

THE VICTORY DISEASE AND THE US ARMY AFTER THE COLD WAR

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This study investigates the US Army after the end of the Cold War, specifically how the "Victory Disease" resulting from winning the Cold War caused a complacency in the US Army which eventually led to the development of a flawed operational concept. This operational concept and its effects on the US Army are examined with respect to recent developments in US Army doctrine, weapons procurement, and force structure.

The US Army is compared to the Israeli Army between 1967 and 1973 to draw very interesting and close parallels concerning how the victory disease affected the Israeli Army after its victory over the Arab allies in 1967 and how complacency in the post 1967 Israeli also led to a flawed operational concept, which, in turn, resulted in vulnerabilities that Israel's enemies were able to capitalize on at the onset of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

This study explains how fundamental shifts in how armies prepare for future conflicts can cause vulnerabilities that an enemy can exploit.

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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE VICTORY DISEASE AND THE US ARMY AFTER THE COLD WAR by MAJ John W. Allen, USA, 84 pages.

This study investigates the US Army after the end of the Cold War, specifically how the "Victory Disease" resulting from winning the Cold War caused a complacency in the US Army which eventually led to the development of a flawed operational concept. This operational concept and its effects on the US Army are examined with respect to recent developments in US Army doctrine, weapons procurement, and force structure.

The US Army is compared to the Israeli Army between 1967 and 1973 to draw very interesting and close parallels concerning how the victory disease affected the Israeli Army after its victory over the Arab allies in 1967 and how complacency in the post-1967 Israeli Army also led to a flawed operational concept, which, in turn, resulted in vulnerabilities that Israel's enemies were able to capitalize on at the onset of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

This study explains how fundamental shifts in how armies prepare for future conflicts can cause vulnerabilities that an enemy can exploit.

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I would like to dedicate this work to the patience and love of my dear wife Tammy. I am humbled to the point of shame when I think of the sacrifices she has made on behalf of my career and this work. If this work were truly reflective of her dedication to my career and the United States of America, then this work would help end war for all time. I also would like to give special credit to my mother Kay H. Allen, for with out her hope, prayers, and prodding, I would not be the soldier I am today, in His name.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It is the end of the twentieth century. The United States of America stands alone on the world stage as the sole superpower. Over the last one hundred years, the United States has emerged from a rising industrial nation to the leader of the information age world. American Society has evolved, in the twentieth century, where computers and information are as valuable as energy and gold were in the America of one hundred years ago. The US military has led and followed society through this journey, and is now standing atop the world stage as the mightiest military force that has ever marched on the earth. Today, the US military, specifically the US Army, sees no peer threat. The US Army is, however, undergoing a comprehensive change within its force. Doctrine, weapons procurement, intelligence and information processing, and force structure are a few aspects of this change which this thesis will examine.

One question lingers with many of the current officer corps. Is the Army changing for the sake of change or is it truly changing to lead the world into the twenty-first century? This problem leads to the issues this thesis will investigate: how have the changes that the US Army has undergone since the victory in Desert Storm and the fall of the Soviet Union led to vulnerabilities that mirror those that the Israeli Army developed between the two Arab-Israeli Wars (1967-1973)?

An unconventional term used as slang in military writings is "victory disease," which is defined as the phenomenon that a nation, and specifically its army, undergoes after a great victory. This disease, which evolves over time, includes an arrogance and complacency with regard to any other adversary that may potentially threaten the nation.

An army in this state is characterized by common thinking that the next time it fights it will fight the same kind of war, battle, and enemy, over which it was recently victorious. Leaders, both civilian and military, view risk based on recent victory and accomplishments. Military readiness is allowed to slip and doctrine is written with a view to past success and not contemporary threats. Weapons are bought and researched based on this doctrine, and force structure more often than not is reduced to gain a peace dividend.

A peace dividend occurs when a nation or government at the end of a war calls out in common voice for its wealth, natural resources, industrial resources, and manpower to be shifted from the war effort to domestic concerns. This is done to change the priorities of government spending so that a large amount of money previously earmarked for national defense is now allocated to social programs. A peace dividend is the result of an intangible state of mind, which leads to complacency towards and a vulnerability to adversaries who do not conform to the standards or fundamentals of past enemies and war scenarios.

For example, during World War II, the US conducted one of the largest war mobilizations in history. The country spent billions of dollars and her industry was heralded as the freedom engine. The US had the largest military force on active duty in its history. Every American felt the cost of defeating the Axis powers in World War II. When the war was over, almost everyone wanted a peace dividend. America was experiencing a victory disease and wanted a payback for its vast expenditures during the war it had just won. The US shifted its wartime efforts to the domestic front and all Americans shared in unprecedented prosperity. Consequently, while the services,

particularly the Army, continued to be deployed throughout the world, resources were shifted back to America and the army was faced with doing more with less.

By 1950, many units in the army were hollow, meaning they had less than their authorized strength, especially in areas where the national strategy considered that a minimal risk was present. The Korean War is testament to the impact of the victory disease and peace dividend on the Army. It is evident that US foreign policy in Korea after World War II and the US Army's administration and preparation for a possible war were clumsy and ill conceived. They reflected not only a lack of understanding, but also a lack of interest in an area of the world with no estimated risk to US interests.

Additionally, US Army intelligence echoed this policy by underestimating the North Korean Army. In all reports the North Koreans were seen as a fourth rate force with antiquated Russian and captured World War II German and Japanese equipment (Hastings 1987, 40-45). The five years between the end of World War II and the Korean War illustrate well how a victorious military may change, from victory in war, through complacency in peace, and back to a war for which it is not fully prepared.

Two views or arguments always exist at the threshold of change, including changes affecting the military. The first point of view is advocated by the traditionalists, who fear that change or deviation from the status quo will make the nation vulnerable. The traditional way has always worked and will continue to work for some time to come. The second point of view is represented by those who advocate change, even when it goes contrary to current traditional military thinking and threat perception. Both views have a certain degree of validity, but neither is always correct, which causes polarization among professionals. The two views pull at the army when change is being considered.

The winner is not necessarily the most correct, but rather the one that is most expedient or the one that is supported by the most powerful or influential group of leaders.

Those advocating maintaining current military capability based on current and recent events further break down into two subgroups. The first consists of those traditionalists who fear that change will lead to catastrophe. They see the status quo as the best way to continue conducting military affairs. During the years between the two world wars of the twentieth century (1918-1939), many in the US Army infantry and cavalry corps resisted the doctrine of using the tank as an independent combat arm. The infantry saw the tank as an infantry assault weapon, with no reason to wander around the battlefield like an infantry battalion, and the cavalry viewed the tank as too complicated and difficult a weapon to maintain and use as an independent arm. These views drove a doctrine and weapons procurement program that left the Army grossly unprepared for the blitzkrieg type of maneuver warfare the Germans used to great success at the outbreak of World War II. This subgroup fears change for change sake.

The members of the second subgroup are more focused on their own vested interests with regard to their particular branches and services, because change influences their overall "piece of the pie". These traditionalists look to the past to protect the future. They view changes as counter to their own service's or branch's best interests, regardless of what is best for the future of the military as a whole. They skeptically view any change as revolutionary and counter to the values and doctrine they have been influenced by as they matured as officers. Their service or branch and its characteristics and objectives was best and will always be the best. For example, the French High Command, fresh from the victory of the First World War, felt the negative effects of the high cost of

modern warfare on men and equipment. As a result, they chose to disregard the doctrinal and equipment changes that were proposed by progressive military thinkers like de Gaulle in France, Guderian in Germany, and Liddell-Hart in England, relying instead on a doctrine, procurement, and force design strategy that was more concerned with cost effectiveness so as to provide a peace dividend to the country. The French built an elaborate fortress line of defense, the Maginot Line, which stretched from the Swiss border to the Belgian frontier, to theoretically provide a cost-effective defense against any potential German invasion. "The German forces that crossed the frontiers of the Netherlands, Belgium, and France on May 10, 1940, so completely succeeded in their aim of cutting through the Allies' defenses that within 10 days they had reached the Channel coast and cut the BEF and a French army off from the rest of France" (Latimer 1998, 1). All other French combat arms were meant to support a defensive infantry force. Despite French expectations, the Germans, who had capitalized on the evolution of modern arms, utterly destroyed the French Army in a few weeks.

In contrast to the traditionalists, those who advocate change look to the future and see dramatic differences between how the military fought in the past and how the military may have to fight in the next conflict. While some call this group alarmist and futuristic, its members believe that change is inevitable and any army or service that does not leverage its resources against the future will go the way of the dinosaur. Heinz Guderian and George Patton are examples of generals who advocated change in their respective armies. Both were Veterans of World War I and both promoted the use of combined arms. Their contemporaries saw both men as eccentric, yet their vision led to the air-land battle that was characteristic of many major campaigns in Europe during World War II.

Their viewpoint concerning mechanized armies was validated between 1939 and 1943, when great tank and mechanized armies fought across the continents of Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. Nevertheless, as World War II drew to a close, these same armies fought campaigns of attrition to end the war in Europe, seemingly countering their theories. In the end, both viewpoints were validated in some way and level during the war. What remains for today's planners is to balance the two theories. Neither view will be totally correct or totally incorrect. The key is to develop doctrine, weapons procurement, and force structure policies that can adapt to any situation in which an army may find itself in the next conflict.

Looking back over the last eight to nine years, it is interesting to explore the question of whether the changes that the US Army has made since the fall of the Soviet Union have resulted in a vulnerability that a potential enemy can exploit, possibly taking advantage of a surprise that may lead to initial or total defeat. Some viewpoints are extreme and lead to alarmist conclusions. Regardless, these viewpoints stem from an overall lack of direction from the civilian and military leadership for the army since the end of the Cold War.

As an example, in a 2 July 1998 *Washington Times* article by Rowan Scarborough, the problem of how vulnerable the US Army is today comes to light. The report quoted military pilots, including those serving in the Army, saying, "All of the politically correct brain washing like consideration for others and the feminization of the combat units, propaganda, and white-laboratory-mouse training should be purged from the military curriculum" (Scarborough 1998).

The armed forces' lagging readiness has been made clearly evident from a report by Senator James M. Inhofe, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Readiness, who held a series of hearings in 1998 to expose a problem the Pentagon only grudgingly acknowledges. A committee staff inspection of scores of military bases found increased cannibalization of Air Force fighters and Army helicopters to keep planes flying; grounding of twenty percent of warplanes the Air Force has deployed around the world while awaiting parts or maintenance; an increased call by observer -controllers at the combat training centers for better training and more training funds; and shortages of ammunition and spare parts at the Marine Corps' 29 Palms training base in California. Mr. Inhofe said in December 1998, "Our current state of readiness borders on disastrous. We are the most threatened I can remember us being in the last generation." He added that US forces "cannot meet public expectations about national defense," and that "recruiting and retention are quickly becoming abysmal" (Maze 1998, 4).

Even Congress is distressed by this somewhat alarming trend of the US Army to downsize in the face of seemingly no peer threat. Recently many senior congressional leaders have come out and voiced concern, as a recent article illustrated:

The problem that the US Army faces comes as the armed forces has shrunk by almost 40percent in force structure and troop levels since the Cold War ended in 1989. Defense spending, when adjusted for inflation, has dropped for 14 consecutive years, to \$270 billion in fiscal 1999. Aides to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott [say] that he has declared to the President of the United States, William J. Clinton, that "the nation no longer has adequate defense. While I believe that more needs to be allocated to our national defense, it needs to be done prudently. We need to get the missions, manning and equipping and pay and benefits synchronized to enable us to continue with a quality force. I urge you, Mr. President, to make this a high priority of your fiscal year 2000 budget request" (Scarborough 1998, 1).

On Tuesday, 18 August 1998, LTG Montgomery Meigs, then the Commandant at the Command and General Staff College, gave a lecture on leadership to the 1998-99 Command and General Staff College class. During this lecture LTG Meigs asked the class if it could name the country which had lost the following out of its force structure:

1. 709,000 regular service soldiers.
2. 293,000 reserve troops.
3. Eight standing army divisions.
4. 20 air force and navy wings with 2,000 combat aircraft.
5. 13 strategic ballistic missile submarines with 3,114 nuclear warheads of 232 missiles.
6. 232 strategic bombers.
7. 500 ICBMs with 1,950 warheads.
8. Four aircraft carriers
9. 121 surface combat ships and submarines, plus the entire support base, shipyards, and logistical assets needed to sustain such a force.

Was it Russia, China, North Korea, or NATO? His answer to a dumbfounded elite officer corps was that these were changes in the United States military since the end of the Cold War, in order to pay the peace dividend for social programs. One can hardly look at these reductions and not draw the conclusion that the US is lulling itself into a false sense of security that may result in vulnerabilities an enemy could exploit.

Perhaps one can gain insight into this question by examining lessons learned from the recent past, specifically, Israel's experience between the two Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973. In 1973, the Israelis barely defeated what they had expected to be an inferior Arab force. Only a few years earlier, in 1967, the Israeli Army had, with few military problems, overwhelmingly defeated a numerically superior Arab force. How did the Arab force improve so much between the two wars and how could the Israeli Army fail to notice these changes? Why did the changes that the Arab military made between

1967 and 1973 work to such advantage for them, almost resulting in the Israeli military's total defeat?

One might question whether lessons learned from the Israeli experience are currently applicable to the US Army? On the surface, the US and Israeli militaries are quite different. The US Army is a global military power, while the Israeli Army is a regional power. The Israeli Army basically uses weapons that the US Army has discarded for more modern equipment. Nevertheless, there are many areas of comparability that allow the analyst to conclude that the US can learn from Israel's mistakes. Israeli society is similar to that of the US. Israeli culture is based on the Judaic tradition, while the US cultural is predominantly based on Judeo-Christian beliefs, which makes the value systems of both countries similar. These armies and governments see war and battle fundamentally from similar points of view, from the individual soldier to the highest official. Their views of life and families all are based on a parallel, if not exact, set of standards. Soldiers from each army could relatively easily be transposed and find themselves in a system or service that is not too different from their own. The governments are democratically elected and similar in how they function and how they control the military. Perhaps the greatest parallels are the similarities in force structure and vision. Many Israeli officers have been students of US military doctrine since Israel's rebirth in 1948. Israel and the US routinely exchange officers at all levels of military academia. Many branches, such as armor, infantry, and artillery, even exchange noncommissioned and commissioned officer instructors at branch particular schools on a full-time or part-time basis. The relationships have made the two armies act similarly, as well as speak a similar military language.

It is from this hypothesis of comparability that this thesis will proceed. It is important to stress that the thesis is not looking for one-to-one correspondences, nor is it a question of which tank is better or if the two armies fight on the battlefield similarly. Instead, the reason for studying and calling attention to the similarities between the two armies is that one can point to a common post-victory mind-set. In the case of Israel, this mind-set came after a stunning victory in 1967 and resulted in a near defeat six years later in 1973. In the case of the US, a similar victory disease mind-set since the end of the Cold War has been driving the development of an inappropriate doctrine, which, in turn, has given rise to a flawed weapons procurement policy and a force structure which may conceivably be inappropriate for the exigencies of the National Military Strategy.

In February 1998, Army Chief of Staff General Denis Reimer, along with the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Chiefs of Staff, had testified before Congress that the US military was in good shape and that, although the services could do more with more funding, all was fine in the Department of Defense (Maze 1998, 4). During a September 1998 congressional appearance, however, General Reimer said, "The Army needs \$5 billion more a year, we have taken too much risk. If we don't do something, we run the risk of a return to the hollow Army of the past and a risk of not being able to execute our national strategy" (Maze 1998, 4). Although it is clear that the US Army military leadership did not purposely deceive congressional leaders, the effects of complacency have, nevertheless, crept into the readiness of the US Army. Over time, under-funding and a postponement of weapons research for close combat forces have resulted in a state of readiness that may not be adequate to successfully deter or defeat a future enemy. Perhaps this has precedence in the past.

A clear parallel emerges between Iraq's defeat and reorganization after Desert Storm and Egypt's defeat and reorganization between 1967 and 1973. Both heads of state continued pressure on the diplomatic front, while rebuilding their armies behind the scenes. Both heads of state demonstrated by using war games, alerts, and general mobilizations against their primary adversary until that adversary developed a sense of complacency about the enemy's military capabilities, government and intelligence community. The Iraqi Army has undergone intensive rebuilding and, to some extent, reorganization. The Iraqi elite Republican Guard has completed a rigorous equipment modernization program that includes the purchase and deployment of the Russian-designed T-80 main battle tanks and sophisticated low-level and medium-level air defense. It is clear that the Iraqi General Staff has applied lessons learned from its defeat in Desert Storm. In Israel, the victory disease caused the Israeli government and intelligence community to underestimate Egypt's capability and intent. In the Iraqi case, it is quite evident that the international community, led by the US, is growing tired of the struggle to keep Iraq in check.

Underlying Assumptions

The purpose of this work is to identify potential military dangers that the US Army may face in the near future and to examine if there is a parallel between military developments that occurred in Israel between the two Arab-Israeli wars and military developments in the post-Cold War US Army. The thesis has two underlying assumptions. The first is that there is an adequate basis to validate comparing the US Army and the Israeli Army within the scope of the thesis question. This assumption is based on the similarities of the two armies, governments, officer corps, and the fact that

the Israeli Army and the US Army exchange officers and instructors at their respective military training schools. Perhaps more important, although less apparent, is that historically and contemporarily these two armies act alike. For example, both armies have fought and plan to fight war on an economy of scale. They both desire to win quickly and minimize casualties and resources. They both plan to leverage technology to offset the possibility of fighting against a larger force or adversary. The focus here is on the end-state, rather than motivation.

The second assumption is that there is currently an attitude of complacency within the US Army that is similar to the attitude that characterized Israel's military planning following its victory in the 1967 war. Guided by this mind-set, the policy that drove developments in the areas of Israel's military doctrine weapons procurement, and force structure resulted in the Arabs' successful initial surprise and Israel's near defeat at the outset of the 1973 war. The thesis questions whether current US developments in the areas of doctrine, weapons procurement, and force structure are leaving the US Army similarly vulnerable to potential enemies.

Terminology

Military Efficiency. For the purposes of this study, military efficiency is the military's ability to conduct operations and training in peacetime at minimal cost, for example, training large caliber weapons systems with subcaliber devices that are less expensive to operate. The trade-off is wartime proficiency. For example, it may be efficient for economic, environmental or political reasons to buy certain weapon systems that supposedly will do the job in peacetime, but may have some difficulty doing so during war. The Sherman tank was produced by the thousands during World War II

because it was good, cheap, and economic to build. Military planners envisioned a blitzkrieg war and the Sherman was the tank for this type of warfare. By the time the Shermans were fully engaged by the allies, major modifications were needed because the nature of the war had transitioned into more of a mobile attrition type of warfare. In addition, the Germans had had more than six years of experience and had built tanks for both exploitation and attrition. As a result, the allied units, using the Sherman tank, had to modify both the vehicle itself and their small unit tactics to overcome the tank's design. One tank sergeant from World War II who had fought the German Army in France noted: "Though reliable as ever, this tank nevertheless was inadequate against Panthers and Tigers [German main battle tanks of the day] due to their guns out-shooting our guns. It didn't matter that there was more of our tanks or that we could make more tanks, what mattered is that when you went against them they would win and we would die" (Macksey 1988, 166-1). Crew morale suffered throughout Europe until the M-26 Pershing tank was introduced. It was bigger, more expensive, and harder to produce, but it could fight tank to tank with most of the German main battle tanks from 1944 until the war's end in 1945.

Military Effectiveness. For the purpose of this study, military effectiveness refers to the military's ability to achieve both peacetime and wartime objectives with the major focus being on minimizing casualties, disregarding, if necessary, resource expenditure and costs.

Peace Dividend. A peace dividend is the shift of part of a country's wealth, natural and industrial resources, and manpower from defense to the domestic infrastructure or other national priorities during the period of peace following a major

victory. A nation or government generally calls for a peace dividend when it believes that a recent victory precludes the necessity of maintaining defense spending at its wartime levels.

Victory Disease. The victory disease describes a phenomenon that a nation and, specifically for this study, its army undergo after a great victory. Over time a state of mind evolves which includes an arrogant and complacent attitude toward any possible adversary that may potentially threaten the nation. Military policy is developed, based on the conviction that the next time it fights the Army will fight the same kind of wars, enemies, and battles it fought and defeated in the past. Leaders, both civilian and military, view risk based on recent victory and accomplishments. Current and future doctrine is guided or written with a view to past success and not current or future threats. Weapons are bought and researched, and force structure more often than not is reduced to gain a peace dividend. One result of the victory disease is that, due to neglect, military readiness is allowed to decline.

Limitations

This thesis will be limited to the period since the end of the Cold War. It will focus, in particular, on changes in the US Army regarding doctrine, weapons procurement, and force structure. A comparison will be made with developments in these three areas in the Israeli Army during the period between the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars, and this will be used as a basis to discuss why the Arabs were able to surprise the Israelis at the outset of the 1973 war. Finally, an analysis will be made to determine whether US Army developments since the end of the Cold War sufficiently parallel those of Israel following the 1967 war to warrant concluding that the US faces vulnerabilities

similar to those faced by Israel prior to the 1973 war. Research is also limited to unclassified sources. The analysis will be qualitative, rather than quantitative, examining lessons learned and current information available through traditional research methodologies and the Internet.

Thesis Outline

Chapter 1 is an introduction that provides a background to the problem and some initial remarks regarding the similarities between the Israeli Army after the 1967 war and the US Army since the end of the Cold War. The primary question of the thesis will be addressed the secondary questions to be answered in support of the thesis will be indicated, and the methodology to be used in answering the questions will be described.

Chapter 2 will be a review of the decline of the US Army since the end of the Cold War and how a flawed operational concept has led to the US Army's complacency.

Chapter 3 will be a detailed review of the US Army's complacency with respect to doctrine, force structure, and weapons procurement. Procurement will be limited to the US Army's tank and heavy forces.

Chapter 4 will be a review these same areas (doctrine, force structure and weapons procurement) for the Israeli Army between 1967 and 1973 and discuss how changes in its operational concept in these areas led to the initial Egyptian success in the 1973 war.

Chapter 5 will be a comparison of the two armies, an analysis of similarities and differences, a discussion of how this relates to the thesis question and a conclusion which answers the thesis question.

CHAPTER 2

THE US ARMY TODAY

The pillars of US defense, as described in the National Military Strategy, consist of force readiness, sustainability, force structure, modernization and investment, and infrastructure and overhead. As stated in Chapter One, many in the military and senior civilian leadership see the US military failing to live up to or properly sustain these pillars. In this chapter I will look at the US Army and what many military and civilian leaders are currently saying about it. This chapter will also focus on force readiness, doctrine, force structure, and modernization as insights into how the US Army has been complacent since the fall of the Soviet Union and how this may have resulted in vulnerabilities which a potential enemy can exploit. At the end of the chapter, it should be clear that the US Army today is different from the army that destroyed the Iraqi Army in 1991 and watched the Soviet Union fall apart at the beginning of the 1990s. It should also be evident that there are problems that many leaders both within and outside of the military see as compromising the US Army's ability to fight and win the next war.

While US Army doctrine has not officially discounted or changed the underlying principle that the US Army primarily exists to fight and win the nation's wars, the army has glossed over or made less important the fact that in order to do so it must put soldiers on the ground in order to move to and destroy its enemies. The Army has viewed the geopolitical world and determined that no potential enemy could challenge or even have a chance to defeat the US on any battlefield. As a result, the US Army has become complacent and arrogant about the near future and has leveraged what resources it has towards a distant future. Currently, the US Army is trading portions of the money and

resources needed to rebuild and prepare today's Army to deal with current and potential near-term missions for what the Army leadership projects as possible threats to the US in a future twenty to thirty years away. This strategy is shortsighted, and today many warning signs are surfacing in many areas of military readiness.

Retention of soldiers, which is critical in an all-volunteer force, is at an all-time low. During the 1990s the US Army has had a dual problem of reducing the force by over one-third while simultaneously recruiting new soldiers into the service. Additionally, the service has seen a decline in benefits, leaving a growing attitude on the part of the youth of America that an enlistment in the Army is not worth it anymore. Recently, the Army has published reports that it is having trouble recruiting, stating that it can not recruit men and women to replace soldiers who are leaving the military. In 1998, the Army missed its recruiting goals by almost 20,000 replacements, and after the first three months of 1999, it was 2,345 soldiers short of its requirements. This has prompted the Army to take six hundred soldiers, mostly noncommissioned officers, out of field units and put them into recruiting commands to help find replacements. This compounds the problem by further degrading the operational force (Moniz 1999, 1).

Moreover, operational readiness due to a lack of funding for spare parts and equipment is at an all time low, and deployments for operations other than war are causing the US Army to operate at a pace exceeding that of any nonwar years in history. The average number of deployments in nonwar years prior to the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union was roughly fifteen to twenty. In the 1990s, the average number of deployments has been more than one hundred. This chapter will describe how the US Army leadership has been called out to answer why this is occurring, and then to

try to demonstrate that the operational concept which grew out of the end of the Cold War and the victory in Desert Storm is fundamentally incorrect, resulting in a lack of balance between preparing for the future and maintaining strength today.

On 28 September 1998, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with the chiefs of staff of the four military services, was called before the US Congress Armed Service Committee. The purpose behind the meeting was to ask the chiefs why there was an emerging problem with the US military's readiness. Many articles, news reports, TV reports, and interviews with military personnel over the past few years have revealed a major problem with US military readiness. The topics discussed were all tied to one variable: money.

Department of Defense funding has been steadily reduced since 1987. The Department of Defense presently accounts for only 16 percent of the total US budget, as compared to 18.5 percent during the peak of the Cold War. Consequently, in view of the nation's status as the only superpower, the committee concluded that the current administration has neglected the US military in favor of its political and domestic agenda.

The operational concept is a form of a military mind-set that is not written down but is demonstrated in action. It acts, as a keel does on a ship, by stabilizing the path a military sails on. It does not necessarily mean that the path or heading is positive. It is merely given to describe the direction an army is heading and does not seek to recount an official document or program. In the 1990s it is clear that the operational concept of the US Army has been to primarily spend its resources on deployment to operations other than war as a way to bolster and validate US foreign policy. This is highlighted by US Army deployments to places such as Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia, Kuwait, Turkey and Iraq.

With a continual priority of resources going for lighter digitized forces meant to be used in the expeditionary force concept and the continual deployment of US Army troops around the world in operations other than war, the US Army has shifted focus away from fighting the nation's wars. For example, US Army Chief of Staff Denis Reimer stated that the Army needed \$5 billion a year more than it is currently scheduled to receive just to pay for all its commitments. The US Army has been drawn down by almost 350,000 soldiers to approximately 485,000. Additionally, it has had to reduce its force structure to pay for research and development for a minimal number of systems, such as the comanche helicopter, and for the upgrading and modernization of the command and control elements of the Army's ground forces. Trading soldiers and force structure for modernization can only be regarded as cannibalistic for an army whose deployment commitments have increased by three hundred percent since the fall of the Communist bloc.

All armies need to modernize; no army needs a force structure that is an un-required drain on resources and serves no vital purpose for national defense. During the 1990s, trading men for research and development has not been good for the US Armed Forces. All four service chiefs testified that being forced to accept current funding was affecting readiness and sacrificing our nation's future security. The symptoms, so to speak, were that more pilots were leaving all four services faster than new pilots could be trained. Military pay has been poorly managed to the point that a pay gap of 14-16 percent exists between military professionals and their civilian counterparts. This pay gap can also be felt in the military quality of life and retirement pay system. Congress and the administration have both neglected the military pay system for years. Military pay has

degraded to the point that congress has debated discontinuing retirement benefits to retired military personnel and or reducing the amount and the benefits currently authorized by law. Military members see that the government and the country have turned their back on the military during some significant economic boom times. As a result, Rick Maze of the *ARMY TIMES* reported that the Army is having a hard time recruiting and retaining soldiers. Officers are leaving in droves for higher paying less risky jobs that offer better benefits than the US military. The Association of Retired Military Officers has spent time and money trying to raise the alarm that there has been detrimental impact on military retention by the reduction of benefits for active and retired military personnel. In many areas and installations, retired personnel from the military are being turned away from military hospitals and clinics. This is seen in the military as a betrayal of promises of lifetime health care for retirees made to all military personnel since World War II (Maze 1998, 4).

Additionally, with the reduction in infrastructure and personnel, the next cut of the 1990s affected weapons and equipment. Current weapons systems that have been in service for over twenty years are not being replaced by more modern equipment. Instead, they are being upgraded or retrofitted or are not being replaced at all, leaving certain holes in the force structure that commanders will, no doubt, have to fill by other methods in the future. General Reimer reported that the \$5 five billion shortfall compounds each year that the Army is underfunded. When asked by the committee if there was any blood left in the bucket or were we steel on steel, General Reimer responded that we were steel on steel and that he was having to cut bone and muscle from the force structure to maintain what was vital and still prepare the military for the future.

The Army has also taken a cut in its share of the defense budget. The US Army normally receives about 26-27 percent of the defense budget, but it has been forced to accept just less than twenty-five percent in order for the Department of Defense to pay for weapons programs in the Navy and Air Force, which have received a two percent increase at the army's expense.

By 1991, Iraq was totally defeated after Desert Storm, the Soviet Union was disintegrating, and the Cold War had, for all intents and purposes, ended. This left the United States the sole military superpower. The US Army now faced a world of regional challenges but no single peer threat. Almost a decade later, in 1999, the administration, Congress, and the Department of Defense admittedly face the challenge that the US Army had declined in readiness to the point that it may not be able to accomplish its mission of defending the country. How did this happen? What changes has the US Army undergone during the 1990s that may have led to complacency and possible vulnerabilities in the next war?

The answer in part is that the new operational concept called for doctrine, weapons procurement, and a force structure that was cheaper and better able to serve a more expeditionary-type force to contend with the new mission of using the military for operations other than war. Resources in general were earmarked to conform with these changes, in many cases to the detriment of those previously allocated for the close battle. Many militaries face the challenge of reorganization after turning points in domestic and world events. The US Army was no exception, with regard to the reorganization in 1990s following the Cold War. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the US Army needed to change in order to be able to stand as the world's premier army for the next century.

Spring-boarded by the crushing defeat of Iraq in 1991, the United States, as a whole, called for a change in how it resourced the military. As a result, many changes took place that led to the current situation. With no real threat, many wanted a better standard of living and more money spent on domestic priorities. Yet war has always stalked the nations of the earth. The Bible, written thousands of years ago, says in Ecclesiastes, Chapter 3, “there is a time for everything, and a season for every activity under heaven...a time to love and a time to hate, a time for war and a time for peace”. This truth from our ancestors is still relevant today.

The US Army is and has been operating for some time under the notion of its own invincibility. This is not reality. Many nations possess the capacity and the will to build a force to challenge the US Army and win. France, England, Germany, Russia, China, North Korea, and Japan, for example, possess the industrial capacity to export military technology and hardware to any nation that might have the will to confront the US. The Cold War military-industrial complex in Russia and some of the former Soviet republics is still operational. Add this to Russia’s problems with its economy, and it would not be hard to envision Russians assisting an emerging nation to build up an armed force that could challenge US policy in a vital region (The New Challenge, CNN online reform, <http://www.pbs.org/newhour>, 7,2198).

On 7 October 1998, retired General Gordon Sullivan, former Army Chief of Staff (1991 to 1995), testified before the United States Congressional House National Security Committee on how the Army has come to be in such a poor state of readiness at the end of the 1990s. He stated, “We have a fragile armed force... When I left the US Army readiness was as a razor’s edge. We are now in the 14th year of defense funding decline.

The troops know it. Their parents and mentors are highlighting high-paying opportunity in the civilian sector” (Maze 1998, 4).

From the above examples we can see that something is wrong within the US Army, as indicated by concern about this issue on the part of both the military (the highest-ranking General – Army Chief of Staff Reimer) and the civilians (Congress). Throughout the 1990s a new operational concept that involved leveraging technology to reach 2010 and 2020, while allocating few resources for the traditional close combat fight potentially facing the US Army, has led to a readiness state that is less than is acceptable. This does not mean that the US Army has lost its ability to fight and win wars. The evidence presented merely concludes that a state of complacency exists, and this can lead to vulnerabilities that could cause the US Army to experience either a surprise defeat at the beginning of the next major conflict, or an initial, major setback resulting in a stalemate at the end of such a conflict. This condition can be directly linked to the operational concept’s impact on how the US Army develops doctrine, procures weapons and builds or, in some cases, tears down its force structure.

CHAPTER 3

US ARMY DOCTRINE, WEAPONS, AND FORCE STRUCTURE

Many senior military and civilian leaders in the US are deeply concerned about the Army's current readiness. For the purpose of this thesis, it is expedient to break down the issue of complacency in the US Army into three categories: doctrine, weapons procurement and force structure. This will help demonstrate the evolution of this issue. This research will examine these three areas with respect to developments in the US Army since the end of the Cold War. What is important to the thesis is the intangible mindset that drives developments in this area. It is from a combination of the objective facts and subjective analysis of that mindset that conclusions can be made and parallels drawn as to how the current complacency affecting the US Army may lead to vulnerabilities in the future.

Doctrine

Since the end of the Vietnam era, three significant events led to the doctrine known as "Air-Land Battle," introduced in the army's capstone doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, *Operations*, in 1983. First, the Army in the 1970s was highlighted by what is defined as hollowness. Hollowness describes a unit of any size that on paper or in tables of organization is defined as strong and prepared for combat, but in reality is undermanned, underequipped, and undertrained and has low morale. The army in the late 1970s produced a new doctrine through a revision of FM 100-5. The 1977 version of this manual laid the foundation for a more focused Army ready to face what was then a huge threat worldwide. Second, the Army began to develop new weapon systems, such as the M1 Abrams main battle tank, that would fight in accordance with this doctrine. Third,

the army envisioned training these new units, outfitted with the latest equipment and supplied with the latest doctrine, on a training ground that would, in effect, prepare them for the next battle in the Cold War.

When the Army achieved overwhelming success in Desert Storm and the Soviet Union collapsed to end the Cold War, most military strategists and senior Department of Defense officials saw the US Army with no peer. Because of this, these strategists and officials questioned the cost effectiveness of maintaining current personnel and equipment levels, and redirected research and development away from more traditional army training/procurements to new requirements for operations other than war. The Army then changed FM 100-5, effectively refocusing its warfighting doctrine to reflect a new operational theory that dealt with force projection and operations other than war. From this new doctrine the Army changed its focus in many areas, such as tank procurement and the use of combat training centers to train soldiers for operations other than war rather than close combat. The Army began to concentrate on the challenges that it would face in the ever-changing and uncertain future. The strategy of a force-projected Army rather than a very costly Cold War strategy of a forward deployment was considered the best. During the Cold War, the US Army had positioned forces in Europe and Asia, and it had sets of equipment all around the world that would enable it to fight a war against a Communist force bent on conquering the free world. As the Communist world collapsed, the United States embarked on a new strategy by pulling the majority of these deployed forces back to the continental US and relying on deploying forces to areas where US interests were most threatened. A lighter more deployable force was thought to be the answer.

As the US began to withdraw and downsize, Iraq attacked and occupied Kuwait in August 1990. This interrupted the downsizing, as a force of 500,000 deployed to the Middle East and fought the war known as Desert Storm. Desert Storm was fought by heavy, light and unconventional land forces against the large Cold War era army of Iraq. The US won a quick and decisive victory in a war that lasted only one hundred hours. Both those who advocated a more deployable lighter force and those who advocated a more balanced heavy-light force pointed to Desert Storm as a validation of their theories. In the end, the US Army chose a lighter more deployable force.

In the early 1990s a new doctrine emerged that the US Army has been following in an era of uncertain threats, fewer resources, fewer forces, and competing priorities within the Department of Defense. The end of the Cold War had a profound effect on US Army doctrine. The strategy became threat based rather than capability based. The new strategy was based on building a force with information technology modernization. This strategy came about as the army shrank by about one-third between 1989 and today. In this period, combat brigades were reduced by thirty-seven percent and combat battalions were cut by twenty-five percent. Personnel strengths reduced from 770,00 to 495,000, or by thirty-eight percent. The US Army's buying power decreased by forty percent, due to actual cuts and the reduced buying power of the dollar as a result of inflation. The Army's total obligation authority, the authorization of funding by Congress, has gone down by an average of 4.5 percent every year since 1989. This reduction is both by design and again a result of inflation. The Army's operations and maintenance budget, the funds that train soldiers to maintain combat readiness, shrank from \$20 billion in Fiscal Year 96 to \$16.8 billion in Fiscal Year 99. These constraints had an impact on the

direction the US Army decided to pursue as it developed doctrinal concepts for the future. Rather than look at more traditional units as a possible solution to some of these issues, the US Army and many military thinkers have put forward futuristic types of units that leverage technology to solve the lower funding dilemma.

At a time when the Army is smaller than anytime since before World War II and the international climate is uncertain and unstable, the nation needs its army to be more capable than before. However, the most recent version of the Army's capstone doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, published in 1993, reflects the confusion over the direction of the Army and strategy. This document largely ignores the positive direction set by the 1982 and 1986 versions that led to the crushing defeat of Iraq in 1990. The change in Army doctrine focuses instead on vague notions of future war, with heavy emphasis on control and staff processes. Operations other than war are presented with the same emphasis as offensive and defensive operations. The manual focuses on a full spectrum of operations, with combat making up only one-third of its doctrine. Humanitarian relief, nation building, and peace support are now vogue buzzwords for doctrinal theory and military publications. Army operations have made a return to a systems approach to warfare, thoroughly rejected in the 1976 version. Perfect intelligence, dominant situational awareness, and applied firepower are emphasized. Long-range helicopter attacks, long-range artillery, and Air Force dominance and precision weapons defeating the enemy from afar with minimal casualties are now how the US Army expects to win wars. None of this emphasizes the soldier or tanker on the ground. Commanders train and have military mission essential task lists (METLs) with operations other than war missions. No longer is there a clear statement of how the Army will fight; instead there is a confused

mass of contradictory operational prescriptions which add up to a determination to move slowly and cautiously, avoid casualties at all costs, and achieve victory through planning (Ancker 1998, 3-5).

Joint Vision 2010

In the midst of the changing national and operational strategy during the mid 1990s, doctrine took a fifteen-year leap forward. The Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff published a conceptual template, known as Joint Vision 2010, for doctrine in the future. It describes how America's armed forces will utilize people and leverage technology to achieve new levels of effectiveness in war fighting. This new operational concept describes where the armed forces will be by the years 2010-2015, and outlines a new operational concept that entails how the armed forces will use dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection, together with unforeseen technological advances under an umbrella of complete information superiority. This new vision entails a great leap ahead for the US military and, if implemented correctly, is predicted to keep the US the military superpower it is today for the next one hundred years and more. What it fails to do, and what it has no intention of doing, is to show how to get to the years 2010-2015. As a result, many current military thinkers and planners have leaped fifteen to twenty years ahead with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but have forgotten to plan for the next fifteen years. As a result, money, training, simulations and research are pouring into any and all efforts to achieve this objective in fifteen to twenty years. What has been left out is any consideration of the possible necessity of fighting a close battle within the next fifteen years, should US national interests be challenged before Joint Vision 2010 is achieved. Overlooking the

possibility of such a challenge is, among other things, a result of continued complacency due to the US military's overwhelming success in the early 1990s.

The operational concept developed as a result of the victory disease and emerging changes in focus are the most telling of recent doctrinal change in the US Army. The army's capstone manual stresses its dominance as a form of doctrine. It does not emphasize the need to shoot anyone or take away terrain and combat power from an enemy. Moreover it describes how the Army will fight all enemies with a "Star Wars" cleanliness that does not direct us to sweat and ache in peacetime so that we will not bleed during a war. They have been catalyzed by complacency, which has resulted in vulnerabilities for the Army in the future:

Modern warfare puts added stress on maintaining dispersed and noncontiguous formations. Army forces overwhelm the enemy's ability to react by synchronizing indirect and direct fires from ground and air-based platforms; assaulting with armor, mechanized, air assault, and dismounted units; jamming the enemy's communications; concealing friendly operations with obscurants; and attacking from several directions at once. The goal is to confuse, demoralize, and destroy the enemy with the coordinated impact of combat power. The enemy cannot comprehend what is happening; the enemy commander cannot communicate his intent nor can he coordinate his actions (FM 100-5, 1993, 2).

The manual also introduces operations other than war as another mission and role for the military. Many have debated why the world's premier military now focuses more attention on operations such as peacekeeping and peace making. Most believe that, due to the fall of the Soviet empire, the absence of any single monolithic threat, and the call for a peace dividend, the US Army's leadership has used operations other than war as a marketing tool to maintain funding required to fight two medium intensity, near simultaneously conflicts. Otherwise the 1990s drawdown would have left almost no capacity for the US Army to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow.

The problem with this strategy and its incarnation in doctrine is that it no longer emphasizes (or perhaps it would be better to say that it de-emphasizes) the close battle. Independent fires concentrating on precision weapons now take center stage. Safe maneuver with little or no attrition is now the preferred methodology of war. Planning and overwhelming information dominance, based on perfect intelligence, along with avoiding any risk, have become the imperatives for combat operations. Major portions of unit operational and maintenance funds are used to train soldiers to conduct operations other than war, rather than the traditional and vital job of training for combat. The army correctly trains soldiers to operate in the environment in which they will find themselves. What is questionable is the concept guiding why US Army combat soldiers are training to keep peace and maintain order in places that have been hit by natural and man-made disasters. The danger here is how the military prioritizes resources. If the will of the people and leaders of the country is reflected in their desire for a peace dividend resulting from the “victory” in the Cold War, but, at the same time, they also want a sound military to protect US national interests, then it is imperative that funding be adequate to maintain the force structure necessary to comply with this. Currently the force structure is not adequate to both prosecute an ever-increasing operations other than war mission and prepare for a potentially larger “traditional” conflict. If operations other than war are truly to be a US Army mission, then the US Army force structure must increase to absorb the task without increasing risk to national interests by de-focusing the Army’s ability to fight.

TRADOC PAM 525-5, dated October 1996, which is a derivative of FM 100-5 and basically describes the future of the army and how it will fight, includes five battle

dynamics: battle command, battle space, depth and simultaneous attack, early entry, and combat service support. The army began to see a fundamental flaw in its future force and weapons development and set about developing a future concept, known as FORCE XXI. Its characteristics include tempo, joint and multinational operation, and control. These characteristics follow a pattern of operations: mission analysis and tailoring of forces, reconnaissance, and decisive action. These concepts diluted doctrine to the point that the basics of offense and defense are de-emphasized in favor of the technology developed to support it.

In a 1998 article, Williamson Murray points out that over the past eighty years, and through the history of modern warfare, true military revolutions were conceptual, not technological. A quick review of current army doctrine reveals a mass of staff processes and technological slogans. Our doctrine does not adequately describe what future war is expected to look like. It fails to state in simple terms how the Army intends to fight and win on the future battlefield. Instead, the effect of this doctrine is to de-emphasize tactical skill and tenacity and reduce the importance of the close battle. We follow this dangerous path because it is presumed that dominant battlefield awareness and precision strike capability will somehow make those skills less important. Intelligence gathered by sensors has revolutionized the art of modern warfare, but intelligence alone cannot win a war. The Achilles heel to this solution of trading people for equipment is that machines can be easily tricked or rendered ineffective, which will, in turn, blind commanders on the battlefield (Murray 1998, 8-5).

Another aspect of a technology-based doctrine is that many humans do not necessarily want to rely solely on a sensor in life and death situations, although

commanders wholeheartedly accept the use of sensors to enhance reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. At the Brigade Advance Warfighting Experiment in spring 1997, 1st Brigade Commander of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) failed to maneuver to destroy an attacking opposing forces regiment because he did not believe what his sensors told him. He rather moved himself so that he could see for himself the situation before committing soldiers to battle. Unfortunately, the enemy moved more swiftly and the window for success quickly closed. This example is one that haunts many commanders as our Army moves to a force structure design that relies heavily on sensors, while at the same time scouting and air/ground reconnaissance forces are reduced in size.

Humans instinctively rely on themselves and other humans they trust when life and death situations occur. This may change as humans build machines that approach one hundred percent reliability, but that will not be for some time, if ever. What does that tell military leaders about the next war? Military leaders may be putting the Army in a situation whereby it may be subject to surprise even when its sensors are working, because the commander or staff officer can not or will not believe what the sensor is telling him about a possible threat. It may be argued that the new doctrine is not at fault, but rather that the problem lies in training with the new doctrine and new equipment. The point is that the doctrinal and training changes in the 1990s have made the US Army vulnerable. At best a compromise is needed in order to prevent units from going into combat too soon without all the problems and miscues ironed out.

Another problem related to doctrinal ineffectiveness is that many officers and civilian authorities who stand to gain resources from the de-emphasis of warfighting, for example, artillery long-range systems, aviation, and the Air Force as a whole, have called

for an end to ground forces as it currently stands. Some use false lessons learned from Desert Storm and the current doctrine as their bona fides. New doctrine is being developed in the wake of new technological advances brought on by the information age. Army doctrine describes five interdependent imperatives to fight and win sustained land combat: dominant maneuvers, precision strikes, protect the force, win the information war, and protect and sustain combat power. In an article published recently in *Army* magazine, LTC John Antal states, "The increased accuracy of fire power and the requirement to win future wars quickly, decisively and with minimal friendly casualties is challenging this balanced approach. Today, some proponents argue that precision strike has ushered in the ascendancy of fires, a new paradigm for ground combat that will transform the role of precision strikes into the decisive element of land combat power" (Antal 1998, 41.). This so-called paradigm has driven much of the virtual testing that has shaped new concepts, including how and why the US Army procures weapons, to be discussed later in this chapter. Tanks and Bradley procurement have taken a back seat to precision weapons.

This doctrinal viewpoint is commonly seen as a result of a revolution in military affairs. This so-called revolution affects how the US Army develops doctrine. Many civilian and military leaders have addressed the fallacy of this viewpoint. Professor David Jablonsky of National Security Affairs at the US Army War College said:

Revolutionary advancements are by their nature unforeseeable. That they will occur is a near certainty; what they will be, however, is far less certain. Changes in technology of a less-than-revolutionary nature are difficult to predict as well! Predicting what advancements will be made implies that one knows that existing obstacles to developing a technological capability can be overcome. This implies, paradoxically, that one somehow knows the solution to the relevant problems in advance of their actual solution (Jablonsky 1994, 3).

During Desert Storm, the US Air Force made a major contribution to the victory over Iraq. Consequently, many civilian and military analysts advocated a greater role for the US Air Force in future US military actions. The ascendancy of precision-guided munitions delivered by airframes over maneuver became a new doctrinal theory. This is because push-button weapons are cheap in comparison with the cost of exposing service members to the dangers of close battle. The prospect of few, if any, US casualties also makes this inviting. This doctrine basically involves using Air Force operations as the principal form of US military action, with land forces then used to execute a clean-up operation on the ground. The Air Force would dominate an enemy from the sky, defeating his ability to communicate and sustain himself, and, in turn, destroying his will to fight. This doctrine advocates shifting billions of dollars of resources from the US Army and Marine Corps to the Air Force for more weapons and weapons development (Jablonsky 1994, 4). In fact, this theory became a definitive point for the US Secretary of Defense during Desert Shield. Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael J. Dugan wrote and made comments about the US Air Force's perceived dominance on the modern battlefield:

There are many things our Air Force cannot accomplish. We had great difficulty in driving people out of the jungle in Vietnam, but we are not going to fight this war in Vietnam. There are no jungles in Iraq. After the Air Force is finished, Marine and Army ground forces could be used for diversions, flanking attacks and to block Iraqi counterstrike on Saudi Arabia, ground forces may only be needed to reoccupy Kuwait, but only after air power has so shattered enemy resistance that soldiers can 'walk in and not have to fight' man to man or house to house. 'I think they'd (the American people) support this operation longer than you would think...that is until body bags start coming home (Woodward 1991, 274-277).

This stance prior to Desert Storm outraged the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US Army, and the US Marine Corps. As a result, Defense Secretary Cheney fired General Dugan. During the war the US Air Force did accomplish its objectives and assisted in shattering the Iraqi war effort. The Air Force battle damage assessment was, however, overestimated. Its count and assessment was that over fifty percent of the Iraqi ground forces were destroyed during the month-long air campaign. When the US-led coalition ground forces attacked Iraq, they found only about twenty percent of Iraqi ground forces had been destroyed: the US Air Forces had been tricked in many cases by Iraqi ground forces. Iraqi ground forces realized that the coalition air campaign was aimed at them, primarily the Iraqi tanks. Iraqi tank crews fooled the high-tech US Air Forces bent on destroying them by relatively cheap methods, for example, scattering the trash from tank crews around the vehicles and burning coffee cans full of fuel on the back of the Iraqi tanks in order to mislead the air crews into thinking the tank was already destroyed. By using this simple tactic, the Iraqis estimated they saved hundreds of combat vehicles. They also believed that, in the end, it was the coalition tanks and artillery that defeated them. This example is a perfect counterpoint to the technology airpower advocates over using highly trained and equipped ground forces. Nevertheless, doctrine in the 1990s has suffered, in part, because many still advocate a doctrine of airpower over ground maneuver.

Another consequence of inappropriate doctrinal focus is the fact that, because of concentration on operations other than war, units are inadequately trained when they deploy for warfighting exercises. Proof of the doctrinal dilemma has been seen at the Combined Arms Training Centers. Units deploy to Hohenfels, Germany; Fort Polk,

Louisiana or Fort Irwin, California far below the training level of the late 1980s and early 1990s. This is indisputable, as the archives at the Center for Army Lessons Learned at the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, testify. Units deploy untrained in their warfighting mission essential tasks lists. The reasons are long deployments in operations other than war, low budgets, and no time and resources to train. Gone are the days when the US Army concentrated on warfighting. Today, under the new doctrine published in 1993, soldiers train to operate food distribution points and civilian checkpoints.

At the national level, the National Command Authority, which drives the strategy by which the US Army develops its doctrine, has had a great impact on how the US Army is focusing itself for the future. The Bosnia situation, the continued brinkmanship trouble with Iraq in its noncooperation with UN weapons inspectors, and the ever continuing deployment of US Army soldiers for everything from disaster relief to riot control have been the cornerstone for vulnerability. In an article in the *New Republic*, Andrew Bacevich describes a paradigm for the US Army.

The paradigm has four basic principles. These efforts are an overwhelming faith in technology. The second is confidence in the potential of a military dominate power to overawe would be opponents. This means simply wielding a big stick like deploying the 1st Cavalry Division to Kuwait whenever Sadam Hussein does not comply with the 1991 UN sanctions. The third is to use precision instruments to cause adversaries to comply with US policy. The final principle is to employ ground forces as a last resort (Bacevich 1998, 19).

The Army in the 1990s has gone from the nation's defense force to a clear instrument of international diplomacy. In the past, US troops have been deployed abroad in numerous places as a means of executing foreign policy. In the 1990s, however, this policy has become too fragmented with regard to prioritizing possible contingency

operations: Somalia, Haiti, and numerous Kuwait deployments, just to name a few. Military power is used in increments and is forced to use its operational and maintenance funds to pay for these last-minute deployments. This has diluted the US Army's focus on warfighting and preparation for its next call to defend US national interests. US Army doctrine in the 1990s has been unfocused. The primary purpose of the US Army is to defend the nation and defeat its enemies in time of war. When it is used for other purposes, it loses valuable preparation time for its primary purpose, which results in an army that is underfunded, undermanned, and tasked with missions that have little to do with warfighting. The US Army must prepare and train for future war. Defending national interests not only involves fighting, it also means deterring possible aggression by maintaining strength so that no one even contemplates challenging those interests. General George S. Patton once said, "One cup of sweat given in training during peace prevents gallons of blood in war" (Houston 1977, 101).

The view by many in the US Army leadership that no peer competitors exist, coupled with many who call for ascendancy of fire over maneuver and a military leadership which spends its research and training dollars on this principle, has led to an Army that is vulnerable to an enemy who has the potential to gradually develop methods to challenge and even, in the short term, defeat the US Army on a battlefield sometime in the near future. Even if such an adversary cannot conclusively defeat the US Army, he may still formulate a strategy that disrupts the lighter expeditionary force concept by "defeating" the US response time and ambushing the lighter force. This would initially take much of the US teeth out of the equation. US military doctrine depends heavily on electronic intelligence gathering and interpretation at the strategic through the tactical

levels. The use of electronic sensors is replacing men on the ground as the US new heavy division design further cuts troop strength from the force structure. By taking away the US Army time to respond, an enemy can easily turn this doctrine and operational concept into a liability for the military leaders and planners.

Weapons Procurement

As stated earlier, the operational concept currently in force is driving the US Army to build weapons for a lighter expeditionary force. Planners want to heavy up the light infantry and lighten up the heavy forces. This idea is flawed and is driven only by the ability to project combat power rapidly by air and sea. Although there is use for such a force, the current concept does not allow for balance. By concentrating on one concept, that is, how the US Army should look and fight in the future, in a world where the future is uncertain and where most armies are building heavy forces, it seems that this concept is driving weapons procurement into the digital, light futuristic realm while leaving the next ten years out of the equation. The long-term impact on the industrial sector is highlighted by the dilemma that the US Army armored force faces.

Currently only 2 percent of the Armored forces budget is funded for research and developing the next generation of tank and armored vehicles. Compared to the 12 percent for the next family of helicopters the armor force is steadily falling behind. Add the fact the US Army is not building new Tanks and merely upgrading its fleet to last twenty-five plus years. In fact the army recently told congress that by 2005, if the army does not research and produce a new tank, the current capacity, skill, and ability of the US to produce a new tank will be lost and it would take two-plus years for the army to design and build a facility to begin producing a tank (Bender 1999, 1-2).

Looking at the policy regarding the procurement of certain weapons, one notices the continuing development of a pattern of complacency and lack of focus. Most of the procurement efforts of the US Army are aimed at light infantry and airpower. Budgetary

politics and intra-Army branch fighting has led to a critical lapse in US Army ground combat vehicle assessment and procurement. Recently retired General William C. Moore reflected on this fact in an article he wrote in the *Wall Street Journal*:

Soldiers see their relevance as warriors being questioned. They are told that the technologists are going to give them an easy way to fight that "situational awareness" is more important than weapon systems, that simulation is a substitute for field training. Fascination with technology is leading to a silver bullet mentality and a belief that anyone can be a warrior by just putting the cursor on the target on your computer screen and clicking the mouse. Despite all the rhetoric about all that is being done for the warrior, those who want to be real warriors feel betrayed. They signed on to be part of the force that clashes with and destroys the enemy. They know the risks of war, but never expected that wanting to be warriors would pose a risk to their military careers. Military leaders, it seems, have been co-opted by social engineers whose agenda is to promote equality rather than to prepare forces for the next war. Anyone can be a warrior if standards are lowered enough, and silver bullet technology turns warfare into just another video game anyone can "play." This attitude toward the warrior ethos is pervasive and dangerous (Moore 1998, A 22).

By 1915, World War I had degraded into a defensive slugfest. When the war broke out, armies fought as they had for years. The machine gun changed the tactics of the day. A trench system stretched from the English Channel all the way to the Swiss, border and the great powers of Europe stood across from each other during the war years, sending a whole generation into a no-man's-land to be slaughtered by thousands of machine gun positions. The European nations sought out a new weapon to overcome this locked defensive struggle. In England, researchers developed a weapon, based on a farm tractor, which broke the struggle and allowed armies to maneuver again. The tank was born out of the necessity to overcome the machine gun, yet it was cumbersome and hard to maintain, and it consumed a lot of resources. In the end the tank was not a wonder weapon of World War I and attrition was the biggest contributor to the war's end.

Between the two world wars, some new military thinkers saw tank-based maneuver warfare as the answer to avoiding warfare based on the defensive attrition strategy of World War I. The radio allowed the tank to be used as a part of a combined arms force that permitted an army to use firepower and maneuver to overcome enemy forces in the defense or counter enemy forces on the offense. As a result, the blitzkrieg was born. World War II was the war of the tank and the airplane. Germany, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States all perfected and fielded large armored and mechanized armies. Great battles were fought all over the world with these combined arms formations.

At the end of the war the atomic bomb was introduced, seemingly changing the tank and armored formation's dominance. Yet, the tank has lived on as one of the cornerstones of every nation's army since that time. From the deserts of the Middle East to the mountains of Korea, the tank has been in every major war since the end of World War II, despite the fact that nuclear weapons were available to the superpowers. The tank has always been a cost trade off. It takes much in the way of resources and manpower to develop, train, and field tank units and armored formations. After every conflict the US Army has participated in since World War II, many called for a lighter and less expensive mode of warfare. The helicopter is an example of a weapon that was born to aid lighter forces in mobility.

All weapons are vulnerable to other weapons that are developed to overcome their superiority. The antitank missile developed in the 1960s was a means for infantry to overcome the superiority of the tank. In 1973, the Israeli Army found out how effective a missile could be against the tank. Yet, the missile did not make the tank obsolete. Desert

Storm proved that tank development had caught up with the anti-tank missile and that the tank was still a powerful weapon on the battlefield.

Even from the early days of World War I the tank has always had its critics. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the tank has once again come under fire. Most of the naysayers argue that the US Army now has a force projection force and most heavy force vehicles, such as the tank, have an average weight of more than sixty tons when combat loaded. This restricts the deployment of tank units because only the C-5 and C-17 can lift a tank and then only one at a time. It would take the entire air force transport fleet to quickly move heavy divisions to some hot spot. For this reason the expeditionary force advocates view tank and mechanized units as too heavy for rapid deployment. Instead, they believe that these units should be placed in the National Guard as strategic reserve. This current and widely accepted viewpoint drives many of the decisions in the US Army concerning how it develops doctrine, procures weapons and builds force structure. This viewpoint is also responsible for the US Army's ignoring the possibility of heavy forces being needed to fight and win a close battle to determine the outcome of an emergency crisis, such as the current situation in Serbia.

Since the end of the Cold War, many think that an air force and infantry with wonder weapons, such as missiles delivered by parachute, are the only force types we need. It seems that the entire Department of Defense has lost its focus. What difference would it truly make if the entire Air Force lift fleet were required to execute a mission in the name of national interests? Who cares how heavy an M1A2 is if that is what is required to accomplish a vital mission? It does not cost any less to deploy over three hundred planes to Italy to bomb the Serbian Army into submission. On 13 April 1999, the

President of the United States asked Congress for an emergency-spending bill of over \$8 billion to offset the cost of a two-week air campaign against the Serbian Army. It cost \$8 billion to sustain ten heavy divisions during Desert Storm. Desert Storm was decisive; to date, the air war in Serbia has not been. The math speaks for itself, yet, paradoxically; there are still those in influential positions that would advocate that there is no longer a need for heavy forces on active duty.

Today the US Army has shut down the production of its Abrams main battle tank. Instead, the US Army is upgrading all its Cold War era tanks, making them digitized and seemingly able to do more. It will take the US industry eighteen months to build up a production facility that can begin producing new tanks if they are lost in a future conflict. The purpose behind this upgrade strategy is driven by the US Army's current doctrine of force projection and reliance on electronic intelligence and sensors. The new or upgraded tank is being rebuilt to be a smarter tank with a command and control package that will allow its crew to down link information from a variety of sources. This down link allows the information from many other tanks and headquarters to be sent and displayed in the tank, giving the crew improved situational awareness and supposedly enabling one tank and crew now to do the battlefield job that previously required many. The consequence of this strategy is that tank commanders are spending too much time viewing their digital screen and not observing their area of operation (Bender 1999, 1).

Additionally, this invalidated conclusion of allowing one tank crew to do the traditional job of many has caused the US Army to change its doctrine and force structure, so that each tank battalion has already been reduced from four tanks and crews to three. Now, without increasing the tank's actual killing capability, the army has given

the three-tank battalion the same area to defend or suppress that it had given the four-tank battalion. This constraint can only lead to warfare on a limited economy of force. Even if an enemy has tanks that are less capable, he now could find exploitable cracks in a US Army tank battalion because forty-four tanks now cover the same area that fifty-eight tanks used to. This will necessitate that companies and platoons spread out almost two kilometers between crews, depending on the terrain. If a battalion loses tanks to maintenance, accidents or combat the problem continues to grow. Even if tanks can see the enemy with new unfielded digitized capability, they could never hope to kill the entire enemy force engaging or attacking along the same traditional front. When this trend is coupled with the military leadership's view of no peer threat, it is evident how the US Army has arrived at this dangerous place in history. Not developing new maneuver weapons systems in addition to the "smarter" weapons systems for the modern battlefield could arguably make the US Army, the heavy forces in particular, vulnerable to future threats from countries which continue to develop systems that can fight heavy US forces on an equal footing. This puts the US Army at risk to surprise if it deploys to a situation it has not prepared for correctly.

As a result of the shift of procurement priorities for forces, the US Army plans to use the current fleet of M1A1 main battle tanks until the third decade of the next century. This is, in part, due to the perceived inability of other armies to challenge the US military in the air or on the ground. This is also due to the reduced resources given to the US Army for heavy forces, research and development. Recently, it was noted in the US Army Armor Association's *Armor Magazine* (Meyer 1998, 9-3), and in *Jane's World Armies 1998* (<http://www.cnn.com/specials/1998/army/>) that many of the armies in the

world, including those of China, Germany, France, Austria, Iraq, Iran, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and Israel, are continually upgrading their heavy forces. Millions of dollars are being spent around the world improving current 1970-1980 era tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to meet the challenges of the future. It is clear that the world watched the US Army tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles smash the Iraqi Army during Desert Storm. Rather than seeing the end of maneuver warfare, the armies of the world are upgrading their maneuver weapons to be equal to or greater in effectiveness than what the US Army demonstrated in 1991. This superiority did not develop overnight, but started in the early 1970s. As a result of the lessons learned from the Vietnam drawdown and the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, the US Army reaped the long-range benefits of developing and training its heavy forces during the 1980s and early 1990s. By changing this strategy with the new doctrinal concept, the US Army demonstrates a lack of vision regarding development and training of its heavy forces, with respect to what the US military immediately faces for the next ten to twenty years. It also highlights a possible vulnerability that has evolved in the US Army since the end of the Cold War.

In the early 1990s, the US Army was in a position to develop new weapon systems, including an air-deployable tank, known as the armored gun system. By the mid-1990s the armored gun system was ready to be fielded. In another example of its lack of vision, the Army cancelled the production of the light tank and, rather than buy or build a new one, simply deactivated its airborne tank battalion. The US Army's only airborne division in force projection doctrine must be immediately ready to deploy and, if needed, conduct a forced entry into an area of conflict. Except for a few rogue states, all armies in the world are equipped with at least 1970s era Soviet and US armor systems.

History has shown light forces can defend themselves against an enemy equipped with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, but they are vulnerable and take high casualties. Instead of equipping US Army airborne units with armor, the US Army will have to depend on the US Air Force and later arriving attack helicopters to offset this problem. This new doctrine solves none of the problems of forced entry, especially in view of the fact that an enemy can totally isolate an airborne infantry unit with no armor and only light fire support.

There have been many papers written to describe why this took place. The fact remains that US Army doctrine calls for force projection units and all of its light and airborne units are without ground antitank tank-to-tank capability. Some say the Army will leverage airpower to offset this imbalance.

If history is an indication of what may lie ahead, one can look at the US Army's experience in World War II and the Battle of the Bulge in 1944. When airpower was not available, the forces on the ground suffered against enemy combined arms teams. Had the weather not broken, allowing for the use of both tanks and airpower, the history of World War II may have been written differently. In the end, the US Army prevailed, but the vulnerability of airpower to weather can not be ignored in the future. The US Army risks its light force and falling short of national strategic goals if it deploys rapid reaction light forces to where an enemy has marshaled heavy armored formations.

The development of US Army heavy forces scout vehicles provides another example of flawed weapons development and procurement policy. The cavalry-scouting vehicle is used for reconnaissance preceding heavy force movement. Until recently the US Army used the Bradley fighting vehicle for this purpose. The Bradley had developed

as an infantry-fighting vehicle and had the unique capability needed for the stealthy scout trying to avoid enemy contact. Due to its noncavalry characteristics and its cost, the US Army began to look at an alternative. With the perceived lack of peer threats, the US Army replaced the armored Bradley vehicle with M998 High Mobility Wheeled Vehicle four-wheeled utility vehicle throughout the heavy force. The HWMMV was developed to replace the Vietnam era Jeep. It can be used as a scout, but not as effectively as the Bradley cavalry vehicle.

Currently, the US Army has begun to develop the next generation cavalry scout vehicle, but it is not due to be issued to the US Army heavy forces until the year 2008. This leaves the heavy forces unprepared to conduct reconnaissance operations at the brigade and battalion level for the next eight years. It is inconceivable how the US leadership could have been lulled into accepting that kind of risk. It can only be a result of becoming complacent about US Army capabilities and the lack of capability of potential adversaries. It would be easy for a potential adversary to design easy and cost-effective measures to surprise or defeat US Army heavy forces in the near future, based on the US lack of vision. The US military and civilian leadership has obviously been drawn into an attitude of complacency when it procures weapons systems such as the Abrams tank.

Force Structure

During the summer of 1997, the Army was faced with the challenge of being underresourced for the units it fielded. As a result, the Army decided to field a force it could pay for. Therefore, without regard to any potential threat, the Army redesigned the heavy forces to meet a 15,000-man endstate.

Armed with virtual simulations of the new upgraded Abrams tank capability, the Army decided to take one tank and one mechanized infantry company out of every battalion in the heavy force. Now battalions have three instead of four tank companies, and the new doctrine requires that these smarter tank units be able to cover more ground with fewer tanks and mechanized forces. A dichotomy now exists as the army fits a lack of resources into a world that has not proven the value of the new weapons design. In fact the new force design theories that call for greater situational awareness for commanders seem to be receiving greater emphasis than a unit's ability to fight. Proponents of information technology over substantial maneuver systems argue that if the commander is armed with complete situational awareness he can do more with less. This theory has never been proven outside a virtual world where real soldiers are not fighting and dying. It is clear that the US Army is being driven by a vision that no longer includes fighting enemies with heavy forces that wonder missiles and airpowers have not already destroyed.

Forces are being designed based on the success of operations other than war. As stated in the army's doctrinal change in the 1990s, force design is following the same path.

We, as nation, seem to have lost sight of why we "raise, train and maintain" a military force, and that one of the basic precepts of the Constitution is to "provide for the common defense." We've gotten so sophisticated those simple truths and principles are always suspected. Our noble military institutions, culture and life have become the targets of cultural warriors. There is an aura of self-righteousness about their activities. They are afraid that there is a broadening gap between society and the military, that some of us are extremists and flaunt it by wearing fancy uniforms, and that if we get "out of touch" we will not be able to serve our country's objectives (Moore 1998, A22).

The US Army relies on the total force concept. A total force requires that many combat support and combat service support units not used everyday, but critical, nevertheless, to an army's operation in war, be put into the Reserves and National Guard. Once a threat is perceived, such as during Desert Storm, Reserve units can be called up to active duty. Additionally, many combat units are being put into the National Guard and Reserves, including over fifty percent of the armored tank units needed to fight under the scenario of a two-theater threat contingency, as called for by the national military strategy.

Many problems arise from this. Perhaps the most striking is that it takes time to call up, assemble, train, and deploy reserve forces, consisting, as they do, of men who are for the most part focused on civilian life rather than the military. Units most vulnerable to deployment time are reserve combat units, whose military skills degrade without constant training. This compounds the problem of leveraging the reserves against the active force structure to save money. For example, during Desert Storm, the three National Guard combat brigades that were called to active duty to deploy and fight never left the US, due to the time required to train and become certified to deploy. In one case, a National Guard mechanized infantry brigade never was ready to deploy to Desert Storm, even after over ninety days of pre-deployment training. Yet, today the US military leaders leverage smaller forces with so-called greater capabilities and a total force strategy to answer the national requirement to be able to fight two major conflicts at one time.

General Reimer discussed this issue in an October 1998 *Killeen Daily Herald* article:

The increased use of the part time soldier means that they have to train more often to be compatible with their active-duty counterparts, No soldier will be sent in harm's way untrained. They (the National Guard) will be trained and certified just like the soldiers of the 1st Cavalry Division because the standards must be the same. The Reserve and Guard make up almost 54percent of the total force so we must figure out how to use that force (Hutton 1998, 1).

To mandate the use of the Reserves, the US Army needs an early political decision with a short reaction time. However, political decisions and reaction time depend upon reliable intelligence, and gathering reliable intelligence requires time. Without adequate intelligence no force projection package will make it to an area where US interests are threatened. US military intelligence has often made oversights that disrupt this power projection strategy. For example, in *The Commanders* Bob Woodward describes how the US was taken totally by surprise strategically when Saddam Hussein sent his army across Iraq's southern border and conquered Kuwait in August 1990. Most telling is that analysts at the Defense Intelligence Agency monitoring the Iraqi Army had seen this coming politically and had sent a warning to the Department of Defense. As in many examples in history, including the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the officers in charge of raising concern and military alertness simply did not believe that Iraq would attack (Woodward 1996, 274). The subsequent acts of the Iraqi Army are a matter of history.

Today, not much has changed in the funding and direction of the national intelligence community, which is also under the same wave of lower budgets and downsizing to which the US military has been subjected since the end of the Cold War. As a result, the US Army strategy to move a large capability into the reserve, coupled with the dependency on the US intelligence community, has left the Army vulnerable to surprise and even initial setbacks in the next confrontation. This is, in part, due to the fact

that Reserve forces that now have vital missions may never reach the threatened area until long after the event is over, if, in fact, they reach this area at all.

This new force structure further leads to many questions. In the US Army, there is much debate over some vital issues, such as who gets beefed up and who gets cut and why; and what the right mix is between reserves and regular forces.

In summary, looking back over the last decade it is hard not to see a decline in the US Army. Desert Storm stands as a hallmark of the post-World War II US Army, yet today, looking at the operational concepts which are driving doctrinal development, procurement (highlighting the tank), and force structure, it is hard not to wonder what lies ahead. There are many examples of armies in the past declining in effect from a glorious victory to an ignominious defeat as a result of a great surprise at the outset of its next conflict. In this century, the French Army between the two world wars is a textbook example. Even more recently, Russia, in the shadow of its Cold War Soviet-style army, was handed a surprising initial defeat at the hands of Chechen rebels in the mid-1990s. The Russian Army took months to regroup and eventually fight the rebel forces to a compromising end. The rebels were forced out of their capital and into a guerrilla campaign that continues to some degree today. This conflict should serve as a warning lesson to US Army commanders and strategist.

Another example of surprise, which may have more relevance to the US, is Israel's near defeat at the beginning of the 1973 Arab Israeli War. Unlike the Soviet-based doctrine the Russian forces used in Chechnya, Israeli doctrine resembled that of the US Army. The Israeli experience at the outset of the 1973 war foreshadows what could happen to the US Army the next time it faces a determined enemy. Chapter Four

discusses developments in the Israeli Army between its victory in the 1967 war and the outbreak of the 1973 war.

CHAPTER 4

ISRAEL'S COMPLACENCY, 1967-1973

In 1967, Israel was surrounded and vastly outnumbered by its Arab neighbors. That Israel was not only victorious in the ensuing war, but also secured that victory in six days was an extraordinary achievement. In contrast to this, about six years later, Israel was attacked by Egypt and Syria and was almost defeated. Many reasons for this have been cited in many reports and investigations. Among them are the issues of Israel's having become arrogant to the point of carelessness after its crushing victory over the Arabs in 1967 and the Arabs being able to successfully exploit this overconfidence. This chapter will review how the Israeli Army overwhelmingly defeated its enemies in 1967, and how, in the aftermath of this victory, Israel's overconfidence eventually led to its being surprised at the beginning of the 1973 War. A parallel with the present state of the US Army will be drawn from this to provide insight into what could happen to the US Army in its next major confrontation.

In June 1967, the Israeli Army conducted a preemptive attack against its enemies, who were massing on Israel's borders. By 1967, Israel stood surrounded by hostile Arab neighbors. The Soviet Union at that time was bent on having a greater role in Middle East policies and backed the Arab nations in an attack against Israel. Soviet diplomats began suggesting that the Soviet Union would back any Arab nation intent on defeating Israel. This diplomatic attack against Israel was an indirect attack on the US, which was supporting Israel. If by weakening Israel the Soviet Union could weaken the US in the Middle East, the USSR would be taking another step toward tipping the scales in its favor during the Cold War. The US told Israel that it would not support Israel if Israel attacked

first. Israel found itself between the vital support of the US and the Soviets' diplomatic agitation of the Arabs. To ensure that the world did not see the Communist underpinning, the Soviets warned the Arabs not to be the first to attack, but assured them that the Soviet Union would see to it that the Arabs could survive the first blow. The Soviets based this "first blow" theory on the assumption that the US would not want to support Israel as the aggressor, as well as on the consequences that supporting Israel might have on US oil diplomacy. With no tactical depth, the Israeli command decided, nevertheless, to act first rather than receive what might have been a fatal first blow from the surrounding Arab Armies. This offensive strike was a major contribution to Israel's subsequent victory. Israel had stood in the face of seemingly overwhelming odds and prevailed. Although the Soviets supported the Arab armies, by this time the United States had begun to waver on the position of not supporting Israel it struck first.

Israel's Air Force struck the first blow by attacking across the sea from an unexpected westerly direction to destroy the Egyptian Air Force. With air superiority thus assured, the Israeli Army struck out in the south against an Egyptian Army with no air cover and little air defense. In concentrated armored thrusts, the Israelis penetrated Egyptian defense positions, as well as Syrian defense positions in the North, and, in a battle reminiscent of Germany's attack against France in 1940, destroyed the opposing Arab armies. Meanwhile, by what proved to be the last days of the war, Jerusalem and the West Bank of the Jordan River were still in the hands of the Jordanian Army. The Israelis tried to convince the Jordanians to leave the ancient city out of the war, but Jordan's Army responded by shelling the city, killing innocent civilians and provoking Israel to attack. By the end of the sixth day, the Israeli Army had secured the land from

southern Lebanon along the West Bank of the Jordan River, the strategic Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula to the Suez Canal. As Israel's actions potentially threatened to continue towards the Arab capitals, an UN-led peace effort brought a cease-fire and an end to the six-day war. Nevertheless, by this time the Israeli Army had captured an enormous amount of Arab land, effectively quadrupling Israel's overall area. Indeed, Israel felt that as a result of the 1967 war, the Arab armies had no way of regaining tactical advantage over the Israeli Army on the battlefield.

The end of the six-day war did not, however, bring peace to the region. Egypt's leader, President Nasser, declared there would never be peace as long as Israel was on Egyptian soil. Rather than resulting in the collapse of the Arab armies and the death of the Arab cause, the defeat at the hands of the Israelis strengthened Arab resolve to regain the land lost during the war and destroy the Israelis once and for all.

To fully understand how the Arab armies' resurrection surprised the Israeli command, I will look at Egypt and its role in the Arab-Israeli struggle. Egypt had gained its independence and emerged from colonial domination in 1952. Soon after, the British gave up their bases protecting the Suez Canal. In 1956, Egypt began to assert its strategic role as keeper of the Suez Canal, which has strategic significance because it connects the Mediterranean Sea with the Indian Ocean and cuts the time by weeks for traveling around Africa by weeks. Nasser closed the Suez Canal in 1956, resulting in an invasion by Britain and France. Israel, spurred on by an agreement with the British and French, attacked across the Sinai Peninsula and swept the Egyptian Army aside. After the UN brokered cease-fire, Israel withdrew to its pre-1956 borders.

Between 1956 and 1967, Nasser began to unify the Arabs into a pan-Arab alliance; by 1967 this alliance had brought together a potentially overwhelming army against Israel. At this time, the Soviet Union was looking to take a more active role in the Middle East, while simultaneously relegating its only superpower adversary, the United States, to a secondary role in influencing Middle Eastern affairs. The USSR believed that assisting the Arabs in realizing their vow to weaken Israel would be a major step in consolidating its own influence over the entire region. In actual fact, for some time Israel had traditionally been a US ally, while Egypt and Syria had been allied with the Soviet Union. Most of the equipment for the Egyptian and Syrian Armies had been supplied by Soviet exports, while Israel was outfitted with US, British, French and limited Soviet bloc equipment. The Soviets began to incite Syria and Egypt into a confrontation with Israel, and under Soviet advice and urging, Egypt expelled the United Nations peace force from the Sinai and closed the Strait of Tiran in the South Red Sea. This action was unacceptable for the Israelis and it seemed that war was imminent for the entire region. The US tried to keep Israel from acting against the Soviet-backed Arabs and creating another Cold War crisis. In the end, Israel, with its back against the wall, attacked across its border and destroyed the gathering Arab armies.

Chaim Herzog, who rose in both the military and civilian leadership throughout the early life of Israel, summed up the events that took place in June 1967, describing how Israel, which had been at the end of a bayonet since its birth, had reacted to victory and what its state of mind was with its victory at the end of the war:

On the morning of 5 June 1967 Israel struck - and within six days had destroyed a great part of the force, which had threatened it, occupying the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank of the Jordan and the Golan Heights. The

transformation from a potential helpless victim into a brilliant victor created a euphoria, which brought about a revolutionary change of attitude in Israel. Against the background of somber prospects a few days before their incredible victory evoked a reaction throughout the Jewish world such as Israel had never known or experienced (Herzog 1975, 3).

Herzog continues to explain how this sweeping victory in 1967 sowed the seeds of the surprise that almost led to defeat in 1973. He explains how the victory disease affected Israel's postwar attitude:

The depth afforded by the territories taken by Israel in the Six-Day War gave the country for the first time in its history a strategic option. All Israeli centers of population were now removed from the Egyptian forces, and a desert barrier of some 150 miles wide separated Israel from the Suez Canal, in itself a natural barrier of no mean proportions. The cities which would now be affected by the outbreak of war would not be Israeli cities but the Egyptian cities along the Suez Canal- Port Said, Ismailia, Suez – with a total population exceeding some 750,000 people. An Egyptian commander thinking of attacking Israel now would have to plan not only the very formidable task of crossing the Canal against opposition but also of developing a major attack across the Sinai Desert. Thus, it seemed to the Israelis, very heavy considerations would weigh against the renewal of hostilities against the new line and Israel. This strategic situation constituted the main factor in convincing the Israeli Government and leaders of the opinion that there was little danger of the renewal of hostilities in a major war against Israel (Herzog 1975, 3).

Egypt was also affected by the 1967 war, learning lessons from its defeat. After the Six Day War, Egypt resolved to never be defeated in such a way again, and set about rebuilding the government and military. Nasser resigned soon after the war in a move calculated to help the Egyptian Army and nation save face. The people refused to accept his resignation, viewing him as a great leader and a hero of the struggle against Israel, so that in the end he remained Egypt's president. He soon began to restructure Egypt so it would not be beaten so badly again, rebuilding the military and governmental hierarchy, and making the chain of command more efficient. He organized a National Security Council and a War Council that assisted him in making national decisions. He put the

Army, Navy, Air Defense Artillery (ADA), and Air Force under one Joint Commander, who reported directly to him. Before 1967, there were at least six separate commands answering directly to the President, resulting in conflicts of interest and lack of cooperation among the different services. Nasser now focused the Egyptian Army by taking away its revolutionary nation building responsibilities and giving it the mission of defending the nation and driving Israel out of the Sinai. This allowed the military leaders to expend all their effort on rebuilding the army, changing doctrine, introducing new technical weapons, and training for the war they all believed would be coming soon.

With Soviet assistance and guided by the lessons learned from the Six Day War, Egypt reorganized its army. College students and middle class intellectuals were drafted into the army, providing it with the ability to field complicated electronics and air defense artillery (ADA) systems, and resulting in the development of better air force and heavy mechanized units. Prior to the end of the war Egypt had one armored division and no mechanized divisions; by 1973 it had two armored divisions and three mechanized divisions, had improved its ADA with the latest Soviet-built missile batteries, and had developed a substantial electronic intelligence capability. Egypt also changed its doctrine to include complex operational offensive actions, among them river crossings and Army level attacks. Nasser and Anwar Sadat, who succeeded Nasser in 1970 upon Nasser's death, planned a strategy that entailed an attack to regain the Suez and eventually recapture the Sinai. They continued rebuilding the army by instituting junior leader training academies, and began to train the army as a whole on a vast scale. Egyptian forces built training areas that simulated crossing the Suez and attacking the defending Israeli army positions.

Strategically, the Egyptian leaders began to set the stage for 1973 by beginning a war of attrition against the Israeli Army. Sadat planned an overall strategy that entailed bleeding Israel dry militarily, gaining political success by limited victories against Israel, and courting the US and the West. It was said in the Middle East that one could have a war with the Soviets but one had to have the Americans to gain peace.

Between 1967 and 1973, Egypt staged raids, including an airborne assault sixty miles east of the Suez, in Israeli occupied Sinai, and a major diplomatic, information and economic campaign aimed at capitalizing on Israeli complacency regarding the Egyptian Front. Egypt had also developed an intelligence community better able to gather information on Israeli dispositions and its mind-set concerning the Sinai. It had learned that the Israelis did not believe the Egyptians could attack with any success against the defending army. Egypt noted that the Israelis had built the Bar-Lev Line (see below) to defend the western Sinai, but did not have major bridging capability to cross the Suez. Egypt transformed this into a doctrine that capitalized on Israel's posture. It pursued this strategy by gathering support among the other Arab nations in the Middle East, embarked upon a campaign to discredit every effort and move the Israelis made for peace, and took risks against Israel's preparations for war. These included information operations aimed at undermining every diplomatic attempt by Israel to gain international support for its settling the territory conquered during the 1967 war. By 1973, Egypt had created an environment that caused Israel to feel confident, unwilling to believe war would soon erupt. Syria, as Egypt's ally, played a minor role in the pre-1973 build up against Israel. Syria merely wanted its territory back, and followed Egypt into the 1973 war mostly as a matter of pride.

On the other side, Israel had begun to debate its presence on the Suez Canal even during the last days of the Six-Day War. Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Chief of Staff, contemplated occupying the East Bank of the Canal, but was worried that a UN brokered cease-fire would come before the Israelis had successfully achieved this goal. He believed that occupying the Suez would never lead to a cease-fire agreement, as this would hurt Egyptian pride, thereby thwarting any attempt to implement a cease-fire and peace. He soon changed his mind stating that:

On the morning of 6 June I changed my mind, ordering the chief of staff to arrive at the Canal. I believed that the reason for this decision was operational – if the Israeli Army gave the Egyptian Army a good thrashing, this would force Egypt to agree to an immediate cease-fire. Egypt had rejected the cease-fire proposed by the Security Council the previous evening. Dayan now deemed these considerations as overriding those reasons, which he had previously cited against the conquest of the Canal. This attitude, which was shared by many in the general staff, permeated throughout the Israeli post conflict attitude and led to their posture along the Suez Canal (Y'Durbin 1979, 440).

At the end of the Six-Day War, Israel postured itself in a defensive line along the Western edge of the Suez Canal. As Egypt re-emerged as a military threat and with continued military actions like ambushes and artillery raids in 1968-69, Israel built a defensive position along the Suez canal known as the "Bar-Lev Line", which consisted of observation posts, strong points and mobile reserves along the east bank of the Suez. This effort constituted a shift from the historically offensively spirited Israeli Army to a new defensive minded doctrine, which advocated holding conquered territory.

Changes in Israeli Army doctrine between 1967 and 1973 were based on an unfortunately erroneous interpretation of the way the 1967 war had been fought, the victory itself, and consequences of that victory. In 1967 the Israeli Army had successfully used combined arms in an aggressive, professional manner. Doctrinally, the Israelis had

applied all the principles of war common to most Western military doctrine: mass, speed, surprise, unity of effort, maneuver, offensive, security. At times Israel massed pure tank formations that raced across the Sinai virtually unopposed, capturing and destroying most of the Egyptian Army in the Sinai. Additionally, the very survival of the State of Israel served as an impetus for the army in its attack.

Again in 1967, when it had become evident that war was approaching, the Israeli Command had concluded that the Arabs must not be allowed to make the first move because by their sheer weight they would gain initial advantages that Israel could not afford. And so despite the very serious international political considerations, which exercised both the Israeli Government and President Nasser – neither desiring to be branded as the attacker – Israel's lack of strategic option had left its forces with no alternative but to take the initiative on 5 June 1967 (Herzog 1975, 3).

As a result, the Israeli Army had clear objectives, a viable strategy, and chain of command. All these aspects led to an overwhelming victory for the Israeli's in 1967.

The doctrine used by the Israelis was a definite advantage, since the equipment used by both the Army and Air Force was either old or cast off. In fact, much of the equipment that both sides used in 1967 was World War II surplus that had been upgunned and armored. The weaponry of both sides was also comparable, therefore providing neither side with an advantage. Israel's opening strikes were reminiscent of the German Army's Blitzkrieg from 1939 to 1942. In the US Army's Combat Studies Institute, Research Survey No. 7, *The Battles for Abu Ageila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars*, Dr. George Gawrych concluded, "Ideally, the Israeli's opening moves were rapid, unpredictable, violent, and disorienting, throwing the Egyptian High Command into a temporary state of confusion... To wage a lightning war, Israeli doctrine and training stressed the principle that combat units in contact with an adversary should

complete their missions rapidly to avoid surrendering momentum to the enemy”

(Gawrych 1990, 123).

At the end of the Six Day War, however, the Israeli General Staff concluded that the strategic depth afforded by the gains in June 1967 gave them the warning time needed to react to any potential surprise by an Arab neighbor. While there was nothing inherently wrong in this inference, the dismal Arab performance on the battlefield comprised a major factor in also convincing the Israeli government that there was little danger of a renewal of Arab hostilities in a major war against Israel. Although Israeli intelligence later even warned that the Arab armies were rebuilding and that there was a threat of imminent war, the Israeli General Staff concluded that the Arabs would not be able to attack with any hopes of success until 1975-76 at the earliest (Herzog 1975, 1-5).

By 1973 Israeli Army doctrine had definitely undergone a formal change. In contrast to the offensive-minded strategy which Moshe Dayan and the Israeli General Staff had advocated during the Six-Day War, by 1973 their mindset, at least Dayan's, was to hold what was gained, absorb the first strike, counterattack and then negotiate a settlement. The turning point had come as a result of artillery raids which Egypt had conducted along the Suez Canal from 8 September to 26 October 1968, killing five Israeli soldiers and wounding fifty-two. After these raids, both Dayan and the military establishment, in an attempt to settle the doctrinal question of how to deal with the East Bank situation, concluded that a fundamental change was called for regarding the entire strategy of the defense of the Sinai and the Suez Canal. Accordingly, Israel developed three new strategies to offset recent events. One strategy envisioned a defensive posture designed to prevent the Egyptians from crossing the Suez Canal and achieving any

territorial gains on the eastern bank of the Suez. This defensive posture entailed keeping large infantry and tank forces along the Suez Canal and was intended to provide early warning while denying Egyptian forces any crossing of the Suez. Its ultimate goal was to retain any land previously taken by Israeli forces. The second strategy was more of what some Israeli officers had doctrinally wanted, calling for a more mobile defense with outposts along the Suez and armored brigades placed in depth to counter any Suez penetration by the Egyptians. The third strategy was a combination of the two, but was closer in concept to the first; its initial intent was to repel crossing attempts by the Egyptians and then bring up the counterattack force to crush any minor crossings. Thus, a political and military decision aimed at holding territory gained in battle drove the new operational concept for the Israelis in the Sinai, resulting in vulnerability in 1973.

The political conception therefore determined the following two premises of the military deployment: (1) the Canal is the frontier, as such it must be defended; and (2) the prospect of an Egyptian resumption of hostilities must be dealt with by defensive means. Given these basic principles, military must propose a plan for deployment, which would defend Sinai from any Egyptian, war initiative. The question was therefore one of the most effective modes of defense: a choice between stationary and hard defensive, or mobile and flexible defense and perhaps a combination of the two (Adan 1980, 45-46).

By 1973 the Israeli Army had come full circle. Initially, 1948-67, the Israeli Army had been infantry intensive. By 1973 the doctrine had changed to one of armored heavy formations. In 1967, the Israelis validated their offensive armor doctrine in the Sinai by quickly defeating the Egyptians with deep penetrations and rapid envelopment. The Israeli Army concluded that the tanks were the finest weapons (together with aircraft) they had, and that fast-moving hard hitting armored formations could easily punch their way into adjacent Arab territory.

This doctrine did not easily suit the new doctrine of defense or the defensive spirit. This is due to the fact that the Bar-Lev Line had evolved into a fortress defensive line, similar to the Maginot Line that the French Army had built prior to World War II to prevent any German attack against France. The Bar-Lev Line consisted of concrete bunkers and static tank positions aimed at being impenetrable to the Egyptian forces. It also served as an insurance policy to political and military leaders worried about any attack on the Israeli frontier, and it made garrisoning the Sinai cheaper in manpower for the Israeli Army. By 1972 the Israeli Army had changed its doctrine in the Sinai to a compromise that included a more flexible armored reserve to counter any Egyptian penetrations of the Bar-Lev Line. The underlying reason for this doctrinal change was due to overconfidence, based on Israel's past experience.

The Israelis maintained that there was no need to stop the Egyptians on the Suez waterline. If they were allowed to penetrate into Sinai, the Israeli armored and air forces would then strike, delivering a blow, which would preclude any territorial achievements on the eastern bank of the Canal. Dayan accepted this position. No one in Israel in 1972-1973 seriously considered the possibility of a serious Egyptian crossing or threat (Tal 1984, 60-61).

It is clear that between the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars the Israelis had become arrogant with regard to their own capabilities and complacent with regard to those of their potential adversaries. Chaim Herzog commented in his book, *The War of Atonement*, that it was, in fact, what might be termed a victory disease (although he did not actually call it that), which led to Israel's being surprised in 1973.

The origins of the Yom Kippur War can be found to a very considerable degree in the Six Day War, which had a profound effect on both sides to the conflict, changing in no small measure Israel's social and political life and dictating basic changes in its strategic and doctrinal thinking. It acted as a catalyst in the Arab world and gave rise to a complex re-evaluation of the military posture of the Egyptians, who drew conclusions from every aspect of their defeat and set about

putting their house in order with active Soviet support. The Israelis on the other hand swept under the carpet all the shortcomings that had been revealed in the war but had been overlooked in the euphoria of victory; consecrating mentally the military concepts that had emerged from the six days of war, they prepared for the next war as if it were to be the seventh day (Herzog 1975, 2).

Herzog goes on to describe how the Israeli people, long suffering and exhausted from war and terrorist attacks, had called for a reduction in the size of active forces and a shift to domestic spending, including the establishment of new settlements on the newly occupied lands. Between 1967 and 1973 the population of Israel grew exponentially as Jewish people from all over the world immigrated by the thousands to Israel. However, although the actual size of the Army increased during this time, the ratio of the numerical size of the military to overall size of the population decreased.

Examining Israel's new defensive doctrine, which emerged, in part, as a result of the victory disease, it is not difficult to understand Israel's false sense of security and its belief that the victories of 1948 (defending its newly-won statehood), 1956 (the Suez Crisis) and 1967 (the Six Day War) had made the nation safe. This led to a domino effect with regard to how Israel reorganized its weapons procurement policy and force structure to fit into this new era. Israel emerged from a predominately infantry based army, much like the US and British Armies of the 1940s and 1950s, to a more tank and air force based force. Israeli armored doctrine, in contrast to the new defensive concept in the Sinai, was characteristic of a hard charging armored force on the ground and a fighter attack force in the air. Israel began to buy modern tanks to replace the hand-me-down force it had prior to 1967. As more and more tanks came into the army, Israeli infantry brigades were converted into armored brigades in what is described as an army gone to "Tank Madness."

At first, the Israeli armored brigades were all-arms combat teams of the Western pattern with a large portion of tanks. As modern, faster tanks were obtained, the Israelis found their old WW II armored infantry vehicles that carried the infantry and such combined arms weapons like mortars and ADA weapons could not keep up with the tanks in training, so they were eliminated from formations and put into follow on forces. This meant that the armored all-arms combat teams became purely tank formations, each having only two tank battalions, with a total of 96 tanks. The mobile infantry, mortars and other subunits were shed completely into a follow on grouping, and only the self-propelled guns were retained in the tank formations (Walkenbridge 1976, 4).

This fundamental shift in doctrine weapons procurement, and force structure within the heavy units proved devastating to the Israelis in the opening battles of the 1973 War. The result of these changes was the destruction of at least four hundred of the eight hundred Israeli tanks in the Sinai during the opening three to five days of the battle. Evidently, Egyptian intelligence had observed not only this change in doctrine, but also the accompanying Israeli complacency toward its neighbors. The Egyptian Army fed this overconfidence by writing military misinformation papers. Among other things, these papers complained that the ADA missile batteries and antitank missile system, which the Soviet Union had given to Egypt to offset the new Israeli doctrine, were not working and that their soldiers were abandoning them. On 7 October 1973, Israel's Nir Brigade of the 131st Operational Group was to be one of the first units to suffer the consequences of this erroneous doctrine:

Lacking infantry to provide close support, Nir's brigade attacked with two battalions on line, brigade in column. Again, without supporting artillery and without mutually supporting infantry, Nir's units deployed and charged. The Israelis did not have the benefit of the sun to their backs, and the Egyptians took a massive toll of the attacking tanks. Eighteen of 22 tanks in one battalion were hit. The Brigade of 56 tanks ended the engagement with only ten operational tanks to fight the Egyptians counter attack (Kennedy 1998, 28).

The Israelis had also dedicated only a minimal number of forces to active duty, focusing resources on electronic monitoring devices at the tactical and national level. They modernized their air forces with modern jets from the US and France. In fact, by all accounts Israel had one of the most effective air forces in the Middle East, and this, too contributed to a mind-set that would prove to be near disastrous:

The strategic situation constituted a main factor convincing the Israeli government and military leaders of the opinion that there was little danger of renewal of hostility in a major war against Israel.... Numerous war games were conducted to test the various strategic and tactical aspects of these new doctrinal defensive lines. All such games being based on the assumption of a wrong period, with the standing armies holding the attack until the reserves were mobilized within a period of some seventy-two hours (Herzog 1975, 4).

The Israelis had shifted their doctrine, weapons procurement and force structure, and in October 1973, Israel was sitting behind a defensive line that was armed with modern weapons, but organized according to how the Egyptians had fought in 1967. Israel's intelligence community, armed with information supplied by US intelligence, indicated that the Egyptians were about to attack. Despite these reports, however, the government and military still believed that the possibility of an attack was minimal. The reserves were not called up and many leaders went off to observe Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish religion. On 6 October 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked, catching the Israelis operationally by surprise. Although the Egyptians limited their attacks to take advantage of the capabilities of the new organization and weapons systems they had developed, they nevertheless shattered the notion of Israeli invincibility everywhere. Within five days and close to collapse and total defeat, Israel changed its tactics and organization, returning to a 1967 model. Israel counterattacked and, in what can only be described as a miracle of small unit leadership, pushed the Arabs back.

Ultimately, it was the United States and Soviet Union who put an end to the conflict, leaving Israel and her Arab enemies positioned territorially close to where they had been at the beginning of the war. Israel was left with many questions and thousands of dead and wounded. Complacency was replaced by an outcry from a very critical and angry population, who could not believe that their Army had been so unprepared for war. On the other hand, the Arabs emerged with new respect, not only from Israel and the world as a whole, but also among themselves, for their ability to fight. Many accounts had been received from Israeli leaders during the first days of the war, stating that, contrary to expectations, the Egyptians were not fighting as they had in 1967. They had learned correct lessons from their defeat, while the Israelis had learned incorrect lessons from their victory.

After most of its major victories, the US experienced a victory disease phenomenon similar to what Israel experienced after the 1967 war. The US Army has institutionalized after action reviews, spent millions of dollars developing the most comprehensive military library and library system, and now boasts the world's premier lessons learned department. Unfortunately, most professionals see these resources as a storehouse or an engine for intellectual debate, and not as a source for developing sound policies. The next chapter provides an analysis of the similarities between the US military today and the Israeli experience between 1967 and 1973, which will make it possible to draw conclusions as to how the new operational concept in the US military has led to a dangerous complacency.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Analysis

This chapter explores why and how the complacency in both the US and Israeli Armies, as discussed in the previous chapters, has had important consequences. Complacency in any army is a dangerous mind-set. An army studies lessons from the past in order to mitigate the impact of uncertainty about the future. In history patterns are set which, if taken in context and viewed in relevant terms, may even assist in predicting future events. This does not mean there is no relevance to simulations and studies to determine how unforeseen enemies and technologies may impact on future war. There can only be one solution and that is striking a balance between applying lessons learned from the past and looking ahead to future possibilities when forming policy. By examining mind-sets and patterns of the past, the foundations of which turned out to be fundamentally erroneous, we can gain insight into today's events and perhaps eliminate, or at least reduce the effect of future vulnerabilities. It is in this context that developments in the US Army since the end of the Cold War and the victory in Desert Storm are compared with developments in the Israeli Army after the victory in the 1967 Six-Day War. From this comparison, and an examination of the consequences confronting Israel in 1973, it should be clear that there is a potential for the Israeli experience to repeat itself in the US Army's not-too-distant future.

Throughout history, armies that have become overconfident have left themselves open to weaknesses that can be exploited by potential adversaries. Earlier we discussed how the Germany Army in 1940 translated the French Army's outdated and inappropriate

defensive doctrine, based on France's victory over Germany in World War I, into total French defeat. Similarly, between 1967 and 1973, the Egyptian Army took advantage of Israel's postwar mind-set of invincibility, taking this into consideration when developing its new doctrine and tactics and eventually leading to initial Israeli setbacks. In the end, both the French defeat and the initial Israeli setbacks signaled a need for re-examination of strategy. Doctrine, weapons, and force structure were all found to be inadequate and ineffective, a result of a flawed underlying operational concept based on a victory disease mentality.

Let us review the similarities between the US and Israel that have allowed us to compare the two for the purpose of this study. The US is a global superpower while the Israelis are a regional superpower. Both countries require any use of military force to be swift, decisive actions with minimal casualties. Both countries have superior air forces and ground maneuver units. Both rely on intelligence in order to execute their doctrine. Both Israel and the US are democracies and have similar religious and moral beliefs. Many Israeli officers have been students of US military doctrine since Israel's rebirth in 1948. Israel and the US routinely exchange officers at all levels of military academia. Many branches, such as armor, infantry, and artillery, even exchange non-commissioned and commissioned officer instructors at branch particular schools on a full-time or part-time basis.

After its 1967 triumph over the Arabs, Israel became the superpower of the Middle East. As history subsequently proved, it would eventually take a united pan-Arab coalition with all its resources to successfully challenge Israel militarily. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the US emerged from the Cold War as the sole superpower in the world

with seemingly no peer. It would ostensibly take a unified coalition of most, if not all, of the world's most influential countries to currently challenge the US on any level. After 1967, the Israeli government and people exhibited symptoms of a victory disease that resulted from an overwhelming battlefield success. Israel in 1973 had good electronic intelligence gathering capability. Arab forces were detected assembling prior to Yom Kippur. The Israeli intelligence community forwarded its observations, but noted that an Arab attack seemed unlikely. The Israeli command authorities also felt an attack unlikely, but within days the Arabs attacked. The US has experienced similar problems before Desert Storm: a US Defense Intelligence analyst saw the Iraqi Army assembling on the Kuwaiti border in July 1990 and passed this information to the Pentagon, but no one believed that the Iraqis would strike. What these two experiences have in common is the fact that intelligence gathered by electronic sensors was misinterpreted, that is, interpreted to conform to a preconceived notion about the adversary.

The Israelis have always advocated a quick decisive war with minimal casualties. The US, armed with a technical euphoria, also seeks a quick and decisive end to any conflict with minimal, if any, casualties. Both the US and Israeli Armies have excellent air force complements, excellent officers and leadership education systems. Both armies have a wealth of military experience and a modern maneuver force capable of defeating most adversaries. Both armies are backed by adequate infrastructure to wage an informational war.

Doctrine is key to how the US Army plans and fights. The US National Security Strategy, published in October 1998, directs the development of US Army concepts and doctrine. This strategy provides guidelines for the army:

The US Military plays essential role in building coalitions and shaping the international environment in ways that protect and promote US interests. Through overseas presence and peacetime engagement activities such as defense cooperation, security assistance, and training and exercises with allies and friends, our armed forces help to deter aggression and coercion, promote regional stability, prevent and reduce conflicts and threats, and serve as role models for militaries in emerging democracies.

Among other things, the National Security Strategy calls for the US Army to be ready now to prepare for the future. "We must prepare for an uncertain future even as we address today's security problems. This requires that we keep the US forces ready for shaping and responding to requirements in the near term, while at the same time evolving the US unparalleled capabilities to ensure we can effectively shape and respond in the future."

This strategy itself seems appropriate to the current situation facing the US Army today and in the future. Where the problem lies is in the implementation of an operational concept that has existed for almost ten years. The US currently has drastically downsized its forces while under-funding research and development for critical close support weapon systems. Most research and development is being spent on weapons and equipment that will not be fully developed and fielded into the whole army for at least another ten to fifteen years.

Another example of how the new operational concept is impacting on how the US Army has forgotten the close battle and its long term effects recently came to light when writer George Seffers reported in the *Army Times*:

Despite two years and millions spent on development, the Army's Tactical Internet (Digitization) software still is riddled with problems and endangers the Army's much ballyhooed digitization process. ...After the 1997 Advanced Warfighter Experiment, when the Army found out there were problems, it didn't just build on the software it had, the Army trashed it and started over from

scratch. The Army has continually trashed problem programs and started over from scratch (Seffers 1999, 26).

Despite a critical lack of resources and aging equipment, the army continues to pour resources into digitization. Consequently, it reduced force structure in the heavy divisions by taking out of the armor battalions and mechanized infantry battalions one company each. This combat power reduction of every heavy division was to be offset by digitization, allowing for increased command and control. Now the combat forces have been reduced and digitization is a pipe dream for some future date. This concept has led to vulnerability as the heavy divisions have lost combat power with nothing to offset it for years to come.

Additionally, as Vince Crawly noted in a *Defense Weekly* article, as the Army looks for future digitization technology to improve the force, the US military is in danger of an electronic "Pearl Harbor." Currently no computer net is totally secure. Recently, a computer hacker compromised a British military computer net and took over command of a communication satellite. Attacks on the US Department of Defense computer network are organized and vast. The problem is so real today that the Pentagon has organized counter-computer attack units. The vulnerability of the digitization system is that with US forces using and planning to use digital technology as one of their primary enablers, it rapidly opens itself up to becoming totally crippled as enemies and even allies devise ways and means to compromise, disrupt and destroy this capability (Crawley, 1999, 1). It seems illogical to trade heavy forces for technology that is either undeveloped or unproven in a world where the dangers are great and unforeseen.

In 1998 the Army, still underfunded, decided to reorganize the heavy division structure to correspond with the new strategy of force projection. Many learned men, within and outside the military and government, suggested numerous models. In the end, the army decided to base the reorganization on cost effectiveness. Planners were given an end strength of 15,000 people to operate a heavy division. The new design utilized future enablers and digitization, based on computers, which would theoretically allow a small force to function as effectively as the larger traditional force. As a result, some command and control positions of the traditional division were placed in reserve units (to be activated in case of war), logistical capability was reorganized into the corps and army logistical organizations, and, perhaps the most telling, this division design reduced every tank battalion by one tank company and every mechanized infantry battalion by one mechanized company. Heavy divisions are normally made up of three brigades of three battalions each. Each battalion is made up of four tank or mechanized companies. By downsizing each battalion in a heavy division by one maneuver company, the division strength is reduced by almost one-third. The army strategy is to offset this combat power reduction with command and control enablers that allow commanders to see the battlefield better. Three companies are now supposedly able to cover the same physical battlespace previously assigned to four companies. The money saved in infrastructure is to be spent on buying new technology and offsetting the training resources spent on contingencies like Bosnia.

A particularly significant aspect of this concept is that the army does not plan for the total heavy force to field these new capabilities until 2010-2015, providing budgetary constraints do not delay this even further. Thus, while many units will still be organized

with traditional capabilities, 1980-1990s weapons and three companies per battalion, others will have the new capabilities. These eight years represent a delta or difference in the plan; it will be an additional eleven years before the whole army is fielded with this weapon system. Apparently, there is a portion of the US Army leadership that is currently unaware of any potential threat to the US, or is willing to take the risk that no such threat will evolve during this time frame.

In January 1999, the government announced that it recognized how military spending in the past decade had hurt military readiness. The Pentagon's budget for 2000 will be increased by \$12 billion and by \$100 billion over the next five years (2001-2005). It seems that even now, despite resources becoming available to offset this deficiency for heavy forces organized for close combat, the US military plans to spend the money elsewhere, including military pay and benefits. Additionally, plans call for three new fighter aircraft, a new aircraft carrier, new destroyers, and a whole new class of attack submarine. Far down the list is the US Army RAH-66 Comanche helicopter, and the Crusade mobile artillery system. (Mitchell 1999, 1-2) In the end the problem is not only money or cost effectiveness, but also other principles in the operational concept which underpins current and evolving doctrine.

The US Army, and the military as a whole, has institutionalized the concept of push-button warfare and the ascendancy of fires. An unidentified Air Force liaison officer training at the Air Combat Center at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, was quoted as saying, "it doesn't matter how many bombs we have or how good an air force we are, when the enemy commanders are eating and drinking at the Air Force officers club when

we land, that means that we have a problem!” This joke would be funny if it did not seem to be so prophetic.

Noted military thinker Michael Howard said, “No doctrine formed in peace can ever be one hundred percent complete. Future battles and war are never how we plan or predict. Military institutions should develop doctrine and a military force that is flexible to fill in the gap between preparedness and the reality of the current operation.” (Howard 1983, 15) Doctrine currently is all but focused on the close combat role for the US Army. Above division level, doctrine is focused on joint operations, integrating forces, the ascendancy of firepower, and operations other than war. At division level and below, the current doctrinal trend is to focus on digitization and peacetime efficiency. Coupled with this are constant unit deployments for participation in operations other than war. Training in such a unit is centered on the task at hand and combat plays a lesser role in the unit’s overall resources and training. Most doctrinal manuals have not substantively changed since the end of the Gulf War, but the execution and intent has changed. The Army today is following the trends of peacekeeping and experimentation for the future.

Experimentation in the form of combat simulation tends to drive how many commanders intend to fight. In one computer program that drives division and corps simulation, artillery algorithms punish and reward commanders for different types of use of combat multipliers. Many see this as a driving factor for the ascendancy of fires that has been discussed earlier. A gap of uncertainty will exist, however, if the army sends units to conflicts for which they have not had the training, resources, or focus to prepare. Soldiers fight and win wars. Commanders who spend the majority of their development with simulators become desensitized to how combat feels and looks on the battlefield.

Decisions made in computer simulations are excellent to enhance training on real weapons and with real units in tactical situations. Leaders who spend their professional careers primarily in operations other than war and on computer simulators are less effective than those who have been training with their units in real situations in the field. This is where and how the uncertainty gap is generated.

We know that US army doctrine hinges on force projection, coupled with an increasing call for use of the military in operations other than war. We have seen how this has diluted the US Army close combat organizations. Israel between 1967-1973 changed its doctrine based on one similarity to the US change, complacency. In the Israeli case, the change proved to be faulty; in the US case doctrinal change, which just happens to be based on force projection and an increasing call for using military in operations other than war, may also prove to be faulty.

As stated in Chapter 4, the Israelis experienced similar doctrinal, weapons procurement and force structure changes, all evolving from their victory euphoria. The Israelis continued to misjudge the Arab, particularly the Egyptian, armies, and as a result were surprised, and paid dearly in the opening stages of the 1973 war, measured in soldiers on the battlefield dying needlessly. Israel was pushed off the east bank of the Suez and was close to being pushed off the Golan Heights. If either of the two fronts had collapsed, Israel would have been potentially overrun; without international intervention, it may well have ceased to exist as a nation. After the Israelis ultimately won the 1973 war the Israeli public blamed the government and military leaders for the unacceptable human cost which had to be paid for survival. The Israelis had to completely redefine

their national and military strategy. In the end they found the balance that has so far continued to keep them free.

Recently, unsubstantiated evidence, which is, nevertheless, considered reliable by many civilian and military thinkers, points to the fact that another reason that led to US assistance and careful Soviet diplomatic and informational rhetoric during the 1973 war is that Israel at that time had nuclear weapons. Faced with being totally overrun, it would have used them to save its statehood, quite possibly starting a nuclear holocaust. What this fact may bring into this analysis is how a nation must pay attention to its ability to fight so that it never has to use nuclear weapons: a nuclear superpower must also sustain its ability to fight conventionally so that it never has to use nuclear weapons to preempt defeat. In Israel's case, the Army found the courage and ability to dig deep enough so that when the Arab opponents in 1973 faltered, the Israelis seized the opportunity to counterattack and regained the initiative. Failure to sustain conventional forces ready to fight heavy traditional warfare then and today might mean the difference between a nation's survival in a nuclear age after all.

The strategy Israel develops in peacetime is vital to its survival and prosperity. Compared to Israel, there is not quite the same danger of survival for the US. Nevertheless, it may be argued that there is equal danger for US prosperity and its way of life. If policy puts the US Army into a situation where a Sadat-type adversary is waiting, the US could face a surprise and, at the very least, a potential setback initially. US reliance on technology and the "no casualty" state of mind which has evolved since the war in Vietnam could easily be used against commanders on the battlefield. If a situation arose whereby an adversary planned merely to kill American soldiers, without worrying

about winning or losing a particular battle or even the war itself, he could easily discover a way to hit vulnerable US forces with weapons which the US considers obsolete or not dangerous, and, therefore, against which it has not prepared its soldiers. In this way an adversary could undermine public opinion and prompt a call for a withdrawal of US forces, thus leaving this adversary in control.

After the 1973 war, the ruling Israeli government and military was criticized until most resigned. Israel had won the war but its leaders had lost power, while the defeated Arab leaders remained in control of their countries. If an adversary could slow down the US decisive and quick victory tempo, and if this is coupled with high profile casualties, then this definitely could influence the national will to continue. If this scenario happened in an area crucial to US national and economic interests, the US could, in effect, surrender its role as a world leader because of its not having the resources, leadership, capability, and determination to influence situations, be they political, economic, or military, vital to its future. If our military and political leaders focus on past victories and rely on past success alone to formulate doctrine, procurement, and force structure policy, then it is not difficult to imagine a potential adversary's planning and developing means to overcome this policy to gain at least a political victory, if not an outright military victory as well.

In the final analysis, an examination of these two countries provides some striking similarities. Both changed their doctrine, weapons priorities, and force structure due to euphoria resulting from a major victory. Part of the engine for these changes was the cost factor. It is, perhaps, natural that in a country's war-peace-war cycle there will always be tension between spending money for an uncertain future, as is the case for military

spending, and spending money on the foreseeable future, as is the case with domestic spending. This tension causes the military to spend very conservatively during peacetime and spend unconstrainedly during war, which can be summed up in the pressure between military efficiency and military effectiveness. When the focus is on military efficiency, an army spends money on operations and maintenance of units to minimize cost rather than maximizes preparedness. The trade off is training to be good enough rather than to be the best. When the focus is on military effectiveness, an army spends money on operations and maintenance, regardless of dollar cost, to be the best-trained and best-prepared military in the world. Obviously the ideal is to strike a balance between the two, but when the pendulum swings too far to one side a military can find itself faced with problems it must overcome. This has been true for the US Army since 1991 due to the continued refocusing of resources.

Military spending for the United States and Israel after their respective victories focused primarily on efficiency. Israel always used reserve rather than active forces because they cost less, so that the impact on the economy at large was minimal. The US Army has repeatedly taken active units out of the inventory due to personnel and equipment costs in order to pay for programs that the leadership deemed more important at the time. Israel pioneered the use of efficient sub-caliber devices between 1967 and 1973 in order to offset the cost of training units for war. The US has spent large amounts of money to build simulators so that pilots do not have to actually fly helicopters and armored soldiers do not have to execute gunnery ranges. This practice does not, in and of itself, necessarily affect the force negatively, and, in fact, can be regarded as both efficient and effective because soldiers continue to train and are at a higher state of

readiness than if the efficient methods had not been introduced. What is problematic, however, is the fact that these innovations have taken a front seat and have replaced, rather than supplemented, more traditional forms of training. Simulators and sub-caliber devices can never be an absolute substitute for true, “hands-on” military training. In an age of complacency, where cost factors are high on the list of priorities, commanders are restricted as to how much they can use their actual equipment and train their soldiers on expensive exercises. This lays the groundwork for future danger for the Army.

As Israeli soldiers found out in the opening days of the Yom Kippur War, the Egyptians of 1973 were not fighting like the Egyptians of 1967. Similarly, it should be clear that a potential enemy of the US will not fight in the future as the Iraqi Army did in 1991, nor will a future scenario necessarily resemble the computer simulator scenarios of today. Adding the struggle between efficiency and effectiveness to the overriding confidence of the US Army today, one can see how even programs that are introduced with good intentions end up being used in lieu of the very programs or training they were meant only to enhance. Today, US Army Commanders face a great challenge in deciding how they will win the eternal peacetime battle between efficiency and effectiveness.

Conclusion

The US Army today stand as the security arm of the most powerful diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power on earth. While governments throughout the world are experiencing setbacks in their respective economies, the US has experienced the largest nonwartime economic growth ever. It is within this context that this author has examined the question: has the US Army become dangerously complacent since the end

of the Cold War? An analysis of the facts has demonstrated that the US Army has, indeed, become complacent, and that this has resulted in vulnerabilities that could have serious consequences in the future.

An article written by John Diamond in the *Washington Times* in September 1998 stated that “the Pentagon has translated hundreds of books and articles by mid-level Chinese military officers. The trend of writings shows that Beijing’s future military leadership sees US military power as waning and plans to exploit weaknesses in US weaponry and supply lines should conflict occur” (Diamond 1998, A-8). The article referred to the minutes from a Senate Arms Services Committee interview with Pentagon military analysts, stating that China could catch up with the US with certain power leveraging weapons like missiles and torpedoes, followed by highly modernized regular units. The testimony concludes that from China’s viewpoint “US Military forces, while dangerous at present, are vulnerable, even deeply flawed, and can be defeated with the right strategy... and that the United States and China will probably enter into a major conflict between 2005-2015” (Diamond 1998, A-8).

The truly dangerous aspect of this problem is that, similar to Israel’s situation in 1967-1972, there are enemies who do not care if they can win a major conflict against the US. There are adversaries who could easily leverage cheap but effective weapons to counter the US doctrine, weapons, and forces structure concept. It would not be hard to envision an adversary who only wanted limited military gains in order to upset or embarrass the US so as to challenge the notion of US invincibility. For example, a rogue state could very easily take the same steps that the Egyptians did between 1967 and 1973: it could play a political game of cat and mouse, leveraging the media’s unrelenting need

for headlines against the growing weariness which has been increasingly more reflected in US policy and inaction. At the same time, it could be covertly planning to launch heavy forces against a major US political or national objective, such as Seoul, South Korea, the Panama Canal, oil fields in the Middle East or South America, or perhaps even directly against a remote US force somewhere in the world conducting operations other than war. By organizing itself with cybernetic weapons to blind the US technological superiority and developing an adequate air defense that could severely damage, and even possibly destroy US Air Force planes entering the area in an attempt to create air supremacy, such an adversary could destroy US deployability and fighting capability. US leaders would then have to assess whether it is in the country's interest to remain engaged in an area where deployed US forces are under attack, or to become newly involved and deploy forces to an obvious hotspot. Such decisions are being made, however, in an atmosphere of low tolerance for US casualties, so that an adversary who can manipulate the media has a good chance of bleeding the national will. In the end, only if the national will is steadfast will the US be able to defend its national security interests.

It seems that the US Army is currently trapped by media images and headlines from the past decade. Images of troops being dragged around the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia, still haunt military leaders, because such scenes violate the "no casualty" mindset not only of the general public, but also within the US military itself. News stories about "TailHook" and Aberdeen remind the military that perhaps the value system it once counted on has slipped. Headlines concerning the government's plan to shrink the military in order to spend the savings to fix domestic problems hamper the military's plan to train and prepare for the future.

Rather, than make hard decisions for readiness, the new operational concept has leveraged spending with a view to ten to fifteen years from now, at the risk of disregarding strategy for the more immediate future. The US Army is now tied to push-button warfare, described as a “sound bite war,” that is, warfare that can be resolved over a relatively short period with few or no casualties. From the lessons learned from small operations other than war, such as humanitarian assistance and nation building in Somalia, peace enforcement in Bosnia, and others, the American people now expect all conflicts to be low cost in terms of lives and materiel. From this it can be further extrapolated that America will have little or no staying power. It would be very easy for an adversary to execute an operation aimed at bleeding America, defeating the US by “forcing” a withdrawal or creating a scenario where the US does not wish to engage its military at all for fear of becoming involved in a prolonged conflict with numerous casualties (what one might call the “Vietnam syndrome”). Freedom and a military that has been powerful and effective for over two hundred years have blessed the American people. Unlike other countries that have had the burden of war on their territory, the US has evolved to expect different realities than nations around the world. War is always “over there” and is only irritating when the country’s young men and women start coming home in coffins.

In the end, the struggle between peacetime efficiency and wartime effectiveness will always pull at an army’s ability to prepare for war. What is good for the peacetime economy is seldom good for preparedness for war. Leaders in the government and the military have to pay dollars and sweat during peacetime in order to save blood in war.

The US Army has become complacent since the fall of the Soviet Union. It has come to believe that its enemies have no real capabilities and, therefore, pose no threat. Israel faced the same situation between 1967 and 1973 and its complacency led to almost disastrous results as its enemies leveraged against its change in doctrine, weapons procurement and force structure. The US today has taken a similar path, and its complacency will ultimately lead to vulnerabilities that an adversary could exploit.

Further research might focus on determining if an opposing alliance could effectively contest current US policy of being able to fight two major regional conflicts in different areas of the world. If, for example, Country X attacked South Korea, while at the same time its ally, Country Y, attacked vital oil field in the Middle East, the US would be hard pressed to be able to react to each scenario with anything more than token forces. If both of these adversaries were traditional heavy forces with limited or potential weapons of mass destruction then the US Army would be only able to effectively respond with 40percent of its force structure. The US would have a particularly difficult time, since over half of the US Army force structure is light or expeditionary and would be nothing other than a “speed bump” (not equipped to decisively fight any force other than similarly equipped light forces, such as guerrillas or armed mobs/bands of soldiers).

Another interesting topic for further research is just how vulnerable the US is due to the changes its military has undergone in the 1990s. The US needs a detailed and continually updated review of how the next eight to fifteen years will impact on the US Army’s ability to protect the nation’s vital interest at home and around the world. There is no doubt that the tools and capability are present for the US to maintain its status as the

sole superpower. There are, however, many emerging nations, such as China, which would like to challenge that status.

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
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
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