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Vietnam Report

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VIETNAM REPORT

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CONTENTS

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

Go Cong Dong Devoted Much Care in Building Armed Forces (Thanh Vien; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 21 May 82).....	1
Vietnamese Ships Flying Flag of Convenience (PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 25 Jun 82).....	2
Tien Giang, Binh Tri Thien Build Discipline at Basic Level (NHAN DAN, 23 May 82).....	3
Editorial Urges Increased Protection of Socialist Property (Editorial; HANOI MOI, 9 Jun 82).....	5
Police Lieutenant Killed by Thieves (Thuy Hoan; HANOI MOI, 8 Jun 82).....	7
Machine Works' Cadres Sentenced for Embezzlement (HANOI MOI, 11 May 82).....	9
Hanoi Cracks Down on Illegal Electricity Use (Quang Cat; HANOI MOI, 11 May 82).....	11

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

Journalists Comment on Reagan Policy (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 6 Jun 82).....	14
Workers Exported to USSR, Eastern Europe (Denis D. Gray; BUSINESS TIMES, 11 Jun 82).....	22

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

Economic Conditions Continue To Worsen (Colin Campbell; BUSINESS TIMES, 17 Jun 82).....	24
--	----

Current Conditions in Ho Chi Minh City Described (VIETNAM COURIER, Apr 82).....	26
Step-up of District Economic Building in Vinh Phu Urged (Hoang Quy; NHAN DAN, 28 May 82).....	32
Circular Defines Eligibility for Supply Standards (HANOI MOI, 8 May 82).....	37
Editorial Emphasizes Importance of Household Economy (Editorial; HANOI MOI, 11 May 82).....	39
Vendor's Brisk Business Seen as Clue to Pleasing Consumers (HANOI MOI, 11 May 82).....	41
State Stores Criticized for Lack of Summer Goods (HANOI MOI, 8 May 82).....	43

AGRICULTURE

Hanoi District Reviews Product Contracting-Out (HANOI MOI, 8 Jun 82).....	44
Over 70,000 Leave To Build Nez's (NHAN DAN, 23 May 82).....	46
Hanoi District Implements Contracting-Out Directive (HANOI MOI, 10 Jun 82).....	47
Editorial Boosts Development of Pisciculture (Editorial; NHAN DAN, 24 May 82).....	51
Harvest of 5th Month-Spring Rice Reported (NHAN DAN, 22 May 82).....	53
Measures Taken To Accelerate Grain Mobilization in An Giang (Ngo Minh Duc; NHAN DAN, 27 May 82).....	55

HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

Hanoi's Building Sector Tightens Security, Management (HANOI MOI, 8 May 82).....	58
---	----

LABOR

Full Use of Spare Labor in Cities Recommended (Do Hoang; NHAN DAN, 27 May 82).....	60
---	----

POPULATION, CUSTOMS AND CULTURE

Modern Western Culture Making Inroads in Hanoi (Michel Blanchard; BUSINESS TIMES, 1 Jun 82).....	62
Authorities Asked To Shut Down 'Mediums,' Card Readers (HANOI MOI, 11 May 82).....	63
Assistance to Cooperatives, Conservation of Grains Urged (NHAN DAN, 24 May 82).....	65

BIOGRAPHIC

Information on Vietnamese Personalities.....	67
--	----

CHRONOLOGY

Chronology of Events During 16 February-15 March 1982 (VIETNAM COURIER, Apr 82).....	72
---	----

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

GO CONG DONG DEVOTED MUCH CARE IN BUILDING ARMED FORCES

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 21 May 82 p 3

[Excerpts from an article by Thanh Vien: "Go Cong Dong Builds District Into Military Fortress -- Care and Devotion in Building Armed Forces"]

[Text] Go Cong Dong is a coastal district of Tien Giang Province. Having a coast of 32 kilometers while being adjacent to Ho Chi Minh City to the north and to Ben Tre Province in the south, Go Cong Dong is an important operating area as far as public security and national defense are concerned. As it was about to implement the movement "Promote the fine quality and raise the fighting power" of various armed forces, the people of Go Cong Dong District got divided by a decision of the Council of Ministers into two districts, Go Dong Dong and Go Cong Tay. From an area of over 7400 square kilometers to the material bases and the mass organizations and groupings, everything was divided into two and the 9 villages in the original district were also multiplied into 16 so as to be consistent with the new structure. At this time the armed forces of the district proved to be too little, and the whole military outfit of the district consisted of 6 persons of whom half were non-commissioned officers. As for the militia and self-defense, they got jumbled up with some getting dissolved and becoming inactive altogether in a couple of places. Because they were stretched thin the Party bases and Youth Union organizations also were lacking in manpower.

Through realistic measures, during three consecutive years from 1979 to 1981 Go Cong Dong managed to recruit steadily reaching the quality that was stipulated by the upper echelons. In phase 1 of 1982 alone almost 16,000 youths had enthusiastically registered for military duty, out of which 2,000 went into the army, reaching 69.51 percent of the total annual quota. Thanks to that, during a short time the local army units have been fully staffed, including those participating in regular fighting and those participating in economic construction. Those not selected for military duty were also used to staff the militia and self-defense units.

On the basis of carefully organized training, the military organs of Go Cong Dong District have on a regular basis selected experienced cadres and fighters to send them on fighting duty far away. During the recent past the district has had many units sent to do international duty and 179 comrades have gone to fight at the northern border. No matter in which battlefield they fight, no matter what kind of hardship they encounter, they all promoted the indomitable tradition of our land, being heroic in fighting and devoted in their work. That is the way of those who have gone far away to fight, as for those who stayed home they remain to produce and fight the enemy together with the rest of the population.

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

VIETNAMESE SHIPS FLYING FLAG OF CONVENIENCE

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 25 Jun 82 p 15

[Text]

HANOI, (AFP) — Part of Vietnam's merchant fleet sails under flags of convenience to stave off ostracism some of the country's ships might otherwise face in foreign ports of call.

Reporting on the country's merchant shipping, informed sources said these flags included the Panamanian flag, but did not go into further details such as the number and tonnage of the ships in question.

The Hanoi publication, information-documents, puts the Vietnamese merchant fleet at 30 ships with a total tonnage of 300,000 tons compared with eight in 1975 with amounting to 30,000 tons.

The fleet, run by the Vosco Company, sails to four continents except the continent of America. In 1975 it only sailed to Hongkong and Japan, the publication said.

In 1976, Vietnamese ships transported more than four million tons of goods, part of which in the past two years, went to Third World countries. The publication said this would have earned the country a profit of \$20 million.

The Vietnamese foreign minister said in Paris that there was also cooperation between Vietnam and other countries, notably Sweden, in equipping ships with Vietnamese crews and flags.

CSO: 4220/195

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

TIEN GIANG, BINH TRI THIEN BUILD DISCIPLINE AT BASIC LEVEL

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 23 May 82 p 1

[Article: "Tien Giang, Binh Tri Thien Build a Pattern of Discipline Maintenance at the Basic Units"]

[Text] In combination with the distribution of Party membership cards, the Party chapter of Tien Giang province has made many efforts in educating the Party members in regard to the implementation of the general line and policies of the Party, of the state laws, to raising the awareness and organization of discipline, and to the training of revolutionary quality and morality. The Party chapter of Tien Giang paid attention to building a pattern of discipline maintenance in close coordination with the work of consolidating the poorer cells. For this reason, the majority of the members in the Party chapter have made efforts in a spirit of responsibility to contribute towards completing the political tasks and doing well their duties towards the state. Many basic organizations of the Party have made one more step forward. Compared to 1980, the amount of solid Party basic units has increased by over 60 percent and the amount of poor basic units is reduced by 9 percent.

A number of basic units in the province still show shortcomings such as the fact that they have not increased the leading role of the Party chapter, they have not strictly managed their members, or that here and there, at times they have not reached full agreement and solidarity, or again that their control and maintenance of discipline is still weak, etc.

The standing committee of the Tien Giang provincial committee intends to continue guiding the Party organizations in grasping even better the aims, requirements and contents of the movement to build discipline at the base level so as to create a vigorous transformation when it comes to awareness and organization of discipline, to the spirit of responsibility, to the determination to fight and to implement well the tasks assigned to them. The various echelons directly guide in the work of discipline building at the base level. The Party members discuss the content of struggle to fight for in keeping discipline and in training a communist morality. The building of this discipline at the base level is directly linked to the consolidation of the control committee at various echelons and to the building of a cadre force devoted to the job of control at the base level.

Guided by the Central Control Commission, a number of base units of the Binh Tri Thien party chapter have built their discipline patterns and reached some initial results; these are the villages of Quang Phuoc (Huong Dien District), Trieu Thanh

(Trieu Hai District), Trung Trach (Bo Trach District), the Public Works Corporation No 15, the Combined Projects Enterprise No 3, etc.

Drawing the lessons of experience from the good work of the above basic units, the standing committee of the provincial committee continues to push forward this movement and make it become a widespread movement reaching into all the basic units of the Party. The various echelons in the Party chapter provide regular guidance, followup and control so as to draw the lessons of experience in time and set forth the guidance plan in close connection with the implementation of political tasks at the local level.

The concrete application of the four contents of discipline maintenance at the Party's basic units is also linked directly to the implementation of the Party and state's regulations.

1751

CSO: 4209/370

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

EDITORIAL URGES INCREASED PROTECTION OF SOCIALIST PROPERTY

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 9 Jun 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Strengthen the Task of Protecting Socialist Property"]

[Text] The ultimate goals of socialist production-commercial activities are to have many high-quality products, attain high economic effectiveness, outstandingly fulfill state plans, and improve living conditions. Therefore, producing many products and protecting them so that none are lost, damaged, or wasted are two missions no aspect of which a production or commercial unit can regard lightly. But not all party committees and unit commanders profoundly understand and correctly implement them. Therefore, the theft of socialist property and the waste of materials and electricity have not decreased but have tended to increase. Some people make the excuses that the production areas are small and crowded and are near residential areas, the goods are easy to steal, easy to sell, and difficult to store, etc., to explain away the deficiencies which cause losses. But when one studies such incidents one sees that objectively the greatest deficiency is the lack of tight, strong bylaws, regulations, and organization regarding the protection of property.

The Transformer Manufacturing Enterprise, the Cu Gioanh Textile Mill, the Thong Nhat Electrical Machinery Enterprise, the 5 Nam Bo Department Store, etc., which for many years have attained outstanding accomplishments in protecting socialist property, do not have greater advantages than the units which lose much property. The greatest advantage of such places is that the party organizations and administrations have confirmed their determination and have positively acted to "oppose the loss of people and property."

The legal bases of the task of protecting socialist property are the responsibility systems, production bylaws, management systems regarding labor, finance, materials, fire prevention, prevention of flood and storm damage, etc. The ideological basis of the task of protecting socialist property is the consciousness of collective mastery on the part of the cadres, the workers, and the people. Another important factor is organizing implementation. Many places have experienced a serious loss of property because the systems regarding the shipping and receiving of raw materials and finished products are not clear, entry into and exit from enterprises and warehouses are not strictly

controlled, and goods are weighed, measured, and counted arbitrarily. A widespread, "alarming" phenomenon is that many protection personnel -- reliable forces of the enterprises -- have stolen, or colluded with people engaged in illegal livelihood on the outside to steal, large amounts of socialist property over a long period of time. Therefore, an urgent task at present is that we must mobilize workers and civil servants to participate positively in protecting socialist property and voluntarily serve as the eyes and ears of the security forces. Furthermore, we must build pure, strong protection forces made up of people who are virtuous and healthy and continually improve their professional ability, and must control their activities and strengthen the guidance of that task by the party committees and administrations. The main objective of those tasks is prevention. But when losses occur it is necessary to resolutely investigate, reach conclusions, and mete out severe penalties, in order to warn bad people and consolidate internal solidarity. Instances of covering up for and tolerating criminals out of "fear of losing prestige," etc., considerably hinder prevention, investigation, and disposition and must be completely overcome. The units must seek the assistance of the local organs, administrations, and people in creating a strong protection network in the factories, warehouses, and stores so that the dishonest people will have no sources of support and no environment in which to operate.

5616

CSO: 4209/399

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

POLICE LIEUTENANT KILLED BY THIEVES

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 8 Jun 82 pp 1,4

[Article by Thuy Hoan: "Another Example of Resolute Opposition to Violators of Socialist Property"]

[Text] Along the stretch of the Red River passing by the villages of Hong Ha (Dan Phuong District) and Trang Viet (Me Linh District), blackmarketers, dishonest merchants, and hooligans often steal state property being transported aboard ships, boats, or barges, or collude with dishonest sailors to steal cargo and buy grain, cement, and nitrogenous fertilizer. They have many schemes to destroy evidence. For example, when they are pursued they sink boats or throw the evidence into the river. On one occasion they sank a boat carrying dozens of tons of grain.

At 2000 hours on 4 Jun 1982 the criminal unit of the Municipal Public Security Service, along with the public security forces and militia of Dan Phuong and Me Linh district carried out patrols and set ambushes to discover and arrest dishonest merchants who stole state property on the northern bank of the Red River in Trang Viet Village and on the southern bank in Hong Ha Village.

The team working on the northern bank, led by comrade Trinh Van Nam, was made up of policemen Nguyen Thai Binh and Le Van Minh, financial cadre Nguyen Kim Son, and Chuong, a cooperative member who operated the boat. The patrol spotted two boats tied up to two barges, from which the crew members were scooping coal. The patrol immediately pursued and arrested them. The police team was forced to open fire and wounded one of them, who was taken to the headquarters of the village administration. Comrade Binh, along with comrade Son, the financial cadre, and Chuong were assigned the mission of remaining on the boat to protect the two cargo-laden barges and to await orders.

When he discovered people on the shore carrying goods on their shoulders, comrade Nguyen Thai Binh jumped ashore and arrested them. Taking advantage of their large numbers, they resisted. Binh, who was 40 meters from the bank of the river, fought resolutely and sacrificed his life while carrying out his mission.

Second Lieutenant Nguyen Thai Binh, born 10 August 1956, a party member who was employed by the criminal bureau of the Municipal Public Security Service, set a brave example in "fighting selflessly for the nation."

A solemn funeral was held for comrade Nguyen Thai Binh. Comrades Tran Quyet and Tran Dong, respectively a member of the Party Central Committee and Vice Minister of Internal Affairs; Nguyen Duc Loc, a member of the Standing Committee of the Municipal Party Committee, and Vice Chairman of the Municipal People's Committee; Pham Tam Long, a member of the Standing Committee of the Municipal Party Committee; and representatives of the sectors and mass organizations in Hanoi, and the party committees, administrations, and people of Dan Phuong and Me Linh districts and the villages of Trang Viet and Hong Ha, attended the funeral of the people's policeman who heroically sacrificed his life and resolutely protected socialist property.

5616

CSO: 4209/399

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

MACHINE WORKS' CADRES SENTENCED FOR EMBEZZLEMENT

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 11 May 82 p 4

[Article: "Trial of Persons Who Intentionally Violated Economic Management Principles and Regulations"]

[Text] The Hanoi Agricultural Machine Works Number 1, which is directly subordinate to the Technical Equipment General Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, has been assigned the task of producing and repairing various types of agricultural spare parts and machines. Taking advantage of the 497,000 dong allocated by the Ministry of Agriculture to the machine works to restore the production installation, director Tran Thanh Tinh, the head of the Capital Construction Office, Hoang Thanh Phong, and a number of other cadres and personnel found a way to control the funds and materials, causing serious harm to socialist property.

Specifically, they took 15,401 dong to be used to hire repairmen to restore a number of projects by declaring that they hired more workers and used more materials than they actually did in order to misappropriate the money for themselves. They also speculated in 20,000 pieces of bamboo and established an "illicit fund" to spend. Their violation of wage and bonus regulations at this machine works caused a loss of 55,782 dong to public funds.

This was a case involving a large number of defendants. All of them were persons of position and authority within the machine works, from the director, the chief accountant and the head and assistant head of the Capital Construction Office to statistical personnel, personnel who receive incoming materials and so forth. Their crime, which was intentional, began in the very first stage, when estimates were being formulated.

Their actions violated enterprise management and property management regulations, caused the machine works to lose much money and many materials, had an adverse influence upon production activities and caused the plan to be unbalanced.

Harshly punishing these persons who intentionally violated economic management and financial management principles and regulations, who engaged in misappropriation

and speculation and who seriously harmed socialist property, the Hanoi Municipal People's Court, in a recent trial of the first instance, handed down the following sentences:

--Tran Thanh Tinh: 5 years in prison.

--Hoang Thanh Phong: 6 years in prison.

The remaining persons were given sentences ranging from a 12 month suspended sentence to 5 years in prison. They are jointly responsible for repaying the money they took from the state.

7809

CSO: 4209/379

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

HANOI CRACKS DOWN ON ILLEGAL ELECTRICITY USE

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 11 May 82 pp 1, 4

[Article by Quang Cat: "From the Inspection of the Use of Electricity in a Number of Localities"]

[Text] Recently, the Power Service, in coordination with the Public Security Service, conducted an inspection along Dai Co Viet Road in Hai Ba Trung Ward and prosecuted more than 20 places for using electricity illegally to make ice cream and noodles, mill flour and even press "pa-panh" bricks. Learning from experience that although something might yield initial results it is not necessarily a thorough success, a number of persons who steal electricity failed to change for the better. The people have demanded that responsible agencies take more concrete, sterner measures.

On Sunday, 9 May, the inspection group dispatched its forces to begin phase two. This time, the group had two deputy directors of the Power Service, more than 10 policemen and dozens of workers of the Power Service and the Dong Da Ward branch power office.

On Lane 85 in Nam Dong Subward, we looked up at the tops of the houses and saw that crisscrossing electric lines had been installed. A number of houses had electric meters but the power lines had been installed directly into the house. Clearly, the theft of electricity was widespread. Many households were using electricity to operate ice cream machines and ice making machines, produce chemicals, operate looms, cook food and cook bran for hogs without ever paying for the electricity. One person was even making explosives by using the electricity to submit a certain type of chemical fertilizer to electrolysis. There, we found dozens of batches of finished explosives, an electrolysis unit in operation and even a converter for converting AC electricity into DC electricity. This person (who had a previous criminal record) not only stole electricity, but also destroyed fertilizer, which agriculture needs, and committed the crime of producing flammable explosives that endangered the people in the vicinity. The party was arrested and all evidence was confiscated.

All other households engaged in illegal production, such as the production of ice cream and ice, the operation of looms, the milling of flour, using electric stoves for cooking and so forth were fined and evidence was confiscated. In particular, nearly 1,000 meters of telephone wire stolen from the state, which the owner of the household had spliced together with the intention of selling, was confiscated.

It can be said that this inspection was welcomed by the people very much. As the group was about to leave, the people of O Chau Dua Subward invited them to "visit" Gieng Lane. The group immediately sent a detachment there. As it turned out, there were many households along the lane producing ice cream illegally. In one of the houses in which ice cream was being made, we saw machines placed near a foul smelling sewer drain, ice cream containers inside a hog pen, laundry pots being used to hold sugar...

The owner of the house was immediately arrested not only because he stole electricity and engaged in illegal production, but also because he is a person without conscience who has little regard for the health and lives of the people.

On this one lane, the group confiscated nearly a dozen ice cream machines.

The inspection achieved good results because it was actively supported by the police forces and had the wholehearted sympathy and support of the people and cadres of the various subwards.

On the occasion of this inspection, the deputy director of the Power Service said: if this is what we found on only two lanes in two subwards, the amount of electricity being stolen throughout Hanoi must use up the rest of the capacity of the Yen Phu Power Plant! The primary cause of the sudden losses of electric power is the theft of electricity which causes an overload and destroys main transformers. Eliminating the theft of electricity would help to provide the capital with a better source of power.

Summer has arrived and countless illegal ice cream installations within the city are in operation. They not only cause a waste of electric power, but also harm the health of the people. Prosecution must be more determined; we should not simply enforce a small fine (which usually constitutes a very small portion of their income) because, after the inspection group leaves, they go back to making ice cream.

The Power Service requests all the people to denounce these persons who are using electricity illegally so that they can be promptly prosecuted. It is best if the letters denouncing these persons are signed but the service will still conduct an immediate investigation even if they are not signed.

Soon, the Power Service will also coordinate with the Public Security Service to conduct continuous inspections and work at many other places. In addition,

the wards and subwards also must organize electricity inspection units that engage in strong activities in order to achieve the desired results, both in breadth as well as depth.

7809

GSO: 4209/379

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

JOURNALISTS COMMENT ON REAGAN POLICY

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 6 Jun 82 pp 2, 4

[Article: "Reagan--His Policies and the Man"]

[Text] Editorial Note: are any aspects of the line and policies of the Reagan administration deserving of attention? Where will this line and these policies lead? These are some of the questions that were raised, analyzed and commented upon in a number of foreign newspapers when evaluating the first year in office of the 40th U.S. president.

Recently, the editorial board of QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Newspaper held an exchange of opinions between the editors and a number of cadres who specialize in studying contemporary events at central agencies. Below are the opinions of Nhuan Vu, Minh Son, Xuan Oanh, Vu Hien, Ta Duy Duc and Phan Lang.

Ta Duy Duc: I would like to express some opinions concerning the first question: are there any aspects of the line and policies of the Reagan administration that are worthy of attention? I think that, in order to point out the aspects that are "worthy of attention," it is first of all necessary to point out what Mr. Reagan wants to achieve through this line and policy. Actually, we need wait no longer; Mr. Reagan himself has frequently stated what he wants. He wants this: to reverse the situation and put the United States back into the position of number one superpower, which it occupied in the 1950's, and make it economically and militarily strong, and, in particular, achieve military supremacy. And, these objectives, according to the desires of Mr. Reagan, will be met in a short period of time. I vaguely remember that the American communist party has also exposed this plan of the U.S. military-industrial complex...

Phan Lang: your memory is good. In a recent issue of the journal FOR PEACE AND SOCIALISM, Arnold Beckett, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and national secretary of the American communist party, wrote an article analyzing in detail the ambition of the Reagan administration and called it "a lightning-like counter attack" designed to turn defeat into victory and restore the imperialist United States to the position it lost.

Nguyen Vu: in order to point out the "aspects deserving of attention" or the so called "special characteristics" and "special features" of the line and policies of the Reagan administration, it is best to employ the comparative method. Some persons compare Reagan to Nixon, saying that these two U.S. presidents are very similar in temperament in that they both are insanely anti-communist and that the policies of Mr. Reagan are the embodiment of the "10 rules of action of the U.S. president" which Nixon set forth in "The Real War," which he wrote a few years ago. Other persons compare Reagan to Eisenhower, the U.S. president who, along with Dulles, was the architect of the "cold war" policy, which took mankind to the brink of war. However, in my opinion, the plumage of these three "hawks" is not the same.

Minh Son: I agree, In the final analysis, when viewed in terms of its nature, the policy line of every U.S. president, with the exception of none, has been anti-communist, anti-socialist, anti-revolutionary, bellicose and oriented toward the arms race for the purpose of achieving military superiority; however, the presidents have differed in terms of the methods and tricks employed by them. This difference has been due to historic circumstances, to changes in the balance of power between the two sides and, to some extent, to the fact that each president has placed his "personal seal" on specific policies...

Ta Duy Duc: in my opinion, the difference in the strategic methods and tricks employed by Reagan and Nixon lies in the following: Nixon opposed the three revolutionary currents but also advocated rendering the Soviet Union ineffective in order to concentrate on opposing the national liberation revolution, the focal point being the war of aggression against Vietnam and the plan being to win victory in Vietnam and deliver a strong blow to the three revolutionary currents in order to divide and undermine the revolutionary movements. Reagan advocates a different policy: direct confrontation with the Soviet Union...

Phan Lang: actually, if we only talk about "direct confrontation with the Soviet Union," before Reagan, Eisenhower adopted the same policy. However, the two styles of "confrontation" differ. Eisenhower advocated "direct confrontation with the Soviet Union" by means of the "massive retaliation strategy," "by means of the nuclear blow." Reagan, on the other hand, says that all of the anti-imperialist developments taking place throughout the world are the result of "international terrorism" and the "hand of the Kremlin, Hanoi and Havana." For this reason, "the United States must thoroughly oppose them," "must confront the Soviet Union not only within the Soviet Union but outside the Soviet Union as well," that is, confront the Soviet Union everywhere and in many different fields, not only in the field of "delivering a nuclear blow."

Vu Hien: when the invitation arrived from you to participate in this forum, the International Office of TAP CHI CONG SAN assigned me to survey the opinions of the office's editors. We would like to point out another "aspect deserving of attention" concerning the very sinister assemblage of forces in the Reagan

strategy. Of course, this is a matter with which every U.S. president has been concerned. However, as we stated, the policies of Mr. Reagan have been adopted at a time when U.S. imperialism is mired in a comprehensive crisis and is in the "post-Vietnam period." This can be irrevocably stated. Today, the United States can do nothing by itself. For this reason, assembling forces, primarily regaining control of and strengthening the position of the United States within the western European and Japanese bloc and then closely collaborating with the Beijing expansionists and other reactionary powers and traitors, is, to the United States, which is on the decline, a very pressing issue.

Xuan Oanh: I have the task of and the conditions for observing the movement [words indistinct] the social attitudes of the United States. I would like to cite another characteristic. Compared to previous presidents, Mr. Reagan is very much more vocal when it comes to provoking big country chauvinism within the United States. He is appealing to the United States to be ready to tighten its belt to "restore vitality to the U.S. giant," to "restore honor to the great United States." On the other hand, he is also trying to exploit the "for a change" psychology, that is, the psychology of wanting things to change, which is rather widespread in the United States at this time, which is growing tired of the structural crisis, the crisis of confidence... "Let us see how Reagan does; whatever happens, he will bring about a change in policy"; this trend of thinking among some Americans is causing Mr. Reagan to think that he is correct and that his compatriots support him.

Ta Duy Duc: actually, there is still another aspect that can be discussed. Under Reagan, not only military, but other measures as well have been very much more intensely pursued, especially the measures of establishing economic embargoes, waging war by means of other persons...(as the United States did when the Afghanistan and Polish "incidents" occurred...). The reason why Reagan has had to do this is the reason mentioned by Vu Hien in his analysis, namely, "the pressing need to assemble forces." Today, if the United States relied purely upon U.S. military measures, it would be unable to do anything. Therefore, of necessity, he has had to take comprehensive, simultaneous and coordinated measures besides military threats; Mr. Reagan has also attached very much importance to using the economic "carrot" and even the economic "stick"...

Nhuan Vu: if we compare Reagan to preceding U.S. presidents, there is another difference that can be cited. Preceding U.S. presidents, including Nixon and Eisenhower, were very aggressive but their strategy was selective. The Reagan strategy embraces much more; it wants everything. It seeks to achieve military superiority and a strong economy. It wants western Europe, wants the entire Middle East, western Asia, southern Asia, northern Asia, Central America, the Caribbean Basin ..even "two Chinas"; generally speaking, there is not any region that it does not "want." Greedy, very greedy but they do not know their strength--this is another aspect deserving of attention.

Minh Son: as regards Nhuan Vu's observation that Mr. Reagan is "greedy," I would like to say something about the "personal seal" issue we raised previously. We discussed the inevitable causes of the birth of Reagan's policies as products of defeat and products of obstinancy. We say "inevitable" because if the 40th president of the United States were not Mr. Reagan, if he were Mr. Jones or Mr. Smith, the policy of the U.S. imperialists in the "post-Vietnam period" would, in its broad strokes, be basically the same as it is now. In past years, when encountering a general crisis, the imperialist cliques always gave first thought to using force, to the arms race, to preparations for war and to starting wars in order to free themselves from the crisis. What I want to say about the "personal seal" of Reagan is this: Mr. Reagan is a person who belongs to the largest military-industrial establishment in the United States, whose power and profits are closely linked and directly proportional to the arms race. His specific policy is always designed to place the interests of this group above everything else. As regards Reagan, there is even the matter of compromising class and group interests.

Phan Lang: I would like to say something regarding the "personal seal" point that Minh Son just developed upon: as you know, in contrast to Nixon and Eisenhower and a number of other U.S. presidents whom commentators of this country still maintain were "persons with a strategic outlook," Mr. Reagan does not come from a political background, but the background of an actor, a salesman. Of course, he left these occupations long ago but these occupations did leave an imprint on his thoughts and actions. One day, I read a newspaper article by an American correspondent drawing the attention of American public opinion to the fact that they should not forget that Mr. Reagan possesses the occupational habits of an actor, that is, of persons who frequently confuse their parts on the stage with the truth in life. This correspondent mockingly stated: he is most afraid that Reagan believes what he says about the power of the United States when he is inspired to brag, invent stories and talk in the style of a stage actor to be the truth and then do something rash.

Xuan Oanh: we are talking about the "strategy of Reagan." Yet, there is still this to consider, friends. The compatriots of Mr. Reagan, at least a rather large number of them, still maintain that Mr. Reagan has no strategy whatsoever. A short time ago, we received a delegation of American clergy and asked them about the "strategy of Reagan." Laughing, they replied in this way: "Our Vietnamese friends, as you know, following the battle of Waterloo, Napoleon sent a letter to a poet friend of his and lamented that in the hands of the French emperor there is no consistent strategy, only one that changes with developments. The plight of the imperialist United States today is similar. If we understand strategy as a farsighted plan for a long period of time, the Reagan administration truly has no strategy whatsoever. Mr. Reagan is groping, doing that which is easy while looking for ways to work around that which is difficult and even denying his initial intentions."

Phan Lang: I think that Xuan Oanh's American guests made a good point. In terms of general intentions and objectives, the Reagan policy is clear. However, the

tricks, methods and measures for achieving these intentions have not been formed, are not complete. It is true that Mr. Reagan is groping. As a result, the policies of Mr. Reagan are not only bellicose in nature, but adventurous as well and this is something that we must very attentively follow.

Ta Duy Duc: the insane arms race policy of the Reagan administration is pushing the world into a very dangerous situation: today, the number of weapons of mass murder that has been stockpiled has reached the point where every living thing on the planet can be annihilated many times. To the United States, the purpose of the arms race is, obviously, to prepare for war. However, in my opinion, this is not a simple calculation but a dual calculation...

Nhuan Vu: I agree that we must develop upon the opinions concerning this and would like to say something additional. As you know, the Reagan administration plans to increase the military budget over the next 5 years to 1.5 trillion dollars. What does he want? He wants to force the Soviet Union to agree to a test of strength that, according to him, would benefit the United States far more than the Soviet Union. Mr. Reagan's thinking is this: the Soviet economy is not as strong as the U.S. economy; therefore, the Soviet Union has but two choices: the Soviet Union must step back and allow the United States to achieve military superiority or, if the Soviet Union does not do this, it will have to bear a heavy military burden, thereby breaking the back of its economy.

Vu Hien: that's very interesting! The international office of TAP CHI CONG SAN here in our country has prepared some economic data that can shed some light on this calculation of Mr. Reagan. Let us review a few lessons of history.

As you know, in the 1950's, when the industrial goods of the United States constituted more than one-half the total industrial output of the world, the economic might of the Soviet Union equalled only about one-sixth of that of the United States. Yet, even during this period, the Soviet Union, not the United States, successfully produced the means to carry nuclear weapons to any place on the planet. This event led to the "Sputnik Crisis," as it is called in the West. Today, 30 years later, the industrial products of the United States have fallen from more than one-half to 26 percent of the total industrial output of the world. U.S. commerce has also declined, from 36 percent to 10 percent. In these 30 years, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik and has recorded the following figure: at present, the economic potential of the Soviet Union equals four-fifths of that of the United States.

Minh Son: I think that, in contrast to what Mr. Reagan plans, the heavy burden of the arms race is breaking the back of the U.S. economy. This reality is causing Americans to look far ahead and it is this that is the basis of the declining confidence of the masses in Reagan.

Phan Lang: I think that Mr. Reagan's arms race policy, as calculated by its architects, is not only directed toward the Soviet Union, but to the allies of the United States as well.

Whereas in the field of modern weapons production, the countries of western Europe and Japan are not the equal of the United States, they must still "depend upon the nuclear umbrella" of the United States. Therefore, the more the United States pursues the arms race, the more dependent upon the United States these countries become.

In recent years, the countries of western Europe and Japan have shown themselves to possess major advantages over the United States in economic competition. Mr. Reagan's very shrewd decision to force western Europe to participate in the arms race has not only turned western Europe into the tail of the United States, but is also designed to eliminate their economic competitiveness, which is now causing very many difficulties to the U.S. economy. The situation can be summarized in one sentence: the policy of drawing the countries of western Europe and Japan into the arms race with the United States is also a policy to regain control of western Europe and Japan and confirm U.S. political, military and economic control over its allies.

Xuan Oanh: I agree with Phan Lang and the others who have stated the need to "regain control of western Europe and Japan," which is a very pressing need to the United States. Let us examine this matter from an economic viewpoint.

Vu Hien presented data which show that, in 1980, the industrial output of the United States only constituted 26 percent of world output. I would like to say in addition that, in 1980, the industrial output of the NATO bloc constituted 18 percent and that of Japan constituted 9 percent of world output. Of course, we know that when it launched World War II, Germany's industrial output only constituted 13 percent of world output. However, the situation then was very much different than it is now. Now, the socialist countries, which are the nucleus in the effort to safeguard peace, have an industrial output that constitutes more than one-third of world output. Clearly, in order to do this, the strength of the United States must be combined with the strength of western Europe and Japan.

Regaining control of western Europe and Japan is the reason why Mr. Reagan is so intensely promoting the arms race.

Next, the persons participating in the forum shifted to an exchange of opinions concerning the issue "Where will the line and policies of Reagan lead?" Referring to the recent article written by Brzezinski in which he mocked Reagan as "an intellectually inadequate president," the participants in the forum predicted that "Reagan policy will experience a crisis in late 1982" and stated that we must wait and see whether the prediction made by the former White House security advisor is correct or incorrect but they also see that the Reagan "new foreign affairs strategy" has encountered at least the following several setbacks in the 1 year it has been in effect:

--The Reagan administration hopes "by means of a lightning-like counter attack," to achieve military superiority; however, despite great efforts, the United States has not been able to reverse the situation. According to a western strategic studies agency, from a military viewpoint, the United States "is still 5 years behind the Soviet Union in strategic weapons, not to mention conventional weapons."

--The Reagan administration pinned very many hopes on the "Polish incident," believing that they could use this "incident" to draw western Europe and their allies into confrontation with the Soviet Union; however, not only did this fail to "unite" them, but "Poland also became a challenge, a divisive force in the relationships between the United States and the western Europe and Japan bloc" because "in the end, western Europe and Japan acquiesced to the power of the Soviet Union."

--Reagan's policy of "confronting the Soviet Union" everywhere and his policy of "determinedly using deterrent force" have, instead of improving, caused the situation in El Salvador and the situation in the Caribbean Basin, the "backyard of the United States," to continue to develop in a manner unfavorable to the United States.

--The Reagan administration has stated that the Middle East is "vital to the United States" but it has still not successfully resolved the crisis, has not dampened the anti-American movement in this region and still not changed the situation, if not to say that the situation is worse than before Reagan entered the White House.

--Despite the fact that, with the support of China, the United States has found a way to sneak into the "club of nations," thereby deceiving a number of gullible persons and winning over a few wavering powers, as a result of his bellicose policy and his policy of collaborating with fascist governments in the developing countries, Mr. Reagan is shunned and hated by the "Third World." The Reagan administration is being denounced by Africa for its policy of collaborating with the South African authorities. This administration is also being denounced by the people of Argentina and Latin America for collaborating with and supporting the British colonialists in the Malvinas.

Reagan suffered a defeat and was very surprised by the unprecedented peace movement in Europe, Japan and even the United States over the decision of the White House to deploy new missiles and pursue the arms race.

--Despite very many efforts to put together an evil alliance to direct a spearhead against the Soviet Union, the Reagan administration, with its "one China, one Taiwan" policy, has failed to establish this alliance, thereby, in the opinions of some persons, bringing Sino-American collaboration to a standstill.

Concluding the exchange of opinions, the participants in the forum unanimously agreed that although the policies of the Reagan administration are replete with contradictions, especially the contradiction between ambition and actual capabilities, it must be realized that because of the insane arms race policy of the present administration in the United States, the world is being moved ever closer to the most tense and dangerous situation since the end of World War II.

This makes it necessary for the people of the world to be especially vigilant in the face of the insidious schemes and reckless actions of the warmongerers and necessary to clearly establish struggling to safeguard peace as the very pressing task of foremost significance at this time.

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CSO: 4209/390

WORKERS EXPORTED TO USSR, EASTERN EUROPE

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 11 Jun 82 p 19

[Article by Denis D. Gray in Bangkok]

[Text]

VIETNAM is sending thousands of workers to the Soviet Union and other Soviet-bloc nations under an expanding labour-export programme to help pay off debts to those communist countries, according to official statements and diplomatic sources here.

Western diplomats say Vietnamese officials in Hanoi privately acknowledge that about 60 per cent of the earnings generated by these workers is used to repay debts or finance imports from the Soviet bloc.

Recent refugees from northern Vietnam, interviewed by the Associated Press in Hong Kong, claimed that one third of the wages earned by the labourers goes to them in the form of an allowance while the rest is channelled to the state to use as it deems necessary.

"Since Vietnam doesn't have much to export these days it would be logical for them to export labour which they have in abundance," said one West European diplomat who follows Indo-chinese developments from Bangkok.

Some refugees fleeing to South-East Asian points from southern Vietnam claim that coercion is used to muster recruits and that some Vietnamese are being subjected to "slave labour" conditions.

These refugees claim that among those destined for places like Siberia are former officers of the fallen South Vietnamese regime who had been placed in harsh "re-education camps" after the 1975 communist victory. Also targeted, the refugees claim, are urban residents unwilling to move to remote "new economic zones" which the communist government in Hanoi established to reduce the populations of congested cities and build up agriculture.

Western diplomats here are generally cautious about such stories.

Better wages

"Are some people going to the salt mines? We just don't know yet," says one Western diplomat who follows Soviet-Vietnam relations.

Besides the possible human-rights issue, some Western nations which accept Vietnamese refugees for resettlement are concerned that stories of "labour camps" circulating in Vietnam — true or not — may increase the outflow of refugees.

The refugees in Hong Kong say there is no coercion involved in recruitment and that some workers even pay bribes to be allowed to go to countries of their choice. Wages — despite the hefty cuts the state takes — are better than in Vietnam, the refugees say. An average worker in Hanoi currently earns about 200 dong (US\$22) a month plus allowances.

Eastern Europe is definitely preferred over the Soviet Union, according to refugee accounts. The refugees say that some Vietnamese and have written home to complain about unexpectedly harsh conditions. These workers, however, were reportedly aware that they could end up laying pipelines or building railways in Siberia since the programme stipulates that recruits can state their countries of preference but not places of work within a country.

Although Vietnamese students and trainees have been going to the Soviet Union for three decades, the work programme began with an April 2, 1981, Soviet-Vietnamese aid agreement. Neither country has given specific figures on the total number of workers involved.

Some refugees claim to have seen newspaper articles in southern Vietnam saying that 500,000 labourers would be sent between 1982 and 1985. This figure — about one per cent of the country's population — appears to be excessive to some of the Indochina experts and has not been cited in any official Vietnamese document available outside the country.

The Soviet government newspaper Izvestia said on May 3 that 7,000 Vietnamese men and women, aged 17 to 35, were working in Soviet enterprises, including some in the not-so-remote areas of Siberia.

The Czechoslovak News Agency reported in

April that 14,000 Vietnamese were working in Czechoslovakia while 3,100 others were in the country for training and study. Vietnamese workers are also believed going to East Germany and Bulgaria but not — at least for the time being — to Poland or Hungary.

Vietnamese Labour Minister Dao Thien Thi emphasised in a recent article that this "new-form bilateral labour cooperation" was a system of work and study that would both imbue Vietnamese labourers with the "industrial working style" and "contribute to communist construction in the Soviet Union."

Reflection

He said that workers were being sent for five to six years and enjoyed the same rights and benefits, including wages, as their Soviet counterparts. The Soviet media have said that after three years of work the Vietnamese may return home for vacation, with the Soviet Union paying most of the round-trip fare.

Labour Minister Thi wrote in the article that Vietnamese workers were already at engineering plants, coal mines, chemical works and textile mills in Astrakhan, Volgograd, Donetsk, Kemerovo, Rostov, Krasnodar and other areas. He said that the programme was being expanded in 1982 "to embrace other jobs and fields."

The extent of Vietnam's debt to the Soviets and Eastern Europe is not known but it is widely believed to be substantial, even if it is assumed that Moscow also provides economic grants and doesn't charge for the military aid needed to keep hundreds of thousands of Hanoi's troops in fighting trim in Cambodia and along the Chinese-Vietnamese border.

The value of Vietnamese exports to the Soviet Union, chiefly agricultural produce, is sometimes given as about half its imports from Soviet-bloc nations.

The Vietnamese and Soviet media present the new labour programme as another step in Moscow's effort to develop Vietnam's manpower and a reflection of strengthening links between the two countries.

Vietnam has noted that the first regular Soviet training programme began in 1951 when 21 Vietnamese students went to Moscow for study and that as of Jan. 23, 1981, more than 14,000 young Vietnamese men and women had attended higher Soviet educational institutions. In November, 1981, Vietnam said that 4,600 students were attending 150 colleges in 33 Soviet cities.

Radio Moscow said on Sept. 2, 1981, that 60,000 skilled Vietnamese workers and cadre had been trained in the Soviet Union and had returned to their homeland. — AP

CSO: 4220/631

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS CONTINUE TO WORSEN

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 17 Jun 82 p 19

[Article by Colin Campbell]

[Text]

THE Vietnamese economy is in a shambles and communists and Western economists, in varying degrees, cite war and the huge military establishment as primary causes. But even Vietnamese leaders are beginning to concede that part of the blame must be placed upon government mismanagement, rigid policies, lack of popular support, official corruption and general weariness.

Signs of deep trouble are everywhere. City streets are full of people with little to do but walk, sit or ride their bikes. Consumer goods are extraordinarily scarce, even more so in orthodox Hanoi than in Ho Chi Minh City, an incorrigible centre of enterprise. The best hotels cannot find light bulbs. Apartments in a six-year-old housing complex lack running water.

Vietnam reported it produced 15 million tons of food grains last year. The performance, largely a result of allowing some private farmers in

the south to sell in an expanded free market, was an improvement over previous years, when floods and other calamities necessitated millions of tons of rice and wheat imports. But imports were sharply reduced to pay the suddenly tripled price of Soviet-supplied oil and Vietnamese nutrition suffered — the people are thin. United Nations experts report most get insufficient calories.

The socialist republic of Vietnam has suffered repeated failures in industrial projects. Lack of raw materials, spare parts, competent managers and engineers has caused even communist aid missions to demand fundamental changes. Non-communist aid missions voiced similar complaints before World Bank, Japanese and much other aid was frozen after Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978.

The most frustrated donor may be Sweden, after a decade of trying to get a computerised

US\$500 million paper mill going at Bai Bang, north of Hanoi. Despite the labours of more than 600 Swedes billeted in an air-conditioned village, the facility is still not

fully operational and Sweden is absorbing the costs. Vietnam has extensive forests but pulp is being shipped in from Sweden, Western diplomats said.

Technicians and diplomats from Eastern Europe have lately admitted to similar frustrations. A Hungarian-backed shoe factory reportedly turns out shoes too shoddy for export. East German technicians at a textile project in Da Nang, a European diplomat said, were arrested after coming to blows with Vietnamese co-workers over how to run things. Nikolai K. Baibakov, chairman of the Soviet state planning committee, is said to have demanded unsuccessfully in Hanoi last fall that Soviet managers be placed in charge of all Soviet projects.

'Clumsy'

Exports last year dropped while prices increased for imported oil, fabric for the textile industry, machinery and most other necessities. Hanoi's foreign currency reserves stood at exactly zero by February of this year, according to a confidential April 29 report by the International Monetary Fund. As of last Dec. 31, it was US\$38 million behind in payments to non-communist lenders.

After sharp economic declines in 1979 and 1980, last year was a good one for rice, light industry and some cash crops. But "such key industries as steel, fertiliser, textiles and cement showed significant declines, mainly because of poor management and continued shortages of raw materials and spare parts," the Fund said. For lack of payment, Iraq has stopped supplying oil. Aviation fuel is short; flights between Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City

have been cut back. Loans from Libya and Algeria have been rescheduled. A US\$30 million textile project financed by Italy, Belgium and West Germany is near collapse.

Official statements continue to blame the grim picture on "30 years of war," American bombings, the destruction of agricultural land by defoliants and the death or dislocation of millions of people. They also point to hostile China, requiring Vietnam to keep large numbers of troops (as many as 40 divisions, intelligence sources say) on the Chinese border and in Cambodia. Hanoi also blames its troubles on United States actions in drying up international aid and on domestic "reactionaries," including ethnic Chinese and southerners irreparably corrupted, it says, by the former United States presence.

But Western analysts, increasingly joined by European communists, stress managerial difficulties. The state-run economy, although less centralised and less fond of heavy industry than before 1979, they say, is still clumsy, slow to make decisions, inflexible on prices, indifferent to export opportunities based on cheap labour, oblivious to quality controls and innocent of the rigours of international trade. Managers are said to be unwilling to take responsibility; workers lack incentives. Western governments, defending their aid cutoff, point to the drain on the economy of the Cambodian occupation. The military absorbs much of the scarce supply of administrators and technicians. (Unlike the Vietnamese, few Western analysts believe that hundreds of thousands of soldiers could easily be transformed into useful workers.)

Criticism by foreign communists, Western creditors and many angry Vietnamese may be taking effect. The long-time officials and old warriors who run the country may be ready to loosen the economic reins a bit. Vietnamese officials have admitted to Western visitors, moreover, that "socialist transformation" of the south - including collectivised farming - will take longer than expected. And Sweden reportedly is being allowed to take control of its monumental paper mill.

Expertise

Officials have also been telling Westerners that poor countries, socialist or not, lack economic and technical expertise, and that the earlier political purges of experts in the south may have been a mistake. They speak of dreadful bureaucrats, opportunists in the party, the importance of family planning (the population is 55 million and growing at least 2.4 per cent a year) and the need to recruit young party members.

Occasionally, they even acknowledge what impresses many visitors as widespread weariness behind their good cheer and good manners - cynicism toward the government and impatience to reap the benefits of peace. "They are on their knees," said a European diplomat in Hanoi. "I think they will have to make changes soon, to become less rigid."

His opinion is widely shared among Westerners in Hanoi. But other observers point to the entrenched realities of state planning and poverty, and the declaration at the fifth communist party congress in March that the socialist transformation of the south must inevitably, albeit more carefully, proceed. Nearly all analysts, Vietnamese and foreign, well-wishers and enemies, agree that the economic crisis is authentic. Most believe that mastering it will require profound reforms.

CURRENT CONDITIONS IN HO CHI MINH CITY DESCRIBED

Hanoi VIETNAM COURIER in English No 4, Apr 82 pp 20-23

[Text]

"Anything new?" Like the *quid novi?* of the ancient Romans, that's the question you're asked whenever you return from Ho Chi Minh City, the former Saigon.

How to view the changes that have happened from year to year? From what angle?

That of the impressions one gets as one walks its streets and visits its markets, where there is much more noise and animation than in any other city of Vietnam? As before, the engine noises of motor tricycles, lorries and buses start at four in the morning but as the day passes, one notes a new feature: the preponderance of bicycles in city traffic.

In shops and markets there still is an abundance of foreign-made articles: fabrics, transistor sets, cassette recorders, wines, electrical appliances, electronic gadgets... but there is more and more competition from locally-made goods.

Even more than those diverse impressions, conversations heard in various circles—government employees, intellectuals, businessmen—are significant. As in previous years, the "negative aspects" (in fact "negative" is an inadequate translation of the Vietnamese words *tiêu cực*, which carry both socio-economic and moral connotations) constitute a favourite theme. But a new phrase now is at the centre of conversations: *làm ăn*. *Làm* means to work and *ăn*, to eat. Put together they take on a whole range of meaning: to

earn one's living, to do business, to run an enterprise, or lead an economic sector. Now *làm ăn* has overshadowed laments and plans to leave the country and occupies pride of place in the minds of both individual citizens and leading bodies of government departments and undertakings.

Not that the people of the City (in popular speech Ho Chi Minh City is referred to simply as the City, not only in the countryside but in other towns and cities of the South as well) did not have enough *làm ăn* sense in previous years. But they were "blocked". The year 1981 was one of "release". The process will certainly take on greater impetus in 1982 and carry people along by its very irresistibility.

People, enterprises, government departments, were blocked, not only by the general atmosphere, but by the regime of "subsidies". Administrative subsidies: the culprit who put a brake on initiatives, sterilized capital, immobilized stocks, short-circuited import-export flows, resulting in a decline of production, a low level of wages and salaries, and an unbearable standard of living for cadres and workers—had finally been unmasked.

It was then that Resolution 6 was taken by the Central Committee and Directives 25 and 26 by the Government: the "release" began. Before that, although no law had prohibited private undertakings—commercial, handicraft, industrial—the general atmosphere was such that a pernicious char-

acter was attached to them. Many cadres thought that the sooner they disappeared, the better it was for the building of the new socialist society.

People with some capital, either in cash or equipment, hesitated to engage in business activities for fear of being labelled "capitalists". Administrative authorities at various levels were unwilling to grant the necessary permits for fear of favouring the rebirth of "capitalism".

It was generally thought that since the regime was a socialist one the State had to take upon itself all economic activities: at one time in Hanoi, even bamboo tooth-picks were made and sold by a State factory. The State had to control all the capital, merchandise, materials, equipment, and hold a monopoly over home and foreign trade so as to determine planned and unified prices and wages and salaries for all government departments and enterprises. All these had to do was to operate according to the plans worked out by superior authorities. The State would provide them with materials, equipment, and cash for salaries and wages while they would deliver all their products to the State trading service at pre-determined prices. That enormous machinery was to operate without a hitch to the great satisfaction of all and gratify that humanitarian and rational spirit which had conceived it.

In fact that system had functioned after a fashion owing to the state of war and the simplicity of the economic apparatus: up to 1975, the economy of North Vietnam had been made up of only two sectors: an almost totally collectivized agriculture and a State sector whose revenue came mostly from foreign aid.

In those circumstances, the peasants supplied food grain to the State out of patriotic duty and obtained a certain quantity of goods in return. Prices and wages and salaries were part of a distribution system of an egalitarian character aimed at satisfying the minimal needs of a nation at war, rather than a system of exchange

based on real production costs, and this held for both internal and external trade.

The end of the war and national reunification introduced new factors of tremendous importance into the national economic picture:

- the cessation of foreign aid;

- the existence in the South of a private industrial, handicraft and commercial sector with an important amount of capital, materials, merchandise and equipment, mostly concentrated in the sprawling city of Saigon;

- the multiplicity of external commercial and economic relations with both socialist and capitalist countries.

To these must be added two other elements:

- For the past century the Mekong delta had been turning out large quantities of marketable produce, in contrast to the Red River delta in the North which had been producing barely enough to feed its own population.

- The flow of goods and foreign currency sent by people who had migrated abroad to their relatives at home, which supplied a fairly large portion of the Saigon population with a livelihood.

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Thus the return of peace and national reunification had created a totally new situation, fraught with considerable difficulties but also containing elements which could help to solve them. In a city of 4 million people who had lived almost wholly on American aid, there were 400,000 former Saigon soldiers besides a considerable number of police, functionaries and secret agents who only yesterday had been serving the Americans, plus half a million Hoa (people of Chinese descent) who controlled three-fourths of all capital and inventories and were tightly knit into a community heavily

influenced by Beijing's warlike propaganda. Questions of security held pride of place in the first years. The fall of Pol Pot and the defeat of Chinese aggression on our northern frontier in 1979 were to make the atmosphere somewhat healthier.

The first step in the releasing process was made by Resolution 6 of the Party Central Committee which affirmed the legality and legitimacy of private individual enterprise in the period of transition to socialism, a period which is to last many years. In the present conditions in Vietnam, private enterprise will not lead to a rebirth of capitalism but on the contrary will contribute to the growth of production.

Second step: government directives gave government departments and undertakings freedom of action to solve their problems relating to buying prices of materials and equipment, selling prices of products, and wages and salaries to be paid in accordance with local conditions, the yields obtained, and the workers' individual productivity, without being bound by the price and salary system established by higher authorities. Some enterprises, regions, cities and provinces were entitled to an allocation of foreign currency proportionate to their export capacity, which would allow them to obtain materials and equipment from abroad. Yet another step, which opened a new field of activity to government departments and enterprises: the recruitment of resistance cadres and functionaries and workers of the former regime had swollen their staffs and lowered productivity. Hence the low wages and salaries. Now, in a socialist country it was not possible to proceed to massive lay-offs, but from now on government departments and enterprises are allowed to use their excess personnel and underused equipment and materials as well as by-products — the results of administrative subsidies and bad management — in subsidiary activities after fulfilling the targets assigned to them by the State plan. Revenue from those

subsidiary activities are distributed to their employees in the form of increased wages and salaries, bonuses, and free lunches.

That release of unused potential in both the private and State sector has spawned a surge of activity. Shops have mushroomed, some opened by government services to manufacture bicycle tyres, automobile tyres, medicines, etc. Everywhere people try to turn out some kind of product with makeshift means. Export companies have been set up: Cholimex, Ficonimex, Pharimex, Direximco, etc. Overseas Vietnamese send capital, equipment, ideas. The movement has spread throughout the country, but possibilities are naturally the greatest in Ho Chi Minh City where most of the unused capital and stocks are concentrated.

New products appear in markets. A large number of workers, engineers, managers now receive salaries and bonuses which allow them to live decently. Hospital doctors can have a private clientele in their off-duty hours. The tone has been set, and the wheels put in place.

As happens with all new policies, not everybody agrees. Some try to put on the brakes. All is at sixes and sevens, so they claim: Private enterprises are turning out adulterated goods and steal materials from government stocks, while government departments and enterprises devote more energies to their subsidiary activities than to their official assignments. The free market rules the roost. Where are we heading?

Every coin has its reverse side, retort the partisans of release. The point is whether production is on the increase and salaried people better off. One has to accept the negative aspects of the movement while taking measures to limit their effects and check them.

It seems that the partisans of release are right if concrete results are examined: output value of industrial and handicraft production of the City went up from 2 billion *dong* in 1980 to 2.6 billion in 1981 of which 1.7 billion were

contributed by the industry under the direct management of the City; the value of exports from 44.5 million roubles (dollars) to 98 million. For 1982 a 40% increase is projected for industrial and handicraft production and one of 290% for exports. Is this over-optimism or the uncovering of considerable potential?

It seems that these optimistic estimates are well founded. However, there is a fear that the movement could spawn an uncontrollable free market, a mushrooming of private enterprises which could smother the State sector, accompanied by a resurgence of a consumer-society mentality which American aid had created and which now may again rear its head. There are already a few signs of this: the proliferation of tea-houses and restaurants, the consumption of foreign-made luxuries, tobacco and wines, etc. Is the City to become a parasitic metropolis, a consumer society, a colossal leech that will suck up the nation's wealth for its orgies and revelries, or is it to become an industrial, scientific, cultural and international-relations centre for the whole of the Mekong delta, a pole of development whose activity will benefit the whole country? This is a question that any observant visitor will ask himself.

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A superficial observer will have paid scant attention to the publication in December 1981 of a review named *Science and Development*. A modest circulation: fewer than 1,000 copies per issue and only 6 issues per year. It's not much for a city of 3.3 million people (if the suburban farmers are included). But it's a harbinger. A releasing process is also under way in intellectual and scientific circles. The leaders, freed from security preoccupations and possessed of more experience, are calling more and more on scientists for the elaboration of plans for

economic and social development.

It is true that following liberation many scientists had offered their services for the survey and exploration of natural resources, the study of new rice strains, or certain chemicals. But their participation had remained limited until 1980. After that date, the tone set by the releasing process has brought about a rapid advance of scientific and technological research, with a view especially to finding more natural resources for the development of industry, handicrafts and exports, exploring new sources of energy — biogas, solar and wind energy, replacement of petrol by alcohol obtained from vegetal matter, utilization of peat, designing of gas-producers for motor cars, etc. Geologists, geographers, chemists are the order of the day. A strong boost has been given to the study of traditional medicines in order to find substitutes for imported drugs. A centre of scientific information is being set up.

What is a real novelty is the use of social sciences, hitherto the poor relations, in the elaboration of plans for integrated technical, economical and social development. For the first time, social scientists trained in Europe and the USA have been given assignments.

The fields of activity of researchers (in both the natural and social sciences) now extends far beyond the City. Several provinces in the South — Long An, Tien Giang, Ben Tre... — have asked them to work out projects for high-yield rice growing, development of coconut and sugar-cane plantations, expansion of exports, etc. Engineers, agronomists, chemists, sociologists, economists, have formed teams which have presented leaders with integrated development plans for whole regions or districts. The improvisations which had led to sometimes disastrous failures in the first years are now giving way to plans worked out after serious surveys and investigations.

In September 1981 there were

two national conferences on the Mekong delta held in Ho Chi Minh City, one of natural scientists, the other of social scientists. For the first time ever, a systematic and global review was made of this region with its ecological and social peculiarities, and initial bases were laid for its future development. This development plan of prime importance for the future of the whole country constitutes an inexhaustible area of research for the scientists of Ho Chi Minh City.

Socialism thus begins to take root with the mobilization of scientists for long-term development. Those who visited Saigon, now Ho Chi Minh City, in the first years after liberation often complained that the subjects of conversation were mainly business deals and trafficking. Now in some circles it is the problems of the future that are debated. The City has gradually freed itself from preoccupation with short-term perspectives. Wider and wider circles passionately discuss the long-term projects now under way: the Tri An hydropower project (320,000 kW); the railway from Ho Chi Minh City to My Thuan on the left bank of the Mekong; the Vung Tau oil complex. Another new fact: one begins to realize how necessary Soviet assistance is to carry out these big undertakings. Imports from and exports to socialist countries are steadily rising. The City is step by step being integrated into the socialist Vietnamese nation and beyond it, into the world socialist system.

It is no mere accident that the releasing process has been especially effective in the 5th and 11th districts where the most active handicraft and small-industry undertakings and the most amply supplied shops of the City are concentrated. This also used to be a Hoa stronghold: the bankers and major traders and industrialists have left, but the

great majority of small traders and artisans — diligent and hard-working — remain. The streets of Cho Lon are as noisy and animated as before. The hustle and bustle never fails to amaze people venturing into that part of the City. The panic which had set in before and after the war started by Beijing and had caused a number of people to leave, is over. Now, with the releasing process, trading and industrial activities have been resumed with renewed vigour.

Thus the Hoa community has a chance to work with diligence and ingenuity to take its place in the Vietnamese nation, as the Chinese migrants of the 17th century who had worked alongside the Vietnamese in South Vietnam to open up virgin land in the deltas of the Mekong and Dong Nai rivers did. Their descendants, the *minh huong*, were gradually intergrated into the Vietnamese national community. The colonial period, French and American, is gone: the Hoa can no longer hope to carve for themselves a privileged position as compradors in the colonial system to the detriment of the indigenous people. They must also forgo their reliance on Beijing to force the Vietnamese people to grant them a higher status, especially with a view to carrying on profitable capitalist exploitation.

One may say that the majority of Hoa people in the 5th and 11th districts, and in other districts of Ho Chi Minh City and other cities of south Vietnam as well, now enjoy a better standard of living than the majority of Vietnamese. Generally speaking, this is something they deserve owing to their industry and ingenuity. If they abstain from serving Beijing's hegemonic ambitions the Hoa will preserve their place in Vietnam indefinitely and without any hitch. For centuries, the Vietnamese people gave refuge to those who fled China on the occasion of major natural disasters or political upheavals. I believe, viewing things in that perspective, that the number of Hoa remaining in Ho Chi Minh City will be much greater than that of those who have left it.

Am I too optimistic?

I have no illusions. In Vietnam the transition to socialism has barely begun. Who will win? This is a serious and urgent question, especially in Ho Chi Minh City. Here the State sector faces great difficulties in its competition with private enterprise. With encouragement from Washington, Beijing, and also Tokyo, those who dream of restoring the former regime have not lost all hope. Calls for sabotage, revolt, and desertion broadcast by Radio Beijing or the Voice of America still fall on willing ears. The past is still there: trafficking continues, including drug trafficking; in temples and pagodas crowds still come to beg for divine assistance in healing ailments or clinching profitable business deals; at the central V.D. clinic, doctors still diagnose new cases of gonorrhea or syphilis. It is a closely disputed contest. Besides, it is by no means easy to manage parallel free and socialist markets. There will be more ups and downs, more rules to make or

to break, more resistance to overcome, more traps to avoid.

Nevertheless the State sector in industry and trade is making steady progress, enrolment in schools and colleges is increasing rapidly, scientific research is assuming an ever more important role, major projects are attracting the interest of more and more people, north-south communications are intensifying, and cadres and leaders are learning to conserve the wealth and manage the affairs of the State ever better. Socialism has begun to take root.

In Ho Chi Minh City, patches of light and shadow exist side by side and jostle with each other, but light is indisputably gaining. More and more, Ho Chi Minh City, the ex-Saigon, is becoming a centre, a pole of development for the entire south of the country.

Ho Chi Minh City — Hanoi

March 1982

NGUYEN KHAC VIEN

CSO: 4220/186

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

STEP-UP OF DISTRICT ECONOMIC BUILDING IN VINH PHU URGED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 28 May 82 p 2

[Article by Hoang Quy, Secretary of Vinh Phu Provincial Party Committee:
"Some Problems in Building the District Economic Structure in Vinh Phu"]

[Text] Vinh Phu is a province with a diversified midland agriculture. Prior to the August Revolution, this province yielded many well-known agricultural products such as tea, lacquer, palms, pineapples, bananas, oleaginous seeds, etc. but its industrial production was then very small. Beside a number of traditional handicrafts in the rural areas and certain service installations in the two cities of Phu Tho and Vinh Yen, the whole province possessed only one paper pulp factory in Viet Tri.

After the complete liberation of North Vietnam, Vinh Phu became one of six industrial development centers in North Vietnam. To date, there are more than 80 centrally run and local enterprises in the entire province. Most enterprises in Vinh Phu are light industry ones which process agricultural and forest products found in the province or brought in from Hoang Lien Son and Ha Tuyen Provinces.

A rapid industrial development has stimulated and transformed the economic structure of Vinh Phu and has turned this agricultural province into an agroindustrial one whose industrial output value represents over 50 percent of the gross agroindustrial output value of the whole province; at the same time, the economic structure of each district has also been changed.

Today there are in Vinh Phu four forms of district economic structure with different characteristics as follows:

1. Agricultural or agroforestry district with a production system still based mainly on self-sufficiency: In districts of this category, the production of agricultural commodities is still underdeveloped and handicrafts are almost inexistent or if they do exist, they are not yet basically segregated from agriculture and their technique is still rudimentary. Typical of this category is the mountainous district of Yen Lap. To this category may be added the midland districts of Lap Thach, Song Thao, Tam Thanh, etc., whose production level has been better developed than that of Yen Lap but whose percentage of agricultural goods and products and whose degree of intensive

cultivation and handicraft development are generally still low. In these districts, the yearly handicraft output value is usually about 2 million dong (in terms of the old prices).

2. Relatively developed agrohandicraft district: In districts of this category, the production and intensive cultivation standards are rather high and there are many traditional handicrafts and famous handicraft villages which use raw materials produced locally or brought in from other districts and provinces and which supply each year a relatively large amount of agricultural products and goods and handicraft products to the province and to certain centrally-run factories located outside these districts. Typical of this category is Vinh Lac District where the use of lands and fields is rotated more than twice per year and whose fulfillment of the grain and food obligation accounts for more than one-fifth the gross output mobilized in the entire province. Moreover, this district supplies more than 30,000 tons of sugarcane and several hundred tons of beans and peanuts to the Viet Tri Sugar Factory and Ngoai Trach Oil Extracting Enterprise. The value of the small industry and handicraft output of the district is over 10 million dong (in terms of the old prices).

3. Agroindustrial district: In districts of this category, relatively large areas earmarked for the specialized cultivation and production of agricultural commodities have emerged to provide raw materials for centrally run and provincial-level factories established in these localities. Handicrafts have at times developed fairly well. Typical is Thanh Hoa District where the ratios of agricultural and industrial outputs are nearly equal. For example, the value of agricultural output represented 49 percent and that of industrial output 51 percent in 1980; these figures became 50.5 and 49.5 percent respectively in 1981.

4. Districts with a highly developed centrally run industry whose installations are not connected with the local sources of raw materials but instead use raw materials brought in from other places. Nevertheless, industrial development in these districts has had the effect of stimulating agriculture to serve factories, thus influencing rather deeply production and the appearance of rural areas. Typical is Phong Chau District. A comparison of the values of the district's industrial and agricultural outputs has revealed that agriculture represents only 21 percent while industry accounts for 79 percent (for which 72 percent belongs to the centrally run industry).

What has happened to Vinh Phu over the past 20 years in the mutation of districts from model category 1 to category 2 or from model categories 1 and 2 to category 3, accompanied by the emergence of an industry and technical revolution brought in from the central and provincial level according to the conditions of the soil, crops or minerals in these districts. For example, the mountainous district of Thanh Son and midland district of Doan Hung were not too far above Yen Lap District in matters of agricultural production standard; however, after a number of state farms and processing factories had been installed by the state in these two districts, the latter were immediately faced with the need to develop the production of agricultural items and commodities completely different from those in the past.

But the process of building the district economy in Vinh Phu has so far been marked by numerous vacillations and fumbblings due to a failure to realize that the law to be applied and the steps to be taken in upgrading agriculture from small- to large-scale production must be connected with the raising of the production force's standards and the building of a specific economic structure and mechanism in each district of different category. At times, there was a tendency to reorganize district production, to direct it uniformly on a district scale by considering each district to be a basic economic unit and to simultaneously conduct the decentralization of a number of agricultural stations and farms, tractor stations and mechanical engineering workshops coupled with the decentralization of certain distribution and circulation segments; this was done in the hope of creating conditions to quickly associate agricultural and industrial productions on the district scale. In practice, this working method sometimes got the district level into trouble, however, because the conditions of districts and their industrial-commercial leadership experiences had not yet been adequately prepared and developed. On the other hand, the method of uniformly directing production by continually launching concentrated effort movements also caused numerous difficulties to the routine production task of cooperatives and sometimes unwittingly weakened the latter's economy. In the economic life, agroindustrial association in each district is an objective law which has existed before we clearly perceive it but how to carry out this association satisfactorily must depend on the production level and economic conditions of each different district.

To promote agricultural or agroforestry districts with a still low standard of production from model category 1 to category 2 or 3, it is first necessary to take as a basis the land potential and the general farming technique and capacities of the local people and to actively invest material facilities and technical cadres after making realistic reckonings. If necessary, one may move a reinforcement contingent of skillful laborers from other areas to these districts and apply policies on land reclamation and appropriate prices to stimulate at all costs the development of the production of staple agricultural commodities. On this basis, one must gradually build and develop handicrafts and small industry along these two lines: state-operated installations or handicraft establishments built within cooperatives. Usually, category-1 districts are those which still have large unexploited land potentials. In these districts, development of the production of agricultural commodities must always be linked to the elimination of the self-sufficient status and the backward farming method resulting in the depletion of natural fertility. Therefore, instead of working at too quick a tempo at the beginning, one must carry out tasks and simultaneously build up typical models, train, educate and motivate the masses and correlate these activities with the need to bring about a practical profit to the people's daily life and to gradually accustom peasants with the new technique in order to make them enthusiastic about selling agricultural products and commodities to productive enterprises or to the purchasing agencies of the state.

With regard to districts of model category 2, beside the tasks of reorganizing production, improving management and encouraging the expansion of intensive and specialized cultivation areas, attention must be paid to restoring traditional handicrafts which have dwindled or vanished but are still needed by

society; at the same time, new trades must be developed in conjunction with changes in the sowing and planting pattern and according to the possibility of producing raw agricultural materials on the spot or expanding their exploitation in and conveyance from other areas. It is important to heighten technical standards in the fields of agriculture, small industry and handicrafts, to build and strengthen stations, farms and installations which supply technical materials and to encourage commercial corporations and marketing co-operatives to widen their scope of activity so as to boost the production of goods.

Category 2 is being considered a model suitable for the progressive abilities of many districts in the province. To take the initiative in rapidly increasing the number of districts after this model category is to quickly augment the amount of agricultural products and commodities and consumer goods under the initial economic conditions proper to a transitional phase. Through the path to be necessarily followed by category-2 districts is to advance to category 3, it is not absolutely essential to begin by building factories to process agricultural products on a large scale but rather by raising the ratio of the small-industry and handicraft production value within the overall district economy through making additional investments in technique, improving industrial designs and organizing more new and suitable trades.

Concerning districts of the agroindustrial model category, it is necessary to examine and overcome impediments in the allotment of obligations, in the pricing policy and in the relations and dealings between processing enterprises at the centrally run and provincial level, on the one hand, and cooperative installations and cooperative members, on the other, and to find ways to stimulate a rapid increase in the amount of agricultural products and commodities in order to fully use the existing factories' capacities. The present situation is still characterized by the fact that though the existing tea and fruit processing factories in these districts have not yet been working at full capacity, cooperatives are reluctant to grow more tea and pineapple crops because the pricing and purchasing procedures are still unsatisfactory and because appropriate investments have not yet been made in the production of raw materials. In these districts, handicrafts must also be restored and developed through a combination of modern and traditional handicraft techniques so as to fully use local raw materials and discards. In the field of agricultural technique, the cooperation and assistance provided by work sites and technical schools, stations and farms dependent on the central and provincial level and established in these localities must be better used to heighten the effectiveness of specialized cultivation zones and to rapidly raise the productivity of the main raw-materials producing crops just because these zones and crops constitute a basis for the agroindustrial districts' development.

As for districts with a large-scale centrally run industry, it is necessary to apply various policies to stimulate the development of those agricultural production sectors which serve the workers' life and to help cooperatives transform crop growing and animal husbandry patterns with a view to applying intensive cultivation to further increase the production of grain and food to meet

the daily requirements of the factories' activities. These factories must, in turn, help district cooperatives develop their diversified handicraft and small industry trades in order to increase the people's income value. Attention must be paid to recruiting local youngsters as [factory] cadres and workers in order to reduce the expenses to be incurred in ensuring their subsistence and activities and, at the same time, to create new conditions to carry out local labor division and further strengthen the sympathetic relations between the factories and people.

To effectively build the economic structure and mechanism of districts, the following measures are suggested:

--Research must be started soon to enable provinces to exercise decentralized management over industrial installations connected with local sources of raw materials. The reason is that once taking control of these installations, the provinces will have the necessary conditions to actively speed up the building and perfection of the district economic structure and to closely link the provincial and district economies within a more uniform structure.

--The question of every locality having to solve itself the grain problem within its own area in a self-sufficient manner must not be raised since the category-3 and -4 districts in Vinh Phu are not in a position to apply self-sufficiency in providing supplies to the factories and state farms set up in their respective areas. In addition to continuously encouraging the application of intensive cultivation to increase the volume of grain and food products, it is necessary to use the effect of an increased value of the principal agricultural products and commodities destined to promote the factories' activities as a yardstick to assess the result of these districts' economic activities.

--It is necessary to quickly modify the organizational mechanism of the district apparatus because the bulkiness and inefficiency of this apparatus make it difficult for various sectors to bring their proper functions into play and to apply an appropriate method of administrative-economic or economic-business management.

There still are countless hindrances in the districts' budgetary situation. A suitable percentage must be allocated to districts on the basis of the tax and profit collected from production units in these districts. Only by doing so can one incite districts to properly guide and serve the economic units' activities. The allocated percentage must be sufficient to enable the district budget to develop the common cultural activities and to make partial reinvestments in production installations with the aim of stimulating production development.

--In the sociocultural field in particular, excessive discrepancies between welfare works designed for centrally run enterprises and those destined to districts must be avoided. The best way is for the state, enterprises, cooperatives and people to join efforts to build schools, hospitals, cultural centers, etc. and then to use these installations in common, except for some special works needed by the enterprises only. This is a question which is related not only to life but also to the worker-peasant alliance in districts.

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

CIRCULAR DEFINES ELIGIBILITY FOR SUPPLY STANDARDS

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 8 May 82 p 3

[Article: "The Regulations for Supplying Goods to Subward and Village Cadres"]

[Text] Who Is Eligible for Which Supply Regulations and Standards?

On 6 April 1982, the Ministry of Home Trade issued circular number 03-NT, which provides guidance for implementing Council of Ministers' decision number 111-HDBT. The contents are as follows:

The persons to whom goods are supplied:

1. Subward and village cadres who receive monthly living cost subsidies equivalent to the amount stipulated in the current wage scale of the heads of specialized committees and the members of the standing committees of the mass organizations on the district level.
2. Professional and specialized cadres and personnel of subward and village party committees and people's committees who receive a monthly living cost subsidy corresponding to the current wage scale.
3. Technical cadres and public health and professional personnel who have a college, vocational middle school or elementary education, are employed in the occupation for which they were trained, are working in accordance with the general regulations of the state and are receiving living cost subsidies equivalent to the salary grade of cadres, are working in the same occupation within the state sector and are equally qualified.
4. The heads of village posts-telegraph stations and village postal personnel (not more than two persons per village).

As regards other persons:

--The Ministry of Home Trade will provide guidance regarding the cadres and personnel of marketing cooperatives, credit cooperatives and so forth who do not lie within the scope of the goods supply regulations of this circular.

--State cadres and personnel who are transferred by the upper level to strengthen subwards and villages and cadres and personnel of the state who are on disability leave or retired (who have regular subsidy books) and participate in subward or village work are not eligible for the supply of goods under this circular because they are supplied goods under decision number 218-CP.

--If, at the end of their term, subward and village cadres are not re-elected and are assigned new jobs, they will be subject to the supply regulations concerning the new job to which they are assigned. If they are not assigned new jobs, they are no longer eligible for the supply system.

The standards for supplying goods to subward and village cadres:

--Subward cadres are allowed to purchase the same food products and several industrial goods that manual workers and civil servants of the state staff purchase under decision number 218/CP.

--Village cadres are allowed to purchase four products at supply prices: cloth, sugar, laundry soap and bicycle spare parts.

The mode of supply:

Each year, the village and subward people's committees will draw up rosters of the village and subward cadres in the four categories mentioned above and submit them, along with the monthly living cost statements of the village, subward and district post-telegraph office (the statement of payments to the station chief and village postal personnel) to the precinct or district people's committee for verification in order to register for the issuance of ration coupons. The registration and coupon issuance procedures to be followed are those that are set forth in Ministry of Home Trade circular number 23-NT dated 19 October 1981.

The Department of Commercial Policy and
Technical Organization

The Ministry of Home Trade

7809

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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

EDITORIAL EMPHASIZES IMPORTANCE OF HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 11 May 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Encouragement and Assistance Must Go Hand in Hand with Guidance and Management"]

[Text] In order to resolve the difficulties faced now as well as over the long range, mobilizing labor forces to produce additional material wealth for society is of extremely important significance. In addition to consolidating, strengthening and developing the role of state-operated and collective production forces, we cannot forget a very large and diverse force, namely, the household economic sector. This force consists of households that work as subcontractors or directly support state-operated units, manual workers, civil servants and personnel of enterprises who perform additional work at home, retired manual workers and civil servants looking for work to perform at home in order to improve their standard of living, households that practice traditional trades or utilize unique technologies, families of private handicraftsmen and so forth. The policy of the party is to encourage this force to display its talents and develop production to insure that the household economy is truly a component of the socialist economy. This means that it is necessary to develop upon positive factors and stop and limit negative factors. We must encourage families that have economic ties to the state-operated and collective economies, families that earn their livings correctly and support the national economy and welfare of the people in order to help them accelerate their production and improve the quality of consumer and export goods. At the same time, we must stop such bad ways of earning a living as developing production in a random manner, conspiring to send valuable raw materials of the state to the outside, evading taxes, using the names of producers to sell products and engaging in profiteering and disrupting the market. In summary, with regard to this production force, encouragement and assistance must go hand in hand with guidance and management.

Because of the diverse nature of the household economy, the methods of management that are employed must also involve many different forms and degrees. The spirit of the party policy must be manifested in specific regulations that give priority to those families that directly support the plan of the state, families with unique trades, persons who utilize sophisticated technology and households that earn their livings correctly. However, certain distinctions must still be made between

the cooperative sector and the private sector regarding political and economic interests in order to avoid unintentionally encouraging cooperative members to leave their cooperatives for private work. On the other hand, it is possible to gradually plan their production to support the overall plan on the basis of their occupations, trades, products, circumstances and level.

As for producers, they should also realize that they have an obligation to socialist construction. Everyone should devote his talents and energies to serving common interests, which include their own interests, and improve their living conditions by contributing many good products to society.

7809

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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

VENDOR'S BRISK BUSINESS SEEN AS CLUE TO PLEASING CONSUMERS

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 11 May 82 p 1

[Article by T.T.: "Behind a Vendor's Stand"]

[Text] Not long ago, passers-by noticed a woman selling glassware at the corner of Ba Trieu and Ham Long Streets. On the piece of nylon she had spread on the ground were only a few products, such as glasses, flower vases and so forth but their style was pleasing and they attracted customers.

A few days later, we noticed that the variety of glassware being sold at this corner had been expanded to many products. This growth has continued and now some of the products there number in the dozens, from lantern globes and fish sauce flasks to goldfish bowls, jars for preserving apricots and so forth priced from 2 to 3 dong up to 40 to 50 dong apiece. Of course, the daily volume of business is not the 50 to 70 dong that it was at the start, rather, it is in the hundreds of dong.

Passers-by give their attention to this stand not only to determine whether the vendor has a business license and complies with market management regulations (this is the task of responsible persons) but also think about a number of other things.

First, the emergence and the customer appeal of this glassware prove that consumers have needs for both quantity and quality and desire new products that are consistent with their requirements. For example, now that sugar is being sold on a regular basis, sugar bowls are needed; in the apricot season, jars are needed to preserve apricots. When many flowers are available, suitable style flower vases are needed and so forth. Therefore, glass products (as well as the other types of consumer goods) must be diverse and consistent with the requirements of the market.

Secondly, consumers have needs which enterprises, cooperatives and state stores have not expanded their production and business to meet and, when they have a source of products, private individuals will spontaneously "serve" these needs instead.

If state-operated enterprises have products but do not have a suitable mode for selling them, they are difficult to sell. Here, private individuals are more astute. They provide water to their customers to show that their glassware does not leak and even provide packing straw to prevent the glassware from being broken.

To resolve the problem of consumer goods for the people, I do not think that we should prohibit the activities of private individuals, but guide them in the correct direction and insure that they comply with production, business and market management regulations and do not disrupt traffic order or the beauty of the streets. Another important aspect is that state-operated and collective forces must take the initiative in expanding their production and business and meet both quantitative and qualitative requirements; state stores must firmly control the sources of goods in order to distribute them in a timely fashion and the method of selling goods must also be more thorough, with more attention given to the requirements of buyers.

State-operated and collective economic forces have a network that can manage the market well.

7809

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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

STATE STORES CRITICIZED FOR LACK OF SUMMER GOODS

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 8 May 82 p 3

[Consumer Notebook column by "Nguoi Tieu Dung"(The Consumer): "Late and in Short Supply"]

[Text] The weather has turned to summer but a corresponding change has not been seen at the state stores. There are still many types of cold weather goods on display on department store counters but summer goods which are needed by the people are either not seen or are only available in very small quantities at very high prices. A number of other products, such as conical hats, caps, paper fans and so forth are still monotonous and affected and their quality is not commensurate with their price. There is a shortage of the various types of electric fans at electric appliance stores but the same stores are filled with oil stoves and a few other products. Food and beverage stores have only a few types of flat-tasting syrup water but virtually no beverages made from fresh fruit...

We have shifted to doing business in the new spirit but the distribution and circulation sector has allowed its old malady (cotton blankets in the summer, electric fans in the winter) to reoccur and is somewhat weak. It is hoped that concerned sectors will quickly take steps to provide guidance and overcome these problems in order to promptly provide goods to serve the needs of the people of the city during the summer for food and clothing. Corporations should do additional business in necessary products in order to meet a portion of demand and reduce the supply shortage. If a few other products are in short supply, the sector should distribute them in a selective manner so that manual workers and civil servants of the state have goods to use.

7809

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AGRICULTURE

HANOI DISTRICT REVIEWS PRODUCT CONTRACTING-OUT

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 8 Jun 82 pp 1,4

[Article: "Tu Liem Preliminarily Recapitulates Its Implementation of Directive No 100"]

[Text] In implementing Directive No 100 of the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee over the course of three production seasons, the collective peasants of Tu Liem District manifested their fine nature and consciousness of self-reliance in production. Although many difficulties were encountered with regard to weather, insects, diseases, materials, and price rises, Directive No 100 truly served to stimulate production. The cooperative members invested more than 2,000 additional dong per hectare of rice land and more than 8,000 additional dong per hectare of vegetable land. The cooperative member families purchased nearly 400 additional draft and breeding water buffaloes and oxen. The public installations constructed by the state and the people to serve production were improved. The district invested in the construction of, and brought into use, three water conservancy projects valued at 600,000 dong.

With regard to production, in 1981 the grain area increased by .7 percent over 1980 and the new rice varieties accounted for about 32 percent of the total area. Therefore, the district's rice yield was 5.5 tons per hectare, and in 1981 the grain output increased by 2,000 tons -- and the vegetable output by 2,500 tons -- over 1980. Although collective stock raising declined the total number of hogs in the district was 23,000 with an average market weight of 51 kilograms, an increase of 7 kilograms over 1980. In 1981 the value of agricultural output amounted to more than 40 million dong, an increase of about 17 million over 1980. Real income was 20 million dong, an increase of 15 million dong over 1980.

However, while implementing Directive No 100 Tu Liem also revealed certain shortcomings and deficiencies, the most important of which were due to guidance and implementation. The production plans of many cooperatives were upset and their crop structures were irrational. In the vegetable-growing area the planting of seedlings and the turning over of products were still arbitrary. Of Tay Tuu cooperative's 72 hectares of vegetable land, 54 hectares were planted in cucumbers to be sold on the market. The five tasks undertaken by the cooperatives were not completely carried out, the role of the cooperative director was not developed, and the cooperative members competed for draft power. During this year's winter-spring season 200 water

buffaloes in the district died from the cold weather. Those deficiencies led to the result of the workers not fulfilling their obligations and responsibilities toward the state and the cooperative. Not all of the products due were collected.

In order to improve the quality of the contracting out of final output, the district took a number of steps with regard to its guiding thoughts, to arranging for cadres to directly exercise management in the cooperatives, etc. If it is deemed necessary to do so, the cooperatives may set up specialized sections to collect the products cooperative member families must turn over to the cooperative according to plan. There must be specific schedules for delivering agricultural products and plans for each season, month, and quarter in both the vegetable areas and the rice areas. The system regarding cadres who directly exercise management must be rationalized and their responsibility must be truly tied in with the cooperative. As regards turning over products, if in a unit the cooperative members turn over the full amount of products the unit commander and the unit command committee are rewarded. In order to serve the coming 10th month and winter-spring seasons, specific guidance measures must be taken with regard to the soil-preparation and seedstock tasks. Depending on the situation of each cooperative, steps must be taken to achieve the truly good implementation of Directive No 100.

5616

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AGRICULTURE

OVER 70,000 LEAVE TO BUILD NEZ'S

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 23 May 82 p 1

[Article: "Over 70,000 Leave to Build New Economic Zones"]

[Text] From January to 15 May 1982 in the whole country there have been 70,636 persons, including 36,610 laboring hands, who have gone to build new economic zones.

The provinces of Nghia Binh, Binh Tri Thien, and Nghe Tinh have made many efforts, they have overcome the difficulties and mobilized the people to go and build the new economic zones in a rather active manner.

The provinces of Ha Nam Ninh and Minh Hai maintained and developed well the formula of creating sisterhood relationships among the provinces and among the districts. Thai Binh, Ha Son Binh, Thai Hoa, Nghe Tinh and Binh Tri Thien sent teams of cadres all the way into the new economic zones and to see the new arrivals reception units as well as to take a good look at the area so that they can streamline the plan for organizing the sending away and reception of new people.

The number of people and laboring hands who have left to build the new economic zones is distributed as follows: 36,813 people, including 17,788 laborers, have gone to state-operated farms; 21,691 persons, including 14,503 laborers, have gone to collective production areas; and 12,132 persons, including 4,319 laborers, have gone to be grafted onto existing projects.

1751

CSO: 4209/370

AGRICULTURE

HANOI DISTRICT IMPLEMENTS CONTRACTING-OUT DIRECTIVE

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 10 Jun 82 p 3

[Article: "Dan Phuong District Implements Directive No 100"]

[Text] To date, 12 of the 16 cooperatives in Dan Phuong District contract out the growing of rice to groups and individual workers.

Dan Phuong, one of the municipality's key rice-growing districts, has many years of experience in intensive cultivation to attain high, stable yields (more than 7 tons per hectare). Therefore, when it began to carry out the contracting out of rice output the district party committee sent study groups to Hai Phong and Ha Son Binh and then explained the requirements, contents, objectives, and principles of Directive No 100, and the methods of implementing contracting-out, to 700 key district, village, and cooperative cadres and to the specialized elements of the cooperatives and the production unit command committees in the district. The District Party Committee also held democratic discussions with the village secretaries and chairmen and the cooperative directors regarding plans to implement that policy in each cooperative. The district was very concerned with the autonomy of the cooperatives and adopted the policy that they must do a good job of implementing the three contracts to production units, which in turn were to contract out final output to workers. The production units were to accept contracting-out plans from the cooperatives and organize their implementation by the cooperative members, and were also responsible for turning over the correct quantity and quality of products to the cooperatives by the stipulated deadlines. Then the cooperatives drafted agenda which were democratically discussed by cooperative member congresses, which approved their implementation.

What initial observations may be made regarding the implementation of contracting out in Dan Phuong during the first season of 1982?

The clearest result was the masses' seething spirit of emulation to increase production. All labor was fully utilized and good use was made of time, with emphasis on planting and tending crops more rapidly and efficiently than during the previous seasons. Dan Phuong had never been late in plowing and transplanting and nearly all of the 5th month-spring rice was planted during the best time of the season. But at the beginning of 1982, because

the Dan Hoai conduit was blocked no water was sent to the fields until the beginning of March. But within a period of only 15 to 20 days the entire rice area of Dan Phuong was covered with green. Furthermore, the cooperative members who accepted contracting-out also invested additional materials and capital in tending the fresh, fertile fields, and were determined to attain high yields.

But in addition to those good aspects there still exist the following deficiencies:

-- Due to failure to firmly grasp and understand Directive No 100, a number of cooperatives have only stressed hastily completing their work and have been careless in making preparations. They contract out final output without requiring commercial accounting, and stress rice growing while ignoring the trades. In some cooperatives, because the cadres lack a sense of responsibility and feel that the new system is too difficult to manage they want to loosen restraints and contract out "blank checks."

-- In assigning contracted-out land, a number of cooperatives still assign it on an "accommodate everyone" basis. For example, the Tan Hoi cooperative contracts out land to all workers -- whether in cultivation or in the trades -- and even retired cadres receive contracted-out land. The Ha Mo cooperative assigns an average of .2 mau of land per principal worker, .1 mau per secondary worker, .1 mau per dependent, etc. In some cooperatives, due to a lack of democratic discussion with cooperative members with regard to determining the yields and output for each area and crop, and also because the cooperative members are still insist on equal distribution, there has arisen the situation of excessive fragmentation, such as in the Lien Hong cooperative.

-- Another deficiency is that when contracting out final output some cooperatives do not pay attention to reorganizing production, especially the reorganization of the five tasks which are the responsibility of the cooperative and the specialized trades of the cooperative. The boundary between social labor and family labor has not been clearly delineated, so there exists the situation of the management boards and production teams being unable to carry out the five tasks, the trades declining, the day-care centers and nursery schools stagnating, etc.

On the basis of above-mentioned good points and deficiencies, in order to correctly implement the spirit of Directive No 100 and improve the quality of contracting-out, Dan Phuong District has set forth the following tasks:

1. Continuing to educate the cadres, party members, and cooperative members so that they can correctly understand and implement Directive No 100. The contracting out of final output does not end with the contracting out of land, but is also a matter of improving management; creating a new management structure; expanding the material bases of the cooperatives to serve as a strong motive force stimulating the development of production and bring about real economic results; and harmonizing the three interests.

2. The contracting out of final output must be tied in with the reorganization of production. The cooperatives must rectify and redefine their production

directions by means of such specific tasks as resurveying the land; redefining their production directions; rearranging their crop structures and practicing intensive cultivation, interplanting, and increasing the number of growing seasons; and fully utilizing labor capability and the potential of the land to bring about high economic effectiveness. They must redistribute labor in accordance with a plan in order to create a balance among cultivation, stock raising, and trades; distinguish clearly between social labor and family labor; enable workers to specialize and have technical knowledge, discipline, and high productivity; achieve a division of labor and cooperation among the various elements and establish ties among those elements; and advance the economic sectors of the cooperatives uniformly.

3. The direction for perfecting the contracting-out of final output is that the cooperatives must carry out the three contracts to production units. The cooperatives must, on the basis of the economic-technical quotas and norms, determine costs, work points, yields, and output assigned to the production units. The production unit, the unit which accepts contracting-out from the cooperative, is responsible for organizing and encouraging the cooperative members in the unit to fulfill the plan assigned by the cooperative. It is also responsible for turning over the correct quantity and quality of products by the stipulated deadline. The production unit then contracts out final output to cooperative members.

On the basis of centralized, unified management, the district must remind the cooperatives to strengthen and do a truly good job of carrying out the five tasks which are collective responsibilities. Specifically:

-- With regard to soil preparation, large and small tractors must be combined with water buffaloes and oxen. Large tractors are managed and dispatched by the district. Each cooperative must set up a centralized unit of small tractors managed by the cooperative director according to plan. As regards water buffaloes and oxen, on the basis of the actual situation of the cooperative each production unit must set up a specialized plowing and harrowing team, or there must be specialized cooperative units managed by director and the production unit leaders.

-- With regard to water, each cooperative must organize a water conservancy unit, which may be divided into two parts, one to manage the conducting of water from the source to the areas of the units, while the other is responsible for bringing water into each area and field for the cooperative members. If water does not flow into a certain area, a source of water must be provided for bailing by cooperative members. The embankment of ditches and the building of area cooperative roads should be avoided.

-- With regard to seedstock, the cooperatives must organize "four specialized" seedstock units made up of progressive workers who are capable of assimilating science and technology. The cooperatives must set aside land for propagating seedstock, have centralized storerooms and drying patios, have water buffaloes and oxen to work the soil, and receive and distribute the various kinds

of seedstock for the cooperative. The cooperative must manage the sowing of rice seedlings until the sprouting stage.

-- With regard to fertilizer, each cooperative must have a fertilizer processing unit to serve the entire cooperative and, along with the scientific-technical unit, take the initiative in propagating and maintaining azolla seedstock. Each unit must set up fertilizer processing groups to process fertilizer for the entire unit and collect fertilizer produced by the cooperative members in their spare time or beyond the contracted-out norms.

-- With regard to the prevention and elimination of insects and diseases, each cooperative must set up a unit to prevent and eliminate insects and diseases which also engages in scientific-technical activities. Such units are made up of mid-level and basic-level cadres who are responsible for managing insecticides and facilities and equipment used to prevent and eliminate insects and diseases.

5616
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AGRICULTURE

EDITORIAL BOOSTS DEVELOPMENT OF PISCICULTURE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 24 May 82 pp 1,4

[Editorial: "Fully Utilize Every Water Surface To Develop Pisciculture"]

[Text] Our country has vast marine resources. The raising and catching of fish has become an important economic branch.

In the total volume of marine products that get exploited every year the amount represented by fish, shrimp and other kinds of freshwater marine products occupies a significant proportion. In our countryside practically every hamlet or subhamlet has its own ponds or lakes. These ponds, together with the peasants' gardens, are closely linked to the people's livelihood, they supply food for the daily meals, bring about revenue for the peasant and worker families' economy, thus contributing to raising the social product.

After it has been collectivized our agriculture has been reorganized and a new distribution of labor has been effected. Our agriculture takes grain production to be the main orientation but at the same time it advocates a comprehensive pattern of development plus commercial dealings in many branches. Pisciculture is one branch with the conditions necessary for expansion. The movement for building Uncle Ho ponds which is closely linked to the economic and technological contents is gradually being expanded to the entire piscicultural branch. The custom of letting the fish breed naturally in ponds is now replaced by methods of fish breeding patterned on technical processes which fully utilize the levels of water surface, which consist of breeding several prolific varieties so as to have a large production volume on a particular area unit of pond or lake. There have been no small numbers of cooperatives and agricultural production groups or people's families who have bred fish reaching a productivity of 5 to 10 tons per hectare. Using other fish breeding methods in self-renewing water sources such as enclosed raft or basket breeding as in the South or in a number of mountain provinces of North Vietnam, people have been able to reach even higher productivities.

Pisciculture needs be developed in all three sectors: the state sector, the collective sector and the people's sector, so as to fully utilize the surface of ponds and lakes, rivers and canals, and deep fields to breed and raise fish.

Ponds and lakes exist everywhere but to transform them into economically highly efficient fish breeding units we must have blueprints and plans for so transforming them. We must base ourselves on the scale and area of the water surfaces to come

up with appropriate forms of production organization and management. If the surface area is small, it should be contracted to individual cooperative members' families. Should it be large, it should be run like a collective business or co-operated among various production units, co-operated by the state and a collective unit, co-operated by a people's collective together with individuals or with other organs, enterprises, etc. so that one could have large capitals to invest, the technology required in order to efficiently exploit the surface area and create concentrated fish products as merchandise. Many localities have applied the formula of final product contracting to the workers and to groups of workers and thus have fully utilized well the potential of the ponds and lakes. Thus, both the collective and the individual workers benefit, and the society has more food.

The first requirement for expanding the area of pisciculture and making it reach a high productivity is that we must have enough breeding fish and food for feeding them. In recent years we have been able to build many fish breeding bases, and reach a number of results in crossbreeding new varieties and making them multiply in artificial environments. Utilizing well the existing bases and building more new ones and insuring that wherever fish breeding is carried out there would be good breeds being produced there, we would not have to worry that there would not be enough breeding fish to respond to the ever expanding breeding requirements.

Through a thorough utilization of various kinds of byproducts and rejects coming from agriculture, coming from the sewerage of the cities and towns or industrial parks as well as those coming from the remains of daily meals, combining fish breeding with hog raising or fish breeding with duck raising and the cultivation of food plants, the various fish breeding bases will all be able to come up with abundant sources of food for the fish.

The protein-rich food requirements of the people are getting greater and greater every day. To answer these needs the task of the marine product branch in the third five-year plan is, together with the reorganization and expansion of the marine product catch branch, "we must exhaustively utilize all water surface areas in order to expand on a large scale fish breeding, shrimp raising and other branches of marine product development."

The expansion and breeding of freshwater fish is something that we can do easily, for which we have good favorable conditions since they do not require large amounts of capital, materials and equipment as in the case of sea fishing; furthermore we can have a rapid source of food in doing it that way, food whose final cost is very low and which does not require much expenditure of food to raise. Thus we must pay even more attention to guiding the development of fresh water fish breeding, so that every locality, every area will have its fish breeding movement. Each Uncle Ho Fish Pond must be run in accordance with progressive methods, must reach a high productivity, and serve as a model for the people's movement for fish breeding, and rapidly increase its production volume.

1751

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AGRICULTURE

HARVEST OF 5TH MONTH-SPRING RICE REPORTED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 May 82 p 1

[Article: "North Vietnam: 80 Percent of Fifth Month-Spring Rice Area Have Eared; South Vietnam: Harvest Completed, Average Productivity 34 Ta Per Hectare"]

[Text] Eighty percent of the 5th month-spring rice in the provinces of North Vietnam have eared. And a number of localities have started to harvest some early ripening fields.

The pest-infected area has been reduced as compared to 10 days before. According to the reports from 10 provinces, by 15 May the insect and pest-infected area has been reduced to 86,000 hectares, representing a reduction of 34,000 hectares as compared to 10 days before. Brown aphids, however, have made their appearance on the late ripening rice.

According to the Ministry of Water Conservancy there are about 110,000 hectares of paddy affected by drought, concentrated in the provinces of Ha Nam Ninh, Thai Binh, Hai Hung, Ha Bac and Ha Son Binh. These provinces are putting into use every means at their disposal to pump in and bail water to fight the drought and save the rice crop.

Thirteen provinces have harvested 58,000 hectares of early rice. The various localities have harvested almost 20,000 hectares of yam and nearly 4,000 hectares of corn. On the harvested area the productivity of yam was relatively good. Thai Binh Province reached 61 ta per hectare and Haiphong City reached nearly 60 ta. The corn productivity reached about 11 ta per hectare. The provinces of North Vietnam also do their best to make every preparation for the main crop production such as: ploughing and harrowing the seedling fields, sowing new seed, and breaking up the fallow land in the main crop fields. These preparations for the main crop are running into difficulty. Because of the lack of rain the ploughing has been proceeding very slowly as compared to last year, and so the time left for working on the main crop is very short. A number of provinces like Thai Binh and Nghe Tinh do not have enough quick maturing rice seed. Fourteen provinces have sown nearly 5,000 hectares of early main crop seedlings so as to transplant them into deep fields.

Also by 15 May the provinces of South Vietnam transplanted and floated 261,000 hectares of summer-autumn rice, reaching 39.5 percent of the plan or representing a speedier rate of 50,000 hectares as compared to the same time last year. But the area of summer-autumn rice cultivation being affected by drought is growing.

The provinces heavily affected by drought are Tien Giang, Cuu Long, Dong Thap and Long An. The localities are in great need of phosphorous fertilizer and it is requested that the materials sector take positive measures to transfer in time the fertilizer needed to the peasants so that they can take care of their summer-autumn rice crop.

Together with the sowing and transplanting for the summer-autumn rice crop, the provinces of South Vietnam are making preparations for the main crop. By 15 May the various localities have ploughed 441,000 hectares of fields, they have sown, transplanted and floated seedlings in 180,000 hectares, representing a speedier rate of 33,000 hectares as compared to the same time last year. The provinces of the Mekong delta have transplanted 164,000 hectares. The province of An Giang is the fastest in working on the main crop, reaching 55 percent of the plan, using in the main the floating main crop variety.

The provinces of South Vietnam have completed the harvesting of the winter-spring 1981-1982 rice crop, reaching the highest productivity ever achieved, averaging 34 ta per hectare or representing an increase of 3.15 ta as compared to last year. Ho Chi Minh City and the eastern provinces of South Vietnam, the provinces of Lam Dong and Thuan Hai have shown only a slight increase in productivity, reaching from 18.9 to 21.7 ta per hectare.

Among the 8 provinces having most winter-spring rice in the Mekong delta (except Minh Hai), only Long An reached a productivity lower than last year, as for three other provinces they all reached a productivity 10 to 20 percent higher than last year; two provinces with the highest productivity are An Giang with 46 ta per hectare and Dong Thap with 45.6 ta per hectare. The area of winter-spring rice cultivation of these two provinces reaches over 40 percent but the production volume of rice that comes from these two provinces comes to 54 percent of the total volume produced in South Vietnam. The provinces with a high productivity are Kien Giang with 18.2 ta (during the 1980-1981 winter-spring crop) having gone up to 27.7 ta per hectare, Ben Tre going from 18.4 to 22.5 ta, Cuu Long from 17.2 to 20.5 ta, and Tien Giang from 29.2 to 32.8 ta per hectare.

As far as the sown and transplanted area is concerned, two provinces have surpassed the plan, that was An Giang which surpassed it by 9,783 hectares and Thuan Hai which went a little bit over. As for the remaining provinces they all did not reach the plan level. The provinces lagging behind the plan are concentrated on the Mekong delta. Figures for the entire South Vietnam show that the winter-spring rice area came to 94 percent of the area planted last year and that was equivalent to only 90 percent of the plan. It is for this reason that although the average productivity increased over 10 percent the total volume of production only increased by 3.35 percent as compared to last year's winter-spring crop.

1751

CSO: 4209/370

AGRICULTURE

MEASURES TAKEN TO ACCELERATE GRAIN MOBILIZATION IN AN GIANG

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 27 May 82 p. 2

[Article by Ngo Minh Duc, of An Giang: "Grain Mobilization in An Giang"]

[Text] Grain mobilization was sluggish at the beginning of the season. However, during the recent period between 1 and 30 April, an amount of 100,000 tons was collected which represented the highest monthly norm ever attained and which included 15,000 tons of tax and old debts, 15,400 tons as settlement of old two-way contracts and 8,800 tons derived from the exchange of material supplies and goods. The average daily rate was 3,173 tons and the average mobilization norm was 14,000 kgs per hectare. Many villages in Chau Thanh, Phu Tan and Cho Moi Districts mobilized 2 tons per hectare.

Generally speaking, from the beginning of the season to date, the entire province has put into store 103,190 tons of winter-spring rice representing 57.32 percent of the plan norm and including tax collection amounting to 79 percent of the norm set for this crop. The collection of old debts and of the yearly tax has been completed by 103 production collectives, 5 agricultural cooperatives, 36 hamlets and 11 villages. As compared with the norm set for the crop, Long Xuyen City and Tri Ton District have basically completed the collection of tax and old debts while 3 other localities have fulfilled 70 to 80 percent of the norm.

What made it possible to accelerate grain mobilization in An Giang in April?

Objectively auspicious conditions are the first reason worth mentioning since they stemmed from the fact that this year the winter-spring production season achieved higher norms than those in all the previous years in terms of cultivated area, productivity and volume of production. While rejoicing at the success of the recent winter-spring season in their province, the local people, aware of the country's situation and of their responsibility to the entire nation, realized that they should resolutely attain a high norm in mobilizing grain from this winter-spring crop in order to make up for the low grain mobilization norm obtained from last year's 10th-month rice crop which yielded poorly after suffering from floods. To satisfactorily carry out grain mobilization, it is thus necessary to clearly understand that solving the grain problem is an urgent demand of the whole country.

April was a month when the harvest would be at its height. The Provincial Party and People's Committees focused guidance on three island districts and those densely cultivated with rice, sent 129 provincial cadres to basic installations and proportionally supplied money, commodities, transportation and cargo handling means as well as warehouses. The districts and cities also mobilized almost all their key cadres and sent them to basic installations to concentrate guidance on grain mobilization and, at the same time, to coordinate it with other routine central tasks and also to carry out propaganda and motivation through the medium of mass organizations in order to launch a seething grain mobilization among the masses. The secretary chairman and many members of the Provincial Party Committee Standing Committee as well as the leading comrades in the Provincial People's Committee made inspection tours to provide guidance, to improve the plan drawn up by each district--especially the districts and cities where rice cultivation was concentrated--and to help them promptly overcome obstacles and difficulties at the grassroots level.

The measures taken by An Giang are to apply the method of regular delivery of grain in villages and hamlets, to launch a movement for grain delivery at the district and city levels and to combine and concentrate efforts on grain delivery in the entire province. In the two grain delivery stages in April, the daily mobilization rate was 4,100 tons in the first and 6,770 tons in the second. Peasants enthusiastically participated in grain delivery, especially in Phu Tan and Cho Moi.

To prepare for grain delivery, the village and hamlet authorities used the assigned norms as a basis, made a list of households, production collectives and agricultural cooperatives, proportionately fixed the quantity to be delivered by each of them, clearly mentioned the debts, tax and amounts to be paid following two-way contract settlements and subsequently convened the people of each hamlet and the members of each production collective and cooperative and published the norms to enable everyone to discuss them and unanimously agree to fulfill them satisfactorily. As a result, every household, production collective and cooperative accepted with self-enlightenment the grain delivery norm assigned to them.

A plan was drawn up fixing the effective and expiry dates of grain mobilization. In the case of low-lying areas, the grain delivery time was calculated also in accordance with the flood period. The working method was to "roll up mats" quickly and neatly amass paddy by pouring it down on a mat and then rolling up the latter at each house and hamlet and to proceed to neatly complete grain delivery by an entire village. Work and responsibilities were specifically assigned to each cadre while adequate preparations were being made for weighing scales, bags, money and merchandises. Transportation means belonging to the state, cooperatives and even private citizens were mobilized.

Prior to taking these measures, the province held a ceremony for districts and cities to sign emulation pledges, thereby creating a movement to satisfactorily fulfill the grain obligation among many pledging localities. In support of these efforts, another movement was launched to motivate people to write poems and songs, to draw up pictures and to carry out mass cultural activities.

During these movements and especially through the two phases of grain delivery by the entire province, all levels, sectors and grassroots cadres had an opportunity to heighten their organizational and command standards, to draw valuable experiences in motivating people to emulate, to develop new factors and new men and to reduce many negative practices.

9332

CSO: 4209/372

HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

HANOI'S BUILDING SECTOR TIGHTENS SECURITY, MANAGEMENT

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 8 May 82 p 3

[Article: "The City Building Sector Continues To Accelerate the Campaign To Combat Negative Phenomena"]

[Text] Each year, the city's building sector is assigned the task of building nearly 100,000 square meters of housing and industrial and civilian projects. The quantity of supplies, machinery and equipment invested in this work is not small. As a result, the sector as well as its installations are very concerned with security work and with encouraging economization in coordination with struggling against negative phenomena in accordance with the directives from the Party Central Committee and the Municipal Party Committee concerning this matter.

The sector has launched a campaign to struggle against negative phenomena in its 35 basic units. Having studied the matter, all cadres, manual workers and civil servants realize their responsibility in protecting the property and materials of the state. Many cadres, party members and people have set good examples in protecting public property and struggling against and exposing the theft of public property. Many types of supplies that were lost have been reclaimed; in the 2 years 1980 and 1981, supplies worth more than 99,000 dong were reclaimed.

The various units have discovered loopholes in their management and learned the tricks used to steal materials in transportation, in shipping and receiving and at construction sites. As a result, they have taken suitable corrective measures. In management, the various units have supplemented their principles concerning the management of labor, plans, technology, supplies, equipment and so forth, material consumption ceilings, etc. Transportation is being managed more closely. Some production units, such as the Cau Duong and Dai La Brick and Tile Enterprises, the Nam Thang Paving Brick Enterprise and so forth, have implemented warehouse receiving and shipping methods not based on charts, begun issuing shipping forms and schedule days for the sale of goods to agencies and individuals in order to easily conduct inspections and combat conspiracy or attempts to send goods to the outside. Prior to 1979, anywhere from 30,000 to more than 100,000 bricks and tiles disappeared each year in the delivery of goods to customers; now that the measures mentioned above have been taken, this problem has been virtually eliminated. As a result of management measures, praise and awards, the loss of

cement during transportation from Haiphong has also been significantly reduced, from 5-10 percent to 0.23 percent. In the construction units, the results that have been achieved have also been due to implementing complete project contracts, specializing each job and accounting for supplies each month and each quarter.

A review that was conducted showed that negative phenomena and organized theft declined by 45 percent in 1981.

Recently, the Building Service held a conference to review the struggle against negative phenomena during the 2 years 1980 and 1981 and control work in 1981. The conference set forth guidelines for developing upon the results that have been achieved, putting the campaign on a regular basis within the units that are conducting it and expanding the campaign this year among the remaining units. Control and inspection work will be intensified and violations will be promptly prosecuted. Complete project contracts will be expanded throughout the sector in order to manage materials and establish the conditions for improving the living conditions of manual workers and civil servants. On the other hand, shortcomings and weaknesses in the campaign at a number of installations will be overcome, such as slowness and delays (especially in phase two), the phenomenon of tolerating or protecting persons in a few incidents, not strictly complying with policies and regulations and selling materials on consignment in violation of principles.

7809

CSO: 4209/379

LABOR

FULL USE OF SPARE LABOR IN CITIES RECOMMENDED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 27 May 82 p 3

[Article by Do Hoang, of Binh Tri Thien: "Making Full Use of Spare Labor"]

[Text] A fair number of laborers in cities are still unemployed. Even those households who have already had a job still have a surplus work force and want to produce goods on contract to increase their income. In many wards of Nam Dinh City (Ha Nam Ninh), the cadres' families and the people have been spinning cotton in fulfillment of a contract with the textile factory. Over the past few months, the city has made arrangements to provide employment for students who had left schools. Households who own looms have accepted threads to weave fabrics and mosquito nets; in certain areas, training courses have been opened to teach embroidery, knitting, reed and kenaf carpet weaving and so forth. Many women have given up their marketing activities and joined knitting and embroidering units.

Over the past year, the Small Industry and Handicraft Cooperatives' Federation has hired hundreds of thousands of laborers for employment in handicraft cooperatives and has simultaneously organized the production of consumer goods by individual households. A glance at the economic-technical achievements shown at the Giang Vo Exhibition Center in Hanoi will reveal that many of our handicraftsmen are very skillful and that they are capable of manufacturing diversified consumer products of export value. The quality of goods displayed at the exhibition center clearly demonstrates the creative talents and vast potentials of our people. Almost all the goods displayed there have won the appreciation of foreign visitors.

However, our people and cadres still lack a large amount of consumer goods in their daily life. Though this state of affairs has many causes, attention must be paid to the failure of many localities to fully use and attract all the unemployed laborers and to make arrangements to engage them in production activities in order to ensure their livelihood. Many people have taken an interest in the production of easily made goods in the hope of reaping a great profit; such activities have failed to meet the local people's demand. On its part, the state has not yet applied an incentive policy with regard to producers of staple and rare commodities.

Cities are places where numerous enterprises and cooperatives with skillful workers are concentrated and where many laborers are still unemployed. To provide jobs for this labor force in order to increase the amount of consumer and export goods, we would suggest that while reforming small traders to motivate them to self-consciously shift to productive activities, it is necessary to create favorable conditions for them to accept the contract production of goods. The exploitation of local sources of raw materials must be well organized in order to provide supplies to handicraft cooperatives. At the same time, a policy must be formulated to stimulate cooperatives which produce goods essential to daily life as well as commodities of export value.

9332

CSO: 4209/372

POPULATION, CUSTOMS AND CULTURE

MODERN WESTERN CULTURE MAKING INROADS IN HANOI

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 1 Jun 82 p 23

[Article by Michel Blanchard in Hanoi]

[Text]

JUST a short step away from the "Little Lake" is a cafe with Abba and Bee Gees posters adorning peeling walls. Young jeans-clad Vietnamese sit on tiny wooden stools and sip lemon juice and Japanese beer while pop music beats in the background.

A typical enough scene for Paris, Amsterdam or New York. But here in Hanoi it is striking testimony to an attitude change over the last year, particularly among the youth, that belies the image of a drab, austere communist city.

One of the most obvious signs is the sudden proliferation of private cafes, often no more than little covered shacks. The richest of them play Western music, which is in vogue here and still banned in Saigon. One new cafe has become a top in-spot by playing jazz.

Slogans

The sound of Western music, turned up to full volume, also blares out of the open windows of private houses and a local cinema has it blasting over the loudspeakers.

Abba is definitely top of the pops in Hanoi but Boney M and the Bee Gees are also very popular, not to mention a host of French singers such as Sylvie Vartan, Jose

Dassin, Mireille Mathieu and Dalida.

At open-air festivals, electric guitars, drums and accordions take over from the official bands.

Some have led a revolution in dress, which is all the more noticeable since most people are still tatty clothed. After work young men and women slip on their jeans and T-shirts and go for bicycle rides around the lake, a popular meeting place. Make-up is gradually reappearing.

American jeans cost 1,400 dong (about US\$140) in a boutique, which is about the average annual salary. Nevertheless they are seen more and more on the streets here.

Some are sent, like music cassettes, in family parcels by relatives who have fled as refugees to the West. Others arrive via the Cholon China town district of Ho Chi Minh City, formerly Saigon, which trades with Hong Kong and Singapore.

Brightly coloured shirts and T-shirts are replacing the strict white women's blouses and the old worn shirts of the men. The colours cheer up the traditional black and white of Hanoi crowds.

There are even printed T-shirts sporting everything from pop-singers'

faces to the American eagle to slogans saying "Love" or commemorating Thailand's bicentennial. Several stores near the big market specialise in printing T-shirts to order.

These trends have befuddled some of the older generation, like the father who wrote to the letters column of the "Hanoi Moi" saying that he had become the laughing stock of his friends because his daughter was wearing a "Kiss-Me" T-shirt and no one in the family knew what it meant.

There has been another development, which just a short time ago would have shocked Hanoi's inhabitants — lovers. Young people no longer worry about walking hand in hand and the intertwined couples on park benches and on the grass around the lakes are oblivious to the world.

Motorbikes are much sought after as a way of impressing the girls. Japanese makes are popping up increasingly, while the old models probably came from Ho Chi Minh City.

Contact with foreigners is still reserved. Suspicion, bans on mingling and the fear of plainclothes security forces is deeply engrained. But foreigners

can go into cafes and people are now friendlier. Even the girls are less timid.

Language is however a formidable barrier as the young do not know any foreign languages.

On May 1, the Vietnamese can go to the dance hall of the "Bo Ho" restaurant where the entrance fee is 15 dong (US\$1.50). There are tables of young people and the girls will not refuse to dance with the "Tay" or Westerners.

On Saturday night black-satin trousers mix with conical hats and green caps. Young men are also starting to wear their hair long, some letting it grow to the shoulder — a long way from the ideal socialist man.

Hanoi's new look may well be a reflection of a desire here to consume after years of deprivation. The standard of living of a certain section of the community has improved with commerce and trade.

It is too early to speak of a liberalisation by the authorities, who at a Communist Party meeting denounced "negative phenomena." Probably they are content to take a "laissez faire" stance while reserving the right to intervene if it goes too far for them. — AFP

POPULATION, CUSTOMS AND CULTURE

AUTHORITIES ASKED TO SHUT DOWN 'MEDIUMS,' CARD READERS

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 11 May 82, p 4

[A Story a Day column by "Nguoi Xay Dung"(The Builder): "...It Is Not That the Basic Level Governments Are Unaware of What Is Going On!"]

[Text] In a letter to the newspaper, Nguyen Hoang Giang (Ba Dinh Ward) said: "I would like to do my part to help put an end to fraud such as the following:

...In My Dinh, there are two blind women who make money by communicating with the dead. Yet, very many people visit them to be happily cheated out of their money. And, they give the two women whatever they ask. Everyone is charged from 20 to 25 dong. It is commonplace for them to make 500 to 700 dong on a Sunday!"

Tran Van Thanh, who lives on Nam Ky Uprising Road, witnessed a comical scene while travelling from Ho Chi Minh City to Hanoi because he received news of a death, which he also related to the newspaper in a letter:

"I shall not go to great lengths describing the procedures for arranging the meeting between 'the dead and the living' which the young woman wanted me to witness. I only want to relate one detail. As the 'spirit' was appearing, it uttered something to the young woman; the 'medium' in Trung Van suddenly asked in a loud voice: 'Oh, departed one, would you shut up so that we can get on with our work?'

As the medium was uttering incantations and pouring words of deception into the ears of her superstitious patrons, her precious 'spirit' decided to try out a newly purchased cassette and began loudly playing a foreign song..."

Both of these letters talk about the holding of "seances" to defraud people of their money. They are held by persons in the villages of Tu Liem, whose acts of deception are known by the governments.

Both of these letters asked the question: When will these superstitious tricks every stop?

On this occasion, I would like to say in addition:

At present, this practice is not only occurring in the two villages mentioned above, but also at a few other places in the outskirts of the city. And, even within the city, on Phan Boi Chau Street, there is a female medium and, on Thai Phien Street, a male medium who opened their private homes at "secret" hours to practice card reading virtually in public.

By means of card games, tricks, kings with bushy beards, gaudy western ladies... these fortune tellers dupe honest people into rashly having their cards read at a cost of 10 dong per reading!

I think that the basic level governments should concern themselves with this matter and take measures to end this practice!

7809

CSO: 4209/379

POPULATION, CUSTOMS AND CULTURE

ASSISTANCE TO COOPERATIVES, CONSERVATION OF GRAINS URGED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 24 May 82 p 3

[Readers Opinions column: "Assist Subward Selling and Buying Cooperatives to Run in the Correct Manner" by Lan Huong and "Conserve Grains" by Le Cong Binh]

[Text] Assist Subward Selling and Buying Cooperatives to Run in the Correct Manner

Since the middle of 1981 the network of buying and selling cooperatives in the Hanoi and Haiphong wards and in the towns of North Vietnam has formed and expanded relatively fast. The selling and buying cooperatives are also one component of the collective economy, they are one component of the organized market. Their main task is to contribute towards overcoming the difficulties and improve the livelihood of the cadres and people living in the subwards.

After over a year of activity, however, we have noticed that very few of the cooperatives have gone into providing a great deal of services or really exploited the sources of agricultural products and grain by working with the agricultural cooperatives engaged in processing so as to improve the daily meals of the people. Most of the cooperatives run after business for profit, violating the very principles and stipulations of the Ministry of Internal Trade. Many cooperatives gathered stocks that are many times the stipulated amount, others even go so far as to take the money from dishonest traders in order to do business. Whenever they see a commodity that is in demand and brings good profit the cooperatives immediately buy and sell them irrespective of the fact whether the said commodity is necessary or not in the people's livelihood or whether that may be a commodity that has been put under the monopolized management of the state. Furthermore, the buying of commodities from state stores and their selling at higher prices or the buying of fake commodities from individuals and selling them to the people have become very widespread phenomena. Recently, the phenomenon of competitive buying, of raising the prices and depressing them in competition with the state stores has made that the prices of many commodities have become unstable. Many cadres and cooperative members have gone South to buy commodities in great quantities, which only helped to bring the prices way up.

We are of the belief that should this be allowed to go on, should there be no control and timely correction, then many cooperatives will work in the most arbitrary way, not only failing to improve the people's livelihood in the subwards but also creating the conditions for enriching a number of bad elements, engendering a poor public perception and lack of trust among the population.

We suggest that the trade provincial and municipal offices call preliminary conferences to go over the activities of the buying and selling cooperatives periodically so as to draw the lessons of experience in time and have correcting measures. At the same time we should have increased control so as to guide the buying and selling cooperatives into the correct tracks. We must sanction strictly but fairly those who deliberately take advantage of the buying and selling cooperatives so as to engage in commodity speculation and in illegal trade.

Lan Huong
(Hanoi)

Conserve Grains

Recently, the newspapers and radio talked a great deal about boosting production and the conservation of grains. But in many localities there is still the situation of irrational distribution of grain. For instance, some people still have their household registrations in Hanoi but in actuality they have left to go into the southern provinces to make a living there for the last several years. Their families in Hanoi still go to the store every month to get rice. At the same time, the locality, the block cell as well as the cadres in charge of the vital statistics just turn their eyes elsewhere, thinking it does not amount to much or out of consideration and refuse to solve the situation. Then there are the cases of those who belong to cooperative families but instead of participating in production they go out and do business for profit yet they still enjoy eligibility to the subsidized rice!

By increasing the control of the distribution link from the people's household level up and by making sure that the amount of grain erroneously distributed get returned to the state, we will be able to conserve a good amount of grain for the state.

Le Cong Binh
(Hanoi)

1751
CSO: 4209/370

BIOGRAPHIC

INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES

[The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisked job title indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.]

Nguyễn Văn Anh [NGUYEENX VAWN ANH]

*Secretary of the VCP Committee, Dong Anh District; his article on improving living conditions in his district appeared in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 27 May 82 p 3)

Sáu Bình [SAUS BINHF]

*Chairman of the People's Committee, Tien Giang Province; he was mentioned in an article on agricultural production in his province. (NONG NGHIEP 5 Jun 82 p 3)

Nguyễn Ngọc Cảnh² [NGUYEENX NGOCJ CANHR], deceased

Born in 1924; former head of the Foreign Languages Department of the College of Foreign Trade; he was in retirement at the time of his death on 7 June 1982. (HANOI MOI 9 Jun 82 p 4)

Hoàng Ngọc Cán² [HOANGF NGOCJ CAANR]

*Deputy Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, Thai Binh Province; his article "The Youth Of Thai Binh Are Determined to Produce Much Grain" appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 22 Jun 82 p 3)

Đường Quốc Chính [ZUWOWNG QUOOCJ CHINHS]

Pursuant to Communique 4 of the 3rd Session of the 7th National Assembly on 28 June 1982 he was appointed Chairman of the Public Health and Social Welfare Committee of the National Assembly. (NHAN DAN 29 Jun 82 p 1)

Đường Hồng Dật [DUWOWNG HOONGF ZAATJ]

Vice Minister of Agriculture; on 25 June 1982 he attended the arrival in Hanoi of an Iraqi economic delegation. (NHAN DAN 26 Jun 82 p 1)

Vũ Dương [VUX ZUWOWNG]

*Director of the Haiphong Broadcasting Station; on 20 May 1982 he signed an emulation agreement with the directors of the Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City broadcasting stations. (HANOI MOI 29 May 82 p 1)

Lê Thanh Đạo [LEE THANH DAOJ]

Member of the Council of State; pursuant to Communiqué 4 of the 3rd Session of the 7th National Assembly on 28 June 1982 he was appointed Chairman of the Youth, Teenagers and Childrens Committee of the National Assembly. (NHAN DAN 29 Jun 82 p 1)

Nguyễn Thị Định [NGUYEENX THIJ DINHJ]

Pursuant to Communiqué 4 of the 3rd Session of the 7th National Assembly on 28 June 1982 she was terminated as Chairman of the Public Health and Social Welfare Committee of the National Assembly. (NHAN DAN 29 Jun 82 p 1)

Trương Kỳ Đức [TRUWOWNG KYF DUWCS]

Director of the Communications and Transportation Service, Ho Chi Minh City; on 30 April 1982 he attended ceremonies marking the heroic death of a dock worker. (GIAO THONG VAN TAI 20 May 82 p 3)

Nguyễn Hiền [NGUYEENX HIEENF]

*Director of the Hanoi Broadcasting Station; on 20 May 1982 he signed an emulation agreement with the directors of the Haiphong and Ho Chi Minh City broadcasting stations. (HANOI MOI 29 May 82 p 1)

Nguyễn Bá Huệ [NGUYEENX BAS HUEEJ]

Deputy Head of the Institute of Veterinary Medicine; his article "Thoughts on Bringing Advanced Technology to Agricultural Cooperatives" appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 28 Jun 82 p 3)

Lê Thiết Hùng [LEE THIEETS HUNGF]

Chairman of the Vietnam Committee in Support of Korea; on 24 June 1982 he attended a film showing at the Embassy of the DPRK. (NHAN DAN 26 Jun 82 p 4)

Lê Khắc [LEE KHAWCS]

Minister of Foreign Trade; *Chairman of the Vietnam Subcommittee of the Vietnam-Iraq Committee for Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation; on 25 June 1982 he attended the arrival in Hanoi of an Iraqi economic delegation. (NHAN DAN 26 Jun 82 p 1)

Ngô Bui Kim [NGOO BUIF KIM]

Commercial Attache of the SRV Embassy in France; on 16 May 1982 he attended the 4th Congress of the Association of Vietnamese Businessmen in France. (Paris DOAN KET 5 Jun 82 p 2)

Nguyễn Đức Kỳ [NGUYEENX DUWCS KYF]

Standing Member of the VCP Committee, Hanoi; Secretary of the VCP Committee, Ba Dinh Ward, Hanoi; on 19 May 1982 he attended ceremonies marking the anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birthday. (HANOI MOI 22 May 82 p 1)

Nguyễn Thành Lê [NGUYEENX THANH F LEE]

Pursuant to Communiqué 4 of the 3rd Session of the 7th National Assembly on 28 June 1982 he was terminated as Member of the Council of State. (NHAN DAN 29 Jun 82 p 1)

Nguyễn Thành Lê [NGUYEENX THANH F LEE]

Pursuant to Communiqué 4 of the 3rd Session of the 7th National Assembly on 28 June 1982 he was terminated as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the National Assembly. (NHAN DAN 29 Jun 82 p 1)

Phạm Sĩ Liêm [PHAMJ SIX LIEEM]

Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Hanoi; on 7 June 1982 he attended the signing of an emulation agreement on housing and urban projects between Hanoi, Haiphong and Ho Chi Minh City. (HANOI MOI 9 Jun 82 p 1)

Đỗ Long [DOOX LONG], deceased

Member of the VCP; former member of the VCP Committee, Khanh Hoa Province; former Director of the 5th Interregion Bank; former Head of the Finance and Planning Department, State Planning Commission; he was in retirement at the time of his death on 26 June 1982 at age 77. (NHAN DAN 27 Jun 82 p 4)

Nguyễn Đức Lộc [NGUYEENX DUWCS LOOCJ]

*Standing Member of the VCP Committee, Hanoi; *Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Hanoi; on 4 June 1982 he attended the funeral ceremony of a policeman who died in the line of duty. (HANOI MOI 8 Jun 82 p 4)

Phạm Lợi [PHAMJ LOWIJ]

Standing Member of the VCP Committee, Hanoi; Deputy Head of the Hanoi delegation to the National Assembly; on 20 June 1982 he met constituents in Hanoi. (NHAN DAN 21 Jun 82 p 1)

Lê Thanh Nghi [LEE THANH NGHIJ]

Vice Chairman of the Council of State; Pursuant to Communique 4 of the 3rd Session of the 7th National Assembly on 28 June 1982 he was appointed Secretary General of the Council of State. (NHAN DAN 29 Jun 82 p 1)

Thanh Nho [THANH NHO]

Director of the Ho Chi Minh City Broadcasting Station; on 20 May 1982 he signed an emulation agreement with the directors of the Hanoi and Haiphong broadcasting stations. (HANOI MOI 29 May 82 p 1)

Huỳnh Tấn Phát [HUYNHF TAANS PHATS]

Pursuant to Communique 4 of the 3rd Session of the 7th National Assembly on 28 June 1982 he was appointed Vice Chairman of the Council of State. (NHAN DAN 29 Jun 82 p 1)

Vũ Quang [VUX QUANG]

Pursuant to Communique 4 of the 3rd Session of the 7th National Assembly on 28 June 1982 he was appointed Member of the Council of State. (NHAN DAN 29 Jun 82 p 1)

Vũ Quang [VUX QUANG]

Pursuant to Communique 4 of the 3rd Session of the 7th National Assembly on 28 June 1982 he was terminated as Chairman of the Committee for Youth, Teenagers and Children of the National Assembly. (NHAN DAN 29 Jun 82 p 1)

Vũ Quang [VUX QUANG]

Pursuant to Communique 4 of the 3rd Session of the 7th National Assembly on 28 June 1982 he was appointed Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the National Assembly. (NHAN DAN 29 Jun 82 p 1)

Trần Quyết [TRAANF QUYETS]

Member of the Central Committee of the VCP; Vice Minister of Interior; on 4 June 1982 he attended the funeral ceremony of a policeman who died in the line of duty. (HANOI MOI 8 Jun 82 p 4)

Nguyễn Văn Sửu [NGUYEENX VAWN SUWR]

Chairman of the People's Committee, Thach That District, Hanoi; his article on agricultural developments in his district appeared in the cited source. (HANOI MOI 3 Jun 82 p 3)

Bùi Văn Thìn [BUIF VAWN THINF]

*Secretary of the VCP Committee, Quoc Oai District, Ha Son Binh Province; he was mentioned in an article on paddy production in his district. (NHAN DAN 21 Jun 82 p 1)

Lê Văn Thân [LEE VAWN THAAN]

Consulor Attache of the SRV Embassy in Paris; on 16 May 1982 he attended the 4th Congress of the Association of Vietnamese Businessmen in France. (Paris DOAN KET 5 Jun 82 p 2)

Nguyễn Tài Thu [NGUYEENX TAI F THU]

Director of the Vietnam Accupuncture and Moxibustion Institute; on 13 May 1982 he spoke in Lille, France to members of the French Accupuncture and Moxibustion Association. (Paris DOAN KET 5 Jun 82 p 2)

Nguyễn Văn Thu [NGUYEENX VAWN THU]

*Vice Minister of Building; on 7 June 1982 he attended the signing of an emulation agreement on housing and urban projects between Hanoi, Haiphong and Ho Chi Minh City. (HANOI MOI 9 Jun 82 p 1)

Xuân Thủy² [XUAAN THUYR]

Pursuant to Communique 4 of the 3rd Session of the 7th National Assembly on 28 June 1982 he was terminated as Vice Chairman and Secretary General of the Council of State. (NHAN DAN 29 Jun 82 p 1)

Lưu Minh Tri [LUWU MINH TRIJ]

Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union; Secretary of the Hanoi Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union; on 19 May 1982 he attended ceremonies marking the anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birthday. (HANOI MOI 22 May 82 p 1)

Vũ Trọng Tuất [VUX TRONGJ TUAATS], deceased

Former member of the VCP Committee, Hanoi; Secretary of the VCP Committee, Ba Dinh Ward; he was in retirement at the time of his death on 23 May 1982 at age 70. (HANOI MOI 25 May 82 p 4)

CSO: 4209/405

CHRONOLOGY

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS DURING 16 FEBRUARY-15 MARCH 1982

Hanoi VIETNAM COURIER in English No 4, Apr 82 p 32

[Text]

FEBRUARY

16. The Council of Ministers adopts a resolution to improve economization in all fields with a view to solving the economic imbalance.

— The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam sends a note to the Chinese Foreign Ministry rejecting their note of February 11, 1982 which said that Vietnam had undertaken armed provocation on the Chinese border during the Lunar New Year Festival.

17. The fifth Indochinese foreign ministerial conference is held in Vientiane on February 16-17. In the joint communiqué, new proposals towards China, Thailand and the ASEAN countries are made.

— The Presidium of the National Assembly of the People's Republic of Mongolia confers Sukhe Bator Orders on Le Duan, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Truong-Chinh, President of the Council of State, and Pham Van Dong, Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

19. VNA rejects the report (AFP news, February 18, 1982) by a spokesman for the Thai Supreme Military Command saying that Vietnam had fought with a borderguard unit on Thai territory.

— French presidential adviser on foreign affairs Regis Debray pays a visit to Vietnam.

20. A spokesman for the SRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemns a declaration of the Taiwanese authorities that the Truong Sa archipelago is under their jurisdiction.

— The Ministry of Health holds a conference reviewing the work of traditional medicine in Ho Chi Minh City.

23. In Hue, the Ministry of Agriculture organizes a conference reviewing its activities in 1981 and to discuss the orientation and tasks for 1982.

24. The Central Committee of the Vietnam Federation of Trade Unions holds a meeting reviewing its activities in 1981 and to discuss the orientation and tasks for 1982.

— An economic delegation from Algeria visits

28. Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, head of the USSR State Planning Committee N.K. Baibakov concludes his visit to Vietnam.

MARCH

1. Rafeenddin Ahmed, special envoy of the UN Secretary-General, paid a visit to Vietnam from February 26 to March 1.

— The Vietnam Institute of Sciences and the Commission for the Study of the Atmosphere hold a symposium on space exploration at which 20 scientific papers were read.

— Vietnam attends a round-table at ministerial level on the development of industry and agriculture in developing countries in Baghdad (Iraq).

5. The SRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs sends a note to its Chinese counterpart protesting against acts of espionage and provocation. On March 2 and 3, nearly 40 armed Chinese boats intruded into Vietnamese waters, four to ten nautical miles off the coast.

6. VNA rejects the news reported by the China news agency Xinhua from Bangkok on March 2 saying that a number of Thai border hamlets were destroyed by Vietnamese artillery.

— A five-year program for literary co-operation is signed in Hanoi between the Vietnam Writers' Association and the USSR Union of Writers.

— From February 27 to March 6 in Hanoi, Vietnam and the Soviet Union held a meeting to discuss co-operation in coal mining in 1982-1983 and implementation of the plan for the period 1981-1985.

7. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers adopts the State fund plan for salary distribution according to work done and productivity.

9. All papers in Hanoi publish a communiqué of the 12th plenum of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee that preparations for the Fifth Party Congress, which will open in Hanoi on March 27, 1982 have been completed.

10. In Hanoi the General Department of Meteorology and Hydrology inaugurates a joint Vietnamese-Soviet tropical meteorological station.

11. VNA rejects the news of western news agencies reporting that Vietnam sprayed toxic chemicals on the Kampuchea-Thailand border area.

13. A delegation of the Vietnam Federation of Trade Unions headed by its President, Nguyen Duc Thuan, attends the 17th plenum of the USSR Central Council of the Trade Unions.