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Near East/South Asia Report

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23 JUNE 1986

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EGYPT

NASIRITE CONFERENCE REVIEWED, SAID ABSORBED IN PAST

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 31 May-6 Jun 86 pp 58-59

[Article by Hamidah Na'na': "23 July Revolution Symposium. Agreement on Accomplishments and Disagreement on Revolution's Democracy"]

[Text] "The 23 July Revolution: Present Issues and Future Challenges."

Under this title a political and intellectual symposium was held in Cairo from 3-6 May 1986 at the invitation of Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi Publishers which is managed by Muhammad Fa'iq, one of 'Abd-al-Nasir's aides in the field of information, culture, and foreign policy. Although over 150 Arab intellectuals were invited, no more than 30 invitees from 14 Arab countries showed up in Cairo to join 56 Egyptian researchers and figures, thus conferring on the symposium an Egyptian character which prompted remarks by several Arab intellectuals.

Although the title of the symposium was "Present Challenges and Future Horizons," the participants nonetheless were absorbed in the past. Most studies focused on an "evaluation of the July Revolution" which was more of a trial with participants trading places between defense and prosecution. Perhaps this was brought about by the attendance of a large number of Nasirist experience symbols in a symposium for the first time following the 15 May 1971 coup led by Anwar al-Sadat. Among those attending were 'Ali Sabri, former vice-president; Amin al-Huwaydi, chief of military intelligence and defense minister during 'Abd-al-Nasir's regime; Sami Sharaf, Tharwat 'Ukashah, Labib Shuqayr, Muhammad Fa'iq, and some men who supported the al-Sadat coup or occupied positions of responsibility, such as 'Aziz Sidqi and Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam al-Zayyat, not to forget, of course, Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal.

This huge attendance by Nasirist leaders was very positive because it was the first time in 16 years that an opportunity was afforded for an open and democratic dialogue between the currents that assumed momentous responsibilities in the July Revolution and a number of present political currents in the Egyptian arena. It was also the first time that an open and democratic dialogue was held among the Nasirites themselves, inside and outside Egypt, that prompted some observers to comment that "this symposium turned into an inevitable re-examination which is essential for a new beginning." The following observations may be made about the symposium.

First, Muhammad Fa'iq, who enjoys the respect and trust of all Nasirist currents, was able to bring the above-mentioned figures together for the first time. The symposium was attended by 'Ali Sabri, Sami Sharaf, and Amin al-Huwaydi who were jailed following the 15 May coup. This is in addition to Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, 'Aziz Sidqi, and 'Abd-al-Salam al-Zayyat who played an important role in legitimizing this coup which they viewed as a correction of an existing situation, rather than a disavowal of the revolution's principles. Haykal was intent on making note of this observation at the conclusion of the symposium from the podium by saying: "Some brothers and friends who are here alluded to the 15 May 1971 events as though they were a coup against the revolution or an apostasy. I declare my disagreement with this view. With this observation I only wish to declare my position clearly: this is not true and it is an observation which is very important to me personally."

The formation of the Nasirist Party was a subject of discussion, not only inside the meeting hall, but outside it as well. The problem of whether or not to allow the Nasirists to form their own party is linked to the fate of a number of parties in the Egyptian arena and indeed to the legitimacy of the Mubarak regime which views itself as an extension of the July revolution.

Second, the symposium succeeded in attracting to Cairo more than 30 Arab political intellectuals and strugglers, most of whom were setting foot on Egyptian soil for the first time since the Jerusalem visit [of al-Sadat]. Their presence gave credence to the principle of separating Egypt, the people, and the revolutionary heritage, from Egypt, the Camp David government. Whereas the boycott of the Egyptian government was brought about by the Camp David accords, relations with the Egyptian people and their national political forces must not be influenced by it.

Third, the symposium may be credited with giving credence to the principle of democratic dialogue, even among adversaries. This symposium was attended by representatives of a diverse group of currents, including Nasirists, Marxists, Islamists, and nationalists, and, at the Arab level by intellectuals from most Arab countries. Nonetheless, a spirit of democratic dialogue prevailed throughout the meeting.

Fourth, a negative aspect of the symposium was the total absence of women. Not one woman contributed a study, a review, or a presentation. It was as though the symposium's organizers had forgotten that the July Revolution was the one that gave the Egyptian woman many of her political rights and that 'Abd-al-Nasir's era witnessed the first Arab woman in government.

Minutes of Symposium

The symposium was a serious endeavor to engage in an objective evaluation of the 23 July experience, an evaluation that dealt with accomplishments and triumphs in the fields of agriculture, industry, international relations, and Arab policy, while not overlooking defeats. As symposium organizer Muhammad Fa'iq put it, "this endeavor was aimed at presenting a critical evaluation of the July Revolution with its successes and failures, and, most importantly,

was an attempt to identify ways of benefitting from the July Revolution experience in building the future."

Whereas most participants were almost in agreement on the importance of the July Revolution, economic accomplishments in the fields of agriculture and industry, and while the debate over Mr 'Aziz Sidqi's research paper, "The Building Industry in Egypt," and Dr Mustafa al-Jayli's, "The July Revolution and Agricultural Development," was calm and scientific, disagreement and differences over the democratic course of the 23 July Revolution came to the surface, thus spurring a controversy, especially following Dr 'Ismat Sayf al-Dawlah's provocative presentation entitled "The July Revolution and the Question of Democracy" in which he confined his study to the 10 years in the life of the revolution from 1957 to 1967 when he said: "These 10 years are the only years during which the Egyptian government had the ability to express itself with regard to the question of democracy."

In characterizing the method of rule, Sayf al-Dawlah emphasized that the revolution was represented by its leader and chief, and duties and responsibilities were distributed over other government agencies and organizations, while the people maintained the role of followers rather than leaders. In judging this period, he said: "Judgment rests on whether that period was one of revolution or one of rule. If it was a revolutionary period of radical social development constituting a source of legitimacy, then it was a democratic revolution. However, if it was merely a period of a higher authority rule bound to an objective legitimacy, then this period was a dictatorship."

Dr Anwar 'Abd-al-Malik, a professor at Sorbonne University and author of the book, "Egyptian Society and the Army," commented on 'Ismat Sayf al-Dawlah's study by asking questions that epitomized questions being raised about the democratic process of the July Revolution. For example, he wondered about the motives that led the revolution's leadership to exclude the popular forces from the political decision-making process and about the method this leadership used to besiege social democracy, which 'Ismat Sayf al-Dawlah regarded as a justification for revolutionary legitimacy in a few years, and how the counter-revolution was able to triumph over it to the degree of complicating matters in Egypt to what we are now witnessing.

Through his questions and reviews, Anwar 'Abd-al-Malik concluded that the July Revolution enabled a band of terrorists and confidence men to dupe the leadership, thus contributing to the 1967 setback and to the apostasy from the revolution's social accomplishments thereafter.

'Ismat Sayf al-Dawlah's study was followed by a succession of presentations, the most important and provocative of which was that of 'Ali Sabri, the man who held the highest positions during the July Revolution and never left 'Abd-al-Nasir's side throughout his regime, later becoming a target of attacks against the revolution following the 15 May 1971 coup as "a center of power that obstructed the revolution's democratic development."

In his presentation, 'Ali Sabri said: "My intention is not to make excuses, but rather to explain to the participants the nature of the circumstances that

surrounded the revolution and the motives that governed its positions at various stages. For I have noticed that even the Nasirist forces have been influenced by the attack of the enemies of the revolution. They have developed great sensitivity toward the democracy complex and never fail to open any debate with a criticism of this aspect of the revolution. I believe that the enemies of the revolution, while attacking the material aspects of the experience, always come up against facts that belie their contentions. If they attack the High Dam, for example, years of drought come to vindicate this great edifice of revolutionary accomplishment. If they attack the public sector, people's adherence to it and the failure of the private sector give it credence. Therefore, the only way to attack the July Revolution was to accuse it of democracy which is a spiritual matter subject to individual interpretations based on whim and ideology.

"The Free Officers, as a political organization, represented a party, but their military circumstances prevented them from making contact with the people during the underground stage. No sooner had the revolution broken out and taken power than the right and the right-of-center united against it, in agreement with Muhammad Najib, to precipitate a battle between it and the parties. This was followed by the period of socialist evolution during which the Socialist Union became the revolution's organizational vehicle for democratic practice. The Socialist Union, however, remained weak due to the leader's historic personality which dominated popular institutions. 'Abd-al-Nasir was ahead of his time and its intellectuals, and through his leadership genius he was able to create a direct bond between him and the people."

Haykal and Future Challenges

Just as the issue of democracy stimulated a dialogue and a provocative controversy, Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal's presentation set off a flow of questions and thoughts which almost turned the symposium into a confrontation between two Nasirist currents had he not ingeniously defused the situation and ended the final session over which he presided without opening the door for discussion.

Haykal opened his presentation by noting that the 15 May 1971 events did not represent a coup against the revolution. From this remark, which he described as personal, he went on to enumerate the following general observations:

First, talk about the past was replete with sadness and nostalgia.

Second, talk about the past had a defensive tone as though it was a reply to a third party that was not in attendance.

Third, talk and debate were mostly confined to Egyptians and Egypt alone without going into the topics' general philosophy at the national level.

Fourth, talk about 'Abd-al-Nasir was almost mythical.

Fifth, some very important topics were handled with much circumspection and brevity, such as the revolution's relationship to democracy and to the

Americans. Following these general observations, Haykal talked about the 'Abd-al-Nasir experience as he saw it. He said: "'Abd-al-Nasir was a historic leader who played the most significant Arab role in the 20th century, for his zeal was as great as his nation's expectations. 'Abd-al-Nasir's historical significance lies in the fact that he did not invent anything, but rather gave free rein to pent-up sorrows and expectations as well as his country's dream, freeing the country from the complex of fear and dependency. He then interacted in all his decisions with the accomplishments of unleashed national capabilities, giving them the best possible expression."

Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal emphasized that 'Abd-al-Nasir was a student of his time who recognized the weakness of the colonialist empires after World War II and realized that historic opportunity for liberating his people had dawned. He set out to create the tool by forming the Free Officers organization which may be considered a political front. In his search for and fulfillment of his country's freedom, 'Abd-al-Nasir was forced into a confrontation with colonialism. This confrontation led him on his search for socialism. Ultimately, his experience was defined by three main features: national independence, universal development, and Arab unity.

Haykal said: "For the sake of the future, we must re-examine our past in a way that upholds our principles while maintaining a measure of freedom. The constants of the 'Abd-al-Nasir experience still hold true and his compliance with them was valid then and remains just as valid after his death."

Haykal added: "Abd-al-Nasir had a knack for re-examination and self-criticism. Therefore, Egyptians must not hesitate to reevaluate the experience in accordance with developments. Here, it is necessary to adhere to the constants and the principles 'Abd-al-Nasir represented, using the same logic, but not necessarily the same method. Nasirism is not an ideology governed by law. 'Abd-al-Nasir translated the constants and had the courage, according to the exigencies of his time, to tackle matters head on. He did not, however, offer a theoretical law for development. He offered a Nasirist plan and not a Nasirist theory similar to the Marxist theory. This does not detract from 'Abd-al-Nasir."

Ahmad Baha'-al-Din followed in the same vein, stressing the importance of bearing in mind Arab and international developments when re-examining the Nasirist experience. He emphasized that such developments, notwithstanding the Nasirist national plan, remains an appropriate basis for joint Arab action, an action Dr Khayr al-Din Hasib, head of the Arab Unity Studies Center, expounded in 5 points:

1. The necessity to define what is constant and what is variable, and what is Arab and what is regional.
2. The national plan is not a Nasirist heritage, but rather a challenge and a confrontation.
3. Self-defense calls for an objective evaluation of the self.
4. There are no historic inevitabilities by which all must abide.

5. Disagreement is logical when it is over the future and not the past.

At the conclusion of the symposium, a recommendation was made to continue the dialogue through a liaison committee composed of leading Egyptian and Arab personalities who are supposed to follow up with similar symposiums in the future.

'Abd-al-Nasir and his revolution came out of this symposium stronger than when they went in, for although he has been gone for 16 years, everyone agreed that his revolution's principles and his response to the events of his time form the basis for any future plan. It may be said that Nasirism and Nasirists, in the wake of this symposium, will not be in the same situation that has prevailed since the counter-revolution's attack on the 23 July Revolution.

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LIBYA

AMERICAN RAID'S NEGATIVE EFFECT ON REGIME DESCRIBED

Tunis AL-ANWAR AL-TUNISIYAH in Arabic 18 May 86 p 11

[Article: "The Myth of Al-Qadhdhafi Has Collapsed in the Eyes of the Libyans!"]

[Text] All reports coming from the Libyan Jamahiriyah concur that the recent American raid on Tripoli and Benghazi subjected the country to a violent shock which has thrown it into nearly total chaos. Alongside the damage it caused there, the raid damaged the Libyan citizen's morale and smashed the dignity the regime had worked to build up through slogans and oil revenues. Questions from Libyans have started to rain down concerning a number of points, as with the person from Benghazi who could not refrain from observing "We are not at the level of power that we had thought we were. Where is the army and its famous arsenal? Where is the air force the countries of the region boast about?"

The fact the world discovered after the raid is that Libya is a small, developing country and nothing more. Perhaps the actions of the Libyans themselves contain proof that the Libyans today feel a sort of self-contempt and inability to raise a challenge, whereas they had thought that they could not be defeated. These days the word "revolution" which had until recently been the "staple" of the man in the street has not been in evidence. The reports state that some areas chased down volumes of the "Green Book" in order to tear it to pieces.

It is worth noting that the Green Book was put out in order to realize a better life founded on freedom, welfare and dignity for the Libyans, but reality has established that these goals have not been achieved and freedom has dissolved under the bullets of the Kalashnikov for the sake of the "yes" or "no" the revolutionary committees hand down. As for the smattering of welfare, the economic crisis in which the country is foundering as a result of debts, the drop in oil prices and the economic boycott imposed on Libya has put an end to that. As for dignity, the smoke of the bombs of the American airplanes which hit the Bab al-'Aziziyah camp has eliminated that, because the smashing of Bab al-'Aziziyah means, as far as the Libyans go, the smashing of the myth of al-Qadhdhafi.

The man in the street had not imagined that the colonel would yield to humiliation by a foreign country, but the 15 April raid proved the opposite, since al-Qadhdhafi received the blow in the center of his home without being able to punish the hand which had reached out to him. Since that day the colonel has lost everything, family, life, dignity and even virility. He has become mortal, in other words, he is no longer capable of remaining a leader, and the masses will not mourn him if he falls.

These are the first lessons which the Libyan masses of various groups and ages have drawn. An example of that is the newly-appointed colonel who left Tripoli to seek refuge in his home in the village of Khums. The colonel said, "In reality I did not believe for a moment the seriousness of our revolution, but I made a show of revolution, like the other young people. I am not prepared to die for al-Qadhdhafi's sake." Concerning the people who fled, eyewitnesses have pointed out that their numbers have extended to members of the revolutionary committees and al-Qadhdhafi's guards. The newly-appointed colonel added that like many of his colleagues he was in favor of leaving the country but that was no longer possible, because a law had been issued prohibiting the receipt of exit visas!

As for Libyan students, the future has become a question mark for them, because most foreign universities no longer want to admit them, and in fact even refuse to give them time for a chance to complete the academic year. One student says, "We have become more dangerous than AIDS!" The students have discovered that they are the victims of the colonel's policy; therefore, most of them in casual conversations do not conceal their hope that al-Qadhdhafi will leave.

The colonel is aware of these facts and follows the growing anger of the people and contempt in the ranks of the army with increasing anxiety, sleeping only by means of sleeping pills. He has started to feel a vacuum about himself, especially now that the Libyan streets did not act spontaneously by demonstrating in his support in the wake of the American attack. Observers consider that al-Qadhdhafi is no longer enthusiastic about meeting the Libyan masses and that he spends most of his time in the bunker, under the guard of 300 foreign mercenaries. Other circles confirm that he is no longer receiving even his ministers and army officers because he is on the verge of a comprehensive nervous breakdown. Arab diplomats, especially ones from the Maghreb, who met him after the raid, related that he had become more nervous in temperament than before, that his laughter was forced and that he exerted enormous physical and psychological efforts to conceal this condition.

The Danger Comes from Within

Al-Qadhdhafi realizes that none of the world tolerates his obstinacy any longer and he wants to change what is in his spirit; will he be able to, though? He has built himself up into a revolutionary figure to which his people have become accustomed, and therefore giving up this figure and image will mean the end.

Here lies the gamble the Americans are intending to win. Who in Libya, however, will dare try to bring the colonel down? The revolutionary committees? The army? What remains of the free officers? Or the people?

As far as the people go, they are oppressed and cannot raise their heads in the context of the harsh military regime. Therefore, they will await the

change which they have been yearning for for a while. The revolutionary committees consist of a spoiled militia which is familiar only with murder and plunder, and it is to be considered far fetched that they would be a source of danger to the colonel.

The army, then? So far it has been kept from playing a major role in the country. Moreover, its image with the Libyan masses is "clean," since it did not participate at all in the acts of repression against the opponents of the regime, indeed was a purge target on more than one occasion. Moreover, al-Qadhdhafi threw it into the Chad adventure without asking its opinion. All Libyans today know why it did not react during the raid, since the ammunition and weapons were in the hands of foreign experts; therefore the likelihood that a military coup might take place is relevant. It is enough for a SAM officer to rebel for his colleagues to follow him. It is perhaps this likelihood that prompted al-Qadhdhafi recently to demand that Iran put another 3,000 guards at his disposal to watch vigilantly over his life, but will that be enough?

11887

CS0: 4504/331

MOROCCO

STRONG DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN RAID ON LIBYA REPORTED

Rabat AL-MASAR in Arabic 7 May 86 pp 13, 14

[Article: "Broad Condemnation of the Tyrannical American Aggression against the Fraternal Country of Libya"]

[Text] With the spread of the first news of the barbaric American aggression against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, in collusion with the countries of the Atlantic Pact and Britain's direct participation, the night of last 15 April, feelings of anger and enmity burst out in various areas of the world against the American crime. Various international capitals in Asia, Africa, Europe and America experienced broad waves of protest against the American brutality and the declaration of solidarity with and support for the Libyan Arab people. Among the people, the world protest movement ranged from condemnation, the expression of disdain and the organization of overflowing demonstrations hostile to American imperialism and its tyrannical aggression against the Jamahiriya to the pursuit of armed operations aimed against the subjects and interests of the United States and Britain. Demonstrators everywhere cried out for the fall of Reagan and demanded that a limit be put to the policy of official terrorism and military crimes which Washington is committing against peoples yearning for liberation.

In Morocco, as in the other Arab countries, intensified security measures did not prevent the spontaneous outbreak of the people's demonstration of solidarity in various Moroccan entities, since the people's resentment was outstanding, their support comprehensive and their condemnation broad. The Moroccan masses through their growing national awareness realized that the Libyan Arab people's struggle in confronting the aggressive terroristic American war supported by the forces of the Atlantic Pact is their struggle also and that the evil American aggression was aimed not just at the Jamahiriya but also at the will to national liberation and progress in the Arab nation. Therefore, the Moroccan people did not hesitate in expressing their feelings of anger, rage and condemnation of the aggression by various ways and means:

In the context of the Moroccan man in the street, a number of people's demonstrations flared out in protest against the barbaric American aggression against the fraternal country of Libya in a number of Moroccan cities. The

demonstrators condemned the aggression and acts of American terrorism directed against the Arab nation and cried out slogans of support and solidarity with Libya. Some news items mentioned that foreigners belonging to Atlantic Pact countries faced the possibility of death.

Most faculties witnessed strikes and demonstrations condemning and expressing disapproval of the barbaric aggression and supporting the perseverant Libyan position of refusal to capitulate.

In another context, the Moroccan national and progressive forces and professional and mass organizations unanimously condemned and disapproved Reagan's criminal policy toward Libya and the Arab countries and declared solidarity with the Libyan Arab people in their resistance to the vile American raids.

As part of the campaign of condemning and replying to the blatant American-imperialist challenge to the Arab nation, embodied in a series of aggressions and terrorist operations, the latest of which was the flagrant aggression against the sovereignty of an Arab country, the Democratic Confederation of Labor called for labor demonstrations to be organized in headquarters and issued a declaration in which it invited the masses and the working class to translate their solidarity and support for the Libyan people into practical, tangible positions. In an appeal it directed to the Moroccan government and Arab governments, it demanded:

"The severance of diplomatic, military, economic and cultural relations with the United States of America and the withdrawal of Arab financial deposits.

"The appeal to Moroccan workers and Arab workers to boycott ships and airplanes of the United States as they load and unload.

"The appeal to the Arab masses to boycott American goods which have enjoyed a broad response among the Moroccan masses."

As for the Society of Boards of Lawyers in Morocco, that issued a statement of solidarity and condemnation against the aggression and demanded "the grant of freedoms to Arabs and the elimination of all restrictions impeding their progress toward comprehensive mobilization to face all aggressive schemes aimed against the Arab nation, in all its parts." It also called on Moroccan lawyers to stop work for a period of an hour on 24 April to express "their support for the fraternal Libyan people."

The Federation of Writers of Morocco issued a communique on the aggression in which it called on "intellectuals committed to the causes of the freedom of peoples to expose the Zionist imperialist conspiracies which threaten the vital interests of developing peoples and obstruct the course of the forces of liberation in the world."

The National Union of Higher Education condemned the barbaric American attack against the Libyan people in collusion with Britain in the name of all Moroccan professors and researchers and declared its full support and solidarity with the Jamahiriyah.

At the initiative of the Society of Thought and Discourse, a committee was formed comprising Moroccan intellectuals belonging to the following organizations: the Federation of Writers of Morocco, the Society of Thought and Discourse, the National Union of Higher Education, the Lawyers' Union in Rabat, the Moroccan Society of Human Rights, the National Press Union, the Moroccan Society to Support the Palestinian Struggle, the Society of Legal Figures, the Moroccan Society of Visual Arts, the Moroccan Movie Club League, the Engineers' Federation, the Doctors' Federation, the National Amateur Theater League and the Moroccan Economists' Society. This committee's task was defined as one of establishing activities and organizing gatherings to support the Jamahiriya. However, no activity emerged into the light of day once the holding of a solidarity festival of speeches which had been called for on Friday 18 April was prohibited.

In spite of the enforced absence of a number of progressive fighting men in prisons, their presence was noteworthy and interacted with the anger of the Moroccan people. Their cries of protest and solidarity emerged from among the heavy bars, condemning the "official Arab position of collusion or impotence" and joining in solidarity with the people of the Jamahiriya and its national regime opposed to imperialism.

While national mass organizations drew the line at statements of condemnation and verbal solidarity, the Moroccan masses, through their spontaneous and automatic demonstrations and their desire for solidarity with the fraternal Libyan people in the struggle to reply to the American challenge, have given clear proof of their insistent will for liberation, the rejection of imperialist domination and the defiant desire to break through the lines of artificial fragmentation which colonialism created, realizing that the aggression against Libya is only one installment in the Zionist imperialist aggression which has the existence, future and destiny of the Arab nation as its target.

11887
CSO: 4504/330

MOROCCO

BRIEFS

TRADE CONVENTION WITH TUNISIA--Carthage, Tunisia, 29 May. Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba signed here Wednesday morning the deed on the ratification of the trade and tariff convention between Morocco and Tunisia, the Tunisian News Agency TAP announced. /Excerpt/ /Rabat MAP in English 1202 GMT 29 May 86
LD/ 12228

CSO: 4500/136

SUDAN

NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT LEADER INTERVIEWED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 17-23 May 86 pp 16-17

[Interview with Dr Hasan al-Turabi, general secretary of the National Islamic Front, by 'Uthman Mirghani: "No One Can Set Us Aside"; Khartoum, date not given]

[Text] Many of the political surprises that the Sudan witnessed during and after the recent general elections center around the National Islamic Front [NIF]. The great victory that the Front achieved in the elections surprised many observers. Most of them expected the Front to win about 30 constituencies, but the Front obtained 51 seats in the Constituent Assembly to become the third largest group of representatives, after the Ummah Party and the Democratic Unionist Party. Given this fact, those who sat down to negotiate the formation of the new government in the Sudan could not leave the NIF out of their calculations. In fact, whether to make the NIF a partner in the government or to keep it in opposition was a question that never for a moment was absent from the minds of the negotiators.

In the light of these developments, AL-TADAMUN turned to Dr Hasan al-Turabi, general secretary of the NIF, in his office in the Front's buildings in Khartoum and asked him a number of questions that have continued to occupy people's minds since the recent elections, including the question of the strong antagonism between him and Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi. Here is the text of the conversation:

[Question] The result achieved by the NIF in the elections surpassed the expectations of many observers. How do you read this result?

[Answer] If we compare the present result with the representational pattern which we encountered during our last acquaintance with democratically contested elections during the sixties, the current picture of the traditional parties appears close to what it was in the past. The two traditional directions (Democratic Unionist and Ummah) used to compete for parliamentary representation, and the size of their gains used to vary according to whether

the situation in each party was one of discord or unity. The Democratic Unionist Party was the one that in fact traditionally enjoyed a political majority. Whenever it entered elections in a state of unity, it drew the majority; whenever it was split, it lagged behind and the Ummah Party advanced over it, especially if the Ummah Party was united.

As for the Sons of the Nubian Mountains bloc, it is the same presence as existed in the sixties. All that has happened is that the name has changed from the Nubian Mountains Union to the Sudanese National Party.

As for the communists, their presence also remains the same and limited in its extent. The picture in the south of the Sudan, however, has changed greatly. Southern members of parliament used to come basically from the SANU Party and the Southern Front. Today, the regional tendency has become the most dominant and visible one. The people of Equatoria are rallying around each other, even though the west of Equatoria is somewhat different from the east. Similarly, the representatives from Upper Nile are rallying around themselves, and the Bahr al-Ghazal representatives are standing close to each other, if we make exception for some tribal, personal, or political conflicts that appear across regional boundaries.

The really new phenomenon in the elections is the size of the Islamic presence. During the sixties, this presence was very limited. Today, however, it has become a presence to be reckoned with. In the geographical constituencies, we won 30 seats distributed in various parts of the Sudan. The extent to which the NIF clearly represents the people was particularly evident in Khartoum, where votes for it were equal to votes for the Democratic Unionist Party. Something we think even more deserving of attention is our winning in the graduates' constituencies. The NIF swept all graduates' seats in the North and some seats in the South, thereby becoming the first phenomenon in modern Sudanese history to challenge the traditional bipolar pattern of the Sudanese political structure. The intellectuals have constantly tried to found parties separate from sectarian and tribal backing. They constantly tried to break free of tribal or sectarian tutelage, but all their attempts ended in failure, with the intellectuals either forced to return to the fold or perishing in a desert of popular isolation. The emergence of the NIF represented the first successful popular challenge to the traditional Sudanese pattern. The Front has become the first political entity balancing a presence in the intellectuals' milieu with one in the popular milieu. This means that our parliamentary bloc comes about half from popular and half from graduates' constituencies. I should not forget to mention that more than 20 of our representatives who won in popular or geographical constituencies are also graduates of the universities and advanced institutes. I should also point out that women were able to get into the Constituent Assembly only through the NIF.

If you want to sum up the results of these elections in brief, their most important result has been the emergence of the NIF as a movement challenging the traditional structure and as a movement uniting the body of intellectuals

and the elite. Second, this result surprised the traditional political structure and thus complicated the formation of a government. What happened in the South also added further complications to the problem of forming the government.

[Question] Does this mean that you are satisfied with the result of the elections?

[Answer] Not at all. On the basis of our participation in the pre-election process of organizational mobilization and on the basis of the mobilization that accompanied some nominations, we estimated that our gain in the geographical constituencies would be greater. But the parties went back to their old style of indifference about proposing a program to the people. They fell back instead on the method of stirring up partisanship, using enticement and intimidation, and exerting pressure. These parties entered the latest stage of the election process in order to use the method of enticement and intimidation. As for intimidation, the pressures involved arose from reliance on tribal and sectarian entities at a time when the NIF was challenging these entities.

As for pressures based on enticement, these made their most concentrated appearance in the political field at a time when the NIF was relying in its political presentation on reminding people that the ballot is a trust and a responsibility and that one should not sell one's vote for money. Certain quarters spent tens of millions during the last days of the elections, at a time when a large number of Sudanese--due to the pressures of subsistence to which they had recently become subject and the lack of political consciousness--were open to temptation by monetary pressure or by tribal and sectarian pressure.

Finally, however, we are satisfied because these pressures could not shrink our representation very much.

[Question] What about the NIF? Is it true that you spent a great deal of money on the elections?

[Answer] Not at all. What we spent on founding the Front and on its conferences was much greater than what we spent on the elections. I should like to state here that our total expenditure on the elections is not equal to what one party spent on buying and renting buildings for political activities; it is not half of what some parties spent on buying transportation to bring voters to the polls; it is not half of what the traditional parties spent on hiring campaign workers.

[Question] Do you feel bitterness over your election defeat in the al-Sahafah-Jabrah district?

[Answer] I feel no bitterness. I have previously had the experience of not being successful in popular districts, and I felt no bitterness even then because I went in at the risk of losing. I entered the previous Constituent

Assembly at the head of the list for the graduates' constituencies and worked hard to abolish those constituencies. We warned the other parties that we would win these districts if they insisted on them; however, the other parties insisted on these districts believing that we were maneuvering in our position. I could have made my position absolutely guaranteed had I stood from one of the graduates' constituencies, but I preferred to enter the popular constituencies campaign because we are occupied with founding a new political movement and it must be given a firm foundation in Sudanese popular reality now that we have already succeeded in giving it a firm foundation in elite circles.

All the parties helped each other against me. I do not think their agreement against me was due to their position on the so-called "Forces of the Uprising." The Democratic Unionist Party, for example, had dissociated itself from the National Grouping before the election, and so there was no coordination between it and the Grouping in the elections. What happened, I believe, is that when the Ummah Party candidate for al-Sahafah-Jabrah district was exposed as linked to the security apparatus, that candidate's political future was destroyed, causing him to withdraw from a fight in which his defeat was a foregone conclusion. So it was easy for the left-wing parties that wanted to defeat me more than they wanted victory for themselves (their role in the Sudanese political arena is negative, rather than positive; they put forth what they oppose, not what they desire)--it was easy for these parties, I say, to join the other parties to oppose me in this district and support the Democratic Unionist candidate.

The leaders of the Democratic Unionist Party were not very excited about what was happening in the al-Sahafah-Jabrah district, but they were naturally not going to refuse a position that was given to them as a gift. Nevertheless, I won 10,000 votes, against 12,000 for the candidate of the other parties, which means that the result, had the contest been equal, would have been completely different. As far as I am concerned, the total of votes that I won was satisfying. Also satisfying to me was the fact that the number of seats we obtained in the Constituent Assembly was quite adequate, especially since there are about 50 university graduates among our representatives in the Front. With their high degree of consciousness, they will fill in for me in the parliamentary ranks. This being the case, I shall devote myself to building up the NIF, since it is a recently formed entity composed of new social tributaries that are capable of growth. We must devote ourselves to it with great care so as to broaden the base of its appeal and strengthen its foundation. We must take an interest in non-political activities in our work for the Front, since the Front is an entity whose comprehensive activities go beyond politics to social, cultural, charitable, and Islamic activity.

[Question] Will you consider a nomination for the Constituent Assembly if a seat becomes vacant or is vacated for you during the next few months?

[Answer] A seat will not be vacated for me, nor will I think of entering the Constituent Assembly, unless it happens without design. I have no plans to run a campaign that would get me into the Constituent Assembly.

[Question] Your being outside the Constituent Assembly necessitates the presence of someone to lead the NIF representatives in the Assembly. Do you expect that this will cause a dichotomy in the leadership?

[Answer] Not at all. Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman, secretary of the Political Bureau of the NIF is present in the Constituent Assembly and will automatically take charge of leading our group of representatives in the Assembly. His chairmanship of the Political Bureau has not previously caused a dualism or dichotomy in leadership, any more than the presence of another person as chairman of the Missionary Bureau, to which we assign major importance in our organizational structure, is a source of dualism in leadership. God willing, no organizational or leadership dualism in our ranks will occur.

[Question] Why does the conflict between the NIF and the Ummah Party, or rather between you and al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, seem to be so deep, even though you are related and cooperated in the past?

[Answer] Cooperation continued between us and the Ummah and Democratic Unionist parties until shortly before Numayri's assault on the Islamic movement. We thought the link would be carried on after the uprising, but it became evident to us that the Ummah Party's position on the assault against the Islamic movement would complicate relations between them and us. It appears that the Ummah Party believed it had the field to itself after the uprising and that its traditional rival had disappeared from existence. However, it found the NIF everywhere, and so a strong jealousy developed between it and us. It wanted to defeat us politically by linking us and the Islam we advocate to the order that had been overthrown. It placed great reliance on this strategy that succeeded only in deepening the rift between it and us. I do not think the Ummah Party representatives in general, even at the leadership level, are eager to aggravate the antagonism between themselves and the NIF; they know that the strategic agreement is too great for us to spoil it with contests based on political jealousy. However, the competition between us and the Ummah Party in the elections was so fierce that it became difficult for the Ummah Party to turn around after the elections, especially when it realized that its calculations concerning the NIF had been completely wrong. However, I do not hold it impossible that in the long run people will transcend a position that was based on a political jealousy that imagined that the NIF could be set aside and done away with. Perhaps, the door will be opened for relations between us and the Ummah Party in the future.

[Question] In the past, you have taken strong stands regarding the movement led by John Garang in the south of the Sudan. Will you make any adjustments in these stands if you find yourselves with him at the negotiating table, or will you hold to your positions even if it involves destroying efforts at dialogue to halt the war in the South?

[Answer] At no time have we said that we do not accept John Garang in the context of the national dialogue or that we do not acknowledge his having a base of sympathy in the South. What we have said and shall continue to say is that he is not the sole representative of the people of the South. The

consensus of Equatoria, most of the people of Upper Nile, and some people of Bahr al-Ghazal are steering clear of him politically. It would be foolish for us to conciliate him for bearing arms against us with a solution that would be antagonistic and provocative to the peaceful majority today. Such a solution might move the presently peaceful majority to take up arms tomorrow. We have had a great deal of experience with such partial solutions whose effects explode a short time later.

We blame John Garang for internationalizing an internal Sudanese problem and making himself the hostage of international quarters that are interested not so much in the conflicts or interests of the people of the South and the North as in superpower conflicts over the Sudan or in Ethiopia's desire for an element of counterbalancing pressure with which to play tricks on the Sudan should [the Sudan] feel that it ought to support the Eritrean cause. The internationalization of this problem thus will introduce elements that complicate the internal dialogue.

However, whatever outrages Garang may have committed, we know that the Sudan as a whole will benefit from a halt to the war in the South. If he renounces arms and accepts dialogue, we shall accept his carrying on dialogue within the context of the other southern and northern parties. However, it appears that even after the elections he does not accept the mandate the Sudanese people gave to their representatives. He rejects the result of this mandate and wants all his conditions granted in advance.

[Question] Do you believe that the application of the Islamic laws is blocking the way to a solution of the problem that exists with Garang and his forces?

[Answer] I do not think so, regardless of how current this theory may be in Europe. John Garang's propaganda has promoted it because it is a slogan that sells in Europe. In reality, John Garang is not very interested in the religion issue, since his inclinations are nonreligious. He took no account of Islamic law when he rebelled and took up arms, for Islamic law had not been applied as of that time. The problem of the South has been with us since independence--30 years, that is, before the application of Islamic law.

The fundamental dispute of the people of the South does not concern Islamic law as much as it concerns the problem of partition and decentralization. Just as we arrived at a formula with the people of the South during the sixties for an Islamic constitution for the country, so today it is possible for us to reach the same formula: one that will allow us to apply Islamic law but will preserve their freedoms and exempt them from certain things they believe would injure their rights to freedom and cultural development.

[Question] If any future government decides to repeal the September laws (the Islamic laws promulgated in September 1983), what will your position be?

[Answer] With the advent of representatives who have entered the Constituent Assembly following an election campaign in which commitment to Islamic law was one of the most advantageous elements, I consider it very unlikely that matters will come to a repeal of the Islamic laws. However, if a majority for the repeal of Islamic law happens to emerge, we shall continue to struggle for Islamic law as we always have struggled. We shall take the very article of repeal as sustenance for our fight and expose the positions in front of public opinion. Thus we hope that the position of Islamic law, even if this be just a promise, will become stronger than it is today, when the positions have a good deal of vagueness.

[Question] Will this fight take place from within the Constituent Assembly?

[Answer] From within it and from outside of it, for political activity in every democratic country transcends the limited parliamentary arena.

[Question] The question of preserving or repealing the September Laws entered into the negotiations for the formation of a national government as a basic theme. To what extent have you shown readiness to offer concessions as regards these laws?

[Answer] We are concerned with the essence of Islamic regulations; we are not concerned with the accompanying formulas or legal obscurities that do not themselves pertain to Islamic law. Nor are we intent upon a particular schedule for the experiment of applying these laws.

It is unacceptable to us to suspend, repeal, freeze, or leave these regulations in abeyance, even if we are promised that they will be readopted in a more complete and better form. We want these regulations to remain--either with an immediate alternative to be adopted without slackening or procrastination, one which would be better formulated and not linked to the May [i.e., Numayri] past; or they should remain until arrangements for preparing such an alternative are completed.

We, therefore, say that we accept replacing the laws in question with an immediate legitimate alternative. But it is not acceptable to us that any non-Islamic breach be made, even if we are given the best of promises. In our historical experience, we have had our fill of promises to wait for the constitution or for Islamic law.

[Question] Where does the NIF go from here?

[Answer] The NIF has a wide field of democratic freedom before it. It is represented in the Constituent Assembly by a sector that is great in quantity and greater in quality. It has mustered under its banner a large and ever-growing sector of educated youth and of women. The Front's economic power and political influence are growing every day. Also, the Front has become truly national and has come to have as much weight as the traditional parties. All of this opens to it a wide door for future growth. We shall see how the responsibility for governing under such delicate circumstances affects the traditional parties whose social reality is passing away every day.

TUNISIA

BRIEFS

LARGEST POWER STATION INAUGURATION--President Bourguiba today inaugurated a new power station in Rades, one of the most important projects of the sixth plan. The station is the biggest so far realized in the country. Its power is 340 megawatts, which will make it possible to meet the growing national needs of electrical power. It can use three different fuels: oil, natural gas and coal. The station costs 154.4 million dinars and offers no less than 220 fulltime jobs. The project helped in transferring advanced modern technology between Japan and Tunisia, as the Japanese manufacturer asked for the help of Tunisian companies, which manufactured an important part of electrical equipment in Tunisia. The station is very economical to run, and tests have showed that it makes it possible to save some 20,000 tonnes of oil a year in comparison with the Sousse station which has the same production capacity. This will save some 2 million dinars. /Summary/ /Tunis Domestic Service in Arabic 1200 GMT 30 May 86 LD/ 12228

CSO: 4500/136

IRAQ

EGYPT OFFERS VARIOUS FORMS OF MILITARY AID

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 21-27 May 86 p 23

[Article: "On Sa'dun Hammadi's Visit to Cairo: Modern Egyptian Military Equipment To Support Iraq's Resistance During Ramadan"]

[Text] At the peak of the inflammation of the heat on the battlefield between Iraq and Iran, the Iraqi air force's prosecution of a series of raids on Tehran and other Iranian cities, and Baghdad's declaration of the advance of its forces over great distances on the front lines, contacts and meetings between Iraqi and Egyptian officials reached the point at which rumors spread concerning a secret visit the Iraqi president Saddam Husayn had made to Cairo.

Although these rumors were not confirmed and no official bodies referred to them, the visit the Iraqi National Assembly chairman, Sa'dun Hammadi, made to Cairo, in which he met with the Egyptian president Husni Mubarak, as well as the foreign minister, Dr 'Isamat 'Abd-al-Majid, and the chairman of the People's Assembly, Rif'at al-Mahjub, indicated that relations between Egypt and Iraq had reached a point which might be better than in the past, before the severance of diplomatic relations in accordance with the resolutions of the famous Baghdad Arab summit.

The chairman of the Iraqi National Assembly went to Cairo to agree to a plan of parliamentary coordination between Egypt and Iraq at international gatherings, but the heating up of the fronts between Iraq and Iran caused his talks with the Egyptian officials he met with to be dominated by the climate of combat, in the light of information which bespoke a great Iranian concentration for a new round.

In the course of all these meetings, Hammadi reassured Egyptian officials about Iraq's military situation and reassured them that Baghdad was waiting for developments in the direction of further support for its military forces and the opening of new fronts in accordance with a decision the Iraqi president Saddam Husayn had taken on the need to follow a new method in confronting and occupying positions within Iranian territory in order to influence the balance of military forces and compel Iran to respond to the appeals for peace.

A Security Issue

Everywhere he went during the week he spent in Cairo, at the headquarters of the office of the president, under the cupola of parliament, and inside the building of the office of the prime minister and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sa'dun Hammadi met with the same assertion, that "Iraq's security is connected to Egypt's security, Cairo will not delay in supporting Iraq and we are in a single trench with Iraq."

Alongside this assertion, the Egyptian officials told the chairman of the Iraqi People's Assembly that Egypt would continue its earlier political efforts and that in spite of Iran's repeated rejection of efforts toward peace Egypt was still constantly allured by hopes of the possibility that the language of intelligence and dialogue would prevail to put an end to this Arab and Islamic tragedy.

Cairo again reaffirmed to its Iraqi guest what it had previously affirmed to more than one Iraqi official, which is that the absence of official diplomatic relations would not affect relations between the two countries. In this regard, a diplomatic source told AL-MAJALLAH that Egypt was not expecting anything in exchange for its support for Iraq, that the thought of getting anything in exchange was basically not at issue and that "our position toward Iraq is essentially nationalistic, we are offering the Iraqi people everything we can in the context of our economic circumstances, and we are trying to meet the basic requirements of the Iraqi army, if we possess them."

The same source said that Egypt's support of Iraq was not just a tentative tactical stand but that it was an expression of a fixed policy reflecting Egypt's commitment to its national obligations and a position of solidarity with any Arab country exposed to foreign aggression.

Last February, when Iran launched its great well known attack against Iraq's al-Faw front, President Mubarak sent one of his senior aides, Dr Yusuf Wali, deputy prime minister and secretary general of the ruling National Party, on an urgent mission to Baghdad to be apprised of the situation from close at hand and reaffirm to the Iraqi president Egypt's position of solidarity with Iraq and defense of its sovereignty.

Military Aid

The same abovementioned source pointed out his country would not raise the subject of the resumption of diplomatic relations with anyone and would not include it in any discussion "but that does not mean that we are not concerned. We appreciate the circumstances of others, and therefore it is not logical that we should set forth the issue of relations as a condition for offering support to an Arab country which is defending its territory and its sovereignty. Jordan restored its diplomatic relations with us without insistence or demands and this restoration was not in exchange for anything."

This source sought as evidence the Iraqi president's statement during the visit both President Mubarak and King Husayn made to Baghdad last year in

which it was stated "Relations are not determined by official formulas, and our relations with Egypt are loftier and stronger than any administrative context. They are relations of people from a single nation and a single national destiny. What is between us and Egypt is no longer an issue of appointment of an ambassador but a question of practical steps."

It is well known that the Egyptian position on the subject of providing support for Iraq is based on a constant principle, which is an absence of direct participation in military confrontations outside Egyptian territory, with emphasis on the continued provision of aid in the form of arms, materiel and ammunition to the Iraqi armed forces.

An Egyptian diplomatic source told AL-MAJALLAH that Egypt has not sent military forces or experts to Iraq because it is confident that the Iraqi army is able by itself to confront the Iranian assaults and that "we offer ammunition and materiel at the prices the Iraqis pay. As for volunteers, contract is made directly with them by the Iraqi government."

On the subject of Egyptian ammunition for Iraq, it is possible to assert that that includes anti-tank rockets, field artillery materiel, reciprocal airplane engines and some equipment which is being repaired by war factories on behalf of the Iraqi forces.

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IRAQ

BASRAH'S THOROUGH RESISTANCE TO WAR'S EFFECTS LAUDED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 16 May 86 pp 64, 65

[Article by 'Afaf Zayn: "The Mother of the South Embraces Both Hope and the Sword"]

[Text] On the road to Basrah, nothing indicates that the war has been living under its black robe for 2 months. The road stretches toward Basrah with a calm permeated by the surrounding air and the breeze of the Shatt al-'Arab. Generally, an Iraqi tank surveys us, propped up against the trunk of a palm, and the ground around it consists of crooked intersecting lines which the equipment going toward al-Faw and coming from it as well have left. Traffic on the road coming from al-Faw is light at times and at other times congested with trailers and trucks bringing everything except for henna. Al-Faw's henna has been absent from the markets this year with the result that its scented brushy presence has been confined to the old Baghdad financier. The faces of martyrs who have fallen have grown in the village of al-Faw, which is accustomed to the greenness of henna, and their blood has washed the rancors of history.

The secure homes of Basrah look out at a distance. Their important position has sought for them to be content, vigorous and rich, with significance for the Arab society with its mosaics of populations, races and creeds. Therefore it was not strange that the war should start from Basrah with a concentrated psychological attack from which the people of Basrah emerged united in their sorrows and their united, unified adherence to the nation to which they have offered and still offer their sons as victims and sacrifices.

It is true that the war has not yet ended and its final results have not been determined, but Iraq has won the war on its internal fronts, which are the most difficult and most sensitive ones, and no victory that is parallel to the nation's coherence and the firmness of its people's affiliation stands loftier than the victory on its theaters. The nation has won because the blood of martyrs has washed the rancors of history and has drowned the rays of new allegiances through adherence to the nation, memory and history.

In the midst of all these victories, Basrah has stood as the Zaynab of all the Arabs. It did not go out on the roofs the day of the battle to become

fanatical about destruction with a headband more intensely inspired by the rancors of history.

The road takes us south as we wonder why the south, of all areas, was sought to be the lord of sorrows. Nonetheless, this Basrah to which the heart bows its head in prayer is inflamed with perseverance and palm trees extending along the banks of the Shatt al-'Arab, and the 6 years of war have closed off the doors toward the water of the ocean to it. Along the stretch of the watery Corniche parallel to the city, ships of numerous flags have been moored, sealed with rust and the neglect the world conscience is observing with respect to a serious struggle they surround with statements, hopes and the expression of anxiety and impatience.

As the road extends toward Basrah, the further we penetrate into the south the lighter the movement of traffic becomes. We often see an Iraqi tank supported by a palm trunk at a dirt wall. From a distance, we gaze at the roofs of the sleeping city and discuss how the silent cities resemble one another as lovers do, although Basrah is more firm than Beirut, because the Zaynab of the Arabs has resolved its options, has reached a decision, has become at rest and has gone out to the fire of battle. From a distance, as you gaze at the roofs of the houses of Basrah, sorrow might fall from the cup of pride: in every home flutters the spirit of a martyr or the letters of a prisoner hang on the curtains of the heart, hanging heroic and ripening with the love of the nation. Basrah is proud of its children, those of them who have martyred themselves, those who have been taken prisoner and those whom the war has devoured in part, "because our people are defending the Arab nation in proxy for the Arabs as a group," says Umm Khalil as she goes about among the fighting men returning from the al-Faw front, giving them water to drink and distributing what is left of her henna among them.

The road stretches out a brief distance before Basrah. In the midst of a group of guest houses, arches of triumph have been raised above every dome, set up to receive the fighting men coming back from the front. It was the city's aim that the lines be absent and the distance of time among its fighting sons on all the domestic and foreign fronts be eliminated. "Coexistence" is one of the current new expressions which the circumstances of the war have imposed on political literature. Coexistence is not just restricted to its semantic meaning but also extends to indicate a platform of life and a unique style of everyday dealing with the phenomenon of war. Therefore, there is not a single citizen in Iraq who has not inhaled the dust of vicious battles at the nation's borders extending along a broad front 1,180 kilometers long. The sons of Iraq flock to forward positions from all levels and centers. There the people clinging to the nation correct al-Buhturi's equation: here the slashing sword is the equal of the pen in persevering in defense of the nation.

Because generosity in hospitality is one of the genuine traditions known among the tribes of Basrah, the domes of the guest houses have arisen and they greet the people returning from the fire of battle and say farewell with ululations to those who are rushing into its embrace. Within the guest houses food is being cooked and there is water and mailboxes packed with fighting men's letters to their relatives. There usually is a telephone

under each dome, and from there greetings are sent out and hearts returning at dawn cry out to perseverant, steadfast mothers in other areas of the nation. When the latest fighting at al-Faw became intense and the fighting men quartered in their positions abstained from their weekly visits, delegations of people from all areas of the country descended on Basrah's guest houses to ask and seek information. Under each dome foreign and Arab correspondents alike watch a new phenomenon which the years of the war have brought to the fore, and all Basrah has been transformed into a single front in which borders are absent, as the fighting people and families share everything early in the morning, from drops of water through moments of nostalgia for family and home to the great concern over the safety of the nation.

The women of Basrah, with the full firmness of position, faith in the nation and pride in its just causes and appeal for peace they possess, have to a large degree participated in creating Basrah's amazing perseverance and its confrontation of destruction in a manner that befits all perseverant, steadfast cities which have set their options and decided their loyalties. In spite of all the attempts at dispossession, banishment and evacuation to which Basrah was exposed just before and during the war, and although the Iranian occupation of al-Faw, one of Basrah's districts, has entered its third month -- in spite of all this the women of Basrah have stood as a stubborn, crushing palm whose height does not bend before an impudent wind. The women of Basrah have stood, have not left their homes and have opened their doors to strangers. While victory has bound up its banners in the theaters of the nation on its domestic front, and Basrah has raised the banner, the women of Basrah have constituted the pillar of the house and its firm, strong foundation.

Therefore it was not strange that the guest house of "the fighting women of Khawlah Bint al-Azwar" was the first shelter to rise on high at the Basrah-al-Faw-Kuwait intersection. Basrah women of various ages and differing degrees of education have given full care and attention to the fighting men. They are all working women or housewives who have mobilized themselves to serve the fighting men: tea, coffee, the aroma of home cooking like that of one's mother and mailboxes constantly overflowing. One day an Iraqi mother from Mosul came down to be reassured about the safety of her son at the front and she stayed with him 3 days in the Khawlah Bint al-Azwar guest house.

All the ladies of Basrah, says the chairman of the Basrah woman's federation, have been trained in civil defense work and also most types of fighting in the context of the People's Army. The women of Basrah have helped offer services in the field of nursing, care for the wounded and prisoners and service to fighting men in their period of convalescence. Basrah has not stinted its daughters, and a large number of them have martyred themselves even in the course of bombardment or on going on inspection visits to the front. Inside the women's federation building, a bronze statue of a lady tall in stature, in the form of a palm tree, bore a long list from which the names of women martyrs of Basrah hung like grapes.

The state of perseverance Basrah is going through has not witnessed a single moment of frustration, although a substantial period of Iranian occupation

of one of its districts, the city of al-Faw, has elapsed. Under the nearly daily bombardment sustained by the district of Shatt al-'Arab, another of Basrah's districts, which lies on the other bank of the waterway, people are experiencing a phenomenon of scarcely paralleled cohesion and solidity. We went from house to house. We heard the mother of a prisoner whose traces had vanished talking about him with pride and glory, and we listened to the wife of a martyr talking about "the absence of the beloved one who went so that something more beloved than him, the nation, might remain."

The children of the Shatt al-'Arab who have grown up with the rhythm of daily bombardment, as the front lines are just dozens of kilometers away from them, have suckled the milk of fervor and have recited it in poem and song. A 10-year-old girl contributed her ring and her golden earring and sang at the funeral of her martyred father "I pledge my blood, my people, who said you have been spoiled?"

The war is in al-Faw and the Basrah Sheraton in its fervent soirees resounds with the echoes of an Iraqi country ballad played by a foreign jazz band. Arab and Turkish contractors, engineering and technical workers and a complete construction workshop have turned Basrah into a beehive pulsating with life, vigor and movement. There are merchants from Bahrain and Kuwait, a foreign female tourist overcome by curiosity who went to the old market following the steps of Hasan of Basrah, and rust covering the anchor of its ship moored in the Shatt al-'Arab. People's frames look out everyday behind the sandbags covering the entries to the houses and warehouses of Basrah looking out over the public roads, they go out to pursue their normal activities and on the way back they pause to contemplate the museum of martyrs facing the statue of al-Khalil Ibn Ahmad al-Farhadi. After the pictures of the martyrs had covered the inner walls of houses by virtue of the daily bombardment and white space had almost disappeared behind the dungeons of the dead and martyred, the Governorate of Basrah decided to set up this museum and collected the dead's clothing and special effects for it, their notebooks and pens, small children's games and mothers' and sisters' shrouds, and turned the museum into a daily stop which the people of Basrah enter.

The war under Basrah's black shroud and the odor of gunpowder fortified by the smoke of combat have permeated the tresses flowing under its golden-edged headband. Nonetheless, here Basrah is perseverant, steadfast and obdurate in its stability and self-possession. The governor of the city, Fawzi Rashid, speaks about al-Faw and says that the recent battles went on in areas of the city from which the inhabitants had been evacuated a long time ago, after the areas had become turned into a theater of military operations. Therefore the Iranian occupation of al-Faw did not cause a process of sudden migration or perceptible population displacement. Basrah's governor speaks with pride about its perseverance and believes that the wise, aware political leadership is in effect the strong buttress of this perseverance. With great pride, he describes what a foreign newspaper correspondent observed in Basrah the morning al-Faw fell, when he did not observe a single truck leaving Basrah carrying furniture and anything facilitating household requirements. The state of fear and panic which it was sought to have Basrah experience in the last act of the psychological campaign to which it was

exposed since the war broke out has been turned into a national reaction which has produced further adherence to the soil of Basrah and devotion to the nation.

The years of war may go on and the fighting may continue, but Basrah, which has determined its options and specified its devotion to the single nation, has written the last sign of victory in the theaters of the nation all along its internal fronts.

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CSO: 4404/331

ISRAEL

MASSIVE AID TO IRANIAN AIR FORCE CHRONICLED

Tunis AL-'AMAL in Arabic 3 May 86 p 7

[Article: "L'EXPRESS Magazine Confirms Cooperation between Tehran and Tel Aviv: 350 Israelis Working in the Iranian Air Force in Addition to Arms Procurement Activities"]

[Text] The French weekly magazine L'EXPRESS has revealed that there are more than 350 Israelis in Iran working as experts with the Iranian air force.

In an article written by the American journalist Kenneth Truman about the process of smuggling arms to Iran, the magazine stressed that firm cooperation between Iran and Israel in military activity and arms procurement is continuing and this cooperation expanded in particular after the flareup in the Iraqi-Iranian war through the intensified dispatching of spare parts and war materiel.

It added that the discovery of the process of smuggling American arms to Iran is the best proof of this cooperation, which the Iranians are trying to conceal.

L'EXPRESS said that Israel hopes, through military aid to Iran, to weaken Iraq, which it considers one of its most remorseless enemies in the region.

From Baghdad, an Iraqi military spokesman denied the allegations Radio Tehran had made concerning the performance of raids by Iranian airplanes on Iraqi positions prior to yesterday.

In a statement IRAQI NEWS AGENCY transmitted, the spokesman said that no instances of the penetration of Iraqi territory were recorded yesterday, clearly indicating the falsity of the material Radio Tehran had broadcast.

An Iranian military communique had mentioned that Iranian airplanes had bombed locations of Iraqi armored force concentrations and inflicted substantial damages on them yesterday morning.

IRAQI NEWS AGENCY also pointed out yesterday that a senior Iranian Guard commander named Asadi Musavi was killed by the Seventh Division last Monday night.

The agency said that the person named Asadi had been commanding Iranian forces' operations in resisting Iraqi units which ultimately failed grievously that night.

The agency also pointed out that a further number of Iranian guard officials were killed in this struggle at the hands of Seventh Division forces as well.

An official source in Abu Dhabi said yesterday that the aggression launched by an unknown airplane against the Saudi oil tanker al-Safaniyah in the middle of the Gulf Thursday afternoon resulted in the death of three persons, including the ship's captain.

Quoting from the same source, the emirates' official news agency pointed out that the ship had been hit by two rockets which exploded in the operations room.

The attack on the 31,500-ton al-Safaniyah, which was headed toward the Saudi port of Ra's al-Tannurah in ballast, occurred in open water off the coast of the western emirates 16 kilometers southwest of the island of Sir Abu Nuwayr. It was possible to control the fire which broke out on the deck of the ship.

Neutral maritime sources point out that the attack occurred south of the Shah 'Ulum area. Maritime sources in the Gulf ascribe responsibility for the raids which take place in this area to Iran, which in this manner is responding to the operations Iraq has launched against ships transporting Iranian oil.

Since the beginning of the war in September 1980, Iraq has been exporting its oil through pipelines only because there are no Iraqi oil tankers. Iranian airplanes have in particular been attacking ships loaded with Saudi oil headed for Arab Gulf countries, in order to make these countries exert pressure on the Iraqi government to put a limit to the oil tanker war.

This is, moreover, the second act of aggression to which a Saudi oil tanker has been subjected in less than a month. The first one occurred last 5 April against the tanker Petrostar 16, and the responsibility for that was also attributed to Iran. It resulted in the injury of 29 persons, including crew members.

Maritime sources pointed out that since the beginning of the year Iraq has hit no less than 15 Iranian oil tankers or tankers which Tehran was chartering, and Iran for its part has attacked about 18 ships.

The maritime sources pointed out that Iran has established its rocket-firing helicopter base on an oil pier in Rostam in the middle of the Gulf in order to respond immediately to Iraqi operations.

ISRAEL

BRIEFS

NEW MILITARY JOURNAL--In its latest issue, the magazine MONITIN has stated that a new military magazine titled "The Spear" will be issued in Israel on the occasion of the occasion of the next independence day; this will be concerned with Israeli military affairs, in addition to the magazine BAMAHANEH ("in the camp") and the magazine MARAKHOT ("battles"), which are now being issued in Israel. The owner and editorial supervisor of this magazine is a former general in the Israeli army signal corps who completed his military service in 1971 and was then engaged in issuing magazines and publications on the Israeli army. He is now issuing a publication under the name DAVIS UPDATE (in English). The owner of the magazine says that the goal in this magazine is to give the foreign world a good image of the Israeli army, the reason for its existence and the nature of its activity, and at the same time he wants to tell young Israelis that the army should be a source of pride and honor, not the army of Sabra and Shatila. He had previously put out two issues of this magazine in the United States, but it was not a success there and he is trying to revive it in Israel this time. The first issue will also contain analyses and data on new military combat helicopters, military robots and new military equipment, in addition to a number of articles on modern combat techniques and means and methods of military intelligence. This magazine will also give priority to the Israeli army and Israeli air industries and the attempt to obtain new markets for their products in foreign countries in the form of arms. It is expected, on the basis of David Eshel's estimates, that between 5,000 and 15,000 copies of this magazine will be printed in the local market and it will be in 60 pages, most in color. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI in Arabic 3 May 86 p 57]

CSO: 4404/335

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

OPPOSITION JOURNAL OFFERS NEWS ITEMS ON POST-COUP ATMOSPHERE

Cairo AL-AMAL in Arabic 5 May 86 pp 4, 5

[Article: "News of Yemen"]

[Text] Every morning Aden observes a number of persons killed but the perpetrators are not known. It has become a daily phenomenon and by virtue of it people refrain from going out in the streets after the twilight prayer.

The great lie which many citizens in Aden and some regions of the south believed is the claim which holds that 'Ali Nasir is currently present inside South Yemen with his personnel. They were greatly surprised when they left the country and discovered that 'Ali Nasir had been living in Ethiopia with his command personnel since the first days of the fighting.

After the failure of the Marxist experiment in Aden, 'Ali Badhib, leader of the Adeni Communist Party, engaged in a drinking bout in an attempt to forget what has happened.

A source close to the Adeni Communist Party leader 'Ali Badhib says that he tells his supporters and groups that the Soviet Union sold their party on behalf of Yemeni and tribal personnel in order to preserve its intrinsic interests.

Six Communist parties have condemned the new Aden regime. The Sudanese Communist party refused to take part in signing this condemnation. In their statement, these parties declared their support for 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, the Marxist regime head isolated in Aden.

People coming from Aden say that the sons of 'Ali 'Antar, 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il, Salih Muslih and 'Ali Hadi Shayi' have formed an unofficial armed force which goes out into the streets of the capital, Aden, every evening, where they stop citizens and search them. It is the fate of people who fall into their hands and were known for their support for 'Ali Nasir to be kidnapped and disappear.

These sources say that these acts are taking place before the security personnel, who do not stand up in any way to stop such serious excesses, which on many occasions have lead to the death of citizens.

Some people coming from Aden have stated that three girls lured away three army officers in South Yemen after drawing their attention in a movie theater. The girls then went in the company of the three officers to the al-Haswah area, where the three officers were murdered. Their car was set on fire and the persons committing the crime managed to escape.

Nayif Hawatimah sold 3,000 weapons to Muhammad 'Ali Ahmad, the Governor of Governorate Three, before the events of last 13 January. Personnel in the new regime in Aden learned of this act, and information has it that they confronted Nayif Hawatimah with this. He admitted that his front had sold such an amount, but before fighting had erupted among comrades in Aden.

In the wake of the failure of the negotiations he was holding with 'Ali Nasir's adversaries in the Soviet Embassy, as a representative of 'Ali Nasir's, and in the wake of the collapse of 'Ali Nasir's regime on behalf of their adversaries, Muhammad 'Abdallah al-Battani, minister of the interior in the former regime of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad in South Yemen, elected to remain within the Russian embassy, out of fear for his life. Information has it that he was moved from the Russian embassy in Aden to Moscow.

Sources close to 'Ali Nasir state that al-Battani held telephone contacts with his group which is now outside South Yemen from Moscow in which he violently attacked them and accused them of cowardice, panic and flight from the arena of combat after the first hours. He also held them responsible for the result of the failure that afflicted them and ultimately led them to leave the country as refugees.

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PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

OPPOSITION FIGURE CRITICIZES ADEN REGIME

Cairo AL-AMAL in Arabic 5 May 86 pp 6, 7, 13

[Interview with Opposition Leader Muhammad 'Ali Haytham: "The Aden Regime Is Secessionist and Its Position toward National Issues and Public Freedoms Has Been Negative Since Independence"]

[Text] On the issue of the south, following the recent events, the subjects and implications of conception and interpretation that have marred it, the position of the southern opposition and the contradictions in views that have appeared in it, the magazine AL-AMAL is happy to play a part, through the dialogue it seeks to hold with the leadership of the southern opposition, in an attempt to understand the events occurring in Aden which broke out on 13 January 1986 and the background of what happened there and is happening continuously. This month AL-AMAL's meeting has been with Mr Muhammad 'Ali Haytham, the assistant secretary general of the National Grouping of Nationalist Forces in South Yemen. In it, it directed the following questions to him:

One: In your conception, what specifically was the goal of the recent fighting in Aden?

Answer One: Perhaps one might not respond in detailed form to what happened last 13 January in Aden. Whatever the details might be, that can only be described in brief as a struggle for power, nothing else, because no clear reasons exist: the people are one, the social identity is one, the culture, religion and faith are one, and above that, they claim that they are a single party, a single ideology, and there is a race and urgent rush to be aligned with a single international party. There are no causative reasons for what happened, and the two parties have not stated causes for the dispute, or what they differed over.

Therefore this means that the struggle was over power and nothing else. A clear, grievous neglect of human rights occurred when more than 10,000 people were killed and thousands were imprisoned and jailed. Most unfortunately and sorrowfully, people are imprisoned because of identity or blood link, and over the coming generations this will leave a legacy of rancor which our people do not need.

Power, power, power is the main reason, and monopolizing power is the cause.

Two: What is the current situation in Aden now?

Answer Two: The situation as far as the ruling group in Aden goes, in spite of their dominance and victory over another group of people, is only that they went out causing damage through the wounds of destruction which occurred on 13 January and after. Its economic institutions have been destroyed, its political and constitutional institutions have been fragmented, all the weapons and personnel of its military and security institutions have been shattered. A frozen administrative situation, a lack of trust between the citizens and authorities, thousands of people killed and surviving families have resulted from that. The government must provide them with the most minor wherewithal for a living.

Thousands of people imprisoned in penitentiaries cannot find food or clothing, because of their great numbers. Greater than that is the state of psychological destruction which occurred among the people and the feeling of frustration and despair among the citizens. The regime is not able to do anything. In spite of all this and the experience of 13 January and its frightening results, the ruling group has not benefited from the experience; indeed, it has started to bring back all political, constitutional and military institutions on a tribal basis and in accordance with the premises of the previous ideology, whose failure has been proved by experience, prompting many technical and domestic personnel and even citizens themselves to seem to be officials, workers or day-laborers for a tribe, not a regime or national cause, driving many of them to quit their positions and jobs and leave the country by the hundreds. This organization itself, and its Marxist ideological assertions, are among the main reasons which led to the destruction which occurred on 13 January. It is this organization which will cause a repetition of the 13 January events in another form at a later time.

Three: Our cause in the south -- now that the conspiracy surrounding it has been unmasked, can one consider it an Arab and Islamic one? In your opinion, how must one deal with it in the Arab and Islamic contexts?

Answer Three: The issue of the secessionist regime in Aden, with all it has done since independence in the form of negative positions toward national causes and public freedoms and the cause of Yemeni unity, and the negative role it has performed regarding national positions, and regarding Islamic causes as well, its negative treatment of them, its departure from Yemeni, Arab and Islamic consensus and its alignment with an international party whose interests contradict our national, domestic and Islamic interests have turned the question of the regime in the southern part of Yemen into a Yemeni, Arab Islamic issue. We urge all parties in this trinity to play a positive role in correcting the historic grievance which has befallen our people and the suicide and destruction of the nation that resulted from that on 13 January. We hope that their hearts will be generous and their ears will be attentive to national, human and Islamic positions and to the political conceptions of national solutions presented by the National Grouping of Domestic Forces in South Yemen, so that the slaughter of 13 January will not be repeated.

Four: What, in your conception, is the solution to our people's tragedy in Yemen?

Answer Four: Our Yemeni people in the southern section of Yemen have suffered from much oppression and intellectual and physical terrorism on the part of the dictatorship of the secessionist regime, through its Marxist-Leninist ideological assertions and the monopolization of power that has arisen from that and from its neglect of Yemeni, Arab and Islamic strategic goals and its total preoccupation with day-to-day dealings with instantaneous tactics. Among these premises and the conditions highlighted by the bloody events on 13 January, a review is required of all the political goals of the Yemeni national movement, of which the National Grouping of the Domestic Forces in South Yemen is a part. The events have affirmed that the experience of any secessionist regime in the southern segment of Yemen will continue to be a series of bloody struggles, no matter what this authority might be, and consequently we stress that the experiment of the regime has failed and that the ideological experiment has failed on all levels, and consequently that requires of us a national pause for reflection and future strategic horizons. From this, we consider that the national forces all must be won over to the importance of national salvation for the cause of our people in the southern segment of Yemen, and this is concentrated on two basic points:

First, the refusal to work to establish any other secessionist regime in the southern segment of Yemen.

Second, realization of the restoration of Yemeni unity by means of the people, since the failure of the experiment of realizing it by official means has been proved since 1972, especially since it is the secessionist regime in Aden that is placing ideological obstacles in the way of its attainment.

In order to realize the two abovementioned objectives, the Yemeni national unionist forces must seek to hold a general people's conference which all political parties in the southern segment of Yemen will attend, including the secessionist group in Aden, in order to endorse practical steps for realizing these two abovementioned goals, summarized in our view that we should make the charter of Yemeni national action the theoretical guide and the general people's conference the political framework.

Five: The press conference the National Grouping held in Paris was published in an official communique of eight points, one of which states:

The Soviet Union appointed a third party which has no relationship to the two parties of the bloody struggle in Aden and is supporting and protecting it now, ignoring the legitimate political and constitutional authorities which have moved their headquarters from Aden to the adjacent area of Abyan, although these legitimate authorities were loyal to it:

1. What third party do you mean?
2. Does the National Grouping consider the former Aden regime legitimate?
3. What is the difference between the former regime and the current one?

Answer Five: When we held the press conference in Paris, that occurred after the return of Haydar Abu Bakr al-'Attas and 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Dali from Moscow and the assignment of the acting presidency to the former and his continuation in the position of prime minister and supervision of the party. At that stage of the development of the struggle specifically matters concerning the leadership elements in the party who had survived had not become apparent with total clarity. It is well known that when the struggle for power between the two parties to the struggle, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad on one hand and 'Ali 'Antar on the other, erupted, Haydar al-'Attas did not represent a position aligned with either of them, did not have influence over the course of events or a hand in what happened, and was not a party to the struggle. On that basis he was called a "third party" lacking strength or power. However, he is a political phenomenon, no more no less, a caricature behind which the real decisionmaker is hiding. For this reason we consider that the Soviet Union brought him in as a way out in order to save its face in the region and preserve its interests there.

As to the second part of the question, the grouping spelled out a clear position from the day the struggle first broke out. It declared that the Marxist secessionist dictatorial party in Aden did not represent any political or national legitimacy in the region because it was an illegitimate regime; rather, the expression came about with the goal of highlighting the negative Soviet position toward its personnel, whom it considered legitimate from the standpoint of its international interests, not the logic of our notion, which holds that the regime is not legitimate in essence.

As to the third part of the question, I consider what happened on 13 January a party and tribal struggle for power, and there is no essential difference in the orientation of the regime in Aden at any level, be that one of internal politics or the position regarding national, Arab and Islamic issues. It is an extension of a part, in the sense that one group prevails over another and its single platform remains.

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PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

PARIS PUBLICATION VIEWS POLITICAL SITUATION

Cairo AL-AMAL in Arabic 5 May 86 pp 10, 11

[Article: "Three Blocs within the Regime Are 'Sufficient' To Make the Struggle Break out Again"]

[Text] In its issue of 14 April 1986, the magazine AL-YAWM AL-SABI', which is disseminated from Paris, published an analysis of the current situation in Aden, attributed to someone the magazine has described as "a senior Yemeni official."

In view of the information the analysis contains, we are republishing here some, the most important part, of what was contained in the analysis.

Under this title, the magazine said,

No single historic figure whose command is uncontested heads the present leadership, the Yemeni official says. 'Ali Salim al-Bid, the party's new secretary general, is a historic figure in the National Front but his effective political role ended in 1972. Before independence 'Ali Salim al-Bid played a basic role in the formation of the National Front organization in the Hadramawt area and after independence he played a prominent role in power, since he was the first defense minister in the independence government and contributed effectively to the people's uprisings to take over the installations of the economy and the country (through mass initiatives, not government decrees) between 1970 and 1972. His effective political activity then ended after that and he was removed after he violated a law which prohibited polygamy except in essential cases and returned to positions of authority only at the start of the eighties. 'Ali Salim al-Bid is known to be harsh and violent in discussions, but he is not the type who has a ready political conception at hand by which he can influence party personnel. In addition to that, 'Ali Salim al-Bid is at present leader of the bloc which can be called the "Hadramawt bloc," and has support in power represented by the president, Haydar Abu Bakr al-'Attas, who also is from Hadramawt. It would be incorrect to say, as of now, that al-Bid, with al-'Attas, constitute a united bloc, but such a bloc might arise in the event an open struggle flares up, since the nature of conditions in the ruling party is pushing in the direction of alliances of this type.

The second bloc in the party and in power is represented by Salim Salih Muhammad, currently the assistant secretary general and former minister of foreign affairs. Salim Salih Muhammad is from the Yafi' area, and historically belongs to the bloc of former foreign minister Salih Muti', who was executed in 1981 on the charge of dealing with Saudi Arabia, which of course is a false charge. From this new position of his, Salim Salih has inherited the leadership of Muti''s bloc within the party, and in addition to that has inherited leadership of the Lahij and al-Dali' bloc, which 'Ali 'Antar led. The reason which facilitated this leadership process was that before his execution in 1981 Muti' was 'Ali 'Antar's candidate to assume the premiership, since 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il had been swept away in 1980. Links existed in the past between the people of Yafi' and the people of Lahij and al-Dali', allowing Salim Salih to head this bloc from his new position in the party leadership.

One prominent feature of the new Yemeni situation is that Salim Salih and his group are now asking for the restoration of Muti''s reputation and requesting that he be considered a martyr of the Yemeni revolution. What encourages them in this regard is that everyone killed in the recent Aden events who was against 'Ali Nasir has been mourned as a martyr of the revolution, and Muti' himself was executed in 1981 in the context of 'Ali Nasir's dominance of power.

The third bloc in the party is represented by Muhammad Sa'id 'Abdallah (Muhsin), current member of the political bureau and former minister of security. Here Muhsin is the heir to 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il's bloc, and stands alongside all the people from North Yemen in the party, especially those who are officers and soldiers of the "Unity Brigade," a military brigade of northerners functioning as part of the Yemeni army. He had a prominent role in the armed resistance which eliminated 'Ali Nasir. Also standing alongside Muhsin in this bloc are all the basic party personnel who consider 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il a symbol of theirs, and these party personnel have firm bonds with a number of party army officers, headed by Col Haytham, current chief of staff, who played the major military role in confronting 'Ali Nasir's forces, taking the initiative of assuming the military command and issuing orders to the forces to move, thus making up for the absence of the defense minister, Salih Muslih, who was killed in the political bureau's meeting the morning of 13 January 1986.

Muhsin, the heir to 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il's bloc, is a historic figure in the Yemeni revolution and has better theoretical training than the people surrounding him now. However, he became unfavorably known as a man of violence, torture and physical liquidation when he was minister of security. Muhsin has basic support in power in the form of Muhammad Sa'id Nu'man, the prime minister, who is known for his firm ties with 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il's bloc; he is distinguished by being a man of political intelligence and has a doctor's degree in economics.

There are no struggles now among these three blocs, and they are not yet engaging in activity as distinctive blocs. They are now joined together by enmity toward 'Ali Nasir's bloc and cooperation in preventing its return to power. However, they are blocs which bear within themselves the seeds of

violent historic struggles, and these struggles could reappear if disputes arose in the coming period on the political platform, the economic platform or means of building up the armed forces. This is what 'Ali Nasir and his group are waiting for and betting on.

On the subject of the positions of Sanaa, Ethiopia and the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the regime currently in being in Aden, AL-YAWM AL-SABI's analysis states:

As far as Sanaa goes, the desire of the authorities in Aden to improve their relations with Sanaa is appearing on the surface. This desire has expressed itself in the dispatch of three delegations to Sanaa so far, but has not prevented a state of wariness from existing between the two parties. The question raised in Aden is, can Sanaa support a military movement of 'Ali Nasir's? The answer in Sanaa is decisively negative and one of rejection. Nonetheless, one of these delegations ventured to tell President 'Ali Salih that 'Ali Nasir was launching armed attacks across the borders, taking off from North Yemen territory. President 'Ali Salih was very adamant about calling on the Aden officials to confirm their information. On investigation of this issue, the Aden officials confirmed the truth of the information and North Yemen's position, since 'Ali Nasir's groups were present in a "neutral" zone, a zone over whose jurisdiction a conflict still exists between Sanaa and Aden. 'Ali Nasir is mobilizing the forces which left with him in this area and is setting out from it to launch his armed raids.

As to Ethiopia's position, that is still obscure. 'Ali Nasir is present in Addis Ababa and the Ethiopians are not asking him to leave. The warships which supported 'Ali Nasir during the fighting fled with their crews and sought asylum in Ethiopia's ports. Their fate up to this point is still the subject of negotiation between the two countries. Contacts took place between the two regimes and led to a resolution of problems related to diplomatic representation and permission for Democratic Yemen airlines (Alyemda) to use Ethiopia's air space after a period in which it had been prohibited from flying in this space. However, in spite of that, there is much antipathy to the negotiating methods because of the personal friendship that exists between 'Ali Nasir and Mengistu, friendship which arose during the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia. 'Ali Nasir also sent forces once again from Democratic Yemen to fight with Ethiopia against the revolutionaries of Eritrea, and it appears that Mengistu wants to repay 'Ali Nasir for the favor. During the flareup of the fighting on 13 January 1986, he proposed to him that he send him 15,000 Ethiopian soldiers to help him resolve the military situation; these forces were on the brink of moving at that time and halted only after a Soviet warning was directed to Ethiopia and after Sanaa had imposed the condition for the movement of these forces that they effect a union between the two Yemens under the presidency of North Yemen.

The unfriendly position from which the Ethiopians are negotiating with the Aden delegates is fully known in Aden. In justifying their support for 'Ali Nasir they are told "If your problem with the Soviets is resolved, your problem with us will be solved. We have committed ourselves to the Soviet position the newspaper PRAVDA expressed on the first day of the fighting. PRAVDA said that what was happening in Aden was a coup conspiracy against

the legitimate authorities. PRAVDA is the newspaper of the Soviet Communists; consequently, it is the newspaper of the world's Communists." In the light of these positions it is possible that the Ethiopians will resume supporting 'Ali Nasir at a stage when it considers that it has become capable of broader movement.

There remains finally Moscow's position, which is one of the most important ones as far as influencing the map of Democratic Yemen goes. Moscow resolved its position at an early time and pursued direct action against President 'Ali Nasir from the fourth day of the outbreak of the fighting in Aden. 'Ali Nasir knows full well that he cannot put his money on the Soviet position, because he knows in particular how Moscow maneuvered to remove him from Democratic Yemen after the outbreak of the events. At that time he received a letter from the Soviet leadership asking him to go to Moscow via Addis Ababa to meet with 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il and reach understanding with him over a solution (the death of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il had not yet been announced). When 'Ali Nasir went to Addis Ababa, he was told that the plane had been delayed, then he was told that a mechanical breakdown had prevented it from arriving, finally he was told that a mistake had been made and the invitation had basically not been sent him to attend, and then he was told, in the last Soviet contact with him, "You are welcome in Sofia," and realized that Moscow did not even want to receive him as a political refugee. For all these reasons, Moscow's position was seized upon at an early time as part of any calculations 'Ali Nasir was betting on for the sake of returning.

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CSO: 4404/332

AFGHANISTAN

KARMAL'S REPLACEMENT LABELED 'MOSCOW HARD-LINER'

London MEED/THE MIDDLE EAST'S BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 10-16 May 86 p 8

[Article by Gaye Wilkinson]

[Text]

THE significance of the 4 May resignation of President Karmal as general secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) has yet to be gauged. Karmal remains titular head of the country, but his power is considerably reduced. That is now in the hands of his successor in the PDPA, Dr Najibullah, former head of the Khad security police. Najibullah is seen as a Moscow man and has been brought in to stabilise the communist rule.

State Department officials in Washington doubt whether Najibullah's appointment will bring about any change in the situation in Kabul. Spokesman Charles Redman says the continued presence of 120,000 Soviet troops is more important. He added that Najibullah — "a long-time communist who has risen to prominence under Soviet tutelage" — is well-known in Afghanistan for his ruthlessness in suppressing opponents, and is unlikely to be the person to broaden the regime.

This view was echoed by the Islamic Alliance of Afghanistan Mojaheddin, whose spokesman, Burhanuddin Rabbani, says: "As long as Soviet invaders are in Afghanistan and Soviet generals rule, it doesn't make any difference who stays and who goes."

Diplomatic reports from Islamabad speak of Soviet fears of a communist backlash against the appointment of Najibullah. The military presence in the capital was stepped up at the time of the announcement; small demonstrations in support of President Karmal are reported to have taken place.

Some Afghan exiles in the Pakistan capital have said that Najibullah, one of the few Pashtu-speaking members of the Parcham division of the PDPA, could heal the rifts in the party with the mainly Pashtun Khalq faction. But one London observer says he thinks it unlikely that Najibullah could bring about unity where Karmal failed.

Najibullah's appointment came less than 24 hours before UN-sponsored peace talks resumed in Geneva. UN mediator Diego Cordovez describes them as: "A make-or-break session. . . if we succeed, there will be peace in Afghanistan. If we fail, I am extremely concerned about the consequences of that on the people of Afghanistan."

Cordovez will continue to shuttle between the two parties, as he has done for the last six sessions. Pakistan still refuses to negotiate direct because it would imply a recognition of the Kabul regime, but it has now agreed to initial any eventual settlement in the presence of the Kabul representative.

Three draft agreements have already been reached. They cover non-interference and non-intervention — thus ending US aid channelled via Pakistan; arrangements for the voluntary return of 3 million Afghan refugees, and international guarantees to maintain Afghanistan's independence. A fourth agreement, which Cordovez is putting before the two parties, links the first three with a schedule for Soviet troop withdrawal.

But many observers doubt that this last agreement will be reached. They point out that the recent heavy fighting around Kandahar and the border regions show that there are few signs of Moscow preparing to withdraw.

AFGHANISTAN

BAKHTAR CITES DAILY ON U.S. AID TO PAKISTAN

LD010711 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0416 GMT 1 Jun 86

[Text] Kabul, 31 May (BAKHTAR)--The main goal of the visit of the Stephen Solarz chairman of the subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Foreign Affairs Committee from Pakistan [as received] is to continue supplying large scale military-economic aid to Pakistan by the USA and also highly assessed the stand of the Islamabad authorities with regard to the situation around Afghanistan, says article published by daily Kabul NEW TIMES.

The United States military aid to Pakistan is truly wide. Under the recently-signed U.S.-Pakistani agreement for another five years, Washington allocates to Pakistan 4,020 million dollars. Most up-to-date tanks, armoured carriers, howitzers, are supplied to equip the modernised Pakistani Army. The Air Force is supplied with additional squadrons of the latest F-16 fighter-bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

Assisting the increase of the might of the Pakistani Armed Forces, Washington also pursues quite definite aims of its own: To use Pakistan in its strategic interests, to turn the territory of that Asian country into a place d'armes for the implementation of the neo-globalism strategy.

In return for billions of dollars, Washington has already received for these purposes Islamabad's permission to use Pakistani seaports and airfields for the interventionist "rapid deployment force."

These billions of dollars in U.S. aid also have the purpose to step up Pakistan's participation in the undeclared war against Afghanistan, to promote the widening of the scopes of aggression against that sovereign state, to stimulate the support for bands of Afghan counterrevolutionary scum.

Washington-Islamabad military alliance poses a direct threat to the countries of the region as well as the world over.

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CSO: 4600/339

AFGHANISTAN

BAKHTAR: NFF PAPER REAFFIRMS DRA'S COMMITMENT TO ISLAM

LD250619 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0415 GMT 25 May 86

[Text] Kabul, 24 May (BAKHTAR)---In order to camouflage their anti-human crimes, the American imperialism, the Chinese hegemonism and other reactionary and imperialist states have started a poisonous propaganda campaign that Islam is in danger in the democratic Republic of Afghanistan, reads an article published in DAILY ANIS, organism of the National Fatherland Front of the DRA.

The fifth article of the fundamental principles of the DRA, which is the interim constitution of the DRA, says that "the sacred religion of Islam is esteemed and protected in the DRA, freedom of religious rites is guaranteed for all muslims living in this country."

Recently, the savage Afghan counterrevolution planted two bombs in the compound of Khirqa Mobarak (Cloak of Mohammad) in Qandahar as a result of which two children, an old woman and an elderly man were injured. The explosion demolished a part of the shrine and its window panes were totally broken.

The people of Qandahar severely condemned this bestial action of world imperialism headed by the U.S. imperialism and its clique, the Afghan counterrevolution, the article points out.

The state of the DRA spent a large amount of money for the construction of new mosques and takayas (worshipping places). Mosques and other holy places damaged by the Afghan counterrevolution are repaired at government expense as well. Monthly stipends and yearly ration coupons are provided to imams and clergymen from the state budget.

Prior to the victory of the April Revolution, the tyrannic regimes of the past did not pay any attention to Islam.

With the victory of the April Revolution, a new Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Religious Trusts has been formed.

It is of utmost importance to say here that one of the main aspirations of the April Revolution is the undeniable protection of Islamic religion and freedom of performing religious rites as well as the accepted traditions of the Afghans as a whole.

In the course of last Afghan year ended 20 March 1986, the article recalls, 114 new mosques were built and 1,026 mosques damaged by bandits were repaired throughout the country. The amount spent for this purpose, (including the sums contributed to scholars and clergymen) amounted to 114 million afghanis.

With the assistance of their revolutionary state and provisions of the fundamental principles of the DRA, our people will protect the sacred religion of Islam to their last breath against imperialism and its sold out lackeys, the Afghan counterrevolutionaries.

Afghanistan is an Islamic country. Our people are not intended to learn Islam from the USA and Pakistan, the article concluded.

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CSO: 4600/339

INDIA

GOVERNMENT SAID SEEKING TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS BLINDLY

New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi 16 Apr 86 p 4

[Article by Satish Jha]

[Text] How to explain to the prime minister that a mere face lift does not make anything new, even though the face lift may consist of science and technology, and the artist may be none other than the prime minister of a country 750 million strong?

Last week in the course of a debate on the budget of the Science and Technology Ministry, the prime minister tried to deflect the debate by describing those who did not agree on the usefulness of foreign technology as belonging to vested interests. Officials of the science and technology department of the government of India admit that for years they have not had a heavy-weight supporter of this kind. Many among those who dispute the prime minister's speech are not ignorant of the dangers of imposing technology.

That is why many scientist-bureaucrats wonder why, in our past, science appears to be associated with culture and why today we are talking of associating people with science. They are also surprised that the ideas of the prime minister should be the last word on scientific knowledge. But, as in all scientific issues, they do not want to initiate this debate. This is nothing new for the scientist-bureaucrat class that emerged after the nationalization of science and technology.

As a matter of fact, the debate over the dissemination of scientific knowledge is old hat. Five to 6 years ago, a group of non-scientists and bureaucrats who had just then lost power, along with their scientist acquaintances and favorites, raised this issue as if they were saying something original. According to them, so long as their countrymen do not acquire a scientific point of view, there can be no progress. Those taking part in this controversy were not scientists. Some sociologists did take part. It was easy for those who wanted to gloss over the difficulties involved to dismiss the opponents of this view as reactionaries and anti-progress. It also met the fate common to all such controversies. Far from becoming a subject of popular debate, it died with a whimper.

Now the prime minister has once again raised this issue. He tends to imply that except for his understanding of this subject, every opinion is nonsense. Not merely nonsense but inspired by vested interests, and that people should be on guard against those who differ with him. Twisting the controversy in this way has numerous advantages. The prime minister knows full well that those who are equipped to take part in this debate generally do not have the guts to question his pronouncements. This is so because the entire science and technology set-up is official. In order to get money for research and to maintain their positions, science professors of autonomous universities also want to toe the line of officials of the central government Science and Technology Ministry. Those who have the courage are so few and their circle and their influence is so limited that they cannot have any effect on the prime minister's views on science. As a result, the prime minister advocates science, and the head of the scientific bureaucracy, the self-serving M.G.K. Menon, quotes the prime minister's view to express his own thinking on science.

But what is the prime minister's thinking on science? This can be understood from the view of the administration. From the point of view of eradicating poverty, those who consider new technological tools synonymous with progress want to acquaint bullock cart-stage farmers with computers. By means of satellite, a central computer will display on TV screens how to use plows, when to plow fields, which fertilizer to use and which crop to grow. It is noteworthy that the government, which has not been able to keep its 40-year-old promise of providing literacy to all countrymen, will now try to communicate people's knowledge to them by means of the computer. One may well ask, Do the farmers need this? Are their crops being lost for want of this exact information? Or is it that the shortage of water--be it from canals, wells, tanks or natural rain--and the condition of land, does not allow them to become better farmers? Can any farming, anywhere, that is run on the basis of centralized information succeed? Because today today's farmer looks after his farming on the basis of his family needs, does it mean that his views are not scientific? Will receiving information by computer, satellite and TV make his point of view scientific?

Leaders who are in a hurry to spread scientific thinking cannot imagine that in the context of his circumstances, the farmer's thinking may well be scientific. This is so because they do not understand Western technology. Instead of taking scientific knowledge to mean making decisions in the context of one's needs and problems, it has been considered as coterminous with copying Western technology.

Till now those who wanted to import foreign technology were linked with vested interests. Now our prime minister has stated in the Lok Sabha that the opponents of this technology have an axe to grind. There is no better example of the changed standards of controversy. But, in this, questions arising out of the history of technological progress are being completely overlooked.

The relationship between culture, conditions and technological progress will become clearer if we examine the story of American and European

progress. We will have to consider the far greater needs and differences in animals in countries with extreme climates vis-a-vis those in countries with moderate climates and how differences in the working ability of work horses and bullocks can lead to different paths of progress. To understand this, we will have to know the role of animals in these countries 200 to 250 years ago and how progress was made by combining technological advances with the needs under prevailing conditions. Can progress be made without obtaining answers to these questions and just by copying? Is the bridging of the gap between the West and us in use of technology the most important aspect of the technological progress? The thought of abolishing it comes naturally to those who believe this difference to be a gulf. Those who look upon it as a gulf need to keep in mind our historical needs and those of the West.

It is not as if those farmers who can afford tractors or those who have the necessary facilities for using them do not already use tractors either by buying or by renting one. Why are they still using bullocks? The prime minister says that without using tractors they cannot become prosperous. But in the progressive set-up following independence when were they given tractors? When technology is associated with society and flourishes with it then such questions are not raised. Then there is no need to describe them as absurd. But in its hurry to impose everything from above, government has always played into the hands of vested interests. And in making the prime minister's technology a corner stone of progress lies the hand of vested interests. This is apparent in the 125-per cent increase in the manufacturing of TV cabinets. In other words, statistics of progress indicate progress of a certain class, not of the country. If, in spite of the 125-per cent, increase in the manufacture of TVs, the country's progress amounts to only 5 or 6 per cent, then, according to government, the fault lies with the economy and not with the TV manufacturers.

It is on the basis of such understanding that the prime minister has evolved his new three-pronged plan for ending the backwardness of his fellow countrymen. First is science which will be used to provide people with water, oil seeds, communication, education and children's immunization. It is implied that until now science has been associated exclusively with industry and that this was a mistake. Now, water, education and oil seeds will be the priorities for science. Even those who have a slight acquaintance with science and technology know that whatever else you may call it, this cannot be called science and technology. To solve problems with the help of available knowledge is surely a utilization of knowledge. Even in the Western system, which is the official measure of scientific progress, this can be describes as the official policy of progress, it can be called the priorities of progress, but it does not fit anywhere in the knowledge of science and technology.

Is this new classification being resorted to merely to save the reputation of the Science and Technology Ministry or is it an excuse to justify spending more money? Provision of water for everyone, immunization of all children and increase of oil seed production are all the basics of progress. The means of achieving these are well-known. If you do not want to buy an

injection from a local shop, you can buy it from a foreign shop. A plan can be devised for providing water to everyone on the basis of available knowledge of the water situation. The society that, with a commitment to universal education, doubled its population in 30 years can, in the same period realize, the goal of 100 per cent literacy. All that is needed is arrangement to provide education to new children. Communication, even today, falls to some extent in the domain of high tech. And whatever progress we want has already been achieved by the borrowed science and technology. Then what is all this fuss about?

If the prime minister's scientific thinking has evolved out of the atomic energy department, the space department and the Green Revolution then much should not be expected from it. But by learning from departments which are not answerable to the taxpayers, the prime minister is making a mistake. Those who expect quick results from science always like to have a mission for technology, be it a Manhattan Project to build an atomic bomb or an Apollo project to reach the moon or "star wars." Technological progress and new inventions have been made and will continue to be made to remove obstacles in the way of these goals. The science that will progress under the mission of finding water has already made enough progress. All that is needed is to give this knowledge the form of a goal. Even if we accept it as progress in science and technology, what will its relationship be to the priorities of high tech? By giving basic scientific research the name of Blue Sky, how shall we link it to high tech? Only the prime minister can explain how these three principles, which are so far apart, will unite to lay the foundation of Indian science. Meanwhile, he is performing face lifts which will suit neither the society nor the present science and technology structure.

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CSO: 4624/12

IRAN

PRIME MINISTER MUSAVI INTERVIEWED ON OIL, WAR, MINORITIES

East Burnham ARABIA/THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English No 57, May 86 pp 43-45

[Interview of Meer Hossain Musavi, Prime Minister, by Aslam Abdullah in Teheran; date not specified]

[Text] A major problem the Islamic Republic of Iran faced after the revolution was the shortage of trained and qualified technocrats committed to Islam. How did the government overcome it?

As you mentioned this was a post-revolutionary problem which continued for some time. But fortunately our technocrats today are working with the Islamic system of government, while religious forces too have undergone training and succeeded in regulating their activities together with our experts.

There was a debate during the early days of the revolution as to whether the experts or the committed individuals should run the country's affairs. But what is prevailing in our society today is the true system of Islamic revolution which is capable of employing technocrats. On February 11, 1979, the revolution triumphed, there were, according to statistics, over 10,000 post vacant (those abandoned by the former regime) in political, economic and other areas, due to the dependence on us and other foreign powers. These were filled by educated people from the lower classes. The Islamic Republic gave them the responsibilities and they proved capable. Today we do not feel the bottleneck that existed at that time.

Did the government seek assistance from experts from other Muslim countries?

We have displayed our interest in attracting experts from Islamic countries and presently some of them are working in Iran.

How far is the opposition allowed to play its role in the national political life?

We allow the opposition to be active as long as it does not intend to overthrow the Islamic Republic. But because of the overwhelming support for the system by the majority of the people the opposition is at a disadvantage and it is very difficult for them to muster support among the masses.

However, the policy of the government has been to tolerate the opposition. As an example I can refer to the Freedom Movement and other groups which are presently active. But as for the US, or the Soviet-backed splinter groups, who may intend to overthrow the government by armed means, we will treat them without the slightest forgiveness and this is something which we still follow.

What are the constitutional guarantees given to minorities in Iran?

The minorities have their own representatives at the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis). There are presently a number of Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian members of the Majlis who enjoy all the rights a representative of the Majlis can enjoy. The minorities participate in political and executive affairs but their most prominent activity is the presence of their representatives in the Majlis which is a very important decision making organ.

What efforts have been made to Islamise the economy?

Extensive efforts have been made in this area, the most important of which is the compiling of principles of economy in accordance with the constitution. We have introduced changes in our foreign and internal economy. I would like to emphasize Article 49 of the constitution which has had a very determining effect in dispossessing all the capitalist dependents of the Shah's regime, the US and other Western powers. This has enabled the government to be in control of 80 per cent of the industries. The government, in order to implement these principles in accordance with Article 44 of the constitution, believes that the private sector, the co-operatives and the government should complement each others work. Regarding laws based on articles of the constitution we are still behind. For example as regards the issues of land, foreign trade and taxes, the laws are still incomplete. It would be appropriate to say that, in accordance with our understanding of foreign trade, and its impact on the security of the Islamic Revolution, the government has taken strong control of the situation. Previously, 15 per cent of the country's imports were in the hands of the government and the remaining 85 per cent owned by the private sector. Today, in addition to controlling all foreign trade imports, 80 per cent of the importing is done by the government and co-operatives, and the remaining 20 percent by the private sector. In order not to become dependent and reliant on either the East or the West we have practically banned free foreign trade and we will continue our strong control in this regard in the interests of Islamic Iran.

Inside the country, and particularly in financial and monetary policies, methods have been employed to ensure that banking credits would be given, with priority to the oppressed section of the society in a manner that the gap of income among various classes lessen. In distributing the per capita income between the city and village, the gap on the income has been decreased in the interest of the villagers. These are only the headlines in Iran's economy.

What about Islamic banking?

Today our banks are functioning practically under the guidance of the government and in compliance with Islamic principles and standards. And this is making a gradual but big change in our

economy. We are trying to employ our monetary credits more and more in the service of industrial production and the agriculture sector, and to some extent housing. In contrast with the former regime which was stressing expansion of the service sector our banking system at present is cautious in this regard.

Does Iran follow the interest-free banking system?

Usury has been completely eliminated from our banking system and all the foreign banks, or joint Iran foreign banks established during the former regime, have been dissolved.

Are economic relations with the Muslim countries on the increase since the revolution?

Before the revolution only two per cent of our foreign trade was with other Islamic countries but today it has reached over 15 per cent.

What efforts have been made to bridge the gap between various Muslim sects?

From the very beginning the Islamic Revolution has presented itself as one proclaiming unity among all Islamic people. It has been arguing for the unity of Islamic people against oppressive powers. The emphasis put on the slogan of unity has not only had wide repercussions abroad but has also foiled many plots inside the country. There were efforts in Kurdestan, Azerbaijan and Sistan Baluchistan regions to create a confrontation between Shias and Sunnis, but fortunately today, if you happen to visit these areas and speak to the people you would hear no Shia-Sunni debate but rather the debate is on the revolution and counter-revolution. This has had its repercussions outside as well. We establish links with Islamic liberation forces, either Shia or Sunni, which are fighting oppressive powers and help them as long as our Islamic revolutionary interests are not jeopardised. An example of this is Lebanon where we maintain close ties with our Shia brothers, at the same time we have excellent relations with the Sunni brothers in Tripoli (Lebanon).

Some time ago a committee was formed at the Al-Azhar University in Cairo to discuss the issues concerning relations among various Muslim sects - many of its members were from Iran. What has happened to these efforts?

At that time our Marja was Ayatullah-ul-Uzma Broujerdi. In Egypt Sheikh Shaltut issued a religious decree in this respect which was welcomed by all Iranian religious authorities and we think this religious decree created great understanding among Muslims throughout the world. I remember several of his books, particularly "*The Interpretation of Majmaul Bayan*" which is among reliable Shia sources printed in Egypt. In Iran also many articles, including Sheikh Shaltut's statements, were published which greatly contributed to mutual understanding. The former regime was against these debates and writings. However, the spirit of unity prevails, that is why we are holding the unity week each year during which we invite Shia and Sunni brothers throughout the world to speak on Islam's pivotal problems together. Our Imam as well as other members of the ulema also emphasize the need for unity among various Muslim sects.

There is talk that Iran is keen to export its revolution to other countries. What do you say about this?

In fact what they call the export of revolution is in fact an effort to defend Islam everywhere. At present there are 40 foreign radio stations active against the Islamic Republic of Iran in an attempt to export their own culture and beliefs to our country. No one says anything when the US wants to export its culture to our country. But when we speak about Islam and that Muslims should return to Islam, they say that we intend to export our revolution - if the export of revolution means that we proclaim the message that the dignity of Muslims depends on their return to Islam then we accept that we export the revolution. But if it means intervention in the internal affairs and provocation of other countries, or that we intend to export arms to other countries, we deny this. And what indeed upsets the superpowers is the very upsurge of Islam and Islamic values as well as the awakening among Muslims to Islam. This upsets them and compels them to react.

How do you view the performance of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC)?

We regard the Organisation of Islamic Conference as a forum which can be useful to the Muslim people and their destiny on the condition that in this conference there is a return - though verbal to Islamic

principles and values. Regretably, the Organisation of Islamic Conference is in its most ineffective form at present. In other words, there is no emphasis on principles and values. Just like the Non-Aligned Movement in which from each corner of the East and of the West the countries are present and each wants to use it for its own goals. The policy we have taken is to take part in the conference and raise our own voice. We hope with the awakening of Islamic notions this conference would turn into a powerful and useful gathering.

Does Iran participate in the activities of the various affiliated bodies of the OIC?

Yes, we participate in its committees. For instance, we attended its agricultural and commercial committees held in Turkey recently.

What has Iran gained from participating in international organisations?

We use these organisations as a platform for our own goals and believe that these organisations instead of serving the interests of the world nations are, in fact, serving the big powers. Yet we do not hesitate in using them for our purposes.

Why is Iran so soft in its criticism against the USSR and other socialist block countries?

We did not sustain as much damage from them as we sustained from the US during the last fifty years. However, we strongly hold to our "Neither East nor West" policy. But it is true that the Eastern Bloc countries have adopted a more realistic policy than the West *vis-a-vis* the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In what way is the present oil crisis going to effect the Iranian economy?

We think the oil price cuts will have their effect. But since our economy is based on definite planning we will overcome it. We will fight against this slump in the oil prices, but even if the oil prices decline even further, or remain at their present level, we would use this as a lever to speed up our self sufficiency and independence. We are determined to continue our policy of being independent of the world's monetary powers regardless of the decline in our oil income. As you see today we owe no money to any foreign country, and in the future too, even though the oil prices are decreased by half. Although it seems improbable, as we do not receive any loans from other countries, we do manage our economy on the basis of that very income.

How could the Afghan jihad be strengthened. What would Iran do in this respect?

We believe that the destiny of Afghanistan must be decided by its own people. Islamically, we are obliged to support the people of Afghanistan in order to give them the necessary help to achieve their objective. We have decisively been demanding the withdrawal of the occupying Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and believe that no compromise must take place in this regard. The withdrawal of the Soviet troops will become possible only through the strengthening of the Afghan jihad.

How do you view the war with Iraq?

We have declared our position on the war time and time again: That the aggressor must be condemned. We believe that the war is on a fundamental issue, even though we have prepared ourselves to stand it even for the next 20 years. But as the internal situation of Iraq stands today we find that the morale of its troops is very low. If we take into account the victories

which we recently had I believe it would not be too long before it ends. We are close to victory after inflicting the final blow on the Iraqi regime.

How do you see the peace efforts to end the war?

We have repeatedly said that if the world wants real peace it must support justice. If this support is not given, and if the aggressor is not tried and punished, we would practically have no peace. In order to remain independent we have to adhere to these policies. We also ask international organisations to follow these policies. If they would have looked at the war from the position of justice they would have achieved better results.

How can the guilty be punished?

We want them (world or Muslim world) to explicitly condemn the aggressor. Unfortunately, due to political considerations, we did not find this explicit condemnation among the international organisations. If there was this explicitness then we will find some solution to the punishment of the aggressor.

/12379

CSO: 4600/350

IRAN

U.S. RAID ON LIBYA LABELLED 'INSANE, FOOLISH' ACT

Tehran ABRAR in Persian 17 Apr 86 pp 1, 3

[Text] In the Name of the Exalted.

The decision of the U.S. Government to attack Libya was insane and foolish.

However, a portion of this government's general policy arises from the long-term motivation of every American for world exploitation.

The execution of this decision despite its shameful, brutal and pitiless aspects, was not a sudden action of blind rage, but rather the result of precise calculation and planning from the stage of preparing propaganda material to the stage of carrying out the attack.

We expected greater elegance in the justification of the attack from minds that are the product of the world's largest centers of learning and that have the inheritance of two world wars and several other big wars, the same elegance that for years prepared the ground for deceiving some nationalists and their supporters. However, in the attack on Libya the United States left not even a pretext to preserve the reputation of its defenders.

The sign of the U.S. defeat in the Libyan attack is the weakness of its propaganda experts. No defects appeared in their control and they gained more experience. The difficulty lies in blocking the roads (in which area the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran is affirmed by both friend and foe).

The United States preferred to present the best and firmest reasons for the Libyan attack in order to confuse one group and save another group from infamy, the reactionary Arab rulers belonging to this second group. The insistence on U.S. airplanes taking off from England is chiefly aimed at preserving the Egyptian regime from infamy. The British people, save a small part of them, will not raise their voices in protest over use of that country's bases. However, the Egyptian situation was more explosive than this.

For several years U.S. policy has rested on attack and aggression without an excuse. This policy was tested for the first time with impudence and shamelessness in the attack on Grenada.

U.S. military intervention in Lebanon supporting the aggression of the regime occupying Jerusalem was a different form of the same policy. And now we see it in Libya with a more naked face. Although the Grenadan adventure had an important worldwide reaction, it was not followed up, and apparently the uproar subsided. In Lebanon the job did not proceed according to plan. Libya has just begun. It can be assumed that following the sinister sound of U.S. airplanes in the Libyan sky, the turn will come for Egyptian forces on Libyan soil. Then we should expect Israel to provoke an incident on the Syrian borders. There are dangers ahead that must be prevented.

Some regional circles frightened of power turned hopeful eyes towards the Soviet Union's reaction. These circles do not consider their our people anything but pawns in the game of the superpowers. They spend their days and nights in doing their global equations. The region's people, although they take all factors into consideration in their struggles, must mainly rely on their own force. If any doubt in this regard existed, the astonishing victories of the Iranian combatants in the impressive actions such as the liberation of Faw must remove all doubts.

The Soviet Union itself is one of the two pillars of the world's superpower system, and seeking refuge from one in the other comes from weakness and helplessness, and only exchanges one bondage for another.

If the region's people endeavor to resist tyranny they can, despite all the difficulties. Population, ideological unity, wealth, the support of other Muslim countries, the support of the oppressed world-wide, the daily increasing spiritual and even material decline of the Western system, and above all, the righteousness of this front and the unrighteousness of the enemy's front, and hope in exalted God, project a birght future.

The officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran displayed the first positive position-taking. They announced that they would stand at Libya's side against U.S. aggression. In light of the fact that Iran is itself involved in an imposed war, this position-taking must bring those governments looking for an excuse to stand aside.

Another step taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran is the call for an oil and economic boycott against the United States. Such actions are necessary in the war against global thugs. And without them, nothing will come of condemnations and expressions of distaste and regret.

9597/12232

CSO: 4640/304

IRAN

TEHRAN CRITICIZES THATCHER'S ISRAEL VISIT

GF291441 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1100 GMT 29 May 86

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpt] What made the British prime minister visit occupied Palestine, particularly as she is the first British prime minister to visit Palestine since the Zionist regime was established there 39 years ago? What are the reasons behind this visit? The answer is not complicated, because all the plans are now clear, and there is nothing vague regarding the British role, which is designed to bolster and strengthen the Zionist entity.

The decision by British prime ministers since 1948 not to make an official visit to occupied Palestine and the careful adoption of positions--whose outward appearance showed amity and friendliness with the Arab governments, while inwardly they reveal grudges toward all the Arabs and Muslims--were neither intended to care for the feelings of the Arab and Islamic peoples nor to avoid enraging them or provoking their dissatisfaction with Britain. This position was attributed to the fact that the international conditions which followed the conclusion of World War II--as the allies were victorious--did not permit unveiling the faces of the superpowers. These conditions required that these imperialist powers hide their somber faces and seek Arab amity as the Arabs possess huge petroleum wealth in their countries. Everyone knows the extent of the superpower's need, including Britain, which was victorious in the war, for petroleum to rebuild what was damaged by the war. These powers, including Britain as we mentioned earlier, did their best to gain the friendship of the Arab countries in order to pillage their oil resources and thus operate the economic machinery in the West. Now as international imperialism executed its means successive plots--which resulted in creating an imbalance in the petroleum market due to the role played by British imperialism through collusion with some reactionary petroleum governments--petroleum markets faced unusual recession. The imperialist powers exploited this recession to make the peoples fall to their knees and neglect them.

The fact is that as the rulers of the largest Arab country--which is Egypt--signed a peace treaty with the Zionist enemy, as the gates of the African

Continent and of many Arab countries were opened to U.S. imperialism and to the Zionist enemy, and as the reactionary rulers continue to talk about secure Zionist borders, there were no justifications--under these conditions--to conceal the relations with the Zionist entity or not to put all the eggs in the Zionist basket. From this premise, the visit of Thatcher to occupied Palestine took place. This visit revealed the malice of all the rulers of the reactionary regime who pant after holy shrines in London, Washington, and Tel Aviv.

/6662

CSO: 4604/37

IRAN

SHEIKH SHA'BAN: SOVIETS NEVER ASSIST ARABS WHEN IN NEED

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 20 Apr 86 p 2

[Text] Beirut, IRNA. In the Friday prayer sermons this week, which were delivered in Mansuri Mosque in the city of Tripoli, Sheikh Sha'ban, the head of the Islamic monotheistic movement in Lebanon, attacked the compromising positions of the Arab rulers with regard to their nations and their deadly silence with regard to the U.S. crimes and said: Muslims are fully aware of the reality of the U.S. policy, which stems from the hostility of Zionism against Islam. But more painful than this conspiracy for us is the compromising position of some of the Arabs who have imposed an atmosphere of dictatorship and terrorism over their people and are even afraid of relations between two brothers. He said: With their silence against the U.S. crime, these rulers endorse these hostile actions.

Sheikh Sha'ban also criticized the deceptive position of the Soviet Union against the Arabs and said: The Soviet Union always supports the Arabs before and after the conflicts, but during the war keeps aside. It has shown us this shameful behavior in all stages and its false attitude is not unknown to anyone. Sa'id Sha'ban added: The Islamic nation has been compromised by the political games of the East and the West because of this infamous conspiracy. Hence, the only way to liberate the nation is in unity and a coordinated fight against the colonialists of the East and the West. He added: The only decision that must be made with regard to the recent aggression of the United States against the Muslim nation of Libya is a united decision which would make the repetition of such aggression impossible.

According to the CENTRAL NEWS UNIT from Beirut, Sheikh Sha'ban added: Behaving in a reactionary manner and killing foreigners who reside in Lebanon is not a proper course of action, because such methods will make us the target of the same accusations that we levy against the enemy. We do not have the right to imitate the United States and Israel in responding to these crimes, because such reactionary imitation will harm the sanctity of our Islamic plan. The head of the Islamic monotheistic movement added: Fighting against the oppressive conspiracies against the Islamic nation is only possible through united decision making. Then, referring to the confusion of the Arabs, which is the natural result of their following the policies of the East and the West, addressing them, he said: Your salvation is only in ideological unity and your unity in political decision making and military coordination. Once

we are united and under a united Muslim leadership, then we can tell the West and the East that we are a nation apart from the two superpowers and will not allow anyone to invade our sanctuary.

Interview with Seyyed Ebrahim Amin

On the other hand, Seyyed Ebrahim Amin, one of the Hezbollah clerics of Lebanon, announced that the U.S. aggression on Lebanon took place to strike a blow against the oppressed nations of the region and the great Islamic movement of Iran, which has changed the political balance in the region.

According to the CENTRAL NEWS UNIT from Beirut, in an interview published in this week's issue of AL-'AHD, the organ of the Hezbollah, Seyyed Ebrahim Amin emphasized that it is not unlikely that the United States will engage in terrorist acts against Muslims in Lebanon as well. He added: The present stage is the age of terrorism by the oppressive governments and large governments who, having lost hope in their puppets, engage in direct attacks on nations. It has been observed that this new method has been carried out by the great governments from the beginning of the victory of the Islamic revolution of Iran, with the oppressed nations of Lebanon, Palestine, Afghanistan and Nicaragua having indirectly risen to confront the oppressive forces.

In conclusion, emphasizing the unity of Muslims to fight against the joint aggression of the United States and Israel, Seyyed Ebrahim Amin said: The scene must either be controlled by the United States or dominated by Islam.

10,000

CSO: 4640/309

IRAN

REPORTER DESCRIBES 'ENTHUSIASM' FOR WAR IN POPULACE

East Burnham ARABIA/THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English No 57, May 86 pp 42-43

[Article by Aslam Abdullah]

[Text]

"Jung, Jung Ta Peerozi" (War, war, until victory), appears nowadays to be the most popular slogan in Iran. Written on almost every visible place in Tehran, Qum, Khorasan, Mashhad, Ahwaz and other large and small towns the slogan tells visitors that the people are behind their government in rejecting any mediation to negotiate a settlement with Iraq. Even on 1 April, when Prime Minister Meer Hussain Mousavi rose to address the people assembled at Tehran University to celebrate the seventh anniversary of the Islamic Republic the only slogan that was audible was "war, war, until victory". Mousavi had to wait for seven minutes before the vast crowd settled for his speech.

Probably Iran's military advances in the Faw region have made people in Iran feel somewhat triumphant. The belief is widespread now that the war against Iraq could be won. Muhammad al-Khan, an Iranian journalist said: "I oppose mediation before any decisive victory", while Mansuri, a resident of the poor quarters of Southern Tehran said: "Mediation, what mediation? We have already won." People all over Iran see in the Faw operation a great opportunity to finish the war by the end of this year. "Not even in previous years have so many people come forward to volunteer for the war", said a high level Iranian official in the Ministry of Revolutionary Guards Corps. Feelings are that Iran is preparing for a final push in the Faw and other war regions to finish off the war by the end of this year. A major offensive in the near future should not be ruled out.

In almost every village and city people are converging around the revolutionary guards offices to enlist. Young, old, children and even disabled can be seen in the queues outside recruitment offices. Among the volunteers are a great number of clergymen who until now were active in mobilising support for the war.

On Sunday 6 April, Tehran daily newspapers published a special application form to be filled in by volunteers who want to be despatched to the front. In order to mobilise the maximum number for the war, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Ali Reza Afshar, has even allowed people who have previously failed to pass the military courses to sign up.

Many of the new fighters are from schools and universities. On 10 April the university students held the biggest gathering in Iran, in solidarity with Ayatullah Khomeini's call for greater participation of skilled manpower in the war. The first group consisting of post-graduate and under-graduate students has already been dispatched to the Faw and other war zones.

The Iranian leadership, as well as the people, are confident that the war could come to an early end. Their confidence stems from three sources: First, within Iran a close link exists between the people and the government; Secondly, Iranians feel that the world in general, and the Muslim countries in particular, are withdrawing their support from the Saddam Hussain regime; Thirdly the Iranian leadership feel that there now exists a strong Iraqi resistance movement capable of diverting the Saddam Hussain forces away from the front.

Iranians, especially those who are more involved with the revolution, are bitter that Muslim countries have not

done enough to condemn the Saddam Hussain regime for starting a war that was unnecessary and futile. If Muslim countries, especially the Organisation of Islamic Conference declares Iraq as an aggressor, peace could result quickly, they feel. There are some Iranians who consider that mediation should be tried to bring an end to the war. But they realise that so much has been put at stake that a negotiated settlement at this stage is impossible. None of them is certain whether the recent military offensive will bring the desired result. They argue that the deepening oil crisis and Saddam Hussain's capacity to muster support for his survival would further prolong the war without any visible victory for either side.

"Even if Saddam Hussain succeeds in surviving we are ready to fight for the next fifty years", said Jaafar Abbas, a revolutionary guard who has lost a limb in the war. Abbas and others are banking upon the sentiments which exist. These sentiments have overcome even the fears caused by the occasional bomb blasts in Teheran, or other places, exploited in turn by the government's opponents. The bomb blast at Maidan Aam, in Tehran, which killed one person and injured 20 others last month did not create any panic in the nearby areas where people had gathered to welcome Iranian combatants.

But it must be said that the additional burden of having to cope with internal subversion and economic difficulties will undoubtedly affect significantly the capacity of Iran to carry on with the war.

/12379

CSO: 4600/351

IRAN

FIRST MILITARY TRAINING OF TEACHERS BEGINS IN TEHRAN

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 20 Apr 86 p 1

[Text] The first military training of the instructors and officials for the sisters was inaugurated with the participation of 450 women members of the mobilization unit of the Guards Corps from throughout the country yesterday in the Martyr Bahonar camp in Tehran.

In this course, various techniques of public defense will be taught to prepare the sister instructors to teach in the Her Holiness Zahra training centers throughout the country.

The sisters participating in this training course will, in addition, become acquainted with techniques of dealing with chemical, biological, and radioactivity defense and emergency and rescue training.

According to IRNA, Hojjat ol-Eslam Rahmani, the head of the mobilization of the Guards Corps, spoke at the opening ceremonies of the first military training course for instructors and officials of the sisters, emphasized the necessity for everyone to become acquainted with defense techniques and mentioned the areas of success in this important area.

The head of the mobilization unit of the Guards Corps referred to the various dimensions of the invasion of oppression against Islam and Islamic values and said: The global oppressor has learned many methods of fighting this movement since the victory of the Islamic revolution and we consider it necessary that simultaneous with the existing presence of the Islamic combatants on the battle fronts and violent confrontation with the enemy, all strata of the society as well as the sisters should acquire the necessary readiness to confront the latest possible conspiracy of the enemy and the likelihood of an expansive, overall invasion of our Islamic homeland so that the grounds for the materialization of the imam's emphasis on the necessity for the participation of everyone in the public defense of the country is provided.

In this area, he also emphasized: Learning and teaching introductory defense techniques is a necessity and we hope that the sisters in our country will also acquire the preliminaries of public defense.

The head of the mobilization unit of the Guards Corps expressed hope that in the future more resources would be provided for the technical defensive training of the sisters and added: For this purpose, some programs are being studied to acquaint the sisters with the principles of public defense in schools. Also, in the future in Tehran a special barracks will be established for this matter.

10,000

CSO: 4640/309

IRAN

LEBANESE MUJAHIDIN DESCRIBE DIMENSIONS OF MUSLIM RESISTANCE

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 20 Apr 86 p 11

[Interview with Lebanese Mujahidin on 19 Apr 86 by the media; place not specified]

[Text] Several Mujahidin members of the Islamic resistance group of Lebanon, who have been invited to Iran following their release from Atlit prison of the Zionists, participated in a press, radio and television interview yesterday morning and responded to questions.

According to IRNA, in the beginning of the interview, several of the combative clerics of southern Lebanon, referring to the history of the struggles of the Muslim nation of Lebanon, explained the various dimensions of these struggles against the colonialists and Zionist occupiers.

"Sheikh 'Abbas Harb," one of the unrelenting, combative relatives of Sheikh Ragheb Harb, explained the struggles of the Muslim brothers in Lebanon and said: Lebanon has always been of special importance in the region from a political, economic and social perspective. It is not without reason that the occupiers of Jerusalem see their survival only in the destruction of the Islamic movement in Lebanon and it is not without reason that a large number of Lebanese Muslim Mujahidin are in Zionist prisons.

"Nabi al-Hejazi," one of the Mujahidin strugglers of the south, explained the situation of the Zionist prisons and the torture methods used on the prisoners and said: Various kinds of torture are carried out in the prisons of the occupiers. I am one of the people who was tortured. The torture methods of the Zionists include solitary confinement, electric shock on sensitive parts of the body, or sticking wires in the genitals of the prisoners, which causes sterility. Also, they place a bag on the prisoner's head during interrogation.

Another Mujahed said in this connection: I was injured and captured during a military mission. After being transferred to the Zionist hospital, I was tortured in various ways, including opening the wounds on my body.

Referring to the questions asked by interrogators, he added: Among the issues that were raised after they learned that we were Shi'ites was whether we emulated Imam Khomeyni or Ayatollah Kho'i. One of the interesting points that they would ask us was: Is there in your Koran or reported traditions anything about the liberation of Jerusalem by the Muslim combatants and Imam Khomeyni?

"Sheikh 'Adel Munes," the Friday imam of the city of (Behyas), referring to their collective release by the Zionists, said: The main reason for our release was the escalation of the Islamic resistance in southern Lebanon, which has inflicted severe blows on the Zionists so far. According to the statements of one of the security officials of the Zionist occupiers, since the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran, this method of struggle has been expanding increasingly.

He added: Another factor in our release was the exchange of prisoners during the hijacking of the U.S. T.W.A airplane and bringing this airplane to Beirut with several U.S. and Zionist officials among the passengers on the flight.

"Sheikh Moharram 'Arefi," considering the U.S. imperialist aggression on the Islamic country of Libya, said: The U.S. aggression on Islamic borders in itself shows the oppressive and aggressive nature of the superpowers. We declare that under such circumstances, it is the duty of all Muslims to continue their struggle against the United States and not to stop until the liberation of all the oppressed people from the claws of these powers.

"Ahmad Nazar," another Muslim struggler of southern Lebanon, emphasized the support of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his brothers in Lebanon and said: The efforts of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Lebanon are always towards eliminating oppression from the oppressed, which is welcomed by all the Islamic resistance groups in Lebanon.

"Sheikh Mohammad Qobeysi," one of the combative clerics of southern Lebanon, declared in this regard: We believe that the cultural aid of the Islamic Republic of Iran to their Lebanese brothers has resulted in the cultural growth of the Muslims.

"Allameh Sheikh 'Adel Munes," referring to the role of the Zionist functionaries in the recent conflicts around the camps of Sabra and Shatila, said: The war between the camps in Lebanon is only a game that has been escalated by 'Arafat, and it is the duty of all Lebanese Muslims not to get involved in these conflicts, because this is the ultimate Zionist goal to redirect Muslims away from them towards internal and group conflicts.

He added: While the imam of the nation asks for the attention of all Muslims of the world to fight the occupiers, the mercenary elements in Lebanon, by raising these differences, cause the deviation of the struggles of the Muslims.

Referring to the statements of Martyr Musa Sadr, who had told 'Arafat that Jerusalem would not be liberated except by relying on Islamic power, he said:

Believing this statement, we think that 'Arafat and any other leader who wants to fight the Zionists through political games will end in nothing but defeat.

At the end of the interview, "Sheikh Moharram 'Arefi," referring to the question of the REUTER'S reporter, who asked the views of Lebanese clerics in connection with the assassination of foreign nationals, said: You can be certain that Islam is a religion of mercy and justice. But the problem that exists in Lebanon is the influence of the mercenaries of the oppressors among the lines of the strugglers.

He added: In the Koran and other holy books, such as the Tora, God has promised his followers suffering actions and blows similar to those the Muslims suffer at the hands of oppressive governments that they will certainly be responded to in kind. You should know that anyone who has no ill intentions towards the Muslims, regardless of what nationality he is, will be safe in the Islamic lands.

10,000

CSO: 4640/309

IRAN

BAZARGAN SAYS GROUP NOT ALTERNATIVE TO GOVERNMENT

London MEED/THE MIDDLE EAST'S BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 10-16 May 86 pp 14-15

[Text] The first new opposition group set up since the early days following the February 1979 revolution held a public meeting on 5 May, apparently with official approval. The group, which includes former prime minister Mehdi Bazargan, is against the continuation of the Gulf war and intends to act as a pressure group in defence of constitutional freedoms.

The Association for the Defence of Freedom & Sovereignty of the Iranian Nation was formed one month ago. Its 20-member central council is led by Bazargan, and consists of veteran politicians, including seven members of Bazargan's 1979 provisional government. Five are also members of Bazargan's Freedom Movement — which was set up in 1961 in opposition to the Shah and which has since 1983 been the only legal opposition party.

The association includes lawyers, university professors, and a rich bazaar merchant. Former Tehran mayor Mohammad Tavassoli says the group can count on "enormous positive support" from government officials, the middle classes and the bazaaris, who believe the revolution's aims have not been realised.

According to the group's manifesto, the Islamic republic is in economic and social crisis; it talks of violence, repression, lawlessness and unwanted continuation of the war with Iraq. The group aims to hold meetings and publish material "to familiarise people with their rights. . . to protest and take collective action in cases of violations of the nation's rights. . . to restore electoral freedoms. . . (and) to defend individual rights."

Bazargan commands great respect — even if not political support — among most Iranians. He told Reuter on 5 May that the association did not want to be "an alternative to the government." It supported the revolution and the constitution, and is "working within the system."

Meetings of his Freedom Movement have often been disrupted by Muslim radicals, who consider him too western-oriented. A particular problem has been his call for a negotiated settlement of the war; some officials, including the powerful majlis (parliament) Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani, have compared his group to a fifth column.

Other senior religious leaders, particularly Ayatollah Hossain Ali Montazeri — Imam Khomeini's designated successor — have long urged officials to open the way for opponents such as Bazargan, as part of general political liberalisation. The republic is too stable to be endangered by its critics, Montazeri has argued; their suppression will only create unnecessary difficulties.

The emergence of Bazargan and the association would seem to be a victory for those urging a more liberal outlook. One week before the association's first public meeting, Prime Minister Hossain Moussavi said opposition groups inside Iran would be allowed to operate provided they did not seek to overthrow the republic.

"The policy of the government has been to tolerate the opposition," he said. "As an example, I can refer to the Freedom Movement and other groups which are presently active. But as for the US or Soviet-backed splinter groups, who may intend to overthrow the government by armed means, we will treat them without the slightest forgiveness."

/13046
CSO: 4600/341

IRAN

COUNTRY'S COMMERCIAL, ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES REPORTED

London MEED/THE MIDDLE EAST'S BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 10-16 May 86
pp 14-15

[Text] **Tehran refinery damaged**

The Tehran refinery at Rey was damaged by Iraqi aircraft on 7 May. This is the second Iraqi attack on a refinery since the Iranian military offensive in Iraq's Fao peninsula.

Tehran reports say an Iraqi aircraft dropped a bomb "as big as a car" in the centre of the refinery, setting off a blaze that lasted for more than three hours. The fire was apparently well away from the two vital catalytic cracking towers. It was not known if the control room was damaged, but several people appear to have died. An official announcement says one unit of the refinery was partially damaged.

The damage seems to have been sufficiently serious to result in a shutdown of at least a few days' duration. Motorists in Tehran are already queueing at petrol stations, in anticipation of shortages.

The Tehran refinery produces more than 200,000 barrels a day (b/d) of oil products. With the 230,000 b/d Isfahan refinery, it meets about two-thirds of domestic needs. The Isfahan refinery was slightly damaged in an Iraqi attack in March (MEED 5:4:86).

German Oil wants to renew supply contract

Negotiations about the renewal of a contract to buy 150,000 barrels a day (b/d) of crude oil are being held in Hamburg by **German Oil Corporation** and a visiting **National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)** team. The company's present contract — signed in April 1985 for 75,000 b/d and expanded in October to 150,000 b/d — runs out at the end of May (MEED 26:10:85).

German Oil plans to buy 75,000 b/d on a netback basis and a similar amount at prices determined by the spot market. Observers say negotiations on the latter arrangement may be difficult — and possibly delayed — because of the collapse in oil prices.

German Oil supplies the crude to West German and Dutch refineries, for resale in Germany. The company was set up in April 1985 by the state of Lower Saxony to buy out **Mobil Oil Corporation's** refinery at the North Sea port of Wilhelmshaven. The refinery was mothballed pending the outcome of the negotiations. There is a possibility that Iran and/or Saudi Arabia may also buy shares in it.

The refinery needs low-priced crude to make it economically viable. The Lower Saxony government wants it reopened to reduce unemployment in the region. Regional elections scheduled for June have added an extra political dimension to the negotiations with Mobil, and officials are reluctant to discuss details.

Foreign loans out

The government will not resort to foreign loans to make up for the recent sharp drop in oil income, Prime Minister Hossain Moussavi says. Instead, it will take advantage of foreign exchange shortages to "speed up our self-sufficiency and (economic) independence."

Moussavi was speaking amid increasing signs that the government plans a general economic mobilisation to reduce dependence on oil revenue (MEED 3:5:86). Oil income in 1986 may drop below \$10,000 million, compared with a projected \$17,500 million — and a record \$23,000 million in 1983.

Iran is determined not to resume overseas borrowing. It now owes no money to foreign countries and will not borrow from them again, Moussavi says--despite recent speculation on international financial markets that the country will soon be forced to approach European banks for loans.

The government's plans for self-sufficiency are being signalled by several senior officials.

Industries Minister Gholamreza Shafei has described the reduced oil revenues as a "blessing in disguise" that will enable Iran to pursue policies more compatible with its basic needs. Disclosing that the majlis (parliament) has given ministries an extra \$900 million to enable priority development projects to keep going, Shafei said workers could not help "but become more imaginatively industrious" under pressure. He called for an expansion of the machinery and heavy industry sectors to serve military industries.

Majlis mines and metals committee chairman M Vaeqi says priority is being given to providing foreign exchange for strategic "industrial and production units," rather than for imports of consumer goods.

At a three-day seminar on taxation, Economy & Finance Minister Mohammad Javad Iravani said tax revenues should provide 80-90 per cent of the country's current expenses, with oil income being spent on development. In the year to 20 March, tax income rose by 14 per cent compared with the previous year, but accounted for only 39 per cent of budget income; still he said, this was better than the 20 per cent share of 1976. Oil income in the year to 20 March accounted for 44 per cent of budget revenue.

Concerning greater reliance on domestic production, the prime minister said it is possible that, for a time, the goods available to the public might be of low quality. But, he added, the people would

no doubt prefer plain goods to luxury foreign ones. Iranians "should rely on domestic capital investments, work and production, and regulate our consumption with our production capacity."

In a report to the cabinet, Heavy Industries Minister Behzad Nabavi has outlined some of his ministry's plans for self-sufficiency; these will cost about \$3,000 million over the next two years. The plans focus on iron and steel works, whose output would save \$110 million a year in foreign exchange. The **Hepco** heavy machinery complex in Arak is being expanded and will save a further \$125 million in foreign exchange annually. Other schemes include diesel engine manufacture, and a shipbuilding and repair yard.

Nabavi revealed that a complex is being set up to provide machinery for oil and sugar refineries, and for power stations and cement works. He referred to the scheme as the Azarab project.

IN BRIEF

- A plan to diversify oil export terminals, thereby reducing oil exports' vulnerability to Iraqi air attack, was presented to the cabinet in late April by Oil Minister Gholamreza Aqazadeh, the official Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reports. European, Japanese and South Korean firms are awaiting a decision on planned export pipeline schemes (MEED 5:4:86).

- Zimbabwe is to supply 100,000 tonnes of maize, valued at \$13 million, according to an Iranian team that had talks in Harare recently. Other supplies will include 100 tonnes of tea and 200 tonnes of coffee. A second team is to visit Harare soon, to discuss purchases of asbestos, steel, tobacco, beef and hides.

- The Tehran Regional Water Board has invited local companies to bid for construction of irrigation networks in Varamin, south of Tehran, and in Garmsar, just east of the capital. Each scheme will cost an estimated \$6 million.

- Two tankers used on the Kharg-Sirri oil shuttle service were damaged in Iraqi air attacks near Kharg island in early May, Gulf shipping observers say. They are the 134,011-ton Cypriot-registered Superior and the 103,163-ton Liberian-registered Energy Mobility.

- Floods and earthquakes in early May killed at least 20 people and caused extensive damage in the south and southwest. The floods, in the Zagros mountains, swept away 15 bridges and cut the strategic railway to the southern war front for 24 hours. The quakes in the Khanj area, 900 kilometres south of Tehran, left thousands homeless.

● The Pachin munitions complex opened a gunpowder unit in late April, in a ceremony attended by Prime Minister Hossain Moussavi. The complex, just east of Tehran, was built by the Shah's regime; it was believed to have started work on producing medium-range surface-to-surface missiles.

● Afghanistan has protested about recent Iranian television interviews with two Muslim rebel leaders, saying they constitute a provocative act that should be stopped. Iranian television can be seen in west Afghanistan. The two are Shaikh Husaini, of the Shia group Nasr, and Nasrullah Mansoor, of the Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami party. There are nearly 2 million Afghan refugees in Iran.

● The **Pars Wagon** plant has signed a contract with the **State Railways Organisation** to supply 400 passenger wagons over the next three and a half years. The plant produced 882 wagons in the Iranian year ended 20 March.

● Waiting time for general cargo vessels at Bandar Abbas is 10-30 days, the London daily Lloyd's List reports.

● The majlis (parliament) has approved article 10 of a proposed bill defining presidential powers (MEED 26:4:86). The article gives the president the right to veto bills within 30 days of majlis approval.

● Mohammad Taqi Mohammadi, former charge d'affaires in Afghanistan, has committed suicide in prison while under investigation for a 1981 bombing which killed the then president and prime minister, according to the Tehran daily Resalat. Without saying when the suicide took place, the daily added that "a number of prime ministry employees of 1981 and others from other institutions and organisations have been arrested in connection with the bombing of the prime ministry building." No one claimed responsibility for the bombing at the time, when the authorities were engaged in a violent confrontation with the leftist-Islamic Mojaheddin-e Khalq guerrillas and supporters of the ousted president Bani-Sadr. That explosion and an earlier one at the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) headquarters, which killed more than 72 people, have generally been blamed on the Mojaheddin.

/13046

CSO: 4600/342

IRAN

ARTICLE EXAMINES WORKINGS OF INTEREST-FREE BANKING

East Burnham ARABIA/THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English May 86 pp 64-65

[Text] With the aim of eliminating riba from the banking system in Iran, an elaborate legal framework has been created with specific guidelines for the Central Banking authority as well as for the commercial banks. The law for Riba-Free Banking, containing 27 articles and four notes, was ratified by the Majlis Shoaraye Islami and approved by the Council of Guardians on August 30, 1983.

The law included a provision that with its ratification all contravening laws and regulations shall be null and void. It was further laid down in the law that by-laws under it shall be drawn by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance at the recommendation of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran and put into effect after approval by the Council of Ministers. For the drafting and approval of the by-laws, the law provided a time limit of four months.

The law for riba-free Banking together with by-laws drawn under it, have had the involvement of the following:

- Council of Guardian
- Majlis Shoaraye Islami (Islamic Consultative Assembly)
- Council of Ministers
- Ministry of Economic Affairs & Finance
- Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran

The high level of involvement is indicative of the importance and seriousness which has been attached to elimination of riba from the banking system in Iran.

Qard-e-Hasana

The law for riba-free banking in Iran besides describing the technical functions of a banking system, gives top most place to the establishment of a monetary and

credit system based on fairness and justice (as delineated by Islamic Jurisprudence). It also advocates the creation of necessary facilities for the extension of cooperation and Qard-e-Hasana (interest-free loan) among the general public through mobilisation of surplus funds and its utilisation for creation of employment and investment opportunities as stipulated in Article 43 of the Constitution of the country.

To promote the concept of Qard-e-Hasana as an instrument for the realisation of the aims of Article 43 of the Constitution, banks are obliged to earmark a portion of their resources for providing Qard-e-Hasana (interest-free loans) which shall be provided in accordance with rules adopted by the Money and Credit Council and endorsed by the Prime Minister. Qard-e-Hasana shall be provided for the following purpose:

- to provide equipment, tools and other necessary resources so as to enable the creation of employment, in the form of cooperative bodies, for those who lack the necessary means.
- to enable expansion in production with particular emphasis on agricultural, livestock and industrial products.
- to meet essential needs.

Expenses incurred by banks on providing Qard-e-Hasana shall be collected from the borrowers and the basis for the calculation of their expenses shall be laid down by the Central Bank.

Other modes of financing

Besides Qard-e-Hasana banks are authorised to enter into civil partnership with their customers to earn a profit. The civil partnership shall dissolve upon

accomplishment of the objectives of the partnership. Banks are authorised to provide part of the capital of a new joint stock company and also to purchase shares of the existing joint stock companies. The ratio of banks' participation in the capital of joint stock companies is to be determined by the Central Bank.

In addition to financial participation by banks in the form of civil or legal partnership, banks are authorised to make direct investment of capital in productive, profit-making developmental projects but investment by banks in the production of luxury or non-essential goods is not permitted. Direct investment by a bank in any project is required to be not less than 40 per cent for which banks are required to submit their plans to the Central Bank for submission to Majlis Shorraye Islami along with the Annual Budget Bill. When a project in which banks had made direct investment goes into operation, the shares held by banks may be offered for sale to the public in coordination with the High Council of Banks.

For the expansion of trade and commerce, banks are authorised to provide cash capital to agents (Modarib who can be a real or a legal person) under a Modaraba arrangement. Under this mode of financing preference is to be given to legally established Cooperatives. Banks, however, are not permitted to enter into Modaraba arrangements with private sector for financing of imports.

For providing working capital to productive units, banks are permitted to make advance purchase of their products at a fixed price with due observance of Shariah. In forward delivery transactions specifications of the product, time of delivery, price etc. have to be settled in advance but banks are forbidden to sell the product so bought before the date of its delivery except where the product is delivered to the bank before the agreed date.

Banks are also authorised to engage in the construction of low-cost housing units. The Central Bank formulates every year a programme of building low-cost housing units and communicates the same to banks for implementation. This is done in accordance with the policy of the Ministry of Housing and Town Planning.

Banks are authorised to provide working capital financing to productive units by purchasing raw material, spare parts, working tools and other items on

their request for sale to them on the basis of deferred payment in instalments. The transaction involves three parties i.e. the seller, bank and the purchaser. In estimating the requirements of a productive unit, the quantity of raw material sufficient for one production cycle has to be taken into consideration. The period for collecting the value of goods sold by banks on deferred payment is not to exceed one production cycle or one year at the most. For new productive units the time limit of one year can be exceeded at the discretion of the banks. For providing facilities for expansion in industry, mining, agriculture and services, banks are authorised to purchase machinery and other equipment for sale to their clients on the basis of deferred payment in instalments. Such articles can also be financed on the basis of hire-purchase.

Housing units constructed by banks can be sold either on the basis of deferred payment in instalments or on the basis of hire-purchase. Banks are, however, required to obtain as 'Payment on account' at least ten per cent of the total cost as part of the rental over the period of hire-purchase. If the account is settled by a hirer before the end of hiring period, he is entitled to a suitable rebate on the balance of rentals remaining due.

Deposits

Banks are allowed to accept deposits from their customers under the following heads:

Qard-e-Hasana Deposits

Investment Term Deposits

Qard-e-Hasana deposits

Under this category, deposits are accepted in Current as well as in Savings accounts which differ in their operational rules. Accepted as interest-free loans from their customers, banks undertake and guarantee the repayment on demand of the principal sum of the Qard-e-Hasana deposits. Deposits in Savings Accounts, therefore, do not participate in the profit or loss of the banks. Qard-e-Hasana deposits received in Current and Savings Accounts are considered under law as part of the "Bank's Resources." However, with a view to encourage mobilisation of deposits in Savings and Current Accounts under the category of Qard-e-Hasana, banks at their discretion, but without any contractual obligation, may grant to such depositors rewards in the form of (a) non-

fixed bonuses in cash or kind (b) reduction/exemption from commission for bank services and (c) priority in the use of banking facilities. The type, level, minimum and maximum of such rewards is to be approved by the Money and Credit Council. Interest-based savings deposits existing on March 20, 1985 were deemed to have been converted under law to Qard-e-Hasana category of Savings Deposits.

Investment term deposits

Banks are permitted to accept deposits under this category for long and short terms. The terms and conditions governing the Investment Term Deposits are to be approved by the Money and Credit Council. Investment Term Deposits are considered as 'Depositors Resources' which are utilised by banks in their capacity as 'attorneys'. Banks undertake or insure at their expense the repayment of the principal sum of the Investment Term Deposits except where such deposits are received for use in specified projects. Even in such cases, insurance of the principal amount can be arranged.

Profit derived by banks from their operations is divided pro-rata between "bank's resources" and "depositors resources." For this purpose, an amount of statutory reserve requirement is deducted from the total of Investment Term Deposits. The banks' remuneration for acting as 'attorney' for utilising the Investment Term Deposits is charged from the depositors' share of the profits. The minimum and maximum of a bank's remuneration is approved by the Money and Credit Council. Banks are required to give priority to the full utilisation of "Depositors Resources". If the total financing by a bank is less or equal to the total of Investment Term Deposits (net of statutory reserve requirements) the entire profit earned shall be divisible among the "depositors resources". Financing in excess of the 'net' amount of Investment Term Deposits shall be treated to have been funded out 'banks resource'.

Interest-based fixed deposits with maturities extending beyond March 20, 1985 not converted by that date, were transferred into Sundry Deposit Accounts under advice to the depositors.

Inter-bank transactions

The banks may provide part of the resources needed by other banks. In doing so priority is to be given to the utilisation of "depositors resources". Where "depositors resources" are provided by one bank to another, the receiving bank as the proxy of the providing bank, is required to use the funds solely for the purpose approved under the Law. The remuneration for 'attorney function' for utilising the deposits by the receiving bank shall be as agreed to between the transacting banks but shall not exceed the rates prescribed by the competent authority as provided for in the Law.

Where funds are provided by one bank to another out of "banks resources" the funds obtained by the receiving bank are to be considered as its own resource. The profit earned on such interbank transactions is to be applied as income to the account of the providing bank and as expense to the account of the receiving bank.

Non-fund based income

The Law provides that funds received as commission and fees constitute banks' income and cannot be distributed among the depositors.

Control by Central Bank

In its dealing with other banks, the Central Bank is not authorised to engage in banking operations which involve 'Riba'. The Central Bank is empowered to intervene and supervise the monetary and banking operations, with the approval of the Money and Credit Council, by availing itself of the following measures:

- a. determining the various fields for investment and partnership with due regard to the economic policy approved by the Council of Ministers.
- b. determining the minimum rate of projected profit for the purpose of selection of investments.
- c. determining minimum and/or maximum share of profit for banks in Modaraba and partnership. The range of profit rates may differ for various fields of activity.
- d. determining at least once a year the ratio in which 'banks resources' and 'depositors resources' shall be utilised in each area of activity or for each approved mode of financing.
- e. determining the maximum limit for each type of facility or total facilities to be allowed to a customer.

f. determining the range of the remuneration for various 'attorney functions' rendered by banks in utilising the Investment Term Deposits.

g. determining the rules governing the range of commission for various banking services. The maximum rate of commission not to exceed the cost of rendering the service.

h. determining the range of rewards on Qard-e-Hasana deposits and the regulating bank's promotional activities in this respect.

Conclusion

The model of riba-free banking adopted in Iran is based on the principle of Modaraba while the model adopted in Pakistan is conceived on the pattern of Musharika. This explains the variations in details of the two models. In Iran the deposits of banks are grouped under 'depositors resources' and 'banks resources'. Only the profits earned on utilisation of 'depositors resources', after deducting the banks' remuneration for performing the attorney functions, are distributed among the holders of Investment Term Deposits. Though there is no contractual obligation on the part of banks to distribute the profits earned on utilisation of 'banks resources', yet non-fixed bonuses are given to holders of Qard-e-Hasana deposits in savings Accounts. Accepting deposits in Current and Savings Accounts by the banks in Iran in the form of Qard-e-Hasana, has enabled them to guarantee the repayment of the principal amount in savings Accounts. Banks in Iran are also obliged by law to earmark a portion of their resources for grants of Qard-e-Hasana for achieving the socio-economic objectives incorporated in the Constitution. As such, the institution of Qard-e-Hasana is destined to occupy a central place on both sides of the balance-sheet.

/9716

CSO: 4600/355

IRAN

EXPORTS THROUGH BANDAR 'ABBAS REPORTEDLY REACH 125 MILLION

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 21 Apr 86 p 4

[Text] In order to increase the non-petroleum exports, in the course of last year, by signing 270 currency contracts, the Iranian Melli Bank, in its Bandar 'Abbas branch, exported large amounts of various kinds of goods at a value of more than \$125,035,000.

The head of the Melli Bank branches of Hormozgan Province announced that, compared to 1363 [21 March 1984-20 March 1985], the above-mentioned exports showed an increase of \$45,128,000. He said: These goods include medicine, dried goods, canned fruit, fabrics, pistachios, various kinds of vegetables, fruits, dates, scrap iron, herbal medicines, palm saplings, stones and red dirt, at a value of 10,071,000,000 rials. He added: The above-mentioned goods, with the facilities provided by the export committee of the Office of the Governor General of Hormozgan were exported to Switzerland, Japan, India, England, the United Arab Emirates, West Germany, East Germany, Holland, Bulgaria, South Korea, Romania, Hungary, Greece, Austria, New Zealand and Yugoslavia.

The head of the branches of the Melli Bank of Hormozgan Province said in connection with the level of the people's deposits in that bank: The total last year was more than 24,074,612,000 rials, which increased by more than 6,856,274,000 rials compared to the previous year.

He mentioned the level of contractual, civil partnership, installment sales, and purchasing of debt transactions and operations last year at more than 1,344,617,000 rials and added: During this period, 1,296,591,000 rials in credit facilities were provided for individuals and government employees. In conclusion, the head of the branches of the Melli Bank of Hormozgan Province said: Last year, in order to encourage depositors, 854 spring of freedom coins, 2 cars, 5 motorcycles, and 3,400,000 rials in cash were granted to bank customers.

10,000

CSO: 4640/309

PAKISTAN

U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP EXAMINED IN MIDDLE EAST CONTEXT

Islamabad THE MUSLIM (MAGAZINE supplement) in English 9 May 86 p 1

[Article by Zulfiqar Alikhan]

[Text]

Antecedents of current US Middle East policy go back a long way. However, the strategic concern for the region began to grow after the withdrawal of British from the Gulf in 1971

When the British announced their decision to end their military presence east of Suez in 1969, the Americans had two options. First, the U.S. could fill the vacuum directly by their own physical presence. The second option for the U.S. was to encourage and support a policy of regional cooperation, and put its principal weight and support behind Iran, on the Shah in particular, and to a lesser degree but on a parallel basis on Saudi Arabia. The Americans hoped that although they were dealing with Iranians on the one hand and Arabs on the other, they would encourage the kind of mutual cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran that would safeguard their interests in the area.

This arrangement was to receive a shattering blow in 1978. The Opposition to the Shah's oppressive rule gained full force and by January 1979, the revolutionary upsurge forced the Shah to flee the country, while Imam Khomeini returned in triumph. The ensuing period can be termed as the most humiliating episode in American history, perhaps worse than the

ignominious retreat from Vietnam.

In November 1979, the US embassy was seized. The ill-fated rescue attempt lay buried in the sands of Dasht-e Kavir while people around the world began to wonder whether America was after all a giant with feet of clay. The impotence of the U.S. was for all to see.

It simply did not know what to do and how to extricate itself from the quagmire of Iran. There was total paralysis at the policy making level.

This situation was further aggravated by the seizure of the Holy Mosque in Makkah, thereby throwing the stability of Saudi Arabia another close ally of the U.S. into question. American policy in the region was undermined, if not destroyed, by the set-back suffered in Iran and the increasing uncertainty of the internal picture within Saudi Arabia.

It was then that the Americans began to seek facilities in the regional countries and increase the size of the Rapid Deployment Force from ten thousand men to two hundred and twenty thousand men.

RDF

The Rapid Deployment Force-later renamed Central Command-was initially conceived by the Carter Administration in 1977 as a light, highly mobile force whose function according to the Pentagon would be waging "bush fire" wars

in the Third World. As the idea evolved, the RDF came to be considered as a more substantial force whose primary mission would be the protection of American access to the oil supplies from the Gulf. While the original plan was for a force of 10,000 men, in 1983 the RDF had 220,000 men at its disposal. The present administration has plans to double this by 1988. By that time it is projected that Rapid Deployment package will include 9 divisions, 36 tactical Air-Force Squadrons, a least 2 Air-craft carriers 6 amphibious ships and 50 escort vessels.

The main purpose of RDF is intended to defend American access to Middle East oil against challenges from indigenous elements. While the invocation of the Soviet threat is primarily useful for stimulating self interested fears, it also serves to make American military intervention morally more palatable by suggesting that they are simply defensive efforts to protect the weak against Soviet aggression.

Secretary of State, Alexander Haig even tried to hammer out a "strategic consensus" against the "Soviet threat" during his tour of the Middle East in April, 1981. The plan was to cement Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia into an alliance to serve the American's Mid-East policy. The only outcome of his efforts was that he distinguished himself with remarks so imprecise awkward, or naively provocative that nothing came of it.

So far as the threat from indigenous sources is concerned, for long the Americans have been seriously considering the possibility of seizing the oil fields should an upheaval similar to the one in Iran take place. Since the American and

Western economies are dependent on oil from the Middle East, it is deemed important for the US to have the ability to ensure its continued access to those supplies. The RDP is primarily intended for use in the Gulf area. Reagan has pledged "We will not permit Saudi Arabia to be an Iran".

COMPULSION

Yet another powerful compulsion for the US in the region is the Zionist entity of Israel. Washington is committed to its existence and security. Initially the Americans sought to achieve this by massive military and economic assistance to Israel. But after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the US began to look for ways and means to provide greater security for Israel, so as to make it the dominant regional power. In fact, within months of becoming Defence Minister, Sharon was boasting publicly that Israel's military sphere of influence in the 1980s spread far beyond the Arab world, encompassing Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and upto Central and North Africa. Israel, he claimed was "the world's fourth largest military power".

The U.S. realized that weapons alone could not always provide sufficient security for Israel. It had to be a comprehensive solution. Where better to begin than with Egypt that great crossroad where all the currents of Arab policy and history converge. Egypt's population is four times as great as the combined population of all Israel's other contiguous neighbours put together. Above all, it was the repository of the Arab military option. Therefore removing Egypt from the military equation, removed the prospect of a major Arab-Israeli war, leaving Israel free to pursue its policies.

Egypt's abandonment of the Arab solidarity was to have tragic and disastrous consequences for the Arab World. With Egypt out of the power equation, Israel fully exploited the situation. It strengthened its hold over the West Bank and Golan heights. The invasion of Lebanon and subsequent massacre at Sabra and Shatilla camps were only possible because Egypt was no longer a front line State against Israel.

There was anger and a sense of outrage against Egypt for its abandonment of Arab and Islamic solidarity. Both the OIC and Arab League suspended Egypt from their membership. This hardly pleased the Americans who had hoped that more Arab and Muslim countries would follow Egypt's example in extending recognition to the State of Israel. It was imperative, there-

fore, for Washington to strive to end Egypt's isolation from the Islamic world. This was achieved in the OIC meeting at Casablanca in January 1984, ironically in the name of Islamic solidarity.

Pakistan was once described as Washington's most allied ally in Asia. In the mid 50s Pakistan signed a mutual defence agreement with the U.S. and became the only regional country to join both the CENTO and SEATO. But the U.S. Pakistan military relationship has had a tortuous history, reaching the first of its several low points with the cut off in American arms aid to Pakistan in the wake of 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. It was anything but intimate on the eve of Soviet move into Afghanistan.

In April, 1979, the U.S. terminated all economic and military credit assistance to Pakistan, alleging that Pakistan was developing a military nuclear capability. U.S.-Pakistan relations received a dramatic blow in November 1979, when mobs incited by reports that the U.S. was involved in the Grand Mosque takeover in Makkah, stormed the U.S. Embassy compound. Two Americans and four Pakistanis were killed. Since the law enforcing agencies were slow to react 137 members of the embassy staff were nearly cooked alive. The Americans did not react as strongly as they normally would have because of the situation in Iran.

With Iran no longer the main pillar of U.S. policy in the region, Pakistan suddenly became vital to American interests. Of course, the Russian intervention in Afghanistan in Dec. 1979 was to reinforce this conviction. However, it is important to remember that the over-riding regional obsession of Washington is not Afghanistan but Iran and the Gulf.

VIEWS

It is relevant in this context to note the views expressed by top U.S. military and government officials. Admiral Thomas Moorer, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, writing in Strategic Review Magazine, suggested that U.S. should utilise Gwadar in Baluchistan as a military port to replace the Iranian military bases and the facilities lost with the exit of the Shah. Moorer also called for reopening the Badaber base near Peshawar which was used as an electronic surveillance centre from 1959 to 1969. Journalist, Lawrence Lifschutz describes what the U.S. expects of Pakistan Thus: "Military strategists within the U.S. administration expect at least three specific operational objectives to be developed

from the new arrangements. These would include military base facilities in one form or the other. Highest and most immediate priority of all would involve the pre-positioning of vast stockpiles of military equipment and the material for the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force, now the dominant concept for a last resort style deployment of American power in the region". Similarly Francis Fukuyama, a member of the State Department policy planning staff said in a Congressional sub committee testimony, "There is a possibility that the Pakistan Army could serve as a proxy fighting force in the Gulf provided that the U.S. undertakes to protect Pakistan from the consequences of such a decision".

For the U.S. giving military and economic assistance to Pakistan would have several benefits. Pakistan would continue to serve as a refuge and sources of arms and other supplies to the Afghan resistance. It would be encouraged to persist in its refusal to recognise Babrak Karmal's regime.

FACILITIES

American support for Pakistan would also enable it to facilitate the build-up of U.S. military power in the Gulf area. While Pakistan may not permit American bases on their territory, they might permit building of facilities, stationing of supply ships loaded with tanks and other military equipment in Karachi and other harbours for use by the Rapid Deployment Force. Finally, and equally important, the U.S. would expect Pakistan to support their Middle East and Regional policies. The price they have decided to pay for all this is not high compared to the 500 billion dollars Washington is spending on Rapid Deployment Force.

The recent "Rambo diplomacy" of the U.S. against Libya is bound to prove counter productive. It is directed against not only Libya but Iran and Syria as well. All three have one thing in common—they are arch enemies of Israel. However, the main weakness of American Mid-East policy is the fragility of American allies in the region. They are either barely disguised military dictatorships or monarchies ruling without the consent of the people and with enormous corruption and inequality of wealth. Iran showed that seemingly secure regimes could be rapidly overthrown once a popular movement began to grow. The structures of such regimes are more frail than previously imagined.

PAKISTAN

FOOD AID AGREEMENT WITH U.S. SIGNED

Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 20 May 86 p 1

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, May 19: United States will provide dollar 50 million to Pakistan in food assistance under the PL-480 programme during the year 1986-87.

In this connection an agreement was signed here today between Pakistan and USA. The US ambassador to Pakistan Deane R. Hinton and Secretary of Economic Affairs Division M.A.G.M. Akhtar signed the document on behalf of their respective governments.

The funds will be used by Pakistan to finance imports of approximately 120,000 metric tons of cottonseed oil, soyabean oil and sunflower seed oil.

In recent years about 15 per cent of Pakistan's total edible oil imports have been financed under this programme. More than dollar two billion in food assistance has been provided to Pakistan under the programme during the past 32 years.

In addition to financing the essential imports of edible oil, the PL-480 programme provides the needed foreign exchange to Pakistan.

Speaking on the occasion the Secretary of Economic Affairs Division expressed gratitude to the US government for generous assistance under PL-480 programme.

He said the food aid under the programme has continued uninterrupted for the last three decades. Thus it has enabled our country to meet critical shortages in basic agricultural commodities by making them available on highly concessional credit terms. Besides he added it has provided the much needed balance of payments support. The secretary also commended the USAID studies on vegetable oil as well as oilseeds industry in Pakistan.

He expressed the confidence that PL-480 agreement would continue to be a corner stone of a very productive US-Pakistan economic relationship in the future.

Reciprocating the gesture the US ambassador to Pakistan expressed the hope that Pakistan would soon be self-sufficient in oilseeds industry.

The ambassador described the 30-year Pak-US cooperation as highly useful and productive. He felt that the rupees generated by the sale of PL-480 products not only reduce foreign exchange burden of Pakistan but help the country in redirecting its resources towards key development activities in areas such as agriculture irrigation, population welfare, health and rural development, etc.-PPI.

/12379

CSO: 4600/349

PAKISTAN

WORLD BANK URGES INCOME TAX ON AGRICULTURE

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 8 May 86 p 1

[Article by Aslam Sheikh]

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, May 7: The extension of income-tax to agriculture—long resisted by powerful landed class in Pakistan—has once again been recommended by the World Bank as part of wide-ranging taxation reform to generate increased domestic resources for the country's sagging economic development.

Even at a moderate rate of 10 per cent, argues the Bank's annual report on Pakistan's economy, the agricultural income-tax has the potential of netting Rs.500 crore—a quantum jump in the current low-yield from direct taxes. Currently, rural elites contribute insignificantly towards national exchequer excessively relying on regressive indirect taxes to finance consumption and development expenditure.

The study argues that 40 per cent of land is operated by large farmers. With incomes upto Rs.24000 exempt from the tax, the new levy will hit only the affluent land-owners.

The yield of Rs. 5 billion from agricultural income-tax is calculated on the basis of the fact that in fiscal 1985, value-added in agriculture was around Rs 102 billion. It is assumed that only half of this value will be taxed at a modest rate of 10 per cent.

Pre-martial law government in 1977 enacted a law to apply income tax on agriculture but with the imposition of Martial Law, the measure was shelved for political reasons as also the move to lower land ceiling to 100 acres.

Apart from the resistance of powerful landed gentry, the imposition of agricultural tax has also been opposed on the ground that it is difficult to compute and collect. Provincial governments have also resisted it as federal levy because agriculture falls within provincial jurisdiction. Because of predominance of agricultural lobby in the newly-formed government party, the proposed measure is likely to run into considerable resistance in the current National Assembly also.

Apart from agricultural taxation, the World Bank has also suggested a broad-based tax on con-

sumption to augment domestic resources. Additionally, increased user charges and withdrawal of nearly Rs 10 billion subsidies on wheat, fertiliser etc.

Over the next three weeks these issues will be closely debated within the corridors of powers in preparation for the federal budget tentatively due for presentation in the National Assembly on May 29. Notwithstanding considerable improvement in government revenues because of a dramatic fall in the price of imported crude oil plus cheaper edible oil, the need for fresh taxation remains pressing because a major escalation in development spending is envisaged for the fourth year of the Sixth Plan. Besides, external donors are also insisting on increased share of domestic resources to back enhanced disbursement of foreign assistance.

The Annual Plan Coordination Committee is meeting here Thursday to firm up estimates for the size of public sector development programme for 1986-87, a major stage in budget preparation. Tentative estimates for this programme range from Rs. 44 to 47 billion. The final endorsement of the programme will come a week or 10 days later from the National Economic Council.

/13046

CSO: 4600/340

PAKISTAN

BENAZIR'S ECONOMIC , SOCIAL POLICIES ANALYZED

Karachi JANG in Urdu 17 Apr 86 p 3

[Article by Irshad Ahmad Haqani: "Miss Benazir's Economic and Social Policies"]

[Text] The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) always claims to support social and economic justice, socialism, Islamic equality, eradication of poverty and programs for helping the minorities. The late Mr Bhutto could not do much for the backward tribes for several reasons. His feudal background stopped him from making the necessary revolutionary agricultural reforms. He claimed to have become "declassed" and immune to the vested interests of his class. Miss Bhutto referred to her father's claim the other day and said that she belonged to the middle class. However, it is a fact that Mr Bhutto, despite his claims, never was "declassed." Policy papers of his party, most of which were written by Mr. J. A. Rahim, Dr. Mubasar Husan and Mr. Bhutto himself, show outlines of plans for curbing vast landownership, capitalism and colonialism. However, when he came to power in 1977, he had moved toward feudalism and had formed a policy followed by Muslim League governments. This very change alienated his revolutionary friends from him. At the end of his reign not only the right wing, but also the left wing groups, were against him. Still, we have to admit that Mr. Bhutto made us aware of the needs of the poor and the deprived. Mr. Bhutto perhaps would have been able to do more for the poor but for the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the world oil crisis and resulting inflation and the 131-percent devaluation of the Pakistani rupee as the result of mismanagement by Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. Then there were the negative consequences of the December 1971 war as both parts of our country were economically interdependent. Later, without enough preparation, Mr. Bhutto nationalized some large industries and hired inexperienced, unsympathetic and greedy personnel to manage them. This adversely influenced our national economy. Mr. Bhutto, thus, could fulfill neither his promise to provide bread, clothes and a roof to poor people nor could he alleviate the problems of laborers and farmers. He did, however, give respect to the poor, elevated their social standing and made them aware of their rights. It is a fact that the poor still consider the PPP their own party and they were in the forefront to welcome Miss Benazir.

Miss Benazir has studied the social and economic policies practiced during her father's era very carefully and has drawn some conclusions. She is aware

that the 1977 movement (and the elections) did not result from the fall of the ballot or the new awareness of Islam or the Maulvis (even though this slogan was used). The deciding factors [causing her father's defeat] were the affluent businessmen, industrialists and the wealthy people living in Mandi towns. They knew that the man who can nationalize rice and flour mills may also confiscate personal wealth. This fearful feeling became omnipresent. The PNA [Pakistan National Alliance] made businessmen, industrialists and religious groups their foremost supporters. This feeling of insecurity [among the rich] resulting from Mr. Bhutto's social and economic policies acted as a catalyst for the PNA. If the upper class and the businessmen were not angry and scared of Mr. Bhutto, news about miscounts of ballots (most of which were not true) would not have caused such a powerful movement. It is said that Mr. Bhutto was surprised that the workingmen and the farmers he championed did not come out to stand by him against the PNA. Mr. Bhutto's surprise indicates his ignorance of facts. Miss Bhutto mentioned the other day that [Mr. Bhutto] had lost sincere and intelligent party leaders, did not have any dependable political framework for his party that could get popular support. During the last part of his rule he had begun to depend overmuch on the bureaucracy and the privileged class. Two opposing leaders of this party, Dr. Mubassar Husan and Mr. Mustafa Khar, agree on this issue. There was no organized PPP with sincere workers in 1977 to help [Mr. Bhutto]. The working class and farmers were sympathetic to him, but there was no person to organize them.

Miss Bhutto, after reviewing the details of these facts for the last 8 or 9 years, is in a dilemma. She is not clear on future strategies or, in other words, she does not agree with the slogans of some of the PPP extremist elements. She appears to have concluded, and correctly too, that blind nationalization is not wise. She does not want to antagonize the private sector again. She just does not want to support any activities that might prove counter-productive to economic growth. She used the last sentence in her press conference last Friday and I believe that she has arrived at the correct conclusion. This is her dilemma. How can she make attractive promises to the working class and at the same time assure the private sector of her cooperation? If she continues to make those promises to the farmers, how can she keep the faith of the private-sector people? European countries practicing social democracy know that social and economic justice cannot be practiced without increasing production. Even in a communist country like China, new economic experiments labeled "semi-capitalistic organization" are being conducted. In the light of these data, Miss Benazir cannot promise "rivers of milk and honey" to the poor. If, for political reasons, she makes such promises, she will lose the support of the private sector. Within a week of her arrival, opponents of her father's social and economic policies felt the need to regroup their forces to fight the increasing influence of the PPP. A confrontation, however, is unavoidable even though Miss Bhutto has not formulated any slogan to scare the private sector. For this reason, some people have criticized her for not talking about improving the lot of the working class like her father did in 1970. Miss Bhutto is in a dilemma. She can neither scare the private sector nor raise the hopes of the deprived masses.

Miss Benazir's dilemma can be real and the result of her careful thinking. It also shows that she is practical, realistic and understands the needs of the time. Some people believe that she has learned from her father's mistakes, the backfiring of extremist slogans and the present economic situation and has decided to stay away from radical slogans. She can be accused of ambiguity as she is using the name of the poor but refuses to provide the pillars of capitalism. Whichever path Miss Bhutto chooses, she will be accused of one thing or another. In the opinion of this writer, Miss Bhutto has chosen a practical and pragmatic economic approach. This approach is also timely. Once I asked Dr. Mubassar Husan, finance minister in Mr. Bhutto's cabinet, whether, if he had to do it all over again, he would use the same economic and social policies as he used in 1971. He replied that he would not nationalize industries on that large a scale. I have learned that Miss Bhutto is still consulting Dr. Mubassar Husan. Dr. Mubassar Husan, whose ideology is not cast in stone, told me 4 or 5 years ago that he would revise the policy if he were to have the opportunity again. Thus, Miss Bhutto is convinced that the 1970 policies and slogans need to be reviewed. The change in her approach on various economic and social issues and implementation of socialism appears to be sincere.

Accusing her of being an opportunist or an "ideology defector" is not right just because she wants to decentralize some government functions and deregulate the industry in order to decrease the tyranny of the bureaucracy. A good socioeconomic structure calls for decreasing the difference between classes and helping the poor. It is not necessary to use the same methodology devised or promised during the Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan eras. Deviation from that methodology cannot be called opportunism. My readers know that when Dr. Mehboob-ul Haq proposed the goals for the sixth 5-year plan, he suggested special attention to rural problems. I had conditionally supported this plan and was accused of being an objector to martial law but supporter of one of its proponents. I do not apologize for that stand. If a person is sincere in helping the deprived minorities, we do not have to criticize his political affiliations. Begging at the doors of international monetary organizations or helping the dishonest industrialists is, of course, deplorable. However, there is no reason for being against a sincere and honest effort by someone who believes in it. The modern world has plenty of experience in social and economic reforms and differences between various approaches have been minimized. Mrs. Indira Gandhi used different approaches in social and economic areas than her father did. But Mr. Nehru, Mrs. Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi all claimed social and economic justice as their goal. Their party [Congress] still declares socialist to be one of its goals. Under these circumstances, it is not right to accuse Miss Bhutto of dishonestly straying away from her father's policies. She is aboveboard when it comes to social justice to the poor. We will have to give her the benefit of a doubt in the area of economy until her actions prove that she is not sympathetic to the poor. It is very easy to give negative criticism. We should not, however, forget common sense at such times.

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23 June 1986

PAKISTAN

RELATIONS WITH INDIA: WOMEN ENTREPRENEURS' EFFORTS DISCUSSED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 9 May 86 p 4

[Article by Sultan Ahmed]

[Text]

Can the women of Pakistan and India succeed where their men have failed dismally? Can the women promote larger commercial and industrial co-operation between the two neighbours with a chequered history of euphoric ups and bitter downs, after the efforts of their men, officials as well as non-officials, have received too many setbacks over a long period of time?

A change of hands in such endeavours, or a change of gender of the persons involved is always welcome. And the person trying for that from the Pakistani end now is a determined lady with high official connections and remarkable energy, who achieves maximum results with minimum exertion.

She is Begum Salma Ahmad, an enduringly attractive ship-breaker and industrialist, who is now an MNA as well. She has announced formation of the Joint Business Women's Council of India and Pakistan, which is soon to be enlarged to cover the SAARC region of seven sub-continental countries.

Following several trips to India as a business lady, the last one leading a five-women delegation, she said that the draft of the proposed council had already been signed by the women leaders of both the countries.

The joint council is to have an executive committee of six members, called the Joint Business Council of Women Entrepreneurs with a chairwoman and co-chairwoman for two years. The first chairwoman will be from India. The council is to meet twice a year — in March and October — alternately in India and Pakistan.

The speed with which the women on both sides have been able to move and set up their bodies should put to shame the federations of Chambers of Commerce and Industry in both countries dominated by elderly men. These men have been either too slow to move or have been at cross purposes, saying one thing and doing something else, or speaking exuberantly of trade between the two countries and then moving too cautiously.

As a result, the two federations have not been able to set up joint committees for promotion of trade and investment cooperation between them, although such efforts were initiated five years ago. Delegations of the two countries have visited each other plenty of times, spoke euphorically of the tremendous possibilities of trade between them, and underscored the urgency for setting up such joint committees in Karachi and New Delhi.

There was also a three-day seminar on economic cooperation among the SAARC countries in New Delhi early in 1983. And yet the joint committees have not been set up, and another effort in that direction is not due until the arrival of a businessmen's delegation in July. But women on both sides have set up their shows in a jiffy.

That is not all. They have a long programme of exchanges and workshops. A workshop under the aegis of the joint council is to be held in Karachi from October 24 to 28. The workshop will comprise seminars, exhibitions and other programmes for the welfare of women in the region.

And that is to be followed by a training programme for women at Ahmedabad, India, later.

And, ambitious as Mrs. Ahmad and other women entrepreneurs are, they have resolved that the fourth International Conference of Women Entrepreneurs should be hosted by India and Pakistan and held at Islamabad in the first week of November next year. That is to be a true international conference with women entrepreneurs from all over the world participating.

The question instantly arises: who will finance such regional and international conferences at the Pakistani end as her organisation is at the embryonic stage here, and it appears to be more of a one-person band?

Among the delegation of five who went to New Delhi Begum Asifa Khusro and Ms. Kishwar Zahra are not known industrialists, unless they have very small outfits, and the two others are journalists.

Begum Salma Ahmad herself is rich, and has become richer steadily. Daughter of a former foreign secretary, Akhtar Hussain, her sister is married to additional secretary Shahriyar of the Foreign Office. She retains the name of Ahmad as her surname from Test cricket. Said Ahmad, a former husband of hers.

She began as a manufacturer of brake-lining, moved to ship-breaking and became the powerful president of the Pakistan Ship-breakers Association, and is currently setting up a cement plant in Azad Kashmir and has a vanaspati factory in Sind.

She had become a farmer by acquiring 2,000 acres of land for cattle farming, and has gone into inland fishing as well. She is publishing an Urdu monthly economic journal with Ms. Ismat Sabir as editor.

If she has been lucky she has tremendous farsight as well. A very modern lady, and an entrepreneur at that, is hardly the person likely to be a steady follower of Pir Pagaro. But even when some of her modern women friends with political ambitions left the Muslim League when Pir Pagaro became its chief, she continued to be a Muslim Leaguer.

She was keen on becoming a member of the Majlis-i-Shoora earlier, and she would become one readily if only a former husband of hers, vice-admiral Janjua had not opposed it as a cabinet minister. But after the elections he vanished from the political scene and she was

elected to the National Assembly from the women's constituency with the blessing of Pir Pagaro by a Pagara Leaguer.

Another reflection of her political acumen is the business partnership which she entered into with Mr. Mohammad Khan Junejo, long before he became the Prime Minister, in her vegetable oil factory. Now Mr. Junejo's son is said to be the partner.

With that kind of pull, and Gen. Zia's admiration for her remarkable business skill, she can achieve a great deal in her new quest for commercial cooperation between the women of India and Pakistan. But gone now is the original proposal for joint enterprises in Pakistan and India by the women entrepreneurs together. She says that the council would consider projects for rural women entrepreneurs jointly. Projects for lower income groups, middle-income group as well as for rural areas would receive the attention of the council. Whatever these projects may mean precisely, they do not seem far different from what is discussed in the national context. Decisions taken in this regard have not been implemented at home for want of resources and the smaller political clout of the villages.

The joint council also discussed possibilities for the women to trade in some specific items, and identified tea from India and Naphtha from Pakistan. I presume that export of tea from India figures as the leader of women entrepreneur's organisation in India. Mrs. Bonti Barua, is a tea-manufacturer. But it may be difficult for India and Pakistan to reserve tea for being traded exclusively by women on both sides. And I wonder whether export of Naphtha from Pakistan to India could be reserved for women in the same manner.

The usual fear on such occasions is that special concessions given to women may be exploited by men who may use the women as "front-men". It can be more like too many large buildings in Islamabad and elsewhere being "owned" by the officers wives, and not by the officers themselves so as to avoid taxation.

Working women and women professionals have identical problems; but the problems of entrepreneurs, men and women, are alike. So that Salma Ahmad can achieve for them with her joint council remains to be seen. But she is a lady who can go a long way anywhere.

PAKISTAN

SEMINAR DISCUSSES TRANSFER OF POWER, POLITICAL STABILITY

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 10 May 86 p 8

[Text]

LAHORE, May 9: The speakers at a seminar on "Mechanics of Transfer of Power and its retention by the people" were of the view that a stable political system could play a vital role in strengthening the civil government and avoiding any further martial law.

The Seminar organised by Group 83 here at local hotel was presided over by Mian Arshad Hussain former Foreign Minister of Pakistan. Among those who read the papers were, Air Chief Marshal (Retd) Zulfikar Ali Khan, Hassan Habib and Air Marshal (Retd) Zafar Chaudhry.

Air Marshal (Retd) Zulfikar Ali Khan in his comprehensive paper said that social mobilisation by the political parties would prove more effective in preventing military regime or their surrogates to come into power. He said that army would not intervene if they fear the retaliatory capabilities of the country's political parties.

He said that successful transition from military to civilian rule and retention of power by the civil government could be facilitated through the diffusion of military power, the creation of an accepted set up of organisational procedure and establishment of local institutions.

Zulfikar Ali Khan said that there were many causes of imposition of martial law in the country. Explaining them, he said, that some political groups after having defeated in fair and free election cooperate with the military regime, welcomed army to impose the martial law.

He said that labour forces sometimes provide temporary cooperation to the military regime. He said that election was also critical period for a civil government and the prospect of renewed military intervention could never be discounted at this stage.

Hassan Habib, addressing the seminar, said that a strong local body system should be established to eliminate the chances of any intervention by the military.

He said that decentralization of powers at all levels would also be helpful for a strong civil government.

Air Marshal (Retd) Zafar Chaudhry said that effective and strong political institutions were must for the stability of the civil government.

Replying to a question Air Chief Marshal (Retd) Zulfikar Ali Khan said that the size of the army had to be determined by the Government. He maintained that if there was no threat from outside then the size of the army could be reduced.

Earlier, A.H. Kardar Coordinator of the Group 83 in his introductory remarks said that evils of a centralised state could be avoided if local governments were allowed to function without intervention from the Provinces and Federal government.

He said that in Pakistan all political parties were reconciled to a federal system but the federal government in practice encroached upon the government of several units.

A.H. Kardar said that connected with the issues relating to taming of power and its retention by the people was the issue of the federal monster devouring no less than 70 per cent of the nation's resources on the lavish maintenance of the state's elitist power structure. He said that the answer to both seemed to lie in the devolution of the machinery of the state and greater control over them by the direct participation in decision making by the people.—PPI

PAKISTAN

OFFICIAL MEDIA CRITICIZED FOR BIASED REPORTING

Karachi JANG in Urdu 17 Apr 86 p 3

[Article by Ahmad Nadim Qasimi in the column "Currents": "Radio, Television and Government Newspapers Should Know that Nation Is Not Made of Leaders Only"]

[Text] Political parties have been holding rallies in large cities since restrictions on them were lifted at the end of martial law. Independent newspapers are usually filled with information about these rallies. This is appropriate since all news media are expected to inform the public about political happenings. However, only the independent news media are doing this important duty. Television and radio do not give any more coverage of these events than of the overturning of a speeding bus near Kala Shah Kokoo. Why do radio and television not report our national political events? Are they not national news media? Is a nation composed of people in power only? If they sneeze, it is important news! If 200 to 1.5 million people gather for a common cause, Pakistan radio and television do not even know it. What kind of independence is this? Those national news media are symbols of our national independence and they do not even recognize independent political activities. Our government still claims that all restrictions on political activities have been lifted. The world will learn about these restrictions only from our radio and television media, but they are totally silent. Large rallies of various political parties are held, but no one knows about them. A tree fell in the jungle and nobody heard it!

We happened to see an English newspaper when we were complaining about the lack of concern by our radio and television. We were astonished to note that this newspaper had covered the great rally to welcome Miss Benazir, which is considered to be the biggest rally in Pakistan's recent history and the details and pictures of which had filled pages of independent newspapers, in two columns at the bottom of the front page. It told us in the very beginning that most of the people attending the rally were "imported" from outside Lahore. The remaining part of this news story appeared on the last page of the newspaper. Right next to that portion was a critique of the PPP by Jamiat-e Ulema-e Pakistan. The newspaper had printed a true story by mistake and now wanted to make sure that it did not leave any effect!

This attitude of our journalists has nothing to do with honesty or truth. This profession also has some ethics. These ethics are violated just because

these newspapers, like television and radio, are owned by the government. They should call it a government newsletter instead of a newspaper. What kind of journalistic honesty is this? They are trying to tell the people that there is only one party and that is the Muslim League party. This party did not emerge from people but was manufactured to meet the specifications of legislative assemblies. On 10 April, two large political parties held rallies. We have already told you how one of these rallies was reported. The second rally was reported with this heading; "Jamiat-e Ulema-e Pakistan says that the PPP is a landlord's party." This style of journalism is an insult to Jamiat-e Ulema-e Pakistan [JUP]. Political parties always have differences. The major theme of JUP has been: "The present government and the president should resign. If the civilian government considers itself in power then it should investigate the president. The present government is unconstitutional, undemocratic and immoral. A judicial commission should be established to investigate the martial law regime. All tyrants must be punished." These are not my words but reproduced from various independent newspapers headlines. You be the judge now. Have the [Pakistan Press] Trust newspapers not tried to confuse the public? Will the learned readers not know at first glance that the truth is not only being hidden but distorted? There are several large organizations of journalists and editors in our country. Why do these organizations not take strict action against erroneous and misleading news reporting? These organizations should reprimand these newspapers and tell them that expressions of differences over policy and politics belong in the editorial pages. Opinions are not expressed in news items. If it is necessary to play down the details of a public meeting, it should be done only without discounting journalistic honesty. It is all right to scowl over the truth as long as you are telling it as it is.

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CSO: 4656/77

PAKISTAN

POLL CLAIMS ONLY 12 PERCENT SUPPORT 'CONFEDERATION' IDEA

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 10 May 86 p 3

[Text] Islamabad, May 9: According to a recent Gallup poll, public opinion support for the "confederation" idea is quite limited, but not insignificant.

Twelve per cent of the respondents in a nationality representative survey supported the notion that Pakistan should have a confederal structure, which would allow a minimum degree of authority to the Central Government, while the provinces would enjoy a highly autonomous status.

66 per cent of the respondents opposed the confederal idea and supported a federal structure for the country. The remaining 22 per cent did not give any opinion on this matter.

The survey was conducted by Gallup Pakistan in 100 statistically selected villages and 75 urban locations all over the country.

These locations were selected through a scientific procedure, which ensured that the sample would be a true cross-section of various regional, linguistic, income and age groups in the country. The findings were later computer processed to analyze the pattern of responses in different segments of the population.

Contrary to common expectations, the support for Confederation is higher among Pushto, Baluchi and even Hindko speaking population as compared to the Sindhi speaking population.

It seems that the Sindhi speaking population is extremely ambiguous on the subject, 42 per cent among them did not give any opinion.

Only 38 per cent of them expressed satisfaction with the existing Federal structure of the country.

It is conceivable that the Sindhi speaking population is viewing the Confederation idea with greater seriousness, and they are withholding their view on it because of greater awareness of its implications, whereas in certain other parts of the country, Confederation is being interpreted as simply more of original autonomy.

The support for the confederal idea is the least among the Punjabi speaking population, only 5 per cent of whom support this idea.

It is interesting to note that the older generation above 60 years of age shows no interest in the confederation issue. Only 4 per cent among them hold a pro-confederation position.

The questionnaire stated: "In the view of certain political leaders Pakistan should become a Confederation, meaning that the provinces would become completely autonomous and very little authority shall rest with the Centre. Others argue that some authority should rest the centre, and some of it should rest with the provinces, meaning that Pakistan should be a Federation. What is your view. Should Pakistan be a Confederation or a Federation". The Gallup survey was conducted in the first week of April.--PR

/13046

CSO: 4600/348

PAKISTAN

SUGGESTION TO MAKE MODIFIED KALABAGH PLAN PUBLIC

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 10 May 86 p 6

[Text]

KARACHI, May 9: Following the statement of the Punjab Chief Minister that the controversial Kalabagh Dam project has been "modified" to meet the demands of the critics, opponents are now demanding that the so-called "modifications" be made public.

In separate statements Mr. Iqbal Haider, Secretary General, Qaumi Mahaz-e-Azadi, and Dr. Hamida Khoro, leader of the Jiye Sind Tehrik, strongly condemned the statements of the Chief Minister and the Punjab Minister for Irrigation and Power, and said the overwhelming majority of the people were against the project.

Mr. Haider said according to the original feasibility report of 1980 the project involves a total expenditure of seven billion dollars, an amount the country could hardly afford for a controversial dam opposed by the other three provinces. Who would pay 7 billion dollars for a project whose total life would be only 30 years according to the report, Mr. Haider asked.

Dr. Hamida Khoro said the "modified plan" of the project should be published in detail and votes be taken from elected bodies of smaller provinces in this regard.

She warned the government of Pakistan that if they wished to retain some credibility as guardians of the interests the country as a whole they must prove it by rejecting this scheme once and for all and find alternate means for generating power.

ARREST CONDEMNED: Office-bearers of Gilgit-Baltistan Jamhoori Mahaz have demanded release of three activists arrested on May 1.

In a statement they condemned the arrest of Hajat Mohammad, Jalal Ahmad, and Gori Khan of Tehsil Gujral and said they were arrested because they were present on the occasion of the visit of the Minister for Kashmir and Northern Areas. They demanded status of a province for Gilgit and Baltistan in the Federation.

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CSO: 4600/348

PAKISTAN

ASGHAR KHAN SAYS ANOTHER MARTIAL LAW MAY BE 'FATAL'

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 10 May 86 p 8

[Text]

ATTOCK, May 9: The Tehrike Istiqlal chief, Air Marshal (Retd) M. Asghar Khan has said that any other martial law imposed in the country will prove fatal for the very integrity of the country.

Addressing a big public meeting at local railway stadium here this afternoon, he said that poor were facing a lot of problems. What to speak of health and education facilities they even do not have clean water to drink, he asked. On the other hand, aristocratic class spends crores of rupees on travelling abroad and on treatment of their family members.

He said corruption was on rise from lower level to higher one and observed that feudal lords and bureaucrats were equally responsible for this sad state of affairs.

The Air Marshal criticised Pakistan People's Party and said that no party would be allowed to hoodwink the facts of history. He said that those who claim to be the upholders of the cause of workers, murdered so many workers ruthlessly during their rule. Asghar Khan observed that it was they who participated actively in dismembering Pakistan and played an important role in the surrender of 90 thousand soldiers in East Pakistan.

Begum Mehnaz Rafi, Vice President, Malik Haider Usman Punjab chief of Tehrik, Maulana Aqeel Turabi, President Attock Tehrik, Syed Zahid Bokhari advocate and former President Attock TIP Qazi Khalid Mehmood also addressed the meeting while Arif Fasihuddin Vardag, Secretary General and Khur-

shid Kasuri were unable to deliver speech due to power breakdown.

Meanwhile Tehrik Chief Air Marshal Asghar Khan was accorded a warm welcome on his arrival at Hattian Chowk on Grand Turnk Road this afternoon and was brought to the local stadium, the venue of the public meeting in a long procession of cars, vans, motorcycles, trucks, buses and other vehicles.

To give a warm welcome to (TIP) chief, a procession from Attock City led by Syed Zahid Bukhari advocate, Attock District President of Tehrik Istiqlal reached Hattian Chowk. Similar processions from Chhach, Fateh Jang, Harro and other adjoining areas headed by Tehrik's former District President Qazi Khalid Mehmood Khan, Maulvi Muhammad Hassan, Tehsil Fateh Jang President Rahmat Khan Vardag also reached Hattian. TIP Central Secretary General Asif Fasihuddin Vardag, Punjab chief Malik Haider Usman, Muhammad Rafi Butt and Maulana Aqeel Turabi were prominent among the people who received Asghar Khan at Hattian.

Young workers of Tehrik were dancing on the beat of drums and raising slogans in favour of their leader. The traffic remained suspended on the G.T. Road for about half-an-hour. The procession took one-and-half-hour to cover the distance of 16 kilometres to reach the venue of public meeting.—PPI

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PAKISTAN

KUKIKHEL ASKS GOVERNMENT TO HONOR AGREEMENT

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 9 May 86 p 10

[Article by Rahimullah Yusufzai]

[Text]

PESHAWAR, May 8: Wali Khan Kukikhel has said that he was still waiting for the Pakistan government to honour the agreement concluded by him with the former NWFP Governor Nawabzada Abdul Ghafoor Khan Hoti on March 3.

Addressing a Press Conference in Peshawar today, he said failure on the part of the government to fulfil its commitments would compel him to rethink the whole matter. He added that assurances to guarantee the special and independent status of the Tribal areas safeguarding of the time-honoured tribal traditions, non-interference in Tribal affairs, and protection of the historical, legal and moral rights of the tribesmen, would have to be respected if the authorities wanted the tribesmen to continue reposing faith in the Government.

The ageing Afridi Malik, who had come to the Peshawar Press Club in the company of a large number of Tribal supporters, vowed to revenge his humiliation and losses in the December 1985 Khyber Agency operation. "Unlike Ms. Benazir Bhutto who says I won't seek revenge, our tribesmen are determined to avenge themselves against those who killed our people and bulldozed our houses" remarked Wali Khan Kukikhel.

The Afridi chieftain singled out former NWFP Governor Fazle Haq as his principal enemy and accused him of ordering the army action to settle personal scores with him. He claimed this enmity dated back to the time when Gen. Fazle Haq's father was serving as an Assistant Political Agent in the Khyber Agency. He said his terms with the former Governor's father were never friendly. Another factor

which contributed to their rivalry was his refusal to be intimidated by Gen. Fazle Haq. Wali Khan Kukikhel said he again earned the Governor's displeasure when he visited Mohmand Agency to offer Fateha for Yar Badshah, the Mohmand elder killed by security forces on his orders. Still another reason which accentuated their rift, according to Kukikhel, was his awareness of the involvement of high officials in the narcotics trafficking.

Levelling serious charges against the former Governor Wali Khan Kukikhel maintained that Gen. Fazle Haq had contacts with many known smugglers. He claimed that one of his brothers, Nazar Hussain was caught abroad on charges of drugs smuggling.

Moreover, he contended that the former Governor was on very good terms with Ayub Zakhakel and Haji Ghaljay, two notorious Khyber Agency smugglers. He also fixed responsibility on certain Provincial government officials for their share in the Khyber Agency operation. Although he didn't name anybody, Wali Khan Kukikhel felt President Ziaul Haq and other high-ups in the government knew about the operation.

The Afridi Malik denied having received Rs 7 crore from the government in the wake of his reconciliation, arguing that he had not even claimed losses incurred by him as a result of demolition of his house. He declared that there would be no bargaining on principles from his side.

Wali Khan Kukikhel thought the arrest of Nawabzada Abdul Ghafoor Khan Hoti's son in the United States on heroin-trafficking

charges could be part of a conspiracy to malign the former Governor following his success in resolving the Khyber Agency dispute created by Gen Fazle Haq.

Wali Khan Kukikhel said he wanted the MRD leaders to visit Khyber Agency and observe for themselves as to how many excesses were committed against the Khyberites. He hoped all national leaders, including Ms Benazir Bhutto, would respond to his call. About Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan he said his contributions made him a respectable figure. He said he wanted to sort out his differences with the family of Bacha Khan in a Tribal Jirga.

He contended that tribesmen who opposed his agreement with the government were either Kabul's agents or had no status in the Tribal society. He said that he had a right to seek arms and weapons from any source to beef up his defences in view of threats to his person and position from various quarters. He informed that Afghanistan government had given him a blank cheque at the time when his relations with

the Pakistani regime were hostile. Wali Khan Kukikhel did not deny that he received weapons from Kabul. The Afridi Malik said he was still ready to take a Jirga to Kabul to conciliate between Pakistan and Afghanistan provided the former was sincere. He was convinced that the DRA regime would agree to a settlement.

Wali Khan Kukikhel was also critical of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan and described their continued stay here as a destabilising factor. He said American arms supplied to the Mujahideen filter back into Pakistani arms market, thereby turning this area into an arsenal. He said the people here feared for their security in view of the great pile-up of arms.

Conceding that he had not been invited to this year's Loya Jirga, Kukikhel however claimed that he was hopeful that the rulers in Kabul would still honour his word. He described the new Afghan leader Dr Najibullah as an honourable Pakhtun belonging to a respectable family from the Paktia province bordering Pakistan.

/13046

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PAKISTAN

MRD CONVENOR CAUTIONS AGAINST 'COMPLACENCY'

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 7 May 86 p 6

[Article by Dastgir Bhatti]

[Text]

HYDERABAD, May 6: Mr. Hussain Bakhsh Narejo, the current convenor of MRD, has cautioned against complacency among MRD parties in the wake of the formal withdrawal of martial law.

Talking to 'The Muslim', Mr. Narejo, who belongs to the Awami Tehrik, said there was need for unity and vigilance. The rulers are constantly hatching new plans to reverse the change unleashed by the peoples' struggle for 9 years.

Some excerpts from the interview:

Q. How do you assess the allegation that after jointly struggling with the MRD for 9 years, the PPP has started going it alone and that Benazir's meet-the-people tour amounts to hijacking the democratic struggle; and PPP's counter-charge that some MRD components were trying to isolate PPP and were entering into an undeclared collusion with the establishment?

A. There can be opportunists in the democratic camp. Tempted by mundane benefits they make common cause with the establishment. If some have fallen victim to the machinations of the establishment, the bargain will prove costly. PPP is the strongest component of MRD. It should be ungrudgingly credited with launching a crusade for the restoration of democracy. The sacrifices of its rank and file constitute a golden chapter in the history of democratic struggles.

The coming into being of MRD was under the collective will of our democratic people. Whatever the objective situation now, it cannot be gain said, that MRD has played a major role with the approval of the people for compelling the autocratic rulers to part with some authority. Its struggle has not been a useless exercise. It has achieved

some positive results. Had the MRD not struggled against martial law, the PPP leader's dazzling reappearance on the political scene on April, 10, would still have been a dream.

I refuse to accept the notion that any democratic political party, or, above all, a leader of the status of PPP's Chairperson, whose contribution in arousing the masses has puzzled political pundits and pirs, could ever ignore the people's monumental sacrifices. So the accusation and the counter-accusation can only be termed as figment of the imagination of some sick minds.

Q. During your convenership the spectacle of some MRD leaders going it alone seems to be a manifestation of inevitable falling apart of the MRD in the near future. Do you conceive of such an ominous development?

A. It would be sheer fantasy that we could achieve the objective without a well-integrated joint action plan.

Q. How do you view MRD parties now disrupting each other's meetings and burning each other's flags?

A. We have yet to learn how to practise democracy among ourselves. We have been fed on negative politics. The moment we feel that power is within sight, we lose sight of the objective conditions and in the misplaced exuberance untrained workers fall victim to personal aggrandisement. The clash thus becomes, sometimes, both logical and inevitable. But, here in Sind, we have had very cordial relations with PPP. The PPP Chairperson has been, as a wise political leader, all the time calling upon her workers not to allow themselves to be swayed by sentiments and indulge in action against

other parties. That is a good omen. We have to be realistic and respect each other. Unity cannot be maintained by just lip service alone. Q. So by implication you concede that there are shortcomings in the ranks of MRD?

A. Yes, of course; it would be naive to deny the objective reality. Lack of communication between MRD components is one big factor causing turbulences. The sooner we realise the vital need of unity, the greater will be the chances of our hitting the final post.

Q. Interestingly, if not intriguingly, there have been some divergent happenings in MRD. Nawabzada Nasrullah has requested you to convene an emergency meeting to consider the current situation, while on the other hand Khwaja Khairuddin of the Muslim League and the chief of JUL, Maulana Fazalur Rehman, have openly criticised PPP of being indifferent to MRD. The latter have announced a date for the convening of the meeting. Have they sought your prior approval?

A. The actual position is that in the last meeting at Karachi of MRD's Central Action Committee, it was decided to hold the next regular meeting at Rawalpindi on June, 18. I was authorised to call an emergency meeting, if considered necessary. But so far I have not

received any notice from any component to convene an emergent meeting.

Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan's reported suggestion to call an emergency meeting might be to take stock of the current situation and that could not be a bad idea. Accordingly, I announced that an informal meeting of the CAC would be held on May 2 in Peshawar. Now, I hear that someone else has fixed a date for a regular meeting with a formal agenda. He has not consulted me. Although I do not take exception to such unilateral actions, yet I would say that this action could possibly be considered a departure from the accepted norm.

Q. And that also proves your weakness as a convener?

A. How could I accept the responsibility of the actions of others. We of the Awami Tehrik have been scrupulously abiding by the rules of the game since the formation of MRD.

Q. What is the stand of your party on the idea of an electoral alliance of the MRD parties?

A. We have not so far demanded any such electoral alliance. But if an alliance is forged through acknowledged democratic process, we shall welcome it.

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CSO: 4600/340

PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY VIEWS UNITY EFFORT BY LEFTIST PARTIES

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 9 May 86 p 4

[Article by Prof. Khaled Mahmud]

[Text]

The elusive quest for left unity has finally made some headway. A new political party has been born; a party of the left not created by a split but a result of the merger of four existing parties. Since the history of the left in Pakistan has been marred by polemics, ideological rifts, and dissensions, the launching of the Awami National Party is a significant departure from its past practice. But formidable tasks lie ahead. There is a gap between a formal declaration of unity and its actual implementation.

Before the new party becomes a viable entity; the modalities of integration at the grassroot level will have to be evolved and the question of leadership settled. Furthermore it will have to establish its credentials as the spokesman of the mainstream left in the country and to compete with the People's Party for gaining a firm foothold in the constituency which can help it develop mass support.

The unity has been brought about after prolonged negotiations and many false starts, the sponsors deserve credit for showing perseverance and tolerance of the level that is unusual among the leftist groups. Though the Sino-Soviet rift had become irrelevant for ideological polemics its fallout had generated tensions and mutual suspicions which were not easy to surmount. But perhaps the

objective conditions were a crucial determinant in combating divisive tendencies and making the leadership comprehend the dire necessity for unity.

Over the years the left has undergone a gradual process of disintegration, its power bases have been eroded and it does not possess the ability to respond to situations which demand decisive political action. Despite years of persistent political work and immense sacrifices, the left does not have an identity in national politics. There was a growing realisation within the left of its limitation and it has been urging the leadership to unite if it had to survive in politics.

The Awami National Party is not a Marxist party, but the moving spirit behind its creation are the several Marxist groups whose capacity to stick together and harmonise their diverse ideological stances will determine its success. It has been described as a democratic progressive party with a radical programme of anti-imperialism, anti-feudalism and maximum rights for the federating units. Essentially it is an alliance of the Marxists and the regional nationalists and represents an effort to resurrect the erstwhile National Awami party, which is the parent of the three of the four component parties.

What are the prospects for its future? The Marxists in Pakistan have little experience of mass politics. For many years they have shunned elections as 'bourgeois' politicking and have pinned their hopes in an armed revolution, which would demolish the existing socio-economic system, notwithstanding their inability to bear the burdens of armed struggle. Their greatest failure was their inability to give an account of their existence during eight years of Martial law, when in the absence of a democratic process the situation from the Marxist point of view was ripe for building a militant resistance against dictatorship. If they still have reservations about electoral politics, their new venture may never give them the credibility they are seeking. But among the regional nationalists there are veterans of mass politics, who have the potential to build a mass following provided they can overcome their elitist inclinations in order to emphasise the radical nature of the party's programme.

The four components of the Awami National Party have substantial pockets of influence. The NDP which is basically a platform for Pakhtoon nationalism and is the only non-left component of the new party, despite having declined in mass support has the advantage of having experienced and mature mass leadership. The PNP a combination of pro-Moscow loyalists and the Baluch nationalists, has sizeable cadre in all the four provinces but its primary constituency is Baluchistan. The Sindhi

Awami Tehrik emerged as a potent political force in Sind during the 1983 MRD agitation. Though, basically a rural based party it has established an impressive network of auxiliary organisations among students, writers and women. Besides having a well knit party apparatus and large number of ideologically motivated cadres, it has demonstrated its ability to mobilise substantial rural masses for political action. The Mazdoor Kisan Party has a traditional power base among the peasantry in the frontier but has also secured influence in the industrial working class in the Punjab.

The new left party, despite all the limitations has the potential to grow into an influential political organisation. It will have a substantial number of politically trained and ideologically committed cadres, it can build effective class organisations among the peasants and the industrial workers and can motivate the radical youth for agitational politics. Once the party enters the political arenas it will attract to its ranks sizeable number of pro-left elements, who are hitherto undecided and may even impel the dissatisfied PPP activists to join in. In terms of electoral politics, the ANP can hope to perform as good

as many better known parties of the right.

In the immediate future, it will have to pay special attention to its relationship with the PPP, which has in the past stolen the thunder from the left and gained legitimacy as the major spokesman of the have-nots. It should neither pursue a policy of open confrontation nor look like an appendage of the PPP. Benazir's current hobnobbing with the Americans and appeasement of the business community may give the ANP the opportunity to demonstrate to the masses the difference between expediency and genuine progressive politics. In order to emerge as a viable left alternative in national politics, the ANP will have to concentrate on aspects of political work, which the PPP has conveniently ignored; building a grass root party apparatus, strengthening its class organisations among the under privileged and emphasising the supremacy of the programme over personalities.

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PAKISTAN

AWAMI NATIONAL PARTY SPOKESMAN CLARIFIES STAND ON ISSUES

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 10 May 86 p 8

[Article by Anwar Iqbal]

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, May 9: The Awami National Party — a new political organisation whose formation was agreed upon recently in Peshawar merging four left-wing parties—wants a federal Pakistan but believes in allowing full autonomy to the provinces with a guarantee of non-interference from the centre.

The Awami National Party or the ANP will include the NDP, PNP, Mazdoor Kisan Party and the Awami Tehreek while they hope that Mairaj Mohammad Khan's Qaumi Mohaz-i-Azadai (QMA) and some other left-wing organisations will soon join the merger.

Sardar Shaukat Ali, convener of the ANP told this correspondent recently that his party believes that the question of nationalities was of the foremost importance. "The fact that millions were turning out in the streets for one party does not mean that the people had forgotten their ethnic, cultural or lingual identities," he said.

He continued that if the government, the PPP and other political forces in the country do not recognise the importance and the urgency of the situation, it will have very dangerous repercussions for the country.

NATIONALITIES: The ANP recognises five different nationalities in the country — Punjabis, Pashtoon, Baluch, Sindhis and Saraikis. The Saraikis are the latest addition to this list but not the last. As Sardar Shaukat Ali says: "If more nationalities insisted on separate recognition, they should also be acknowledged. "The recognition of Saraikis as a separate nationality also reflects the urge of the smaller provinces to break up the majority of Punjab.

Sardar Shaukat Ali said the languages spoken by these nationalities should be promoted as national languages while Urdu

should only be used for communication between the provinces and with the centre.

He said uncontrolled migration to the bigger cities was turning the local population into minorities. This should immediately be stopped and the cultural and lingual heritage of the nationalities should be preserved.

ARMED FORCES: The ANP stands for a total restructuring of the armed forces "to end the possibility of martial law once and for all." The ANP convener said: "Pakistan cannot afford such a huge regular army." His party believes in raising a people's army with compulsory service for everybody between 15 and 45. The money thus saved will be spent on education and health.

To make the provinces feel secure and to guarantee their autonomy, the ANP suggests the establishment of four separate militias under the direct control of the provincial governments.

"This is to decentralise the armed forces and to end the usurpation of the people's rights", said Sardar Shaukat Ali. He said the four militias will also help defend the country in case of a foreign invasion. A moderate regular army will also be maintained, he added.

FOREIGN POLICY: In the field of foreign policy, the ANP believes in 'positive neutrality' which is non-alignment with "a positive tilt towards the cause of the Third World and underdevelopment". The cause of the people in South Africa, Libya, Palestine, Nicaragua and other places "will be openly supported but efforts will be made to maintain an equidistant relationship with the two super-powers without being subservient to any".

"Under the ANP, Pakistan will no longer ignore the socialist bloc

as it is doing now under American influence, but first and foremost will be the interest of our own country," said the ANP convener.

The new left-wing party wants an end to the subservient economy and comprador capitalism. It will introduce cooperative farming on government lands and the lands given as 'rewards' to high government officials will be confiscated. So will be the lands of the 'big landlords.'

Basic and heavy industries will be taken into the public sector while light industries will be allowed in the private sector. "However, the relation between the workers and the factory owners will be regulated."

The ANP convener said preference will be given to local labourers in the industrial sector. More factories will be opened in the underdeveloped areas and education and health care will be free. Efforts will also be made to provide homes to the homeless.

PEOPLE'S PARTY: Sardar Shaukat Ali refuted the charges that the merger aimed checking the PPP's thrust.

He said the PPP was not alone in struggling for democracy. The movement was spearheaded by the MRD and the parties joining the ANP had made more sacrifices than the PPP. The Awami Tehreek was in the forefront of the movement in 1983. The MKP was the most active in Lahore. People like Rasool Bakhsh Palejo, Fazil Rahu, and Jam Saqi were languishing in jails for years without trial. He said the forming of a new progressive party will strengthen the movement for democracy rather than weaken it.

Sardar Shaukat Ali said it was the government's propaganda that the merger was against the PPP. In fact it will only contribute to the positive role the PPP was playing in

awakening the people against the Zia regime.

He also rejected the suggestion that it was the fear of the PPP's popularity that made the four smaller parties get together in defence of their interests. He said: "We are all allies in the MRD, including the PPP, though there could be some difference of opinion, but it does not pitch us against each other. He said as a politician he does not believe in the concept of smaller and bigger political parties. An upsurge in popular support at one stage and the lack of it at another does not make a political party bigger or smaller."

However, he declared that their policy towards Afghanistan and the American loans was different from that of the People's Party.

He also disagreed with Sardar Ataulah Mengal who once said that certain people were now using socialism against the smaller nationalities in the same way as the rightist forces used Islam to usurp their rights. Sardar Shaukat Ali said such allegations only show the narrow-mindedness of the person who has made them.

He said people in Punjab should be made to participate in the struggle for the might of the nationalities. "Without their struggle, this task cannot be accomplished only progressive elements in the country could make the Punjab participate."

REACTIONARY FORCES: He said in the present situation the Jamaat-i-Islami and the so-called Afghan Mujahideen who are the reserve force of American imperialism, will not tolerate any progressive or democratic movement in Pakistan. They will not hesitate in using the arms supplied to them to fight the Russians

against the democratic forces within the country. But the people of Pakistan, he said, had passed the stage where they could be fooled in the name of Islam or Jihad. They will not tolerate these so-called Mujahideen who were indulging in the smuggling of narcotics and arms.

He said it was a tribute to the people's consciousness that despite all its efforts the government failed to convince them that what was happening in Afghanistan was a Jihad. They don't want to be involved in the conflict of the two superpowers.

NO HASTE: Sardar Shaukat Ali also disagreed with those who say that the merger was being made in a haste and therefore, it will be shortlived. He said the spadework for the merger began in 1978 and the urge to have a united platform for the progressive forces matured during the nine repressive years of martial law.

He said an alliance of the left-wing parties prior to the merger wouldn't have worked. He said MRD itself was an alliance made possible only through the struggle of the left-wing forces. Another alliance would only harm the MRD.

About Mairaj Mohammad Khan's reluctance to join the ANP he said the QMA participated in the negotiations while Mairaj was in London. "We are still talking to the QMA and other progressive parties and hope that they will soon join us."

He said it was wrong to say that the ANP was another name for the NAP. He admitted that there were many NAP people in the ANP who "will help and guide the newer elements." However, there were many new faces in it. Besides, the conditions had changed now and there were many issues that the ANP will have to tackle which the NAP did not.

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PAKISTAN

MINISTER SAYS MUSLIM LEAGUE MAY SEEK OTHER PARTIES' COOPERATION

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 9 May 86 p 10

[Article by Ashraf Hashmi]

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, May 8: Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo's Pakistan Muslim League, though having no immediate plans to seek cooperation of other political parties, was not opposed to mutual cooperation and understanding with them, particularly those which had worked in the Pakistan National Alliance against PPP rule.

This was stated here by the Federal Minister for Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Iqbal Ahmed Khan, in an exclusive interview with The Muslim.

Commenting on the recent meeting between Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo and the Tehrik-e-Istiqal Chief, Asghar Khan, the Minister welcomed such contacts and said the Prime Minister had never been averse to such political dialogue and always sought the cooperation of other political parties to work for the consolidation and stability of the political process. "Close cooperation was possible not only with the Tehrik-e-Istiqal but also with all those political parties which had worked together in the Pakistan National Alliance," the Minister remarked.

Ruling out the possibility of holding mid-term elections in the country, the Minister said "how could you expect the government which had been in power for only a few months to go for polls and abandon its programme which it had promised to the nation?" he asked.

He said the PPP Chairperson Miss Benazir was raising self-contradictory demands of holding mid-term polls and removal of the President.

Explaining the legal side of the issue, he said constitutionally it was the President who, on the advice of the Prime Minister or acting on his own discretion, could hold elections. If the President was removed who will hold the elections, he asked, and said that the demand was not aimed at holding elections but to pave the way for another extra-constitutional method and that could only be the imposition of martial law in the country.

He said that by raising such demands efforts were being made to destroy the political system in the country and to deprive the people of what ever political rights they have achieved.

The political parties, he said, should wait till 1990 and in the meantime work hard to organise themselves from the grassroots level. The present government, he said, was ready to give all possible assurances for a free and impartial elections in 1990 and the Prime Minister was fully committed on this issue.

Talking about the amendment made in the Constitution through the Eighth Amendment Bill, the Minister said the Parliament was fully sovereign to make amendments in the Constitution. He said an 11-member Senate Committee was already busy in examining the apprehensions that the 8th Amendment Bill had adversely affected the quantum of provincial autonomy granted in the 1973 Constitution. If the committee made specific recommendations the government party would certainly look into them and act accordingly.

When asked to comment on the President's remarks about the possibility of another Martial Law in the country, he said the President had only warned the politicians that they should not cross the democratic limits and create such conditions which endangered the lives and properties of the people. The President's remarks were nothing more than a realistic reading of the situation, he said. The politicians should realise that if they kept on insisting on extra-constitutional measures this would lead to a total reversal.

Talking about the forthcoming budget session of the National Assembly, he said the national budget would be presented the day the National Assembly meets. The session, he said, will be held by the end of this month and a firm date for it will be announced either on May 12 or 13.

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PAKISTAN

KHAR CRITICIZES JATOI'S REMOVAL AS SIND PPP CHIEF

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 10 May 86 p 5

[Text]

LONDON, May 9: Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar, political ally of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, has said the removal of Mr. Jatoi is one of the most irrational and erratic decisions the Acting Chairperson of Pakistan People's Party, has taken. In his opinion it was against the national and party interest.

Mr. Khar who called Miss Benazir Bhutto as "this girl" said on Wednesday "when 'this girl' came to Britain, I met her several times. But after the very first meeting I had serious doubts and thoughts about 'this girl' as she was bent upon to serve the vested interests."

He said I am genuinely convinced and I do not mince my words that Benazir Bhutto's leadership would be detrimental to the integrity of the country if she is not controlled. She has dictatorial attitude. If she got an opportunity, it will be bad day for the people of Pakistan.

"PPP is a great institution, biggest party of the country and

has a great future, but if Miss Benazir Bhutto is unchecked and uncontrolled, then the country will be in great danger," he added.

Mr. Khar said: "We made certain mistakes in the past by building personality cult. The country cannot afford the repetition of past mistakes."

Mr. Khar was of the view that Miss Benazir had removed Mr. Jatoi at a most inappropriate time. "There is no reason for such an action. The party leader should not take hasty decision against such an important member of the party, as Mr. Jatoi whose sacrifices are well known," he added.

"It is not the one and only mistake, she is going to commit many blunders and as senior members of the party we have a duty to save the party and the country as she is leading them to chaos and destruction," he said.

"We did not join the party we founded it at the time when Miss Benazir was in Kindergarten, Khar said and declared that he had

full faith in Mr. Jatoi's leadership and "we will be making positive contributions and stand with the workers."

When asked to comment on Miss Benazir's return to Pakistan, Khar said the way she was organising her rallies was the biggest blunder and thought that she should have consulted the senior party leaders instead of going first to Lahore. She should have started her campaign from Bahawalpur or any other city and finally should have come to Lahore, he said adding that by doing so she most probably would have brought down the government. "If any government in Pakistan survives Lahore it can survive any other city, she has not missed one but hundreds of opportunities."

Khar said Gen. Zia is ruling the country not through the will of the people and his own competence but due to the incompetence of politicians and especially the PPP leadership.

Khar charged that Miss Bhutto was only interested in sitting in PM House and President House.--PPI

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PAKISTAN

PUNJAB CHIEF MINISTER GIVES SLUM DWELLERS PROPRIETARY RIGHTS

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 10 May 86 p 6

[Text]

LAHORE, May 9: Punjab Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif conferred free of cost proprietary rights to the dwellers of former 'China Basti' in New Abadi, with cheques of Rs. 10,000 to each family as loan from the House Building Finance Corporation and transportation facility for shifting their households. At a simple ceremony here this morning.

The 'China Abadi' was located over a piece of land of 25 Kanals owned by Model Town Society where Christian families were living under most unhygienic conditions. The Chief Minister took keen interest to shift them to a plot of land of 150 kanals belonging to the Lahore Municipal Corporation where all the 258 families have been provided with all civic amenities of life, including water supply, electricity, street lights, drains, roads and two plots of six marlas each for a church and a school building.

While conferring proprietary rights, the Chief Minister remarked that since he was also the President of Model Town, he considered it his duty as a Muslim to ensure that his neighbours were not in difficulty. He regretted that in 'China Basti' its former residents were living an uncertain life. There were no facilities in the 'basti' for civilised human beings.

The Chief Minister continued his speech amidst slogans like 'China Basti ki Taqdeer, Nawaz Sharif, Nawaz Sharif', 'Nawaz Sharif Aagya, China Basti ki Taqdeer Bana Gaya', 'Muslim-Christian Unity Zindabad', 'Col. W. Herbert Zindabad', and 'Prime Minister Junejo Zindabad.'

He said that the House Building Finance Corporation had arranged loans in lumpsum for the 258 families in a record time of three days. He added that he would himself visit the new place across the Ferozepur Road to see the development work being carried out there and ensure that its residents did not face any difficulty.

The Chief Minister announced amidst clapping, that he would also make arrangements for providing jobs to the children of the new 'abadi'. He wished a better future not only for the present residents of the 'abadi' but also for their coming generations.

He said that all the citizens of Pakistan, irrespective of their religions, had made sacrifices to achieve this ideological state, and therefore, he added, all of them had equal rights to live an honourable and comfortable life in it.

The Chief Minister said that Islam was a universal religion which guaranteed equal rights to all people irrespective of their caste, creed and religion. He said that it was the bounden duty of all Pakistanis to work for strengthening its integrity and solidarity.

He said that some elements had tried to exploit the situation as a result of shifting of the residents of 'China Basti', but, he added, they had to eat humble pie.

He said that the present government and the local administration would be ever ready to listen to their problems and solve them at the earliest.

He also paid compliments to Lt. Col. (Retd) W. Herbert, Federal Parliamentary Secretary for Defence, and other Christian leaders for their enthusiastic spirit to work for the development of their homeland.

Speaking on the occasion, Lt. Col. (Retd) W. Herbert said that at present there were 146 'Katchi Abadis' in Lahore which were being developed. He said no 'Katchi Abadi' had been provided such facilities as had been made available to the former residents of 'China Basti'.

He described the conferring of proprietary rights to the residents of former 'China Basti' as a historic step and a reflection of great Islamic values and love and affection of our Muslim brethren for the Christian community. He added that Islam was a religion for the salvation of the poor and the oppressed people, and the present government of the country had given a demonstration of it.

Commissioner, Lahore Division, and Administrator, Model Town Society, Mr. Saeed Mehdi, said that it was previously decided that the residents of the 'basti' should be shifted to some place in the township of Kot Lakpath, but, he added, it was due to the personal interest of all Pakistanis that they were provided a place near the former 'China Basti'.

The ceremony was also attended by the MNA of the area and Chaudhry Fazal Haq and a labour leader, Mufti Riaz, who, in their brief remarks, said that it was the national duty of all Pakistanis to safeguard the ideological and geographical frontiers of Pakistan which was achieved after great sacrifices under the dynamic leadership of the Quaid-i-Azam.—APP

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23 June 1986

PAKISTAN

BRIEFS

SRI LANKAN MAIDS--Pakistan is today faced with a new phenomenon of influx of Sri Lankan Ayahs (Maids). Of late, they have started coming in hordes and are taking up jobs at a salary of Rs 600 for non-English speaking and Rs 800 for those who speak English. The 'Modus Operandi' is that they are brought in here by agents who charge Rs 3000 per Ayah from the employer. The employment is for a one-year period in the first instance at which time a month's leave with passage has to be given if the services of the same Ayah are required by the same employer. These ayahs have found employment mostly in Karachi and Lahore. Since the Sri Lankans can come to Pakistan without a visa and have not to report about their arrival to the police, they take jobs without any hurdle. There is hardly any one to tell them that they are not supposed to take employment while they are visiting Pakistan, nor is it believed to be illegal to ask the agents to provide such Ayahs on demand. [Text] [Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 20 May 86 p 1] /12379

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