

308207

JPRS 84399

26 September 1983

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1796

Reproduced From
Best Available Copy

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

19990916 040

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

10
102
A06

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

26 September 1983

USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1796

CONTENTS

ARMED FORCES

Moskalenko on Battle of Kursk (K. Moskalenko; ZNAMYA, No 7, Jul 83).....	1
Hand-To-Hand Mountain Combat Training Discussed (V. Yefanov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 4 Aug 83).....	15
Attention Given to Characteristics of and Treatment for Hapatitis, Dysentery (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 7 Jul 83).....	18
Subsidiary Farms Used To Supplement Military Diet (R. Tavadze; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 29 Jul 83).....	21
Importance of Battle of Kursk Stressed (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5, 7 Jul 83).....	23
Dragunskiy on Battle of Kursk, by D. Dragunskiy Official View of Significance of Battle of Kursk, by A. Yakushevskiy	
Rokossovskiy Recalls Battle of Kursk (K. Rokossovskiy; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 6 Jul 83)....	33
Ideal Commander's Wife (Galina Sul'zhenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Jul 83).....	38
Complaints That Servicemen Are Not Assigned to Area of Specialty (N. Lukashenko, V. Svetlov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 Jul 83).....	41

Complaints About Leadership Styles (Bogdanovskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 3 Aug 83).....	43
Table of Contents: TEKHNICA I VOORUZHENIYE, No 7, July 1983 (TEKHNICA I VOORUZHENIYE, No 7, Jul 83).....	47

AIR FORCES

Training for Mountain Combat Discussed (M. Sotskov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 16 Jul 83).....	49
Simulator Proven Effective Not Used in Training (P. Zhiganov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 Jul 83).....	53
Unnecessary Risk-Taking Criticized (A. Sorokin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 4 Aug 83).....	56
Problems in Aircraft Maintenance Noted (B. Makarevich; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 20 Jul 83).....	60

NAVAL FORCES

Engr-Adm Kotov Assigns Primary Naval Role to Nuclear-Powered Submarines (P. Kotov; SOTSIALISTICHESKSYA INDUSTRIYA, 31 Jul 83)..	64
Soviet Sub Sunk in Black Sea During World War II Found (K. Aposhanskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 31 Jul 83).....	67
Commanders' Risks Must be Justifiable (B. Belyakov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 Jul 83).....	69
Interview With Commander of Northern Fleet Mikhaylovskiy (Arkadiy Petrovich Mikhaylovskiy Interview; SOVETSKIY VOIN, No 13, Jun 83).....	73
Resources for Training for Long-Range Cruises Pointed Out (Editorial; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 Jul 83).....	79

CIVIL DEFENSE

Training Exercise Under Nuclear Conditions (A. Krotov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 29 Jul 83).....	82
--	----

DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

Second DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum (SOVETSKIY PATRIOT, 24 Jul 83).....	84
Report on Plenum Yegorov Report to Plenum, by G.N. Yegorov	

ARMED FORCES

MOSKALENKO ON BATTLE OF KURSK

Moscow ZNAMYA in Russian No 7, Jul 83 pp 155-165

[Article by MSU K. Moskalenko: "Fiery Bulge"]

[Text] In the middle of the summer of 1943, a gigantic duel took place between the armed forces of the Soviet Union and fascist Germany on the forest-steppe expanses of our country's European part in the areas of Kursk, Orel, and Belgorod. This event, which received the name of the Battle of Kursk, was the most important stage after the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad and an historic position on the path to victory over fascism on scales of the entire World War. Having smashed the enemy at Kursk and crushing his defense on the Dnepr, the Soviet Army accomplished a radical turning point in the war and no longer let the strategic initiative slip from its hands until the enemy's total defeat. Subsequent events on the Soviet-German front, the determining front of the entire World War II, developed only according to the plans of the Soviet Supreme Command.

"If the battle at Stalingrad presaged the decline of the German-fascist army, the battle at Kursk brought it to the edge of catastrophe," this is how the Chairman of the State Defense Committee, J. V. Stalin, evaluated the results and consequences of the battle in a report on 6 November 1943.

And actually, not only the idea of revenge for the defeat at Stalingrad, but also the offensive strategy of the German Wehrmacht were buried in the bloody battles at Kursk. The Hitlerites did not succeed in restoring their military prestige in the satellite countries and preventing the collapse of the aggressive fascist bloc which had begun. However, despite inexorable facts, Hitler and his associates believed that the war was still far from lost and the serious situation could be rectified.

The military-political situation of the USSR had become considerably stronger by the summer of 1943. As a result of the victories which had been won, especially at Stalingrad, the international position of our country was strengthened even more. All the progressive forces of the world which fought against fascist Germany and its allies rallied around the Soviet Union.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government directed all the efforts of the people toward the most rapid destruction of the enemy under the slogan,

"Everything for the front, everything for victory!" The military-economic might of the Soviet Union grew and was strengthened from month to month and the production of combat equipment, armaments, and ammunition increased.

In 1943, the Soviet economy demonstrated indisputable superiority over the economy of fascist Germany. If military production in the USSR increased 4.3-fold in comparison with the prewar level, in fascist Germany it increased only 2.3-fold although it, together with occupied Europe, produced more metal, coal, and electric power. In 1943, the Soviet aviation industry produced 9,700 more airplanes than fascist Germany; in 1942-1943 our tank-building plants produced 44,600 combat vehicles while Germany produced only 18,200, that is, almost 2.5-fold less.

During the two years of the war the Soviet Army acquired great combat experience and learned to beat the crafty and strong enemy under the most varied conditions. As they say, it passed the examination for maturity.

By the summer of 1943, the transition to the corps organization had been basically accomplished in the Soviet Army. This permitted improving control in the combined-arms armies and making them more powerful.

The development of the armored and mechanized troops proceeded along the line of their further organizational massing and strengthening of their combat might. The creation of five tank armies with the new organization, which received artillery and mortar regiments, was especially important.

The artillery of the RVGK [Reserve of the Supreme High Command] was also improved. The formation of big artillery large units--brigades, divisions, and corps--continued. Along with this, the organization of tank-destroyer, rocket, and antiaircraft artillery was improved.

The quantitative and qualitative growth of the rifle, armored and mechanized troops, artillery, airborne forces, and rear services units and installations, and the tremendous work in training command and political personnel completely met the nature of the offensive operations of Soviet troops which had been initiated and the requirements of Soviet military art.

The Communist Party displayed great concern for strengthening its influence among the Soviet men and for their political indoctrination. The introduction of one-man command furthered the rise in the effectiveness of party-political work among the troops.

By the start of the decisive summer battles, the political organs and party organizations had completed the restructuring of the party organizations. Primary party organizations were created in all battalions and subunits equal to them. They intensified the assistance to commanders in the accomplishment of combat missions, improved indoctrinational work, and increased the influx of the best men into the party. Typically, the greatest influx into the party and the Komsomol was observed in periods of intense battles.

By the spring of 1943 the condition of fascist Germany became unfavorable and critical. It was determined by the situation on the Soviet-German front where, during the winter campaign of 1942-1943, the Soviet troops crushed about 200 enemy divisions or up to 40 percent of all his large units in the East.

The armored troops--the main strike force of the Wehrmacht--were in a serious state after the battle at Stalingrad. The inspector-general of armored troops, Guderian, wrote in his report in March 1943: "Unfortunately, we now no longer have one completely combat-effective tank division. However, the success of combat operations this year as well as in subsequent years depends on whether we will succeed in again creating such large units. If we succeed in solving this problem, then in coordination with the Air Force and submarine fleet we will win the victory." The results of the battle at Kursk showed that the intentions of the Hitlerites were not accomplished. Tremendous losses sharply aggravated the crisis of the fascist bloc which had begun after the defeat at Stalingrad.

In order to make up the losses and take revenge, the rulers of fascist Germany implemented a number of extraordinary measures in the winter and summer of 1943. Total mobilization of males from 16 to 65 years of age and of females from 17 to 45 years of age permitted them to make up the numbers of troops on the Soviet-German front to a considerable degree. More than seven million foreign workers and prisoners of war were forcibly used for work in industry, agriculture, and in transportation.

Relying on the economic and military resources of almost all of Western Europe, Germany more than doubled its production of tanks, guns, and mortars and increased the production of combat aircraft 1.7-fold. By the summer of 1943, the enemy troops began to receive "Tiger" and "Panther" tanks and "Ferdinand" self-propelled guns which possessed better armor protection and more powerful armament than former vehicles. The new Focke-Wulf-190A high-speed fighters and new 75-mm and 88-mm antitank guns strengthened the combat capability and firepower of individual units and subunits of the Hitlerite army, but on the whole the enemy lost so much military equipment that even the significant growth in its production could not make up these losses. As a result, even on the Soviet-German front, to which the German command sent its best troops, by the start of the battle at Kursk 60 divisions were counted which were manned at reduced strength.

By the way, in spite of everything the Hitlerite command believed that it had sufficient forces to inflict a decisive defeat on the Soviet Army during the summer and thus again overcome the course of military operations on the Eastern Front. The Hitlerites tried to demonstrate at any price the ability of their army to conduct big offensive victorious operations. They assumed without justification that the transition to a defensive strategy is equivalent to admitting the failure of plans to win world supremacy and, in essence, signifies Germany's defeat in the war.

The fact that the fascist command received the opportunity to concentrate its main forces on the Eastern front was furthered by the repudiation, by the governments of the United States and Britain, of their obligations to open a second front in Europe in 1943. The allies of the USSR in the anti-Hitlerite coalition restricted their activity to actions in the Mediterranean theater of the war, far from the borders of the fascist Reich. In essence, they sabotaged the start of military operations in Northern France; judging from everything, they counted on the German and Soviet troops exhausting their forces in single combat on the Eastern Front. In the summer of 1943, even the dispatch of sea

convoys from Britain to the northern ports of our country was stopped. This was justified by W. Churchill because, allegedly, there were not enough transport ships to support the operations of the Allied troops on the island of Sicily.

The German-fascist command concentrated on the Soviet-German border up to 70 percent of the infantry divisions and 63 percent of the tank and motorized divisions which received replacements from among the hastily trained soldiers of the new "total" call-ups. There were also shortcomings in the technical equipping of these large units. However, the Hitlerites clearly overestimated the forces of the Wehrmacht and underestimated the Soviet Armed Forces. Here are figures which characterize the important changes in favor of the Soviet Army and which occurred in the correlation of forces on the Soviet-German front by the beginning of July 1943:

Men and Weapons	Soviet Army	Wehrmacht and Satellite Forces	Correlation of Men and Weapons
Personnel of active army and fleet (thous. men)	6,612	5,325	1.2:1
Guns and mortars (not considering 50-mm mortars and rocket artillery) - (thous. weapons)	105.0	54.3	1.9:1
Tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts (assault guns)	10,199	5,850	1.7:1
Combat aircraft	10,252	2,980	3.4:1

Not having the men and weapons for an offensive on a broad front, the German command decided first to crush our large grouping of forces in the area of Kursk. It self-confidently considered that namely here it can take revenge for the defeat at Stalingrad and, as a result, again seize the strategic initiative.

The configuration of the front line in the area of Kursk played an important role in the selection of the sector of the front for launching the strike. It recalled a horseshoe, with the bulging side facing the west, in the depths of the territory occupied by the enemy. The enveloping position of the German-fascist troops permitted them to hope to reach the rear of the Soviet troops by two encounter attacks from the north and south and to quickly encircle and destroy our armies which were in the defense within the horseshoe. This concept also formed the basis when planning the Wehrmacht's summer offensive.

On 15 April, Hitler proclaimed in an order: "I have decided, as soon as weather conditions permit, to conduct the 'Citadel' offensive--the first offensive of this year. Decisive significance is attached to this offensive. It should be crowned with rapid and decisive success. The offensive should place in our

hands the initiative for this year's spring and summer. In this connection, all preparatory measures must be conducted with the greatest thoroughness and energy. The best large units, the very best weapons, the best commanders, and a large amount of ammunition should be used on the directions of the main efforts.... Victory at Kursk should be a torch for the whole world....

"The goal of the offensive is--by the concentrated strike conducted decisively and rapidly by the forces of one shock army from the area of Belgorod, and of another--from the area south of Orel, to encircle the troops located in the area of Kursk by means of a concentric attack and destroy them...."

In case of the success of operation "Citadel," others were to follow it, including a strike to the northeast to envelop Moscow.

The Hitlerite leadership evaluated the offensive on the Soviet-German front as both a military and a most important political action. At one of the conferences the chief of staff of the Supreme High Command, General-Field Marshal Keitel, declared: "We should attack for political considerations." Himmler prophesied, speaking in Khar'kov before the officers of an SS tank corps: "The fate is decided here, in the East.... Here the Russians should be exterminated as people and as a military force and should choke in their own blood."

In operation "Citadel," the enemy placed main reliance on a surprise, massed strike by tanks of a new design on narrow sectors of the front. Great hopes were also placed on aviation.

The enemy intended to break through our main defensive zone in two days and, by the end of the fourth day of the offensive, the strike groupings of the Wehrmacht were to link up in the area of Kursk.

Perhaps the German-fascist strategists did not prepare one operation of World War II as thoroughly and comprehensively as operation "Citadel." Its plan was discussed and refined many times at various levels. The time for its start was postponed repeatedly. Only by the middle of the summer did the fascist command consider the preparations of the troops completed. On 1 July Hitler announced his final decision: to begin the offensive on 5 July.

The strategic plan of the Soviet command for the summer-fall campaign of 1943 proceeded from a realistic estimate of the correlation of forces and directly envisioned the continuation of the driving of the fascist aggressors from the limits of our motherland.

At the end of March and beginning of April 1943, an exchange of opinions concerning where and how to accomplish the main missions of the war took place in the Headquarters, Supreme High Command, and in the General Staff. The question "where" was not too difficult. According to intelligence data of all types, by this time it was established that the Hitlerite command was trying to accomplish its strategic missions in the area of the Kursk Bulge, where powerful strike groupings were also concentrated. One way or another, it was completely clear to the Soviet command that namely here, at the Kursk Bulge, it was expedient to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy main forces. Moreover, the nature of the terrain permitted employing all types of combat equipment in mass quantities in this area.

The second question was much more difficult: how to accomplish the basic missions of the summer-fall campaign?

By this time, the Soviet troops were able to begin the offensive first. The strategic initiative belonged to the Soviet Army which was superior to the German-fascist army in men and weapons. However, information on the fascists' preparation of a large offensive which was obtained by our intelligence induced us not to hurry but to make an estimate of the situation again and adopt the most expedient decision.

On 8 April 1943 the deputy of the Supreme High Command, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov, who was in the area of the Kursk Bulge sent to Headquarters a report on the possible nature of military operations in the summer of 1943. In particular, he wrote in it: "I consider it inexpedient for our troops to go over to the offensive in the immediate future to forestall the enemy. It will be better if we wear the enemy down in our defense, knock out his tanks, and then, committing fresh reserves, launching a general offensive finally finish off the enemy main grouping." This point of view was also shared by the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevskiy.

To adopt the decision, the Supreme Commander, J. V. Stalin, asked the opinion of several front commanders.

The views which were presented to the Headquarters were attentively studied. On 12 April Headquarters adopted a preliminary decision. Here is its essence. Although the Soviet Army has sufficient forces for the launching of a decisive offensive, under conditions where the enemy is preparing for a powerful offensive it is most expedient to meet his strike with a deliberate, well organized defense. In a defensive battle, to wear down and bleed the enemy tank groupings and then to launch a counteroffensive. In case the Hitlerite command does not undertake an offensive in the immediate future, the Headquarters envisioned another variant: without waiting for enemy strikes, the Soviet troops will launch active operations.

The final plan for the summer campaign was refined at the end of May - beginning of June.

It must be noted that in adopting the final decision for the summer campaign, Headquarters made a thorough and comprehensive study of the opinions of the commanders of the Central and Voronezh Fronts, including several suggestions on launching preemptive strikes. Thoroughly weighing all pro's and con's, Headquarters firmly decided to meet the enemy offensive with a deliberately occupied, deeply echeloned, and well organized defense. Only after irreplaceable losses are inflicted on the enemy by fire of all types, air strikes, and counterblows should his destruction be completed in the course of a decisive counteroffensive.

A case unique in the history of war occurred: the strongest side deliberately assumed the defensive. This testifies not to the indecision of the Soviet command, but to the creative approach of the Headquarters and General Staff to the accomplishment of the war's missions.

Of course, the Soviet Army was able to conduct preemptive battles against both enemy strike groupings. However, it is not difficult to imagine what colossal efforts and what losses this would have cost us in that specific situation where the enemy was still very strong and, in addition, had prepared for an offensive against our defense. At the same time, launching a counteroffensive after the enemy troops have been bled and worn down in fruitless attacks promised us decisive successes attained with much smaller losses.

In the end, the decision adopted by Headquarters was dictated by the striving of our command to achieve victory with less blood--an example which characterizes Soviet military art most favorably.

The preparation of our troops and the engineer preparation of the terrain for the defensive battle were conducted with great straining of efforts. The defense was to stand up against the onslaught of big enemy tank groupings; therefore they continued to improve it up to the very start of the battle. As a result, the Central and Voronezh Fronts prepared a deeply echeloned defense on the Kursk Bulge, powerful as regards antitank and anti-artillery engineer improvements, with a total depth of 150-190 kilometers. Each front created three army zones and three frontal defensive lines. In addition to this intermediate lines and switch positions were prepared. The length of the army defensive zones, front defensive lines, intermediate lines, and switch positions was about 2,600 kilometers.

The northern side of the Kursk Bulge was defended by troops of the Central Front (commander Army General K. K. Rokossovskiy, member of the Military Council Major General K. F. Telegin, chief of staff Lieutenant General M. S. Malinin), and the southern side--by troops of the Voronezh Front (commander Army General N. F. Vatutin, member of the Military Council Lieutenant General N. S. Khrushchev, chief of staff Lieutenant General S. P. Ivanov). I had the occasion to command the 40th Army which was part of the formations [ob'yedineniye] of the Voronezh Front along with the Guards armies of Generals I. M. Chistyakov and M. S. Shumilov and the armies of Generals N. Ye. Chibisov, M. S. Katukov, and V. D. Kryuchenkin.

Defensive lines were prepared behind these fronts by troops of the Steppe District (commander Colonel General I. S. Konev, member of the Military Council Lieutenant General I. E. Susaykov, chief of staff Lieutenant General M. V. Zakharov). It was in Headquarters reserve and was the most powerful strategic reserve ever created in the years of the Great Patriotic War. At the beginning of July the Steppe District was converted to the Steppe Front.

The total depth of our troops' defense in the area of the Kursk Bulge up to the Don River was up to 300 kilometers.

To restrict the maneuver of enemy tanks, it was planned to destroy 361 bridges and to mine 500 kilometers of railroad track with delayed action mines in the zone of the Voronezh Front alone. Prior to the start of the defensive battle on 6-8 May and 8-10 June our aviation conducted two big air operations, as a result of which about 700 enemy airplanes were destroyed in the air and on airfields. This seriously weakened the enemy air grouping since the Hitlerites placed great hopes on their aviation.

The staffs of the fronts and armies painstakingly collected and studied information on the enemy and his regroupings and intentions, followed the concentration of men and weapons, and organized the coordination, communications, and control of the troops. On specially created fields our men learned to conduct volley fire on the infantry, destroy tanks from trenches and foxholes, and make effective use of small arms and engineer equipment. Methods for combating "Tiger" and "Panther" tanks and "Ferdinand" self-propelled guns were worked out with special persistence.

The political organs and party and Komsomol organizations directed all their efforts toward raising the combat training of the men and officers, strengthening military discipline, and raising the personal responsibility of each one for the precise and implicit accomplishment of the combat mission.

It must be noted that all measures in preparation for the defensive battle were conducted in an environment of high vigilance of the troops and their readiness to repel the enemy attack at any time.

May passed in tense expectation. We experienced even greater tension in June--the period of short nights with which the Germans frequently timed their most active combat operations. June 1943 also passed. There was still no German offensive. At the beginning of July, Headquarters, Supreme High Command established that the German offensive was expected in the period of 3-6 July. The troops were immediately issued the necessary instructions.

The Soviet command attentively followed the actions of the German-fascist troops on the Kursk Bulge. When, according to intelligence data, it was precisely established that the enemy would launch the offensive on the morning of 5 July, at dawn on that day the artillery of the Voronezh and Central Fronts began a planned counterpreparation. A powerful concentration of fire rained down on the enemy's combat formations, firing positions, and command and observation posts. The artillery counterpreparation weakened the enemy blow. The Hitlerite command was forced to postpone the attack by 2.5-3 hours.

From the private soldier to the general-field marshal, the Germans were convinced that they had lost the factor of surprise on which they had set such great hopes. This caused confusion among the enemies.

At 0530 hours on the Central Front and 30 minutes later on the Voronezh Front, the Hitlerite troops launched the offensive.

Implementing the thoroughly worked out plan, the Hitlerite command sent tank rams of tremendous strength to narrow breakthrough sectors.

The strike grouping of Army Group "Center" which was combined as part of the 9th Army of Colonel General Model--eight infantry, six tank, and one motorized division--operated opposite the troops of the Central Front from the area of Orel. It contained more than 270,000 men, about 3,500 guns and mortars, 741 tanks (including 45 "Tiger" tanks), and 280 "Ferdinand" assault guns. After an artillery preparation and air strikes the 9th Army strike grouping launched the attack on a front of 40 kilometers and, on the very first day, seven infantry and two tank divisions and assault gun units were committed to the battle here.

The main strike was launched against Ol'khovatka which was immediately attacked by up to 500 tanks and assault guns. The Hitlerites had no doubt that their new equipment would break through the defense of the Soviet troops.

On the southern side of the Kursk Bulge the troops of the Voronezh Front were attacked by Army Group "South" under the command of General-Field Marshal Manstein--six infantry, eight tank, and one motorized divisions. It consisted of more than 280,000 men, about 4,000 guns and mortars, 1,559 tanks (including 337 "Tiger" tanks), and 253 "Ferdinand" assault guns. Two strikes were launched from this direction: one--on Obotan', the other--on Korocha, in which regard already on the first day the foe committed to the battle here five infantry and eight tank divisions (including the SS "Reich," "Adolph Hitler," and "Death's Head" Tank Divisions which were considered the best in the German-Fascist Army) and one motorized division.

Manstein tried to reach Kursk in record time, surprising all with the speed of his operations.

By the way, I do not doubt that the course of the historic battle is sufficiently well known to the readers. Without going into detail, I will recall that the Hitlerites did not achieve the desired success in two days, in five days nor, finally, in eight days. The Hitlerite strike groupings intended to break through the defense of the Soviet troops in two days. But the northern strike grouping was only able to penetrate the defense of the Soviet troops to 10-12 kilometers in 7 days and was stopped.

On the eighth day after the start of the battle the Wehrmacht was also stopped on the southern side of the bulge. Here the enemy was able to penetrate our defense only to 35 kilometers, suffering tremendous losses in men and equipment.

Our troops met the enemy fully armed. Unprecedented steadfastness, courage, and mass heroism became the standard of behavior of the Soviet men. Employing their weapons skillfully, overcoming difficulties and privations, and displaying bravery and fearlessness, they steadfastly repelled the fierce enemy assaults. They did not waver before the avalanche of enemy tanks and were not frightened by the "Tigers," "Panthers," "Ferdinands," or air strikes; they converted the new equipment, the last hope of the Hitlerites, into tremendous bonfires and cemeteries of scrap metal. Commanders at all echelons demonstrated great skill in the control of the troops; the two-year's experience of the war had taught them much.

Already by 10 July the offensive of the German-fascist troops on the northern side of the Kursk Bulge had ended in failure. The same happened on the southern side. The enemy strike grouping could not break through from Belgorod to the north and link up with Model's 9th Army.

Manstein decided to shift the efforts of his depleted troops, shifting the blow in the northeast direction to Prokhorovka and there, in one more tank battle, to turn the entire course of the battle. However, fierce battles at Prokhorovka on 12 July ended with the defeat of the enemy's powerful tank grouping.

In order to save themselves from complete destruction, the German-fascist command decided to withdraw its troops on the Belgorod direction to their former positions which were well prepared for defense. By the end of 23 July, the troops of the Voronezh Front and the Steppe Front which had been committed to the battle reached the lines which they had occupied before the enemy had launched his offensive.

The enemy penetration into the zone of the Central Front was eliminated in the course of the counteroffensive on the Orel direction from 15 through 17 July. The enemy command had exhausted its reserves, and operation "Citadel" collapsed.

The enemy was forced to assume the defense. The hopes of the German-fascist command for revenge for preceding defeats were finally buried beneath the wreckage of "Tigers," "Panthers," and "Ferdinands."

Several words on an evaluation of the actions by the troop command of the Voronezh and Central Fronts in the defensive operation. Why did the enemy penetrate the defense of the troops of the Voronezh Front a little deeper than the defense of the Central Front?...

First of all, it should be considered here that with a relatively equal quantity of men and weapons the Central Front could create on its sector of 95 kilometers, where the enemy could launch the main effort, a considerably greater density of troops and equipment, simultaneously holding sufficiently strong reserves in the rear. But the Voronezh Front was to create a strong defense in a zone of 164 kilometers. Naturally, the density of personnel and equipment here was lower than on the Central Front:

Further, it is extremely important that the grouping of Germans which attacked the troops of the Voronezh Front, unquestionably, was considerably stronger than that which operated opposite the troops of the Central Front. Manstein had more tanks and self-propelled guns and several crack and full strength SS divisions operated with his troops and, in addition, he committed all his tank forces at once. But Model did not commit all the divisions since he feared an attack by the Western and Bryansk Fronts.

So that the comparatively deeper penetration of the Germans on the southern side of the Kursk Bulge can in no case be blamed on the troops of the Voronezh Front. In the course of the battle an excellently organized maneuver was conducted which permitted Headquarters, Supreme High Command, and the command of the Voronezh Front to eliminate quickly the enemy's superiority on the main directions and to concentrate the forces necessary for decisive counterblows. More than a third of all the rifle divisions, more than 40 percent of all the tank destroyer artillery, and almost all separate tank and mechanized brigades participated in the regroupings of the troops of the Voronezh Front.

This experience is priceless, especially if we consider the increased significance of maneuver in contemporary war.

Thus, absolutely objectively, the troops and command of both fronts equally deserve the warmest words for the successful accomplishment of the defensive missions.

The most important achievement of the Soviet command was that on the eve of the battle of Kursk it was able to disclose the enemy's intentions and determine the grouping of his troops, and this permitted preparing the men and weapons for his destruction ahead of time.

Among the numerous books on the last war and its biggest battles, works by foreign authors are encountered which absolutely distort the prehistory and course of the battle of Kursk. Thus, some bourgeois historians try to prove that in the defensive battle on the Kursk Bulge "Moscow won thanks to spies" who, they say, informed the Soviet command of the Germans' plans in good time and accurately. There is no need to explain to these sorry "historians" that victories are won on the battlefield, and reliable data on the enemy are obtained only as a result of the joint efforts of intelligence of all types. As regards the overall evaluation of our intelligence's operations, there is no doubt that it managed to perform its duties well.

The counteroffensive of our troops was prepared by the Headquarters and General Staff ahead of time and preparations by the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts were begun immediately after our troops assumed the deliberate defense on the Kursk Bulge.

Headquarters envisioned two big operations of strategic significance: the Orel operation of the Western, Bryansk, and Central Fronts (Operation "Kutuzov"), and then the Belgorod-Khar'kov operation of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts (Operation "Polkovodets Rymyantsev").

On 12 July, the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts launched an attack against the enemy Orel grouping at the very culmination point of the defensive battle. On 15 July troops of the Central Front joined the counteroffensive.

As a result of the joint operation of the three fronts, by 18 August the German Orel bridgehead was eliminated. The Orel operation lasted for 37 days. Our troops, initiating an offensive in a 350-kilometer zone, advanced in a westerly direction 130-150 kilometers and smashed up to 15 enemy divisions.

The counteroffensive on the Belgorod-Khar'kov direction began on 3 August. It was conducted by troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts with the assistance of troops of the Southwest Front and was concluded on 23 August by the complete destruction of the large enemy grouping, marking the end of the battle of Kursk. The Belgorod-Khar'kov operation lasted 21 days.

Initiating an offensive in a zone of up to 250 kilometers, Soviet troops advanced to a depth of 140-150 kilometers and destroyed 15 enemy divisions.

On 5 August, troops of the Bryansk Front liberated Orel, and of the Steppe Front--Belgorod. In honor of the valiant troops which liberated these cities, on 5 August artillery salvos thundered in salute in the capital of our motherland.

On 23 August, Moscow again saluted the Soviet men in honor of the liberation of Khar'kov.

As a result of the counteroffensive at Kursk, the Soviet Army accomplished the missions assigned by Headquarters, Supreme High Command. The enemy groupings which were concentrated on the northern and southern sides of the Kursk Bulge were destroyed and thrown back to the areas of Bryansk and south of Khar'kov.

The counteroffensive at Kursk was the third and biggest strategic counteroffensive by the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War.

If the counteroffensive at Moscow was accomplished by 17 combined-arms armies, and at Stalingrad by 14 combined-arms, 1 tank, and 3 air armies, at Kursk 22 combined-arms, 5 tank, and 6 air armies participated in the counteroffensive. In which regard, unquestionably these armies were stronger than the former ones.

The Soviet command began to accomplish preparation of the counteroffensive in the spring of 1943. Strategic reserves were accumulated in the area of the Kursk Bulge ahead of time, and this permitted going from defensive operations to the counteroffensive in the shortest time.

The moment for launching the counteroffensive was also determined extremely fortunately: after fierce defensive battles, when the enemy had committed almost all his forces and the crisis in the offensive operations of both his strike groupings had been completely determined.

A large role in the success of the counteroffensive was played by the coordination between front groups since it pinned the enemy down and hindered the transfer of his forces to the directions of our troops' main efforts. Important work in coordinating the operations of the fronts was accomplished by the representatives of Headquarters, Supreme High Command, Marshals of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevskiy.

Our aviation operated extremely successfully on operations on the Kursk Bulge. Here, strategic air supremacy was finally won by Soviet aviation. In the course of the counteroffensive, our pilots continuously supported the ground troops, which substantially facilitated their operations.

It can be said without exaggeration that in the course of the grandiose tank battles on the Kursk Bulge, a wealth of experience was accumulated in the employment of big tank large units and formations in offensive operations.

The 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies of M. Ye. Katukov and P. A. Rotmistrov operated most effectively in the Belgorod-Khar'kov offensive operation. These armies were used for the first time in accordance with their direct purpose--as the front mobile group which develops tactical success into operational success, which was extremely useful experience in subsequent operations.

The experience of the counteroffensive at Kursk confirmed once again that the skillful selection of the direction of the main effort and the concentration of the principal efforts on the main directions determine the success of the operation to a great extent.

The Soviet command demonstrated high skill in the conduct of offensive operations under summer conditions, beginning with the correct selection of the moment for launching the counteroffensive.

Utilizing the experience acquired on the Kursk Bulge, subsequent operations of the Soviet Army often ended with the encirclement and destruction of big enemy forces.

The victory at Kursk demonstrated convincingly the salutary qualities of well organized party-political work among the troops. By personal example, the communists carried the fighting men along. Political organs mobilized the men for exploits and propagandized leading experience in the conduct of battles under various conditions. In July, about 30,000 of the best men were accepted as members of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of bolsheviks)] and more than 50,000 were selected as candidate members on the battlefields at Kursk.

More than 100,000 soldiers, sergeants, officers, and generals were decorated with orders and medals for participation in these battles, and more than 180 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The decisive counteroffensive of the Soviet Army which followed immediately after the defensive battle had a stunning influence on the Hitlerite generals. They in no way assumed that the Soviet Army had reserves which permitted undertaking offensive operations of such a scale.

The most outstanding military leaders of Germany in the opinion of the Hitlerite leadership--Field Marshals Manstein and Kluge, Generals Model, Goth, Kempf, and others-- suffered a crushing defeat which signified the failure of fascist Germany's military doctrine. An irreparable blow was inflicted on the prestige of German arms.

The German-fascist army, having undertaken the "decisive battle" and lost it, lost about 500,000 men and officers, 1,500 tanks, 3,000 guns, and more than 3,700 airplanes. The losses were colossal and irreplaceable. Of 70 divisions which participated in the battle, 30 were destroyed. Especially heavy damage was inflicted on the Hitlerite tank large units.

The failure of the long-awaited summer offensive with which hopes for a rapid victory were linked had a tremendous demoralizing influence on the men, officers, and the entire population of fascist Germany.

The propaganda myth created by Hitlerite propaganda that summer is the time for the attack and victory of the German army and that the Soviet Army, they say, can attack only in winter was finally shattered on the Kursk Bulge.

Our Armed Forces demonstrated brilliantly the complete superiority of Soviet military strategy, operational art, and tactics over the military art of the German army.

The historic victory of the Soviet Army on the Kursk Bulge had a decisive influence on the entire international military-political situation.

First of all, the authority of the Soviet Union as the decisive force of the anti-Hitler coalition grew immeasurably.

Not one important political problem pertaining to the conduct of the war and to the postwar building of the peace could be solved any longer without the participation of the Soviet Union. The Anglo-American allies understood that the Soviet Union was able to win the war even without them.

A profound military-political crisis seized the entire fascist bloc. Faith in the possibility of the victory of Hitlerite Germany was finally shattered. The victory of the Soviet Army on the Kursk Bulge caused a wave of sobering in those so-called "neutral" countries which, in the first period of the war, openly and secretly supported the German-fascist aggressors.

In the end, all this accelerated significantly the victorious conclusion of the Great Patriotic War.

The battle on the fiery bulge at Kursk was one of the most important positions on the difficult, heroic path of the Soviet people to complete victory over Hitlerite Germany.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Pravda". "Znamya". 1983

6367

CSO: 1801/419

ARMED FORCES

HAND-TO-HAND MOUNTAIN COMBAT TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Aug 83 p 1

[Article by Maj V. Yefanov, Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District: "In Hand-to-Hand Night Combat"]

[Text] The evening haze formed a blanket of darkness over the mountain range. We checked our route one more time, took each other firmly by the hand and began fording the mountain stream.

Our reconnaissance group was led by Lieutenant M. Chernikov, a member of the unit sports committee. He is not only a veteran airborne scout but is also a master of hand-to-hand combat techniques and a candidate master in judo.

We had been "hanging" on the mountain shelf for an hour, preparing for the assault. We weighed all of the pros and cons before entering into single combat with the "enemy" defending a site at the top of the cliff.

The pre-arranged signal was given. With a single leap Private S. Shchetinkin, unit free-style wrestling champion, fell upon the sentry. His "enemy," Private A. Shevchenko, is not an easy one to take. He has taken first place in the unit boxing competition and has lightning-fast reactions and good physical conditioning. He was therefore not taken without making some noise. A shot rang out, and then a second. A flair suddenly lit up the night sky. The group had been detected. There was only one chance of accomplishing the combat training mission--to approach the "enemy" and enter into hand-to-hand combat.

Hand-to-hand combat.... Victory is not easily gained in such a battle. Only the physically developed fightingman with stamina, one with good reaction time and the ability to rapidly get his bearings in a difficult situation, can win.

It is with good reason that the training of the fightingmen in techniques for hand-to-hand combat in mountains is one of the important parts of the combat training program in the paratroop unit we are discussing. Hand-to-hand combat sections are functioning in most of the companies and battalions. They were created at the initiative of the party organization and with the commander's support. Subunit officers are most frequently the unofficial instructors in the sections. Many of them are tested fighters in close combat and are masters of self-defense and attack techniques.

For example, the paratroopers watch Senior Lieutenant M. Voronitskiy, a platoon commander, with admiration. He is a candidate sportsmaster in unarmed combat and unit champion in this sport. Senior Lieutenant M. Voronitskiy supplements the tactical training exercises with training in hand-to-hand combat techniques and uses concomitant physical drills for this purpose.

Officers V. Portnyagin, V. Bogdan, R. Khabirov and others have demonstrated that they are methodologically good teachers of hand-to-hand combat techniques.

The experience of the paratroopers in teaching hand-to-hand combat, including combat conducted at night, is being actively disseminated in the district forces. The fightingmen in the light-blue berets are frequently invited to give demonstration classes at assemblies held at mountain training centers. Their training was shown this spring over Central Television and in the program "I Serve the Soviet Union." Personnel of the company commanded by Captain V. Vorob'yev demonstrated hand-to-hand combat at recent assemblies.

And now, the paratroopers of this company had crossed the mountain shelf and rushed toward the target, an "enemy" position.

...The hand-to-hand combat was almost silent. Privates First Class V. Drutskiy and A. Shalenko were engaged in single combat in a minute area on the left flank. These paratroopers are active in several types of sports, including karate. The fighting was brief but intense. In a fraction of a second Drutskiy deflected a blow from a submachine gun and knocked his "enemy" off his feet. Private A. Arutunyan leapt out from behind a rock. He waved an entrenching tool, but Private A. Movsesyan, his rival from the "snatch" group, was alert. He knocked the entrenching tool from Arutunyan's hand with a single motion....

Small groups were engaged in hand-to-hand combat throughout the trench. How important are initiative and independent thinking in such a situation! If one lowers his guard ever so slightly or looses his head, a blow may connect.... In the drills, the paratroopers therefore thoroughly master techniques in striking with a bayonet, an entrenching tool or the butt of their submachine gun, and practice all of the numerous hand-to-hand combat techniques with their weapons.

Just before the exercise, for example, Lieutenant M. Chernikov, member of the unit sports committee and the best expert in hand-to-hand combat methods, conducted a drill with Captain V. Vorob'yev, company commander, and Private First Class Drutskiy, unofficial hand-to-hand combat instructor. He began with self-protection techniques. After convincing himself that all of the young paratroopers had firmly mastered them, the officer went on to the main subjects. The officer first demonstrated even a familiar technique (this is a significant part of the training) and then went over the individual elements in order to reinforce their grasp of the subject. Junior Sergeant S. Gerilovich, candidate sportsmaster in unarmed combat, first demonstrated a series of techniques and then had the men work on the techniques as a group. Each of the paratroopers is able to walk noiselessly along a path and knows hand-to-hand combat techniques.

...The battle ended as suddenly as it had begun. The "snatch" group was successful. The company commander praised the determined actions of Lieutenant Chernikov, the initiative and independent thinking demonstrated by the junior commanders. He

held up as an example Junior Sergeant S. Vlasenko and other fightinemen who had demonstrated selflessness during the rapid march and in the hand-to-hand combat at night.

11499

CSO: 1801/442

ARMED FORCES

ATTENTION GIVEN TO CHARACTERISTICS OF AND TREATMENT FOR HEPATITIS, DYSENTERY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jul 83 p 4

[Article by Honored Doctor of the RSFSR and Colonel of the Medical Service M. Ignat'yev: "Prescriptions for Summer"]

[Text] Summer is the time of many infectious illnesses. Which ones are the most widespread during this period? How are they prevented under military conditions? [Signed Senior Lieutenant V. Shpagin and Warrant Officer D. Sysoyev].

A rather numerous group of acute intestinal illnesses takes special place among human ailments. Infections of this group are caused by bacteria, viruses, and the simplest single-celled organisms. The intestines are mainly the site for localization of pathogenic organisms. Having similar manifestations to some extent, these illnesses can take an extremely diverse course. And it is even characteristic that they all have a pronounced seasonal prevalence: maximum prevalence falls in the summer months of the year.

Let's begin with the acute intestinal infections among which dysentery is encountered more often than others. This illness has been familiar to mankind for a thousand years and much has been done to eliminate it, however, it now takes one of the first places after influenza and other acute respiratory illnesses.

Several self-sustaining kinds of pathogenic organisms are known at the present time. They are rather resistant to the influence of external environmental factors. They endure drying and low temperatures well and the most favorable environment for their inhabitation is foodstuffs (milk, lactic products, meat, pates, sausages, salads, kissels, and so forth).

For example, if one has to deal with the soil, it is established that microbes survive up to three days on the skin of the hands. During this period it is possible to infect oneself and transmit the infection to others. At the same time, the destruction of microbes is noted within 10 minutes with heating up to 60 degrees and they are killed immediately with a temperature of 100 degrees. They are also extremely sensitive to disinfectants (chloride of lime and carbolic acid) which should be utilized in places for general use.

The first symptoms of an illness appear within two to three days after infection, but the latent period can also last up to seven days. However, there are known cases where an illness allowed itself to be known already within two to four hours. Chills, fever, lethargy, weakness, headaches, reduced appetite, and abdominal pains should begin to put one on guard.

We described a more frequently encountered form of the onset of acute dysentery. However, the illness can also take a different course. So-called subtle forms of the disease as well as a bacteria carrier are encountered. The latter is a form of dysentery infection when the state of health is not disturbed and manifest symptoms of the illness are absent.

It is no mere chance we mentioned the mild form of an illness with a "subtle" course: that is, in these cases patients do not seek medical assistance and consider it possible to treat themselves at their own discretion or on the advice of acquaintances. As a result, the illness takes a lingering course and can lead to complications.

Viral hepatitis A also belongs to the acute intestinal infections. Infection occurs when the pathogenic organism reaches the gastrointestinal tract. Transmission of the infection occurs through infected foodstuffs or water as well as direct contact with the patient. Bedding, linen, towels, toothbrushes, footwear, and many others which one must deal with in private life can be carriers of infection. Flies promote spreading of the illness. They can infect foodstuffs, kitchen stock, dishes and other goods.

The hepatitis A virus is the smallest formation which one can see only in an electron microscope with great magnification. It reproduces only within living cells and is resistant to freezing (it can survive for two years with a temperature of minus 20 degrees). Heating objects up to 98 degrees, ironing linen, and boiling water render the virus harmless. It is sensitive to the effect of chlorine-containing disinfectants (chloride of lime and chloramine).

Having reached the gastrointestinal tract, the virus penetrates various organs and systems and damages them. The liver--the most important chemical laboratory of a human--suffers in particular. The gravity of the course of the illness also determines to a considerable extent the degree of damage to the liver. From 7 to 50 days (on the average 14-20 days) can pass from the moment of infection to the initial manifestations of illness. This is called the incubation period. The pre-jaundice period lasts on the average from one to one and one-half weeks. The temperature jumps up briefly and general weakness, reduced appetite, nausea, and pains in the liver and stomach area are noticed at this time.

Prior to yellowing of the skin, some patients think that they have food poisoning, acute gastritis, polyarthrititis, and so forth. And again there is self-therapy which is naturally not very effective.

Meanwhile, they are dangerous to those around them precisely at the initial period of the illness.

Then the illness enters a period when both the patients themselves and those around them notice the appearance of a "jaundiced color." This can continue from two to six weeks. General weakness, headache, nausea, vomiting, loss of appetite, pains in the upper part of the abdomen and in the right subcostal rib area, and elevated temperature are noticed at this time.

What kind of preventive measures can protect against acute intestinal infections? Most of them are common knowledge to us, but quite frequently we disregard them. First of all, do not eat unwashed fruits and vegetables, And, of course, keep the hands clean. Remember: soap is our reliable ally and it has a disinfecting effect. A recommendation can appear trite: wash the hands after visiting the toilet and without fail before a meal. There is worldly wisdom that says: if the entire population would get into the habit of using the toilet in a civilized manner and would wash their hands with soap after each visit to the lavatory and before a meal, the prevalence of dysentery would be reduced many times. A compulsory rule is to wash one's hands also after returning from the job and working in the field (in fact, on the way home a person comes into contact with many objects which can be carriers of an infection).

It is also very important to keep foodstuffs pure. Warm milk, sour cream, cheeses, cottage cheese, salads, fish dishes, boiled sausages, and pastries with cream are a good medium for the rapid reproduction of pathogenic organisms. Therefore it is important to preserve the enumerated dishes accordingly.

Without fail, on hikes and military exercises boil water taken from open reservoirs. This is the simplest and most effective method for disinfecting water. It is necessary to keep boiled water in a closed container and to retain it for no more than a day. Stagnant water, even though boiled, serves as a good medium for the inhabitation of pathogenic organisms.

In brief, such are the prescriptions for summer. Nevertheless, they are not only for summer.

COPYRIGHT: "Krasnaya zvezda", 1983

9889

CSO: 1801/410

ARMED FORCES

SUBSIDIARY FARMS USED TO SUPPLEMENT MILITARY DIET

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jul 83 p 4

[Article by Lt Gen R. Tavadze: "We Answer the Readers' Questions: Subsidiary Farms]

[Text] I recently had occasion to visit a remote garrison. We got there at the right time, as they say, for supper. On the table was a fresh vegetable salad, new potatoes with pork, milk. For the guests? No, all personnel had the very same menu. Lt Col G. Roshchin explained that the unit had a good subsidiary farm.

We listened with interest to his story that the soldiers here often are offered a supplementary diet of lard, fish, dairy products and wild greens. We saw fattened cows, hogs and poultry at a local farm.

I attached no significance to the term "subsidiary farm" there on the spot, believing that this concerned the familiar kitchen farms which have long existed in military units, but later I heard that this apparently is not one and the same. Just what is the difference between these concepts?

[Signed] Maj A. Chumachenko, Red Banner Far East Military District

At the editors' request the reader's question is answered by Lt Gen R. Tavadze, deputy commander of the Red Banner Far East Military District for rear services and chief of district rear services.

I will note right away that there is in fact no fundamental difference between the concepts of "kitchen farm" and "subsidiary farm." Both accomplish the same task of providing supplementary food products for the soldiers' fare, thus reducing the dependence on centralized deliveries, which is especially important with regard to remote posts. Nevertheless the term "subsidiary farm" appeared in guidance documents and everyday usage in far from a chance manner. This is connected above all with the fact that in recent years both the organization and material basis of such farms have changed.

What is characteristic of a kitchen farm? First of all, the fact that it was set up only where there was a sufficiently large food unit since it is actually oriented only on using the food wastes. This is why pork was the primary

product of such farms. By the way its production also most often was not planned as it is difficult to build prospects with a weak fodder base. Moreover only servicemen of housekeeping subunits worked in the kitchen farms.

But the addition to the soldiers' fare even under such conditions, especially, for example, with consideration of our far-eastern features, was perceptible. Commanders and rear services specialists devoted more and more attention to developing farms and their experience built up. Locally people took a more and more competent approach to the keeping, feeding and reproduction of animals and worked with hothouses more actively. Such a thrifty attitude toward the matter was echoed by an increase in profitability of the farms and by the very perceptible economic advantages. Indeed! The fact is that many units have considerable natural lands in the areas of ranges and training fields and are fully capable of keeping cattle, rabbits and poultry.

It is true that the organization of what is, I would say, a multisectorial farm requires certain inputs, and units were given such opportunities. Seed funds began to be released for growing greens, early vegetables and potatoes on the lands assigned to them. The centralized delivery of highly productive animals, especially to units located on island territories and in the Far North, became the practice. All this provided such a level of production and such quality, assortment and production cost of products that kitchen farms became a substantial support to troop logistics. Judge for yourselves: We now already have units capable of supplying a considerable portion of the personnel's requirement for meat, milk and many vegetables.

I recall a recent trip to one of the subunits. Lt Col Ye. Khrolenkov shared plans for the future and spoke about difficulties in acclimatization of cows on the island. But I most recall on that trip the earthenware pots with fresh milk which the wives of officers and warrant officers carried from the farm for their children.

Special attention began to be given to kitchen farms after adoption of the USSR Food Program. The work now was being organized on a planned basis. Steps are being taken to keep all breeds of cattle and poultry on the farms which are productive under local conditions and develop plantings of potatoes, vegetables, fodder crops and fodder grains.

The competency of commanders and other appointed persons in directing units' farms also expanded accordingly. Because of the funds allocated for a specific kind of allowance they now can pay the wages of specially hired workers and acquire the necessary equipment, animals, poultry, the seeds of grain and vegetable crops, and fodders. Sums also can be allocated from these same funds for construction and repair of animal husbandry spaces, hothouses and hotbeds, and for veterinary medical measures. As a result in the past year alone far eastern soldiers received several thousand tons of meat, potatoes and vegetables from their farms for planned rations. More than a hundred tons of wild greens alone were gathered and delivered for the soldiers' fare.

In short, more and more subsidiary farms are appearing in place of our kitchen farms, capable of satisfying the troops' needs to a considerable extent.

ARMED FORCES

IMPORTANCE OF BATTLE OF KURSK STRESSED

Dragunskiy on Battle of Kursk

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jul 83 p 2

[Article by Col Gen Tnk Trps D. Dragunskiy, twice Hero of the Soviet Union: "On the Kursk Salient"]

[Text] Chronicle of the People's Feat

The defensive period of the Battle of Kursk, which was one of the most brilliant pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War, began 40 years ago, on 5 July 1943. The enemy was exhausted and weakened in the defensive battles fought on the Kursk Salient. Forces of the Central and Voronezh fronts frustrated all attempts by the Hitlerite command to encircle and destroy more than a million-strong grouping of Soviet forces.

The following article was written by Colonel General of Tank Troops David Abramovich Dragunskiy, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. He served in the Soviet Army from 1933. In 1938 he took part in the fighting at Lake Khasan. He commanded a brigade during the Great Patriotic War. He took an active part in the fighting at Smolensk, Moscow, Kursk, Belgorod and Kharkov, in the liberation of Kiev and the Right-Bank Ukraine and in the battles fought on the territories of Poland, Germany and Czechoslovakia. Following the war he commanded a tank division and an army and served as first deputy commander of district forces. He is presently chief of the "Vystrel" Higher Officers Courses imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov.

There are days in the life of every person, which are the pivotal point, as it were, of his entire biography, which leave a profound, unfading mark on his memory. The memorable summer of 1943 was such a period for me and for my fellow soldiers, for all those who fought the fascist invaders on the Kursk Salient.

We knew that the enemy had placed everything on the line in an attempt to achieve success in the Battle of Kursk. During the first half of April the German fascist

command prepared the plan for an offensive operation against the Soviet Army. It was code-named "Zitadellë." We know that the overall plan for this operation called for two simultaneous meeting attacks on Kursk from the area of Orel to the south and from the area of Kharkov to the north for purposes of encircling and destroying the Soviet forces on the Kursk Salient.

In order to implement these plans the Hitlerite command massed 50 select divisions on the axes designated for the offensive, including 16 tank and motorized divisions, a number of separate units which were a part of the 2nd and 9th Armies of the "Zentrum" Army Group, the 4th Tank Army, the "Kampf" Operations Group and the "Zud" Army Group. In addition, around 20 divisions were operating on the flanks of the assault grouping.

The Soviet Supreme Command understood the importance of the Kursk Salient and took appropriate action. It not only detected the groupings of German fascist forces but also determined the approximate times for the offensive they were preparing.

The defense of the Kursk Salient was assigned to forces of the Central and Voronezh Fronts, which were commanded by Army Generals K.K. Rokossovskiy and N.F. Vatutin. A powerful strategic reserve, the Steppe Front, commanded by Colonel General I.S. Konev, was created in their rear. The front's operations were coordinated on the spot by Marshals of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevskiy and G.K. Zhukov from Headquarters.

The Soviet forces were assigned the mission of offering a vigorous and determined defense to weaken German fascist assault groupings, should they switch to an offensive, thereby creating advantageous conditions for switching to a counteroffensive. In their strategic and operational plans the Supreme Command and Army General Vatutin, commander of the Voronezh Front, assigned to our 1st Tank Army, in which I was serving as a brigade chief of staff, the mission of acting as a sort of armored shield in the defensive battles on the Belgorod-Kursk axis. It was ordered to be prepared to carry powerful counterthrusts.

We officers did not learn of command's plan until much later, however, and by this time we were already working day and night to prepare for the forthcoming battle. We knew the enemy's intentions and were prepared to die rather than give up our positions. Party-political work was conducted during that period with the slogan: "Not one step back without an order from the commander! Selflessly defend every inch of Soviet land!"

A peculiarity of the organization of the defense on the Kursk Salient was the fact that there were large tank field forces and formations in the second echelons of the fronts. This factor played an important role during the battles with respect to maneuvering personnel and equipment both from the depth and along the front.

The Battle of Kursk began at dawn on 5 July with counterpreparation artillery fire by Soviet forces against areas of concentration of the enemy's groupings. This counterpreparation fire significantly disorganized the combat formations of the Hitlerite units and subunits. The German fascist command was forced to

postpone the beginning of the offensive 2.5 to 3 hours in order to restore the disrupted troop control.

The offensive against Kursk was initiated at 0530 by an enemy grouping from an area south of Orel. At 0600 an enemy attack was launched from the south, from the area of Belgorod.

The main thrust of the enemy's northern grouping against the Central Front was directed against the 13th Army commanded by Lieutenant General N.P. Pukhov, and against the 48th and 70th Armies adjacent to its flanks. The very first day the enemy transferred nine divisions to fight there, including two tank divisions, as well as seven battalions of assault guns and a separate tank battalion, with the intention of rapidly penetrating our forces' defense to a great depth. The plan failed, however. On that first day the enemy advanced no more than 6-8 kilometers on a narrow sector in the zone defended by the 13th Army. The enemy was halted in the second defensive zone. This was accomplished in great part because of a counterthrust carried out by the front's operational reserve the next day.

The Soviet fightingmen did not flinch in that difficult situation. They shelled the enemy tanks with artillery and antitank weapons and set them on fire with bottles of flammable mixtures. The communists and Komsomol members set an example of courage and steadfastness. They were on the most difficult sectors.

The fiercest battles broke out on the northern side of the Kursk Salient. They were fought for the railroad station at Ponyri, which switched hands several times. On 12 July the Hitlerite troops were forced to halt their offensive there.

The ground forces received important assistance from the aviation, which won air superiority and carried out massed strikes against the enemy. For the first time the flyers made extensive use of hollow-charge antitank aerial bombs.

The southern enemy grouping carried out the main attack against Oboyan. More than 700 Hitlerite tanks swept down upon the combat formations of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies, and hundreds of aircraft dropped their deadly cargo on the Guardsmen's positions. They demonstrated mass heroism and valor, however, and steadfastly fought off the enemy attacks.

An immortal feat was performed by fightingmen of the 214th Regiment of the 73rd Guards Rifle Division, who repelled an attack by 120 enemy tanks. Guardsmen of the 3rd Battalion especially distinguished themselves. Only 150 of the 450 soldiers and officers in this subunit were left in the formation, but they kept the fascist tanks from breaking through. All of the battalion personnel were awarded orders and medals for that battle, and Guards Captains A. Bel'gin and I. Ilyasov and Guards Sergeant S. Zorin were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

The Hitlerite attacks came one after another. Tanks and infantry attempted to break through our brigade's positions, but our tankmen skillfully permitted the enemy tanks to approach and shelled them point-blank at close range.

It was difficult to withstand the armored enemy armada. It was especially difficult to destroy the "Tigers," which had front armor 100mm thick. I recall Captain P. Smirnov, a company commander, yelling at me at the height of the battle: "What can we do, Comrade Lieutenant Colonel, our armor-piercing shells are not effective against the 'Tigers,' and we have very few sub-caliber guns...." I ordered the troops to fire the armor-piercing shells at the viewing slits and at the tracks and suspension of the tanks and to reserve the sub-caliber guns for close range combat, when they could not miss. My decision proved to be the correct one. Several tanks were halted. Some of them began smoking.

The bulk of the tanks continued to press us, however. What could be done? We decided to attack the armored personnel carriers with concentrated artillery fire to cut them off from the "Tigers." Several armored personnel carriers burst into flames. The others came to a halt and began backing up. The "Tigers," left without support, also slowed down. Our "34s" and antitank gun crews took advantage of this. They began to fire confidently at the most vulnerable spots on the "Tigers": at the tracks, the fuel tanks and the base of the turrets.

In the second half of the day the Hitlerites sharply stepped up their onslaught against our brigade. Our fightingmen continued to fight to the death, however. I would like to stress the fact that the sense of fighting comradeship, friendship and fraternity among the fightingmen, who represented many of our country's nations, was felt especially strongly in that situation. Senior Sergeant I. Zinchenko, commander of a machine gun platoon, performed a heroic feat in that fighting. His platoon, in which the sons of many of our homeland's peoples were fighting, always distinguished itself with its solidarity and steadfastness. Occupying a defense at a hill near the village of Syrtsevo, it successfully fought off several attacks by the Hitlerites. During one of the attacks, however, the enemy, with cover from tanks, managed to approach the trenches. Zinchenko put a medium tank out of action with a skilful toss of a grenade. This tank was soon followed by a heavy "Tiger," however. The senior sergeant understood immediately the terrible danger posed to his combat friends by the heavy tank. He instantly strapped on some antitank grenades, took another grenade in each hand and threw himself under the "Tiger's" tracks with the cry: "Goodby, my friends! Get revenge for me, for my homeland, the Ukraine"! There was an explosion and the tank came to a halt. For that feat Senior Sergeant Zinchenko was posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

An especially fierce tank battle developed on the approaches to Prokhorovka. A total of 1,200 tanks and assault guns on the sides entered into the single combat. Unable to withstand the intense battle, the Hitlerites were forced to switch to a defense after losing more than 400 tanks, including 70 "Tigers." On 16 July the enemy began withdrawing its forces to their starting points. The Hitlerites were unable to encircle the Soviet forces on the fourth day of the battle, as called for by the "Zitadelle" plan.

The command of the Central Front reported to Headquarters, Supreme High Command, during that period: "Greeting the enemy with a wall of raining metal, with Russian steadfastness and determination, forces of the Central Front exhausted the enemy in continuous, fierce fighting and halted the enemy's onslaught. The first phase of the battle has ended."

I learned the joyous news of the total failure of the fascist offensive on the Kursk Salient in a field hospital. As a tankman I was especially glad to know that the tank troops had played an important role in that battle.

Our successes in the first round of the battle were due primarily to the fact that the party had readied the Soviet Army for the crucial battles against the fascist invaders by performing an enormous amount of work to increase the army's combat strength, to strengthen troop morale, to increase the production of new combat equipment and weapons, to improve the organizational structure of the troops and build up reserves. Our Soviet military art and the skill of our military leaders and commanders had also improved greatly by that time. One demonstration of the maturity of the Soviet military strategy was the decision by Headquarters, Supreme High Command, to deliberately switch to a strategic defense even though we had overall superiority in personnel and equipment. This decision demonstrated the Supreme High Command's ability to thoroughly see through the enemy's plans, to realistically consider the existing situation and correctly switch to the most expedient types of combat operations, forms and methods for conducting them.

A grand memorial has been erected where the first attack by the Hitlerite troops was received, in honor of the valorous Soviet fightingmen who gave their lives in the battle with the fascist invaders on the Kursk Salient. War veterans, the participants in that fighting, meet there near the Eternal Flame each year and recall those who died in the battle with the enemy. They recall them by name. The Soviet people go there in an endless flow to honor the memory of the heroes of that great battle.

Official View of Significance of Battle of Kursk

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jul 83 pp 2-3

[Article by Col A. Yakushevskiy, candidate of history: "The Battle of Kursk Viewed Through the Years--the Historical Truth Against the Falsifiers"]

[Text] For almost 2 decades bourgeois historiography has been attempting to ignore that battle and the victory gained in the battle by the Soviet forces, a victory which played such an important role in fascist Germany's ultimate defeat. The large-scale combat operations conducted at Kursk, however, especially the tank engagements fought there, which were the largest engagements of World War II, have increasingly drawn the attention of the military experts.

Special works on the Battle of Kursk began to be published in the West in the mid-1960s. In 1980 alone two books were published in the FRG ("The Offensive Against Kursk" by S. Stadler and "'Tsitadelle', the Great Tank Battle in the East in 1943" by I. Engelman), and two in the USA ("E. Goldberg, "Kursk, the Greatest Tank Battle in History, July 1943"; and S. Cole, "Prokhorovka").

For the sake of fairness we must point out that many of the western writers do acknowledge the great scope of the Battle of Kursk and the importance of its outcome to the rest of the war. It is the assessment of Professor Rodney Loehr of

the University of Minnesota that this battle is "in all probability the greatest battle of all times and is unquestionably the greatest of World War II." In his book "The 'Tigers' are Burning," Martin (Keydin), another American historian, admits that the Wehrmacht suffered "a defeat, a catastrophe on an unimaginable scale" at Kursk. Describing the importance of the Battle of Kursk, he writes: "...When the last shot was fired the motive force in the war was under the control of the Russian Army, and it now dictated where, when and how the war would be conducted."

We can only welcome such objective assessments. Unfortunately, however, they are not the determining factor in the western historiography of the Battle of Kursk. Dealing with the battle from the standpoint of the interests of their armies, bourgeois writers focus their attention mainly on the Wehrmacht's offensive operations and the organization of the Soviet defense, while giving meager coverage to the counteroffensive conducted by the Soviet forces on the Orel and Belgorod axes. They make every attempt to belittle the worldwide historical importance of our victory in the Battle of Kursk and to play down the achievements of Soviet military art.

The political design behind such attempts is apparent. The history of the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War has long been an object of fierce ideological attacks and inexcusable falsifications on the part of bourgeois historians. This is admitted even by certain western writers. In the foreword to his book "The War Which Was Not Forgotten: Hitlerite Germany Against the Soviet Union, 1941-1945," published in the FRG in 1981, for example, H. Golhardt writes: "There has never been such an acute conflict of opinions on any other war as there has been on the war conducted by the Germans against the Soviet Union." In the West, Golhardt notes, "prejudices are widespread with respect to the Russians and to an even greater degree, to the Bolsheviks," "Insolence and arrogance are manifested toward the East."

It is not just a matter of prejudices and arrogance per se, of course. These are only a result of that malicious anti-Soviet and anti-communist propaganda initiated against the USSR by ruling circles of the imperialist states, guided by their class hatred. Bourgeois falsifiers of the history of the Battle of Kursk are active in the mainstream of this propaganda campaign.

One of the main trends in the falsification of the Battle of Kursk is the belittlement of its foreign policy significance, of the effect of its outcome upon the subsequent course and outcome of World War II. Bourgeois historians E. Goldberg, I. Engelman, A. Taylor, R. Cartier and others maintain that the influence of the Battle of Kursk and the victory gained by Soviet forces in that battle upon the strategic military situation was limited to the Soviet-German front.

In fact, however, the Soviet Army's victory in that battle affected all the fronts and all the warring states. It was greatly appreciated by the leaders of states in the anti-Hitlerite coalition. "During a month of gigantic battles," U.S. President F. Roosevelt wrote to I.V. Stalin on 6 August 1943, "Your forces not only halted a German offensive which had been planned for a long time, with their courage, their selflessness and determination, but also launched a successful counteroffensive with far-reaching consequences."

Our victory at Kursk created favorable conditions for operations by the allied forces in the Mediterranean and for making preparations to open a second front. Suffice it to say that between July and December of 1943 the fascist command transferred 29 divisions and five brigades, including three divisions from Italy, from the nations of Western Europe to the Soviet-German front. This weakened the fascist defense in Italy and along the Atlantic coast. General D. Eisenhower, who commanded the British-American forces in the Mediterranean theater during the period of the Battle of Kursk, wrote that the active operations conducted by Soviet forces: "performed an enormous service in the very fact that we operated confidently, knowing that the German command could not devote proper attention to the area of Southern Italy."

The victory achieved by Soviet forces in the Battle of Kursk demonstrated to the entire world that despite the absence of a second front in Europe, fascist Germany, which lost around 500,000 soldiers and officers, 1,500 tanks, 3,000 guns and more than 3,700 aircraft in that battle, was faced with a military catastrophe and its total defeat was inevitable. This helped to consolidate the anti-Hitlerite coalition and brought other states which had been temporizing, to join it. Speaking at a conference of American governors in the summer of 1943, General G. Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, underscored: "Trust has been greatly strengthened among the allied nations... and the situation is now such that those nations which were formerly maneuvering in order to be on the side which won the war cannot fail to see that Germany no longer has any prospects of winning whatsoever."

The fact is also irrefutable that the victory won by the Soviet forces at Kursk had an effect even upon military organizational development in the USA. In 1943 a special committee was created in the American army staff to make a study of the number of units and formations of ground forces required by the USA in its war against Germany and Germany's allies. Based on a study of the strategic military situation which developed in the summer of 1943, the committee concluded that "Russia, contrary to expectations, was not destroyed, and it has undertaken large offensive operations which are pinning down an enormous number of divisions of nations of the Axis," and "these favorable factors are reducing America's need for ground forces, especially in the combat divisions." Based on the committee's conclusions and recommendations, the U.S. military leaders decided to create only 90 divisions instead of the planned 250.

All of these facts expose those who would limit the significance of the Battle of Kursk to the Soviet-German front.

Another direct falsification of history is the version, spread by many bourgeois writers, about the allegedly limited scope and local nature of the Wehrmacht's operation "Zitadelle." In his new book "The Fall of Fortress Europe, 1943-1945," published in 1982, British historian A. Seaton states that "a strategic offensive into the interior of Russia was not a part of Hitler's plans for the summer of 1943," because he anticipated an invasion of Western Europe by British-American forces and saw this as the "main danger." Therefore, the book states without any proof, the German fascist command in its plans for the east, decided "to undertake an offensive with very limited territorial objectives," to achieve only a "reduction of the front line" there, "to force the Soviet side to switch to a

passive defense," while "turning the Wehrmacht's forces around to repel an invasion from the west." This point of view is defended by (A. Konradi) of the FRG, W. Carr of England, T. Dupuy of the USA and other bourgeois writers. They defend it despite historical truth to the contrary.

The truth is that the German fascist leaders were preparing a strategic offensive with far-reaching objectives at Kursk. Operational Order No. 6 issued by the Wehrmacht headquarters on 15 April 1943 stated: "Crucial importance is attached to this offensive.... The victory at Kursk must be a torch lighting up the entire world." This torch was not achieved, as we know. The world witnessed incinerating attacks by the Soviet forces. A fact is a fact though, and in the summer of 1943 the Hitlerite military and political leaders made a final, desperate attempt at Kursk to seize the military initiative and alter the course of the war in their favor.

The German fascist command massed enormous forces for Operation "Zitadelle": more than 900,000 soldiers and officers, around 10,000 guns and mortars, as many as 2,700 tanks and assault guns and around 2,050 aircraft--nearly 70 percent of the tank divisions, up to 30 percent of the motorized and more than 20 percent of the infantry divisions out of the total number present on the Soviet-German front.

The enemy's plans were frustrated and buried entirely due to the heroic and skillful actions of the Soviet forces, organized according to the latest word in military art. This fact is indisputable, but nonetheless the bourgeois falsifiers ([F. Kurovski] of the FRG, R. Payne of USA and [Dzh. Strauson] of England) continue to stubbornly maintain that the "main factor" forcing Hitler "to suddenly halt" the offensive at Kursk was the landing of British-American forces in Sicily on 10 July 1943, that after this the fascist leaders' "main concern" was the battle against the western allies.

Once again, the authors of such statements are distorting historical events in the most unscrupulous manner. It is a well-known fact, after all, that in actuality Soviet forces weakened, exhausted and halted the enemy's assault groupings in only a week of fighting, with a determined defense organized in advance, before the western allies landed in Sicily. Our defense proved to be stronger than the Wehrmacht's armored strike force. "In my opinion," Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevskiy wrote, "the defeat of the enemy's tank formations should be considered the main result of the defensive engagement. As a result of this a balance of power especially favorable to us developed with respect to this important branch of troops."

The necessary preconditions for the switch to a planned counteroffensive by Soviet forces were created there in the defensive battles fought at Kursk and not in the Mediterranean. It was begun on the Orel axis on 12 July 1943 and on the Belgorod-Kharkov axis on 3 August. The liberation of Kharkov on 23 August was the victorious culmination of the Battle of Kursk, which was the prologue to the general strategic offensive by the Soviet Army and the liberation of the Left-Bank Ukraine and the Donbass.

Active attempts have been made in the West in recent years to rehabilitate the Wehrmacht's command, its generals and officers. This trend can be seen in works

on the Battle of Kursk by bourgeois authors. For example, E. Klink and (P. Karell) of the FRG, T. Weiner of the USA and others place the blame for the failure of Operation "Zitadelle" on Hitler. They write about his "shortsightedness," about the "operational and strategic errors" made by him, and so forth.

Hitler's adventurism is well known. Something else needs to be underscored. The documents prove that errors were made in the planning of the armed conflict on the Soviet-German front by fascist Germany's entire leadership. This includes Field Marshals Manstein and Kluge, who were directly in charge of Wehrmacht forces during the preparation and the conduct of the offensive on the Kursk Salient and who are being praised in the West today. Statements to the effect that the fascist German generals were not involved in the development of important strategic decisions are contrary to the facts.

In addition to glorifying the Wehrmacht's military art, reactionary bourgeois writers also juggle the facts about certain incidents to indicate that the German fascist forces demonstrated great combat skill in the Battle of Kursk. Bias and prejudice are especially apparent in the latest works by West German historians (A. Konradi) ("The Turning Point of 1943"), (F. Kurovski) ("On Land, on Water and in the Air") and S. Stadler ("The Offensive Against Kursk").

For example, Stadler states in the very beginning of his book that the performance of the 2nd SS Tank Corps in the Battle of Kursk, of its commanders and soldiers, is "beyond all praise." The book's author asks people not to forget the "sacrifices which were made," "to express feelings of gratitude" to the Wehrmacht soldiers, because otherwise, he would have us believe, "all incentives to defend the Vaterland will be blocked" and there will be a weakening of the national defense." Stadler is up in arms against progressive and democratic forces in the FRG and is in fact taking a path of openly preaching revanchism.

In his book "Nineteen Forty-Three: The Victory Which Never Was," British scholar J. Grigg assesses the Battle of Kursk and its consequences from an openly anti-Soviet position. With respect to the victory gained by the Soviet forces in that battle, Grigg expresses his regret at the lateness of the landing in Western Europe by British-American troops. According to his viewpoint, the western allies committed an error: They should have opened a second front in France in 1943 instead of 1944. In this case, he states, the Soviet Union's position in Europe would have been considerably weaker and the results of the Teheran Conference would have been "entirely different," since the "Russians would have had to travel a long way to the main centers of Eastern Europe."

Certain other reactionary historians also engage in such verbiage of a doubtful nature. Attempting to find "blunders" and "errors" in the actions of the leaders of the western powers during World War II, especially with respect to the USSR, they are serving as apologists for imperialism's more aggressive circles, attempting to justify the anti-Soviet course presently pursued by the American administration and fighting for "solidarity" in the West in the face of the "Soviet military threat" invented by the imperialist slanderers.

The falsification of events of the last war is thus being diverted into the channel of "ideological support" for the reactionary policy of the present-day

"crusaders." In the final analysis, however, the falsifiers and political speculators are helpless before the truth of history, including the truth about the Battle of Kursk.

Our victory at Kursk was of outstanding importance. It demonstrated with new force the advantages of the Soviet social and state structure, the enormous capabilities of its military organization. It was a natural result of the heroic efforts made by the entire Soviet people, guided by the Communist Party. Its lessons provide a stern warning to the imperialist adventurers who are hatching up new plans for a war against the USSR and the socialist commonwealth.

11499

CSO: 1801/411

ARMED FORCES

ROKOSSOVSKIY RECALLS BATTLE OF KURSK

Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jul 83 p 12

[Article by K. K. Rokossovskiy, Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Soviet Union: "In the Arc of Fire"]

[Text] //The date 5 July 1943 marks the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, which became the major turning point in the Great Patriotic War.

In order to imagine its scale, it should be recalled that more than 4 million soldiers, up to 70,000 guns and mortars, about 13,000 tanks and assault guns, and up to 12,000 combat aircraft participated in the battle on both sides.

Marking the 40th Anniversary of the Battle of Kursk, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA is publishing today an article written for the foreign press soon after the battle by one of its heroes, commander of the troops of the Central Front, Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Soviet Union Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy, and also the recollections of the writer Vadim Ocheretin.// [in boldface]

In summer 1943 I participated in the Battle of Kursk as the commander of the Central Front. It was a truly immense battle. Both sides prepared for it most painstakingly.

We believed in our victory over the enemy, and that belief was well justified. Our main enemy, Model, the Fuhrer's favorite, whom Hitler had assigned to implement the plan for defeating the Soviet forces at Kursk, was well known to us. And we had won the beginning of the duel with Model already before the decisive encounter on the field of battle. This is how.

Early in the spring, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of Soviet forces, having weighed intelligence information and the situation at the fronts, and having consulted with the army commanders and headquarters personnel, came to the conclusion that a Soviet offensive would be inappropriate. The enemy would not fail to cut off the Kursk Salient in order to destroy approximately seven Soviet armies and in so doing better his own position. So let him beat his own head against the anvil of the Soviet defense, which has to be prepared in advance. Then it would be possible, having amassed major reserves, to inflict a crushing blow to him once his blood had been drained.

It remained for us to figure out the further plans of Hitler's command. And we figured them out. They intended to make the main frontal attack at the base of the salient between the Orel-Kursk railroad and road, by the most direct route.

But are we not making a mistake? I was not the only one concerned with this question. It also concerned the commanders of the other fronts. Many a sleepless night was spent at the operations map and with the troops. But, apparently because we were so intimately familiar with Model's "handwriting," our confidence in the correctness of our decision remained firm. Model had his favorite maneuver: a deep enveloping strike on the flank. In this instance he could not resist the temptation to use this maneuver, all the more as the disposition of the opposing sides promised great advantages for implementing such a maneuver.

Following the Volga catastrophe, the enemy needed success--major and immediate! Model was also counting precisely on this, in order to strike with his mailed fist (and his new tanks at that) not along a huge front as before, but on a 30 kilometer sector. The enemy's racket at the top of the Kursk Salient, on the Donbass roads, was merely an attempt to confuse us, and draw off part of the Soviet forces from the direction of the main enemy attack.

"Stop!" I thought. "Let's weigh each argument over and over again." We weighed them at the operations map, at supper and dinner, in conversations with M. S. Malinin, front chief of staff; K. F. Telegin, member of the Military Council; V. I. Kazakov, artillery commander; G. I. Orel, chief of tank troops....

They all agreed on one thing. The enemy is cunning, but he will attack in the "Model" style. Therefore it was decided to design the defense so as to wear down and drain the life blood from an exceptionally strong and armor clad enemy.

Was this easy? It was extremely difficult. Active combat operations were taking place then on the territory of eight oblasts. More than two million people took part in the battle. To carry out operations in the Kursk region the fascists created a strike group consisting of 50 reinforced divisions, that is more than one third of all the forces then opposing the Soviet Army. Out of this number, 16 were tank and motorized. The enemy had 10,000 guns and mortars and up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns. The air forces supporting the fascist troops numbered more than 2,000 combat aircraft. Moreover, the German command placed great hopes on its new combat equipment--the "Panther" and "Tiger" tanks, "Ferdinand" assault guns, and "Focke-Wulf 190A" and "Henschel-129" aircraft. At that time these weapons were truly formidable. For example, the 60-ton "Tiger" heavy tank had up to 100 mm of side armor and was armed with an 88 mm gun and two machine guns.

Hitler could no longer conduct offensive operations simultaneously on several axes. He lacked the forces. Therefore his headquarters decided to strike Soviet forces in the region of the so-called Kursk Salient. This salient had formed as a result of a Soviet Army offensive which had penetrated deep into

the enemy troop dispositions north, west and south of Kursk. But the Kursk Salient was equally suitable for offensive operations by both sides. Soviet forces threatened the flanks and rear of the Germans located in the area of Orel and Kharkov. In the south and north the enemy threatened reinforcements for Soviet units. Hitler's command decided to exploit this and, by a simultaneous strike of strong tank groupings from the north and south, eliminate the Kursk Salient and close the ring of encirclement of Soviet forces located in the region.

The Soviet command knew about Hitler's plans. Even in the early spring of 1943 intelligence had accurately established that powerful infantry, artillery, tank and air forces were concentrating on the Kursk axis. For example, it was known that in the southern sector, which extended 80 kilometers, the Germans had 19 divisions, including 11 tank divisions. Along the Belgorod-Kursk highway the enemy had concentrated six tank and two infantry divisions just for the offensive.

According to the plan of the Soviet Supreme High Command, the Central and Voronezh fronts were to bear the enemy's main attack. They were given missions of conducting a deliberate defense to exhaust and drain the enemy's strike groupings, and then develop a general offensive on a broad front.

The practicality of this plan was not in doubt. The forces of both fronts brilliantly prepared a deeply echeloned defense capable of withstanding any enemy onslaught. In the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command concentrated the most powerful strategic reserve ever created during the Great Patriotic War--the Steppe Front under the command of Col Gen I. S. Konev. The troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts were substantially reinforced with personnel, weapons and military equipment. More than 3,000 trains were used to haul all the various reinforcements to these fronts!

We knew that the enemy placed his main hopes on mass tank strikes, and therefore we structured the Kursk defense primarily as an anti-tank defense. Its depth, considering the boundary of the Steppe Front and that prepared on the west bank of the Don River, extended 300 km.

Hitler's command set 3 am on 5 July for the start of its offensive at Kursk. This was known to us with certainty. With permission of the Supreme Headquarters--represented by G. K. Zhukov--we decided to forestall the enemy's artillery preparation with a powerful counterpreparation. It began at 2:30 am and continued for 30 minutes. Six hundred guns fired simultaneously. For a half-hour there was such a thunder that ears rang and the ground shook as in the epicenter of a 9-point earthquake, and continuous black clouds of dirt were thrown into the air over the fighting positions which were prepared for the enemy's charge.

Then everything suddenly died down. A delicate dawn quiet replaced the deafening thunder of cannonades. And the longer it continued the more disturbing it was for us. The same question bothered all of us who at the moment were in the command post: Why is Model's artillery silent?

Our eyes were riveted to the clocks. They counted the minutes and seconds excruciatingly slowly. A half-hour passed. An hour. During that time we hurried to prepare a new, still more powerful counterpreparation, and the enemy remained silent.

The thought crossed my mind: "Did we really make a mistake and expend so many rounds for nothing?" No, that was ruled out. The statements of a deserter and prisoners coincided precisely with the information which we had. Then what was up?

We received the answer to that vexing question much later. A German officer who crossed over to the side of the Soviet forces, recalling our counterpreparation, reported:

"Those thirty minutes were a real nightmare. We did not understand what had happened. Panic stricken officers asked each other: 'Who is preparing to attack--we or the Russians?' Our company suffered 20 killed and 30 wounded. Our battalion commander was killed. Six tanks were put out of commission without having fired a single round. Three close support guns and five mortars were destroyed."

Time passed. The enemy silence persisted. Our agitation grew. But when the hands of the clock showed 4:30 Model finally found his voice. At his command the Nazi troops opened fire on our formations with artillery and mortars of all calibers. We answered with a new 30 minute counterpreparation, this time from a thousand guns. So, following an adjustment of one hour, forty minutes which we introduced in the plan for Hitler's "Operation Citadel," the terrible symphony of the Battle of Kursk began.

On both the north and south sides of the Kursk Salient, the enemy offensive was conducted in narrow sectors and dense combat formations. "Tiger" and "Panther" tanks were in front, supported by the "Ferdinand" assault guns. The infantry moved behind. Attacks followed one after another, but all were repulsed by the stubborn defense of our infantrymen, artillerymen and tankers. They countered the enemy onslaught with their unbending will to victory and great combat skill. Enemy tanks were shot point blank by our direct fire weapons and were blown up by our mines. The infantry following the tanks were cut off and destroyed by the fire of our rifles. Our aviation made constant strikes against the attacking enemy.

It was especially fierce in the Ponyri-Olikhovka area.

The offensive capabilities of the enemy grouping attacking Kursk from the south were exhausted following a powerful counterstrike conducted by the Voronezh Front at Prokhorovka. The greatest tank battle of the Second World War took place there.. Up to 1,500 tanks participated on both sides.

Heavy defensive battles continued until 23 July. But then Soviet forces, without any operational pause, shifted to a decisive counteroffensive on the Orlov and Kharkov axes. On 5 August we occupied Orel and Belgorod, and on 23 August--Kharkov. The victorious counteroffensive at Kursk grew into a general offensive

of the Soviet Armed Forces on a huge front from Velikiye Luki to the Taman Peninsula. The battle in the Kursk arc of fire continued for 50 days, each of which was filled with the pathos of the mass heroism and bravery of the Soviet soldiers. During its course we inflicted tremendous losses on the enemy. Of the 70 divisions which the enemy had to move here for the battle, 30 were destroyed. With the failure of the summer offensive of the German fascist forces, the myth created by Hitler's propaganda of the "seasonal nature" of Soviet strategy was forever buried. Our troops demonstrated the ability to attack skillfully both winter and summer. The offensive strategy of the Wehrmacht failed once and for all.

The historic victory of the Soviet Army at Kursk had tremendous international significance. It showed the whole world that the backbone of Hitler's army had been broken by the might of Soviet weapons, and fascist Germany was confronted with inescapable catastrophe. The favorable outcome of the Battle of Kursk significantly eased the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy. The failure of Hitler's "Operation Citadel" still further strained relations between fascist Germany and her allies and intensified dissatisfaction with the war among the German people.

Following the unprecedented defeat of the Germans at Kursk, there followed a whole string of operations, which led to the liberation of the Crimea, Ukraine, Belorussia, etc., from occupation by Hitler.

9069

CSO: 1801/415

ARMED FORCES

IDEAL COMMANDER'S WIFE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jul 83 p/4

[Article by Galina Sul'zhenko, Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District: "The Commander's Wife"]

[Text] I heard a lot about Lyudmila Ipatiyevna Poveliy on my first trip here. At that time the unit women's council was awarded a certificate by our district commander, an event which brought joy and excitement to everyone at the post. I heard the commander's wife mentioned more than once among the public activists. I did not get to meet her at that time, however. I was sorry I could not meet her, because Lyudmila Ipatiyevna interested me a great deal. Everyone spoke of her with a respect which reflected great fondness and warm, kind feelings. I gathered from what I had heard about her that she was full of initiative and active, that she was always first to start things. I just naturally formed in my mind a picture of her as a woman grown wise with the years, strong-willed and purposive.

...Lyudmila Ipatiyevna has large radiant eyes. If we accept the fact that the eyes are the mirror of the soul, then upon meeting her for the first time one can see that this woman has a big heart, receptive to everything good and kind. This is perhaps her most important feature, and all her other qualities stem from it. Probably, even her occupation. She is a nurse.

People go to her for help without hesitation. A child is sick and it is dozens of kilometers to the nearest medical facility. Lyudmila Ipatiyevna gladly responds to the need and will carry out the doctor's instructions day after day.

At the family evenings at the clubs she dances and even gets the young people to join in. "Why sit here in the corner?" she will ask. With her enthusiasm she creates an atmosphere one would call festive. When a "Health" group is formed, she is its most active promoter. She invites everyone to participate in the sections for volleyball, basketball, amateur gymnastics.

In the women's council she is assigned the household sanitation section. She organizes competitions for best-kept home and stairs, and volunteer Saturdays spent improving the grounds. All of these things are important and necessary. Is this enough for Lyudmila Ipatiyevna's public spirit, however? Everything considered, she should be chairman of the women's council. And she has been nominated for the position. She has always declined to accept, however.

Lyudmila Fedorovna Meshcheryakova, chairman of the unit women's council, told me the following:

"My husband will soon be transferred to another station. I am turning over my duties to Tat'yana Alekseyevna Raznikova, a young public activist. She doesn't have much experience, of course, but I am confident that things will go well for our women's council. Lyudmila Ipatiyevna Povel'iy is here, after all. She is not only a good counselor to all of us, but also a good example."

"The family and the home--what could be finer?" Lyudmila Ipatiyevna says. "I frequently remember my father's house, and I am glad to see that my son and daughter feel the same sort of love for their home. What a pleasure it is when we all get together there!"

Isn't it amazing that she gives so much of her time to things outside her family, although she considers this personal life to be the most important? No, it is not amazing. She has great maternal concern for her son, a cadet at a military school, and for her daughter, a schoolgirl, but is equally concerned about the affairs of the army post, about the climate in the community.

...One day the news circulated on the small post that a young couple were separating. Lyudmila Ipatiyevna paid a difficult visit to the couple. They had a baby. In the heat of the argument had they thought about the child, about who was responsible for it?

It is not an easy thing to intrude into the troubles of others, to be the judge of who is to blame. And not everyone has the moral right to do so. It is accepted that Lyudmila Ipatiyevna has this right. What she has to say is what is needed.

Galina Andreyevna Gribova, in charge of the library, had the following thoughts:

"Isn't it a paradox that those who would seem to have no free time do the most reading. Take Lyudmila Ipatiyevna Povel'iy, for example. She has more than enough to do at the medical facility, and her public work and her family.... Her name is always on the waiting list for every new book, however. She reads thoughtfully and seriously. It is a pleasure to discuss with her what she has read."

Lyudmila Ipatiyevna's eyes light up when she speaks of her husband:

"We are proud of his success. How happy we were, the children and I, when we learned that he had been elected a delegate to the 26th party congress!"

She experiences her husband's every success and every failure as though it were her own. She does not mention the fact that she herself does everything she can to see that he has the greatest possible success and that there are no failures whatsoever, however. She does it in a modest way, unnoticed, but she devotes herself entirely to her husband's work! And his work requires greater sacrifice on the part of the wife than any other. Take just her dream of receiving a higher education. And that is not all.

How afraid she was (and her family tried to talk her out of it) to travel with her two children (her daughter was only 2 months old) across the country to join her husband, where he had been sent on a special assignment. She went, though. And the unsettled life, the fact that they could be together only once a week, on his days off, did not make her doubt that she had done the right thing.

"I do worry about the children, of course," Lyudmila Ipatiyevna says. "It is difficult for them to get a good education. They change schools and teachers when we move. Instead of theater we have television, instead of a concert we have an amateur performance at the club...."

When she says this it does not sound like a complaint, though. On the post and in the parents' committee at the school, which is several kilometers from the post, Lyudmila Ipatiyevna tries to set up groups and sports sections for the children.

Anatoliy Povelii, a cadet at the Leningrad Higher Military-Political School of Air Defense, told me confidentially:

"Moma taught me from childhood to perform the tasks assigned me no matter what. And she set the example. She decided to learn to knit, and a year and a half later she took first place in the knitting competition arranged by the women's council. She decided to learn to drive, and she now drives as well as my father. When we transferred from one post to another, I was always amazed at the number of people who came to see us off. On every holiday she sends off an incredible number of cards. She sends them to every military post where we have ever lived."

It was sad to say goodbye to Lyudmila Ipatiyevna. It is always sad to part with a person one likes. I subconsciously envied the people who lived around her. How happy her bright smile and the warmth of her generous heart must make them!

11499

CSO: 1801/420

ARMED FORCES

COMPLAINTS THAT SERVICEMEN ARE NOT ASSIGNED TO AREA OF SPECIALTY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Jul 83 p 2

[Article by Reserve Major N. Lukashenko and Retired Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel V. Svetlov: "Not According to Specialty"]

[Text] At the DOSAAF radio engineering school in Voronezh where I work as an instructor, a strong and amicable pedagogical collective was formed. All the instructors have an engineering education and a large working practice in those communications systems--the latest very high frequency radio sets--which the military students are assimilating. Some also have more teaching experience behind them which was acquired in a period of active [military] service. I was in service for more than 30 years with the VVS [air forces] and I know that even military training sections do not always have so many qualified instructors. We prepare good specialists in a short time. We judge this by the good replies from unit commanders. Our pupils are allowed to work on their own, including flight operations support, in a week or so already after taking the military oath.

So I took a pen in hand to tell about a problem the solution of which does not depend on a school. The fact is that not all of our graduates get to units where it's possible to use their specialized knowledge. Two years ago we turned to "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" regarding this. The editorial staff sent a letter to competent organs and two of our graduates, Privates P. Popov and A. Gantsev, were sent to another unit where they became radio mechanics. But in a year the graduates' unit again turned out to be not where they are expecting them. The story also repeated itself this spring. Letters to the head of the school arrived from Privates A. Rubtsov, I. Bezrukov, A. Shebaldykin, L. Lagunov, O. Labutin, I. Malyukov, Ye. Zhuravlev, and S. Zdorovtsev in which yesterday's military students report that they are not serving in their specialty. The father of Private V. Zan'ko sent a letter full of distress. He writes that his son is assigned in a section to a job having nothing to do with the specialty he acquired before conscription and generally not requiring high qualifications. Meanwhile, the enumerated school graduates were honor students in training, active workers, and proved to be industrious and conscientious people. Their emotional state is understandable. In fact, in addition to everything, we communicated to them a love for the specialty and a pride in it.

It is prohibited not to use DOSAAF school graduates in their specialty. But this prohibition is violated. And not only with respect to the pupils of our school but a number of others also. I formed this opinion after assemblies of instructors from the defense society's schools which were held in Tula and Voronezh. The problem disturbs many. Considerable resources are expended for the instruction of military students. If military students are not convinced that they will serve in their specialty, it is a complicated matter to conduct educational work and to achieve high efficiency in the educational process.

It seems to me that any miscalculation in the utilization of conscripts who have completed DOSAAF schools adversely affects the combat readiness of units and ships. [Signed Reserve Major N. Lukashenko].

I work as a military instructor in the Umanskiy medical school. Unlike girls, youth come to us reluctantly for training. The city military commissariat assists in recruiting for the school: the medical assistant specialty is also valued in the armed forces. After conscription for active periodic service, our graduated must be utilized precisely in this specialty.

Recently however, I received a letter from Private Viktor Goncharuk who was distressed by the fact that in one of the units of the Kiev Military District they attached no importance to his special training and sent him to a training detachment preparing radio operators.

This mistake ought to be corrected. Why should youth lose skills acquired during two and one-half years of training? [Signed Retired Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel V. Svetlov].

COPYRIGHT: "Krasnaya zvezda", 1983

9889

CSO: 1801/410

ARMED FORCES

COMPLAINTS ABOUT LEADERSHIP STYLES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Aug 83 p 2

[Article by Col Bogdanovskiy, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "What Kind of Strictness is That?--Thoughts on the Editors' Mailbag"]

[Text] There is reason to assume that Lieutenant Colonel M. Kanivets was under stress at that time. In other words, he was beside himself with rage. He therefore did not worry about his language when he dressed down his subordinate, Senior Lieutenant Ye. Yepifanov, for an extremely serious failing in his work. At the end he applied the strictest penalty he is authorized to apply to the senior lieutenant.

The young officer's attempts to explain that he was not the only one to blame, and perhaps not even the one most to blame, for what had happened got him nowhere. Lieutenant Colonel Kanivets cut him off:

"There is nothing to explain! Everything is perfectly clear...!"

The account of Senior Lieutenant Yepifanov's punishment, which was described in a letter to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, had to alarm us. The following lines especially: "Lieutenant Colonel Kanivets is rude and arrogant. He does not hesitate to dress down a soldier or an officer. He uses only coercion in the indoctrinational work...."

Similar statements were made in a letter received by the editors two and a half years ago. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers became acquainted with Kanivets from the article "I Can Appologize....," printed in the issue of 12 February 1981. The article also discussed his rudeness and tactless handling of subordinates.

And now we have another complaint. I read the latest letter and thought to myself: Can the officer possibly not have derived the proper conclusions for himself?

I had a talk with Lieutenant Colonel Kanivets.

"The thing that bothers me," he began, "is that not a word is said about the good things I have done. And I have done a great deal for the unit. I have exhausted a lot of energy and nerves.... Maybe I did say things I shouldn't have said, but I only said them to those who are negligent in their work...."

At the formation headquarters I was also told: "Kanivets is a demanding person. He is concerned about the job. We now have better organization and order in the collective which he heads."

There have been successes. But then this collective was not considered a poor one even before. And the cost to morale is evident.

"Sometimes," one of the officers said, "you simply throw up your hands at the idea that you can be insulted and belittled for the slightest error."

Lieutenant Colonel Kanivets tried to justify his indoctrinational methods when he talked with me: "You have to stimulate an individual, to motivate him, with a sharp tone. You have to bring out his energy, so that he really exerts himself on the job."

It would be difficult to object to an attempt "to orient" the individual in the proper direction, of course. There is something else, however. How should one orient the men and what does one mean by demandingness? In this case, we have to agree with the idea expressed in the letter that for Lieutenant Colonel Kanivets demandingness and rudeness are one and the same. He forgets that these are incompatible concepts. Demandingness is a virtue in a commander. Rudeness is a defect.

"It often happens here," Lieutenant Colonel Tatarin told me, "we make the slightest error, and rude yelling and penalties from the commander follow. He places himself above everything. I sometimes give instructions, proper and necessary instructions, to the men. Lieutenant Colonel Kanivets will always countermand them, however, and make the men do everything his way...."

Naturally, not everyone likes this sort of leadership style and methods. And nothing good can come of them. Majors V. Malygin and N. Yashchuk requested transfers. Captain S. Saburov was transferred to continue his service in an adjacent subunit.... And all of these things happened after Lieutenant Colonel M. Kanivets took over the unit.

Another letter was written by Nina Sergeyevna Kotlyar, a Soviet Army employee. "The motor vehicle battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel I. Bessarab," she wrote, "successfully accomplishes its large and difficult tasks. The commander's strictness and demandingness have a great deal to do with this. He loves order in all things. Battalion personnel know that if they make a mistake, he is not going to pat them on the back. The important thing, however, is the fact that the commander does not make the people mad, because his strictness is combined with sensitivity and concern for his subordinates."

After visiting the subunit and talking with the men I was convinced that all of this was true. Lieutenant Colonel Bessarab listens to the opinions of the officers, the warrant officers, the party and Komsomol organizations. And things are going well in the battalion. For several years in a row the subunit has been an excellent one. There are no gross infractions of discipline in the subunit. The fightingmen serve with enthusiasm and live as a harmonious combat family.

Respect for subordinates, the ability to unite the personnel, to direct their efforts into the proper channels.... All of this is very important. Lieutenant Colonel Bessarab constantly reminds the company, platoon and section commanders: "You must be more than just demanding of the personnel. You must also be tactful, attentive and concerned." This comes not from a desire to make a name as a good leader but from a profound understanding of the fact that the morale in the collective depends in great part upon the commander's moral makeup, his tact and restraint.

And so, we can strive to achieve the goals in different ways. We can do it by acquiring the ability to work with the personnel, to move forward from one success to another, or we can maintain an outward show of wellbeing in the collective by harsh measures (usually for only a very short time, however). Sooner or later it becomes clear that excessive criticism, berating, punishments and threats have a negative effect on the personnel, which invariably affects their performance. This is what happened in the collective headed by Lieutenant Colonel Kanivets. The combat and political training deteriorated, and infractions of discipline began to occur.

It should be absolutely clear to a commander that even a casually spoken, rude word wounds an individual, suppresses initiative and creates a climate in which it is no pleasure to work. This fact is still sometimes forgotten, however.

The following is taken from yet another letter to the editors. The author writes with bitterness about how Major G. Buchik, training center chief, verbally abuses his subordinates. The communists have attempted to tactfully point out these deficiencies to Major Buchik. The major rudely interrupted those speaking at the party meeting.

Major Buchik was frequently rude and arrogant with Major I. Kuptsov, Captain Yu. Korniyenko and certain other officers. This was known to the senior chiefs. They should have held their subordinate strictly accountable for his actions. But Buchik was only admonished.

Perhaps this amazing softness toward Major Buchik, although it cannot be justified, is due to some special merits on his part? There are none, as it turns out. There is a failure to appreciate the work performed by the party, Komsomol and trade union organizations and the women's council, however. Infractions have been covered up, and materials have been used unlawfully. Some people are afraid to speak out loud and clear about these matters, however.

The letters and complaints which we are discussing might never have written, if the errors had been pointed out to the officers and they had been ordered to correct them by those whose service duty demands that they do so. They might never have been written, if those people had assessed the performance of their subordinates with exactingness, as demanded by the regulations.

A party organization, of course, should never ignore cases of rudeness and lack of tact. We must not forget the great force of the communist's moral example, especially that of a communist in charge. The June 1983 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee pointed out the fact that he is always in the public eye, and the

higher his position, the greater is his responsibility. Serious dangers and failures await those who forget this, those who become infected with the "disease of arrogance."

It is this, the role of the moral example set by the commander or chief, which is the subject of these letters from the readers.

11499

CSO: 1801/442

ARMED FORCES

TABLE OF CONTENTS: TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE NO 7, JULY 1983

Moscow TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE in Russian No 7, Jul 83. (signed to press 15 Jun 83) p 44

[Text] CONTENTS	Page
"The Officer's Technical Sophistication".....	1
"The Battle of Kursk".....	3
"A Brief Chronicle of the War".....	4
"On the Tank Field" - A. Smetanin.....	5
"The Nation's River Fleet" - V. Tikhonov.....	6
STATUS, PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS	
"Hydrofoils" - N. Korytov.....	8
"ASW Grenade launchers" - L. Zabudkin.....	10
TRAINING, OPERATION	
"Enhance the Naval Training" - G. Bondarenko.....	12
"TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE Replies to Readers' Questions".....	14
"For Your Notebook".....	15
"A Trainer for the Director of Periodic Technical Servicing" - A. Bychkov.....	16
"Mobile Training Station" - V. Ul'yanov.....	18
"Cruiser of the Revolution" - B. Tyurin.....	19
"The Criterion is Quality" - Ye. Pateyuk.....	20
"The Technical Diagnostics Section" - V. Shcherbinin and N. Novikov.....	25
"Overtaking" - A. Sidorovich.....	27
"A Review of the Standards for Workers' Initiative" - Yu. Mushkalov.....	28
INVENTIONS AND RATIONALIZATIONS	
"Innovators at the School--Into the Forces" - M. Pilipenko.....	30
"Standard Designs for Work Stations" - B. Baberdin.....	31
"The Commission on Inventions" - V. Shershov.....	32
"Recommended for Adoption".....	33

	Page
"The Baton of the Innovators".....	34

IN THE ARMIES OF THE CAPITALIST STATES

"Refueling Aircraft" - V. Shchedrov and A. Vladimirov.....	36
"Equipment and Weapons".....	38
"Free-Flight Anti-Submarine Weapon" - V. Dorodnykh and M. Kozhevnikov....	40
"Test Your Knowledge".....	43

Inside front cover--photo by V. Revuki

Inside back cover--article, "Transitional Chambers for Checking
Manometers," by S. Shabalin

Outside back cover--drawing by O. Shmelev

COPYRIGHT: "Tekhnika i vooruzheniye", 1983

11499

CSO: 1801/438

AIR FORCES

TRAINING FOR MOUNTAIN COMBAT DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jul 83 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen M. Sotskov, first deputy commander, Red-Banner Transcaucasus Military District: "For Mountain Combat: Military Specialty and Physical Training"]

[Text] The motorized rifle regiment under the command of Lt Col P. Shulyak, while on a tactical exercise in the mountains, was assigned the mission of seizing a mountain pass and securing the advance of the main forces of the attacking combined unit. Accomplishment of the mission, difficult under any conditions, was complicated by the factor of limited time available. Moving swiftly, however, and employing all weapons, the motorized riflemen successfully accomplished the mission. One of the battalions, executing a turning maneuver, hit the "opposing force" in the rear. Exploiting the adversary's confusion, another battalion attacked.

During the postexercise critique, district commander Col Gen O. Kulishev particularly stressed that the level of combat readiness and fighting efficiency of subunits is determined to a considerable degree by good physical conditioning, stamina, and the ability to operate at night, in mountain terrain, to cover considerable distances, and to cross swift-flowing rivers. The tactical exercise convincingly confirmed this.

The district command authorities and sports committee are devoting greater attention to mountain-training personnel. A good deal of work is being done in the units toward this end, and a certain amount of experience has been amassed.

Before sharing this experience, I shall present an idea which is subject to debate. It is my conviction that actions for mountain fighting should be taught... on the flat, employing a minimum of equipment, primarily base sports facilities, rather than building facilities on mountain terrain dozens of kilometers from garrisons, as is sometimes done, for the effect gained is small, and construction expenditures grow like a rolling snowball.

I shall endeavor to demonstrate this with examples. The regiment under the command of officer P. Shulyak is one of the district's finest in mountain training, although it differs in no way in table of organization from other motorized rifle units and operates on equal conditions with them. The whole thing lies in

skilled organization of the process of physical training, special training skills and mass sports activity. Sports committee member Maj A. Litvinenko, a master of sport in officer multiple competition, as well as other activists involved every man without exception in sports activities. Preference is given to athletic activities which help develop qualities and skills needed for mountain combat.

Special training drills are organized for subunits preparing to head for the mountain training center. These sessions primarily help increase the system's resistance to hypoxia. Particular attention is devoted to development of general and specialized endurance. Sprinting while holding one's breath and running middle distances while wearing altitude oxygen simulators are used for this purpose. Short forced marches, cross-country runs, hand-to-hand combat, and athletic games are also quite beneficial.

Conduct of these activities does not require special outlays or specially trained instructors. Rock climbing and mastering the skills of crossing various obstacles and swift-flowing rivers is another thing altogether. Training equipment and specialist involvement are essential here. A mountain obstacle course designed for motorized rifle and reconnaissance subunits has been designed and built in the Transcaucasus Military District. It provides the opportunity to practice crossing hand over hand on a rope, sliding down a cable, climbing over a cornice, up steep and vertical walls, and negotiating difficult terrain on projecting rocks.

The obstacle course has now been modified, on the basis of experience and increased demands. Some of its elements have become more difficult, while others have been simplified. The basic purpose of the course remains unchanged, however: to develop endurance, strength, quickness, agility, and determination. Only after mastering the proper techniques and acquiring sufficiently solid skills can one go into the mountains and perform training missions. As a rule attempts to commence mountain training without preliminary practice on the mountain obstacle course are unsuccessful. It takes longer to adapt the men to actual conditions, and they fail to meet many performance standards which can be met by subunits which have trained down on the flat but under conditions of artificial hypoxia.

Experience has demonstrated that even well trained officers and men lose acquired skills to some degree during the first days of operations in the mountains. Specialists in our district have developed a method of achieving rapid compensation. It consists essentially in the following: from the time they arrive at the mountain training area, each man is given a stress load which in the past would have been considered quite substantial. In approximately one week's time, as the system adapts, the intensity of training activities increases and reaches a level corresponding to flatland conditions. Adaptation time is considerably shortened, and subunits proceed to a normal training regimen, with intensive morning calisthenics, with troops moving at double time to training locations in order to develop endurance, plus many other items.

Simulators are widely used to increase endurance in the mountains. For example, tank crewmen practice loading, and mortar crewmen practice carrying ammunition.

Such drills are highly effective. In the motorized rifle regiment in which Sr Lt V. Koval'skiy serves as a member of the sports committee, the following experiment was conducted: they demonstrated the performance of crews which were at a different level of preparedness for mountain operations. As had been predicted, the winners turned out to be the subunits which had gone through the training cycle. They were able to almost double the standard performance levels.

Incidentally, the mountain obstacle course is equipped with special devices to achieve maximum psychological effect on the men. During training activities a tape recording of sounds of combat is played over speakers -- simulating weapons fire, a siren, explosions, and the roar of aircraft and tank engines. The men endeavor to meet time performance standards while working under a laid-down smoke screen. They carry ammunition and assist "wounded." They work on mutual assistance problems in pairs, by squad and platoon. Such drills teach military comradeship, which unquestionably unifies military collectives and promotes strengthening of discipline and organization. It has been noted that during activities in the mountain training area there do not occur any violations of regulations or departures from moral standards of military life in the subunits.

Incidental drills which end with hand-to-hand combat, widely employed in the garrisons, help maintain a high level of physical fitness and preparedness to operate in critical situations of mountain combat. Unit sports committee member Capt G. Iliopulo has trained subunit commanders, who skillfully conduct hand-to-hand fighting following a march, on approaching the boundary of the mountain training center. The tactical situation is different at each such drill, but it always includes the element of surprise and compels the men to operate with field-expedient means: entrenching tool, ice axe, as well as bayonet and rifle butt.

In another unit, in which Maj V. Bogarchuk is a member of the sports committee, they began conducting hand-to-hand combat drill immediately after landing on the high-mountain training area. The combat trails here are equipped with means of rehearsing attacks and creating critical situations. Lt Col Sh. Khmaladze has proven to be a skilled organizer of such activities.

There are many such sports activity organizers in the district who combine an encouraging word with personal example. During sports activist training sessions at the high-mountain training area, each had to take part in competitions in applied military exercises directly related to mountain training. Master of Sport Maj O. Poluzhskiy, who received marks of excellent in 14 areas, set a fine example. It is obvious that such an officer enjoys a great deal of respect by his men and that he is capable of conducting training drills in the most complex tactical situation.

But of course developing skilled organizers of mass sports activities is a complicated matter which requires time and painstaking work, for the young officers who report for duty in our district sometimes have little knowledge of the specific features of conduct of physical training activities and special drills in mountain conditions. The only exception is the graduates of the

Baku Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR.

Also deserving attention is such a relevant issue as provision of special gear for training activities, for it is extremely difficult to train a specialist for mountain combat with conventional physical conditioning equipment. There is plenty of food for thought here for the people in the rear services. Mountain training today requires thorough research and study. A group of enthusiasts headed by Maj V. Khomitskiy is engaged in such research. But the circle of investigators should be much broader, including military psychologists, medical experts, scientists and practical experts of other specializations. Then we can expect solid scientific recommendations.

3024

CSO: 1801/412

AIR FORCES

SIMULATOR PROVEN EFFECTIVE NOT USED IN TRAINING

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jul 83 p 2

[Article by P. Zhiganov, colonel of medical services and RFSFR honored doctor, in the column, "Psychology Calls"; "Higher Educational Institutions: Quality of Instruction"]

[Text] Trainee S. Ivanov was completing his flight along the flight route. When the plane was at a considerable distance from the airfield, cumulonimbus clouds appeared ahead. In such cases, student pilots are directed to go around the clouds, having reported the fact to the officer in charge of flying.

In this case, strict orders were given to the students and commander of the flight training regiment. However, S. Ivanov decided to "test" himself in complex weather conditions and directed his aircraft into the clouds on purpose. He quickly lost his spacial orientation. His instruments indicated he had turned upside-down, but he didn't believe them: a stressed state resulted. The flight barely did not end tragically.

What happened is summed up simply and accurately in a saying: look before you leap. The trainee didn't know precisely what conditions he would encounter in the clouds and how to respond. He did not have the proper psychological preparation and experience. And without those things, it's difficult to talk about flight safety.

Lack of trouble in flight operations depends on the reliability of the aviation equipment, level of the pilot's professional training, and his psycho-psychological condition. Practice makes sure that reserves of further increases in flight safety have been laid precisely in the improvement of the pilot's professional and, above all, psycho-physiological preparation for carrying out specific flight missions and for operating under special circumstances. In other words, in the complex system of "man-machine" interaction, the pilot's psychophysiological reliability has decisive significance.

We know that the less a person knows and can do, the more he will worry before an especially important operation. Careful training prior to performing the mission permits to lower stress. The trainee calmly completes

the exercise if on a training flight in a trainer aircraft, while practicing mission elements in various simulators, in the plane's cockpit, or during ground study of situations that might be complicated in the air. He has already worked out a clear mental model of the task to be performed. In flight he will execute it, determining the course of action.

The mental run-through of the mission--the so-called imaginary flight--is an important element of the pilot's professional and psychophysiological training prior to operations in the air. Multiple mental runs-through of aerial situations, special circumstances, and his actions in complex conditions facilitates man's adaptation to danger, eliminating stress in a complex situation. This is easily confirmed by examples.

In the flight training regiment of the Kharkov Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots imeni twice Hero of the Soviet Union S.I. Gritsevets, flights were taking place. Trainee A. Vol'nov ascended for solo practice of the aerial exercise. When he reached the assigned altitude and entered the flying zone, his engine quit. It was later learned that this occurred as a result of student error. However, at the moment when turbine rpm's began to drop, the beginner pilot did not lose his head. He precisely reported what had happened to the flight controller, just as he had been trained, performed an aerial re-start, and safely landed the aircraft.

Trainee A. Vol'nov said that the engine failure, for himself, was considered the most complex special incident and systematically, mentally played through the possible courses of action, having worked them out in the simulator. Therefore, when an engine failure occurred in actual flight, he correctly evaluated the difficult situation and time available, by which he laid out his capabilities and acted further--calmly, confidently. "Everything seemed easier than I had imagined it would," concluded the future officer after the unexpected experience. As happens sufficiently often, man does many things automatically at the moment of danger, according to the stereotypical actions worked out earlier.

As a flight surgeon, I strongly support those commanders and instructor-pilots in training regiments who, in instructing students, demand multiple and systematic repetition of imaginary flights. Experience shows that the future pilot retains some imaginary flights in the same way as an actual flight.

Skill clearly presents its influence in the defeat of a flight, and they think through the training in detail. The more seriously the trainees take their training, and the more demanding of themselves they are, the quicker it goes. On the other hand, the training itself, educates the young aviators in the spirit of conscious self-discipline, psychologically attuning them to successful mission accomplishment, and forces them to search for and find answers to the multitude of questions.

It all seems clear. However, the psychological demands in flight preparations are not always considered. At one time, in the Chernigov Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots imeni Lenin Komsomol, it was noted that the

students accomplished Nesterov loops only with great difficulty. Nose down flight, even short-term, caused negative emotions. Great strength was required--of both the trainees and instructors--in order to overcome the uncertainty barrier.

The idea emerged to build a special simulator. Inventors, headed by Colonel-Engineer N. Kuz'menko, were assembled to work on this matter. In a short time there was a "Petlya" ["loop"] simulator in the class. By operating the systems--moving the stick--the effect on the pilot in the simulator sufficiently reproduced the features of complex flight maneuvers and won the sympathy of the instructors, instructor-pilots, flight surgeons and students. The number of preliminary training flights needed to accomplish Nesterov loops was reduced. Everything indicated that the simulator was an excellent means of psychological training for complex flight. However, today, two years after its manufacture, the simulator is not used. The students once again require many additional flights to master the compulsory fighter-pilot exercise. What happened?

Some in the school became skeptical toward the simulator because working on it caused the students unpleasant feelings. But this was precisely the virtue of the simulator. It's better when feelings of this type are overcome on the ground--in complete safety--rather than in actual flight.

Officials who once welcomed the arrival of the new simulator found some justification. They say that the research organization, whose attention was drawn to the "Petlya" simulator, completed studies and dismantled a portion of the optical instruments. It's a pity that the directors of the higher aviation school resigned themselves to this, not defending this interesting development that made it easier to train students for complex flight tasks.

New complex equipment has appeared at airfields. To master it without considering the psychophysiological capabilities of the man or his individual qualities is impossible. Without knowledge of psychology, it's difficult to guarantee flight safety. The more attention paid to these problems in training regiments and aviation schools, the higher the quality of professional training for young aviators.

12304

CSO: 1801/425

AIR FORCES

UNNECESSARY RISK-TAKING CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Aug 83 p 2

[Article by Col A. Sorokin: "The Sky is a Harsh Element"]

[Text] The supersonic missile-carrier was approaching for a landing. It was nighttime, there was low cloudiness, but visibility was adequate. Why was the missile-carrier continuing to descend, however, when it was already below the glide path? The flight operations officer and his assistant, the crew's navigator, had already warned Lieutenant Colonel V. Shcherbina, pilot and commander of the air detachment. He had answered: "Rodger. I see...." But he had continued to do it his own way. He even snapped irritably: "Be quiet! We are flying correctly." Right after that, however, the aircraft received a blow--it had struck an obstacle on the landing course with the wheels of the right landing gear. The strut was severed as though with a knife. He had to land on just the left landing gear. Fortunately, everything came out all right.

How could a pilot do such a thing? Perhaps he was not adequately trained? When the navigator crawled out of the cockpit, however, he snapped heatedly: "And he tells me he is a master, a sniper!...." This was indeed the only military pilot-sniper in the regiment and a veteran master of combat employment, who, incidentally, had initiated the socialist competition in the Air Forces.

This veteran of the regiment was its pride. For many years his picture did not come down from the Board of the Outstanding. He had been written up more than once in the newspapers and magazines. The youth learned from his experience. And suddenly he was the one to do something which even a young pilot would not do.

Unfortunately, this pilot-sniper was not content with the prestige earned for him by his skills level and by his extensive experience. He also had to make his own, special mark in the sky, from which everyone at the airfield could see from afar that this was an "eagle of the sky." One of the elements of this mark was to pass over the obstacle on the landing course at impermissibly low altitude. A very risky element! It was a constant precondition for a flight accident. He got by with it for a time. This time, however, the landing conditions were complicated--a fairly strong side wind began blowing--and the pilot-sniper made a false move.

How was it that the others, even the relatively new pilots, had successfully handled the drift, while Lieutenant Colonel Shcherbina failed? This is what Officer G. Sopov, the crew's navigator, had to say about it: "I have flown with many of the regimental pilots, but I have never seen such poor piloting techniques from any of the others."

Despite this, the pilot had complicated his landing approach by deviating from the landing altitude. And Viktor Grigor'yevich Shcherbina is not a young man. He is going on 53 years. If he had just considered the fact that his physical capabilities were not what they had been several years before, he would probably have rejected the idea of showing off, of flying too low on the last leg of the landing path, showing his "mark." Had the commanders and superior chiefs actually failed to notice the systematic violation of flight rules? They had noticed this. They also knew Lieutenant Colonel's Shcherbina's age. No one cautioned him in time, however. "It would have been rather awkward," Lieutenant Colonel V. Tatarchenko, regimental commander, said. "After all, he has twice as much flight time as I do. He has flown from this airfield for 31 years. He is also a famous sniper...."

It was awkward.... It was also "awkward" for the political section chief in one of the air divisions to caution the division commander in good time. The latter could not forget his laurels as an expert, although he was also no longer a young man. Scorning the flight preparations, he would "improvise" in the sky. Because of the excessive loadfactor on one of the flights, he did not maintain his rate of angular rotation in one of the flight maneuvers and created a serious precondition for a flight accident. This incident was brought up at a meeting of the Military Council of the Air Forces, which was discussing the problem of assuring flight safety. Among other things, concern was expressed about the fact that there is a growing number of preconditions for flight accidents through the fault of leading flight personnel--the most experienced, first-class pilots and navigators.

Strange as it sounds, those who are being trained sometimes observe the flight regulations more strictly and prepare more carefully for every flight than those who are doing the training and who, in view of their service position, should undeviatingly observe the flight laws and serve as an example in the training, in their performance in the air and in their observance of flight discipline. Some of the comrades with vast experience and sniper skills make "schoolboy" errors and blunders and actually deviate from the requirements contained in the flight regulations. Attempting to impress their subordinates with their "unique mark" in the air, they demonstrate this kind of bravado, flashiness and braggadocio. Their strengths and capabilities frequently do not measure up to their ambitions in such cases, and they are embarrassed in front of everyone.

Marshal of Aviation A. Pokryshkin has said that no matter how bold and fearless the air fighter, he absolutely must think, both in combat and on the ground. There is perhaps no other job, he stressed, which grades people with such fairness as does flying. Nothing can help, if you don't know how or do not want to work. You have to be bold--always; you have to be calm--always; you have to be ready to fly--always. And this can only be achieved by working and drilling everyday. The sky is a harsh element, which does not honor a pilot's position or rank, his former merits or his age.

Let us talk about age. I have mentioned this word more than once. And with good reason: Age is an important factor for the flight leader and must be given consideration. The subject is worth discussing in detail. When the author mentioned the fact that Shcherbina was flying in his 53rd year, the author had no intention of saying that this is some sort of limit for a pilot. We know of cases in which people have flown at a far older age. Marshal of Aviation Ye. Savitskiy piloted a supersonic fighter in his 62d year. Lieutenant General of Aviation D. Os'kin still flies the modern aircraft, and he is going on 63. Colonel General of Aviation V. Babkov flies the third generation of supersonic fighters, although he is 65 years old!

These are all exceptions and not the rule, however. Lieutenant General of Medical Service N. Rudnyy, doctor of medicine and professor, had the following to say on this subject:

"Every organism has a reserve, figuratively speaking. It is consumed more intensively and in different ways in the flight service. We know that with age reaction time slows, perception sharpness and the ability to assess situations in extreme circumstances are blunted, and other qualities so essential to the flight work deteriorate. An older pilot must be especially attentive to the state of his health, to his capabilities, and must be absolutely frank with the doctors. And no matter what position he occupies, of course, he should prepare with special thoroughness for every flight."

What pilot doesn't like to hear people call him an eagle, hear them say that he flies and his years mean nothing? I believe it is simply irresponsible to stubbornly resist the pressure of age in the flight profession, however, to try to hide the infirmities which come with age. It is especially inadmissible to attempt stunts in the air, to violate flight rules in order to maintain a reputation. One needs to soberly assess his capabilities.

Sober self-assessment.... One of the meanings of the word "sober" is "sensible" or "reasonable" (according to the S. Ozhigov dictionary). It is this sort of realistic approach which helps one to correctly assess one's capabilities for achieving the goal. And self-assessment, the psychologists say, is the moral assessment of the performance and moral qualities of one's own person, its capabilities and possibilities. It is expressed in demandingness of oneself, in the ability to look at one's actions and one's moral makeup as though from the side, comparing oneself with others. And the degree to which this look at oneself is principled and self-critical determines the objectivity of the assessment of one's capabilities and the correctness of one's conclusions for the future. Any attempt to disguise or conceal flaws not yet apparent to those around one, to be led by vanity and pride, can result in great unpleasantness in life. In the flight work it can lead to disaster.

The veterans in the formation.... Made wise by life and experience in their profession, they are surrounded with respect and attention. This is our golden treasure, the living embodiment of the succession of all the best things from the combat traditions. It involves honor and responsibility. The youth, particularly those in the flying field, look upon them as their teachers, with good piloting techniques, unsurpassed skill in carrying out missile and bomb

attacks and outstanding aerial tactics. This is what the older comrades want to teach the young pilots and navigators, and not how to violate flight regulations. And the leaders in the winged formation are expected to teach those they lead just as the frontline aces once taught the youth in the flames of battle.

I have in my hand a leaflet from those years. It tells about one of the battles in the North. The regimental commander shot down the first fascist aircraft and drew the flight of Messerschmitts after him, so that his subordinates, for whom this was the first air engagement, could open their "combat account." And they opened an account: On the first attack they shot down four enemy aircraft. Only Junior Lieutenant Pavlovich hesitated to attack, fearing an attack by the Hitlerites from the rear. He immediately heard the commander's "Go ahead and attack. I'm covering you"! Pavlovich flew into the attack and shot a fascist aircraft down in flames. A total of 11 enemy aircraft were shot down in that battle, while our pilots suffered no casualties. The leaflet is decorated with a picture of the regimental commander, with the brief inscription: "Hero of the Soviet Union P.S. Kutakhov." Yes, the leaflet is about him, about Chief Marshal of Aviation Pavel Stepanovich Kutakhov, commander in chief of the Air Forces.

The air regiment was saying farewell to its veteran. Lieutenant Colonel V. Shcherbina had served in the regiment 31 years. But why did the speeches lack that note of excitement which would have been so timely and so appropriate? After all, the young aviators taking the baton from the veteran's hand could be his sons, and the words of filial gratitude for their knowledge and firm commitments not to stray from the course set by the combat traditions could have resounded from the heart. But no, the regiment, which had been the frontrunner in the socialist competition for more than 10 years and was even now moving up to the "excellence line," had been slowed down by a retiring officer. This was why the farewell was a gloomy one.

This is just an unfortunate incident in the life of the regimental personnel, one which the people can get over more easily together. But what about Colonel (Reserve) Shcherbina? For the rest of his life he will have a bitter feeling of pain and disappointment in his heart. One sincerely sympathizes with him. This is not the way he imagined his departure for a well-earned rest, of course.

I recall farewell ceremonies for another veteran of the same unit, Lieutenant Colonel V. Panov, a year before. The farewell ceremonies were far more festive. The sadness was a good sadness. First-class pilot Vladimir Dmitriyevich had headed the unit party committee for many years. He called upon his colleagues to strengthen combat readiness and assure flight safety with more than just his inspired party word. He himself set the best example for the communists and all of the personnel in the observance of flight laws, an example of combat skill. This individual was concerned least of all with his own personal prestige. That is why it is still high in the unit. It is the prestige of a veteran, a communist and a remarkable military pilot.

AIR FORCES

PROBLEMS IN AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jul 83 p 2

[Article, published under the heading "For Flight Safety," by Maj B. Makarevich: "Performance Standard Surpassed, But..."]

[Text] The fighter-interceptor was rapidly growing larger as it approached the airfield. Its wheels touched down on the concrete slabs. Soon the missile-armed aircraft had taxied into the turnaround servicing area.

The fighter was met by aircraft technician Sr Lt Tech Serv G. Nikiforov. Waiting for the pilot to remove his helmet, he then asked him: "Comrade Major, any problems?"

"Thanks. Everything is fine," replied military pilot 1st class Maj V. Krinitsyn. "I did fly through a flock of birds, but I did not notice any problems with the engine or aircraft systems."

The ground technician proceeded to inspect the aircraft. He inspected integrity of mountings, looked for damage, and checked to make sure that all systems were properly sealed. He performed these inspection procedures thoroughly and, it would seem to an outside observer, unhurriedly.

Nikiforov is top proficiency-rated. It would seem that he could perform these procedures in a shorter time, particularly since the pilot had no squawk-sheet complaints. But Nikiforov knows that he would not be delaying turnaround servicing, and excellent quality of performance is ensured in large measure by detailed inspection of components and assemblies within the allocated standard time.

Of course a performance standard is not a dogma: highly-skilled specialists can surpass a performance standard to some degree without detriment to quality by employing advanced inspection methods and improved testing equipment.

Experienced technicians organize their work so as to eliminate any wasted time. For this reason Senior Lieutenant Technical Service Nikiforov, while seeming to work unhurriedly, always surpasses the time performance standard without diminishing quality of readying the equipment. Nothing specified by procedures will be left out. Also reflected in this is the initiative and innovativeness

of an experienced officer, which guarantee both that the aircraft will take off precisely on schedule and a safe flight.

On this occasion as well the senior lieutenant technical service, remembering the pilot's words, particularly carefully inspected the air intakes. He saw a dark spot on one. There was no damage. "This was probably left by a bird," the technician decided. "But what if one of the birds got into the engine?" He reported his concern to the squadron engineer. A more thorough inspection of the compressor blades confirmed his suspicion. A precondition for a possible air mishap was prevented.

Officer Nikiforov is not alone -- all this regiment's aviation engineer service specialists do a high-quality job of aircraft turnaround servicing and are on good communication terms with the pilots. This latter is important. The quality of preflighting an aircraft also depends in large measure on how complete a report on the state of an aircraft ground technicians receive from a pilot after landing and also depends on how they follow up on these comments. It unfortunately happens that some ground maintenance specialists ignore pilot comments in their desire to surpass standard performance times.

I witnessed the following in a certain aviation unit. Lt Tech Serv G. Korzenkov met a fighter returning from a training mission, helped the pilot, Sr Lt E. Pashayev, out of the cockpit, but did not ask him how the aircraft had performed. Pashayev, however, volunteered: "She is a little heavy on the controls. She keeps wanting to turn left, making it necessary to maintain pressure on the control stick."

Korzenkov did not ask him for more detail but merely handed the pilot the check sheet without comment. The pilot hesitated a moment, and then wrote: "No squawks." He then headed for the pilot lounge shack. The ground technician, glancing at the entry, proceeded to preflight the fighter. Greatly surpassing the performance time standard, he signed the sheet, indicating that the aircraft was ready to go.

I was concerned by the fact that Lieutenant Technical Service Korzenkov had preflighted the aircraft so fast. He had not had a great deal of actual aircraft ground maintenance experience: he had been servicing aircraft unsupervised for only 6 months. I stated my opinion to the unit deputy commander for aviation engineer service, Engr-Lt Col V. Pershin.

"Korzenkov is not typical of our unit," he replied. "Of course he is short on experience and works hastily where he should not."

One is hard put to agree with this assessment of the incident. Experience does not come automatically to young technicians. A well-planned system of developing in ground maintenance specialists a feeling of responsibility for the assigned job and for flight safety is needed. But in this unit they "feel shy" about continually reminding the lieutenants how important it is first and foremost rigorously to observe the requirements of the documents which specify the work procedures of aviation personnel.

Oversight over the ground maintenance personnel is also organized less than optimally in the aviation engineer service headed by Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel Pershin. Lieutenant Technical Service Korzenkov had surpassed the performance standard, violating the requirements of guideline documents, at a time when the flight's maintenance chief was absent. Sr Lt Tech Serv Yu. Glukhov had gone over to supply on "urgent" business. But upon returning he merely glanced over the inspection sheet. And this is not an isolated incident. On the adjacent aircraft, for example, Sr Lt Tech Serv Yu. Samoylenko was also preflighting the fighter in a hasty manner. The flight's maintenance chief, Capt Tech Serv V. Makarov, was standing right there, but he said nothing. Evidently he had become accustomed to such procedures.

This is dangerous complacency. Several potential air mishap situations were created through the fault of the regiment's ground maintenance specialists, who performed maintenance support services for a large number of logged flight hours. This was the result of the chase after "gross" performance figures and unwarranted surpassing of time performance standards, which resulted in worsened quality of aircraft ground maintenance. And most of the errors occurred during turnaround servicing and preflighting. Judging by all indications, however, this did not disturb anybody. Even the pilots failed to react.

We know that a ground maintenance technician is supposed to report aircraft readiness to the pilot according to an established procedure. The pilot accepts the aircraft, and then climbs into the cockpit. In this unit some veteran pilots merely exchanged brief words with the maintenance technicians: "Ready!" a pilot would ask. "Everything is in order!" the reply would come.

"Then let's go."

One can easily imagine the potential consequences of such casualness. These pilots were also lax about entering postmission comments on the inspection sheet. If she flies, good enough. If the performance standard was surpassed in preflighting -- this means everything is fine.

The younger pilots took an example from their elder comrades, and they in turn failed to enter comments, as was the case with the above-mentioned Sr Lt E. Pashayev. He explained his position as follows: "I made an oral comment. It is up to the ground technician to decide what steps to take...."

Thus potential conditions for an air mishap were created.

Why did this happen? After all, many specialists in this aviation unit display a model attitude toward their duties. For example, Capt Tech Serv A. Konyukhov has been an aircraft maintenance technician for 28 years. Regimental veteran Capt Tech Serv A. Lymarenko possesses a wealth of experience and know-how. But the problem is that right now this experience is theirs alone. The young specialists do not know how performance standards are surpassed in a high-quality manner. They "catch up with" the experts "in their own way".... Delay and procrastination in dissemination of advanced know-how, as was noted at the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum, is effort lost.

Preconditions for air mishaps also occur because people ignore rules and regulations and display poor follow-through. And this cannot be concealed behind the externally satisfactory situation of "surpassed performance standards."

3024

CSO: 1801/412

NAVAL FORCES

ENGR-ADM KOTOV ASSIGNS PRIMARY NAVAL ROLE TO NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES

Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKSYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 31 Jul 83 p 1

[Article by P. Kotov, Deputy CINC of the Navy, Hero of Socialist Labor and Engr-Adm: "Guarding Our Country's Borders"]

[Text] Each year, on the last Sunday of July, our vast country's seaport cities dress up in holiday attire.

Wherever he is on this day, the Soviet sailor--in a most remote corner of the World Ocean or at a base in the motherland, at battle station or on leave--has festiveness and joy in his spirit. He feels a personal participation in the motherland's great achievements, a constant concern for the party and the government and about reliable protection for it, a love of the people, and his high responsibility for carrying out his honorable constitutional military duty.

In an environment of ever-increasing aggressiveness of imperialism, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government have been compelled to take steps to provide for the country's security. One of these measures was the establishment of a qualitatively new fleet, an oceanic nuclear-missile fleet, that meets all the demands of modern warfare. Great geographical sweep of operation, the capability to secretly and rapidly deploy its forces and to inflict shattering blows on enemy targets at sea and on land, and constant high combat readiness of its chasty [units] and soyedineniya [large units] have become characteristic of it.

Nuclear submarines, which are capable of executing the fleet's main missions, are now the main resources. Of all the classes of ships, they, to the greatest extent, meet the requirements of modern war.

Soviet nuclear submarines have showed their excellent seagoing qualities, even under the eternal ice of the North Pole and in tropical latitudes during round-the-world cruises. Many submariners have been awarded orders and medals for outstanding feats and the successful use of military equipment during days of peace. The family of sailors who are Heroes of the Soviet Union is growing.

Our fleet has at its disposal missile-armed, ASW, minesweeping, landing and other surface ships. Among them are such mighty ships as the ASW cruisers

"Kiev" and "Minsk" and the nuclear cruiser "Kirov." They are armed with modern combat equipment and have excellent seagoing qualities. At the first signal, helicopters and airplanes rise into the sky from the decks of these ships. The ASW weaponry is faultless. Swift missiles scrutinize the sky carefully.

Naval missile-armed and ASW aviation has opened up new possibilities for augmenting our fleet's military might and for increasing the mobility of its strike forces. Naval aviation pilots handle complicated aviation and missile equipment with perfection, they fly with confidence above the limitless expanses of the oceans, and they successfully solve the missions assigned them.

Naval infantry, which became famous during the Great Patriotic War, has been reconstructed on a new technological base. It is now capable of striking powerful surprise blows in the most important areas, at the rear and on the flanks of enemy naval groups, and of extending reliable support to our ground forces.

Our people can rightly consider the creation of the powerful modern fleet to be one of its most outstanding labor feats. The birth of new ships and airplanes, propulsion machinery and systems of weaponry, communications and control have required an enormous expenditure of effort and energy, persistent studies and the creative inspiration of many collectives of scientists and designers, and engineers and blue-collar workers. Sailors feel respect and gratitude toward the selfless labor of the shipbuilders and defense-industry workers, and to all Soviet people who have created the fleet's supply and equipment base.

The creation of an oceanic missile-armed nuclear-powered fleet that can carry out strategic missions is a most important event, which has dispelled the illusory hopes of the imperialist aggressors that they will not have a strong enemy at sea.

A remarkable feature of today's fleet is the high level of general education and of ideological, professional and military training of its command and political personnel. Admirals, generals and officers are, as a rule, people with an academic education who possess deep and comprehensive knowledge and great practical experience in organizing effective combat and political training for personnel. Their ideological conviction and their scientific Marxist-Leninist world view dictate an active vital attitude, which is manifest primarily in the tireless struggle for the high combat readiness of ships and subunits.

Everyday training of the fleet today includes long-range oceanic cruises. It is there, during severe prolonged sailing, that the naval art is grasped, skill in handling weaponry and equipment is improved and skill in waging struggle with a powerful, well-equipped enemy is acquired.

"Increase vigilance and insure the motherland's security reliably!" is the motto of the competition of the current training year. The crew of the nuclear missile-armed submarine that Capt 1st Rank A. Samokhvalov commands won the honor of being the initiator of competition in the fleet. A persistent struggle is going on aboard the ship for punctual fulfillment of the commitments adopted.

During his visit to the Red Banner Northern Fleet MSU D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Minister of Defense, noted the good training of the crew of the nuclear cruiser "Kirov." He called upon the fighting men to learn to wage war in modern fashion and to struggle decisively against indulgence and oversimplification in combat training. It is precisely this way, by self critically evaluating the results of their daily military work, that many shipboard and shore-based naval combat collectives are persistently advancing toward the new goals for combat readiness.

Party and Komsomol organizations are serving as the political nucleus of the fleet's collectives. They operate in the thick of the masses of servicemen. By their work, they help to implement the party's policies in the areas of strengthening the country's defense and they provide an unflagging influence on all aspects of the lives and the combat and political training of the fighting men.

Our Navy is actively participating in its government's foreign-policy measures and it is helping to implement the policies of friendship between peoples and peaceful economic and cultural collaboration, and to strengthening and developing our country's ties with the peoples of many countries and continents.

The Navy is carrying out its tasks within the framework of the Warsaw Pact with honor. Ties of the allied navies are constantly being strengthened, a broad exchange of experience in combat and political training is going on, and joint measures, including large exercises and maneuvers, are being conducted. Such campaigns and exercises will enable the interaction of personnel to be improved, a unity of views on the most important questions of the military art to be worked out, the training of commanding officers and staffs to be improved, and the naval, air and ground training of the troops to be increased.

Our fleet does not threaten anyone, but it is always ready to reliably defend the state interests of the country of the Soviets and of all socialist collaboration from the military adventures of the enemies of peace and the security of peoples.

11409

CSO: 1801/423

NAVAL FORCES

SOVIET SUB SUNK IN BLACK SEA DURING WORLD WAR II FOUND

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Jul 83 p 3

[Article by K. Aposhanskiy (TASS correspondent) (Red Banner Black Sea Fleet):
"The Fate of the Submarine Shch-204"]

[Text] The curtain surrounding the circumstances of the loss of the Soviet submarine Shch-204, which vanished without a trace in December 1941, has parted slightly. This was made possible by divers, who completed the first stage of their operation on the eve of USSR Navy Day.

...The "Shchuka," with side number 204, became part of the celebrated Black Sea submarine brigade, which, in the first year alone of the Great Patriotic War, completed more than 100 combat cruises and made 24 torpedo attacks, sending 9 enemy ships and transports to the bottom. Moreover, the submarines landed several landing parties and laid hundreds of mines, which blew up several more enemy ships.

In December 1941 the Shch-204's crew, under Capt-Lt Ivan Gritsenko and Political Commissar Zunya Myaskovskiy, had to discontinue a combat reconnaissance. The submariners had learned that the Shch-205 had been blown up by a mine not very far away, and they rushed at once to the aid of their comrades. The further fate of the submarine was not known until now....

A month ago one of Bulgaria's fishing ships got "anchored" with a trawl over a sunken ship. On descending to a depth of 32 meters, Bulgarian divers saw on the submarine's conning tower the five-pointed star with hammer and sickle in the center.

Soon a special ship of the Red Banner Black-Sea Fleet arrived. For 2 weeks 10 Soviet and 7 Bulgarian divers descended daily to the bottom. The most important work was done by Black Sea navymen Capt-Lt Viktor Don and Seagoing WO Valeriy Zhgun and their Bulgarian colleagues Capt 3d-Rank Nayden Angelov and PO 2d Class Antoni Dimitrov. The divers, after clearing the ship of multilayered alluvial ooze and scraps of fishermen's gear, reported that the boat, which had been sunk by an enormous rupture in the starboard side, was lying on an even keel. Its outer hull, which encased the strong one, had suffered much damage.

After opening the conning-tower hatch, the divers penetrated the ship's central control compartment. Here they found clocks stopped at 2045 hours, a navigator's tracing with well-preserved penciled lines of combat courses, and also the watch journal, which revealed the submarine's name. The remains of seven submariners, who had not left their posts prior to the last instant and had never removed their individual rescue gear from the assigned holders, were carefully transferred to the Soviet ship.

The presence of munitions on the ship--torpedoes, mines and shells--will complicate further operations. Despite this, the divers intend to investigate the compartment where the commander's cabin and its safe are located. Possibly this will give new information about the last minutes of the submarine's life, all 42 of whose crewmembers were faithful to their oath to the motherland.

11409

CSO: 1801/424

NAVAL FORCES

COMMANDERS' RISKS MUST BE JUSTIFIABLE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jul 83 p 2

[Article by flagship navigator of the twice-decorated Red Banner Baltic Fleet Captain 1st Rank B. Belyakov: "The Boldness of a Maneuver"]

[Text] The escort ship, which is commanded by Captain 3rd Rank V. Khizhnyak, was approaching the base. During the approach to it, the engineer-mechanic reported to the commander concerning trouble in a compressor which occurred through the fault of a young seaman. Having heard the report, the commander began to ponder. The ship's chances for maneuvering were somewhat reduced. It was necessary to cut the speed for some time in order to quickly eliminate the trouble. But Khizhnyak didn't want to be delayed. "That's all right," he decided, "We'll take the risk and moor somehow."

Alas, these hopes were not realized. The mooring turned out unsuccessfully.

This fact received a fundamental evaluation on the part of the unit's command headquarters. Khizhnyak was severely punished. But that is what alerted me personally. Upon examining this incident, not all ship commanders unequivocally evaluated Khizhnyak's actions.

Some people even tried to acquit him. Specifically, discussions were heard concerning the fact that the commander acted boldly, but he simply was not lucky. And generally speaking say, is that any seaman who avoids risk?

Oh yes indeed, such are the distinguishing characteristics of naval service--surprises lie in wait for seamen at every turn. Gales and squalls, fogs, and insidious currents test their will, self-control, and character. They have to get through straits, narrows, and other regions that are complex in a navigational sense. Honor and praise to the commander who is not afraid of any ordeal prepared for him by the ocean and is able to act with confidence in a complicated situation. Ship regulations also require this and in one of its clauses it says: "A ship commander must operate his ship boldly, energetically, and resolutely without fear of responsibility for a risky maneuver dictated by a situation."

One can cite scores of examples from navy life when precisely this ability makes it possible to achieve a successful solution.

A need arose in replenishing supplies of fuel, water, and provisions on one of the ships located in the far approach. The ship arrived at the rendezvous point with the tanker. But here bad weather unexpectedly amended the sailors' plans. They had to abandon coming alongside in the conventional manner. Then the commander decided to approach on a slow, parallel course. This is an extremely complicated maneuver. Of course, the officer understood this, but he also took into account the fact that a ship and a tanker will find great stability while in operation and they will answer the helm better. The main thing is to act with utmost care and coordination and to select the most suitable moment for mooring. The bold scheme was irreproachably executed.

How great the difference is between these two examples! In one case the risk is justifiable and thought out, and in the other it is senseless and careless. A good commander does not renounce the first case when there is a need, and he never tolerates the second. This means that when analysing a specific case, the question must mention the ability to keenly sense the boundary of reasonable risk, which is the most important component of a ship commander's skill. This ability is formed from the capacity to profoundly evaluate a situation at sea, to correctly determine the true necessity for actions associated with a danger, and under the most complicated circumstances striving to act both boldly and prudently. Selecting an alternative method for a solution which is associated with the least risk in any situation is an art which comes with experience and skill.

The shaping of ship commanders as mature ship drivers depends on many factors. But in particular, on the part of senior commanders, they would like to select constant and consistent exactingness for them. Unfortunately, constancy and consistency are precisely lacking in it here and there.

In fact, it sometimes happens in any case. For a while, a commander is new, takes only the first steps in mastering the art of operating a ship, and they work with him a great deal.

But then certain skills are found. The officer begins to conduct himself more boldly on the bridge. All the fine points of the commander's science still have not been grasped, but confidence has already appeared in operating the ship. And sometimes at this stage, a perfectly unjustified decrease in attention to working with the commander is allowed and there is a relaxation in supervising his professional growth. But very likely as a result, the confidence which was engendered already has turned into self-confidence and also even conceit.

Something similar happened to Captain 3rd Rank N. Sirotkin, the former commander of the escort ship "Neukrotimyy" ["Indomitable"]. He was highly reputed for his abilities in ship navigation. He frequently confirmed this in practice. But, unfortunately, nobody noticed that at a certain stage Sirotkin started to show more and more preceptibly the symptoms of complacency

and overestimation of his qualities. And here is the result--during an approach in a generally harmless situation, he completely unjustifiably proceeded on a risky maneuver by which he placed his ship in a complicated position.

We can say frankly that a case of this kind is very unpleasant, but instructive. It again demonstrates that no distinguished service by a commander gives him the right to become content with an attained level of training and to lower exacting standards for himself. They also will not relieve his superiors from the necessary supervision and assistance. Of course, the question is not about guardianship which deprives commanders of independence and engenders a lack of belief in his strengths. Unfortunately, this extreme is still encountered also. First of all, the role of supervision by senior commanders lies in cultivating a steadfast need among ship commanders for constant work on themselves and for critical self-evaluation of their training. An officer like that is both sufficiently circumspect and properly bold in any situations. He knows how to behave prudently and steadily at sea during all stages of navigation and to correctly evaluate the situation.

The absence of such an inherently strong foundation on the part of a commander is fraught with dangerous vacillations in his behavior. When Lieutenant Captain A. Kopyl'tsov put to sea, he was so "pumped full" of all kinds of recommendations, cautions, and prohibitions that the officer began to indiscriminately fear everything. Operating under comparatively simple conditions, he became unnecessarily nervous himself and made his subordinates nervous. When the ship had executed a number of tasks, Kopyl'tsov now saw that all his troubles were past. And he suddenly showed astonishing negligence by not having performed the necessary measures to provide a safe anchorage for the ship on the roadstead. The sea punished the unlucky seafarer on the spot. It tore the ship away from its anchor.

The skill to act at sea is wisely cultivated through reasonable measures. In this regard, I am impressed with the operating style of Rear Admiral A. Oleynik, who is their experienced mentor, with landing ship commanders. A complicated landing maneuver from ships directly onto shore did not come easy for all of his subordinates. Here in the shallows at the shoreline, the slightest miscalculations are particularly dangerous to the operation of large landing ships. The senior commander spent a great deal of work so that commanders in theory profoundly mastered this maneuver and then they duly experienced it in practice.

Running through a preliminary routine of actions in theory and on maps under the direct supervision of flag officers before putting out to sea is of great importance in the growth of ship commanders. Here it is precisely possible by means of complicated tactical problems to check expediency of the most diverse maneuvers and to know by their own experience the gravity of miscalculations, oversights, and unwarranted caution. And experienced senior commanders think it is completely valid that the more "accidents" and "beachings" there are among the commanders while on shore, the more reliably they will act at sea.

Unfortunately, sometimes also training resources at sea are not always used completely. Now and then some of the unit commanders decide not to launch ships during bad weather even for executing simple combat training missions. The forecast deteriorates and different kinds of prohibitions and cancellations of projected plans follow right away.

It is necessary to resolutely contend with a similar oversimplification in combat training. In my opinion, it would be more expedient to draw up provisional navigation standards for ships in zero visibility, gales, and those with technical navigation equipment which has become partially "out of order."

Of course, it's not very simple to organize training under unfavorable weather conditions. Indeed then, maximum foresight and skill in sensing the boundary of risk are also required from the training process organizers themselves.

The skill of a commander having high responsibility for safety of the ship and personnel must be kept within these strict limits--reasonable caution and expedient risk. Without these qualities, victory is inconceivable in combat where the mariner's skill is only one of the components of a commander's combat skill.

COPYRIGHT: "Krasnaya zvezda", 1983

9889

CSO: 1801/413

NAVAL FORCES

INTERVIEW WITH COMMANDER OF NORTHERN FLEET MIKHAYLOVSKIY

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 13, Jun 83, pp 3-5

[Interview by SOVETSKIY VOIN correspondent with Hero of the Soviet Union Admiral Arkadiy Petrovich Mikhaylovskiy, commander of the Red Banner Northern Fleet, and with Hero of the Soviet Union Vice Admiral Nikolay Vital'yevich Usenko, chief of the Political Administration, Red Banner Northern Fleet: "At Watch on the Sea Borders"]

[Text] [Correspondent] The Red Banner Northern Fleet is 50 years old. Our readers would like to know when and how it was created, what ships it has at this time, who commands it and whose names have been inscribed in the history of the fleet.

[Mikhaylovskiy] The Northern Fleet is our country's youngest fleet. Its creation stemmed from the need to defend our northern borders in the face of an ~~ever~~-growing danger of aggression by imperialist powers.

On 1 June 1933 a circular was signed by the chief of staff of the Workers and Peasants Red Army about the formation of a military flotilla in the north. On 5 August 1933 the first ships of Special Purpose Expedition No 1 passed through the White Sea--Baltic Canal, which had become an important shipping artery. It included the destroyers Uritskiy and Kuybyshev; the destroyer escorts Uragan and Smerch; and the submarines Dekabrist (D-1) and Narodovolets (D-2). In September of the same year the destroyer Karl Libknekht, the submarine Krasnogvardeyets (D-3), and the destroyer escort Groza arrived in the north. I. S. Isakov, future Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union, led the transit of the second group. At the same time as the transit of the warships, construction of Polyarnyy, main base of the flotilla, began in the Kola Gulf (Yekaterininskiy Port) on order of the Soviet Government.

S. M. Korov, A. I. Mikoyan, A. A. Zhdanov and K. Ye. Voroshilov were deeply involved in construction of naval bases and airfields, and the organization of supply and repair of ships in the north. Party organizations and workers of the Leningrad, Murmansk and Archangel oblasts constantly rendered great assistance to the Northern Fleet sailors. The whole country helped out. New combat vessels were built and dispatched to the Polar Region, and Northern Fleet sailors were provided with modern weapons. Murmansk and

Archangel workers directly participated in the construction of naval bases, airfields and other military facilities.

In 1935, the 7th Separate Air Flight, consisting of three MBR-2 aircraft under the command of Sr Lt G. V. Stepanov, was detached from the Red Banner Baltic Fleet to the flotilla. This marked the birth of naval aviation in the north.

Here is one notable fact. The destroyer Uritskiy became the flagship of the flotilla. Prior to 1922 it had been named Zabiyaka. Its crew participated in the October Revolution armed uprising. Along with the cruiser Aurora the destroyer entered the Neva River, and its crew participated in storming the Winter Palace. During the Civil War the sailors of this ship fought on many fronts. The destroyer was in service some forty years and participated in the Great Patriotic War.

On 11 May 1937 the flotilla was reorganized as the Northern Fleet. Its first commander was Flag Officer 1st Rank Konstantin Ivanovich Dushenov. In the past he had been a Baltic Sea sailor on the Aurora and an active participant in the great October Revolution. A man of tireless energy, great organizational capabilities, and high political maturity, K. I. Dushenov did a great deal to establish the fleet. He was the first USSR Supreme Soviet deputy from the Northern Fleet.

At the end of that year the fleet received new submarines: Shch-401, Shch-402, Shch-403, and Shch-404. In 1939 the Northern Fleet obtained 14 more warships, including 4 new destroyers (Groznyy, Gromkiy, Gremyashchiy, and Sokrushitel'nyy) and 10 submarines (4 "Shch" class, so called "shchuki" [pike] and 6 "M" class--"malyutki" [mini subs]).

In summer 1940 two cruiser submarines ("K" class) and the destroyer Stremitel'nyy were transferred to the Polar Region.

The Northern Fleet air forces had 116 fighters, bombers and MBR-2 reconnaissance aircraft by Summer 1941.

Thus, by the start of the Great Patriotic War a reliable military screen was in place on the northern borders of our Homeland; the Northern Fleet was standing watch. It had thoroughly trained cadres and an experienced command and political leadership and was equipped with new equipment and arms.

[Usenko] The party gave priority attention to strengthening the northern borders of the Fatherland. The fleet was manned by the country's best people. Getting to serve on the ships of the Northern Fleet was considered a great honor. Young people strove with their unflagging labor to merit this right. The importance of the help given by the Komsomol to the Navy cannot be overestimated. The best representatives of our youth filled its ranks.

[Correspondent] Yes, we did have people and weapons to meet the enemy on our northern borders. As is well known, the fleet had engagements and battles from its very first days. Tell us about this in more detail, please.

[Mikhaylovskiy] The war did not catch the Northern Fleet unawares. The fleet entered the war fully combat ready. The fleet's weapons "spoke" literally from the first days of the war. They supported by fire our heroic ground forces, placing themselves in the path of the enemy who was trying to break through to Murmansk, cut the Kirovsk railroad, come out on the shore of the White Sea, seize Archangel, and thus block our exits into the North Atlantic.

But the enemy did not succeed in this. On the very first day of the war, the shore battery commanded by Sr Lt P. F. Kosmachev sank an enemy mine-sweeper with accurate fire. (Today one of the guns from this battery is set up as a monument in the fleet's capital, Severomorsk, on a hill adjacent to Coastal Square.)

On 28 June, 1941, Sr Lt B. F. Safonov, commander of an air squadron, shot down an enemy plane over the Polar skies, and by May 1942 his kills numbered 30.

For his outstanding combat services, Boris Feoktistovich Safonov was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union three months after the start of the war. He became the first serviceman in the Great Patriotic War to be twice awarded the title of Hero.

The crews of surface ships, submarines and shore batteries fearlessly fought the enemy. Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Minister of Defense, discussed the accomplishment of the defenders of the Polar Region very well in his speech at the 10 March 1983 ceremony awarding the city of Murmansk the Order of the Patriotic War 1st Class.

Ustinov emphasized that the sailors of the Northern Fleet and troops of the 14th Combined Arms and 7th Air Armies covered their Colors with unfading glory in battles against the German fascist invaders. Twice-heroes of the Soviet Union Boris Safonov, Aleksandr Shabalin, Viktor Leonov; Heroes of the Soviet Union A. F. Bredov, M. I. Gadzhiyev, S. G. Kurzenkov, N. A. Lunin, and many other courageous soldiers fought here. Hundreds of enemy aircraft went to their graves in the icy waters of the Barents Sea and the Polar reaches. Northern Fleet submariners sank dozens of fascist ships.

For their contribution in defeating the enemy, 12 submarines were awarded the Order of the Red Banner; eight of them earned Guards designations. In all, 46 ships, units and large units of the fleet were awarded orders for their contributions to defeating the enemy. The Homeland marked the feats of more than 48,000 Northern Fleet personnel.

Dozens and hundreds of names are written in gold letters in the history of the fleet. The Soviet State highly valued the services of the Northern Fleet Sailors: 85 officers, petty officers and sailors were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. Today's generation of sailors piously revere and are augmenting their traditions. The fleet has collectives which are 100 percent class qualified specialists and sub-units which are true masters of their work.

During the war, the commander of the Red Banner Northern Fleet, Admiral Arseniy Grigor'yevich Golovko proved himself to be a talented military leader, able leader and courageous seaman.

[Usenko] The military successes of the Northern Fleet were reliably based upon the great feeling of Soviet patriotism and filial loyalty of the troops to their Homeland. Of course, military communists were the cohesive force on ships, in units and at airfields.

The popular saying that communists have only one privilege--to be first where things are difficult; to be at the head of the line--is well known. And I must say that Northern Fleet communists actively used their privilege during battle!

They unified the troops and inspired them on to military feats with their fervent, impassioned words and personal example.

Many examples of this can be given. In battle during a landing at the port of Liinakhamari the landing platoon commander, Lt Aleksandrov, was seriously injured. Sergeant Ivan Katorzhnyy, a communist, took command and led the troops in attack, inspiring them with his courage. The landing party succeeded in seizing four enemy pillboxes early in the battle and later also seized several moorages. The fascists brought up strong forces in trying to regain the lost positions. During the course of 18 hours the platoon repulsed the enemy attacks and held the port, which secured deployment of the detachment's main forces. For courage and heroism all personnel in the platoon were awarded orders and medals, and Sergeant Ivan Pavolvich Katorzhnyy was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The courage and heroism of communists in battle with the enemy, and their utter devotion to their people and beloved Fatherland, still further strengthened the authority of the Communist Party. And the homeland's defenders strove to link their own fate with the party. During the decisive minutes of battle, many Northern Fleet personnel wrote: "I wish to be accepted into the party. I wish to enter battle as a communist." Not only individual teams, but entire ships' crews consisted of communists. Here is a typical example. In August 1942 the challenge Red Banner of the Komsomol Central Committee was awarded to the komsomol organization of Guards Submarine M-171, as the best in the Navy. Twelve sunken enemy ships were credited to the crew, which was commanded by Hero of the Soviet Union, Captain 3d Rank V. G. Starikov.

After some time all the sailors in the submarine's crew became communists. This incident is not at all unique.

The famous Northern Fleet submariner, Vice Admiral Grigoriy Ivanovich Shchedrin, Hero of the Soviet Union, commanded the Red Banner Guards Submarine C-56. On one of its voyages the submarine found itself in very difficult situation--it had been detected by enemy ships. In order to conceal its movements, the air regulating equipment in the compartments was turned off. The concentration of carbon dioxide in the boat exceeded all

allowable norms. Some sailors began to lose consciousness. Then Grigoriy Ivanovich Shchedrin, the commander of the submarine, addressed the crew, saying that non-party personnel were allowed to rest. Communists were called upon to stand watch for themselves and their comrades, to hold fast.

The seventh compartment responded first: "No non-party here. We are standing watch!"

The sixth replied that Nazarov had submitted his party application and the nonparty personnel asked not to be replaced.

During these decisive minutes not a single man left his post. A party meeting took place on the submarine to examine party applications. The party organization of submarine C-56 equalled in number the size of the crew on that trip.

During the terrible years of the Great Patriotic War, 24,000 Northern Fleet personnel joined the party. These were those who devoted themselves totally to victory over the enemy. The names of many fearless fighters entered the annals of the fleet. Today's generation of Northern Fleet sailors strives to be deserving of the heroic feat of the defenders of the Homeland. One evidence of this is the struggle for the right to be named heirs of the best specialists of the war years. Hundreds of Northern Fleet personnel have now earned this honor. They are studying diligently. They have been entrusted with qualitatively new vessels and modern equipment.

[Correspondent] Thank you. Our next question is: Tell us, please, about the present-day Red Banner Northern Fleet.

[Mikhaylovskiy] Because of the will of our party and the selfless labor of the Soviet people, the Soviet Navy has become a blue-water and a nuclear navy. The Red Banner Northern Fleet is equipped with nuclear powered submarines, and modern surface ships, aircraft, weapons and combat equipment. Our nuclear missile submarines, the nuclear missile cruiser Kirov, the anti-submarine warfare cruiser Kiev, and many other vessels are the pride of Soviet shipbuilding. Today the Navy has gone out into the expanses of the world's oceans. It has everything necessary to reliably defend the Homeland and the gains of socialism. But in all of this, our greatest pride is the people of the Red Banner Northern Fleet. Isn't that so, Nikolay Vital'yevich?

[Usenko] Yes. Our main wealth, our pride, are the people of the fleet: sailors, petty officers, warrant officers, officers, admirals. They are ideologically mature, thoroughly trained defenders of the Homeland, who are boundlessly loyal to the Communist Party and the Soviet people. More than 93 percent of the fleet's personnel are communists and komsomol members. Political organs and party organizations are constantly concerned, as the CPSU Central Committee decree, "On the 80th Anniversary of the 2d Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party," emphasizes, that every communist be a selfless fighter for the triumph of the great ideals of the CPSU, and that he be profoundly knowledgeable of, understand and implement the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the policy of the party. Fleet communists and komsomol members carry out difficult service in the severe Polar

Region and on long voyages, enhancing the glorious traditions of the sailors of the older generation. Closely linked by indissoluble bonds of friendship and military comradeship, representatives of 85 nations and nationalities of our country serve in the fleet.

They constitute a single military family, live at one with the interests of the workers of our great Homeland, and are doing everything to reliably defend the peaceful labor of the Soviet people.

Northern Fleet personnel consider the visit of Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, USSR Minister of Defense, to be a vivid demonstration of the Central Committee's concern about strengthening the combat might of our Armed Forces.

[Correspondent] Visiting the Red Banner Northern Fleet, one feels and sees its mighty modern ships and aircraft and sees how responsibly its personnel work. I would like to know something about the leading ships, those which are best in competition.

[Mikhaylovskiy] Speaking on the cruiser Kirov, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense, stressed that to serve in the Northern Fleet is a great honor and that the Soviet people highly value the difficult military labor of the Northern Fleet seamen. These words inspired the fleet personnel in their combat training and service and socialist competition in honor of the fleet's 50th anniversary. Results of competition were given on the eve of the anniversary. They show that the personnel distinctly recognize the difficulty of the present international situation and are persistently increasing their vigilance and combat readiness. More than 75 percent of the sailors are highly qualified specialists. Among them are many masters of military subjects who have mastered a related specialty. Many ships and units hold the rank of "excellent." Among them I would like to name first the submarine commanded by Captain 1st Rank V. A. Zhuravlev, the large anti-submarine ship Marshal Timoshenko, the large minesweeper Kolomenskiy Komsomolets, and others.

[Usenko] That which has been achieved is our firm foundation for moving confidently ahead, for successfully implementing those tasks which the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense set before the Northern Fleet. These tasks are great and responsible. They are linked with the further improvement of the quality of combat and political training, with all types of study on shore and at sea, with the organization of competition, education of personnel, and strengthening of military discipline.

[Mikhaylovskiy] The most important and determining task for all remains the further improvement of combat readiness, in order to reliably defend the state interests of the Soviet Union in a difficult international environment.

COPYRIGHT: "Sovetskiy voyn," 1983

NAVAL FORCES

RESOURCES FOR TRAINING FOR LONG-RANGE CRUISES POINTED OUT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jul 83 p 1

[Editorial: "The School for Long-Range Cruises"]

[Text] A large landing ship, "Petr Il'ichev," is on a long-distance cruise for several months. Each day of ocean sailing tests the sailors severely. Frequent storms, the tiresome rolling, the tension of under-way watches, the lengthy isolation from the shore and from home--all these and many other things require that the "sailors exert maximum moral and physical effort and display firm resolve, self control and psychological stability. But whatever the difficulties the crew encounters, drills, exercises and training go on as usual. The sailors persistently improve military mastery and battle coordination. Many of them have raised their skill ratings and mastered allied specialties during the cruise.

This example is characteristic for today's everyday routine in our Navy. It is not accidental that they call the Navy "oceanic" these days. Cruises of thousands of miles, each of which was an extraordinary event not so long ago, have now become the everyday norms for Soviet sailors, the basic type of activity that determines their life and training. On such cruises, the ship's personnel carry out a substantial portion of the plans and programs for combat and political training and they improve tactical and nautical training and master weaponry and equipment.

Ocean sailing is an excellent opportunity to check on the ability of the commanding officer and of the whole crew to act under complicated conditions and to harden their will and character. The environment itself of the cruise has a mobilizing effect on people and helps them to acquire rich practical experience. But it would be wrong to presume that the sea and the ocean can teach anything in and of itself. Training in the environment of a cruise is genuinely effective only when it has been comprehensively prepared for and carefully planned and is aimed at high-quality execution of military-training tasks and the development within the sailors of skill in beating a strong enemy and acting with confidence in the environment of modern battle.

The effectiveness of a mile of cruising is predetermined by preparation of the ship at the base. At that time the sailors carefully prepare the ship's equipment for prolonged operation on the ocean, and they play out variants of solutions of forthcoming missions. Important assistance in this matter is a study of the experience of ships that have returned from cruises and consideration of the recommendations expressed by senior officers during analyses of lengthy cruises.

The crew of the large Guards ASW ship, "Krasnyy Krym," displayed just such a businesslike approach while preparing to go to sea. Thanks to this, the sailors did not have to waste time on the cruise in mastering rudiments. A sound foundation of practical training conducted at the base enabled them to use each cruise mile with maximum effectiveness.

However, at times, cases are encountered of an underestimation of careful, systematic preparation for sea voyages. A strict check of the status of weaponry and equipment and of specialists' vocational training is lacking. Deficiencies of precisely this type were committed before going to sea on the escort ship "Doblestnyy." An interruption in the work occurred at sea through the fault of Capt-Lt A. Kulemin's subordinates. As a result, the quality of fulfillment of the assigned mission turned out to be too low.

The ocean is a stern environment. It severely punishes people for thoughtlessness, negligence and lack of conscientiousness. Success in resolving combat-training missions is achieved only by crews and sailors who are distinguished by high naval skills and a feeling of responsibility for the assigned job.

Commanding officers are called upon to set the tone here. The responsibility for special order when far from home shores lies on them. The fate of the ship, the fates of tens of people is in the hands of the man on the bridge, who is trusted. At sea he usually does not expect promptings from anyone: he must rely upon his own knowledge and experience in everything. All this requires high demands on the training of the commanding officer in military theory, tactics and international law and on his high skill in deeply assessing a situation that takes shape while under way, and in adopting informed decisions, and on his initiative, his self reliance, and his capabilities to organize the training of subordinates at the proper level.

Precise organization of training at sea and its dedication to high final results depend directly upon senior officers, who often go to sea on ships subordinate to them, and on flagship specialists and other representatives of control organs. The effect of their presence on board is determined greatly by the style of work. It is important that flag officers and staff officers do not stand in for commanding officers or ship specialists but teach them in practical fashion the art of managing the ship and competent operation of the equipment, generalize the tactical measures and other innovations that are engendered during ordinary days of the cruise, and spread advanced experience in combat training and competition.

The golden rule has long been known: the more complicated the situation in which a combat collective is to operate, the more actively should party and political work be conducted. Far from home shores, in direct proximity to NATO navy ships, it should be constructed especially purposefully and aggressively. It is necessary, guided by the decisions of the July 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, to explain in depth to the fighting men the complexity of the modern international situation and indoctrinate them in the spirit of high responsibility for the motherland's safety, for increasing vigilance in combat training, and for strengthening military discipline and regulation procedure.

Socialist competition has become an integral part of life and combat training of navy sailors while at sea. The prerequisites for organizing it for a long-range cruise are extremely specific. Therefore, organizing it must be approached creatively, recalling that the forms of competition are not something that has congealed, has been given once and for always. It is correct when, on leaving the base, comradely rivalry is organized for the best combat watch and best station and for the title of best watch officer, when such questions as the drive for high quality in carrying out watches while under way, for competent operation of weaponry and equipment, for rational use of cruise time, and for saving fuel and engine life, are especially singled out.

Ocean sailing is a real school of manhood and skill. The potential which this remarkable school offers must be realized in every possible way and used with maximum effectiveness.

11409

CSO: 1801/424

CIVIL DEFENSE

TRAINING EXERCISE UNDER NUCLEAR CONDITIONS

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jul 83 p 1

[Article by Col A. Krotov, Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District: "In a 'Center of Destruction'"]

[Text] The "enemy" has used nuclear weapons, and the situation in the city is a difficult one. Damage at the various facilities ranges from medium to heavy. The radiation level.... I order the 1st Mechanized Company to perform rescue and emergency repair work at our facility.... The main effort is to be focused....

This was the beginning of the demonstration, special tactical exercise by one of the civil defense subunits. The objective of the exercise was to show the young fightingmen how to prepare themselves to skilfully accomplish their missions in a combat situation.

The young soldiers observed the actions of their senior comrades with interest.

The platoon commanded by Lieutenant S. Volkov was the first to enter the "center of destruction." It was followed by the men commanded by Senior Lieutenant S. Pekarev and Lieutenants A. Popenko and A. Marmor. Performing in a great deal of smoke at the site of a fire, they removed "victims" from beneath piles of rubble and demolished shelters and gave them first aid, explaining their actions as they worked.

The pace of the exercise was picking up. The commander of a reconnaissance platoon reported: "The area around the shelter is flooding and the water may enter the shelter."

A team from an emergency technical platoon was sent out to localize the area of damage by decision of Senior Lieutenant A. Tarasenko, company commander. An excavation 1.5 meters deep rapidly filled with water. In order to stop the flow the team had to enter the water wearing self-contained breathing apparatuses. A few minutes later Lieutenant Marmor's men reported that the danger of flooding in the shelter had been eliminated.

Hypothetical problems came one after the other. "A gas line has been broken by an excavator digging out a collapsed shelter in the area of Shop No. 2." This delayed somewhat the work being performed by Senior Lieutenant Pekarev's subunit

to clear away the rubble. The rescuers remained calm, however. The officer was first to rush to repair the damaged gas line, drawing his men after him. This emergency was also rapidly cleared up.

The machine operators demonstrated good skill in the handling of the equipment during the exercise. Clearing away rubble and digging pits and trenches, they skilfully selected the required mode of operation for the machinery. Other missions were also successfully completed. When an inflammable mixture was poured on the tracks of a bulldozer, for example, and the fire threatened to spread to the fuel tank, all of the team members joined in the struggle to save it. They extinguished the fire with sand and canvas and continued to clear away the rubble.

In the meantime Lieutenant Popenko's men were evacuating people from a burning building. The fire had leapt from the top to the lower floors. Stairwells collapsed. The rescuers led by the officer were cut off. Unable to use the fire escapes, they descended on a rope. The officer tied the rope to a secure object with a fireman's knot and descended first. The other fightingmen followed him.

11499

CSO: 1801/442

DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

SECOND DOSAAF CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM

Report on Plenum

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 24 Jul 83 p 1

[Report: "2nd Plenum of USSR DOSAAF Central Committee--Information Announcement"]

[Text] The 2nd Plenum of the Central Committee of the Order of Lenin, Red Banner All-Union Voluntary Society for Cooperation With the Armed Forces was held in Moscow on 21 July.

The plenum was opened by Hero of the Soviet Union, Fleet Admiral G.M. Yegorov, chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

The plenum discussed the following subjects:

1. On raising the level and enhancing the effectiveness of the work performed by DOSAAF organizations to provide the workers and the youth with military-patriotic indoctrination in light of demands set at the June 1983 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: A speech was delivered at the plenum by Comrade Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

2. Information on the work performed by the Presidium and the Bureau of the Presidium of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee during the period between the 1st and 2nd plenums of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

Fleet Admiral G.M. Yegorov, chairman of the Central Committee of the USSR DOSAAF, delivered a report on the first topic.

Lieutenant General V.V. Mosyaykin, deputy chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, delivered a report on the work of the Presidium and the Bureau of the Presidium of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee during the period between the 1st and 2nd plenums of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

The reports are being published.

The following people participated in the plenum: A.N. Soshnikov, deputy chairman of a department in the CPSU Central Committee; 3-time Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of Aviation A.I. Pokryshkin, member of the Presidium of the USSR

Supreme soviet; V.N. Makeyev, secretary of the AUCCTU; D.A. Okhromiy, secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee; B.P. Utkin, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy; Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel General A.S. Zheltov, chairman of the Soviet War Veterans Committee; twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General I.I. Gusevskiy; Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General I.G. Pavlovskiy; Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of Aviation S.I. Rudenko; 3-time Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel General of Aviation I.N. Kozhedub; A.N. Osipov, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education; F.Ye. Shtykalo, deputy USSR minister of education; Hero of the Soviet Union, Pilot-Cosmonaut of the USSR G.S. Titov; and Hero of the Soviet Union, Pilot-Cosmonaut of the USSR S.Ye. Savitskaya, as well as responsible workers of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, ministries and departments, and representatives of public organizations.

Taking part in the plenum were members of the Central Auditing Commission of the USSR DOSAAF, chairmen of kray and oblast committees who are not members of the defense society's central directing bodies, deputy chairmen of the DOSAAF central committees of Union republic, kray and oblast DOSAAF committees of the Russian Federation for mass organizational work and military-patriotic propaganda, and activists in the defense society.

The following people spoke during the discussion of the reports: O. Gunyayev, deputy chairman of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian SSR DOSAAF; M.V. Naumov, member of the Central Auditing Commission of the USSR DOSAAF and chairman of the Proletarskiy Rayon DOSAAF Committee; Yu.I. Bakin, chairman of the Amur Oblast DOSAAF Committee; N.G. Belous, chief editor of the newspaper SOVETSKIY PATRIOT; K.N. Kirillov, chairman of the Sverdlovsk Oblast DOSAAF Committee; G.V. Naneyshvili, chairman of the Central Committee of the Georgian SSR DOSAAF; V.M. Pinchuk, chief of the Khabarovsk OTSh [expansion unknown]; Ye.N. Bondurenko, chief of the STK [technical sports club?] for the city of Yeysk; Krasnodar Kray; Colonel General Yu.A. Naumenko, deputy commander in chief of the Ground Forces for civilian military training; V.V. Barybin, committee chairman in the primary DOSAAF organization on the Rossiya Kolkhoz in Lipetsk Oblast; and V.V. Shishlakova, USSR master of sports (Tatar ASSR).

A resolution was passed on the first topic on the agenda.

The plenum was informed on the work performed by the Presidium and the Bureau of the Presidium of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee since the 1st Plenum of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

Plenum participants enthusiastically endorsed a letter to the CPSU Central Committee and to Comrade Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

With this the 2nd Plenum of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee concluded its session.

Yegorov Report to Plenum

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 24 Jul 83 pp 1-2

[Report by Fleet Admiral G.N. Yegorov, chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee: "Military-Patriotic Indoctrination--up to the Level of Party Demands"]

[Text] Comrades!

The Soviet people, including the defense society's members, received the decisions coming out of the June 1983 Central Committee Plenum and the 8th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th convocation, and the election of Comrade Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, as chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, with enormous enthusiasm and fervent approval.

The June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee discussed urgent problems of ideological and mass political work, which our party regards as one of the most important elements in the building of communism. The plenum decisions, the speech delivered by Comrade Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and the report presented by Comrade K.U. Chernenko, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, provided the party and the Soviet people with a concrete, long-range program for perfecting developed socialism.

The new edition of the CPSU Program, which is being prepared by a decision adopted at the 26th party congress, should play an exceptionally important role in the ideological work, in all of the work in general.

The plenum devoted considerable attention to matters pertaining to the military-patriotic indoctrination, which develops in the Soviet people the good ideological-political, combat and moral-psychological qualities necessary to accomplish the tasks involved in protecting our country and the entire socialist commonwealth.

Military-patriotic indoctrination is a task of great political and state importance. It is being accomplished by trade union, Komsomol and DOSAAF organizations, creative unions, the press, schools and other educational institutions, under the guidance of party and soviet organs.

The All-Union voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Armed Forces plays an important role in the military-indoctrination and the preparation of the youth for military service.

During the time which elapsed since the 26th CPSU Congress the DOSAAF organizations have continued to carry out the main task set for us by the party, that of actively helping to strengthen the nation's defense capability and to prepare the workers to defend the socialist homeland.

DOSAAF has a considerable range of means of ideological indoctrination and technical military training, a large number of skilled cadres and a large aktiv for the accomplishment of this task.

The scope of the defense society's work has grown. The society is engaged in work at various levels of military-patriotic and international indoctrination of the workers, under the leadership of party and soviet organs and in close coordination with the trade unions and the Komsomol, the "Znaniye" Society, political organs of the army and navy, military commissariats, civil defense staffs, the Soviet War Veterans Committee and other state and public organizations. In thousands of primary organizations millions of DOSAAF members are participating in mass defense work and learning basic military skills. Every third draftee today has trained in DOSAAF training organizations. Each year more than 2 million people learn the technical skills essential to the national economy in clubs, schools and courses. A total of 32 million Soviet people engage in the technical and applied military types of sports. And the military-patriotic work performed in the defense society must measure up to its tasks, which are constantly growing in extent and complexity.

One of the main tasks assigned to DOSAAF organizations by the party is that of indoctrinating the defense society's members in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and constant readiness to protect the homeland.

It should be noted that under the influence of the general improvement in the party's ideological work and in the process of implementing the demands set forth at the 26th party congress and the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On the Further Improvement of Ideological, Political and Indoctrinational Work," DOSAAF organizations have improved the military-patriotic work to a certain degree and have begun linking it more closely to the defense society's life and its tasks.

But has this been achieved universally? Frankly, no. The Tajik SSR DOSAAF Central Committee and the North Ossetian, Tomsk, Chuvash, Arkhangelsk and Kursk oblast DOSAAF committees, which have been slow in reorganizing the military-patriotic indoctrination, have been repeatedly subjected to serious criticism.

Proper attention is not always being given to the work of enhancing the ideological and political level of the military-patriotic propaganda. The Marxist-Leninist principles with respect to defending the socialist homeland and the need for inseparable unity for the tasks of building communism and the tasks involved in strengthening the nation's defense capability are not always thoroughly explained.

The DOSAAF organizations are not adequately linking the propaganda of Leninist concepts and the principles contained in the Constitution of the USSR on the defense of the socialist homeland, the Law of the USSR "On Universal Military Duty" and decisions adopted by the party and the government with respect to strengthening the nation's defense capability to the work of explaining the complexity of the international situation to the youth and the practical tasks involved in further enhancing vigilance and our readiness to defend the homeland. The inseparable linkage between the glorious traditions of the past and the heroic present and the need to preserve and add to the Soviet people's revolutionary, combat and labor traditions is not always skilfully depicted.

More active participation by the DOSAAF organizations in the All-Union Tour of Sites of Revolutionary, Combat and Labor Glory of the Communist Party and the Soviet People, the "Zarnitsa" and "Orlenok" military sports games, the "Chronical of the Great Patriotic War" Expeditionary Search and a number of other mass activities are expected to play an important role in the correction of these deficiencies. We need to work persistently to increase their applied military focus.

During preparations for the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR, DOSAAF organizations increased their attention to the indoctrination of the upcoming generation in a spirit of friendship and fraternity of peoples of the Soviet Union and to the international indoctrination of the Soviet people. We should continue to develop this work, using it to instill intolerance of all manifestations of chauvinism and nationalism in the young men and women.

In the contemporary situation the party feels that we must have a well-conceived, unified, dynamic and effective system of counterpropaganda. And the defense society has a place in this system.

While recognizing the leading role of substance in the propaganda, we must not underestimate the importance of the forms of this work. The 26th CPSU Congress directed our attention to this. Unfortunately, we still have lengthy and boring didactic monologs, and a considerable part of the visual agitation is not being worked into the process. We do not always have good propaganda support for the sports activities.

Some committees do little by way of oral propaganda and do not adequately draw upon lecturers from the "Znaniye" Society, veterans of war and labor and of the Armed Forces, and servicemen at local garrisons for conducting this propaganda. Some lecture groups and groups of DOSAAF reporters rarely present good lectures and reports on matters of military organizational development, on the tasks of the Armed Forces in the contemporary situation, on the work of the DOSAAF and its role in the strengthening of the nation's defense capability.

The DOSAAF committees should actively strive to enhance the quality and effectiveness of the propaganda lectures, to build up the propaganda aktiv and improve the skill of the lecturers.

There is no place for platitudes in the military-patriotic indoctrination. It can only be successful and effective where there is creative quest, where it is linked with the teaching of the basic military and technical military skills. And some of the DOSAAF organizations are still using the old ways, are not taking a differentiated approach to different groups of workers and the youth and are not relying adequately on the experience of war veterans and veterans of the Armed Forces in this work.

We should give more attention to our work with the school children. We need to place the society's facilities at their disposal and involve them in the groups and sections more extensively. We know that the clubs of young sailors, airmen, border troops and cosmonauts are popular with the school children. Unfortunately,

the functioning of these clubs has deteriorated in recent years in Maritime Kray, Voronezh and Chemkent oblasts and other areas, and the number of these clubs has been dropping.

The speaker stressed the fact that we cannot reconcile ourselves to the fact that military-patriotic activities in the DOSAAF organizations of Estonia, the Dagestan and Komi ASSRs, Murmansk and Chita oblasts are not reaching a significant part of the rural youth.

We need to do more to help the VUZ defense organizations. The DOSAAF committees should actively assist the organizing sections for military-patriotic and mass defense work in the schools for the public occupations with the coordination of the training process and with the selection of instructors.

It is important for us to improve such forms of military-patriotic indoctrination as Lenin readings, lecture groups, film-and-lecture groups and military-patriotic clubs.

The decree passed at the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee stresses the need to enhance the effectiveness of the ideological, political and indoctrinational work conducted in the labor collectives themselves, where our material and spiritual treasures are being created, where the homeland's economic and defense capabilities are being strengthened. This means that the DOSAAF committees have the task of basically improving supervision of the defense society's primary organizations and enhancing their activeness and militancy. After all, they do have the leading role in the military-patriotic indoctrination of DOSAAF members and the development of a sense of responsibility in the members for the fulfillment of the Charter requirements for discipline and organization.

Take the primary organization of the Serdobsrk Electric Lamp Plant in Penza Oblast, for example. Good individual work is performed with the draftees there. Mentors and young workers, reserve servicemen, participate in the work. When the youth from that enterprise enter the army they are ordinarily holders of the GTO [ready for work and defense] badge and are rated sportsmen in the technical and applied military types of sports. And the units report that they are excellent soldiers.

Our task is one of seeing to it that every primary organization conducts the military-patriotic work with the same degree of initiative and purpose, on a daily basis. In order to achieve this each activist responsible for a specific section must put his heart into the assigned job, strive to improve the performance of his primary organization and take part in the development of a sense of pride in the society members, in their enterprise, kolkhoz, sovkhoz or educational institution, in their DOSAAF organization.

The press is a powerful means of ideological indoctrination. Experience has shown that the level of the military-patriotic propaganda is ordinarily higher where the DOSAAF committees have established strong ties with the press, radio and television. The DOSAAF committees of Belorussia, Moscow, Omsk, Ryazan, Sakhalin and a number of other oblasts in the Russian Federation, for example, work productively with the mass media.

DOSAAB work has recently been receiving greater publicity in the central agencies of mass information and propaganda. The leader of our press, the newspaper PRAVDA, regularly carries articles on the defense society's life and work, on its activists and sportsmen. The same can be said of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, KOMSOMOL'-SKAYA PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and other newspapers.

DOSAAB's contacts with the Central Television Network and the All-Union Radio Network have become closer and more substantive. This fact is confirmed by the programs: "I Serve the Soviet Union," "On Land, in the Air and at Sea" and "Come on, Fellows"!

Many of the society's kraykoms and obkoms hold press conferences and schedule meetings with workers of the press, television and radio, work out joint military-patriotic propaganda plans and acquaint the journalists with the work performed by the primary, training and sports organizations.

Unfortunately, not all of the DOSAAB committees maintain working ties with the mass media. This is especially true of the Tuva, Chuvash and Kemerovo oblast committees. The leaders of those and certain other committees cannot seem to get around, so to speak, to establishing such contacts.

The DOSAAB press agencies are faced with some big tasks stemming from the demands set at the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Despite this, the society's newspapers and magazines are still not always focusing attention on the main areas of its work, rarely bring out matters of current importance and do little to involve the rank-and-file DOSAAB members in the discussion of such matters.

Our press needs to be more aggressive and respond more promptly and effectively to developments. The effectiveness of propaganda is determined primarily by the degree to which it is scientific, just and realistic. These qualities are needed in articles both about our successes and about problems and criticism. Leaders of the society organizations must keep the press informed on the work performed by the committees and the nature of the problems with which they are dealing. They must respond promptly and substantively to criticism contained in the press and broadcasts by radio and television, and promptly inform the editors of steps which have been taken.

Books, pamphlets and other literature put out by the DOSAAB Publishing House should be employed more actively in the patriotic indoctrination of society members.

Decisions coming out of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the 8th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet open up great possibilities for improving the military-patriotic propaganda. It is therefore one of the most important duties of the society's committees to arrange for the DOSAAB workers and activists to thoroughly study CPSU Central Committee Plenum materials and the speech delivered at the plenum by Comrade Yu.V. Andropov, and decisions adopted at the 8th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. We should extensively publicize the tasks stemming from these documents for DOSAAB and help the society's organizations to carry them out.

The Communist Party demands that we link the ideological work more closely with the campaign to accomplish the key national economic and sociopolitical tasks. For DOSAAF this linkage means assuring that the mass defense work, the preparation of the youth to serve in the Armed Forces and of personnel for the general technical occupations, and the development of the technical and applied military types of sports are at a high level.

The DOSAAF organizations should do more to instil in each young person, each future fightingman, a thorough understanding of his constitutional duty to defend the socialist homeland and a desire to master a military specialty.

In order to be a patriot today one must constantly contribute to the strengthening of our homeland's economic and defense capabilities, improve his readiness to protect peace against any encroachments by an imperialist aggressor and conscientiously perform his military duties.

On the whole, the youth are serving well in the army and persistently mastering the modern equipment. The speaker pointed out, however, that there are also deficiencies in the preparation of the draftees to serve in the armed forces. There is a real reserve for enhancing the practical quality of the training received by the students in DOSAAF schools and clubs, he said, in the area of improving the training process and strengthening labor discipline in all the society's elements and at all levels--from the master of production training to the chief of the training organization and the chairman of the DOSAAF committee. Fulfilling the demands set at the November 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the DOSAAF committees have stepped up their campaign against laxity and irresponsible handling of their duties by some of the workers. The work in this area is still proceeding slowly, however, and is not always effective.

We need to understand once and for all, the speaker stressed, that the strengthening of discipline, as the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee pointed out, "is not a short-term campaign but a matter of daily, painstaking work" and we need to engage in this work in all seriousness and with a sense of great responsibility.

Traffic accidents are producing major moral and material damage in the training of specialists. These are due primarily to personal lack of discipline and an irresponsible attitude toward the fulfillment of requirements for job safety and the safe operation of equipment. Those in charge at all levels, especially the chairmen of the Kazakh SSR DOSAAF Central Committee, the Krasnoyarsk Kray and the Gorkiy and Sverdlovsk oblast DOSAAF committees, must focus their efforts on the timely and thorough performance of measures to prevent accidents.

Working without accidents is an important factor of training effectiveness in the society's aviation organizations. The requirements for organizing and conducting the flight and parachute training have been violated, however, in the air clubs of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Omsk, Leningrad, Ulan-Ude and Chelyabinsk. The DOSAAF committees must assure that thorough and timely steps are taken to prevent accidents and must increase the responsibility of those in charge for the absolute fulfillment of the established regulations, requirements, orders, instructions and manuals, and improve the indoctrination of those who work with the equipment.

We must totally eliminate misrepresentation of the actual state of affairs, exaggerations and sham, simplifications and indulgences in the practical training of the draftees.

G. M. Yegorov criticized deficiencies in the work performed with the permanent staff of the schools and other DOSAAF organizations and failings in the political-indoctrinational work performed with the students. These exist where the committees do not have a thorough understanding of the organization and the content of the political-indoctrinational work performed with the permanent and temporary school staffs and do not strive to improve it.

Poor combined-arms training is a typical deficiency in a number of DOSAAF training organizations, the speaker noted. They are not demonstrating proper persistence in the organization of competition by task and norm, the intensification of rivalry in the training process, the development of practical knowledge and skills for operating and servicing the equipment and the improvement of the training facilities.

The plenum of the CPSU Central Committee noted the need to create a situation making it easy for the populations of the national republics to study the Russian language, the language of international communication. This is especially important for the future fightingmen, because a poor knowledge of Russian makes it difficult for them to understand army terminology, to master the combat equipment and perform their military service.

Some work is being done in this area at a number of DOSAAF schools in the Uzbek SSR. Courses have been set up there in a 50-hour program of self-training. This system should be extensively adopted.

The training of cadres for the national economy in the general technical occupations with military application is an important area of work for the DOSAAF organizations. It is carried out in accordance with a state plan and helps to meet national economic needs for skilled workers and to build up reserves for the Armed Forces. It is also an effective form of propaganda for technical skills.

Unfortunately, there are still major deficiencies in this work. The specialist training is being improved too slowly. We are not using all the reserves for increasing the training of specialists for the rapidly developing areas of Eastern Siberia and the Far East. DOSAAF organizations of the Kirghiz SSR, Kirov, Pskov and certain other oblasts are not devoting proper attention to the training of motor vehicle and tractor drivers and combine operators for agriculture.

In order to eliminate the shortcomings the DOSAAF organizations must develop in the society's workers and activists, a sense of great responsibility for the quality of the specialist training and an understanding of the importance of DOSAAF's contribution to the accomplishment of national economic tasks.

Fulfilling the requirements set forth in the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "On the Further Improvement of Mass Physical Culture and Sports," organizations of the defense society are taking

steps to develop the technical and applied military types of sports. Participation in sports helps to develop well-rounded, ideological convinced, technically competent and physically strong builders of communism. Because of this it is important for the workers, especially the youth, to use their leisure time to regularly engage in the technical and applied military types of sports.

A thorough critical study recently made of the work of Azerbaijan's DOSAAF Central Committee and certain other committees, however, showed that the state of the mass defense work and the level of development of the technical and applied military types of sports still do not fully meet the requirements set by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers and do not conform to the defense society's possibilities or the requests of the youth. G.M. Yegorov pointed out major failings in a number of organizations with respect to the military-patriotic indoctrination of the sportsmen and the development of good moral and ethical qualities and strong will in them.

Important dates in the life of the Communist Party, the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, outstanding Soviet statesmen, famous military leaders, Heroes of the Soviet Union and Heroes of Socialist Labor produce an important indoctrinational effect. The sports activities held on these dates put the participants into contact, as it were, with the heroes of our nation's past.

It is very important to thoroughly prepare for the sports competitions and to strive to enhance their indoctrinational role. Parachute competitions for a prize from the magazine KRYL'YA RODINY conducted in the city of Donetsk were an example of skilful organization of such activities. They drew around 30,000 spectators and turned into a real festival.

Unfortunately, there are also examples of another kind. The racing finals of the 8th Summer Sportakiad of Peoples of the USSR, which were held in Kursk, did not attract a large number of youth. This was the fault of the Kursk Oblast DOSAAF Committee, primarily of Comrade Demidov, its chairman. The stands were only half-filled.

Right now, when the finals in the 8th Summer Sportakiad of Peoples of the USSR are underway, we must do everything possible to see that each competition is performed in a well-organized and precise manner, that it be interesting to the spectators and contributes to the indoctrination of the participants themselves.

We need to conduct more competitions in the primary DOSAAF organizations--at the plants, at vocational and technical and other schools. And we should see to it that they provide good shows for the spectators and publicize the achievements of the best sportsmen. We also need to improve the work performed with the trainers, to provide them with better skills in performing political-indoctrinational work with the sportsmen.

The speaker stressed the important role of the central DOSAAF sportsclubs in the development of mass sports. They are still doing little to work out methodological recommendations for improving the ideological and moral indoctrination of the sportsmen.

Success in further improving the society's military-patriotic work depends greatly upon the state of the materials and equipment. Fleet Admiral G.M. Yegorov discussed the tasks involved in improving capital construction and material and technical supply for the DOSAAF organizations and production enterprises.

We are troubled, the speaker stated, by cases of pilferage, losses and damaging of equipment and property. These have been found in DOSAAF organizations of Stavropol and Krasnoyarsk krays and Murmansk Oblast, among others. Nor can we be satisfied with the way the material and equipment base is being utilized for military-patriotic indoctrination. The auditoriums and lecture halls belonging to DOSAAF organizations are frequently empty on Saturdays and Sundays. A number of committees are not properly seeing to the condition and the use of the technical propaganda means and are not devoting proper attention to the dissemination of literature, posters and films ordered by the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

The newspaper SOVETSKIY PATRIOT recently printed an article entitled "They Don't Get Around to it," which severely criticized the Krasnoyarsk Kray DOSAAF Committee. Almost 8,000 rubles worth of literature and graphic aids need by the primary, training and sports organizations has piled up in its warehouse. It is time for Comrade Konev, and the leaders of certain other committees as well, to establish order in such an important matter as the dissemination of military-patriotic literature.

The speaker reported that the work of DOSAAF production enterprises has improved somewhat. A great deal remains to be done, however, to enhance the production effectiveness and product quality. It is no less important to improve the indoctrinational work performed in the collectives. We need to strictly and consistently implement the Law of the USSR on Labor Collectives and the Enhancement of Their Role in the Administration of Enterprises, Establishments and organizations, which went into effect on 1 August 1983.

The June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee charged us with the task of considerably improving supervision of the ideological and the mass political work. In order for us to fulfill the tasks set at the plenum we must improve the organizational and military-patriotic work and increase its influence upon all aspects of the functioning of DOSAAF organizations.

The cadres are the key element in this matter. The DOSAAF committees are doing a lot to strengthen the cadres of the society's directing bodies, to improve the indoctrinational work performed with them and to increase their responsibility for the fulfillment of service duties. The process of improving the qualitative makeup of the leading cadres continues.

A system of retraining and instruction for the staff workers and activists has been developed in both the center and locally. This year more than 1,000 workers in various categories have already completed the Central or regional DOSAAF courses. Assemblies, seminars and conferences are regularly held. Other ways are also being used for accomplishing the political indoctrination and improving the skills of the cadres.

This is enhancing the role of the leading personnel and many workers in the committees, training and sports organizations with respect to the indoctrination of the defense society's members and is creating the preconditions for further improving it.

The 9th All-Union DOSAAF Congress justly condemned those committees which are guilty of major deficiencies in the work performed with the cadres and of not being demanding of them, those who have not rid themselves of the old methods of leadership and who do not critically assess the results of their work. Personnel turnover is still great, especially in the DOSAAF rayon and city committees.

We need to improve the selection, placement and indoctrination of cadres and be more demanding of them.

The DOSAAF committees must constantly follow our party's rules for the military-patriotic work and see that their word turns into action, as Lenin put it. With the guidance of party and soviet organs we need to thoroughly coordinate the efforts of the DOSAAF committees with those of trade union, Komsomol and other organizations concerned.

The speaker noted that the DOSAAF committees of Turkmenia, Kirghizia, the Karelian and Chuvash ASSRs, Kalinin, Kaluga, Vladimir, Ulyanovsk and a number of other oblasts are dragging their feet with the implementation of the party's demands for the ideological work. They have done nothing more than discuss these at committee plenums and meetings. The decisions they have adopted are not specific and do not name the individuals to blame for the shortcomings. The Kalinin Oblast DOSAAF Committee, for example, has discussed the state of affairs at the Kalinin Automobile School four times in the presidium and approved appropriate documents, but there have still been no improvements at the school.

Such examples as this tell us that shortcomings cannot be corrected with resolutions and instructions alone. The decisions must be backed up with organizational work and precise instructions as to how and when things need to be done, and with their fulfillment strictly monitored.

The committees absolutely must understand the fact that the very nature of DOSAAF as a mass, amateur, public military-patriotic organization demands the application of volunteer principles at all levels in the defense society. This requirement was underscored with new force in the CPSU Central Committee's greeting to the 9th All-Union DOSAAF Congress. The functioning of every defense organization must be based on the extensive involvement of the aktiv and the demonstration of initiative and self-motivated activities on the part of society members.

The decree passed at the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee points out the need to persistently strive for unity of ideological and political, labor and moral indoctrination. The example set by the leader is very important in this matter. He is always in view of the defense society's members and influences their views and attitudes not only with his words, but also with his attitude toward the work and his conduct in his personal life. And the higher the position occupied, the greater is the individual's responsibility. The vast majority

of the leaders of DOSAAF committees, training and sports organizations and production enterprises perform their party and state duty in a worthy manner. During the past 3 years around 300 DOSAAF workers have been awarded orders and medals of the USSR.

Unfortunately, the speaker noted, we still frequently encounter arrogance, rudeness, bureaucratic delay and punctiliousness. We still have officials who confuse their pocketbook with the state purse and abuse their service position. For these and other reasons the Bureau of the Presidium of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee has been forced to remove the leaders of a number of DOSAAF committees from their positions.

We cannot reconcile ourselves to the fact, F.M. Yegorov said, that for a number of years the DOSAAF Central Committee of the Moldavian SSR, the Krasnodar and Altay Kray DOSAAF Committees and the Arkhangelsk and Yakutsk DOSAAF Oblast Committees have not been properly carrying out instructions, orders and decrees issued by the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee. It is time to understand that performance efficiency is one of the most important elements defining the political and performance qualities of any leader.

The level of the indoctrinational work, the speaker said, depends greatly upon how well it is planned. It is good that most of the republics, krays and oblasts have begun using comprehensive plans, and their military-patriotic indoctrination is being more closely linked to the mass organizational, training and sports work and the management functioning of the DOSAAF committees. There is not enough consistency and efficiency in the fulfillment of these plans, however.

Excessive paperwork, speechifying and evaluation based on purely quantitative indices, lectures and reports are not to be tolerated in the military-patriotic work. For us the main criterion of its effectiveness has been and remains primarily a thorough understanding by each DOSAAF member of his patriotic duty to strengthen the homeland's economic and defense capabilities, good moral qualities and will-power and the physical preparedness of the youth to fulfill their sacred duty to defend the socialist homeland.

In his speech at the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu.V. Andropov stated: "We must resolutely bring all our ideological, indoctrinational and propaganda work up to the level of those great and complex tasks being performed by the party in the process of perfecting developed socialism." This requirement applies totally and fully to the DOSAAF organizations. Their work must be based on materials and documents of the plenum of the party Central Committee and the 8th Session of the Supreme Soviet, and instructions issued by Comrade Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Specific ways and means of implementing the decisions adopted must be thoroughly understood and discussed at plenums of the society's committees and at meetings of its primary organizations, in the collectives of the DOSAAF training and sports organizations and its production enterprises. And we need to have demanding discussion everywhere, in order to severely criticize deficiencies in all

elements of the indoctrinational system and in the organization of the military-patriotic work and the practical training of the workers and the youth in the basic military skills.

Speaking for the plenum participants and for all the members of the twice order-bearing defense society, Fleet Admiral G.M. Yegorov assured the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, its Leninist Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo headed by Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov that the DOSAAF members will do everything necessary to work even more vigorously to strengthen the economic and defense capabilities of our great homeland.

11499

CSO: 1801/405

- END -