country. Plans of this type usually involve a comprehensive analysis of the national economy, including its inherent growth potentialities, the existing level of development and the condition of the productive forces. Recurrent setbacks in the PRC's economic development during the past 20 years or so, have been caused by disregard for these requirements. Meanwhile, economic realities make their corrections in plans concerning both ultimate goals and the deadlines and ways of their fulfilment.

²⁵ See *Shehui kexue jikan* (Shenyang), 1981, No. 6, p. 47.

²⁶ See *Renmin ribao*, March 16, 1979.

²⁷ See *Jingji yanjiu*, 1981, No. 11.

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JAPAN IN U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 84 pp 52-62

[Article by D. V. Petrov, doctor of historical sciences and professor]

Since the United States torpedoed the Geneva talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, there has been a sharp deterioration in the international political situation. Konstantin Chernenko, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, has emphasised: "We are well aware of the threat posed to mankind today by the reckless, adventuristic actions of imperialism's aggressive forces and we speak about it loudly, drawing the attention of peoples throughout the world to that danger."¹

The US stand in Geneva laid bare Washington's imperialist ambitions, and its urge to achieve world hegemony on the basis of a change in the strategic balance of power in its own favour, ensuring the possibility of delivering a decisive "first strike" and emerging victorious in a nuclear war.

At the same time, it was reiterated that the United States regards military force as the main means for achieving these ends. In fact, Washington rejects the principle of negotiations and attainment of reasonable compromises, banking on an unbridled arms race. It is steering not only towards a quantitative buildup of different types of armaments, but primarily towards their qualitative improvement, including the elaboration of new weapons systems of mass destruction and the use of outer space for military purposes.

The Geneva talks have demonstrated that, in its strategic concepts, the Pentagon has been attaching growing importance to its allies. The use of the territories of Britain, the FRG and Italy makes it possible to bring the missiles' launching pads closer to the vital centres of the Soviet Union, in order to reduce their flight time before they hit their target, thereby ensuring substantial strategic advantages for the USA. At the same time, the stationing of missiles in Western Europe ties these countries even closer to the US military-strategic system, bringing them towards a direct military confrontation with the USSR and other socialist countries, thus providing Washington with important supplementary levers for exerting an influence on the shaping of their political line and the elaboration of basic economic measures.

The stationing of US missiles in Western Europe, which has just started, far exceeds the regional framework in its significance. It is an integral part of Washington's global policy and serves as a model of sorts, the application of which is in no way excluded in other regions of the world that the USA declares "vital" to it.

Thus, the developments in Western Europe turn out to be directly connected with the situation in other parts of the world, including the Asian-Pacific region.

JAPAN AND IMPERIALISM'S NUCLEAR POLICY

Although the Geneva talks were held directly between the USA and the Soviet Union, their outcome depended largely on the positions taken by the West European countries that were allowing new nuclear means

¹ Pravda, Feb. 14, 1984.

to be deployed on their territories. Politically, the stand of Japan—which ranks second in economic might among the capitalist powers and is the most important US ally in Asia—was of great importance.

A realistic and restrained policy of Japan, a sincere striving on its part to promote the solution of a most acute issue of our day and age could have contributed to the creation of a more favourable atmosphere at the Geneva talks and exerted a positive influence on Washington's fundamental approach to them. This did not, however, occur. On the contrary, the Japanese government, headed by Yasuhiro Nakasone, which came to power in late November 1982, began vigorously supporting the Reagan administration in its line of frustrating detente and establishing a rigid military confrontation with the USSR. In January 1983, during his visit to Washington, the Japanese Premier expressed full solidarity with US policy and promised all-round cooperation on the part of Japan. He stated that Japan and the USA had become full-fledged members of one and the same team,² that "they are bound by a common destiny",³ that Japan was seeking to become "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" and was ready to extend substantially its contribution to the US military-strategic system in Asia.⁴ The Japanese press noted that, in the course of the negotiations, "an agreement was achieved on pursuing a tough line in relation to the Soviet Union".⁵

A week later, during the talks in Tokyo with US Secretary of State George Shultz, the Japanese Prime Minister stressed that he "supports the 'zero option' proposed by President Reagan".⁶ In his turn, the Japanese Foreign Minister reassured Shultz that Japan, within the limits of its possibilities, would spare no effort to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union. He said that the "economic policy of Tokyo as regards the Soviet Union would be tougher than the policies of West European countries"⁷ and that "Japan would use its economic might as a weapon against the Soviet Union".⁸

This policy was further developed at the meeting of the heads of the seven imperialist powers in Williamsburg (USA) from May 28 to 30, 1983. Prime Minister Nakasone not only lent support to Reagan, but was also an author of the political declaration proclaiming the unity of the approach of all participants in the meeting to the problems of nuclear arms.

Reporting that, in Williamsburg, Prime Minister Nakasone "consciously took upon himself the role of a proponent of Reagan's nuclear strategy", the Japanese press emphasised that, on May 29, 1983, at a session of the "Seven", he favoured the unconditional stationing of US missiles in Western Europe, even if it resulted in thwarting the Geneva negotiations. "As a result, the tension will probably increase: as a sign of protest, the USSR would walk out from the negotiations and call off its representatives. However, let it do whatever it wishes. Some day the Soviet Union will again return to the negotiations,"⁹ Nakasone said.

After the conference was over, S. Abe, the Japanese Foreign Minister, stated at a press conference that the "Japanese government is ready to cool its relations with the Soviet Union" and pointed out that it "will continue to take a tough stand".¹⁰

² *Asahi shimbun*, Jan. 20, 1983.

³ *Japan Times*, Jan. 19, 1983.

⁴ See *Washington Post*, Jan. 19, 1983.

⁵ *Yomiuri shimbun*, Jan. 21, 1983.

⁶ See *Mainichi shimbun*, Feb. 1, 1983.

⁷ *Sankei shimbun*, Feb. 1, 1983.

⁸ *Mainichi shimbun*, Feb. 1, 1983.

⁹ *Tokyo shimbun*, May 30, 1983.

¹⁰ *Mainichi shimbun*, June 1, 1983.

That was obviously a line towards torpedoing the talks, inciting the Reagan administration to apply the most rigid "coercive means", and was actually tantamount to a complete refusal to make any attempts to attain a mutually acceptable solution. The Japanese press noted that Nakasone "for the first time on behalf of Japan demanded that Western Europe exhibit toughness in relations with the USSR concerning the nuclear armaments on the continent", that he "fully backs and shares the stand of the Reagan administration to hold negotiations with the USSR 'from a position of strength'".¹¹

At the very last stage, early in November 1983, when the Soviet Union voiced a number of clear-cut warnings to the United States concerning the aftermaths of the schemes to station cruise missiles and Pershing-2s in Europe, which were stubbornly carried out by Washington, Japan, far from calling on the USA to take a constructive stand and respond to the Soviet Union's appeal for a quest for a mutually acceptable solution, consistently asserted that the negotiations should be approached from a "position of strength". In the course of the meeting with FRG Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, a special "Tokyo Statement", not envisaged by the schedule of the visit, was adopted on the initiative of the Prime Minister Nakasone on November 1, 1983. It stressed the fidelity of the two countries to the decisions adopted in Williamsburg and emphasised the need for "solidarity and cohesion between the USA, Japan, Western Europe and also other countries of the free world".¹² The Japanese press stressed the tough anti-Soviet trend¹³ at the talks in Tokyo, evaluating Nakasone's stand as overt "support for a nuclear buildup".¹⁴

President Reagan's visit to Japan from November 9 to 11, 1983, was fresh demonstration of the unity between the USA and Japan in their approach to the problems of nuclear weapons. Washington's general line towards the global military superiority of the United States was fully revealed in the Asian-Pacific region as well, where the second large grouping of the US armed forces abroad, after that in Western Europe, has been concentrated. It is from there that Washington plans to deliver strikes at the strategically important centres in the southern and eastern areas of the Soviet Union. It was pointed out in the report of the US Defence Department to Congress in connection with the budget for 1984 fiscal year that "the Western Pacific near Japanese waters occupies a front-line status, ranking with Europe, in the US nuclear strategy against the Soviet Union".¹⁵

The danger posed by US policy is that the balance of power in the region does not suit Washington. Like in Europe, the White House is going out of its way to undermine it, primarily by building up its nuclear forces and the means for their delivery.

In the course of the summit talks in Tokyo, in November 1983, one reason that the USA demanded a fast and large-scale military buildup of Japan was the so-called "Soviet military threat". Representatives of the US command stressed authoritatively, however, that today there is parity in the Pacific. Moreover, in their opinion, the USA was even superior to the USSR in some respects.

The US Seventh Fleet is the American strike force in that region. It has over 60 warships, including 3-4 aircraft carriers; 5 missile cruisers,

¹¹ *Tokyo shimbun*, May 30, 1983.

¹² *Yomiuri shimbun*, Nov. 2, 1983.

¹³ See *Yomiuri shimbun*, Nov. 3, 1983.

¹⁴ *Mainichi shimbun*, Nov. 1, 1983.

¹⁵ *Asahi Evening News*, Feb. 23, 1983.

20 destroyers, and 7 nuclear submarines.¹⁶ Highly assessing the combat potential of the Seventh Fleet, Vice-Admiral M. S. Holcomb claimed that "the strength of the Seventh Fleet, properly applied, would prevail over the Soviet Pacific Fleet".¹⁷

Nonetheless, US strategic schemes provide for a further increase of strategic forces in the area. According to William Akin, Director of the centre of nuclear weapon problems, the US nuclear buildup in the Pacific is regarded by the Reagan administration as a prime task.¹⁸

In reality, this policy is expressed in the fast increase in the number of combat units of various nuclear weapons stationed at US bases in South Korea, the Philippines, Japan, the warships of the Seventh Fleet, and also in the deployment of new systems for their delivery.

According to official data released by the US Defence Department, there are some 1,500 units of non-strategic nuclear weapons on board the warships, which include nuclear warheads for medium-range missiles. The offensive force, the core of which consists of aircraft carriers, has about 200 nuclear warheads with a capacity of 100 to 500 kilotons each at its disposal. Their total capacity thus amounts to 20,000—100,000 kilotons, i.e., exceeds the bomb dropped on Hiroshima five thousand times.

In mid-1983, the Navy began to be equipped with the Tomahawk cruise missiles. The first 32 cruise missiles were stationed on the *New Jersey* battleship, which, since July 1983, has been part of the Seventh Fleet. In 1984, according to a statement by US Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger, Tomahawks, which can be equipped with nuclear warheads, were also to be stationed on other warships of the Seventh Fleet.

At the same time, the number of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons increased considerably. During 1983, the stationing of 15 strategic B-52G bombers was under way on Guam. They have a range of 12,000 km. Each of them can carry 12 cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. In other words, the plan is to station 180 carriers of that type of weapon. Considering the 32 cruise missiles on the *New Jersey* battleship, the USA has approximately 212 carriers of nuclear weapons in the western part of the Pacific.¹⁹

The Pentagon did not stop at that however. In a bid to upset the balance of power in its own favour, as it did in Europe, it decided to bring the nuclear weapon carriers just to the borders of the Soviet Union. A decision was adopted to take four years, beginning with 1985, to station 48 F-16 planes capable of carrying nuclear weapons at the US airbase in Misawa.²⁰ With a range of more than 2,000 km, this plane can be used to deliver nuclear strikes at the key military and industrial targets in the Soviet Far East and Eastern Siberia.

Thus, the policy of the Reagan administration in the Far East leads to a greater threat of a nuclear war, sharply aggravating the explosive conflict situations in the area.

NUCLEAR THREAT IN THE FAR EAST

In its nuclear strategy in the Far East, the United States attaches special significance to Japan. The 119 bases and military installations on its territory are assigned the task of supporting combat operations by US armed forces in the event of a nuclear war. The Japanese government has repeatedly declared its loyalty to the "three non-nuclear principles":

¹⁶ See *Yearbook on Defence. 1983*, Tokyo, 1983, p. 509 (in Japanese); *Military Balance, 1983/84*, London, 1983, pp. 9-10.

¹⁷ *US News & World Report*, April 4, 1983, p. 56.

¹⁸ See *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Nov. 1983.

¹⁹ See *Mainichi Daily News*, May 5, 1983.

²⁰ See *Asahi shimbun*, March 18, 1983.

not to manufacture, not to possess and not to bring nuclear weapons onto its territory. Many times, however, it has resolutely turned down all the demands of the opposition to formalise these declarations legally.

As a rule, US spokesmen state that "in the interests of security" they can neither confirm nor refute the presence of nuclear weapons on board the ships calling at the bases, confining themselves to assurances that they "respect" Japan's stand. In its turn, the Nakasone government claims that it "trusts" the United States, and so does not deem it necessary to demand any specific information or conduct preliminary consultations stipulated by the Japanese-US "security treaty" if the weapons on the bases change in character.

There are, however, increasing numbers of facts testifying that Japan is gradually becoming an important atomic base for the United States.

Top US officials have repeatedly confirmed the presence of nuclear weapons on board the US ships and submarines calling at Japanese ports. For example, Edwin Reischauer, former US Ambassador to Japan, stated in May 1981 that, early in the 1960s, a secret agreement was reached between the governments of the USA and Japan that the latter would not object to warships with nuclear weapons on board calling at its ports.²¹

In his interview for *Asahi* in connection with the calling of the *Enterprise* aircraft carrier at the port of Sasebo, former US President James Carter confirmed that aircraft carriers and planes on them operating near Japan were equipped with nuclear weapons, i.e., he admitted indirectly that there are nuclear weapons on board the ships calling at Japanese ports. Commenting on that statement, *Asahi* wrote that "the unusual disclosure by the former Supreme Commander of US Forces will further strengthen suspicions that US warships are calling at Japanese ports with nuclear arms aboard in violation of Japan's three non-nuclear principles".²²

The report carried by *American Naval Fighting Ships*, the official reference book of the US Navy Department stated that, from 1959 to 1964, the submarines *Trawler* and *Grey Back*, equipped with strategic nuclear weapons, called, on at least four occasions, at the US naval base Yokosuka. It was fresh evidence that the USA had been using Japan as its nuclear base.²³

In an interview for *Asahi* in connection with this report, E. Reischauer stated: "As far as I understand, before calling at Japanese ports US ships do not unload nuclear weapons, neither do they leave them in any other place. Apparently the reports about the calling of submarines with nuclear weapons are true to fact."²⁴

According to the Japanese Foreign Ministry statistics made public on June 4, 1981 by a Communist MP, from January 1, 1974 to December 31, 1980, US warships called on 82 occasions at 17 Japanese ports with the permission of the government to say nothing of the calls at naval bases; in 56 cases they might have nuclear weapons on board.²⁵

In recent years the frequency of calls by warships with nuclear weapons on board has gone up considerably. For example, in May 1983, after a 15-year interval, the *Enterprise* aircraft carrier called at Sasebo, soon to be followed by the *Carl Winson*, an atomic aircraft carrier, with a displacement of 81.6 thousand tons. *Asahi* wrote: "The inclusion of that ship in the US naval force in the Pacific and its visit to Sasebo

²¹ See *Washington Post*, May 23, 1981.

²² *Asahi Evening News*, May 26, 1983.

²³ See *Yomiuri shimbun*, Jan. 9, 1984.

²⁴ *Asahi shimbun*, Jan. 9, 1984.

²⁵ See *Akahata*, June 5, 1981.

will result in a considerable boosting of US military might in the region. No doubt this will further aggravate military tension in the Far East".²⁶

US strategic submarines call increasingly often at Japanese ports. Spokesmen for the Japanese government have stated that, in their opinion, "the number of calls by US nuclear submarines at Japanese ports will increase."²⁷ In 1982 US warships paid 20 visits, three times more than in 1981, and 29 visits in 1983, this actually meaning that, as the Japanese press noted, "the figure was slightly smaller than that characterising the year 1972, at the peak of the war in Vietnam."²⁸

The Pentagon, however, has no intention of confining itself to short-term visits. There are press reports about plans for turning Sasebo port into a "large-scale base for submarines" that will patrol the Sea of Japan and East China Sea round the clock and block the strategically important international Korean Strait. In the near future, three US submarines will be based permanently at Sasebo.²⁹ As in other cases of calls by US warships at Japanese ports, Tokyo will have no right to examine them to find out whether they are carrying nuclear weapons.

The Pentagon has been making vigorous preparations for stationing in Japan means of delivery for not only sea-but also land-based nuclear weapons. Among other things, the possibility is being examined of deploying, in addition to F-16 fighter-bombers, several groups of cruise missiles. The American journal *Aviation Week and Technology* has reported, for example, that "the US Defence Department plans to deploy Tomahawk land-based anti-ship cruise missiles in Japan to blockade Japan's strategic straits and prevent the passage of the Soviet Pacific Fleet from the Sea of Japan into Pacific Ocean in the event of an emergency".³⁰

The existence of such plans was confirmed in a special report by the Nuclear Weapon's Agency of the US Department of Defence, which stressed the expediency and "high efficiency" of stationing Tomahawk cruise missiles in Japan, and the proposal was made to place them at the Sasebo and Misawa bases.³¹

The deployment of mobile land-based cruise missiles, in addition to those already stationed on ships and aircraft, will be tantamount to a new attempt by the United States to upset the balance of power in the Far East. These steps can only be regarded as obvious provocation, compelling the Soviet Union to take corresponding measures to ensure its security.

By backing the US policy of an unlimited nuclear arms race in the Far East and providing its territory for the deployment of means for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction, the Japanese government shares the entire responsibility with the Reagan administration for the greater threat of a nuclear war.

This is particularly true since the Nakasone government has undertaken a number of serious commitments directly in the military sphere.

First, Japan has agreed to provide US nuclear submarines with the necessary navigation and reconnaissance information. In particular, a station on the Shimokita Peninsula, in the north of Honshu Island, was commissioned. On a regular basis it gathers information on the undercurrents, water temperature, and so on, thereby supplementing the activities of US centres watching the underwater situation. In 1984, a similar station is to be built on Okinawa, and later another one of this type will

²⁶ *Asahi shimbun*, Sept. 29, 1983.

²⁷ *Asahi shimbun*, March 14, 1983.

²⁸ *Yomiuri shimbun*, Dec. 31, 1983.

²⁹ See *Yomiuri shimbun*, Dec. 11, 1983.

³⁰ See *Asahi Evening News*, March 3, 1983.

³¹ See *Sankei shimbun*, Oct. 2, 1983.

be constructed on Iwojima Island, to the south of Tokyo. According to a spokesman for the National Defence Agency (NDA), the information collected by these three stations "will surely be available to the US forces in Japan" and will be used "to serve as practical information for anti-submarine operations".³²

Second, Japan plans, with the help of an extensive system of various means, to monitor the movements of Soviet ships and submarines. According to Kazuo Tanikawa, the then Defence Agency Director (March 1983), "the government's policy is to exchange various kinds of information with the USA in both peacetime and wartime even in an emergency in which Japan is not directly involved."³³

Third, Japan has agreed to convoy US warships, including ones with nuclear weapons on board. Responding to questions in the Chamber of Councillors of the Japanese Diet on April 18, 1983, K. Tanikawa stated outright that the Japanese "judgement on the protection of US warships should not be based on the types of arms they are carrying".³⁴ It was also announced that such joint actions are possible in the vast sea area at a distance up to 1,000 miles from the Japanese coast.³⁵

Sharply condemning these decisions, the Japanese press had every reason to emphasise that "any Japan's Self-Defence Forces action meant to defend N-armed US vessels could increase the danger of Japan being dragged into a nuclear war."³⁶

The decision adopted during the talks in Washington in May 1981 to help the USA, in violation of all rules of international law, in blocking the three straits leading from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean, inflicts a similar danger on Japan.

This means that the mine-laying could be carried out not only in Japanese territorial waters, but also in the high seas. Moreover, speaking in Parliament on February 19, 1983, the Prime Minister stated that the government would permit the United States to lay mines in the straits independently "even if Japan is not subjected to an attack".³⁷

Such decisions completely explode the myths concerning the "defensive character" of the Japanese military doctrine. How can this be called "defence", if assistance to the US military operations against the Soviet Union is planned even if the latter takes no unfriendly actions against Japan?

THE ROAD TO PEACE AND SECURITY FOR JAPAN

The mounting participation of Japan in the nuclear strategy of the United States, far from ensuring the former's security, entails, on the contrary, a real threat of drawing Tokyo into any conflict situation that may be created by the USA's adventuristic policy in the Far East.

The annual report of the US Defence Department published in Washington on January 31, 1983, stressed that Japan had military and allied relations with the USA that were equal to those with the NATO countries. The report noted the need to set up a "collective security system" in the Asian-Pacific region with the participation of Japan as a factor of the "joint defence of countries of the Western alliance".³⁸

This means that Washington intends to demand that Japan enhance its role in the military strategy in Asia, the long-term purpose being a merger of NATO with the bilateral military alliances between the USA

³² *Japan Times*, March 8, 9, 1983.

³³ *Japan Times*, March 3, 1983.

³⁴ *Mainichi shimbun*, April 19, 1983.

³⁵ See *Asahi shimbun*, March 5, 1983.

³⁶ *Mainichi Daily News*, April 19, 1983.

³⁷ *Sankei shimbun*, Feb. 20, 1983.

³⁸ *Asahi shimbun*, Feb. 1, 1983.

and Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, and the formation, on this basis, of a single, global, imperialist, military-strategic system.

M. Dugersuren, Foreign Minister of the Mongolian People's Republic, was quite right in saying that Japan is getting increasingly tied up with the NATO nuclear strategy, which "has already exceeded its European framework and is beginning to envelope the Far East."³⁹

Japan's support for the USA's aggressive line could not but tell on Japan's relations with neighbouring countries, above all the Soviet Union. Nikolai Tikhonov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, noted in his answers to questions put by *Yomiuri* that "the Japanese government, not without consulting the opposite coast of the Pacific Ocean, has been deliberately steering towards, I would say, dismantling the entire system of Soviet-Japanese relations created by the efforts of the two countries during the post-war period." The head of the Soviet government emphasised that such a stand would hardly be in Japan's national interests and that "the only reasonable way is an allround expansion and consolidation of mutually beneficial ties in a spirit of goodneighbourliness."⁴⁰

The extremely grave danger posed by the policy pursued by the Conservatives is becoming increasingly obvious to the broad population in Japan. This was graphically demonstrated by the elections to the Chamber of Representatives of the Japanese Diet, held on December 18, 1983. The impressive defeat suffered by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party which, for the first time since its inception, lost 36 seats, demonstrated that millions of ordinary Japanese people demand a radical revision of the domestic and foreign policies pursued by the Nakasone government. According to the Japanese press, "the voters demanded an end to the Nakasone line towards strengthening the military alliance with the USA".⁴¹

By means of backstage combinations, Nakasone managed to stay in power and form his second cabinet. In his very first policy-making statements, he stressed his loyalty to the former line of supporting Washington's military course.

In a new-year interview, the Prime Minister declared that Japan's approach to the problems of nuclear disarmament was "excessively sentimental and devoid of any scientific, realistic foundation". He lamented that, while the NATO countries "know full well about, for example, the characteristics of missiles, the places of their deployment and so on, the Japanese, more often than not, lack the special technical knowledge and approach the problem as amateurs." Nakasone said that the government had decided to "fill this blank" and was starting actively collecting information on nuclear weapon problems.⁴²

The elimination of the "amateur approach", in combination with the appeal to get rid of "sentimentality" in assessing the role and significance of nuclear weapons, mean that Japan wants to enhance substantially the level and scope of its contribution to the nuclear strategy of the United States.

The line towards confrontation leads, however, to a further exacerbation of the situation in the Far East. The road to peace and security in Asia, as well as in Europe, lies not through greater confrontation, but through a reduction in tension, on the basis of negotiations and mutually acceptable agreements.

For example, the Nakasone government asserts that it sees the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles in the Asian part of the USSR as a threat

³⁹ *Pravda*, Dec. 7, 1983.

⁴⁰ *Pravda*, Jan. 2, 1984.

⁴¹ *Tokyo shimbun*, Dec. 30, 1983.

⁴² See *Asahi shimbun*, Jan. 1, 1984.

to Japan's security. Here, Tokyo is deliberately ignoring the fact that the Soviet Union, in the interests of attaining an agreement in Geneva, made a highly important concession, i.e., it stated that, if an agreement on the limitation of nuclear weapons is achieved, the Soviet Union is ready to dismantle the SS-20 missiles deployed in the European zone on the spot, without sending them to the Eastern areas of the USSR.⁴³ Moreover, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness, in this case, to immediately discontinue the deployment of SS-20 missiles to the east of the Urals, provided the United States does not deploy new nuclear means of medium range in areas from which they could reach the eastern part of the USSR.⁴⁴

These proposals open up a real possibility for reducing the level of tension not only in Europe, but also in Asia. Hence, the USA should display readiness to come to terms on a mutually acceptable basis. Japan's protests against the stationing of SS-20 missiles in the Asian part of the USSR should now be addressed to Washington, rather than to Moscow. It is unjust and unreasonable to demand the unilateral disarmament of the Soviet Union and its allies. Moreover, if the United States listen to the voice of reason and stops its provocative nuclear buildup, returns to the situation that obtained before the cessation of the talks, and displays readiness for mutually acceptable agreements, the Soviet Union, in its turn, would always be ready to show goodwill and agree on limitations and a reduction of nuclear forces, including in the Far East.

Under the conditions of the mounting global threat of a nuclear war, resulting from the Reagan administration's policy of frustrating any agreements with the Soviet Union, the conclusion of international agreements that would enable it to stand aside from a nuclear conflict would be of special significance to Japan. The Soviet Union has solemnly declared that it will not use nuclear weapons against states that do not possess them, do not manufacture them and do not have them on their territories. In view of the fact that the Japanese government has repeatedly declared its loyalty to the "three non-nuclear principles", the Soviet Union has stated that it does not see any obstacles to the beginning of an exchange of opinions with Japan on the formalisation of mutual commitments between the two countries in a corresponding legal contractual form.

Taking into account the boosting by the United States of its nuclear means in the Asian-Pacific region, the Soviet proposals on the elaboration and use of confidence-building measures in the Far East are becoming even more important. The Soviet government has expressed its readiness to start implementing these proposals on both a multilateral and a bilateral basis.

Apparently realising the inadmissibility of any further deterioration in relations with the Soviet Union, which, as a result of the support given by Japan to the aggressive anti-Soviet line of the Reagan administration has been at its lowest level in recent years, Foreign Minister S. Abe stated in the Diet that he was going to take "a serious approach to the diplomacy in relation to the USSR" in 1984.⁴⁵ He stressed that he deemed it necessary to "continue and develop the dialogue between our two countries".⁴⁶ If these words are backed by concrete proposals, then such a constructive stand by Japan could provide an impulse for a substantial improvement in Japanese-Soviet relations. As far as the Soviet side

⁴³ See *Pravda*, Aug. 27, 1983.

⁴⁴ See *Pravda*, Oct. 27, 1983.

⁴⁵ *Yomiuri shimbun*, Jan. 6, 1984.

⁴⁶ *Tokyo shimbun*, Jan. 9, 1984.

is concerned it has always pointed to the unswerving nature of its policy geared to the allround development of friendly relations with Japan. This has been reiterated recently by Nikolai Tikhonov, who emphasised that "the Soviet Union treats the people of Japan with respect and sympathy, and wishes sincerely that confidence and goodneighbourliness might gain the upper hand in our relations. The Soviet people has never had any other intention."⁴⁷

The growing gap between word and deed, between high-sounding declarations about loyalty to the "three non-nuclear principles" and Japan's deeper involvement in the US nuclear strategy may have serious consequences for the country.

The efforts of Japan's ruling quarters are aimed not at curbing the nuclear arms race but, on the contrary, at frustrating the agreements on the control over weapons of mass destruction and supporting the US line towards elimination of the strategic parity with the Soviet Union, thereby intensifying the threat of a nuclear war.

This policy made itself felt in especially bold relief in Japan's approach to the Geneva talks on the limitation of strategic weapons. The support to the NATO schemes of deploying cruise missiles and Pershing-2s in Western Europe at any cost was tantamount to a fundamental departure from the previous foreign policy line. Earlier, Japan had declared its intention of avoiding participation in the nuclear strategy of the NATO countries and had stressed its unique status as a country that had renounced the use of force for ever as a means for achieving foreign policy ends, while now, in its relations with socialist countries, it has begun openly banking on the US nuclear potential.

Another new phenomenon in the Japanese policy was that, from moral-political support for the US line towards frustrating detente, Japan switched over to direct participation in the preparations by the United States for a nuclear war. It prefers not to take effective measures to ban the bringing of nuclear weapons to Japan and has nothing against the stationing of both sea- and land-based means of its delivery on its territory. Simultaneously, plans are being drawn up and forms being worked out for direct participation by the Japanese "self-defence force" in military operations using nuclear weapons. Japan gives assistance to the US nuclear forces by providing services for them at the bases. It has agreed to protect American warships, including ones with nuclear weapons on board, in the high seas at a considerable distance from Japan's shores. Besides, Japan has assumed responsibility for supplying US strategic submarines with reconnaissance and navigation information, as well as providing them with services and the material means necessary for conducting combat operations.

All this testifies that, both politically and militarily, Japan is becoming a direct accomplice of the United States in the preparation for a nuclear war. The pressure brought to bear by Washington on Tokyo, for all its significance, in no way relieves the Nakasone government of the responsibility for the growing tension in the Far East because, far from displaying a desire to resist this pressure, on the contrary, it has, on its initiative, declared its readiness to make a growing contribution to the US nuclear strategy both on a regional level, by extending its military functions within the framework of the military-strategic system together with the USA, and also on a global level, by means of unconditional and allround support for the course towards a confrontation with the

⁴⁷ *Pravda*, Jan. 2, 1984.

USSR and other socialist countries and towards the nuclear arms race. This policy pursued by the Japanese government shows disdain for the clearly expressed opinion of the Japanese people and the interests of the security of their country. It is fraught with the danger of Japan's automatic involvement in military adventures that may be unleashed by the United States in Asia, thus facing Tokyo with the threat of a nuclear catastrophe.

The policy of peace, neutrality, non-participation in the implementation of the USA's dangerous schemes in Asia, and the policy of friendship and goodneighbourliness with all countries constitute the only real way to ensure Japan's security. Of great importance in this respect could be Japan's active cooperation in attaining agreements on averting the spread of the nuclear arms race to the Asian-Pacific region. Mutually acceptable decisions on the political aspects of bringing down the level of confrontation and measures of military confidence could improve the situation in the region considerably and serve as a major contribution to reducing the threat of a nuclear war, in full conformity with the hopes and demands of the broad sections of Japanese population.

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CSO: 1812/76-E

YOUTH MOVEMENT IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 84 pp 63-74

[Article by A. G. Georgiyev and A. S. Krasil'nikov]

The Reagan Administration's aggressive militarist policies have had a negative impact on the situation in Asia and the Pacific Ocean region which has a population of over 1.5 billion.¹ In today's world the people's destinies, including those of the younger generation, are inseparable from the state character of international relations as well as major trends in evolution. The deteriorating international situation and the profound crisis of the world capitalist system are accompanied by new attacks by Western governments and reactionary regimes on working people's rights, which result in growing social unrest and dislocations. These, in turn, seriously affect the condition of the younger generation which is already suffering from such of capitalism's ills as unemployment, rising prices and inflation.

The young were particularly hard hit by the world-wide slump in the capitalist markets. Unemployment among young people in Asia and the Pacific has become a major social problem. In 1983 young men and women accounted for 22-75.5 per cent of the total number of unemployed in the region.² In 1980 in Thailand 75 per cent of the unemployed were young people; in Singapore the figure was 58 per cent, in Australia 56, in the Philippines 55, and in South Korea 49 per cent. These figures represent lost chances, despair and dissatisfaction. According to the Japanese Prime Minister's Office, in 1983 there were 1,580,000 unemployed in that country, 280,000 more than in the preceding year and nearly 3 per cent of the country's work force. According to data provided by Japan's trade unions the actual number of unemployed workers in Japan long ago topped the three-million mark.³ According to spokesman for Japan's Department of Labour in 1983 for every 100 job-seekers there were only 58 jobs, and out of 480,000 graduates from institutions of higher learning only 61,000 could find a job in the same year. Young women were especially hard hit because seventy per cent of Japan's corporations announced that they would not hire girls who had just finished higher school.

Universities, colleges and secondary schools have become a real fountainhead replenishing the army of the unemployed not only in Japan but in other countries of the region. For example, in 1983 100,000 graduates of higher and secondary educational establishments in Thailand joined the country's jobless, not counting about half a million young men and women who could not find work after finishing secondary school. Despairing of finding employment in their native land some young people look for work abroad. The developed capitalist countries have taken advantage of this trend by offering career opportunities to the best gra-

¹ It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all of the diverse problems facing youth and youth movements in such a vast region as Asia and the Pacific which includes socialist, capitalist (Japan, Australia, New Zealand), a variety of developing countries (ASEAN members and island states in the Pacific), as well as the puppet regimes of South Korea and Taiwan. Confining themselves mainly to youth movements in the developing countries, the authors have concentrated on the problems of the anti-war youth movements and on the attitude of imperialism toward the younger generation in the region.

² *Pravda*, April 11, 1983.

³ *Bulletin of Foreign Commercial Information*, Oct. 15, 1983 (in Russian).

duates. For example, about 40 per cent of the graduates of the Philippine University's medical school work in the United States.⁴ At the same time there is acute shortage of medical personnel in rural parts of the Philippines.

The increasing deterioration of youth problem and mounting social unrest in many countries of the region have not escaped the attention of those in power who, however, have opted not for solving the problems but for increasing their control over the younger generation. Imperialism and local reaction resort to ever more sophisticated methods of combating the mounting democratic youth movement. Anxious to smother the flames of social protest by young people in Asia and the Pacific they seek to split the youth movement, to pit different youth groups against one another, to prevent cooperation between groups of different political persuasions and above all to undermine the positions of Communists, who have shown themselves to be consistent fighters for the vital interests and the rights of young people. Such policies are characteristic of the ruling quarters in Australia, New Zealand, Japan and certain Southeast Asian countries. The governments of South Korea, Taiwan, and several other countries quite openly pursue anti-communist policies.

Both advocates of traditional anti-communism and all sorts of "new anti-communists" from the "new philosophers" to the "New Right" try to make political capital on the new dynamism of the swelling youth movement: they spread anti-communist, bourgeois-reformist and leftist ideas among the younger generation, throwing the red herrings of nationalism, anti-communism and "youth counter-culture" before some groups and leading others up the blind alley of extremism and terrorism.

Calling on the younger generation to organise "a revolution of consciousness and culture" and to restructure their way of life, albeit not in the spirit of the revival of national culture, they seek to divert the attention of youth from burning social and political issues, and to keep it away from the revolutionary struggles of the organised working class. This official policy, widely followed in the West, has not taken the root in Asia and the Pacific, with the notable exception of Australia and Japan. In several countries of Southeast Asia such as the Philippines, Thailand and, to a certain extent, Malaysia the "counter-culture" has manifested itself, although in a distorted way, in the youth "riots" against the values of bourgeois civilisation and in attempts to rebel against the existing order and thus to change it. Although these riots were indeed a form of protest against bourgeois civilisation, this protest, "like religion, was peculiar form of sublimation and a continuation of the bourgeois way of life which lacked real values; it was not, however, a revolutionary negation of it."⁵

The region's military-bureaucratic regimes follow a policy of "depolitisation", especially of the rural masses. This is essentially an attempt to make them immune to the influence of political parties. Soviet scholars note that "the depolitisation of the masses" in combination with the single-minded ideological brainwashing conducted by the governments is a characteristic feature of such regimes".⁶ Indonesia and the Philippines put a great deal of effort into setting up government-sponsored (but not ruling) parties which draw their support from civil servants, the military and youth.

⁴ *Za rubezhom*, 1983, No. 28, p. 12.

⁵ *Kommunist*, 1979, No. 16, p. 76.

⁶ *The East: the Threshold of the 1980s. The Newly-Free Countries in Present-Day World*, Moscow, 1983, p. 172 (in Russian).

Certain sections of youth in Japan, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines are under the influence of "left-wing" extremism. This political phenomenon has been brought to life by objective causes: the impoverishment of peasants, accompanied by mass bankruptcies among small businesses, artisans and craftsmen, growing unemployment and the swelling ranks of the lumpen-proletariat. The movement's base has expanded lately due mainly to the increased participation of intellectuals, primarily university and secondary school graduates who have failed to find employment. The spread of left-wing extremism in developing countries has been facilitated by other factors, such as the insufficient organisation of the working class, police harassment and other forms of persecution by the ruling regimes.

A feature common to all ultra-leftist groups is their negation of the role played by the working class as the revolution's principal guiding force. They also negate the role played by mass organisations of working people in the revolutionary process. Outbreaks of left-wing extremist sentiment among young people, primarily university and secondary school students, are usually observed at times when socio-economic contradictions are growing. The sentiment is fuelled by hopes for a quick transformation of society, disappointment with bourgeois ideals, discontent with the repressive and anti-popular activities of the rulers, lack of progress in the socio-economic sphere and by a desire to stop the erosion of national culture caused by Western ideological expansion. Trotskyite groups in the student and trade union movements exert a negative influence on the younger generation. In this they are at one with outside forces which try to take advantages of these outbursts of despair by young men and women. The activities of left-wing extremist groups in the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and several other countries have already done a great deal of harm to the democratic movement including the democratic youth movement. It is one of the reasons for the relative weakness or absence of democratic youth organisations in several developing countries in the region.

Right-wing circles in certain Asian and Pacific Ocean countries do everything in their power to shore up the conservative youth organisations which they see as supporters and allies in their struggle against progressive forces. In some other countries those in power seek to prevent the politisation of the youth movement, to obstruct the work of the existing political parties among young people, to establish their own youth organisations. A typical example is Indonesia, where a 1975 law restricted the grass-roots activities of political parties, which effectively placed them under the full control of the authorities.⁷ The Indonesian government sponsors the Indonesian National Youth Committee (INYC) which is a purely consultative body. It has no clear programme and its activities, which are entirely non-political, include cultural propaganda, sports promotion, family planning, etc. The governing committee of the INYC consists of leaders from the major youth and student organisations and, the committee has a "monopoly" on all international contacts made by Indonesian youth.

The Movement of Nationalist Students of Indonesia (MNSI) which is considered to be the principal "opponent" of the INYC has a different platform. The Chipayung Group whose members are Muslim, Christian and national student organisations is an affiliate of the INYC. The MNSI and the Chipayung Group want to reduce the role which the army plays in the country's political life. They also criticise government control on the freedom of existing political parties.

⁷ Yu. A. Plekhanov, *Indonesia: Problems of Development*, Moscow, 1980, p. 44 (in Russian).

Malaysia's Youth Council (MYC) has a platform similar to that of INYC. It is made up of about 20 diverse national youth organisations and nine youth councils from all the states. The country's ruling party—the United Malay National Organisation—has a youth component—the UMNO Youth Movement.

A 1975 Presidential decree created a youth organisation known as Kabataang Barangay (KB) in the Philippines. Its initiators hoped to unite the younger generation and give it a government-drafted programme which would lead it to adopt the official New Society Movement designed to speed up the capitalist transformation of Philippine society. In the ideological sphere the policy's main objective is to build national unity among all citizens regardless of their class or social status in order to implement the ideals of a new society.⁸

Kabataang Barangay proclaimed as one of its main objectives the allround development of the younger generation in the Philippines, a country which has a rich cultural tradition and which has succeeded in preserving its national identity, despite four centuries of colonial rule. The KB operates youth centres in the country's provinces and towns where young men and women are introduced to the country's literature and music, take part in amateur folk-song and dance groups, study painting and theatre.

However, the political turmoil of 1983 in the country—when in protest against the assassination of its leader, former senator Benigno Aquino, the country's opposition organised mass demonstrations against the government—showed that the KB could not hold the country's youth in check. This is indirect proof of the fact that the organisation has no real sway over the country's younger generation, although its membership includes over 6 million young Filipino men and women out of the total 8 million in the 15-21 age bracket.

The Democratic Youth Council of the Philippines (DYCP) and its members—the Association for Progress of Philippine Youth (APPY), the Movement of Nationalist Students for Progress and Education, and Bongong Sibol—also have a progressive democratic platform whose planks include the participation of young people in national development, the elimination of unemployment, free education (including higher education), opposition to outside interference in the country's internal affairs and to US military bases in the Philippines. They also condemn imperialism's aggressive actions against the peoples of the Middle East, Latin America and other regions. The DYCP plays a rather active role in anti-war activities organised by the Philippine Peace Council and the Philippine Committee for Disarmament and Peace. APPY has been a member of the WFDY since 1978 and is contributing to the cohesion of the democratic youth movement. At its 3rd Congress in 1982 APPY resolutely opposed the existence of US military bases in the Philippines.

The role of religion in shaping the world outlook of the younger generation in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and several other countries deserves special mention.

In the Philippines, for example, the church plays a particularly important role in the ideological training of young people. Over one million children attend Catholic schools and about 5,000 study in clerical seminaries. At the same time it must be borne in mind that parish pulpits frequently become political rostrums and parish priests often prefer social protest to Christian humility. Some of them even join the anti-government armed movement which is operating in some parts of the country. The Philippines has a union of young Christian workers which cooperates with the Democratic Youth Council of the Philippines. But it has

⁸ Ferdinand Marcos, *Notes on the New Society of the Philippines*, S.L., 1974.

practically no authority among the country's young men and women. Religion's influence on youth is especially strong in those countries with large Muslim populations (Indonesia, Malaysia and several others). Trying to impose their control over youth in general and to prevent the spread of radical ideas, clerical circles in these countries press ahead with the process of Islamisation. In certain countries of Southeast Asia Muslim groups even go as far as to demand the official adoption of Islamic law and promote religious strife and intolerance. At the same time it is important to remember that the question of religion in Southeast Asia is complex and frequently controversial. In these countries Islam serves not only the interests of the conservative bureaucracy and military elite, but the popular masses as well which spontaneously clamour for democratic reform. In certain Southeast Asian countries Islam frequently assumes the ideological form of social, anti-western protest. Right-wing and conservative groups seek to make Islamic youth organisations steer toward anti-communism. In Indonesia the trend is exemplified by the Muslim Muhammadiyah Youth Organisation which wants to see more religious instruction for young people both at school and in everyday life, calls on the Indonesians to be vigilant vis-à-vis "the communist threat" in the country, to close their ranks and to work for the unity of the armed forces and the people. Other Moslem youth organisations in the country include the Kaaba Youth Movement (Kaaba, the sacred stone of the Moslems, is the symbol of the Party of Unity and Development), the Movement of Solidarity Among Indonesia's Young Moslems, the Liaison Society of Moslem Youth and the Association of Moslem Students.

The most active organisation in Malaysia is the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (MIYM). Most of its 40,000 members are students who see in Islam "a revolutionary force" which can achieve "a reign of equality and democracy" and help attain national objectives. The organisation's leaders are opposed to economic domination by local Chinese capital and are sceptical about Western civilisation.⁹ The Perkim Islamic Youth Organisation which has a membership of slightly over 10,000 is primarily involved in educational activities. Perkim enjoys support among certain groups in Saudi Arabia.

A characteristic feature of Malaysia's youth movement is its division along national lines: the country has an Association of Young Malaysian Chinese, a Congress of Young Malaysian Indians and Student Union of University of Malaya. The division of youth along national lines created additional difficulties hampering not only the solution of youth problems but the attainment of national unity as well.

In Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea student movements have become a major political force, something with which the ruling regimes must reckon. Active student support for the rights of youth and the democratisation of society in these countries has a long history. Student "riots" are but an outward manifestation of the broad discontent among the masses. Students together with workers and other progressive forces in 1973 toppled the dictatorial regime of Thanom Kittikachorn and Prapat Charusathien in Thailand. In defiance of harsh repression South Korea's students are demanding an end to the anti-popular policies and arbitrary rule by the police characteristic of Chun Doo Hwan's regime. The period between January and June 1983 alone saw 128 different demonstrations on university campuses which were crushed by security police. However, the anti-popular regime cannot stem the tide of mounting opposition. This was evidenced by new student actions in the autumn

⁹ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 3, 1983, Vol. 119, No. 9, pp. 20-21; *Asiaweek*, July 30, 1982, Vol. 8, No. 30, pp. 14-15.

of 1983, including those in protest of President Reagan's visit to South Korea.

In Indonesia and Thailand student actions are held in the name of a broad democratic struggle in the interests of the majority. Democratic Indonesian students sharply criticise the domestic and foreign policies of the "New Society" as well as the activities of the country's legislature.¹⁰ Indonesia's university campuses have been swept time and time again by waves of student unrest. In October 1983 Indonesia's authorities even decided to close down Jakarta's Jabaia University because of student demands for a reduction in tuition fee and the restoration of the student council which had been banned by the administration.

Discussing the role of Thailand's students, Thai sociologist Thongchai Pongsanti wrote: "Students continue to participate in liberation struggles even though the authorities curtail academic freedoms and resort to the catchword, 'The duty of students is to study' in an effort to prevent young people from joining in politics. Many students have proved their worth as propagandists and initiators of mass action. The more closely their patriotic activity is linked with the workers' and peasants' struggles, the more effective it is. The anti-imperialist potential of our students", the sociologist concludes, "makes them, now as in the past, an important force in the liberation struggle."¹¹

Thammasat and Chulalongkorn Universities, traditional centres of Bangkok's public's life, have become real bastions of democratic students. Alumni from these universities have repeatedly taken a firm stand against the military dictatorship demanding a democratisation in the country. The democratic anti-war and anti-American sentiments have become stronger among the students and youth of the Philippines and Malaysia. In Malaysia the Islamic Malaysian Youth Group organised a boycott of American goods in protest of the US Middle East policy and in support of Lebanon and the people of Palestine. This bears witness to the increasing efforts made by youth and students in a number of countries of Southeast Asia and the Far East to combat imperialism, in support of peace and democracy.

However, the youth movement in Southeast Asia as a whole is characterised by inconsistencies and contradictions. Its main weakness lies in the lack of strong ties with other political movements and the organised working class.

The growing number of workers, primarily in manufacturing industry, and the formation of the working class in the newly-liberated states is accompanied by the emergence of an influential national proletariat. The national proletariat provides the basis of the emergence and growth of communist movements in the region's developing countries, which operate under difficult conditions. In Indonesia, for example, according to S. Sudiman, a member of the Communist Party's leadership, the working-class party operates underground. However, with the help of explanatory material and other methods it succeeded in producing an impact on public opinion. The awareness of the need of greater involvement of the masses in the mounting peace movement is growing among the patriots. The activity of Indonesia's communists is double-purpose: they struggle for democracy and they uphold peace.¹²

The communist's and worker's parties in Japan, Australia and New Zealand have as their youth divisions; the League of Democratic Youth (LDY), the All-Japan Federation of Student Autonomies (Zengakuren), the Socialist Union of Australian Youth and the New Zealand Young

¹⁰ Yu. A. Plekhanov, *Op. cit.*, p. 57.

¹¹ *World Marxist Review*, No. 4, 1982, p. 93.

¹² See *World Marxist Review*, No. 6, 1982.

Worker's Alliance. They are all members of the WFDY and the IUS. The League of Socialist Youth which is sponsored by the Socialist Party of Japan is also a WFDY member. The League of Socialist Youth struggles for the democratisation of Japanese society and against both the threat of nuclear war and the US-Japanese military alliance.¹³ Speaking before the 19th Congress of the USSR Young Communist League chairman of the JLSY Central Committee Dzemme placed particular emphasis on the following activities undertaken by his organisation: "We also promote the in-depth study of Marxist-Leninist theory. Interests among workers in Marxist economic doctrine is growing. We do everything in our power to sustain this interest. At the same time we try to tell Japan's working people about the life of working people in the socialist countries. Against the background of mounting anti-Soviet and anti-Socialist propaganda this is of great importance to our struggle."¹⁴

Most youth and students' organisations in the developing countries of Asia and the Pacific, with the exception of members of the WFDY and IUS do not have well-developed international contacts. Over 20 national youth councils in Southeast and Southern Asia, Oceania, Australia and New Zealand, usually functioning under the aegis of their governments, make up the Asian Council of Youth (ACY) which was established in 1972 as a regional secretariat of the World Youth Assembly (WYA). The WYA headquarters is located in Kuala-Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia. In an effort to promote international contacts among government-sponsored youth organisations the WYA organises seminars and conferences on non-political subjects. It showed definite interest in declaring 1985 the International Year of Youth.

In 1983 ESCAP, assisted by the European Coordination Centre of Social Studies and Documentation held a regional conference of the problems of youth in Bangkok as a part of the preparations for the International Year of Youth. The conference demonstrated that there is a growing awareness among ACY members and other youth organisations in Asia and the Pacific of the need to step up the struggle for peace.¹⁵ However, there are also forces which would like to isolate the youth of Asia and the Pacific from young people of the other continents, to have it look away from today's important problems, confine itself to purely educational and cultural work and adopt anti-Soviet and anti-Communist policies.

However, despite the opposition of imperialists and local reactionaries, government-sponsored youth organisations in the developing countries of Asia and the Pacific display a growing interest in contacts with youth organisations in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, as well as with the WFDY and IUS. The National Committee of Indonesian Youth maintained ties with the USSR Committee of Youth Organisations for a while. The Soviet Committee of Youth Organisations also has ties with Kabataang Barangay. The trend towards broader contacts and cooperation in the struggle for peace is here to stay. The struggle against the threat of war and for an end to the arms race has become an area of cooperation among youth and student organisations in Asia and the Pacific. The struggle for peace and an end to the arms race is the most important task facing young people today. The arms race steals funds badly needed for education, as well as combatting hunger and poverty. The propaganda of war and enmity between peoples undermines the ideals of friendship and cooperation among the world's youth, preventing it from fulfilling its plans and hopes.

¹³ See "On YSL Activities", *USSR CYO News Letter*, 1980, No. 7, pp. 33-43 (in Russian).

¹⁴ *Speeches of Foreign Delegates at the 19th YCL Congress, Moscow, 1982*, p. 218.

¹⁵ *News Service*, 1983, No. 22.

Together with other peaceloving and progressive forces, the democratic youth of Asia and the Pacific makes its own contribution to the struggle for peace and the curbing of the arms race. A characteristic feature of the vast majority of countries in the region is the growing role played by youth and youth movements, the ever greater involvement in the anti-war movements of their peoples and in the world revolutionary process. The young men and women of the USSR, Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, the DPRK, and the democratic youth of Japan, Australia, New Zealand and several developing countries are in the front ranks of this struggle. However, the struggle for peace and disarmament, against imperialism's aggressive policies has a long way to go before it becomes the prime concern of many youth and student organisations in Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Pacific island states.

Today youth movements in the developing countries of Asia and the Pacific concentrate their efforts on the struggle for socio-economic and political rights by young people, for freedom and democracy, against the domination of foreign monopolistic capital. Nowadays the struggle for peace and the struggle for democracy are closely related, because democratic freedoms as well as other vital objectives can be attained only when peace is assured and the arms race has come to a halt. In most developing countries of the region young people become involved in the struggle for peace through their participation in the struggle for their social and political rights.

The creation of a zone of peace in the Pacific is an important task. It can be carried out only through mobilisation of the public at large, including young people. To prevent the further involvement of the peoples of Japan, Australia and other countries of the region in US aggressive policies, the communist and workers' parties as well as progressive youth alliances are stepping up their efforts to attain the goals common to all peaceloving forces, taking into account specific conditions in certain parts of the Pacific Ocean.

Factors which add to the scope and intensity of this struggle leap to the eye. The dangerous policies of the Reagan administration which spurs on the arms race and heightens international tensions have provoked a new upsurge in the anti-war movement. The public is increasingly aware of the danger looming over the planet and posing a threat to mankind's very survival.

New peace initiatives by the USSR, Mongolia and the countries of Indochina, designed to normalise the situation in the Pacific and Indian Ocean, the Far East and Southeast Asia enjoy increasing support among the younger generation.

The anti-war activities of the youth in Asia and the Pacific draw strength from international peace conferences held in the area, the vigorous activities of the national Peace Committees and the consistent, principled policies of the WFDY and the IUS. The participants in the international conference for the banning of nuclear weapons which took place in July 1983 in Japan made a passionate appeal for peace and the prevention of nuclear catastrophe. The month before a conference for a nuclear-free and independent Pacific Ocean had been held at Vila, the capital of Vanuatu. Attended by representatives of 20 island states and territories of the Central Pacific as well as by peace activists from Australia, New Zealand, Japan and several other countries, the conference opposed US aggressive designs on the region, demanded an end to the testing of French nuclear weapons in the South Pacific and a creation of a nuclear-free zone.¹⁶ At the 39th annual session of the UN Economic and

¹⁶ *Pravda*, July 11, 1983.

Social Council for Asia and the Pacific which was held in Bangkok in 1983 the representatives of Kiribati, the Cook Islands, Nauru, Papua-New Guinea and Solomon Islands came out against the nuclear threat and the pollution of the ocean by radioactive wastes.¹⁷

The degree of popular participation, including that of youth, in the struggle for peace is determined by the following principle: as a rule, the greater the degree of their governments' involvement in US imperialism's military plans, the stronger the peace movement in that country. Ample proof of this principle is provided by the situation in Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and other countries in the region. In Japan, for example, an opinion poll of high school and university graduates showed that about 70 per cent of those questioned ~~opposed~~ the buildup in the country's armed forces as a part of the official militarisation policy.¹⁸ Over 70 per cent of Australia's population is opposed to the country's participation in the multinational force in the Sinai, which is being done at the behest of the US.¹⁹ This is an unambiguous expression of the Australians' refusal to adhere to Washington's dangerous policies. In the Philippines the ranks of young people taking part in the demonstrations against US military bases are swelling. At the same time in Nauru, Fiji and several other countries there is no mass anti-war movement to speak of.

Unquestionably, anti-war movements in certain countries of the region would be of a greater scope if they were less fragmented. Although the slogans used by youth and student organisations in their struggle for peace and disarmament hardly differ, these groups frequently act in isolation, sometimes placing the partisan interests of their political parties above everything else. This is the case in Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

The unity of the anti-war movement is negatively affected by those forces which want it to be directed against both the US and the USSR in equal measure as the two countries, they allege, "are equally to blame" for the arms race and the mounting threat of war. There is a broad diversity in the main objectives of the youth movement and the forms of its involvement in the struggle for peace in Asia and the Pacific. In Japan these struggles are primarily directed against the Japanese-US security treaty, the US military bases in Japan, against the practice of US warships armed with nuclear weapons calling at Japanese ports, against nuclear weapons in general, against the deployment of new US missiles in Western Europe and for the strict observance of the "three non-nuclear principles" by the country. In Australia and New Zealand as well as in some other countries of the Pacific the movement opposes the testing of French nuclear weapons and seeks to make the Pacific a zone of peace. Young people in the Philippines and Australia are actively opposed to the presence of US military bases in their countries. The anti-war movement in Japan uses a great variety of forms of protest: public rallies, demonstrations, and peace marches sweep the country practically every month. Annual international conferences on the banning of nuclear weapons are held. These are attended by youth organisations. A great effort goes into making the population aware of the threat of nuclear war. For example, the three peace festivals held in April and May 1982 in Central and Southern Japan under the auspices of the youth branches of the Soka-Gakkai organisation, adopted Peace Declarations in which over 150 thousand participants expressed their resolve to struggle for stable peace in the world and for nuclear disarmament.²⁰

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, May 30, 1983.

¹⁸ *Pravda*, June 8, 1983.

¹⁹ *World Marxist Review*, 1982, No. 6, p. 12.

²⁰ *Soka Gakkai News* (Tokyo), 1982, Vol. 7, No. 159, pp. 10-12.

Demonstrations outside US military bases and ports used by US warships have become almost a daily occurrence in Japan. Over 900 towns and villages proclaimed themselves nuclear-free zones as a part of a new form of anti-war activity which is known as the Drive for the Creation of Nuclear-Free Zones at the Family, Business, District, and Local Administrative Levels. Japan's children have joined the country's young men and women in their struggle for peace. In 1983 Japan's school students launched the Children for Nuclear Disarmament campaign. Thousands of Japanese children write letters to President Reagan demanding an end to the arms race and action to prevent a nuclear catastrophe.²¹

At the 6th International Seminar of Young Researchers Studying the Problems of Cooperation in the Pacific which took place in the Soviet port of Nakhodka in 1981 the representatives of Japan's Council of Youth Organisations cited an astounding fact: when all the appeals, petitions and other written demands for disarmament signed by the young people of Japan were gathered together they weighed 13 tons. Copies of these materials were sent to the UN.²² Democrats in the country want the anti-war movement to go beyond merely holding rallies and demonstrations against nuclear weapons, for disarmament and peace and to evolve onto a continuing campaign designed to force the Nakasone government to modify its dangerous policies on issues of war and peace.

A striking example of this new trend was the mass demonstration by Japan's democratic public held in November 1983 in protest against President Reagan's visit to Tokyo and Seoul: on November 9, thousands of Japanese citizens went out into the streets of Tokyo to condemn the arms race and Washington's brazen interference in the internal affairs of independent countries. On the same day South Korean students demonstrated against Reagan's visit to Seoul.²³ Earlier, mass anti-American demonstrations in the Philippines in combined action with other factors brought about the cancellation of the planned visit by Reagan to that country. Democratic forces, including Asia's youth, reject the dangerous policies pursued by the US administration which are designed to draw them into the arms race and a confrontation with both the USSR and the socialist community.

Representatives of the Democratic Youth League, the Youth Socialist League, the Youth Section of the General Council of Trade Unions (Sohyo) and the Youth Bureau of the Socialist Party of Japan are in the front ranks of the youth protest movement in Japan. Seeking to unite the efforts of young peace workers the 19th YSL Congress (1982), called for greater unity among the country's democratic youth at large. The Congress noted that an example of such unity was the participation of the YSL the Council of Youth Organisations (Nisseiko), Japan's Democratic Youth League and several other organisations in the 1982 anti-war action in Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since 1977 six Japanese youth organisations have participated in the work of the Forum of Youth and Students for the success of annual anti-nuclear weapon conferences. Certain student and youth organisations jointly organise "convoys of youth and students for peace, against nuclear weapons".²⁴

Protest rallies and demonstrations are held by the progressive and democratic forces in Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and Malaysia. In 1983 peace marchers in Australia struck camp outside the federal parliament and have been demonstrating ever since against the transformation of the country into a supplier of raw materials for the manufacture

²¹ *Za rubezhom*, 1983, No. 42, p. 13.

²² *Asia and Africa Today*, 1981, No. 11 (in Russian).

²³ *Pravda*, Nov. 11, 1983.

²⁴ *USSR CYO Newsletter*, 1983, No. 3, p. 16 (in Russian).

of nuclear weapons in the US and France and against the threat of nuclear war. On November 3, 1983, a large group of young peace activists broke into the Australian Parliament and staged a sit-in. A common feature of peace struggles in New Zealand and Japan is the picketing in boats of the ports used by US warships. In November 1983, New Zealand's peace activists used 100 small craft to block the way of the US nuclear submarine *Phoenix*, bound for Wellington, the country's capital. In yet another display of disregard for human life *Phoenix* rammed two of the craft.

Lately the peace movement has become more goal-oriented and popular. Its participants are increasingly aware of the need to combine peace efforts with work for social progress and democracy. Speaking before the 19th USSR Young Communist League congress the representative of New Zealand's Young Workers' League pointed out that the struggle for detente and disarmament was one of the burning tasks for all progressive forces on the planet. An important step in this direction would be the creation of zones of peace in different regions. For example, the establishment of a peace zone in the Pacific was a vital need not only for preventing potential destruction of mankind but also for liberating the colossal resources needed for peaceful construction in the region, for development assistance to the newly liberated peoples and progress of those peoples which continue their struggle for independence.²⁵

The upsurge in the anti-war movement in the Philippines is important not only for that country, but also for the whole of Southeast Asia. Young men and women, who are among the most active participants in the movement, stage demonstrations outside the US embassy in Manila demanding an end to the US military presence in that country and, particularly, the removal of US military bases. Elimination of the bases remains the primary objective of the anti-war movement. Meetings and rallies are held not only outside the US Embassy but also on the campus of Philippines University and at other educational establishments. On June 12, 1983, the country's national holiday, after the ceremonial hoisting of the national flag at the J. Risal monument in Manila, for the first time in the country's history, an official function had an unofficial continuation: many of its participants joined the anti-American youth demonstration which demanded the closing of US military bases.

The WFDY, the IUS and their members from socialist countries, primarily the USSR, Vietnam and Mongolia, make a significant contribution to the greater cohesion of all progressive democratic and anti-war youth groups in Asia and the Pacific. The 10th and 11th WFDY assemblies and the consultative meetings of WFDY members from Asia and Oceania (Tashkent, 1982) made an in-depth analysis of the problems facing youth in the region and ways of strengthening the unity of the young people's democratic movement. Similar matters were discussed by the Asian Consultative Meeting of Student Organisations (Delhi, 1978) and the 14th IUS Congress (Sofia, 1984). Addressing the Delhi meeting a representative of the IUS Secretariat said that his organisation is prepared to cooperate and exchange views with both IUS members and non-members. It was stressed that the IUS was prepared to create favourable conditions for arranging meetings and the exchange of views between Asian student organisations and those in other regions.²⁶ The participants in the Delhi meeting unanimously stated that such meetings were in the interests of the progressive and democratic movements in Asia. The resolution of the 11th WFDY Assembly (Prague, 1982) on Asia and Oceania supported the Soviet proposal to draw up and sign an agreement on mea-

²⁵ *Speeches of Foreign Delegates at the 19th YCL Congress*, p. 141 (in Russian).

²⁶ *Asian Consultative Meeting. IUS Contribution*, p. 10.

asures of mutual confidence in the Far East and other initiatives, as well as the proposals of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea on turning Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and stability, on the normalisation of relations with the ASEAN members, and Mongolia's proposals on a duly prepared convention of mutual non-aggression and non-use of force in relations between countries of Asia and the Pacific. The 11th WFDY Assembly called for a further development of friendship and cooperation among the progressive and democratic youth of Asia, Oceania, the Indian and the Pacific Oceans in the struggle for peace, detente, against the arms race, for the elimination of the imperialist military bases, and for socio-economic and political reforms in the interests of the younger generation.

The efforts made by the young people in Asia and the Pacific to prevent war are backed up by a swelling youth campaign which supports turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, and opposes the US military base on Diego Garcia. The issue was discussed by the following major meetings: the 9th, 10th and 11th WFDY assemblies (1974, 1978, 1982), the 14th congress of the IUS (Sofia, 1984), the IUS Executive Committee (Aden, 1981). The joint IUS-All-India Youth Federation and All-India Students' Federation Conference on Security in the Indian Ocean (India, 1981). All these major international youth forums resolutely demanded an end to the US military presence in the Indian Ocean and expressed their support for the people's struggle to turn the ocean into a zone of peace.

Representatives of Soviet youth have taken active part in all WFDY and IUS activities in Asia and the Pacific, contributing to broader cooperation among young people of the countries in the region, their struggle for peace and disarmament.

On the initiative of Soviet youth six international seminars of young people studying the problems of cooperation in the Pacific have already been held in Nakhodka. The USSR Committee of Youth Organisations and the USSR Student Council together with a number of public and scientific organisations including the Far Eastern branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences have not only made the seminars the only regular meetings of youth organisation representatives from the Pacific countries thus far, but, as the joint statement of the participants in the 6th seminar (1981) pointed out, "a forum for a constructive exchange of views and ideals, which is a genuine contribution to the greater cooperation of youth organisations in the Pacific area". The statement goes on to say that, given the existing international situation, broader and closer ties between youth organisations of different political orientations and their joint, concrete actions in defence of peace acquire special significance.²⁷

It was in this spirit that the October 1983 Khabarovsk Meeting of the Working Youth of Japan and the USSR was held. In summing up the results of the conference, the leaders of the Soviet and the Japanese delegations pointed out that the meeting was a fruitful one and showed that the young people of the two neighbouring states have a solid foundation on which to continue their struggle for peace and goodneighbourliness.²⁸

The progressive and democratic youth of Asia and the Pacific is aware of the need for unity and cohesion in the face of the imperialism's warmongering which threatens the cause of peace. This bears witness to the continuation of the irreversible historical trend toward the strengthening of cooperation between peoples despite scheming by the supporters of the arms race and the heightening of international tension. The younger generation is increasingly aware of its responsibility for the future of the planet and the destinies of their peoples.

²⁷ *Komsomolskaya pravda*, Aug. 25, 1981.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Oct. 20, 1983.

JAPANESE WORKER PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT BELITTLED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 84 pp 75-85

[Article by V. N. Khlynov, doctor of economic sciences, and A. B. Orfenov, candidate of economic sciences: "Labor and Capital in Japan; An Inquiry into Worker 'Participation' in Production Management"]

In recent years the problem of worker "participation" in management has increasingly gained the attention of political groups in Japan. This has its origins in the new conditions of Japanese economic development. First, the rate of economic growth has slowed considerably since the 1974-1975 crisis. Second, the work force is rapidly growing older. Third, there has been an erosion in the hitherto effective traditional system of labour relations with its three main principles: life-long employment (shushin koyo), pay in accordance with age and length of service (nenko chingin) and company trade unions (kigyo betsu kumiai).¹

The first two elements of this specific Japanese system are gradually fading away because they have become economically unprofitable. Therefore, Japanese businessmen are searching for new ways of exploiting labour. Hence the upgrading of the slogan "worker participation in management" which in reality is aimed at increasing production efficiency, thus serving the interests of Japan's bourgeoisie.

Much interest in worker "participation" in management is also displayed by Japan's social reformers, including the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the Japanese Confederation of Labour (Domei) and other right-wing reformist organisations.

The problem of labour-capital relations has also gained the attention of the political parties of the working class — the Communist Party (CPJ) and the Socialist Party (SPJ) — as well as the largest trade union organisation the General Council of Japanese Trade Unions (Sohyo). They give the concept of "participation" quite a different socio-economic and political meaning. The CPJ has demanded that democratic control be established over production. The SPJ and Sohyo are working out their own conceptions of worker participation in management.

An analysis of the interests diametrically opposed political forces display to one and the same question reveals that worker "participation" in management is one of the most complicated and pressing problems facing Japan today.

1. BOURGEOIS AND REFORMIST CONCEPTS OF "PARTICIPATION"

A graphic exposition of the "Japanese version" of "participation" as it is conceived by the bourgeoisie is presented by the well-known Japanese sociologist K. Odaka in his book *Towards Industrial Democracy: Management and Workers in Modern Japan*. "In any group", K. Odaka points out, "the essentials for leadership are maximally to fulfil the following two conditions: that each member of the group should be able to satisfy his needs and desires and to develop his talents and capacities; and that the group as a whole should be able to operate as efficiently as possible, to

¹ For more on this, see *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1982, No. 1.

attain its goals, and to perform its social functions". It is to the latter condition that the book attaches primary significance.

In order to stop workers from likening "industrial democracy" to Japan's traditional paternalistic system of labour-capital relations with its clear-cut exploitative principles, such as "the manager is the father, the workers are his children", "the father's duty is to command, the children's duty is to obey", the two above-mentioned conditions are supplemented by a third: "every member of the group must be allowed to participate in managerial decision-making", i. e. given the right to "participate" in the management of production.

According to Odaka, this necessitates adherence to at least five principles. First, the employer must treat his hired workers as partners in the management of the enterprise, and not simply as the work force. "This kind of employee treatment," Odaka argues, "contrasts sharply with paternalism, which often regarded employee as 'our servants' or 'people depending upon us like children'".² Second, "employees, as partners, should be given training of a job-centered type." The author is referring not to the skills necessary at a particular enterprise but a worker's qualifications and knowledge which can be used in any sphere of production. "This is quite distinct," Odaka says, "from the type of training in company folkways" which was common under paternalistic management."³ Third, every hired worker must be given the job which fits best his personal interests and talents. Also, according to the well-publicised concept of "industrial democracy", the worker should only be paid for the work he performs and not for his length of service, as stipulated by the traditional Japanese system. At the same time, the most capable and productive workers must be promoted irrespective of their education, age and length of service. Fourth, hired workers must have the opportunity to participate in managerial decision-making. This implies that "at the shop level, employees may be encouraged to attend periodic shop-level conferences and freely to discuss means for carrying out the production program of the workshop most efficiently." And fifth: "Each employee should be responsible for observing the rules and carrying out the tasks which have been decided upon with his participation."⁴

Even a cursory analysis of these "democratic" principles shows that the so-called "industrial democracy" has a well-defined class character and is democracy for the employers alone. Under private capitalist ownership of the means of production such democracy makes hired workers dependent on the owners of capital and pursues just one goal: through demagogical talk about "equal opportunity" to increase exploitation of the working people.

So, in the light of this concept, what is the attitude of Japan's monopolistic bourgeoisie and of middle and small businessmen towards the problem of "participation"?

The attitude of Japanese monopolies is mixed. On the one hand, mindful of the new economic conditions and looking for more efficient methods of exploiting hired labour, they pursue increased "cooperation between labour and capital". As D. Yasui, a prominent bourgeois sociologist points out, "To overcome the present crisis we need cooperation between labour and capital, in the form of greater participation in management".⁵ On the other hand, monopolies guard rather jealously their managerial prerogatives, fearful of undesirable development of the institution of "participation". "Participation in management, if it exceeds the limits set by the

² K. Odaka, *Towards Industrial Democracy: Management and Workers in Modern Japan*, Tokyo, 1975, p. 14.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁵ *Nihon rodo kyokai zasshi*, 1975, No. 5 (194), p. 5.

employers, can take on a revolutionary character," bourgeois economist N. Maruo warns.⁶

Introducing one or another form of "participation", the monopolies pursue, in fact, two aims: one is to maintain capitalism as a system; the other is to step up exploitation of the working people.

In practice, the monopoly bourgeoisie is guided in its treatment of "participation" by the recommendations of business organisations, above all the Japanese Association of Businessmen and the Society of Like-Minded People on Questions of Economic Policy, the National Council of Social and Economic Questions and the Japanese Centre of Productivity, the four of them making up the "brain trust" of big business. Let us take a brief look at these recommendations.

The Japanese Association of Businessmen (Nikkeiren) recommends, in particular, the concept of so-called "general participatory management", worked out by the association's experts. The chief goal of modern production, the experts say, is the simultaneous achievement of three objectives: high efficiency of production, humanisation of working conditions and of the workers' social involvement in capitalist production. According to this theory, these objectives can be achieved by way of "general participatory management", that is a system of decision-making based on consensus of all the workers at a given enterprise. Advocates of this system do not attempt to hide its advantages for employers. "On the one hand," they point out, "democratisation of management will improve relations between businessmen and hired workers through better mutual understanding, thus stabilising labour-capital relations. On the other hand, humanisation of labour conditions will help overcome the negative consequences of worker alienation brought about by the gigantic size of the production structure and monotonous work. In turn, all of this will boost labour productivity."⁷ Wary of possibly "exceeding the limits of participation", the authors of this proposal emphasize that "general participatory management" ought to be exercised under the employers' control.⁸ It must be noted that Nikkeiren comes out against trade union participation in management, drawing a line between "participatory management" (zenyin sankaku keiei) and "participation in management" (keiei sankano rouri to tembo) which provides for trade union participation in decision-making.⁹ In addition, through "participatory management", under the employers' control Nikkeiren hopes to do away with the trade union movement altogether. "Given successful development of general participatory management," says the document, "trade unions will become superfluous".¹⁰

A somewhat different idea of "participation" is propounded by the so-called Society of Like-Minded People (Keizai doiyukai). Proceeding from the specifics of Japanese labour relations it comes up with the concept of "Japanese-style participation" (nihonteki keiei sanku) which grants the trade unions the opportunity of using certain production information, and working out the general principles of a system of labour-capital consultations to be established by legislation. It also envisages the formation of a tripartite committee comprised of representatives of the government, employers' organisations and national trade union centres to deal with general economic questions. The authors of this project propose that the questions of including workers' representatives on boards of directors, introducing a system of "profit sharing", and expanding grass-root "partici-

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1976, No. 2 (203), p. 3.

⁷ "General Participatory Management", *Principles and Prospects of Participation in Management, West-European Trends and Japanese Reality*, Tokyo, 1979, pp. 303-304 (in Japanese).

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 308.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 310.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

pation" "not for the purpose of higher efficiency but to enable workers to utilise all their talents" should be studied.¹¹ In contrast to Nikkeiren, the Society of Like-Minded People believes that the right to "participation in management" should be granted only to members of trade unions which "must be aware of their social responsibility and carry out a policy of cooperation."¹² This is a clear indication that the purpose of this scheme is to integrate the working people and their unions in the capitalist economic system.

The National Council on Social and Economic Questions (Shakai keizai kokumin kaigi) thinks that the primary purpose of "participation" is the "achievement of both a national consensus on managing the economy and labour-capital cooperation on managing enterprises".¹³ This can be realised, according to the National Council, only by coping with three interconnected problems — the humanisation of working conditions, the democratisation of the economy and the raising of labour productivity. Stressing that labour-capital relations are undergoing a serious crisis due to general economic difficulties, the National Council thinks it possible to overcome the crisis through the development of "participation" which is bound to contribute to dialogue, not confrontation. The National Council thinks that trade unions should be granted some production information.¹⁴ Thus, the main purpose of this plan is to lower the degree of confrontation between labour and capital by integrating unions in the structure of state-monopoly capitalism and making them serve the interests of big business.

Much attention is paid by the monopoly bourgeoisie to the recommendations of the Japanese Centre of Labour Productivity (Nihon seisancei hombu), which advocates a system of "mutual consultations" between labour and capital as the main form of "participation".¹⁵ The Centre supports the idea of union "participation" in management, provided that management's sphere of responsibility is clearly separate from the unions'.¹⁶ Contrasting the institution of "mutual consultation" to collective bargaining, the Centre believes that the functions of the two should be divided in accordance with the principle put forward by Ichiro Nakayama, a well-known bourgeois economist, head of the Standing Committee on Labour-Capital Mutual Consultations. According to this principle, "collective bargaining should settle those questions in which the interests of labour and capital diverge, whereas mutual consultations should be concerned with the problems where their interests converge".¹⁷ Thus, in the final analysis, the Centre's plan aims at undermining the system of collective bargaining and at integrating trade unions in the system of state-monopoly capitalism.

Such are the conceptions of "participation" worked out by Japanese monopoly organisations. Some nuances notwithstanding, all these ideas are much alike in principle as they serve the interests of big business.

The stand of the small businessman on the question of "participation" has a number of distinctive features because of the dual position occupied by this social stratum in the system of modern state-monopoly capitalism. On the one hand, being the owner of capital, small businessman exploits the working class, but on the other hand, he is himself exploited by big capital, above all by monopolies, as a result of the redistribution of a part

¹¹ "Report by Subcommittee on Participation in Management", *Principles and Prospects of Participation in Management*, pp. 300-301.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 302.

¹³ "On Participation in Production Management by Representatives of Trade Unions and Workers", *Principles and Prospects*, p. 287.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 286-287.

¹⁵ *White Book on Labour-Capital Relations*, Tokyo, 1980, p. 212 (in Japanese).

¹⁶ *System of Mutual Labour-Capital Consultations in Japan. Its Status and Purposes*, Tokyo, 1976, p. 15 (in Japanese).

¹⁷ I. Nakayama, *Economic Sociology of Labour-Capital Relations*, Tokyo, 1976, p. 220 (in Japanese).

of surplus value. Hence the small businessman's somewhat critical attitude towards the system of state-monopoly capitalism. His views on "participation" are also influenced by certain factors characteristic of small business such as the greater frequency of paternalistic relations, considerable instability, the lower level of trade union organisation, etc.

In contrast with monopolies, small and middle businessmen have not come up with any substantial programmes on the subject of "participation". Their views, usually contradictory and eclectic, are presented most fully by H. Matsumoto, president of the Fuji Ryodjin Kogyo Company in his book *Participation in Management in Japan. The View of Small and Middle Businessmen*, which has been praised by small business.

The author levels sharp criticism at capitalism but calls not for a radical transformation of the existing order, but for democratic reforms. A concrete step which, in his opinion, would lead to "true democracy of self-control, uniting the whole nation" is worker "participation" in management. At the same time, H. Matsumoto has no illusions about the "participation" practiced at big enterprises, viewing it as a product of collusion between labour and capital and the deception of workers.¹⁸

The main purpose of the institution of "participation", the author believes, is to improve the lot of hired workers, on the one hand, and to create better conditions for small businessmen, on the other. Believing that these aims are not contradictory but complementary, H. Matsumoto asserts that "through participation in management the workers will find a common language with the small businessmen". On this premise he calls upon the workers to embrace the idea of "common interests" with the employers for the good of one's "own" enterprise. The author supports the participation of unions in management, provided they adopt a reformist platform.¹⁹ As an ideologue of small business, H. Matsumoto claims that the realisation of his proposals will bring about "general prosperity".²⁰

Besides the conceptions discussed above the country is rife with reformist ideas about "participation", presented in the most straightforward manner in the programmatic documents of the Party of Democratic Socialism and right-wing reformist trade unions.

The Party of Democratic Socialism, founded by a group of Social Democrats which left the SPJ and called by some in Japan a "middle of the road party", looks upon the "participation" as a means of achieving class cooperation between labour and capital. The 1960 party programme proclaims the working people's "participation" in management an important element in "democratic socialism" which the party wants to build. However this point in the programme is deliberately made rather vague: "It is necessary to find a way of expressing the collective ideas of workers regarding management. In order to limit the growing power of the owners of big enterprises, a great deal of importance should be attached to the views of hired workers on management".²¹

A programmatic document of the party, known as The 10 Plans of the PDS, also adopted in 1960, further develops the idea of "participation" and makes it more precise. Here emphasis is placed on the system of "mutual consultations" the main purpose of which is "to make production more efficient in order to soften class antagonisms".²² Japanese communists describe the PDS's position as a call for "the traditional policy of collusion between labour and capital".²³

¹⁸ H. Matsumoto, *Nihon-no keiei sanku. Aru chusho kigyokahigan*, Tokyo, 1976, pp. 8, 124.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

²¹ *PDS Programme*, Tokyo, 1975, p. 23 (in Japanese).

²² *Shakai shimpo*, Tokyo, Feb. 1, 1960.

²³ *PDS. Its Principles and Activity*, Tokyo, 1976, p. 64 (in Japanese).

Much attention is devoted to the problem of "participation" by the party's 1978 programmatic document. In particular, it advances the idea of "public participation and mutual responsibility". "There is no other way of reviving democracy in our country, but to embrace all spheres of public life with the principle of participation". At the same time it is stressed that "trade unions must approach the question of management with a sense of responsibility". Otherwise, "participation" becomes "a selfish demand for rights and results in a weakening of the state of general prosperity and, even worse, in the destruction of the whole of society".²⁴

Thus, the "participation" proposed by the PDS is of an illusory nature and is aimed at strengthening cooperation between labour and capital.

An overtly opportunist position in regard to "participation" is taken by the right-wing trade unions of the Japanese Confederation of Labour (Domei). They approach this problem on the basis of the "common goals of labour and capital". Domei's theoretician, A. Sato, says: "The common goals of labour and capital are participation and cooperation. Realisation of a system of participation calls for consultations between labour and capital and mutual responsibility... Participation means the translation into practice of industrial democracy."²⁵ The confederation's position regarding "participation" is presented in a special programmatic document entitled, "For Establishing Economic System of Participation" (1974). Stressing the "advantages of participation in management" both for employers and workers, the document states the following: "Participation meets the interests of labour and capital. Capital gets bigger profits, labour gets greater satisfaction from work".²⁶ Hence the conclusion that employers and unions must together introduce "participation" based on cooperation.

Such are the prevailing fundamental bourgeois and reformist conceptions of "participation". They determine to a great degree how "participation" is practiced in Japan today.

2. "PARTICIPATION" IN PRESENT-DAY JAPAN

In capitalist Japan there are no enterprises with true worker control over production. The beginnings of such control existed for a brief time at a few business right after the Second World War when the working class, aided by an upsurge in the democratic and working class movement, put up a determined fight for participation in management. In the course of this struggle Japan's working people sought the right to set up "production consultative committees" (seisan kyogikai). These standing bodies were comprised of an equal number of representatives from management and the unions and their decisions, touching on various aspects of the enterprise's activity, were treated as directives. In the first half of 1946 the country had 170 such committees,²⁷ but by the summer of that year the ruling circles in Japan, with the sanction of the US occupation authorities, hastened to do away with this democratic achievement of the working people. By order of the Supreme Court the production consultative committees were disbanded.²⁸

Today, the bourgeoisie ranks first in the movement for "participation". So most forms of "participation" practiced today correspond with the in-

²⁴ *Japanese Economy Facing a New Choice. Medium Term Plan of Economic Development Proposed by PDS. Towards General Prosperity, Without Unemployment and Inflation*, Tokyo, 1978.

²⁵ *Domei*, Tokyo, 1980, No. 6, pp. 61-62.

²⁶ "Sanka keizai taisei-no Jitsugen-no mate-ni", *Keiei sanko-no ronri to tembo...*, p. 312.

²⁷ I. Nakayama, *Op. cit.*, p. 256.

²⁸ See R. A. Scalapino, *Japan Labour and Economic Development*, New York-London, 1959, p. 124.

terests of the ruling class and present but a semblance of participation in management by workers, office employees and their unions. Depending on specific conditions it is practiced at four levels, primarily in the following forms: 1) the work-place level — workers' control over the quality of production, prevention of spoilage, organisation of so-called small autonomous groups, shopfloor meetings, etc. 2) the enterprise, firm or company level — mutual consultations between labour and capital, collective bargaining, inclusion of workers' representatives on boards of directors, etc.; 3) the industrial level — "consultative boards" made up of representatives of the industry's union federation and employers' organisations; 4) the national level — various government consultative committees comprised of representatives of the government, national trade unions and federations of employers.

Today "participation" is most widespread at the first, i. e. the lowest level. As a rule, it coincides with various forms of propaganda about "human relations in industry". At present such "participation" in one or another form exists at almost all Japanese enterprises and is willingly accepted by employers because it does not threaten capitalist management.

A widely practiced form of "participation" at this level is the so-called "movement for self-regulation" (jisu kanri katsudo), which includes "control over the quality of production" and "work without spoilage". There is a growing number of "small autonomous groups" (work-teams), which have the right to make decisions within the bounds of their specific production tasks. One quite common form of "participation" is the shopfloor meeting. This can be anything from a daily 15 minute briefing to a monthly marathon conference.

At the enterprise, firm or company level the most widespread forms of "participation" are mutual consultations between labour and capital (roshikyogisei) and collective bargaining (dantai kosho). These are practiced at almost all enterprises, especially big ones. Taking part in them are representatives of management and trade unions who discuss various issues, from working conditions to financial problems. In practice mutual consultations and collective bargaining grapple with the same or nearly the same kinds of problems.²⁹ As for worker representation on boards of directors, employers display little enthusiasm for the idea. In 1978 this form of "participation" was present at only 1.5 per cent of all enterprises and in practice has been reduced to the formal representation of several trade union leading functionaries on boards of directors.³⁰

In contrast to other developed capitalist countries (for example, West Germany) Japan lacks special legislation on "participation" in management. Therefore, at the work-place, enterprise and company levels "participation" is carried out on the basis of a collective agreement between management and the trade union.

"Participation" at the industrial level is poorly developed. At present there are only 13 labour-capital consultative boards in eleven branches of industry (cement, electricity, automobile, shipbuilding, coal mining, sea transportation, textile, metallurgy, production of electric cables, electronics and electrical appliances). The meetings of the above-mentioned boards are held 3-4 times a year mainly to exchange information of interest to both sides.³¹

A similar situation obtains at the national level. Of the total 246 standing government committees, workers are "represented" on only 41. The interests of workers and office employees are voiced by 145 union func-

²⁹ *Japanese Economy Facing a New Choice*, pp. 49, 59; *System of Mutual Labour-Capital Consultations in the Epoch of Participation*, Tokyo, 1976, p. 47 (in Japanese).

³⁰ See *Work Force and Enterprise Management*, Tokyo, 1978, p. 196 (in Japanese).

³¹ *Modern Forms of Wage*, Vol. 4, "Tasks in the Sphere of Wages", Tokyo, 1977, p. 49.

onaries, comprising a mere 13 per cent of the membership of these committees. To make matters worse, the working people's representatives often fail to present a united front because of the different ideological leanings of their respective trade unions. Out of the 145 afore-mentioned representatives, the left-wing General Council of Japanese Trade Unions (Sohyo) is represented by 67; the right-wing reformist Japanese Confederation of Labour (Domei) by 56; the Council of Independent Trade Unions (Churitsuroren) by 20; the Congress of Industrial Trade Unions by 2; etc.³² As a result, just as it did at the industrial level, "participation" here exists more in word than in deed.

The main purpose of all these forms of "participation", practiced with the blessing of the bourgeoisie, is the achievement of higher production efficiency through more intensive exploitation of labour. In this respect "participation" at the lower and middle levels is especially "successful". As a result of such forms of "participation" as "the movement for self-regulation", particularly "control over quality" and "work without spoilage", the quality of production has been considerably improved, and is much higher than at enterprises that do not resort to this form. Moreover, these forms of "participation" have ensured extremely high standards of quality even against tough international norms. Thus, a 1980 survey of three Japanese and three American companies, producing integrated circuits, revealed the following. The proportion of spoilage in an entire shipment of products by the three Japanese companies equaled 0 per cent, while the respective percentages of the American companies were 0.19; 0.11; 0.18. The proportion of spoiled production after one thousand hours of testing amounted to 0.01, 0.019 and 0.012 per cent for the Japanese companies, and to 0.09; 0.059 and 0.267 per cent for the American. As a result, the integral index of quality for the Japanese companies was 89.9, 87.2 and 87.2 per cent; and for the American — 86.1; 63.3 and 48.1 per cent.³³

The profitability of different forms of "participation" is also indicated by the substantial rise in profits made by those companies that use these camouflaged methods of exploitation. For example, Nippon Denki, a major electrical engineering company, practicing "work without spoilage", earned additionally some 3,000 million yen in 1965-1967 alone as a result of rationalisation measures proposed by the workers.³⁴ Major metallurgical companies, having spent 700 million yen on the "movement for self-regulation" earned more than 40,000 million yen.³⁵

Such are the fruits of the "participation" in management by Japan's toiling masses. The bourgeois nature of this practice inevitably leads to increased exploitation of the working class, on the one hand, and higher profits for the monopolies, on the other. Democratic forces in the country oppose "participation" of this kind. They support participation which is in the interests of the working people.

3. THE TYPE OF PARTICIPATION DEMANDED BY DEMOCRATIC FORCES

Rejecting the bourgeois practice of "participation" and aware of the growing importance of this problem, Japan's democratic forces have been paying more attention to this issue.

The most consistent stand is taken by the Communist Party of Japan which defends the class interests of the proletariat. Right after the defeat

³² *Consultations at the Industrial and National Levels*, Geneva, 1978, p. 38.

³³ See T. Kakuma, *At the Forefront of World Technological Battle*, Tokyo, 1981, p. 58 (in Japanese).

³⁴ See S. Tsujioka, *Modern Rationalisation*, Tokyo, 1969, p. 114 (in Japanese).

³⁵ See E. A. Starovoitov, *Management of Japan's Major Metallurgical Companies*, Moscow, 1980, p. 136 (in Russian).

of militarist Japan in the Second World War Japan's communists demanded people's control over the main industries and workers' control over private enterprises.³⁶

This fundamental position was established in the new Programme adopted by the 8th CPJ congress in 1961. "The Party is working for the establishment of people's control over monopoly capital, aimed at the subsequent transition through this control to nationalisation of the financial organs of monopoly capital and monopoly enterprises in the basic industries; with this aim in view and depending on necessity and concrete conditions the Party will demand nationalisation of certain monopolistic enterprises or establishment at them of people's management."³⁷

Today the CPJ considers the struggle for participation an important element in the national fight for democratic change in the country. The party document "Programme of a Democratic, Left-Wing Coalition Government", approved by the 12th Party Congress (1973), stresses that without democratic control over major enterprises such a government would be unable effectively to conduct a progressive economic policy. In the opinion of the CPJ, such control should be carried out from above — by parliament and governmental bodies where democratic forces must win the majority of seats — and from below, by the working people's organisations at enterprises. An important prerequisite of participation from below is expansion of the rights of hired workers and trade unions.³⁸

The CPJ's position on this score was further developed in a "Declaration on Freedom and Democracy", adopted by the 13th Extraordinary Party Congress (1976). This programmatic document discusses the necessity of realising "economic democracy" even under capitalism. As a concrete step in that direction the CPJ proposes a considerable expansion of the rights enjoyed by trade unions in the sphere of collective bargaining for the purpose of greater union influence in management and pricing. The CPJ insists on the inclusion of representatives of workers, peasants and consumer organisations in the government Committee on Equitable Transactions, as well as into all government consultative bodies developing economic policy. The CPJ proposes that workers' committees be set up at enterprises. Management would be required to take into consideration the opinions expressed by these committees.³⁹

The idea of establishing democratic control over big capital is elaborated by the CPJ in its 1977 document "Our Economic Proposals. A Plan for Restructuring Japan's Economy to Challenge the Crisis", which constitutes a democratic alternative to the domination of monopolies in the economy. The Communist Party sees as a necessary conditions for realising democratic control in, among other things, the "expansion and elaboration of the contents of collective agreements, development of the movement for participation in management on the basis of initiative from below, and not in the calls for 'harmony' between labour and capital".⁴⁰

Much attention to the problem of participation has been paid in recent years by the Socialist Party of Japan whose interest in this important issue arose in the late 1970s, i. e., much later than did the interest of the CPJ. Two SPJ programmatic documents which are still operative today, "The Programme of the United Socialist Party of Japan", adopted in 1955, and "Japan's Path of Socialism", approved in 1969 as "the Party's

³⁶ *Nationalisation of the Major Industries and Establishment of People's Control Over Them. Reference Book*, Tokyo, 1948, p. 3, 12 (in Japanese).

³⁷ *The 8th Congress of the Communist Party of Japan*. Moscow, 1961, p. 293 (in Russian).

³⁸ See *Main Documents of the Twelfth Congress of the Communist Party of Japan*, Tokyo, 1974, pp. 390-393.

³⁹ *Freedom, Democracy and the CPJ*, Tokyo, 1976, pp. 39-49, 126 (in Japanese).

⁴⁰ *Nihon keizai-e-no-teigen. Kiki-no chosen suru saiken keikaku*, Tokyo, 1977, p. 81.

ideological and theoretical foundation" do not even mention the question of workers' control.⁴¹ It was only in 1977 that, at the initiative of the SPJ, a Committee was created to study the problem of independent workers' control (Rodosia dzisiu kanri kenkiu kaigi). It conducted a number of studies and in 1979 its recommendations were taken into account by the 43rd SPJ Congress when discussing a document on mid-term economic policy.⁴² It set the task of a democratic transformation of the country's economy and in this connection attached much importance to expanded "participation" by working people in management. That document does not raise the question of nationalising basic industries but proposes so-called "socialisation". This abstract "socialisation" is meant to be supported by the working people's "participation" in management.⁴³

This kind of approach to participation was criticised by the left wing of the SPJ which came out against the "unduly abstract" interpretation of "participation" that did not take into account the objective foundation and subjective conditions of its realisation. These critics think that any interpretation which does not involve a democratic coalition government with the indispensable participation of communists plays into the hands of the reactionary forces.⁴⁴

Ever more interest in the problem of true participation is shown by those trade unions which share the idea of the class struggle, in particular, Sohyo and Churitsuroren. For a long time their attitude towards this problem was negative for they considered "participation" a camouflaged form of labour exploitation by the bourgeoisie. Sohyo's leadership, in particular, believed that "it is not expedient to develop the idea of participation in management" because "in Japan, where trade unions are built on the principle 'to every enterprise its own union', workers are strongly attached to the management and the workers' movement is insufficiently organised".⁴⁵

In 1979 the problem of participation was raised at the 59th Sohyo Congress which came out against one-sided interpretation of this problem and spoke of the necessity of combining the struggle for the unions' expanded rights in management with the fight for social, economic and political changes. The Congress named development of collective bargaining at the shopfloor, enterprise, company, and industrial levels, as well as negotiations with the government as the institution of participation. Simultaneously, the Congress set the tasks of studying in greater detail the problem of participation.⁴⁶

Thus, we conclude that the very approach taken by the country's various political forces to the participation of Japan's toiling mass in management is becoming a major social and economic issue since there is a clash of interests between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the main opposing classes of modern Japanese society. They invest the term "participation" with differing socio-economic and political meanings and strive to use the institution of participation for their own, opposing aims.

Representatives of the truly democratic forces of Japan — first and foremost the front-rank contingents of the working class are trying to use "participation" in the interests of the broad toiling masses. They recognise participation as an active form of class struggle against the domina-

⁴¹ See G. I. Podpalova, *The Socialist Party of Japan. 1945-1972*, Moscow, 1975, pp. 111, 205-208 (in Russian).

⁴² *Plan of Rebuilding Japan's Economy. For Democratisation and Stronger Public Character of the Economy. Middle-Term Policy in the Sphere of Economy*, Tokyo, 1979, p. 579 (in Japanese).

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁴⁴ *Shakai tsushin*, 1978, No. 40, p. 9.

⁴⁵ See "Statement by Sohyo's Leadership", *Daiyamondo*, 1976, No. 29, p. 50.

⁴⁶ *Sohyo*, 1979, No. 9, pp. 53-57.

tion of monopolies. They come out for turning the already existing institutions of "participation" into potent levers to influence the policy of the state and monopolies. The winning and realisation of the right of true participation are regarded by the working people, first as an important part of their struggle to improve their socio-economic position, and second, as a means of creating conditions favourable to the expansion of the struggle against the system of capitalist exploitation. Thus, the revolutionary potential of participation by working people in management is quite obvious. Hence its positive meaning.

On the contrary, "participation" as it is currently practiced, together with the numerous recipes for its "improvement" in a bourgeois or reformist spirit are aimed, in the final analysis, at strengthening the exploitation of the working class and integrating it into the capitalist economic system. In other words, these are subtle methods of achieving both old aims under new conditions of Japanese economic development, and "harmony" between labour and capital in the interests of the latter. Such "participation" is a serious blow not only to the basic class interests of the proletariat but also to its workaday economic interests.

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CSO: 1812/76-E

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF LAW IN THE PRC

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 84 pp 86-96

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Modern Chinese law evolved under the direct impact of peculiarities of the revolutionary process which led to the formation of the People's Republic of China. This process emerged in the provinces and converged on the centre, and new state structures in general took shape in the liberated areas where certain experience had been accumulated in governing vast territories, administering justice and making laws. This experience was for the most part of local and even rural origin, while war-time conditions imposed harsh constraints on the implementation of the democratic postulates professed by the revolutionary forces. Besides, during a certain period of the revolution there was an agreement on a united front with the Guomindang and the liberated areas formally recognized the authority of the Central Government of the Republic of China while in fact constituting state-like formations on its territory. At that time government and legislative bodies had to reckon with the law-making of China's central authorities and even local traditions, which the Guomindang courts also used more readily than the legal codes the Guomindang government had compiled on the basis of West European and Japanese legislation.

However, the local nature of legislation in the liberated areas did not prevent it along with some regulations of the Soviet Republic of China of the 1930s and laws operating in major liberated areas during the People's Liberation War of 1945-1949, from being used as a basis for evolving legislation in the People's Republic of China.

Special documents were issued to extend the application of certain legal acts of the liberated areas to the entire territory of People's China. For example, a directive issued on February 28, 1950 by the financial and economic committee of the PRC Administrative Council applied to the whole of China the rules of organising factory committees and factory conferences of workers' and employees' representatives at state and public enterprises that had been endorsed by the People's Government of North China on July 10, 1949.¹ As for earlier legislation, on August 4, 1953, the PRC Administrative Council, making some additions, reinforced documents which had been adopted by the Central Soviet Government in Ruijing (Jiangxi province) in 1933 and which contained important legal instruments, such as "How to Identify Classes in Rural Areas" and "Decisions on Some Problems of Agrarian Reform". The preamble to the act mentioned that these two documents had already been made public by the CPC Central Committee on May 25, 1948, "and were applied in carrying through the agrarian reform [in the previously liberated areas. — *Auth.*], which confirmed the possibility for applying them to the agrarian reform underway at present".² In that case the functioning of the CPC Central Committee as a law-maker in the liberated areas was quite natural because those areas had no single governmental body.

¹ See *A Code of Laws and Regulations of the Central People's Government of 1949-1950*, Peking (in Chinese).

² *Ibid.*, pp. 96-108.

The nature of the revolutionary process in China developing in the main as a civil or anti-imperialist war also determined the special role of the Chinese armed forces both in the course of that process and in the evolution of new statehood and legislation. Military-administrative committees (with the exception of Northeastern and North China, the key bases of the Chinese revolution) stood at the head of the major liberated Chinese areas, on whose basis large administrative regions were subsequently formed in the PRC. Similar to the people's governments of Northeastern and North China, these committees were the local bodies of supreme authority, and adopted a great number of legislative instruments both before the PRC was formed (as has been mentioned earlier) and afterwards, up to the abolition of the military-administrative committees. In some cases, after October 1, 1949, military-administrative committees issued legislative instruments on problems outside centralised jurisdiction. These acts were usually included in the general PRC codes of law and regulations as addenda, some of them endorsed by the Administrative Council of the PRC Central People's Government. For instance, the agrarian reform legislation section of the *Code of Laws and Regulations of the Central People's Government of 1949-1950* had an addendum, which included, among other things, Regulations for the Punishment of Landowners Committing Outrage (Defying Law—bu fa), in East China, adopted by the East Chinese military-administrative committee, two acts adopted by the military-administrative committee of Central-South China and one by the military-administrative committee of Southwestern China.³

The military-control committees of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLAC) united under the leadership of the People's Revolutionary Council, made a certain contribution to evolving a system of legal regulation of urban life. Prior to the formation of the PRC the Council had headed the revolutionary armed forces and was then included in the Central People's Government of the PRC as a body exercising "the united leadership and command of the People's Liberation Army of the entire country as well as of other detachments of the people's armed forces" (from Article 23 of the Law of the Formation of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China).

The presence of the PLAC military-control committees reflected not only the special role played in the Chinese revolution by its armed forces but also the dynamics of the revolutionary process in China, which, as has already been mentioned, developed from the provinces to the centre and also from rural areas, where the early bases of the developing revolution had been set up, to the cities. For this reason the Chinese communists who spearheaded the revolutionary forces of the country lacked experience in managing cities, especially big ones. The first experience in running such cities was accumulated on the territory of the Manchurian revolutionary base, where the Soviet military administration gradually handed over the functions of civilian rule to the Chinese authorities. The PLAC military-control committees on the whole followed the same pattern, receiving power from the Guomindang authorities and gradually transferring it to the local people's governments, which, incidentally, actively employed Guomindang officials and even policemen for some time. The military-control committees issued many legislative instruments which regulated various aspects of life in the liberated areas.

This experience of the people's government in law-making and the corresponding legislative base enabled the CPC, the leader of the Chinese

³ See *The Code of Laws and Regulations of the Central People's Government, 1949-1950*, p. 73.

revolution, to abrogate old legislation in the liberated areas even before the formation of the PRC. This was effected by a party document issued by the CPC Central Committee—The Directive on the Abrogation of the Guomindang Complete Book of Six Laws and on the Establishment of Principles of Justice in the Liberated Areas (the fundamental principles of this directive were subsequently reproduced in Instructive Order No. 8 of the “fa” series by the People’s Government of North China). Instead of the abrogated legislation the courts were advised to use regulations expounded “in the programmes, statutes, orders, resolutions and other documents made public by the people’s government and the People’s Liberation Army and, in their absence, the policy of new democracy.”⁴ In practice, however, before the judiciary reform of 1952-1953 judges who had been employed in the old legislative system continued using the abrogated Guomindang laws in the people’s courts.

The Guomindang regime formally had a fairly developed legal system. Criminal and civil codes, financial and maritime laws, the code of civil procedure, land law and so on were evolved in the late 1920s and the early 1930s. But, as has already been mentioned, these codes and laws copied foreign legislation (these acts sometimes even combined borrowed instruments with articles codifying the customary law of old China). Furthermore, most of these laws were not implemented. Only public safety laws and regulation designed to establish total control over the population and suppress the revolutionary movement were actively employed. Besides, the maritime regions of China and the North East of the country were occupied by the Japanese army, where the laws of the puppet state of Manzhou-guo operated.

Old China’s legislative inheritance was not restricted by the laws and regulations of the Guomindang regime. Since ancient times China had had a specific legal culture: the imperial dynasties had established numerous criminal (*liu*) or administrative (*lin*) laws necessary to ensure their dominion over the people and retain their rule. Legal norms regulating the status of the individual formed only part of these laws and regulations. China had evolved no system of private law as, for example, did Ancient Rome; Chinese law was only a means and instrument of suppression. These laws held no force over village communities, which had used customary law passed from generation to generation since time immemorial. The civil code worked out under the Guomindang regime, for the greater section of the country existed only on paper and, consequently, could hardly change anything in the Chinese legal tradition.⁵

During the formation of the PRC the General Programme of the People’s Political Consultative Council (PPCC), and the Law on the Central People’s Government of China, adopted by the PPCC plenary session in September 1949, as well as some other enactments of the same plenary session, such as on the state capital and flag and on the new calendar, all served as provisional constitutional acts determining the legal foundations of the state. Some provisions of the PPCC Organisational Status were also of a constitutional nature since it granted the PPCC plenary session, which was never convened subsequently, the powers of the National People’s Congress, including the power to form the Central People’s Government. Article 17 of the PPCC General

⁴ *Study Materials on the History of the State and Law of China*, issue 3, Peking, 1954, p. 2.

⁵ See J. Inako, *Law and Politics in Modern China, 1949-1975*, Moscow, 1978, pp. 24-25.

Programme endorsed the abrogation of the legal and court systems of the reactionary Guomindang government.

During the rehabilitation period the Chinese legal system was shaped by diverse factors, while law-making itself was characterised by decentralisation and multitude of subjects.⁶ Nevertheless, along with the centralisation of finance, the economic efforts and other sectors of management, the process of centralising legislature began with the gradual expansion of centralised legislation (especially economic legislation) and the corresponding decrease in the number of legislative acts issued by major administrative regions. Law-making at this level was stopped in November 1952, when the military-administrative committees of major administrative regions were transformed into administrative committees by a resolution of the Central People's Governmental Council. In July 1954 the major administrative regions were abolished.

September 1954 saw the adoption of the first Constitution of the PRC and, together with it, of five organic laws that determined the structure and operation principles of the National People's Congress (NPC), the State Council (the PRC government), the local people's congresses and local people's committees, people's courts and procurator's offices.

Wide use was made during the evolution of the PRC's Constitution and of the country's organic laws of the experience of the USSR and other socialist countries in building a new state system (the experience of "advanced socialist states", as Liu Shaoqi put it in his report on the draft Constitution of the PRC).⁷ The system of bodies of power was supposed to be built on the principles of democratic centralism, collective leadership and the participation of the mass of the people in running the state. The constitutional system of the judiciary was based on the democratic principles of administering justice only through the courts, the participation of people's assessors in legal proceedings, judges' independence and their subordination only to law, publicity of judicial proceedings, and granting the accused the right to defence. The procuratorates were organised and functioned on the principles of centralising the procurator's offices and their independence from the local bodies in carrying out their functions. The Constitution proclaimed the equality of the citizens in law, their national equality and guaranteed them social, economic and other rights. It also charted out the ways of the country's socialist development and socialist transformation in the forms of ownership and was a far-reaching programme of building socialism in China.

The National People's Congress which, as the body of supreme state power stood at the head of the Chinese authorities became the only one vested with legislative powers. Considerable independent competence was accorded to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. The Constitution also introduced the institution of the chairman of the PRC into its system of bodies of supreme authority. As well as performing other constitutional duties, the chairman took part in law-making by enacting all Chinese laws (except for the Constitution, which was made public by a resolution of the presidium of the National Pe-

⁶ Even in the centre, apart from the Central People's Governmental Council, laws were in fact enacted by the Administrative Council, the Finance-Economic Committee affiliated to it and some other central bodies, including provisional ones set up in connection with mass campaigns (e. g., the National Committee for Control over the Economy Regime formed in connection with the campaign of struggle against the "three evils").

⁷ See Liu Shaoqi, "On the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China." In *Narodny Kitai*, No. 19, 1954, p. 12 (in Russian).

ople's Congress session) and the orders of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

The National People's Congress, however, was not destined to be the only legislative body in the country. Already the second session of the First National People's Congress (1955) bestowed upon its Standing Committee the right to issue specific legislative acts. The resolution of the National People's Congress session contained no definition of the latter concept but subsequent law-making in China makes it possible to conclude that it primarily referred to the possibility for the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress to introduce amendments in the laws passed by the Congress, as the corresponding acts on such amendments were never subsequently debated by the sessions. Meanwhile the Standing Committee began issuing decrees, which introduced amendments not only in laws but also in the Constitution. The new capacity of the Standing Committee as a legislative body was formalised by a resolution of the first session of the Second National People's Congress of April 28, 1959.⁸ From the late 1950s the Standing Committee became the only legislative body, as the legislative activity of the National People's Congress gradually came to an end. The beginning "cultural revolution" paralyzed law-making and, for that matter, any other type of activity of the Standing Committee, save for some representational and protocol functions carried out for the most part by the Committee chairman and his deputies.

By the end of the 1950s the National People's Congress, its Standing Committee and the State Council, which came to replace the Administrative Council, had passed a significant number of legislative instruments. At the same time no code of laws was adopted during that period (though certain steps in this direction were indeed made)⁹, hence the conclusion that in the 1950s China had no integral legal system and its evolution still had a long way to go.

Party veteran Dong Biwu, Member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee who was at that time chairman of the Supreme People's Court, voiced concern over this in his speech at the 8th CPC Congress (1956). He deemed it a serious drawback that the country lacked the criminal and civil codes which it so needed, the laws of procedure, of labour and land tenure, etc. "If the situation continues to exist for long," he said, "with no system of laws, this will, beyond doubt, become a serious drawback."¹⁰ In the context of subsequent events special mention should be made of Dong Biwu's analysis of the social roots of the contempt for legality already displayed in the CPC and the PRC at that time. Dong Biwu said, "The petty bourgeoisie is the largest class in our society. The majority of our party members also come from the petty bourgeoisie... Lenin pointed out that in certain circumstances the petty bourgeoisie often has revolutionary fervour but lacks staunchness, organisation and resolve. The petty bourgeoisie is easily inclined to feel contempt for any legality. Petty bourgeoisie ideology readily teams up with anarchism. We can say, therefore, that all views conveying contempt for legality in fact reflect anarchist ideology of the petty bourgeoisie".¹¹

This was a sound analysis of the situation, which, if we take subsequent developments in the country into consideration, proved to be quite prophetic, as the ideology of contempt for legality eventually tri-

⁸ See *Renmin shouqie*, Peking, 1959, p. 241.

⁹ For instance, in 1957 the 4th session of the National People's Congress approved the draft *Criminal Code* of the PRC for experimental use.

¹⁰ *Documents of the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China*, Moscow, 1956, p. 248 (in Russian).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

umphed throughout the period of the "cultural revolution", while certain phenomena of this kind had been manifested even earlier.¹² Thus, the concern over the situation with legality in the country which was voiced at the CPC Congress was not groundless. Besides, it should be pointed out that, even though the foundations were laid for making use of the creative role of legislation in China, there were many obstacles to implementing this.

The dangerous symptoms of a nihilistic attitude to law and legality, including to the legal foundations of the state, were first openly manifested during the period of the "great leap forward" and "communisation" and the preceding campaign against the "right-wing bourgeois elements." The campaign was initially directed against the bourgeois intelligentsia within democratic parties but then spread to government departments and the CPC. Many staff-members of the political and judicial bodies were branded as the "right-wing elements who had wormed themselves into the Party". They were accused of upholding the independence of judges and their subordination to law alone, of advocating the centralised subordination of the procurator's offices and state control, their independence in carrying out their functions from the local bodies, and so on. Under the pretext of combatting "bourgeois judicial constructions" progressive democratic legislative principles and institutes were discarded, allegedly because similar concepts were to be found in bourgeois writings on legal problems. For example, the premise that criminal responsibility can be borne only for actions defined by law as crime was declared bourgeois and therefore unacceptable, as well as the principle according to which nobody can be considered guilty until his or her guilt is proved in the course of an established legal procedure, etc.

The "communisation" of the countryside tangibly infringed on the constitutional foundations of the PRC and as a result virtually eliminated grass-root representative bodies in the countryside. Every "people's commune" was organised on the territory of several (not less than two) districts. District assemblies of people's representatives were united into the congresses of communard representatives, which took over the functions of the former assemblies of the cooperative members, that is to say, focussed their attention on production problems. Problems pertaining to the services, culture, education and health care remained in the competence of the district assemblies of people's representatives and were often left out of the sphere of activity of the congresses of communard representatives. Besides, these congresses were convened twice a year, whereas the district assemblies were held on a quarterly basis.

Representative bodies in general played a less significant role during the period of the "great leap forward" and "communisation". Elections to these bodies were not held regularly and from 1958 to 1964 did not take place at all. The few sessions of the assemblies of people's representatives which were held in those years dealt exclusively with budgetary and organisational problems. In some years no session was held at all and in 1961 even the National People's Congress was not convened.

¹² While agreeing with Dong Biwu's views quoted above, it is nevertheless necessary to say that the social composition of the party was not, apparently, the only reason for contempt for legality. Similar feudal traditions and the onerous legacy of the past, in particular, the downtroddenness of the peasants, cultural backwardness, and the general and legal ignorance of the broad strata of the population, must also have played a certain role.

To a certain extent the "great leap" affected the work and in some places even the organisation of political and judicial bodies, which were instructed to ensure mass campaigns and other undertakings within the "great leap" programme. For example, during the mass movement for making steel and pig iron in home-made furnaces, united groups representing public security bodies, the courts and procurator's offices were set up. These groups, according to the Chinese journal, *Political and Law Studies*, "conducted surveys, interrogation and inspections, very quickly ascertained facts of subversive activity by the corresponding criminals, asked in due time for sanctions from the party committee and immediately held public trials."¹³

During the period of the "great leap", the Chinese press, including special law journals, ever more frequently contained nihilistic statements with respect to law. Demands for supervision over legality began to be viewed as attempts to weaken the dictatorship of the proletariat, "to bound the dictatorship hand and foot." Particularly vehement attacks were levelled at demands to strengthen legality in the work of governmental offices. Such attitudes were characterised as a manifestation of the bourgeois view of law.¹⁴ The theoretical law journal declared: "If one should start looking for violations of laws in governmental political and judicial bodies... when laws are consistently observed, this can only weaken the dictatorship."¹⁵

Even proposals that the civil and criminal codes should be adopted, the dire need for which was stressed at the first session of the 8th CPC Congress, began to be viewed as undermining the "democratic dictatorship of the people."¹⁶ The draft criminal code of the PRC which was recommended by the National People's Congress session in 1957 for experimental use was never made public and in fact remained a secret directive for legal officers. Proceedings in a case were also determined by another secret directive. Many other legislative instruments, also existed which were sent to government departments without being made public. This sort of procedure gradually became commonplace in conducting the affairs of the state; the number of acts made public first went down and then ceased to be made public altogether.

According to official directives, legal officers were to be guided by maxims instead of laws. In particular, they were especially recommended at that time to use Mao Zedong's latest speech (made at the February 1957 session of the Supreme State Conference) instead of laws. It contained general instructions as to who should be regarded as the people and who as the enemy, which were to replace the definition of the elements of crime and offence of the law, and the grounds and conditions of responsibility.

The so-called "quotation procedure" which has been severely criticised in China since the 1970s goes back to that period. During the campaign of criticism of Lin Biao and the "gang of four" *Guangming ribao* wrote: "They [Lin Biao and the gang of four].— *Author.*] sought to attribute the power of law to Mao Zedong's maxims, creating in this way 'quotation procedure' similar to the one which used to exist in medieval religious courts. Several maxims, at times even distorted or falsified, were enough to doom a person to death."¹⁷

During the period of the "great leap" Chinese writers on legal problems came up with the concept of it being admissible constantly to exceed the limitations of laws. The leading Chinese law journal expound-

¹³ *Zhengfa yanjiu*, No. 6, 1958, p. 68.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 1, 1959, p. 42.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 6, 1958, p. 40.

¹⁷ *Guangming ribao*, October 26, 1978.

ed the concept in the following way: "The unceasing revolutionary movement of the masses guided by the party, and tempestuous constructive development, in which 'one day is equal to twenty years', constantly go beyond certain legislative instruments and articles of law... From our point of view, this is a normal phenomenon."¹⁸ Law in China began to be viewed exclusively as an instrument of suppression, necessary only "to struggle against the enemies of the people."¹⁹ Such an interpretation of socialist law led to its renunciation as a means of regulating economic relations and of educating a new man. Furthermore, one of the most important functions of law, namely, to serve as a means of control over the measure of work and the measure of consumption, was completely ignored.

Nihilistic tendencies in the field of legality gathered force on the eve of the "cultural revolution". In early 1965 the *Zhengfa yanjiu* journal issued the following instructions to the staff of the political and judicial bodies: "All purely legal precautions and unnecessary ceremony, which restrict the masses and ill-match the revolutionary struggle, should be cast off without regret. It should be clearly understood that all the necessary legislative instruments and procedures are intended for the struggle against the enemies rather than for binding ourselves. We should apply the revolutionary point of view of class struggle instead of treating metaphysically different prescriptions of laws..."²⁰

During the "cultural revolution" the emergent legal foundations of the state were shattered. The period from 1966 to 1976 and even somewhat longer was practically wiped out of the history of Chinese law: the "cultural revolution" created its own state and political system, which prior to 1975 had not been formalised in any, if only token, legal document. It was not until 1975 that the first (and only) session of the Fourth National People's Congress adopted a new Constitution of the PRC. This, however, marked a considerable retrograde step compared with the first Chinese Constitution of 1954. It was an extremely brief document (containing only 30 articles), looking more like a declaration than a legislative act. The new Constitution was designed to legalise some institutes and political principles born of the "cultural revolution" in violation of the previously existing foundations of the state and its politics. For instance, the Constitution formalised the so-called "revolutionary committees" which came into being during the "cultural revolution". They were in fact given the status of the bodies forming the political basis of the state, though formally they were declared to be merely permanently operating organs of the local people's assemblies. These "revolutionary committees", however, were given powers equal to those of the people's assemblies, which meanwhile held no sessions. The 1975 Constitution abolished the post of the chairman of the PRC and such institutes as the State Defence Committee and the Supreme State Conference. It significantly curtailed the powers of the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee, dropped the provisions on the rights and guarantees of the Congress deputies, together with the provisions on the standing commissions, abolished the Supreme People's Procurator's Office and the local procurator's offices (though at the same time re-establishing a system of courts headed by the Supreme Court, which was eliminated at the beginning of the "cultural revo-

¹⁸ *Zhengfa yanjiu*, No. 6, 1958, p. 44.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 3, 1963, p. 28.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 1, 1965, p. 19.

lution"),²¹ and also docked the functions of the State Council. Former provisions on national equality, the equality of all citizens in law, and the prohibition of discrimination and oppression towards any nationality were missing from the new Constitution. At the same time the people's communes which were formed in the period of the "great leap" were institutionalised as the grass-root bodies of power in the countryside. Civil rights were treated in an especially regressive way, their guarantees, both material and legal, being excluded from the text of the Constitution.

Adopted against the backdrop of complicated political struggle in the country, the 1975 Constitution could hardly have been a document to last for long. Soon after the political changes in China which followed the death of Mao Zedong and the elimination of the "gang of four" from the political scene, it became the order of the day to introduce changes in the Constitution or, rather, to adopt a new one. Already in October 1977, that is, a year after the "gang of four" was eliminated, the Standing Committee of the Fourth National People's Congress adopted an official decision to introduce changes in the Constitution and put the issue on the agenda of the forthcoming NPC session. The draft of the third Constitution of the PRC, just like, incidentally, the second Constitution, was not made public in advance nor submitted for nationwide discussion. It was discussed and adopted by the second plenary meeting of the CPC Central Committee of the eleventh convocation (February 1978), on whose resolution it was put forward to be discussed by the first session of the Fifth National People's Congress. It was adopted as the Constitution on March 5, 1978.

The 1978 Constitution was a markedly compromise document, which combined the postulates of the new Chinese leadership with some slogans of the "cultural revolution". Ye Jianying said in his "Report on the Changes to Be Introduced in the Constitution" that it should "embody in full and exactly", on the one hand, the doctrine "of the continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat", "to strengthen and further the accomplishments of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" and, on the other, "to reflect in full... the strategic decision" "to establish general order in the country by getting hold of the decisive link," "to sum up the experience of combatting the 'Gang of Four' and to put an end to its baneful influence". The Constitution indeed incorporated certain directions of the "cultural revolution" and its political institutes (for example, the "revolutionary committees"). At the same time it restored some provisions of the 1954 Constitution on the nationalities problem (for example, on banning discrimination against and the oppression of any nationality), on guarantees of civil rights, on bodies to supervise legality—the procurator's offices, on the people's assemblies as the local organs of power (the "revolutionary committees" were formally assigned only the status of executive bodies), and others.

The third Constitution had 60 articles, twice as many as the preceding one, which made it possible more clearly to define the status of government bodies, more often than not by restoring the corresponding provisions of the first Chinese Constitution. For example, in 1978 the functions of the National People's Congress were defined almost exact-

²¹ Jiang Qing said at a meeting with Hongweipings on December 18, 1966, "Public security troops, the procurator's offices and the Supreme court, all of which were brought to us from capitalist states, have placed themselves above the party and the government; all of them eventually supervise and blacken us, all of them are bureaucratic organs."

ly as in the 1954 Constitution, with the exception of the provision pertaining to the institute of the chairman of the PRC which had been abolished by that time. Chapter III of the Constitution, which dealt with "The Fundamental Civil Rights and Duties" was especially enlarged, restoring the guarantees of social and economic rights, which had been excluded from the 1975 Constitution, and after a long period of silence on the problem, the Chinese press began to debate the problem of strengthening legality while the 1978 Constitution was still in the making.²²

Nevertheless the Chinese Constitution of 1978 lasted only a little over four years, just one year longer than its predecessor. Before the new Constitution was adopted in 1982, it was twice subjected to essential changes. In 1979 the second session of the Fifth National People's Congress abolished the "revolutionary committees", which were replaced in administrative units by local people's governments beginning with the districts and higher, while in communes the "revolutionary committees" were reorganised into boards. A new institute—the standing committee of a local assembly—was introduced at the same time. In 1980 a decision was made to introduce new changes in the Constitution and the NPC session set up a constitutional commission with this aim in view. This commission spent a total of 26 months preparing a draft of the new Constitution.

In connection with the working out and adoption of the 1982 Constitution the Chinese mass media repeatedly drew attention to the weak aspects of the country's current Constitution.²³ Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that that Constitution was an historic event which triggered the restoration of the legal foundations of the modern Chinese state. The long-term plan for this process was made public in 1978 in a report made by Public Security Minister Zhao Cangbi at a conference on legislation development problems held by the political and judicial group of the CPC Central Committee.²⁴ The report showed that the Chinese leaders had decided first of all to enact legislative or some other legal instruments, which had been revised or re-elaborated, in the field of economic, criminal, forensic and procedural law as well as constitutional and administrative law, especially those pertaining to the maintenance of public order and control over the organisation and functioning of different government bodies.

Early 1979 saw the first legislative instruments to be published after a fifteen-year break.²⁵ These were the PRC Regulations for Arrest and Detainment and the experimental Law of the PRC on Forestry (the Forestry Code of the PRC). The Regulations for Arrest and Detainment were based on a similar act passed by the Standing Committee on December 20, 1954, and, as it were, re-established the legal norms which had been swept aside by the "cultural revolution", relating to bodies empowered to arrest and detain and to different guarantees of civil

²² The article "To Strengthen Socialist Legality" published by the *Hongqi* in 1977, pp. 81-84, was one of the first to deal with the problem.

²³ For example, it was declared at the third session of the Fifth National People's Congress (1980) that in 1978 "they as yet failed to summarise comprehensively the experience and lessons of the entire period of the republic's existence nor managed to discern profoundly and eliminate the influence of the left-wing views of the ten years of trouble" and that the Constitution still contained "a lot of inexpediences" and "many not quite perfect or clear-cut expressions". See *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 9, 1980.

²⁴ See *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 28, 1978.

²⁵ In 1978 the State Council adopted and the NPC Standing Committee endorsed some legislative instruments, such as, for example, the Resolution on Problems of Military Service (March 8, 1978), Provisional Regulations for Catering for the Aged, Physically Weak and Crippled Cadre Workers (May 25, 1978) and Regulations for Military Service by PLAC Cadre Officers (August 19, 1978). Their full text, however, was never made public.

rights in connection with the operation of the said bodies. This introduction of a legal act designed to limit arbitrariness was an understandable measure after the arbitrary mass arrests of the "cultural revolution". Neither was it fortuitous that the Law on Forestry was given priority. In his aforementioned report Zhao Cangbi officially stated that the planless felling of trees in some regions of the country had had an adverse effect on climatic conditions and agricultural production. Later on the Chinese press reported that, as a result of excessive losses suffered by forests, some cities in the country, including Peking, "were seriously threatened by sands".²⁶

A number of important legislative acts were passed by the second session of the Fifth National People's Congress in the summer of 1979. It was the first time in the history of the PRC that the criminal and procedural codes were adopted together with laws on the establishment of local people's assemblies and local people's governments, courts and procurator's offices. A law was also passed on the operation of enterprises based on mixed Chinese and foreign investment, which laid the groundwork for attracting foreign capital to China.

The years following 1979 saw a gradual accretion of legal acts in a limited range of sectors which we have already mentioned.²⁷ Legal acts regulating various aspects of the country's economic life and foreign economic relations obviously predominate. Speaking at the third session of the Fifth National People's Congress in 1980, Peng Zhen who at that time headed the Legislation Commission of the NPC Standing Committee said that in the year of the session's convocation, more than 70 legislative instruments for regulating the economy were being prepared. This demonstrates that China wants legal acts comprehensively to serve the main programme—that of "four modernisations".

The new Constitution of the PRC was adopted and enacted in 1982. All postulates and provisions born of the "cultural revolution" have completely been eradicated from the current Constitution. As far as the regulation of the organisation and work of government bodies is concerned it repeats almost in full the postulates of the first Constitution of the PRC. The legal differences between the two Constitutions are confined to the difference in the status of the chairman of the PRC (who is no longer the commander-in-chief and convenes no supreme state conferences), the consolidated competence of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the State Council, some changes introduced in the guidance of the armed forces, decentralisation of the procurator's supervision, and the consolidation in the state structure of the standing committees of the local people's assemblies which had existed since 1979. The new Chinese Constitution, which has brought back to life many a provision of the 1954 Constitution, has given Chinese law a broader base for its development.

Needless to say, the introduction of modern law will be restricted as before by the lack of legal cadres (Deng Xiaoping confessed that in 1980 the country was short of up to 2,000,000 lawyers). There is hardly any experience to speak of or traditions of relying on legal instruments in administration, while the level of literacy, to say nothing of legal awareness among the people remains quite low. The development of law-making will, of course, largely depend on the stabilisation of the political situation in the country.

²⁶ *Guangming ribao*, March 2, 1979.

²⁷ It should be pointed out that approximately 1,500 legal acts adopted prior to the "cultural revolution" were re-enacted in 1979, part of them being republished in the press.

IMPERIALIST AND REACTIONARY INTRIGUES AGAINST PEOPLE'S KAMPUCHEA

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 84 pp 97-109

[Article by D. M. Pospelov and Yu. M. Ryakin]

On January 7, 1979, the patriotic forces of Kampuchea, supported by Vietnamese volunteer troops, overthrew the bloody butcher's regime of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan clique, which brought the Kampuchean people to the verge of national extinction. "Democratic Kampuchea", which was hated by the people, ceased to exist, and the remnants of the Pol Pot army found shelter in neighbouring Thailand. The Soviet Union, Vietnam, other socialist countries, many nonaligned states, and the progressive world public welcomed the victory of the Kampuchean people. The long-suffering people of Kampuchea faced the prospect of national salvation and rebirth.

The triumph of the Kampuchean people in the struggle against the Pol Pot regime opened a new chapter in international relations in Indochina. It buttressed the combat solidarity between the People's Republic of Kampuchea, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) and the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), the fraternal countries of the region. Simultaneously, the prerequisites were created for developing good-neighbourly relations between these countries and ASEAN members.

MOBILISATION OF THE KHMER REACTIONARIES FOR THE STRUGGLE AGAINST PEOPLE'S KAMPUCHEA

The rout of the bloody Pol Pot regime caused an immediate reaction on the part of its patrons. Concentrating their efforts on a general complication of the situation throughout Southeast Asia, the forces of imperialism and hegemonism came out against the Kampuchean people and the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). In their attacks against the PRK, along most diverse lines (political, economic, military, diplomatic, and so on), the forces of imperialism and hegemonism have made active use of such an instrument as reactionary Khmer emigrants. A motley of reactionary elements has been mobilised for a struggle against people's Kampuchea: the gangs of Pol Pot men thrown out of the country, who have entrenched themselves in Thailand, the detachments under the command of Son Sann, a leader of the extreme right-wing with pro-Washington orientation.

Prince N. Sihanouk who was half forgotten after the almost two-year "house arrest" under the Pol Pot regime, again emerged on the political scene. As early as January 1979, he was taken to Peking and then hastily brought to New York to speak as a "supreme representative of Democratic Kampuchea" at a session of the UN Security Council. Sihanouk made use of the rostrum of the UN Security Council to launch fierce attacks against people's Kampuchea and the policy of the SRV, which is friendly to it, and also to voice anti-Soviet insinuations. "We will never surrender", he stated. "We may lose everything but we will never lose our national dignity." It is indicative that "national dignity" was mentioned by a man who represented the forces that brought the Kampu-

chean people to the brink of national extinction. At the same time, Sihanouk departed from the scenario written for him and denounced the regime of "Democratic Kampuchea" that he represented.

The Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan clique proved a most active and well-organised anti-Kampuchean force. Adapting themselves to the new situation, the Pol Pot men driven from Kampuchea were rapidly changing their "strategic line". As early as January 1979, they began talking about the need to "unite the whole Kampuchean people" into a "broadest national front" in which the contradictions "between classes and political groups" would recede into the background.¹ This was thus a clear task for uniting all anti-Kampuchean forces. In this connection, a corresponding indoctrination of Sihanouk became urgent. He was supposed to make the anti-Kampuchean "opposition" more "attractive" in the eyes of the world public, because not only Washington,² which was launching a global campaign for "human rights", but also the other patrons of the Pol Pot men were unwilling to cooperate openly with such odious figures as Pol Pot and Ieng Sary.

Meanwhile, Sihanouk noted enhanced interest in his person on the part of the forces taking an anti-Kampuchean stand and went out of his way to build up political capital. Launching fierce attacks against people's Kampuchea and friendly Vietnamese-Kampuchean relations, Sihanouk simultaneously criticised the Pol Pot men. For example, in May 1979, he told a group of French journalists in his residence in Peking that Thailand was pursuing a "stupid policy", receiving detachments of "Khmers rouge", i. e., Pol Pot men, on its territory. He even claimed that he wished the defeat of the remnants of the Pol Pot troops, comparing the collapsed regime with Hitler's.³ Naturally, such statements had nothing to do whatsoever with any considerations of principle: Sihanouk just made use of world public indignation at the crimes committed by the Pol Pot clique to consolidate his own positions in the bargaining with the patrons of Khmer reaction.

Sihanouk even moved demonstratively from Peking to Pyongyang. In one of his countless interviews, the Prince said on that score: "I continue to love China, but I cannot live there on a permanent basis. First because our viewpoints on the problem of Kampuchea and the plight of the unfortunate Kampuchean people are diametrically opposite and incompatible. Second, China has now become a large rear-base for the criminal "Khmers rouge" who are guilty of the dreadful and unlimited disasters of my people. I cannot breathe the same air with Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Ieng Tirit and others who found refuge in China... Third, despite all my entreaties, China still insists that I come to a reconciliation with the Khmers rouge and again form a single front with them." Of course, Sihanouk overstated the degree of the differences that divided him and other anti-Kampuchean forces. Moreover, the contradictions themselves were of a purely time-serving nature.

Meanwhile the Pol Pot men, implementing the order to set up a "single front", continued declaring their readiness to unite with Sihanouk and the Son Sann grouping. They kept persistently indoctrinating Sihanouk, taking into account his constant desire to play a political role in order to meet his mercantile interests. Khieu Samphan, their representative, said in an interview to the Paris-based *Le Monde* in the autumn of 1979: "We suggested that Sihanouk take the post of chairman of the front of the great national, patriotic and democratic union... if he ag-

¹ See *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 11, 1979.

² In 1978 US President J. Carter called the Pol Pot men "the most villain violators of human rights".

³ *Le Matin*, May 23, 1979.

rees, we are ready to reorganise the government, owing to the creation of that front. In that case, he would also take the post of chairman of the presidium of the state."⁴

By the end of 1979, the right-wing Son Sann grouping, who felt that the political initiative is being seized by more numerous and better organised Pol Pot men, became more vigorous. In October 1979, it was declared in Bangkok that he had established a "national front", allegedly numbering several thousand soldiers. In November 1979, the Son Sann's "front" advanced a proposal to organise a "land bridge" from Thailand to Kampuchea as if to supply the starving population of Kampuchea with food. Moreover, "authoritative countries" were asked to protect the food lorries, using also the armed forces of the "national front" for rendering support. Son Sann's goal was quite clear: to stage a large-scale armed provocation on the Thai-Kampuchean border and, under the cover of foreign troops, invade Kampuchea. In a bid to enhance his prestige among the patrons of the anti-Kampuchean reactionaries, Son Sann kept asserting persistently that he was acting independently of Sihanouk and regarded the activities of the latter's advocates only as a supplement to those of the Son Sann "national front". At that time he rejected any alliance with the "Khmers rouge".

Sihanouk also continued manoeuvring. Interviewed by the Austrian TV in Paris in December 1979, he again rejected the possibility of cooperating with the Pol Pot men. He stated that joint actions with Khmers rouge, who were barbarians, butchers and murderers, was absolutely out of the question. Sihanouk even dared to reproach China and Thailand for supporting Pol Pot and his gangs. He then showed his trump card: "In the end, I will have to turn to China. The Chinese know that, in my person, they have a more respectful and important political force than the Khmers rouge".

The disorder in the Kampuchean reactionaries' camp considerably reduced the possibility of efficient actions against the PRK and naturally caused anxiety among their patrons. To neutralise the centrifugal tendencies characteristic of the Khmer anti-popular emigration, its patrons resorted to "reorganising" the government of "Democratic Kampuchea". The "reorganisation" was carried out, due to the need for a new strategic "political line" which, as was reported, was aimed, first, to "secure a greater possible unity", and, second, "to get together with all forces in different countries of the world, regardless of their political world outlook."⁵

In conformity with the "reorganisation" course, it was declared that Pol Pot had resigned as "Prime Minister of Democratic Kampuchea", but had retained the post of "Commander-in-Chief" of the armed forces.⁶ The Pol Pot men's "representative" in the UN explaining the programme for further actions by "Democratic Kampuchea" stated outright: "Western countries, in particular the USA, and also Japan, ASEAN states and China are interested in our victory." At the same time, the Ambassador of "Democratic Kampuchea" to China reported that Khieu Samphan, who replaced Pol Pot as "Prime Minister", had sent a cable to Sihanouk suggesting that he became chairman of the "national front" and head of state.

Of course, the reorganisation of the "government of Democratic Kampuchea" was purely superficial. It was only aimed at whitewashing the facade of the same anti-popular cutthroat force and replacing the odious figures of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary by their long-standing henchman Khieu

⁴ *Le Monde*, Sept. 2, 1979.

⁵ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 25, 27, 1979.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Dec. 28, 1979.

Samphan, who was not so well known to the world public as an accomplice of the genocide in Kampuchea. This action was purely formal, because Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, who receded into the "background", retained the real levers of power in guiding the "Khmers rouges" *sans*.

The Pol Pot men who, as a result of the "reorganisation", secured more definite support from the West, above all the USA, tried to lead world public opinion astray, by more than once "admitting" the "errors" they had made prior to January 1979. For example, Ieng Sary stated in an interview for the *New York Times*: "We admit that errors were made and leftist extremities. We acted too hastily. There were political errors. We thought insufficiently over the concrete structure of the state. We placed too great an emphasis on the political consciousness and had too little experience in administering state." Having easily acknowledged his "errors", Ieng Sary, who was personally involved in murdering millions of Kampucheans, stated outright: "We shall not beg the West to believe us. We only want it to understand where its interests lie."⁷

All these avowals were directly addressed to Washington, which was "bound", to a certain extent, in its relations with the "Khmers rouges" by the framework of the campaign of struggle for "human rights" on a global scale. President Carter, as well as members of his administration, were forced from time to time to criticise the actions of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique. For example, Assistant Secretary of State R. Hallbrooke stated in August 1979 that he considered the Pol Pot regime to be the most repressive one can imagine as far as human rights were concerned.⁸ Yet such statements did not prevent Washington from confidentially maintaining close "working" relations with Pol Pot men, as the strongest and active anti-Kampuchean and anti-Vietnamese reactionary grouping.

The following developments show what functions were assigned to the Pol Pot men. In mid-1980, imperialist quarters, pro-imperialist and hegemonic forces attempted to invigorate sharply the struggle by the Khmer reactionaries against the PRK. In the guise of "voluntary repatriation" of Kampuchean "refugees", Pol Pot men, armed to the teeth, were sent from Thailand to Kampuchea on a mass scale in June 1980. The aim of the provocation was to capture at least a small territory near the border and proclaim the puppet government of "Democratic Kampuchea".⁹ The cutthroats were driven back to Thai territory. The complications that took place on the Kampuchean-Thai border as a result of that operation were used by the USA as a pretext for urgent deliveries to Thailand of new batches of weapons for the anti-Kampuchean reactionaries.

The forces interested in aggravating the "Kampuchean problem" guided the activities of the Pol Pot men and simultaneously brought pressure to bear on Son Sann, insisting on his cooperation with the "Khmers rouges". For some time, Son Sann refused to agree on a formal alliance with the "Khmers rouges", but speaking in 1980 in Paris in favour of elaborating an "all-embracing active strategy" against the PRK and the SRV, he mentioned the possibility of military contacts with the Pol Pot men in the struggle against the "chief enemy", having obviously succumbed to the pressure, in particular from the USA.

Although Pol Pot had been replaced by Khieu Samphan, the world public continued to regard the "Khmers rouges" as the symbol of a bloody regime. Son Sann, who declared himself and his supporters to be a "third force", allegedly not connected with the crimes committed by

⁷ *New York Times*, March 1, 1980.

⁸ *Newsweek*, Aug. 20, 1979.

⁹ See *Nhan Dan*, June 27, 1980.

the Pol Pot men, seemed more suitable to the West. This situation caused discontent among the Pol Pot men, who were worried about maintaining their leading position in the camp of Khmer reactionaries.

Meanwhile, Sihanouk, who was busy consolidating his personal positions, sometimes resorted to the most unexpected manoeuvres. For example, back in October 1979, just before meeting French President Giscard d'Estaing, he suddenly stated his refusal to play any "political, diplomatic or military role". At the same time he was gravely anxious about the political activities of Son Sann, who enjoyed special confidence in the West. That is why Sihanouk declared that he was categorically against the grouping of the former Prime Minister Son Sann, which actually served the interests of foreigners to the detriment of the interests of the Kampuchean people. Attacking both the Pol Pot men and Son Sann, Sihanouk made it clear to the patrons of the Khmer reactionaries that he alone was capable of effectively ensuring their interests.

The rivalry among the Khmer reactionaries was becoming increasingly overt. In a bid to seize the political initiative, Son Sann set forth his plan for setting up a "provisional government". In turn, the Pol Pot men continued actively to indoctrinate Sihanouk, seeking to secure his support and, through him, to influence Son Sann. In March 1981, negotiations between Khieu Samphan and Norodom Sihanouk were held in Pyongyang, which, according to the former, "were a success". Later, Khieu Samphan also stated that the relations between the Pol Pot men and Son Sann "are developing positively".¹⁰ Then the Pol Pot men declared that an agreement had been reached "in principle" concerning the setting up of a "united front" of the three groupings. The PRC press welcomed this report.¹¹ Washington also approved the unification of the Khmer reactionaries.¹²

Trying somehow to justify his actions, Sihanouk claimed that he had entered the coalition allegedly under pressure brought to bear from outside and explained that he had joined the coalition as "a private person". In an interview with *Spiegel*, Sihanouk stated again that the "Khmers rouge are dreadful, they have committed awful crimes". In response to the question as to why then he had joined the coalition, Sihanouk answered cynically: "The Chinese wanted this. They are insisting on creating a united front immediately to bolster the forces of resistance before the international conference on Kampuchea. That is why I am joining the front and will not stand in its way."¹³

Simultaneously with the schemes for forming a united front of Kampuchean reactionaries, imperialist and hegemonic forces sought to organise (and Sihanouk took it into account) broader international pressure on the People's Republic of Kampuchea to frustrate normalisation and revolutionary transformations in the country, step up tension round Indochina, and undermine the dialogue between ASEAN states and the countries of Indochina. The so-called "international conference" on Kampuchea, held in New York in July 1981, was used to this end. The selfsame Ieng Sary and Son Sann tried to represent the Kampuchean people at that conference. They spoke on behalf of their "fronts", which did not and could not express Kampuchea's national interests because their leaders were on the payroll of the diehard enemies of the Kampuchean people. Their speeches came down to slanderous concoctions about the PRK and the SRV, which was actually one of the main aims of the sponsors of the conference. This made itself felt most graphically in a

¹⁰ *Renmin ribao*, March 13, 1981.

¹¹ See *Beijing Review*, May 1, 1981.

¹² See *New York Times*, May 6, 1981.

¹³ *Der Spiegel*, June 9, 1981.

speech made at the conference by the then US Secretary of State A. Haig. Among other things, he dealt with the "more than ten-year-long sufferings" of the Kampuchean people, including war, famine, foreign invasion, colonisation and genocide. The whole world knows that all these calamities were caused by the US invasion of 1970-1975, the genocide launched by the Pol Pot regime from 1975 to 1978 and, finally, by the inroads made against the PRK by the Pol Pot and other gangs. Yet Haig tried to lay the blame on Vietnam and the Soviet Union, which had assisted the Kampuchean people in getting rid of the American aggressors and the Pol Pot men, and are now rendering allround help to people's Kampuchea. In conclusion, Haig threatened Vietnam that the USA would hamper any aid to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam from international organisations.¹⁴

The governments and peoples of the Indochinese countries rejected all the "decisions" of the conference. In a statement by the Foreign Ministry of the PRK, the conference was declared illegitimate and its decisions null and void. The statement read that there was no Kampuchean problem, that the situation in the People's Republic of Kampuchea was irreversible, and any encroachments on the latter's independence and sovereignty were doomed to failure.¹⁵ The statement by the Foreign Ministry of the Lao People's Democratic Republic stressed that the decisions adopted at the conference were illegitimate, ran counter to the spirit of the UN Charter, while the actions by the sponsors of the conference were directed at restoring the Pol Pot regime of genocide in Kampuchea and at aggravating tension in Southeast Asia.¹⁶ In its statement, the Foreign Ministry of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam also resolutely rejected the decisions of that conference and described them as illegitimate and invalid, based on a distortion of the true reasons for tension in Southeast Asia.¹⁷

After the fiasco of the "international conference" on Kampuchea, fresh attempts were made to form an alliance of Khmer reactionary emigrants. Being afraid that the Pol Pot men and Son Sann would plot without his participation and he would have to join them on less advantageous terms, Sihanouk, in turn, made another zigzag in his position. In August 1981, he declared the establishment of "his own" government as a matter that had been decided upon and dependent on him: "My government will consist of representatives of the Khmers rouge, the Son Sann grouping and Sihanouk men." The Prince hurried to specify his terms, however: "I want for myself the posts of head of state and prime minister. Otherwise, I will not assume the responsibility."¹⁸ In September 1981, the ringleaders of the three reactionary Khmer groupings of Sihanouk, Son Sann and Khieu Samphan met in Singapore. They set up a "tripartite committee", with an eye to forming a "coalition government" and putting all Kampuchean counterrevolutionaries under its leadership.

THE "COALITION GOVERNMENT" OF THE KHMER REACTIONARIES

The positive changes that had occurred in the PRK by the end of 1981 and the country's return to a normal life were increasingly persuading the world public that the expulsion of the Pol Pot men from Kampuchea had been the salvation of the entire Kampuchean people, and served as the strongest argument in favour of the government of Peo-

¹⁴ See *Renmin ribao*, July 16, 1981.

¹⁵ See *Pravda*, July 20, 1981.

¹⁶ See *Pravda*, July 24, 1981.

¹⁷ See *Nhan Dan*, July 20, 1981.

¹⁸ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Aug. 15, 1981.

ple's Kampuchea. The People's Republic of Kampuchea fully proved its viability. The PRK government, formed as a result of a general election, established full control over the whole territory of the country. Impressive successes were scored in overcoming the grave consequences of the economic and socio-political crimes committed by the Pol Pot clique. The international prestige of the PRK grew and it was recognised by a whole number of UN member states.

The striving of imperialist and hegemonic quarters, alongside the political and diplomatic pressure brought to bear on the popular government of the PRK, to continue struggling against the latter by means of bandit detachments formed on Thai territory from the remnants of the Pol Pot troops and "refugees", who were peaceful citizens of Kampuchea driven by the Pol Pot men to Thailand by force of arms, aroused increasing condemnation. The demand that the representatives of "Democratic Kampuchea", i. e., the Pol Pot men, be expelled from the UN was resounding ever stronger. The fact that the representatives of "Democratic Kampuchea" remained in the UN was used by the imperialist and hegemonic forces to reanimate the Pol Pot regime and to engage in anti-Kampuchean intrigues.

Under these conditions, in pursuance of the orders of their foreign masters, the Khmer reactionaries intensified their efforts to consolidate "unity" in their anti-Kampuchean activities. Meeting their partners halfway, on December 6, 1981 the Pol Pot men declared the disbandment of their "communist party". This step was aimed at evoking a favourable response from Son Sann and his patrons, strengthening "mutual understanding" with them, and removing the imaginary "ideological" barriers that allegedly separated the Khmer reactionaries. In accordance with the designs of Pol Pot and his henchmen, this action was supposed to promote a strengthening of the tripartite "coalition".

The task of forming a coalition was not, however, an easy one, because each of the partners was suspicious, corrupt and eager to boss the others. Only nine months after the Singapore meeting, in Kuala Lumpur in June 1982, were they able at last to declare the formation of a tripartite "coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea".

The report on that "event" was approved only in certain particular international quarters. Imperialist and hegemonic forces openly linked the formation of the "coalition" of the motley gangs of Kampuchean reactionaries with the intention of whipping up tension in the relations between ASEAN members and the countries of Indochina, and preventing any dialogue between them that might lead to a stabilisation of the situation in Southeast Asia.

It would apparently be apt to say a few words about the "political leaders" of that "government" and of the objective of its establishment. There seem to be full grounds for calling that "government" just a handful of puppets. First among them is Sihanouk, who took the post of "president" of the non-existent state. Despite his repeated assurances that he would not enter into any deals with the Pol Pot men who, by the way, killed Sihanouk's five children, 14 nephews and grandchildren,¹⁹ for his own selfish ends he betrayed his people and found himself in the "government" together with the Pol Pot butchers, helping them hide their past and screen bloody deeds by means of a "coalition" with the "respectable" ex-monarch and ex-premier.

Son Sann, a diehard reactionary is Number Two Man in the "coalition". In the 1960s, he was prime minister of the Sihanouk government. Son Sann declared himself "premier" of the new "government", though

¹⁹ See *Nhan Dan*, April 30, 1983.

he has a rather vague idea about its composition and location, because this "government" heads a non-existent state.

Khieu Samphan, the theorist of the Pol Pot genocide, former president under Pol Pot and his official successor, is the third participant in the anti-popular "coalition government", in which he is "vice-president".

Right from the moment when this "government" was formed, it was clear that it was abortive and had no legal right at all to represent the Kampuchean people, because it was formed by a group of criminals and reactionary emigrants. It had neither territory, nor population. The editorial comment in *Nhan Dan* of July 26, 1982 stressed that the coalition formed in Kuala Lumpur was actually the same as "Democratic Kampuchea", i. e., an overthrown regime of genocide, guilty of killing three million people, the regime that brought Kampuchea to a national catastrophe unprecedented in history. The Communiqué of the 6th Conference of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Kampuchea noted: "The LPDR, the PRK and the SRV hold that the creation of the so-called coalition government of Kampuchea is nothing but a farce, aimed at whitewashing the Pol Pot men and imposing once again the regime of genocide on the Kampuchean people, who hardly avoided extinction".²⁰ The Kampuchean Information Agency described the formation of the "coalition government" as a trick designed to make Pol Pot's "Democratic Kampuchea" more respectable and preserve it in the UN.²¹

The Soviet Union also gave a corresponding evaluation of the "coalition government". The Joint Soviet-Vietnamese Communiqué on the results of the official friendly visit to the USSR by a Party and Government Delegation of the SRV, headed by Truong Chinh, a Member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee and Chairman of the State Council of the SRV, stated: "The Soviet Union and Vietnam have rendered and will continue to render all-round support to the Kampuchean people in building a new life. They condemn the provocative fuss around the 'coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea', formed by the Pol Pot clique and its patrons, launched by imperialist and hegemonic quarters and representing direct interference in the internal affairs of the PRK. The presence in the UN of representatives of the criminal Pol Pot clique is at loggerheads with the principles of that organisation and is inadmissible."²²

The Statement by the Tenth Session of the Presidium of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation gave the following assessment of the "coalition government": "Despite the hullabaloo, this so-called coalition arouses no interest among the people of Kampuchea, who consider the coalition to be a mask hiding the Pol Pot regime, which the people do not want to be restored in any form."

The formation of the "coalition government" did not justify the hopes of the foreign patrons and inspirers of Kampuchean reaction to enervate and unite its subversive activities against people's Kampuchea. The coalition is rather amorphous; it is torn by internal contradictions; its leaders are at one only in their hatred of the new system and the people who expelled them from Kampuchea. The "coordination committees" attached to the "coalition" government exist only on paper, and each of the three groupings—the monarchic Sihanouk's militarised "Molnaka grouping", the Son Sann's "national front" and the army of "Democratic Kampuchea", i. e., the gangster detachments of the Pol Pot men—is

²⁰ *Nhan Dan*, July 8, 1982.

²¹ See *Nhan Dan*, June 26, 1982.

²² *Pravda*, Oct. 9, 1982.

still striving to assume the leading role in the coalition. Their interrelations are characterised by constant disputes and clashes in their shelters on Thai territory, primarily in connection with the distribution of military and other deliveries from abroad and domination in the "refugee camps" and the local "black markets".

Late in 1983, the *Times* reported on a crisis of the "coalition government", which found itself on the verge of collapse, and the acute discontent of Sihanouk with the ASEAN members, which render assistance not to him, but to Son Sann. The Singapore papers carried reports on Sihanouk's decision temporarily to give up his duties as "president of the coalition government". He explained this decision by his fears that his participation in the "coalition" was only a "cosmetic cover for the Khmers rouge". In this connection *Nhan Dan* wrote on January 7, 1983: "Sihanouk's anxiety that he will become a useless figure in the 'coalition government' is well grounded." Late in May 1983, according to France Presse Agency, Sihanouk again admitted the total lack of prospects for the "coalition's" attempts to ensure recognition by some part of the Kampuchean population, and to influence somewhat the course of events in Kampuchea. Indeed, the People's Republic of Kampuchea is successfully advancing. The Communiqué of the 6th Conference of Foreign Ministers of Indochina emphasised: "The Conference notes with particular satisfaction the impressive successes in all spheres—economic, military, political and diplomatic—achieved by the People's Republic of Kampuchea, which frustrate all perfidious designs of the expansionist, imperialist and reactionary forces seeking to reverse the process of the rebirth of the Kampuchean people."²³

By the autumn of 1983, the animosity between the groupings of the coalition had developed into fierce armed clashes. According to reports from Bangkok, the Pol Pot gangs often keep Sihanouk men under "house arrest". An internecine struggle is also under way between the Pol Pot and Son Sann groupings. A "circular" issued by Pol Pot's headquarters ordered, covertly and overtly, to "demoralise, damage, and destroy the forces" of the Son Sann group. The latter, in turn, distributed the following "document": "Esteemed brothers, to free our nation from the oppression of Pol Pot so that his regime might not return, you should, brothers, join your forces with the national front headed by Marshal Son Sann."²⁴

Nevertheless, the leaders of the reactionary alliance and the foreign propaganda supporting them are doing their best to create the impression that the "coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea" constitutes a real force both inside Kampuchea and internationally. For example, Sihanouk keeps touring the capitals of Western states, advertising the "coalition government" and begging hand-outs for the maintenance of his "army". From time to time, he appears in Thailand, visits the "headquarters" of the Pol Pot, Son Sann and his own "armies", holds meetings of the "coalition government" in some "liberated zones", declaring in this connection that his "government" has a territory and is therefore not a government in emigration.²⁵

Yet all these manoeuvres by the Kampuchean reactionaries do not and cannot yield the desired fruits. Despite the piratical inroads and subversive activities of (most often the Pol Pot's and more rarely the Son Sann's and Sihanouk's) gangsters from Thai territory, the People's Republic of Kampuchea is confidently marching forward, relying on the

²³ *Nhan Dan*, July 21, 1983.

²⁴ See *Pravda*, Feb. 29, 1984.

²⁵ See *Nhan Dan*, July 21, 1983.

allround support and assistance of its friends and allies in the socialist countries.

The stronger the people's system in Kampuchea, the more evident is the total lack of prospects for the alliance of the Khmer reactionaries. The contradictions are intensifying, as is the infighting between the groupings of the "coalition government", and the coalition is on the brink of a complete collapse. To delay, at least temporarily, the disintegration of the coalition, the ring-leaders of the groupings got together in Peking in December 1983, where they met, both jointly and separately, with the top-ranking leaders of the PRC.

The Peking meeting of the ring-leaders of the "coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea" was masterminded as a demonstration of the "unity" and "cohesion" of the three Khmer groupings, about which there was much talk during the meeting and afterwards.²⁶ The Thai authorities, in particular the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Thailand, joined the propaganda of this thesis. According to him, the unity of the "three forces" in the coalition not only have been consolidated, but its international prestige enhanced, too.²⁷ Such statements show that some people indulge in wishful thinking. In reality, the situation was much more complicated. According to the comments of the Kampuchean News Agency, the sponsors of the meeting had to bend every effort merely to get all the participants in the "coalition" together. This testifies not to the unity, but to the inability of the "three sides" to coordinate their actions.

Right after the Peking meeting, its participants began demonstrating the "unity" and "cohesion", "viability" and "activities" of the tripartite coalition. Sihanouk hastily held a meeting of the "coalition government" in "one of the areas near the Thai-Kampuchean border". A decision was taken at the meeting to invigorate the armed struggle,²⁸ i. e., the bandit inroads against the PRK in the border areas. Later, Sihanouk inspected one of the "liberated zones", where a meeting was held, and "vice-president" Khieu Samphan appealed for a consolidation of the "three forces". During that trip, the farce was staged of the handing to Sihanouk of the credentials of some ambassadors accredited to the "coalition government to Democratic Kampuchea".²⁹ Sihanouk also made an "inspection trip" of the "headquarters" of his own and of the Son Sann's armed groupings. Here, too, meetings were held, at which Sihanouk and Son Sann called on the people for "cohesion" and "unity".³⁰

In a nutshell, after the Peking meeting everything possible was done to advertise the allround activities of the "government" and its groupings. Sihanouk even tried to demonstrate some "peace initiatives" of his coalition, stating at a press-conference his readiness to hold an unofficial meeting with representatives of the PRK government. Yet he put forward the provocative condition that the latter recognise the illegitimate UN resolutions on the "Kampuchean problem".³¹

The reports on Sihanouk's trips to the "headquarters" of certain groupings of the "coalition government" kept stressing that all this occurred in the so-called "liberated zones of Democratic Kampuchea". In fact, no such "liberated zones" exist. Commenting on the stay by the ring-leaders of the Khmer counterrevolutionary emigrant groupings in Peking in December 1983, the Kampuchean News Agency noted that the Khmer

²⁶ See *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 5 and 24, 1984.

²⁷ See *Ibid.*, Jan. 7, and 27, 1984.

²⁸ See *Ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1984.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1984.

³⁰ See *Ibid.*, Jan. 31 and Feb. 1, 1984.

³¹ *Ibid.*, Feb. 1, 1984.

reactionaries did not control an inch of Kampuchean territory.³² The detachments of the Pol Pot, Sihanouk and Son Sann men found shelter in camps on Thai territory. From there, under cover of Thai troops, they make inroads, from time to time, on villages in the border areas of Kampuchea, plundering and killing peaceful citizens and taking them prisoner. The radio broadcasts by the stations belonging to reactionary groupings present these piratical acts against the peaceful citizens of the PRK as "heroic feats and impressive victories of the patriotic resistance forces".³³

Appeals for plunderous onslaughts to be made against people's Kampuchea, their organisation and camouflage as actions by some "patriotic forces" have now become the main line in the activities of the "coalition government" as a whole and of all its groupings. At a press conference organised in the jungle near the Thai-Kampuchean border Sihanouk insisted on "unifying" the armed actions of all groupings "not only in the defence, but also in taking the offensive against the enemy." According to him, this demand is supported by Khieu Samphan and Son Sann.³⁴

Thus, the Kampuchean reactionaries still cherish hopes, with the support of imperialist and hegemonic forces and using the territory of Thailand as their base, of bleeding the People's Republic of Kampuchea white, of drowning the Kampuchean people in blood and reestablishing the Pol Pot regime of genocide. Besides, the ringleaders of the Khmer emigrants are well aware that only if they take "active" actions against the PRK may they count on material hand-outs from abroad, without which neither they nor their groupings can exist.

THE PROCESS OF KAMPUCHEA'S REBIRTH IS IRREVERSIBLE

The years that have elapsed since the liberation of the Kampuchean people from the fetters of the criminal Pol Pot regime provide graphic evidence that all attempts by the Khmer reactionaries to shatter the people's system are totally doomed. All the time, the designs of the external forces to compel people's Kampuchea to compromise with the Pol Pot regime have invariably ended in a fiasco.

Despite the great difficulties caused by the grave consequences of imperialist aggression and the Pol Pot regime of genocide, the People's Republic of Kampuchea has scored considerable successes in its national rebirth and the development of a peaceful life. In conformity with the programme elaborated by the 4th Congress of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea (PRPK), the country is witnessing the normal restoration of its economy and an enlivening of all spheres of public life.

The sixth year of the PRK's existence is ushering in a qualitatively new period in the country's life. With the restoration of the economic structure, life normalised, and the political system of popular power consolidated. As can be seen from the documents of the Session of the PRK National Assembly held in February 1984 and from the decisions of the 7th Plenary Meeting of the PRPK Central Committee which preceded it, the Kampuchean people are starting to implement the programme for founding a socialist society. Dozens of industrial enterprises have been commissioned, and considerable successes scored in ensuring self-reliance of the country in food. The cooperative sector of the economy of the PRK is becoming the key one, which is a most important achievement in the country's development.

³² See *Pravda*, Dec. 22, 1983.

³³ See *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 4, 12, 25, 29, 1984.

³⁴ See *Ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1984.

The successes in restoring Kampuchea would have been even more impressive but for the tension on the Kampuchean-Thai border, created by the Pol Pot gangs and other counterrevolutionary groupings obtaining armaments and military hardware from the Thai authorities and also from abroad.

The Kampuchean people wish to live in peace and friendship with their neighbours. With this aim in view, over the last five years they have put forward quite a few concrete proposals directed at relaxing tension round Indochina, in particular normalising the situation on the Kampuchean-Thai border. Among them is a four-point proposal by the PRK, the aim of which is to turn the Kampuchean-Thai border into a peace zone, in particular the establishment of a demilitarised zone near the border; the joint proposals made to Thailand together with the SRV and Laos that they all sign bilateral or multilateral non-aggression pacts and agreements on non-interference in each other's internal affairs, the renunciation of allowing any other country to use their territories as a base for struggle against another country or countries; the statement on the readiness to sign bilateral treaties on peaceful coexistence with the PRC on the basis of the principles that are part and parcel of international relations; the initiative to hold a regional conference of the two groups of countries—Indochina and ASEAN—and also to convene an international conference to discuss the situation in Southeast Asia.

The durability of the people's power in Kampuchea and the irreversibility of the development of a new life are converting the PRK into an important stabilising factor in the situation in Southeast Asia. Together with its allies—Vietnam and Laos—the People's Republic of Kampuchea favours a constructive dialogue between the three states of Indochina and the ASEAN members. The Communiqué of the 8th Conference of Foreign Ministers of Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos, held late in January 1984, again expounded a broad platform for discussing possible measures, together with the ASEAN members, towards settling outstanding issues. In this connection, the three fraternal states declared that the consolidation of security and stability of the People's Republic of Kampuchea would ensure the possibility of withdrawing another group of Vietnamese volunteers from it this year. The Communiqué of the Conference reaffirms the proposals previously advanced on normalising relations with China. "The peoples of Indochina and the Chinese people," the Communiqué stresses, "have common interests in preserving peace so that they might have an opportunity to channel their resources and energy towards national rebirth. In this spirit, the three countries of Indochina reaffirm their proposals aimed at restoring friendship and good-neighbourliness with the PRC on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence."³⁵

The Kampuchean people and their government regard the provision of their own security as one of their major tasks. This task is being successfully fulfilled by the people's revolutionary armed forces of the republic, which resolutely cut short armed provocations and subversive activities carried out in the border areas with Thailand by the Pol Pot gangs and other counterrevolutionary groupings, seeking to block the settlement through negotiations on the problems existing in Southeast Asia. The Statement issued by the Ministry of National Defence of the PRK on the occasion of the withdrawal, in May 1983, of part of the Vietnamese voluntary troops from Kampuchea noted that "today the positions of the Kampuchean revolution are stronger and more solid than ever before ... Of paramount importance is the further strengthening of the People's Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea which has been scoring

³⁵ *Nhan Dan*, Jan. 30, 1984.

fresh successes in safeguarding the revolutionary gains and eliminating the remnants of the Pol Pot gangs and of other Khmer reactionaries. In the course of the operations conducted during the 1983 dry season, the officers and men of the People's Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea won impressive victories mopping up the border areas of a number of provinces from the Pol Pot men and other counterrevolutionaries, who were trained and armed with US weapons in Thailand."³⁶

The Communiqué of the abovementioned Conference denounces all the schemes of the imperialist and hegemonic forces for using the so-called Kampuchean problem to create a threat to the security of the PRK, in particular, the Communiqué stresses that the US administration is increasing the scope of its military aid to the ruling quarters of Thailand and other ASEAN member-countries opposing the national rebirth of Kampuchea.³⁷

In its foreign policy, the PRK, apart from bolstering its special relationship with Vietnam and Laos, attaches great importance to the strengthening of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. The Soviet Union fully backs the measures proposed by the PRK, the SRV and the LPDR towards eliminating tension in Southeast Asia. The message of greetings sent by the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers to the leaders of the PRK and the PRPK on the fifth anniversary of the formation of the People's Republic of Kampuchea highly appraises the victories scored by the Kampuchean people and expresses decisive support for their efforts in building the economy and safeguarding peace in the region. The message reads in part: "Over the last five years, the Kampuchean people, under the guidance of their militant vanguard, the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea, and relying on support from countries of the socialist community and progressive forces of the world, have overcome numerous difficulties and secured outstanding successes on the road towards building a new life. Today, the working people of the PRK look to the future with confidence and are successfully implementing the decisions of the Fourth Congress of the PRPK, which put forward a programme for creating the foundations of a socialist society in Kampuchea. We are convinced that the industrious Kampuchean people will fulfil the complicated tasks they are facing and will score fresh victories in the revolutionary remaking of society."

"We note with satisfaction that the relations between the Soviet Union and people's Kampuchea are developing successfully in most diverse spheres, on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. We shall continue to consolidate friendship with the PRK for the benefit of the peoples of our countries in the interests of the cause of peace and socialism."³⁸

Enjoying the support of the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Laos and other socialist countries, the people of Kampuchea has been marching forward with confidence along the road of creative endeavours. All attempts by Khmer reactionaries and their foreign masters to hamper this process are doomed. Pol Pots, Sihanouks, Son Sanns and the like, who have been cast on to the dump of history, present the past of Kampuchea, and they are unable to stop the irreversible process of the country's rebirth.

³⁶ Quoted from *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1984, No. 2.

³⁷ See *Nhan Dan*, Jan. 30, 1984.

³⁸ *Pravda*, Jan. 7, 1984.

ADMINISTRATIVE TRADITIONS IN PRC POLITICAL CULTURE (AN INQUIRY INTO RESEARCH METHODS)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 84 (signed to press 5 Jun 84) pp 110-123

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences L. S. Perelomov and Candidates of Historical Sciences P. M. Kozhin and G. F. Saltykov]

[Text] In reference to the objectives of the future development of ideological work in his speech at the June (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, Comrade K. U. Chernenko said: "Scientific workers must act more with an eye to the future and must be able to 'catch sight of' emerging tendencies in a timely manner. I am referring to scientific forecasts contributing to a better view of the future and sound decision-making."¹ The improvement of scientific forecasts is closely related to the attainment of new frontiers in the social sciences, particularly further work in such fields as the study of political culture.

The issues raised at the June plenum have a direct relationship to the activity of researchers of current Chinese affairs. One way of attaining this objective consists in the objective study of political opinion and the political culture in present-day China. In our opinion, one of the significant differences between the PRC and other socialist countries can be found in this area. This was referred to specifically by Yu. V. Andropov when he said that "there are considerable differences between socialist countries in their economies, their cultures and their means and methods of attaining socialist objectives." In connection with this, Yu. V. Andropov said that "an objective scientific analysis of differences of opinion arising between individual socialist countries and between some fraternal parties in the world communist movement and the search for ways of surmounting them on a Marxist-Leninist basis and ways of strengthening communist solidarity certainly constitute an important party objective on the international level."²

The political culture of socialist society in general and the Soviet society in particular is being researched extensively by Soviet scientists.³ Comrade K. U. Chernenko said that research in a country uniting over 100 nationalities and ethnic groups would be unthinkable "without the careful study of their specific interests and the distinctive features of their ethnic consciousness and culture."⁴ The need for "the systematic enhancement of the

political culture of workers, so that each individual can become...a conscious participant in public affairs" was discussed by Yu. V. Andropov in a CPSU Central Committee meeting with party veterans.⁵

Another pertinent topic in this field of research consists in the establishment and development of the political culture, its distinctive features and its place in the system of public administration in other countries, especially the countries making up the socialist world system. This applies to the study of contemporary China. The unique features of Chinese political culture have been manipulated in various ways by bourgeois researchers. According to our calculations, there were at least 800 publications dealing with aspects of the political culture in the United States and other developed capitalist countries between 1979 and 1983. Leading Sinologists in the capitalist countries and many social scientists have given this matter considerable attention and have attempted their own "interpretations" of this truly complex Chinese phenomenon. Furthermore, they have indulged in various lines of speculation that have distorted the very essence of the Chinese political culture. Our literature already contains extensive criticism of the most reactionary interpretations of the Chinese political culture by bourgeois researchers.⁶ There is no doubt that the time has come for the more thorough and comprehensive study of this culture on a Marxist-Leninist basis, as a specific spiritual development in contemporary Chinese policy, in public opinion and behavior, in the activities of related political institutions and in the political thinking of the Chinese leadership. Since this is the first time PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA is dealing with this subject matter, we feel that the reader should first learn about the degree to which this matter has been studied in Soviet science and abroad.

The political culture is a specific historical phenomenon. Just as any other culture, it is created by people over the course of history, is affected by the economic and sociopolitical interests of certain classes and is the expression of these interests during the process of public administration. It is precisely the class nature of the political culture that gives it substance.

It is necessary to "distinguish between (with a view to antagonistic socio-economic structures) the political culture of the dominant, exploiting classes and the diametrically opposed political culture of the laboring masses and the oppressed and exploited classes. It is important to underscore the fact that the dominant classes make every effort to force the popular masses to accept certain elements of the political culture which are specifically designed to perpetuate the exploitative order, maintain and justify an undemocratic government and even bring about the active support of the existing government by the governed."⁷

The political culture of the PRC, its structure and its functions cannot be analyzed until they have been related to the general concept of culture. The complexity and multifaceted nature of this social phenomenon complicate the development of a general theory of culture, but successful attempts at an analysis of culture from the standpoint of logic have already been made in our scientific literature.⁸

The political culture essentially consists of the same formal elements as other types of culture, and it can be defined as "part of the spiritual culture of the class society, expressing the interests of a specific class and personified in political thinking, the principles and methods of political administration, the style of political relations and the specific political actions of the masses, classes, political parties and individuals."⁹ Another approach has been taken by some Soviet authors, who regard the political culture as an element of the political system and examine it as "a specific structure consisting of all the means of organizing political affairs (political procedures, the standards of political behavior, political roles, political traditions, etc.) and all of the factors motivating political activity (political feelings, knowledge and beliefs, political outlooks, political values and ideals)."¹⁰ This definition largely corresponds to our approach to the study of the Chinese political culture.

The study of all the different institutions, establishments and organizations of political systems was begun by J. Locke and has been continued by contemporary bourgeois researchers in connection with investigations of the traditional and efficient types of social administration and government organization, leading these researchers to look for the factors determining the effectiveness of government policy.¹¹

For this purpose, systemic studies were conducted in various spheres of government activity, and the relationship between the government and public organizations, between institutions and citizens, and between small groups and interest groups has been studied.¹² The term "political culture" was invented by bourgeois specialists to define the source and level of political activity, the nature and machinery of interaction by higher and lower levels, the highest government bodies and local government, the center and the periphery, the urban and rural populations. It is made up of such elements as ethnic features and the relationship between tradition and innovation in economic and political affairs. But there is no single definition of this term as yet.¹³

In essence, the more intense studies of political affairs were largely the result of political and socioeconomic reforms in the socialist and developing countries, the growing international significance of the experience of countries whose political systems were formed under the influence of ideas differing from European ideas in their cultural, historical and sociopsychological bases.¹⁴ Observations of the political experience and political practices of non-European countries introduced certain changes into the very definition of the term "culture."¹⁵ Political culture was included as one of its elements, equal in importance to the material and spiritual elements.¹⁶ As mentioned above, there is no single definition of the concept of the political culture in bourgeois science, and this is due to the differing approaches of different schools and currents and the related weakness of the methodological base of research. It is quite indicative that bourgeois researchers use this term primarily in connection with social thinking and public opinion. This approach views the political culture as an indicator of the public interpretation of political objectives, programs and the actual performance of the leadership. Bourgeois political analyses generally focus attention on the differing

political cultures of various ethnocultural groups, nationalities and races,¹⁷ and these differences are explained as the result of traditions determining specific forms of political behavior.¹⁸ The traditions with the strongest impact on public administration, according to these authors, are forms of intergroup communication, methods of reporting information, the regulating machinery of prohibitions and inducements and the nature and organization of the communication system. Furthermore, the problem of communications is assigned a special place when the parameters and limits of cultural reforms and the modernization of culture are determined in societies with influential traditional structures and relations.¹⁹ The effectiveness of the political system depends partly on the accurate and adequate assimilation of information from the administrative center on the local level and the accuracy with which the aims and actual results of the receipt of this information can be predicted.²⁰ These researchers believe that information conveyed in the symbols of the traditional culture will be assimilated most accurately in these cases.²¹ In the final analysis, according to bourgeois researchers, the conflict between the masses and the elite in the political culture leads to a situation in which the administrative system can rely only on coercion for the attainment of its goals.

Western bourgeois historians have still not agreed on the elements of the Chinese political culture. General statements can be found in the works of L. Pye, R. Solomon, F. Mote, T. Metzger and others.²² The Chinese political culture, in their opinion, is influenced by such factors as the centuries-old population "surplus," the high population density and the relatively crowded living conditions, which have demanded the avoidance of conflicts in daily social life and have thereby maintained conservative philosophical and sociopolitical ideas, syncretic religions, organizations of "people's self-government" and other institutions designed to secure "tranquility in the Celestial Kingdom."²³

Despite all of the different functions of the political culture and all of the differing approaches to the definition of its structure, it is the unanimous opinion that the administrative function (and the social relations connected with it) is the main one, and that the methods and means of social administration determine the political culture. Administration in a class society must be political even when economic organizational activity is assigned priority during the course of socialist construction and development. V. I. Lenin distinguished between the problems of public and economic administration, but he also repeatedly stressed the interconnection and hierarchical relationship of various aspects of administration. He stated several times that there is a need for political administration in the class society--or, in other words, the kind of administration presupposing the regulation of relations between classes, social strata and groups with the aid of the state, parties and other elements of the political system. In a certain sense, the political organization of society functions as something like a circulatory system, through which power "flows"²⁴ and the object and subject of administration engage in an exchange.

In addition to all of the various institutions functioning through laws, official directives and judicial and administrative provisions--that is,

officially recorded rules--customs and traditions are also part of the political culture and also regulate relations within the political system.

The traditions of public administration in the PRC, simultaneously an important part of the political culture and a product of its influence, have certain distinctive features and all of the common features inherent in any mechanism of administration and social regulation, because any "society engenders certain general functions, without which it cannot exist."²⁵ Considering the ethnic and historical features of China, where the people have a common set of traditions, it is expedient to assess problems in individual, social and government administration from the historical standpoint even today, with a view to the fact that the administrative traditions are primarily the traditions of the political culture of the ruling class, or the traditions used by the ruling class.

Public administration in the PRC is closely related to the origins, development and functioning of the Chinese state, the history of which spans around three millenia, dating back to the Yin-Western Zhou era (18th-17th centuries B.C.). The establishment of administrative institutions on the national level can be dated back to this time.²⁶ It took an entire millenium, however, for the results of the functioning and development of the Chinese state to be analyzed and to serve as the basis for attempts at the creation of efficient models of administration. It is still difficult to completely explain why problems in social and government administration were of so much interest to scholars and politicians from various schools of political ethics, even diametrically opposed ones, during the Chunqiu-Zhanguo-Qin period (7th-3d centuries B.C.). The following basic causes, however, are indisputable.

In the first place, it was precisely during this era that the Chinese state experienced a qualitative advance in its development. Prior to this, the administrative system was almost completely based on the principle of inheritance--the individual's office and rank depended on the status of his ancestors ("zongzu") in the strict family hierarchy, and the contender initially did not need any kind of special knowledge or the support of a powerful patron.

In the second place, during this era the principle of genealogical kinship gradually grew less important, and the supremacy of the hereditary aristocracy was replaced by the rise of new community leaders--new landowners, the emerging bureaucracy, wealthy merchants and craftsmen. The process by which the supreme ruler of the country gained more and more personal power reached its maximum (initially through the increase of supreme authority in various Chinese principalities). The ruler finally acquired the right to appoint officials with a view to the candidate's political connections and personal abilities instead of his family ties.²⁷

In the third place, uneven population growth and settlement patterns, the relative population surplus in central regions and the thinly populated (in terms of farming area) outlying regions gave rise to a discrepancy between human and land resources. Shang Yang proposed two solutions: the offer of privileges to colonists and the development of virgin lands. Ancient thinkers, especially the legalists, realized that this major Chinese problem could only

be solved by a centralized state. This was the reason for their interest in efficient and coordinated administrative decisions.

In the fourth place, the written languages of various principalities were gradually replaced by a single national written language, accomplished through the standardization of characters (that is, the system of information as an element of administration) under Qin Shihuang.

Therefore, the Chinese political culture was established during the 7th-3d centuries B.C. Specialists have good reason to call this period the golden age of Chinese philosophy. It affected Chinese culture for many centuries and actually determined the mainstream of its future development and the formation of the social ideals, especially ideals of "administration," of the masses and progressive social thinkers.

From these two millenia of history, we can conclude that the models of individual, social and government administration created by Chinese thinkers in the 7th-3d centuries B.C. were much broader and deeper than the model personified in the imperial system of government (221 B.C. to 1911 A.D.). Many of their promising ideas were distorted or "forgotten." Theory was richer than practice in those centuries. Chinese politicians of the 20th century have had good reason to refer back to the sources of their national art of administration,²⁸ and this tendency will apparently continue in the future. This is why it is useful to recall the two main models of administration--legalist and Confucian--with a view to the theories that made the imperial system viable by giving it a backbone of "eternal" principles, and to the theories that were distorted by Chinese bureaucrats over the course of two millenia or were deliberately discarded as "unnecessary" because they did not correspond to the political interests of the ruling elite.

Both models, Confucian and legalist, presupposed the creation of a powerful and rich state with an authoritarian system of administration. The ruler was obligated to see to the welfare of his subjects and was "responsible" only to the supreme deity--Heaven. This was the strategic aim the ancient thinkers set for the state in their attempts to organize efficient administration and create the ideal administration. The function of concern for one's subjects was present in the name of the state--"guo jia," literally "state-family." This term is still used today.

The idea of the state's concern for the good of the people was interpreted by the founders of these currents in different ways. Whereas Mencius, who followed Confucius, asked the ruler to give all of his subjects plowed fields of equal value for free (the theory of "jing tian"--"fields with wells"), Shang Yang recommended that concern be displayed only for those who had distinguished themselves in exercising the government "theory of the entity"--that is, had been successful in war or farming. In contrast to Mencius, who declared the people's right to overthrow a ruler who did not concern himself with the good of the people, Yang Shang did not recognize this right. It is in this sense that we should interpret his precept: "The state is powerful and the people are weak."

Both the Confucians and the legalists were well aware that all of their theories would be unproductive unless the problem of bureaucracy could be solved. The legalists proposed that the bureaucracy be placed under the law by organizing a strict system of control to prevent corruption, graft, authoritarianism, etc. The Confucians, on the other hand, were more "humanistic." They expected their theory of the ideal ruler, personified in the image of "jun zi" ("the noble husband"), to put the bureaucracy on the right track with the aid of only moral standards. They categorically objected to laws controlling the actions of administrators. This is why the legalists were defeated in their lengthy battles with the Confucians.

Even the legislative system of the imperial period was permeated with the Confucian ideals that, despite all of the Confucians' good intentions, served to conceal actual lawlessness. The strategy defined by the ancients--concern for the good of the people--was unrealizable under the conditions of antagonistic structures, and although emperors invariably vowed fidelity to this precept, their vows were a meaningless ritual. But it is even more important that the ideals of the ancients stayed in the memory of the Chinese people for centuries and became an integral part of their political culture. The image of the honest official persecuted by bureaucrats also stayed in the people's memory. This image was particularly popular in the Chinese theater, which was so loved by the common people and was frequently attended by them. In dramatic performances, the dishonored official was generally saved by the incorruptible judge Bao Zheng.²⁹ Both the honest official and Bao Zheng personified the ideal features of the early Confucian rulers. But all of this was on the stage. In real life, authoritarianism and lawlessness prevailed. The institution of censorship did not perform the purifying functions it had been assigned by ancient utopian thinkers. The concept of "taking the bureaucracy in hand" (according to Shang Yang, this was the right of the community leaders to control the actions of administrators) was not employed and was revived many centuries later in the modified form of the "sida" of the era of "Cultural Revolution": "da ming, da fang" (the widespread expression of opinions, the complete disclosure of views); "da bianlun" (widespread debate); "da zibao" (large-character posters).

At the beginning of the 20th century Chinese democrats and revolutionaries had to choose a method of constructing a new state. Many of them were acquainted with the works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin and tried to combine some socialist ideas with something national of their own. In the 1903 article "Chinese Socialism," Liang Qichao gave K. Marx' teachings his own interpretation, writing, for example, that the idea of nationalizing land was proposed by Mencius and that the "well system" in ancient China was based on the same principles as contemporary socialism. Analyzing the socialist model of administration, Sun Yat-sen also said repeatedly that the idea of the state's regulating role in economic affairs was first expressed by ancient Chinese thinkers. "Our Chinese youths, who no longer study ancient Chinese theories," he said in his fourth lecture on the principle of nationalism on 17 February 1924, "assume that these theories (European socialist theories--A. M.) are the newest thing in the world, not knowing that the newest thing for Europe is not new in China because it happened here several thousand years ago." L. N. Borokh was the first in Soviet Sinology to point out the fact that

Sun Yat-sen's theory about a reasonable balance of state and public interests, in accordance with which the state is obligated to concern itself with the welfare of its subjects, was worded in the terms of the traditional doctrine of social administration. Above all, this applies to Sun Yat-sen's concept of "guo ji min sheng"--"the destiny of the state and public prosperity."³⁰

Policy statements of the CCP also contain references to the traditional belief that concern for public welfare is the highest aim of public administration. Hu Yaobang's accountability report at the 12th CCP Congress said: "What we need, first of all, is to secure enough food for ourselves and, secondly, to build--this is the basic guiding principle of all of our economic work."³¹ When CCP and PRC leaders determine the strategy of social administration, they often employ the traditional terms coined by the creators of the first administrative models in the 7th-3d centuries B.C. After the events of 1976 in the PRC, the line of "bo luan fan zheng"--"eliminating confusion and returning to the true path of administration"--was officially announced. The text of a speech presented by General Secretary Hu Yaobang of the CCP Central Committee at a rally celebrating the 60th anniversary of the CCP (on 1 July 1981) indicates that these four characters were used as a concise and eloquent description of the "past, present and future of the party and state." "At this time," Hu Yaobang said, "all of us must be constantly aware that our party and our state are undergoing the important historical period of 'bo luan fan zheng.'" The idiom "bo luan fan zheng" evokes associations with Mencius' saying ("bo i mao er-li Tianxia"), condemning those who "would not part with a single hair for the sake of the Celestial Kingdom."³²

It is known that the institution of "history as policy" was always an integral part of the machinery of social and government administration in China. This tradition is still alive in the PRC, and the concept of "using antiquity for the good of the present day" is one of the CCP's ideological premises. More energetic steps are now being taken in this direction. Chinese researchers believe that all historical works, starting with Sima Qian's "Historical Notes," the "Tongdian" and "Zizhi tongdian" encyclopedias and others, taught people for many centuries how to "cure the state of chaos and bring it out of the state of decline" ("zhi luan xing shuai"). Even now, history in the PRC is supposed to perform the same function.³³ As an example, we could look at the "List of Amendments to Unjust Court Decisions in the History of All the Dynasties," compiled by researchers from the Legal History Department of the Beijing Institute of Politics and Law. Information about the revision of unjust court decisions from the West Han period to the Ming and Qing periods is taken from dynastic histories and legal documents. "Judging by the cases discussed in this book," Zeng Bingjun says in the foreword, "unjust, false and mistaken accusations were also the result of the abuse of power by court officials who acted according to the likes and dislikes of their superiors and did not take the trouble to distinguish truth from lies; they were the result of suspects who agreed to confess under torture; they occurred through the fault of judges who wanted to see only the criminal aspects of the individual and to put him in prison." The publication of this anthology, as its compilers write, was a way of implementing the principle of "putting antiquity at the service of the present day," and for this reason the book "should instill the reader with a belief in socialist democracy and law."³⁴

If we analyze the specific undertakings of CCP and PRC leaders in the pursuit of this policy line, we can easily see the continuation of both historical types of administration--the early Confucian type, based on moral education, and the legalist type, which assigned priority to the strict and unconditional punishment of violaters of the law. The most important part of the educational process, according to Chinese journalists, is the personal example set by the leader. The Chinese people have a proverb: "Moralizing takes a long time, setting examples takes a short time." Among the writings included in Deng Xiaoping's selected works, the report "Top-Level Cadres Must Set an Example in the Development of the Best Party Traditions" is assigned special significance in the PRC. Here he appeals for the revival and development of the best party traditions--the traditions of industry, frugality in the home, close contact with the popular masses, and the setting of examples "in the improvement of party style and social mores." There are severe penalties for violations of the party charter by officials, the embezzlement of public property and other types of unscrupulous behavior. When a matter is taken to court, the proceedings are generally open to the public, and photographs of the proceedings are displayed in plants and establishments as graphic proof of the crime. The press covers major trials or reports their results to the population. The trial of the "gang of four" was even televised. We can illustrate this with an excerpt from the "Report of the Central Commission for the Verification of Discipline of the CCP Central Committee on the Work To Prevent Serious Crimes in the Economic Sphere" (1983): "According to statistics, by the end of April this year, commissions for the verification of discipline and judicial bodies throughout the country investigated over 192,000 cases involving various economic crimes. They tried 170 people who had obtained over 100,000 yuan illegally, and more than 7,000 who had obtained over 10,000 yuan illegally; more than 71,000 party members were implicated in these crimes. They have now completed the investigation of more than 131,000 cases, or 71 percent of the total; around 30,000 people have been sentenced, and more than 8,500 party members, guilty of crimes or implicated in them, have been expelled from the party. Embezzled money and goods with a total value exceeding 410 million yuan have been confiscated and returned to the treasury."³⁵

Among the administrative traditions characteristic only of states with written characters, there were the traditions of poetry and calligraphy in the ruling elite, which were among the most important criteria in the recruitment and certification of officials. Calligraphy was part of the Chinese culture for a long time and became a separate form of art. The very term "modern individual" or "educated individual" automatically presupposed the ability to draw beautiful characters. It became a custom to quote the astute remark of Han thinker Yang Xiong (53 B.C.-18 A.D.), who was able to convey the essence of calligraphy so concisely: "The word is the voice of the soul, and the written word is its graphic expression. The difference between *jun zi* (the gentleman) and *xiao ren* (the worthless person) can be judged from the voice and the drawing."³⁶ The works of the best calligraphers, such as Wang Xizhi (321-379), were worth more than gold, and the emperor Taizong (627-649) even stated in his will that the autograph of Wang Xizhi should be buried with him. The art of calligraphy was appreciated in the political culture of workers and exploiters. Rulers in imperial China wrote personal inscriptions in places revered by the public, vying with one another in the art of character writing. Anyone could

judge their skill. Many inscriptions were of a political nature, and here art served politics directly. This also presupposed a reciprocal connection between the people and the ruling elite because the common people could judge the writer's personal ability and had a sense of personal contact with the leader. This tradition still exists in the PRC and has even been developed further. On the 25th anniversary of the publication of the first issue of HONGQI magazine (in 1983), the seven senior members of the CCP Central Committee Politburo sent their inscriptions to the editors, and each was reproduced on a separate page of the magazine: "Analytical work will aid in the accomplishment of socialist modernization" (Deng Xiaoping); "Establishing contact with practice and perfecting style, earnestly endeavor to raise the level of analytical propaganda" (Li Xiannian), I; "Practice must be guided by theory; theory must be related to practice" (Chen Yun), II; "Adhering firmly to Marxist-Leninist positions, views and methods, arm cadres and the broad popular masses with the spirit of objectivity, the unswerving defense of the truth and the timely correction of errors" (Peng Zhen); "Firmly adhering to the policy of relating theory to practice, contribute to the revitalization and development of party analytical work" (Xiu Xiangqian); "Raise analytical standards by generalizing practical experience" (Nie Rongzhen); "By arming the people of the entire country with the ideals of socialism and patriotism, HONGQI magazine has invariably made an outstanding contribution to the cause of China's development" (Wang Zhen), III³⁷ (see p 121) [inscriptions not reproduced].

The reader of these inscriptions in translations into Russian or another European language will notice only differences in the content of the messages, but anyone who knows Chinese characters will notice differences in the style and manner of writing. The publishers felt that each CCP and PRC leader could thereby display his own personal abilities and let the reader judge his embodiment of the laws of calligraphy. Everyone in China realizes how important the performance of a slogan or appeal is to the prestige of the writer.

The political culture of the PRC also inherited the national tradition of using symbolic numbers in the administrative sphere. They can make slogans concise, specific and eloquent. Some examples are the political slogans "san fan" ("the struggle against the three evils"), "wu fan" ("the struggle against the five evils") or "san nian chi ku--wan nian xingfu" ("3 years of persistent labor--10,000 years of happiness"). The policy of accelerated national development was widely known as "si hua" ("the four modernizations"). Citizens of the PRC associate this slogan with the total renunciation of the practices of the "gang of four" ("si ren bang"). Symbolic numbers also have a political meaning. It is possible that if there had been a "gang of five" in the PRC, the number of modernizations would also have been increased to five.

The political culture of China has always been distinguished by the use of the statements and authority of outstanding historical figures as an indisputable argument to reinforce the authority of the current administrative system and practices. The same tendency can be seen in the PRC. The Chinese press focused attention on the presence of Kong Demao, a 77th-generation descendant of Confucius, and descendants of Kang Yuwei and other outstanding figures of

the past among the delegates to the Sixth Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.³⁸

The establishment and development, stability and variability, structure and content of the Chinese political culture, including administrative traditions, have been distinguished by the following main features.

The first is China's lengthy ethnocultural history and the development of the Chinese state within the framework of essentially a single historical structure with a constant economic, primarily agrarian, cycle. Along with other factors, this contributed to the formation of equally constant general principles of individual and group relations with the society and state.

The second is the strictly organized and constant system of philosophical concepts (political ethics), which have invariably contained the "eternal" or "primordial" goals of administration (the good of the people, the achievement of abundance, harmony and order in the society, etc.) and the "absolute" methods of attaining these goals (participation by the masses in self-government, their acknowledged connection with the organizational function of government, the creation of the ideals of the honest, just official and the wise ruler) and equally constant ideals of social organization (Datong and others). Of course, these ideal structures are characteristic of the utopian frame of mind, and the negative and naive features of many of these concepts and precepts were constantly revealed in the administrative practices of imperial China. The concept of dynastic cycles, each of which included phases in which the society and the government rose, flourished and declined, was invented and existed without changes for more than 2,000 years to balance ideal precepts with the practice of feudal despotism in traditional Chinese historical studies.

The third was the maintenance of a political system in pre-socialist China which was secured by a centuries-old professionally trained bureaucracy, taking synchronized actions on the local, regional and state levels.

These basic features are the main factors determining the characteristics of the Chinese political culture, the very procedure by which political actions are undertaken on a mass scale, attained objectives are consolidated and new political (and, of course, economic, social and ideological) objectives are chosen. The specific elements of the political culture, on the other hand, are quite diverse. We will mention only a few of them.

First of all, there are the invariable organizational principles of mass-scale cooperation in labor processes, in collective political action, etc., and the extraordinary organizational mobility and "law-abiding nature"³⁹ of mass associations, which have amazed Western bourgeois observers.

Secondly, there is the tradition of strong reliance on specific positive and negative examples. The upper echelon formulates moral, ethical and commercial models--stereotypes and their exact opposites--with a view to past political experience, and the lower strata use these examples or some of their features in their daily life and in extreme situations in ways corresponding to their political culture. The institution of "history as policy" plays the deciding

role in the formulation of behavioral stereotypes and the choice of examples indicating optimal methods of dealing with certain situations.

Thirdly, the careful choice of slogans, and their wording with consideration for symbolic numbers, graphic connotations, etc., occupy a significant place in the administration of sociopolitical processes on various levels, from the lowest to the highest.

Fourthly, the choice of optimal ways of combining administrative practices with social undertakings is an important consideration. This has been reflected in the organization of direct government administration and indirect methods of administration through the special system of internal self-government by small, localized social groups ("baojia"). This system has evolved over thousands of years, changing its functions in different social structures and different eras, but maintaining a specific form. Community organizations, building, block and neighborhood committees with the functions of community mutual aid, welfare, job placement and other services, are gaining more importance in the PRC today.

Fifthly, the form and method of solving the problem of the center and the periphery have played a tremendous role in administrative traditions (the Chinese theory and practice of administration have contributed greatly to the creation of a stable balance between outlying districts and the center). This has gradually become an economic issue, connected with economic regionalization, the distribution of natural resources, etc.

Although administrative traditions have remained an important part of the Chinese political culture, they have played differing roles during different stages of the PRC's development. The search for a suitable way of synthesizing the traditional and the contemporary is still going on, now that the theory of "socialism with a view to China's specific features" is being worked out in detail. The official goal of the policy of the "four modernizations" was the creation of a "society of small-scale prosperity" ("xiaokang shuiping") by the year 2000. The term was first used, however, in the Confucian treatise "Liji" ("Notes on Ritual"), and then in the works of Kang Yuwei in connection with the theory of "Great Unity" ("Datong").⁴⁰

When we assess the role of the traditions of public administration in the contemporary Chinese political culture, we must pay special attention to the ratio of subjective to objective factors in PRC political practices. The same economic basis, K. Marx pointed out, "can display an infinite number of variations and gradations due to the infinite variety of empirical circumstances, natural conditions, racial relations, outside sources of historical influence and so forth." This is precisely why administration "is an essential part of any method of production."⁴¹ It is a science and an art, it is a synthesis of the objective and the subjective, and it is affected by natural historical tendencies and by the creativity of individuals. It is not surprising that V. I. Lenin wrote about "the art of administration and politics."⁴²

The contemporary use of traditions depends largely on subjective factors. They are known to have played an important role in the PRC in recent decades

and have had a serious effect on the "art of administration" in the country. Nevertheless, even during the "dismal decade," many elements of the administrative art and many administrative traditions continued to function. Objective conditions acquired stronger influence in the use of administrative traditions in connection with the policy of "socialist modernization," and this has been reflected in the decisions made on the demographic problem in the PRC, in the system of public education and in patriotic indoctrination.

The topic of administrative traditions, just as all aspects of the PRC political culture, will require further comprehensive analysis. The authors of this article wanted to demonstrate the complexity and diversity of the tasks set for Soviet Sinologists by contemporary Chinese politics, and the significance of the continued perfection of scientific methodology in accordance with the party's demands on research in the social sciences.

FOOTNOTES

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BIOGRAPHY OF FORMERLY PERSECUTED PRC WRITER

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 84 (signed to press 5 Jun 84) pp 135-142

[Article by S. A. Toroptsev, candidate of philological sciences: "Wang Meng: Creative Inquiries and Discoveries"]

[Text] The interest in new things and artistic inquiry are among the important features of Chinese literature of recent years. Analyzing the results of a Chinese national novella competition in which the latest works by Wang Meng, Jiang Zilong, Shen Rong and other authors, both famous writers and beginners, won awards, a critic said: "Our writers make inquiries into diverse fields, but in general they can be divided into two groups," one of which believes in the "continuation of traditions" (this does not refer to the conservative and stagnant practice of copying centuries-old models; it is a spirit of inquiry, but it is directed at the depths of traditional national art), while the other "borrows" from various contemporary European and American literary currents.¹ Another researcher focused attention on the "tendency to philosophize," which reflects a desire to raise Chinese literature to the contemporary level, demanding philosophical ideas and abstract concepts even from the aesthetic sphere, and lists a number of different "groups" in his article, testifying, according to the author, to a realization of the immutable fact that the "spirit of the age" must be personified by writers in an "inimitable aesthetic manner."²

If we look at the list of writers mentioned in articles and letters from readers discussing aspects of innovation in numerous debates by literary scholars, critics and readers, we will find Wang Meng's name at the top of the list--"a new literary phenomenon in the garden of our culture, evoking enthusiastic discussion"³ and "one of the brightest and most striking...stars in the literary heavens,"⁴ whose "prose has broken out of the framework of traditional structures" and proves that we are dealing with an "outstanding writer."⁵

The absence of absolute recognition has not kept Wang Meng from winning prizes in all-China competitions (for the stories "Most Precious of All" and "Spring Voices" and the novellas "Difficult Meeting" and "The Moth"). "The Moth" has been made into a movie. Wang Meng's fame has already crossed national boundaries. A. Dolezhalova translated one of his stories into Slovak. There are Spanish translations of his works. A collection of his works has been published in a Hungarian translation. Russian translations of two stories were

included in the anthology "Lyudi i oborotni" [People and Werewolves] (1982), "The Moth" was included in the anthology "Chelovek i yego ten'" [Man and His Shadow] (1983) and other translations will be published soon. Professor F. Gruner (GDR) presented a report on Wang Meng's works at the 28th European Sinologists Congress in Cambridge in 1982.

Wang Meng's works are the most vivid example in PRC literature of the active search for new images, a new style and even a new content. No other writer has displayed these features so clearly.

The writer's biography is also typical in many respects.

Wang Meng was born in Beijing in 1934. He made his first juvenile attempts at writing when he was 7. In 1953, after he had already been part of the student movement and the anti-Guomindang struggle, had gone underground, had joined the CCP in 1948 and held a responsible position in the Komsomol gorkom, 19-year-old Wang Meng began to think about the power of the written word to preserve the moment and to give events eternal life. "The writer is the luckiest person on earth," Wang Meng later recalled his belief of those crucial years, "because he can talk to thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of friends."⁶

The young man took up the pen. He carefully read the Chinese and world classics, Lu Xin, Ba Jin and Ding Ling, and he read works by Soviet authors, with N. Ostrovskiy and A. Serafimovich topping his list. His novel about school-boys, "Long Live Youth," was a test of his talent. Famous literary critic Shao Quanlin read the manuscript in 1962 and said: "You write clearly and you have a talent for prose." In his opinion, the novel was completely ready for publication, but he advised the writer not to be in a hurry because this was the time when the harsh criticism of "average heroes" (and this novel was full of them) and the strict conformity demanded of writers would certainly have left Wang Meng, who was already in disfavor, open to attack by ultra-leftist critics. "I was 27 then," the writer recalls, "and I had no idea of the hurricane that was coming."⁷

The beginning writer's first published work was the story "Stringbean," printed in the Beijing magazine RENMIN WENXIUE in 1955. Wang Meng won some recognition, entered the first all-China young writers' competition in 1956 and participated in preparations for a conference on the writer's relationship with his editor in spring 1957.

But a story published in 1956, "Novice in the Organizational Division," evoked widespread debate in the country and stimulated political criticism (with administrative "organizational conclusions") as well as artistic criticism. The authors of the introduction to an anthology of contemporary Chinese short stories, A. Zhelokhovtsev and V. Sorokin (the latter translated this story into Russian), mention the "naivete of some dialogue and situations" and the "inexperience of the beginning writer," but also see "the purity of his intentions and his faith in the future" and make special mention of "the complex, multidimensional character of Liu Shiwu" (a raykom official, an experienced party leader but a cold pedant and dogmatist). The political thrust of the story, in their opinion, is aimed against "formalism, narrowmindedness,

tolerance for defects, indifference concealed behind lofty phrases, actions that contradict words.... Subsequent events proved that the young writer had noticed and revealed to his countrymen some of the...fundamental weaknesses of the CCP power structure."⁸

As Wang Meng himself later remarked, "political campaigns tore literature to pieces" after 1949.⁹ The writer was expelled from the CCP and was sent away for "corrective hard labor."¹⁰ In 1962 he was able to return to Beijing for a short time and even to publish two stories, but then he was exiled to a settlement in the Yili district in Xinjiang soon afterward and it was not until 1973 that he was allowed to work in the local cultural administration.

For all these years, with the exception of 1962, Wang Meng was not allowed to write. How did he live during these 20 long years? What were his prevailing emotions at that time?

"He had already heard the first bars of a great new form of music in his dreams, but who could have known that the music was not for him and that this orchestra would not accept him.... Was he not something like an old violin with broken strings? A tiresome drum with holes in it, letting the air through and ruining the charm of the landscape? Or was he just an old black carcass, a drop of dirty water spilled on the clean and neat sheet music? For more than 20 years he dreamed and hoped for something..."--this is what the author says about the hero of his story, "The Roan" (1981), Cao Qianli, a musician from the capital who was labeled a "rightist" and was exiled to a remote part of Xinjiang. In an article Wang Meng presented a much more uncompromising description of his emotions during those years: "Then I made a 'conscious' effort to renounce literature and, above all, to renounce myself. If China would be even cleaner, more beautiful and happier after I had been discarded on the junkheap of history, why should I not lie there quietly? ...After I was described as petty and useless in 1957, I actually felt petty and useless for more than 20 years!"¹¹ There is reason to believe that the last statement is the result of excessive self-deprecation, but the writer expresses the same opinion in "The Roan," a story with, as all of Wang Meng's works, distinct autobiographical features. In one part of the story Cao Qianli finds an old domra in a poor Kazakh village. He "tightened the strings and began to play. He had not touched a musical instrument for the 3 years he had been here, in the commune. All of this was part of the past he was trying to bury irrevocably. He had even begun to believe that he did not like music, that he had no talent for composing, that he knew nothing about rhythm and tempo and that he could not even read music. But then he took this old domra into his hands and a melody poured out.... When he began to play, the shepherds and an old cowherd were literally stunned. They had no idea that the stranger was such a maestro! Then he began to sing about youth and spring, about life, about the boundless sea, about the whistling wind, about the hands of a craftsman and about the eyes of a maiden."

Wang Meng himself began "singing" again in 1978, after he had been completely vindicated. But his 20 years in exile were not merely a gaping hole in his life. "My defeats enriched and strengthened me," the writer stated.¹² There is some measure of truth in this statement, but is "defeat" always a guarantee

of "enrichment"? Not everyone is revived by a rainstorm; many are simply broken to pieces and dashed to the ground. It takes a strong human heart to be "enriched" rather than warped. In the same story, Wang Meng attributes his hero's viability to his lust for life, his open mind and spirit and his faith that the storms would pass: "Just 3 years ago he had arrived in the commune and had avidly observed everything--the local way of life, local speech, local cuisine. He subconsciously felt that he must become a part of the life here: This would not only be an important part of his rehabilitation but would also be essential to his adaptation, survival and stability, and perhaps even the basis for the enjoyment of life in the future." This is precisely why Xinjiang occupies an important place in Wang Meng's current works. He makes the admission, quoting from classical poetry: "'My native land is 8,000 li away, but the hurricane of destiny took me away from it for 30 years' (8,000 li is the distance between Beijing and Xinjiang)--today I take this as my point of departure."¹³

Summing up his past life, he mentions the following milestones: "In the 1950's I put my skills to the test but the curtain fell, and it is only in the last 3 or, more precisely, the last 2 years (that is, since 1979; the article was written in 1980--S. T.) that my literary career has essentially begun anew. I am taking the first steps!"¹⁴ "Revitalized, I was faced by the colossal task of finding myself...my place, my points of reference, my themes, my literary ideas, my style and my form.... When I was 20, life and literature seemed as innocent and open as a beautiful and pure maiden, and my works were something like a poem to my first love.... But now I see life and literature as a strict, experienced and concerned mother.... Stern and serious melodies can be heard in my song. My song can no longer be a youthful serenade.... It must be more like a chorale. Yes, the 40-year-old author is much more complex than he was at 20."¹⁵

Judging by the few works Wang Meng was able to write before he was exiled, it is evident that he was taking the traditional road of detailed narrative prose and relied on the spoken word, especially dialogue, following the tradition of expressing ideas in them, and on plots involving crises or conflicts. In other words, he relied on the customary means of organizing artistic ideas, confining them within certain established boundaries.

The Wang Meng of today seems quite different. He has stated his intentions: "I have tried to use psychological descriptions to break through the limits of time and space, to completely reveal the '8,000 li' and '30 years' of which I spoke and to unravel the chain of associations and comparisons along this lengthy road. I have searched through antiquity and the present day, in China and abroad, from above and from below, for the purpose of eventually finding 'myself' in my art."¹⁶ The journey has not been easy. This article was written in 1980, but when the writer was interviewed by a journalist at the end of 1982, after he had just finished the short story "Qinglongtan," which would arouse considerable interest after its publication, he suddenly admitted: "I have written a great deal, but I am embarrassed because there is no depth to these works."¹⁷ Of course, this was not a renunciation of his earlier works, but an observation on the unavoidably limited and incomplete nature of any phenomenon. Wang Meng, one of the most prolific writers, who tried to encompass as much of life as possible in his works, began to realize

that his omnivorous period was passing and that he should probably choose his "main area of concentration." Time goes on, the "pain" that still cannot be concealed by "laughter"¹⁸ will probably grow less intense, and tomorrow Wang Meng might smile more and frown less. But it is unlikely that he will give up his attempts to "break through the limits of time and space" or the "psychological descriptions" with which he delves into the deepest reaches of his heroes' minds, because these are the very essence of the Wang Meng who astounded the Chinese reading public and changed the course of Chinese literature by cultivating its taste for inquiry. Today no researcher of contemporary Chinese literature can ignore Wang Meng. The first thing the researcher must do is explain this paradox: How did one of the most confined Chinese writers fill his works with so much air, movement and space?!

The epic panorama is not Wang Meng's style. In an article entitled "The Art of the Short Story," in which the author states his artistic beliefs and his ideas about the essence of the creative process, Wang Meng speaks of the "two stages" of work on a story. During the first stage, the writer searches through boundless "space" for some small "point of reference"--"a memory, a feeling, a sensation deeply hidden in your heart, indistinct even to you." In addition to this "small point," something else is also essential: "The subject matter must affect you deeply, even if only subconsciously, even if you do not know that it has touched your heartstrings in such a way that your spirit has been filled with harmonious music and singing."¹⁹

The writer therefore holds a magnifying glass in his hands, or, using Wang Meng's own description in a speech at the third congress of the Union of Chinese Writers in November 1979, a "microscope" and an "x-ray machine."²⁰ He also has a "warning flare" in his possession, but he has left this to his writer colleagues, even though he sometimes sounded the alarm in his initial works, in his "Novice in the Organizational Division," for example. Wang Meng does not usually look for "some kind of spectacular story" (in principle, however, he does not deny the value of adding this kind of zest to a work; this "point of reference" is also possible, and he says this in the article on "The Art of the Short Story"). There are rare exceptions--such as his short novella "The Event That Might Have Occurred," in which an idea presented in a grotesque form of paradox is expressed through a completely realistic plot and story line. For this reason, this novella is unlike Wang Meng's customary calm, unhurried and dispassionate narratives, and is therefore something like a parable.

His heroes sit in crowded railroad cars ("Spring Voices"), swim in the surf and take walks along the beach ("Dreams of the Sea"), ride off on horseback to the mountains and travel so slowly that they only manage to reach an isolated Kazakh village in the foothills, despite the fact that the journey lasts for two and a half printer's sheets ("The Roan"), take walks in the park where they had gone in search of a daughter on a rendezvous but found "themselves" ("Spring Evening") or arrive in a vacation resort, spend almost an entire printer's sheet listening to the splash of the surf or the hum of an irritating gnat, and then leave without doing anything out of the ordinary ("Listening to the Sea"). The critic and the reader are absolutely at a loss: "Things are obscured by fog for 5 li in all directions." "At first I doubted my own

intellectual abilities," the author of an article in an established literary magazine admitted.²¹ Some people even deny that Wang Meng's writings are works of art and represent a unique genre, and they categorize them as mere semifictionalized accounts or essays--as "lyrical sketches," according to the discreet definition of the same critic,²² who only doubted his own "intellectual abilities" on the first page of the article. Not everyone understands why Wang Meng is drawn to such confined and insignificant subjects, situations, characters, dialogue and action. His view ("we do not have enough prose describing a single sight, a single remark, a single feeling, a single exchange of words; a story can be built on a single exclamation") is criticized by his opponents as something "contrary to the laws of art."²³

Obviously, there are readers in China for whom the "5 lis of fog" have disappeared. At a special conference on Wang Meng's works, organized by the Chinese Contemporary Literary Studies Society, complaints of this kind ("vague characterizations and the absence of complex typical characters" or "holes and tears in the artistic fabric") were accompanied by accurate statements about the unique nature of Wang Meng's prose, which "has broken out of the framework of traditional structures," as a result of which "we must not measure the talents of this outstanding writer with obsolete yardsticks," and the comment that in, for example, "Dreams of the Sea," "only the hero's feelings are described, but they reveal the wealth and depth of the author's ideas."²⁴

If literature is approached, as it was for a long time in China, from a single standpoint--that of the "typical character" (and, what is more, with a vulgar overemphasis on sociological concepts), described in a direct narrative style--it would be difficult to give Wang Meng's works the appreciation they deserve or to value their merits. Even the critic Zhang Zhong, who has written positive and astute analyses of the writer's most uncommon works ("Spring Voices," "Dreams of the Sea," "A Look into the Night,"²⁵ "Snake on a Leash," "The Moth" and "With Bolshevik Regards"), is disturbed by the "indistinct, imperceptible ideological outlook and external appearance of characters," which "complicates the expression of profound social meaning."²⁶

After the writer puts the hero of "The Roan" on horseback and sends him off on his long journey, he makes the ironic comment: "But enough of this, let Cao Qianli and the roan continue their journey alone. Let the intelligent reader and the incomparably more intelligent critic decide which is more expressive, the image of the horse or the image of the man, and which is more typical, the image of the man or the image of the horse, let them decide how accurately the horse's head and man's face have been described, whether they reflect the main theme, whether they contain symbolic meanings, whether they have any profound significance, whether the episodes are interconnected, whether the landscape hints at the character's feelings and whether all of the descriptions of nature are as sensuous as, for example, the following phrases--'The monk unlocked the midnight gate,' 'The apricot blushed and began to seethe with spring' or 'The spring wind turned the Jiangnan shore green again.' Let them tell the author to remove the stream of consciousness if it is present, and if it is not present let them tell him that the gun seen on stage during the first act must be fired in the fourth, or let them assert that all of the psychological nuances there are contrary to Chinese tradition, that

the masses will not understand these allusions and that the author is pandering to the tastes of all kinds of degenerates."

The meaning of this excerpt is that there is no point in seeking the typical only in the ordinary "image of the horse" or "image of the man." In the story, this section is followed by a sarcastic "brief biography of Cao Qianli, his political past and the main events of his life," in which elements of the medieval practice of letting the hero "introduce himself" are mixed with the bureaucratic language and wordy "self-criticism" demanded by ultra-leftists during various stages of Chinese history. It is precisely here, as if the writer were indulging in mockery, that the vulgar critic will find the "typical" elements he is seeking, but this will have nothing in common with the actual portrayal of the hero and, although it pretends to be a complete disclosure--internal and external--it will not even contain a hint of the hero's actual emotions.

Inner emotions and layers of consciousness are Wang Meng's main interest. In "The Roan," the extremely frank story in which the author's beliefs are laid bare, the hero's external appearance is described only in stylized terms and his features are deliberately caricatured: "Distinguishing marks. The face of a failure, narrow at the bottom, and with the back of his head jutting out like an eggplant. His left eye was slightly larger than the right, and he had a straight, refined nose (his only good feature, but note that this did not give him the right to look down his nose at anyone)." To what extent do we know the hero from this description? Even if we forget the irony for a moment, we may have been introduced to a "typical" character, but this is still far from what can be called a human being! The reader learns much more about Wang Meng's hero in an episode which is the product of the author's "visionary" imagination: "The cone of black clouds stretched out, changing shape and covering the sky, and it seemed to Cao Qianli that he could already hear the sound of rain.... Cao Qianli felt that he was being pursued, the prey surrounded by hunters, exiled to a place from which there was no escape, on this rolling plane in this desolate spot, at the edge of the earth, without any fellow sufferers, shacks or leafy trees and certainly without any mountain caves. No place to hide, no place to run. Without a doubt, Allah had abandoned him in this wilderness. And what a useless and stupid nag the horse was! Its entire coat, not just its mane, was tangled and wind-tossed. It also seemed to be freezing without a blanket and was nervously bucking and shuddering, making things uncomfortable and almost unbearable for the rider. Nevertheless, it kept going at the same unhurried speed. Would you like to speed up? 'Well, I could,' the horse replied, stretching out its neck, 'but what difference would it make? I have no way of sheltering you from the rain-clouds on this open plain. Could we find any shelter on this plain that stretches as far as the eye can see? So let it pour. What is wrong with that? Do you think rain has never leaked through the mud and cane roof of my crowded and dirty stable? And could that dirty, muddy water be compared to this marvelous rain falling from the heavens?! If so, would I be this dirty?'"

Here the author digresses to make an ironic comment in the anticipation of possible criticism: "It sends chills up my spine when his horse suddenly starts talking, but I will not write a critical article because he will be writing more mature works in the future. My compliments, and thank you very much!"

It must be said, however, that isolated excerpts taken out of context generally do not convey the total mood created by the complete work. One of the paragraphs in "Spring Voices" sounds something like scattered pages from a dictionary: "Free market. Department store. Quartz-battery electronic timepieces from Hong Kong. The movie 'The Rolled-Up Mat' based on a play from the Henan theater--youeju. Soft rolls with mutton. A rice omelet. Cross-country races. Women jockeys. Group production assignments. The onion harvest. Chinese medicine's victory over cancer. Campaign competition by candidates. Wedding celebrations...." Out of context, this excerpt has no central theme and consists of isolated fragments. In the story, however, the list is symbolic--the hero of the story listens to the conversations of other passengers in a crowded railway car, and the list therefore symbolizes crowding, trivia and simultaneous connection and disconnection. In general, many of the objects in "Spring Voices" are described through the sounds they make--the clattering of wheels, the music of a tape recorder, conversations, the whistle of the locomotive, "the frantic, triply frantic rumbling, rattling and roaring." The hero of this story, physicist Youe Zhifeng is taking a crowded train to spend the holidays with his aged father, who has just been "rehabilitated," as has the hero. The windows are tiny, and it is growing dark. The single light cannot penetrate the darkness in the car, and his impressions of his fellow-passengers are based on his sense of hearing, touch and smell ("in the acrid smell of sweat and strong tobacco, Youe Zhifeng sensed the familiar aroma of beans"; "Youe Zhifeng bit into the dried persimmon he had bought for the trip and began to chew it slowly, remembering the sweet taste of his youth"). Along with the hero, the reader senses and feels things without seeing them. The writer rounds out the scene with the aid of unnecessary details, telling the reader everything the hero notices and reconstructing a world through the hero's mind--as the hero perceives it. The stream of consciousness and the chain of associations which do not always have an apparent connection but are related by deeper similarities--this is the style of "Spring Voices" and some other works by Wang Meng, who has broken out of the traditional framework (although the writer himself once discussed literary traditions and found the "unconscious" in the classic novel "Dream of the Red Chamber" and "stream of consciousness" in the works of medieval poets Li Bo, Li Shanyin and Li Ji).²⁷

This polyphonic, counterpoint structure forms the basis of Wang Meng's literary ingenuity. He is fully aware of this. In an article entitled "A Discussion of Some Literary Theories," he states: "It is not wrong to use external details to describe thoughts, feelings, associations, ideas and flights of consciousness. This is more like music than a portrait. It creeps into the depths of the soul and has tempo and rhythm."²⁸ He goes on to name the fundamental difference between traditional and contemporary literature, still with the use of musical analogies: "In the past all of our national music was performed in unison. There was no harmony, and no matter how large the orchestra was, all of the instruments played the same melody. The good points of this kind of composition were precision, clarity and simplicity, but its defect was its limited capacity for expression." In literature, this gave rise to the same kind of monotonal structure, "unadorned" ideas, exaggerated precision and overemphasis, whereas what is "necessary is a subtext, multidimensional descriptions and multiple meanings"--that is, polyphonic sounds.²⁹

The action in Wang Meng's works develops in several intricately interwoven plot lines. The least significant is the main story, which exists only as an occasion or pretext for numerous digressions. For example, the reader of "Spring Voices" is less concerned with the external realities of Youe Zhifeng's trip than with the whimsical associations which are sometimes far removed in space and time from the train, while this train continues its unhurried journey toward the end of the line.

"Youe Zhifeng listened to these conversations in the darkness and he found them soothing. After all, once there was no railroad here, no highway, not even a bicycle path. The rich traveled on donkeys and the poor traveled on their own two feet. Peasants would heave a thousand and a half eggs onto their shoulders and set off before daybreak, in the dark, on their way to some city, passing countless river valleys and burial mounds. Oh, my cherished land, you are beautiful but poverty-stricken! Will prosperity ever come to you? Bitter memories drift away like smoke, like fog. Not all of them, not all--not everything should be forgotten! But the past is the past, the present is the present, and dreams are dreams. Beep beep, psss psss.... Rattle rattle.... The express railway along the Rhine. Vineyards on the slopes. Dark green water. The world whizzing by.

"No, this is not Frankfurt. This is his native northwestern plateau. A huge lilac bush is blooming on the gray tiles of a roof. It is like snow, like jasper, like sea foam. He remembered tearing off an emerald willow leaf, rolling it up and then, raising his head to the white clouds against the deep blue sky, blowing a piercing whistle with it. Frightening two tiny yellow orioles. Tagging along with his older sister to pick dusty vegetables and put them in a basket. Throwing stones, chasing rabbits, collecting bright multicolored quail eggs. Playing with everything--puppies, kittens, calves and colts. Turning each blade of grass into a pipe to play.

"No, this is not the northwestern plateau. This is Peiping before liberation. No, this is not Peiping. It is gone and will never return. This is the liberated capital, with stars emblazoned on red banners. This is youthful first love, this is a light breeze, penetrating him to the core for the first time with a mild puff.

"This is, this is.... What is this after all? Goldfish and snails? Marsh rushes and wild strawberries? A bullfinch hatching her eggs? ...He shook himself awake, rubbed his eyes again and saw everything more clearly: It was the heated railway car of the N-X train. Through the darkness, through the noise."

It is usually difficult to summarize Wang Meng's works in brief. His digressions are unnecessary and are added on to a rigid plot framework consisting of terse descriptions of completely ordinary actions: The hero catches a train, sits in the railway car and gets off at his station ("Spring Voices"); he goes to the seashore, swims in the surf (or listens to its rumbling) and goes back home ("Dreams of the Sea" and "Listening to the Sea"); he goes to another city on business and comes back a few days later ("Confusion"). "The Roan" and "The Sparkling Lake" have only the beginnings of a plot, ending with one

of these digressions. The plot structure itself is not tight enough to keep an insensitive and pedantic critic from easily finding episodes that could "best" be omitted in order to "give the main theme more emphasis and profundity"--this, the critic believes, will make the work "more concise, clear and profound."³⁰ It would be more concise, but would this add to its clarity or profundity? Wang Meng's groups of verbal associations, however capriciously and even improperly they may be related to the plot (connected not to the main shaft, but to a dangling thread), perform a literary service within the context of the work: They form an image. First of all, the image of the perceiving mind and, secondly, the image of the world perceived by this mind. Is this a minor service? Furthermore, is this only an innovative form, as some of the critics, even those with favorable opinions of Wang Meng's works, have tried to say? It is more likely that this is a change in the entire form and content of Chinese literature.

Space and movement are apparently of special meaning to Wang Meng. When he spoke of the "8,000 li" and "30 years," he said that these sizeable figures were the point of departure for his art, in his pursuit of scope. But I must clarify that this "scope" applied to the hero's internal feelings and emotions. The author's concern for the individual, however, did not cause him to ignore the hero's surroundings. We could even say that Wang Meng the artist was motivated by his love for his native land, which was not expressed in the abstract concept of "patriotism," but in delight with a bridge across a river, a snow-covered peak and the tiny craters formed in the dust by raindrops. His heroes live in a tangible land, know all of its details intimately and love it to the point of pain. This results in descriptions on various scales: from a single blade of grass to the vast expanses of a boundless plateau.

And this is characteristic of the "new" Wang Meng, beginning with the works he wrote in 1979. In "Novice in the Organizational Division" and in the 1978 short stories "Most Precious of All" and "The Story of the Brigadier, the Secretary, the Wild Cat and the Broken Chopsticks," the narrative does not break out of confined indoor settings (even though the setting of the last story, for example, is rural). After 1978 the setting of Wang Meng's works was no longer immobile and stable. Even when the heroes were locked inside, this indoor setting did not stand still (the train in "Spring Voices"). If the hero was not given enough space for physical movement, he would gaze out over the sea, where the horizon was only an imaginary line, and not a real barrier ("Dreams of the Sea"). Sometimes the writer even repeats himself, when he remembers one of his favorite meaningful images--for instance, that of the brave swimmer who swims beyond the protective shark net and challenges nature to a duel ("Dreams of the Sea" and "Listening to the Sea").

And of course, the author's thoughts do not stand still: Throwing off the fetters of plot structure and breaking through the limits of space and time, they race off to the constellation of Cassiopeia or to the bygone era of imperial concubines. Sometimes they make their way along a ladder of associations, but sometimes these ideas skip several rungs and leave a large gap. Is this a sign of the author's ineptitude? Or is it his attempt to make the reader think, try to figure things out for himself, put himself in the hero's place and undergo a transformation? Here, for example, is how "Spring Voices" begins: "Something rumbled--and night fell. A yellowish moon, large and

square, rose on the opposite wall...." Is this nonsense? Not at all. The reader who does not give up at this point will reach an explanation (indirect, of course, but quite precise): The "rumbling" was made by the iron door of the railway car platform, "night" fell inside the car, where there were only four tiny windows, and the "moon on the wall" was created by the light of the station lamp shining through a square window. Wang Meng's works are not good bedtime reading; they require thought and provide food for thought.

Cao Qianli in "The Roan" is approaching advanced age, but deep within his soul he feels a burning desire to gallop on a magnificent bay: the kind of horse that will "take flight at a mere touch. But if you try to poke him in the rear with a whip, he will buck, leap a hundred meters or so, and throw you onto the slope." And what if--but this is beyond belief--"you should tan his hide? Obviously, no one would dare.... But what if they did? Would he toss his red mane, leap toward the clouds and turn into a dragon? Would he shudder from the pain, jerk himself free and plunge into the depths of the forest? Would he plunge desperately, like an epileptic, and then fall in a dead faint, so that you will have trouble gathering his bones together?" And what if someone were to try all of these? One, two, three, "and one fine day the magnificent bay will be just like this decrepit roan, downtrodden, insensitive and completely apathetic. This is how the old roan was judged to be safer than all the rest. By losing everything, he gained safety. And safety means everything. When there is no safety, everything else can be meaningless. Who will deny this absolute fact? Cao Qianli blinked, grinned, nodded his head, heaved a deep sigh and inhaled noisily. This was the 'psychotherapy' he had invented to make things seem better."

The hero is looking only at a horse, but his thoughts encompass all of China and its recent fans of "hide-tanning."

The tendency to philosophize is one of the most salient features of Wang Meng's works. Today this is becoming increasingly characteristic of all Chinese literature--the use of the expanses of prose to express the writer's own views on vital issues. Even here, however, Wang Meng has his own style. A critic who wrote an article specifically about "the tendency to philosophize in contemporary prose" puts Wang Meng's works in a special category and mentions the use of ancient parables in a contemporary context, "sometimes conveying the 'moral of the story' and expressing the philosophical content of the work in concise form, expanding the reader's ideological field of vision," as well as the philosophical convergence of far-removed objects and events.³¹ The first of these is certainly not of primary importance to Wang Meng, and few examples of the use of ancient parables can be found in his works. The second is more important. The critic, however, illustrates this idea by quoting not Wang Meng, but another writer (Jiang Zilong's story "Oh, Qingdao"), who compares the feelings of former lovers to opposing electrical currents. It is not likely that this is an example of the tendency to philosophize; after all, this is a standard literary image of the era of technological revolution (although this is still beyond most of today's Chinese writers, on a level to which Chinese literature as a whole has tried to rise only in the last few years).

Wang Meng's tendency to philosophize is such that any object or any event can serve as a pretext for thoughts which do not pertain to the object per se, but to distantly removed things, connected to the former on two levels--the level of external or surface associations and the level of deeper analogies. Miao Keyan's unslaked thirst for what Grin calls the "Unrealizable" is described in the following manner in "Dreams of the Sea": "Gazing at the sky, he sensed an almost imperceptible and inexpressible sadness. He compared the vast and eternal sky to the insignificance and mortality of human life. Another day had passed, it was gone and would never return. At that instant he felt an inner urge to throw off his clothes and plunge into the sea, in spite of the wind and the waves, the cold water, the sharks and jellyfish, in spite of the coming darkness and long night ahead. There, where the sky met the sea, where the clouds were heading and were changing from a fan into a pyramid--he would swim there. It was only there that he would find the real sea, the real sky and real infinity. There he would see the sea he had dreamed of in his youth and overtake the dreams of the sea that had slipped through his fingers for half of his life. Stars, the sun, clouds, strong winds, a sea serpent, sirens, a white whale racing through the waves--all of this was there, everything was there! 'Oh, my impassioned soul, my burning emotions, my active imagination and the sea of my youthful dreams--where are you?' Alas, he did not plunge into the sea. Oh, this damned left calf! These fleeting 52 years, which can never be turned into 25! But was it perhaps better not to swim? A writer from northern Europe once described a fantasy island of unparalleled charm. Young people were drawn to it and made their way to the island when the sea was frozen over, reaching it after a whole day of strenuous cross-country skiing. And what happened? They found nothing there but bare and gloomy rocks. The pain of giving up a dream is described so vividly in this story! And after all, Miao Keyan had passed the age of dreaming! He decided it was time to leave. He had dreamed about this for 50 years, but he could not stand it for even 5 days."

The author's ideas, overgrown by clusters of associations, become complex and acquire multiple meanings. Wang Meng sometimes takes such delight in playing with images that he makes contradictory or inconsistent remarks for their sake (or is he so engrossed in the game that he does not notice them?). In "The Roan," for example, the author repeats his favorite trick of transposing the numbers of the hero's age to underscore a point: "'Oh, you poor little boy!' the mistress of the house exclaimed, as if Cao Qianli was 14 instead of 41." And near the beginning of the story, when Wang Meng moves on from his satirical "brief biography" to the action of the story (and therefore still speaks in a sarcastic tone), he reports: "At that time, on 4 July 1974, Cao Qianli had just turned 43 years, 6 months, 8 days, 5 hours and 42 minutes."

Wang Meng acknowledges his tendency to philosophize and sometimes admires it, although he speaks with touches of self-mockery. In "The Roan," for example, Cao Qianli interrupts himself in the middle of an internal monologue about the decrepit saddle torturing the horse and embarrassing the rider: "Everything is confused, everything has been forgotten, no one cares about anything, everything boils down to power and policy, policy and power, fighting for something, fighting against those who are for something, fighting against those who are against those who are for something, and so forth, and the absolutely, positively main thing: Who can afford to care about anything else now? Who cares

about an old horse and his saddle? Is the saddle worn out? So what? Can this affect power and policy? And if the horse dies, is this any reason to make a fuss? Besides, the roan is not dead, he is alive and healthy!"

This ability to approach the ordinary from an extraordinary and unfamiliar vantage point, to illuminate it with an unexpected light, to extend the chain of associations to major social problems and moral issues and to encircle the plot with philosophical ideas that are not alien to the literary context but fit into it organically, is characteristic of Wang Meng's prose. This prose is new in many respects for China. It is experimental prose which does not abandon tradition but is nevertheless leading Chinese literature to tomorrow's horizons--to a look into the depths of the human soul and all the details of the individual state of mind. In a debate with his opponents (in China these matters still have to be thoroughly supported and defended in arguments), Wang Meng stated: "It seems to me that a look at the outside world (the objective world) can be combined with a look inside the individual (the subjective world). Is it possible that only the dying classes have this kind of internal world? Obviously, this is not true!"³² By carrying out this artistic program, Wang Meng is enriching Chinese literature with new means of expression and a deeper look into the human soul.

FOOTNOTES

1. GUANGMING RIBAO, 24 March 1983.
2. SHEHUEI KEXIUE (Shanghai), 1983, No 1, p 71.
3. GUANGMING RIBAO, 28 September 1980.
4. WENXIUE PINLUN (Beijing), 1982, No 1, p 74.
5. RENMIN RIBAO, 3 September 1980 (report on the scientific conference).
6. The article "What Am I Seeking?" reprinted in the "Beijing Yearbook of Literature and Art. 1981," Beijing 1982, p 241 (in Chinese).
7. Wang Meng, "Selected Prose and Essays," Beijing, 1981, p 7 (in Chinese). There are differences of opinion regarding the time of this novel's publication. A biographical note in the "Anthology of Prize-Winning Works in the All-China Competition for the Best Short Story of 1980" (Shanghai, 1981, p 345) says that the novel was published in 1953. This is apparently an error. The information about the author in "Selected Prose and Essays" says that it was "officially published" in 1978. The author states that the date of publication was 1979--"After my son was already older than I had been at the time" ("Beijing Yearbook of Literature and Art," p 241).
8. "Lyudi i oborotni," Short Stories by Chinese Writers, Translated from the Chinese, Moscow, 1982, p 10.
9. "Beijing Yearbook of Literature and Art," p 243.

10. Various sources cite 1957 as the date the author was sent away for "corrective labor," but the writer himself (GUANGMING RIBAO, 12 September 1982) says that he was expelled from the CCP in 1958.
11. "Beijing Yearbook of Literature and Art," pp 243-244.
12. Ibid., p 244.
13. Ibid., p 245.
14. Ibid., p 247.
15. Ibid., pp 244-245.
16. Ibid., p 247.
17. RENMIN RIBAO, 4 January 1983.
18. This is how the writer's literary style was described by a critic who did not care for it--"Beijing Yearbook of Literature and Art," p 246.
19. RENMIN WENXIUE (Beijing), 1980, No 7, p 54.
20. WENYI BAO (Beijing), 1979, No 11-12, p 49.
21. WENXIUE PINLUN, 1982, No 1, p 74.
22. Ibid., p 79.
23. Ibid.
24. RENMIN RIBAO, 3 September 1980.
25. The Russian translation of this story in the anthology "Lyudi i oborotni" is called "Night in a Big City."
26. GUANGMING RIBAO, 28 September 1980.
27. WENYI BAO, 1980, No 9, pp 49-50.
28. Ibid., p 49.
29. Ibid.
30. WENXIUE PINLUN, 1982, No 1, p 78.
31. SHEHUEI KEXIUE, 1983, No 1, pp 73-74.
32. WENYI BAO, 1980, No 9, p 49.

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U.S. POLICY ON CHINA IN 1949 CRITIQUED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 84 pp 110-120

[Article by A. M. Malukhin, candidate of historical sciences: "Bankruptcy of U.S. Expansionist Policy in China"]

For the USA, one of the participants in the anti-Hitler coalition, the victory of the anti-fascist forces in the Far East during the Second World War had its pluses and minuses. On the one hand, US imperialism rid itself of the pressure of Japanese militarism in Asia and the Pacific and even gained an opportunity to act in its own interests in Japan itself, but, on the other, nearly lost its positions in China, where the end of World War II speeded up the people's revolution, the victory of which made the US "leave" China.

The "loss of China" inflicted considerable damage to US imperialism, that could not be completely compensated for by the alliance with Japan. For the USA, the problem of relations with the PRC is far from only bilateral in nature and it does not come down to merely acquiring the coveted positions in that country. Washington connects its policy throughout East and Southeast Asia with the Chinese problem and, of course, also with its global anti-Soviet and anti-communist strategy.

For more than three decades since the formation of the PRC, the US ruling quarters have been designing models of policy towards China, which is either called a "new policy towards China" or a "new policy in East Asia". Disputes are still under way among US Sinologists and diplomats concerning the "new policy", which takes into account the "errors" and "instructive lessons" of the previous line.

The mounting interest shown in recent years by US historiography in the period of the collapse of the Guomindang regime and the triumph of the people's revolution in China can apparently be explained by the striving of bourgeois Sinologists to stress the merits of their modern concepts of a "new policy" against the broad background of the failure of US aid to the Chiang Kaishek regime. Their interventionist principle consists in encouraging "national communism" and carrying out "flexible", more "rational" forms of confrontation with the people's liberation struggle in developing countries, relying on "national communists", i. e., nationalists. In reality, of course, they have in mind the concepts of suppressing national liberation movements and popular revolutions and of the struggle against genuine communists and people's democrats, who value internationalist solidarity highly and orient themselves on a socialist road.¹

The attempt to evaluate the merits of the US "new policy" in East Asia by comparing its objects with those of the old policy pursued in China dozens of years ago, under totally different socio-historical conditions and in a different international situation, is hardly scientifically substantiated. US policy in China was based on the historical class confrontation between US imperialism, on the one hand, and the liberation

¹ Analytical assessment of the bankruptcy of US policy of aid to the Guomindang regime and of the "loss" of the opportunities for rapprochement between Washington and the CPC leadership, which underly the anti-communist and pro-nationalistic concepts of the US "new policy" in East Asia are cited, for example, in the writings by the bourgeois Sinologists: B. Tuchman, "If Mao Had Come to Washington: an Essay in Alternatives", *Foreign Affairs*, October 1971; S. Topping, *Journey Between Two Chinas*, New York, 1973; M. Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, New York, 1979.

forces of the country and the people's revolution, on the other. During the civil war in China, US imperialism could pursue its expansionist policy only on the side of the reactionary Guomindang and not on that of the Communist Party. The victory of the CPC in the civil war compelled the USA to "retreat from China" and resulted in its "loss of China".

While comparing the US "new policy" with the old one that Washington pursued in China in the latter half of the 1940s, it should also be borne in mind that, at that time as well, US diplomacy also resorted to "flexible" and "rational" methods of elaborating future relations. The US administration tried to adapt its policy to the changes in China, which were decisively determined by the defeat of the Guomindang in the civil war. Owing to the vain efforts to save the Guomindang regime, it discontinued aid to the latter, and the State Department resorted to a policy of "wait-and-see", manoeuvring towards rapprochement with the CPC leadership whom prominent US Sinologists and diplomats were inclined to regard as nationalistic and reformist.

The triumph of the people's revolution in China put an end, however, to the manoeuvring of US diplomacy in 1948-1949. The US's "retreat" from China became inevitable, owing to the lack of prospects for the attempts to find a pivot in a China that was liberating itself. At that time, the "flexible" methods for setting up contacts with the CPC did not bear fruit for US diplomacy. Moreover, US monopoly quarters, observing the interests of US imperialism,² did not deem it possible to agree to a rapprochement with the CPC leaders.

The "loss of China" predetermined the quest for a new policy for the USA, to replace the bankrupt old one. The US diplomatic service first started shaping its "new policy in East Asia" in 1949, and began this ungrateful work by analysing the policy that had been stubbornly pursued by the White House, Congress and the Pentagon for five years, with the aim of rescuing the Guomindang regime and frustrating the victory of the people's revolution.

In fact, the current return of US historians and Sinologists to analysing the lessons of the crushing failure of the policy of rescuing the Guomindang regime is a repetition of the past. True, a retrospective glance may reveal a useful truth for the authors of new concepts: the notorious innovations of US policy in the developing countries have already been applied in China which, nevertheless, was "lost" for the USA.

The detailed documentary chronicle of US-Chinese diplomatic, military, political and economic relations—the so-called *White Paper*³—remains not only a source for studying history, but also an aid in analysing the methods and forms by which the United States pursues its imperialist policy of interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

The *White Paper* issued by the State Department reflects the traditions and character of the rivalry between different groupings inside US ruling quarters, which protect the interests of the monopolies inside the USA and in the international arena. It is full of facts cited to "justify" the futility of the efforts made by the American administration towards rescuing the Chiang Kaishek regime and strengthening US positions in China. It is precisely these facts that are mentioned by bourgeois historians and publicists when they talk of the "instructive lessons" and "lost

² See Yu-ming Shaw, "John Leighton Stuart and US-Chinese Communist Rapprochement in 1949: Was There Another 'Lost Chance in China'?", *The China Quarterly*, March 1982.

³ *United States Relations with China (with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949)*, Department of State Publication, Washington, 1949.

opportunities" of the past and about models for further US policy in the Far East, and also during other speculations on these problems. Yet these facts provide an opportunity for assessing objectively the concrete deeds and intentions of US imperialism.

The idea of publishing the *White Paper*, the work by the State Department on it, and the political passions aroused by it in the USA and beyond it have clearly showed the Washington's policy brought to a deadend and the feverish efforts to find a way out of it.

In early 1949, immediately after Chiang Kaishek went into "retirement" and the People's Liberation Army of China ((PLA) entered Peking, the US press began talking about a new policy in relation to China. A Hong Kong-based paper put out by Chinese emigrants wrote in response to utterances of US political observers: "The USA can and will render assistance to the authorities that come out against communists and the USSR. In China, such aid did not prove efficient, and the US policy is no longer able to ensure the suppression of the Chinese communists by the Chiang Kaishek men; neither can it secure a compromise with them. The most that the USA can do is to promote the unification of China by a third force, to make it a partner in the anti-communist and anti-Soviet bloc in the Far East."⁴

Outwardly the US administration continued its "wait-and-see" policy in China. After the new inauguration in the White House, from January 20 President Truman totally ignored the problem of China in his speeches. This stand caused a sharp reaction by the pro-Chiang Kaishek lobby on Capitol Hill, however. In a letter to Truman, 51 Republican members of the House of Representatives demanded that the President form a commission to investigate Chinese problems immediately and give recommendations to Congress. John Leighton Stuart, US Ambassador to Nanking, a strong proponent of the "wait-and-see" policy, in a bid to reach a time-serving compromise with the Chinese communists advised, in a cable of February 19 that Secretary of State Dean Acheson render "constructive assistance to the Chinese people through reforms in the government, national and provincial"⁵ (In response to the demand made by Congressmen that a campaign be organised "exposing the evils of communism and awakening thinking Chinese to this threat to national independence and individual human rights").

Meanwhile, Chiang Kaishek, who formally occupied no official position, continued to guide the Guomindang centre behind the scene, planning to continue the civil war. The government cabinet, headed by Premier Sun Fo, which moved from frontline Nanking to the city of Canton, actually acted in accordance with his directives. At the same time, acting president Li Zongren and Defence Minister He Yingqin remained in Nanking, where they started peace negotiations with the CPC. The sharp differences between Li Zongren and the Canton clique of Sun Fo resulted in an exacerbation of the chronic government crisis. Early in March, the Sun Fo Cabinet had to resign. Li Zongren appointed He Yingqin a new Prime Minister.

The changes in the Guomindang government were vigorously promoted by US Ambassador L. Stuart, who also stayed in Nanking. The Guomindang papers *Yishi bao*, *Heping ribao* and others reported on frequent contacts between L. Stuart and Zhang Qiumin, Shao Lizi and Zhang Zhizhong, outstanding Guomindangers who dealt directly with the problem of negotiations with communists. On March 10, Stuart asked the State Department to "be authorised to discuss with top communist leaders

⁴ See *Huaqiao ribao*, Feb. 12, 1949.

⁵ *The Forgotten Ambassador: The Reports of John Leighton Stuart, 1946-1949*, Boulder, Colorado, 1981, p. 307.

the points at issue between the United States of America and the Chinese Communist Party in the hope that this would help toward a better mutual understanding".⁶

Republicans in Congress, who were in opposition to the US Administration, tabled on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a bill to render help to nationalist China to the tune of \$1,450 million. On March 15, in a secret letter to Tom Connally, the Chairman of that Committee, who was ready to approve the bill, Secretary of State Acheson came out categorically against the aid as unwarranted by present circumstances in China. In his letter, Acheson wrote in conclusion that, in any case, the Guomindang government would no longer be able to oppose the decisive offensive made by the communists in South China, and the immense credits to that government would be a catastrophe.⁷

Most of all, however, Acheson was alarmed by the mounting criticism in Congress of the negative attitude taken by the Truman Administration to the problem of rendering further large-scale aid to the Guomindang. Some Republicans stated that the State Department decision played into the hands of the Chinese communists and voiced personal accusations against Acheson, even demanding a personal investigation. It was precisely in connection with all these developments that the State Department decided to put out the *White Paper* and form a special group for that purpose, consisting of State Department staff members, headed by F. Jassep, a Roving Ambassador.

Since in Canton, the Guomindangers were being increasingly investigated concerning the US aid, in his instructions to the Canton branch of the US Embassy in China Acheson stressed "the need for the Chinese to demonstrate the possibility of effective resistance to communist expansion before expecting the US to make further investments in National China".⁸

The pro-American press published in China in English came out increasingly in favour of a positive attitude towards "Red China", which "had no reason to quarrel with the USA". For example, an article by Edgar Snow, a well-known bourgeois historian and biographer of Mao Zedong, under the title "Will China Become a Russian Satellite?" is a case in point. The article was published by the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, *China Weekly Review* and other publications on the eve of a new southward offensive staged by the People's Liberation Army of China. E. Snow wrote: "Chinese Red successes did not endanger our security. As a market, China need not be missed in the American economy." Snow demanded that US ruling quarters use "all the necessary preconditions" to obtain in Asia "the first communist-run major power" opposing the Soviet Union.⁹

By mid-April, the armistice situation on the Yangtze River had become greatly aggravated. The Guomindang side refused to accept the eight peace clauses set forth by the CPC leadership, regarding them as a demand for an unconditional surrender. Thus, peace negotiations entered a final impasse. In connection with the PLA ultimatum, on April 15 Li Zongren addressed the US Administration through Stuart with a request that a statement be made warning the CPC "that a Communist crossing of the Yangtze would be considered a threat to the security of the US".¹⁰

When the negotiations between the Guomindang and the CPC were frustrated, Acheson sent to press the above-cited letter written to Tom Connally on March 15, which contained his opposition against aid to

⁶ *The Forgotten Ambassador...*, p. 309.

⁷ *United States Relations With China*, pp. 1053-1054.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 301.

⁹ *China Weekly Review*, March 9, 1949.

¹⁰ *United States Relations with China*, p. 303.

Guomindang. Republican Senators Styles Bridges, W. Knowland, W. Morse, P. McCarran and others staged a sharp protest in Congress. Harold E. Stassen, the former candidate for presidency, proposed to confirm the MacArthur Plan which provided for allocating \$1 billion to South China.¹¹ The fierce infighting of American politicians on the Chinese issue continued after April 20, i. e., after the crossing of the Yangtze by the PLA. The Scripps Howard agency called the State Department China policy a "dismal failure".¹² President Truman was forced to explain to the infuriated senators in the White House what "they had not known before".¹³

The White House did not answer to Li Zongren's request to issue a warning to the CPC as regards the crossing of the Yangtze, and in a cable to L. Stuart of April 21 the State Department noted that the request was "overtaken by events".¹⁴

Sharp differences inside US quarters on the Chinese issue at that critical moment were based on the two following premises: a) the PLA offensive southwards will be speeded and efficient; b) the armed struggle will be a protracted one. In the editorial concerning D. Acheson's letter to T. Connally the *New York Times* predicted: "It is extremely unlikely that the communists will be able to organise a government for the whole of China. There will be fragmentary and pocket opposition."¹⁵ The Guomindang lobbyists in Congress were inspired by Chiang Kaishek's statement about his confidence in ultimate victory, though the war might last for three years.

On May 27, the PLA captured Shanghai, the centre of US activities in China. This, however, far from cooling the bellicose Republicans in Washington's ruling quarters, made them even more militant. In June, in a letter to Truman a group of senators declared that they were resolutely "opposing any recognition of the communist regime in China" and that "the issue of communist recognition is under study" by the government.¹⁶

On June 23, Acheson reported to pressmen that a *White Paper* was being prepared to shed light on the state of affairs over the China issue. State Department staff members explained to journalists that the book would show how Chiang Kaishek was constantly ignoring US advice on civil war matters.¹⁷

In its reports on the China issue, the US press increasingly threw off the mask of pseudo-objectivity, reflecting its adherence to particular concepts. The *New York Herald Tribune*, a government mouthpiece, demanded that the Secretary of State publish the *White Paper* as soon as possible. The editorial of the paper read, in part: "Neither Mr. Acheson's apparent fear that the *White Paper* would embarrass the Nationalists in China nor his apparent concern over the effects it would have on the defence of South China, is a good reason for keeping secret this documentary record of events leading up to a decision to end large-scale aid to the Chinese government. The public and the public's representatives in the Congress are entitled to know precisely what American officials have been doing in China, the facts on which the State Department's policies have been based and why results have not been better."¹⁸

¹¹ *South China Morning Post*, April 19, 1949; *North China Daily News*, April 20, 1949.

¹² *China Daily News*, April 25, 1949.

¹³ *China Mail*, May 1, 1949.

¹⁴ *United States Relations with China*, p. 307.

¹⁵ *New York Times*, April 16, 1949.

¹⁶ *South China Morning Post*, June 26, 1949.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, June 25, 1949.

¹⁸ *New York Herald Tribune*, June 25, 1949.

Meanwhile, the US Embassy continued functioning in liberated Nanking. Leighton Stuart did not follow Li Zongren and He Yingqin, who left Canton on the eve of the PLA's entry into the capital, which was left by the Guomindang rearguard. The US Ambassador was tolerant towards the 12 PLA soldiers, who came to his bedroom early in the morning of April 25 to make a search. Fu Jingbo, Stuart's secretary, soon established contacts with Huang Hua, the chief of the Foreign Relations Department at the Nanking Military Control Committee, who explained to him that the appearance of armed soldiers in the ambassador's residence was unauthorised. Stuart's secretary was indirectly informed that Zhou Enlai wrote a letter stating that he was distressed by the incident.¹⁹

In May and June, Stuart, on a personal basis, met with the chief of the Foreign Relations Department in Nanking. In his reports to the Secretary of State of May 14, and then of June 8 and 30, he described long conversations about the terms on which the new power in China might be recognised and on other matters. On June 13, Stuart passed to the State Department a draft agreement between the USA and Peking, consisting of eight points and related mainly to the establishment of relations de facto. Through Jingbo, Stuart put out feelers concerning a trip to Peking, where he had once been rector of Yanjing University. First, however, he was permitted to go to Shanghai, to meet American businessmen and missionaries. From June 12 to 16, he met there not only with them, but also with Chinese graduates of the Yanjing University, including Luo Longji, Vice-President of the Democratic League.²⁰

On June 28, the Foreign Relations Department informed Stuart that the CPC leaders would welcome him to Peking if he would like to pay a visit to Yanjing University. The Department expressed its readiness to contribute in every possible way to the early accomplishment of his trip. Asking for instructions from the State Department, Stuart assessed the report of the Nanking branch of the Foreign Relations Department as an invitation to Peking on the pretext of visiting the University. "Such a trip," he wrote to the Secretary of State, "would be a step toward better mutual understanding and should strengthen the more liberal anti-Soviet element in the CPC".²¹

A few days later, however, Stuart was forced to inform the State Secretary of the need to take account of the foreign political orientation of the CPC.

The closed Second Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee, held in early March 1949 in North China, played an important part in determining the foreign policy platform of the Chinese communists. The Plenary Meeting put forward the task of turning China into a socialist country and approved its alliance with the USSR.²² The decisions of the March 1949 Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee were immediately published in the press.²³ The line of the CPC towards cohesion of future People's China with the Soviet Union was later expressed in an article by Mao Zedong "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" published on June 30, 1949, the eve of the 28th anniversary of the formation of the CPC. The article clearly stated the prospects for the development of China after the victory of the revolution: "It is possible to adhere either to imperialism or to socialism not only in China but throughout the world. Neutrality is a camouflage, and there is no third way... Internationally, we belong to the anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union, and we should hope for truly friendly assistance from that front, rather than

¹⁹ *The Forgotten Ambassador...*, p. 322.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 325-329, 331-332.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 333-334.

²² See *China's Contemporary History*, Moscow, 1972, pp. 237-238 (in Russian).

²³ See *Renmin ribao*, March 25, 1949.

from the imperialist front.”²⁴ In a ciphered report to the US Secretary of State on July 6, Leighton Stuart cited Mao Zedong’s article in detail and stressed that “solidarity with the USSR [was] expressed in many important CPC pronouncements since the release last November of Liu Shaoqi’s article ‘On Nationalism and Internationalism’”.²⁵

On July 1, in response to his request to visit Peking, Stuart received instructions from Washington to make this visit dependent on a preliminary trip to Mukdeng, with the purpose of releasing staff members of the US General Consulate who had been arrested as spies and taking A. Ward, General Consul on his plane. This directive was confirmed by the US Administration, which concluded that a trip by Ambassador Stuart to Peking would cause an unfavourable reaction inside the USA.²⁶ Thus, Stuart’s trip to Peking never took place.

Having given up his intention to meet the leaders of the CPC, Stuart undertook the last attempt independently to set up contacts through a middleman, Chen Mingshu, one of the leaders of the Guomindang Revolutionary Committee in Shanghai, who took part in the preparations for convening the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in Peking. Chen Mingshu agreed to play this role and, on July 9 and 10, handed Stuart a memorandum written on the basis of conversations with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, with two political letters for Stuart enclosed, one of them written personally by Zhou Enlai.²⁷

The letters contained compliments to Stuart and stressed that he could come to Peking as a “private person”. Concerning the possibility of establishing contacts between Peking and Washington, however, the letters included references to Mao Zedong’s speech of June 15 at the sitting of the Preparatory Committee of the People’s Political Consultative Conference, in which he mentioned the general terms for establishing diplomatic relations with any state, including a discontinuation of relations with the Guomindangers. In his letter, Zhou Enlai criticised US imperialist positions as regards China. Negative assessments concerning the fast establishment of relations between the USA and Peking also prevailed in the Chen Mingshu memorandum, though a hope for a better future was expressed.²⁸

Having studied the documents from Peking and recent speeches by Mao Zedong, Stuart regarded the stand taken by the Chinese leaders as a dual one—“ideologically orthodox and diplomatically flexible”. He was unable, however, to accept this and, in his report to the State Department, called it discouraging, leaving no hope that US efforts could bring about the establishment of political and economic relations between China and the West.²⁹

In pursuance of Washington directives, Ambassador Stuart asked for exit visas from China for himself and Embassy staff members. Though the press reported that the *White Paper* was ready for publication, the State Department continued working on it.³⁰ The thing was that, in the initial version of the book, all the errors made in the former Truman-Marshall policy vis-à-vis China were referred only to Chiang Kaishek, who was also blamed for the ineffectiveness of the US aid to the Guomindang government. Thus, it was planned to support Stuart’s efforts in

²⁴ Mao Zedong, “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship”, Shanghai, *New Life*, 1949, pp. 15-22 (in Chinese).

²⁵ *The Forgotten Ambassador...*, p. 335-336.

²⁶ See Yu-ming Shaw, “John Leighton Stuart...”, *China Quarterly*, March 1982, p. 82.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 84-86.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

³⁰ See *Hong Kong Standard*, July 1, 1949.

establishing future ties with Peking by publishing the *White Paper*, if there were any signs of success.

After Stuart stopped his manoeuvring in Nanking, some changes had to be inserted in the *White Paper* towards developing a negative stand as regards the CPC and Peking. The emerging strategy of "containment of communism in Asia" was mirrored in the final variant of the book to please the Republicans, who criticised the State Department policy. Finally, on July 27, Acheson stated that the *White Paper* was ready and its publication delayed only for security considerations. He also declared that the Jassep group had started elaborating a new China policy and would do that in close contact with the Foreign Relations Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives.³¹

The security considerations were linked with a delay in closing down the US Embassy in Nanking because the Chinese authorities demanded the implementation of a number of procedures for foreigners leaving China. Besides, Stuart asked the State Department to cancel its directive concerning the flight from Nanking to Washington via Canton. In a cable to Acheson, Stuart wrote: "While I concur in Dept's decision that I not travel to Peiping with hat in hand to call on Chairman Mao, by same token I feel it unwise to change my course and pay visit to Chairman Chiang."³²

On August 2, Leighton Stuart flew from Nanking to Washington via Okinawa by his personal C-47 plane. The Hong Kong papers reported that, by that time, Chiang Kaishek had flown from Canton to Tokyo and Seoul, stopping in Okinawa to meet Stuart and inform him of the situation in China and his plan for setting up an anti-communist Pacific alliance.³³ Some time earlier Chiang Kaishek had spent several days in Canton, after having arrived from Taipei as governor of Taiwan.

On August 4, President Truman declared at a press-conference that the *White Paper* would be released the next day. "It is only in this way," he stated, "that the people of our country and their representatives in Congress can have the understanding necessary to the sound evolution of our foreign policy in the Far East."³⁴

In contrast to US diplomatic manoeuvring, Soviet diplomacy invariably adhered to a policy of non-interference in China's internal affairs. That was fairly evaluated even in the Hong Kong bourgeois press: "The Russians have behaved with diplomatic correctness in conducting their relations with the present Chinese government. When the shaky regime changed its headquarters from Nanking to Canton before the onrush of Mao Zedong's Red armies, General Roshchin was the only big-Power ambassador to move along with it."³⁵

The functioning of the Soviet Embassy, which arrived in Canton early in February 1949, was not marked by diplomatic activities. On May 31, Ambassador N. V. Roshchin left for Moscow via Paris. Soviet Acting Charges d'Affaires in China V. V. Vaskov maintained permanent contacts with Ye Guongchao, Acting Foreign Minister of the Central Government headed by Premier Yan Xishan.

After the People's Republic of China was proclaimed in Peking, the Soviet government recognised it immediately and broke off diplomatic relations with the Yan Xishan government. Soviet diplomats moved from Canton to Peking early in October. They were joined by a small group of Embassy staff members, headed by Counsellor Shibayev, who had stayed in Nanking as part of the diplomatic corps. Under the influence of US

³¹ See *Hong Kong Standard*, Aug. 29, 1949.

³² *The Forgotten Ambassador...*, p. 342.

³³ See *South China Morning Post*, Aug. 5, 1949.

³⁴ *Daily News Bulletin, United States Information Service (Canton)*, Aug. 5, 1949.

³⁵ *South China Morning Post*, June 6, 1949.

and British diplomats, the embassies of capitalist countries remained in Nanking.

The Soviet Union was the first state to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, and N. V. Roshchin was the first Ambassador of a foreign state in Peking.

For the US Administration, it proved impossible to establish relations with the PRC after the failure of the policy of gross interference in the internal affairs of China on the side of the Chiang Kaishek counterrevolution. After L. Stuart left Nanking for Washington and the US Embassy located on the liberated territory of China was actually closed down, the remaining staff members first moved to the Guomindang Canton, then, together with the Guomindang government, to Chungchih and, further on, to Hong Kong. In mid-December, the US State Department received a note from the Guomindangers that their capital was in Taipei and it was declared that the US Embassy in China would move to Taipei.³⁶ Such was the infamous Odyssey of US diplomacy in the year of the triumph of the People's Revolution in China.

Some US historians, particularly publicists, continue to support the myth that, in 1949, US diplomats failed to make use of an opportunity to develop good relations with Peking and preserve influential positions in China. For example, in connection with President Nixon's visit to the PRC in 1972, Assistant Editor-in-Chief of *New York Times* S. Topping recalled the lost chance, casting a retrospective glance at the year 1949 when he was an Associated Press reporter in Nanking. His reminiscences were developed by B. Tuchman, a journalist.³⁷ The subject of the "belated connection with China" was also covered in other papers.³⁸ The motives behind the belated lamentations can be seen in the recently published collection of Ambassador Stuart's reports to the State Department.³⁹

In reality, there was no opportunity whatsoever for a US-Chinese rapprochement in those times, and the more shrewd American historians are compelled to admit it.

In his letter to Truman, published in the *White Paper* as a preface, Dean Acheson was forced to admit: "The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed the result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not. A decision was arrived at within China."⁴⁰

Immediately after its release, the *White Paper* was subjected to sharp criticism by the US and Chinese press.

In connection with the reproaches made to the US Administration that the State Department had wrongly assessed the situation in China,⁴¹ at a press-conference on August 11 Truman hurried to state that US policy remained unchanged and that it had never been favourable to Chinese communists. The next day, Truman's words were in all American and Guomindang papers.

Anticipating fresh criticism from Republicans in Congress, Acheson tried to add an anti-Soviet hue to his letter. At the very last moment, he

³⁶ See *China Daily News*, Dec. 19, 1949.

³⁷ See *New York Times*, May 30, 1972.

³⁸ See *Washington Post*, July 22, 1972.

³⁹ *The Forgotten Ambassador...*, "The End of the Embassy", p. 6.

⁴⁰ *United States Relations with China*, p. XVI.

⁴¹ See *New York Times*, Aug. 7, 1949.

included in the letter slanderous statements to the effect that the Soviet Union "has been most assiduous in its efforts to extend its control in the Far East", that the USA had supposedly assisted the Chinese in "throwing off the foreign yoke", and that the Chinese people should realise that "the communist regime serves not their interests but those of Soviet Russia".⁴²

Nevertheless, Republicans in Congress accused the authors of the *White Paper* of dishonesty and not including many important documents in the book. Senator Walter Judd mentioned 16 documents, some of which bear on the policy of internationalist solidarity of the Soviet Union with the Chinese revolution and the CPC. The so-called American China Policy Association pointed to 39 documents and sets of documents that had been "accidentally omitted" in the *White Paper*, such as the secret agreements signed between the USA and China in Cairo on deliveries of military hardware for 90 divisions of the Guomindang government, recommendations by H. Wallace to the US President, Stilwell's accusations against Chiang Kaishek, and the conversation between Stalin and H. Hopkins in May 1945. It was also pointed out that the *White Paper* failed to reveal the US stand as regards the Soviet-Chinese relations, that it made no mention of analytical documents of the State Department on Chinese communists and so on, and so forth.⁴³

The Peking press sharply condemned the "provocative acts of American diplomacy", calling the *White Paper* a document of US self-exposure and testimony to its defeat, impotence and confusion. On August 12, the Xinhua News Agency condemned the policy of the US aggressors, spear-headed "against the friendship of the Chinese people with their Soviet brothers" and the US urge to "split the anti-imperialist anti-aggressive alliance in the Far East", and warned that the "US Administration would bring harm to China in the country and outside it, create obstacles and bring disorder in the East and in the West". In its statement of August 13, the Xinhua News Agency reiterated that "the USA opposes China's independence, opposes any regime that does not serve the interests of American monopolists, and opposes any state that is willing to help China".

All papers in the liberated areas reprinted the editorial entitled "Farewell, Leighton Stuart". It read in part: "The USA did not bring large numbers of troops to launch an offensive against China, not because US Administration did not want this, but because it had its own fears," in particular it "feared that the peoples of the Soviet Union, Europe and the whole world would oppose it, and it would run the risk of arousing universal condemnation." The article ended with the following words: "Leighton Stuart left, the *White Paper* appeared. Very good! Very good! These two things are a genuine congratulation."⁴⁴

Later on it became known that the article had been written by Mao Zedong.

Hong Kong papers that sympathised with the forces of people's democracy resolutely exposed US actions. They stressed that the US was continuing its expansion, usurping "on the pretext of fighting Soviet aggression" the role of "defender of the fundamental rights of the Chinese people" and "security in the Far East".⁴⁵ Such pronouncements, made over 30 years ago, echo the disclosure and condemnation of the policy and practice of the US aggressors today.

⁴² *United States Relations with China...*, pp. XVI, XVII.

⁴³ See "Annotations of Documents and Sets of Documents" in *Hong Kong Standard*, Sept. 19, 1949.

⁴⁴ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 18, 1949.

⁴⁵ *Huashang bao*, Aug. 7, 1949.

As usual, the Guomindang leaders had no concerted diplomatic stand, and they were guided by the interests of their own clans. Gan Chehou, personal representative of Li Junggeng, who was in the USA, made a speech on August 23 in Washington in which he accused the State Department and the compilers of the *White Paper* of lying.⁴⁶ Chiang Kaishek and his entourage preferred to keep silent.

Speaking on August 24, Acheson defended the *White Paper* not from positions of self-justification but even agreeing with the Senators who criticised it and insisted that the *White Paper* could not be regarded as an "exhaustive historic document". The Secretary of State said that the main value of the *Paper* was its importance for the "bi-partisan approach to a new US policy for Asia". As regards the Chinese communist movement, this meant the "containment policy".⁴⁷

The fundamental trends in the new US policy in Asia were marked by open expansionism and reflected Washington's intention to oust its imperialist rivals, European colonialists, from the region. Two representatives of monopoly capital were included in the group of Roving Ambassador Jassep, who was busy elaborating this policy. Late in 1949, a commission of representatives of the Bankers' Trust, Rockefeller Corporation, the Morgan International General Electric Company and others inspected the activities of the State Department and the Jassep group in shaping US policy in Asia. Early in February 1950, E. Jassep and W. Butterworth, Assistant Secretary of State on Far Eastern Affairs, held in Bangkok a conference of US diplomats from Asian states on the "preservation of South Asia outside the communist control" by arming and financing reactionary regimes and simultaneously establishing US domination in the region.⁴⁸

The ousting of the French colonialists from Indochina and the aid granted to Bao Dai and other puppets were among the fruits of the "new policy" pursued by US imperialism in the 1950s. The gendarme "containment" of the national liberation struggle waged by the peoples of Indochina, which was turned into the dirty aggressive war in Vietnam in the 1960s, ended in a disgraceful defeat for the US aggressors. Discouraged by their rout, this time in Southeast Asia, the aggressors started the quest for safer, more "flexible" and "rational" methods for interfering in the internal affairs of countries enveloped in the revolutionary and liberation struggle.

Today, however, the Reagan Administration does not confine itself to banking on nationalist reactionaries in different countries and regions; it also resorts to the former policeman's techniques in suppressing revolutionary movements and progressive regimes. The syndrome of armed adventurism has increasingly made itself felt in US foreign policy. By their military interference in the Middle East and Central America, the inciting of an attack by the South African regime against Angola and Mozambique, US imperialists outdid the efforts, made in the past by the Truman Administration to reverse the course of history in China.

Any "new policy" of US interference in the struggle waged by the peoples of the developing countries inevitably takes the grossest forms of participation in the efforts by the forces of extreme reactionaries who are eventually defeated, as happened in China and in Vietnam.

⁴⁶ See *South China Morning Post*, Aug. 25, 1949.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Aug. 26, 1949.

⁴⁸ See *New Times*, March 22, 1950.

CHINESE PRESS CITED ON 1983 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 84 pp 121-127

[Article by V. P. Fetov and V. Ya. Matyayev: "The Development of the PRC National Economy (The Chinese Press on Some Developments in 1983)"]

The year of 1983 was the third year in China's sixth five-year plan period (1981-1985). It was not until late 1982 that the five-year plan was adopted. The Main Statistical Board of the PRC estimated that the 1985 targets in 35 types of industrial products were met two years ahead of schedule. Compared with 1982, the value of the gross industrial production grew by 10.2 per cent and reached 614,700 million yuan (605,000 million yuan was the target figure for 1985). Light industry expanded by 8.4 per cent and heavy industry by 12.1 per cent; freight and passenger transportation by rail increased respectively by 4.5 and 6.3 per cent.

According to the Main Statistical Board, eleven months of 1983 saw gross profit on sales and tax revenues go up by 6.5 per cent, as compared with the corresponding period in 1982. During the period total losses at unprofitable enterprises shrunk by 30.6 per cent, while labour productivity grew by 7.7 per cent.

It was also reported that, compared with 1982, the 1983 figure for the output of coal grew by 5.1 per cent, of steel by 7.6 per cent, of oil by 3.8 per cent and of electric power by 6.2 per cent. The grain yield amounted to 380 million tons as against 353.4 million tons in the good year of 1982, and there was also a bigger harvest of cotton fibre (4.32 million tons). The output of tea, sugar, meat and some other foodstuffs stood approximately at the 1982 level.

The Chinese press reports a marked improvement of supplies to the population, first and foremost the peasants. Retail trade expanded in 1983 by more than 10.5 per cent (by 130 per cent in the private sector), as compared with 1982. Consumption of certain types of industrial and agricultural products in per capita terms also slightly grew, though on the whole it remains at a comparatively low level. It is planned to cancel rationing cotton fabrics and some other goods in 1984.

The economic development results of 1983 were officially estimated highly in China. It was pointed out, among other things, that from 1981 to 1983 industrial production growth rates amounted to 7.3 per cent instead of the planned 4-5 per cent and that the five-year plan was in the main fulfilled practically in two years. These estimates are, however, contradicted by numerous reports by the Chinese press to the effect that high gross output figures were attained to the detriment of the "re-adjustment" policy and the drive for quality and efficiency. "Economic efficiency should be manifest in certain rates, but rates and efficiency not always keep pace with each other," the *Fudan xuebao* journal writes with alarm, "high rates can be achieved at great costs and with a considerable squandering of resources. After 1949," the journal goes on to say, "even

with fairly high rates, economic efficiency, save for the first eight years [after the establishment of the PRC.—*Auth.*] has for long remained low." The period from 1979 to 1982 saw no turn for the better, the journal claims, and even though "a lot of decisions have been made to attach most serious attention to raising the quality of management, senior officials ignore these decisions..."¹ The Chinese press reports that at "a host of enterprises" production costs continue to grow, the cost price of products is rising, labour productivity falling, and many enterprises start bringing little profit.

Should we draw generalisations from the corresponding pronouncements in the press, the conclusion would be that the 1983 increment was attained by striving after gross output both at individual enterprises and on the scale of entire economic regions, accorded certain independence as a result of economic reforms. The reforms started in China in 1980, essentially boil down to spreading the system of individual farms in the countryside, experimental broadening of the rights of state-run enterprises, encouraging the development of "collective and individual" private enterprises, expanding turnover channels, cutting intermediary links (in particular, introducing "open supply" of the majority of 256 types of centrally distributed resources), transforming the system of price-formation, taxation, the financial and crediting system (including sample experiments with "floating prices"), transferring a portion of capital construction and technical modernisation to bank crediting, enhancing the role of provinces in the financial system and so on. The policy of attracting foreign capital has gained wider application, with foreign trade and foreign economic functions being dispersed.

These transformations to a certain extent livened up the economy by first and foremost boosting agricultural production and expanding exchange between the town and the countryside. At the same time, according to Chinese press reports, the task of raising economic efficiency has not been accomplished. The reforms also had rather grave negative consequences, such as the decentralisation "of no precedence in the history of the PRC", the falling importance of planning, weaker control and even loss of it by central bodies over capital construction, the utilisation of the financial and material resources, their squandering and, last but not least, the revival of private property tendencies.²

Another serious problem is the condition of the state budget, in which income is lowering despite internal and external loans, considerable deductions from local banks to cover budget deficit as well as cutting certain expenditures. It is recognized that but for these measures budget deficit would have been even bigger.³ Between 1979 and 1982 the aggregate social product grew by 33.6 per cent and national income by 23.7 per cent, while budgetary revenues dropped by 3.3 per cent and their share in the national income reduced from 31.9 to 24.5 per cent, as non-budgetary funds swelled by 87.3 per cent. During that period the own funds of enterprises increased by 34.94 billion yuan (as compared with 38.8 billion yuan during the previous 30 years.)⁴ "The present-day considerable dispersal of the national income as it is distributed negatively affects already in many respects the healthy growth of the economy and does not contribute to the creation of conditions for its subsequent development."⁵

¹ *Fudan xuebao*, No. 1, 1984, p. 34.

² See *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 22, 1983.

³ See *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 13, 1983.

⁴ See *Hongqi*, No. 12, 1983, pp. 24-25; *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 13, 1983.

⁵ *Hongqi*, No. 12, 1983, p. 25.

Capital construction remained the Achilles' heel of Chinese economy. It "went beyond plan targets" because of capital investments made by the local authorities, departments and enterprises on their own. Disregarding state interests, the Chinese press points out, the local authorities were building on a mass scale technically backward small and medium-sized enterprises duplicating one another, such as tobacco, knitwear, clothes and textile factories. At the same time, investments in power engineering and transport that were called for by plan grew insignificantly, as a result of which the situation in transport, power and raw materials supply, tense as it was, grew even worse.⁶

The annual performance should be evaluated in view of all this.

A marked production growth in 1983 was explained by a number of factors. In certain key industries, for instance, it was stimulated by enhanced attention to the modernisation of enterprises and the large-scale development of capital construction; but it was in that field that the state of affairs was far from commendable. A number of engineering branches are just replacing the losses suffered after the initiation of the "readjustment" course in 1979. "The leap in the automobile industry is just the return to the 1980 level, when 222,000 motor vehicles were produced," *Jingji ribao* points out. The production of tractors dropped by more than 40 per cent from 1980 to 1982; now it is being restored but through the output of low-capacity manual tractors, which can be afforded by peasant households. The development of electronics was promoted by purposeful imports of technology and equipment from other countries and the attraction of foreign capital into that industry. On the other hand, the impressive figures of the growth of production of a number of consumer goods reflect a tendency for the uncontrollable production of goods without plan in localities, most often without any regard for market needs.

"At the same time it cannot be overlooked," the same paper continues, "that a number of major industries, such as power engineering, non-ferrous metallurgy, and the light and chemical industries, have not met their plan targets and that quality indicators, with the exception of individual products, are not improving. The rising production costs, large production expenses and inordinate material and energy per-unit ratios constitute serious problems. Almost one-fourth of government-owned industrial enterprises still operate at a loss."⁷

Prices, particularly for consumer goods and food, keep growing in China. According to official figures, in 1983 vegetable prices rose by 8.1 per cent, sea-food prices by 11.6 per cent, fruit prices by 13.9 per cent and prices for clothes and cotton wares by 18.6 per cent.

Chinese economic growth still has a character of "recovery", an emergence from the crisis, from the almost catastrophic situation, as the Chinese press admits. Imbalances inherited from the past still make it impossible to develop the economy in the optimal way. About 20 per cent of production capacities stand idle because of fuel and energy shortages, which means that the country fails to get more than 100 billion yuan worth of output a year.⁸

The economic reform intended to enhance "effectiveness" through the use of the levers of "economic independence" of enterprises has actually come into conflict with the policy of "readjustment," envisioning first and foremost the evening out of imbalances through the strict regulation of industrial production as a whole.

⁶ See *Hongqi*, No. 12, 1983, p. 25; *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 22 and 5, 1983.

⁷ See, for example, *Jingji ribao*, Oct. 11, 1983.

⁸ See *Liaowang*, 1983, No. 8, p. 6.

Beginning with the second half of 1983 the Chinese leaders had to take a number of measures to consolidate the priority of centralised planning and to carry out the reform on a countrywide basis gradually and with greater caution. Special resolutions provide for stricter financial control over industrial plants and whole industries and over capital investments in construction. Conferences were convened by the CPC Central Committee in August and October 1983 to demand the concentration of resources at the construction of key projects and control over investments in fixed assets. The local authorities and industrial managers were instructed to cut by half the losses of enterprises in 1984. The funds allocated for the projects of the fuel and energy complex and for transport and communications development grew in 1984 to 38.1 per cent of the total volume of capital investments as compared with 29.4 per cent in 1983. As many as 18.7 per cent of the total capital investment will go into 70 key projects of the five-year period. Mandatory deductions to the fund of the construction of key projects of the power industry and transport were increased by decision of the State Council. Energetic propaganda campaigns are being carried out to encourage the fulfilment of these decisions.⁹

At the same time efforts were stepped up to reinforce industry in every way, in particular, to set up different production and industrial amalgamations and integrated works so as to put an end to the irrational expenditure of raw materials and power as well as equipment and labour. The press abandoned its recent practice and no longer calls for "the unfettering of local initiative," which manifested itself in the anarchic establishment and construction of small-scale economic units.

By and large, by the end of 1983 the situation of the late 1982 had been roughly restored, with "further serious readjustment" having been declared the basis of economic policy that was to be promoted by experimental reforms. A national economic conference which took place in February 1984 reaffirmed that line. The plan targets set for 1984 included a 5 per cent growth of industrial output, a 4 per cent rise in farm output and a 8.8 per cent increase in budgetary revenue.¹⁰ The introduction of comprehensive reforms was postponed, once again, for the next, seventh five-year period.

Chinese agriculture continued to hew its policy of the maximum use of the labour of the country's 800-million-strong peasantry through the introduction of individual farming on socialised land or, to be more precise, farming by family or farmstead contract, which applied to 93 per cent of households. This policy led to an increase in agricultural output and a certain improvement in the commodity performance of agriculture, which nevertheless is still very low; the earnings of a part of the peasantry increased. The present-day agrarian policy is viewed as particularly suitable for a longer term.

Certain reforms continue in the countryside, the most important of them being the elimination of people's communes as the grassroots administrative bodies. It was decided to complete by the end of 1984 in the main the establishment of regional governments, separating the powers of the bodies of government from the communes, whereas the latter can remain or be replaced by other agricultural organisations. It was admitted that "the communes have not justified themselves and put a brake

⁹ See *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 23 and Oct. 26, 1983; *Jingji ribao*, Sept. 28 and 29, 1983; Oct. 7, 24 and 26, 1983.

¹⁰ See *Wenzhai bao*, Feb. 17, 1984. The National Economic Development Plan for 1984 was approved by a session of the National People's Congress only in May 1984.

on the manifestation of the activity of the broad mass of cadre workers and peasants."¹¹

The situation taking shape in the Chinese countryside, however, is giving rise to quite a few serious social and economic problems. To begin with, it is necessary to dovetail the new system of economic management with planning, with state interests. There has emerged a distinct group of "specialised households", the number of which is growing; they concern themselves with a certain type of activity—usually non-farming—and most often are perfectly autonomous and outside of plan. By the end of the year there were 24.82 million such households out of the total of 182 million, or 13 per cent.¹² There have appeared households which "have refused a land contract" and actually engage in private enterprise, as the Chinese press points out. There are roughly 10 per cent such households of the total number of households categorized on family contracts.¹³ "Land subcontracts" have become an alarming tendency and land is more often unlawfully resold or leased out for profit.¹⁴ In this way the differentiation of rural Chinese households according to their property status keeps growing, actually leading to the social stratification of the peasantry.

The Chinese press admits that today's agrarian policy is viewed everywhere as a "movement backward," a "retreat."¹⁵ Small wonder that high on the agenda is the question of overcoming "wrong views" and "incorrect attitude to" well-to-do households, which actually is an admission of a hostile attitude to them on the part of the bulk of the peasantry. This question was "one of the most important" at a conference on work in the countryside that took place in late 1983.¹⁶ The conference approved special document envisioning the extension of land contracts from 1-3 to 15 years with the fixing of annual government targets for peasants on the basis of the average production results during the previous three years.

The difficult task of the technical reconstruction of agriculture causes concern in the country. "Its further comprehensive growth will depend to an ever greater extent on the support of industry. It is difficult to try to sustain the prolonged and constant growth of agriculture separately from the growth of industry and the continuous enlargement of its assistance." As before, hopes are pinned on the maximum mobilization of the inner resources of agriculture itself.

At the same time, along with appeals for not revising the guidelines of agrarian policy "for a long time" there are warnings that "the family form of farming" cannot provide a foundation for the universal transition to really modern intensive agricultural production on the basis of industrial development, the growth of the productive forces and genuinely scientific zoning and specialization.¹⁷

The measures taken by the Chinese leadership last year are just another step in the incessant revision of economic policy, which was not at all fortuitous. That revision is interpreted merely as "an alteration of certain concrete methods" or "improvement in the course of practice" of the immutable "basic course of reforms and economic revival,"¹⁸ presumably carried out consistently and purposefully on the basis of clear

¹¹ See *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 7, 1983; by October 1983 as many as 9,028 people's communes in 902 counties had been restructured into 2,786 regional people's governments (Banyue tan) 1983, No. 21, p. 12).

¹² *China Daily*, Dec. 14, 1983; *Beijing Review*, March 5, 1984, p. 4.

¹³ See *Jingji yanjiu*, 1983, No. 12, p. 43.

¹⁴ See *Liaowang*, 1983, No. 8, pp. 3, 43.

¹⁵ See *Jingji yanjiu*, 1983, No. 11, p. 57.

¹⁶ See *Wanyue tan*, 1983, No. 24, p. 5.

¹⁷ See *Kuoyeshu yanjiu*, 1984, No. 1, p. 60.

¹⁸ See *Liaowang*, 1983, No. 8, p. 6.

ideas of the ways to boost the economy. In fact, however, the concepts, priorities, rates and principles of economic development are being constantly revised and reinterpreted, and there crop up contradictions in tactical postulates, "outrunning" and "set-backs" either in theory or in the practice of economic management, and chronic discrepancies between policies laid down from higher up and their interpretation and fulfilment in practice.

There emerge in discussions different, sometimes mutually exclusive views and appraisals of the available experience of development, the existing economic situation and further policies. It is openly admitted that there "exists dissent" over "what the 'revival' of the economy actually means."¹⁹ Debates have grown markedly again over the charting of the country's development strategy, the planning of actual ways and methods of its modernization in every field, and the fulfilment of the "general goal" set by the 12th CPC Congress, namely, the quadrupling of the gross national product in value terms by the year 2000 as compared with 1980.²⁰

It follows from the Chinese press that there are those who use these growing pains to push the country towards capitalism. *Hongqi* points out that "during the past few years certain people have begun to voice doubts of the advantage of the system of the socialist planned economy and to call for the market economy, like the capitalist economy, in China"; these persons claim that supposedly there are not yet material conditions for a "planned economy" and that the "planned economy" is unable to ensure the country's stable, progressive and fast economic growth."²¹ The well-known Chinese economist Liu Guoguang also takes issue with those who "believe that at present capitalism can be developed in China but socialism cannot be built."²² Note was taken, in particular, of "differences of opinion" as regards public property of the means of production in connection with the economic reform. There are views according to which "the public form of property should be renounced for the sake of reform."²³

Reality makes Chinese politicians and economists insist on the restoration of the priority of state planning and prompts them the conclusion that "the planned economy is the main form of socialism" and that "there can be no revival without limitation and control and that it can only bring about chaos."²⁴ "Plan comes before everything," one article says. "The direction of production cannot be altered arbitrarily in a drive for profit."²⁵ At the same time it is recommended not to call into question such principles as the consolidation of the public property of the means of production, the right of the socialist state to the organization of the economy and the party's role in the administration of economic activity.

As during earlier years, the solution of the problems facing the country depends on the development of a scientific and comprehensive economic strategy, and this fact is admitted in China. According to Liu Guoguang quoted above, a major problem "is the drafting of a correct strategy of economic development and the ensuring of comprehensive balances in the planned economy."²⁶ Another well-known Chinese economist, Ma Hong, stresses that particular lesson should be learnt from the so-called "concept of quick success", banking on "fast effect", and

¹⁹ *Jingji ribao*, Sept. 22, 1983.

²⁰ *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 20 and 24, 1984.

²¹ *Hongqi*, 1984, No. 3, pp. 26, 28, 29.

²² *Jingji ribao*, Nov. 8, 1983.

²³ *Jingji wenti yanjiu*, 1983, No. 5, p. 10.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 11, p. 7; *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 22, 1983.

²⁵ *Jingji ribao*, Sept. 22, 1983.

²⁶ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 23, 1983.

that emphasis should not be laid on development rates alone.²⁷ Supporting this postulate, *Hongqi* calls for awareness of the fact that "modernization is bound to be an historically long, complex and far from easy process."²⁸ "To begin with, it should be firmly established as a guiding idea that the struggle will be long and advance gradual," *Renmin ribao* says. It is pointed out at the same time, that "the development strategy of the socialist economy and socialist society must be based on Marxism."²⁹

It goes without saying that the implementation of the correct postulates formulated above, let alone the drafting of a long-term strategy for the socio-economic development of such a country as China with its demographic and historical characteristics and particularly with its intricate zigzags of historical development is far from easy. However, the accomplishment of this task is affected not only by the burden of the past but also by the fact that the point of departure in tackling it is the concept of "the development of socialism with Chinese specificity", whereas, according to the Chinese press, there is no clear understanding of this specificity. Newspapers explain that there are different views of "socialism with Chinese specificity", and "the building of socialism with Chinese specificity."³⁰ At the same time it is clear that this concept over-stresses the factors of national specifics, which in itself makes it difficult to formulate and resolve questions correctly and to find effective approaches to outstanding socio-economic problems.

The economic development in China during the recent period, particularly the results of economic performance in 1983, show that there are considerable potentialities and untapped reserves for progress even if partial measures are taken to improve the economic machinery. When all is said and done, this is evidence of the huge creative, constructive possibilities of socialism, evidence of the fact that the period of socialist development, first and foremost the 1950s, when a good deal was done with the help of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, was not wasted for the Chinese people despite all the well-known zigzags in national development.

The efforts made to pull the economy out of the crisis and ensure its progress are yielding tangible results, which are already noticeable today. However, as is admitted in China, even more has to be done both to consolidate the initial results and to put the national economy onto the basis of unhindered further development.

V. FETOV,
V. MATYAYEV

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Oct. 25, 1983.

²⁸ *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 12, p. 13.

²⁹ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 11, 1983; *Shijie jingji dao bao*, Nov. 21, 1983, p. 6.

³⁰ *Guangming ribao*, Sept. 5, 1983.

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CHINESE PRESS ON LATIN AMERICAN PROBLEMS

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 84 pp 128-134

[Article by I. O. Ural'tsev]

In recent years improving relations with developing nations has remained an important element in the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China. At a meeting with João Bernardo Vieira, Chairman of the Guinea-Bissau Revolutionary Council, in April 1982 Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang spoke again of "greater unity and cooperation with Third World countries". This well-known thesis, which was reaffirmed by the first session of the Sixth People's National Assembly, has been translated into specific foreign policy actions. In his report on the government's activities Premier Zhao Ziyang emphasised that "greater unity and cooperation with other Third World nations is a pivotal point of our country's foreign policy".¹

Within the framework of its expanding, allround (political, party, economic and cultural) relations with developing nations China devotes a good deal of attention to Latin and Central American countries which are viewed as "an important component of the Third World"². China's periodicals, which play an important role in publicising the country's political moves, has increasingly turned its attention to the problems facing Latin American countries and the developments on that continent.

Special care is taken in newspaper and magazine articles to demonstrate the "closeness" and "commonness" of the interests of China and those of Latin American countries. Against the background of the general slogan that "socialist China belongs to the Third World"³ it is emphasised that "China and the Latin American nations are developing countries and are members of the Third World". A heavy stress is laid on the similarities of their histories and contemporary problems. Specifically, it is pointed out that the People's Republic of China and Latin American countries "have been subject to aggression and exploitation by imperialists and colonialists and have been waging a sustained struggle to win and defend their national independence; today they are facing common or similar tasks". "The lack of conflicting vital interests, outstanding problems and disputes," it is emphasised, "is a reliable basis for a continuous expansion of Sino-American relations".⁴

Despite such statements, China is seeking to solve its problems by developing ties with Western countries, the USA above all, and with Japan. Peking's pro-Americanism causes apprehension among progressive Latin American states.

In its treatment of the Latin American theme the Chinese mass media pays a great deal of attention to the political processes in the region, its urgent problems and foreign policy activities. The general political situation in Latin America is characterised as complicated, while in Central America it is called "explosive". It is pointed out that the past year was marked by a rise in the national-democratic movement in Central America and a continuous deepening of internal differences: "the

¹ *Renmin ribao*, June 7, 1983.

² *Guoji wenti yanjiu*, 1984, No. 1, p. 24.

³ *Proceedings of the 12th All-China Congress of the CPC*, Peking, 1982.

⁴ *Guoji wenti yanjiu*, 1984, No. 1, pp. 24, 25.

strife between various internal political forces and outside interference", writes the Chinese press, "continued to aggravate the situation in the region turning it into a 'hot spot' of general attention in the exacerbated international situation".⁵

Although it never tires to reiterate its "all-purpose" formula about "the clash between superpowers" the Chinese press cannot leave unheeded in its analysis of the causes of increased tension in the region the flagrant violation of Latin America's sovereignty by the United States' aggressive behaviour. Specifically, it points out that "the US armed invasion of Grenada has added to the tension in the Caribbean".⁶

In a review entitled "Central America: A Year of Growing Disquiet" *Renmin ribao* wrote: "Resorting to military, political, economic and other devices the USA seeks to neutralise the influence of the Soviet Union and to suppress the craving of the peoples in the region for democracy and social reforms so as to protect traditional American interests here". Summing up the year's events the newspaper noted that "the first notable feature specific" of the situation in Central America is "the substantial increase in US interference in the affairs of the region". It pointed out that the continued growth of the national-democratic popular movement in Central America was regarded by the US ruling clique as a "threat" to US "security" and "prosperity" and that the Reagan Administration's attempted "hard line" was an "advanced version of long-standing US policies in Central America".⁷

The Chinese press is critical of Washington's increasing efforts to strengthen its military presence in Latin and Central America. It noted that "the USA escalates its military activities in Central America and the Caribbean sending there large naval forces and troops for protracted exercises. This show of military muscle is intended, on the one hand, to intimidate the forces fighting for democracy, and, on the other, to warn their rivals".⁸ Lan Caiji's article "US Military Activities in the Central American Region" which appeared in *Renmin ribao* gives a comprehensive critical analysis of US military preparations. It states directly that by all its actions, specifically, by its joint exercises with Honduras the US intends "to ensure its long-term military presence in Central America". These actions, continues the article, "strongly exacerbate the situation in the region. The US Administration," concludes the author, "must clearly realise that gunboat diplomacy is a bygone course" and that the continuation of this policy "definitely can yield no positive results".⁹

A commentary in the popular political magazine *Shijie zhishi* pointed out that the US "tries to arrest the wave of democratic revolutions and national liberation struggles in Latin America" and with this aim in view "is taking a series of measures to isolate and topple the Sandinista government in Nicaragua".¹⁰

One such "violent" measure was the US armed intervention in Grenada. Spokesmen for the PRC condemned this action. At a press conference on October 26, 1983 in Peking a Foreign Ministry official, Qi Huaiyuan, characterised the US attack on Grenada as "a hegemonic act in flagrant violation of the UN Charter and the standards of international law" and demanded "an immediate withdrawal of US troops from Grenada". In a talk with the wife of Guayana's President Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang stressed that China "is against small nations being slighted by big powers which is why it strongly condemns the landing of US troops in

⁵ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 21, 1983.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Dec. 30, 1983.

⁷ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 21, 1983.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Nov. 20, 1983.

¹⁰ *Shijie zhishi*, 1983, No. 16, p. 5.

Grenada and demands their immediate withdrawal".¹¹ Reports about these declarations made the headlines of Chinese newspapers. China's permanent representative to the United Nations Ling Qing warned that the international community "must be vigilant" with regard to the US Administration's action and must see to it that an armed intervention in the internal affairs of a state like the one in the Caribbean Sea should not be allowed to happen in Central America".¹²

The official position was given much space in the Chinese press. For example, *Renmin ribao* emphasised in its commentary that "the USA must comply with the UN resolution and withdraw its troops from Grenada" because it "is in the interests of peace and security throughout the world". It was pointed out that "the US invasion of Grenada has exacerbated the situation in the Caribbean".¹³

Peking seeks ties with Managua. Its press covers the situation around Nicaragua and its comments are more favourable to this revolutionary country than they were a short while ago. For instance, *Shijie zhishi* says that the Nicaraguan revolution and the overthrow of Somoza's military dictatorship in 1979 "have been conducive to ending internal chaos and achieving stability in the region".¹⁴ It has also been noted that "in the face of the US threat the Nicaraguan leaders, who recently unmasked again before the whole world the US plans to invade Nicaragua, have mobilised the people for the hard work necessary to prepare for war". It was emphasised that "if the USA expects Nicaragua to be an easy prey as Grenada was then just an illusion".¹⁵

The newspapers also carry reports, although without official comment, on practically all major proposals and initiatives made by the Nicaraguan leadership to relax tension. For example, much space was given to the declarations made by the Nicaraguan Government's Coordinator Daniel Ortega Saavedra to the effect that his country had not lost faith in the Contador Group's efforts to achieve peace and his appeal to the US public not to let the Reagan Administration unleash war against Nicaragua. In reference to statements by Nicaraguan spokesmen it was also reported that the US "wants Nicaragua to agree to Washington's terms and force the Salvadoran guerrillas to lay down their arms".¹⁶

The fighting patriots in El Salvador are no longer treated by the Chinese press as "anti-government elements". The activities of the Salvadoran "guerrillas" are reported with less bias than before and it is stressed that "the civil war in El Salvador is escalating because of the interference from outside"¹⁷ meaning, chiefly, US support to the regimes of El Salvador and Honduras, and aid to the rebels by progressive forces.

In describing the most acute political problems of Central America the Chinese press pays a great deal of attention to the efforts to solve them while at the same time making known the official position of the Chinese government. At a press conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Department Chief Qi Huaiyuan said that China "supports the position of the Contador Group and a large group of Latin American states which back the principles of self-determination and noninterference, oppose the super-powers' attempts to draw Central America into the orbit of their struggle for hegemony and call for a search for a peaceful solution to Central America's problems".¹⁸ Later, a commentary

¹¹ *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 10, 1983.

¹² *Ibid.*, Nov. 11, 1983.

¹³ *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 6 and 30, 1983.

¹⁴ *Shijie zhishi*, 1983, No. 16, p. 5.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 1983, No. 24, pp. 10, 11.

¹⁶ *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 7, 1984.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, June 1, 1983.

in *Renmin ribao* pointed out that "the Chinese people takes a consistent stand for the independent solution by the Central American nations of their problems, against the interference by any outside force under any circumstances and in any form in Central America affairs". The commentary expressed the hope that "the states in the region will respect each other's sovereignty, will not interfere in the internal affairs of other states and will settle their disputes and disagreements through just and peaceful negotiations".¹⁹

Although the People's Republic of China does not actually take part in settling Central and Latin American political problems its mass media, chiefly, the press gives a great deal of coverage to the activities in the region aimed at relaxing tension and normalising the situation. Special attention is paid to the activities of the Contador Group. It is pointed out that the Group "plays an active role in relaxing the tension in Central America", that its efforts "fully meet the interests of all Latin American governments and peoples".²⁰ It is emphasised that the Group's "proposals express aspirations common to Latin America and the entire Third World"²¹ and "in a concentrated form express the desire of all Latin American countries to get rid of outside interference".²²

The Chinese press approves of the following proposals from the "Cancun Declaration of Peace in Central America" sponsored by the Contador Group: to establish effective control over the arms race in Central America; to withdraw from it foreign military advisers and to establish demilitarised zones; to ban the use of the territory of this region's countries for subversive political or military activities against any country in the region, as well as to prohibit aggression and interference in any form in the internal affairs of any country in the region.²³

The Chinese press pays a good deal of attention to various economic and socio-economic problems which the Latin American countries are experiencing. Assessing the general situation on the continent *Renmin ribao* pointed out that "for the past two years the economic situation in all Latin American countries has been continually worsening under the impact of the economic recession in Western countries" and that "economic difficulties constitute a vital challenge which faces Latin American nations today". The slump in industrial production, lower exports, the growth of inflation and the foreign debt result, the press indicates, from "the use by industrial Western countries of the unjust international economic order to shift the burden of their economic recession onto the developing nations".²⁴

China actively supports greater unity and cooperation among developing countries in overcoming their national economic difficulties, accelerating the rates of socio-economic development and fighting for the establishment of a new world economic order (NWEQ). "Third World" cohesion is considered an indispensable condition for meeting the challenges which confront it. Accordingly, the Chinese mass media accentuates stronger unity of Latin American states.

Significant in this respect are the materials which the Chinese press published when the Latin American countries were celebrating the 200th anniversary of Simon Bolivar's birth. In its commentary *Renmin ribao* pointed out that "the need for unity among Latin American countries declared by Bolivar has become both the objective and the banner of all Latin American nations", that "the present-day position of Latin Ame-

¹⁹ *Renmin ribao*, July, 23, 1983.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Dec. 30, 1983; Jan. 7, 1984.

²¹ *China Daily*, Jan. 5, 1984.

²² *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 7, 1984.

²³ *Shijie zhishi*, 1983, No. 16, pp. 5-6.

²⁴ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 17 and July 26, 1983.

rican states on economic integration and extended regional cooperation stems from Bolivar's ideas on the unity of Latin America as developed and applied to the new situation".²⁵ Under the heading "Stronger Latin American Unity as Urged by Bolivar" the newspaper gave wide coverage to various commemorative activities in the region. Receiving particularly extensive coverage was the "Declaration to the People of Latin America" adopted by the leaders of six Latin American countries during the celebrations in Caracas. Its contents were reported in detail emphasising the passages to the effect that "the unity of Latin America is a historical necessity and the major political goal in order that its peoples may show what they are really worth" and "only the joint efforts of Latin American nations can bring about peace in this region".²⁶

Strengthening unity and cooperation are also viewed by the Chinese mass media as an effective means of overcoming the region's political and economic difficulties. It emphasised that such a course "is really very important for overcoming the difficulties and reviving the economy". It noted approvingly that in discussing their economic problems Latin American countries "study the ways of solving them through self-reinforcement and collective reliance on their own resources". In this connection and in view of China's preference for "South-South" cooperation the Chinese press devotes a great deal of attention to regional cooperation. It pointed out that "the activities of Latin American states in the sphere of economic cooperation have been to a greater or lesser degree a success".²⁷

The functioning of regional economic organisations—the Central American Common Market, the Andes Pact, the Latin American Economic System and the Caribbean Community—is given good coverage and positive appraisal. In a review on the Caribbean Community's tenth anniversary *Renmin ribao* said that "this regional organisation has, through the efforts of its member-countries, achieved notable success". In an article about the Andes Pact it pointed out that this organisation founded in 1969 "has scored important successes in defending the sovereignty and the general economic interests of its member-states" and "has effectively contributed to the national economic development of the signatory countries".²⁸ It particularly emphasised the fact that, "during the Argentine-British conflict concerning the Malvinas the Andes Pact stepped up its economic cooperation having displayed the militant cohesion of Latin American countries".

The Chinese press assessed the aspiration of Peru and Ecuador, members of the Andes Pact, for a peaceful settlement of their frontier disputes and Panama's wish to join the Pact as "a new situation in the relations of unity and cooperation between the Andes states". It noted with satisfaction that "the idea of regional cooperation has taken deep root in the five Andes Pact nations".²⁹

The Chinese press concentrates on the activities of the most vigorous participants in regional cooperation. In one of the articles Uruguay is cited as a positive example because it is a member of the three largest regional associations for economic cooperation and "devotes particular attention to cooperation with its neighbours in such areas as the economy, social problems, education, science and technology". Particular stress was laid on the declarations of the Uruguayan Government that it sought "to promote independently relations with other Third World nations".³⁰

²⁵ *Renmin ribao*, July 24, 1983.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, July 25, 1983.

²⁷ *Renmin ribao*, July 26, Nov. 15 and Dec. 28, 1983.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, July 10, 17, 1983.

²⁹ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 17, 1983.

³⁰ *Shijie zhishi*, 1984, No. 3, p. 31.

The Chinese press also gives coverage to specific aspects of the domestic political and economic activities of Latin American countries. It describes favourably the increasing trend in Latin America towards democratisation of the forms of government and public institutions. The Chinese mass media calls this trend "a major distinguishing feature of the present-day situation" on the continent "resulting from the long-standing confrontation between democracy and dictatorship after the Latin American states gained their independence". Many "military juntas", it says, came to power "through coup d'etats inspired by the USA", and after that "exercised military dictatorship in domestic policy and followed the lead of the USA in foreign policy" which "led to lasting instability in the Latin American political situation".³¹

Of late the Chinese press has been commenting in a similar vein on the developments in Chile. It points out that "severe reprisals by military governments against democratic forces have provoked fierce protests from the masses".³² The struggle of Chileans for broader democratisation is given detailed and regular coverage. The situation in Chile is characterised as alarming "reflecting the acute contradictions of Chilean society". It is emphasised that the severe reprisals by the authorities "have failed to stop the struggle of the Chilean people" and that "the military junta will continue to be subject to increasing pressure, while the situation in the country will remain tense".³³

The Chinese press comments on the democratic processes and election campaigns in Latin American countries. For example, it covered the elections in Venezuela and the campaign for the democratisation of public activities and the restoration of the constitution in Argentina.

Detailed reports are published on economic and business activities in individual Latin American countries, such as reports on the reclamation of the Amazon River basin in Brazil, the development of copper deposits in Chile, oil extraction in Venezuela, etc. It is pointed out that the Latin American countries "have accumulated a good deal of experience telling them how to proceed from the actual conditions in their respective countries when formulating development plans, reforming economic patterns, maintaining comprehensive balances in the national economy and attracting and using foreign investment".³⁴

Mention must be made, however, of the fact that China's stand on a number of important aspects of the situation in Latin America is prejudiced by the notorious concept of "superpower clash". For example, acknowledging that the instability and tension in Central America are caused by complicated historical and contemporary relationships among the countries of the region, Peking claims: "It is clear, however, that if the two superpowers do not stop their direct or indirect interference there will be no tranquility in the region".³⁵ It is emphasised that "the rivalry of the two superpowers increases tension in the region"³⁶ which means that the actions of the Soviet Union and the United States in Latin America are equated. Moreover, the press reported a number of statements by Chinese officials which drew parallels between the sending of limited contingents of Soviet troops to Afghanistan, on the one hand, and the US armed invasion in Grenada, on the other. The landing of US troops on the territory of a sovereign state was considered "a hege-

³¹ *Shijie zhishi*, 1983, No. 12, p. 8.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³³ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 13, 1983; *Shijie zhishi*, 1983, No. 12, p. 9.

³⁴ *Guoji wenti yanjiu*, 1984, No. 1, p. 25.

³⁵ *Banyue tan*, 1983, No. 13.

³⁶ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 11, 1983.

monic act of suppression of the weak by the strong",³⁷ whereas the Afghan "problem" was assessed as "in fact, an armed intervention and military occupation by a superpower of a weak Third World nation".³⁸ This provides grounds for hushing up or distorting, first, the positions of the Soviet Union, Cuba and other socialist countries on events in Central America, and, second, their support and assistance to the peoples fighting for their freedom, independence and security. Commenting on the internationalist actions of the Soviet Union and Cuba the Chinese press says that "by supplying arms and experts the Soviet Union seeks to penetrate into and extend its influence" in the countries of the region and "to use the national democratic movement in Central America" to the same effect.³⁹

Such an approach by China's leadership to the Soviet Union's constructive and principled policy on Latin American problems cannot be conducive to the achievement of peace on the Latin American continent and, in fact, plays into the hands of the US Administration. A change-over to a Marxist class analysis of the policies pursued by the imperialist and socialist forces in Latin America would make a useful contribution to the struggle of Latin American peoples and, in the long run, to increasing the role and prestige of socialist countries in international affairs.

³⁷ *Guoji wenti yanjiu*, 1984, No. 1, p. 75.

³⁸ *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 23, 1983.

³⁹ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 21, 1983; *Guoji wenti yanjiu*, 1984, No. 1, p. 25.

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NEWLY LIBERATED COUNTRIES IN TODAY'S WORLD

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 84 pp 135-136

[Review by V. A. Vasil'yev of book "Vostok. Rubezh 80-kh godov. Osvobodivshiesya strany v sovremennom mire" [The East at the Beginning of the 1980's. The Newly Liberated Countries in Today's World], Moscow, Nauka, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1983, 270 pages]

This collectively authored monograph is an analysis of the most salient socio-economic and political processes under way in newly liberated countries in the 1980s. The mid-1970s saw what amounted to the final collapse of colonial empires and the transformation of former colonies and semi-colonies into politically independent states. The withdrawal of the former colonial periphery from imperialism's military and political system was especially rapid, although this process is still far from complete: in a number of instances purely colonial forms of military-political dependence were replaced by neocolonial varieties. Attainment of economic independence is going to be an even more protracted and complex process.

Victorious popular national liberation revolutions in the Orient resulted in the dismantling of CENTO and SEATO, the major imperialist blocs in the region, and the

adoption of independent foreign policies by some of its former members in the developing world. The vigorous foreign policy activities of the newly emerged countries in the 1970s-1980s were the result of changes in the alignment of forces between the two opposing socio-political systems in the world, broader and stronger ties between the world socialist community and developing countries, and the greatly shrunk sphere of imperialism's direct or indirect domination.

The authors treat this subject—the situation in the developing countries of the Orient at the turn of the 1980s—in a comprehensive manner: each of the monograph's eight chapters represents an exhaustive discussion of a certain aspect of the situation which is inseparably linked to the other by the general idea of the narrative.

In light of the decisions made at the 26th CPSU Congress the authors, specialists

in the economic and political problems facing the newly liberated countries of the East, set out to analyse new trends in relations among these countries and to discuss their role in the world economy and politics, as well as in the world revolutionary process. The authors seek to provide an in-depth analysis of the causes of the growing socio-economic contradictions and mounting class struggle in the Oriental countries, and to set in bold relief the fundamental difference between imperialism's aggressive neo-colonialist policies and the internationalist policies of the USSR and the whole socialist community toward newly liberated countries.

Since the mid-1970s there has been a sharp rise both in the role which the newly liberated countries of the East play in the world economy and politics, and in that popular anti-imperialist movements there play in the world revolutionary process. At the same time world imperialism and local reaction remain the main obstacles to objectively inevitable processes of national revival and social renewal in the newly emerged countries. The authors stress that by the early 1980s the newly free countries have made definite headway in the struggle for social progress due to the following four factors:

1. International détente, which made it more difficult for imperialism to use force on young independent states;

2. The use of political sovereignty as an important lever in the struggle against remnants of colonialism in the socio-economic structure and against neo-colonialist exploitation;

3. The positive influence exerted on the progress of newly independent states by the existence of the world socialist system, and, for many of them, by direct economic, scientific and technological cooperation with the socialist community on the basis of equality and mutual gain;

4. Certain new trends and conditions evolving in the world capitalist economy.

On the basis of an in-depth analysis of regional economic relations, making use of foreign sources and a vast body of statistics the authors show that the rivalry in the imperialist camp and the growing differences between the advanced capitalist and developing countries call for new mechanisms of international relations and ways of overcoming the existing problems.

The authors stress that the neocolonialist strategy of the international division of labour compels the developing nations to pay a high price for economic growth which im-

poses new forms of economic dependence on them, namely in technological, financial and food supply spheres.

Using aid to create a favourable investment climate in the developing countries, state-monopoly capitalism has made them easy prey for massive infusions of capital by transnational corporations (TNCs). In the second half of the 1970s TNCs invested in the developing countries four times as much as during a similar period in the 1960s. Investing primarily in industries with large input of cheap local labour (textiles, electronics) and in energy-intensive industries, TNCs extract profits which are twice as large as those made in the mother countries. By drawing the economies of the developing countries into the world capitalist economy, TNCs make them increasingly dependent on the world capitalist market. As a result most developing countries remain an economically backward and dependent part of the world capitalist economy. This is a profound and irresolvable contradiction of capitalism as a social system. The backwardness of the Afro-Asian countries' socio-economic structures prevents capitalism's expansion and strengthening of its periphery, narrows markets, increases rivalry for access to them, stimulates the anti-imperialist struggle of newly liberated countries for economic independence and, in the final analysis, aggravates capitalism's general crisis.

The authors pay particular attention to the extremely negative impact which the US abandonment of detente and its policy of seeking military superiority over the Soviet Union have had on the situation in Asia and Africa. These policies have well-defined regional aspects which seriously affect the interests of the newly liberated countries of the East. The concept underlying the Reagan Administration's policies is the existence of "three strategic zones": the European, Far Eastern and Middle Eastern. Aggressive circles in the US place special emphasis on the creation of a Middle Eastern "strategic zone" of global opposition to the socialist community under the pretext of "defending" Persian Gulf oil from "Soviet aggression". Refusing to participate in talks on making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, which is demanded by all the coastal states, the US is building up a powerful strike force in the

area on the basis of bilateral agreements with a number of countries in the region, and covering the Middle East and East Africa with a network of military bases. These preparations, which are directed against national liberation movements, pose a threat to the security of peace-loving countries in the region, trample on the sovereignty of the peoples whose governments have made a deal with US imperialism and seriously destabilise the situation in both the region and the world. At the same time Washington tries to strengthen the second, Far Eastern, "strategic zone": it seeks closer ties with the PRC and Japan, hoping to play the so-called "China card"; it aggravates tensions on the Korean Peninsula and continues to skirt the Taiwan problem. These US policies pose a threat not only to the socialist community but also to the security of Southeast Asian countries, particularly in view of territorial claims on certain countries in the region.

Of special interest are the sections devoted to a discussion of the Soviet position on regional economic cooperation in the Pacific. The record shows that unless the legitimate interests of the USSR and other socialist countries are taken into account, the implementation of the "Pacific community" idea may become a factor aggravating the situation in the region. Imperialist quarters want to use the complexities of the developing countries' participation in international relations to intensify existing contradictions and involve these countries in their global confrontation with the world socialist community. In contrast, the authors stress, the world socialist system regards the developing countries as its natural allies, gives them selfless assistance and supports them in every way. A radical restructuring of the system of international relations is already under way. The struggle of the peoples of the East for peace and security in Asia, Africa and the world over, for a new international economic order and for peaceful coexistence merges with the struggle of world progressive forces to solve these historic tasks.

And finally it must be stressed that the problems discussed by the monograph's authors are not only of scholarly interest but are politically relevant as well.

V. VASILYEV

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CHINESE IN UNITED STATES

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 84 pp 137-139

[Review by A. I. Borisova, candidate of historical sciences, of book "Kitaytsy v SShA i amerikano-kitayskiye otnosheniya na sovremennom etape" [Chinese in the United States and American-Chinese Relations at the Present Stage] by V. I. Biryukov, Moscow, Nauka, 1983, 142 pages]

For many years already policy in respect of overseas Chinese is a component part of the general foreign-policy course of the People's Republic of China. At the present stage the Chinese leadership has considerably stepped up its activities to win over the overseas Chinese so as to try with the help of their economic, political, financial, scientific and technical potential to solve not only a number of domestic political and economic problems, but also some questions of the PRC's foreign policy.

Problems of the Chinese emigration have been repeatedly taken up in Soviet scientific literature dealing with China, but the main attention usually was devoted to the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, where more than 90 per cent of all overseas Chinese live. The publication of the book *Ethnic Chinese in the USA and American-Chinese Relations at the Present Stage* by V. I. Biryukov, Cand. Sc. (Hist.), considerably expands the elucidation of this problem by offering a comprehensive analysis of the

position of Chinese in the United States and its dependence on the general state of American-Chinese relations and on the PRC's policy in respect of Chinese living in the United States.

The book encompasses the period from the mid-19th century to the early 1980s and consists of four chapters. The first deals with the origination and development of the ethnic Chinese minority in the United States. The author notes that the gold rush in California in the middle of the past century brought about the first mass influx of Chinese to the United States where rather big Chinese settlements (so-called Chinatowns) sprang up. In that period Chinese were employed not only in mining but also in railroad construction and agriculture in California. Although in their mass the Chinese settlers were unskilled labourers they managed nonetheless to play a definite role in the development of America's capitalist economy.

But demand for unskilled labour dwindled with the change in the nature of capitalist production and growing demand for skilled labour. From the end of the 19th century to the middle of the present one Chinese emigrés were shouldered out of the leading branches of the US economy, gradually becoming a target of racial discrimination elevated to the rank of state policy. The anti-Chinese laws adopted in the United States resulted in a decrease of the Chinese population in the country, its remainder concentrating its labour activities in Chinatowns.

The author rightly stresses that "... the anti-Chinese measures... had a clearly expressed economic nature" and did not just reflect racist sentiments. As to the anti-Chinese legislation, it was directly connected with the development of the labour movement in the United States. At the time American workers viewed Chinese as the main culprits of their worsening position, this enabling the American ruling circles to solve the "Chinese problem" in a direction advantageous to them. At the same time, I believe, the author should have dwelt in greater detail on such a question as the role of Chinese monopoly companies and their agents in recruiting "coolies", since the activity of these companies had contributed much to the growth of anti-Chinese sentiments.

Gradually the Chinatowns became centres of the economic, social, political and cultural life of ethnic Chinese. By the mid-20th century, the author notes, structural changes began to shape up in the nature of the employment of Chinese in the United States, this being determined by the requirements of the American economy in conditions of the scientific and technological revolution and the adjustability of the Chinese themselves. It was during that period that the tendency towards assimilation and the stratification of the once monolithic Chinese community emerged.

The national self-isolation of the Chinese population in the USA enhanced the greater exploitation of Chinese working people not only by the American but also by their "own" bourgeoisie. During its rule in China the Guomindang banked precisely on the Chinese bourgeoisie and with the passage of time this gave it political control over the entire Chinese community in the US.

The second chapter takes up questions connected with the position of the Chinese

ethnic minority in the USA in present-day conditions (1965-1980). The American immigration policy was modified in the mid-1960s as a result of which "immigration legislation formalised the already existing tendency to attract skilled workers and specialists from other countries with the aim of using their experience, energy and know-how for the development of American society" (p. 48). Chinese immigration to the United States increased again and the Chinese settled mostly in cities. Along with this the number of American Chinese continued to grow as a result of natural increment as well. The qualitative composition of the settlers also changed: whereas at the first stage of the Chinese immigration in the 19th century most of the immigrants were destitute peasants or petty traders, now the Chinese immigrants are more varied socially (p. 51). The share of intellectuals and specialists has grown considerably.

The ratio between classes and social groups in the Chinese community is changing, the author points out. At present the bourgeoisie comprises a rather big part of the Chinese community in the United States. Private enterprise with a low or average level of profit is the sphere of the economic activity of the Chinese bourgeoisie. But, as it is noted in the book, "the tendency towards the appearance of a strata of big bourgeoisie among the Chinese in America is clearly evident in recent years" and although "the share of Chinese-owned business in the American economy is not yet great, the emergence of wealthy businessmen from among the Chinese is proceeding at a rapid pace" (p. 61). In its turn this process brings with it the growth of a Chinese financial bourgeoisie as well.

The combination of national-psychological and economic factors with the specificities of the American immigration legislation determined the appearance in the United States of a large number of Chinese scientists and engineers specialising predominantly in the field of exact sciences. The assimilation of the Chinese with American society enabled the former to increase their role in host country's social and political life (pp. 65-67).

The author singles out the following of the new political directions in the life of Chinese in the United States: the movement for greater participation by Chinese in the life of American society; the traditional pro-Guomindang direction; the movement of supporters of the PRC and the movement

for declaring Taiwan an independent state.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the USA and the PRC helped Peking to a certain extent to elbow aside its main rival in the struggle for influence over the Chinese emigration—the Guomindang regime in Taiwan. However, as it is noted in the book, the scope of the activity of the PRC's supporters in the United States in recent years is by no means proof of unity in its ranks. Quite often the newly created organisations, especially those of students, copied the methods employed during political campaigns in the PRC. In the late 1960s the detachments of "hongweibings" organised in San Francisco's Chinatown tried to master support for the PRC's policy. When the organisation of "hongweibings" collapsed the supporters of the PRC set up other societies with programmes designed to encompass the broadest sections of the population in Chinatowns. One such society, "Boxers", as it is noted in the book, set itself the task of uniting workers from Asia with the American working class. The main attention was given to young Chinese emigrés who for lack of education, vocational training and sufficient knowledge of English were unable, as the author writes, to integrate itself in American society (p. 76).

As I see it, the causes of this phenomenon are connected also with the self-isolation of the Chinese community and the desire of its upper crust to have everything under its control. But the policy of isolating the Chinese community from the rest of the population, this being pursued under the pretext of preserving national identity, language and customs, serves not so much the aims of preserving national culture as, first of all, aims of preventing assimilation. The perpetuation of old traditions enables the bourgeois sections of the Chinese immigration to retain their influence in the community and exploit the toiling part of the American Chinese.

The third and fourth chapters of the monograph are devoted to a study of the PRC's policy in respect of ethnic Chinese in the United States and their role in the development of American-Chinese relations in the 1970s.

The formation of the People's Republic of China changed the nature, content, forms and conditions of struggle for influence over the overseas Chinese. They changed in accordance with the main periods of the

PRC's foreign policy. Although the traditional close ties of the overseas Chinese with China were temporarily severed during the first years of the PRC's existence, the Chinese leadership tried to find a key to co-operation with them. For this purpose the PRC government worked out a special policy in respect of Chinese emigrés. It found its reflection in the general programme of the People's Political Consultative Council of China, adopted in 1949, and in the Constitution of the PRC. A Committee for the Affairs of Overseas Chinese was set up under the PRC's State Council, which is engaged in practical work with emigrés, the sphere of its activities encompassing also the relatives of overseas Chinese living in China. Similar activities were conducted by a United Front Department of the CC CPC.

In the 1970s the Chinese leaders started promoting a new approach to the emigrés. Governmental organisations concerned with emigrés elaborated and carried out concrete measures to utilise the economic, political, scientific and technical resources of overseas Chinese. Work was stepped up to attract the capital of Chinese emigrés to the PRC's economy. The sums of money remittances and deposits sent to China and Chinese banks increased, tourism was being developed at a rapid pace, universities for overseas Chinese were reopened in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, the regions in which many of the overseas Chinese have family roots.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the USA, as the author rightly notes, created favourable conditions for the pursuance of the PRC's policy in respect of ethnic Chinese in the United States. The PRC's activities among Chinese in the United States included propaganda (circulation of printed matter, use of the local press, radio programmes, films, the creation of various organisations and societies of the PRC's supporters) and personal contacts with emigrés during their trips to the PRC. An important role in the work with the Chinese community in the United States was played by the PRC's official representatives in that country. And

diplomatic personnel was selected with due account for the nature of the above-mentioned tasks.

During that period the Chinese leaders urged the overseas Chinese to display "patriotism" and help the fulfilment of the programme of "four modernisations". Soon the Chinese leadership started consolidating economic cooperation with the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie. The PRC went so far as to create conditions in the country guaranteeing the functioning of foreign capital. Hotel construction and the tourism became the main sphere of application of the capital of Chinese living in the United States. Americans of Chinese extraction began playing also a greater role as go-betweens in the development of Sino-American trade. In its desire to get access to the latest American scientific accomplishments and technology the Chinese leaders started paying special attention to American scientists of Chinese origin, especially specialists in nuclear physics, electronics, computer technology, etc. The activity of these scientists, as it is noted in the book, goes far beyond the framework of official American-Chinese scientific and technical ties.

So the author is totally right in drawing the conclusion that in the present conditions the PRC leadership strives to step up its ties virtually with all sections and groupings of overseas Chinese in the United States so that they would help fulfil the plans of "modernisation". Recent events also reveal the special activity of American Chinese in the matter of "reunification" with Taiwan, this being in line with the Chinese leadership's political tasks.

In conclusion I would like to note that the questions raised in V. I. Biryukov's book are not just of academic interest but have political urgency. The author deals with such aspects of China's foreign policy in respect of the United States that are not sufficiently known. There is no doubt that this book will attract both specialists and readers in general interested in problems of international life.

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CSO: 1812/76-E

JAPANESE SCHOLAR'S VIEW OF SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMY

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 84 pp 140-143

[Review by D. Mun, candidate of economic sciences, of book "Gendai kankoku keizai bunseki. Kaihatsu keizaigaku to gendai ajia" [Analysis of the Economy of Present-Day South Korea. Political Economy of Developing Countries and Contemporary Asia] by Watanabe Toshio, Tokyo, Keiso Shobo, 1983, 208 pages (in Japanese)]

Since the 1960s, the South Korean economy has been attracting the growing attention of foreign scholars, many of whom extol the "South Korean phenomenon", the "progressive role" played by the USA, Japan and other capitalist countries in the industrialisation and modernisation of South Korea's economy, while smokescreening the real intentions of the foreign monopolies in the country. These scholars' assessments of the development of South Korea are very often narrow, biased, to some extent sensational, and, as a rule, silent about the negative aspects of South Korean reality, which are obvious.

There are, of course, substantial studies, too, giving the reader an idea of the main directions of South Korea's economy. The book by Toshio Watanabe, an expert on developing countries and the so-called "new industrialising states", is valuable in this respect. The book is an attempt at a thorough analysis of the progress of the South Korean economy which, in the author's opinion, is of interest in itself, besides being attractive for researchers from the point of view of the "political economy of the developing world", to quote the author.

Disclosing the specifics of the progress of the South Korean economy since the 1960s, T. Watanabe contends that "high economic growth achieved over a short period of time is the main typical feature of contemporary South Korea's economic development" (p. 16). The economic growth of the South was indeed going on rapidly enough. Industrialisation, for example, showed higher rates in South Korea than in Japan, which, in the recent past, developed faster than any other capitalist state. While it took the advanced capitalist states from 20 to 30 years to pass from the first stage of industrialisation to the second, South Korea did this in six years (1960-1966). To characterise these stages Watanabe uses the so-called Hoffmann indicator, i. e., the ratio of the values added of light and heavy industry. South Korea made the transition from the second stage of industrialisation to the third, also according to the Hoffmann indicator, in a third to a quarter of the time

taken by the countries of the West, the intention being to achieve the current level of the industrialised capitalist states by 1991 (pp. 26-27, 84).

Admittedly, in the conditions of the general economic slump and deep crisis in 1980 Seoul revised its Long-Term Plan of Socio-Economic Development for 1977-1991, which provided for the South attaining the contemporary level of Western industrialisation in the early 1990s. According to the revised, less ambitious plan, South Korea intends to achieve this level somewhat later. Besides, it should be remembered that the Hoffmann indicator reflects the level of industrial development very inadequately, since it can show a high level of industrialisation, provided the share of heavy industry in industrial production is considerable, even if overall industrial development is generally weak. South Korea became an industrial-agrarian country as late as the mid-1970s, and only according to a few indices, while according to the Hoffmann indicator it was on its way to the rather high, third stage of industrialisation.

At the turn of the 1980s, "high economic growth" ceased being typical of the South Korean economy. Although the author speaks in the preface about an absolute drop in production in 1980, he says nothing about the South Korean economy developing much more slowly since then. Meanwhile even the country's ruling circles were compelled to admit that the "high economic growth" period was over and that the South had entered a stage of moderate economic development.

Later Watanabe discusses the role played by the "foreign impulse" in the country's economic progress. In the process of industrialisation, Watanabe contends, South Korea made extensive use of foreign technology for the spinning, weaving, ship-building, chemical, iron-and-steel, engineering and chemical-fibre industries. During the period from 1962 to 1978, the South bought 1,125 processes, which were instrumental in raising the technological level of South Korea's industry (p. 33). As a result, the country's technological base has

become one of the most advanced in Asia. For example, by the end of the 1970s, the washing machines, refrigerators, lighting facilities, radios, TVs and galvanic elements produced in South Korea were up to the standard of Japanese output. According to the author, the influx of foreign capital, which figures prominently in the accumulation, was a major "foreign impulse" promoting the South Korean economy. The role of foreign capital in capital accumulation was especially great in the early 1960s, falling somewhat in subsequent years, but still remaining important. From 1971 to 1976, the average share of foreign funds in the aggregate volume of capital accumulation was 20.8 per cent against 47.7 for 1962-1966 and 38.8 for 1967-1971.

Demonstrating the role of foreign capital in capital accumulation, the author keeps silent—which is typical of him—about South Korea's growing financial dependence on the imperialist powers. It would not be out of place to mention here that, in 1982 South Korea's foreign debt, including loans and credits, as well as short-term credits repayable in less than a year, amounted to \$36 billion, as against \$1.7 billion in 1970. The interest alone on loans and credits cost the South \$3.7 billion in 1981.¹ Naturally, the volume of realised foreign funds was much decreased once the interest was paid off. A substantial growth of foreign debts, in which South Korea ranks fourth in the world, and a rise in interest show that South Korea is being subjected to an increasing financial exploitation by countries exporting loan capital.

T. Watanabe writes that foreign capital was penetrating South Korea not only in the form of loans, but also as direct investment. While investing capital in South Korea, foreign monopolies introduced advanced technology, know-how, and trade marks, organised the batch production of all kinds of goods meeting world standards, their marketing and up-to-date factory management. All this played a certain part in bringing the economy of South Korea up to the modern technological, organisational and managerial level. During the 1960s and early 1970s, direct investment was channelled mainly into the textile and clothing in-

dustries; in the 1970s, a substantial part went into the production of synthetic fibres and tar, and the promotion of power engineering. A tangible portion of direct capital investment was also concentrated in labour-consuming industries with comparatively easy production processes, such as the textile, wood-working and car-assembly industries.

It has to be noticed that while analysing direct foreign investments in South Korea, the author hardly mentions the cause and effect of this penetration. In fact, however, the transnational corporations (TNCs) are the main investors of foreign capital in South Korea. Establishing factories and plants there, the TNCs are eager to develop a profitable sphere of capital investment, to expand accumulation, seize the local market, move into the country labour-consuming and ecologically-dangerous industries, combine sophisticated equipment and know-how with the cheap local labour force to produce commodities that can be sold at a profit, disguised by South Korean trade marks, both on the local market and outside the country. All these tricks of the trade used by the financial and industrial corporations have one and the same goal: to extract maximum profits and material resources from South Korea. The TNCs' revenues greatly exceed their expenditures in the country, with foreign entrepreneurs getting added surplus value. The rate of profits received by foreign companies is 1.11 per cent higher than that of local ones, reaching an average of 4.08 per cent. Backed up by their financial, technological and scientific superiority, the imperialist monopolies are elbowing aside the local bourgeoisie and seizing the key positions in many industries. Japanese capital, for instance, controls 100 per cent of the chemical, aluminium, and glass industries, 80 per cent of the rolled steel and refrigerators, and 50 per cent of cement industry.²

The author notes that the lion's share of the funds, both drawn from abroad and raised in the country was channelled into the manufacturing industry and infrastructure which are not only of economic but also of military significance, manufacturing being the priority recipient of investment. The rapid growth of investment in the manufacturing industry was the reason for

¹ See *Industry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Economic Basis, Contemporary Level and Structure*, Moscow, 1977, p. 143 (in Russian); *Gekkan Tyosen Siryo*, 1982, No. 3, p. 50; *Financial Times*, Jan. 20, 1983.

² See *Pravda*, Sept. 16, 1980; *Gekkan Tyosen Siryo*, No. 5, 1982, p. 60.

its rather speedy development: for 1962-1966 the average annual production increment in it was 15 per cent, for 1967-1971—21.8 per cent, and for 1972-1978—18.7 per cent. As a result, the share of manufacturing in the GNP grew from 14.3 per cent in 1962 to 27 per cent in 1978 (p. 24).

Since the mid-1960s South Korea has been pursuing the export course of industrialisation, including the following government measures: a) the multiple exchange rates were replaced by a free exchange rate; b) the won, whose exchange rate was intentionally kept up prior to the 1960s, was devalued many times to conform to the real rate of exchange in relation to the US dollar; c) the income tax levied on juridical persons in export industries was halved; companies were exempted from entrepreneurial tax and the tax-free import of goods intended for producing export commodities permitted (in 1972 these privileges were canceled); easy interest rates were established for export credits; d) imports were liberalised.

T. Watanabe stresses that South Korea's export sector developed fairly rapidly and became a leading factor behind economic progress, which led to the export quota of the GNP growing from 5 per cent in 1962 to 34.1 per cent in 1978. The speedy development of manufacturing, which became the chief export basis of South Korean economy, laid the foundations for the expansion of exports. Not by chance did the share of manufactures reach 89.9 per cent of exports in 1978, against 27 per cent in 1962. Such industries as textile, footwear, woodworking, industrial rubber, metal-working, electrotechnical engineering, and precision-instrument-making took on a marked export specialisation. In 1975, the ten most export-oriented branches accounted for 67 per cent of all South Korea's exports, with the textile industry accounting for 24.7 per cent. Almost all these branches are labour-intensive and put out finished consumer goods. The rapid growth of exports was accompanied by that of imports, because the development of export industries required fuel, raw materials and other goods; the impetuous growth of exports and imports resulted in an increase of the share of foreign trade in the GNP up to 71.3 per cent in 1978 (pp. 55-57). This points to the creation in South Korea of an economic, primarily industrial pattern, oriented on the foreign trade exchange of labour-intensive

finished goods for industrial ones. The creation of this pattern in South Korea is an inevitable stage in the industrialisation process, as the country has a weak basis for independent development of capital goods industries and underdeveloped related branches. This pattern has emerged mainly because the penetrating foreign capital aimed to create an international "subcontractor system" in the country.

Stating that "there is no transition from a dependent economic pattern to an independent one... other than through industrialisation based on the development of heavy industry" (p. 82). T. Watanabe devotes a whole chapter to analyse the development of heavy industry in South Korea. He notes that, up to the late 1960s, South Korean industry mainly produced short-term and durable commodities, as well as building materials, by processing imported raw materials and intermediate goods, using imported equipment. The textile and food industries loomed large in the pattern of industry, with mechanical engineering, iron-and-steel and chemistry playing a modest part. From 1972 to 1976, the setting up and development of heavy industry was expanded, which brought about changes in the structure of industrial production, with the share of heavy industry growing. The author's detailed analysis of the development of ferrous metallurgy and petro-chemistry provides examples of the specifics of the formation of heavy industry in South Korea. Among the reasons for the accelerated development of the country's heavy industry he names the following: first, a strengthening of local financial and industrial groupings, with their pronounced similarity to monopolies investing capital in large modern enterprises; second, the state's active (direct and indirect) participation in the setting up of large-scale factories, industrial complexes and entire branches of manufacturing industry; third, the cementing of the accumulation basis during industrialisation; fourth, Seoul's winning of "trust" among its capitalist partners, resulting in the TNCs settling in the south of the Korean Peninsula, as soon as they saw opportunities for making profitable investments in heavy industry.

The chapter dealing with shifts in the labour market is also of interest. The author writes that, from 1970 to 1977, the number of people employed in South Korea's manufacturing industry increased by an

average of 12 per cent. against 4.1 per cent in the economy as a whole. In terms of the growth of employment rates in the manufacturing industry, the South outstripped Singapore and Malaysia, where this index was the highest among the Asian countries (p. 113). The rapid growth of employment in the South stemmed largely from the development of its export branches. In 1975, 40.7 per cent of those employed in industry were to some extent connected with the production of export goods (p. 115). Such export branches as the clothing, textile, woodworking and electrical engineering industries attracted more labour force than others. Industrialisation was accompanied by intense urbanisation: poor peasants moved from villages into Seoul, Pusan and other big cities. Owing to high exploitation rate, the low wages paid to workers and the priority development of labour-intensive branches, South Korea was able to compete on the world consumer goods market. Since modern industry could not absorb all the poor people ousted from farming, a substantial proportion of migrants found jobs in the "non-organised" traditional sectors such as the services, where the pay is extremely low. This was an additional reason for these branches lagging behind the modern industrial sector.

The monograph under review ends with a chapter on the trade and economic relations between South Korea and Japan. In the author's opinion, the trade between these two countries is characterised by the following peculiarity: Japan sells to Korea mainly capital goods, while South Korea sells mostly consumer goods. In 1978 machines, metals, chemicals and other heavy industry wares accounted for 82.7 per cent of all the Japanese goods sold on the South Korean market, while 43.1 per cent of South Korean exports to Japan consisted of textiles. According to T. Watanabe, this pattern "is an example of trade between two economies with a vertical division of labour" (p. 172). The bilateral trade is greatly

lop-sided in Japan's favour with South Korea's barter deficit showing a tendency to grow. In 1970, the South's negative balance of trade with Japan equalled \$ 589 mln., but by 1978 it had spiralled to \$ 3,412 mln (p. 176). The author explains that the demand for consumer goods in South Korea exerts a much stronger influence on production in Japan than the demand for South Korean products does on the Japanese market. This demonstrates the one-sided economic dependence of South Korea on Japan and the weak complementary relations between the two economies. The horizontal division of labour between South Korea and Japan has been progressing over recent years. In Watanabe's opinion, a gradual transition from a mostly one-sided economic dependence of South Korea on Japan, toward their mutual dependence should be expected.

In conclusion, it should be mentioned that, although the book by T. Watanabe is rich in facts, it is tendentious in the manner usual for bourgeois economic science in general. In the early 1960s, the USA and Japan promoted South Korea's embarking on modern production, guided, in addition to purely economic reasons (getting additional surplus value), by a desire to buttress Seoul's position in its competition with North Korea, and to tie South Korea more strongly to the triple coalition spearheaded against the socialist countries in the Far East. The penetration of foreign monopoly capital, for which Seoul created a favourable investment climate, has given rise to the more serious problems in the economy of South Korea, such as a tremendous growth of the foreign debt, a serious dependence on foreign capital, primarily Japanese, disproportions in the development of certain industries, etc. These features are typical—and will become more typical still—of the economy of South Korea.

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EXTENDED SESSION OF ALL-UNION SINOLOGISTS' ASSOCIATION BOARD PRESIDIUM

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 84 (signed to press 5 Jun 84) pp 187-188

[Report on extended session of All-Union Sinologists' Association Board Presidium in Moscow on 14 May 1984]

[Text] An extended session of the All-Union Sinologists' Association (VAKIT) Board Presidium was held in the House of Friendship with the People of Foreign Countries in Moscow on 14 May 1984 and was attended by the administrators and bureau members of republic and local branches of the association and representatives of scientific and practical organizations working in the field of Sinology.

The time that has elapsed since the VAKIT constituent conference on 22 June 1983 has conclusively proved the importance and timeliness of the creation of this association--a social organization formed for the purpose of uniting and coordinating the efforts of Sinologists throughout the Soviet Union for the continued improvement of comprehensive studies of our great neighbor, the People's Republic of China.

This session of the VAKIT Board Presidium was one of the first major events in the new organization's history.

At this session, where the introductory speech was presented by Doctor of Historical Sciences O. B. Rakhmanin, first deputy chairman of the central board of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society and deputy chairman of VAKIT, there was a discussion of several aspects of the association's work and an exchange of information about Sinological activity in the USSR.

A report on the work of the VAKIT Board was presented by Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu. M. Galenovich, the deputy chairman of the association. He informed the gathering that 10 republic, regional and municipal branches of VAKIT had been opened in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghiziya, Tajikistan, Moscow, Leningrad, Ulan-Ude, Vladivostok, Khabarovsk and Chita since the time of the constituent conference. The administrators and bureaus of these branches were elected. He also reported on other organizational undertakings connected with the establishment of the association, membership requirements, etc.

Doctor of Economic Sciences V. I. Shabalin, member of the association presidium, reported on a number of current Chinese issues.

Speeches were presented by researchers and public spokesmen (in alphabetical order): N. V. Abayev, chairman of the Buryat branch of VAKIT and candidate of historical sciences; G. V. Astaf'yev, chairman of the Moscow branch and doctor of historical sciences; B. I. Iskandarov, chairman of the Tajik branch and academician of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences; Ye. I. Kazennov, chairman of the cis-Amur branch (Far Eastern Scientific Center, USSR Academy of Sciences); A. Ya. Kalyagin, chairman of the Soviet War Veterans Committee; V. A. Krivtsov, deputy chairman of VAKIT and doctor of historical sciences; F. V. Solov'yev, chairman of the Maritime branch and doctor of historical sciences; M. Ya. Sushanlo, chairman of the Kirghiz branch and doctor of historical sciences; A. A. Khamatova, deputy chairman of the Maritime branch and candidate of philological sciences; and others.

The speakers stressed that Soviet Sinologists unanimously support the CPSU's consistently principled and profoundly internationalist policy line in relations with the PRC.

The February and April (1984) CPSU Central Committee plenums and the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet clearly demonstrated the continuity of the foreign policy line of our party and country. This fully applies to policy on China. When General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee K. U. Chernenko met with voters on 2 March 1984, he stressed: "The augmentation of socialism's role in international affairs would certainly contribute to the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China. We have consistently supported this normalization. Political consultations indicate, however, that there are still differences of opinion on several fundamental matters. In particular, we cannot conclude any agreements detrimental to the interests of third countries."

Speakers noted that Soviet-Chinese intergovernmental relations have recently been revitalized in some areas, the sphere of mutual relations is expanding and the number of contacts is increasing. They stressed that progress in specific areas of Soviet-Chinese relations through mutual efforts could stimulate their overall improvement. The Soviet Union has consistently favored the development and normalization of relations with the PRC, but although the Chinese side has verbally expressed a desire for better relations with the Soviet Union, it is still insisting on an entire series of preliminary conditions and demands detrimental to the security of the Soviet Union and the interests of third countries, and this is seriously impeding the fundamental improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations.

Speakers stressed that mankind is now living in turbulent times as a result of imperialist, especially American, aggression. At this time of international tension, it would be of great significance if the PRC were to join other socialist countries in the struggle for peace and against imperialism and war.

In its relations with China, our country will continue to pursue a principled line aimed at the improvement and normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of their common interest in peace and socialism. The CPSU and the Soviet people have never been indifferent toward the fate of the Chinese people, the Chinese revolution and the nature and state of Soviet-Chinese

relations. The history of our interrelations is the history of an active struggle by the CPSU for the development of the Chinese revolution and people's China, for friendship and cooperation between our two countries and populations and for a socialist future for the PRC.

Speakers stressed that VAKIT activities should serve these goals.

Speakers noted the need to continue and develop the study of PRC foreign policy, Soviet-Chinese relations and China's socioeconomic problems, history, language, culture and art.

The plan for VAKIT projects in 1984-1985 was discussed and approved at the session.

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INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE CONFERENCE ON PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES IN FAR EAST

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 84 (signed to press 5 Jun 84) p 189

[Report on international science conference in Far East Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, in Moscow in May 1984]

[Text] An international science conference on "Peace and Security Issues in the Far East" was held this May in Moscow, in the Far East Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. It was attended by researchers and experts on international affairs from the socialist countries and from leading research establishments in Moscow, Leningrad and other cities and republics of the Soviet Union.

The conference was called to order by Professor V. A. Krivtsov, doctor of historical sciences and acting director of the Far East Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences. At plenary sessions of the conference, 36 reports and speeches were presented. Besides this, around 30 more scholars addressed two discussion groups.

The subject matter of the reports and speeches covered a broad range of topics--from an overview of the situation in the Far East to an analysis of peace and security issues in various subregions. Speakers stressed the importance and pertinence of scientific analyses of problems in the safeguarding of peace and security in the Far East, which has often been the site of destructive and bloody conflicts since World War II. They noted that there has been a recent clear tendency toward increased tension in the region and that the main cause is the policy of imperialism, especially the American variety, which is designed to start conflicts and effect broader subversive military and political activity in the region.

All of the reports and speeches proved that it is precisely the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries that are the main bulwark of peace and security in the Far East and the rest of the world.

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15TH CONFERENCE OF YOUNG SCHOLARS OF USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES FAR EAST
INSTITUTE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 84 (signed to press
5 Jun 84) pp 190-191

[Report on 15th annual conference of young scholars of Far East Institute in
Moscow on 2-3 April 1984]

[Text] The topic of the 15th annual conference of IDV [Far East Institute] young scholars in the IDV, USSR Academy of Sciences, on 2-3 April 1984 was "China: 'Regulation and Reform' in the Policy of Modernization." The conference was also attended by representatives of other scientific establishments and organizations. The conference provided them with another good opportunity for the free exchange of opinions, the elevation of analytical standards and the acquisition of necessary experience in scientific debate.

Deputy Director of the IDV V. I. Potapov, chairman of the Commission on Work with Youth, presented the introductory speech at a plenary session. Noting the constant elevation of the standards of research projects conducted by young institute scholars and the stable growth of the scientific creativity of young IDV experts on Chinese and Japanese affairs, V. I. Potapov stressed the need for the continued enhancement of the professionalism of young scholars. He noted several promising fields of research and informed conference participants of specific projects representing an organic part of the general research work of the institute.

Professor Ye. F. Kovalev, doctor of historical sciences, discussed methodological problems in the improvement of general theoretical training and the need for the maximum application of fundamental Marxist-Leninist premises in the thorough analysis of current events in China. He expressed the hope that this conference, just as previous ones, would be a noteworthy event in the scientific life of the entire institute.

Reports presented on the first day of the conference dealt with important aspects of contemporary Chinese socioeconomic, ideological, historical, political and foreign policy issues and provided scientific assessments of current processes in the PRC.

P. B. Kapralov's detailed report on "The Reorganization of the PRC Reproductive Machinery" contained a thorough analysis of problems in the reform of

the reproductive system in today's China. S. R. Belousov's report on "The Specifically Chinese Variety of Socialism: The Ideological Roots and Present Meaning of This Concept" aroused interest because it included a detailed analysis of the external signs and internal content of one of the basic aspects of ideological life in today's China. S. N. Goncharov reported on "PRC Policy on 'Peaceful Reunification' with Taiwan" and discussed new aspects of this complex problem with the aid of thoroughly documented facts. D. A. Smirnov's report on "Contemporary Ideological Processes in the PRC" also aroused interest, and interesting reports were made by S. N. Aleksakhina and Yu. M. Ovchinnikov. The reports evoked lively and enthusiastic discussions of these topics by the majority of those present.

Current events were also the main topic on the second day of the conference, when three discussion groups--on socioeconomic issues, on history and ideology and on foreign policy--met.

The principal aim of the group on socioeconomic issues was the assessment of the nature and purpose of fundamental processes and changes in current PRC economic policy. Ye. V. Grebennikova presented a comprehensive report on "The Current Stage of the Period of Transition in China." L. V. Novoselova presented a pertinent report on "Capital Construction in the PRC: The Interaction of 'Regulation' and 'Reform.'" Reports on the most important "specific" problems in present-day China's economic organization by K. L. Syroyezhkin, T. V. Akimova and S. S. Tsyplakov aroused interest.

The discussion group on history and ideology emphasized the examination of basic tendencies and natural trends in the evolution of ideological and political processes in China in recent years. In particular, these matters were discussed in A. Ye. Kozhevnikov's report on "An Inquiry into the Nature of the CCP at the Present Time" and N. N. Okhlopkov's report on "The General Features of Public Mind Control in the PRC." Reports by B. L. Perelomov and I. L. Karmanovskaya contained interesting information. A. B. Krasnov's report on "The CCP Leaders' Attitude Toward Chinese Traditions" included an informative analysis of the traditional sources of current PRC foreign policy.

The PRC's place and role in international relations were assessed in the discussion group on foreign policy, particularly in A. O. Vinogradov's report on "The Outlines of the Foreign Policy Program of 'Distinctively Chinese Socialism,'" and in reports by N. U. Sharibzhanova and others. Besides this, important aspects of Chinese-Japanese relations were analyzed (in the report by A. A. Shlyndov), as well as some current Japanese affairs (in a report by A. D. Bogaturov) and various aspects of international politics in the Far East.

In general, the most urgent problems in China and other Far Eastern countries were pointed out and discussed at the conference. It was distinguished by a broad range of topics, the serious and comprehensive approach to research and ingenious methods of stating matters in the majority of reports, and the efforts of speakers to analyze the most important problems of countries in this region in depth and to look into the prospects for their future resolution.

In conclusion, it must be said that this conference helped to reveal the scientific potential of young Sinologists and attested to the indisputable elevation of their professional standards. The reports presented at the conference were entered in the third competitive review of scientific projects by young scholars of the IDV, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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- END -