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USSR Report

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 1, Jan-Mar 1984

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19 June 1984

USSR REPORT

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 1, Jan-Mar 1984

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language journal PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA published quarterly in Moscow by the Far East Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.

CONTENTS

Statement by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Yu. V. Andropov (pp 3-6) (not translated)	
Statement by Yu. V. Andropov (pp 7-10) (not translated)	
The Consolidation of Peace and Disarmament--A Dictate of the Times (pp 11-20) (not translated)	
* Soviet-Vietnamese Economic, Cultural, Diplomatic Cooperation Lauded (pp 15-26) (A. S. Volodin).....	1
* Current Stage of Antiwar Movement in Japan (pp 27-37) (A. I. Ivanov, Yu. D. Dmitriyev).....	13
* U.S., Japan Said To Try To 'Impose' Military Role on ASEAN (pp 38-47) (E. S. Grebenshchikov).....	24
* PRC Debates Changing Farm, Industrial Property System (pp 48-63) (I. N. Naumov).....	34
* Development of Industrial Technology in Japan: Trends and Prospects (pp 64-73) (E. V. Kikabidze).....	50
Anniversary of 1948 Communist 'Liberation' of Manchuria Noted (pp 80-81) (O. B. Vladimirov).....	60
* Translation taken from English-Language FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS No 1, January-March 1984.	

CONTENTS (Continued)

* Soviet Advisers' Assistance to Sun Yat-sen Recalled (pp 74-79) (R. A. Mirovitskaya).....	62
* Political Significance of PRC Writings on 12th-Century General Explained (pp 80-93) (S. N. Goncharov).....	68
* Recent American Writings on U.S. China Policy Critiqued (pp 94-105) (M. V. Koval').....	82
* PRC Claims of Historic Ties to Kirghizia Refuted (pp 106-119) (A. K. Karypkulov, M. Ya. Sushanlo).....	94
Qu Yuan: Hypotheses and Irrefutable Facts (pp 128-138) (N. T. Fedorenko) (not translated)	
* PRC Writers Union Head's Interest in Russia Stressed (pp 120-131) (A. N. Zhelokhovtsev).....	108
Pages from Japanese Pushkin Studies (pp 149-156) (A. I. Mamonov) (not translated)	
* Rise of Singapore, Hong Kong as International Banking Centers Noted (pp 132-137) (V. N. Karpunin).....	120
* Biography of Early Soviet Diplomat Reviewed (pp 138-139) (L. G. Sukhov).....	126
* Book on Mongolian Cultural History 1921-1940 Reviewed (pp 140-142) (S. B. Chimitdorzhiev, G. N. Zayatuyev).....	129
* Tikhvinskiy Reviews Russian Edition of Medieval Chinese Fantasy Novel (pp 142-143) (S. L. Tikhvinskiy).....	132
* Book on Mongolian Working Class Reviewed (pp 144-146) (A. V. Pantsov).....	134
* U.S. Book on Asian Policy Criticized (pp 146-151) (Yu. M. Ryakin).....	137
Japanese Poet's Legacy (pp 172-174) [Review of 'Ishikawa Takuboku-- Critic and Publicist' by V. A. Grishina] (A. A. Antipovskiy) (not translated)	
Obituary of Specialist on PRC Foreign Policy, Overseas Chinese Kotova (p 175).....	143
* Translation taken from English-Language FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS No 1, January- March 1984.	

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SOVIET-VIETNAMESE ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION LAUDED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 84 pp 15-26

[Article by A. S. Volodin: "Effectiveness of Soviet-Vietnamese Cooperation (Commemorating the Fifth Anniversary of the USSR-SRV Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation)"]

The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the SRV was signed in Moscow on November 3, 1978. It reflected the political will of our two parties, states and peoples to develop in every way the truly comradely relations that have historically formed and been tested by history itself, to strengthen tirelessly friendship and solidarity, all-round cooperation and mutual assistance. The treaty convincingly confirmed the socialist nature of the foreign policies of the Soviet Union and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which are firmly based on principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian socialist internationalism. It formalised as a legal norm of relations between the USSR and the SRV such principles as full respect for state sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, equality and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.¹

By signing the treaty the Soviet Union and Vietnam clearly and unequivocally demonstrated with new force the peaceful nature of their entire policy. By its letter and spirit the treaty convincingly shows that the USSR and the SRV emphasise in all their international activity the interests of universal peace, the development of the peoples of the Asian continent in conditions of security, and goodneighbourly relations in Southeast Asia.

Time has fully confirmed the historic importance of this document which has raised the entire complex of Soviet-Vietnamese relations to a qualitatively higher level. The powerful mobilising force of this document manifests itself in any sphere of Soviet-Vietnamese ties that we may take—political relations, economic, scientific and technological cooperation, interaction between state bodies or public organisations.

The principles of relations between our countries, jointly formulated and recorded in the treaty, have withstood the test of time. A dynamically developing mechanism of allround cooperation has been created. Inter-party and inter-state ties are being filled with rich content. The economic,

¹ See *Pravda*, Nov. 4, 1978.

scientific and technological cooperation of the Soviet Union and Vietnam is becoming ever more effective. The exchange of cultural values is acquiring an intensive nature. The foreign policy of the two countries is being coordinated. Having become a veritable charter of Soviet-Vietnamese friendship, the treaty is effectively serving the peaceful creative labour of our peoples, the defence of their revolutionary gains from any encroachments from outside. The forces of imperialism and hegemonism have to take into account its effective force whether they like it or not. The treaty's aims and principles accord with the aims of struggle by the revolutionary forces of the planet for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism.

The close unity of the CPSU and the CPV is the directing and organising force of Soviet-Vietnamese relations. Relations between our parties are characterised by sincerity, deep mutual trust, ideological and political unity, based on their loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. The CPSU and the CPV constantly protect Soviet-Vietnamese friendship as the greatest gain.

Soviet communists take justifiable pride in the fact that the CPSU and the Soviet state have made a worthy contribution to the strengthening of allround Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation. The course of further consolidating the USSR's interaction with socialist countries, the SRV among them, is clearly spelled out in the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, of the November 1982 and June 1983 Plenary Meetings of the CPSU Central Committee. When addressing the June Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yuri Andropov noted that the strengthening of the cooperation and cohesion of socialist countries is the paramount direction of the CPSU's and the Soviet state's international activity.

Solidarity and cohesion with the party of the great Lenin, with the country of the October Revolution have always been a spirited tradition of Vietnamese communists. It was already in the 1920s that the first Vietnamese communist Ho Chi Minh, inspired by the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the wonderful example of the Russian revolution, taught his associates: "When confronted by capitalism and imperialism we have the same interests. Remember the call of Karl Marx: 'Workers of all countries, unite!'"² At their 5th Congress in March 1983 the Vietnamese communists described friendship and cooperation with the CPSU and the Soviet state as the cornerstone of the SRV's foreign policy, as "a principle, strategy and revolutionary fervour" of the CPV's activities.³

Regular contacts between the leaders of our parties and states are of much importance for the inter-party relations between the CPSU and the CPV. It is during such meetings and conversations that views are exchanged on the most substantive questions of Soviet-Vietnamese relations, on the fundamental problems of party and state life in the USSR and the SRV. Pressing problems of world development are jointly analysed and the further routes of advance towards common aims are outlined.

A new impulse to the entire complex of Soviet-Vietnamese relations was given during the conversation that the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR

² Ho Chi Minh, *Selected Works*, Hanoi, 1973, p. 17.

³ *The 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam*, Hanoi, 1983, p. 97.

Supreme Soviet Yuri Andropov had with the General Secretary of the CPV Central Committee Le Duan on July 29, 1983.⁴ Comrades Yuri Andropov and Le Duan stressed the resolve of the CPSU and the CPV to develop further and perfect the allround Soviet-Vietnamese relations formalised by the treaty.

The ties between the CPSU and the CPV, based on plans of inter-party cooperation, are vigorous and multifaceted. Our parties attach much importance to exchanging experience of socialist and communist construction. Serious tasks in this field were set before the communists of our countries by the 26th Congress of the CPSU and the 5th Congress of the CPV. When expanding their exchange of experience of socialist construction, our parties proceed from the premise that this course of cooperation is an important reserve of further successes. It makes it possible to reduce the time and effort spent on the quest for the best solutions of the increasingly more complex and large-scale tasks of building a new society.

Studied today in the course of the inter-party exchange of delegations are the experience of party organising work, the forms and methods of party work in the field of ideology, questions of party guidance of various branches of industry, transport, agriculture, science, education, culture and public health. Moreover, contacts along the lines of local party bodies, scientific and educational establishments of the CPSU and the CPV are steadily expanding as is cooperation along the line of the party press. Such ties are viewed by the CPSU and the CPV as a component part of the entire system of inter-party relations.

The publication in Vietnamese of the collected works of V. I. Lenin in 55 volumes was an event of great political importance. This task was mastered by two publishing houses of the fraternal countries—the Vietnamese firm Su That (Truth) and the Soviet outfit Progress Publishers. The successful completion of this important project, started in 1971 was timed to coincide with the 5th Congress of the CPV. The publication of the collected works of V. I. Lenin, *Nhan Dan*, the newspaper of the CPV CC, stressed, is an important event in the political and cultural life of Vietnamese society, a vivid testimony of the friendship and allround cooperation between two socialist countries—the USSR and the SRV.⁵ This publication, in effect, signifies the beginning of a new stage of a fuller and all-embracing study of V. I. Lenin's creative heritage in the SRV. It provides the mass of activists new opportunities for checking the practice of socialist construction against the theory of scientific communism. This fruitful Vietnamese-Soviet cooperation, as Nguyen Vinh, Director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPV CC, stressed, is of invaluable importance for raising the theoretical standard of Vietnamese communists and helps the CPV solve complex tasks of socialist construction.⁶

When addressing the 2nd Congress of the Comintern, V. I. Lenin advanced the thesis that "with the aid of the proletariat of the advanced countries, backward countries can go over to the Soviet system and, through certain stages of development, to communism, without having to pass through the capitalist stage".⁷ The entire history of Soviet-Vietnamese relations confirms the brilliance of Lenin's foresight. The USSR's disinterested aid to Vietnam was one of the decisive factors of the Vietna-

⁴ See *Pravda*, July 30, 1983.

⁵ See *Nhan Dan*, Nov. 2, 1981.

⁶ See *Izvestia*, Jan. 21, 1983.

⁷ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 244.

these people's victory in the struggle against colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism, for the unification of the homeland, in defence of the revolutionary gains from encroachments from outside, for strengthening the country's defences. Today, too, Soviet-Vietnamese ties play the role of a mighty accelerator of the efforts of the Communist Party and working people of Vietnam to turn the SRV into a modern socialist state with a developed industry and agriculture, modern science, technology and culture.

The Soviet and Vietnamese peoples are absorbed in socialist construction. The development of the economy, the raising of the working people's living standards, the satisfaction of their cultural requirements, the progress of science and technology—these are only some of the elements of the broad front of our joint actions in which the effective force of the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty manifests itself in full measure.

Relations in the economic field hold a special place today in the steadily expanding complex of Soviet-Vietnamese ties encompassing virtually all aspects of the life of the peoples of our countries. The successes in building socialism and communism, in defending revolutionary gains are largely determined by the success with which economic tasks are being solved.

Our countries are pooling efforts to consolidate and increase the effectiveness of trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation. They are deepening the coordination of their economic development plans.

Soviet and Vietnamese planning and economic bodies have done a mass of work to ensure the best possible alignment of the common content of our cooperation and the concrete tasks in each branch of production with the requirements and real possibilities of the current stage of the social and economic development of the USSR and the SRV and the growth of national wealth, and to ensure the steady and stable advance of both countries to new heights of socialist and communist construction.

The Soviet Union and socialist Vietnam take full account of the fact that the social and economic development of the countries of the socialist community is now taking place amid an aggravated international situation and the considerable deepening of the general crisis of capitalism, with the resultant drastic growth of the aggressiveness of the ultra right-wing forces headed by the US imperialism. Imperialism is forcing an economic war on the socialist countries, resorting to economic boycott and other subversive actions. Amid the sharp class struggle in the international arena, the strengthening of the economic might of our countries, the development of interaction in this field, including the coordination of economic policy and the search for new organisational forms of cooperation, is gaining increased importance.

The merging of efforts in the solution of economic tasks is producing important results. Dozens of engineering, transport and construction enterprises as well as food and processing industry enterprises have been put into operation in Vietnam in the years since the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the SRV. These include the Kao Son strip mine with a capacity of a million tons of coal a year (first section), the Mong Ziong colliery with a capacity of 450,000 tons a year (first section), the first section of the cement works in Bim Son with a capacity of 600,000 tons of cement a year, five modern wharves in Haiphong harbour and the Intersputnik earth station.

When coordinating the economic development plans of the USSR and the SRV for the current five-year period (1981-1985), the sides reached agreement on cooperation in the construction of some 40 major economic projects in Vietnam.⁸ In fulfilment of its internationalist duty the Soviet

⁸ See *Sotsialisticheskaya industriya*, May 24, 1983.

Union is giving Vietnam assistance first of all in the development of such branches and capacities that enable that country to make effective use of its own natural resources, existing production potential and tremendous manpower resources, and to resist successfully the trade and economic pressure by imperialist and other reactionary circles.

Among the above-listed branches, mention should be made first of all of the fuel and energy complex. The programme of cooperation in the 1980s provides for Soviet technical assistance in the construction of big power projects in Vietnam: the Hoabinh hydropower station (2 mln kilowatts), the Phalai thermal power station (640,000 kilowatts), the Trian hydropower station (320,000 kilowatts), and the building of big opencast mines and coal pits in the Quangninh basin.

The USSR and the SRV devote much attention to the Vietsovpetro joint enterprise for prospecting and extracting oil and gas on the continental shelf in the south of the SRV. A powerful coastal production base, capable of ensuring offshore oil and gas extraction, was set up jointly within a short period of time in the south of Vietnam, in the area of Vungtao. Soviet research ships have performed a big volume of comprehensive geophysical and geological studies. Stationary platforms for mounting work in the open sea have been supplied by the USSR and are now being assembled.⁹ The completion of this project will go a long way in helping to solve the fuel and energy problem and allow for the creation in Vietnam of a number of new industries and will give a boost to the whole of Vietnam's economy.

Our countries are also giving unflagging attention to the solution of transport problems both inside Vietnam and on lines linking the USSR and the SRV. With the aim of developing transport in Vietnam, the Soviet Union is assisting the completion of the reconstruction of Haiphong harbour, the building of the Thanglong bridge, the longest in Southeast Asia, across Red River, and the modernisation of the Hanoi railway hub.

In our cooperation ever more importance is being given to the effective utilisation of the existing production capacities. Economic bodies are taking vigorous measures to improve the efficiency of almost 200 enterprises that have been set up with Soviet assistance and determine to a large extent the level of operation of many branches of the SRV's national economy.¹⁰ Joint work is also being done to ensure the rational utilisation of the machinery, equipment, materials and other resources supplied from the USSR. The importance of this work becomes obvious considering that the industrial projects built in Vietnam with the USSR's assistance now account for the bulk of the gross national product: 89 per cent of all coal, 76 per cent of machine tools, 35 per cent of all electricity generated in the SRV, 100 per cent of superphosphate, apatite and metal-cutting tools, and 23 per cent of all coffee.

The USSR is the SRV's biggest trading partner. Since the signing of the treaty much has been done to enhance the efficiency of trade ties. They are characterised by great dynamism. At a time when capitalism is experiencing an economic crisis, this is evidence of the stability and reliability of our economic relations. Whereas in 1978 the trade turnover between the USSR and the SRV amounted to 457.6 million roubles, in 1982 it had already exceeded a billion roubles.¹¹ In the period from 1981 to 1985 it will almost double as compared to the previous five-year period.¹² In accordance with a protocol on trade turnover and payments between the

⁹ See *New Times*, 1983, No. 35, p. 22.

¹⁰ See *Izvestia*, Dec. 31, 1982.

¹¹ See *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, April 14, 1983.

¹² See *Izvestia*, July 31, 1981.

USSR and the SRV in 1983, deliveries of Soviet goods to Vietnam will grow by more than 30 per cent as compared to 1982.¹³

Our countries are making every effort to fulfil the obligations they have taken on. The high rates of growth of the trade turnover between the USSR and the SRV are yet another piece of evidence of our countries' resolve to do everything necessary to make the multifaceted Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation have a reliable material foundation. Soviet deliveries today meet the Vietnamese economy's requirements in metal, oil products, fertilizers, machine tools, equipment and many consumer goods. In doing so our country also grants the SRV a whole number of easy terms in the field of trade turnover, prices and cargo carriage.

Growing at the same time is the volume of deliveries of Vietnamese goods to the Soviet Union. Exports to the USSR account for almost half of Vietnam's total exports. In 1982 the volume of the SRV's export to the USSR went up by 50 per cent as compared to 1980.¹⁴ Increasing especially noticeably is the export of traditional Vietnamese commodities: coffee, tea, volatile oils, black and red pepper. Deliveries of natural rubber are also growing. The population of the Soviet Far East and Siberia is getting fresh farm produce from tropical Vietnam. Garments, textiles, woolen rugs from Vietnam and the output of Vietnamese craftsmen are popular in the Soviet Union.

New forms are being introduced in the trade and economic relations between the USSR and the SRV. The new, integrated approach to cooperation established itself during the development of oil and gas deposits on the continental shelf in the south of Vietnam. A number of the SRV's industries (the textile, carpet and shoe industries) are operating partly on Soviet raw materials. The first steps are being made in developing cooperation on a buy-back basis (plantations of hevea, production of tin). So gradually taking shape in relations between our countries is the coordination of production which was predicted by Marx when he wrote about the "harmonious national and international coordination of social forms of production".¹⁵

Our countries have accumulated extensive experience of international cooperation in various spheres. Soviet and Vietnamese scientists are playing a growing role in this process. Today they are jointly working on dozens of scientific programmes that are most closely connected with the needs of the economy. The joint work of scientists is being conducted in accordance with the plan of long-term cooperation (1980-1985) signed in January 1980 by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the National Research Centre and Committee of Social Sciences of the SRV. Important work is being conducted by the state committees for science and technology of the USSR and the SRV.

The cooperation of Vietnamese and Soviet scientists fosters the strengthening of the SRV's scientific potential. It helps acquire experience of organising, managing and planning of research. Soviet research institutes have given Vietnamese scientists extensive possibilities to work in their laboratories. The Soviet Union is also giving important assistance to the creation of the modern material and technical base of Vietnamese science.

The cooperation of Soviet and Vietnamese social scientists is strengthening. They concentrate their attention on key problems of the theory and practice of building the new society, and are especially actively elaborating various aspects of the transitional period in the building of socia-

¹³ See *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1982.

¹⁴ See *Foreign Trade*, 1983, No. 4, p. 10.

¹⁵ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Works*, Vol. 17, p. 553 (in Russian).

lism. The joint writing of monographs and the holding of joint scientific conferences is being increasingly practiced.

The flight of the joint Soviet-Vietnamese crew on board the Soyuz-27 space ship became a symbol of the high level of interaction in the field of science. Cosmonauts Viktor Gorbalko and Pham Tuan carried with honour the banner of the inviolable Soviet-Vietnamese friendship over the entire planet.

Both countries are paying special attention to the training of Vietnamese national cadres. This is quite understandable for the solution of the ever increasing volume of tasks of building the material and technical base of socialism, the revolution in the field of science and technology, the reforms in the field of ideology and culture are unthinkable without skilled cadres virtually in every branch of the economy, science, technology, culture, education and enlightenment.

In the years of our cooperation more than 60,000 specialists for various branches of the SRV's economy, including some 15,000 specialists with a higher education, have been trained at Soviet educational establishments. At present some 5,000 Vietnamese students are enrolled at 150 establishments of higher learning in 33 towns of the Soviet Union. Soviet universities, colleges and research institutes have trained for the SRV more than 2,000 candidates of science and more than 40 doctors of science. Graduates of Soviet educational establishments play an important role in the economy, education, culture, science and public health system of socialist Vietnam. Among them there are ministers and economic managers, prominent party leaders, statesmen, public figures, scientists, teachers and public education officials.¹⁶

In accordance with the Soviet-Vietnamese agreement signed in 1981 our country is giving assistance in the training and advanced training of managers and specialists in the sphere of managing the national economy. The SRV was visited by over a hundred prominent Soviet experts in economics. More than 4,000 party and state functionaries and managers of the highest and middle echelon received systematic knowledge on economic management at courses conducted by these Soviet scientists.

Hundreds of Vietnamese senior officials have undergone retraining in the field of economic management at Soviet establishments of higher learning. As it is noted by the Vietnamese comrades, "the experience of the CPSU and the Soviet state at the most important stages of socialist construction—the Leninist economic policy, industrialisation and the collectivisation of agriculture—were thoroughly studied and analysed so that we could draw on everything useful in this experience that could be applied in the actual conditions of economic development and management in Vietnam".¹⁷

With the expansion in the SRV of the front of socialist construction and the complication of tasks in each section of the economy, increasingly higher demands are being made to the level of knowledge and qualifications of the main productive force of modern industry—the working class. The very growth of industry draws into its ranks masses of people who had no experience of large-scale socialist production in the past. The role of cooperation in the training of skilled workers increases in these conditions. Already for many years the USSR has been giving the SRV assistance in organising a system of vocational training. Several vocational schools have been built in Vietnam with the Soviet Union's assistance. Soviet specialists working at projects built with our country's technical assistance also share their experience and knowledge with their Vietnamese comrades.

¹⁶ See *Pravda*, Sept. 28, 1981.

¹⁷ *Pravda*, July 30, 1983.

Still all the "secrets" of large-scale industrial production can be mastered only in conditions of an actually existing socialist industry. Thus originated the idea of young Vietnamese workers being trained and working directly at enterprises and organisations in the Soviet Union. Under an inter-governmental Soviet-Vietnamese agreement, signed in Moscow on April 2, 1981, more than 15,000 young Vietnamese men and women are now staying in the USSR.

Soviet-Vietnamese cultural ties are developing on a long-term plan basis. This is facilitated by the agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation, signed in April 1982 and providing for the further strengthening and development of cultural contacts. These ties are an important channel of the drawing closer together and mutual enrichment of the socialist cultures of both countries, of the implementation of the Marxist-Leninist principles of the partisanship, popular spirit, national character and mass nature of culture and art. Every year our countries exchange exhibitions, groups and individual performers, films, television programmes, socio-political literature, fiction and publications disseminating the advanced experience of the USSR and the SRV and the other socialist countries in developing the economy, science and culture. Exchange of trips by writers, film-makers, representatives of other professional groups, cultural workers, public education and public health officials and sportsmen is of a regular nature.

The Vietnamese friends have played host to a whole number of Soviet art groups and individual performers: the Beryozka state ensemble, a ballet group, and theatre companies. In turn, the Soviet public has a possibility to get acquainted with Vietnam's culture and art. Performances of the Lotos and Youth ensembles, the Tuong national theatre and the Vietnamese circus were a big success in the USSR. Works by Vietnamese film-makers that were shown at the Moscow international film festivals were viewed by cinema goers with interest.

The Soviet Culture Days in the SRV, held for the first time last year, were timed to coincide with the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. That was one of the biggest reviews of Soviet art held abroad in the jubilee year. Numerous exhibitions, film showings, performances by Soviet theatre companies, get-togethers and festivities were held throughout Vietnam. Soviet films were shown in more than 2,500 movie houses and clubs of the country.¹⁸ The Soviet Culture Days became not only a holiday of Soviet art but also a vivid demonstration of the close and fruitful cooperation of the two countries in the field of culture. In accordance with the agreement, Vietnam Culture Days will be held in the Soviet Union in 1985 during the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

The CPSU and the CPV are tirelessly working for the further ideological drawing together of our fraternal peoples, for strengthening the feeling of unity and common historical destiny. The cooperation of the Soviet and Vietnamese mass media is of considerable importance in this process. The exchange of printed matter between the USSR and the SRV has more than trebled in the five years since the signing of the treaty.¹⁹

Soviet readers appreciate Vietnamese socio-political literature and fiction. In the postwar years books by Vietnamese authors have been published in the USSR about 300 times in a total printing of more than 13 million copies. Our publishing houses have repeatedly put out documents and materials of the Communist Party of Vietnam, works by Ho Chi Minh and Le Duan. A multi-volume *Library of Vietnamese Literature*

¹⁸ See *Izvestia*, Dec. 6, 1982.

¹⁹ See *Pravda*, April 17, 1983.

is being published in our country. Works by Vietnamese writers are being read in the tongues of 19 peoples of the USSR.²⁰

Soviet fiction, socio-political, scientific and technical literature is extremely popular in Vietnam. Being published in the SRV in mass printings are documents of CPSU congresses, works by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Yuri Andropov and other leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet state. Works of Soviet classics, literature of the period of the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War and books by modern writers are being translated into Vietnamese. More than 300 books by Soviet writers and classics of Russian literature have already been translated into Vietnamese.²¹

Ideas of the friendship and cooperation of the Soviet Union and Vietnam keynote the social life of our countries. Concern for the strengthening and deepening of Soviet-Vietnamese friendship and solidarity has become a cause of the broad popular masses. Of much importance in this process is the activity of trade unions, Komsomol and other public organisations, including the friendship societies of the USSR and the SRV which number millions of activists in their ranks. The friendship societies have become really effective assistants of the CPSU and the CPV in educating the working people of the USSR and the SRV in the spirit of mutual understanding and fraternal inviolable unity.

In July 1983 the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Society extensively marked its 25th anniversary. The telegram of greetings from the General Secretary of the CPV CC Comrade Le Duan to the Central Board of the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Society on the occasion of the anniversary read: "The Communist Party and people of Vietnam highly appreciate the big and effective contribution made by the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Society to the cause of strengthening and developing relations of fraternal solidarity between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Vietnam. These relations, which have become a glorious tradition, are rooted in the immortal ideas of the October Revolution and the great Lenin. It was steeled in the process of revolutionary struggle on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism". The Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Society is proud of this high evaluation of its activity. The society's activists are doing a lot to familiarise broad sections of the Soviet public with the life and struggle of the Vietnamese people, with its successes in the cause of socialist construction and defending the independence and sovereignty of the homeland.

It is an invariable aim of the policy of the USSR and the SRV to ensure lasting peace. The line of strengthening peace, of resolutely counteracting the aggressive policy of imperialism and its accomplices is authoritatively expressed in the decisions of the 26th Congress of the CPSU and the 5th Congress of the CPV, in the subsequent documents of our parties and states.

The leaders of the CPV and the SRV stress that the struggle for peace, for ending the arms race, for nuclear disarmament, is the top-priority task of all peoples. The policy of peace and international friendship is a concentrated expression of the will of the Soviet Union and Vietnam which have experienced the horrors of war. There are no classes or social groups in our countries that have an interest in war. The interests of building socialism and communism in the USSR and the SRV require peaceful conditions.

²⁰ See *Book Review*, 1981, No. 36.

²¹ See *Socialist Republic of Vietnam*, Moscow, 1981, p. 101.

It was stressed more than once at Soviet-Vietnamese summit talks that the Soviet Union and Vietnam have a common understanding of international problems, of ways of struggle for easing international tension, for stopping the arms race and strengthening peace. The CPSU and the CPV come out for strengthening the unity of socialist countries and the world communist movement, against the imperialist policy of the United States and its NATO allies, which are bent on attaining domination in the world with the help of military force, on achieving military superiority over socialist countries and on forming for this purpose an aggressive alliance.

The programme aims and statements of the USSR and the SRV are backed up by practical actions. Our countries have a common approach to the solution of pressing international issues. The Soviet Union and socialist Vietnam have a common strategy in the field of foreign policy—a strategy of peace and friendship among peoples. The jointly determined common course takes into account the specificities of the situation and the specific interests of our countries. It is a firm alloy of the views and positions of the USSR and the SRV.

Our countries have accumulated positive experience of practical cooperation in the foreign policy sphere. The forms of this cooperation include consultations on major international issues, exchange of information, the pursuit of a coordinated line and close interaction when carrying out measures of a foreign policy nature.

The exchange of views on pressing international issues, the formulation of a joint line in foreign policy matters constitutes a permanent content of the talks of Soviet and Vietnamese leaders, representatives of foreign policy, ideological and propaganda bodies.

The Vietnamese comrades have expressed full consent with the evaluation of the international situation outlined in the report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress, resolutely supported the Peace Programme for the 1980s. Vietnam has also supported the constructive proposals made by Yuri Andropov and also the proposals contained in the Prague Political Declaration of Warsaw Treaty member-states and the Joint Statement of the participants of the June 28, 1983 meeting in Moscow of the party and state leaders of European socialist countries.

The Soviet Union and Vietnam also have a common approach to the problem of such an explosive area as Southeast Asia, where external forces are not stopping their subversive activities. The Soviet Union is giving vigorous support to Vietnam's efforts directed at lessening tension in the region and turning Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, goodneighbourhood and stability. Our country wholly shares the peaceloving and principled course of the SRV at settling relations between the countries of Southeast Asia and developing a dialogue between the countries of Indochina and ASEAN with the aim of establishing normal relations between all countries of the region. The imperialists and other reactionary forces should be prevented from further compounding the situation in the region. An international conference on Southeast Asia, as it is proposed by Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, could be a suitable forum for discussing the problems existing in that region.²²

The Soviet Union fully supports the line of Vietnam, Laos and People's Kampuchea of further strengthening relations of friendship and cooperation linking the peoples of the Indochina peninsula. The premise from which the USSR proceeds is that their internationalist unity is a reliable shield protecting the revolutionary gains of these peoples from encroachments from the outside, a guarantee of the independence and progressive development of each of them. This unity is one of the decisive factors facilitating the consolidation of the positions of the forces of peace, national

²² See *Izvestia*, Oct. 6, 1982.

liberation and social progress not only in Southeast Asia but also in the entire Asian continent.

Proceeding from the cardinal interests of their peoples and guiding themselves by the decisions of the congresses of the CPSU and the CPV the Soviet Union and Vietnam consistently come out for the normalisation and establishment of goodneighbourly relations with China. Our countries have demonstrated goodwill and a responsible approach more than once, holding that all questions should be solved by way of talks on the basis of respect of independence, sovereignty, equality and mutual advantage, noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

The USSR and the SRV invariably come out on the side of those who now are struggling for freedom and independence, for the very existence of their peoples, who are forced to fight off the onslaught of the aggressive forces of imperialism and international reaction. Our countries support the just struggle for the final uprooting of colonialism and racism in all their forms and manifestations, support the struggle by the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, for the strengthening of independence, in defence of sovereignty, for the right to dispose freely of their natural resources, for the establishment of new international economic relations free of inequality, diktat and exploitation.

The USSR and the SRV condemn the Israeli aggressors for the heinous crimes they perpetrate with the direct support of the United States against the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples and other Arab peoples. They have stressed more than once their confidence that the just cause of the Palestinian people will triumph.

The striving of the Indian Ocean littoral states to turn that area into a zone of peace, to achieve the removal of US military bases from the region has the full support of the Soviet Union and Vietnam.

Being principled supporters of the national liberation movement, our countries have repeatedly demanded an end to the aggressive actions and hostile policy of the South African racists in respect to Mozambique, Angola and other frontline states in Africa, an end to apartheid and racism—the shame of mankind.

As it has been repeatedly stressed in high-level statements by the Soviet and Vietnamese sides, the US policy of intervention and threats of aggression is the cause of the continuing tension in Central America and the Caribbean basin. The USSR and the SRV support the struggle by the peoples of that area for peace and independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity, for social progress.

Active support is given in our countries to the nonaligned movement, which finds its strength in its directedness against imperialism and colonialism, against war and aggression. Being a participant of the non-aligned movement, the SRV presses for the consolidation of positive tendencies within that movement, facilitates the anti-imperialist unity of nonaligned countries, the cohesion of the movement with the socialist countries, with all peaceloving and progressive forces in the world. The Vietnamese delegation made a considerable contribution to the success of the 7th Conference of Heads of State and Government of Nonaligned Countries, held in New Delhi in March 1983. The SRV consistently pursues the course of developing cooperation with all countries belonging to that movement. This is confirmed by the SRV's fruitful relations with India.

The USSR and the SRV invariably express striving for an open, honest and equal cooperation with countries that are ready to reciprocate and to display goodwill, respect for the lawful interests of other states without demanding any preliminary concessions whatsoever for the normalisation of relations.

Nothing has ever darkened Soviet-Vietnamese friendship throughout its history. It is becoming stronger and more multifaceted with every year. Our cooperation is acquiring an increasingly fruitful nature. The foreign policy of our countries is gaining growing prestige in the international arena. A new type of international relations is strengthening and developing under the guidance of the CPSU and the CPV. Instead of relations between the oppressors and the oppressed, the exploiters and the exploited, this type of relations asserts the principles of comradeship and brotherhood. Following the Leninist course, the USSR and the SRV, as members of the single family of countries of the socialist community and together with their allies and friends in the whole world, are asserting the triumph of the ideals of socialism and communism.

As it was stressed during the recent visit to the SRV of the Soviet party and government delegation, the time has fully proven the tremendous vital force of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty and demonstrated that this document is a reliable instrument in the struggle for peace and security of the peoples of Southeast Asia and the whole Asian continent. The treaty is bound to serve, in the future as well, as a sound basis of the Soviet-Vietnamese relations developing in accordance with the laws of socialist internationalism.

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CURRENT STAGE OF ANTIWAR MOVEMENT IN JAPAN

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[Article by A. I. Ivanov and Yu. D. Dmitriyev]

The anti-war movement in Japan occupies a prominent place in the worldwide struggle to eliminate the nuclear threat, to curb the arms race and strengthen peace, which gained particular scope on our planet since the early 1980s, that witnessed a substantial growth of the danger of nuclear catastrophe. The movement in Japan originated several decades ago and has its traditions and special features.

The numerous sacrifices and privations which the Japanese people suffered in the Second World War as a result of the aggressive policy of militarism has generated in the broad masses of the Japanese people a resolute condemnation of the militaristic past. The dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States, which made the Japanese people the first victims of nuclear weapons and which claimed hundreds of thousands of human lives, resulted in a widespread awareness in Japan of the special danger of war involving the use of the latest weapons of mass destruction. The rout of Japanese militarism created conditions for the legal activity of democratic, peace-loving political forces.

All this taken together facilitated the forming among various sections of the Japanese population of strong and lasting anti-war sentiments, their resolve to prevent Japan from ever again embarking on the road of militarism. This resolve found its reflection in the Japanese constitution that was adopted in the first postwar years and is effective to this day, which prohibits Japan from creating armed forces and waging war.

But already in the late 1940s the forces of Japanese reaction, operating in close cooperation with the American occupation authorities, drew Japan into the orbit of the "cold war" and confrontation with the forces of socialism and national liberation. Moreover, Japan was turned into a rear base of the "hot" aggressive war conducted by the United States in Korea. The Japanese people keenly felt the threat emanating from its country's participation in imperialist plunder, from the policy of atomic blackmail pursued at the time by American imperialism. An anti-war movement began to bloom in the country. The movement for prohibiting nuclear arms acquired a broad nature in the early 1950s: more than 30 million signatures were collected in Japan.

The anti-atomic, anti-nuclear movement in Japan grew still further when anger and indignation were triggered in the country by the fate of the crew of the Japanese fishing vessel *Fukuryu-maru No. 5*, who suffered as a result of an American nuclear weapons test on the Bikini Atoll in March 1954. Since then the struggle against nuclear weapons has become an inalienable part of the Japanese anti-war movement. Starting with the mid-1950s annual conferences for the prohibition of atomic and nuclear weapons have been held early in August as a reminder of the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Gradually these conferences acquired an international nature. They are organised by the Japanese Council for Struggle to Ban Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons (Gensuikyo), which was set up in 1955 and unites numerous workers', peasants', women's, youth and religious organisations, progressive intellectuals and prominent people in the arts. Anti-atomic conferences, including activities of an in-

ternational and national nature, are being held to this day, although the movement has had to overcome considerable difficulties in the decade since the mid-1960s.

The nationwide struggle against the military alliance between the United States and Japan (the so-called "security treaty"), that mounted in the 1950s and early 1960s, and the struggle in the late 1960s and early 1970s against American imperialism's aggression in Indochina and the complicity in it of Japan, which again played the role of a supply base of a dirty war, were important milestones of the anti-war movement in Japan. The Japanese peace champions demanded a cancellation of the Japanese-American "security treaty", the withdrawal of American troops and military bases from Japanese territory, the prevention of the revival of Japanese militarism and the pursuance by Japan of a genuinely peace-loving policy.

The cooperation of the country's democratic, and progressive forces was forged in the process of the anti-war struggle of those days and preconditions appeared for their merging organisationally into a united front. The National Council of Struggle Against the "Security Treaty" was formed in the course of the protest movement against the military alliance with the United States. Represented in the Council were Communists, Socialists, representatives of trade unions, peasant, women's, youth and many other democratic organisations. The struggle against the United States' aggression in Indochina brought to life concerted anti-war actions by the democratic forces. Thus, mass concerted actions—meetings, demonstrations, etc.,—have been held each year throughout Japan on October 21 for already more than 15 years.

The task of blocking a revision of the constitution, in which the reaction wants to delete or weaken the so-called "peace" clause, acquired great urgency for Japanese peace champions in the second half of the 1970s. The attempt by the ruling circles to railroad through parliament the so-called "emergency legislation" was a trial step to create conditions for delivering a subsequent decisive strike at the constitution. The progressive public was quick in seeing through these militaristic plans and repulsed them by concerted effort. The struggle against the introduction of the "emergency legislation" gave an impulse to stepping up the activity of the People's League in Defence of the Constitution (Gokenren), which was set up back in 1954 and unites mostly Socialists and their supporters in the trade unions and democratic organisations, as well as the Liaison Council of various circles coming out for preventing amendments to the constitution (Kempo kaigi), that was formed in 1965 by representatives of a number of public organisations and the CPJ.

Amid Japan's drawing into Washington's strategic plans and simultaneously with the struggle in defence of the peaceful clauses of the constitution, also gaining increasing importance was the task to prevent the government from reneging on the "three non-nuclear principles" proclaimed by it under the influence of the demands of the popular masses: not to have its own nuclear arms, not to allow the importation of such arms into Japan and not to allow their deployment on Japanese territory.

A new powerful wave of the anti-war movement rose in Japan in the early 1980s. It came as the working masses' natural reaction to the dangerous aggravation of the international situation caused by the adventurist course of the American administration, which has set itself the aim of achieving military superiority over the forces of socialism by way of the arms race, first of all the nuclear-missile arms race, as a reaction to the drawing of Japan into the imperialist policy of confrontation with countries of the socialist community and other progressive forces launched by the United States, and also to the intensification of the militaristic

ambitions of reactionary forces in Japan itself. The awareness on the part of ever broader masses of how real the danger of nuclear catastrophe threatening mankind is sparked off a qualitatively new stage in the development of the anti-war, anti-nuclear movement.

The contemporary anti-war movement in Japan, just as in other capitalist countries, is characterised by its unprecedented scope—socially, politically and ideologically. The organisers and members of the movement include representatives of various political parties, ranging from Communists and Socialists to individual members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Thus, representatives of all political parties are among the members of the Association for Promoting International Disarmament, formed by deputies of the Japanese parliament.

The Japanese trade unions, youth, women's, cooperative and many other mass organisations are taking an active part in the anti-war movement. Representatives of the intelligentsia—writers, artists, musicians, theatre and cinema workers, etc.—are coming out resolutely for curbing the arms race. The extensive involvement of religious circles—Buddhists, Christians, etc.—is an important feature of the present stage of the anti-war movement.

Quite often vigorous actions of an anti-war nature originate spontaneously, at grass-root level without any direct links with political parties or organisations. Sometimes these actions stem from local demands of the population (for instance, demands to eliminate jamming owing to the proximity of military installations, etc.) but they reflect the mounting anti-war sentiments of the popular masses and impart new strength to the movement for peace. These actions have become known as "kusanone" (grass roots), because the demands of the masses have sprung to the surface like grass, which grows rapidly during warm spring days.

The struggle against the nuclear threat is uniting ever new sections and groups of the population, this leading to the springing up of numerous new organisations working in the anti-war movement next to and parallel with the "traditional" organisations of peace champions. Hence the diversity of methods, forms and directions of activity. The presence in the anti-war movement of representatives of various social strata, political parties and groupings increases its ideological and political heterogeneity, complicating and making more difficult the formulation of a common platform of joint actions and sometimes even cooperation in the struggle for the common aim—the consolidation of peace.

At the same time it should be stressed that mass organisations of working people with rich experience of struggle against militarism and war have constituted the most solid basis of the anti-war movement in Japan. The political parties of the working class—the Communist and Socialist—are the most consistent fighters for peace, although for reasons of the special features of the political situation in the country they do not always act in concert, limiting themselves mostly to parallel actions.

The extensive participation of the Japanese people in the collection of signatures under calls for disarmament and banning nuclear weapons, timed to coincide with the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament, was one of the forms of the anti-war movement. A whole number of organisations carried out the campaign to collect these signatures from the end of 1981 to June 1982.

The most vigorous and consistent organisations of peace champions pooled their efforts to collect signatures and formed a Liaison Council of Popular Movements for Total Prohibition of Nuclear Arms and for Disarmament. It was founded on November 14, 1981 on the initiative of a group of prominent personalities in public life, the arts and sciences. Communists and Socialists, the national trade union centres Sohyo,

Tyuritsu roren and Shinsambetsu, the Japanese Peace Committee, the Gensuikin and Gensuikyo organisations of the anti-nuclear movement, the organisation of victims of the atomic bombings and also various democratic youth, women's and other associations cooperated in the Liaison Council, which operated as a temporary coordinating body set up for the period of preparations of the Second Special Session on Disarmament.

The Council had set itself the task of informing the world of the truth about the tragedy of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, urged the people to demand the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear arms and the setting up of nuclear-free zones, and to take other steps directed at disarmament. The leaflets circulated by the Council for signing bore the following inscription: "The danger of nuclear war is on the doorstep. There should be no more victims of nuclear bombings! It is impossible to wait any longer! We persistently call for concrete actions with the aim of achieving a ban on nuclear arms and disarmament". Two major anti-war actions were organised on the Council's initiative in the country in 1982: some 200,000 people participated in Hiroshima on March 21 and more than 400,000 in Tokyo on May 23.

Parallel to this, signatures under demands for peace and disarmament were collected by the Liaison Council for Nuclear Disarmament, formed by the centrist opposition parties (Komeito, Democratic Socialism Party and the Social Democratic Union), the New Liberal Club and also the All-Japan Labour Confederation (Domei). The leadership of these parties and of Domei, which usually tried to avoid mass political actions and adopted at their congresses in recent times a number of essentially conciliatory resolutions concerning Japan's foreign policy course (they actually express approval of the Japanese-American military and political alliance and the militaristic course of Japan's ruling circles, even though their consent to the build-up of the country's military might is accompanied with reservations about "limits" on this might) could not but take into account the views of the masses demanding the adoption of immediate measures to curb the arms race.

Many religious organisations in the country vigorously joined the collection of signatures. Some of them cooperated with the above-mentioned liaison councils. The Rissho koseikai society of Buddhists and 80 other religious associations, belonging to the Federation of New Japanese Religious Organisations, were the most active of those that engaged in the collection of signatures independently.

The vast scope of the campaign for the collection of signatures under demands for disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear arms was facilitated by the numerous anti-war statements and calls made by prominent Japanese scientists, writers, artists, journalists and retired officers. These calls came one after another, starting with the appeal issued by 3,678 Japanese scientists on December 15, 1981.

The adoption by local government bodies of resolutions demanding a ban on nuclear arms and the promotion of disarmament is yet another form of the anti-war movement. After the adoption of such resolutions in 1981 by the prefectural assemblies in Hiroshima and Kanagawa, similar documents were adopted in 40 prefectures in 1982. Such resolutions were passed by 126 city assemblies in 1981 and by 298 in 1982. On March 23, 1982 the small town of Tsushima in Aichi prefecture (population 52,000), declared its territory a nuclear-free zone. In mid-October of the same year the Tokushima prefecture declared the impermissibility of deployment of nuclear arms on its territory. In 1983 the number of towns that issued declarations of peace or banned nuclear arms on their territory reached 64.

Both the scope of the anti-war movement and especially its directedness caused much concern of the Japanese authorities. Despite the constant and systematic propaganda of the myth that a "threat from the north", or "Soviet threat", supposedly exists for the Japanese, reality has proved to the masses the unfoundedness of these contentions. The Japanese people are aware of the Soviet Union's peace initiatives and its persistent striving to strengthen peace and prevent the outbreak of a new world war.

Leonid Brezhnev's answer to Japanese writers, who wrote an appeal against nuclear war, was received in Japan with much interest. The Japanese public was granted the opportunity to see for itself again the peace-loving nature of the Soviet Union's policy, its readiness never to use nuclear arms against those states that renounce the production and acquisition of these arms and do not have them on their territory. Of particular value was the readiness expressed by the Soviet Union to commence an exchange of views with Japan on the conclusion of an appropriate agreement either within the framework of a previous Soviet proposal to hold talks on confidence-building measures in the Far East or in any other forms acceptable to both sides.¹

The Soviet Union's statement on not being the first to use nuclear arms evoked widespread response in Japan. This statement gave the Japanese peace champions new strength in the struggle against nuclear arms.

As different from the peaceloving policy of the USSR, the imperialist ruling circles and the US military insisted on the "possibility of a limited nuclear war", and launched a new, unprecedented in scale spiral of the arms race, including the race in the production of the most lethal types of weapons of mass annihilation. Japan's population could not ignore the fact that its government consented to the upcoming deployment of American aircraft with nuclear capability at the airbase in Misawa, to the plans of arming ships of the US 7th Fleet, based at Japanese naval bases, with cruise missiles, which are also intended to serve as delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons.

Faced with an upsurge of anti-war actions, Japan's ruling circles arrived at the conclusion that this not only seriously obstructed the fulfilment of their own militaristic ambitions but also threatened their relations of alliance with the United States. At a joint meeting of representatives of the government and the LDP leadership headed by the then Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki in the spring of 1982, it was recommended that a series of measures be undertaken to prevent the movement against nuclear arms and for disarmament from becoming an "anti-American movement" and from "benefiting the Soviet Union". A special booklet was circulated among LDP organisations in which the movement of Japanese peace champions was described as a "manifestation of the Soviet Union's strategy". All LDP organisations received instructions with special warnings against the adoption at local level, at prefectural, city and settlement levels of anti-nuclear declarations and the proclamation of various parts of the country as nuclear-free zones. It was even recommended to keep out of resolutions of local meetings such expressions as, for instance, "promotion of disarmament". The LDP demanded of its members abstention from participation in campaigns to collect signatures under demands for disarmament and against nuclear arms.

The Liberal Democrats succeeded in impeding the activities of peace champions, for instance, in preventing on a number of occasions the adoption by local self-government bodies of such resolutions that could become a serious obstacle to the plans of militarising the country and to

¹ See *Pravda*, March 2, 1982.

the further strengthening of the military and political alliance between Japan and the United States. Thus, at a meeting of the Tokyo prefecture LDP deputies prevented the adoption of a declaration proclaiming the capital a nuclear-free city. But all this did not stop the movement against nuclear arms, for disarmament.

The big upsurge and strength of the anti-war movement in Japan is evidenced, for instance, by the fact that in May 1982 both chambers of the Japanese parliament unanimously adopted under its influence an appeal for international measures to liquidate nuclear arms and prohibit their use. Even those members of parliament were compelled to vote for this resolution who upheld the policy of building up Japanese military might and who, to a varying extent, gave actual support to the imperialist foreign policy of the United States, which threatens peace and the security of peoples.

The organisations of peace champions reached the goals set by them in collecting signatures. They sent a delegation of more than 1,200 people to the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament and presented petitions signed by 82.5 million Japanese in favour of disarmament. Of this number the Liaison Council of Popular Movements for Total Prohibition of Nuclear Arms and for Disarmament collected 28.8 million signatures, the Liaison Council for Nuclear Disarmament collected 16.1 million signatures and the Federation of new Japanese religious organisations—36.7 million signatures.² Even though the United States Department of State took measures to bar a considerable part of the Japanese peace activists from New York by denying them entry visas, the Japanese delegation took the most active part in all the activities of peace champions in New York. Six of its representatives spoke from the rostrum of the United Nations session. They recalled the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and called for a ban on nuclear arms and for disarmament.

Quite naturally, the anti-war movement did not limit itself to the collection of signatures. In their actions against the threat of nuclear war the Japanese peace champions constantly draw attention to the urgent need of resisting the drawing of Japan into the global aggressive plans of the United States, and the turning of Japan into a major military power. Held in the country all the time are meetings and demonstrations of protest against the expanding military cooperation between the United States and Japan and against the growth of the American military presence in Japan, against the joint military exercises of the two countries on Japanese soil (on Okinawa, near mount Fuji, etc.) and also in sea areas adjoining Japan, against the participation of Japan in the Rim-pac multinational naval exercises, etc.

The Japanese government's decision to start preparations for deploying at the Misawa airbase American F-16 fighter-bombers, capable of delivering nuclear weapons was met by a mass movement of protest. Demonstrations were held against the government's activities to promote the image of the "self-defence force" designed to draw young people into military service. More and more people are participating in activities against spiraling military expenditures and the resultant decline of allocations for social needs.

Large anti-war actions were held in the autumn of 1982. Anti-War Day, held on October 21, was observed in 475 localities, including concerted actions by Communists and Socialists in 25 prefectures out of 47 (in Tokyo and a number of other prefectures organisations associated either with the CPJ or the SPJ conducted their activities separately). Anti-war meetings and demonstrations within the framework of the Week of Strug-

² See *Asahi nenkan*, 1983 (Yearbook of the newspaper *Asahi*, 1983), p. 458.

gle for Disarmament, proclaimed by the United Nations, were held in many parts of the country on October 24. The most impressive of them was the meeting organised by Sohyo in Osaka and attended by 500,000 people.

Anti-war actions in the autumn of 1982 demonstrated the untenability of the assertions widely made in Japan about an inevitable "tailing off" of the anti-war movement after the ending of the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament. There was no doubt that the contentions about the temporary nature of the mass participation in anti-war activities emanated from the ruling party, which feared that the mass anti-war movement against the drawing of Japan into the global military strategy of the United States, against the country's militarisation, would undermine the LDP's and the government's positions.

It goes without saying that some forms of the anti-war activities (the collection of signatures, the sending of delegations to New York, etc.) were directly timed to coincide with the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament and ended with the conclusion of the session. Likewise, some organisations set up specially for these actions, including the Liaison Council of Popular Movements for Total Prohibition of Nuclear Arms and for Disarmament, ceased their activities. This, however, did not mean at all a termination of the anti-war movement. Mass anti-war organisations, first of all those with long experience of the struggle for peace, are continuing intense activities. The principal aims of the anti-war movement remain as well: to liquidate the nuclear threat, to curb the arms race, to ban nuclear arms, to terminate the Japanese-American military alliance, to prevent Japan from becoming a major military power, to ensure that Japan pursues a genuinely peace-loving policy, to protect the peaceful constitution, etc. After the ending of the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament one can speak of a certain regrouping of the anti-war movement in Japan, about a certain change in the ways and means of anti-war actions.

Already in the beginning of 1983 there was a new upsurge of the anti-war actions in Japan. The immediate impetus for this were the belligerent statements made by the Japanese Premier Nakasone during his visit to the United States in January about the intention to turn Japan into an "unsinkable aircraft carrier", to block international straits near the Japanese shores and about the "defence" by the Japanese navy of sea lanes at a distance of a thousand miles from Japan. The Japanese public rightly regarded these statements by the prime minister as evidence of the further strengthening of the military alliance between Japan and the United States, of the expansion of Japanese-American military cooperation and also of Japan's ruling circles' desire to play a more prominent military role in the world.

Nakasone's belligerent statements along with the nagging calls to strengthen the "solidarity of the Western world", this meaning in practice full acceptance by the major capitalist countries of the adventurist course of the Reagan Administration, fuelled the fears of the popular masses that the United States could draw Japan into war contrary to the will of its people. A poll conducted by the Japanese NHK Radio and Television Corporation in October 1982 showed that 78 per cent of Japanese believed in the existence of such a possibility.³ Further public opinion polls, repeatedly conducted by the Japanese mass media in 1983, revealed that the majority of the population mistrusted the Nakasone government's "defence policy".

³ See *Japan Press Weekly*, April 16, 1983, p. 14.

The mass meeting and demonstrations held in many parts of Japan under the slogans "We will prevent the turning of Japan into an unsinkable aircraft carrier!", "We will prevent the turning of Japan into a nuclear battlefield!" reflected these mass sentiments. The mass actions combined with speeches in parliament by deputies of left-wing parties. Deputies from the CPJ and SPJ used the parliamentary rostrum to condemn the government's militaristic policy, to demand an end to Japan's military cooperation with the United States, a reduction of military spending, and vigorous actions by Japan in the international arena for detente, disarmament and the strengthening of peace.

In the spring and summer of 1983 Japanese peace forces staged a number of mass anti-war actions. It was announced at a meeting attended by 5,000 people in Tokyo late in February, that almost 22 million signatures had been collected under a petition to parliament demanding a cut in military spending and the use of the money thus saved for the needs of the people.

A national week of protest actions against the entry into Japanese ports of the American nuclear-powered aircraft carrier *Enterprise* was held from March 20 to 26. Meetings and demonstrations of protest were held in many towns, the largest of which was in Sasebo, the port where the *Enterprise* called in March 1968 after a 15-year interval. At the head of a whole squadron of American naval ships. Concerted national actions for the liquidation of the Japanese-American "security treaty" were held on April 28.

Anti-war slogans were prominent also at May Day demonstrations and meetings attended by 3.9 million people throughout Japan and 350,000 people in Tokyo. The participants in the May Day activities condemned the arms race, and opposed the militaristic course of the Nakasone government, which wants to turn the country into an "unsinkable aircraft carrier". Demands in defence of the peaceful constitution and against its revision by the ruling circles were voiced in many parts of the country on May 3 during activities devoted to the 38th anniversary of the coming into force of the country's fundamental law.

The 26th Peace March from Tokyo to Hiroshima and Nagasaki took start on May 7. Such marches have been held in Japan every summer since 1958 on the eve of the anniversary of the barbarous atomic bombing of Japanese cities. The peace marches in the direction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were conducted also from the far north and south of Japan (from Hokkaido and Okinawa), from the Toyama, Niigata, Mie and Wakayama prefectures, from Shikoku island, etc.

A movement of protest in the country against the mounting military presence of the United States, which is fanning up tension in the Far East, rose in the country in response to the Japanese government's consent to allow the modernised American battleship *New Jersey* with Tomahawk cruise missiles on board and the American nuclear-powered aircraft carrier *Carl Vinson* to enter Japanese ports. In response to a call by the Central Executive Committee of Struggle for the Liquidation of the "Security Treaty", for the Satisfaction of Other Demands of the People, the Japanese Council of Struggle for the Prohibition of the Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo), the Japanese Peace Committee, the Central Liaison Council of Youth and Students, the National Liaison Council against Military Bases, a week of protest against the call at Japanese ports of the battleship *New Jersey* and the turning of Japan into an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" was held from July 16 to 24. The city assembly of Yokosuka, one of *New Jersey's* ports of entry, unanimously voted against the call.

Anti-war slogans were also present at election campaigns throughout 1983. Thus, questions of struggle for peace were actively debated during

the April national elections to local bodies of government in Hokkaido, which the ruling circles want to turn into an anti-Soviet bastion by means of a revanchist campaign of territorial claims to the Soviet Union. The elections for the post of governor of Hokkaido were won by T. Yokomichi, a candidate of the Socialist Party who is for Japan's development along the road of peace and neutrality. This meant that the people of Hokkaido reject the militaristic designs of the Japanese reaction. It is indicative that parallel to the election campaign the socialists conducted in April and May nationwide actions in defence of the peace constitution, against the war danger and for disarmament.

The SPJ also devoted much attention to questions of the struggle for peace and disarmament during the elections to House of Councillors of parliament. It based its activities on its concept of "unarmed neutrality". This is the policy that Japan should promote, in the opinion of Socialists in order to make its contribution to the cause of strengthening peace throughout the world. The present SPJ Chairman M. Ishibashi, one of the co-authors of this concept, stressed that since there would be neither winners nor losers in a nuclear war it is much more important to think about the prevention of war than about armaments. "Unarmed neutrality" means renunciation of militarisation and the conclusion of military alliances with other states, a policy of developing friendly relations with other countries. This concept of the socialists is criticised from various directions, being labeled as "unrealistic" and "failing to accord with the present international situation", but the CPJ substantiates its position by saying that the policy of unarmed neutrality would serve the best interests of Japan, as a country that was the victim of atomic bombing and has a constitution prohibiting armament and the waging of war.

The problems of the struggle for peace, against nuclear arms were actively raised during the already-mentioned parliamentary election campaign also by a number of "mini-parties" that sprang up in 1983, first of all the Movement for Peace and Democracy and the Civic Alliance of Non-Party Members, that were formed by such prominent representatives of the Japanese anti-war movement as the noted writer and publicist M. Oda and the influential politician and public figure, adviser of the Association of Members of Parliament for the Promotion of Disarmament T. Utsunomia. These groups tried to get their candidates elected to parliament by appealing first of all to the anti-nuclear and anti-militaristic sentiments of the public.

But the attempts of these "mini-parties" to secure for themselves a place on Japan's political arena ended in failure. Neither was the Socialist Party's performance a success. In this connection the Liberal Democrats contend that "pacifism is unpopular in the country", that anti-war calls do not have the support of the masses.

But these contentions lack any substantiation. First, they are disproved by the already-mentioned numerous public opinion polls. Second, the failure of the "mini-parties" at the elections to the House of Councillors is explained primarily by the fact that in the multi-party system existing in Japan it is all but impossible for new small political groupings to win an influential and, the more so, stable position, in particular in parliament. As to the failure of the SPJ, this, too, can be explained by factors of a political and inner-party nature. Third, for the Communist Party of Japan, which vigorously promoted anti-war slogans during the election campaign, the elections were a success.

In April the Chairman of the Presidium of the CPJ CC K. Miyamoto suggested that the government proclaim Japan a nuclear-free country. On May 1 the Japanese Communists started a nationwide campaign to collect signatures under the call to adopt a declaration on non-nuclear

Japan. This work was continued as well during the election campaign to the House of Councillors.

As the anti-war movement in Japan developed, it continued to produce new forms of activity. The "10-Foot Movement" is gaining ever greater popularity in the country. It began with the aim of purchasing from the United States a film made and carefully concealed by the Americans about the consequences of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Every participant in the movement donated enough money to buy a part of the film 10 feet in length. Then this movement set itself the aim of using documentary cinematography to tell the truth to Japan and other nations about what awaits mankind in the event of the outbreak of a nuclear war, about who is preparing such a war and how, about the struggle by peace forces to prevent nuclear catastrophe. Three documentary films have already been made, one of them with the assistance of Soviet peace champions. Already more than 500,000 people are taking part in the "10-Foot Movement".⁴

Tens of thousands of rank-and-file Japanese are helping the campaign to collect money necessary for the holding of anti-war activities. Thus, very popular is the movement held under the slogan "Even one yen received from you will help the cause of peace".

Vigorous actions by Japanese peace champions helped the successful holding of the latest international conference against nuclear arms, that was held from August 1 to 9, 1983 in the form of a number of joint activities of Japanese peace champions in Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the participation of 160 foreign peace champions from 33 countries and 13 international organisations, including a delegation from the Soviet Peace Committee.

After the split in the Japanese anti-nuclear movement in the mid-1960s, the joint holding of this major forum of Japanese peace champions was the seventh since 1977. And although the organisational unity of the mass anti-nuclear movement has not yet been restored and the two special organisations setting themselves the aim of mobilising the public in a struggle against the nuclear war danger—Gensuikyo and Gensuikin (Japanese National Congress of Struggle for Banning Nuclear Arms, formed in the mid-1960s with the support of the CPJ and a number of trade unions) continued to operate mostly separately. The cooperation of these organisations, and also of Communists and Socialists, trade union centres, etc., in holding the international anti-nuclear conference confirmed and demonstrated once again the need of cohesion in the struggle against the war danger of most diverse forces and trends irrespective of their political and ideological orientation.

The participants in the conference were in agreement that the most important and urgent tasks of all upright people now are to ensure universal peace, stop the arms race, first of all the nuclear arms race, to effect a discontinuation of nuclear weapon tests and a total ban on them, and to exclude the danger of nuclear catastrophe from the life of mankind. It is these tasks that formed the basis of two important documents adopted at the conference—the Tokyo Declaration and the Nagasaki Appeal.

The conference demanded the liquidation of all foreign nuclear bases and supported the idea of creating nuclear-free zones. It assessed highly one of the most important Soviet peace initiatives—the USSR's pledge not to be the first to use nuclear arms.

As the international anti-nuclear conference was being held, meetings and demonstrations again took place in many Japanese cities under the slogans of "No to nuclear arms", "Prevent the turning of the country into an unsinkable aircraft carrier of the Pentagon", "No to the strengthening

⁴ See *Pravda*, June 7, 1983.

of the military alliance with the United States", "No to the militarisation of Japan". Representatives of all sections of the population took part in the anti-war activities timed to coincide with the 38th anniversary of the barbarous atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The vigorous anti-war actions in Japan have not yet merged into a single, organised stream of all, or of the majority of peace champions and have not yet resulted in a total sobering up of the reactionary, militaristic forces. Still the process of Japan's turning into a seat of military danger in the Far East has been substantially slowed down. The ruling circles of Japan have been forced to manoeuvre, to try to justify in every way their military cooperation with the United States and the militarisation of the country. Attempts are being made to dampen the intensity of the anti-war movement, to sow confusion in its ranks, to spearhead it against the USSR under the false pretext of the "Soviet military threat". But the Japanese people's desire for lasting peace is growing, this creating an objective basis for the further invigoration of the anti-war movement. The Japanese people must say its decisive word in the choice of its country's road of development.

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U.S., JAPAN SAID TO TRY TO 'IMPOSE' MILITARY ROLE ON ASEAN

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 84 pp 38-47

[Article by E. S. Grebenshchikov, candidate of historical sciences: "ASEAN in the Strategy of Washington and Tokyo"]

The Reagan Administration has made it a rule to proclaim practically any region of the world a zone of "vital" interests of the USA, having declared a "crusade" against socialism on a global scale. At the same time, under the flag of struggle against the "communist threat", the reactionary imperialist quarters spare no efforts to consolidate their positions in the former colonial world and prevent the urge of the developing countries towards independent development. Washington is going out of its way to subordinate Southeast Asia to its diktat as well; despite its "traumatic" experience, the USA is obviously seeking to take revenge.

In spite of the tasks and aims of the Association provided for in its Charter and orienting it towards solving by joint effort the vital socio-economic problems, ASEAN has been continuously subjected to powerful pressure brought to bear by the united front of capitalist powers which are intent to turn the Association into a militaristic alliance and an instrument of their policy of confrontation. Since the early 1980s the countries of the "Five" are being actively drawn into the struggle against socialism, forces of social renovation and progress not only at the regional level, but also on a global scale, including the UN, the non-aligned movement, and other broad international forums.

1

The collapse of the intervention in Indochina impelled the US ruling quarters, which nevertheless have never given up their imperial claims to look for more rational methods of controlling processes and developments in Southeast Asia. It was assumed that such a goal could be best achieved by relying on regional alliances and organisations of pro-Western orientation. Henry Kissinger, at that time Professor at Harvard University, gave a clear enough formulation of this approach. He wrote: "Regional groupings supported by the United States will have to take over major responsibility for their immediate areas, with the United States being concerned more with the overall framework of order than with the management of every regional enterprise."¹ Such a task in Southeast Asia could obviously be entrusted only to ASEAN, because AZPAC which initially had competed with it, was paralysed, and SEATO completely discredited itself as a direct instrument of aggression. Making use of the prejudice of the ASEAN countries' ruling element against socialism, Washington tried to channel the development of the Association in a direction favourable to it, primarily stimulating its militarisation.

Back in 1968, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, speaking with the

¹ *Agenda for the Nation*, Washington, 1968. p. 614.

straightforwardness which subsequently was only rarely matched by the US top ranking figures, demanded from ASEAN members "to spare no efforts to build up ASEAN as a purely military organisation".² US strategists have invariably regarded this grouping as an obstacle to the "spread of communism", as an anti-Chinese and later as an anti-Vietnamese outpost, the major point of the wide "security belt" embracing East Asia and Australasia and supported by the military might of the United States.

From the very beginning, however, the leaders of the "Five" have not expressed their readiness completely to join the US aggressive line and be integrated into the military-political system of imperialism, realising that this would limit their freedom of manoeuvre and increase tensions in that already disturbed region. Besides, they thought that the primary task was the consolidation of ASEAN as a non-military organisation and assertion of its individuality and originality, whereas "SEATOisation" would not contribute to this goal.

Nevertheless, the Pentagon would not renounce its efforts to impose on the Association the functions which are unusual to it, in which it relies on the influential pro-American militaristic lobby in the countries of the "Five". It is no wonder that a campaign is launched regularly for the extension of the framework of the grouping, intensification of military cooperation between its members, and for the spread of the integration process into the military-political sphere. Attempts were made to push through the idea of conducting military exercises involving four or even five countries (till now they were held only between two or sometimes three countries). Every three months, meetings of experts of ASEAN countries are convened on the problems of standardisation of armaments, at which specific measures are chartered in that sphere.

A system of joint purchases of armaments and combat hardware abroad is being worked out, and this, naturally, leads to a greater unification of the arsenals of ASEAN countries. Saiut Kerdpol, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Thailand, who is rather active in that sphere, proposed the members of the Association to store ("in case of a conflict") logistical essentials on one of the Pacific islands belonging to the USA. The idea of using the American Clark Field Air Base in the Philippines for the training of airforce personnel of the "Five" under the guidance of US instructors was also set forth. As seen by the Pentagon, today it is especially important for the US military establishment that ASEAN countries situated at the junction of the two oceans continue to develop "further the capacity of member-countries to support the projection of United States power from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean... and the Gulf".³ US bases in the Philippines may serve as transit point for such projection.

The idea of joining other members of ASEAN to ANZUK set up in 1971 and including Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand, and also two members of ASEAN—Malaysia and Singapore—testifies to the sophisticated tactics of ASEAN militarists and their overseas patrons. This is an attempt, not only to galvanise the hitherto unimportant grouping, but also to find ways of imparting military character to the Association under some aegis. Direct participation of the USA is not provided for, and perhaps, there is no need for it. Australia and New Zealand—US partners in ANZUS—may serve as vehicles of its influence.

The "reserve version"—the plan for reanimation of SEATO—has not been abandoned either, the more so that the 1954 Manila pact, on the

² *Eastern World*, May-June 1968, pp. 5-6.

³ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 116, No. 25, June 18, 1982, p. 11.

basis of which this close alliance was set up, is regularly confirmed. The *Economist* noted that the new US-Philippino agreement on bases included for the first time a reference to SEATO, which enables the USA, in the opinion of a "high-ranking American diplomat", to use the bases in the Philippines to defend Thailand.⁴ It is only natural that the close military cooperation of these two countries with Washington cannot but cast shadow on the character of the entire organisation which, as early as 1971, declared the establishment of a zone of peace and neutrality in Southeast Asia as its policy-making task. Adam Malik, former Vice-President of Indonesia, who for more than twelve years was its Foreign Minister and, in effect, a founder of the Association, stated in an interview to *Asahi*: "The presence of US troops in the region is incompatible with the policy of peace and nonalignment pursued by ASEAN countries."⁵ However, they are present there, and on rather a large scale. The Pentagon has the following strongpoints on the Philippines: a naval base at Subic Bay and an airbase at Clark Field, the latter being the largest US base outside the United States. The two bases are manned by more than 18,000 US military and civilian personnel. According to the press, these bases are annually visited by hundreds of thousands of US servicemen.

Under the pretext of "maintaining the balance of forces" in the western part of the Pacific, after short negotiations Washington succeeded, in June 1983, to sign a memorandum with Manila on the continuation of using the bases on its territory during the next five years, although the government of the Philippines has to encounter the mounting and better organised public movement for the elimination of the US military presence and for the observance of the nonaligned principles in foreign policy.

Taking into account the unpopularity of their decision, the authorities promised that "in the final analysis" US bases in the Philippines would be closed down. It would not be out of place to recall the fact that the constituent declaration of ASEAN adopted in August 1967 proclaimed the "provisional" status of foreign military bases in ASEAN zone.

After the Pol Pot regime was toppled in Kampuchea, Washington redoubled its efforts in cultivating "special relationships" with Thailand. While the Philippines are regarded by the Pentagon as an outpost of US naval policy, Thailand may apparently be regarded as the edge of the US continental strategy spearheaded against the socialist countries of Indochina.

Inroads and raids against the People's Republic of Kampuchea are conducted by the armed detachments of Pol Pot men and other Khmer counterrevolutionaries from the territory of Thailand with the connivance or, to be more precise, the encouragement of the latter's ruling circles. The flow of expensive armaments and military hardware to the "frontline state" (as it is called in Washington) is growing. The line towards whipping up tensions in Southeast Asia, with the White House behind it, inflicts serious damage on the Thai economy which is going through a crisis. One may get the impression that some Thai leaders are turning their country into a pawn in the risky game played by their overseas partners with the destinies of Southeast Asia.

It is no secret why the US military display such a profound interest in the territories bordering on China. There is no grounds to talk about a "return" of the United States to that region, because it has never left

⁴ *Economist*, June 11, 1983, p. 52.

⁵ *Asahi*, Feb. 2, 1983.

it. The USA counters the successes in peaceful construction in the countries of Indochina and the far-reaching social transformations there by the demonstration of might, muscle flexing, and the "red menace" scare campaign.

Speeches by Washington crusaders often refer to Thailand and the Philippines as the "key" states in Southeast Asia. The USA has been purposefully working to intensify military contacts with them (arms supplies, exchanges of military delegations, training of military personnel, calls of the US Seventh Fleet at local ports, etc.).

Simultaneously, the US military-industrial complex has made contacts with other ASEAN countries as well. For instance, Singapore already provides military-technical service to US reconnaissance planes barraging over the Indian Ocean. The press carried reports about the intention of this small state to purchase three US-made AWACS aircraft, which may become an important step towards creating an integrated air defence system of the Association countries.

The Republican administration is characterised by an emphasis on the military and political contacts with the ASEAN countries. While welcoming in word ASEAN's economic and social achievements (Ronald Reagan even called it a "model of economic cooperation"), the USA is avoiding giving these countries any substantial aid in this particular sphere. In reply to the appeal of the leaders of the "Five", Washington recommended that ASEAN rely on multilateral financial agencies of the capitalist world and US private capital, rather than on governmental aid given on easier terms (this aid tends to be reduced).

In a bid to set up *cordon sanitaire* around Indochina, the US is assigning the main role in this unseemly, or, to be more precise, provocative campaign, to ASEAN countries, preferring to stay in the background. At a press conference, US Secretary of State George Shultz answered in the affirmative to the question as to whether the United States exerted continuous military pressure on Vietnam and specified that Washington preferred to act through "the Asian countries".⁶ This obviously brings to mind the Nixon "Guam Doctrine", which blessed the practice of setting one Asian state against another. According to the official version of the US State Department, Washington limits itself only to the support of ASEAN strategy directed at rendering political, moral and humanitarian assistance to Khmer resistance, as Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant US Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, stated during his visit to Thailand. Such assertions do not hold water. First, Washington is a chief instigator and inspirer of interference in Kampuchea's internal affairs. Second, the policy of the Association countries, given the illegal nature of its provisions on the "Kampuchean problem", is not so homogeneous; third, far from everyone agrees with the negative aspects of that policy in the ASEAN countries in which there is a growing will for a dialogue with Hanoi and for seeking a way out of the artificial deadlock.

Despite the community of class interests and rigid anti-communist views of the US ruling quarters and the ASEAN countries, the relations between the sides are marked by permanent friction and acute differences. The leaders of the "Five" regularly tell Western powers, the USA above all, that contacts with the Association should be built on the principles of sovereign equality and respect for its needs. Jusuf Wanandi, an Indonesian researcher (who can hardly be suspected of unloyalty toward the USA) writes: "...It is hoped that the administration will develop a greater sensitivity to the aspirations and interests of its allies in the

⁶ Department of State Bulletin, March 1983, p. 62.

region"⁷. Wanandi is against spreading to ASEAN the "global rhetoric on the Soviet threat to the Third World," concoctions about which, together with the inventions about "Vietnamese expansionism" are fabricated by the imperialist propaganda services and their minions. And here is an admission of an American author, who said that in a substantial part of Asia, particularly in the ASEAN states, there was a growing awareness that the Reagan Administration did not understand their problems and was unwilling to deal with them. Moreover, he added, actually it even aggravated them by its obsession with the Russian threat.⁸

Washington's persistent attempts to turn the Association into a pliant instrument of an aggressive policy shows that without any hesitation it is ready to sacrifice to its hegemonistic designs the goals of this organisation, which have been more than once solemnly proclaimed at different international forums.

2

Washington is active in enlisting the help of its allies from the capitalist camp and primarily its number one partner in Asia—Japan—in implementing its own strategic and tactical aims in Southeast Asia. Since the foundation of ASEAN, the USA and Japan have closely coordinated their approach to this organisation; particularly intensive consultations between Washington and Tokyo were held on the eve of major events within the framework of the grouping (primarily, two summit meetings in 1976 and 1977, and the annual conferences of foreign ministers of the "Five"). Both powers almost simultaneously established official contacts with ASEAN as an organisation—the USA in March, and Japan in September 1977. The strict sharing of roles between them involved a high degree of mutually complementary effort: the USA kept its military-strategic eye on that zone, while Japan "patronised" it economically.

Of late, however, such pattern of divided responsibilities has ceased to satisfy the White House. Discontent both in the academic community and governmental spheres of the USA is growing in view of the United States having to carry an "unproportionately large" part of expenditures for the maintenance of "order" in the ASEAN subregion, while the Far Eastern ally has concentrated its effort and resources on foreign economic expansion. Urging Tokyo to escalate its military outlays at a high rate, the US government hopes, among other things, to undermine the competitiveness of the Japanese monopolies.

The class and political imperatives dictating the need for joint efforts to reinforce the subordinate situation of the ASEAN countries within the system of the international capitalist division of labour in no way remove the fierce competitive struggle between US and Japanese monopolies. For the time being these clashes are in favour of the latter, but their US rivals are preparing a springboard for a counteroffensive. This is the background against which the responsibilities between Washington and Tokyo are being redistributed. This process boils down to the enhancement of Japan's "responsibility" for the situation in the ASEAN zone by means of its gradual involvement in military and political activities there. Washington uses a wide range of means for bringing pressure to bear on Japan to make it escalate its military effort.

In a lead article, *Asahi Evening News* quoted Carlos Romulo, Foreign Minister of the Philippines, who during World War Two fought ag-

⁷ *Economic, Political and Security Issues in Southeast Asia in 1980s*, Berkeley (Cal.), 1982, pp. 118, 121.

⁸ See *Foreign Affairs*, 1982, No. 3, p. 693.

against Japanese occupationists. "History must not be repeated. Both America and Japan are committing a grave mistake. America for prodding Japan into increasing its military power, and Japan for blindly following the American order,"⁹ he said.

Japan's military ambitions are fraught with a grave threat to ASEAN countries, considering their geographic proximity, strategic positions, rich and diverse mineral resources, and also Japan's traditional "interest" in that zone.

No small danger lies in the fact that the Japanese military carry out their far-reaching plans in a *fait accompli* manner seeking to evade a wave of criticism and opposition to these plans in Japan itself. For example, the government made no clearcut official statements concerning the one-thousand mile maritime "defence" zone which, as it is obvious, spreads to the waters washing ASEAN countries. The *Australian Financial Review* wrote that Tokyo's defense strategy had taken shape imperceptibly, and the expansion of the Japanese government policy to the defence of ships under foreign flags bringing commodities to Japan took place in the course of a remark by Nakasone in the Japanese parliament on March 9, 1983.¹⁰

Serving as a propaganda cover for these measures are anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnamese insinuations which, although being obviously senseless, still influence to a certain extent some political leaders of ASEAN countries. Not without influence from outside, the "Five" began, though with certain reservations, to allow in recent years a possibility of Japan's military buildup allegedly to counter "communist expansion". There were calls for Tokyo to help building in ASEAN countries large-scale enterprises producing weaponry and military hardware on US licences. This is nothing but preparations for the formation of an actual military-political alliance between Japan and ASEAN with the blessing and support from the United States.

Initially, granting the Japanese armed forces some military-police functions in Southeast Asia was described as a "forced" measure, a compensation for the reduction of the United States' involvement in that region, and a means of filling the "vacuum" which may form as a result of US combat units being sent elsewhere. Today these "defense" arguments have been cast away. The White House states categorically that even a partial reduction of US military activities in Southeast Asia is out of the question. On the contrary, a "sharp increase" of US military presence in the Pacific is expected, with ASEAN being its inalienable part.¹¹

The US and Japanese military buildup and consolidation of their military alliance portends only the growth of tensions in Southeast Asia, making the prospect for stabilisation of the situation in the region even more remote.

After Prime Minister Nakasone visited the Association countries last spring, Tokyo asserted that it allegedly succeeded in finally convincing these states of the "defense character" of the Japanese military programmes. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, a usually reliable source, wrote that the semblance of a positive reaction in the countries of the "Five" was intended to be used for weakening the domestic opponents of the defensive buildup and depriving the Japanese opposition of a powerful argument¹² (the opposition parties constantly drew attention of the

⁹ *Asahi Evening News*, Jan. 25, 1983.

¹⁰ See *Australian Financial Review*, April 19, 1983.

¹¹ See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 21, 1983, p. 39.

¹² See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 19, 1983.

government to the protests voiced in Southeast Asia against the rearmament of Japan). This implies that the Japanese ruling elite either deliberately misinformed the public or was deceived, having underestimated the strength and depth of firm anti-Japanese and anti-militaristic sentiments in ASEAN.

There are no doubts as to the direction of the Tokyo diplomatic effort. According to *New York Times*, it is aimed at political and military influence of Japan to be felt in all countries of the Pacific.¹³ The advocates of the large-scale rearmament of Japan are also ready to act in contravention of the peaceful provisions of the Japanese constitution. *Ekonomisuto* magazine arrives at a conclusion that "Nakasone's chief aim is to set up an anti-Soviet bloc in East Asia. However, the formation of a vast anti-Soviet security system... should rather be called not an 'original construction' by Nakasone but a 'global strategy of Reagan'. Nakasone only plays the role of an active middleman."¹⁴

The Republican Administration is forming an anti-Soviet coalition on a global scale, with Japan acting as a regional "subcontractor".

Of course, to a certain extent, the United States is compelled to reckon with the on the whole negative reaction of ASEAN countries, as well as many other Asian states, to Japan turning into a powerful military state, because this brings back the formidable ghosts of the past. Therefore, Washington deems it expedient to pose, as the London-based *World Today* put it, "as guarantor of Japan's good behaviour".¹⁵ Even Americans (including the military) often asked themselves about the unpredictable consequences of Japan's militarisation, since it threatens to go out of control.

Those who are at the helm in Tokyo hope to decide the destinies of the regional group. Moreover, in the future they even see the contours of Japan-ASEAN alliance, which would make it possible to increase Japan's weight in world politics. They avoid advertising their intentions, urging, for the time being, statements in favour of this concept in countries of the "Five". It is planned to reach this goal in alliance with, and reliance on, the USA. In seeking to prove their loyalty to the patron, the Tokyo politicians keep calling on ASEAN countries to strengthen the bonds linking them with the United States and in no way "to alienate themselves" from Washington. "Neutrality [what is meant here is, probably, the principles of nonalignment.—E. G.], however, cannot be made use of in an emergency to secure the stability of Southeast Asia," noted Toru Yano, an expert in international affairs who is close to the government, "even though it is a strong positive factor. This is why the role the US can play in Southeast Asia must be considered."¹⁶

Prior to 1979, i. e., before the toppling of the Pol Pot regime, Tokyo, though inconsistently, advanced the thesis of the need for a more flexible approach to Vietnam than that being offered by Washington. Today the Japanese policy is practically identical to the American approach. At present the allies are seeking together to preserve the crisis in the international relations of Southeast Asia, piling up obstacles on the way leading towards the improvement of the situation. For example, on the eve of the visit of Shintaro Abe, Japanese Foreign Minister, to Bangkok to meet his colleagues from ASEAN, *Mainichi* reported about the discontent in the ruling quarters of Japan concerning the quest by the Association of a way towards an "agreement" with Vietnam, which may result in an "actual recognition of the *status quo* in Kampuchea [i. e., the

¹³ *New York Times*, Dec. 7, 1982.

¹⁴ *Ekonomisuto*, May 3, 1983.

¹⁵ *World Today*, Vol. 39, No. 6, June 1983, p. 214.

¹⁶ *Asia Pacific Community*, No 3, Jan. 1979, p. 19.

legitimate regime in the People's Republic of Kampuchea.—E. G.] on the part of ASEAN".¹⁷

The overlapping of interests of the USA and Japan makes itself clearly felt in the "Pacific Community" concept which they are advocating. It is self-evident that, without participation of ASEAN countries, this idea will actually hang in the air. There are different variants of the composition of that forum, yet ASEAN countries are regarded as "firm" candidates. The USA, Japan and also Australia have already launched a long-term campaign to persuade the Association members. South Korean authorities, too, hurried to make their contribution. In May 1982, of course, with sanction from Washington, they came out with a proposal to convene a summit meeting with the participation of the USA, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, ASEAN countries and also South Korea to examine the "Pacific Community" concept. In the future such meetings were to be held on a regular basis. The Seoul regime claimed the role of a middleman between Western states and ASEAN countries. However, during his visit to Seoul in October, 1982, President Suharto of Indonesia unequivocally turned down this initiative, which killed the plan.

ASEAN countries maintain that the Pacific project is a too heavy construction in which they could not find a suitable place, because in any case the USA and Japan (or in the reverse order) will take the lead in it. This is why the attitude of the "Five" is on the whole marked not only by "lack of enthusiasm", but also by deep scepticism. These countries obviously prefer their membership in the Association, trying to consolidate it as much as possible as an independent subject in international relations.

At the negotiations of the ASEAN leaders with Tokyo the sides discussed not so much military-strategic problems or the grandiose projects like the "Pacific Community" to say nothing of the problem of neutralising the "Soviet threat" (as Tokyo would like it), but quite concrete and palpable topics: nonequivalent economic exchange, negative balance of trade between Japan and three ASEAN countries, rigid terms of access to the Japanese market of ASEAN industrial commodities and others. All these long-standing and painful problems have been more aggravated due to the crisis in the world capitalist economy, with which the economic development of ASEAN countries has been linked so closely.

Whereas in the past Japanese representatives were working for guaranteed deliveries of raw materials from ASEAN countries (for example, oil and liquified gas), now the latter have to struggle for Japan not to reduce the amount of its purchases, for raw materials account for 90 per cent of their exports to the Japanese market. Certainly, one cannot deny that Tokyo makes definite well-calculated concessions to keep afloat the branches of the economy of ASEAN countries which are of particular importance to the Japanese economy. However, financial injections are often tied with imports of Japanese commodities. As a result, the spending on aid is fully compensated. The *Japan Times* honestly admits that Tokyo's "present economic prominence owes a great debt to Southeast Asia".¹⁸

Franklin Weinstein, an American expert on Southeast Asia, who does not think it necessary to conceal his critical attitude towards the Japanese policy, stated: "I found that criticism of the Japanese was just as strong as it had been previously, though it was seldom expressed publicly. ...Fukuda's pledge of \$1 billion for five ASEAN industrial projects

¹⁷ *Mainichi*, June 26, 1983.

¹⁸ *Japan Times*, Sept. 26, 1982.

has become a symbol of frustration, as these projects have proven difficult to bring to fruition. Japan's setting of detailed priorities might be viewed as an effort to impose its own development strategy on the region and to intervene more directly in the economic policy-making of the ASEAN countries."¹⁹ US companies too are striving for the same goal. The common denominator of efforts of all of them, as well as of the governments supporting them is the ensuring of what they understand as "political stability" in ASEAN states, where they hope to preserve in fact their own profit. Thus, what ASEAN countries face is, in fact, a united front of neocolonialists.

However, there are objective possibilities enabling ASEAN to oppose successfully the external diktat. Among the powerful factors containing the forces of imperialism and hegemonism are the growing activity of the young independent countries in the world arena, their persistent struggle for a new international economic order, and profound positive influence exerted by countries of the socialist community on international relations. If the ice of distrust were melted and the road towards developing goodneighbourly cooperation with Indochinese states were opened up, the countries of the "Five" would consolidate their positions considerably.

Undoubtedly, the community of class interests, the adherence of the ruling elites of ASEAN countries and a number of Western states to anti-communist dogmas leave a profound imprint on the foreign policy platform of ASEAN and its member-countries. This explains ASEAN's orientation towards the West, the USA above all, the option of the extreme right elements for a tough confrontation with Vietnam, and the containment of cooperation with the Soviet Union. At the same time, there is another tendency in the activities of ASEAN, which, though with difficulties, is paving a way for itself. It consists in the striving towards normalisation and consolidation of relations with the states of Southeast Asia having a different socio-economic system, and towards independent foreign policy.

The alignment of forces between these two policies which have influential advocates and opponents inside the ruling elites of the ASEAN countries, has been constantly changing. The problems of Indochina which have turned into a touchstone of the abilities of responsible leaders for realistic consideration, objective analysis and readiness for an equitable dialogue became an arena of political struggle among them.

Regrettably, since the end of the 1970s, certain quarters in ASEAN have taken an openly unfriendly stand as regards Vietnam, Laos and the People's Republic of Kampuchea. Ignoring the fundamental changes in Indochina and the will of the Kampuchean people, who have eliminated the hated Pol Pot regime, some members of the Association have embarked on provoking complications and open interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring states. As a matter of fact, some ASEAN members have taken it upon themselves to carry out the instructions of US leaders. Late in 1981, succumbing to their pressure, the countries of the Association were zealously forming a coalition of Khmer counterrevolutionaries—the so-called "Tripartite government" of Sihanouk, Son Sann and Khieu Samphan.

Judging by all appearances, the leaders of those countries fear greatly the dissatisfaction of imperialist powers. As a result, the crisis phe-

¹⁹ *Economic, Political and Security Issues*, pp. 186-187.

nomena in international relations of Southeast Asia threaten to become permanent, and the solution of the problem has been postponed.

Nonetheless, despite all intrigues of the external and internal reaction, the diplomacy of Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea are out to look persistently for ways and means to improve the situation and develop a dialogue in the region.

A whole series of constructive well-thought-of initiatives of the three states of Indochina aimed at attaining this goal is well known. Diplomatic steps taken by Vietnam, Laos and the People's Republic of Kampuchea enjoy the full support of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.

At a meeting with the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam Le Duan, held on July 29, 1983, Yuri Andropov stated that the USSR would continue to contribute to the constructive efforts of socialist Vietnam, which acts together with Laos and Kampuchea, the efforts directed at turning Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, cooperation and stability. The leaders of the two parties noted the great importance of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation whose fifth anniversary was marked last year. It will not be out of place to recall that Article 5 of the Treaty reads: "The Contracting Parties... should support the striving of the peoples of Southeast Asia towards peace, independence, and cooperation among them."²⁰

The stage-by-stage withdrawal of the Vietnamese volunteers from Kampuchea is also evidence of the steady stabilisation of the situation in that much-suffering country, and a convincing demonstration of Vietnam's goodwill, a stabilisation that no subversion by the reactionary Khmer emigres can frustrate, with Vietnam continuing to hope for reciprocity of its neighbours in the region. The overcoming of differences at a negotiating table on the basis of a sober-minded accounting of the mutual interests and equality, improvement of relations between the two parts of Southeast Asia—the states of Indochina and the ASEAN countries—in spite of intrigues and obstruction of the imperialist powers, will contribute to the cause of peace in Asia and in the whole world and thwart the military and strategic plans of Washington and Tokyo vis-à-vis the Association.

The Soviet Union views with sympathy the efforts by the "Five", like those of other newly-free countries, to attain economic independence, strengthen political independence, and ensure fruitful socio-economic and cultural cooperation on regional basis. One could only welcome the Association leaders' official statements concerning their loyalty to the tasks set forth in its Charter, and the inadmissibility of it being turned into a military bloc, if these were consistently and firmly adhered to. For its part, the USSR, as it was stated in the CC CPSU Report to the 26th Party Congress, sees no obstacles on the way toward establishing good cooperation with the ASEAN member-countries.

²⁰ *Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union and International Relations. 1978. A Collection of Documents*, Moscow, 1979, p. 191 (in Russian).

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PRC DEBATES CHANGING FARM, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY SYSTEM

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 84 pp 48-63

[Article by I. N. Naumov, candidate of economic sciences: "Debates on Forms of Ownership in China"]

A discussion on highly important theoretical questions of the socialist political economy—on objective economic laws, on the aims of production and the fundamental economic law of socialism, on the nature of relations of distribution, on the essence, place and role of commodity-money relations and the law of value in the conditions of public ownership, and on the correlation of planned and market regulation—has been going on in the People's Republic of China since the latter half of 1977. This discussion has been necessitated by life itself. The acute socio-economic problems, which became seriously complicated in the long years of the "big leap" and the "cultural revolution", have made it imperative to revise the "guiding ideas" on which the official economic policy was based in 1958-1978.¹

But it may be said without exaggeration that the questions of the character of property relations in China and the prospects of their further development are the chief items in this discussion. Some participants in the discussion justly pointed out that it was gross breaches in this decisive sphere of relations of production that became the cause of the critical situation in China's economy, the source of many conflict situations in Chinese society.

In order better to understand the purpose of the discussion under way, it is necessary to recall the most important events in the transformation of property relations in the PRC and the "basic guiding ideas" theoretically justifying these transformations.

If out of the mass of events that had taken place, and the measures that had been carried out in the socio-economic sphere after the founda-

¹ The discussion began in the summer of 1977 with a debate by Chinese economists and sociologists on questions of distribution and wages under socialism. In 1978 the discussion was extended to the questions of commodity-money relations and the operation of the law of value, the aims of production under socialism, and the nature of the socio-economic system in the PRC. An active discussion of property relations began with the publication in the No. 1 issue of the journal *Jingji yanjiu* for 1979 of an article entitled "Apropos of the Forms of Socialist Property in China" by the well-known economist Dong Furen. Very many known Chinese specialists in political economy, as well as some politicians, gave their views on the questions raised in the article (on the essence and character of state and cooperative property and ways of their transformation). Many speeches, articles and reports by the participants in the discussion have been published in the national press (*Hongqi*, *Renmin ribao*, *Guangming ribao*, etc.) and also in economic science periodicals (*Jingji yanjiu*, *Jingji guanli*, *Jingji hexue*, *Jingji liun yu Jingji guanli*, etc.) and transactions of universities and institutes. The various points of view on important questions of political economy were briefly outlined in the collections *Discussions on the Most Important Questions of Political Economy in 1949-1980* (Peking, 1981) and *Polemics on the Questions of Political Economy in the PRC in 1977-1980* (Xian, 1982). The questions of China's socio-economic development under discussion are reflected in textbooks on political economy and in other books (Xue Muqiao's *Economic Problems of Socialism in China*, 1980, *The Economic System of Socialism and Its Advantages*, 1981, editor-in-chief Dong Furen, etc.). Periodically journals publish brief reviews of the discussion. From the end of March to the beginning of April 1981, for instance, 150 reports, articles and surveys were submitted for discussion on the property issue (see *Jingji yanjiu*, 1981, No. 6).

tion of the People's Republic of China, one were to single out the main ones, which decisively influenced all other events, they would undoubtedly be the transformations in relations of ownership of the means of production. Never before in its long history had Chinese society known such major changes in property relations—in radical character, scale and rate—as those after 1949. In the first three years of its existence (1949-1952) China carried out an agrarian reform and nationalised banks and the property of bureaucratic and foreign capital. The result was the fulfilment in the main of the tasks of the people's democratic stage of the revolution: abolition of the economic foundation of feudalism, of bureaucratic and foreign capital. The next stage (1955-1956), the stage of socialist transformations, saw the cooperation of the peasantry and urban artisans, and the transformation of the property of the national bourgeoisie into mixed, state-private property. As a result, an end was put to the multi-structural system in Chinese society which embarked upon the path of socialist construction.

Economic development in the first eight years of the PRC's existence showed the big advantages and vast potentialities of new forms and property relations. The economy began to develop at a rate unknown in old China. But already then one could see the negative aspects of intensive socialisation of the means of production: the huge gap between the new forms of property and the backward material and technical base, between the scale of socialisation of the means of production and the low level of management of the socialised economy. It is natural, therefore, that the tasks of laying a solid modern material and technical foundation for the new forms of property, improving the structure of organisation of social production, devising an effective economic mechanism, and bettering the system of economic management became the prime tasks in the PRC's further socio-economic development.

The advocates of the "single socialist public property" conception repudiated the objective laws of establishing socialist property and claimed that the socialisation of the means of production did not depend on the level of development of the productive forces, i. e., on the level of socialisation of the process of production and labour. They imagined that the means of production could be socialised at any, even feudal, stage of their development.

The "single socialist public property" conception naturally was not created for the sake of pure theory. It had a thoroughly practical purpose. Its formulation was to enable the state to carry out an unprecedented mobilisation of labour and material resources to achieve superfast rates in economic development. The emergence of this conception in China created ideological conditions for the transition to a new round in the socialisation of property. In what concerned the rate of socialisation, Mao Zedong held that the main thing was not to miss the political moment and to take advantage of the masses' sentiment—"to strike while the iron is hot",² as they say. Socialisation was to assume the form of successive political campaigns. The mass campaign for the realisation of this theory began in 1958, with the transition to the "three red banners" course. In the cities this process found expression in the conversion of handicraft cooperatives into state enterprises. Mixed enterprises, working on state and private capital, also became state enterprises. Private businesses in the services, trade and handicrafts were almost completely liquidated.

The process of changing the forms of property was especially stormy in the countryside. The small cooperatives were said to be "fettering the big leap" and "retarding the development of the productive forces", and it was said that the amalgamation of cooperatives was required by pro-

² Mao Zedong *sixiang wansui*, Peking, 1967.

duction and demanded by the masses. The people's commune which was regarded as the best form for the transition from collective to public property and from socialist to communist society was the form chosen for the amalgamation of the cooperatives. An important factor in the establishment of "single public property" was gigantomania, i. e., the urge to set up large economic units, to effect all-embracing socialisation of property. It was held that the bigger the enterprise, the more vividly the advantages of socialism manifest themselves. Literally within one month (September 1958) more than 760,000 production cooperatives were transformed into 24,000 people's communes. On the whole, the period of transition from collective to public property was set at three-four years, and five-six years in the outlying regions.³ The "single public property" conception negated even the possession of personal belongings. Not only all the large means of production, but even small hand-operated farm implements, small cattle, poultry and even kitchen utensils were socialised when the people's communes were organised. Subsequently, the people's communes were to extend to the cities and become "an instrument for reconstructing the old city and building a new, socialist city", and finally turn into the basic "primary unit of social structure" in China.

Violated in the creation of "single public property" were not only the laws of development of socialist property itself, but also the objective economic laws which are engendered by the establishment of social property and the observance of which can alone ensure the successful development and strengthening of social property. Thus, the objective need of subordinating production to the satisfaction of the working people's fast growing requirements was negated and identified with the thirst for the "bourgeois way of life". The law of socialist accumulation was distorted: an "accumulate more, consume less" principle was advanced in the distribution of the national income. Both theoretically and practically the law of planned proportional development was opposed by the so-called "wavelike development", spontaneity was justified and encouraged. The ideas of non-commodity socialist production were widely popularised. The essence of self-sustainment under socialism was distorted; egalitarian principles in distribution were idealised. Remuneration for work and the existence of commodity-money relations were regarded as a "basis for the restoration of capitalism".

Many acute problems accumulated in the management of public property and the economy on the whole. Not a single scientifically-based economic reform was carried out in China after the formation of the economic-administrative mechanism in the mid-1950s. The changes wrought in the economic mechanism in the years of the "big leap" and the "cultural revolution" did not improve it, but seriously weakened it. The employment of economic methods in management was qualified as betrayal of "true socialism" and a concession to "revisionism". The economic rights of enterprises in industry were reduced to the minimum. All profits and depreciation charges were taken either by the state treasury or by the treasuries of the local administrations. The piece-rate system and bonuses were abolished. Administrative bureaucratic methods with the guiding principle that "politics is a command force" prevailed in economic management.

The Chinese economy did not mark time after 1958, of course. But its progress was attended by slumps, by huge labour and material losses.

It is only natural that in such highly unfavourable conditions public property could not fully display its advantages. Moreover, as many Chinese economists now affirm, the untimely establishment of "single public property" caused enormous harm to the development of the productive

³ See *Xinhua banyuekan*, 1958, No. 24, pp. 3-11.

forces and undermined the people's productive activity and labour discipline.

The critical economic situation demanded immediate steps to regulate it and the reappraisal of a number of "guiding ideas" concerning property. The reassessment begun in mid-1977 of some of the economic postulates advanced in the years of the "big leap" and the "cultural revolution", gained momentum after the Third Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in December 1978 which had decided that it was necessary to "bring relations of production into line with the development of the productive forces."⁴ The purport of this thesis began to reveal itself during the implementation of the concrete measures directly affecting property relations. Thus, the peasants were allowed to have husbandries and engage in handicrafts and a start was made in the transition to the system of responsibility for production, including household family contract;⁵ small businesses were permitted in the cities; foreign investments were invited and four "special economic zones" were established in Guangdong and Fujian provinces;⁶ industrial enterprises began to be vested with certain rights in the spheres of planning, realisation of output, material incentives,⁷ etc.

During the discussion on the transformation of the forms of property in town and country most of its participants agreed that the transformation of property in 1955-1956 and the establishment of people's communes in subsequent years were done "hastily". In his book *Economic Problems of Socialism in China* the well-known economist Xue Muqiao wrote: "At one stage we devoted excessive attention to the fettering effect the backward relations of production had on the productive forces and in the conditions when the latter were not yet much developed we hastily transformed the relations of production without realising that the transformation of relations above the requirements of the productive forces may equally hamper the development of the productive forces. At the same time, after the appearance of the new relations of production which allowed full play to the development of the productive forces we paid insufficient attention to strengthening the new relations of production and to concentrating efforts on the development of the productive forces."⁸ Campaignwise voluntaristic methods of socialising the means of production, routine approach to socialisation, etc., were condemned.

Nearly all the participants in the discussion stress that the conception of "single public property" is theoretically untenable and practically harmful because it does not accord with China's specific conditions and above all with the backward "uneven" level of development of the productive forces. The necessity to set up people's communes in 1958 was flatly denied. *Hongqi* wrote in 1980 that the level of the productive forces at the present stage in the PRC was far from sufficient to transform all the means of production into state socialist property. In analysing the property system it is necessary to bear in mind China's characteristic attributes—its vastness and poverty.⁹

Hence the only natural conclusion that it is necessary to "regulate" and "transform" the existing property system in the PRC. Moreover, these transformations were regarded as the backbone of the entire economic reform. One important conclusion was the recognition of the need to make every possible use of the diverse forms of cooperative property in both country and town, and also to preserve small property, auxiliary hus-

⁴ *Hongqi*, 1979, No. 1, p. 16.

⁵ *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1983, No. 2.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷ See *Zhongguo jingji nanjian*, 1980, Peking, 1981, pp. IV-6-10.

⁸ Xue Muqiao, *Economic Problems of Socialism in China*, Peking, 1980, p. 257.

⁹ *Hongqi*, 1980, No. 24, p. 24.

bandries and handicrafts of the working people. There were nevertheless sharp and fundamental differences between the participants in the discussion over the nature and trends in the changes of the structure of property, in the appraisal of different forms of property, etc.¹⁰

In the course of the discussion some of the participants questioned the correctness of the socio-economic transformations which took place in the PRC in 1955-1956. The published reviews show that they had doubts about "China's entry into socialism", bypassing the capitalist stage of development, and affirmed that "for the time being China has not the appropriate production forces to build a socialist society", that the level of socialisation of the production process is still low, that the "ideas and theories of socialist transformations" carried out by the CPC do not accord with the principles of "Marx's scientific socialism" but represent ideas of "peasant socialism" which are oriented upon small, rather than large-scale production. There was talk of the premature abolition of the capitalist system and it was said that the bourgeoisie and not the patriarchal peasantry should be the ally of the working class in the building of socialism.¹¹ Views were also voiced that it was premature to create public property.¹²

Most of the participants, however, disagreed with such an appraisal of the transformations of property relations in 1955-1956. They recognised that the transformations in the relations of ownership of the means of production in China were objectively necessary and that "their trend was correct" inasmuch as they paved the way for China's socialist development.¹³ But they were simultaneously critical of the rates, methods and forms of these transformations. Thus, in some press articles it was unambiguously or ambiguously stated that in 1955-1956 it was unnecessary to turn low-type cooperatives into producers' cooperatives of the highest type inasmuch as the latter, in their opinion, in no way accorded with the conditions and the requirements of the Chinese countryside.¹⁴

Most of the participants spoke up for the departure from "pure", i. e., single economic system and for the transition to the multi-structural economy, for the creation of a "multilayer structure of property which would correspond to the real level of the productive forces in the PRC at present".¹⁵ That is why they justified and substantiated government decisions on the inclusion in the structure of the property relations of different, non-socialist, too, forms of property (individual, state-capitalist and capitalist). They backed their arguments not only by the abovementioned conclusions (low level of productive forces, "unevenness" of their development, manual labour) but also affirmed that the individual, state-capitalist and capitalist systems must play the role of certain ferment in the "moribund" economic life of the PRC and exert "external pressure" upon the socialist sector, impelling it to raise its "competitive power". Some press articles affirm that it is the "multilayer" structure of property that is capable of accelerating the development of the productive forces in all systems in the PRC too.¹⁶

Other participants in the discussion took rather coolly the withdrawal to the multi-structural economy of such a type. They propose chiefly to take the path of regulating two forms of property—state and coope-

¹⁰ *Jingji yanjiu*, 1981, No. 6, pp. 34-37.

¹¹ *Honqi*, 1982, No. 6; *Shehui kexue*, 1982, No. 5, pp. 25-40.

¹² *Discussions on the Most Important Questions of Political Economy in 1949-1980*, Peking, 1981, p. 263.

¹³ *Jingji yanjiu*, 1981, No. 6, p. 34.

¹⁴ *Renmin ribao*, May 8, 1983; *Guangming ribao*, March 27, 1983; *Honqi*, 1983, No. 5, pp. 9-17.

¹⁵ *Guangming ribao*, June 5 and July 9, 1980; *Jingji yanjiu*, 1981, No. 6, pp. 36-37, No. 7, pp. 3-10.

¹⁶ *Guangming ribao*, July 19, 1980.

rative—and to include in its structure, on a limited scale, individual property as a supplement to public property.¹⁷

Many participants obviously try to gloss over, to veil socio-economic nature of the transformations that are now taking place in property relations. All the changes occurring in the structure of property, including the permission of individual enterprise, foreign capital and transition to household (family) contract in the countryside are interpreted as no more than changes in the forms of economy and management that allegedly do not affect the essence of socio-economic relations in Chinese society.

The advocates of the return to the multi-structural economy have opponents both among the scientists and among the experienced and rank-and-file workers who fear the possibility of return to the pre-socialist order.

One of the main items of discussion was the elucidation of the nature, place and role of state property in the PRC. A number of economists denied it the right to be a form of socialist public property. Major defects were noted in its functioning in the years of the PRC's existence, especially after 1957: overcentralisation and lack of economic independence of enterprises, disregard of economic laws and commandism, severance of production from consumption, growth of bureaucracy, etc. But some of the participants in the discussion, while rightly criticising administrative-bureaucratic and militarised methods of economic management, attribute these violations to the very nature of public property, especially in its state form. They affirm that state property cannot be a form of public property, that a new and more acceptable form must be found for the latter.

What arguments do these economists adduce as proofs for their points of views? In their opinion, it turns out, socialist state property in all cases negates "commodity production and the law of value" and "cannot ensure the direct connection of the labour force with the means of production", of personal interests of the working people with national interests. It allegedly does not create stimuli for the development of production. Consequently, the state bodies of power, the proponents of this viewpoint say, substitute for the economic management bodies, enterprises become appendages of the different bodies of power and cannot implement an allround independent system of cost accounting. According to their statements, the state form of property easily engenders bureaucracy, commandism and voluntarism, and deprives enterprises of material interest and "internal stimuli of development".¹⁸

It is not difficult to see from the above that in this particular instance all the distortions in China's political economy in the years of the "big leap" and the "cultural revolution" are attributed to socialist state property. Indeed, where objective economic laws are consciously and grossly violated, the use of state property may lead and does lead to the negative consequences the authors speak of. But in such cases it is not the form of state property as such that is guilty, but the character of its use in contravention of its inherent internal laws of development. The advocates of the abolition of state property as a form of public property talk all the time about "new approaches" and "new decisions", without apparently noticing that they themselves remain on the positions of old metaphysical methods of the days of the "big leap" and the "cultural revolution". Then they spoke and acted in China in accordance with the "either-or" principle, i.e., either "single socialist public (state) property" or commodity production, total self-sustainment, economic independence and inevitable "restoration of capitalism". At present the advocates of the abolition of

¹⁷ See *Jingji yanjiu*, 1981, No. 6, pp. 36-37.

¹⁸ *Jingji yanjiu*, 1979, No. 1, pp. 21-26.

state property as a form of public property affirm: either commodity production, self-sustainment and economic independence of enterprises, or state property.

There is one thing common in these viewpoints: their authors regard it as inconceivable that the dialectical combination of these two opposites—both socialist state property and commodity-money relations, self-sustainment and relative independence of enterprises—is inherent in socialism. The whole history of the development of real socialism has proved this. In no socialist country, where state property is the economic basis, has its development led to the elimination of commodity-money relations, self-sustainment and economic independence of enterprises. On the contrary, the reinforcement of state property and the enhancement of centralised planning simultaneously required fuller use of commodity-money relations, greater economic independence of enterprises, and stricter self-sustainment.

Just as groundless are the assertions about the other “chronic evils” allegedly inherent in socialist state property. Naturally if, as it is now admitted in the PRC, the working class was kept from managing enterprises for decades, the trade unions and other public organisations and the congresses of workers’ representatives were dissolved, and material incentives were abolished, while all the profits were channelled into the state treasury, there is no need to speak of the “direct union of toilers with the means of production, of the combination of state and personal interests”. But what has socialist state property to do with it?

The abovementioned concept of abolishing state property as a form of public property is of different varieties. Thus, some economists admit that the establishment of public property at the initial stages of the revolution is a necessary and progressive phenomenon (it ensures a relatively rapid victory of the revolution, speeds up the abolition of the old economic system and the establishment of a new one, and creates favourable conditions for the establishment and consolidation of the socialist superstructure, etc.), but in ordinary conditions in subsequent years, they affirm, it outlives itself and must be changed.

Other sociologists sought to depict departures in the building of socialism in the PRC as a norm, as some general law, allegedly operating in all the socialist countries. Thus, they recognise that the economic system of socialism is capable of effectively mobilising resources and quickly developing production; liquidating exploitation, the anarchy of production and capitalist competition; creating relations of comradely cooperation among people, and adhering to the principle of distribution according to work done. At the same time they charge socialism with excessive concentration of the right of adopting economic decisions, undermining of the economic initiative of enterprises, insufficient development of horizontal ties, “deficit” of the motive power for improving production, for renovation of machinery, for increase of labour productivity and improvement of the quality of production.¹⁹ The key argument of the advocates of this viewpoint is the assertion that it is impossible to combine the working people’s personal interests with national interests in the conditions of socialisation of the main means of production. In their opinion, public property and the socialist system engender wage-levelling, in all conditions, which leads to lower labour activity.

What do they offer in exchange for state property as a form of public property? Some (Dong Furen, for instance) recommend the establishment of a kind of “people’s sovereign” (“independent”) form of property, others propose a sort of “associated property”.²⁰

¹⁹ *Jingji yanjiu*, 1981, No. 12, pp. 9-10.

²⁰ *Polemics on the Questions of Political Economy in the PRC in 1977-1980*, pp. 74-75.

The purpose of these "new" forms of property is made clearer by their recommendations on the reform of state property in the PRC.²¹ They propose to turn over state enterprises to "worker collectives" or to lease them by contract to "united toilers" for the "direct union of the means of production with manpower" so that every man will be both "toiler and manager". It was thus proposed in an article in the journal *Jingji wenti tansuo* in 1982: 1) completely to separate state-administrative and political power from enterprises; to build relations between the state and the enterprises on the basis of the price policy, tax policy, credit and interest; 2) to leave only part of the most important enterprises under state management; to abide by the system of combining state and cooperative management in regard to medium-size enterprises, and lease part of them, preserving them as state property, to workers and employees; to turn over to workers and employees small enterprises, particularly in the spheres of trade and services, and let them manage them at their discretion; 3) to develop "horizontal" ties in production in order to turn the enterprises into opposing "commodity producers" and "commodity disposers".²²

Some participants in the discussion criticised such views of public property. The opponents claimed that at the present stage of China's economic development state property should be improved and strengthened, rather than abolished, that the property of all people constituted the basis of the advantages of the socialist system and required a single economic centre which would dispose of all the means of production in the name of the entire people; that state property could alone be such a form at the stage of socialism. "The problem today," wrote *Honqi*, "is not to effect the transition from collective to the property of all people, nor to abolish the property of all people, but to regulate relations of the latter and collective property and further strengthen and improve both of these forms of property... The sources of the defects in the economic system are not in the property of all people as such, but in the insufficient knowledge of the laws of development of the economic system on the basis of the property of all people, in the fact that we did not act in conformity with the laws of property of all people."²³

The advocates of this point of view actively uphold the advantages of public property, affirming that "production on the basis of the property of all people with conscious management by society and with the aim of meeting the ever-growing requirements of the working people is in a position... to develop at a high rate".²⁴ In their opinion, the successful transformation of private property into socialist public property in 1955-1956 fully testified to the advantages of socialist public property, while the subsequent departures were an extremely important lesson: socialist property may reveal its advantages only if its establishment and development are in accord with the socialisation of production.²⁵ The degree and sphere of socialisation of the means of production must correspond to the level of socialisation of the production process. One highly important and complex task, the advocates of this viewpoint hold, is that all the toilers become, in deed and not in word, the owners of socialist public property in order to unite democratism and centralism, personal and collective interests with the interests of society. The solution of this task fully depends on the improvement of the political and economic systems. They hold that one of the most important peculiarities and advantages of the socialist social economy is the conscious use of objective economic laws.

²¹ *Jingji wenti tansuo*, 1982, No. 2, pp. 25-29; *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 6, 1982; *Jingji yanjiu*, 1981, No. 6, pp. 35-37.

²² *Jingji wenti tansuo*, 1982, No. 2, pp. 27-29.

²³ *Honqi*, 1980, No. 24, p. 24.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 13, p. 15.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 14; *Jingji yanjiu*, 1982, Nos. 6, 7 and 8.

Following the actual disintegration of the people's communes and the transition of the Chinese countryside to the so-called "system of responsibility for production", Chinese sociologists began to discuss the essence of different forms of "responsibility for production". What especially attracted attention was the so-called household contract²⁶—the dominant form of the "system of responsibility for production" in China's agriculture. The household, or family, contract is in itself an extremely contradictory phenomenon. The fact that three-quarters of the Chinese peasants have gone over to individual farming testifies to their negative reaction to the official policy in the countryside after 1957. It also shows how internally weak the whole system of people's communes proved to be. It is clear that in some areas (mountainous and remote) the household contract is truly indispensable. For some time it may prove useful in especially critical conditions, with the social economy being completely disintegrated. The instinct of self-preservation compels the peasants to step up production activity and look for new means of livelihood. At the same time this major event of 1979-1982 has extended to relatively developed rural areas and has been attended by unprecedented raging of private-ownership elements in the Chinese countryside. Although land remained by law in the collective possession of teams, it was handed over to peasant households for their use, which naturally led to its partition among them. Moreover, subject to partition were not only poor arable lands, but also irrigated and flooded fields with developed modern irrigation systems. Farm machines (except big tractors), draught and breeding cattle, and farm buildings were assessed and sold to peasants. In some areas things went as far as the division and destruction of irrigation installations and mechanised wells.²⁷ In October 1981 *Renmin ribao* wrote in the editorial "To Protect Collective Property Is to Protect the Productive Forces" that the transition to the "system of responsibility for production" and "especially the household contract" gave rise to "egalitarian distribution of property" which is "tantamount to the destruction of productive forces" in the countryside. There have been examples of peasants and rural functionaries displaying thriftlessness with regard to collective property, spoiling and stealing farm implements, and building dwellings and farm facilities on plots allotted to households for cultivation.²⁸

It should be noted that only the exponents of the household contract can now speak out in the press. One can read what its opponents think only in the critical articles about their arguments. The opponents of the transition to the household contract have pointed out many of its defects and possible negative consequences, notably the impossibility of successfully combating natural calamities and fully and rationally using machinery, labour resources and land, the difficulty of increasing social accumulation, capital construction in the fields, planning and managing production, and state purchases of farm produce. They warned that the household contract would have a negative effect on the safety of social assets (machinery, cattle, farm buildings), on the operation of irrigation systems and rural industry, environmental protection, struggle against erosion, etc.²⁹ The household contract, they said, "does not accord with the main trend" of society's development and means "deviation" from socialism, that after its institution "the rich will grow richer and the poor

²⁶ *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1983, No. 2.

²⁷ *Nongye jingji wenti*, 1981, No. 8, pp. 9-10; *Caiwu gongshe*, 1981, No. 2, p. 13; No. 4, p. 9; No. 5, p. 25, etc.

²⁸ *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 4, 1981.

²⁹ *Nongcun gongzuo tongxun*, 1980, No. 12, p. 4.

poorer", and there will be greater property differentiation among the peasants.³⁰

There is no unanimity among the advocates of the household contract. The most ardent and active ones regard it as an "objective necessity" and "historical inevitability",³¹ as a "great historical turn"³² in the life of Chinese countryside, the third most important reform (after the agrarian reform in 1949-1952 and cooperation in 1955-1956) in the history of rural China,³³ as a "road to affluence in the country and among the peasants",³⁴ as a "great achievement of the Chinese peasantry in the sphere of economic management", their "contribution to the theory of scientific socialism".³⁵ The purported struggle against "leftism" is used to propagandise the big possibilities of small farms in the development of the productive forces and providing peasants with the means of livelihood. The view is voiced that the household contract has become the best form of "direct union of the tiller and the means of production", operation of the law of distribution according to work and enhancement of the peasants' production activity.

How do these advocates of the household contract visualise the present and the future of the Chinese countryside? They see it as an ocean of small peasant farms (at present there are over 170 million peasant households in China with 100 million hectares of ploughland all told bound up with the state by the contract system on the basis of "equality, voluntariness and mutual profit").³⁶ In this contract, *Renmin ribao* writes, "each side must recognise the economic interests of the other side and promote close combination of common interests with the interest of the individual participant". Such alliance of the state and the individual peasant is to ensure the Chinese peasantry's successful advance "on the highway of Chinese agriculture".³⁷

The household contract, it is said in another *Renmin ribao* article, is "in its way a new family economy based on socialised land."³⁸ One official document affirms that it is necessary to create in the countryside "a multitude of small-scale economic and cultural centres" which would "move the Chinese countryside along the road of allround development of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, by-production, fishery, complex management of agriculture, industry and trade".³⁹ Only in this way, they say, can the Chinese countryside "raise economic effectiveness", "meet the requirements of industry and the people", "ensure the employment of the redundant rural population", give peasants a prosperous life and "change the face of the countryside", and "gradually reduce the difference between industry and agriculture, town and country".⁴⁰

The exponents of such views lay stress on the "setting free" by the household contract of the "peasants' creative activity", of the "productive forces" of the Chinese countryside. They in fact share the viewpoint that collective farms make it impossible to combine personal and social interests, fully to develop the tillers' labour activity, and see no alternative to the household contract.

How do they justify the transition of most of the teams to the household contract? At present these advocates of the household contract are

³⁰ *Jingji yanjiu*, 1981, No. 1, p. 67.

³¹ *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 6, 1981.

³² *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 17, 1982.

³³ *Renmin ribao*, June 5, 1981.

³⁴ *Renmin ribao*, June 5, 1981, and Oct. 31, 1982.

³⁵ *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 5, p. 17; *Renmin ribao*, March 7, 1983, June 29, 1983, etc.

³⁶ *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 5, 1982.

³⁷ *Ibidem*.

³⁸ *Renmin ribao*, March 8, 1983.

³⁹ *Renmin ribao*, April 10, 1983.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*.

trying to lay a theoretical foundation for it. One of the main postulates they use to develop the theory of contract is the assertion that concentration of production and labour is organically and historically alien to agriculture in general, and to Chinese agriculture in particular, that from time immemorial production has been conducted by small family farms and that the Chinese peasant is accustomed to it. In the past, in the epoch of feudalism, however, family farms had been fettered by feudal chains, while the foundation of the PRC released them from the chains, preserving all the advantages of small-scale production. "Concentration of labour and concentration of management in particular cannot accord with the specifics of Chinese agriculture", says one of the article in *Honqi*.⁴¹

A far-reaching practical conclusion is drawn from this assertion: production cooperation does not suit Chinese agriculture (the authors admit the possibility of other types of cooperation) with its concentration of labour resources, centralised economic activity and distribution according to labour units.⁴² They allege that production cooperatives "do not conform to the conditions in China, do not accord with the situation in agriculture, for a long time engendered stagnation in it, and retarded the historic process of conversion of natural and semi-natural production into commodity socialised production".⁴³ "Concentration and production cooperationing," they affirm, "lead to the 'moribundity' of the economy and abolish commodity-money relations".⁴⁴

The exponents of the household contract draw their arguments from the negative experience of the people's communes. They do not see anything positive at all in the cooperative movement in the Chinese countryside which preceded the establishment of the people's communes. Transition from dispersed farms through small groups to large production amalgamations is not acceptable to Chinese agriculture, they say.⁴⁵

The household, or family, contract is in their interpretation a complete opposite to production cooperation. As they assume, the household contract is precisely the production unit, the form of farming that best suits China's conditions.⁴⁶ Small family farms are said to be "highly viable" and "very efficient and adaptable".⁴⁷ The institution of the household contract, they averred, totally "smashed the system of people's communes", the "big cauldron" (wage-levelling),⁴⁸ the "stagnant form of collective economy", and "released the productive forces" in the Chinese countryside.⁴⁹ The family contract "possesses a definite advantage of the peasants' culture and equipment corresponding to the level of economic management."

Desperate efforts were made in the PRC in the years of the "big leap" and the "cultural revolution" to skip over whole stages of historical development in contravention of the objective economic laws. It was then held that there would be a paradise on Chinese soil with the establishment of giant people's communes. But there are no such things as miracles. The "single property of all people" had to be renounced. Many Chinese sociologists and politicians have now gone to the other extreme. Tirelessly talking about the need to guide themselves by objective economic laws, they advanced a no less illusory idea—that of promoting

⁴¹ *Honqi*, 1983, No. 5, p. 11.

⁴² *Renmin ribao*, June 29, 1983; *Honqi*, 1983, No. 5, p. 11.

⁴³ *Renmin ribao*, June 29, 1983.

⁴⁴ *Renmin ribao*, May 8, 1983; *Guangming ribao*, March 27, 1983, etc.

⁴⁵ See *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 5, 1982.

⁴⁶ *Honqi*, 1983, No. 5, *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 6, 1981, Oct. 5, 1982, April 10, 1983, March 7, 1983, June 29, 1983, etc.

⁴⁷ *Guangming ribao*, March 27, 1983.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁹ *Renmin ribao*, June 29, 1983.

general welfare in China by implanting 170 million tiny family farms, thus ignoring the very same objective laws they talk about.

The very need of production cooperation and concentration of labour resources, naturally within reasonable limits, is called for by the specifics of Chinese agriculture. What would the Chinese people do now if they had not built giant dikes and irrigation systems? For the time being the household contract is exploiting what had been done earlier thanks to the concentration of labour resources. Concentration of production makes it imperative to use rationally the extremely limited arable land in China. The mass institution of the household contract inevitably activated the laws governing small-scale production. Arable land is being misused for edges of fields, buildings, etc., labour resources are being wasted, it has become impossible to use rationally the farm machinery already available.⁵⁰ As many admit, the volume of irrigation construction in the countryside has sharply decreased,⁵¹ in many areas production management has deteriorated. The worst predictions of the opponents of the household contract are coming true.

Even among the active advocates of the household contract there are people who cannot but see some of the highly complex problems it has given rise to. In one of its editorials *Renmin ribao*⁵² wrote that some proponents of the household contract "suffer from blind optimism", that they "are satisfied with the present state of affairs", "do not heed the people's voice, do not see new problems and do not notice new tasks". And "stabilisation and improvement of household contracts" is the most urgent of these tasks.⁵³ One objective cause of instability is the distribution of land. Land, it is known, needs a permanent and single owner, it takes big labour and material outlays to keep and enhance its fertility. Since the ownership of land remains collective, the household contract provides for its periodical redivision (every two-three years) on account of changes in the composition of the family and in labour force. The peasants who have worse land naturally strive to get better plots. The fear of redivision results in the peasants refusing to make long-term investments, "in not fertilising the land" and in farming in a way that exhausts land resources.⁵⁴

A whole group of sociologists and functionaries regard the household contract as a stern necessity engendered by mistakes in collectivisation and also by the low level of the productive forces in the countryside, prevalence of manual labour, backward management and the peasants' low cultural and technical level. They admit that the household contract has its merits, but do not shut their eyes to the problems that have arisen. The household contract, they believe, is the simplest and most accessible form of farming and as such corresponds to the level of the Chinese peasantry and their mentality at the present stage.

Other participants in the discussion have tried to see the household contract from the angle of its "rationality" and "limitations".⁵⁵ They consider positive the abolition of wage-levelling and the development of the peasants' production activity which lead to an increase in production and improved living conditions. They see the contract's limitations in the fact that it is based on two forms of property: collective (land) and individual (implements, livestock, seeds, etc.), in the weakening of the peasant household's ties with teams, and in the impossibility of planning the organisation of production and fully using the resources. In the future, they

⁵⁰ See *Jingji yanjiu*, 1981, No. 10, p. 46.

⁵¹ *Jingji yanjiu*, 1981, No. 1, p. 37.

⁵² *Renmin ribao*, May 8, 1983.

⁵³ *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 6, 1982, April 27, 1982, Dec. 18, 1982, March 7, 1983, etc.

⁵⁴ *Renmin ribao*, May 8, 1983.

⁵⁵ *Jingji yanjiu*, 1981, No. 10, p. 45.

affirm, the household contract will hinder the development of the productive forces. The transition to the household contract has brought about definite changes in property relations. It "cannot fully implement the principle of distribution according to work".⁵⁶

The exponents of the household contract hold that this form of farming has not altered the socialist nature of the countryside: the right of land-ownership remains with the team, the peasants are given only the right of tenure and use of land; the team retains the collective ownership of irrigation facilities (reservoirs, wells, canals, etc.), large mechanised means of production (big tractors, machines for processing farm products, etc.), public buildings, warehouses, etc.⁵⁷ These advocates of the household contract do not consider it the eternal lot of the Chinese peasant whose future they see on the road to production amalgamation. But this process, in their opinion, must not be forced by mass movements so as to avoid the destruction of the productive forces.⁵⁸

Other participants in the discussion, agreeing with the socialist nature of the household contract, say its spread is leading not only to the change of the forms of management, but of the character of the structure of the countryside. They claim that the household contract is an "essentially socialist individual farm" because part of its means of production (fertilizers, seeds and simple implements) are privately owned and farming is done individually on collective land and with the use of large collective implements. The view is also expressed that although nominally the land belongs to the team, in practice it may become an empty word because of the long use of land by the households. Consequently, they say, the household contract should not be embellished.⁵⁹

Lastly, some scientists believe that the socio-economic nature of the household contract may be established only by concretely analysing the actual economic relations into which the household enters in the sphere of production, distribution and circulation. It is determined not only by the fact that the household does its farming on collective land, fulfils purchase plans and turns over part of the output to the team's fund. At present economic relations in the Chinese countryside have not yet stabilised. The Chinese countryside is at the crossroads, as it were, and its development along the socialist or individual private lines will depend on the state's ability to direct the "free" initiative of the households. The transition to the household contract, they affirm, has given rise to a sharp contradiction between the need of single management of agriculture and the scattering of individual farms on a gigantic scale. If the state fails to direct the "freed" individual initiative of the peasants toward solving nationwide tasks, the household contract will lead to the development of individual private economy.⁶⁰

A big role in the state's organisation of socialist production in the countryside is assigned to the production team, whose task is to run peasant households, support them and restrict their negative economic activity. The exponents of this viewpoint hold that the state has the administrative and economic power to direct the activities of the households to solve important nationwide tasks. On the state's instructions, the team must plan production and tell the household what and how much to produce. The household has certain rights in the choice of the method of production of the planned produce. If the household that has contracted to fulfil a plan refuses to do it, the team has the right to take the land

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

⁵⁷ *Jingji wenti tansuo*, 1981, No. 1, p. 51.

⁵⁸ *Jingji wenti tansuo*, 1981, No. 1, p. 52; *Renmin ribao*, March 7, 1983.

⁵⁹ *Discussions on the Most Important Questions of Political Economy in 1949-1980*, Peking, 1981, p. 276.

⁶⁰ *Zhongguo jingji wenti*, 1982, No. 5, pp. 25-26.

away from it. In the past, they hold, a peasant had no concrete obligations to the state and no rights, but now he clearly sees his obligations and has been vested with rights. The production possibilities of a household are limited. The sphere of distribution is also under the control of the state: the household must fulfil its purchase and tax commitments and contribute to the team's collective funds. The only part of the income that is not subject to distribution is that which goes for reproduction. This part is regarded as the most precise measure of labour, but it is also controlled.

The state retains big possibilities of controlling the processes going on in the countryside through the sphere of distribution, i.e., purchase prices and the prices of farm implements, fertilizers and seed, through credits, as well as with the help of administrative measures. It is believed that the use of these measures can guarantee the socialist development of the Chinese countryside.⁶¹

Considerable interest in the discussions on questions of property relations is displayed in cooperative property in the cities. The debates concern the fundamentals of its functioning, its evolution, socio-economic nature, concrete forms, relations with other forms of property, primarily state property, etc. The participants have rejected the former "leftist" conceptions about this form of property as a "system of large-scale (collective) private property" which must be restricted in every way.

At the same time the participants in the discussion are not at one in assessing the socio-economic essence of cooperative property at the present stage. Some of them, agreeing with the gross mistakes made about this form of property in 1958-1976, hold that it remains cooperative by origin, by the methods of formation and distribution of the wage fund, and by the way it is included in the state plan (after the fulfilment of the plan the cooperatives could dispose of part of the output at their discretion). Their opponents think that, on the contrary, the modern cooperatives in the cities and the countryside have deviated substantially from the path of development of cooperative property and turned into mixed state-cooperative enterprises. Some participants are even more categorical in their assessments affirming that cooperative enterprises have essentially lost the character of cooperative property and become the property of the local government bodies. To develop genuinely cooperative property in the cities, some participants propose securing their right of ownership, the right of distribution of profits, etc.

Questions relating to the character of individual enterprise in the cities are discussed now. The number of individual businesses grew rapidly in 1979-1981. At the end of 1978 there were 140,000 of them and at the end of 1981 their number was already 826,000, in which 1,011,000 people worked.⁶² Individual enterprise has been allowed in the economy for the following reasons: weak and uneven development of the productive forces, mass unemployment, small investments, and the backwardness of the spheres of trade, services and transport.

As in the case of the household contract in the countryside, differences among the economists arose over the socio-economic essence of individual businesses in the cities. Some say these businesses are of a capitalist character and therefore jeopardise the very foundation of social property in the PRC. Others, on the contrary, regard them as "socialist auxiliary economy" since they rely on the socialist economy based on social property. Still others affirm that individual business remains individual business in the socialist conditions too, and so it should not be disguised by the term "socialism". The very name "individual business" explains its

⁶¹ *Zhongguo jingji wenti*, 1982, No. 5, pp. 25, 26 and 37.

⁶² See *Jingji guanli*, 1982, No. 8, p. 8.

individualistic essence, its inner content. And still others seek to prove that at the present stage of the PRC's development individual business is dual in nature. From the point of view of the economic relations characteristic of it, it is working people's private business, small-scale economy. But it is part of the system of socialist economic relations and mutual ties, is subordinated to the socialist economy which holds a dominant position in society, and supplements it. Consequently, the individualistic activity of individual businesses is influenced by the socialist relations of production and objective economic laws.

In the course of the discussion the participants also raised the question of the possibility of small-commodity businesses growing into capitalist ones. Since such conditions do exist in individual businesses (private ownership of the means of production and the output), the possibility is there. But not every possibility, as some economists have pointed out, can be realised. The small-commodity economy in the PRC at the present stage substantially differs, in their opinion, from the private small-commodity economy in the pre-capitalist and capitalist periods, just as it is different from the private economy in the period prior to cooperation in the PRC. The following arguments are adduced to prove that it is impossible for individual businesses to turn into capitalist ones: 1) an individual business can now develop only by relying on the existence and development of social property; 2) part of the surplus product created by a private business goes to the state in the form of tax; 3) economic activity is subjected, directly or indirectly, to state regulation and is channelled into the planned socialist development through the conclusion of different kinds of economic contracts.⁶³

How is practical economic policy related to the theories discussed by Chinese economists? The hardships of the PRC's socio-economic development after 1957 have shown that a high price has to be paid for deviation from Marxism-Leninism in building socialism. At present, a truly scientific theory for the development of Chinese society is needed badly. But as the discussions on the political economy now going on in China reveal, that country's economic science is still following the practical measures of the government and is busy primarily with laying a theoretical basis for them. A large number of official documents on the subject of "regulating" the structure and forms of property were adopted after 1978. It was stressed at the 12th CPC Congress that the state sector plays the leading role in the economy, and at the same time it was declared that "inasmuch as the development of the productive forces in China in general is still at a relatively low level and highly uneven, different forms of economy will have to be retained for a long time yet. It is envisaged that unprofitable small state enterprises may be handed over to worker collectives and individuals. The report on the Sixth Five-Year Plan delivered at the Fifth Session of the National People's Congress announced that the government had decided to make small state enterprises completely self-sustaining within the next three years, by renting them out or putting them out to contract to collectives of workers and employees or even individual workers and employers."⁶⁴

Amendments have also been made in the new PRC Constitution. The articles concerning the property of the people's communes have been substantially revised. The provision about three-stage property—property of the people's communes, large production teams and production teams—has been eliminated from the Constitution. Article 8 allows peasants, within the bounds stipulated by law, to cultivate land and mountain plots allotted to them for personal use, engage in auxiliary husbandry and breed

⁶³ See *Jingji wenti tansuo*, 1981, No. 1.

⁶⁴ See *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 14, 1982.

stock. There is no mention in the Constitution of the household contract in the countryside. Only in Article 10 is it said that organisations and individuals are forbidden to appropriate land, buy and sell it, lease it or illegally dispose of it in any other way. Article 11 contains legal grounds for the inclusion of individual enterprise in the economy in town and country, regarding it as supplementary to the socialist public economy, while Article 18 allows foreign enterprises, organisations and individuals to invest capital in China in accordance with the PRC law and cooperate economically in different ways with Chinese enterprises and other economic organisations.

A large number of decisions regulating the activities of foreign capital, mixed and individual businesses were adopted in China in 1979-1982. One of the latest, directly concerning property, is the Provisional Decision on Some Questions of Policy Towards Collective Property in the Cities.⁶⁵ This government decision says inter alia that city businesses based on collective property are an important component part of the socialist social economy and accord with the present level of development of the productive forces.

Thus, a sharp change has occurred in the past four years in the Chinese sociologists' views on property, as well as in this sphere—from "single socialist property of all people" which the Chinese leaders sought to implant unsuccessfully for about 20 years, to a multi-structural system and a "multitude of forms of property". Moreover, this is interpreted as an important feature of "Chinese specific socialism". The situation which has taken shape in economic science in China in recent years reflects, to some extent, the contradictory processes going on in both the property relations and economic science itself.

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DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY IN JAPAN: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

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[Article by E. V. Kikabidze]

By the beginning of the 1980s Japan had narrowed down the gap dividing it from the United States and outpaced Western Europe in the case of a number of basic economic indices. But though it has substantially altered the correlation of forces in its favour. Japanese imperialism is still behind these two biggest centres of imperialist rivalry, not only in economic, but also scientific and technical potential.

Because of the peculiarities of its participation in the international division of labour, it is vitally important for Japan to build up its scientific and technical potential. Whereas in the postwar period the reconstruction and high rate of growth of its economy were possible mainly thanks to imported industrial technology, today Japanese state-monopoly capitalism is stepping up the development of new trends of science-intensive technology on the basis of its own fundamental research.

RESULTS OF IMPORT OF FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY BY THE END OF THE 1970s

In the 1950s Japanese state-monopoly capitalism embarked upon the policy of making wide use of foreign machinery and technology (in the form of purchases of patents and licences and conclusion of technical agreements). Particular attention was devoted to the creative elaboration and improvement of foreign machinery and technology with due account of the national conditions, thus considerably enhancing their efficiency. Besides importing achievements of world science and technology, Japan worked on its own research, experimental and development projects.

Prior to the 1960s the main factor determining the character of Japan's scientific and technological policy was the need to build up production capacities and increase the competitive power of the output of the leading branches of industry, notably chemical, metallurgical and engineering (chiefly electrical engineering, shipbuilding and machine-tool industry). Imported technology was of applied character and particular interest in it was shown by private industrial companies which, besides actively importing technology, accounted for more than 70 per cent of the overall expenditure on research, experimental and development projects. Foreign achievements and experience in the spheres of science and technology were acquired and national research, experimental and development projects carried out above all to promote the priority trends of scientific and technical progress promising quick and effective returns. The role of the state in these years was confined mainly to granting loans to private firms operating in the basic branches of industry and also to regulating the terms of the licence conditions concluded by private monopolies.

At the beginning of the 1960s the state-monopoly machine started to exert a growing influence on the elaboration of scientific and technical

policies, singling out and heading the basic trends of fundamental research, and also working on research, experimental and development projects in electronics, on the creation of new materials with pre-set properties, and in some other spheres of scientific and technical development. The intensive rate of industrial production established in the mid-1960s required still greater influence by the state-monopoly machine on national scientific and technical policies, especially in the branches then considered most important. Thus, from the mid-1960s, 25-30 per cent of all the outlays on research, experimental and development projects went into the electrical engineering and electronic industries.¹

Early in the 1970s the needs of economic, scientific and technical development gave rise to tasks with which the monopolies, even the biggest, could not cope without the active participation of the state. Especially important in those years for Japan, which was vulnerable from the point of view of natural resources and the ecological state of the habitat, were the new problems in the sphere of raw-material, energy and natural resources, as well as of environmental protection and restoration. Alongside this there appeared the need to resolve a whole number of social and economic problems. The 1970s were distinguished by the emergence and development of economic branches with science-intensive technology, such as nuclear and aerospace industries, exploitation of the resources of the World Ocean, industrial use of lasers, industry of struggle against the pollution of the environment, biotechnology, information industry, search for new sources of energy and methods of using the traditional types of raw materials and fuel more effectively. The solution of the new scientific and technical tasks in the abovementioned spheres and the problems it involves requires concentrating efforts on both fundamental research and experimental and development projects and this entails colossal investments which are often beyond the means not only of powerful corporations, but even of the country itself. This presupposes that the state's scientific and technical policies are to play a bigger role in the further development of the Japanese economy. An important part in Japan's scientific and technical policies will still be assigned to industrial research, experimental and development projects, but the accent will be on the development of new trends of science-intensive technology on the basis of its own fundamental research.

For decades Japan derived practical gain from inventions made in other industrial capitalist countries, particularly the United States. However, on the threshold of the 1980s Japanese state-monopoly capitalism was confronted with the acute problem of strengthening the scientific and technical potential primarily by mobilising resources for the development of its own science and technology, with the view to speeding up economic growth, solving increasingly sharp social and economic problems, and furthering foreign trade and economic expansion. By this time the United States had lost its leading position in a number of branches of industrial technology and the new trends in Japan's scientific and technical development became the object of attention and discussion at international symposiums on the world economy and scientific and technical progress. Foreign and particularly Japanese specialists attach much importance to the analysis of the causes of the reorientation of Japanese scientific and technical policies chiefly on the development of the country's fundamental research.

Scientists note that Japan can no longer count on the advantages attending its previous development (possibility of exploiting foreign natural resources at a low level of world prices of raw materials, including energy; wide adoption of the scientific and technical achievements of

¹ See *World Economy and International Relations*, 1982, No. 6, p. 64 (in Russian).

Western industrial countries; absence of control over its state and protection of the environment). Acquisition of foreign technology by Japanese firms is becoming an increasingly difficult affair. The terms for the import of technology are growing worse, and this is natural considering the rapid rise of the competitive power of Japanese goods. The terms of licence agreements are being made tougher and this manifests itself notably in the restriction of sales of goods manufactured on the basis of foreign licences. In 1968 such restrictions were stipulated only in 10 per cent of the agreements and by 1976 the figure had risen to 39 per cent.² In 1977 export was altogether prohibited in 49.4 per cent of the cases. Scientific and technical activity and technical innovations, in particular, became the main sphere of competition in the world markets. At present more than a half (51.8 per cent) of the processes of Japanese industrial technology are national and are developed by the majority of private companies on the basis of their own experience.³

In 1950-1979 Japan bought and put into operation about 34,000 licences. Effective use of foreign technology enabled Japan to save time and considerable material and labour resources in narrowing down the "technological gap" with Western Europe and the United States and in raising the level of research and development projects undertaken in the country. Thus, at the end of the 1970s Japan was second only to the United States in the capitalist world in the absolute level of outlays on research, experimental and development projects, though it is still behind the leading Western industrial countries in the share of these outlays in the gross national product: in 1978 this share came to 2.35 per cent in the Federal Republic of Germany, 2.24 per cent in the USA, 1.76 per cent in France, and 1.73 per cent in Japan. In this connection, one of the main objectives of Japan's scientific and technical policies is to raise the overall outlays on research, experimental and development projects to at least 3 per cent of the gross national product. In the number of scientists and engineers working on these projects, per 10,000 employed, Japan is likewise second to the United States in the capitalist world.

One of the most important indicators of the effectiveness of applied inventions and projects is the patenting of inventions. The level of a country's scientific and technical development may be judged by the extent of its participation in the trade in patents and licences, by the balance of their purchases and sales. A country's activity in the sphere of patents is thus one of the criteria for the assessment of its own stock of scientific ideas, inventions and discoveries. Unlike the other capitalist countries, Japan and the United States have a positive "patent balance", i. e., they get more patents abroad than they give to foreigners. The "patent balance" between Japan and the United States is improving in favour of the former and this is evidenced by the annual increase observed since the early 1970s in the number of Japanese applications in the United States and the decrease in the number of applications submitted by the Americans to Japan. All this testifies to the gradual contraction of the gap in the levels of scientific and technical development of Japan and the leading Western countries.

In the technical level of production Japan has caught up with industrial capitalist countries and even surpassed them in some spheres. According to Japanese economic statistics, the index of the technical level of production in 1977 (USA=100) was 56 in the FRG, 50 in Japan, and 38 in France.⁴ Japan thus advanced to third place among the leading capitalist countries. Nevertheless, it generally lags behind them in the level

² *World Economy and International Relations*, 1980, No. 2, p. 77 (in Russian).

³ *Fortune*, Aug. 10, 1981, Vol. 104, No. 3, p. 63.

⁴ *Hachijunendai-no tsusanseisaku bijyon*, Tokyo, 1980, p. 277.

of technical projects. The level of technical projects in Japanese industry is on the average 0.53 computing unit below its technical level.⁵

In the last 10-15 years changes have also taken place in Japanese trade in technology. Although payments for the import of technology have revealed a tendency to grow all through the postwar period, the rate of their increase slowed down at the end of the 1970s and their share of the national expenditure on research, experimental and development projects dropped to 6.8 per cent in 1979 (from 14.1 per cent in 1966). This testifies to the possibility to spend more to step up work on the country's own research, experimental and development projects.

The structure of the import of technology has changed in favour of licence agreements concerning up-to-date technical information and distinguished by higher technical and economic indices. That Japanese firms tend to use the most modern technology (both Japanese and imported) is also evidenced by the increase in the number of licence agreements concluded for periods of less than five years and the decrease in the number of agreements for longer periods. Licence ties are being improved and their number is growing especially in the key branches of the manufacturing industry. In these same branches of industry one observes a growth in the number of agreements with foreign firms on the establishment of mixed companies producing goods on licences from foreign firms. The establishment of mixed companies aims at obtaining new foreign technology which it is difficult to obtain by means of traditional agreements.

Positive tendencies, for the Japanese monopolies, to export Japanese technology became apparent in the mid-1960s. In 1975, for the first time, receipts from the export of Japanese technology exceeded 20 per cent of the amount spent on the import of novelties of foreign technology and reached 22.6 per cent⁶ (2.4 per cent in 1960). It should be noted that with the import of technology considerably topping its export in recent years, the rate of growth of receipts from the export of Japanese technology is outpacing the rate of growth of payments for the import of technology. In 1981, according to the Science and Technology Board, receipts from the export of Japanese technology increased by 42 per cent and payments for imported technology rose by only 19 per cent.⁷

The positive tendencies in Japanese trade in technology also testify to the rise of the country's scientific and technical level, but it is still too early to affirm that Japan has eliminated the "technological gap" dividing it from the Western industrial countries. Export of technology exceeds its import in all those countries with the exception of the FRG. In the industrial capitalist countries the technology export-import ratio is highest in the United States. In 1979 it was 9.49:1 in the USA, 1.43:1 in France, 0.46:1 in the FRG, and 0.27:1 in Japan. Some key branches of Japanese industry still depend considerably on the import of technology from industrial capitalist countries.

Importing scientific and technical achievements from the industrial Western countries on a large scale and working on its own research, experimental and development projects, Japan has enhanced its economic, scientific and technical potential and shown that it is capable not only of assimilating foreign experience, but also of conducting original research whose results are not inferior and sometimes much better than those abroad. Japan has achieved particular success in the development of industrial technology. Towards the end of the 1970s Japan advanced

⁵ Moritani Masanori. *Nihon-no sangyo gijutsu potensharu. Hachijunendai-no kiso sangyo*. Tokyo, 1980. p. 67.

⁶ *Kagaku Shimbun*, Oct. 1, 1976.

⁷ *Japan Times*, Oct. 19, 1982, p. 2.

to the fore in some areas of science-intensive technology (integrated microminiature circuits, industrial robots, biotechnology, development of new materials with preset properties, etc.).

The technologically most developed branch is the electronic industry which, operating on the basis of new scientific principles, simultaneously requires applied technical processes, uninterrupted improvement and mass production. Development lately has been rapid in two areas: creation of large-sized electronic computers and microminiature large-scale integrated circuits.

Large computers will be used in the state information system. The development of new models of computers revealed more clearly Japan's desire to unite the efforts of other states in this field. The Japanese government sponsored a conference in Tokyo in October 1981 of representatives of 15 American, European and Japanese companies to discuss the development of fifth-generation computers.⁸ The conference was attended by more than 300 scientists specialising in electronic computers, including 86 representatives of 14 other countries.⁹ There are different views about this idea. Japanese specialists hold that the cost of developing new models of computers is too great not only for a company, but even for a country. And so there arises the need of uniting the efforts of several states in order to mitigate financial difficulties and also tone down the conflicts which are bound to flare up among the competing companies producing computers.

Wide use in different apparatus is made of microprocessors. They are superior to the electronic vacuum tubes and semiconductor devices mainly because they are more reliable, less power intensive and cheaper. Research in the sphere of integrated circuits was initiated in Japan in 1965. In 1975 four big Japanese companies began to export their goods to the world market. Research is directed towards the development of technology for the production of large-scale integrated circuits. Since 1976 research in this field has been conducted within the framework of state programmes.

The first industrial robots in Japan were made at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. Considering that the first robot in that country was developed in 1967, five years later than in the USA, the progress in this field is admittedly considerable. In 1968 Japan produced 200 robots at the overall cost of 400 million yen and in 1979 it made 14,500 robots costing 44.3 billion yen.¹⁰ Rapid progress was achieved in the sphere of practical employment of industrial robots: 57,000 industrial robots were used in Japan at the end of 1979 and 98 per cent of them in different branches of the manufacturing industry. The industrial robots produced in 1979 were distributed among the various industries as follows: 38 per cent for the production of cars, 18 per cent for electrical engineering goods, 11 per cent for plastics, and 9 per cent for metal.¹¹ Japanese companies now hold leading positions in the development and employment of industrial robots on the basis of microprocessors. Research, experimental and development work on robots is done in accordance with special state programmes which coordinate the research done by universities, research institutes, and laboratories of private firms. Bearing in mind the high cost of industrial robots (\$60,000 on the average),

⁸ *Inside R and D*, Sept. 23, 1981, Vol. 10, No. 38, p. 3; *New Scientist*, Oct. 15, 1981, p. 149.

⁹ *Business Week*, Dec. 14, 1981, p. 66.

¹⁰ K. Sadamoto, ed., *Robots in the Japanese Economy. Facts About Robots and Their Significance*, Tokyo, 1981, p. 131.

¹¹ *Business Week*, July 19, 1982, p. 24.

because of which large companies are chiefly able to use them, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry approved the establishment of a special organisation that hires robots out for any periods. Its operation is financed by the Japan Development Bank. It is believed that this will enable small companies to use robots in small-scale production.¹² It is generally recognised that wide use of industrial robots was one of the main factors of the Japanese automobile monopolies' success in the world market by the beginning of the 1980s.

Highly promising results have been received by Japanese researchers in biotechnology, one of the most important strategic spheres of scientific and technological progress in the 20th century. Biotechnology penetrates into the sphere of nuclear energy (use of certain micro-organisms of the type of algae and actinomycetes to extract uranium out of sea water). Numerous attempts are being made to use the results of the development of biotechnology in medicine, agriculture, and chemistry. Japan leads in some fields of biotechnology. Successes in the technology of fermentation, which is the basis of biotechnology, enabled Japanese firms to capture leading positions in the world market in the output of amino-acids. In 1980 Japan became the biggest producer of new medicines in the capitalist world after the USA. Unlike the United States, where the initial successes of biotechnology were linked with the activity of small research companies, the development of biotechnology in Japan was already at the early stage in the hands of such large companies as Aji-no moto and Mitsubishi Kagaku.¹³ Moreover, there is an evident tendency on the part of the large Japanese companies to unite for joint research, experimental and development work in the field of biotechnology. Illustrative in this respect is the amalgamation of such five large companies as Asahi Kasei, Mitsubishi Kagaku, Sumitomo Kagaku, Mitsui Toatsu Kagaku, and Kyowa Hakko Kogyo.¹⁴ In recent years the state has been taking an increasingly active part in the widespread research done by private firms. Direct assistance to the development of biotechnology is given, besides the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, by the Science and Technology Agency and the Ministry of Health and Welfare.

The ruling quarters and the private sector are joining efforts further to develop the technology of production of fibre optics which will enable Japan to obtain optical fibre with a long service life.

Power development and aerospace research entail rapid progress of innovations in designing new materials, notably new types of ceramics that better resist heat and corrosion, are stronger and may be used in more ways than metals. Japanese researchers in this field compete with researchers in the United States and West European countries. Thus, one of the latest achievements of research in this field belongs to Japan. The scientists of the National Institute for Research in Inorganic Materials have devised transparent ceramics 0.6 millimetre thick capable of resisting a temperature of up to 1,300 °C. The new material, consisting of silicon, aluminium, oxygen and nitrogen, stands sharp changes in temperature and may be widely used.¹⁵ Thanks to their excellent electric conductivity, the new types of ceramics are used in fibre optics and in the production of large-scale integrated circuits. Specialists expect that wide use may be made in the next few years of ceramics as a structural material for gas turbines and automobile engines.

In the coming decade of the present century the development of the

¹² *Economist*, Jan. 17, 1981, p. 71; *World Economy and International Relations*, No. 4, 1982, pp. 55-56 (in Russian).

¹³ *Chemical Week*, Dec. 16, 1981, Vol. 129, No. 25, p. 38.

¹⁴ *CEER*, March 1981, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 41.

¹⁵ *Inside R and D*, Nov. 18, 1981, Vol. 10, No. 46, p. 3.

above-listed new trends of science-intensive technology will obviously be in the focus of Japan's scientific and technical activity.

Towards the end of the 1970s, thanks largely to active imports of foreign machinery and technology, Japan approached the industrial Western countries in the level of scientific and technical development, and came to the fore in the world in some areas of science-intensive technology. The significance of the import of technology as one of the basic factors of Japanese economic growth somewhat decreases as the "technological gap" between Japan and other industrial capitalist countries further diminishes, but it is not altogether ruled out.

BASIC TRENDS OF DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE-INTENSIVE TECHNOLOGY ON THE BASIS OF NATIONAL FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH IN THE 1980s

Scientific and technical progress in the capitalist countries deepens internal contradictions, makes development more uneven and serves to stimulate the aggravation of inter-imperialist struggle.

In the conditions of growing competition among the leading capitalist powers for leadership in scientific and technical progress and for the possession of the latest technological innovations Japan faces the problem of remaining one of the main centres of world imperialism.

At the end of the 1970s, following in the footsteps of the industrial capitalist countries, Japan entered a new stage of economic development characterised by a total demolition of the structure of production and its replacement by a new one whose nucleus will be science-intensive branches capable of influencing structural changes in the economy in general. The main criteria of the new production structure are to be low consumption of power and materials. The task set is to step up the removal of the most power- and material-intensive processes, as well as those polluting the atmosphere, beyond the boundaries of Japan.

The urge to intensify scientific and technical progress in precisely the fields and areas where the future structure of the economy may take root is a characteristic feature of all the industrial capitalist countries. As the leading countries of the capitalist world approach one another in a number of traditional quantitative indices and in some qualitative indices of effectiveness of industrial production, as well as in the availability of natural resources and raw materials, including energy, the centre of gravity of rivalry shifts into the sphere of the scientific and technical potential. That is why the efforts of the government bodies directing the development of scientific and technical progress in Japan in the 1980s aim at laying the foundation of the scientific and technical potential of the future.

The basic principles may be said to be those laid down in a document called "Vision of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry in the 1980s",¹⁶ published in March 1980. This document especially singles out three items: development of new materials, acquisition of alternative sources of energy, and build-up of social infrastructure.

Having this programme in view, the bodies directing research activity in the main ministries and departments advance their own, more concrete programmes of intensification of work on the national research, experimental and development projects in the revolutionising areas (exploitation of new sources of energy and development of energy and raw-material saving technology, electronics, new materials, biotechnology, information industry).

These areas are the mainstreams of scientific and technical progress.

¹⁶ *News from MITI*, March 16-17, 1980.

But while the information and electronic industries bring returns and profit within a short time, the development of alternative sources of energy goes through a number of stages from survey to exploitation and extends over decades.

Despite the shortage of state funds, the Japanese government gave five state bodies special priority in appropriations for research, experimental and development projects in the 1981 financial year. They were the Science and Technology Agency at the Premier's Office, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the Industrial Science and Technology Board, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare.

The perspectives of development appear to be more concrete in some of the programmes advanced by the Science and Technology Agency, the Industrial Science and Technology Board, and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and so we shall dwell on them.

The Science and Technology Agency decided to implement a scientific research programme aimed at creatively developing new areas of science-intensive technology with scientists in different fields cooperating. As provided for by the new research programme, scientists of universities, private companies and government institutions will work on common subjects for five years. The themes of research were approved by the Cabinet's Council for Scientific Technology. Out of 3,350 million yen of budget appropriations for research, experimental and development projects in 1981, it was planned to allocate 500-700 million yen for this programme.¹⁷

In the 1982 financial year, according to an announcement by the Industrial Science and Technology Board, it was intended to initiate fundamental research in Japan with a view to developing robots for use in outer space. The main aim of this research is to obtain technical data to make preparations for the future practical employment of robots or manipulators for work in outer space. A small robot, 60 centimetres in height, can assemble and manipulate objects in outer space. Plans provide for the quick improvement of robots and reduction of their cost, and leaplike development of modern microcomputers. The 1980s will be the period of development and wider use of second-generation robots.

The development of fifth-generation electronic computers in accordance with the ten-year programme drawn up by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry began in the 1982 fiscal year. An important role in the realisation of this programme will be played by the electric engineering laboratory of the Industrial Science and Technology Board. The first three years will be devoted to fundamental research in this field. The Ministry of Finance allocated 426 million yen for this purpose in the 1982 fiscal year.¹⁸

In October 1981 the Ministry of International Trade and Industry adopted a programme of fundamental research in the field of up-to-date science-intensive technology. Sixty-seven industrial companies will take part in the implementation of this programme. It is a ten-year programme that will cost the state 104 billion yen.¹⁹ The aim is to devise and put new materials (superstrength ceramics) into production, develop biotechnology and elaborate new types of semiconductor elements. The fulfilment of this programme is attended by the current structural reorganisation of the economy and will contribute to the development of the electronic, engineering, power, food and other industries.

The Ministry of International Trade and Industry announced the ini-

¹⁷ *Japan Times*, Jan. 16, 1981.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Jan. 8, 1982, p. 2.

¹⁹ *CEER*, April 1982, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 49.

tiation in 1982 of an eight-year national programme of fundamental research in the sphere of fine ceramics. Such a plan of systematic research in this field is the first in the world. The programme will be implemented under the guidance of the Industrial Science and Technology Board jointly by state institutions, universities and private firms, and 17 billion yen will be appropriated for it.²⁰

The development of science-intensive technology on the basis of national fundamental research enhances the need of centralised state regulation and entails an increase in state expenditure. All through the post-war period the state's share of the total sum of appropriations for research, experimental and development projects came to less than 30 per cent, i. e., 33-50 per cent below the amount spent in other industrial capitalist countries.

Thus, in 1978 the states's share of appropriations for research, experimental and development projects was 58.4 per cent in France, 49.8 per cent in the USA, 46.7 per cent in the FRG, and 28 per cent in Japan. Japan lags behind in the level of state appropriations for research, experimental and development projects with regard to the gross national product. The corresponding figures in 1978 were 1.12 per cent in the USA, 1.09 per cent in the FRG, 1.02 per cent in France, and 0.48 per cent in Japan. The White Paper for science and technology for the 1980 financial year proposed stepping up the development of national science-intensive technology by increasing outlays on research, experimental and development projects, particularly in the public sector. Towards the end of the 1980s it is planned to increase the state's share of these outlays to at least 40 per cent. To this end it is proposed to use state loans as well as to look for new financial sources. The abovementioned ideas, however, hardly differ from the proposals repeated time and again over a number of years by the Japanese business circles and the government committees for the development of science and technology.

In the conditions specific to Japan's scientific and technical development with the greater part of financial resources and personnel being concentrated in the private sector, the bourgeois state has worked out a whole system of measures to stimulate action by the private sector which is interested in more purposeful direction of fundamental and applied research. This system is being constantly improved. Besides the measures practised earlier (tax privileges, subsidies, rules of accelerated depreciation, etc.) there appeared new forms of cooperation with private business firms in the 1970s—contract agreements. A graphic example is the realisation in present-day Japan of the so-called programmes of large-scale national projects. The various projects undertaken by the state within this programme in the sphere of research, experimentation and development are turned over for their realisation to private enterprises on the basis of contract agreements. The Industrial Science and Technology Board and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, for instance, intend to establish a contract system for research, experimental and development work in the sphere of revolutionising advanced technology. The Industrial Science and Technology Board thus proposes to activate the efforts of the private sector in elaborating the key trends in science-intensive technology which will lay the foundation for progressive branches relying on national forces.

Especially big hopes in stimulating contract agreements are entertained in the sphere of realisation of energy programmes. As practice has shown, private firms prefer to finance research and innovations that are profitable in their eyes. Investing in research, experimental and development projects, a firm must bear in mind the need to sell its products in

²⁰ *CEER*, March, 1981, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 41.

the conditions of market competition. Since research in the field of power development is a risky affair, private enterprises prefer not to develop new technology by themselves, but to take part in the realisation of government projects—"Sunlight" (development of alternative sources of energy) and "Moonlight" (development of energy-saving technology).

In the 1980s Japan will continue to work on the improvement and complication of existing technology (notably imported) and on the acceleration of new trends in science-intensive technology on the basis of national fundamental research. All of this will, probably, enhance the state's role not only as organiser and coordinator, but also as a source of financing research, experimental and development projects, as well as entail a more active involvement the private sector in the development of new trends in science-intensive technology.

Making wide use of the results of the development of new trends in science-intensive technology in industry, the Japanese monopolies hope to capture leading positions in various spheres of science-intensive production and ensure themselves stable advantages in the competition on the world market. The use by Japanese state-monopoly capitalism of the latest achievements of scientific and technical progress is subordinated to the main aim of capitalist production—and this aim is to extract maximum profit.

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ANNIVERSARY OF 1948 COMMUNIST 'LIBERATION' OF MANCHURIA NOTED

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, Oct-Dec 83 (signed to press 1 Dec 84) pp 80-81

[Article by O. B. Vladimirov: "A Noteworthy Anniversary"]

[Text] On 2 November it was 35 years since the end of the Liaoshen offensive operation of the troops under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in northeast China. The operation played an important role in the Chinese people's liberation struggle against the reactionary Guomindang regime, which was backed up by American imperialism.

As a result of the Liaoshen operation (from 12 September to 2 November 1948), Manchuria was almost completely liberated within less than 2 months. This was the country's most important industrial region, the center of metallurgy, coal mining, machine building and electrical power engineering, and this created favorable opportunities for the complete triumph of revolutionary forces and the creation of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949.

The Liaoshen operation began with an offensive by a huge force--the Northeast Field Army (later renamed the Fourth Field Army)--against the city of Jinzhou. As a result of its encirclement, large units of Guomindang troops near the cities of Changchun and Mukden (Shenyang) were isolated from Chiang Kai-shek's forces in north China. On 5 October the people's troops took the city of Jinzhou by storm. On 19 October the city of Changchun was liberated. Part of the Changchun garrison, numbering 26,000 men, rebelled and went over to the side of the revolutionary troops. The rest of the garrison--57,000 men--surrendered. When the group commander was taken prisoner, he asked only that blanks be fired on the Guomindang troops "for propriety's sake." On the orders of Chiang Kai-shek, the Mukden garrison of 100,000 men tried to break through into north China, but these forces were stopped near Heishan. After this the Guomindang troops turned toward Yingkou port in the hope of escaping by sea, but they were overtaken and defeated on 28 October, when 87,000 men and their commander were taken prisoner. On 1 November Mukden, the largest industrial center in northeast China, was liberated, and Yingkou was liberated on 2 November 1948. The Liaoshen strategic operation was a success. The way was paved for a revolutionary offensive from Manchuria to the Guomindang Army's main strongpoint in north China (the Beijing--Tianjin--Kalgan fortified region).

The Liaoshen operation was the first of three major strategic operations by the People's Liberation Army (followed by the Huaihai and Beijing-Tianjin operations), during the course of which the main forces of the Guomindang Army, numbering over 1.5 million men, were destroyed. During the Liaoshen operation alone, 66 select divisions numbering 470,000 men were destroyed. The fighting spirit of the Guomindang Army, the most capable members of which were trained and armed by American imperialists and were transferred to Manchuria in 1945, on the eve of the civil war in China, was completely undermined. The success of the Liaoshen operation, according to Chinese historians, "signaled a radical shift in the balance of power between the Guomindang and CCP" and "established the necessary conditions for the total liberation of northern China and the entire country."

The Manchurian force which was led by the Chinese Communist Party and successfully conducted the Liaoshen operation and other strategic operations, was created in northeast China under favorable historical conditions. The defeat of Fascist Germany and militarist Japan offered extensive opportunities for the completion of the Chinese people's revolutionary liberation struggle under the guidance of the Communist Party. The radical changes which took place in the world as a result of World War II and the alliance of Chinese progressive forces with the USSR and the world revolutionary movement were the deciding foreign policy factors in the victory of the Chinese revolution. This alliance compensated to some degree for the relative weakness of the Chinese working class, helped to unify all anti-imperialist and antifeudal forces in the country and impeded the export of counterrevolution by imperialism.

When northeast China was liberated by the Soviet armed forces, it essentially became the main strongpoint of the Chinese revolution. Popular armed forces, cadres and lines of communication for the deciding assault in the struggle to free China from the yoke of imperialism and feudalism began to be prepared in Manchuria in 1945-1949 with the aid of the Soviet Union. The army was backed up by an alliance of the working class and the laboring peasantry, with CCP party organizations playing an active guiding role. Revolutionary troops in Manchuria were equipped with sufficient up-to-date weapons and ammunition, including some seized by Soviet troops during the defeat of Japan's Kuangtung Army. Commanders who had received military training in the USSR played an important role in the creation of the revolutionary armed forces. Soviet military specialists rendered considerable assistance in the organization of training for the high command. With the support of the Soviet Army, the revolutionary forces were organized, armed and properly trained when they entered the civil war begun by Guomindang forces. It is quite understandable that it was the Manchurian force that became the spearhead of the liberation struggle during the final stage of the revolution, after it had become the central force among the formations engaged in the PLA's successful southern offensive.

The 35th anniversary of the triumphant conclusion of the Liaoshen strategic operation, which marked the beginning of the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek's troops and represented an important step toward the victory of the Chinese revolution, is a noteworthy event in the history of China's revolutionary movement and a vivid reminder of the historic significance of the Soviet and Chinese people's combat solidarity in their common struggle against imperialism and reaction.

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SOVIET ADVISERS' ASSISTANCE TO SUN YAT-SEN RECALLED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 84 pp 74-79

[Article by R. A. Mirovitskaya, candidate of historical sciences: "The First Soviet Advisers in China"]

In 1923, Sun Yatsen, the great Chinese patriot, a recognised leader of the liberation movement in China and a bourgeois revolutionary democrat, addressed a plea to the Soviet government to help the Chinese people in its revolutionary struggle. As a result, the activity of Soviet political and military advisers who worked in the very midst of the masses became one of the crucial elements of Soviet aid to China. It was there that they were called upon to share with the Chinese revolutionaries their experience in building the army and the party, in organising and waging a revolutionary war.

The practical activity of Sun Yatsen and his associates during the years of cooperation and friendship with the USSR, of the work to create a united national front and a revolutionary base in Guangdong, the whole of Sun Yatsen's heritage is still a topical theme of research for sinologists and politologists across the world. Western bourgeois historiography presents a distorted version of Sun Yatsen's activity, attempting to hinder the cooperation of political leaders of developing countries with local communist parties and the Soviet Union.

In the USSR volumes of literature have been published about Sun Yatsen's revolutionary activity and his ideological and theoretical views, about the reasons that made him the first bourgeois figure of awakened Asia to embark on the alliance and friendship with Socialist Russia, i. e., take historical decisions that determined the destiny of Chinese revolution for many decades.

The works by Academician S. Tikhvinsky, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences M. Sladkovsky, A. Meliksetov, G. Yefimov and many other Soviet sinologists have convincingly demonstrated that this phenomenon is rooted in Sun Yatsen's understanding of the realities of the post-October world, the part of the Soviet state in it and the part of China. His search for a way by which to turn China into a great power had convinced him that the solution of crucial problems of Chinese society, such as the attainment of the country's unification, national independence, sovereignty, and socio-economic progress, was hardly possible without the cooperation of states friendly to China. The Soviet Union was such a friendly power, a moral, political and material base of the world revolutionary process. Having taken decision on alliance with Soviet Russia, Sun Yatsen thereby accepted the proposal by Chinese Communists for the unity of action in the liberation struggle.

However, being a bourgeois revolutionary, Sun Yatsen did not immediately establish close political contacts with the USSR. Showing keen interest in the experience of the October revolution, in Lenin's personality, in the questions of building an army, Sun Yatsen, along with other prominent Guomindang leaders, under the influence of anti-communist and anti-Soviet propaganda, was at first somewhat wary when receiving Soviet

¹ S. L. Tikhvinsky, *Sun Yatsen. Foreign Policy Views and Practice*. (From the History of the Chinese People's National Liberation Struggle, 1885-1925), Moscow, 1964; M. I. Sladkovsky, *A History of Trade and Economic Relations Between the USSR and China (Before 1917)*, Moscow, 1974.

representatives in China. Misgivings that close cooperation with Soviet Russia might bring the "dictatorship of the proletariat" to China were for a time one of the obstacles to mutual understanding between Sun Yatsen and the leaders of the Soviet state. Receiving S. A. Dalin, for example, who contacted him at the request of the head of the first Soviet mission in Peking (the talks were held in the presence of Chinese communists Zhang Tailei and Qu Qiubo in April-June 1922) Sun Yatsen paid special attention to elucidating the Soviet viewpoint on the problems of Chinese and Russian revolutions and the peculiarity of China.²

Even in those years the prominent Chinese leader, who took care of the destiny of his country, followed the events in revolutionary Russia with utmost attention; he became more convinced with her every new success that it was necessary to learn from the experience of the Bolsheviks in order to solve the key problems of Chinese society. He also began to work out versions of Soviet Russia's possible aid to China, trying to determine the USSR's part in the development of China of the 1920s.

Let us recall that the problem of selfless foreign aid was an important component of Sun Yatsen's "Industrial Plan" ("The programme of building the country", 1917-1919). It notes, in particular, that "near the end of the war in Europe, the author of this work commenced the study of the question of development of China's industry by joint efforts of different countries..."³ Of course, the idea of using foreign capitalism to build socialism in China, as demonstrated by reality, has been and remains a dream, but the very idea of the possible role of foreign states in China's development explains his interest in the problems of foreign aid. In subsequent years, elaborating on this theme, Sun Yatsen pointed out that he meant aid by friendly foreign states.

In 1922 Sun Yatsen engaged in prolonged talks about US aid. He also pinned hopes on the "common destinies" of China and Japan, trying to reach mutual understanding with Japanese statesmen. However, this did not exclude his attention to the Russian issue. Sun Yatsen worked on the question of developing ties with revolutionary Russia, becoming more set on this opinion as the international stand of Soviet Russia was growing stronger. Soviet Russia was of interest for Sun Yatsen as a successful social experiment of realising the Russian version of the "three people's principles".

Therefore the version of bourgeois sinology that Sun Yatsen applied for aid to the USSR, having exhausted the possibilities of receiving economic and political backing from the US and other capitalist countries, seems untenable.⁴

However, the taking of a stand vis-à-vis the Soviet state was delayed by instability in South China. Sun Yatsen returned to the post of the head of the southern government only in the spring of 1923. Unceasing struggle to consolidate his positions in the early 1920s, preparations for the Northern March, etc., as reported by many Soviet envoys that met Sun Yatsen, postponed decision on relations with the Soviet Republic.⁵

The Sun Yatsen—A. Ioffe communique (1923) provided a certain landmark in the development of Soviet-Chinese relations. The document underscored "the full concurrence of views on Sino-Russian relations" on a number of questions, in particular that "the communist order or even the Soviet system cannot be introduced in China", that "the most essential

² See S. A. Dalin, *Chinese Memoirs, 1921-1927*, Moscow, 1975, pp. 109-115; Chiang Chung Shen (Chiang Kaishek), *Soviet Russia in China*, New York, 1959, pp. 17-18.

³ Sun Yatsen, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1964, p. 285 (in Russian).

⁴ See F. G. Chan, T. H. Etzold (Ed.), *China in the 1920s. Nationalism and Revolution*, New York, 1976, p. 16.

⁵ See S. A. Dalin, *Chinese memoirs...* p. 120.

and important task for China is her national unification and attainment of full national independence".⁶

Regarding this communique, a recent article in *Renmin ribao* points out that "Sun Yatsen once again welcomed Soviet aid to China, determined the policy of alliance with Russia".⁷

In the course of subsequent meetings with A. Ioffe, Sun Yatsen asked for the Soviet Union's support for the national liberation movement in China. In a message to Moscow handed over by the head of the Soviet diplomatic mission in China Sun Yatsen said that he "would like to use advice and aid in transforming Guomindang, in building a revolutionary army, mounting a march to the north to unite the country, as well as receive financial support for all the planned measures".

On May 1, 1923, the government of the Soviet Union sent a cable to Sun Yatsen expressing its readiness to provide necessary aid to China.⁸

The Soviet government proceeded from the fact that the Chinese people in their liberation struggle were opposed by the camp of external and internal reaction. Under the circumstances the USSR deemed it its internationalist task to support the forces that asked for its aid. On the first stage, Soviet backing could objectively contribute to unifying the forces in favour of the national liberation of China, help coordinate actions of the two leading parties of the Chinese people—the CPC and the Guomindang. The Soviet Union was called upon to become an important factor in China's political life, in the Chinese people's liberation struggle.

In that period Sun Yatsen was an active sponsor of Soviet experience, of creating a positive Soviet stereotype, constantly stressing certain points of similarity in the principles of domestic and foreign policy of the USSR and *sanmin zhuyi*, the three people's principles, and the resulting necessity to use Soviet experience in a creative way, above all in building the party and the army. He viewed the successes of the Soviet people as the possibility of a joint struggle of the revolutionary parties of the two countries.⁹

His analysis of the struggle and victory of the Soviet people led Sun Yatsen to the realisation that "reliance on military force alone cannot guarantee real success... If our party wants to achieve real success it should not henceforth rely just on troops... Why did we not know this before?" "Because we had no example to follow".¹⁰

Thus, for Sun Yatsen Soviet Russia was an example worth to study and follow, and he saw to it that those ideas were shared by his associates and the wide popular masses.

The works of Soviet sinologists, in particular those of Academician S. Tikhvinsky, offer a solid analysis of the influence of the ideas of the Great October Socialist revolution and the Soviet government's practical activity on Sun Yatsen's ideological and theoretical thinking, as reflected in his new interpretation of the "three people's principles" which became a real programme for achieving vital tasks of the Chinese revolution at a new stage.

All practical activity, including the work of popularisation, by the leader of the national liberation movement shows that the policy of cooperation and friendship with the USSR was the strategic course of the Guomindang of the Sun Yatsen period.

⁶ *Soviet-Chinese Relations. Collection of Documents. 1917-1957*, Moscow, 1959, p. 65.

⁷ Fang Wuguang, "First Cooperation of Guomindang and the CPC and the New Interpretation by Sun Yatsen of 'Sanmin Zhuyi'", *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 10, 1982.

⁸ In Chinese literature it is reported that Sun Yatsen sent his request for political and military advisers with a military delegation sent to Moscow in August 1923 (see *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 10, 1982). This must have been a second request by Sun Yatsen on this matter.

⁹ See Sun Yatsen, *Selected Works*, p. 29.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 366.

With the approval of Sun Yatsen and his associates, a group of experienced political, military and other advisers were sent by the Soviet Union to South China to provide assistance to Chinese revolutionaries. The Soviet government instructed them to follow the decisions of the Comintern and the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the revolutionary movement in China and to creatively provide the Chinese people with the experience of the October revolution and the Soviet state on the points of need in China, i. e., in the creation of a revolutionary army and party, in organising a revolutionary war. The available documents and vast memoir literature published in the USSR in the last two decades leave no doubt that the Soviet government was very careful in choosing candidatures for work in China. Those were men with vast experience in revolutionary party work and military commanders that had been through the Civil War and that had studied in Soviet military academies.

The first small group of Soviet advisers arrived in Canton in early October, 1923, headed by M. Borodin, who was instructed to be guided above all by the interests of the national liberation struggle in China.¹¹

The chief military adviser was V. Blyukher, a famous commander and hero of the Civil War.¹²

In 1923-1925 the Soviet advisers were faced with the practical task of helping the Chinese people to set up a united national front. Simultaneously they had to provide assistance in building the front's military forces.

The Soviet advisers were guided by the directives and instructions of the Comintern on the Chinese problem, but Chinese reality, the revolutionary activity of millions of people constantly confronted the leaders of the advisers' group with new problems, and very often under critical circumstances that left no time for reflection. In conditions of the day, especially due to lack of speedy communications with Moscow, they had very often to act independently, relying on their own experience, knowledge and political intuition.

The strategy and tactic of the national liberation movement were worked out by Lenin, who underscored the necessity for support by the international communist movement to the national liberation movement, for an alliance of the peoples of colonial and dependent countries with Soviet Russia in the struggle against imperialism. Lenin pointed out the need, because of certain peculiarities in the liberation movement in the East, for an alliance of the proletariat with bourgeois democracy, with the peasant masses in an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggle.¹³

The main theoretical and practical problem which the Comintern, the CPSU and the Soviet advisers had to cope with in China was the problem of correlation of class and national interests in the national liberation movement. The practical realisation of Lenin's indisputably correct conceptions encountered a number of difficulties and called for working out a vast complex of additional theoretical and political problems advanced by Chinese revolutionary practice.

The Chinese reality the Soviet advisers plunged into in late 1923-early 1924 could not but tell on their first actions in China. As was reported by M. Borodin and as is evident from A. Cherepanov's memoirs published in the 1970s,¹⁴ the social and political situation in South China, and in the country as a whole, turned out to be more complicated than it looked from

¹¹ See *Comintern and the East. The Struggle for the Leninist Strategy and Tactic in the National Liberation Movement*, Moscow, 1969, p. 132; *Communist International. Short Historical Essay*, Moscow, 1963, p. 200.

¹² On M. Borodin and V. Blyukher see *Prominent Soviet Communists, Participants in the Chinese Revolution*, Moscow, 1970, pp. 22-40.

¹³ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, pp. 146-147, 150, 242-243.

¹⁴ See A. Cherepanov, *Notes by a Military Adviser in China*, Moscow, 1976.

Moscow or even from Peking, which demanded, primarily, additional study of Chinese reality, traditions and history. In Canton it became clear how few people, among those surrounding Sun Yatsen, really shared his idea of alliance with the USSR, even less of cooperation with Chinese Communists. Initially Chinese Communists could not be of much assistance to the advisers: they lacked knowledge and experience, besides, the party was not numerous and the idea of a wide united national front in the form of Guomindang (on the basis of alliance between the proletariat, peasantry and petty and national bourgeoisie) was opposed even in the CPC or demanded additional protracted explanatory work by the Soviet advisers and Comintern workers.

On the other hand, Sun Yatsen, firmly believing in the correctness of his choice of foreign policy orientation—that is reliance on the USSR and friendship with it—sought an atmosphere of trust for Soviet specialists, particularly for his political adviser M. Borodin. In his speeches in 1923-1924 Sun Yatsen repeatedly pointed out to Guomindang the necessity of borrowing Russian experience of party and military construction which was suggested by representatives of the Soviet Union.¹⁵ Sun Yatsen appointed M. Borodin an adviser for reorganising the Guomindang, then M. Borodin became the Guomindang's political adviser.

The history of the Guomindang's reorganisation and creation of the united national front is well elucidated in the works by Soviet authors, in the memoirs of former military advisers in China. It seems indisputable that without direct participation of experienced Soviet party functionaries in the theoretical and practical preparation of the first Guomindang congress and its work¹⁶ (the congress formally organised the bloc of the Guomindang and the CPC) the united front would not have been set up in such a short historical time. Sun Yatsen was very grateful to the USSR for aiding China. After the close of the Guomindang's first congress he wrote to L. Karakhan that the congress was grateful to the Russian people for sympathy with the Chinese in their revolutionary struggle. He expressed confidence that "both peoples, Chinese and Russian, will cooperate on the road of freedom and justice". He singled out M. Borodin as head of the advisers' group. In an official letter to G. Chicherin in February 1924 Sun Yatsen wrote the following: "...I express my deep gratitude for the services rendered us by comrade Borodin in reorganising the Guomindang. He was invaluable, and his visit seems to be a remarkable event".¹⁷

The other major aspect of cooperation was, as has already been stated, the assistance in building the united front's army. With the arrival of Soviet advisers the matter was put on a practical footing. In the 1920s China's revolutionary forces were confronted by the militarist armies supplied with foreign weapons. What's more, armed detachments of imperialist powers in China were ready at any moment to attack the anti-imperialist movement growing in the country. The lack of military forces of his own made Sun Yatsen rely at different periods of the struggle on various militarists who, pursuing their own interests, sought to use Sun Yatsen as a banner in the struggle for power in Canton. Thus Sun Yatsen's interest in Soviet experience of military construction was quite understandable. In an 1923 appeal he wrote that he was interested above all in the creation of an army and in staging a march to the North. Despite open opposition by many Guomindang members, Sun Yatsen largely trusted Soviet military experience in the person of Soviet advisers, which was to the benefit of Chinese history and revolution.

¹⁵ See Sun Yatsen, *Selected Works*, p. 368 and others.

¹⁶ See *Leninist Policy of the USSR Toward China*, Moscow, 1968 pp. 28-29.

¹⁷ Sun Yatsen, *Selected Works*, pp. 415, 569-570.

The National Revolutionary Army, established in the 1920s, not only made a worthy contribution to the national-democratic revolution of the 1920s but also provided a prototype for the People's Liberation Army of China.

In South China a South-China group of Soviet advisers was formed headed first by P. Pavlov, a hero of the Civil War, and from October 1924 by V. Blyukher¹⁸. In 1923 the group was made up of five persons, by June 1924 it had increased to 25, and in January 1926 there were 27 Soviet advisers and 20 technicians in South China. Their small number was compensated by the rich experience of Soviet commanders who had won honours during the Civil War and had taken a theoretical course at Soviet military academies (their upkeep in China was fully paid by the USSR).

In 1923, 1924 and the first half of 1925 the main concern of the advisers was the opening of a military school to prepare officers for the first units of the united front army, in Wampu (Huangpu). The Soviet Union granted China considerable sums to organise the teaching process and for other needs of the school. The latter was provided with weapons and ammunition from the USSR. The system of training and curriculums were worked out jointly by Soviet and Chinese teachers who took into account the experience of Soviet military schools during the Civil War in the USSR. Naturally, in view of preparation for war, much attention was paid to practical training, especially to field and individual training.

Of particular importance was the cadets' political education conducted mainly by Communists and left Guomindang members (Zhou Enlai, Yun Daiying, Liao Zhongkai, and others). By the beginning of Northern March over 6,000 officers had been trained at Wampu, who became the backbone of the National Revolutionary Army.

The introduction of the system of political work, which took into account the experience of the Red Army, determined a qualitatively new type of the army that was created. Its very first military action, the "March to the East" to liberate Guangdong from the power of the militarist Chen Junming—demonstrated its high battle qualities. According to the Chinese press of 1925, it was these units that made the main contribution to victory. All the main operations had been worked out with the assistance of Soviet advisers and, according to the witnesses and participants in the offensive, V. Blyukher was even able to predict the duration of the march. When the first "March to the East" had ended, Soviet Ambassador L. Karakhan reported to Moscow on March 1, 1925, that "the Guomindang Central Executive Committee receives telegrams wherein all Canton generals express admiration and delight for our commanders, particularly Blyukher".

Further work of the Soviet advisers in China proceeded after Sun Yatsen's death in March 1925.

To the last days of his life Sun Yatsen remained a consistent fighter for China's freedom, the way to which he saw in an alliance with the USSR. In his testament he bade his successors to bring the revolution to an end, "to arouse the masses and wage the struggle in alliance with the peoples of the world that maintain relations with us on the basis of equality". In his death-bed message to the Soviet Union, Sun Yatsen expressed the hope that "a time will come when the Soviet Union, as the best friend and ally, will welcome a powerful and free China, when in the great battle for the freedom of the oppressed nations of the world both countries will march forward hand in hand to victory".¹⁹

¹⁸ From mid-1925 to March-April 1926, the South China group of advisers was headed by N. Kuibyshev, known in the literature by his pseudonym of Kisanka (Pussy Cat).

¹⁹ Sun Yatsen, *Selected Works*, pp. 555, 556-557.

POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF PRC WRITINGS ON 12TH-CENTURY GENERAL EXPLAINED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 84 pp 80-93

[Article by S. N. Goncharov, candidate of historical sciences: "Yue Fei as a Historical Personality and the Struggle of Ideas in China"]

Chinese ideological and political life in the past 25 years was characterised by the recourse to traditional ideological material borrowed from ancient and medieval history with the aim of implanting in the people's minds certain stereotypes about the political situation at home and abroad. This "utilisation of things old for the sake of modern times" is exemplified by the notorious campaign of "criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius".¹ In their latest publications Chinese authors exposed the reactionary essence of this campaign, which had nothing to do with scientific history, and showed how, under the pressure from above, historical facts were distorted for the sake of certain political aims and how even celebrated scholars had to falsify wittingly the historical truth.

To elucidate how traditional ideological material was used for political purposes, we believe it of interest to consider how the image of Yue Fei, China's most popular military leader of the 12th century, was interpreted as a historical personality by scholars.²

To begin with, here are a few basic facts of Yue Fei's biography³ as reported by Chinese historiographers of old. Yue Fei was born into a poor peasant family in the Tanying province (on the territory of the modern Henan province) in 1103. His youth and adulthood coincided with the time of ruthless wars waged by the Song Empire (960-1279) against the Jurchen state of Jin (1115-1234). China suffered a number of grave defeats at the hands of the Jurchen. In late 1126, they seized by storm Kaifeng, the capital of the Song Empire, and in early 1127 took to Manchuria, their native land, captivated by them Hui-zong, the Song Emperor who had abdicated during the Jurchen attack, and his son Jin-zong, who was on the throne when Kaifeng was stormed. That the Chinese emperors were captured and driven away into captivity caused a psychological shock among the contemporaries and to this day is viewed by the Chinese as a "shameful incident" in the country's history. In the same year Hui-zong's ninth son Gao-zong (his personal name was Zhao Gou) ma-

¹ See L. S. Perelomov, *Confucianism and Legism in China's Political History*, Moscow, 1981, pp. 253-306 (in Russian).

² We will not concern ourselves with the way Yue Fei is portrayed by Chinese fiction writers. See, for example R. Ruhlmann, *Traditional Heroes in the Chinese Popular Fiction. — Confucian Persuasion*, Stanford, 1960, p. 154. For the portrayal of Yue Fei in traditional Chinese drama see articles by Feng Qiyong, published by *Guangming ribao*, Sept. 27, Nov. 10 and Dec. 22, 1964.

³ All of Yue Fei's biographies go back to the one compiled by his grandson Yue Ke (1183-after 1240). See Yue Ke. *A Collection of Documents from Jintuo in the E Province Brought to the Consideration by the Emperor*, Chapters 1-8, Hangzhou, 1883.

naged to restore the rule of the Chinese Empire in the south of the country (the period of the existence of this state is usually referred to as Southern Song, 1127-1279). Gradually the Song armies gained in strength and succeeded in containing the Jurchen's onslaught in the areas between the Huaihe and the Yangtse Rivers, in the middle reaches of the Hanshui River and also somewhere near the border between the modern provinces of Shenxi and Sichuan.

Yue Fei, who made his way from a rank-and-file soldier to an outstanding military leader of the Empire, was perhaps the most brilliant representative of a galaxy of famous Chinese military leaders at that time. Endowed with outstanding organisational ability and a flare for military leadership, Yue Fei created a well-disciplined and efficient army, which repeatedly defeated the Jurchen. Contemporaries believed that the main characteristic which distinguished that army from those of other Song military leaders was that it did not pillage or oppress the civilian population. Like other major military leaders of that time, Yue Fei, apart from fighting against the Jurchen, obeyed his Emperor's orders and suppressed peasant uprisings that flared up on the territory of Southern Song. His troops had a decisive role to play in suppressing a major peasant uprising under the leadership of Zhong Xiang and Yang Yao in 1134-1135.

Yue Fei scored his greatest success in an engagement against the Jurchen in 1140. His army launched an offensive in the Henan province, headed towards the former Song capital, Kaifeng, and routed Jurchen troops on its way. Before he reached Kaifeng, however, Yue Fei was compelled to retreat. Traditional Chinese historiography claims that he withdrew, obeying the order of Emperor Gao-zong. At the same time it is pointed out that the order was prompted by Qin Gui (1090-1155), the first minister of the Song court who was very powerful at that time and who is portrayed as a "Jurchen spy" and an "influential rascal" in most of the historical sources and literary pieces. In his article published in 1902 Japanese scholar Senziro Ichimura graphically demonstrated that Yue Fei's army withdrew because it was cut from the bulk of the Song forces and had no flank support rather than, because the emperor ordered it to (incidentally, it is highly doubtful that such an order was given).⁴ Some Chinese historiographers⁵ to a certain extent accepted Ichimura's conclusion but the majority of papers retained the more dramatic and impressive traditional version, according to which it was Qin Gui's "subversive activity" that forced Yue Fei to retreat on the eve of a decisive victory.

The Song ruling elite was wary of the growing might of its military leaders and their possible "self-will" and defiance of court orders. In 1141, the prominent Song military leaders Han Shizhong, Zhang Jun and Yue Fei were invited to Linan, capital of Southern Song (the town of Hangzhou in the modern province of Zhejiang), under the pretext of receiving awards for victories scored in battle. In actuality, however, in keeping with the plan worked out by Qin Gui, all of them were assigned high posts in the central government with no real authority and in this way were isolated from their troops. Stripping them of military authority was an important step in working towards a peace with the Jurchen, prepared by Gao-zong and Qin Gui, as all these military leaders opposed coming to terms with a "sworn enemy". Subsequently Han Shizhong, Zhang Jun and Yue Fei were forced to resign and to quit their nominal posts, while Yue Fei, the most firm and consistent opponent of peace, was brought to court on a fabricated charge. He was accused of "preparing a mutiny" and put behind bars, where he died in late 1141. At the same

⁴ S. Ichimura, *Studies in Chinese History*, Tokyo, 1943, pp. 421-438.

⁵ See, for example, Deng Guangming, *Yue Fei's Biography*, Peking, 1958, pp. 223-228.

time talks were conducted with the Jurchen Empire. As a result the terms of a peaceful agreement were finally coordinated in 1142 and the Chinese Emperor recognised himself a "vassal" of the Jurchen Emperor, pledging to pay a large annual tribute to the Jin state and recognising its right to own vast territories of China, including those of the modern provinces of Hebei, Shandong, Henan and Shenxi. In turn the Jurchen, in keeping with the treaty, released from captivity Gao-zong's mother (who was Hui-zong's concubine) and also the remains of Hui-zong and two of his wives who died in the Jin state. The Chinese believe by tradition that that treaty, called the "peace of the Shao-xing period" in keeping with the motto of the Gao-zong government, was one of the most infamous in the country's history.

For centuries the tumultuous events of the mid-12th century have been attracting the attention of the ruling elite or its opposition. In different periods both the 1142 treaty and the main characters of that time were appraised in an entirely different way, depending on the political situation in the country. With every passing generation Yue Fei steadily rose in popularity. The common people revered him above all as a hero who defended their country from foreign invasion and as a military leader who forbade his subordinates to mistreat the population (quite a rarity in old China). The ruling classes exploited the reverence displayed by all social strata towards Yue Fei and advertised his "impeccable loyalty to the ruler". The Manchu Emperor Qian-long, for instance, wrote a special essay,⁶ in which he asserted that, when Yue Fei got the order to withdraw, he knew that the "influential rascal", Qin Gui intended to ruin him and still did not hesitate to withdraw troops and then submissively went to the capital to meet his certain death, because he believed that obedience to the emperor's order should be placed above the desire to save one's own life. Qian-long praised this "loyalty to the ruler" as a brilliant example to be emulated by all the loyal subjects.

Now let us look at how Yue Fei was portrayed in the 20th century, focusing only on the main trends manifest in the course of debates on the military leader.

1. "MEDIEVAL MILITARIST" OR "HERO DEFENDING THE MOTHERLAND FROM AGGRESSORS"?

In his textbook on Chinese history published in 1923, Lǚ Simian praised Qin Gui for succeeding in ousting the Song military leaders, including Yue Fei, from power. In his opinion Yue Fei was a "medieval militarist" in no way different from the Chinese militarists of the 1920s and his removal could only benefit the country.⁷ This appraisal reflected the progressive public's dissatisfaction with the internecine strife among the militarist cliques weakening the country. Later on, in the 1930s, this appraisal of Yue Fei as a "militarist" was used for entirely different purposes.

In 1931, Chen Dengyuan published an article assessing the historical role of Qin Gui.⁸ It cited the evidence provided by those historical documents which positively evaluated the peace concluded on Qin Gui's initiative with Jin and his removal of the Song military leaders from power. Deng Zhicheng also tried to justify Qin Gui's desire to make peace with

⁶ See Li Hanhun, *The Biography of Yue, Posthumously Granted the Title of the "Militant and Wise"*, Taipei, 1975, p. 367 (Appendix).

⁷ See Lǚ Simian, *The History of the Motherland in Colloquial Chinese for Practical Self-Education*, Vol. 3, Shanghai, 1923, pp. 7-14.

⁸ Chen Dianyan, "The Critical Appraisal of Qin Gui", *Jinling xuebao* (Nankin), 1931, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 28-45.

foreigners in his book published in 1936. He was perhaps the first Chinese historiographer to have tried to prove that as a result of making peace with the Jurchen and the subsequent reduced spending on the upkeep of troops, taxes were somewhat lowered for the Southern Song subjects.⁹ Shen Qiwei, a historiographer of the PRC, pointed out that on the eve of the anti-Japanese war some Guomindang leaders, who were ready to conclude a peace agreement with Japan, sought to justify Qin Gui's peaceful policy and to belittle Yue Fei's military exploits.¹⁰ Perhaps this was precisely the underlying political cause for the appearance of the aforementioned studies. This tendency, however, was immediately rebuffed by the leaders advocating a military resistance to the Japanese aggression. In their articles published in 1936, Miu Penglin and Zhu Xie¹¹ sought to shatter the opinion that the conclusion of a peace treaty with Jin was justifiable and benefited China and tried to prove that Qin Gui was a "state criminal" while Yue Fei a "national hero" rather than a "militarist".

After the massive Japanese aggression against China launched in July 1937, the problem of appraising Yue Fei as a symbol of resistance to invaders and of Qin Gui as a symbol of defeatism and treason became especially acute.

Views current in China at the time cannot be analysed without reference to pronouncements by Japanese authors who began actively using the image of Qin Gui to justify and "substantiate" their government's reactionary and aggressive policy. In 1937, Shizuo Sogabe published an article in which he spoke quite favourably about the peace concluded with the Jurchen on Qin Gui's initiative.¹² After Nanking was seized by Japanese troops in late 1937, the Japanese voiced their "readiness to make peace" with China in a bid to split the Guomindang government, to weaken its resolve to resist and to ensure support from the defeatist elements in it.¹³ Amid this the political meaning of Sogabe's other article on Qin Gui's peaceful policy becomes quite clear. Adhering to the extremely chauvinistic positions and making numerous insulting remarks about the Chinese people, Sogabe called on Chiang Kaishek to follow the "old wisdom" of Qin Gui, "not to precipitate his own demise" and to quickly make peace with Japan.¹⁴

After the Wang Jingwei faction took Japan's side and launched the campaign for the conclusion of a peace treaty with the aggressors, the Japanese began directly comparing Wang Jingwei with Qin Gui, announcing the peace they attained "expedient" and "wise". For instance, in his monograph published in 1939, Gunji Toyama reappraises the characters of Yue Fei and Qin Gui and openly compares Wang Jingwei with the first minister of the Song, speaking quite favourably about the latter's policy. At the same time he tries to prove that "Yue Fei was far from being all good" and that his removal from military rule and his murder

⁹ See Deng Zhicheng, *2000 Years of Chinese History*, Vol. 3, Shanghai, 1936, pp. 246, 249, 250-252, 256.

¹⁰ See Shen Qiwei, *A Study of the History of Wars Between Song and Jin*, Wuhan, 1958, p. 130.

¹¹ Miu Penglin, "On Peace Talks of the Song Ruler Gao-zong with the Jurchen", *Guofeng yuekan* (Nankin), 1936, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 39-44; Zhu Xie, "The New Analysis of Peace Talks Between Jin and Song", *Dongfang zazhi* (Shanghai), 1936, Vol. 33, No. 10, pp. 65-74.

¹² S. Sogabe, "On Student Political Movements in China", *Gaiho joho* (Tokyo), 1937, Vol. 83, No. 1 (776), p. 261.

¹³ See Huang Meizhen, Zhang Yun, "The Capitulation to the Enemy by the Wang Jingwei Grouping During the Anti-Japanese War", *Fudan xuebao* (Shanghai), 1982, No. 6, pp. 63-67.

¹⁴ See S. Sogabe, "China Should Learn the Lesson of Qin Gui's Peace Talks", *Gaiho joho* (Tokyo), 1938, Vol. 85, No. 1 (794), pp. 273-286.

were quite justified.¹⁵ This judgement was also supported by the pro-Japanese leaders in China. For instance, Tao Xisheng, a well-known historian and public figure who joined Wang Jingwei in 1939, praised Qin Gui's peaceful policy and censured Yue Fei for his "excessive militancy".¹⁶

The Japanese not only used Chinese history to justify their aggressive policy of conquest but also drew in practice on the "experience" of China's former conquerors. In 1943, a group of authors published in Japan an anonymous monograph which summed up that "experience". Among other things, it spoke well of Yue Fei's removal from military power and of Qin Gui's peaceful policy.¹⁷ The book's introductory article directly stated that the aim of the publication was to bring the experience of medieval conquerors of China within the reach of the Japanese—leaders of the so-called "great East Asian sphere of coprosperity".¹⁸ The book's authors came to the conclusion that, judging by historical experience, the most effective form of maintaining an occupation regime on Chinese territory was to pursue the policy of "governing the Chinese with the help of the Chinese themselves under the conquerors' military control".¹⁹ In this context American author Tao Xisheng seems to be justified in concluding that, when setting up puppet regimes on Chinese territory, the Japanese to a certain extent used the experience of the Jurchen, who set up on the lands of the Song Empire they seized the puppet state of Chu (1127) and Qi (1130-1137).²⁰

The ideological onslaught by the Japanese and their utilisation of Chinese history with the aim of propagandising their reactionary policy of conquest could not but be rebuffed by the patriotically-minded scholars and politicians of China. For example, Li Ji wrote that the crushing defeats and bitter humiliation experienced by China in the Song period prompted the conclusion that the policy of "begging for peace" from the enemies is fatal for the country.²¹ There also appeared papers which disputed the opinion that Yue Fei was nothing but a "medieval militarist" rather than a national hero,²² the opinion which was current in China prior to 1937 and which was later on inculcated by the Japanese and their puppets. Well-known Chinese historian Jian Bozan compared Liu Yu and Zhang Bangchang, "rulers" of the puppet kingdoms set up by the Jurchen, as well as the Song defeatist Qin Gui with his contemporary collaborationist and defeatist Wang Jingwei. He noted the urgent need to struggle against national treason which, according to Jian Bozan, threatened the country, as was confirmed by the historical experience of the Song period.²³ In another article he spoke highly of the ac-

¹⁵ *Abstracts of Research into the Song Period*, Tokyo, 1974, pp. 677-678; Liu Zijian, "Yue Fei: Analysis from the Point of View of Historiography and the History of Ideology", *A Collection of Studies into the Song History*, Vol. 6, Taipei, 1971, p. 63. Similar ideas are expressed in Toyama's postwar monograph, which was based on his articles written in the 1930s-1940s. See Gunji Toyama, *Studies of the History of the Jin Dynasty*, Kyoto, 1964.

¹⁶ "A General Guide to the Critique of Zhou Gucheng's Reactionary Historical Point of View", *Lishi jiaoxue* (Tianjin), 1964, No. 11-12, p. 33.

¹⁷ See *The History of Foreign Rule Over China*, 1943, pp. 137-138.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

²⁰ Tao Jing-shen, *The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China. A Study of Sinicization*, Seattle-London, 1976, p. 35.

²¹ See Li Ji, "The Lesson to Be Derived from Begging for Peace Under the Two Song", *Dongfang zazhi* (Shanghai), 1941, Vol. 39, No. 9, pp. 26-36.

²² See Chen Lifu, "It Is Necessary to Teach History and to Write History for the Sake of Making History", *Jiaoyu zazhi*, 1941, Vol. 31, No. 11, p. 3; Qian Mu, *A Brief Study of Native History*, Vol. 2, Shanghai, 1943, p. 434.

²³ See Jian Bozan, *A Collection of Articles on Chinese History*, Chong qing, 1944, pp. 125-137.

tivity of the people's home guards who fought against the invaders on territories occupied by the Jurchen. He stressed that the military leaders, such as Yue Fei, who maintained close links with those guerrilla units, were most successful in their struggle against the aggressor.²⁴ In general it can be safely stated that the attempts by Japanese authors and the Chinese who sided with Wang Jingwei to denigrate Yue Fei and laud Qin Gui had little effect on the bulk of Chinese society. Yue Fei became ever more popular among the people.²⁵

Severe debates and disagreement on the evaluation of Yue Fei and Qin Gui were echoed in writings that appeared after 1949. Jia Jinyan wrote in an article published in 1951 that "some people" urged that a discussion be initiated on the roles played by Yue Fei and Qin Gui.²⁶ Soon enough the problem indeed attracted the attention of Chinese authors in connection with the critique of the works by Zhou Gucheng. In 1939, Zhou Gucheng published his *General History of China* in Shanghai, occupied by the Japanese at the time. The book spoke favourably of the puppet states of Chu and Qi set up by the Jurchen, justified entirely the peaceful policy pursued by Qin Gui and defended the aforementioned point of view, according to which Yue Fei and other military leaders were nothing but "militarists" that had to be removed.²⁷ Given the political situation, Chinese readers could well interpret these appraisals as an approval of the Japanese policy of setting up puppet regimes and of the policy of appeasement of the aggressor. Zhou Gucheng's book was reprinted in the PRC in 1955 and 1957 practically without any changes.²⁸ Perhaps this was in tune with the policy of the time, that of "letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend". Later on when the campaign of "criticism of the right-wing bourgeois elements" was launched, Zhou Gucheng's book also found itself under a barrage of criticism. In 1958, this criticism was fairly civil and did not go beyond the framework of an academic discussion.²⁹ During the "second round" of criticism in 1964 it became more acute. For his sympathetic portrayal of what Qin Gui did and the desire to belittle the role played by Yue Fei and to justify the setting up of the puppet kingdoms of Chu and Qi by the Jurchen, Zhou Gucheng was accused pointblank of his ideas in their time playing into the hands of the Japanese invaders.³⁰ It goes without saying that the changed keynote of criticism reflected the general worsening of the situation in China on the eve of the "cultural revolution". In 1981, an article appeared which praised Zhou Gucheng and

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 106-124.

²⁵ See Liu Zijian, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

²⁶ See Jia Jinyan, "Appraising Qin Gui on the Basis of Jin Documents", *Lishi jiaoxue* (Tianjin), 1951, Vol. 2, No. 5, p. 13.

²⁷ See Zhou Gucheng, *General History of China*, Vol. 1, Shanghai, 1941, pp. 716, 738-740, 752-753.

²⁸ The changes introduced in the 1955 edition were, for example, the following: imitating medieval historiographers, Zhou Gucheng in the early editions of his book called the rebellious peasants *Zei*, robbers, the term put in inverted commas in the 1955 edition.

²⁹ See Ji Tian, "Criticism of Zhou Gucheng's 'General History of China'", *Xin jianshe* (Peking), 1958, No. 7, pp. 62-63; Fan Wenlan, "It Is Necessary to Pay More Attention to Modern Times in Historical Research and Less to Ancient Times", *Renmin ribao*, April 28, 1958; Zhao Qian, "Why Acquit Traitors?", *Guangming ribao*, Aug. 30, 1958.

³⁰ Jin Yingxi, "How Zhou Gucheng Whitewashes Qin Gui, Praises Trucklers and Denigrates the Advocates of War", *Hongqi*, 1964, No. 17-18, pp. 21-24; Ding Liling, Chung Yu, Pei Rucheng, "How Zhou Gucheng Revises the Activities of Qin Gui and Zhang Bangchang. Criticism of a Reactionary Point of View which Propagandises National Treason in the *General History of China* written by Zhou", *Zefang ribao*, Oct. 16, 1964; Guan Liliqun, "Let Us Speak About the 'Peaceful' Situation Between Song and Jin After the 'Peace of the Shaoxing Period'. On Exposing One of the Absurd Theories of Zhou Gucheng Who Whitewashes Qin Gui's Crimes", *Lishi jiaoxue* (Tianjin), 1964, Nos. 11-12, pp. 27-29.

stated that the "first round" of his criticism (the late 1950s) was initiated by Kang Sheng and that in the early 1960s Yao Wenyuan emerged as the leading figure in this critical campaign.³¹ It is noteworthy that in 1981 the *General History of China* was again reprinted in the PRC in its original form. To all appearances, it is the only work published in the PRC of late which maintains that Yue Fei was a "militarist". We have already pointed out that the idea was advocated in certain quarters already in the 1930s-1940s.

2. "A FEUDAL SERVANT WHOLEHEARTEDLY LOYAL TO THE EMPEROR" OR "A PATRIOT FOR WHOM THERE IS NOTHING LOFTIER THAN LOVE OF HIS MOTHERLAND"

As Marxism spread throughout China and its influence grew, progressive thinkers in that country were faced with the task of revising their entire history from scientific, class positions, including the task of reappraising the role played by outstanding historical figures and of working out proletarian principles of ideological and political work. The great Chinese writer Lu Xin was, perhaps, the first to correctly appraise Yue Fei on the basis of revolutionary principles. In a number of articles written in 1935-1936 he developed the idea that there existed two types of a single national anti-Japanese front. Under the first ("old", in Lu Xin's terminology) the mass of the working people obeyed unquestioningly the reactionary ruling classes. Lu Xin compares their obedience to Yue Fei's "loyalty to the ruler". This form of the national front could, according to Lu Xin, eventually lead to defeat, just like Yue Fei's "impeccable loyalty" proved fatal for himself and led to the conclusion of the infamous peace treaty. Under the second or "new" type of the single front, Lu Xin maintains, "the proletariat has power in its hands and pursues an independent course". It is only such a single front that is capable of attaining victory over Japan. Without detracting from the positive qualities of Yue Fei, Lu Xin came out against praising his image without reservations by Guomindang leaders of the period (including his "loyalty").³²

These ideas of Lu Xin, who was the first to speak about the class limitations and contradictoriness of Yue Fei's state of mind deserve special credit all the more so since they were formulated during the period when the slightest "lack of loyalty" with respect to Yue Fei could entail accusations of being unpatriotic. Incidentally, it is essential that from Lu Xin's point of view, when promoting its own patriotism, the proletariat cannot confine itself to exclusively old feudal ideological material.

Marxist philosopher Ai Siqu also spoke in a clear-cut way about the contradictory nature of Yue Fei's state of mind.³³ In his book *Philosophy for the Broad Masses of the People*, he tried to explain the meaning of the basic categories and laws of Marxist dialectics, drawing on examples from the country's history and culture that could be understood by all Chinese. Explaining the law of the unity and struggle of opposites, Ai Siqu cited as an example the fate of Yue Fei. He pointed out that the current opinion that the intrigues by traitors and capitulators were the main cause of Yue Fei's death was superficial and failed to reflect the complexities of what had happened. According to Ai Siqu, Yue Fei's "loyalty to the ruler" which forced him to retreat, obeying the emperor's order, rivaled his "love of the motherland" which urged him to fight on

³¹ See "The 60th Anniversary of Zhou Gucheng's Teaching Activity", *Fudan xuebao* (Shanghai), 1981, No. 3, pp. 65-70.

³² See Yan Jiayan, "A Study of an Interview Given by Lu Xin to the *Jiawang qingbao* Newspaper", *Xin wenxue shiliao* (Peking), 1980, No. 1, pp. 246-247.

³³ For Ai Siqu's ideas see V. G. Burov, *Modern Chinese Philosophy*, Moscow, 1980, pp. 72-74, 90-93.

until the enemy was eventually routed. His death was predetermined when his "loyalty to the ruler" got the better of his "love of the motherland".³⁴

Another Chinese writer, Qin Wenxi, was to draw a fairly categorical conclusion from Ai Siqu's ideas. He claimed that, as Yue Fei's mind was dominated by the "ideology of a feudal slave", he could not be considered a national hero at all. According to Qin Wenxi, only the leaders of peasant uprisings who had come out against feudal oppression could be considered as such.³⁵ The appearance of such a point of view made Ai Siqu elucidate his position. He branded as simplistic the idea that representatives of the ruling feudal class could never be national heroes. Yue Fei, beyond doubt, did a great service to the Chinese people by repelling the invading Jurchen. At the same time Ai Siqu pointed to the limitations and reactionary aspects of Yue Fei's ideas, which was historically and socially conditioned. This reactionary character was above all manifest in Yue Fei's suppressing the peasant uprising led by Zhong Xiang and Yang Yao. Nevertheless, the main aspect of Yue Fei's activities was not the quashing of uprisings, but the mounting of resistance to the aggressors: so, there is every reason to consider him a patriot and national hero.³⁶

The fact that Yue Fei suppressed the uprising led by Zhong Xiang and Yang Yao proved delicate for those authors who sought to "uphold" the traditional high prestige of the military leader. Zhao Lisheng tried to completely ward off the accusations of Yue Fei's "servile loyalty" to the class of feudal lords and represented his policy towards the rebels as exclusively gentle and directed only to "appease and attract" peasants rather than to exterminate them. According to Zhao Lisheng, the very fact of quenching the uprising had a positive effect because the rebels who had joined Yue Fei's army strengthened it considerably and in this way enabled it to withstand the Jurchen more successfully.³⁷ This point of view was subjected to justified criticism. Ning Ke, for instance, though recognising the outstanding role played by Yue Fei in the struggle against Jin, nevertheless said that the suppression of the uprising could in no way be considered to his credit.³⁸

Works published in the 1950s were also characterised by the desire to stress the close link between Yue Fei and the people's movement of resistance to the invaders.³⁹ This was to fully justify the portrayal of Yue Fei as a truly popular hero close to the masses.

Eventually a commonly recognised point of view of the role played by Yue Fei in the country's history evolved. It was fairly completely expressed in *Yue Fei's Biography*, written by Deng Guangming.⁴⁰ Admitting that the military leader made mistakes when he quashed uprisings, the author said that nevertheless his activity was for the most part focused on the struggle against Jin. Though subjectively Yue Fei indeed fought for the sake of being "loyal to the ruler", his struggle was objectively in the interests of the working people, who actively supported it.

Written in a lively way and containing stimulating studies of nume-

³⁴ Ai Siqu, *Philosophy for the Broad Masses of the People*, Dalny, 1948, pp. 153-155.

³⁵ See Qin Wenxi, "Should Yue Fei Be Considered a National Hero After All, or Not?", *Lishi jiaoxue* (Tianjin), 1951, Vol. 1, No. 5, pp. 17-18.

³⁶ See Ai Siqu, "Is Yue Fei a Patriot?", *Zhongguo qingnian* (Peking), 1951, No. 64, p. 19.

³⁷ See Zhao Lisheng, "The Uprising Led by Zhong Xian and Yang Yao in the Early Southern Song Period", *Lishi jiaoxue* (Tianjin), 1954, No. 1, pp. 17-18.

³⁸ See Ning Ke, "On Some Problems Connected with Appraising Yue Fei", *Wen shi zhe* (Qingdao), 1957, No. 5, pp. 40-43.

³⁹ See Lai Jiadu, Li Guangbi, "Yue Fei's Northern March and the 'Units of Allegiance and Loyalty to One's Duty' in the Country's North", *A Collection of Articles on China's Historical Figures*, Peking, 1957, pp. 149-168.

⁴⁰ Deng Guangming, *Op. cit.*, pp. 257-267.

rous important facts, Deng Guangming's book can by right be considered the best biography of Yue Fei written in the PRC. It had noticeably influenced the works by He Zhuqi and Shen Qiwei.⁴¹

Up to the late 1950s debates on appraising Yue Fei on the whole were of an academic nature. Beginning in the late 1950s, the growing "politicalisation" of the country's ancient and medieval history had a bearing on the problem we are concerned with. In 1964, amid the commencement of the "movement for socialist education", the problem of appraising Yue Fei's "loyalty to the ruler" shifted into the realm of political ideology. Now it was a matter of whether it was expedient for the Chinese in our time to inherit Yue Fei's "loyalty" and patriotism or whether these characteristics of his should be completely denounced as a "reactionary legacy of the feudal past". The latter idea was developed in articles written by Wang Sizhi and Liu Weihua.⁴² They claimed that Yue Fei's "patriotism" boiled down to nothing but "loyalty to the ruler", was entirely reactionary and should be rejected by the Chinese people completely as useless and even harmful. Hua Shan defended Yue Fei, stressing that his "patriotism" was indeed inseparably linked with his ideas of "loyalty to the ruler" because of the peculiarities of that historical period and his class position. Nevertheless, his "patriotism" was not objectively confined to mere "loyalty": it was nurtured by the love which the broad mass of the Chinese working people fighting against foreign invaders had for their motherland. It was for this reason that the image of Yue Fei inspired in later periods the Chinese people to fight aggressors and it is for this reason that Yue Fei's "patriotism" (rather than his "loyalty to the ruler") deserves to be "accepted critically".⁴³ However, this point of view advocated by Hua Shan who sought to defend the appraisal of Yue Fei worked out by Chinese scholars in the 1950s, met with no support and was supplanted by the idea that the military leader's image was "useless" and even "reactionary".

Soviet scholars are known to have interpreted this wholesale rejection of the cultural heritage of the country and its historical past during the "movement for socialist education" as a form of brainwashing the masses in preparation for the "cultural revolution". A similar conclusion was eventually made in China in the past few years in admissions that during the "movement for socialist education" a leftist deviation took place in "treating the intellectuals and problems of education, science and culture", which kept progressing and subsequently triggered the "cultural revolution".⁴⁴ That such an appraisal is justified is confirmed, among other things, by the attitude to Yue Fei during the "cultural revolution". In 1966 the hongweibings destroyed his tomb and temple on the shore of Lake Xihu in the Zhejiang province, one of China's most famous historical monuments. Later on, in the early 1970s, Yue Fei was more than once strongly attacked for having "sacrificed the interests of the people" for the sake of "loyalty to the emperor that became stupidity" and was even proclaimed a "criminal".⁴⁵

⁴¹ He Zhuqi, *A Study of the History of Yue Fei's Struggle Against Jin*, Peking, 1959; Shen Qiwei, *Op. cit.*, pp. 92-130.

⁴² Wang Sizhi, "Let Us Discuss 'Loyalty to the Ruler', Proceeding from Yue Fei's Tragedy", *Xin jianshe* (Peking), 1964, No. 1, pp. 71-79; Liu Weihua, "Confucian Social and Moral Norms, Rituals and Doctrines Cannot Be Accepted as Legacy", *Xin jianshe*, 1964, No. 7, pp. 86-87.

⁴³ Hua Shan, "Can the Critical Acceptance of Yue Fei's Patriotism Be Justified?" *Xin jianshe*, 1964, No. 7, pp. 91-100.

⁴⁴ See *Resolutions on Some Problems of the History of the CPC Since the Formation of the PRC*, Peking, 1981, p. 31 (in Russian).

⁴⁵ See Xu Weiping, "On the National Hero Yue Fei", *Guangming ribao*, Feb. 13, 1979. Yue Fei's temple and tomb were restored and reopened for the public in 1979. See Chang Shaowen, "Tomb of Yue Fei, Song Dynasty Hero," *China Reconstructs*, 1980, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 55-57.

It has already been pointed out that Lu Xin came out against lauding Yue Fei uncritically and advocated a class approach to appraising his personality. Nevertheless, Lu Xin never interpreted this approach in a one-sided and oversimplified way as the need to discard the country's entire historical heritage. It was precisely one of the aspects of the "cultural revolution" that exemplified a distorted class approach to history. In the past few years many scholars sought to undertake once again a scientific study of Chinese history, which also refers to the personality of Yue Fei. For example, the well-known historian Lin Ganquan pointed out that Yue Fei's patriotism could not be completely reduced to his "loyalty to the ruler" and that he merited high praise and a "critical acceptance" by the people of our time.⁴⁶ This point of view coincides with the opinion held by Hua Shan, who opposed a nihilistic approach to Yue Fei during the movement for "socialist education" in the mid-1960s.

After the ousting of the "gang of four" the problem of Yue Fei's "loyalty to the ruler" continued attracting the attention of Chinese scholars, though the focus of attention slightly shifted. For example, Wang Jilie admitted that the dominant ideology of Yue Fei was his "loyalty to the ruler". He agreed that in feudal China such "loyalty" could play a positive role at certain periods, cementing the ruling class and in this way making it possible to maintain the unity of the country. However, during national crises and wars, when the feudal rulers were ready to sacrifice the interests of the state for the sake of preserving their own power, "absolute loyalty" to such rulers became a negative, reactionary factor. According to Wang Jilie, Yue Fei's tragedy was that he was "absolutely loyal" to a "bad emperor". Wang Jilie sees a "profound historical lesson" in the fact that Yue Fei was ruined by his loyalty.⁴⁷

Most of the present-day Chinese authors do not share Wang Jilie's opinion that "loyalty to the ruler" was pivotal to Yue Fei's ideology. According to them, Yue Fei was first and foremost a patriot who believed that it was more important to rebuff the invaders than to preserve in power the ruling imperial clan and for this reason constantly opposed, as far as he could, the capitulatory orders of the court, refusing to blindly fulfil them.⁴⁸ In the wake of such an approach to the image of Yue Fei, Chinese authors began criticising Qian Cai's popular novel *The Tale of Yue Fei* for portraying the military leader as a "loyal subject" of the emperor happy to die on his order, whereas in fact Yue Fei always opposed Gao-zong's capitulatory policy.⁴⁹

Obviously the image of Yue Fei as a man who sought as far as he could to oppose the anti-popular orders of the rulers and refused to blindly obey them seems to be especially attractive in present-day China, which has lived through a "decade of great disturbances" and has a first-hand knowledge of what blind obedience can sometimes lead to.

⁴⁶ See Lin Ganquan, "On the Critical Attitude to Historical Cultural Heritage", *Zhongguo shi yanjiu* (Peking), 1983, No. 2, pp. 18-19.

⁴⁷ Wang Jilie, "Criticism of the Idea of Yue Fei's Loyalty to the Ruler", *Qinghai shehui kexue*, 1980, No. 2 (for a brief account see *Guangming ribao*, Oct. 22, 1980).

⁴⁸ See Deng Guangming, "On Some Problems Connected with Yue Fei", *Qu yi* (Peking), 1981, No. 5, pp. 8-12; id., "Qin Gui's Treacherous Activity in the Eighth and Ninth Years of the Shao-xing period (1138-1139) and Yue Fei's Resolute Resistance", *Shehui kexue jikan* (Shenyang), 1982, No. 4, pp. 91-100; Gung Yanming, "Once Again on Criticism of the Idea of Yue Fei's Loyalty to the Ruler", *Zhongguo shi yanjiu* (Peking), 1981, No. 4, pp. 83-91; Zhang Yunxiao, "Yue Fei's Struggle Against Zhao Gou", *Shehui kexue* (Shanghai), 1982, No. 6, pp. 61-62.

⁴⁹ Li Zhongzhang, "A Critical Appraisal of the Dominant Ideology of *The Tale of Yue Fei*", *Shehui kexue gongbei*, 1982, No. 1, pp. 146-153; Wang Duanlai, "Yue Fei in History and Fiction", *Wenshi zhishi* (Peking), 1981, No. 1, pp. 33-38.

3. WHO DESERVES MOST OF THE BLAME FOR YUE FEI'S DEMISE?

The "utilisation of events of the past for modern times" enables people, who do not support the official interpretation of one problem or another, to express their point of view in a figurative way. This was fairly well manifest during a debate to be described below.

In the early 1960s a number of articles were published in China as a result of a discussion over interpreting sources dealing with the naming of the official heir to the throne by Gao-zong. In fact, however, these articles dealt with disagreement on a more acute problem, namely, who was primarily to blame for Yue Fei's demise. Some authors asserted that Yue Fei was put in prison and then killed there with the emperor's consent, or rather, on his order.⁵⁰ Others tried to prove that Qin Gui, "traitor and spy", destroyed Yue Fei, having bypassed the emperor and "forged the order" of his imprisonment.⁵¹ Given the political situation of the day when the Chinese public had fresh memories of the events connected with the removal of Marshal Peng Dehuai, an outstanding military leader, openly compared with Yue Fei in publications of the 1950s, the problem of who was primarily to blame for the death of the Song military leader—the emperor or his stooges—acquired for Chinese readers certain topicality.

Chinese authors again returned to the problem of who was primarily to blame for Yue Fei's demise after the fall of the "gang of four". Wang Zengyu, who has written several interesting articles about Yue Fei in the past few years, enthusiastically proves that the emperor, beyond doubt, was the "main villain" who destroyed the military leader. "Millennium-long feudal absolutism," he writes, "has accumulated a host of absurd, bad practices which cause hatred. For instance, the subjects had no right to criticise the crimes and mistakes of the emperor of the reigning dynasty."⁵² Yue Fei's opposition to the emperor's policy, was the reason for his imprisonment and death. Wang Zengyu develops the same idea in his other articles.⁵³

He Zhongli who disagrees with Wang Zengyu on certain specific historical facts, shares the latter's opinion that the emperor was mostly to blame for Yue Fei's death.⁵⁴

We shall see below that, when turning to one historical fact or another, particularly to the image of Yue Fei, authors aim not so much to discover the objective truth as to express their own view of some outstanding problems of the country's ideological and political life. This is true not only of political ideology but also of law. For instance, 1981 saw the publication of the book *The Revision and Correction of Unjust Sentences*

⁵⁰ See Ruo Wen, "On a Document About Yue Fei and Zhao Gou", *Guangming ribao*, June 6, 1961; Zhang Xuanhao, "A Point of View on the Heir to the Throne", *Guangming ribao*, Jan. 21 and 25, 1962.

⁵¹ See Dai Bufan, "Yue Fei's Poetry and Prose", *Xiju bao* (Peking), 1960, No. 23-24, p. 36; id., "On Yue Fei's Request to Elevate the Heir to the Throne and Other Things", *Guangming ribao*, Sept. 19 and 21, 1961; Deng Guangming, "Let Us Speak Again About the Fact Connected with Yue Fei and Zhao Gou", *Guangming ribao*, July 8, 1961. In 1963 Deng Guangming published an article, in which he was even more strict in elaborating the arguments he had used during the discussion. See Deng Guangming, "Some Problems of Struggle Between Southern Song and Jin", *Lishi yanjiu* (Peking), 1963, No. 2, pp. 21-32.

⁵² See Wang Zengyu, "The Demise of Yue Fei", *Lishi yanjiu* (Peking), 1979, No. 12, pp. 29-41, 38.

⁵³ Id., "The Military Might and Organisation of Yue Fei's Army", *Wen shi*, Issue 11, Peking, 1981, p. 119; "A Critical Description of Qin Gui's Activities", *Qianxi shehui kexue*, 1981, No. 4. For brief contents see the *Chinese Historical Yearbook*, Peking, 1982, p. 56, "On the Message Sent by Wuzhu to Qin Gui and Problems Connected with it", *Nankai xuebao*, 1981, No. 5, pp. 78-79, 41.

⁵⁴ See He Zhongli, "Analysis of the Story About the 'Message Sent by Wuzhu to Qin Gui'", *Hangzhou daxue xuebao* (Hanchou), 1980, No. 1, pp. 42-45.

in *Different Periods*, prepared by the Institute of Law of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The introductory article of the book justly notes that "unjust, falsified, or erroneous sentences" bespeak the decline of a country. The "case of Yue Fei" is cited as a classical example of such sentences. The CPC Central Committee, the authors remark, has set forth the task of revising unjust sentences handed down during the rule of the "gang of four". They believe that the experience of the past should serve as a sound foundation in accomplishing this. It was precisely with this aim in view that cases of unjust sentences that had been passed in Chinese history and then revised were gathered in this book. Much space was given to the "case of Yue Fei", who was rehabilitated only posthumously under Xiao-zong, Gao-zong's heir. It is noteworthy that, though the source analysed said nothing about the emperor's responsibility, the authors of the book attached to the text a commentary which stated specifically that Qin Gui destroyed Yue Fei on Gao-zong's order.⁵⁵ Zou Shencheng, who also analysed the "case of Yue Fei" from the legal point of view, made a similar conclusion.⁵⁶ Deng Guangming is perhaps the only author who believes that the First Minister Qin Gui rather than the emperor was primarily to blame for the death of Yue Fei⁵⁷. In the early 1960s almost 50 per cent of authors believed Gao-zong responsible for the death of Yue Fei and the other 50 per cent put the blame on Qin Gui. Now the overwhelming majority asserts that the emperor was the "main villain" on whose order Yue Fei was ruined.

Nevertheless, according to the official version, it is Qin Gui rather than the emperor who is primarily to blame for the death of Yue Fei. For example, on May 12, 1983, the Hong Kong newspaper *Gong shang ribao* reproduced the text of a Peking radio programme devoted to Yue Fei on May 11. Among other things, it was said in it that "after the death of Yue Fei the villainous minister *secretly* [my emphasis.—S. G.] decided to destroy his entire family".

The renowned Chinese writer Ba Jin revealed the political underpinning of disagreements about the role of Gao-zong and Qin Gui in the death of Yue Fei. Beginning in 1979 he began publishing in the Hong Kong newspaper *Dagong bao*, which has close links with the PRC, his reminiscences dealing for the most part with the tragedy experienced by the Chinese people during the "cultural revolution" and the lesson to be derived from it. In 1980 a part of these reminiscences was published in the PRC and was highly acclaimed there.⁵⁸ In one of the chapters Ba Jin writes that a foreign guest asked him in bewilderment how the "gang of four" could have such power and strength; the author was taken unawares and could not answer the question. It was fairly often that he found himself in a similar situation when talking to foreigners. But once, he writes, he saw in Hangzhou a film about Lake Xihu sights. The gem of those parts is Yue Fei's tomb with the sculptures of kneeling Qin Gui, his wife Wang, military leader Zhang Jun and censor Moqi Xie, who are known to have played the sinister role in the "case of Yue Fei". It should be pointed out that in the minds of the Chinese these four villains are mostly associated with the "gang of four", because each group consisted

⁵⁵ See *The Revision and Correction of Unjust Sentences Passed in Different Periods*, Peking, 1981, pp. 1-3, 117-122, 119.

⁵⁶ See Zhou Shencheng, "The Abolition by the Emperor's Order of Law Under the Song Dynasty and the Unjust Sentence of Yue Fei", *Henan shida xuebao*, 1981, No. 1 (for brief contents see *The Chinese Historical Yearbook*, Peking, 1982, p. 57.)

⁵⁷ See Deng Guangming, "On Qin Gui Being the Main Wrong-Doer Who Ruined Yue Fei", *Beijing daxue xuebao*, 1981, No. 5, pp. 2-9.

⁵⁸ See Yao Beihua, "Historical Tragedy Should In No Way Be Repeated! (Feelings Caused by Reading the 'Notes of Thoughts' of Ba Jin)." *Nanjing shifan daxue xuebao* (Nanking), 1980, No. 2, pp. 32-34.

of three men and a woman. The film Bao Jin watched had an off-screen remark that the emperor, the top-ranking and most important villain, was missing among those kneeling in front of the tomb. This was another allusion involving the "four" from the imperial retinue of the time of Yue Fei and the "gang of four" and its patron of the recent past. Ba Qin knew in an instant how he should answer the foreigners' tricky questions. When he was examining Yue Fei's tomb somewhat later he understood perfectly well the idea expressed in the last line of the poem by Wen Zhengming, poet of the Ming period, inscribed on the stone stele: "In smile at what vile (Qin) Gui could have done on his own! (He merely) wanted to humour his (emperor's) desires." This was the answer found by Ba Qin. "Now this answer is common knowledge", the writer stresses.⁵⁹ There is apparently no need to explain to the experienced Chinese reader whose desires the "gang of four" tried to "humour" just like Qin Gui tried to "humour" the desires of the emperor. It was only thanks to him that the "four" enjoyed unprecedented power and could destroy a lot of people, just like Qin Gui destroyed Yue Fei on the emperor's order.

4. THE IMAGE OF YUE FEI AND THE PROBLEM OF REUNITING TAIWAN WITH MAINLAND CHINA

The Chinese government is known to have been proposing in the past few years to reunite Taiwan Island with the PRC, in keeping with the aspirations of the entire Chinese people. By way of an initial step the PRC proposes to initiate trade, cultural, sports and other contacts with Taiwan. Nevertheless the Guomindang government, which is armed and supported by US imperialism, flatly rejects all the PRC's proposals. Meanwhile the Guomindang authorities cannot but see that, despite their bans, contacts between the inhabitants of the PRC and the Taiwanese are growing and the latter's natural interest in what is going on in mainland China is growing. For instance, in late 1981 one of the Taiwanese newspapers carried an article written by Hou Rongsheng, who visited Yue Fei's tomb. She described the present-day appearance of Yue Fei's temple and commented on the vast amount of work done to restore it after it had been destroyed by the hongweibings. Unlike official Taiwanese journalists, she refrained from attacking the PRC.⁶⁰ The article aroused great interest and numerous responses from Taiwanese readers. To all appearances, the Guomindang leaders were disturbed by this great interest Taiwanese display for the fate of the popular national hero's tomb. In March (when Yue Fei's birthday is traditionally marked) 1982, the official Guomindang newspaper *Zhongyang ribao* published an article written by Chen Lifu. He stated point-blank that he wrote his article in response to the one written by Hou Rongsheng. Bluntly distorting historical facts, Chen Lifu tried to prove that prior to the "cultural revolution" Yue Fei was viewed in the PRC only in negative terms as a "feudal slave" and it was only in recent times that under the impact of his enthusiastic appraisal on Taiwan they began speaking favourably about the Song military leader in the PRC.⁶¹ Chen Lifu's arguments can impress only those who know absolutely nothing about PRC historiography.

⁵⁹ Ba Qin, *Notes of Thoughts*, Note 86, *Dagong bao*, May 13, 1982.

⁶⁰ See Hou Rongsheng, "The Temple of Yue Fei after Being Renovated", *Zhongguo shibao*, Nov. 15, 1981.

⁶¹ See Chen Lifu, "Describing the Feelings in Connection with the 879th Anniversary of Yue Fei's Birthday", *Zhongyang ribao*, March 10, 1982. A year later Li An, Yue Fei's compatriot who wrote a good deal about him, published an article with a similar content. See Li An, "On How Yue Fei Was at First Belittled in the PRC and Then Praised", *Zhongyang ribao*, May 26 and 27, 1983.

The Guomindang leaders try to exploit the image of Yue Fei to discredit the idea of talks with the PRC. A number of articles have been published on Taiwan, praising Yue Fei for opposing "ruinous" peace talks with the "sworn enemy".⁶² The tense and almost hysterical tone in which these articles are written suggests that "peaceful talks", whose "ruinous nature" is being demonstrated to the Taiwanese with the help of references to Yue Fei, are far from being all that unpopular on the island.

At the same time the Guomindang authorities try, again resorting to the image of Yue Fei, to offer the Taiwanese some positive programme of action. In this connection Yue Fei is lauded as the fighter for the "return of the lost lands".⁶³ His image was especially vigorously propagandised in 1983 because the 880th anniversary of his birth coincided with Youth Day marked on Taiwan on March 29.⁶⁴ Apart from promoting Yue Fei as a "model" for the young people, his image was exploited at the time for an unbridled praise of the Taiwan regime.

Nevertheless, the unrestrained praise runs counter to confessions that appear in the Taiwanese press. Thus, at the height of the hullabaloo raised on Taiwan in connection with the 880th anniversary of Yue Fei's birth, *Zhongyang ribao* published an article written by teacher Yi Geng, who seems to have a good idea of the mood among the Taiwanese young people. He writes that he would like to see them emulate Yue Fei. But, he points out, the young people do not want to imitate Yue Fei: they "wallow in pleasure and peaceful life", unwilling to sacrifice themselves for the sake of "winning back the mainland". A similar mood, according to Yi Geng, is current not only among the young people.⁶⁵ It is clear from this article that the image of Yue Fei as a "man who gave his life for the sake of returning the lost lands", which is being implanted by the Guomindang authorities among the Taiwanese as a "model for emulation", finds little response because Guomindangs' slogan to "win back the mainland" is impracticable and unrealistic.

Quite a few leading Chinese scholars have been pointing out of late that this ideological activity served to justify the policy which was blatantly at variance with the objective needs of China's social development as a whole and with the interests of the development of historiography in particular. Some Chinese scholars tried to overcome such a biased attitude towards history. It would be wrong to assert, however, that the discussions to assess Yue Fei's personality, held in the 1980s, were purely of an academic nature. The topical problems facing present-day China have been reflected in the interpretation of Yue Fei's image.

⁶² Li An, "We Recognise the Importance of Yue Fei's Spirit 'to Thank the State by Irreproachable Loyalty' and His Services in Winning Back the Lands of the State", *Jinri Zhongguo* (Taipei), 1982, No. 125, p. 53; id., "The Return of Song Lands by Yue Fei and His Opinion of Peaceful Talks at the Time Misleading the State", *Jinri zhongguo*, 1982, No. 130, pp. 71-79. For articles of similar content see *Zhongyang ribao* of March 21, 27 and 30 and April 1-3, 1983.

⁶³ See Li An, *The Historical Role and Glory of Yue Fei Under Southern Song. A Collection of Studies of the Song Period*, Vol. 6, Taipei, 1971, p. 125.

⁶⁴ See *Zhongyang ribao*, March 22, 29 and 31, 1983; *Jili wanbao*, March 29 and 30, 1983.

⁶⁵ See Yi Geng, "The Innermost Thoughts (About What Happened) 800 Years Ago Having Burnt (the Letter) I Send It to the Deceased Yue, the Prince of the E Province, Posthumously Granted the Title of 'the Militant and Wise'", *Zhongyang ribao*, March 29, 1983.

RECENT AMERICAN WRITINGS ON U.S. CHINA POLICY CRITIQUED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 84 pp 94-105

[Article by M. V. Koval', candidate of historical sciences: "Modern U.S. Sinologists' Views on U.S.-Chinese Relations"]

The past few years saw a marked increase in studies of Chinese history and Sino-American relations of the Guomindang period. Stepped-up American research in the field is not accidental but is explained by special relations that have been developing between the US and China since the early 1970s.

Liberal American scholars of the so-called Harvard School and also historians close to them in their political beliefs and methodology fairly quickly responded to changing relations between China, on the one hand, and the US and other capitalist countries, on the other. Already in the early 1970s scholars of this school of thought began criticising the doctrines and concepts, which lay at the basis of American policy towards China during the Second World War and in the 1950s. By the late 1970s and the early 1980s, new aspects and assessments evolved in this criticism, which became large-scale and was applied to the whole of American policy in East and Southeast Asia. Washington's strategy and tactics in China in the 1940s were essentially revised from the viewpoint that American foreign policy could have been far more effective if the Americans had not relied on the Chiang Kaishek regime and followed a more flexible line towards the PRC. In the 1970s and the 1980s the idea became especially topical and widespread in the US academic community.

In 1979 young American Sinologist Michael Schaller (assistant professor of history at Arizona University) published in New York two books, which were acclaimed by John K. Fairbank, the leading and most authoritative American Sinologist and vintage representative of the Harvard School. In 1974 at Michigan University Schaller defended his doctorate thesis on American policy in China in the 1940s. His book *The US Crusade in China*¹ written on the basis of this thesis, is a fairly profound critical analysis of American-Chinese relations during the Second World War.

Schaller examines the political situation in China, focussing on the negative aspects of the policy and activities of the Chiang Kaishek regime, sharply criticises the misjudged American reliance on the mercenary Guomindang government and contrasts the latter with the dynamic policy of the Chinese Communists and with the CPC potential which grew in the course of the war. He uses and reassesses some documents, which have been "buried" in US political departments during the investigation of the "Amerasia affair", in the years of McCarthyism and the "cold war", and cites writings by American diplomats, scholars and journalists, such as Edgar Snow, E. Clubb, J. Service, John Davies and others, who advocated cooperation with the Chinese Communists back in

¹ M. Schaller, *The US Crusade in China, 1938-1945*. New York, 1979.

the 1930s and the early 1940s in the belief that they were the true and most effective nationalist force of Chinese society with any prospects to speak of.

Introducing this book to readers, Fairbank called it a classical analysis of American policy during the Second World War, the book that produced a refreshing Watergate effect on American studies.

Schaller's other work, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, encompasses a wider time frame and surveys different trends in Sino-American relations, including the PRC period. The book ends with President Nixon's visit to China in 1972.²

The main aim of the author is to analyse the major trends of American policy which got the US involved in the Korean war and the Vietnam war later on, trends which took shape and were put into effect during the Second World War when the US, to quote Fairbank, opposed the Chinese Communist revolution. It was at that period, Schaller writes, that "American policy towards nationalism and communism in China became fixed in a pattern that ultimately led to bloody conflicts in Korea and Vietnam."³ He draws attention to the American fiasco in China in the 1940s and points to the need to take into account the sad experience of the past years in cleaning up the mess, surmounting the difficulties in today's Sino-American relations and establishing further mutual understanding between China and the US.

Schaller's books are the most tangible contribution made in the 1970s to the American bourgeois liberal studies designed to revise the principles of "cold war" in Asia and the entire US strategy during the Second World War and in the postwar period. Similar research continues developing conceptually, extending the critical tendency in American historiography, which became forcefully manifest in the second half of the 1960s and the early 1970s in works by Owen Lattimore, John Service, John Davies and many others "victims" of the McCarthyist period, who were accused of organising a "communist plot" among American academia and government officials in the 1940s.⁴

In both books Schaller expounds the same concept, focussing on the erroneous American policy towards Guomindang China, and on the underestimation of the potential and the role of the CPC, proceeding from the spurious idea that the Chinese communists were "the tool of the Kremlin" and part of "Orthodox world communism" of the pro-Soviet type. The two books examine in no uncertain terms the "faithful nationalists", an influential group within the CPC leadership following its own, specifically Chinese road and ready to cooperate closely with the US already in the late 1930s.

Edgar Snow was the first to voice a similar opinion way back in the 1930s. He pictured the Chinese communists as petty-bourgeois "agrarian reformers".⁵ This point of view was later developed by John Service and some other authors.

This is precisely the concept that has been advocated by the Harvard School representatives, who constantly point to the "specificity" of Chinese communism. That was why, they maintain, in the 1940s the US should have relied on the CPC, rather than on the Guomindang, and in

² M. Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, New York, 1979.

³ *Ibid.*, p. VII.

⁴ See O. Lattimore, *History and Revolution in China*, Lund, 1970; J. S. Service, *The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of US-China Relations*, Berkeley, Univ. of California, 1971; *US Policy with Respect to Mainland China*. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 89 Congress, 2 Session. Washington, 1966; J. P. Davies, *Dragon by the Tail*, New York, 1972.

⁵ E. Snow, *Red Star Over China*, London, 1937, pp. 443-448.

the future should unswervingly steer towards rapprochement with Communist China so as to exploit the Chinese leaders' nationalism and to direct China's development along the lines of bourgeois democracy.

Schaller subscribes completely to that school's ideas and, citing the opinion of former American diplomats and the military who closely associated with the Chinese communists in the 1940s, concludes that during the Second World War "China in effect was a laboratory for the development" of American policy towards all the future revolutions in Asia.⁶ The author argues that the prime reason for some American politicians' insistence on giving support to the Chinese communists in the 1940s was their view of China as a force restraining Soviet influence in Asia.⁷

It was in the desire to impede the growth of Soviet influence in China and among the Chinese communists that the US Administration sent in the 1940s its representatives to Yanan to initiate a direct dialogue with the CPC leaders (the Dixue, Hurley and Marshall missions).

Schaller writes that the Chinese communists were willing at that time to accept all the American proposals and that America's alliance with the CPC depended then exclusively on the American stand.⁸ He accuses American politicians of the period of having lost China and says that Washington's strategy and tactics in the 1930s and the 1940s was "unrealistic" and faulty and that the US itself facilitated the Sino-Soviet rapprochement and cooperation in the late 1940s. According to him, the loss of China was a tragic occurrence and a hard historical lesson for American politicians. The policy of relying on the Guomindang, he writes, could be justified morally prior to Pearl Harbor but, once the US was involved in the war in the Pacific, the nature of American responsibility changed radically, and Washington's ruling elite allegedly failed to realise that in time. This led the US to a debacle first in China and then, despite direct American interference, in Korea in 1950, where American strategists sought "to create a puppet Asian nationalism which would sweep back the tide of social revolution".⁹

Ideas outlined in Schaller's works were further developed in the monograph *Sentimental Imperialists. The American Experience in East Asia* published in the US by three American authors J. Thompson, P. Stanley and J. Perry in 1981.

Written by historians who specialise in international affairs and problems connected with China, Japan and other Asian countries and who have links with Harvard University (they studied, taught or are still teaching there), the book claims to be the first of its type after the critical events of the 1970s (that is, after the end of the Vietnam war, the official recognition of the PRC by the US, etc.) and to give a broad-ranging interpretation of American relations with East Asian civilisations, including China, Japan, the Philippines, Korea and Vietnam.

The authors aim at revealing the reasons for constant "American involvement in the affairs of the region" and at defining the nature and motives of American policy in East Asia in the past and in the future.¹⁰

American policy towards China outlined by J. Thompson, a Sinologist who is a disciple of Fairbank and assistant professor at the East Asian

⁶ See M. Schaller, *The US Crusade...*, p. 139.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 193; J. S. Service, *Lost Chance in China. The World War II*, Dispatches of John S. Service, New York, 1974, pp. 291-295; 372-373; J. P. Davies, *Dragon by the Tail*, pp. 342, 343, 345, 321.

⁹ M. Schaller, *The US Crusade...*, pp. 303-304.

¹⁰ J. C. Thompson (Jr.) P. W. Stanley, J. C. Perry, *Sentimental Imperialists. The American Experience in East Asia*, New York, 1981, p. IX.

Institute of Harvard University, is central to the abovementioned book, with Sino-American relations during the Second World War playing the decisive role in the assessment of this policy. The concept and evaluation of this period in Sino-American relations are similar to Schaller's opinion. Thompson is also sharply critical of American policy in East Asia and censures American leaders for the inability to understand "Asian nationalism" and to use it in American interests. J. Fairbank, who wrote the introduction to the book, also points out that American politicians and scholars underestimated what he calls Vietnam's "national communism", which was what defeated the US.¹¹

Fairbank's judgement merits attention because he in fact recognises the power and effectiveness of the national liberation struggle of South-east Asian peoples, even though he refers to it as merely "nationalistic". The American politicians' disdain for what they call "Vietnam's national communism", just like their previous attitude towards "Chinese communism", which the US "had failed to see in China", Fairbank contends, was what led the US "to defeat both in China and in Vietnam".¹² The views he expressed in the introduction to that book are similar to the ideas he expounded in his memoirs of China covering the fifty years of his research. He draws the noteworthy conclusion that "...cold war zeal could not substitute for realistic knowledge". It should be also pointed out that, being a serious scholar, Fairbank is quite realistic about the tense international situation of the past few years and the danger threatening mankind and calls on all nations to pool their efforts and establish closer mutual understanding.¹³ But the ways and means he offers for the attainment of "mutual understanding" among nations show that he overlooks some socio-political factors and absolutises "knowledge", that is, the study of the history and life of other peoples and countries. Knowledge of each other, the scholar maintains, can save nations and states from external and internal afflictions. He directly connects the tasks of studying China and other countries with the complicated situation in East Asia and says that had the US paid more attention to research, perhaps, both the Vietnam and Korean wars could have been avoided.¹⁴

These pronouncements by the leading American Sinologist possibly reflect dissatisfaction with Washington's ruling elite, which fails to enlist at present an adequate number of liberal-minded scholars, those of Harvard University in particular, in policy-making, nor heeds to the opinion of this school of thought. In essence Fairbank's reasoning is fairly idealist. Research, no matter how profound, in itself, of course, cannot change the nature of American imperialist policy. There is ample proof to the effect. To substantiate his ideas, Fairbank presents the authors of the book—Thompson, Stanley and Perry—as first class experts in East Asia and claims that they alone can picture correctly American relations with East Asian countries.¹⁵ He recommends precisely their knowledge and concepts, singling out Sinologist Thompson, who had lived in China since childhood, learned Chinese there, knows the country well and also studied at Harvard, where he now teaches. In the 1960s J. Thompson worked for five years at the US Department of State and accumulated there, according to Fairbank, "an invaluable first-hand experience of the policy-making process".¹⁶ In 1969 he published a book about China.¹⁷

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. XI.

¹² *Ibidem*.

¹³ J. K. Fairbank, *Chinabound: A Fifty-Year Memoir*, New York, 1982, pp. 395-396.

¹⁴ *Sentimental Imperialists...*, p. XI.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. XIII.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ J. Thompson, (Jr.), *While China Faced West? American Reformers in Nationalist China, 1928-1987*, Cambridge Mass, 1969.

Seeking to understand American policy in East Asia in what amounts to almost a century (from 1890 to 1980), the authors of *Sentimental Imperialists*, among other problems, raise the key issue or, as they put it, a cosmic problem of whether "American policy generally was 'imperialist'" and if so, whether Americans in particular, "which of them, in what sense, when, and regarding which nations and issues in East Asia" were "imperialist".¹⁸ Taking into account the title of the book, it is indicative the way the question is formulated. The authors indulge in sheer rhetorics because the answer is predetermined. Indeed, the book closes with an explanation that "if Americans were, as a group, imperialists, their inexhaustible fuel was sentiment". Only some Americans who "wanted literally to carve out territorial acquisitions" can, according to the authors, be called imperialists without reservations.¹⁹

The conclusions drawn by the authors are a far cry from reality and distort the aggressive nature of American hegemonic foreign policy to such an extent that they can hardly be taken seriously. When describing and commenting on American policy from the late 19th century and up to the early 1980s, the authors in fact seem to contradict their own conclusions. When they appraise American policy in the aforementioned period, they never once mention any "sentimentalism" and portray American policy as patently imperialist. For example, they do not conceal the fact that the US repeatedly used force in its Far Eastern policy, namely, against the Philippines, Japan, China, Korea and Vietnam. They criticise the traditional American concept that the US allegedly conducted exclusively "economic diplomacy" in Asia, guided only by "commercial and cultural interests". They also question the "humanitarian motives" of the activity of American missionaries. Thompson, for example, compares the aims of American missionaries in China with those pursued later on, after the Second World War, by the US Peace Corps in the developing countries or with those reflected in President Truman's Point 4 about rendering "aid" to the underdeveloped states (but in fact about the neo-colonialist enslavement of these countries with the help of this "aid"). Thompson points out that the experience of American missionaries in China is being used by present-day American politicians as a model to be used in developing countries, to change the "direction of their development", that is to say, for subversive purposes.

The "open doors" policy pursued by the US in China and throughout Asia is called "economic expansion" by the authors, and its frankly colonialist goals and intentions to turn the US with its help into a "key force in the international correlation of forces" are not concealed.

Such an approach to analysing the motive forces of US policy and the essence of concepts justifying the policy of plunder and coercion under the banner of "open doors", evolved by American scholars already in the early 20th century, is, beyond doubt, quite objective in retrospect. The authors are also critical about the by-now-traditional American myth that the US allegedly committed itself to helping to "maintain China as a territorial and administrative entity" and began posing as China's "special friend" and "protector",²⁰ that is, about the concept of American "good will" and "paternalism" towards China and Asia in general. It was this concept that served as the theoretical foundation and an essential component of the "open doors" policy, which the authors with good reason call "free trade imperialism". This concept is known to be current in American historiography till the end of the 1970s, despite the political contention and bitter theoretical debates among American

¹⁸ *Sentimental Imperialists*, pp. 2-3.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 311.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

historians and political scientists after the Second World War, criticism by "revisionist" scholars, the strengthening positions of "interventionist" scholars who openly demanded that the US pursue an actively aggressive course in the world, and the correspondingly weakening positions of "isolationist" scholars who advocated the "non-interference" by the US in any conflicts (which in fact nearly always led to encouraging and supporting aggressive forces).

After the Second World War, the authors write, America was at the peak of its power and its "benevolent ideal became fueled by military might and by the real or imagined existence of evil adversaries, especially communism".²¹ The authors unambiguously make the reader understand against whom American military might is now being directed as before under the smokescreen of talk about "benevolence".

Amid the sharpening of ideological struggle between the two social systems, the deepening of imperialism's political crisis and the spread of socialist ideas to new parts of the world, the American monopolies and ruling elite are bending over backwards to whitewash the reactionary, predatory nature of the activities by US imperialism in Asia, Africa and Latin America and to pass it for the "defence of human rights" and democratic ideals, contrasting it with the fictitious "Soviet threat". In practice the US ruling elite pursued the policy of "containing" and then "rolling" communism back, ruthlessly suppressing the national liberation struggle. We can recall in this connection the American postwar aggression in Korea, invasion of Lebanon and Jordan, attempted invasion of Cuba in 1961, invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965, "dirty war" in Vietnam, support for the Israeli aggression in the Middle East, interference in Nicaragua, recent criminal armed aggression against Grenada in October 1983. The *US News and World Report* magazine wrote that since the Second World War the American armed forces were used for foreign policy purposes not less than 262 times.²² In 1980 the US started forming the 200,000-strong "rapid deployment force"—elite US armed forces intended for use in any "trouble" spot of the world. It is known that in some local crises the US leaders were ready to resort to extreme measures, that is, to use nuclear weapons (in four cases they were to be used directly against the USSR).²³

But it is not for this that Thompson and his coauthors censure the makers of American policy in Asia. Ideas of American "singularity" and the special role of the US in Asia, they write, existed both before and after the war until the shock of the Vietnam debacle shook the entire nation to its roots. It was the "Vietnam trauma" and the shock of the US defeat in Vietnam that enabled the more far-sighted American politicians and scholars to realise that former American foreign policy concepts were ineffective in the context of new world reality.

That is why it is only on the face of it that the stand adopted by the authors, particularly by Thompson, seems to be contradictory. Thompson gives a fairly objective appraisal of US policy, saying that after the Chinese people's victory in 1949 American relations with East Asian nations changed markedly and that the "loss of China" negatively affected US policy in the region. As a result "the United States was playing as never before the role of gendarme of the Pacific".²⁴ His words "as never before" were not accidental. According to him, the "cold war" unleashed by the US at the time produced undesirable effects inside the country, causing the US to adopt a militarist position in the Pacific and East

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 310.

²² *US News and World Report*, April 11, 1983.

²³ See *World Marxist Review*, 1983, No. 7, p. 36.

²⁴ *Sentimental Imperialists*, pp. 217-218.

Asia "unusual" for it with the aim of "containing and isolating red China".

Thus, while in fact justifying the American foreign policy concept of "containing communism", Thompson at the same time tries to convince the reader that Washington's tough, militarist stand and policy were not characteristic of the US but allegedly caused by Chiang Kaishek's defeat and the "loss" of China by the Americans.

In reality there is no contradiction here at all. American authors consider American foreign policy in Asia from the positions of a big imperialist power and, undoubtedly, defend in their work the global strategy of American monopoly capital, the general trend and aims of Washington's policy and the interests of the American ruling class. But they are concerned that the tactical arsenal of the American foreign policy strategists is so imperfect that very often anti-communist "sentiments" overpower "rational judgement" and the US meets with one failure after another. The liberal scholars of the Harvard School criticise the US Administration not for some "sentimentality" in the literal sense of the word but for an oversimplified approach to complex processes in the present-day world and the "blind" hatred of communism, that is, for its rabid anti-communism and anti-Sovietism and its adherence to exclusively "force" methods in foreign policy. Such a foreign policy, with politicians giving in to unnecessary "sentiments", that is to say, to openly anti-communist "sentiments" and acting to the detriment of "sensible" policy, was what, according to the scholars, has brought the negative results of the US in Asia.

That is why liberally-minded scholars led by J. Fairbank, while criticising the "crude" anti-communism of Washington's strategists, are looking for an alternative course, which would be more flexible and "realistic" and to a greater extent take into account the national peculiarities of the Asian countries, making more adroit and more subtle use of the ideology of nationalism in these countries for its own global purposes.

Going back to the American fiasco in China, Thompson, like Schaller, looks for the answer in the complicated intertwining of events in China during the war, the Chinese nationalists' conservatism and weakness, and the creeping demoralisation of Chiang Kaishek's regime. The author implies that the main thing that put the Americans in the state of shock was Japan's defeat in China and the unexpected strengthening of the positions of the CPC. It is only natural that Thompson cites Fairbank who, discussing the significance of Japan's defeat, pointed out: "This was a moment when the American people were least prepared, emotionally and intellectually, to face a Chinese crisis. We had no intention in the winter of 1945-1946 of fighting another war in East Asia."²⁵ Drawing on the opinion of Fairbank, Thompson tries to prove that the US allegedly sought to pursue a peaceful policy in 1945-1946 but, despite its will, all those attempts were fruitless.

In other words, Thompson echoes Fairbank in his attempt to justify American policy and American aggression in China after the defeat of Japan. In fact he subscribes to the well-known conclusions of the White Book published in the US in 1949, alleging that China "had been lost to communism" only due to mistakes, numerous shortcomings and oversight on the part of the Guomindang national leadership.

The thesis in itself is nothing new. Placing the entire blame for defeat in China on the Guomindang, American scholars, as it were, belittle the importance of the Chinese people's revolutionary struggle and at the

²⁵ *Sentimental Imperialists*, p. 224.

same time try to denigrate the role and importance of the Soviet Union and other revolutionary forces in supporting the Chinese revolution and creating favourable conditions for its victory.

The authors are especially resolute in denouncing everything that happened in the US after the complete defeat of Chiang Kaishek. The Republican Party, which was out of power for 20 years, wanted to regain the lost positions and was actively looking for culprits in the "loss" of China, a vast country allegedly handed over to communism.²⁶

These quests for culprits were fueled by an impressive group of American supporters of nationalist China, the so-called "Chinese lobby", which included politicians, businessmen, journalists, missionaries, military and other figures. Thompson writes that among them were well-known publisher Henry R. Luce, leading politician and businessman Alfred Kohlberg, who cashed in on China textile imports, Senators William Knowland, Joseph R. McCarthy, Pat McCarran and others.

Thompson is critical about the entire "hunt for culprits" which was conducted in three stages, first headed by Senator McCarthy, then by Pat McCarran and beginning with 1952 by John Foster Dulles. In 1950, Thompson writes, McCarthy was looking for communists in the US Department of State but found there only one "Moscow agent No. 1"—Prof. Owen Lattimore, renowned Sinologist, director of the School of International Relations of John Hopkins University, former US Administration adviser on Chinese problems, Chiang Kaishek's political adviser in 1941-1942, editor of the scientific journal *Pacific Affairs* under the Institute of Pacific Relations and member of the *Amerasia* board.

Needless to say, Lattimore was no communist at all but only wanted the US Administration to pursue a more flexible foreign policy in Asia, opposed the solution of the Chinese problem with the help of a preventive war and urged to make use of Asian nationalism to preclude a revolutionary settlement of problems in Asia. Later on he was cleared of all the accusations but still left the US in 1955 and settled in Leeds (Britain).

In 1951-1952 Senator McCarran launched an all-out attack against experts on Asia, especially experts on China, working at the Institute of Pacific Relations. All of them were charged with aiding and abetting the Chinese communists and many lost their jobs. Only few retained their positions. For example, J. Fairbank remained fairly safe throughout the McCarthyist period, even though he was accused of being a "voluntary or involuntary agent of the Stalin plot". During the subsequent 10 years he did not enjoy the confidence of the administration nor was he invited for consultation on Asian problems or asked to review books for the *New York Times*.

After the Republican Administration of President Eisenhower came to power in 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles intensified the "witch hunt" and "purged" from the government all experts on China and all those who in any way "sympathised with the Chinese communists". In the period from 1953 to 1957, Thompson says, "an entire generation of America's most carefully developed, and rare, China expertise has been thrown out or banished". As a result "America's China policy-making was placed entirely in the hands of people who had little or no experience or understanding of the Chinese revolution". It was for this reason, Thompson claims, that American policy in Asia became skewed and "out of that skewing came two perhaps entirely avoidable wars—in Korea and Indochina."²⁷

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 226-228.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

He explains the American Administration's tough anti-communist policy during that period by the fact that there were no expert students of China in the US government and also by the US leaders' being carried away by their anti-communist hysteria. Thompson emphasises the emotional aspect, speaking about the fear and hatred the US felt towards communist China, which mirrored the American Administration's general hatred of the Soviet Union and the general anti-communist panic, and points to the fatal fanaticism of American politicians of the period. He has nothing against the general anti-communist tendency of American policy but regrets that the Chinese trauma went beyond all reasonable norms. Hatred of China, he recalls, was so great that McCarthy suggested that from 20 to 30 nuclear bombs be dropped on Manchuria and a scorched out radioactive zone be established along the Yalu River.²⁸

The same hatred pushed American politicians to launch a venture in Indochina, to recognise the puppet government of Bao Dai and to interfere in Vietnam's civil war on the side of the reactionary forces, which immediately made the US an enemy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and an enemy of the communist forces headed by Ho Chi Minh.

Though critical about the anti-communist blindness of the US ruling elite, Thompson and his coauthors at the same time want to whitewash US policy in Vietnam as a whole, claiming that the subsequent American activities can hardly be called politics and that the problem the US faced during 25 years was how to extricate itself from Indochina. They also call the US Administration's actions in Indochina "unexpected", that could be foreseen by nobody because Southeast Asia had never been of prime importance for the US but served as a focal point of interests and rivalries of other European powers.

It is also indicative that the authors see the "historical dynamics of conflicts on the peninsula" as the main cause for the American intervention in Indochina after the Second World War, that is, try to account for the matter by the national strife among the Indochinese peoples.

For this reason the Vietnamese people's victory looks, in keeping with the authors' concept, accidental, determined by no historical law nor resultant from the inevitable victory of the national liberation movement of the Indochinese peoples. It was simply a matter of American politicians making too many mistakes and, what is most important, overlooking the power of Asian nationalism.

The authors feel obliged to mention subsequently the American doctrine of containing communism throughout the world, especially in Asia, in that period, the fact that in the 1960s the "containment" idea gave birth to another American concept, according to which, Southeast Asia was a vitally important region for the US national security and also the emergence of the "domino theory" at the time. But it is only the "domino theory" that they criticise, saying that it was a dangerous over-simplification which deluded an entire generation of Americans. Their criticism, however, springs forth from the view that the "domino theory" disregarded the "power and resilience of Asian nationalism".²⁹

Several theories and concepts appeared in American bourgeois historiography, among politicians, journalists and scholars in the second half of the 1970s with regard to the reasons for the American defeat in Vietnam, explanations of how American policy pursued under six presidents representing both political parties during 30 years (from 1945 to 1975) could prove so catastrophic. The answers they give are different, sometimes even conflicting and range from the US Presidents' "carelessness" or "oversight" (the "quagmire" concept) to the Presidents' excessive at-

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 246.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 261.

tention to that problem, from the "leftist" criticism of American economic imperialism to ultra-rightist attacks on the government, which allegedly restrained the American military from using the entire arsenal of weapons at their disposal, that is, from using nuclear weapons, with the help of which they wanted to send North Vietnam back to the Stone Age (this was precisely the call made by the American "hawks").

The authors themselves see the reason for the American debacle in Vietnam in the legacy of the 1950s, first and foremost in the "loss of China", the frustration of the Korean war and the entire excessively crude and blunt East-Asian policy pursued by Secretary of State Dulles. Besides, they claim, in the 1960s US government offices dealing with East Asia, especially the Department of State, lacked knowledgeable experts in China and objective politicians as well as experts in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. Bearing in mind the sad diplomatic experience in China during the Second World War, American diplomats in Vietnam in the 1960s refrained from giving their Administration true accounts of the state of affairs in Vietnam and sent to Washington "excessively optimistic", that is to say, false information.

In this way Thompson and his coauthors try to reduce everything to particular problems, such as the absence of trained personnel, the personal fault of Secretary of State Dulles. They justify and explain the policy "from a position of strength" pursued by the US in Southeast Asia by referring to the "cold war psychosis" and the mounting "threat of a communist attack" on America. But, according to the authors, Washington leaders are mostly to blame for "having overlooked the main thing"—specific peculiarities of every country and first and foremost "competing nationalisms" of the Southeast Asian peoples.³⁰

What they in fact mean by "competing nationalisms" becomes clear when they analyse what they refer to as the split of the "Sino-Soviet bloc".

"...The historically enduring power of competing nationalisms," the authors write, "and especially Chinese versus Russian—was becoming ...a newly understood factor in international politics both in Asia and elsewhere."³¹ It was precisely that factor that they proposed to exploit as far as possible.

The American scholars have no doubt that the shift in the development of Sino-American relations in the early 1970s is explained by the "complete severance of Soviet-Chinese relations" and by the fact that "for China, Russia had become a supremely dangerous neighbour and a heretical rival in the fierce struggle over Marxist orthodoxy..." They wholeheartedly support the American Administration's desire to play the "Chinese card" to "bring pressure to bear on Moscow" and even assert that this policy of Washington has already yielded positive results—it was allegedly under its impact that the Soviet Union agreed to SALT-I talks with the US and on reaching a settlement on Berlin.³²

In this case the authors not merely distort the truth of the matter but directly support aggressive American foreign policy in Asia and other regions of the world, completely and openly approving the policy of anti-Sovietism and anti-communism pursued by Washington. They also support the modern foreign policy concept of defending American "national interests" in most diverse regions of the globe, which serves to retain American supremacy in the capitalist world and to help the US attain world domination.

As is seen, the position of the Harvard scholars discussed here is quite logical and consistent: they have dotted their "i's". They are indeed cri-

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 276-277.

³¹ *Sentimental Imperialists*, p. 281.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 285, 287-288.

tical, at times sharply and resolutely, of the policy pursued by the US ruling elite for its failures and debacles in Asia that, according to them, started with the events in China during and after the Second World War. American scholars recognise that the American strategy "from a position of strength" proved bankrupt and are looking for new ways and devising new models and concepts to accord American foreign policy with the country's real potentialities. They want in some way to remedy the unfavourable impression the world at large has about America's aims and role in the world as a whole, and in China and East Asia in particular. It is only in this context that the strange version of "sentimental imperialists" expounded by Thompson, Stanley and Perry in their book can be viewed.

However, all liberal bourgeois scholars, including Sinologists from Harvard University, have one serious drawback that interferes with their research—they are under the spell of anti-Sovietism and unable to shed this "prejudice" because of their class-based world outlook. It is only natural that they are critical only of the past events. For some reason American authors say nothing that American foreign policy today again resorts to the "cold war" methods they denounced so vigorously when speaking about the events of the 1950s. They also keep mum about the anti-Soviet hysteria increasingly mounted in the past two years or so by the Reagan Administration and about the veritable "crusade" against communism proclaimed by Ronald Reagan. Nor are they critical about Washington's whipping up the runaway arms race, about its growing armed interference in the affairs of not only Asian countries but also of those in Africa and Central America, and about its "headlong sliding into the quagmire of another Vietnam", to quote the Italian newspaper *Repubblica*.³³

On the contrary, they try to give an idyllic picture of complete "peace and tranquility" in Asia in the 1980s. "Never in a century had China, Japan, and the United States been into such an extended period of peace and partnership with one another," the authors write in the conclusion. According to them, "the foremost common bond" between these three nations so different in their culture, socio-economic system and level of development, the bond far more important than what separates them, "was fear, or at least deep suspicion, of the policies of the Soviet Union". The authors, incidentally, believe that this factor is of constant nature and not likely to change essentially in the foreseeable future. Even if Washington, Tokyo and Peking, they argue, had no other reasons for rapprochement, the existence of the Soviet Union alone would be quite sufficient for this.³⁴

To sum up, confrontation with the Soviet Union and notorious anti-Sovietism underpin the alliance of the US, Japan and China which Washington politicians are trying to form and which is fully approved by American political scientists and Sinologists. It is noteworthy that at this point the authors forget their own advice against anti-communist sentiments. On the contrary, using the "Soviet threat" concoctions, they seek to nurture Washington's striving to involve the PRC in an anti-Soviet military and political alliance formed by the United States and Japan in East Asia and urge the ASEAN countries to concentrate efforts, together with Peking, on struggling against their "smaller neighbour, Communist Vietnam".³⁵

In other words, despite their on the whole critical works, Schaller, Thompson, Stanley and Perry, warmly encouraged by the Harvard School

³³ Cit. *Pravda*, Aug. 7, 1983.

³⁴ *Sentimental Imperialists*, pp. 306-307.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 308.

leader J. Fairbank, analyse the policy pursued by the US Administration in China and in the Pacific region from the narrow class positions of the bourgeoisie, acting as loyal supporters of America's imperial ambitions and of the aggressive foreign policy pursued by the ruling elite of American monopoly capital.

As a matter of fact, the hallmark of the Harvard School Sinologists has always been their justification of colonialism and disregard for the role of advanced internationalist elements in the development of China. Present-day American authors transfer conclusions made with respect to China to Indochina and the rest of East Asia. In their time Harvard scholars discovered Mao Zedong as an embodiment of Chinese nationalism ("Chinese communism" in their parlance) and urged the US to rely on Maoist (rather than Guomindang) nationalism. The single concept of reliance on "Asian nationalism", which is viewed as the key force in Asia opposing the "Soviet threat", communism, and internationalism as a whole, is pivotal to the works written by the scholars of this trend in the 1970s-the 1980s. Small wonder that they harp upon the "demoralising effect competing nationalisms have on communism", persistently emphasise the "power and viability of Asian nationalism" and give nationalism preference as compared with any other ideology.

By "Asian nationalism" they, beyond doubt, mean revisionist, reactionary elements in the national liberation movement that can be exploited by the US to consolidate with their help the positions of American imperialism and to prevent the victory and strengthening of the socialist forces in the given region by, for example, preparing the conditions for "eroding" the foundation of socialism in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Kampuchea and other countries.

The works analysed here show that American scholars are now looking for "new parameters" of ensuring American supremacy in the world and new "rational" ways of defending American "vital interests" in Asia. Developing the critical trend in Western historiography, the representatives of "political realism", the school of thought to which most of the Harvard scholars belong, in fact help objectively and quite purposefully put into effect Washington's aggressive aspirations aiming at establishing American supremacy in the world.

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PRC CLAIMS OF HISTORIC TIES TO KIRGHIZIA REFUTED

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[Article by A. K. Karypkulov and M. Ya. Sushanlo: "Some Aspects of Kirghizia's History and Its Treatment in the PRC Press"*]

In chronicles and other historical sources, in unbiased and objective research writing, as well as in the memory of the people as reflected in their rich folklore, the many-century-long history of the Kirghiz people is recorded as a saga of the continuous, never-ending struggle for ethnic integrity, national independence, and social liberation. Only after the Great October Revolution of 1917 did the backward and downtrodden Kirghiz people become an equal member of the fraternal family of all Soviet nations, big and small. Bypassing capitalist development, it stepped into socialism, having made unprecedented progress in all spheres of life. Soviet Kirghizstan today is a republic that has an up-to-date, highly developed industry, diversified agriculture, advanced science and culture, and continually rising living standards. This unheard-of flight from patriarchal primitivism to the pinnacles of modern progress was accomplished owing to the enormous everyday concern of the Leninist Party and the Soviet state, the selfless labour of workers, farmers and intellectuals of the Republic, the fraternal friendship of Soviet nations, and the selfless assistance of the great Russian people.

"Today," said T. U. Usubaliev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kirghizia, "we keep on reemphasising with gratitude the historic role played by the Russian people and its glorious working class in creating a fraternal union of Soviet peoples and eliminating the economic, social and cultural backwardness of the peoples that lived in former national outlying areas, including the Kirghiz people".¹ This fraternal union originated more than a century ago when Kirghizia voluntarily acceded to Russia. The Kirghiz people broke out of its isolation from the outside world and overcame the barrier of tribal and clan feuds to share, together with other big and small nations of Russia, the later glorious history of the Russian people.

"Kirghizia's accession to Russia," emphasised the message of greetings of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, sent on the occasion of the centennial of this event," marked the beginning of the Kirghiz people's unification and was of great progressive significance for its further social and cultural development. The Kirghiz people that languished under the despotic rule of the local feudals and the Kokand Khanate, that was pe-

* This article was published in the *Newsletter of the Academy of Sciences of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic*, 1983, No. 3.
¹ *Sovetskaya Kirghizia*, May 20, 1983.

rennially in danger of foreign enslavement, found in the Russian people a brother and a reliable protector".²

As it had no written language before the October Revolution, the Kirghiz people failed to record its previous history in writing. It was only Soviet historical science in general and Kirghiz historiography in particular that have introduced into the use of scholarly community vast archaeological, ethnographic and historical material relating to the history of the ancient nomads, the ethnogenesis of the Kirghiz people, and the voluntary accession of the Kirghiz tribes to Russia.

Historical science, which studies the processes of social development, is today acquiring an increasing scholastic, practical and political value. Emphasising the importance of historical science, V. I. Lenin indicated that Marxism puts "on historical footing" all cardinal problems of social development "not only in the sense of explaining the past but also in the sense of a bold forecast of the future and of bold practical action for its achievement".³

As it sums up the experience of human progress, analyses the past, and draws on it for necessary lessons, historical science addresses its conclusions to the present and the future. In this country it serves the lofty cause of communist construction, while in the imperialist countries it is used for distorting and falsifying historical processes to serve the ends of political and ideological struggle.

Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, said at the Plenum of the Central Committee in June 1983 that the present stage of world development "is marked by a confrontation, of intensity and acuteness unprecedented in the whole of the postwar period, of two diametrically opposite world outlooks, two political courses—socialism and imperialism. A struggle is in progress for the minds and hearts of billions of people in the world. And the future of mankind depends to no small degree on the outcome of this ideological struggle".⁴

Soviet scholars often encounter crude distortions of historical facts. Also, there is no overlooking the fact that in their attempts to "substantiate" China's territorial claims, split the monolithic unity of the Soviet people and sow discord among them, some Chinese historians do not scruple to falsify the record of China's relations with the neighbouring countries and nations.

Taking at face value the ancient Chinese chronicles permeated with the Sinocentric, expansionist doctrine of many a ruling dynasty in China, as well as the historiography of the Chiang Kaishek period, many modern writers on "historical" subjects distort the history of relations between Russia and China and give a biased interpretation of the Kirghizes' role in these relations. According to their latest "discoveries", the Kirghizes have always been one of China's national minorities and must be considered as such; allegedly, they always actively defended the Chinese borders from Russia's encroachments; the aggressive policies of Russian tzars supposedly made them flee from the Yenisei river to Tien Shan, and thence to Eastern Turkestan, or Xinjiang; therefore, Kirghizia's voluntary unification with Russia could not have taken place.

In 1979 a voluminous work pretentiously entitled *A History of Tzarist Russia's Aggression in the Northwestern Borderlands of China* was published in the People's Republic of China. In 1983 it was followed by an article, identical in spirit, in the news bulletin of the Institute of National-

² *Centennial of Kirghizia's Voluntary Accession to Russia. A Collections of Materials*, Frunze, 1964, p. 7 (in Russian).

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 72

⁴ Yuri Andropov, *Analysis of Existing Situation and the Landmarks for the Future*, Moscow, 1983, pp. 5-6.

ities. The article was entitled "The Aggression of Tsarist Russia and the Resistance Struggle of the Kirghiz People"⁵. By distorting facts and falsifying historical data its author, Du Rongkun, tries to "prove" that "tsarist Russia was a country that seized the largest portion of Chinese territory of all", while the Kirghizes supposedly were in the forefront of "resistance to tsarist Russia" and together with other "nationalities of North-western China" made their contribution to "the cause of developing and defending the borderland of their Motherland [i. e., China.—*Auth.*] and to strengthening national unity".

To "substantiate" these assumptions Du Rongkun gives a chronologically tendentious description of the Kirghizes' history and their relations with Russia, starting from the 17th century, in the three geographical regions: the Yenisei river basin, the Tien Shan and the Pamirs.

Soviet historiography has long proved that the biased great-power approach to the history of relations between the peoples of Russia and China is pseudo-scientific and groundless⁶.

In view of the publication in China of the abovementioned new "historical" research paper, we intend to examine in the same chronological sequence the author's treatment of the historical processes involved and to show what was happening in reality.

1

When Du Rongkun writes that "in the early 17th century the larger part of China's Kirghizes(?) inhabited the middle and upper reaches of the Yenisei and the Ob rivers" (?) he either intentionally ignores this country's historiography or simply testifies to his own ignorance. Du Rongkun's claim that in the 17th century the Kirghizes, whom he describes as a fully-evolved nationality, were allegedly driven by the Russian troops from their lands and had to resettle to the Tien Shan, is scientifically untenable. The ethnogenesis theory developed by Soviet scholars proves that the evolution of an ethnos is subject to the influence of many complex factors, both external and internal, and cannot be reduced, as some Chinese historians seek to do, merely to migrations. That is why all true researchers, both in this country and abroad, have long rejected the concept of the Yenisei Kirghizes' resettlement to the Tien Shan.

A special conference on the ethnogenesis of the Kirghiz people (Frunze, 1956) attended by leading Soviet Kirghizologists reached the consensus that the Kirghizes had evolved as a nationality in Tien Shan in the 16th century on the basis of the two major components: the aboriginal

⁵ *News Bulletin of the Central Institute of Nationalities*, Peking, 1983, No. 2.

⁶ See A. L. Narochitsky, *The Colonial Policies of Capitalist Powers in the Far East, 1860-1895*, Moscow, 1956; B. I. Iskandarov, *Eastern Bukhara and the Pamirs in the Latter Half of the 19th Century*, Part I, Dushanbe 1962; *The Manchurian Rule in China*, Moscow, 1966; V. A. Alexandrov, *Russia on its Far Eastern Borders (Second Half of the 17th Century)*, Moscow 1969; *China and its Neighbours in Ancient Times and in the Middle Ages*, Moscow, 1970; V. M. Ploskikh, *The First Kirghiz-Russian Ambassadorial Relations, (1784-1827)*, Frunze, 1970; *The Tatars-Mongols in Asia and Europe*, Moscow, 1970; *Russo-Chinese Relations in the 17th Century. Materials and Documents*, Vol. I (1608-1683), Moscow, 1969; Vol. II (1686-1691), Moscow, 1972; *Historical Science in the PRC*, Moscow, 1981; *The New History of China*, Moscow, 1972; V.M. Ploskikh, *The Kirghizes and the Kokand Khanate*, Frunze, 1977; S. L. Tikhvinsky, *Chinese History and the Present*, Moscow, 1976; M. I. Sladkovsky, *China: Main Problems of History, Economy and Ideology*, Moscow, 1978; M. S. Kapitsa, *PRC: Three Decades—Three Policies*, Moscow, 1979; B. P. Gurevich, *International Relations in Central Asia in the 17th-the First Half of the 19th Century*, Moscow, 1979; *The Latest Few Centuries of China's History*, Moscow, 1981; *Against the Maoist Falsification of Kirghizia's History*, Frunze, 1981; V. S. Kuznetsov, *The Qing Empire on the Borders of Central Asia (Second Half of the 18th-First Half of the 19th Centuries)*, Novosibirsk, 1983 (all the books cited above are in Russian).

population and the Turkic tribes from Central Asia, who came to settle there.⁷

The local Kirghiz substratum began to form in the Tien Shan as far back as the Bronze Age and the time of the early nomads. Large Turkic tribes from Central Asia moved over and settled there in the 6th-7th centuries. As a result of protracted and complicated ethnic interaction, prerequisites had been created in the Tien Shan in the 10th-12th centuries for the formation, on a multi-tribal basis, of a Turkic nationality, but the Mongol invasion interrupted the process, bringing with it a new phase.⁸

Further research in South Siberia, East Kazakhstan and the Tien Shan revealed that the Yenisei Kirghizes in general have nothing to do with the second (migratory) component. The Central Asian component in the Kirghiz nationality in Tien Shan was represented by other tribes, while what "moved over" from the Yenisei was, in fact, only the term "Kirghiz".

For the first time the ethnonym "Kirghiz" was mentioned in the *Historical Notes* by the Chinese scholar Sima Qian in 201 B. C. The Talas Valley runic texts (6th-8th centuries) echoed the names of individual Kirghiz tribes which later made part of the Kirghiz nationality. In the 8th-10th centuries the Yenisei Kirghizes, a conglomeration of Turkic tribes, founded a state of their own. A series of aggressive wars they started in the 9th century brought them, in the west, to the shores of the Irtysh river and the foothills of East Tien Shan, where they encountered heavy resistance from a strong state of the Kimaks, centred on the Irtysh river. But in the early 10th century the situation in the Kimak-Kirghiz borderlands had essentially changed: an onslaught of new Turkic tribes from Central Asia weakened the state of the Kimaks, while the Kirghizes extended their dominion to the Altai and the Irtysh river basin.

The emergence of comparatively small groups of the Yenisei Kirghizes in the territory of the Kimak and Kypchak tribes, i. e., in the Altai and the Irtysh river basin, has been corroborated by a wealth of archeological finds. It is only there that tumuli of the Kimaks, who buried their dead clad in full armour and with a horse in earth pits or in stone graves, occur simultaneously with the archaic Yenisei-type tombs of the Kirghizes who burned their dead.⁹

Soon, as a result of intensive ethnic processes, the Yenisei Kirghizes that settled in the area between the Ob and the Irtysh rivers began to assimilate with the Kimak and Kypchak tribes, something that showed in the community of their material culture and the fact that the Kirghizes changed their burial ritual. The latter circumstance indicates that Kirghiz groups were numerically inferior. Nonetheless, some Arab and Persian sources, already in the 10th century and later, continued to refer to the Altai, Black Irtysh and East Kazakhstan tribes as "Kirghiz". That the name "Kirghiz" was retained by what was a Kimak and Kypchak, rather than Kirghiz, ethnic community can be explained by the old steppe traditions whereby independent nomadic groups known by their own names took on the name of a leading tribe, when forming a confederation.

The ethnonym, if the assumption is true, was of a political significance, for, as the same took place when the steppe states of the Huns, the

⁷ See *Transactions of the Kirghiz Archeological and Ethnographic Expedition*, Vol. III, Frunze, 1959, p. 233.

⁸ See S. G. Klyashtorny, "The *Kutadgu bilig* Epoch", *Soviet Turkology*, 1970, No. 4, p. 86.

⁹ See D. G. Savinov, "Settlement of the Kimaks in the 9th-10th Centuries as Seen from Archeological Sources", *Kazakhstan's Past According to Archeological Sources*, Alma Ata, 1976, pp. 96-97 (in Russian).

Turks and the Mongols came into being, it likewise might have been the case in the mid-9th century when the Kirghiz state was in the making.

Thus, by the early 8th century the Mountain Altai and the adjacent steppes between the Ob and the Yenisei rivers had been inhabited for more than 200 years by a group of Kimak and Kypchak tribes which had the common name of "Kirghiz". Ethnically, it had nothing in common with the Yenisei Kirghizes who continued to develop their original culture whose continuity can be traced archeologically from the 6th to the 18th century. The Yenisei Kirghizes became the ancestors of what is now the Khakas people.¹⁰ The later history of the Altai group of Kirghizes was linked with the history of Mogolistan, a state formed in the 14th century, its centre being in Tien Shan.

For a long time the Kirghizes lived in the periphery of Mogolistan. Following the weakening and collapse of Mogolistan in the late 15th century, this group of Kirghiz tribes could spread all over Tien Shan and unite local Turkic and Mongolian tribes which assumed a new common ethnonym, "Kyrghyz". It was in Tien Shan that the dual ethnopolitical organism—*on kanat* (right wing) and *sol kanat* (left wing)—evolved, which marked the opening of a new stage in ethnic history of Kirghiz tribes and tribe confederations that saw the formation of a Kirghiz nationality.

At that time the Kirghizes had no contacts with Russia and the claims of some Chinese historians that the Yenisei Kirghizes "were forced" to resettle to Tien Shan, because they could not offer resistance to the Russians have nothing to substantiate them, whereas history knows of Chinese invasions in Central Asia, including Kirghizstan.

As far back as the late 2nd century B. C. the Chinese armies attacked Fergana, but were defeated by the joint forces of the Ferganese, the Kangyuks (Tashkent-Talas) and the Usuns (Semirechye and Tien Shan) and repulsed for a long time to come. In the mid-8th century the Chinese invaded Northern Kirghizia and reached the Talas river. However, the local Turkic tribes which later formed part of the Kirghiz nationality, jointly with the Arab troops which had some Central Asian elements dealt a crushing blow to the Chinese aggressors in the Talas river battle of 751. The battle's historical significance was in that it determined what culture was to develop in Central Asia. After the Talas river battle troops under Chinese standards did not venture into the territory of Kirghizia for more than a thousand years.¹¹

It ought to be noted that, unlike contemporary Chinese historians, the authors of ancient and medieval chronicles never regarded the races which inhabited what is now Kirghizia, or the Kirghizes themselves, as national minorities of China proper. They treated them as an ethnic group which was alien and hostile to China and its culture. Archeological excavations on the territory of Kirghizstan corroborated the evidence that since ancient times it was a centre of an original nomadic, agricultural and urban culture that had deep-going links with the cultures of the neighbouring peoples, primarily those of Central Asia and Southern Siberia. These peoples spoke an old Turkic language and had their own system of runic writing which in the 10th century had been supplanted by Arabic characters. They produced a galaxy of outstanding men-of-letters, scholars and lawyers. The generally-recognised prominent literary works of that period include *Kutadgu bilig* by Yusuf of Balasagun and *Divanu lugat-it-turk* by Mahmud of Kashgar (11th century), an encyclopedia of sorts of the Tur-

¹⁰ See L. R. Kyzlasov, *The History of Tuva in the Middle Ages*, Moscow, 1969 (in Russian).

¹¹ See N. Ya. Bichurin (Iakinf), *Collected Data on Peoples That Inhabited Central Asia in Ancient Times*. Vol. II. Moscow-Leningrad, 1950, p. 187; O. E. Bolshakov, "A History of the Talas Battle (751)," *Countries and Peoples of the Orient*, Issue XXII, Moscow, 1980, pp. 132-135.

hic world. Both masterpieces came from the Karakhanid state whose central part comprised the whole of Kirghizstan; they are a most ancient contribution of our remote ancestors to the treasure-house of world culture. This high culture was destroyed in the early 13th century by Ghenghis Khan's hordes.¹²

In writing about the Yenisei Kirghizes of the 17th-18th centuries, Chinese scholars seem to overlook the fact that they deal with the ancestors of what is now the Khakas people, not with the Kirghiz nationality that had come into being in Tien Shan two hundred years earlier. Moreover, tendentiously juggling with the facts borrowed from the book *A History of the Dzungar Khanate (1635-1758)* by the Soviet historian I. Ya. Zlatkin, Du Rongkun misconstrues them as a "struggle against the aggressors". But the very few conflicts that did take place between the Russian Empire and the Dzungar Khanate had nothing to do with China.

For a long time the Qing troops had been waging wars of aggression against the Dzungars, their neighbours in the west, and in 1757 captured Ili. "This victory was gained through a most merciless, almost entire extermination of the people of Dzungar. At times of prosperity Dzungar boasted more than 200,000 families, or a population of over 600,000; but after the military rout three-tenths of the population were killed by the Qing troops, four-tenths died of small-pox and the rest had to flee for safety to the Kazakhs in Russia".¹³ That was the real course of events and the toll of human lives involved. Unhaunted by any doubts, Du Rongkun describes it as "a unification of the north and the west".

Many Chinese historians today prefer to forget about the brutalities of the Qing troops over the neighbouring non-Han peoples; they seek to whitewash them and to present them as the "saviours" and "benefactors" of the contiguous countries and peoples. The misdeeds of the Qing rulers will forever be a shameful chapter in China's history.

These are the real facts from the history and ethnogenesis of the Kirghiz people. That Du Rongkun devoted a large part of his article to the Yenisei Kirghizes and "the struggle of resistance of the Kirghiz people" against "the aggression of tsarist Russia" just reveals that he is absolutely ignorant of the ethnogenesis of the aboriginal population of Southern Siberia and Kirghizia. Scholars have established beyond any doubt that the Yenisei Kirghizes were the ancestors of the present-day Khakasians, whereas the Kirghiz nationality as an ethnic unity evolved in Tien Shan long before the events described by Du Rongkun.

2

Turning to the Tien Shan region, Du Rongkun also tries to misrepresent Russia as aggressor and the local Kirghizes as its victims. After the Kirghizes from the upper reaches of the Yenisei river came over to the Western Tien Shan, he argues in his article, they mixed with the Kirghizes who had moved there at an earlier historical epoch and settled west of the Issyk Kul lake in an area stretching to the basins of the Chu and the Talas rivers. Later, because of the feudal oppression, they "left" for the mountain districts of Tashkent, Fergana, etc., some of them moving over to the Pamirs, Hindu Kush and Kara-Kunlun. And only in the mid-18th century, "having unified the north and the west", the Qing government "inherited the former Dzungar lands bordering on Russia" and, consequently, sovereignty over the Kirghizes. And not a word about the near

¹² See *Soviet Turkology*, 1970, No. 1, pp. 3-12; 1972, No. 1, pp. 3-17.

¹³ *Essays on the History of China. From Antiquity to the "Opium" Wars*, ed. Shang Yue, Moscow, 1959 (in Russian).

destruction of a whole people as the result of this "unification"! So, what happened in reality?

Let us turn to the sources and to I. Ya. Zlatkin's work quoted by Du Rongkun. "The fall of the Dzungar Khanate," writes I. Ya. Zlatkin, "upset the balance of forces in Central Asia and caused a series of grave international complications. Having seized Dzungaria in 1758 and East Turkestan in 1759, the Qing Empire moved its borders close to those of Russia and the Central Asian Khanates.¹⁴ Nota bene: it was not Russia that advanced towards the Qing Empire's frontiers, but the Qings that moved their borders towards Central Asia and Russia and established on the occupied territory an imperial vicegerency, the new province of Xinjiang (which means a "New Border").

At that time there were no clashes whatsoever with Russia. True, in the latter half of the 17th and in mid-18th century the Tien Shan Kirghizes were repeatedly attacked. The attackers, however, were not Russians, but Dzungar feudals who plundered the Kirghiz tribes and threatened their existence. Most of these tribes had from time to time to migrate from Tien Shan to Fergana. But the Kirghizes never ceased to fight back the Dzungars, which is why the Chinese sources recorded that "even in their heyday the Dzungars were unable to subjugate the Buruts [i. e., the Kirghizes.—*Auth.*]"¹⁵

As soon as the Dzungar Khanate collapsed, the Kirghizes returned to their own lands to fall, for the first time, victim to a Manchu-Chinese aggression. The point is that after the rout of the Dzungar Khanate the Qing rulers declared their right of succession to all former possessions of the Dzungars, including, not only the newly-conquered territory of Dzungaria and East Turkestan, but also the lands which the Dzungars had temporarily occupied in the course of their conquests.

What was the reaction of the local populations, including the Kirghizes to this act?

Even the Chinese sources of that time indicate that subsequent developments did not follow the designs of the Manchurian rulers. When, in the summer of 1758, the Manchu-Chinese units arrived in the Issyk Kul area in an attempt to penetrate into East Turkestan, the Kirghizes rose in arms.¹⁶ All further attempts of the Qing troops to entrench themselves on the territory of Kirghizia, to set up their guard posts in the vicinity of the Issyk Kul lake and the valleys of the Chu and the Talas rivers failed. The Qing authorities had to admit that the areas inhabited by the Kirghizes were a territory beyond their control. "After the Dzungars had been subdued," runs one of the official Qing codes, "(the Kirghizes) retrieved their pastures".¹⁷ During his "inspection" tours of the Kirghiz territories in Naryn, Jumgal and Talas, Qing general Zhao Hui read out there the following manifesto of Emperor Qianlong: "...Now that the Dzungars have been completely conquered, your lands are contiguous to our border. Should you, gravitating as you are towards (our) civilisation, come for obedience, I shall allow you to live as before: I shall not order changes in costumes, appoint officials or impose taxes. But if you send an ambassador to solicit, I shall augment favours and rewards. Your alien customs differ from the customs of the Middle Kingdom, therefore, you will obviously not agree to come over to our side and obey, but this

¹⁴ I. Ya. Zlatkin, *A History of the Dzungar Khanate (1635-1758)*, Moscow, 1964, p. 467 (in Russian).

¹⁵ Extracts from *Descriptions of What Was Seen and Heard About Western Lands*, tr. from the Chinese, A. A. Kondratyev, Manuscripts Fund, Social Sciences Section, Kirghiz Academy of Sciences.

¹⁶ See B. P. Gurevich, *International Relations in Central Asia in the 17th-early 19th Century*, Moscow, 1979, p. 162.

¹⁷ V. S. Kuznetsov, *The Qing Empire on Central Asian Borders*, p. 48.

is your own business. But you should keep in check the tribes under (your) jurisdiction and see to it that they keep off the borders..."¹⁸ Is it not the most convincing evidence that the Kirghizes were not under the jurisdiction of the Qing empire? And this evidence is contained in the Emperor's manifesto.

Du Rongkun interprets the conquest of East Turkestan as a "unification of the North and the West". In reality these lands had never belonged to China. The very name Turkestan, which means "a country of the Turks", is direct proof of it. From time immemorial the lands were inhabited by Turkic peoples, such as Uighurs, Kazakhs and Kirghizes, who more than once rose in arms against the Qing Empire after the conquest. Up to now the toponymy of the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous District of the People's Republic of China abounds in Turkic place-names: the towns and rivers of Axu and Yarkend, the cities of Karashar, Kara Mai and Ulugmuztag, the mountain range Altyntag, and, finally, a city and a river bearing the name of the great Kirghiz epic hero—Manas, and numerous others.

In the 15th-late 16th centuries the whole of East Turkestan was part of the Turkic state which the contemporaries called Mogolistan. It was composed of some independent estates of Turkic tribes called "principalities" in Chinese sources. The *Ming shi* chronicle (*A History of the Ming Dynasty*) contains a description of the Turkic, not Chinese, principalities of Hamy, Turfan, etc. Muhammed Mirza Haidar, member of a powerful Turkic family who lived in East Turkestan in the early 16th century, devoted his famous two-volume work *Tarikh i Rashidi* (*A History of Rashid*)¹⁹ to Mogolistan. In this authoritative chronicle of the Turkic states in Central Asia and East Turkestan, covering the period between the 14th and the 15th centuries, there is no mention of the presence of the Chinese, to say nothing of their possessions, in East Turkestan. At this very time and later the Kirghizes took an active part in East Turkestan's political life. Led by Muhammed, they left a deep imprint on the 14th century history of Hotan and Yarkend. Many a town in East Turkestan in the first part of the 18th century was possessed by Kirghiz feudal lords. Specifically, the largest area of Kashgar was ruled by Koisarybyi, a Kirghiz, succeeded by Arzu Muhammed. This Kirghiz feudal lord was, in fact, an independent ruler of the largest part of East Turkestan, including Yarkend, Hotan, etc. *The Life Stories of Hodjas* by Muhammed Sadyk Kashgari²⁰ provides a full idea of the agonies of the Dzungar Khanate and the political activities of the Kirghizes in East Turkestan before it was seized by the Qing Empire. And even after East Turkestan had been captured by the Chinese aggressors, the Kirghizes more than once joined hands with the Kazakhs in support of the conquered peoples' uprisings against the new rulers.

In the course of uprisings in East Turkestan by the indigenous Uighurs, Kirghizes, Kazakhs and other Turkic peoples the Chinese were many times driven out of Xinjiang. An objective result of the uprisings of the non-Chinese populace against the Qing Empire was the creation in East Turkestan, in the 1870s, of an independent state of the local Turkic peoples called Iyettysar (or Dzetishar, or, literally, the Province of Seven Cities) under the Kashgar *badaulet* Yakub-bek.

In the Tien Shan region, in the second part of the 18th century, the Kirghizes continued to act independently both of China and Kokand. As

¹⁸ *Pingding zhongeer fanglue*, 1772, pp. 25a-26b.

¹⁹ See *Materials on the History of Kazakh Khanates in the 15th-18th centuries* (Extracts from Persian and Turkic Sources), Alma Ata, 1969, pp. 185-232.

²⁰ See M. A. Salakhedinova, "The Work of Muhammed Sadyk Kashgari *Tashkir* 1 *hadzagan* as a Source of Kirghiz History", *News Bulletin of the Kirghiz Academy of Sciences*, Vol. 1, Issue 1 (History), Frunze, 1959, pp. 103-124.

to Kokand the Kirghizes put themselves on an equal footing with it.²¹ They had diplomatic relations with China. In those days an exchange of gifts was a widespread diplomatic practice. The official Qing codes of the 18th-early 19th centuries call the Kirghizes an "external barrier" of the empire which means that "inspection" tours were in fact armed forays on the independent territory.²²

The claims of Chinese historiographers that these relations were of "vassal" dependence, that the visits of ambassadors were those of "subjects" and their gifts were "tribute" are absolutely groundless.

Practically, the border between the Kirghiz possessions and the Qing Empire was delimited by a line of permanent Qing outposts (of which there was none in the territory of Kirghizstan). Occasional encroachments by China on the Kirghiz lands were inevitably beaten back. The history of stubborn and not unsuccessful resistance of the Kirghiz people to the Chinese aggressors is related in the greatest heroic folklore epic *Manas*, this monumental masterpiece of poetry (almost a million verse lines), or, as Chokan Valikhanov beautifully put it, an encyclopedia of Kirghiz life.

The history of the Kirghizes' relations with Russia was quite different. Despite Du Rongkun's attempts to falsify and present them as inimical, they were peaceful from the outset, and reflected the Kirghizes' wish for a voluntary accession to Russia to obtain reliable support and protection against the encroachments of China and the Kokand Khanate. Most convincing evidence of it are historical documents which testify that on August 23, 1758, Abdrahman Kuchakov and Shergazi, the first Kirghiz plenipotentiaries from the Chu river, arrived at the border fortress of Omsk, whence they were taken to St. Petersburg, the capital of Russia. In his letters to Empress Catherine II and the local Siberian authorities Kirghiz ruler biy-Atake sought advice on whether he could count on Russia's protection, offering in exchange his assistance to Russian merchant caravans bound for East Turkestan and India.²³

In St. Petersburg the Kirghiz envoys were accorded warm hospitality, presented with rich gifts and assured of Russia's goodwill towards the Kirghizes.²⁴ Political ties with Kirghizia were considered important, though the great distances separating Russia from the Kirghiz lands made progress difficult. Nonetheless, the Kirghizes, torn by internal strife increasingly gravitated towards greater contacts with the Russians. And though the Kirghizes were not yet in receipt of Russian military aid and protection, Russia already counted on their friendly cooperation in the foreign policy and trade, something that the Manchurian authorities and the Kokand Khans could not fail to reckon with.

The way to mutual understanding was open. In 1814 another Kirghiz embassy led by Kychybek and Dzakyb arrived from Issyk Kul to Russia's border post in Siberia. The envoys "expressed by word of mouth their desire to conduct trade and... insisted on being taken to St. Petersburg to convey the humble respects and obedience of their own and their people of His Majesty the Emperor".²⁵ In 1825 the Kirghiz tribe leaders had a *kurultai* (general assembly) on the Dzergalan river to honour the arrival of a Russian embassy led by T. V. Nyukhalov and F. K. Zibberstein. The assembly decided to reject Kokand's encroachments and to seek Russian subjecthood. Zibberstein wrote in his travel diary that biy-Uldzebai and biy-Dzapalak, confident of the strong protection they could get from Russia, rejected for the first time any idea of Kokand and by their example

²¹ See V. M. Ploskikh, *The Kirghizes and the Kokand Khanate*, pp. 77, 88.

²² See V. S. Kuznetsov, *The Qing Empire on Central Asian Borders*, pp. 50-51.

²³ See State Archives, f. 1, i. 1, f. 237, pp. 154, 157.

²⁴ See Central State Archives of Ancient Acts, f. 15, f. 2, Part IV, pp. 286-487.

²⁵ USSR Central State Historical Archives, f. 1263, i. 1, f. 58, pp. 455-456; f. 59, p. 236; State Archives, f. 3, i. 1, f. 425, pp. 4-5.

of good attitude towards the Russian Empire won on their side all other Kirghiz chieftains.²⁶ But, for a time being, Kokand's wars of aggression held back the accession of Kirghizia to Russia.

In 1844 the *manap* of Bugin, Borombai Bekmuratov, addressed the West Siberian authorities on behalf of the Issyk Kul Kirghizes. Reporting of tribal strife in the Kirghiz society he pleaded for "Russia's high protection" and for Russian subjecthood so that he might obtain "peace and prosperity". Borombai urged that his delegates be allowed to go to St. Petersburg to take an oath of allegiance,²⁷ but Governor-General of West Siberia Gorchakov had to refuse the "solicited protection" for two reasons: first, because of the remoteness of the capital city; and, second, because of the lack of adequate troops in Siberia to maintain proper order and defend Kirghizia from strife, Kokandians and the Chinese.

Three years later (1847) the Russian authorities were addressed by representatives of other large Kirghiz tribes. In his 1848 message to West Siberian Governor-General, Borombai again pleaded for protection. In January 1855 on behalf of the Issyk Kul Kirghizes *manap* Kychybek Sheralin swore in Omsk "eternal obedience and allegiance to Russia". As "an authorised representative of the Bugu clan of the Wild-Stone Kirghiz hordes that owe allegiance to no government" Kychybek pledged "to be forever a faithful, kind and obedient subject", never "to enter a foreign service, to share information with an enemy that may bring harm, to carry secret correspondence in or outside the Russian Empire, or in any other way act against the duty" and "to protect and defend with maximum discretion, strength and ability, without sparing his life, the rights and privileges enjoyed through the exercise of the power and authority granted or to be granted, and to bend every effort to facilitate everything that may be of use to loyal service and public benefit". The concluding words of the oath were as follows: "The Bugu clan is dutifully willing and ready to fulfil these commitments".²⁸ Such was the completion of the first stage of Kirghizia's voluntary accession to Russia.

The Qing Empire sought to halt the process of Kazakhstan's and Kirghizia's acceding to Russia. From time to time it dispatched emissaries and military troops to the Kazakh and Kirghiz steppes behind the lines of its permanent guard outposts; it made advances to and flirted with local feudals and even made unsubstantiated territorial claims on the Russian authorities to a number of areas in South Kazakhstan and North Kirghizia already under Russia's jurisdiction. At the same time the Manchurian soldiers continued their forays and outrages in Kirghiz and Kazakh *ails* (settlements).

In 1862, a large group of prominent *manaps* from the Bugu clan was forced to turn to the Russian authorities for help. They wrote: "Having become Russian subjects we hoped to be a free people, to be rid of the oppression of the Chinese, but the latter continue to hurt us, to take away our camps in Tekesu, Muzartu and Kerenu, claiming them to be Chinese, though, since times immemorial, the times of our ancestors, these lands have always belonged to us; now they are also the property of the tsar as ruler of Russia's subjects".²⁹

With the collapse of the Kokand Khanate, Kirghizia's gradual incorporation in the Russian empire was completed. No aggression or violence was used by Russia to bring it all about. Du Rongkun's claim that

²⁶ Historical Archives I, M., 1936, p. 249.

²⁷ See Archives of External Policy of Russia, f. Main Archives, I-7, 1844-1862, f. I, pp. I-2.

²⁸ Archives of External Policy of Russia, f. Main Archives, I-7, f. 2, pp. 12-14.

²⁹ Archives of External Policy of Russia, f. Main Archives, I-9, 1862, f. 8, f. 24, Part I, pp. 453-454.

"tsarist Russia not only seized vast areas around the Issyk Kul lake and the basins of the Chu, the Talas and the Naryn rivers, etc., but also absorbed the Kirghiz and Kazakh tribes inhabiting these areas, which from the beginning were the Chinese subjects (?)" is a deliberate attempt to distort the history of the Kirghiz people and the record of Russia's relations with China in the latter part of the last century.

Kirghizia's voluntary accession to Russia was of great progressive significance for the future of the Kirghiz people. The Kirghizes were delivered from the cruel yoke of the Kokand Khanate and the danger of being enslaved by the Qing Empire or British imperialism. Cessation of internecine wars and emergence from tribal isolation created definite conditions for the consolidation of the Kirghiz nationality.

Under the influence of migrant Russian peasants important changes began to take place in the economic activities and the home life of the Kirghiz population: increasing numbers of nomads opted for a settled mode of life; with the development of industries many of them became factory workers.

Contacts and association with advanced sections of the Russian proletariat won the Kirghiz working masses to the side of the revolutionary liberation movement.

The October Revolution of 1917, the friendly, allround cooperation and assistance of the family of fraternal nations helped the formerly backward peoples, including the Kirghizes, make giant strides towards socialism, avoiding the agonies of the capitalist stage of development. Kirghizstan's achievements today at the stage of advanced socialist development³⁰ are a dramatic and convincing proof of the triumph of the Leninist policy of the Party and the Soviet state.

3

In his article Dun Rongkun also tries to "substantiate" China's territorial claims as regards the Pamirs. Using the already tried method of falsifying facts, he claims that since the beginning of time (?) the Pamirs has been part and parcel of what is historical territory of China, and that later Russia allegedly occupied it. In so doing, he completely disregards the historical facts. He refers to the aboriginal inhabitants of the Pamirs, including the Pamirs Kirghizes, as "subjects of the Qing Empire" on the grounds of "His Majesty the Emperor's order and the geographical description of Western territories" compiled by court officials. It is common knowledge, however, that an "imperial order" in China was a law for the officialdom, and that officials made geography according to an Emperor's will, paying little attention to the realities, especially when it concerned a people's belonging to China. The reality, however, was quite unlike the official descriptions. Historical annals have it that the Kirghizes inhabited the Pamirs for many centuries. They maintained traditional ties with Sarykol, Badakhshan and Kokand; in the first half of the 19th century they were incorporated in the Kokand Khanate and later integrated with Russia. Many documents in the archives show that the Pamirs Kirghizes appealed to Russia for citizenship. Among these are travellers' notes and accounts, as well as the reports of the Turkestan administration and appeals from the Kirghizes themselves.

A dispatch from a commanding officer of a troop detachment stationed in the Pamirs to the Governor-General of Turkestan reads: "Rumours about my arrival in Rang-Kul are travelling fast... The Kirghizes are

³⁰ See T. U. Usubaliyev, *Leninism: the Greatest Source of Friendship and Fraternity of Nations*, Moscow, 1974; A. A. Altynyshbayev, *Lenin and Marxist Propaganda in Kirghizia (1905-1923)*, Frunze, 1967; B. D. Dzamgerchinov, *Kirghizia's Voluntary Accession to Russia*, Frunze, 1963 (all in Russian).

coming here from all over the place: almost a hundred of them have thronged by today... All of them complain of oppression by the Chinese and ask for protection".³¹

The Kirghizes from the East Pamirs appealed to the Russians for help repeatedly. One of their messages received in the spring of 1892 ran as follows: "If you do not come to protect us, who will be to blame for our destruction? Our affairs are very bad".³²

In April 1894 Russia and China exchanged notes pledging not to violate the *status quo* in the Pamirs (the Sarykol range).

Negotiations also started with the UK on delimitation of the southern and western frontiers of the Pamirs. In January 1896 the Russian government ratified the description of the Russian state border in the Pamirs from the Zor-Kul lake to the borders of the Chinese Empire, made by the joint international commission.³³

The border was delimited peacefully and not through armed violence as Du Rongkun claims. Many a decade afterwards the border in the Pamirs was never disputed either by Afghanistan or by China.

After the 1917 October Revolution the peoples inhabiting the Soviet Pamirs, including the Kirghizes, of their own free will joined the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic and have been taking an active part, together with other Soviet nations, in the construction of a communist society.

Du Rongkun's usual method is to pronounce totally groundless maxims like, for example, this one: "After the tsarist Russia had captured by military force some areas of our country to the east and south of the Balkhash lake (?), it tried to grab Kashgar, the main city on Xinjiang's southwestern border". No reference is made even to Chinese annals that could confirm this intention. Presumptive allegations, and a lack of proofs are a typical technique used by falsifiers of history.

In passing Du Rongkun also touched on the 1916 uprising of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. This problem has long since been solved by Soviet historiography, including Kirghiz scholars³⁴. Du Rongkun points out that as the result of the 1916 uprising a "large" number of Kirghizes and Kazakhs fled to Xinjiang. But he must know that almost all the Kirghizes and Kazakhs who had run away to China in 1916 returned to their native lands after the October Revolution of 1917. Yet he fails to mention it. He must also know that the Kirghizes in Xinjiang number today some 100,000.³⁵ They are all descendants of those Kirghizes who were permanent residents in East Turkestan and since the early 18th century never stopped fighting against the Manchurian-Chinese aggression.

It is also common knowledge that, according to the 1979 census, the number of Kirghizes living in the Soviet Union is equal to 1,906,000, whereas in the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic they total 1,687,000.³⁶ Can one speak in earnest of a large Kirghiz population in Xinjiang? The author also keeps silent about the fact that the Kirghizes in the Soviet Union, unlike those in Xinjiang, enjoy national statehood and sovereignty.

³¹ Central State Archives of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, f. 19, i. 1, f. 3342, p. 305.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 205.

³³ See *Description of the Russian State Border in the Pamirs from Victoria (Zor-Kul) Lake to the Borders of the Chinese Empire Made by the Joint International Commission*, a Copy, Central State Archives of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, f. 19, op. 1, d. 4546, p. 45.

³⁴ See *History of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic*, Vol. I, Frunze, 1968, pp. 668-686.

³⁵ See *China*, 1981, No. 1.

³⁶ See *The Population of the USSR According to the 1979 Census*, Moscow, 1980, pp. 24, 30.

After the October Socialist Revolution of 1917 the peoples who inhabited Russia, of their own free will acceded to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with the territories which they owned from time immemorial.

Kirghizia's voluntary accession to Russia opened up before the Kirghiz people vast historical vistas of social, economic, political and cultural development. Such are the facts which no manipulations can screen from the public eye.

The historical experience of the Soviet nations, including the Kirghiz people, is the building of a socialist country which came into being after the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917; it is a record of transition to socialism of scores of peoples saved from the long and agonising process of capitalist development; it is a story of the evolution and consolidation of a new social and international community—the Soviet people, and the moulding of communist outlook and morality, and of building a communist society.

Speaking at the joint meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic in 1982, Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said: "I would say that history has never seen such rapid progress from backwardness, misery, and ruin to a mighty, modern great power with an extremely high level of culture and a constantly rising living standard"³⁷. From this perspective the experience of the Kirghiz people, like that of the other fraternal Soviet nations, as summed up in their history, is of great international significance.

As a result of versatile creative activities of Kirghizia's working people led by the Communist Party and continually assisted by fraternal nations, specifically the great Russian people, the Kirghiz Republic has created an up-to-date, quickly developing economy which is part and parcel of the Soviet Union's national economic complex. Today's Kirghizia is an industrial-agrarian Republic in the Soviet East; modern industry is a key sector of its economy accounting for more than 50 per cent of the Republic's aggregate social product.

Its industrial sector is composed of 130 industries which make over 4,000 products. Among the leading sectors are tool- and instrument-making, electronics, hydropower, mining and non-ferrous metallurgy. This industrial progress is a result of the consistent policy of the Communist Party to equal out the rates of economic growth of all Union Republics.

Power generation has been given a powerful boost. Before the October Revolution there was no power industry in Kirghizia. Today its power plants generate 2.4 million kWt. The harnessing of the Naryn river has yielded so far over 31,000 million kWt of cheap electricity.

Extension of the Naryn river cascade which is under way is very important not only for the Republic, but for the whole of Central Asian region. 1,200,000 kWt of electricity from the Toktogul hydropower plant flows into the united Central Asian power grid, whereas the water accumulated in a huge reservoir is used also to irrigate the fields of the neighbouring Republics, as well as those of Kirghizia.

The range, amount, and geography of Kirghizia's deliveries of industrial goods continue to expand. Its exports go to almost all economic regions of the Soviet Union and to Western Europe, Asia, Africa and

³⁷ Yu. V. Andropov, *Sixtieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Moscow, 1982, p. 11.

Latin America. This is an important indicator of the Republic's high technical level of industrial development and its scientific and technological progress, which cannot go unnoticed.

Radical changes have also taken place in agriculture. The up-to-date farm machinery, irrigation works and the enthusiastic labour of the farmers account for unprecedented progress in farming and animal husbandry which constitute now a highly profitable sector. In the past 60 years the gross grain production has increased 620 per cent and the sheep and cattle population have swelled by 400 and 200 per cent, respectively. The output of individual products rose as follows, meat, by 750 per cent; milk, by 1,260 per cent; eggs, by 3800 per cent; and wool, by almost 1,200 per cent.

As a result of a cultural revolution contemplated by V. I. Lenin the almost total illiteracy of the Kirghiz population was eliminated within the lifetime of one generation; a ramified network of specialised secondary and higher schools has sprung up. The following statistics are indicative of the swift rise in the educational and cultural levels of the Republic's population: every third citizen attends classes either at school or courses; per each 10,000 of the Republic's population there are one and a half times more students than either in Britain or West Germany, and over twice as many as either in Spain or Turkey.

An extensive network of scientific institutions led by the Academy of Sciences has been developed in the Republic in the years of Soviet power. Kirghiz scholars and scientists successfully tackle complicated scientific and technical problems related to the development of the Republic's national economy, making their contribution to boosting its economic and spiritual potential.

The Leninist nationalities policy has given a powerful impetus to the flourishing of the Kirghiz culture. Before the Revolution the spiritual wealth of the Kirghiz people was concentrated in its oral folklore poetry crowned with the *Manas* trilogy, a sort of encyclopedia of the Kirghiz people's life. Today it takes pride in its spiritual flight over the years of Soviet power: from a primer to a six-volume national encyclopedia. Many of Kirghizia's musical and theatre companies and men-of-letters have won recognition of the exacting Soviet public, which is the best proof of the true flourishing of Kirghiz national culture and the best refutation of the lies of foreign falsifiers about its "Russification".

The Leninist friendship of the peoples was a source of these signal achievements. Speaking at the celebrations in the Kremlin devoted to the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR T. U. Usubaliev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kirghizia, said: "The Kirghiz people is infinitely proud and appreciative of belonging to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to this new historical community, the Soviet people. The invariable profound gratitude of the Kirghizes to the Russian people, to all the fraternal peoples will be alive for centuries."³⁸ What he said fully conveyed the true thoughts and feelings of the entire Kirghiz people.

In his replies to *Pravda's* questions Yuri Andropov emphasised that "the efforts to improve Soviet-Chinese relations were assuming particular importance and urgency amid the worsening international situation. We are confident that objectively the interests of the Soviet and the Chinese peoples do not vary in what it concerns the elimination of the danger of war and the consolidation of peace."

A. KARYPKULOV,
M. SUSHANLO

³⁸ 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. December 21-22, 1982. Stenographic Report. Moscow, 1983, p. 93 (in Russian).

PRC WRITERS UNION HEAD'S INTEREST IN RUSSIA STRESSED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 84 pp 120-131

[Article by A. N. Zhelokhovtsev, candidate of philological sciences: "Ba Jin: Writer and Patriot"]

Ba Jin is a progressively thinking writer, full of enthusiasm; he ranks among the very few good authors. It is true that he is known as an "anarchist", but he has never opposed our movement and even signed the militant manifesto of the League of Arts and Literature Workers

Lu Xin. Reply to Xu Maoyong on the matter of a united anti-Japanese front.

(3-6 August, 1936)

According to an old adage: at death's door one grows mellow. I was not aware of this before, now I appreciate the wisdom of this adage.

Ba Jin. Sui xiang lu (Capriccio).
Xiangang, 1979.

Ba Jin (b. 1904) is one of modern China's oldest living authors of international renown. The head of China's Writers' Union, he continues to write and translate prolifically, puts out new editions of his works and addresses writers' conferences, although last year his health deteriorated and his speeches had to be read by others.

Ba Jin lived a difficult life. His many trials and tribulations included the dark years of the Japanese aggression, detention and interrogation in Japan, and several years in a "pigsty" during the ill-famed "cultural revolution".

One of modern China's most educated intellectuals, Ba Jin has been actively writing since an early age when he won a name for himself by his very first work. When he was elected chairman of China's Writers' Union, Ba Jin said, "To tell the truth, I am not suited for the post of the union's chairman. What I would like is to be a rank-and-file member. I accept the nomination only to show that I approve of the Writers' Union's activities. I also dream of a good cause—to create as soon as possible a museum of literature which would bring together and preserve literary material dating back to the '4th of May movement' and onward. It would be a depository of literary experience of the last sixty years."¹

A prolific writer, Ba Jin completed his first short novel, *Perdition*, in France in 1928 when he was 24. Already next year the work was published in *Xiaoshuo yuebao*, the most authoritative of China's literary journals of the time, winning him renown. His novel *Family* (1931), the first part of the *Rapids* trilogy, made him known throughout China. His other works include two more trilogies, *Love* (1931-1933) and *Fire* (1940-1943), the short novels, *A New Life*, *Miners*, *Snow*, *A Garden of Joy* and *A Cold Night*, as well as many short stories and essays, a total of several score volumes. In addition, he put out more than fifty volumes of translations.² In 1958-1962 Ba Jin edited and put out a new Chinese edition of his collected works mainly including titles produced between 1928 and 1948—a total of 14 volumes.

It was no accident that Lu Xin referred to Ba Jin as an anarchist. The latter's attraction to anarchism was transparent already in his choice of a

¹ *Wenyi bao*, 1982, No. 2, pp. 3-4.

² *Ba Jin zhuanji* (Collection of materials about Ba Jin), Yangzhou, 1981, p. 4.

penname. The fact was made much of by Guomindang critics and subsequently by American Sinologists. O. Lang, for example, wrote in her book on Ba Jin that Ba Jin was the penname of Li Feigan. The name, first used in 1929, when he signed his first novel by it, expressed the author's devotion to anarchism and his admiration for its two great leaders—Bakunin and Kropotkin. "Ba" is the first syllable of Bakunin, and "Jin"—the last syllable of Kropotkin in the Chinese transcription. Those who gave him the name of *Feigan* were inspired by other antecedents. Those words mean "a pleasant refuge" and were taken from the *Book of Songs*, a Chinese classic.³

For decades the Guomindang authorities and official critics tried to compromise Ba Jin in the eyes of China's reading public, giving him out to be a Europeanised, cosmopolitan writer, alien to the national soil; they tried to make much of the foreign origin of the young writer's penname and his anarchist leanings. In reality, Ba Jin's penname may have several interpretations. The hieroglyph "Ba" was taken not only because it makes part of Bakunin's name but also because it was the name of a Chinese student, Ba Jin's acquaintance, who, in a moment of despair, committed suicide in far-off France.

The writer recollected later: "Doctors advised me to take a rest in a small town on the Marne. Later I studied French in a local lycée. There I made the acquaintance of several Chinese friends. One of them, by the name of Ba, hailing from the north of the country, stayed with me for about a month and then left for Paris. Next year I learned that he had drowned himself in Angers. Although I hardly know him, his suicide made me suffer. The syllable "Ba" in my penname was taken in his memory. It is owing to him that I discovered that the name "Ba" exists in China."⁴

The syllable "Jin" was indeed borrowed from Kropotkin's name. Besides, the author was attracted to the favourable overall meaning of the name: in Chinese it means literally "The Gold of Sichuan", the native province of the bearer. Multiple meanings of pennames are generally typical of China, and Ba Jin's case is no exception.

Ba Jin was born into a rich and noble family. Under the Qing dynasty his father for two years was the ruler of the Gyanyan county, in the Sichuan province. The family clan, headed by the grandfather occupied a large house, where over fifty members of the household were attended to by an equal number of servants. The grandfather ruled the family with an iron hand; his authority was indisputable. However, young Ba Jin broke with this way of life. This was a veritable rebellion. Many years later he recalled, "We spoke... not as grandfather and grandson, but as two enemies."⁵ Ba Jin's upper-class origin was often held against him in the People's Republic of China and on more than one occasion he had to refer to it in a penitential tone. In 1979 the author wrote the following about his childhood years;

"I was born into a family of a big landowner and mandarin. For a long time I lived among country gentry—ladies, gentlemen, misses and young masters. I was friends with lackeys, messengers, coolies and kitchen-boys (exactly as in Turgenev's short story "Punin and Baburin"). I saw a lot of injustice and foolishness. I deeply sympathised with people of the so-called lowly station. They taught me many things in life. Often I would climb on coolies' bunks when they were smoking opium and hear many fascinating stories from them. Without realising it I was in sympathy with them, even loved them."⁶

³ O. Lang, *Ba Jin and His Writings. Chinese Youth Between the Two Revolutions*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1967, p. 7.

⁴ *Wenyi yuebao*, 1958, No. 4, p. 58.

⁵ O. Lang, *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

⁶ Ba Jin, *Xuanzhi houyui* (Postface to Collected Works) *Dushu*, No. 2.

Young Ba Jin's introduction to literature began with old Chinese novels. From age 14 he read Chinese translations of European novels. "From my early years I loved reading novels," recollects Ba Jin. "The first one was *The Story of Yue Fei*, then I read *Judge Shi's Cases* and *Judge Peng's Cases*. I read only the first part of the latter, because I could not lay my hands on the second one. For several years I kept dreaming that finally I succeeded in getting the complete book, and I woke up in an undescrivable ecstasy... I began writing novels because I had read so many of them. My own novels are unlike *The Story of Yue Fei* or *Judge Shi's Cases*, because it was mostly foreign novels that I read."⁷

In his youth Ba Jin craved a new, different life, although he had no idea what it was like. Later he recalled, "There was a short time when I nearly became a Buddhist... But this did not give me anything, it was an illusion, an impossible dream."⁸

Ba Jin entered a foreign languages school in the town of Chengdu in his home province. Having broken with his family, he went to Shanghai. After an unsuccessful attempt to enroll at Peking University, he went to France to continue his education. Asked in May 1979 by Pierre-Jean Remi, *Le Monde's* correspondent, why he came to France in 1927, Ba Jin answered, "I was looking for the truth and for its sake I came to France at my own expense to study economics."⁹

Young Ba Jin was both ardent and sincere in his "search for truth". He had been looking for it in China in literary journals in the vernacular which appeared in profusion after the "May Fourth movement" for a new culture. He had written a letter to Chen Duxiu, one of the movement's leaders who was General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee in 1921-1927, which remained unanswered. Young Ba Jin was decisively influenced by P. Kropotkin's *Appeal to the Young* and *On the Eve*, a play by the now forgotten playwright Leopold Kampf. "An Appeal gave me an ideal of love for humankind and the world," reminisced Ba Jin, "It gave me a naive belief that tomorrow's morning sun would bring forth a society where everyone would be happy, that all things evil can disappear overnight. In *On the Eve* I saw the great tragedy of the younger generation of another country fighting for the freedom and happiness of its people. For the first time I found the heroes of my dreams and a purpose in life. This purpose was in harmony with the instinctive belief in justice which I had come across in our servants and palanquin bearers."¹⁰

Ba Jin was not a little influenced by Russian classical literature, especially the writings of I. Turgenev and L. Tolstoy. He was profoundly impressed by Tolstoy's *Resurrection*, *An Egg-Sized Grain*, *How Much Land a Man Needs*, and *Tale of Ivan the Fool*. Ba Jin's elder brother even became a follower of Tolstoy's teaching of non-violent opposition to evil.

In France Ba Jin led a retiring life, mixing primarily with Chinese students. Later he wrote with his typical modesty: "I did not pick up any knowledge, not even that of the French language. I read indiscriminately and wrote the short novel *Perdition*."¹¹

Already an old man, in 1977 the writer said, "I am not writing to be a writer; it is my past life that makes me take the pen."¹² Recalling his first published work which so felicitously made him a recognised man-of-letters, he gives a good description of the state of mind of a person who wrote simply because he could not help it: "I needed to give vent to my

⁷ Ba Jin *zhuanji*, p. 576.

⁸ O. Lang, *Op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁹ Ba Jin *zhuanji*, p. 79.

¹⁰ O. Lang, *Op. cit.*, p. 46.

¹¹ N. K. Mao, *Ba Jin*. Twayne's World Authors Series, Boston, 1978.

¹² *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 13, 1977.

feelings, to pour out love and hatred, for fear of letting my young heart suffocate. And so I picked up the pen and put down my feelings on paper, poured out my love and my hatred. Every evening, when the silence was punctuated only by the chimes of Notre Dame's bells I opened my notebook, wrote until I was completely exhausted and then collapsed on my bed."¹³

Although the recognised title of Ba Jin's first book in Russian is *Ruin*, a more correct translation is *Perdition*, for the title was borrowed from K. Ryleev's poem *Nalivaiko*:

I know, *perdition* [My italics.—A. Zh.] awaits
Him who is the first to rise up in arms
Against his people's oppressors.
My fate has already doomed me,
But tell me when was it that
Freedom was won without sacrifices?

The hero of Ba Jin's first story was a revolutionary terrorist. Love and revolution were to become the leitmotifs of his writings. His success in the China of the 1930s pregnant with a revolution, was therefore not surprising. O. Lang admits, "More than any other modern Chinese writer, all his life Ba Jin expressed the aspirations of young people. He wrote about youth for youth, mainly about young intellectuals. Ba Jin's works create a mosaic portrait of young people of China of the period of transition which is not unlike the portrait of a young Westerner in 19th century in European literature."¹⁴ The appreciation does full justice to the writer and, whatever American Sinologists said later, it is strictly to the point.

Ba Jin's success with China's young people of the 1930s was phenomenal, for the writer was talking about love and revolution in Guomindang China, in conditions of a reactionary repressive regime. An anarchist's label, a certain distance from the organised literary left-wing movement and commercial success of his novels helped him to overcome the barriers of censorship. The American Sinologist Nathan K. Mao admits that "Guomindang censors regarded his books subversive".¹⁵ There were cases when restrictions imposed by censorship compelled the writer to publish his books abroad at his own expense.¹⁶

A popular and prolific writer, Ba Jin made a substantial contribution to the emergence of a progressive and revolutionary atmosphere in China. He led his readers along a road of revolution, his writings were a first step toward revolution, they stimulated revolutionary sentiment, from where it was only a short distance to the genuinely revolutionary Communist Party of China and organised struggle against imperialism and reaction. It is difficult to say why Ba Jin did not write about Communists: for objective or subjective reasons or both, but he did say recently to a *Le Monde* correspondent: "In the 1930s I was in very close contact with Communist writers, but in my work I followed my own independent road. I especially respected Lu Xin, Lao She and Mao Dun."¹⁷

Lu Xin met Ba Jin in 1933 and, considering him his friend, said so in a statement for the press in 1936, two months before his death. As Lu Xin correctly and appreciatively remarked, Ba Jin had never come out against Communist writers and revolutionary literature; he was doing his own bit of work which benefited China's revolutionary movement and all progressive literature.

¹³ *Ba Jin zhuanji*, p. 176.

¹⁴ O. Lang. *Op. cit.*, p. 2.

¹⁵ O. Lang. *Op. cit.*, p. 29.

¹⁶ L. L. Nikolskaya, *Ba Jin (Portrait of a Writer)*, Moscow, 1976.

¹⁷ *Ba Jin zhuanji*, p. 81.

In new editions of his writings which began to come out after the victory of the Chinese revolution and the proclamation of the People's Republic of China Ba Jin weeded out most references to anarchism and removed all anarchistic traits from the characterisations of his heroes. This was duly noted by O. Lang: "In his fiction he tried not to be outspoken in the expression of his anarchist ideas. He rarely referred to his literary heroes as anarchists, preferring the vague name of 'revolutionaries'. Once during the war he even said: 'Anarchism and my novels, that is those written or translated by me, are quite different things.'"¹⁸

Ba Jin is one of China's most Europeanised writers. Foreign literature, especially Russian 19th century literature, exerted a strong influence on him, the fact he admitted not without pride. While his childhood reading of Chinese novels sparked his interest in literature, knowledge of English and French introduced him to foreign authors from whom he consciously borrowed certain techniques. Ba Jin adapted the techniques of the European novel to the Chinese scene, passing his own experience through this new creative prism, and became a modern writer in the full sense of the word. This was something new and invigorating in contemporary Chinese literature, although the European reading public is frequently aware of Ba Jin's *déjà vu* quality. O. Lang made a thorough compilation of literary parallels to Ba Jin's writings. In her view, *A Dream in the Sea* is similar to I. Turgenev's *On the Eve*; the ending of the *Fire* trilogy is strikingly reminiscent of that of *Fathers and Sons*; *Ward No 4* is like A. Chekhov's *Ward No 6*; Ba Jin's short novel *Snow* bears clear traces of the influence of E. Zola's *Germinal*, even the first title of the short novel, *New Shoots*, is evocative of the meaning of "germinal".¹⁹

It seemed that, inspired by a European work, young Ba Jin immediately created its analog on Chinese material. This was literary influence *par excellence*—prompt adaptation of literary experience to a different level.

However, Ba Jin mastered the "European manner" of writing and no longer confined himself to literary analogies. He was under foreign influence also in the choice of his subject matter. His short stories begin to include foreign characters and action frequently takes place abroad. In his best works he is absolutely original and up-to-date. It is gratifying that in his literary quest Ba Jin was inspired primarily by Russian classics. This is borne out even by such not unbiased witnesses as Western Sinologists: all researchers of Ba Jin's writings agree that he worshipped Russian literature and was enthusiastic about its masterpieces.

Ba Jin himself repeatedly made public his love of Russian literature, and that not only in the 1950s, when he visited the USSR three times, invariably finding a warm and friendly reception and learning about more and more translations of his works into Russian and other national languages of the USSR, but also in the difficult times that followed. Ba Jin's utterances about Russian literature, particularly those of the 1930s-1940s and 1970s, combine a wealth of factual information with many insights into his noble personality and artistic conscience.

In spite of repeated and sometimes cardinal changes in China's political climate, Ba Jin's attitude to classical Russian literature remained unchanged. Whereas before the victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949 his access to Russian literature was limited by the small number of translations into the Chinese and his own poor knowledge of Russian, in the 1950s Ba Jin acquired sufficient command of Russian to read Russian literature in the original.

Western Sinologists always wondered why this most Europeanised of China's writers, who had learned English and French at an early age, pre-

¹⁸ O. Lang, *Op. cit.*, p. 226.

¹⁹ O. Lang, *Op. cit.*, pp. 235-237, 248.

ferred Russian literature and used English only as a go-between. O. Lang acknowledged in 1967 that "interest in Russian literature among China's intellectuals was stimulated by their sympathy for the growing revolutionary movement in Russia".²⁰

Such frank admissions became possible for Western Sinology only in the 1960s. Before that it viewed the phenomenon exclusively in terms of "spiritual affinity". For example, O. Brière wrote in 1942, "By their sheer power of attraction for modern Chinese writers Russian novels were unrivalled. There exists a great similarity between the souls of Russian and Chinese novelists."²¹

Ba Jin once told his friend, French Jesuit Jean Monsterléet, about Russian writers, that he loved them ardently, because conditions of life in Russia closely resembled the condition of the Chinese people at the time. The Russians' character, aspirations and tastes were somewhat similar with ours.²² Asked in 1936 what writers help one become "a real man" Ba Jin named L. Tolstoy, F. Dostoyevski and M. Artsybashev.

The latter name produces a discordant note for us today, because in the USSR Artsybashev's reactionary writings were long ago and deservedly relegated to oblivion. His works of 1908-1912 are full of invective against revolutionaries and he ended his days in emigration after the October Revolution. However, in China of the 1920 books of this emigre Russian writer were the only source of information about the Russian revolution not suppressed by reactionary censorship, and mention of his name by Ba Jin should not be surprising. In 1920-1921 Lu Xin translated Artsybashev's short stories *Bliss*, *Family Doctor*, and his novel, *Worker Shevrygov*, which was prompted not by sympathy for the author's world outlook but by a lively interest in the Russian revolutionary theme.²³ It may well be that precisely Lu Xin's translations so powerfully impressed Ba Jin.

L. Tolstoy's and F. Dostoyevski's impact on Ba Jin is much more understandable. The Chinese writer first read Tolstoy's novels at the age of 19. Attracted by the Russian genius's moral and social philosophy, he fell under his influence, although he did not become his follower. Ba Jin loved Tolstoy's fiction, knew it well and used it as a source of literary craftsmanship. He once remarked that he had learned from L. Tolstoy the art of achieving concordance among a character's appearance, dress, behaviour and spiritual life.²⁴

The Chinese writer mastered the techniques of the European novel to such an extent that O. Lang was compelled to note the naturalness of unpremeditated borrowing in his works. In other words, Ba Jin's writings do have characters and plots similar to those of Western authors whose works he simply had no way of knowing. This similarity seems to stem from the typological affinity of situations. For example, although Ba Jin did not read M. Gorky's *Thief* or A. Kuprin's *Molokh*, according to O. Lang, he has similar works,²⁵ which is not borrowing properly speaking but literary influence *par excellence*.

More than any other Chinese writer Ba Jin's style was under the influence of foreign literature. The writer himself admitted the fact in 1979: "When I began my novel, my style was strongly Europeanised and I frequently used phrases typical of English syntax. At the time I was

²⁰ O. Lang, *Op. cit.*, p. 221.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 232.

²³ Han Changjing, *Lu Xin yu eluosi gulian wenxue* (Lu Xin and classical Russian literature), Shanghai, 1981.

²⁴ In O. Lang, *Op. cit.*, p. 233.

²⁵ In O. Lang, *Op. cit.*, p. 244.

translating Kropotkin's *Ethics*. The book contains a lot of quotations from difficult philosophic literature which I had not read. I started reading, failed to understand a lot of things or translate them; then I adopted the procedure used by the Japanese translator Utiyama Kenzi which amounted to following the foreign grammatical construction word for word... As a result my literary idiom became increasingly Europeanised."²⁶

As for Ba Jin's technique, although he was inspired by the masterpieces of 19th century Russian literature, he spun the fabric of his works from personal experience and life around him. In this he was always uncompromisingly honest and sincere. During the last few years Ba Jin repeatedly commented on the writer's craft. Speaking in Tokyo during his 1980 tour of Japan, he said, "I wrote not to make a living or to attain to fame. Of course, I too must eat, but I did not marry until I was forty, and how much does a bachelor need? I wrote to fight my enemies. In this fight I did not hesitate to use any weapons, grasping at any weapon within reach, provided it served to rout the enemy... Outdated traditional attitudes, an unwise social system hampering social progress and the development of a well-rounded personality, as well as forces deforming love—those are my principal enemies. I exposed and scourged them in all my writings."²⁷ The life work of Ba Jin, for decades the most popular writer among young Chinese intellectuals, was to become a powerful weapon in the fight against the old and rotten social system in China.

Ba Jin never shared the primitivist-utilitarian view of creative writing common in China in the 1950s and prevalent in 1966-1976. In his 1979 article entitled "On the Eve of the 60th Anniversary of the May Fourth Movement" Ba Jin thus summed up his earlier pronouncements on new Chinese literature: "Literature has a propaganda role to play, but propaganda cannot supplant literature; although literature has an educational role, education cannot supplant literature. A work of literature has the capacity of being remembered and thus moulding people's souls; of course it can also have a negative effect, corrupting human souls; however, both possible impacts of a work of fiction are determined by the reader's experience in life and education. In a book the reader is looking only for what he needs."²⁸

Ba Jin combined knowledge of foreign literature, especially Russian, and several foreign languages (for example, he read Dante in the original) with a keen power of observation and a rich and varied experience, which gave many of his works autobiographical traits. The writer gave the following description of his literary method in *Capriccio*, a book of reminiscences published in Xianggang in 1979:

"I have been writing novels for more than 50 years and I have always painted my characters to the extent of my power of observation, on the basis of what I knew well and saw with my own eyes. I have never written from book sources or upon anyone's orders. Since I first started writing novels, I have never stopped observing people. I have developed a peculiar way of seeing people: although I pay no heed to their deeds or their dress, I carefully watch their manner of thinking and their inner life. Over many years I have met all sorts of people. When 'zaofans' or 'hell-raisers' locked me up in a 'pigsty', illegally stripping me of all civil rights, I did not lose my eye for observation. Evil designs did not escape my keen eye even when they were disguised under such lofty-sounding names as 'workers' agitation teams' or 'army representatives'. True, my power of observation failed me several times. For example, after my release I frequently met Zhang Chunqiao in Shanghai—he was our boss—

²⁶ *Ba Jin zhuanji*, p. 606.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 665-666.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 574.

and watched him stealthily, but I never divined what he was thinking when talking to me. That is the sort of person Zhang Chunqiao is!"²⁹ One of the "Gang of Four", later on put to trial in the PRC, Zhang Chunqiao was then at the top and decided the fate of millions. Elsewhere Ba Jin quotes his scornful remark: "The likes of Ba Jin cannot write articles." The writer remembered the words well. Neither did he forget Zhang Chunqiao's boastful reference to the writer's being locked up in a "pigsty": "We did not kill him, we did not shoot him, we just pursued a policy..."³⁰

The "cultural revolution" was the most serious trial in Ba Jin's long life. Generally speaking, his fate was not overly merciful to him. The writer-to-be became orphaned at an early age: his mother died when he was 10, three years later he lost his father. At 19 the young man broke with his grandfather, who was his guardian, and went to Shanghai, to go it alone. In 1931 his elder brother Li Yaomei, with whom he was on most intimate terms, committed suicide. In 1932 when Japanese troops attacked Shanghai, Ba Jin's house with his library and manuscripts burned down.

In May 1934 Ba Jin went to Japan. What brought him to this country which was at the time so ruthlessly torturing his own? "What brought me here? I won't find here freedom which I crave so..." he wrote at the time.³¹ Maybe he wanted to see "the Japanese way of life" with his own eyes.

In Tokyo the writer was arrested, for local authorities held him as a potential terrorist and wanted to take no chances during an official visit by Pu Yi, Manzhou Guo's puppet emperor. Ba Jin spent twenty four hours at a police station and was duly interrogated. The anti-Japanese war started soon after his return to China.

"I frequently recall and relive what happened more than forty years ago," Ba Jin wrote recently. "With my wife Xiao Shan and three friends we were hiding in a forest. When we heard the terrible roar of approaching motors we looked up toward the sky. Soon enemy planes, silvery white swallows, floated by in the blue sky. They flew in nines, three in every flight. The first formation was followed by another one, then another one... They flew to bomb Kunming. There in the forest in the Chenggong district we were in relative safety, but the roar of bombers, like the sound of a tuning fork, left an indelible impression in my memory. The sound continued to torment me for years..."³²

Ba Jin enthusiastically welcomed the victory of the Chinese revolution and the establishment of the People's Republic. In 1958-1962 he put out a new fourteen-volume edition of his works. In addition to the three USSR trips, during the Korean war, he visited democratic Korea, where he wrote a number of feature articles on the war theme. He also visited Vietnam during the American aggression against that country. In the 1950s and 1960s Ba Jin devoted himself to publicistic writing: he wrote a book entitled *About Chekhov* (Shanghai, 1955) and edited Shanghai's literary journal in book form *Shouhuo*.

His literary and public work was interrupted by force by the "cultural revolution". The writer's biography written by a group of Shanghai's Fudan University scholars gives the following description of this period of his life: "During the unprecedented so-called great proletarian cultural revolution Lin Biao and the 'Gang of Four' pursued a leftist counterrevolutionary policy which in the cultural sphere amounted to a feudal-fascist dictatorship. All spheres of culture and science fell victim to 'crackdowns'. Ba Jin also was subjected to cruel harassment and persecution. The mass media, controlled by the 'Gang of Four', launched a campaign of poisonous lies and vicious invective against him, but the

²⁹ *Ba Jin zhuanji*, pp. 615-616.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 550.

³¹ N. K. Mao, *Ba Jin*, p. 30.

³² *Ba Jin zhuanji*, p. 647.

writer did not submit and continued to struggle. ...He believed that the people would ultimately carry the day".³³

In 1978-1981 Ba Jin published a detailed account of the hardships that befell him. The blow aimed at him was an unexpected one: "Early in 1959 Renmin wenxue Publishers put out a collection of my works written during the ten years after the proclamation of the People's Republic of China. Could I imagine that seven years later these very same writings would be branded as 'major anti-Party and anti-socialist poisonous weeds' and become the target of unending criticism. 'The great cultural revolution' gave me a baptism of fire. I lost my dearest one... The great 'cultural revolution' profoundly reeducated me. I paid a colossal price for this..."³⁴

News of Ba Jin's lot travelled abroad. Prominent American journalist H. Salisbury commented on it not without irony: "Ba Jin's adherence to the communist cause went for naught once the cultural revolution started. For ten years he was reviled and "struggled" with. For ten years he was not permitted to write. He is now in his mid-70s and many Chinese are surprised to find him still alive."³⁵

In a 1979 interview to *Le Monde* Ba Jin gave a more detailed account of his tribulations: "Although I was not beaten, I went through many indignities. They wanted me to admit to my crimes, they wanted me to repent. At first I admitted guilt, because under the influence of leftist ideology I imagined that my books are really very bad. After all I am no peasant or worker, I was brought up in a big landowner's family. So I told myself: you enjoyed colossal privileges. They froze my bank account, giving me only a monthly pittance. Then I was sent to the country where for two and a half years I grew vegetables. My wife fell victim to this persecution: deprived of medical care and medicines, she died only because I was pronounced a counterrevolutionary"³⁶

Barred from creative work in those difficult years, Ba Jin used every free minute for a titanic and selfless labour—he translated into Chinese A. Herzen's *Thoughts about Things Past*, a book which he had worshipped since his youth. Hesitant at first to take on this fundamental work, he once again edited and collated his translation of Ivan Turgenev's *Novelty*, done back in the 1930s, and began the *Thoughts*. The translation is now completed; two of its six volumes have already been published.

In a postface to the translation, written on September 17, 1978, Ba Jin tells his Chinese readers about A. Herzen, quoting liberally from V. I. Lenin's famous article *In Memory of A. Herzen*, and speaks of considerations which had prompted him to do the job.

"One might say that *Thoughts about Things Past* was my teacher," Ba Jin writes. "I made my first acquaintance of the book on February 5, 1928 when I bought an English translation by Garnet. At the time my first short novel *Perdition* was still to see the light. Although my mode of life was simple, in my soul too fire burned and feelings craved to pour out. I wanted to share my likes and dislikes. My blood and my tears went down on paper in a hieroglyphed text. Unconsciously I was influenced by Herzen. Subsequently I translated several passages from *Thoughts* driven by one thought: to learn, learn from the author the trick of conveying feeling by the written word. Now I have completed the translation of *Thoughts*, but the desire to learn has not left me: I want to learn from this book to the end of my days. It can teach one many

³³ *Ba Jin zhuanji*, p. 5.

³⁴ *Guangming ribao*, Dec. 10, 1978.

³⁵ H. Salisbury, "Now it's China's Cultural Thaw", *New York Times Magazine*, Dec. 4, 1977, p. 120.

³⁶ *Ba Jin zhuanji*, p. 83.

things, what I am learning now is how to use simple words and phrases to convey what you feel to other people and how to infect the reader with your optimism."³⁷

Ba Jin feels that A. Herzen's book is going to find a receptive audience in today's China. He also attaches political significance to his work: "In September 1975 I finished the new translation of *Novelty* and started translating *Thoughts*. In April 1977 the first two volumes were completed. When I was translating this colossal epic I did not hope it would be ever published. I viewed this as the last work in my life and tried to keep it a secret, because the 'Gang of Four' wanted me 'to croak on my own'; in Shanghai its watchdogs kept their eyes glued on me and madly barked at me. Then in May 1977 I published *A Letter* in which I wrote: 'Daily I did several hundred hieroglyphs of translation, and it seemed to me that I was dragging myself through the darkness of 19th century Russia alongside Herzen. Herzen was cursing Czar Nikolai's despotism, while I was anathematising the 'Gang of Four', believing that the remaining days of their rule could not be too many... Some people think that Czar Nikolai's despotism and the arbitrary rule of the 'Gang of Four' make a poor comparison because our country has long been cleared of traces of feudalism. I would not like to argue my point, but the book is before me and let those who are in doubt see for themselves if they can find any analogies. But I do want the reader to note the place where the heir apparent throws peach stones on the window-sill. Can this be just a one-hundred-forty-year-old anecdote?'"³⁸

The reference is to the anecdote told by Herzen about prince Nikolai Pavlovich who threw peach stones trying to guess whether his elder brother Konstantin was going to abdicate, thus making him the next czar. The high-handed rule in czarist Russia is clearly evocative of Ba Jin's own bitter experience of the "cultural revolution".

For his translation Ba Jin used the text of *Thoughts* from Volume 8 of the 30-volume collection of Herzen's writings published by the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1956. He also used an English translation of the work. It is interesting that Ba Jin's was not the only translation of Herzen's *Thoughts* in China. When Shanghai's newspaper *Wenhua* reported in May 1978 about his translation, another translation of four parts of the novel was sent to Ba Jin from Fujian province, while a translation of part two of the book came from Liaoning province. This meant that people read and translated Herzen in the darkest years of the "cultural revolution". Can there be more convincing proof of the Chinese readers' love for classical Russian literature? What this also showed was that the aging Chinese writer had lost none of his keen sense of time and scored a direct hit by his choice of subject.

In his 1980 Tokyo speech Ba Jin said, "I believe that the pogrom of ten years was a major event in the history of mankind. To my mind, it concerns not only us but the whole of humanity. If it had not happened in China, it would have happened somewhere else..."³⁹

Having survived these years of trial, Ba Jin preserved his sincerity, honesty and confidence in a bright future for the people of China, and resumed his literary work with gusto. Now he was infused with a sense of responsibility for the past and the future. He did everything he could to help literature to become a positive social force.

"I luckily escaped the axe of the 'empress' who had not made it to the throne," wrote Ba Jin in the May 1979 issue of the *Hebei wenyi* journal, "but how am I to console the souls of those who perished, how

³⁷ *Changchun*, 1979, No. 1, p. 19.

³⁸ *Changchun*, 1979, No. 1, p. 23.

³⁹ *Ba Jin zhuanji*, p. 667.

am I to inspire those living? To tell the truth, my generation has failed in attaining the goals of anti-feudal struggle and building genuine democracy. Meeting people today and talking to them I do not perceive in them the spirit of scientific quest. We have grown used to boasting, clap-trap and lies, and a boss's nod is enough to make all problems evaporate... Have we really no problems?"⁴⁰

In 1982 it was announced that in the writer's native Sichuan province a ten-volume collection of his writings was published, with the works having been selected by the author himself.

Ba Jin and his works are well known in the USSR. Here his books have been put out in nearly 500,000 copies. His *Family* (1956) and two volumes of *Selected Works* (1957) were provided with exhaustive prefaces devoted to his life and work, written by V. Petrov, a Leningrad Sinologist. The American Sinologist O. Lang admits Ba Jin's close links with the Soviet reading public: "Between 1952 and 1958 he paid visits to the USSR. He was welcomed enthusiastically and on his part he showered praise on the country, its people, literature and the party; he spoke of the unbreakable ties of friendship connecting Russia and China. Several of his novels and many short stories were published in the Soviet Union in large editions in 1955, 1956 and 1957 and in a somewhat smaller one in 1959."⁴¹

The first Russian translation of a Ba Jin short story appeared in the *Za rubezhom* journal back in 1937. In 1976 the Moscow University Press put out a book entitled *Ba Jin: a Writer's Portrait*, by L. Nikolskaya. Aware of the Chinese writer's trials, the author expressed a fear, justified at the time, that "as a writer he may not recover"⁴². The book was reviewed in the *Far Eastern Affairs*.⁴³ In a detailed survey of Ba Jin's principal novels, short novels and collected short stories, L. Nikolskaya revealed the political thrust and topicality of his writings, concentrating on *Family*, his best novel. The book gives a good idea about Ba Jin's work between the 1930s and 1960s. In 1979, a collection of short stories by Chinese writers of the 1920s and 1930s under the common title of *Rain* included two previously published short stories by Ba Jin.

Ba Jin's popularity in the USSR is miles apart from that in the West. O. Lang wrote in 1967, "It must be mentioned that only a fraction of Ba Jin's writings has been translated".⁴⁴ The short story *Dog* (the title of the 1937 Russian translation is *Who Am I?*) appeared in a 1936 anthology of short stories by contemporary Chinese writers compiled by E. Snow.⁴⁵ Later in Shanghai a Chinese translator published three of Ba Jin's short stories in the form of parallel texts in two languages.⁴⁶

The first articles about Ba Jin by Western Sinologists appeared in French in editions published by missionaries in China. In 1942 O. Brière and J. Monsterléet concurrently put out critique about him. The latter knew Ba Jin personally and devoted three articles and a section in his 1947 unpublished doctor's thesis on him. Out of these we had access only to J. Monsterléet's book published in Paris in 1953, where the chapter entitled "A Singer of Rebellion" is devoted to him.⁴⁷

Ba Jin's plight during the "cultural revolution" and O. Lang's book about him repeatedly quoted by us attracted to him the attention in the

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 581.

⁴¹ O. Lang, *Op. cit.*, p. 272.

⁴² L. A. Nikolskaya, *Ba Jin*, p. 101.

⁴³ See V. K. Potayenko, A. N. Snigirtsev, "A Book about Ba Jin", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1978, No. 4, pp. 179-180 (in Russian).

⁴⁴ O. Lang, *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁴⁵ E. Snow, *Living China*, London, 1937.

⁴⁶ I. Wen, *Short Stories by Ba Jin*, Shanghai, 1941.

⁴⁷ J. Monsterléet, *Sommets de la littérature chinoise contemporaine*, Paris, 1953, 167 pp.

West. In Italy his trilogy of novels: *Family*, *Spring* and *Autumn* was translated, in France appeared *Family* and *A Cold Night*, in Sweden *A Cold Night* and in the USA a new edition of *Family* (1972).⁴⁸

US academics were so profoundly impressed by *Family*, which had long been famous in China, that the novel was approved as obligatory reading for US university students. Several philology theses were devoted to it⁴⁹ as well as a special vocabulary and notes.⁵⁰

American studies of Ba Jin's life and work are marred by all kinds of contradictions and one-sidedness. For example, O. Lang clearly overemphasises the significance of anarchism in his work and the role of anarchist ideas in the moulding of his outlook. Leo Ou-fan Lee contends: "For Ba Jin, as for Turgenev, it is less politics than love that serves as the leading motif of all his novels."⁵¹ Nathan K. Mao, in contrast, finds "a political appeal to the reader"⁵² in his works, and sees a major detracting factor in that "the demonic power of sex remains un-researched."⁵³

Ba Jin's 1979 trip to France was a great success. "Phoenix, the only store in France offering books published in China... made a point of inviting the whole delegation of Chinese writers to meet the Parisian reading public, and the tiny bookstore was jam-packed. Many held French translations of Ba Jin's *Family* and *A Cold Night*, hopeful for an autograph. The narrow street outside was also milling with people... Suddenly Ba Jin became very much the fashion in Paris, along with other Chinese writers."⁵⁴

In 1982 Ba Jin was awarded the Dante Prize. Italy's ambassador to China handed him a magnificent four-volume gift edition of the *Divine Comedy*. Ba Jin took this as a great honour. "In difficult times I read him and the reading inspired me, helped me to live through hardships and gave me courage. I love Dante's works", he commented on the occasion.⁵⁵

In May 1983 Ba Jin was awarded the Order of Legion d'honneur.

Although in 1981 Ba Jin's health deteriorated, he is full of plans. He continues the publication of his translation of Herzen's *Thoughts*. In 1979 he published in Xianggang parts of his reminiscences under the title of *Capriccio* and continues writing his autobiography. He has also completed several chapters of a new novel about the destinies of Chinese intellectuals during the difficult years of the "cultural revolution", and provided recent editions of his books with new forewords.

Ba Jin repeatedly said that before the age of 80 he was not going to lay down his weapon—the pen. Addressing China's writers, who elected him president of their union, the 77-year-old author said: "I am fast approaching the limit of life, and there is precious little time left for creative work, but the flame of hope is still bright in my heart, and I love my socialist motherland and my infinitely kind people as ardently as before.... I feel that our present-day writers and their works have already surpassed the epoch of the 1930s and 1940s."⁵⁶

Ba Jin's life is a graphic example of patriotic service to motherland and literature.

⁴⁸ Ba Jin, *Family*, New York, 1972.

⁴⁹ C. C. Kubler, *A Study of Europeanised Grammar in Ba Jin's Novel Jia*, Cornell University, 1975.

⁵⁰ C. C. Kubler, *Vocabulary and Notes to Ba Jin's Jia: an Aid for Reading the Novel*, Ithaca, N. Y., 1976.

⁵¹ Leo Ou-fan Lee, *The Romantic Generation of Modern Chinese Writers*, Cambridge, Mass. 1973, p. 273.

⁵² N. K. Mao, *Ba Jin*, p. 62.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁵⁴ *Wenyl bao*, 1982, No. 5, p. 24.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁵⁶ *Wenyl bao*, 1982, No. 2, p. 3.

RISE OF SINGAPORE, HONG KONG AS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CENTERS NOTED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 84 pp 132-137

[Article by V. N. Karpunin: "International Financial Centers in Southeast Asia"]

In the 1970s and early 1980s one of the newest trends in capital's financial sphere is the emergence of Singapore and Hong Kong as the world's leading financial centres. According to the size of their international currency transactions, Singapore now ranks third behind London and the Bahamas,¹ and Hong Kong has moved up alongside such West European financial centres as Milan and Frankfurt.²

Among Southeast Asian nations, Singapore and Hong Kong are the two largest producers and marketers of goods. A greater part of all goods going in and out of the region passes through these two countries. The Port of Singapore handles more cargo than any other port in the world besides Rotterdam. These centres, moreover, are strategically located not far from the region's other raw materials and goods markets, which explains why foreign monopolies view them as profitable and convenient jumping-off points for penetrating the countries of Southeast Asia. All of this predetermines the dominant position of West European, US, and Japanese multinational corporations in Singapore and Hong Kong. Following in the wake of industrial monopolies were transnational banks which provide the multinationals with financial services. In Southeast Asia, these banks find clients in the person of major local companies, which have outgrown national bounds and are actively included in international business. One more factor attracting foreign banks is that Singapore and Hong Kong are important links in the global 24-hour currency network. They take over the functions of West European and North American financial centres on the international money market after the latter have come to the end of their business day. During these hours all the activity of the international money market is transferred to the Southeast Asian centres. West European banks therefore widely employ their services until the start of the transaction day in Europe. Their offices in these financial centres furnish international banks with the opportunity to conduct business on the world financial market practically round-the-clock, thus increasing their profits.

The liberalisation of currency, financial, and taxation policies by the local governments played an important role in Singapore and Hong Kong's emergence as major world financial centres. The international banks located here have been set very low tax rates on their international operations, which allows them to shield from taxation profits in the millions of dollars, and also, by exploiting this legal and tax situation, to conduct wide-ranging speculative operations. In Singapore, for ex-

¹ See *Financing Foreign Operations*, Published by Business International Corporation, 1982, Section "Commercial Banks", p. 6.

² See *Banker*, March, 1979, pp. 22-23.

ample, in 1968, three years after it declared its independence, the tax on the bank accounts of foreign corporations was abolished and permission was given for opening numbered accounts, the kind offered by Swiss banks. In subsequent years the Singapore government took additional steps to grant banks more freedom to conduct their activities.

In view of this the regional banking community is rapidly growing. In 1970 they numbered nearly 40, and by 1981 the number had mushroomed to more than 304.³ The banking sector is dominated by foreign banks, mainly branches and subsidiaries of major European, American, and Japanese banks. Most prominent of these are British banks, especially the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Chartered Bank. However, banking monopolies from other countries are starting to challenge British banks in this promising international credit market, making Singapore an area of fierce rivalry between banking groups from West Europe, the United States, and Japan. American banks have been most successful in Singapore, especially such giants as Citibank and Bank of America, which, along with Japanese banks, are among the largest in the country.

The largest local banks have begun to make inroads into this war of profit. Of them the Development Bank of Singapore, the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation, the United Overseas Bank, and the Overseas Union Bank at present lead in many spheres of banking activity in the country, and, moreover, have a ramified network of foreign subsidiaries, including in the world financial centres of West Europe and North America, thus introducing a new element of rivalry into these "traditional" international financial markets.

The banks' main line of business is to finance Singapore and other Southeast Asian countries' trade with industrially developed capitalist countries, and also to furnish loans to industrial and other enterprises that are being established in this region by foreign corporations. In view of this, Singapore, as a member of the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), is the major lender of capital to and a most profitable market for capital investments from ASEAN countries. For example, with the help of capital obtained in Singapore, oil companies are carrying out exploratory work and are extracting oil in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and other ASEAN nations.

The major sphere of activity of a great many of Singapore-based banks, however, is in international financial operations on the so-called Asian currencies market, which took root here in 1968 when the Singapore government followed the advice of California-based Bank of America and allowed local banks to receive deposits of foreign currency. This brought a flood of foreign currency into Singapore, mainly temporarily free foreign currency assets of national companies, and also of international monopolies carrying out economic expansion in the region. The American dollars possessed by the local Chinese bourgeoisie were a major source of funds. Ever since the Asian currencies market has been expanding at a steady and rapid clip. In the period from 1969 to the end of 1982 it has skyrocketed from \$123 million US to greater than \$100 billion US.⁴ The Asian currency market's rapid expansion is due largely to the fact that it meets regional demands better than the international European currency market since it concentrates the foreign currency resources of small holders and satisfies the foreign currency credit needs of even relatively small firms (the minimum deposit is \$25,000, or 4 times less than in the Euro-dollar market).

³ See *Credit Suisse Bulletin*, Vol. 83, Autumn, 1977, p. 10; *Financing Foreign Operations*, Published by Business International Corporation, 1981, Section "Singapore", p. 6.

⁴ See G. G. Matyukhin, *World Financial Centres*, Moscow, 1979, p. 159; *BIKI*, 1982, No. 145, p. 7 (in Russian).

What sets Singapore apart from other financial centres is that most Singapore financial institutions specialise in interbank "wholesale" credit operations and in attracting and accumulating foreign capital, most of which is transferred from Singapore to other financial centres, particularly Hong Kong, where it is ultimately lent out. This is why Singapore is regarded as an important attractor of funds and as the "wholesale" centre of the region.

The Singapore currency market has become fairly well-established, which is a result of local currency controls that are less strict here than in other Southeast Asian countries. In 1982 an average of \$8.9 billion US changed hands each day, which can be compared with an average of \$350 million daily in 1974.⁵ The *Financial Times* of London has calculated that half of all foreign currency circulating in Asia passes through Singapore banks.⁶ In addition to supplying the foreign currency needs of Singapore, Singapore banks also satisfy the needs of other countries in the region, particularly members of ASEAN.

Singapore is also an international gold market on the Asian continent. In 1982, deals in gold wavered from \$8 billion to \$12 billion US daily.⁷ Those responsible for most of the trading activity on the Singapore market are consumers from Southeast Asian countries (mainly big Chinese bourgeoisie), though the activity of investors from other countries is increasing.

In 1973, the Singapore Stock Exchange was founded (replacing a stock exchange shared by Malaysia and Singapore). As of today it lists stocks of 261 companies, worth a total of \$26.7 billion US.⁸ Singapore authorities have declared that they are considering expanding the long-term capital market, seeing this as a way for developing Singapore as a financial centre.

Singapore's international financial activities are largely responsible for what is commonly referred to in the West as Singapore's "economic miracle". This explains the Singapore government's interest in strengthening and promoting further growth in Singapore's international banking activities. The foreign capital which flows into the country through the international banks and which is used to finance the construction of new enterprises to a certain extent fosters the expansion of the country's economy, helps the country's industries to more quickly apply the latest equipment and technology and train qualified personnel. However, not all good ensues from the development of Singapore's financial centre. It also brings with it economic, political, and social evils. The transnational banks, by offering more profitable opportunities for investments than the local market, siphon off local funds from the national economy and use them on the international market in the interests of big monopoly capital, which does not benefit the national economy. Bankruptcies have been mounting among small-time local businesses and banks which are unable to compete with the foreign industries and banking corporations located in Singapore. In addition, the exploitation of natural and manpower resources is increasing, property inequality is spreading fast, and prices of consumer goods are rising, all of which threaten the country with grave social disruptions.

The sway of foreign capital in Singapore's economy is drawing the Singapore government with increasing force into the foreign-policy orbit of capitalist countries, especially the US. For example, during the US

⁵ See *Banker*, July 1982, p. 107; *Press Bulletin of Economic Information*, Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd., March 15, 1979, Vol. 152, p. 21.

⁶ See *The World Economy and International Relations*, 1979, No. 11, p. 22 (in Russian).

⁷ See *Banker*, July, 1982, p. 118.

⁸ See *Financing Foreign Operations*, Section "Singapore", p. 17.

aggression in Vietnam, the United States often turned to the Singapore credit market for funds to maintain its army in Indochina.⁹ Presently the American government is bolstering arms supplies to Singapore in a bid to use the country as a "Trojan horse" within ASEAN with the aim of turning the Association into a military bloc.¹⁰

As for Hong Kong, the leaders of this British colony are following the example of Singapore and putting into effect a whole series of measures to relax controls, reduce taxes, and create a salubrious environment for foreign banking institutions. Another important factor of the growth in Hong Kong of international financial operations is its long-standing key position as a most important centre of colonial and international trade for Britain and other developed capitalist countries with Southeast Asian countries and its role as an outlet into the capitalist markets for China, which explains the strong position of Chinese capital in many sectors of the Hong Kong economy, banking included.

A large number of banking institutions have established themselves in Hong Kong. Of them, 44 are local and 122 foreign, and another 107 foreign banks have branches here.¹¹ The rapid growth of banking activity in Hong Kong is confirmed by the fact that from 1978 to 1982 banks assets have leaped from \$132 billion Hong Kong to \$420 billion Hong Kong.¹²

The banks serve mainly the foreign trade of countries of this region with the rest of the world and also the expansion of multinational corporations of the United States, West Europe, and Japan in Southeast Asian markets. Besides, they conduct international financial operations and connect Hong Kong with other financial centres in Southeast Asia and throughout the capitalist world. One of the main forms of the banks' activities is participation in the syndicated credit business—the organisation of banking syndicates to grant major loans, in most cases to foreign borrowers. Thus Hong Kong has gained the reputation both in the region and in the world as a specialist in international syndicated loans. *Banker* magazine reports that 80 per cent of all financing in Southeast Asia is conducted through Hong Kong.¹³ In 1981 Hong Kong banks organised 115 international Euro-currency loans totalling \$5.5 billion US. This sum nearly equals that of the international Euro-currency loans put together by Paris, one of the leading financial centres in the capitalist world, and exceeds the total of such loans originating in Singapore, the region's largest financial centre, by \$1 billion US.¹⁴

The largest financial institution in the Hong Kong banking community is the British-based Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, which, together with its sister bank, the Hang Seng Bank, controls more than half of the local banking business.¹⁵ Because Hong Kong has no central bank, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank fulfills some of its functions, including being the creditor of last instance for other banks and also together with the Chartered Bank and the Mercantile Bank putting into circulation the local currency—the Hong Kong dollar. The Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank issues from 75 to 95 per cent of the local currency.¹⁶ In view of its central role in Hong Kong's economy, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank has a hand in drafting and enacting local economic policy, which has been increasingly tilted towards

⁹ See *Credit Suisse Bulletin*, Vol. 83, Autumn, 1977, p. 9.

¹⁰ See *Za rubezhom*, 1983, No. 31, p. 15.

¹¹ See *Banker*, May, 1981, p. 143; *Euromoney*, July, 1982, p. 127.

¹² *Euromoney*, July 1982, p. 94.

¹³ *Ibid.*, April, 1979, p. 67.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Oct., 1982, p. 62.

¹⁵ See G. G. Matyukhin, *World Financial Centres*, p. 171 (in Russian).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

international and large national corporations, while outrightly ignoring the interests of the working people and small producers.

Hong Kong as an international financial centre has become an arena of embittered confrontations between financial monopoly groups from various capitalist countries, which are vying for leading positions in this credit market. Having had the most success in this battle so far are banks from Japan, Australia, and Singapore, which have posed a serious challenge to British banks. Banks from ASEAN countries are also shoring up their presence in Hong Kong. Banks from the PRC, however, are topmost. The 13 of them that do business in Hong Kong are all directly controlled by the Bank of China. As for the size of their operations, from 1975 to 1980 deposits in the PRC-controlled banks doubled, and they increased their share of total deposits from just under one-third to 40 per cent. These banks' profits for the same period registered a five-fold increase.¹⁷

The escalation of the Chinese banks' activities is due to the colony's special significance for the Chinese economy. Located very close to China geographically, Hong Kong is the second largest market for Chinese goods, an important go-between for Chinese foreign trade, and the main source of China's foreign currency. In 1982, \$3.46 billion US worth, or 12.4 per cent of total Chinese foreign trade, passed through Hong Kong. Also in 1982, the reexport of Chinese goods through Hong Kong comprised 14.3 per cent of all the PRC exports, and reimports accounted for 10 per cent.¹⁸ From 1977 to 1980, Hong Kong's share in Chinese currency revenues shot upwards from 29.3 to 36.5 per cent, reaching a figure of \$6.9 billion US.¹⁹

The Hong Kong stock market has undergone considerable growth. Measured by volume and the size of mobilisable funds, it is the third largest stock market in Southeast Asia after that of Tokyo and Sydney. The Hong Kong stock market is orientated mostly towards foreign business. It serves large foreign borrowers, satisfying their needs for long-term capital and also giving them the opportunity to conduct vast speculative operations. Presently the Hong Kong stock market is undergoing reorganisation. The four existing stock markets are being combined into a single Hong Kong Stock Market.

The gold market occupies an important position in Hong Kong's financial structure. The Hong Kong gold market is the largest in Asia and the third largest in the world after that of London and Zurich. In Hong Kong items of gold are traded on two exchanges: the Chinese Gold and Silver Exchange, an old and rather isolated market catering traditionally to rich investors of Chinese descent, and the Merchandise Exchange, on which the number of gold transactions is rising rather quickly (in 1981 it grew by 160 per cent.²⁰).

In the 1970s, a certain specialisation evolved between Hong Kong and Singapore in various areas of international banking activity. While Singapore is the region's largest attracter of funds and a "wholesale" credit market for international banks, Hong Kong is a "retail" market from which borrowers can take out loans. The primary source of funds for the syndicated loans underwritten in Hong Kong is Singapore, which transfers its attracted capital to Hong Kong. This, however, does not rule out competition between the two centres for a slice of the business on the international market of loan capital.

¹⁷ See *Banker*, May, 1981, p. 145.

¹⁸ See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 17, 1983, p. 74.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Jan. 20, 1983, p. 42.

²⁰ See *Banker*, Oct., 1982, p. 63.

The further development of Hong Kong as a world financial centre is largely contingent on how quickly the question of the colony's future is solved. On June 30, 1997 Britain's lease of the "new territories" is due to expire. For this reason the banking community waited impatiently for the visit of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to Peking in September, 1982, during which she was to discuss Hong Kong's future. However, no concrete solutions were found, which told immediately on business in Hong Kong.²¹

In conclusion it ought to be said that the development of Singapore and Hong Kong as international financial centres has engendered a new web of contradictions in the international economic relations of capitalist countries both within the region and in the world as a whole. The economic disorders and crises experienced by developed capitalist countries tell on the activities of these financial centres, thus affecting the economic development of Southeast Asian countries by aggravating the negative phenomena in their national economies and sharpening social conflicts. The multinational corporations use these centres as jumping-off points for penetrating the economies of the states of this region and for making them dependent on international capital. Thus the emergence and development of the world financial centres in Southeast Asia will result in the further deepening of capitalism's contradictions and reveal new facets of its general crisis.

²¹ See *Economist*, Feb. 19, 1983, p. 92.

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BIOGRAPHY OF EARLY SOVIET DIPLOMAT REVIEWED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 84 pp 138-139

[Review by L. G. Sukhov, doctor of economic sciences, of book "Na boyevykh postakh diplomaticheskogo fronta. Zhizn' i deyatel'nost' L. M. Karakhana" [At the Key Posts of the Diplomatic Front. L. M. Karakhan's Life and Career] by V. V. Sokolov, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1983, 193 pages: "L. M. Karakhan--A Diplomat of the Leninist School"]

The Soviet people remember with great gratitude the first diplomats of the Soviet state who, under the leadership of Lenin, prepared the necessary foreign policy conditions for the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Among them are G. Chicherin, V. Antonov-Ovseyenko, Y. Berzin, V. Vorovsky, A. Kolontai, L. Krasin, M. Litvinov, L. Karakhan, K. Yurenev--diplomats of the Leninist school and comrades-in-arms of the founder of the Soviet state.

Lev Karakhan takes a worthy place in this constellation of Soviet diplomats. He was among the first to work in the sphere of foreign policy, and the first twenty years of Soviet diplomacy, the initial steps of Soviet Russia in establishing and developing equitable diplomatic relations with neighbouring states, especially with Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Japan, China, Mongolia and some others, are closely connected with his name.

It was the time when peoples of colonial and semicolonial countries of Asia and Africa embarked on the struggle for independence. Lenin described it as the "awakening of Asia" and the beginning of an active struggle for political independence of peoples of colonies and semicolonies. He wrote: "...a new source of great world storms opened up in Asia. The Russian revolution was followed by revolutions in Turkey, Persia and China."¹

The entire diplomatic activities of Lev Karakhan, one of the first Soviet diplomats, a close associate and friend of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Georghi Chicherin, began and proceeded against the background of the broad politi-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 584.

cal "awakening of Asia". Lenin knew well and highly appreciated Karakhan as an expert in the Oriental affairs. Many foreign policy steps of the Soviet government in the 1920s with regard to Asian countries, in particular, the Far Eastern states, were linked with his name. Lev Karakhan took a direct part in working out a number of appeals of the Soviet government to the peoples of the East, which were based on Lenin's Decree on Peace, The Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia, and the Appeal to All the Tilling Moslems of Russia and the East. With the participation of Karakhan, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs worked out addresses to the government and the people of Mongolia, to workers and peasants of Persia, and of Turkey, to the revolutionary organisations of Korea, to the Chinese people and the governments of South and North China, etc.

The monograph by Sokolov acquaints the reader with Karakhan's life and activity, from his first diplomatic steps during the talks in Brest to his activity as Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to a number of Western and Eastern countries. Until recently this information was known to a limited number of historians, orientalist and sinologists.

Lev Karakhan was born into a poor Armenian family in Tiflis (now Tbilisi) on January 20, 1889. At the end of 1905, the whole family moved to remote Harbin. Karakhan was not yet sixteen when he joined the Tiflis branch of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) in 1904. In the Maritime Territory and in Harbin Lev Karakhan actively worked with the Bolshevik organisations—the Vladivostok and Harbin groups of the RSDLP. There young Karakhan began his acquaintance with China and its people.

He took part in the preparation for and the accomplishment of the Great October Socialist Revolution as Secretary of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and Secretary of the Military-Revolutionary Committee. Lev Karakhan actively participated in the preparation for and holding of the Second All-Russia Congress of the Soviets, which passed the Decrees on Power, on Peace and on Land.

Karakhan's diplomatic activities began with the peace talks in Brest and the signing of a peace treaty with Germany together with Chicherin, the future People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Later on, as Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Lev Karakhan was engaged in

activities connected with numerous instructions and directives by Lenin and the Soviet government, aimed at ensuring an armistice and creating favourable foreign policy conditions for the consolidation of Soviet power.

In his book, V. Sokolov tells the reader about Karakhan's work in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the strategy and tactics of the Soviet state directed at a breakthrough of the diplomatic blockade, Karakhan's activity as Soviet Ambassador in Poland, and the development of normal diplomatic relations with Iran, Turkey and Yemen. But of greatest interest to the reader and specialists are these pages which deal with Karakhan's work in China, his efforts to conclude agreements with Japan and China, and to settle the conflict at the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Also of interest are the materials about Karakhan's negotiations with the Chinese on the normalisation of Soviet-Chinese relations and the conclusion of an agreement on the general principles of settlement of questions between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China. On the instructions of the Party Central Committee and the Soviet government, Lev Karakhan signed the above-mentioned agreement with the Chinese government on May 31, 1924, which envisaged establishment of normal diplomatic and consular relations between the two states. On January 20, 1925, after talks with the Japanese representative, Lev Karakhan and the Japanese envoy Yoshizawa signed the convention on the basic principles of mutual relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan (p. 130).

The conclusion of the agreement and the signing of the convention marked an important achievement of the young Soviet diplomacy in the Far East. That was the completion of the long and complicated stage of struggle waged by the Soviet Union for normal relations with its Far Eastern neighbours.

The author describes the internationalist assistance given by the Soviet Union to China already at the time when the USSR was just beginning to overcome the devastation caused by the Civil War. Even under most complicated political and economic conditions, Soviet Russia found it possible

to give significant aid to the patriotic forces of China.

Much attention is given to the correspondence between Lev Karakhan and Sun Yatsen, their meetings in Peking, and their friendly relations. As is known, Sun Yatsen, the great patriot of his country, could not imagine the successful allround development of China without Soviet Russia. He deeply believed in friendship between China and the Soviet Union. He believed, as he wrote in his last message to the members of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, that "in the great battle for freedom of the oppressed nations the two countries will march shoulder to shoulder towards victory" (p. 133).

Lev Karakhan was working to bring an end to the diplomatic isolation of the USSR in the Far East, for security in that region and against the aggressive policy pursued by Japanese militarism, for giving fraternal assistance to the Chinese and Mongolian peoples in their struggle for national integrity and statehood. In the Far East Soviet diplomacy faced a most diverse challenge. It had to prevent the setting up of an alliance of imperialist states on an anti-Soviet basis in the Far East.

It should be pointed out in conclusion that while analysing different aspects of Lev Karakhan's activities in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the author, on the basis of a wealth of historical and archive materials, showed the extremely complex nature of the diplomatic struggle waged by the Soviet Union during that period.

The foreign policy measures and diplomatic acts by the USSR, in particular in the Far East, make it possible to get a better understanding of the intricate processes of that time, and realise the far-sightedness of the current policy pursued by the CPSU and the Soviet government to oppose the schemes of the militaristic and revanchist quarters in Japan and other imperialist powers.

The book by V. Sokolov will be of use to those who are keen on the history of diplomacy and international relations of the Soviet Union in Asia and in the Far East.

BOOK ON MONGOLIAN CULTURAL HISTORY 1921-1940 REVIEWED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 84 pp 140-142

[Review by S. B. Chimitdorzhiev, doctor of historical sciences, and G. N. Zayatuyev (Ulan-Ude) of book "The History of Culture in the MPR, 1921-1940" (in Mongolian), vol I, Ulaanbaatar, 1981, 306 pages: "Cultural Construction in the MPR"]

This is a new book acquainting the reader with the history of culture of the Mongolian People's Republic and the impressive achievements scored by the Mongolian cattle breeders at the democratic stage of the people's revolution, in 1921-1940.

The monograph is a collective work by researchers of the Institute of History, Mongolian Academy of Sciences, with the participation of cultural workers of socialist Mongolia. The authors used original sources and numerous writings published in Mongolia, the USSR and other countries.

Specialists, in particular Soviet scholars, have an incessant interest in the history of culture and cultural development in the Mongolian People's Republic. As early as the 1930s, the *Modern Mongolia* journal carried articles on that problem. A number of serious works on separate problems of the cultural revolution and cultural development of the MPR came off the press in the 1940s-1970s, among them such fundamental works as *The Great October Socialist Revolution and Mongolia* (Ulan Bator, 1969).

Essays on the History of Culture of the MPR dealing with the problems of its culture, were published in Ulan Ude in 1971. The book covers the period from 1921, i. e., since the triumph of the people's revolution in Mongolia to 1967, and reveals different aspects of cultural development in the MPR. An interesting monograph is L. Gataullina's *The Development of Socialist Culture in the Mongolian People's Republic* (Moscow, Nauka Publishers, 1981).¹

History of Culture of the MPR written by a team of Mongolian scholars, makes a tangible contribution to the study of a major section of the modern Mongolian

¹ See *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1983, No. 1, pp. 190-191.

history, that of creating and developing new culture and cultural construction in the MPR. The authors give the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the history of the cultural revolution in Mongolia, and show that it radically changed the spiritual image of the Mongolian people.

Of great scientific, theoretical, and political significance is the study of the experience of cultural construction accumulated during the years of the people's revolution in Mongolia which, under complicated conditions, accomplished the transition from feudal backwardness towards socialism, bypassing the capitalist stage of development.

Volume One of the *History of Culture of the MPR* consisting of six chapters, an introduction and conclusion, sums up a wealth of facts embracing the period from the victory of the people's revolution up to 1940, and reveals the essence of the cultural revolution and different aspects of cultural construction in the Mongolian People's Republic at the democratic stage of the revolution. The book provides a profound analysis of the problems of creating a new culture in close connection with the political and economic tasks of the initial stage of the revolution. The authors fully and convincingly revealed the specific historical conditions of Mongolia in the 1920s-1940s, as well as the distinctive features of the cultural revolution and cultural construction.

Chapter One, "The Basic Content of the Initial Stage of the Cultural Revolution in Mongolia", is preceded by a theoretical substantiation of the historical prospect for conducting the cultural revolution in that country. The authors justly note that this prospect evolved as a result of the fraternal revolutionary alliance between people's Mongolia and the first country of the dictatorship of the proletariat—the Soviet Union, the large-scale use of the latter's experience in cultural construction and direct and selfless assistance from the USSR; as a result of the fruitful application by the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in the revolutionary construction of theoretical legacy of Marx, Engels and Lenin given the specific conditions of Mongolia, in particular of Lenin's theoretical provisions on the cultural revolution at the general democratic stage of the Mongolian revolution and also personal advice given by Lenin to Mongolian revolutionaries (p. 41).

Subsequent chapters deal at length with

the elimination of illiteracy among adults, organisation of elementary, secondary and specialised secondary schools, the creation and growth of a new, people's intelligentsia, the establishment of a network of cultural and enlightenment centres, the starting up of publishing activity and national periodicals, the development of science, revolutionary literature and new arts, organisation of public health protection, development of physical culture and sports, improvement of living conditions and well-being of the working masses.

Drawing on numerous facts, the book reveals the difficulties in the development of a new culture of Mongols, and large-scale transformations in the cultural life of society. The years 1921-1924 saw the preparations for and creation of socio-political conditions for democratic changes in the sphere of culture. Of great importance were the separation of the church from the state, the exclusion of religion from school curricula, and other measures.

Having substantiated at its 3rd Congress (August 1924) the historical need for a non-capitalist way of development, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party determined the basic directions of cultural construction.

A most acute struggle was underway for revolutionary democratic development of culture in 1925-1931. In those years the right-wing and the "left"-wing deviations in the party were condemned, the building of schools and cultural establishments was gaining momentum, the press and the book publishing were developing, and ground-level creative organisations and theatres were set up. Socio-economic measures were carried out which eliminated special rights and privileges of lamas and played an important role in the struggle for a new culture.

The authors tell of the truly gigantic work accomplished by the MPRP and the people's government in the building of a new life. The main problem was that the people's republic inherited from the past a backward economy, poorly developed cattle-breeding, awful poverty among the cattle breeders and almost one-hundred per cent illiteracy.

The book cites impressive facts pertaining to the great successes in cultural construction during the democratic stage of the people's revolution in Mongolia. The first stage of the revolution—anti-imperial-

ist, anti-feudal, general democratic—was completed in the MPR by 1940, providing economic, political and social basis for the building of socialism. The achievements in cultural construction were also significant for Mongolia's transition to a new stage of historical development.

The monograph makes the conclusion that the cultural revolution in Mongolia delivered the working masses from spiritual slavery, darkness and ignorance, and opened for them the way towards knowledge and the wealth of national and world culture. The new culture absorbed all the best of the culture of old, creatively assimilated it and developed further on the basis of the revolutionary world outlook.

Though the book is of great interest in general, it has some shortcomings. In our opinion, the authors should have noted the great cultural role played by the People's Revolutionary Army in Mongolian society of the 1920s and the 1930s. Volume One of the *History of Culture of the MPR* devotes just two or three passages to this aspect (pp. 74, 105-106), while the PRA has always been one of the most powerful and efficient revolutionary institutions in which generations of Mongolian cattle breeders successfully underwent military, political, educational and cultural training.

This tradition of giving an allround education to servicemen was laid down by the leader of the Mongolian revolution Sukhe Bator. During the subsequent years of the general democratic stage of the revolution, the MPRP CC and the people's government constantly improved and developed in every way the educational and enlightenment work within the army.

Mongolian servicemen returned from the army being able to read and write, politically mature and active builders of a new life on their ancient soil. They replenished the ranks of the participants in the anti-illiteracy drive, of public club and library workers, state employees and cooperators. They continued studying in elementary, secondary and specialised schools which opened in the country at that time, making the new, people's intelligentsia.

In such a fundamental work the authors should have described in greater detail the socio-cultural policy of the MPRP, the people's government and the activities of the entire cultural and educational system of the country with regard to the part of Mongolia's population, which, due to the

conditions of life, prevailing in pre-revolutionary Mongolian society, was turned into lamas. On the eve of the revolution, the total number of lamas amounted to 100,000, i. e., they accounted for one-sixth of the population. Due to a resolute and uncompromising class struggle against the church feudals and the reactionary upper crust of the lamas, and the tactful and purposeful work aimed at bringing lower and medium strata of lamas to a new life, the majority of lamas began taking part in the production labour. That was a great victory for the MPRP, the people's government and the entire Mongolian people. That was a peculiar feature of the cultural revolution in Mongolia.

The monograph failed to tell about the development in the MPR of radio broadcasting, a new and powerful means of spreading urgent information, conducting mass propaganda, and the enlightenment of the population. Lenin called it "a newspaper without paper and distance". The radio system began to be introduced in Mongolia in the 1930s. On September 1, 1934, the radio centre in Ulan Bator started regular broadcasting for the entire country. From the mid-1930s, radio, an important factor and means of culture and communication in the MPR with its vast territory, became part and parcel of the every-day life of the Mongolian people.

The shortcomings we have mentioned are apparently inevitable in writing the first monograph on the history of culture of the MPR. They can be easily eliminated in the next edition of this valuable and highly interesting study conducted by Mongolian historians.

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TIKHVINSKIY REVIEWS RUSSIAN EDITION OF MEDIEVAL CHINESE FANTASY NOVEL

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 84 pp 142-143

[Review by Academician S. L. Tikhvinskiy of book "Sun' Ukun---tsar' obez'yan" [Sun Wukong--The King of Apes] by Wu Chenyan, translated by A. Rogacheva, poems translated by I. Smirnov and Ark. Shteynberg, Moscow, Khudozhestvennaya literatura, 1982, 751 pages: "Chinese Fantasy Novel"]

The full text of the well-known Chinese medieval novel *Journey to the West* in four volumes by Wu Chenyan was put out as early as 1959 by the Khudozhestvennaya Literatura Publishers. The translator was the prominent Soviet Sinologist and specialist in philology Professor A. Rogachev who acquired renown by his translations of a number of Chinese classical literary works, including *Water Margin*, a medieval novel by Shi Nai'an. The latter novel was overloaded with historical, ethnographic, religious, and philosophical details, numerous repetitions, and poetical inserts. Therefore the narration proved too difficult for the readers who happened to see a Chinese medieval novel for the first time. Taking this into account, A. Rogachev made an abridged version of the novel and named

it *Sun Wukong, The King of Apes*, after the principal character of the book.

Wu Chenyan (1500-1582) was born into a family of a clerk. He was a gifted and well-educated person of his time. Since childhood he was keen on folklore and legends. He based his novel on a Chinese folk legend about a trip of Xuan Zang, a Buddhist monk (596-664) to India. During the nine centuries that had passed the story of his wanderings took on various fantastic details.

Among the characters of the novel are fantastic creatures resembling human beings, such as ape Sun Wukong, the wild boar Zhu Bajie, and Shaseng, the monk's groom, driven from the heaven for an offence. All of them are companions of the pious, but absolutely impractical, monk. They accomplish various unbelievable feats, thereby ensuring the success of Xuan Zang's pilgrimage, his aim being to bring holy books from India to China.

The magic ape is endowed with outstanding merits, as is the entire ape people of whom Sun Wukong became the King. The latter is a rebel unwilling to follow the generally accepted laws established for ordinary mortals. At the same time he is

seeking the meaning of life. Like the heroes of European medieval novels, Sun Wukong should redeem his sins by performing feats. The author endowed him with courage, gumption, wisdom and generosity. He is always ready to fight against injustice. In his introduction to the novel, A. Rogachev points out that this was a "knight without fear or blame", a mischievous, wild and restless "chevalier".

The novel about the travel of the monk and his companions is an epic consisting of one hundred chapters in which folklore themes, geographical descriptions and realistic sketches of contemporary life in China alternate with fairy tales, descriptions of innumerable Buddhist and Tao gods, ghosts, inhabitants of the underground kingdom, the heaven and the underwater kingdom, werevolves, magicians, as well as with stories about various miracles and fantastic events. The novel contains vividly drawn pictures of everyday life of ordinary people—peasants, artisans, fishermen, hunters, and lumberjacks. The author levels scathing satire at courtiers, officials, merchants and monks, providing a wide portrayal of medieval China's social and cultural life.

Wu Chenyan showed in allegorical form many unattractive features of his epoch, the hypocrisy and servility of the powers that be, moral depravity and mercantile ways, the sway of eunuchs at the imperial court, and the decline of public morality. For example, the following excerpts were undoubtedly regarded by the readers of those days as a truthful description of the Chinese reality: "There has been a drought for several years running. The soil has grown infertile, the rivers are running shallow, and there is no water in irrigation canals. Wells and springs have dried. But the rich take care only of their property. The price of one *dow* of grain has gone up to one hundred silver *lyans*, while a bunch of brushwood costs five *lyans*. Girls are bar-

tered for three *shens* of groats and boys are given away for nothing. In towns people pawn their belongings, whereas in villages they rob treasure houses or devour each other—just to survive" (p. 613). "Officials are promised a promotion of three grades for catching a monk. Ordinary citizens are granted a reward of fifty *lyans*, not only monks but also anyone who has his hair cut or has a bald patch has no chance to flee. The country swarms with spies" (p. 284).

The novel has been popular in China for more than four centuries; many episodes from it were staged. Excerpts from the novel were invariably part of the repertoire of folk-tale narrators who acquainted the people of China (the overwhelming majority of them could neither read nor write), with the fascinating adventures of Sun Wukong, the King of Apes, a most popular personage among the people.

A. Rogachev has done an immense amount of work in translating the text written more than 400 years ago in literary Chinese, which was a far cry from the spoken speech of that remote period. The book is easy reading, despite a great number of characters. A. Rogachev has succeeded in conveying the original flavour of medieval China, without tiring the reader with repetitions and digressions which the original abounds in, and the verses skillfully translated by I. Smirnov and A. Steinberg are a valuable contribution to the text. The commentary by D. Voznesensky brings out a number of notions which were not explained in the text, thereby helping the reader to make out the subject-matter of the book and the complicated Buddhist, Tao and Confucian terminology used by Wu Chenyan.

Acquainting the Soviet readers with this outstanding work of Chinese literature is a contribution to friendship and cultural ties between the two neighbouring peoples.

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BOOK ON HISTORY OF MONGOLIAN WORKING CLASS REVIEWED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 84 pp 144-146

[Review by A. V. Pantsov of book "The Non-Capitalist Way of Development in Mongolia and the Working Class" (in Mongolian), Collected Articles, Ulaanbaatar, 1981, 148 pages: "A Study of the Formation and Development of the MPR Working Class"]

Social, ideological and political problems of the non-capitalist way of development of the Mongolian People's Republic, primarily the role and place in social life of the young working class as the leading force in the building of socialism, comprise a most important trend in the research of the contemporary social sciences in Mongolia. This is only natural, because it was the people of Mongolia who was the first in the history of mankind to realise, within a framework of a sovereign state, the brilliant forecast of the classics of Marxism-Leninism that "with the aid of the proletariat of the advanced countries, backward countries can go over to the Soviet system and, through certain stages of development, to communism, without having to pass through the capitalist stage."¹

The bulk of empirical material accumulated in this sphere during recent decades served as the basis for the first generalising collection of its kind by a group of Mongolian scholars, mainly researchers from the Institute of History, the Mongolian Academy of Sciences, in which a fruitful attempt has been made, at a high level, to show in an integral and systematic form the major specifics inherent in the formation of the working class and its social role in the Mongolian People's Republic. The book under review is a collection of articles dealing with most urgent and topical problems relating to the development of the Mongolian working class. The book

examines the process of assumption by the Mongolian working class of the leading role in society, and also the significance of the policy pursued by the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) in transforming the social structure of the country, changing its social composition, enhancing the cultural, professional and technical level of Mongolian workers, and in moulding the scientific world outlook of the working class and its patriotic and internationalist awareness. In this work an important place is given to an analysis of the socio-economic aspects of the union between the working class and the cooperated cattle breeders. Much attention is also devoted to a study of the international ties of Mongolian workers.

The collection opens with an article of Ts. Balkhazhav, Chief of a Department of the CC MPRP, which contains a general review of the formation of the Mongolian working class, beginning with the 1930s, when radical democratic reforms aimed at eliminating patriarchal relations were under way. "Already at that time," the author stresses, "one could discern the social and political conditions which predetermined basic peculiarities of the formation of the Mongolian working class and its qualitative difference from the working class in capitalist countries" (pp. 5, 6). The author concentrates on the most important features, namely on political, economic and social aspects inherent in the process of shaping the Mongolian working class, which ensured its acting since its conception as a class-carrier of socialist relations of production. Through this prism the article examines all questions pertaining to the problem of the development of the working class: major sources of the formation of the new social category, purposeful nature of the policy pursued by the MPRP, the internationalist support given by the Soviet

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol 31, p. 244.

Union, and the internally predetermined nature of quantitative and qualitative changes. The article shows that at the general democratic stage of revolutionary development, the leading role of the Mongolian working class manifested itself mainly in that it formed within the framework of the internationalist alliance between the working class of socialist countries and the cattle breeders of Mongolia. The author points out that this form "was a principal precondition and source of the struggle for creating the national working class and its reaching an ideological and political level that would enable it to begin discharging its historic mission as the leader of all working people in the struggle for socialism" (p. 20).

Ts. Balkhazhav, also examines in general form other questions, including the socio-economic condition of the Mongolian proletariat, its place in the sphere of material production, and regularities governing the formation of communist consciousness. The problems outlined in this article are further developed in the subsequent articles of the collection.

For example, in his article Ts. Namsrai shows the multifaceted role of the MPRP in the formation and the development of the working class from the mid-1920s to the present. The author notes that the foundation of this policy, its direction and character were determined by Lenin who, during his conversation with a delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic in November 1921, stressed that the main condition ensuring a transition onto the road of non-capitalist development was "hard work on the part of the People's Revolutionary Party and the Government".² Creatively developing Lenin's ideas, the Mongolian revolutionaries elaborated a scientifically substantiated programme for the transformation of social relations in the country, and industrial proletariat began to emerge in the course of its implementation. Thus, the emergence of industrial proletariat occurred owing to the purposeful class policy pursued by the state led by the MPRP, rather than as a result of a spontaneous differentiation of petty peasant owners which is always accompanied by mass pauperisation of the population. Mongolian workers, employed only at state-owned and cooperative enterprises of socialist type, never experienced capitalist exploitation, nor did they know the hardships of economic crises and unemployment. From the very outset the influx of workers to factories and enterprises was regulated by the state.

On the strength of broad statistics and documents, Ts. Namsrai shows the deep and benign influence of the policy pursued by the MPRP on social, political and spiritual image of the working class. The party has always devoted and continues to devote special attention not only to the growth of

the number of workers but also to the upsurge of their educational, vocational, and ideological level. It has also invariably expressed concern about the raising of living standards of industrial workers.

The party believes that the enlistment of the best workers to its ranks is an important condition for intensifying political and labour activities and the class consciousness of workers. In 1943 workers accounted for 3.8 per cent of the MPRP members, in 1947—4.7 per cent, in 1961—26.2 per cent, in 1966—29.6 per cent and in 1976—31.3 per cent (p. 28). While forming the working class, the MPRP was strengthening its own proletarian basis, increasingly turning, as Lenin foresaw, from a people's revolutionary party into a communist party. This is a manifestation of the natural interaction of the process of development of the MPRP and the development of the working class.

An important place in the collection is taken by the two articles by B. Tudev, a prominent specialist in the problems of the working class of Mongolia,³ i. e., "Changes in the Social Composition of the Mongolian Working Class" and "Problems of Growth of the Vocational Level of the Working Class". Of great importance is the broad use by the author of a wealth of statistical material, sometimes very rare, taken from different archives of Mongolia—from archives of ministries and departments to local current archives of industrial enterprises.

In the first of the above-mentioned articles, B. Tudev traces the stages of social formation of the working class, closely linking them with the historical periods in the development of the Mongolian People's Republic. He explains the radical qualitative changes in the working class itself and in the sources of its formation, that occurred during the people's power, with the far-reaching socio-economic transformation in the country, primarily with industrialisation, socialist reforms in agriculture, and the victory of the cultural revolution (p. 51). During the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal

³ B. Tudev's works have been more than once published in the USSR. See, for example, B. Tudev, *Formation and Development of the Working Class of the Mongolian People's Republic. Historical Essay*, Moscow, 1968; B. Tudev, *The Formation of the Working Class of the MPR*. In the book *Mongolian Collection*, Moscow, 1969.

revolutionary-democratic transformations (1921—1940) mainly the poorest peasants and also the low lamas were the main source for the formation of the working class, whereas now the contingents of the workers are replenished primarily with graduates of secondary, vocational and technical schools and also with members of major socialist agricultural associations (pp. 38-39, 41).

"The building of socialism and socialist industrialisation," B. Tudev writes, "have brought to light such channels and forms of reproduction and increase of the size of the labour force as broad involvement of women in production, the formation of a category, though still young, of hereditary workers, such methods of replenishing the working class ranks as appeals by the Party and public organisations to the working people, and so on" (p. 51). A close internationalist alliance with the working class of socialist countries largely made it possible to improve as well the qualitative indices of the structure of the Mongolian working class, with the contingent of workers in heavy industry growing considerably.

In his second article, B. Tudev contends that by 1980 the professional and technical level of Mongolian workers changed considerably. During the years of the 5th and 6th five-year periods (1971-1980) alone, higher, secondary special educational institutions and vocational schools trained for the national economy over 126,000 specialists and skilled workers (p. 73). Great

assistance in training highly educated personnel has been rendered by the Soviet Union. The upgrading of the professional level of Mongolia's working class is an important factor providing for the accomplishment of the building of socialist society.

Other articles in the collection are also of great interest, especially that by A. Zheleznyakov. Proceeding from the results of the studies from the previous articles of the collection, A. Zheleznyakov examines the development of the Mongolian working class in close connection with the historic changes in the contemporary epoch—that of the transition from capitalism to socialism,—as an organic and dynamic part of the world communist movement. The author brings to light the dialectical interaction of the national and international in the development of the guiding role played by workers in Mongolian society.

It should be stressed in conclusion that the problems in the collection under review are not only of scientific interest, but also of immense political topicality. The experience of non-capitalist development of the Mongolian People's Republic, in particular, the experience of purposeful formation of the working class in a backward society carrying out a historic transition from feudalism to socialism is valuable to all developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

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U.S. BOOK ON ASIAN POLICY CRITICIZED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 84 pp 146-151

[Review by Yu. M. Ryakin of book "Asia and U.S. Foreign Policy," edited by J. C. Hsiung and W. Chai, New York, 1981, 263 pages: "Asia in Washington's Strategy"]

At the junction of the 1970s and 1980s Western political scientists, especially American, have produced a number of works devoted to the current problems of Asia and US policy in this part of the world over the last decade.¹ The appearance of these

works was prompted by a number of factors. The first is the steadily expanding role the Asian countries, which possess vast natural resources and an inexhaustible supply of manpower, today play in international relations. Second is the significant shifts in the alignment of forces in Asia and the

¹ See, for example, R. H. Solomon (ed.), *Asian Security in the 1980s. Politics and Problems for a Time of Transition*, Cam-

bridge, Mass., 1980; R. Sutter, *China-US—Soviet Relations*, Washington Congressional Research Service, 1980; *The United States and People's Republic of China. Issues for 1980s*, Washington, 1980; D. Shanon, *The Soviet Triangle. Russia's Relations with China and the West in the 1980s*, New York, 1980; R. Solomon (ed.), *The China Factor. Sino-American Relations and the Global Scene*, New Jersey, 1981; W. Watts, *The United States and Asia. Changing Attitudes and Politics*, Lexington, 1982.

painful defeats the American imperialists suffered in some Asian regions in the last few years. Deserving mention in this connection is, among other things, the further consolidation of socialist countries in Indochina, the April Revolution in Afghanistan, and the Islamic revolution that overthrew the Shah in Iran. Finally, American political scientists were faced with the challenge of formulating the principles of a US policy in Asia for the Reagan administration upon its coming into power.

The coming to power of the Reagan administration with its cult of force for settling international affairs, its unrestrained ideological and political expansion and aggressiveness and rabid anti-Sovietism left a visible imprint on the writings of American political scientists. The Reagan course directed at increasing international tension and spurring on the arms race, the White House's penchant for passing the buck, namely, for blaming the Soviet Union for the growth of unemployment in the West and for the sufferings of the people fighting for their freedom and those repressed by the imperialists, in a word, to accuse the Soviet Union of being the "focus of evil" are all dealt with in works by American political scientists. No exception in this respect is the collection of articles, *Asia and US Foreign Policy*.*

The collection brings together works of an imposing roster of authors, all of whom are experts on Asian affairs or specialists on US policy in Asia. In their articles the authors examine a vast range of issues of a military, political, and economic nature. In the introduction to the collection we are informed that "this is probably the first such systematic attempt" to investigate so profoundly US policy towards Asia (p. 3).

The book provides us with the pivotal thought that "Asia, in the 1980s, will have a strategic importance for the United States..." (p. 1). The authors symptomatically see Asia's steadily growing significance in US foreign policy in the fact that Asia will be to an "increasing extent" the arena of the Soviet-American rivalry, which arises mainly from the supposed mounting "Soviet threat" and the necessity for America to counter it. *Asia and US Foreign Policy* bases itself on the stale notion about a growing "Soviet threat", on the fantasy

about the USSR's "expansionism" in several Asian regions and on the orchestrated notion that Washington, its current and potential allies in Asia must "counter" these tendencies.

To get an idea of the position of the authors of *Asia and US Foreign Policy*, we will focus on the views of Glen Camp, a so-called "specialist" on Soviet foreign policy whose views reflect those of the authors of the book. In essence, he bases all of his conclusions on the contention that the Soviet Union poses a mounting threat to countries in the Asian and Pacific Ocean region, that the Soviet Union is carrying out "expansionism" in this zone which has allegedly picked up speed beginning in the late 1970s. And Washington, argues Camp, must counter these inroads mainly by fashioning in Asia diverse anti-Soviet alliances (without a doubt, under its aegis). In so doing, Camp firms, the Soviet Union's international positions will weaken, forcing it to be more "compliant" and "restrained". In such a way, Camp covers up Washington's course towards destabilising Asia in the interests of American monopolies.

The United States counts on Japan for carrying out its plans in regional (Asian) and global policy. In the book former American diplomat John K. Emmerson, now a fellow at the Hoover Institute of Stanford University, examines Washington's policy towards Japan. Not disclosing anything new, Emmerson states that "for the United States, Japan was always the anchor, the linchpin, the essential element in our security policy for East Asia" (p. 26). However, it is not without interest that his view on the direction in which American-Japanese relations are developing can be on the whole summed up by a similar (even in terms of wording) statement made by Zbigniew Brzezinski: that the American-Japanese "security treaty" "serves as the anchor for American positions in East Asia".² Calling America's current relations with Japan an alliance, Emmerson states plainly that "(it) will continue to be the foundation of Japan's international relations" (p. 35).

What kind of future does Emmerson see for Japan's domestic and foreign policy for the 1980s? He believes basically that in the 1980s "Japan will be able to build a credible air defence and to protect its shipping

* J. C. Hsiung, W. Chai (eds.), *Asia and US Foreign Policy*, New York, 1981, 263 pp.

² *Department of State Bulletin*, June, 1978, p. 3.

in adjacent waters, perhaps even within a perimeter as far as a thousand miles beyond its frontiers. It is quite likely that Japanese defence budgets will be increasing gradually but substantially during the 1980s, regardless of what percentages of GNP they may attain" (p. 38). On the whole, Emmerson predicts, Japan's foreign policy activity will increase and its foreign policy will be "internationalised". What he means by this is that Japan's relations with the US are developing on the basis of an alliance and that its military preparations are being conducted in violation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.

Japan's militarisation of its foreign and domestic policies is viewed with alarm by neighbouring countries, in particular those in Southeast Asia. As if making amends for these sentiments, Emmerson edifies: "From the US point of view, the trends of Japan in 1980 towards internationalisation and the adoption of a concept of comprehensive national security should be welcomed" (p. 39). In this regard he notes with satisfaction the growing military and strategic cooperation of the US and Japan, and the improvement in the "quality" of Japan's "military mechanism". For the sake of preserving the alliance, Emmerson deems it necessary for both sides to at all times display "goodwill" and rid their mutual ties of any friction or rough spots (he gives as an example Japan's flooding the US with automobiles).

Like Camp, Emmerson sanctions Washington's aggressive activity in the Far East, the growing military and strategic cooperation between the US and Japan, and the evolving of militaristic tendencies in Japanese policy because of the very same invented "Soviet threat".

The current situation in Asia obliges us to admit with great anxiety that as a result of the "efforts" of the Reagan administration and the Suzuki and Nakasone governments, the American scholar's predictions are coming true, and even sooner than he had imagined. The cooperation in the military sphere between the US and Japan is posing an ever greater, dangerous threat to peace. In the spring of 1981 Japanese-American relations were elevated to the level of an "alliance". What's more, the operational zone of Japan's "self-defence forces" has been extended far beyond the boundaries of the Japanese Islands, and Japan's expenditures for military purposes

are steadily mounting. Finally, the United States and Japan are actively building a vast structure of military and political cooperation, including the transferral to Japan of a part of the US military functions in East Asia and in the western part of the Pacific Ocean.

The authors of *Asia and US Foreign Policy* also touch on the Korean question. Through the fault of American imperialism, the situation on the Korean peninsula has remained unsettled for more than three decades and this region has become an area of permanent tension in the Far East. The source of this tension is the continued presence of American troops in South Korea and the aggressive position of the US military and political allies, particularly South Korea.

It is noteworthy that S. Kim, a specialist on East Asian affairs who wrote the chapter on Korea, concedes that "the presence of US troops in Korea may still serve some US geopolitical interests in the short run, but it does not serve global human values". Nor, according to Kim, does the American military presence "serve specifically the deep national aspirations and needs of the Korean people" (p. 68). The author is even in favour of altering the US policy towards Korea. "Since the original division of Korea was an American idea, the United States has a special moral responsibility to change its Korean policy to help, not hinder, the reunification process" (p. 68).

Yet it would be naive to expect Washington to structure its foreign policy with account taken for "human values" or the "aspirations and needs" of the Korean people. But in spite of the fact that this approach is amorphous politically, his position seems attractive, especially against the background of Washington's practical activities.

As is known, the suggestion that American troops be withdrawn from Korea is viewed in Washington as "contradictory to US national interests". Washington, despite protests by North Korea, a resolution of the 30th Session of the UN General Assembly, and world public opinion, continues to pursue a course towards perpetuation of its occupation of South Korea and the continued artificial division of the country.

It goes without saying that American political scientists are unable to steer clear of US relations with China. And, natural-

ly, *Asia and US Foreign Policy* gives them their deserved attention.

The current US official policy is targeted for expanding and deepening the US strategic partnership with China. As a result, Western political scientists are faced with a number of auxiliary tasks, one of which is to "explain" to the reader the reasons for Washington's recent unfriendly policy towards China. Attempting to answer this question and others is American Sinologist P. Chan, the author of the chapter "China; Part I: The Tortuous Path to Normalisation".

The following statement sums up his position: "Historically, the United States has always pursued a friendly, even paternalistic policy towards the Chinese people and their government" (p. 103). This view is widespread among bourgeois, especially American, Sinology. Its adherents, for reasons ensuing from the practical tasks of the current US foreign policy line, attempt to create the impression that in the past the United States never carried out imperialist diktat in China, never took part in the colonial exploitation of the Chinese people, etc., that relations between the two countries have always been "friendly". Such an interpretation of American-Chinese relations before 1949 by American Sinologists has already been given well-grounded criticism by Soviet Sinologists.³

Chan contends that "every US president from Truman to Carter has attempted in his own way to resolve the complex and difficult issue of China, but despite their divergent approaches from conciliation to confrontation, their efforts have either failed or met with only limited success, for the issue remains unsettled" (p. 113).

In regard to this statement we would like to remind the reader in short how Washington has resolved the "China issue". US policy towards China assumed an unconcealed hostile character beginning approximately in the mid-1950s when China concluded a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union. Washington followed this course until the end of the 1960s, when it was decided to use normalisation of relations with China for anti-Soviet purposes. Yet what Chan calls Washington's "conciliatory" policy do-

es not mean that the US took into account Chinese national interests, since this policy is mainly aimed at using China as a junior partner in its foreign policy combinations in international politics.

The author of the second chapter on China, J. Syun, maintains that the shift in the US policy vis-à-vis China was spawned by Washington's desire to play the notorious "China card" [in the struggle between socialism and capitalism.—Y.R.]. Syun points out that both Presidents Nixon and Carter entertained the idea of playing the "China card", although its most outspoken proponent was Zbigniew Brezinski, under whom this strategy was put into effect (p. 119).

At present the US policy towards China is marked by a certain degree of duplicity. On the one hand, Washington repeatedly points out the "strategic benefits" of normalising Sino-American relations, especially for countering the Soviet Union; on the other, the US continues to hold an anti-China position on the Taiwan issue.

To a certain degree the point of view of John Gregor and M. S. Chan, the authors of the chapter on Taiwan, reflects the duplicity of the official US position. Both of these authors are adamantly for the continuation of US military and political cooperation with Taiwan, in particular, for the continuation of the policy of arming Taipei. They urge leaders in Washington to leave unaltered the US relationship to Taiwan as an important link in its military and political strategy in East Asia, since any change in the relationship "would violate the express interests of the United States, impair its international credibility, and undermine its strategic interests in the Far East" (p. 144).

The point of view of Gregor and Chan on the Taiwan issue reflects the widely-held conviction among American business and political leaders that the White House should continue to bring pressure to bear on China and continue to interfere in China's internal affairs. Needless to say that such a policy fails to take into account the real interests of the Chinese people.

To this it should be added that Washington, in drafting its China policy, takes advantage of China's acute interest in expanding American-Chinese relations. American officials are therefore confident that Peking will hardly dare oppose the United States on the "Taiwan issue" and will remain conciliatory. Previous experience suggests that Washington continues to pursue

³ See, for example, L. A. Bergany, *The Beginning of Colonial Expansion in China and Modern American Historiography*, Moscow, 1972.

a course of "strategic interaction" with the PRC.

G. Boyd, the author of the chapter on Indochina, repeats the stereotyped charges that the Soviet Union and Vietnam reportedly pursue a policy of "aggression" and "expansion" and pose a "threat" to the Southeast Asia region. For keeping the Soviet Union and Vietnam "in check", he proposes various combinations of outside forces, at the same time cautioning that too much zeal in knocking together various types of anti-Vietnamese alliances might push Vietnam "closer" to the Soviet Union (pp. 169-170). Needless to say, all of Boyd's arguments are built upon a false assumption that is unable to stand up to criticism, namely, that the Soviet Union and Vietnam pursue an aggressive policy. As for Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation, it is built upon a principled foundation, and its durability, which has withstood the test of time, is totally independent of the jockeying of outside forces.

The chapter on US policy in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region was written by William Andersen, an employee of the US State Department. All Andersen's arguments as regards the worn-out charge of the "Soviet threat" are constructed in the spirit of imperial logic typical of Washington and the extreme right-wingers. According to this logic, various regions of the world (in this case South and Southeast Asia) are labeled spheres of "US vital interests"; and any action the Soviet Union may take to defend its interests and rights is branded expansionism.

Deserving particular attention is the way in which the American scholar construes Indian foreign policy, especially in light of developments in Afghanistan. Andersen, although forced to admit the existence of cleavages in the US and Indian stand on the Afghan question, nevertheless tries to prove that there is a certain similarity or even identity in the two countries' position, manifesting itself in the alleged "condemnation" of Soviet actions not only by the United States but as well by India. However, the world community is well familiar with India's much-pondered and realistic approach to the Afghan question, which has nothing in common with the US position. What's more, India rightly regards the militaristic intrigues of Pakistan and its American sponsors that have been ventured under the cover of Afghan events as a threat to its

own security. India is pursuing a policy aimed at supporting peace and friendly relations with its neighbours, and despite assertions by Andersen has not expressed the desire to be included in the campaign against the Soviet Union or Afghanistan.

W. Andersen's assessment of the situation in the Indian Ocean basin smacks of rabid anti-Sovietism. Prototypical of Andersen's position is the assertion that "Soviet expansionism in the Indian Ocean region has forced the United States to adopt a version of the containment policy of the 1950s and 1960s, with the difference that the Soviet Union is now far more militarily powerful and has more overseas forces and allies at its disposal" (p. 203). We might note that Andersen has it completely backwards. It is the United States that is building up its forces in the Indian Ocean region, bringing there more troops and taking possession of new bases. Attesting to Washington's intention to bolster its aggressiveness in the region is the creation of a centralised command centre (CENTCOM), whose area of operation encompasses virtually the entire Indian Ocean region.

In distinction from the Soviet Union, the United States responded negatively to a proposal put forth by the states in the region to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. The US is doing all it can to sabotage a proposal made by these states to convene an international conference to initiate a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, and it has unilaterally broken off talks with the Soviet Union on the situation in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, Washington has rejected outright Soviet initiatives to ease tensions in the Persian Gulf region and in the Indian Ocean region as a whole.

The aggressive policy of the US in South and Southwest Asia is encountering resistance not only on the part of the Soviet Union. It is also denounced by young sovereign states in the region, by nonaligned states. For example, the US expansionist policy was rebuked at the Delhi Conference of Non-Aligned States.

On the whole it can be said that the contributors to *Asia and US Foreign Policy*, following the official policy of Washington, occupy a tough anti-Soviet position on a majority of the issues concerning US policy towards Asia. Furthermore, they are apologists for the increasing aggressiveness in the foreign policy course of the US and its Asian allies. Using the alleged "Soviet thre-

at" as a smokescreen, they treat as negative all positive changes in Asia.

As for the Soviet policy towards Asia, it has as its goal the maintenance of peace and stability on the continent. The 26th Congress of the CPSU advanced a number of highly-publicised constructive proposals aimed at easing the tension on the continent. The Soviet Union's new major peace initiative was reflected in the answers given by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Yuri Andropov in a

Pravda interview.⁴ Yuri Andropov unveiled a number of measures aimed at radically reducing tension not only in Europe, but also in Asia.

The policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries serves as the sole reasonable alternative to the designs of imperialists in Asia, which run counter to the interests of the Asian peoples.

⁴ See *Pravda*, Aug. 27, 1983.

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OBITUARY OF SPECIALIST ON PRC FOREIGN POLICY, OVERSEAS CHINESE KOTOVA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, Oct-Dec 83 (signed to press 1 Dec 83) p 175

[Text] Tat'yana Mikhaylovna Kotova, senior researcher at the Institute of the Far East, supervisor of a scientific group and candidate of historical sciences, passed away after a serious illness on 1 October of this year.

T. M. Kotova was born on 12 June 1934 in the settlement of Opalikha, Krasnogorskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast. In 1958 she entered the Chinese Department of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and graduated from the institute in 1963. After working for TASS for a few years, Tat'yana Mikhaylovna began post-graduate studies at the Institute of the Far East, USSR Academy of Sciences, in 1967 and wrote a dissertation on "PRC Policy Toward Singapore," which she defended successfully in December 1972. In 1974 T. M. Kotova became a senior researcher at the institute and the supervisor of a scientific group.

Tat'yana Mikhaylovna performed a great deal of productive work in the investigation of various aspects of PRC foreign policy, particularly in Southeast Asia. The study of the status of the Chinese population of Singapore naturally led to the study of an important current issue--the overseas Chinese. She studied this topic with great enthusiasm and amazing devotion during the last years of her life. The result of her persistent labor was a monograph on Chinese emigres, an important contribution to Soviet Sinology. This was the first Soviet analysis of the historical development of Chinese communities in various countries, a thorough description of the role of these communities in the economic and political affairs of these countries and an investigation of the evolution of PRC policy toward Chinese emigres. Tat'yana Mikhaylovna planned to continue her studies in this field, and she would certainly have done so had it not been for her untimely death.

T. M. Kotova wrote around 30 scientific works, co-authored several collective monographs and took part in a series of international and all-union conferences and symposiums.

T. M. Kotova was active in institute social affairs. She was elected a member of the party buro several times by the communists of the foreign policy department.

T. M. Kotova's death is a severe loss for the institute collective. We have lost an unpretentious, industrious and responsive person, a talented communist scholar. She will live forever in the memory of all her comrades and colleagues.

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