A Critical Analysis of the SRI Lankan Governments Counterinsurgency Campaign.
Abstract
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the Tamil insurgency that is going on in Sri Lanka for the last eighteen years. It lays out the historical, economic, political and military background to the problem in the initial two chapters. The discriminatory policies that were followed by successive governments against the Tamil people and the foundation of the government's counterinsurgency strategy are the main areas discussed in this part. The U.S. and the British counterinsurgency doctrine were used as the guideline to evaluate the conduct of Sri Lankan government's counterinsurgency campaign. Few case studies were used to identify trends and lessons learned. Failure to develop a proper national plan, lack of good intelligence and a clear political objective, inconsistency in carrying out plans, poor leadership, and ineffective psychological operations program were identified as the major shortcomings of the government's counterinsurgency campaign. The study suggests certain recommendations that could address the problems identified in the government's counterinsurgency campaign. Finally, the thesis concludes that the ongoing crisis will take a few more years of wise leadership and participation of all the parties involved to end this wasteful war.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1999
- Accession Number
- ADA367729
Entities
People
- Raj D. Vijayasin
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College