

JPRS-UFE-86-003

18 JUNE 1986

USSR Report

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No 4, OCT-DEC 1985

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18 JUNE 1986

USSR REPORT

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No 4, OCT - DEC 1985

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language journal PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA published quarterly in Moscow by the Far East Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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* Translation taken from English-language FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS No 1, Jan-Mar 86.

PUBLICATION DATA

English title : PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST
No 4, 1985

Russian title : PROBLEMY DALNEGO VOSTOKA

Author (s) :

Editor (s) : M. I. Sladkovskiy

Publishing House : Izdatelstvo Progress

Place of publication : Moscow

Date of publication : Oct-Dec 1985

Signed to press : 25 November 1985

Copies : 10,675

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27TH CONGRESS OCCASION TO REVIEW LENINIST PEACE POLICY

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 86 pp 3-15

International developments in the present exceedingly complicated and responsible period in world affairs show beyond a doubt that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government firmly and consistently follow the Leninist foreign policy worked out at the 26th Congress of the CPSU and the subsequent plenums of its Central Committee. Its aim is to create conditions for the peaceful and free development of all nations, to eliminate the threat of a thermonuclear cataclysm, and move on from the confrontation of the two social systems to peaceful competition.

For the Soviet people to carry out their big constructive plans, they need a tranquil world, continued relaxation of international tensions, and elimination of any and all threats of an armed conflict erupting between the opposite social systems. That is why the inventions about a "Soviet threat" circulated by certain political quarters and ideologists in capitalist countries are really ludicrous and senseless. As Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CC CPSU, pointed out in his interview to *Time* magazine, war will not come from the USSR which will never begin it. Soviet foreign policy is directed towards broad, fruitful international cooperation free from diktat and interference in the affairs of other countries, to their mutual benefit and for the good of all humanity. The Soviet Union will do everything it can to secure a peaceful future for the present and the rising generations. That is the goal of our policy.

Intensive and varied work is under way in the Party and country in preparation for the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which is going to be held on February 25, 1986. The congresses of our Party—and this is conclusively borne out by past experience—are events of tremendous international political significance. Their special historical mission transcends the borders of our country, for they exercise a profound and far-reaching influence on developments and prospects across the world.

The importance of the congresses of the CPSU may be traced to the fact that they tackle problems of truly worldwide significance, and to the role played by the Soviet Union in world affairs. The congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union define and chart the cardinal aspects of the foreign policy of the CPSU and the USSR in the period to come in conformity with the Party's fundamental guidelines, and advance a clear and concrete programme for resolving burning international problems, above all, those related to the curbing of the nuclear arms race.

One of the key objectives of the CPSU in the theoretical field is to scientifically substantiate and work out the crucial problems of socialist foreign policy, to produce a Marxist-Leninist analysis and sum up the experience of the CPSU and the Soviet government in foreign rela-

tions, and secure a synthesis of theory and practice in socialism's conduct of foreign policy. It is natural, therefore, that these issues will occupy a special place in the work of the coming 27th Congress of the CPSU, which is to adopt a new edition of the Party Programme. A quarter of a century, which is no short period, has elapsed since the present edition of this highly important document was adopted. During this time our country gained the capacity for accelerating its social and economic development; changes have occurred in the world socialist system—it has made headway and grown stronger; the world has witnessed qualitative changes in the correlation of forces on a global scale. It is self-evident that so eventful a period in history offers expanses for conclusions and generalisations of a profoundly fundamental and long-term significance.

In October 1985, the CPSU Central Committee's Plenum discussed the draft of the new edition of the Programme of the CPSU, which was drawn up by decision of the 26th Congress of the CPSU. The draft reflects the main trends in the country's domestic life and in international affairs, along with the experience the Party has accumulated since the adoption of the present Programme, and is based on the guidelines of the April 1985 Plenum of the CC CPSU and the conference on questions related to the acceleration of scientific and technical progress.

A distinctive feature of the Draft project is the continuity of the basic theoretical and political provisions underlying the Party work. The continuity implies an undeviating and consistent adherence to the theory and policies pursued by the Party and its loyalty to Marxism-Leninism. At the same time, consistency and continuity aim at creative development of the theory, strategy and tactics of the Party and at innovative quest along the key directions of its activity.

The draft of the new edition of the CPSU Programme rests on the firm foundation of Marxism-Leninism and on the realistic analysis of the country's domestic and international situation. It contains specific, broad characteristics of strategies followed by the Party, the Soviet state and the entire people.

The radical change in the correlation of world forces clearly visible within this particular period resulted in a steady growth of socialism's role and, as one of its effects, in the growing impact of socialist foreign policy, above all the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, on present and future international relations. The qualitative changes in world affairs, in the contention between the two social systems, have greatly extended the potentialities of socialist foreign policy and increased its active and positive influence on the course and outcome of crucial events in the world of today. By virtue of the objective conditions, socialist foreign policy has become a key factor in the struggle for lasting world peace and against the global imperialist policy of aggression and diktat.

Soviet foreign policy has a reliable foundation in the country's economic power, the successful fulfilment of its imposing plans of social and economic development.

The concept of the acceleration of the country's socio-economic development is central to the policy the Party pursues at the present stage. It is this concept that the Party puts across to the people on the way towards the forthcoming 27th CPSU Congress. This concept underlies the provisions specifying goals and tasks facing the Communist Party and Soviet people in all spheres of life. Through the acceleration of the country's socio-economic development towards the achievement of a qualitatively new state of society—such is the backbone of the new draft edition of the CPSU Programme.

The CPSU Central Committee's Plenary Meeting (October 1985) has discussed the draft of the Basic Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1986-1990 and in the Period up to the Year

2000. The draft, which was approved by the Plenum, centres on a steady rise in the people's well-being impelled by heightened rates of the country's socio-economic development, a decisive switchover of the economy to intensive methods, and acceleration of scientific and technical progress. It envisages extensive technical modernisation of all economic fields, more effective use of the existing productive potential, a steadily rising productivity of labour, and a sweeping improvement of the system of management. Achievement of the targets set in the draft Basic Guidelines, the Plenum noted, will ensure a qualitatively new level of economic development, will meet the material and cultural needs of the Soviet people more fully than before, and secure the further strengthening of the country's defences.

The effectiveness of Soviet foreign policy depends on the state of the country's economy. Lenin's well-known postulate about the organic connection and interdependence between domestic and foreign policies is still entirely valid. Our Party's economic strategy is aimed at making the fullest possible use of the advantages of the socialist economic system. That is why it is determined to eliminate shortcomings in industry and transport, agriculture, and all other areas.

The influence of the socialist world on international events depends on the strength of the fraternal alliance of the states building the new society. People all over the globe associate their hopes of general peace, of averting another world war, with the efforts of the socialist community. And the socialist countries are, indeed, doing everything they can to live up to the hopes and aspirations of the mass of the people across the world.

The community of socialist countries is making good headway as it asserts an entirely new type of international relations that repose on ideological unity, common aims, and comradely cooperation, displaying profound respect for the interests, specificity, and traditions of every country. Their mutual relations are based on the principle of socialist internationalism, whose content is continuously enriched with the passage of time in the process of building the new society, in the joint struggle against imperialism. The socialist community today is a powerful and sound organism that plays a tremendous and benign role in the modern world.

The mechanism of fraternal cooperation extends to diverse fields in the life of our countries, to diverse areas of joint socialist construction. Our joint efforts help us find ever more effective ways of combining the common interests of the community with the interests of each of its members. As recorded in the Statement of the Economic Conference held in Moscow in June 1984 on the Basic Directions of Further Development and Closer Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation among CMEA Member-Countries, "the greater economic power of CMEA member-countries has become the material foundation for their policy of peace, detente, and mutually beneficial cooperation with other countries. The international prestige of socialism, that determining factor of humanity's social progress, has risen considerably. Its influence on world developments has increased." An effective means of coordinating foreign policies of the socialist countries is the Warsaw Treaty. Conferences of the Political Consultative Committee and sittings of the WTO Foreign Ministers' Committee work out collective measures to attain the peaceful political aims of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

Strengthening and development of relations with other socialist countries have always been and still are at the centre of the attention of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its Politburo. "Under prevailing conditions, while tackling the tasks of buttressing world peace", Mikhail Gorbachev has said, "we must devote

ourselves first of all to strengthening the positions of the socialist countries on the world scene, to furthering their allround cooperation. That is exactly what we are doing."

The prolongation for the next 20 years of the Warsaw Treaty, the political and defensive basis of the alliance of the fraternal socialist countries, was an event of tremendous international political importance. It is hard to overrate the historical significance of the Warsaw Treaty. It has been, and still is, a dependable shield protecting the interests of the socialist community countries. At the same time, it is a reliable instrument for consolidating world peace.

Accelerating scientific and technical progress, heightening economic efficiency, improving economic mechanisms, working on the further development and improvement of all aspects of life—these are the areas where socialist countries pool their efforts, and success will depend in many ways on still closer economic cooperation, on the economic integration of the fraternal socialist countries within the CMEA framework. The CPSU and the Soviet government consider these objectives vitally important for the advancement of socialism and for the consolidation of its positions in the economic competition with capitalism.

They are also highly important for frustrating attempts of the imperialist powers to exert economic and other pressure on the socialist states. Imperialist quarters do not confine themselves to ideological fabrications and acts of subversion. They try to use economic levers to combat socialism by boycotts and sanctions, and even direct economic blackmail. The US ruling quarters are especially eager to do so in a bid to use economic relations with socialist countries for their political ends and, in so doing, seek to exert undisguised pressure on the allies and rivals of the USA in order to secure their support for such unlawful actions. But their policy has no future. It is puerile to think that the advance of the socialist countries to the summits of social progress can be stopped by pressure and blackmail, unless, of course, one chooses to turn a blind eye to their true economic power, their colossal material resources, and their highly dynamic economy. What is more, such a policy is damaging first of all to the initiators of these sanctions.

The policy of aggressive US and NATO quarters, aimed at scrapping detente and at intensifying the arms race and military confrontation, is opposed by the Warsaw Treaty Organisation's strong efforts to consolidate peace, further international cooperation, secure arms reduction, and promote closer relations and mutual understanding among nations. This is the policy that governs all the collective resolutions and actions of the Warsaw Treaty countries. In the 1980s, it was vividly reflected in the documents of the WTO Political Consultative Committee's conference in Prague on January 4-5, 1983, the meeting of top Party leaders and statesmen of seven socialist countries in Moscow on June 28, 1983 and the Economic Conference of CMEA Countries in Moscow on June 12-14, 1984. In October 1985, the WTO Political Consultative Committee's conference in Sofia reaffirmed the common, jointly charted policy of the WTO members, defined concrete measures for improving the international situation and furthering international cooperation and unanimously adopted the resolution "For the Elimination of Nuclear Threat and the Turn for the Better in European and World Affairs".

Special note should be taken of Soviet efforts to promote relations with the People's Republic of China. The Soviet Union wants a serious improvement of relations with the PRC, and holds that, given reciprocity, this is quite possible. Important for the development of bilateral ties were the recent visit to the PRC and talks with Chinese leaders of the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers I. Arkhipov, and the visit to the USSR and talks with Soviet leaders of Yao Yiling, Deputy Premier

of the PRC State Council, and also the agreements on trade, economic and technical cooperation signed by the two countries during those visits. The Politburo of the CC CPSU reiterated the need for further efforts on both sides, on a mutually acceptable and equal basis, to finally overcome the negative period in Soviet-Chinese relations and to restore goodneighbourly cooperation. The Soviet side expressed its readiness to actively further this process.

"Our country is consistent in its fundamental approach to relations with the PRC. It is working to improve them, to develop mutually beneficial ties and contacts, and to extend and deepen the political dialogue." This was set out in the congratulations sent on behalf of the Soviet people to the people of China on the 36th anniversary of the People's Republic of China by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers. "The Soviet Union," the message says, "is convinced in the need for restoring goodneighbourliness and allround cooperation between the two countries on a mutually acceptable and equal basis, which would meet the vital interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples, consolidate security in Asia and strengthen peace and socialism".

The proposals of the Soviet Union and its allies are no abstract declarations or statements of good intent designed to win here-and-now prestige in the world. They are clear and well-grounded proposals that take account of the realities of world politics, of the interests of all states, and what is still more important, of the interests of all humanity.

In its approach to these exceedingly complicated international problems, the Soviet Union bases its foreign policy on the Marxist-Leninist doctrine which is the unshakeable foundation of our Party's and government's international activity.

The USSR will firmly follow the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence, a policy set once and for all by our socialist system and anchored in our morality and world outlook.

Peace and socialism are indissolubly related conceptions. It was the building of socialism, the consolidation of socialism's international positions, that made it possible to place on the order of the day the question of excluding wars from the life of society. The objective processes that are taking place in the world necessitate further improvements in the cooperation of socialist community countries in all fields, including that of foreign policy where they are opposed by the united front of the imperialist states. All this is relevant both to the global problems and the problems of a regional nature.

As before, the most important area in the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government is solidarity with the forces of progress and democracy, with those countries and peoples that are working to safeguard their freedom and independence against reactionary impingements, to eliminate the remnants of colonialism and neocolonialism, and to assert in international relations their inalienable right to be masters of their own destiny. The contention in this particular area of international relations is becoming increasingly acute with the passage of time, confirming Lenin's prophecy that "during the past few years it is this majority [of the population] that has been drawn into the struggle for emancipation with extraordinary rapidity, so that in this respect there cannot be the slightest doubt what the final outcome of the world struggle will be."¹

The specific feature of the present situation is that the role of the newly-free countries in world politics is growing. They are now an active and influential force that is working for peace and international security on the world scene, whose weight in world politics depends not only on their number but above all on the fact that, by and large, they follow a

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 500.

peaceable policy and are vitally interested in relaxing tensions and extending mutually beneficial cooperation.

The position of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in matters of war and peace, of averting a nuclear war, is in many ways consonant with that of the newly-free states, which, indeed, is the objective basis for their broad joint actions for peace. The Soviet Union and the socialist community as a whole consider the young states their friends and equal partners in the fight for peace and social progress, and support their efforts to consolidate sovereignty and safeguard freedom and independence. For objective reasons, the national liberation movement is becoming more and more distinctly anti-imperialist, because imperialism with its reluctance to acknowledge the right of all countries to choose their way independently, with its attempts to retaylor and alter the modern world to suit its own ends, is a source of danger for all nations, the biggest threat to world peace.

We in the Soviet Union have a high regard for the nonaligned movement which embraces the majority of the newly-free countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. We invariably support the initiatives of that broad international movement expressing the wishes of the newly-free peoples for equal cooperation, recognition of their lawful rights and interests, for a new international economic order, and removal from international life of all domination and diktat, and the claims to hegemony which imperialism and neocolonialism are so reluctant to renounce.

For forty years the world has lived in the shadow of the nuclear bomb, the most destructive and deadly of all weapons ever devised. Nearly a quarter of a million of civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki died within a few seconds when atomic weapons were first put to use by the United States in August 1945, with the atomic radiation still taking the lives of those who had been exposed to its effect in those tragic days.

The development of military technology has attained a stage where war becomes totally inadmissible in terms of its consequences for human civilisation.

Yet nuclear arms have been at the heart of the imperialist policy followed by the United States and its closest allies after World War II. From the outset, the United States and the politico-military NATO bloc which it heads had counted on cowing into submission the socialist countries and the national liberation movements through their military strategic superiority, and on subordinating them to diktat and, in the final analysis, establishing America's world supremacy.

In face of the nuclear arms race spurred by imperialism's aggressive forces, above all those of US imperialism, in face of their drive for military superiority over socialism, one can hardly count on the good will of those who have picked up the baton in the relay of the "godfathers" of the atomic bomb. Other, more tangible factors of containment are needed. The military-strategic parity with the United States achieved by the Soviet Union deprived militaristic quarters across the ocean of the chance to blackmail us with the nuclear threat. But at the junction of the 1970s and 1980s, this adventuristic militaristic policy of imperialist "hawks" has again been given impetus, pregnant with dire consequences. With the coming to power of the present US administration, the so-called Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) announced by the US President in March 1983, has become part of this dangerous policy that is

pushing the world towards nuclear catastrophe. The press described SDI as the Star Wars programme.

One of the most hypocritical ploys in advertising SDI is to portray it as a logical continuation of the "humane" policy of the US which allegedly "had an absolute monopoly on nuclear weapons for many years, but took no advantage of this". That was the "justification" of the new US doctrine put forward, among others, by US Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger.²

Pronouncements of this sort are clearly a falsification of the actual state of affairs. There is, in fact, a direct and organic link between the present and previous phases of US politico-military strategy, the strategy "from positions of strength" laying the ground for another world war. This applies not only to the United States having used atomic weapons twice already—in Hiroshima and Nagasaki—not as a means of quickly ending World War II but much more as a claim to military hegemony and diktat in the postwar world. Ever since nuclear weapons appeared they have been the ominous sword raised by US imperialism above the socialist world—at present also from outer space—and all humanity.

The unbridled arms race which Washington has imposed on the nations is causing growing alarm and concern everywhere in the world, the USA included. Large segments of the public in the United States are ever more clearly aware that military power, no matter how much it is increased, does not buttress the country's security, as the politologists in the White House and Pentagon would have the world believe.

As before, the US administration is counting on force in its international policy. It opposes force to any search for constructive solutions of pressing international problems through serious and equal negotiations aimed at achieving mutually acceptable agreements rather than camouflaging militarist ambitions and mollifying the public with talk about the "humane" aims of the SDI and exploration of outer space with allegedly purely scientific aims. US Secretary of State Shultz has spoken out quite unambiguously on this score. He said the United States must be strong and, what is more, must be prepared to use its strength. Americans, he said, are inclined to think that strength and diplomacy are alternatives. In fact, however, he declared strength and diplomacy must always go together, for otherwise the United States is not likely to achieve much in this world.³ Behind these pronouncements one can distinctly see Washington's ambition to win world supremacy.

The Soviet decision to unilaterally stop all nuclear explosions as from August 6, 1985, works in the vital security interests of all nations. The moratorium on nuclear tests is welcomed and backed by the general public across the world, because it meets the desires of all peoples. The broad response of the public from all corners of the world holds that it is now up to the United States and the other nuclear powers to follow suit and halt nuclear explosions. This would be a tribute to the memory of the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and, indeed, a tangible contribution to strategic stability and peace.

If Washington is really interested in stopping the arms race, as the US administration tried to persuade the world public on so many occasions, it should prove this by deeds: the United States should have used the opportunity and also cease nuclear explosions. But when it comes to deeds, Washington begins feverishly to invent all sorts of excuses trying to avoid accepting the Soviet proposals. The White House set up a kind of perimeter defence to "repulse" the pressing demands for a moratorium on nuclear explosions. It invokes even incredible "arguments", such as alleg-

² *The Washington Post*, April 3, 1985.

³ See *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1985, p. 718.

ing that the Soviet Union has outstripped the United States in weapons and that a moratorium on testing would "perpetuate the lag". The absurdity of these allegations was admitted by the *New York Times*, which cited highly persuasive data on this score. Since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it said, the Pentagon has spent more than \$750 billion on new nuclear weapons systems, whose stockpile of more than 25,000 warheads has a destructive power that exceeds the bomb which destroyed Hiroshima by something like a million times. For Washington, however, this is not enough. The fact of the matter, the *New York Times* pointed out, is that the strategists in Reagan's administration do not want to stop. This way to an agreement on halting nuclear tests and moving ahead to the elimination of nuclear weapons in general, Mikhail Gorbachev has said in his replies to a TASS correspondent, "does not suit only those who count on forcible pressure, who nurse plans of developing more and more new types of nuclear weapons on the Earth, and who have set their sights on starting an arms race in outer space."

The decision to halt all nuclear explosions on a unilateral basis has a special bearing on the Asian and Pacific Ocean region, for that was where the two US atomic bombs were dropped. Throughout the postwar years, Asia has seen no more or less lengthy period of peace and stability. Peopled by nearly two-thirds of the world population, it saw seats of tension spring up one after another, leading to acute conflicts that brought innumerable calamities and suffering to its peoples, diverting them from their daily vital tasks.

Today, too, through the fault of the imperialist powers, above all the United States, the situation in many parts of Asia remains tense. In a bid to turn the continent into an arena of confrontation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, with the forces of national liberation, the White House is trying to enlist the Asian states as accomplices in its military ventures.

Hundreds of US military installations are scattered all over the Far East. The second largest US overseas armed force is stationed there. Japan, whose government has expressed readiness to contribute to the US Star Wars programme, is being hitched more and more tightly to Washington's war chariot. This is adding considerably to the instability in the region.

In recent time, Washington has been trying to establish a new politico-military structure in that large region, with Japan being assigned a prominent role in it. A Washington-Tokyo-Seoul triangle is being planned on the basis of already existing bilateral agreements, with the partners of the USA playing the role of American nuclear missile bases. This is accompanied by attempts to create a still broader politico-military alliance in the shape of a so-called Pacific Community that would include all the ASEAN countries along with the states that are already tied to the USA by military commitments.

A thorough exchange of opinions on how to secure peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific Ocean occurred when Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CC CPSU, received a delegation of the Socialist Party of Japan in September 1985. Mikhail Gorbachev and Chairman of the SPJ Executive M. Ishibashi noted that it was desirable to pool the efforts of the countries of that vast region regardless of their social systems and turn it into a zone of peace and equal cooperation. Gorbachev emphasised that people in the Soviet Union respect Japan and its people. Japan's role in world affairs would increase if it contributed to a peaceful solution of

burning international problems and helped to arrange peaceful cooperation with all countries and peoples rather than embarking on militarisation and committing itself more and more to backing the US military plans. Mikhail Gorbachev stressed that the concrete Soviet proposals to Japan aimed at improving the political climate between the two countries, were still valid. He noted that it would be a good thing if the fruitful experience in trade and economic relations between the Soviet Union and a number of West European countries based on long-term economic cooperation agreements and relevant long-term cooperation programmes were extended to Soviet-Japanese relations.

One of the most important problems in the contemporary world is that of securing lasting peace in the Indian Ocean area, one of the world's most densely populated regions. Nearly a third of mankind lives in its littoral states. It is an active zone of national liberation. Despite the variety of political, socio-economic and religious features, most of the peoples living there have a common historical past and a common desire to become true masters of their present and future, and thus play the due role in the world community.

Imperialism busily "develops strategically" the Indian Ocean. The number of warships of the US navy and the navies of other NATO countries cruising in its waters is growing steadily. Existing military bases and strongholds are being expanded and new ones are being built. Their number is already approaching thirty. Furthermore, the Pentagon is planning to deploy medium-range Pershing-2 nuclear missiles in some of the littoral states, and arm its ships with cruise missiles.

The Indian Ocean is being inscribed into the Star Wars orbit. A ground satellite tracking station designed to knock out artificial earth satellites is being installed on Diego Garcia, while the submarines based there will have vertical launch systems for nuclear missiles and fuses whose energy is convertible into laser beams to destroy enemy missiles directly on launching pads. Reports have come to hand of the intention to develop elements of Star Wars systems in other parts of the Indian Ocean.

The "zone of responsibility" of Pentagon's Central Command (CENTCOM) set up in January 1983 extends to many Asian countries. Like the sword of Damocles, the Asian countries are threatened by the Rapid Deployment Force, which has been activated by the United States to dictate its will to other countries by force of arms. This policy of the US administration is tending to stoke up existing seats of military tension and to create new situations of conflict. And most of the flashpoints are situated on the Asian continent. The imperialist aggression against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is being escalated, armed forays against the People's Republic of Kampuchea continue, bloodshed does not stop to flow in long-suffering Lebanon, and the war between Iraq and Iran is being dragged out.

The other no less important aspect in the Asian policy of the imperialist states is that neocolonialist exploitation and plunder of newly-free Asian countries continues, is even being escalated, through transnationals and non-equivalent commodity exchange. The debt burden and other methods of pressure are used to influence the policy of these countries, making them serve the gigantic military programmes of Washington and NATO directly or indirectly.

It is becoming more obvious now that to fight for their interests against outside encroachments, the Asian countries must deal in a most serious manner with the fundamental problems of peace and security in the region because success in resolving the intricate problems of their socio-economic development requires peace and stability. It would be dangerous and short-sighted for them to permit any rise of tension in Asia and the Pacific Ocean. Asia must, and can, become a continent of peace

and goodneighbourly relations. Speaking on August 29, 1985, in the Kremlin, Mikhail Gorbachev recalled the recent Soviet proposal for working out a general, comprehensive approach to Asian security. Its substance is to pool the efforts of all Asian states, regardless of their social system, to ensure peace and stability on the basis of the peaceful coexistence principles. In this major undertaking, it is important to have a broad basic approach to securing greater strategic stability consistent with the interests of all countries in the region without exception. It could include the five principles of peaceful coexistence worked out by Asian countries years ago, the ten Bandung principles, and some of the initiatives relating to Asian security made by the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the countries of Indochina, the Republic of India, and other states in the region.

The Soviet Union has no intention of imposing a ready formula of Asian security on the other states in Asia and the Pacific. It is calling on them to work together in producing such a formula by means of bilateral and multilateral contacts. The Soviet Union has proposed that an Asian forum should be held to exchange opinions and find constructive solutions to this important problem.

While proposing to make the most of the good experience of the European Conference, the Soviet Union does not expect, of course, that the Helsinki scheme would be mechanically transplanted to Asian soil. But many elements of the European experience in detente can be applied in Asia as well. Take, for example, the principles of respect for sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs; non-use of force; peaceful settlement of disputes; the right of nations to decide their own future, and equal, mutually beneficial cooperation.

In recent years, the socialist countries have come forward with a large number of initiatives concerning various aspects of Asian security. The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, the two nuclear powers on the continent, have pledged no-first-use of nuclear weapons. The Mongolian People's Republic has proposed concluding a convention on mutual non-aggression and renunciation of force by the countries of Asia and the Pacific. The three countries of Indochina have come forward with realistic proposals for normalising the situation in Southeast Asia. A number of constructive proposals aimed at settling inter-governmental issues with Pakistan and Iran have been made by the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Peace in the Far East would be greatly enhanced if the proposals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for withdrawing US troops from South Korea and unifying the country on peaceful, democratic principles without outside interference, were adopted.

The unilateral Soviet decision to cease all nuclear explosions as of August 6, 1985, like its new major proposal on international cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space in conditions of its non-militarisation, submitted to the 40th session of the UN General Assembly, work in the vital interests of all nations. The concept of Asian security could well include the demand for all nuclear powers to completely renounce nuclear weapons tests in Asia, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the rest of the world, and for the states of the region to renounce participating in space militarisation programmes.

A sense of responsibility for the future and for the survival of all peoples on our planet is taking root in the countries of Asia and the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and, for that matter, in the entire developing world. Compliance with the principles on which the Soviet proposal is based, writes the *Indian Express*, may gradually pave the way to an Asian security conference on the lines of the Helsinki Conference.

The constructive peace initiatives of Asian countries addressed to va-

rious aspects of security on the continent as a whole or its separate regions, are appreciated and supported in the USSR. In a message of greetings to the international conference, "Fortieth Anniversary of the Victory over Japanese Militarism and the Tasks of the Peace Movement in the Countries of Asia and the Pacific", Mikhail Gorbachev said: "We hope that the Asian countries will concert their efforts and jointly produce a common, comprehensive approach to the problem of security in Asia and the adjoining Pacific and Indian Oceans."

People all over the world are aware more and more clearly that humanity faces a serious choice: either concrete steps bridling the arms race or a continued drift towards the nuclear abyss. That is why the large-scale Soviet peace initiatives—the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests, and the proposal to put into the agenda of the 40th UN General Assembly on international cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space in conditions of its non-militarisation—are so warmly welcomed everywhere. The press response on various continents, notably in the United States, expresses fears that the militarisation of outer space would greatly increase the nuclear threat and deprive the peoples of all hope that nuclear weapons would one day disappear from the face of the earth. What is worse, the arms race would gain a qualitatively new, still more dangerous, dimension. It would grow in all directions and colossal resources, in addition to those that are already being spent, would be flung into it instead of serving the progress of humanity and helping to resolve many of its vital problems.

Many prominent statesmen and political leaders, heads of anti-war organisations, and public spokesmen support the Soviet peace initiatives, saying that they would put up a reliable barrier to the arms race. Strategic stability would be considerably greater all over the world. A palpable contribution would thus be made to the final elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

Taking account of the existing realities, the Soviet Union has never thought, nor does it think now, that progress in disarmament can be achieved easily. But we are convinced that no difficulties are reason enough for pessimistic conclusions as to the fight for stopping the arms race, and much less for conclusions that the struggle to resolve this key problem of our time is hopeless. On the contrary, the significance and topicality of that task compels us to continuously escalate the effort to win that struggle so that all nations would jointly frustrate the man-hating plans of imperialism's aggressive quarters.

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to its relations with the United States, which it regards as a most important factor of international politics. We hold, in principle, that there is no preordained inevitability of confrontation between the two countries. This is borne out by the history of Soviet-American relations, both negative and positive.

The position the Soviet Union adopted at the summit talks in Geneva is all but too clear: to prevent the arms race in outer space and to reach an agreement with the US on mutual reduction of relevant nuclear armaments based on the principle of equality and equal security.

"Our countries," Mikhail Gorbachev stressed in a talk with US journalists, "simply cannot afford to take matters to the point of confrontation. That is in the true interests of both the Soviet and American peoples. And it must be translated into the language of real politics. It is essential to stop the arms race, to work on disarmament, and to normalise Soviet-American relations. Honestly, it is high time to make the relations

between our two great nations worthy of their historic role. After all, the future of peace, the future of world civilisation, really depends on our relations. We are prepared to act in that direction."

A high place among the Soviet Union's foreign policy priorities is devoted to political dialogue and interaction with other capitalist countries, to expanding mutually beneficial cooperation with them on a long-term basis in commercial, economic, scientific, technical, cultural and other spheres. The Soviet Union holds that these countries can contribute substantially to the improvement of the political climate and help in resolving problems that are facing humankind. History shows beyond a doubt that they play an active positive role in international relations when their policies are truly independent, based on national interests, and when they do not follow blindly in the wake of the militaristic policy imposed on them by Washington.

Certainly, it is no secret that US ruling quarters exert powerful pressure on the policy of their allies, seeking to subordinate it to their egoistic interests. But centrifugal tendencies are making steady headway in the capitalist camp, operating not only in the purely economic sphere, where the contradictions are growing sharper and the competitive struggle is becoming highly acute. The public in the Western states is calling ever more insistently for a more independent, more self-sufficient policy on the international scene, above all in such areas as security, reduction and limitation of the arms race, and also the further development of relations with socialist countries. They are clearly aware that the policy of limiting contacts with the socialist states which Washington is seeking to impose, is contrary to their true national interests. A mass movement is gaining momentum in Europe to improve East-West relations and to revive detente, which has already struck deep roots on the European continent.

The peaceful nature of Soviet foreign policy springs from the very essence of the socialist system. Looking forward to the 27th Congress of the CPSU, Soviet people are motivated by peaceful aspirations and resolved to fulfil the far reaching plans of accelerated socio-economic progress worked out by the Party. Our Party has formulated a policy to attain a new qualitative dimension in the state of our society, envisaging scientific and technical renovation and achievement of the world's highest standards in productivity of labour, perfection of social and economic relations, deep-going changes in the sphere of labour and in the material and spiritual conditions of life, a vitalisation of the system of political and social institutions, and a deepening of socialist democracy.

The interconnection and interdependence of home and foreign policies are also acquiring a new dimension. The greater economic power of the Soviet Union, the dynamic development of its economy, is making its foreign policy of peace more effective in a most direct and immediate way. Soviet foreign policy works in the rock bottom interests of the Soviet people, and is based on the labour of millions of people in our country.

In spite of the fact that the Geneva summit failed to solve concrete problems relating to limitation and reduction of armaments, the corroboration of the January 1985 Soviet-American agreement on the need to search for ways to prevent the arms race in space and to put an end to it on Earth is of tremendous importance.

Primary significance is attached to the final document of the Geneva talks in which it is jointly stated that the nuclear war is totally unacceptable and that neither side will seek military superiority.

The summit meeting in Geneva has also paved the way to the dialogue which is aimed at improving the Soviet-American relations and the world situation on the whole.

Addressing the parliamentarians of France, Mikhail Gorbachev said: "On the threshold of the third millennium we must burn the evil book of 'nuclear alchemy'. May the 21st century become the first century of life without the fear of universal destruction. We will achieve this mission if we join our efforts. The Soviet Union is prepared to make its contribution to a peaceful, free, prosperous future in Europe and all other continents. We will spare nothing for this end."

The CPSU declares, it is stated in the draft of the new edition of the CPSU Programme, that there is no weapon on Earth that the Soviet Union would be against limiting or banning on a mutual basis and with the use of efficient means of control.

Everything done by the CPSU and the Soviet government bears out their goodwill and their readiness to deliver humanity from the threat of nuclear catastrophe, to make our world a better world, a world without fear of war. Since the Great October Socialist Revolution the socialist state has been carrying high the banner of peace and friendship among nations. The CPSU will forever remain faithful to this Leninist banner.

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CSO: 1812/94

USSR'S ROLE IN AIDING CHINESE REVOLUTION IN MANCHURIA NOTED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 86 pp 16-25

[Article by O. Ye. Vladimirov]

Forty years have passed since the defeat of Japanese militarism and the victorious end of World War II, an epoch-making event in human history. The Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic, and also the revolutionary forces of China, Korea and Vietnam made an immense contribution to the common victory which created the prerequisites for the rapid advance of China and other Asian countries along the path of social progress.

The history of the Chinese Revolution is a record of the hard and heroic struggle of the Chinese people and the country's finest representatives for the national and social liberation. The revolution abounds in examples of mass heroism, especially on the part of Communists. The revolution in China was a continuation of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia.

The Great October Revolution caused a gigantic breach in the capitalist system, thus weakening the imperialist powers' pressure on China and facilitating the national liberation movement there. As a result of the October Revolution, Russia ceased to be among the major imperialist states threatening China's national independence. Moreover, it became a country which firmly supported the Chinese people in their national liberation struggle.

China's development after the October Revolution, its relations with the USSR played a crucial role, being an intrinsic component of the radical social changes in the country. The Chinese Revolution is a convincing proof that the success of a revolutionary movement in any country, especially where the proletariat is relatively weak, depends largely on assistance and support from countries where socialism has already triumphed, on the role played by those countries in international affairs and on their position in the alignment of world forces. Without such assistance and support, it is difficult for the revolution to succeed and for the people to begin building socialism.

Viewing the Chinese Revolution from this angle, it is worth emphasizing that the victory of the progressive forces of peace over German nazism and Japanese militarism in World War II, to which the Soviet Union made a decisive contribution, was a factor of crucial importance for its success.

The triumphant development of the Chinese Revolution was not an isolated socio-political process. The liberation movement in China developed in conformity with Lenin's teaching on revolutions in colonial and dependent countries. The international factor was important for the final

victory of the revolution and played a decisive role at certain stages in its development.

The varied support and assistance rendered by the Soviet people to the Chinese revolutionary forces was a practical realisation of Lenin's idea of the assistance provided by the triumphant proletariat to liberation movements. This policy was especially explicit during the Japanese-Chinese war of 1937-1945, which put the Chinese people in a precarious position. If the Soviet Union had not entered the war in the Far East in August 1945 and had not decisively defeated Japanese militarism, the war might have been harsher and more prolonged for China. In an article entitled "The Soviet Red Army on the Far Eastern Theatre of War" *Jingji ribao* wrote on 3 August 1985: "It must be specifically emphasised that the Soviet Red Army, having launched an offensive on the North-East of our country, destroyed the main forces of the Japanese Kwantung Army, precipitated the total defeat of Japanese fascism, and in this way speeded up China's victory in the resistance war against Japan. The Chinese people will never forget this act of revolutionary internationalism."

Chinese Communists, workers and peasants made effective use of the fruits of the Soviet victories over Japanese militarism and the results of fierce and bloody class battles in the country and scored a victory in 1949.

This victory convincingly bore out Lenin's idea that the "revolutionary movement of the peoples of the East can... develop effectively, can reach a successful issue, only in direct association with the revolutionary struggle of our Soviet Republic against international imperialism."¹

Following the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the tasks of rehabilitating and developing the economy and culture were also tackled with extensive economic, technical and cultural assistance from the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community during the imperialist blockade of the PRC.

More recently, Soviet assistance and support have also been crucial for the national liberation and revolutionary struggle of the Chinese working people at major stages in China's historical development. Every time that Soviet-Chinese relations have grown stronger, China's revolutionary forces have consolidated their position, the progressive movement has received a fresh impulse, and reactionary forces have had to take up defensive positions. And conversely, the weakening of China's ties with the Soviet Union had a negative impact on the political climate in the country, decreased revolutionary activities and facilitated the growth of nationalist tendencies. It is appropriate to recall here the words of the great son of the Chinese people, Sun Yatsen, who said in his farewell message shortly before his death that he was confident that the day would come when the Soviet Union would welcome a powerful and free China as a friend and ally, and that the two allies would march hand in hand towards victory in the great struggle for the liberation of oppressed peoples.

Faithful to its allied obligations undertaken at the Yalta Conference of the three powers, the Soviet Union entered the war against militaristic Japan. At the talks in the Crimea, the Soviet government secured the political terms for entering the war against Japan which would not only best safeguard the interests of the USSR (primarily, strengthening

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 151.

the security of its borders in the Far East), but also ensure success for the mission of the Soviet Army to liberate the peoples of China, Korea and other Asian countries.

The Soviet Union was loyal to its internationalist duty to the Chinese people who had been in a state of war with Japanese militarism for many years. Although the Soviet people sustained immense material and human losses in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, they made new sacrifices in the name of the freedom and independence of Asian countries.

It should be noted that the United States and Great Britain had reasons for wanting the Soviet Union to enter the war against Japan. They realised full well that surrender was inconceivable without the Soviet Union's entry into the war and without the defeat of the Kwantung Army. It was not for nothing that the Western powers drew up their plans on the assumption that the war with Japan would be protracted.

The defeat of German fascism notwithstanding, Japanese imperialism refused to lay down arms and pursued the policy of dragging out the war. In May 1945, the Supreme Military Council of Japan advanced the slogan of a "hundred years' war for the empire". The Japanese government turned down the Potsdam Declaration forwarded to Japan on behalf of the governments of the USA, Britain, and China on 26 July 1945. The Declaration demanded that the Japanese armed forces surrender unconditionally. The content of this Declaration was fully in line with the interests of the Soviet Union, which gave its backing to the Declaration on 8 August 1945.

By deciding to prolong the war, the Japanese militarists sought to bring about the collapse of the anti-fascist coalition, thus avoiding unconditional surrender. Their calculations were not entirely groundless. By August 1945, the Japanese armed forces had reached 7.2 million men. The Japanese High Command pinned great hopes on the well-trained and well-armed Kwantung Army.

The Japanese militarists' plans to prolong the war also took into account the calculations of the US military command and the combat potential of the Chinese armed forces. In the spring of 1945, US intelligence believed that if the USSR did not enter the war, the Japanese would be able to continue fighting on the mainland till the end of 1946, 1947 or 1948 (even after the occupation of the major Japanese islands). The US and British Command was planning to engage in "decisive" operations against Japan as late as 1946-1947.² Churchill stated that no one could say how long it would take to conduct those "decisive" operations.

On the eve of the USSR's entering the war against Japan the US government dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These barbaric actions were nothing less than a crime against humanity. The United States condemned the population of these Japanese towns to atomic death at a time when the aggressor's fate had already been predetermined by the very course of World War II and imminent operations by the Soviet Armed Forces. It was already clear by then that there was no military need for the use of atomic weapons.

The death of hundreds of thousands of people did not sober the Japanese militarists. The American military historian L. Morton asserts that the bombing of Hiroshima caused a certain amount of confusion among the Japanese leaders, but did not in the least prompt them to capitulate.

The Chinese people wholeheartedly welcomed the USSR's declaration of war on Japan, realising that this would precipitate the defeat of Japanese militarism and ensure the liberation of China. This is what

² See *The History of China from Ancient Times to Our Days*, Moscow, 1974, p. 402 (in Russian).

Mao Zedong wrote on this score: "On the 8th of August the Government of the Soviet Union declared war on Japan; the Chinese people ardently welcome this. Thanks to this step made by the Soviet Union, the duration of war with Japan will be considerably shortened. The war against Japan is already in its final stage and the hour of ultimate victory over the Japanese invaders and all their hirelings has struck."³ Mao Zedong and Zhu De solemnly declared that they would fully coordinate their war effort with the "Red Army and the armies of the allied nations in the cause of defeating the hated Japanese invaders."⁴

The Japanese High Command and administration stepped up their anti-Soviet propaganda among the local population following the advance of Soviet troops on to the territory of Manchuria. They intimidated the Chinese, Manchurians, Mongols and Koreans, saying that the Red Army would allegedly "engage in wide-scale massacres, looting and violence." This malicious slander was backed up by the White-Guard Chief Directorate of Russian Emigration at Harbin and its local bureaus.⁵ Authorities urged the population to engage in guerrilla operations against the advancing Red Army. In some areas political prisoners were executed. Retreating from towns the occupationists set on fire industrial enterprises, railway terminals and river ports, depots with fuel, munition and food, and also dwelling houses.

The population of Manchuria did not, however, succumb to these provocations. They met the Soviet liberation army enthusiastically and assisted it vigorously in its further advance. People repaired roads and railways on their own initiative, mended blown-up bridges, set up civil defence detachments, engaged in anti-crime activities, etc.

The USSR's engagement in the war and the successful actions of Soviet troops and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army in Manchuria caused the rapid retreat of the Japanese from Inner Mongolia and North China and served as a signal for the CPC-led Chinese revolutionary army, which, on August 11, 1945 launched an offensive.

However, Soviet troops advanced so rapidly that the Japanese were defeated before the 8th Chinese Army could engage in large-scale combat operations.

By the time the Soviet Union entered the war with Japan, the Chinese revolutionary army in Manchuria was in extremely difficult conditions. In early August, the Japanese military command had concentrated large forces and encircled the Chinese units under General Zhao Wenjin at Pinquan. Their liquidation was only prevented by the swift advance of Soviet troops, namely units of the 17th Army of the Trans-Baikal Front.

The Red Army Command effectively assisted the Chinese 8th and New 4th armies. Captured enemy weapons, including artillery and light tanks, were transferred to the personnel of those armies on the move, while their commanding officers and soldiers were helped to master the weapons and equipment. The soldiers and officers of the Chinese revolutionary armies expressed their heartfelt gratitude to the Soviet troops for their assistance, because it was thanks to this assistance that the lives of thousands of Chinese soldiers and officers were saved.

The quick defeat of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and Korea, the liquidation of Japanese units on South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands frustrated all Tokyo's hopes for prolonging the war.

On 18 August 1945, the Commander of the Kwantung Army, in keeping with the Emperor's rescript, ordered that all combat action be

³ Mao Zedong, *Selected Works*, Vol. 4, p. 617.

⁴ Quoted from A. M. Dubinsky, *The Liberation Mission of the Soviet Union in the Far East*, Moscow, 1966, p. 536 (in Russian).

⁵ See I. V. Shikin, B. G. Sapozhnikov, *The Feat of Arms at the Far Eastern Frontiers*, Moscow, 1975 (in Russian).

ceased. Nevertheless, Japanese troops continued fighting in most areas. Only on 23 August was resistance stopped. This made it possible to sign the act of Japan's surrender on 2 September 1945 aboard the US battleship *Missouri* anchored in Tokyo Bay.

The victory over Japan—Germany's main ally—signified the end of World War II, the fiercest and most bloody war in human history.

The Soviet Union, its heroic people and its Armed Forces made a decisive contribution to the defeat of Japanese militarism. This fact is of lasting historic significance.

Chinese leaders repeatedly emphasised the importance of the USSR and its struggle for the cause of the Chinese Revolution. Mao Zedong said: "No state denounced its extraterritorial rights in China. The Soviet Union alone did so. Since the beginning of the war of resistance, no government of any imperialist country has rendered us real assistance. The Soviet Union alone has provided large-scale assistance with its people, material and financial resources."⁶

Liu Shaoqi referred to the great importance of the Soviet Union's victory in the Far East: "Following its victory on the European front, the Soviet Union, despite the immense damage done by the war, quickly entered the war with Japan, liquidated the Japanese Kwantung Army and helped China liberate its North-Eastern region. And now, during the course of the present-day people's liberation war, the Soviet Union has continued its trade, so vital for us, with the liberated regions of the North-East. The fact that the existence of the mighty Soviet Union and the presence of growing popular-democratic forces in the world firmly restrain the major forces of imperialism is of particular significance. Hence, it became possible to achieve a swift victory in the people's liberation war in China."⁷

The Soviet Union's victory in the Far East was not only a crushing blow for Japanese militarism, but also a turning point in the history of the peoples of East and Southeast Asia. The national liberation movement began to develop rapidly in the region.

This victory played a decisive role in the further upsurge of the Chinese revolutionary struggle. With the active support and assistance of the USSR, Manchuria, liberated by Soviet troops, turned into the main military and strategic bridgehead of China's revolutionary forces, into a new political centre of the Chinese Revolution.

Following the surrender of Japan, China remained divided into two camps. Three quarters of its territory and practically all of its towns were controlled by Chiang Kaishek backed up by a multimillion army.

Like the rest of China, Manchuria was also divided into two camps. People's power headed by the Communist Party of China was actually established west of Changchun and north of Jilin, and also on the Liaodong peninsula where Soviet troops were stationed. People's democratic bodies of authority were set up on this vast territory by the people's free will. These bodies began preparations for radical socio-economic changes. The rest of Manchuria was controlled by Guomindang forces.

Using as a pretext the acceptance of Japan's surrender and US assistance to the "lawful" regime of Chiang Kaishek, the United States did

⁶ Mao Zedong, "Stalin, the Friend of the Chinese People". The article was written in 1939 and reprinted on 20 December 1949 by all Chinese newspapers.

⁷ Quoted from the speech by Liu Shaoqi at the inauguration conference of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Society on 5 October 1949 in Peking.

everything possible to prevent the peaceful democratic development of China.⁸

In 1945-1946, Chiang Kaishek's strategic plan was to consolidate his positions in South and Central China, to establish control over North China and enter Manchuria. The plan counted heavily on active US support.

As early as October-December 1945, Chiang Kaishek's forces, supported by US army, air and naval units, launched an offensive in Manchuria.

The Communist Party of China attempted to settle the question of Manchuria peacefully, but all these attempts proved futile because the Chiang Kaishek clique stubbornly sought to spread their dictatorship by force of arms to the North-East. In this situation, the revolutionary forces were compelled to rebuff the aggressive actions of the Guomindang.

Talks between the CPC and Guomindang were interspersed with flare-ups of civil war. The Communist Party of China supported by the Soviet Communist Party and world progressive forces, strove to create conditions for a democratic reshaping of society in the interests of the Chinese national liberation movement.

The US-Guomindang reactionary forces tried to slow down and frustrate the revolutionary process, to subordinate national interests to those of foreign and comprador monopolies, and to turn China into a bridgehead for the cold war and aggression.

The struggle between these two trends in China and in the international arena was the main aspect of the period between 1945 and 1949. Of course, the complex diplomatic and political confrontation involved Manchuria as well. The issue at stake was this: either the region bordering on the Soviet Union would turn into a bridgehead of the Chinese Revolution or it would become a base for counterrevolution and aggression.

The USSR insisted that the allied commitments towards China be fulfilled. But the Western countries did everything to evade their fulfilment.

By this time democratic bodies of power had been established in Manchuria. In the later period, when the Guomindang forces launched an offensive, the CPC and other democratic parties and organisations repeatedly proposed a peaceful settlement of the question of Manchuria based on the establishment of a local democratic coalition government, but these proposals were invariably bluntly declined by Chiang Kaishek who refused to enter any negotiations on the subject.

Addressing the National Political Council on 1 April 1946, Chiang Kaishek declared the democratic government in Manchuria "unconstitutional". On 9 April, in a conversation with an American correspondent, he said that he was resolved to "liquidate the Communist Party".

Relying on their overwhelming military superiority, the Guomindang leaders planned swiftly to crush the resistance of CPC forces in Manchuria and take over its major towns and railways. Faced with the threat of the Guomindang reactionary government coming to power again, the Manchurian population liberated by the Soviet Army, the elected democratic government bodies and the armed forces led by the Communists rose up in arms and resisted stubbornly.

The Guomindang attacks were countered with the dependable defences of the Manchurian group of CPC forces which by then had been regrouped and rearmed. Very soon, Chiang Kaishek's large-scale offensive in

⁸ For more details see: *The Modern History of China*, Moscow, 1972; *The History of Foreign Countries After World War II*, Moscow, 1964; *The History of Diplomacy*, Vol. V. Book 1, Moscow, 1974; G. V. Astafiev, *The US Intervention in China and Its Defeat (1945-1949)*, Moscow, 1958; V. I. Glunin, *The Third Civil Revolutionary War in China (1946-1949). An Essay of Political History*, Moscow, 1958; A. M. Dubinsky, *Op. cit.*; A. M. Dubinsky, *Soviet-Chinese Relations During the Japanese-Chinese War. 1937-1945*, Moscow, 1980 (all in Russian).

the liberated regions, including Manchuria, got bogged down. As soon as Chiang Kaishek realised that the onslaught of his forces in Manchuria would definitely be crushed, he declared on 3 June, 1946 that talks through the mediation of the representative of the US administration, George Marshall, were a matter of top priority. Following two days of contacts between Zhou Enlai and George Marshall, on 6 June 1946 Chiang Kaishek signed an order to cease military operations in Manchuria for 15 days (from 7 to 22 June) and agreed to resume negotiations with CPC representatives on all disputed questions.

The Soviet Army's presence in Manchuria contributed immensely to the consolidation of the Chinese revolutionary forces. The People's Liberation Army was ensured a secure rear there.

CPC-controlled troops underwent rigorous military training, the people's volunteer corps was expanded and equipped with new weapons. The transfer of captured Japanese weapons to the revolutionary forces greatly increased their combat potential. Also of great importance was the fact that Soviet troops were stationed in major strategic centres, such as Port Arthur and Dalny, which were inaccessible for the Guomindang and US forces.

Faced with the failure of its policies and realising that the time factor was against Guomindang-US domination in China, the Chiang Kaishek regime launched a campaign of anti-Soviet hysteria in 1946.

Encouraged by Washington, the Guomindang authorities went so far in their hatred for the Soviet Union as openly to declare a "crusade against the USSR". They whipped up war hysteria and clamoured about the "Red aggression in China", the "threat to America", etc.

US policy in China was determined by the general political, economic and military-strategic objectives pursued by the US imperialist circles in the Far East in the postwar period. This policy was aimed at further strengthening US positions in China and at turning it into a strongpoint and a vehicle for American expansion in the Far East.

US intervention in China pursued the following objectives:

—to change the alignment of forces and rapidly train the Chinese reactionary forces for civil war in order to crush the popular democratic movement in the country and restore the Guomindang regime throughout China;

—to turn China into a US military bridgehead for preparing an attack on the Soviet Union and for suppressing the national liberation movement in Asia.

In the first months after the end of World War II, when a considerable number of Japanese still remained on Chinese territory, the US military command explained the presence of American troops in China by the alleged need to repatriate the remaining Japanese. Later, however, in August-September 1946, the Americans began to claim that they stayed in China to "help establish law and order in the country". In other words, they openly acknowledged their interference in China's internal affairs, by siding with the Guomindang regime.

Having actually launched an intervention in North China, the US military command declared that it acted with the agreement of the Guomindang government.⁹

The American government wanted to have China as its loyal "junior partner". President Truman condemned Roosevelt, saying that his prede-

⁹ See *Xinhua ribao*, Oct. 1, 1945.

cessor had allowed Stalin too much, promised him too much and helped him too much.¹⁰ At the same time the US leaders realised that they could not openly break with the USSR, renounce the Yalta decisions and declare that the ending of the war against Japan concerned the United States alone. This was why Truman began to look for another way of "curbing Russia's communist plans as regards Asia".¹¹ He believed that it would be most dangerous for the USA if the forces of the USSR and those of the people's liberation armies joined in a common offensive under the guidance of Communists. The US government strove to consolidate its ground in Manchuria whatever the cost. To achieve this goal they not only provided massive military assistance to the Guomindang regime, but also openly interfered militarily in North China. This, of course, hindered the advance of the Chinese Revolution.

In his memoirs, Truman recalls that seeking to prevent the surrender of Japanese troops to the CPC forces, the US Ambassador to China, Patrick Hurley, sent a cable to Washington proposing that the Japanese military command and their Chinese puppets be instructed to pass their arms exclusively to Chiang Kaishek's government and to punish all those who gave up their arms to Chiang Kaishek's rivals. Hurley advised that the State Department include in the terms of Japan's capitulation a provision saying that no Japanese arms should be passed to the armed party of Chinese Communists.

On 26 September 1945, US news agencies carried a report on the launching from Ryukyu Islands of a landing mission comprising two American Marines divisions. It was announced that the mission's objective was to protect the Tianjin area during the acceptance of the Japanese surrender which was allegedly planned by the Guomindang command on 30 September 1945.¹²

The landing of the 18,000-strong US 1st Marines Division began on 30 September 1945 at Tanggu, a sea-port near Tianjin. The same day its 1,200-strong forward group entered Tianjin. By 8 October, American troops were landing at three ports in North China, namely, Dagou, Tanggu and Qinhuangdao, with over 200 naval and transport vessels concentrated in the area. The US contingent did not confine itself to seizing these ports and Tianjin, a major economic centre in North China, but pushed forward, establishing its control over the adjacent railways Tianjin-Qinhuangdao-Shanghaiguan and Tianjin-Peking.¹³

On 10 October 1945, a big landing force of US Marines occupied the port and town of Qingdao. Simultaneously, a US airborne force was dropped at Peking.¹⁴

On 7 October 1945, the Commander of the 8th CPC Army, Zhu De, delivered a letter to the US Command protesting against preparations by the USA to land its Marines at the ports of Yingkou, Chifu and Weihaiwei, "in view of the fact that there are no Japanese troops there and they are entirely controlled by the forces of our army".¹⁵

Despite the protest, US naval units appeared at Yantai (Chifu). Zhu De sent a cable to the US Command, which read: "The town of Yantai (Chifu) was liberated by our troops on 24 August 1945. The Japanese and puppet troops there were disarmed. Order has been restored in the town. There is absolutely no need for American troops to land in that town... In view of the above, I request the US Command to order that

¹⁰ See *Modern Studies and Information*, May 1945, p. 32 (in Japanese).

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹² See *Xinhua ribao*, Sept. 28, 1945.

¹³ See *Ibid.*, 9 Oct. 1945.

¹⁴ See Liao Gailong, *A Short History of the Liberation War of the Chinese People*, Peking, 1953, pp. 19, 80 (in Chinese).

¹⁵ See *Ibid.*, p. 19.

the American sailors leave the town and port and refrain from further landings. If American troops make a forceful landing, thus creating a serious incident, the US Command will be held entirely responsible."

The US government did not heed such warnings and continued building up its aggressive actions. This amounted to direct interference in China's internal affairs. The US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, said later that the US Marines' objective was to occupy major sea-ports and prevent their seizure by the Communists, and also to establish control over the railways leading to these ports.¹⁶

In Manchuria, the Soviet Army accepted the capitulation of the Kwantung Army and disarmed it. For this reason the USA could not use the question of capitulation as a pretext for expanding American intervention in that part of China. The US Administration then came up with another false pretext alleging that Chiang Kaishek's "lawful" power should be spread to Manchuria.

The Soviet government and Soviet Command in Manchuria resolutely rejected the US claim to use Port Arthur and Dalny, saying that the Soviet-Chinese Agreement of 14 August 1945 made the Soviet Union responsible for defending the bases.¹⁷

The US imperialists who acted in close alliance with the Chiang Kaishek regime, were thus planning to enslave the country and neutralise China's revolutionary forces. These neocolonialist plans were foiled, however, by the Soviet Union which supported the just struggle of the Chinese people for freedom and independence.

It was the Soviet Union which served as a firm support of the Chinese liberation movement, enabling its successful development. The USSR's strenuous diplomatic and political struggle against US aggression in China and its support for the revolutionary, democratic forces of the Chinese people have gone down in history forever. The revolutionary base in Manchuria became the main stronghold of the Chinese Revolution during this difficult period. The CPC Army was growing stronger there. In 1948-1949, it launched a march southward which resulted in the utter defeat of the Guomindang regime. The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers noted in their congratulatory message to the PRC leaders on the occasion of the 36th anniversary since the establishment of the People's Republic of China: "The victory over the forces of imperialism, feudalism and reaction in China, which marked the Chinese people's entrance on the road to socialism, justly crowned their revolutionary heroic struggle for national and social liberation; it was a landmark in world history."¹⁸

Important changes were effected in the country following the proclamation of the People's Republic of China. The establishment of new, socialist relations was a basis for the PRC's successful development. During the first decade, the material and technical base of socialism was built in China and the people's welfare was raised, with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries actively assisting.

The Soviet people together with progressives all over the world sincerely rejoiced at the successes of the People's Republic of China in building a new life.

The socialist community countries still believe that the vital interests of China and those of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries

¹⁶ Quoted from *The History of China from Ancient Times to Our Days*, p. 404.

¹⁷ See *Pravda*, Nov. 30, 1945.

¹⁸ *Pravda*, Oct. 1, 1985.

do not conflict. On the contrary, mutual relations of friendship and comradely cooperation would meet such interests most fully. This would also correspond to the vital interests of world socialism, and would consolidate international security.

The Soviet Union's approach to the PRC is clearly and precisely spelled out in the decisions of CPSU Congresses, Plenary Meetings of its Central Committee and in speeches by the General Secretary of the CC CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev, and other Soviet leaders. All these documents and, indeed, life itself show that the USSR has done everything possible to engage in constructive dialogue. In his speech at the Dnepropetrovsk Iron-and-Steel Works in June 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said: "I think that time has shown both sides that neither one benefits by alienation, to say nothing of unfriendliness and suspicion. But goodneighbourly cooperation is quite possible and desirable. As for us, we intend actively to work towards completely overcoming the negative phase in Soviet-Chinese relations, which has resulted in many artificial difficulties. I am confident that ultimately this will happen."¹⁹

Certain positive shifts have occurred in Soviet-Chinese relations over recent years. Trade has expanded and contacts in sports, science, technology and public relations have been growing. Political consultations on bilateral relations are held and views are exchanged on international problems. All this corresponds to the long-term interests of the struggle to consolidate the unity of the world socialist system, the international communist movement and anti-imperialist forces in various regions, including Asia. In his message to the international conference, "Forty Years Since the Victory Over Japanese Militarism and the Tasks of the Peace Movement in Asian and Pacific Countries", Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stressed: "Now that the danger of a worldwide nuclear-missile catastrophe overshadows the planet, there is no more important and urgent task than protecting peace on earth. The militaristic circles of imperialism are pursuing an aggressive policy in this vast region of the globe, hatch up plans to turn it into an arena of military and political confrontation with the socialist and many nonaligned countries, and are bent on remilitarising Japan and creating an aggressive grouping of Washington—Tokyo—Seoul."²⁰

The attempts to exacerbate relations between the USSR and the PRC play an important part in those schemes. The CPSU educates the Soviet people in the spirit of friendship and profound respect for the Chinese people, for their history and culture, for their heroic exploits in the struggle for liberation from foreign oppressors, for revolutionary changes in their country. In their congratulatory message on the occasion of the 36th anniversary of the establishment of the PRC, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the USSR Council of Ministers said: "Loyal to its internationalist duty, the Soviet Union has constantly supported the just cause of the Chinese working people and has always been on their side."²¹ The defeat by the Soviet Army of the million-strong Kwantung Army was the greatest Soviet internationalist contribution to the cause of the Chinese Revolution. This defeat made possible the creation of a powerful military-revolutionary base of Chinese Communists on the territory of Manchuria. The history of the struggle for Manchuria in the 1940s shows clearly who was and has remained a true friend of the Chinese people and who was and has remained their enemy.

¹⁹ *Pravda*, June 27, 1985.

²⁰ *Pravda*, Sept. 5, 1985.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Oct. 1, 1985.

JAPAN'S DEFEAT SEEN AS FACTOR IN ASIAN POPULAR REVOLUTIONS

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 86 pp 26-36

[Article by M. L. Titarenko, doctor of philosophy: "The Significance of the Defeat of Japanese Militarism in the Victories of the Popular Revolutions in China, Korea and Vietnam"]

The Soviet people and all progressive and peaceloving forces throughout the world have widely celebrated the 40th anniversary of the rout of Japanese militarism and the victorious end of World War Two.

The Central Committee of the CPSU passed a resolution "On the 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945", which states that "past decades have brought out even more vividly and more fully the historic significance of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War. The rout of German fascism and then of Japanese militarism had a most profound effect on the entire course of world development. Favourable conditions were created for the struggle of the working masses for their social and national liberation. The positions of progressive, democratic, and peaceloving forces were strengthened and the influence of Communist and Workers' Parties enhanced. The world socialist system emerged and has been developing successfully. The process of the disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism was accelerated and ended in its collapse."¹

The significance of the Soviet people's victory in terms of its political, social, economic, and ideological impact was described graphically and profoundly by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, in his report at the ceremonial meeting held in the Kremlin to mark the 40th anniversary of the Victory, and in speeches by other Soviet leaders.

The Soviet Union's liberating mission was of great historic significance for the success of the popular-democratic and national liberation revolutions in China, Korea, and Vietnam. Attempts are being made by bourgeois and nationalistic historiographers to belittle the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War, specifically in its final stage, and also the USSR's contribution to the liberation of Asian nations from the yoke of the aggressors and colonialists. It is becoming more and more obvious, however, that those attempts are utterly inconsistent.

The rout of nazi Germany and militaristic Japan, which cultivated chauvinism and racism, made it possible not only to expose and denounce the inhuman nature of the fascist and militaristic ideologies, but also to ensure political isolation of their advocates in Europe, Asia, and America. In terms of political impact, the rout of fascism and militarism substantially weakened and disorganised counterrevolutionary and colonialist forces and provided the prerequisites for successful national liberation revolutions in former colonies. Ideologically, the utter collapse of the reactionary and racist myths of the fascist and militarist ideologists broadened the scope of revolutionary nationalism and brought it closer to Marxism-

¹ *Kommunist*, No. 9, 1984, p. 36 (in Russian).

Leninism and the principles of internationalism, so patriotism and nationalism were combined in national liberation movements. Later, all this created the essential prerequisites for a gradual transition by major social groups, above all progressive patriotic elements, from progressive nationalism and revolutionary democratic principles to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

At the same time, the war efforts of the anti-Hitler coalition, plus the experience of anti-fascist and anti-militaristic resistance in European and Asian countries, demonstrated the ever-lasting political significance of the unity of anti-imperialist forces for success in the liberation struggle and for preservation of peace in future.

The Soviet Union's decision to enter the war against Japan was commanded by a number of objective factors. The primary one was *the need to bring the Second World War to an end* as soon as possible and thus to save nations from further suffering. The Soviet Union was also guided by its sense of *internationalist duty and commitment to its allies*, to which it was always faithful. Another factor was that the USSR had to *ensure the safety of its Far Eastern border*, and finally, there was *the need to restore historical justice, which had been trampled under foot*.

The most graphic and comprehensive proof of the great influence exerted by the Soviet Army's liberating mission was *the victorious outcome of the national liberation and revolutionary struggle of the peoples of China, Korea, and Vietnam*, and also other peoples that cast off the yoke of colonial oppression in Asia and, later, on other continents.

The leadership of the Communist Party of China welcomed the Soviet Union's entering the war against Japan. This is how the outstanding Chinese military leader Zhu De described the contribution made by the Soviet armed forces to the liberation of North-Eastern China (Manchuria), "The Soviet Army came into Manchuria, completely defeated and destroyed the Kwantung Army—the bulwark of the Japanese militarists, and thus forced Japanese imperialism to surrender."² The following comment once appeared in a Chinese newspaper, "When the Soviet Union moved in its troops and Japan Kwantung Army suffered a crushing defeat, that was the end of the Japanese invaders' hopes of turning Manchuria into a den in which to fight the final battle. No way out, except unconditional surrender, was left."³

It is now acknowledged in China that the bulk of the CPC's forces entered Manchuria only after the Soviet Army had liberated the territory from the Japanese invaders. A collection of memoirs by participants in the Chinese revolution was published in 1983. The book cites facts showing that *it was the initiative of the Soviet military Command to invigorate the activities of the CPC toward consolidating the popular masses in Manchuria, and to use the North-Eastern industrial base to build up the CPC's armed forces, in the interests of the Chinese revolution*.

The Soviet proposals were examined by the Politburo of the CPC CC on September 16, 1945, and used as a basis for a special resolution adopted by the CPC Central Committee. As Liu Shaoqi said at that meeting the Central Committee "*has definitely decided to build a stronghold in North-Eastern China and to do everything to control that part of China...*" [My italics.—M. T.] With revolutionary forces deployed in North-Eastern China, we now can render support to the whole country and speed up the course of the Chinese revolution."

² *Pravda*, July 21, 1949.

³ *Guangming ribao*, Sept. 3, 1951.

With direct contacts established between the Soviet Army Command and the CPC Central Committee, the party's leadership made the decision to "strengthen its forces that hold important strategic points in North-Eastern China".⁴ Almost 60,000 regulars were moved to Manchuria from various revolutionary bases and unit after unit was urgently sent there from the main body of the New 4th Corps and the 8th Army, those troops exceeding a total of 100,000. More than half of the CPC top leaders came to Manchuria in those days for varying periods of time, among them Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yun, Gao Gang, Rao Shushi, Peng Zhen, Luo Ronghuan, Li Fuchun, Zhang Wentian, Huang Kecheng, Li Lisan, and Lin Biao.

Democratic self-government bodies were established. They were supported by the Soviet Command, and their work promoted in every way. Due to all this, Communists and their supporters now obtained favourable conditions for their work, whereas previously many had been in prison and others had had to work underground. Party locals in Manchuria were returning to active work, and their numbers grew rapidly. The CPC's army grew notably, and, most importantly, the new recruits were mainly from factory workers.

After Japan's surrender, the main task was to *democratise China and do away with its semi-colonial condition*. This work was greatly impeded by international imperialism and imperialist-supported reactionary forces in China. Owing to that, the Guomindang troops were able to regain control over three-quarters of Chinese territory and maintain a several-million-strong army. With air and naval support provided by US units at the end of 1945 the Chiang Kaishek clique attempted to capture Manchuria. The efforts made by the CPC to reach a peaceful settlement of the problem were blocked by the Chiang Kaishek clique's stubborn persistence in extending its reactionary and anti-popular dictatorship to North-Eastern China.

In this situation, the revolutionary forces had to start a rapid concentration of reserves in order to rebuff the reactionary forces. The Soviet Union invariably provided moral, political, and material support for all the forces that worked to create the conditions for a democratic transformation of Chinese society in the interests of the overwhelming majority of the working people.

Soviet assistance was of great importance in consolidating the revolutionary forces in Manchuria and enhancing the role of the Manchurian revolutionary base in those days. This is graphically proved by statements cited in a selection of works by Chen Yun, a prominent figure in the Communist Party of China. This is what he wrote in November 1945, "The existence of the Soviet Union undoubtedly plays a decisive role in outlining my work in Manchuria... The primary goal of Soviet policy is to maintain peace in the Far East and throughout the world."⁵

In that situation, it was crucial to *strengthen the Manchurian revolutionary base*.⁶ The efforts of the Chinese Communists to this effect received material, military, and political support from the Soviet Union; the USSR also defended the interests of the Chinese revolution against international imperialism on the diplomatic front. As for the US—Guomindang reactionary forces, they tried to hold back and disrupt the revolutionary processes, to place China under the control of the Guomindang and foreign monopolies, and to make it a bridgehead for cold war and aggression not only against national liberation revolutions in Asia, but also against the Soviet Union.

⁴ *The Spark, Seventh Issue*, 1983, p. 31 (in Chinese).

⁵ Chen Yun, *Selected Works (1926-1949)*, Peking, 1984, p. 221 (in Chinese).

⁶ See O. Borisov, *The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Revolutionary Base (1945-1949)*, Moscow, 1985 (in Russian).

From 1945-1949, Manchuria was a major object of complicated *international diplomatic and political struggle*. It was essential to make Manchuria, which bordered on the USSR, a powerful base for the Chinese revolution. Otherwise it would have turned once again into a stronghold of counterrevolutionary and aggressive forces, as was the case during the rule of the White Chinese militarists, and especially the Japanese militarists, who set up the puppet state of Manchukuo. This is why the Soviet Union insisted that the United States fulfil its commitments concerning China. The western powers and the Guomindang government made every effort, however, to stop those commitments from being fulfilled.

In the years that followed, the Soviet Union did much to defend China's positions in the international arena and, above all, to prevent US occupation of Chinese territory. In September 1946, on behalf of the Soviet government Andrei Gromyko proposed that the UN Security Council discuss the withdrawal of the United Nations troops from non-hostile states. Gromyko then made a direct reference to China, saying, "The currently unjustified presence of American troops in China and their interference in China's internal affairs have caused a tide of protest. Protests are being expressed by most diverse strata of the Chinese public... All these voices should be heeded to; they cannot be ignored. They touch upon an issue that affects not only China and the United States."⁷

To promote consolidation of China's positions in the world arena and its sovereignty over the territories that the USSR had fought to liberate from the Kwantung Army, the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship and alliance with China, in keeping with the spirit of the Yalta Conference. The treaty was concluded as early as August 14, 1945, and it played a positive role, restraining the anti-Communist and anti-Soviet policy of the Guomindang government and encouraging the effort of China's democratic and progressive forces. On August 27, 1945, the paper *Jiefang ribao*, an organ of the CPC Central Committee, described the Soviet-Chinese treaty as "an expression of the policy of equality that the Soviet Union has always pursued with regard to us". Speaking about the treaty and the bi-lateral agreements signed at that time, Zhou Enlai pointed out that they were fully in line with "the interests of the Chinese people's revolution".⁸

In the complicated international situation, given the cold war policy launched by aggressive imperialist forces against the socialist countries, the Soviet Union worked to promote a process in which the democratic and progressive forces of China led by the CPC might consolidate, close their ranks, and unite all possible allies.

In view of the acute contradictions within the Guomindang and of the people's powerful action for a peaceful democratic renovation of China, the CPSU backed the line towards negotiations between the Communist Party of China and the Guomindang, and termination of the civil war. This enabled the CPC to win the support of the vast popular masses, regroup its ranks, and strengthen its forces.

The United States pursued a different course. It provided massive military aid to the Guomindang, encouraging it to escalate the civil war and, at the same time, sought ways to increase its own military presence in China, to occupy it, actually, with the complicity of the Chiang Kaishek clique.

The United States and its Guomindang henchmen started a wild campaign of slander and provocations in China concerning the presence of Soviet troops in Manchuria. It should be mentioned that Soviet units

⁷ *The USSR's Foreign Policy. A Collection of Documents, Vol. VI* (Sept. 1945—Feb. 1947), Moscow, 1947, p. 657 (in Russian).

⁸ Cao Xizhen, *History of Diplomatic Relations Between China and the USSR*, Shanghai, 1951, p. 79 (in Chinese).

stayed on there at the insistence of the CPC leadership and had to carry out a complex and arduous mission. Their presence prevented the Americans and the Guomindang from turning the region into their base. The Soviet troops actually provided strong shield for the Chinese People's Liberation Army, which protected the CPC liberated areas and the new democratic precesses started in those areas.

The significance of the Soviet assistance in strengthening the democratic revolutionary forces in Manchuria was highly appraised by Mao Zedong. In his letter to Peng Zhen, who was the CPC CC commissioner in Manchuria at that time, Mao Zedong wrote, "In view of the support from our elder brother [the USSR.—M. T.] and the development of our struggle in Manchuria, Chiang Kaishek's troops have failed to advance in Manchuria or to make efforts to assume power there."⁹

By the end of 1945, the CPC forces in the region totaled 300,000. They were reorganised into a United Democratic Army (UDA), which included former guerrilla detachments and units of the 8th Army. When the Soviet troops withdrew from Manchuria in 1946, the UDA had well-trained units, a certain experience, and modern weapons. By that time, millions of people in North-Eastern China and all over the country were involved in the revolutionary struggle.

In their liberation struggle, the people's army and the progressive forces of China derived major political benefits from the presence of Soviet personnel on the Chinese Changchón Railway and, after Soviet troops had been pulled out of Manchuria, the presence of Soviet armed forces at Port Arthur and Dalny. These were two critical strategic points along the route of the Guomindang and US troops' penetration into Manchuria. Besides, training was provided there for officers of the revolutionary forces of the CPC. US Admiral F. Sherman said in August 1945 that if Dalny and Port Arthur were open to the Americans and Chiang Kaishek, this would totally change the situation that emerged in China after the war.¹⁰ The Guomindang military command then intended to conduct a landing operation there and attack the revolutionary forces in Southern Manchuria from the rear.

These factors were of primary significance, at that time and later, for the victory of China's democratic forces and the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Shortly before the victory of the people's revolution in China, Mao Zedong pointed out that the USSR had come to the Chinese Changchón Railway and Port Arthur "not as an imperialist, but as a socialist force, to defend common interests". American imperialism, he said, "stays in China to oppress, while the Soviet Union is at Port Arthur to furnish protection against Japanese militarism".¹¹

The Soviet Union contributed greatly to *Manchuria's economic restoration*, to the revival of its industrial and transport facilities and power stations. The Soviet government sent a team of specialists to Manchuria to help restore the railways and other transport facilities and to put them back into operation.

The Manchurian revolutionary base was established and developed at a difficult time, when the US-Guomindang reactionary forces, through political manoeuvring and blatant military threats, raised major obstacles to impede the development of the revolution.

Despite some military set-backs suffered in the beginning, the Manchurian United Democratic Army successfully defended the liberated territory and the people's revolutionary gains. It should be noted that for

⁹ A. M. Dubinsky, *The Soviet Union's Mission of Liberation in the Far East*, Moscow, 1966, p. 571 (in Russian).

¹⁰ Quoted from O. Borisov, *The Soviet Union and the Manchurian...* p. 82.

¹¹ Quoted from O. Borisov, *From the History of Soviet-Chinese Relations in the 1950s*, Moscow, 1981, pp. 74-75 (in Russian).

a number of reasons, the role of the Manchurian revolutionary base in the successful outcome of the Chinese revolution was, for a long time, disregarded by Soviet and foreign historians. So we should be grateful to our prominent military commanders and political workers who wrote memoirs about the Soviet Union's liberating mission in the Far East and pointed for the first time to the significance of Soviet assistance to the Chinese people in their struggle for national and social liberation and, specifically, to the historic role of the CPC Manchurian base.¹²

This subject has been examined in detail by a number of Soviet historians.¹³ Recently the important role of the Manchurian base has begun to be acknowledged in China, too.¹⁴ Indeed, its contribution to the final victory of the Chinese people's struggle in 1949 can hardly be exaggerated. It was a base with the support of which the reorganised, well-trained, and reequipped People's Liberation Army, led by the CPC, drove away the Guomindang reactionary forces. A well-substantiated assessment of the Manchurian base's role is now needed in order to restore the historical truth and to disprove all sorts of false concepts that seek to minimise the significance of the international factor, particularly the Soviet Union's role, for the victory of the Chinese revolution. The political, economic, and military assistance rendered by the USSR at the time of the establishment and development of the Manchurian revolutionary base provides more proof of the CPSU's and Soviet people's loyalty to their internationalist duty.

The false interpretations, widespread in bourgeois historiography concerning the Soviet Union's role in the rout of militarist Japan have been convincingly refuted by Soviet scholars, including war historians. In contrast to those false concepts, however, a number of serious works by prominent foreign scholars contain basically objective evaluations of the effect produced by the world factor on the development of the revolution in China from 1946 to 1949. Those works more than just acknowledge the significance of Soviet assistance to the Chinese revolution; they also describe it in sufficient detail. The well-known American sinologist A. D. Barnett wrote: "When the Russians occupied northeast China—Manchuria—at the end of the war, the Chinese Communists moved major elements of their forces there, and the Russians gave substantial aid, turning over to them large amounts of Japanese military materiel. *This timely assistance was of critical importance to the Chinese Communists.* [My italics.—M. T.]. It helped them to defeat the Nationalists in Manchuria, which then became a primary base for their nationwide military challenge to the Nanking regime".¹⁵ A similar evaluation is given by another American sinologist, R. Thornton, in his book titled *China: The Struggle for Power, 1917-1972*.

The Chinese revolution proved the correctness of Lenin's prediction that in the modern age the success of a revolutionary movement in any country, and especially in a country where the proletariat is relatively weak, largely depends on the assistance and support the movement receives from victorious socialism, on the role socialism is playing in inter-

¹² See *The Finale*, 2nd edition, Moscow, 1969; I. A. Pliyev, *Across the Gobi and the Khingan*, Moscow, 1965; I. I. Lyudnikov, *Across the Greater Khingan*, Moscow, 1967.

¹³ See O. Borisov, *The Soviet Union and the Manchurian...* (1st edition, 1975); O. Ye. Vladimirov, *The Unforgettable Pages of History and Maoist Falsifiers*, Moscow, 1971; S. L. Tikhvinsky, *The History of China and Contemporaneity*, Moscow, 1976; A. M. Dubinsky, *The Soviet Union's Mission...*; A. M. Dubinsky, *Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1937-1945*, Moscow, 1980; B. G. Sapozhnikov, *The People's Liberation War in China (1946-1950)*, Moscow, 1984 (all in Russian).

¹⁴ See Zhu Jianhua, Zhao Yinglan, *On the Historical Role of the Revolutionary Base in North-Eastern China at the Time of the Liberation War*, Jilin, 1984, No. 1, pp. 62-68 (in Chinese).

¹⁵ See A. D. Barnett, *China and the Major Powers in East Asia*, Washington, 1977, p. 24.

national affairs, on the place it occupies in the arrangement of forces in the world arena, and on the development of the universal revolutionary process in general. Without that assistance and support, a successful development of a revolution and transition to building socialism is extremely difficult if not impossible. This is how Mao Zedong put it, "If the Soviet Union had not existed, if victory had not been won in the Second World War against fascism, if Japanese militarism had not been routed... then the international reactionary forces hanging over our heads would surely have been immeasurably greater than now. Could we have won under such circumstances? Of course, not."¹⁶

The victorious development of the Chinese revolution is not an isolated socio-political process. The liberation movement in China developed in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the universal revolutionary process, on revolutions in colonial and dependent countries. The international factor has always been of major importance for the final victory of a revolution, and at certain stages of it its significance may even predominate.

The operations in which *Korea was liberated* constituted an important part of the successful campaign carried out by the Soviet Army in the Far East in August 1945.

The Japanese imperialists gave Korea a prominent place in their expansionist plans, turning it into a springboard for aggression against the USSR and a firm centre of defence. So the Soviet troops that moved into Korea met with a strong and well-prepared enemy.

The Soviet armed forces successfully carried out their liberating mission in Korea. They stayed there till the end of 1948, and showed genuine internationalism, providing the Communist-led progressive forces with extensive disinterested assistance in creating the conditions favourable for the establishment of Korea's state independence and for democratic transformations. In an address to the newly-liberated people of Korea, issued on August 15, 1945, the Command of the 25th Army of the First Far-Eastern Front, said, "Citizens of Korea! Remember that your happiness is in your own hands. You have gained freedom and independence, and now your fate depends on no one but yourselves. The Soviet Army has created all the conditions for the Korean people's free constructive work. The Korean people should become the maker of its own happiness."

As early as November 1945, the Soviet Command in Korea started working to commission the first industrial facilities there. In August 1946, it placed all factories, hydro-electric power stations, banks, and other facilities formerly owned by Japan, as well as property abandoned by the colonialists, at the disposal of the Provisional People's Committee of North Korea.

"The glorious feats accomplished by the Soviet Army in the name of the liberation and revival of our country will be remembered forever... The Korean people will never forget the Soviet soldiers' heroic exploits."¹⁷ These are words from the Korean people's letter to the Soviet government on the occasion of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Korea. The Koreans expressed their gratitude to their liberators in monuments and obelisks put up in Korea to honour the Soviet soldiers.

Speaking about the significance of Korea's liberation by the Soviet Army, Kim Il Sung said "Even in the grimmest days of Japanese rule,

¹⁶ Mao Zedong, *On New Democracy*, Moscow, 1960, p. 100 (in Russian).

¹⁷ *Relations Between the Soviet Union and People's Korea. 1945-1980*, Documents and Materials, Moscow, 1981, pp. 6-7, 63-64 (in Russian).

the true patriots of Korea found a source of strength in the growing might of the great Soviet Union and, seeing in it its liberator, fought with unending fortitude and persistence.

"Korea's liberation by the Soviet Army initiated a new era in the history of our country. A broad road of national independence and democratic development opened up before the Korean people."¹⁸

The Soviet Union's victory over militaristic Japan was of tremendous significance for *the Vietnamese revolution*, though the Red Army did not move into Vietnam as it had into China and Korea. The first President of independent Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, pointed out, "The rout of Hitler's fascists and the Japanese militarists by the Soviet Army was the factor that helped our victory in August 1945 more than anything else."¹⁹

In early August 1945, a revolutionary situation emerged in Vietnam, where a Japanese occupation regime had actually been established since March 1945. The Communists controlled a rather vast area and were preparing the working people for a general uprising to gain national independence. When the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan, this inspired the revolutionary masses in Vietnam to a liberation struggle and undermined the morale of the Japanese troops in Indochina, which began to surrender.

On August 13, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indochina, headed by Ho Chi Minh, convened a party conference. The conference thoroughly analysed the international situation and the situation in Vietnam itself and decided to start a general uprising to seize political power. The conference also formed a committee to lead the nation in the uprising and, on the same day, the committee issued an order that said: "Our main enemy is defeated. The hour has struck for a general uprising." On August 16, a National People's Congress opened in a liberation area. It formed a National Liberation Committee, headed by Ho Chi Minh. By that time the Japanese authorities in Hanoi had officially announced Japan's surrender and the transfer of "all power" to the North Vietnamese vice-regent of the Emperor of Vietnam. So the Japanese military who constituted the only force at that time that could keep the Vietnamese Communists from assuming political power, laid down their arms. The revolutionary movement spread from the liberated area all over the country. On August 19, a people's government was established in Hanoi, on August 23, in the Emperor's capital of Hue, and on August 25, in Saigon. It took twelve days to establish a people's government almost throughout Vietnam. At a mass rally in Hanoi on September 2, Ho Chi Minh announced the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. "After the Soviet Union routed the Japanese fascists", Le Duan pointed out, "the party opportunely led the people in a revolt to seize power on the national scale."²⁰

In those days, the Vietnamese Communists showed a genuinely Leninist attitude to armed uprising as an art. They chose a good time for it, when the Soviet Army had crushed the number-one enemy of the revolution, united the bulk of the Vietnamese population under the slogan of national independence, and established a sovereign Democratic Republic of Vietnam. That victory was quite easy; in many provinces the new governments were formed and proclaimed at rallies. This was made possible,

¹⁸ Kim Il Sung, *Selected Articles and Speeches*, Moscow, 1962, p. 326 (in Russian).

¹⁹ Ho Chi Minh, *On Lenin, Leninism and the Inviolable Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship*, *Selected Articles and Speeches*, Moscow, 1970, pp. 114-115 (in Russian).

²⁰ Le Duan, *Selected Articles and Speeches*, Moscow, 1975, p. 176 (in Russian).

above all, by the Soviet forces' victories in the Far East. Modern historians in Vietnam point out that following the Japanese surrender "there emerged a very rare opportunity for the fast and almost bloodless victory of the August revolution".²¹

In his speech at the ceremonial meeting on the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War, Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out, "Our Victory has not receded into the past. It is a living Victory, related to the present and the future."²²

The lessons taught and learned in the course of the rout of militaristic Japan may be summed up as follows:

1. Militaristic Japan's aggression against China and other Asian nations was a result of acute imperialist contradictions; it stemmed from the policy of utter connivance, pursued by the ruling quarters of the United States, Britain, and France in collaboration with Germany—something similar to the Munich deal in Europe. In the East, as earlier in the West, the imperialist powers were at work to guide the aggressor into war against progressive revolutionary forces. In Europe, the governments of Britain, France, and the United States had pushed Germany primarily eastwards, into war against the USSR. Later, in Asia, they adopted an attitude of connivance, thereby encouraging Japan in its aggressive aspirations, and made efforts to guide its expansionist policy against the USSR and national liberation movements in Asia, above all in China.

2. Just like nazism in Europe, Japan's fascist and militaristic doctrine grew on the ideological soil of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism.

3. The Soviet Union has always demonstrated a class-conscious and internationalist approach to the analysis of world developments and to the war danger. So it has never identified the reactionary ruling quarters of countries, even the culprits of aggression, with the working masses of those countries. Never has it linked the treacherous policies of the corrupt ruling circles of the countries which were subject to aggression but took an anti-Soviet stand just the same, with the working people in those countries, who fought justly for liberation. That was the approach taken by the Soviet Union in the 1930s-1940s with regard to China and Japan. That was why the USSR's hero Richard Sorge enjoyed the support of patriotic and progressive forces in Japan, who sympathised with the USSR and realised that militarist and aggressive line threatened their country. That approach was also evident when the Soviet people carried out its internationalist mission of helping China against Japanese aggression. Hundreds of Soviet pilots flew combat missions in China, defending its towns and villages, its civilians against Japanese air attacks. Prominent Soviet commanders trained Chinese military personnel to fight against the aggressors.

4. The Soviet Union's revolutionary solidarity with the Asian nations' liberation struggle, as well as its moral, political, and material support for that struggle laid solid foundations for friendship and cooperation between those nations and the USSR. We are certain that no zigzags of history, no subjectivistic misinterpretations or falsifications, and no one's attempts to besmirch the genuinely internationalist liberating mission of the Soviet Union and the deep roots of its friendship with the peoples of China, Korea, Vietnam, and other Asian countries, can ever make the world forget what the great Soviet people did to promote the rise of the liberation movement and the victorious outcome of the revolutions in Asian states.

The Soviet Union's liberating mission in the Far East served to provide the prerequisites favourable for a people's revolution in China

²¹ *The History of the August Revolution*, Hanoi, 1973, p. 161.

²² M. S. Gorbachev, *The Immortal Feat of the Soviet People*, Moscow, 1985, p. 3 (in Russian).

spearheaded against feudalism, the comprador system, and the Guomindang reaction. Following that revolution, the People's Republic of China was established, and the revolution itself started evolving into a socialist one. Similar processes took place in Korea and Indochina, where new states appeared: the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (now the Socialist Republic of Vietnam), the Lao People's Democratic Republic, and later, the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

5. The rout of militaristic Japan in Asia and the victory over Nazi Germany in Europe substantially altered the political map and changed the alignment of forces in favour of peace, progress, and socialism.

Observing the 40th anniversary of the rout of Japanese militarism and holding sacred the memory of those killed in the fighting for justice, we are analysing the lessons of history in order to warn nations of the need to redouble their vigilance against new intrigues contrived by aggressive imperialist forces in the Far East and Asia-Pacific region.

In the imperialist world, certain forces still remain and are at work that have not only buried the lessons of World War Two in oblivion but also want to reverse the course of history to their own benefit and to take class revenge.

The most negative factor in the current developments in the region is the escalation of the efforts of the United States and its allies to gain military superiority over the Soviet Union and the socialist community, and to restrict their influence in Asia. Moreover, a trend is emerging to disregard the USSR as an Asia-Pacific power and to isolate it. Washington is pushing a plan to build a US "security belt" in the Far East and the Pacific region. Under this plan, not only Japan and South Korea, but also Australia, New Zealand, the ASEAN nations, and Taiwan are expected to engage in foreign-policy and military cooperation with the United States as allies.

Recently, the US and Japan, and also Australia, Canada, and some ASEAN countries have been actively discussing the establishment of what is termed a "Pacific community", a sort of Common Market for Asia. Washington has been trying to link these plans to its global strategy of struggle against socialism and national liberation processes.

The world situation is now tense, and the CPSU, in close cooperation with other fraternal parties and countries, is working hard to unite all peace-loving forces to oppose the policy of the arms race and aggression pursued by the warlike forces of American imperialism and its allies.

The situation in the Asia-Pacific region could be improved and tension eased by putting into effect Mikhail Gorbachev's call to the Asian nations and the peace-loving public of the continent to show a comprehensive approach to the problems of security in Asia and to seek specific ways of pooling efforts to that end. The Soviet Union wants good relations with all states, and certainly with its Asian neighbours, including Japan and China.

Two major events that have promoted the consolidation of peace and stability in Asia were the recent visits to the USSR by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India and a party and government delegation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, led by Le Duan.

The USSR proceeds from the assumption that normalisation of Soviet-Chinese relations would be a major factor for improving the world situation in general. We believe that the People's Republic of China could play an important role in making the climate in Asia healthier.

The Soviet Union, true to its highly-principled internationalist course, has been making persistent efforts towards genuine normalisation of relations with the PRC. This course was reaffirmed at the plenary meetings of the CPSU Central Committee held in March and April 1985, and during

the Soviet-Chinese talks conducted in Moscow from July 9 to 12, 1985. In his speech on June 26, 1985, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, pointed out that time had shown both sides—China and the Soviet Union—that “dissociation and, moreover, unfriendliness and suspiciousness benefit neither of them, and goodneighbourly cooperation is quite possible and advisable. We, for our part, are determined to work actively to completely overcome the negative stretch in Soviet-Chinese relations, which engendered a great deal of artificial difficulties. I am certain that, in the end, this is how it will be”.²³

The Soviet Union's constructive peace initiatives open up opportunities for solving the complex international problems in the Far East, as well as in other regions, not through confrontation but through equal negotiations and mutual understanding. At the same time, they mobilise nations for a strong rebuff to the aggressive aspirations of imperialism and to any encroachments on the security and independence of the nations in the region.

Explaining the essence of the Soviet initiatives concerning a comprehensive approach to the problems of security in Asia, Mikhail Gorbachev said, “It is especially appropriate to stress the necessity of struggle against the intrigues of imperialism and reaction in Asia, now that the peoples of the Asia-Pacific region, along with all progressive humanity, are observing the 40th anniversary of the victory over Japanese militarism. The growing activity of the anti-war forces in this region is a convincing indicator of the ever growing concern of the public in the countries of Asia over the fate of the world.”²⁴

When observing the 40th anniversary of the victory over Japanese militarism, we turn again and again to the lessons and experience of the last war. The main conclusion here is that we must act against a new war before it breaks out. The Soviet people, engaged in peaceful construction, in view of the 27th CPSU Congress, have focused all their thoughts on fulfilling the Party's plans, on coping with the key priorities in speeding up the country's economic development. At the same time, the Soviet people are vigilantly following the development of the complex and contradictory international situation and doing everything possible to consolidate the defence potential of the USSR.

Taking into account the lessons of World War Two, the CPSU and the Soviet government are doing everything they can to safeguard and strengthen peace and to save humanity from the danger of a nuclear holocaust. The Soviet people's selfless work, and the economic, scientific, technological, and military might of the USSR are the primary factor in safeguarding peace and restraining the aggressors.

²³ M. S. Gorbachev, *To Act Vigorously, Not to Lose Time*, Moscow, 1985, p. 23 (in Russian).

²⁴ *Pravda*, Aug. 30, 1985.

SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCES ON 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF END OF WORLD WAR II

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 86 pp 37-50

[Reports by M. M. Zeynalov and F. Lappo on conferences commemorating World War II victory and stipulating current objectives of Asia-Pacific peace movement]

The international conference devoted to the 40th anniversary of the victory over militarist Japan and the tasks facing the peace movement in Asian and Pacific countries had become a major forum marking the jubilee of the great victory. It was convened on the initiative of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, the Soviet Peace Committee, other public organisations and academic institutions of the Soviet Union. The conference aroused lively interest among broad strata of the public abroad. Along with Soviet war veterans, prominent party functionaries and statesmen, scholars and writers, it was attended by representatives of political parties, anti-war movements, scientific and religious centres from dozens of countries, as well as delegations of international democratic organisations. The Conference examined, logically and consistently, the developments of the concluding stage of World War II, i. e., the rout of Japanese militarism, the postwar development of the former colonial and dependent countries of Asia, and the present-day situation on the continent and in the Pacific.

The participants in the Conference warmly welcomed the wise and encouraging message by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. This political document reaffirmed the clear and unshakable line of the Communist Party and the Soviet government aimed at curbing the arms race and averting a nuclear war. It also contained major initiatives and proposals by the Soviet Union geared to establish peace and an atmosphere of confidence and cooperation among the countries of Asia and the Pacific.

V. Orlov, Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet delivered a report at the conference. He pointed out that 1985 was marked by many important events for every country and nation. However, to the whole of peaceful mankind it was primarily, notable as the 40th anniversary of the defeat of Hitlerite fascism and Japanese militarism and the end of World War II.

When the Japanese brasshats began implementing their aggressive designs several years before the beginning of World War II, the Soviet Union, firmly following Lenin's behests, consistently favoured the establishment of an efficient system of collective security both in Europe and in Asia, and firmly proposed blocking the aggressive ambitions of Japa-

nese militarism. The USA, Britain and France turned a deaf ear to the warnings given by the Soviet government and refused to take part in jointly rebuffing the aggressor. On December 7, 1941, the USA became victim of a Japanese attack. Subsequently, Japanese troops occupied a large part of China and approached the border with India. The Japanese militarists were waiting for the right moment to launch an attack against the USSR.

It took considerable efforts on the part of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition to repulse the Japanese aggression. Patriots of China, Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines and other countries of the Asian-Pacific region fought courageously against the Japanese invaders, thereby bringing their liberation day closer. The Communists and progressive forces of Japan made their contribution to the struggle against the fascist-militaristic regime. The Soviet Union, loyal to its allied commitments, declared war on Japan to accelerate the rout of Japanese militarism. The USSR, its heroic people and its valiant armed forces bore the brunt of the Second World War, played a decisive part in the defeat of Hitler's Germany, and later of militaristic Japan, the speaker stressed. It was precisely the Soviet Army, in combat cooperation with the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, that delivered a crushing blow to the Kwantung Army and forced Tokyo to surrender. The collapse of Japanese militarism saved the Asian peoples from untold sufferings.

The rout of militaristic Japan by the Soviet Army, the liberation of Northeast China and North Korea, and the victorious end to the war were epoch-making events with an extremely profound impact on the destinies of mankind, and on subsequent socio-political processes in the world.

A new chapter opened up for the peoples of Asia who were given the real opportunity to radically change their destinies. There is no doubt that but for the victory won by the Soviet Union, colonial domination in Asia would have ended much later, demanded more privations and claimed many more victims. Moreover, the moral, political and material assistance given by the world's first socialist country largely predetermined the outcome of the courageous struggle waged by the Asian peoples, making it irreversible. One after another, independent national states began to sprout up on the ruins of colonial empires. The peoples of China, North Korea and Vietnam embarked upon the path of socialism.

Touching upon the current situation on the continent, V. Orlov emphasised that, at present, the policies of the imperialist forces are spearheaded at destabilising and aggravating the situation in Asia. Under false pretexts of "ensuring the security" of Asian countries, the USA has been grossly interfering in their internal affairs, whipping up hotbeds of tension, declaring whole regions to be spheres of its vital interests and establishing a network of military bases and strongholds throughout Asia. The revival of militaristic trends in Japan's policy, and the expansion of its military and political cooperation with the USA and NATO cause deep concern. An analysis of the contemporary political situation in Asia warrants the conclusion that the world's biggest continent, in which over 50 per cent of mankind lives is seriously threatened by imperialist forces headed by the United States. These forces are openly out to turn Asia, after Europe, into a theatre of nuclear-missile confrontation with the countries of the socialist community. The threat hanging over Asia dictates the urgent need for efficient measures to rebuff the self-styled claimants to world domination and ensure stability and peace on the continent.

The constructive initiatives of Mongolia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan serve the noble goal of ridding Asia from wars and conflicts. The peaceloving

foreign policy of India, the leader of the nonaligned movement, is a major factor of stability in Asia.

The new Soviet proposals put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, during his talks with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam Le Duan are permeated with the sincere desire to eliminate hotbeds of tension and promote a peaceful settlement of problems in Asia.

The peoples of Asia and the whole world remember the terrible events of World War Two and this impels them to come out more actively and persistently for disarmament, international detente, thereby promoting joint efforts to save life on earth. The World Peace Council, the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation and other international and national organisations uniting millions upon millions of people of good will devote their tireless activities to attaining these noble goals. The Khabarovsk Conference is also designed to revive contacts and exchanges of opinion on pressing international issues. V. Orlov stated in conclusion that, in this connection, he would like to reassure his foreign colleagues that the Soviet public would remain a reliable and interested partner who is ready to make a constructive contribution to the work aimed at starting a Pan-Asiatic dialogue to find ways to improve the political climate in the Asian-Pacific region.

In their speeches many foreign delegates stressed the decisive part played by the Soviet Union in defeating Hitlerite fascism and Japanese militarism. The act of the unconditional surrender of Hitler's Germany signed on May 8, 1945, finally and irreversibly determined the outcome of the Second World War, while the surrender of militaristic Japan on September 2, 1945, marked the end of the war, Kurt Seibt, member of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, stated. The Soviet people and its glorious Army bore the brunt of the struggle in that historic battle. The representative of the German Democratic Republic pointed out that not only the peoples of Europe, but also those of Asia drew strength and confidence from the victories won by the Soviet Army.

In his report at the conference P. Zhilin, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, noted that when the Soviet Union declared war on imperialist Japan on August 8, 1945, it was pursuing exceptionally fair goals: to fulfil its obligations given to its allies in the anti-Hitler coalition at the Yalta Conference, to bring about the end of the Second World War as soon as possible, thus saving millions of lives; to ensure the security of the Far Eastern borders of the USSR; and to render assistance to the peoples of East and Southeast Asia in their struggle for liberation from foreign occupation, for national independence and freedom. The war in the Far East required new, major efforts on the part of the Soviet people, the Communist Party, the Army and the Navy. The Central Committee of the CPSU, the State Defence Committee and the General Headquarters carried out a tremendous amount of work aimed at a strategic regrouping of the Armed Forces from the West to the East on a scope unknown in world history. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan and the latter's surrender were major events which were of decisive significance for the end of the Second World War in the Far East as well. The defeat of the million-strong Kwantung Army, which was the best trained and equipped group of Tokyo's land forces, deprived Japan of its main means of further waging the war and made it surrender. The Soviet scholar stressed that without the Soviet Union, the USA and Great Britain would have been unable to solve this problem successfully.

In his speech at the Conference, Professor M. Titarenko, Director of

the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, spoke of the importance of the defeat of Japanese militarism for the triumph of popular revolutions in China, Korea, Vietnam and other Asian countries. M. Titarenko pointed out that the Soviet Union's revolutionary solidarity with the liberation struggle of the Asian peoples, the moral, political and material assistance given to this struggle by the Soviet Union laid firm foundations for the Soviet Union's friendship and cooperation with the peoples of those countries. (See Professor M. Titarenko's report on pp. 23-36 of this issue).

Addressing the meeting in Moscow on May 8, 1985, devoted to the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War, Mikhail Gorbachev emphasised: "Our Victory has not receded into the past. This is a living victory belonging to the present and to the future." The international conference in Khabarovsk and its results graphically confirmed the correctness of these words. Turning to the tragic lessons of the Second World War Li Sang Ho, a public figure from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Belikten, Editor-in-Chief of the *Party Life* magazine from Mongolia, Lieutenant-General K. Kalashnikov, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, A. Gilbert of Great Britain, a veteran of the anti-fascist struggle in Spain, and many others touched upon the present-day fears harboured by the peoples, resolutely condemned the imperialist nuclear madmen who are pushing mankind towards holocaust, and passionately called for the unity of all forces of peace in the confrontation against that terrible threat.

Many participants in the Conference did not conceal their concern while talking of the rebirth of Japanese militarism which, as was the case 40 years ago, may threaten the peaceful life of the peoples of East Asia. Public representatives from the Philippines, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Vietnam, Bangladesh and other countries pointed to the growing military partnership between the USA and Japan, and the attempts to set up a militaristic Washington—Tokyo—Seoul alliance. The speeches made by representatives of the democratic, peaceloving forces of Japan, who took part in the Khabarovsk Conference, were listened to with great attention. Kumao Terada, Deputy of the Chamber of Councilors of the Japanese Diet from the Socialist Party, told the audience of the struggle waged by the progressive forces of his country for the complete observance of the peaceful constitution and the latter's three non-nuclear principles. He also pointed to the direct involvement of the USA in the remilitarisation of Japan and in pushing the latter onto the dangerous path of confrontation with the Soviet Union. Kumao Terada stressed that the progressives deem it their main task to prevent the rebirth of Japanese militarism, thus making their contribution to the cause of defending peace throughout the world. Koji Sugimori, General Secretary of the Japanese Association of Cultural Ties, speaking of the reasons for the unprecedented international tension, pointed to the "invariable lead of the USA—from Truman to Reagan—in the nuclear arms race". He highly appreciated the decision of the Soviet Union to end all nuclear tests as from August 6, 1985. At the same time, Japanese representative, apparently reflecting the views of a certain section of the Japanese public, stated that the Soviet Union should unilaterally declare a broad programme of arms reduction. In the opinion of Sugimori, such unilateral measures would allegedly fetter the US military-industrial complex. Such a simplified and naive view on the most complex issue of our day and age is not supported among those who seriously contemplate the problems of disarmament and military detente. It has been generally recognised that it is the principle of equality and the equal security of the sides that serves as a firm basis and a time-tested criterion for possible measures in the field of disarmament between the Soviet Union and the USA, the

Warsaw Treaty and the NATO bloc. Any violation of this principle, the more so when Washington openly declares its line towards achieving military superiority over the USSR, would be fatal to the destiny of mankind. This is also seen from the lessons of the Second World War.

In his speech G. Kim, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, dealt with the results of the Second World War and the burning issues of peace and security in Asia and the Pacific. Unleashed as a result of the crisis of imperialism, the Second World War brought about the collapse of the shock forces of imperialist reaction and the emergence of the socialist states' community. Among the other most important results of the war, G. Kim mentioned the disintegration of colonial empires, the liberation from colonial dependence of the majority of Asian, African and Latin American countries, and their embarking upon the path of independent development. In touching upon the problems of the Asia-Pacific region, the scholar noted that the main destabilising factors here include the conceptual provisions of US Pacific policy and the practical activities of US administration in that area. The US Pacific policy is part and parcel of its global anti-Soviet strategy. After the concepts of "mass retaliation" (1950s), "flexible response" (1960s), "realistic deterrence" (1970s), Washington, in the first half of the 1980s resorted to the strategy of global and regional "direct confrontation" with the USSR. It provided for drawing the Soviet Union into the arms race, "the encirclement of the USSR" and the possibility of local nuclear wars. East Asia and the Pacific are regarded as the "second front", after Europe, of confrontation with the Soviet Union. The strategic propositions and practical measures by the US administration in that region are directed at undermining the existing balance of forces, at creating a nuclear bridgehead in the close vicinity of the Soviet Far Eastern borders to exert constant pressure on the USSR. An important part in these dangerous schemes is assigned primarily to Japan and South Korea, with which the USA has been so closely coordinating its military activities that this warrants the conclusion that a tripartite military-political alliance is being formed. In recent years, the USA has been giving close attention to the activities of ANZUS military bloc, seeking more actively to draw it into its militaristic orbit. The attempts of the US government to make the ASEAN a militarised regional grouping, the desire to counterpose it to other countries of Southeast Asia, and to foil detente in that area cannot but cause apprehension. Postwar history shows that the relaxation of tension in the Asia-Pacific region largely depends on the realistic and well-thought-out policy of all states of the region, G. Kim went on. That is why the USSR proposes holding negotiations on confidence-building measures in the Far East, which would embrace both the political and military spheres. The Soviet Union came out with initiatives such as the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, including their non-use against non-nuclear states, negotiations aimed at reducing the level of naval activities in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, and so on.

Professor M. Zuberi, member of the Executive Council of the All-India Organisation for Peace and Solidarity, Head of the Department of Problems of Disarmament in Jawaharlal Nehru New Delhi University, delivered an interesting report on the subject, "The Danger of Nuclear War and the Nonaligned States". He talked of the broad support given by India and many other nonaligned states to the Soviet Union's unilateral commitments not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and to halt nuclear explosions from August 6, 1985. World public pressure must be stepped up to make the United States of America, Great Britain and France undertake similar pledges. The Indian scholar emphasised that the non-aligned movement had contributed a great deal in that direction to the struggle of the peaceloving forces for curbing the nuclear arms race and averting the nuclear war danger. He drew the audience's attention to the

danger of the American plans of militarising outer space, and stressed the topicality of the Soviet proposals on the peaceful exploration of outer space in the conditions of the latter's non-militarisation.

Professor D. Petrov (the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences) noted that the US ruling circles regard the setting up, under their aegis, of different types of military-political alliances and blocs as a major means for bolstering up their positions and preventing the growth and influence of socialism in Asian countries. This line, invariably followed during all postwar years, has been further developed in the policy of the Reagan administration which has been pursuing an overt policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, seeking to foil detente and ensure strategic superiority over the world of socialism by unleashing an unbridled arms race. The US military-bloc policy, alongside the line towards undermining strategic parity by launching new types and systems of armaments, has been the chief destabilising factor in the Asia-Pacific region as well. Under these conditions, of paramount importance are the Soviet initiatives aimed at ensuring a lasting peace and security in that region of the world.

V. Khlynov, Dr. Sc. (Econ.), of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences, pointed out that the development of broad mutually beneficial economic cooperation between the Pacific countries themselves, as well as global economic ties, are a real path towards attaining that goal. The centrifugal and centripetal forces, and also various levels of economic development and rapprochement are closely interwoven in the complicated and contradictory process of the internationalisation of economic activities in the Pacific. However, the very fact of the development of that process attests to the mutually advantageous character of economic cooperation for all countries of the region without exception. The Soviet Union, a state with powerful economy and extensive commercial ties, makes a tangible contribution to the development of that cooperation.

V. Chichkanov, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Director of the Khabarovsk Institute of Economic Research, Far Eastern Scientific Centre of the USSR Academy of Sciences, spoke about the great role played by Siberia and the Far East in the international division of labour.

For three days the participants in the international Conference in Khabarovsk had the opportunity to make a frank and interesting comparison of their viewpoints and exchange opinions on the ways and means of consolidating peace, strengthening confidence and mutual understanding among the peoples and countries of the Asia-Pacific region and averting the nuclear danger hanging over the world. Their common views, reflecting the stand of broad circles of the world public were expressed in the conference's unanimously approved final document—An Appeal to the Peoples of the Asia-Pacific Region.

A. Dzassokhov, First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, summed up the results of the fruitful discussion. Speaking at the closure of the Conference, he stated among other things: "Participants in the Conference, representatives of different ideological, political and religious views unanimously assessed and analysed the causes of the present-day alarming situation in the world, including the Asia-Pacific region. The Conference clearly pointed to the source of the nuclear threat to mankind. It is the purposeful hegemonistic policy pursued by the militaristic circles of imperialism, US imperialism above all, that is the source of the danger. It is precisely through their fault that many so-called small or local wars have been unleashed in different areas of Asia, and Asian peoples have to pay a high price for them. Against the background of the war psychosis whipped up by the aggressive circles

of imperialism, these wars and conflicts threaten to set off a worldwide nuclear conflagration. Grave concern was voiced from the rostrum of the Conference in connection with the obvious attempts by the US administration to turn the Asia-Pacific region into yet another arena of a global nuclear missile catastrophe, and to turn the countries and peoples of the region into hostages of its military strategy. In expressing the will of the peaceloving forces of Asia-Pacific countries and of the broad world public, the Conference stated the need for building up efforts and actions aimed at frustrating these dangerous schemes and fighting to make Asia a zone of peace and confidence—and the Pacific Ocean—a nuclear-free zone.

"The conference actively supported the peaceful initiatives and proposals made by socialist and nonaligned Asian countries, paving the way towards attaining this noble goal. The peoples of Asia have long historical traditions and a wealth of experience in creating peace and confidence. Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his message to our Conference stressed the eternal significance of the *pancha shila* principles and the spirit of Bandung. The responsibility for the destinies of mankind, the striving and readiness to do everything possible to preserve life, solidarity with the struggle waged by the Asian peoples for security and goodneighbourliness brought representatives of anti-war forces and organisations from America, Europe, Australia, and Africa to our Conference. Their speeches forcefully expressed the thoughts of hundreds of millions of people, gave voice to their consciousness and reason, and their belief in a peaceful future for humankind. And among those favouring peace, the voices of those in Japan who have not forgotten, and will never forget the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and who are struggling insistently for peace rang out loud and clear."

The International Conference in Khabarovsk reflected the dynamic role of the Soviet Far East in the socio-political life of the Asia-Pacific region. The forum's foreign guests had the chance to see the Soviet people's sincere adherence to the cause of peace and the fraternity of nations. Having visited labour collectives and families of the working people, and having participated in the mass anti-war demonstration by the citizens of Khabarovsk, delegations from foreign countries fully felt the Soviet people's deep-seated hatred for war and its instigators, their determination to defend peace and life on Earth.

M. Zeynalov,
Secretary of the Soviet Afro-Asian
Solidarity Committee

The Moscow Scientific Conference, like the International Conference held in Khabarovsk a month later, was devoted to all four main aspects of the 40th anniversary of the rout of Japanese militarism and the corresponding results of the victorious end to the Second World War: 1) the USSR's role and importance in the victory over militarist Japan and in determining the final outcome of the Second World War, particularly in Asia; 2) the significance of the rout of Japanese militarism for the victory of the people's revolutions in Vietnam, Korea and China; 3) the defeat of Japan and the development of the national liberation movement in Asia; 4) the 40th anniversary of victory over Japanese militarism and the tasks of the movement for peace and security in Asian and Pacific countries. In the range of problems studied, the diversity of the analysis and level of representation the Conference was unique, this corresponding to the level of cognition of the problems of social development and the fate of mankind attained by the mid-1980s and the degree of awareness of the responsibility for the fate of peace and mankind. The Conference demonstrated that both this level of knowledge and this degree of responsibility are determined primarily by the accomplishments of Marxist-Leninist social thought, the peaceloving and scientifically substantiated policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state, the achievements of the socialist community, and the progressive social movements of our time. The Conference demonstrated the unfading and perpetual importance of the victory scored by the Soviet people and its armed forces, guided by their Leninist Party. The Conference reminded with new force about the lessons of the Second World War that was unleashed by imperialism and terminated by socialism.

Every aspect was studied comprehensively in terms of its historical and current importance; there was exhaustive criticism of bourgeois falsifications and nationalistic distortions concerning history and roles in history; and revanchist chimeras and new militaristic ambitions were resolutely repulsed.

The scope of the Conference was also characterised by its representative nature. It was attended by prominent Soviet commanders and representatives of the Main Political Administration, veterans of the battles against the Japanese militarists—living witnesses of history, top officials from the CPSU Central Committee and scientists from the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, military historians and representatives of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Moscow State University and the Far Eastern Scientific Centre. It was attended by guests from socialist countries, progressive scientists and public figures from India, Japan and Britain, their presence reflecting the extensive international ties of our science and public life.

The forum "40 Years Since Victory Over Militarist Japan" was opened by Academician P. Fedoseyev, Vice President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. In his opening statement, he stressed that the 40th anniversary of victory is a great event of our time. There are those in Japan who are now trying to portray the Japanese militarism of 1945 almost as a "victim of attack" and, for this reason, Academician

Fedoseyev clearly formulated the reasons for the USSR's entry into the war against Japan—fulfilment of its allied and internationalist duty, a striving to ensure the speediest possible end to the war and the security of its borders in the Far East, and to restore the historical justice flouted by Japanese militarism.

Concerning the consequences of the rout of militarist Japan, Academician Fedoseyev noted that the fate of every single country in the East, Southeast and South Asia and in the Pacific was positively affected by our victory, which ensured the conditions for a mighty upsurge of the national liberation movement and disintegration of the disgraceful colonial system. The prominent Soviet scholar stressed that the Conference's task was to make an indepth and allround analysis of the military and political importance of the victory in the East, to demonstrate the decisive contribution made by the Soviet people and its armed forces to the conclusion of the Second World War, the unbreakable link between the successes of the popular revolutions and the national liberation movements in the countries of the region and the Soviet Army's liberation mission, and also to show the results and significance of the victory for the present day, for the struggle to prevent a new world war, because some politicians and historians in the United States, Japan and other countries are trying, for anti-Soviet purposes, to distort the events of August 1945 and conceal the criminal nature and the true essence of the barbarous American atomic bombings.

Preparing for the 27th Congress and in connection with the 40th anniversary of victory, the CPSU and the Soviet state reaffirm their striving for goodneighbourly relations with Japan and other Asian countries, for turning the Asia-Pacific region into a zone of peace. The speaker expressed confidence that the Conference would not only be a milestone in scientific studies, but also make a substantial contribution to the struggle for peace, become an integral part of the powerful upsurge of the anti-war movement that encompassed the entire world in 1985, including the Asian countries.

The USSR's decisive role in the rout of Japanese militarism was shown in the report made by Admiral N. Amelko, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, entitled "The Military-Political Importance of the Rout of Militarist Japan" and during the work of the Conference's 1st Section, headed by General of the Army Professor S. Ivanov and Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR P. Zhilin. In the East, as in Europe, the Soviet Union also played the decisive role in routing the aggressor; in the East, as in Europe, the Soviet Union set its allies an example of how to fulfil one's allied duty in the struggle to end the war. It is relevant to remember the USSR's reliability in honouring its commitments, today, when fulfilment of agreements reached and the organisation of international cooperation are so needed, the speaker stressed. There are forces in the world capable of reminding us all of this example and of the lessons of 1945 in general. Even the fact that attempts to distort the role of the USSR in the war and its conclusion have now become more vigorous is indirect evidence of the topicality of our victory, its fruitful impact on the present and the future, noted General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev.

The first question invented by the falsifiers of history is that of the nature of Japanese-Soviet relations in connection with the USSR's entry into the war in the Far East. The fate of the Japanese aggressor was sealed when the Soviet Union routed nazi Germany, but Japan's militaristic leadership hoped still to wage the war for years to come (4-8 years) and counted on an "honourable peace". There were strategic military and economic grounds for these hopes. As for relations with the USSR,

all attempts at speculations on this score are dashed by the facts: the existence and steady strengthening of the Kwantung Army were for the sole aim of waging war against the USSR. Admiral Amelko clearly explained the reasons why the Kwantung Army did not attack the USSR, even though the "Northern problem" was the core of Japanese militarism's strategy (by means of an offensive in the South, it wanted to provide itself with resources for the war against the USSR; it waited for the outcome of Hitler's war against the USSR; and it was deterred by the Soviet Army's successes in the West, etc.) Yet even under these conditions, Japan continued to take part in the struggle against the USSR by creating, as we now call it, a regime of terror and provocations on our borders and ocean lanes and by tying down up to 30 per cent of the Soviet Army's forces and armaments in the East from 1941 to 1945. Here is an illustration of this "neutrality": 3,259 violations of the border from 1941 to 1944; or ten a day! The second question invented by the falsifiers is the question of the moment of ending the war. It took Soviet soldiers virtually only ten days to rout a Japanese force that was comparable (and in some elements superior) to the Japanese forces stationed in the Pacific or in China and which had demonstrated its ability to wage war for years. In manpower terms, the Kwantung Army accounted for a fifth of the entire Japanese armed forces [according to the highest estimate, it had 1.5 million men.—Ed.]. It had a third of all the guns and combat planes and almost half the tanks of the Japanese armed forces. The Kwantung Army had powerful fortifications and the Japanese generals thought they could hold out behind them for a year in the event of the USSR's entry into the war and a generally unfavourable situation. Last but not least, the top command of the Kwantung Army was the leading political clique in Japan.

Despite their initiative and successes in the Pacific and Burma, the allies lacked the strength to land in Japan. Had the war dragged on, it would have claimed millions more lives. The two atomic bombs that killed or maimed over half a million Japanese civilians did not hurt the imperial army in any way. It was only the USSR's entry into the war that saved mankind from countless further losses and suffering. The Soviet forces were fully aware of this. Within a matter of days, they smashed the Kwantung Army not only because of their superior weaponry, but also the heroism, combat skills, and high morale of the Soviet soldiers and officers who had the experience of the Great Patriotic War.

Such was the USSR's decisive contribution to the ending of the war. The speaker analysed in detail the sources of and reasons for the Soviet victory in the Far East and stressed that the preparation and execution of the Far Eastern Campaign were carried out under the guidance of our Leninist Communist Party, which ensured the highest level of organisation in the actions of the Soviet troops.

General of the Army Professor S. Ivanov was in charge of the deliberations of the 1st Section of the Conference. In 1945, he was Chief of Staff of the Soviet High Command in the Far East (he was 38 years old at the time). He presented, in a well-argued manner, a number of theoretical solutions of problems relating to the history of the Far Eastern Campaign, above all a fundamental proposition that was received with great satisfaction by the participants in the Conference—that the Manchurian offensive was a unique *general engagement* that sealed the outcome of the concluding stage of the Second World War. Whoever, for whatever reason, tried to stand out against the background of the grim events of those years, he would never succeed in belittling the importance of the Soviet soldiers' feat. Our people's efforts and sacrifices are irreplaceable and do not lend themselves to comparative appraisal, because their price was the future of mankind. As for the role of the United States,

General S. Ivanov stressed, even at the time when the war was still going on, it was increasingly acquiring the nature of a strategy of terror and intimidation. As in the case of Dresden and Jena in the West, the United States used the tactics of massive bombing of the peaceful population, completely destroying about a hundred Japanese towns and ports, killing or maiming hundreds of thousands of people, in fact only slightly fewer than in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This strategy culminated in the two atomic strikes that were to put mankind in a state of fear and submissiveness.

The members of the Section described the actions of the various arms of the services in the Far Eastern Campaign, the specifics of party and political work in the army and navy, spoke about the mass heroism of our troops, the exploits of the working people of Siberia and the Far East, who provided the Soviet Army with men and armaments within the shortest possible time, about the internationalism of the Soviet Army's mission of liberation and about the comradeship-in-arms with the men of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army.

The participants in the Conference noted the outstanding role of Soviet commanders, these masters of military art. Of the three possible variants for entry into the war (a strike at Japan, assistance to Chinese troops and the Manchurian Operation) they chose, brilliantly prepared and carried out the most effective one (achieving even more than was planned).

The second aspect of our victory in the East was studied in the report "The Importance of the Rout of Militarist Japan for the Victory of People's Revolutions in Countries of East and Southeast Asia", presented by Prof. M. Titarenko, Dr. Sc. (Philos.), Director of the Institute of the Far East of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. One of the most important consequences of the rout of Japanese militarism was the creation of favourable conditions for invigoration of the region's revolutionary forces, for the wars and revolutions of liberation to develop into people's, popular-democratic ones. This brought about the appearance of states of a new type in Asia—People's China, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, etc. In addition to the Mongolian People's Republic, the world system of socialism was joined by new Asian countries.

The USSR's victory and the Soviet Army's liberation mission, and the internationalist assistance rendered by the Soviet people brought about profound historic changes in the lives of many peoples, and a restructuring of the entire system of international relations in the Far East. These processes were reflected in the reports by F. Solovyov, L. Kutakov, G. Sakharchuk and others. B. Pospelov's paper dealt with the very important question of the influence exerted on Japan's development by the defeat of militarism. B. Sapozhnikov devoted his report to the strategy and tactics of the region's progressive forces in those years. Professor M. Titarenko announced plans to put out a book, jointly with foreign colleagues, about the comradeship-in-arms of our peoples in the struggle against Japanese militarism.

All the speakers stressed the profound connection between the historical study of the problems under discussion and an analysis of present-day situations, a study of the present role of the USSR and the Asian socialist countries in the struggle for peace and security, for social progress and the development of culture in Asia, and also the need to expose the efforts of US imperialism to destabilise the situation in the Far East, Southeast Asia and the Pacific region. Alarm was expressed about the militaristic and revanchist tendencies in the policy pursued by Japan's ruling circles.

Professor Van Trong (Institute of Asian and Pacific Studies under the

Committee for Social Sciences of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam) gave an analysis and critique of the reactionary allegations concerning a "Soviet threat" to Japan, which serve the needs of the forces and sentiments speculating on the problem of "northern territories" and obstruct the development of the country's relations with the USSR. The Vietnamese scholar also critically analysed some PRC publications that try to start invented discussions, for instance, on the day when the Second World War broke out or on the subject of whether China helped the USSR during that war or vice versa. Professor Van Trong rightly noted that recognition of the decisive role of the Soviet people's victory in no way detracts from the accomplishments of the other participants in the anti-fascist, anti-militarist struggle. The Vietnamese scientist also stressed that Mikhail Gorbachev's call to protect peace has evoked an ardent response among the peoples of the world, especially those of Asia, where wars and conflicts have flared up repeatedly in post-war years and where a high sense of responsibility on the part of the peoples and a broad anti-war front are needed.

Kan Un Pin, director of an institute of the Academy of Sciences of the DPRK, convincingly and clearly demonstrated the organic link between the military and political manoeuvres of the United States at the close of the Second World War and its current imperialist strategy in the region, as well as the unseemly role played in complicating the situation in Asia by Japan's reactionary circles, which obediently toe Washington's line and, at the same time, "covet indigenous Soviet territory". The prominent Korean scholar spoke very warmly about the exploits of Soviet soldiers and stressed that every effort should be made to preserve and develop the fruits of the great victory. This aim, he went on, is served by the policy of the Workers' Party of Korea, which expresses the nation's common desire to see the homeland reunited and to safeguard peace in Asia and throughout the world.

The Cuban representative M. Nogales exposed the slanderous, hypocritical and basically neofascist nature of "descriptions" of the events of the Second World War offered by subversive imperialist propaganda. Quoting from Raul Castro's speech at a celebration meeting devoted to the 40th anniversary of victory, she said: "The need to revere the memory of what the Second World War meant increases still further as we observe, with alarm, the deployment of new American nuclear missiles in Western Europe, the growth of US military preparations in the Far East and the growing militarisation of Japan." Nogales sharply condemned the US attempts to turn the PRC into its military and political ally.

Academician S. Tikhvinsky delivered a report entitled "The Defeat of Japan in the Second World War and the Development of the National Liberation Movement in Asia", which dealt profoundly and comprehensively with the third aspect of the Conference's subject-matter. "The lightning defeat of militarist Japan and the increased military might of the land of socialism in the Far East in many ways determined the fact that the collapse of imperialism's colonial empire—an event second in historic importance only to the Great October Socialist Revolution and the formation of the world socialist system—began precisely in Asia. It was on that ancient continent that the mighty wave of socio-political change rose and then swept the countries of Africa and Latin America." The first to collapse was the Japanese "empire"—a result of extensive conquests over a span of fifteen years, based on cruelty and ruthless plunder and encompassing a territory of ten million square kilometres with a population of 400 million. In Asia, millions of people lost their lives at the hands of Japanese militarism. In one way or another, however, millions of people also joined the struggle against it, learned to handle both military and political weapons, this making inevitable the growth of revo-

lutionary-liberation processes against their "own" colonialists. The Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed on August 17, 1945 and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on September 2 of that year. First of all, Communists formed partisan armies in Malaya and the Philippines. Burma's national army turned its weapons against the occupationists.

The speaker stressed that, both in the first years of its existence and also during and after the Second World War, the USSR invariably gave tremendous moral, political and diplomatic support to the fighters for independence. Wherever the Soviet Army was present, it unfettered progressive forces and helped the peoples against the export of counterrevolution. The USSR gave the peoples allround assistance. Wherever this factor was absent, however, grave trials fell to the lot of the struggling peoples before they acquired independence (most often with the coming to power of bourgeois circles) or completed their liberation late in the 1940s or 1950s. S. L. Tikhvinsky described comprehensively the USSR's assistance to the newly-independent countries in the post-war period and currently, in their struggle for political and economic independence, against imperialism's unceasing subversive activities and against neocolonialism. The speaker took a Marxist-Leninist approach in examining the Reagan Administration policy with respect to the developing countries, its attempts to turn them into a frontline of struggle against socialism and progressive forces, above all in Asia, where it views Japan as its closest associate in this venture. In contrast to the United States, the Soviet Union offers a broad programme for constructive, peaceful and goodneighbourly cooperation.

The People's Republic of China can play an important role in improving the situation in Asia. The further normalisation of Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of mutual respect and mutual advantage is extremely useful in this respect. Other socialist countries are also coming out with valuable proposals on how to strengthen peace and security in Asia, the speaker noted.

Half of the population of the world were born after the war, but the lessons of the Second World War urge all peoples to engage in anti-war activities, and oppose American imperialism's aggressive plans. The peoples of Asia face the urgent task of preserving and consolidating the gains attained as a result of victory in the Second World War and in the post-war years.

The 3rd Section of the Conference, headed by Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR G. F. Kim, concentrated on three issues: the causes and consequences of the formation of the hotbed of war in the Far East, the nature of the Japanese colonial policy in East and Southeast Asia and its impact on the national liberation movement in the region, and current trends in imperialism's policy in the Far East. On the basis of an analysis of the policy pursued by the United States and Japan in the 1930s and 1940s, A. I. Utkin showed convincingly how right Lenin was in predicting an American-Japanese conflict on the basis of "common" imperialist ambitions. He also showed the mechanism of connivance with respect to Japanese aggression evolved by the United States with the aim of directing that aggression in a northeasterly direction. V. Solovyov devoted his report to aspects of the ideological brainwashing to which the Japanese population and armed forces are being subjected. Using a wealth of historical material, Y. Pevzner, A. Savin, and G. Levinson presented a striking picture of Japanese colonial policy and of the political tactics employed by the occupationists in the colonies. The Conference focused considerable attention on questions of the Indian people's anti-Japanese struggle, the specifics and lessons of the struggle waged by communist parties in East and Southeast Asian countries. D. Petrov and V. Bunin concentrated on questions of the struggle

against US imperialism's Far Eastern policy and against the revival of Japanese militarism.

At the concluding meeting, the participants in the Conference were addressed by Professor Van Trong on behalf of the delegations of socialist countries. He expressed deep gratitude to the heroic Soviet people for its exploits during the Second World War and expressed a firm belief in the future triumph of the cause of peace and socialism in Asia.

Admiral N. Amelko, the Lenin Prize Winner, summed up the results of the Conference, thanked its participants and singled out the main problems studied: the sources of the victory of the Soviet armed forces over Japanese militarism, the USSR's decisive role in ending the Second World War, the superiority of the Soviet art of warfare, and the influence of our victory on world events, this being especially topical today, when the world is threatened by a terrible catastrophe and when the forces of peace and progress have never been stronger. He also dwelt on the tasks facing Soviet scientists in the struggle against the militaristic plans of imperialism and revanchist forces, against bourgeois and other anti-Soviet falsifications of history, in military, patriotic and internationalist education.

The Conference called on the Soviet people for working selflessly to preserve the peace that was won 40 years ago, to strengthen the anti-war, anti-imperialist forces in Asia and throughout the world.

F. LAPPO

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CSO: 1812/94

APPEAL ON CREATING 'ZONE OF PEACE' IN ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Moscow PROBLEMY DALNEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, Oct-Dec 85 (signed to press 25 Nov 85) p 51

[Appeal to people of the Asia-Pacific region from participants in international conference commemorating 40th anniversary of World War II victory, in Khabarovsk on 7 September 1985]

[Text] We representatives of the Asian and Pacific public, delegates from national and international organizations, have gathered at the conference in Khabarovsk to commemorate an event of worldwide historic significance--the 40th anniversary of the victory over Japanese militarism and the end of World War II--and to discuss the current problems of safeguarding peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

After looking back at the tragic lessons of the last war, we and all other people of goodwill must pay a tribute of the deepest respect to the eternal memory and glory of the millions of sons and daughters of the earth who defended the liberty of people against barbarous enslavement 40 years ago at the cost of colossal sacrifices and deprivations, at the cost of their most precious possession--their lives.

Here, on Soviet land, we gratefully acknowledge the Soviet Union's decisive contribution to the defeat of Hitler's fascism and Japan's militarism.

Today people are well aware that there is no task more important than saving the world from a new holocaust. The nuclear threat hanging over mankind demands collective efforts from all people. We are calling upon the public in the Asian and Pacific countries to augment their contribution to the worldwide movement to curb the arms race and eliminate the threat of thermonuclear war.

The alarm bell of Hiroshima and Nagasaki can be heard all over the planet today. It commands people to do everything within their power to prevent a repetition of the nuclear tragedy in any place and at any time and to put an end to nuclear weapons completely and forever! The achievement of lasting peace in the Asia-Pacific region is a difficult but noble objective. We are firmly convinced that the countries and people of the region, moving step by step toward this cherished goal, will certainly make it a reality through their combined efforts.

The public of the Asian and Pacific countries has rich experience in the struggle for peace. It was the countries of this region that performed the historic service of arousing international interest in concepts of peaceful coexistence which won worldwide acknowledgement, such as the "Pantja Sila" and the Ten Principles of Bandung.

We applaud the initiatives on the creation of zones of peace and nuclear-free zones in various parts of Asia and the Pacific region, on the institution of confidence-building measures in the Far East, on the conclusion of non-aggression pacts and agreements not to use force in relations between Asian and Pacific states, on the limitation of naval arms and naval activity in the Pacific and Indian oceans and on a comprehensive approach to the problems of guaranteeing peace and security in Asia.

We heartily support the Soviet initiative on the unilateral suspension of all nuclear tests on 6 August as new evidence of the constructive, peaceful policy line of the USSR. It is obvious that the inclusion of the United States in this moratorium would be of great significance in curbing and stopping the nuclear arms race and would have a restraining effect on other countries. The new Soviet initiative must not be ignored!

We express solidarity with the peoples and countries advocating the creation of nuclear-free zones. We sincerely sympathize with the efforts of millions of common people in different countries to win nuclear-free status for their cities, towns, rural communities and entire regions and territories.

We support the struggle of democratic antiwar forces and organizations opposing the establishment of imperialist military bases and installations on their territory, the entry of their ports by ships carrying nuclear weapons, the inclusion of their countries in militarist blocs and groups and, in particular, the U.S.-Japan-South Korea military alliance.

We believe that bilateral and multilateral contacts and dialogue on the official and sociopolitical levels should be used to seek and find realistic ways of solving urgent problems in the Asia-Pacific region on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. We are well aware that there is no alternative to extensive political dialogue, collective efforts and a comprehensive approach in the struggle to achieve lasting peace and security. We are called upon to do this by the lessons of the last war, the end of which we are celebrating now, 40 years later.

The flames of a new war must never blaze on Asian land! Asia must be a continent of lasting peace, cooperation and prosperity! The Pacific and Indian oceans must be zones of peace!

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CSO: 1805/4

USSR'S COOPERATION WITH ASIAN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, KAMPUCHEA

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 86 pp 51-63

[Article by M. S. Ukraintsev]

The first half of the 1980s saw a further growth and consolidation of the Soviet Union's cooperation with the Mongolian People's Republic, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and the Lao People's Democratic Republic. Since 1982, certain positive changes have occurred in the relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China, especially in trade and economic links. The Soviet Union has helped the People's Republic of Kampuchea recover from the devastation caused by Pol Pot's rule, and is still assisting the Republic in protecting its revolutionary gains and independence.

These processes acquire special importance in the context of United States' growing military preparations in the Pacific, the militarisation of Japan, the building of an aggressive bloc consisting of the United States, Japan, and South Korea, and the efforts to form a Pacific community modelled on NATO. So, the more closely the Asian socialist nations cooperate, the greater the positive role they will play in improving the political situation in Asia and the Pacific and in consolidating Asian security.

SOVIET-MONGOLIAN COOPERATION

The years 1981-1985 were marked by new achievements in building socialism in Mongolia, while its long-standing friendship with the Soviet Union became further consolidated, and comprehensive cooperation between the two countries developed in every way. A fundamental factor promoting that cooperation is the ever deepening links between the Soviet Communist Party and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, which are based on the ideological and political unity of the two parties and the two nations, and on the community of their tasks in building socialism and communism.

Cooperation between the two fraternal parties and nations is promoted, above all, by traditional regular meetings between top-level Soviet and Mongolian party and government leaders.

In October 1984, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Jambyn Batmünh, made a working visit to the USSR. In August 1985, when he was here on vacation at the invitation of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, Jambyn Batmünh met with Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee. On August 29, 1985, in the Kremlin, the two leaders signed a long-term programme for economic, scientific, and technological cooperation between the Soviet Union and Mongolia up to the year 2000. Mikhail Gorbachev described that programme as "a document of great political significance. Its implementation", he said, "will make it possible to make fuller use of capabilities and reserves of Soviet-Mongolian mutual links, to pool our efforts and experience, resources and knowledge more efficiently for increasing our eco-

conomic potential and raising the well-being of the working people."¹ Between 1981 and 1985, several other Mongolian leaders visited the Soviet Union.

During the five years, several Soviet party and government delegations visited Mongolia, including ones led by Mikhail Gorbachev (in 1981) and other party and government leaders of the USSR.

Summit talks were held on topical matters of the two nations' political and economic cooperation. Meetings of Soviet and Mongolian leaders have a favourable effect on the entire complex of Soviet-Mongolian relations, which are becoming increasingly dynamic and more profound with every passing year.

Between 1981 and 1985, the Soviet Union and Mongolia concluded a number of agreements on economic, scientific, technological, and cultural cooperation, on training specialists and skilled personnel for Mongolia, and on many other matters. Of special importance is the Soviet-Mongolian intergovernmental agreement on economic and technological cooperation. It was signed on June 13, 1980 and, under it, Soviet economic assistance is being channeled into building up the material and technical basis of Mongolian agriculture and ensuring priority development in mining, fuels and energy, construction, transport, and other branches of Mongolia's economy, and also into improving its people's well-being.

When signing the Soviet-Mongolian long-term programme for economic, scientific, and technological cooperation up to the year 2000 in Moscow on August 29, 1985, Jambyn Batmünh said it "opens broad prospects and sets the basic guidelines for furthering our countries' diverse cooperation. Successful implementation of this programme will lead to a new advance of our country's economic potential, to improvement of the material well-being of the working people."²

More than thirty major economic projects built for Mongolia by Soviet agencies were commissioned in the 1981-1985 period. They include a mining complex at the Baganur coal seam producing one million tons of coal a year, a railway line connecting Bagahangai and Baganur, the Borundur-2 fluorspar prospecting and mining facility, with an annual output of 100,000 tons of ore, a bakery, a spinning mill, and some other projects. Heat and Power Plant-4 has been commissioned in Ulan Bator. A considerable contribution to Mongolia's economic development is made by Soviet-Mongolian joint enterprises like the Erdenet ore-dressing plant, the Mongolsovtsvetmet non-ferrous metals agency, and the Ulan Bator Railway joint-stock company.

Mongolia's work in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) is gaining importance, and its contribution to the implementation of the comprehensive programme for socialist economic integration has been growing. Mongolia is opening up new fields of cooperation with fraternal socialist nations, and this ensures more efficient use of the republic's own resources and leads the nation to great achievements in economic, scientific, and cultural development. The economic summit held by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in Moscow in 1984 produced decisions that are extremely important for further consolidating Mongolia's economic, scientific, and technological potential.

Mongolia's international prestige is growing by the year, largely owing to its close cooperation with the Soviet Union and other fraternal nations. Mongolia maintains diplomatic relations with 94 states. It is a member of 22 governmental and 60 non-governmental international organisations and signatory to more than 40 international treaties and agreements.

¹ *Pravda*, August 30, 1985.

² *Ibidem*.

The Soviet people and progressive public throughout the world appreciate and highly value Mongolia's consistent peace-loving foreign policy, its highly-principled approach to handling international problems, and its tireless search for ways to improve the political climate in Asia and establish trust, goodneighbourly relations, and mutually rewarding cooperation among Asian nations.

At its 18th Congress, held in May 1981, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party moved a proposal to work out and sign a convention on mutual non-aggression and the non-use of force in relations among Asian and Pacific states. The proposal was strongly supported by the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries. On Mongolia's initiative, the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly adopted a declaration, On the Right of Peoples to Peace. Mongolia's peace proposals are in line with those moved by the Soviet Union and other socialist states.

Mongolia has resolutely supported Soviet peaceloving policy which, among other things, was reflected in the stand taken by the Soviet delegation at the Geneva summit talks.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

In the first half of the 1980s, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was subject to increasing military and political pressure from the United States, Japan, and the South Korean regime. That pressure was best illustrated by the Team Spirit military exercises—the world's biggest peace-time exercises which US and South-Korean forces conduct every year, to show their readiness to deliver a strike on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including a "preemptive" nuclear strike.

In response to the growing military preparations of the United States and its allies, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea made efforts to consolidate cooperation with socialist nations. The republic's growing cohesion with socialist states was illustrated by the 1984 European tour by its top-level party and government delegation, led by Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The delegation made official visits of friendship to the Soviet Union (May 23-25), Poland (May 27-29), the German Democratic Republic (May 29-June 2), Czechoslovakia (June 4-6), Hungary (June 7-9), Yugoslavia (June 9-11), Bulgaria (June 15-17), and Romania (June 18-21). The delegation's talks with the leaders of the socialist nations demonstrated the unity of their views on the fundamental problems of modern world development and a common desire to promote and consolidate friendship and cooperation between their respective parties and peoples. The leaders of the socialist states reaffirmed their unflagging support for the efforts made by the Workers' Party of Korea, the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the entire Korean people towards a peaceful democratic reunification of Korea, without any external interference.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea received great impetus from the top-level agreements concluded during Kim Il Sung's visit to Moscow in May 1984. The two countries' efforts to put those agreements into effect deepened their foreign-policy cooperation; exchanges of party delegations became more active, and so did delegation exchanges in the fields of culture, science, technical education, health-care, literature, the arts, the news media and information, communications, cinematography, sports, tourism, etc. Contacts were also expanded in trade, economic, scientific, and technological cooperation. A major contribution to further promoting bilateral relations

was made by the official friendly visit by Kim Yong Nam, Politbureau member, the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, Deputy Premier of the Administration Council and Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He was in the Soviet Union from April 16 to 23, 1985, and the results of his visit were summed up in a special communiqué. In the course of that visit, the two countries signed a treaty on their common frontier, and also a consular convention. The two sides discussed topical problems of the current world situation, and the talks showed a common understanding of all the problems discussed. The importance was stressed of joint efforts to counteract the United States' militaristic policy in the Asian-Pacific region and its knocking together a military and political bloc consisting of the United States, Japan, and South Korea, and also to offset the western countries' attempts to perpetuate the division of Korea by blocking the peace initiatives moved by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

On August 15, 1985, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea celebrated the 40th anniversary of its liberation from Japanese colonial domination. The celebration was a vivid manifestation of Soviet-Korean friendship and diverse cooperation. The festivities were attended by a Soviet party and government delegation, led by Geidar Aliev, a military delegation, a group of Soviet war veterans who had fought to liberate Korea, and also by representatives of Soviet public organisations, and Ministries and Departments that maintain close links with partners in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Soviet-Korean relations are quite active in the field of trade, economic, scientific, and technological cooperation. The Soviet Union is republic's Number One partner in trade, providing it with industrial equipment and scarce raw materials such as oil, petroleum products, and coke in exchange for magnesite clinkers, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, rolled stock, some types of engineering output, and consumer goods. In 1984, their bilateral trade grew by 21 per cent to reach 712.8 million rubles (Soviet exports totalled 347.2 million rubles, imports—365.6 million rubles). The estimated growth of bilateral trade for 1985 was to be about 20 per cent.

Over sixty major industrial facilities have been built or restored in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with Soviet material and technological assistance. Among them are the Suphung hydro-electric power station, a metallurgical works in Chongjin, a non-ferrous metals plant in Namp'o, a heat and power plant in Pyongyang, a thermal power station in Puckchang, and an oil-refinery in Unggi. At present, the Soviet Union is helping build 8 major projects in the republic: plants to produce bearings, aluminum, micro-electric motors, a heat and power plant in Chongjin, coal mines in Anju; moreover, the Kim Chak metallurgical works and the Puckchang thermal power station are being expanded.

After Kim Il Sung's visit to the Soviet Union, bilateral economic links started growing rapidly in both scale and variety. Preparations are in progress to build a nuclear power station, to prospect for oil and gas on land and offshore, and to build more industrial projects—all this with Soviet assistance.

SOVIET-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS

Consolidation of relations with the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist states is a priority foreign policy line pursued by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and its Communist Party. The nation regards the persistent implementation of this course as a major prerequisite for coping with the tasks facing Vietnam: to build the material and technical

basis of socialism and safeguard the republic's sovereignty and independence. Speaking at the 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1982, the General Secretary of the Party's Central Committee, Le Duan, said that "cohesion and comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union have been and remain the cornerstone of the foreign policy of our party and state... We regard this as a guarantee of our people's success in defending our country and in building socialism, and also in consolidating national independence and the positions of socialism in Indochina..."³

Soviet-Vietnamese relations entered an essentially new phase when the two countries concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (on November 3, 1978) and signed a long-term programme for economic, scientific, and technological cooperation (in 1983).

Ideologically and politically, Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation in all fields is based on the close unity of the two nations' communist parties, which rests on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism. The Soviet-Vietnamese Declaration of June 1985 states that the two sides "will tirelessly continue to strengthen the ties of close friendship and cohesion between the Soviet Communist Party and the Communist Party of Vietnam. Such is the principled and immutable course of the Soviet Communist Party and the Communist Party of Vietnam, and of the Soviet Union and Vietnam, reflecting the will and aspirations of the two nations."⁴

Trade and economic links are now a major component of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation. Economic, scientific, and technological links are steadily growing in scale and variety, spreading to more and more fields and branches. The Soviet Union provides Vietnam with technical assistance in building and modernising economic projects, assistance that grows by the year. In all, the USSR has helped Vietnam build, restore, or modernise more than 200 projects.

In the course of the Soviet-Vietnamese talks between party and governmental delegations in June 1985, the two sides pointed to the great potentialities for steady expansion of bilateral economic, scientific, and technological cooperation. It is now essential for that cooperation to be made more effective, for the entire complex of bilateral economic links to be further improved on the basis of long-term planning, specialised production to be promoted, and mutually beneficial special-purpose programme to be implemented.

Cultural and scientific links have been quite successful, too. A great number of Vietnamese people study at Soviet educational establishments; besides, there is a special intergovernmental agreement under which many Vietnamese people come to the USSR for job training, and some come here to work.

The Soviet Union and Vietnam are actively cooperating in the world arena. Close coordination of the two countries' foreign-policy efforts is effected through regular consultations at various levels. This coordination is based on the identity of positions of the two states as regards all major international issues. Vietnam has actively supported the Soviet constructive stand at the Geneva summit in November 1985. Consultations between the two countries' Foreign Ministries are now conducted on a regular basis, as are top-level talks. Coordination of the two nations' foreign policies was given fresh impetus when Mikhail Gorbachev met with Le Duan in June-July 1985. The Soviet-Vietnamese declaration that followed from the meeting stated that "the talks and conversations were conducted in a friendly and cordial atmosphere reflecting the fraternal cha-

³ *The Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam*, Moscow, 1983, pp. 96-97 (in Russian).

⁴ *Pravda*, June 30, 1985.

racter of Soviet-Vietnamese relations, and reaffirmed the complete unity of two sides' positions on all matters discussed."⁵

THE SOVIET UNION AND LAOS

The foreign policy of the Lao People's Democratic Republic and its attitude towards topical world problems are determined mainly by the nation's affiliation with the socialist community and also by its special position in the world arena. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, Prime Minister Kaysone Phomvihane, has described Laos as an outpost of socialism in Southeast Asia, situated at the forefront of confrontation between socialist and capitalist systems in the region. The Lao foreign policy, he said, is designed to provide external conditions of peace that would promote socialist construction.⁶

The main directions of the nation's foreign policy outlined in the Lao government's programme of action in 1975 were confirmed and developed at the 3rd Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party in April 1982. The Congress said that all-out consolidation of cohesion and expansion of cooperation with Vietnam, Kampuchea, the Soviet Union, and other socialist nations was a consistent and principled long-term policy of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party and government⁷. The nation's strong alliance with Vietnam and Kampuchea is of special significance for its position in the world arena, particularly for providing favourable conditions under which the basis of socialism might be built.

Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Laos shows dynamic development. The two nations' leaders meet regularly, and the top-level contacts are of fundamental significance for consolidation of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Communist Party, and the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, and between the two nations. In August 1985, Kaysone Phomvihane came to the USSR on a working visit of friendship. When he met with Mikhail Gorbachev, the two leaders noted the steady development and deepening of Soviet-Lao relations, centred on comradely collaboration between the Soviet Communist Party and the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, and expressed their intent to continue raising the level of coordination of the two countries' foreign-policy activities for the sake of peace and socialism.⁸

Soviet-Lao links in the economic field have been quite successful and are improving. A protocol on coordination of the two nations' economic plans for 1981-1985 was signed in Moscow in September 1980, this marking a new phase in Soviet-Lao cooperation.

In December 1980, the Lao People's Democratic Republic celebrated the 5th anniversary of its establishment. The festivities in Laos were attended by a Soviet party and government delegation, which also took part in the second meeting of the intergovernmental commission on economic, scientific, and technological cooperation. The commission discussed the promotion of bilateral trade and economic cooperation for 1981-1985, setting the basic guidelines for cooperation for the subsequent five years and the longer term. Agreements were signed on trade and payments for 1981-1985, and also on bilateral economic and technological cooperation during that period. The plan was to increase trade by about 250 per cent over the five years. The USSR provides Laos with machinery

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ See *World Marxist Review*, No. 9, 1981.

⁷ *The Third Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party*, Moscow, 1983, pp. 46-47 (in Russian).

⁸ *Pravda*, August 29, 1985.

and equipment, petroleum products and consumer goods, in exchange for light-industry output and agricultural produce.

Economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Laos is structured primarily to promote the public sector of the Lao economy. From 1976 to 1985, the USSR helped Laos with a number of important economic projects—road bridges across the rivers Nén and Ngým, a hospital, an oil reservoir, motor vehicle and farm-machinery repair stations, an Intersputnik satellite communications ground station, the first section for the Latseng state farm, and some others.

At present, the Soviet Union is helping Laos build Highway 9, a polytechnical school, a medium-wave broadcasting radio station, a 150-bed hospital, and two long bridges on highway 13. Besides, a building and a transport agency are being established with Soviet assistance.

The two countries' interaction in foreign policy is growing in depth. The Lao leadership consistently supports the foreign policy of the Soviet Communist Party and state, including the Soviet peace initiatives intended to prevent a nuclear war, to curb the arms race, and to safeguard and consolidate peace.

The Soviet-Lao statement that followed Kaysone Phomvihane's visit to the USSR in August 1985 stated that the Soviet Union and Laos were working steadily to make Asia a continent of peace, stability, goodneighbourliness, and cooperation, and came out in favour of pooling the efforts of Asian states in the search for mutually acceptable constructive decisions for settling existing problems through bilateral and multi-lateral consultations, and, in the future, of holding an all-Asia forum to examine the entire range of issues concerning the maintenance of security and equal cooperation of Asian states.

October 1981 saw another major event in the history of Soviet-Lao cooperation in the world arena. The Lao Foreign Minister, Phoune Sipaseuth, came to the USSR on a friendly visit and had talks with Andrei Gromyko. The talks featured complete unanimity of views on all the matters discussed.

More recently, the comprehensive links between the USSR and Laos were substantially strengthened when a delegation of the Soviet Parliament (the USSR Supreme Soviet), led by Vladimir Dolgikh, made an official visit of friendship to Laos in November 1984. The delegation also visited Vietnam and Kampuchea and, on its return, the results of the tour were discussed by the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. The Politbureau then pointed out that "the Soviet Communist Party and state will continue their consistent support for the peoples of the Indochina countries in their struggle for social progress, in defence of their national sovereignty, for peace and security in South-east Asia."⁹ The Soviet Union expresses whole-hearted solidarity with Laos in its demand for a complete withdrawal of Thai troops from the territory in Sayaboury province that they occupied in June 1984. Laos demands respect for its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

The tragedy of Kampuchea shocked the whole world. With Vietnam's support, people's Kampuchea got rid of the Pol Pot regime and is now reviving.

In accordance with the guidelines set by the 4th Congress of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea in May 1981, the republic favours promotion of relations with all states on the principles of peace-

⁹ *Pravda*, Nov. 30, 1984.

ful coexistence, and strengthening of solidarity with socialist and newly-free states and with national liberation movements.

The core of Kampuchea's foreign-policy course is promotion of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and other socialist states. The republic gives special attention to fraternal friendship and close cooperation with Vietnam and Laos. The basic guidelines for that cooperation were set by the Indochina nations' summit, held in Vientiane in February 1983. In accordance with the treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation signed by Vietnam and Kampuchea in February 1979, there are Vietnamese volunteer troops on Kampuchean territory providing internationalist assistance to the republic in defending its sovereignty and independence. As more and more Khmer counterrevolutionary bands that have been making raids into Kampuchea from Thai territory are destroyed, the Vietnamese volunteers are gradually being pulled out. The first troop pullout was in 1982.

February 1980 saw an event of great importance for Soviet-Kampuchean relations—the first official friendly visit by a Kampuchean top-level delegation to the Soviet Union. The talks in Moscow produced a number of documents providing a solid basis for bilateral cooperation in the economic, technological, cultural, scientific, and other fields. Bilateral relations were further promoted by the official visits of friendship paid to the USSR by a delegation of Kampuchea's National Assembly (in May 1982) and its Prime Minister (in July 1984), and also by the visit of a delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet to Kampuchea in November 1984 and by several meetings between the two countries' leaders.

The Soviet Union is helping Kampuchea build or restore a large number of industrial and agricultural facilities, power stations, ports, roads, irrigation canals, etc. By the start of 1984, Soviet economic and technical assistance to Kampuchea totalled 58 million rubles. In 1982, Soviet-Kampuchean economic cooperation was put on a long-term basis.

In February 1983, the two countries signed a trade agreement for 1983-1985, under which the Soviet Union's supplies of goods to Kampuchea exceeded seventy million rubles in 1984. Also in that year the two countries formed an intergovernmental commission on trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation. The commission met for the first time in January 1985, and it is doing much to promote bilateral cooperation.

Some 1,500 Kampucheans were studying in the Soviet Union in 1984. The two nations now have contacts in the fields of health care, education, science, culture, and sports, and public organisations exchange delegations and promote other links.

In his speech at the session to mark the Soviet Union's 60th Anniversary the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea and Chairman of the republic's State Council, Heng Samrin said, "The People's Revolutionary Party and the people of Kampuchea express their unfailing gratitude to the country of Lenin for the aid and support rendered to us, and pledge to do their utmost to consolidate Kampuchean-Soviet fraternal friendship further."¹⁰

The Soviet Union has shown profound understanding of the tragedy through which the Kampuchean people had to pull during the rule of the Pol Pot terrorists, so the USSR supports Kampuchea in its defence of independence and revolutionary gains against the Pol Pot gangs that found shelter in Thailand and are warring against people's Kampuchea, with aid coming from imperialist and reactionary forces. The Soviet Union maintains that confrontation between the ASEAN nations and the states of Indochina should be eliminated and that joint efforts should be made to make Southeast Asia a zone of peace and cooperation.

¹⁰ *Pravda*, Dec. 23, 1982.

The ASEAN states pursue a line that actually leads to confrontation with the Indochina nations, thus enabling various external forces to interfere in Southeast Asian affairs. Kampuchea and the other nations of Indochina find themselves under pressure exerted for the purpose of forcing them to agree to a settlement of the alleged "Kampuchean problem" on conditions that suit the ASEAN best. The countries of the ASEAN, particularly some of them and their "patrons", try to make the "Kampuchean problem" international. Year in, year out they impose discussions of the so-called "Kampuchean issue" on the United Nations' General Assembly and push through resolutions calling for what is termed "a political settlement of the conflict on the basis of a withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea". In July 1981, they even formally set up a so-called "International Conference on Kampuchea".

The ASEAN nations differ, however, on the issue of relations with Kampuchea. The differences currently taking shape in the ASEAN nations' regional policies are due, in part, to disagreement over the causes of instability in Southeast Asia. Time is on Kampuchea's side.

SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS

In its relations with China, the Soviet Union has been strictly following the course chartered by the 24th and 25th Congresses of the Soviet Communist Party and reaffirmed by its 26th Congress, steadily working to restore and promote links with that country on a goodneighbourly basis. The 26th Party Congress reiterated that the Soviet Union's proposals aimed at a normalisation of its relations with China remained in force, just as the Soviet people's feelings of respect and friendship towards the Chinese people remained unchanged.

The Soviet Union's principled and consistent course has been repeatedly expressed by the Soviet Communist Party leaders. Speaking in Tashkent back in March 1982, Leonid Brezhnev said, "We remember well the times when the Soviet Union and People's China were united by bonds of friendship and comradely cooperation. We have never considered the state of hostility and estrangement between our countries as normal. We are ready to negotiate, without any prior conditions, on measures acceptable to both sides to improve Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of mutual respect for each other's interests, non-interference in each other's affairs, and mutual benefit—and certainly not to the detriment of third countries." It was indicated that this applied to economic, scientific, and cultural links, as well as political relations, as the sides became ready for specific steps in any of those fields.¹¹ In answering questions from the Soviet daily *Pravda* in August 1983, Yuri Andropov said that certain positive trends had begun to take shape in Soviet-Chinese relations. "However", he went on to say, "the present level of bilateral relations is, we are convinced, far from what it should be between such major and, moreover, neighbouring powers as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China."¹² Yuri Andropov indicated that "much can be done in the area of further expanding trade, promoting economic, scientific, and technological cooperation, and in the field of cultural, athletic, and other links." Then he stressed that, "Placing the relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China on a healthier basis becomes especially important and topical under the conditions of the present aggravation of the international situation. We are certain that, objectively, the interests of the Soviet and the Chinese peoples do

¹¹ *Pravda*, March 25, 1982.

¹² *Pravda*, Aug. 27, 1983.

not diverge wherever it comes to eliminating the danger of war and consolidating peace."¹³

In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union also moved a number of proposals on resuming negotiations between the two countries and on taking practical measures to help restore links in various fields, but there were no positive changes in 1980 or in 1981. At that time, the Chinese leadership pursued a course unfriendly to the Soviet Union, and this produced a clearly negative effect on Soviet-Chinese relations. Peking then continued to follow a line towards a bloc with American imperialism, and called for building "a structure of joint resistance to the Soviet Union". A leading role in that "structure" was reserved for the United States, and apart from China it was to consist of the NATO countries, Japan, and any other states that could be dragged into it. Complete support was expressed for the new round of the arms race started by the United States' ruling quarters, and approval was given to NATO's decision to deploy American first-strike nuclear missiles in Western Europe. The idea of Chinese-American "strategic coordination" featured during Defense Secretary Brown's visit to China in January 1980. On January 20, 1980 China unilaterally suspended the inter-state relations talks with the Soviet Union which had begun in 1979. On April 11, 1980, owing to a previous decision taken by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance became invalid. That treaty, concluded back in 1950, had for many years provided the basis for Soviet-Chinese relations.

In practical cooperation, bilateral links of the early 1980s were few, too. Under the protocol on trade and payments for 1981, trade totaled about 170 million rubles, a major set-back from the 1980 volume exceeding 300 million.

Certain positive changes in Soviet-Chinese relations were first noted in 1982. This was undoubtedly due to the growing awareness, even among the Chinese leadership, that the state of hostility and estrangement in the relations between the two neighbouring socialist countries was strikingly anomalous. Besides, it was becoming increasingly evident that the one-sided stake on partnership with the United States and other western powers was irrational from the viewpoint of China's own interests, since China actually found itself in the position of a "junior partner" of imperialism.

In outlining China's foreign-policy course, the 12th Congress of the Communist Party of China stressed its "independence and self-sufficiency" and said it was necessary to "struggle against imperialism, hegemonism, and colonialism", "in defence of world peace". It was also indicated that the People's Republic of China was ready to promote relations with any countries on the principles of peaceful coexistence. So, even though the basic orientations of China's foreign-policy course remained the same, including a trend towards political cooperation with western powers, there was a certain shift of emphasis: formerly, Peking had openly emphasised one-sided political cooperation with the United States and other western powers, and hostility towards the USSR; now it proclaimed the course of opposing two "super-powers". The slogan of a "united front of struggle against hegemonism", which was spearheaded against the Soviet Union, is going out of use.

Starting in 1982, Soviet-Chinese links and contacts in various fields gradually began to be restored, a development that the Soviet side had repeatedly called for ever many years.

October 1982 saw the start of Soviet-Chinese political consultations, conducted by special representatives of the two governments—the Soviet

¹³ *Ibidem.*

Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Ilyichov and the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Qian Quchen. The consultations are held in Moscow and Peking in turn. Seven rounds have now been held, during which the two sides have been exchanging views on matters of normalisation of relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. In view of differences on important international problems and of different approaches to relations with some countries, so far the consultations have not yielded major positive results.

The lack of success is mainly due to what are termed "the three obstacles", the three prior conditions set by the Chinese side: the USSR should stop supporting Vietnam and impel that country to pull its troops out of Kampuchea; it should also withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and reduce its troops in the Far East, as well as remove Soviet military units from Mongolia. The Soviet side has expressed its readiness to discuss confidence-building measures along the border, but rejects the demands that go beyond the sphere of bilateral relations and/or concerning third countries. The USSR favours improvement of relations with China, but this should not be to the detriment of its friends, nor at the expense of third countries. The Chinese side alleged that normalisation of relations must begin with removal of the "obstacles" and declined the Soviet proposals on concluding a treaty of non-aggression and non-use of force and a convention on the principles of mutual relations.

The two sides' coordinated reports on the results of particular rounds of consultations¹⁴ show, however, their interest in pursuing efforts aimed at improving relations and a readiness to expand links and contacts in the political, economic, trade, scientific, technological, and other fields. In this connection, they consider the consultations and dialogue useful and intend to continue them.

Since 1983, the Soviet and Chinese Foreign Ministries have been conducting annual consultations on international matters between Deputy Foreign Ministers, in Moscow and Peking in turn, exchanging information.¹⁵

In September 1984, the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and the Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian met twice; in September 1985 in New York a conversation took place between Eduard Shevardnadze and the Chinese Foreign Minister. The two sides spoke in favour of pursuing the political dialogue between the Soviet Union and China at various levels.¹⁶

In December 1984, the First Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR, Ivan Arkhipov, visited the People's Republic of China, and in July 1985, the Deputy Premier of China's State Council, Yao Yilin, paid a return visit to the Soviet Union. This exchange of visits was of major importance for bilateral relations, especially for promoting trade, economic, scientific, and technological links.¹⁷

Indeed, it is due to both sides' efforts that bilateral trade has grown markedly since 1982, its volume rising from 170 million rubles in 1981 to 1.6 billion rubles in 1985. In the field of scientific and technological cooperation, the two countries have started exchanging groups of specialists, who familiarise themselves with the subjects agreed upon.

The talks conducted by Ivan Arkhipov and Yao Yilin in the Soviet Union and China made possible major steps towards the long-term planning of bilateral trade, economic, scientific, and technological coopera-

¹⁴ *Pravda*, April 23, 1985, Oct. 21, 1985.

¹⁵ *Pravda*, Sept. 16, 1983, July 1, 3, 5, 1984.

¹⁶ *Pravda*, Sept. 23, 1984.

¹⁷ *Pravda*, Dec. 21-24, 29, 1984; July 9-12, 1985.

tion, and also providing a legal foundation for these types of cooperation.

In the course of Ivan Arkhipov's visit to Peking, three agreements were signed. One was between the Soviet and Chinese governments on economic and technical cooperation. The second was on scientific and technological cooperation, and the third was on the establishment of a Soviet-Chinese commission on economic, trade, scientific, and technological cooperation.

The two sides also gave favourable consideration to matters involved in signing a cultural cooperation plan, broadening the areas of scientific and technological exchanges, and promoting exchanges of college students and persons sent for advanced studies, as well as certain other fields of inter-state relations.¹⁸

In July 1985, the Deputy Premier of the Chinese State Council, Yao Yilin, made an official visit to the USSR, at the invitation of the Soviet Government. At the end of their talks in Moscow on July 10, Ivan Arkhipov and Yao Yilin signed agreements on trade and payments for 1986-1990 and on economic and technical cooperation in the construction and modernisation of industrial facilities in China. Under the trade agreement, Soviet-Chinese trade is to continue growing over the next five years to reach a total of 12 billion rubles, while the figure for 1990 is fixed at 3 billion rubles, almost double the 1985 figure. Under the cooperation agreement, seven new projects are to be built in China and 17 are to be rebuilt with Soviet participation and assistance.¹⁹

Another important development in Soviet-Chinese relations was the establishment of contacts between the two countries' supreme legislatures—the National People's Congress of China and the USSR Supreme Soviet. In March 1985, a delegation of the National People's Congress led by a member of its Standing Committee Zhang Chenxian, made an official visit to the USSR at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The delegation familiarised itself with the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet and its standing commissions. The delegates were provided with information about the Supreme Soviet's relations with local Soviets and about ways to supervise the activities of people's deputies.²⁰

In October 1985 a delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet headed by Chairman of the Soviet of the Union, USSR Supreme Soviet, paid a return visit to China. During the meetings and conversations with Chinese MPs, including Peng Chen, member of the CC CPC Political Bureau, Chairman of the Standing Committee, China's National People's Congress, mutual satisfaction was expressed with the positive changes in Soviet-Chinese relations, the development of contacts between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the National People's Congress, and mutual desire was expressed to build parliamentary ties on a regular basis.²¹

The USSR and China have identical stands on some international issues (the need to prevent militarisation of space and to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, and a settlement in Namibia). The Chinese side displays no readiness, however, to cooperate with the USSR and other socialist nations in efforts to prevent a nuclear holocaust, to promote reductions of weapons, above all nuclear weapons, to restore detente and consolidate peace. China's appraisals of the causes of international tension and of the situation in and around Kampuchea and Afghanistan differ from those given by the other socialist countries. During his visit to the United States in July 1985, Chairman Li Xiannian said that China would not permit its relations with other countries "to be determined by

¹⁸ *Pravda*, Dec. 30, 1984.

¹⁹ *Pravda*, July 11, 1985.

²⁰ *Pravda*, March 12, 1985.

²¹ *Pravda*, Oct. 12, 1985.

likeness or difference of social systems or ideologies". Earlier in London, a statement to the same effect was made by the Premier of the Chinese State Council, Zhao Ziyang.

The Chinese leadership is putting certain limits on the development of Soviet-Chinese relations, too. China, they maintain, "will not come back to the big family", "will not return to the relations of the 1950s". Chairman Li Xiannian said in the United States that, even if "the three obstacles" were overcome and relations with the USSR improved, they "would not return to the alliance of the 1950s".²²

As for the Soviet Union, it has been making efforts, and will continue to do so, to bring Soviet-Chinese relations back on to the path of good-neighbourliness. The continuity of the Soviet Communist Party's course with regard to China was stressed at the Plenums of the Party's Central Committee in March and April 1985 and in a number of speeches delivered by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In his speech in Dnepropetrovsk on June 26, 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev said, "I have already had an opportunity to speak about relations with the People's Republic of China. I believe time has shown both sides that dissociation and, moreover, unfriendliness and suspiciousness benefit neither of them, and goodneighbourly cooperation is quite possible and advisable. We, for our part, are determined to work actively to completely overcome the negative stretch in Soviet-Chinese relations, which engendered a great deal of artificial difficulties. I am certain that, in the end, this is how it will be."²³

The general aggravation of the world situation, brought about by the imperialist forces' attempts to upset the parity of strength existing between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, the arms buildup and extensive war preparations may, in the future, make the Asian-Pacific region a zone of extreme tension. It is up to all states of the region to prevent such a development, and this would be greatly helped by implementation of Mikhail Gorbachev's initiative of May 21, 1985. Mikhail Gorbachev said it was necessary to show a comprehensive approach to the problem of Asian security and, in the future, to hold an all-Asia forum to exchange views and search jointly for constructive solutions. The peace and security proposals moved by Mongolia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Indochina nations, and India could be of great help, too. Promotion of the Soviet Union's relations with the socialist countries and other states of the region will help unite Asian nations' efforts to this end.

²² *Renmin ribao*, July 27, 1985.

²³ *Pravda*, June 27, 1985.

NONALIGNED MOVEMENT--A MAJOR FACTOR IN WORLD POLITICS

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 86 pp 64-80

[Article by Professor I. I. Kovalenko]

The emergence of the nonaligned movement was a major consequence of the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism. Against the favourable background of the postwar weakening of the positions of imperialism, the growing prestige of world socialism and the successes of the national liberation struggle, the movement increasingly gathered momentum and became a powerful factor in world politics. Over the two decades since the first meeting of the nonaligned countries in 1961, the ranks of the movement have grown fivefold and now it comprises more than 100 countries. A new progressive factor has emerged in international relations which has been exerting a positive influence on every aspect of world politics.

The nonaligned movement arose as a manifestation of the will and striving of young states for consolidating their political and economic independence and gaining the opportunity to take part, on an equal footing, in the solution of international issues.

Having emerged on the ruins of the imperialist colonial system, the nonaligned movement became, as it were, the continuation of the peoples' national liberation struggle under new, changed circumstances in which imperialism was no longer able to dominate using the old colonialist methods and to keep them within the sphere of its political and economic influence by outright gross military force. The nonaligned movement was a form for young nation states to express themselves politically and an instrument for bolstering their national, political and economic independence. It has become a powerful weapon in the struggle for consolidating their independence, for joining the world community of nations and active participation in the solution of global problems.

The Soviet Union welcomed the emergence of the movement from the very outset and from its formation into organisation. Today, too, the socialist community regards the nonaligned movement as a powerful factor in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, against the forces of war and aggression. The socialist states are at one with the decisions adopted at various forums of the movement, inasmuch as these decisions are aimed at promoting universal peace and international security, curbing the nuclear arms race, and attaining general and complete disarmament.

By contrast, the forces of imperialism and reaction view the nonaligned movement as a formidable obstacle on the path towards establishing their world hegemony. They seek, in every possible way, to undermine and weaken the movement, resorting to the most villainous and inhuman means.

Just like every socio-political movement, the nonaligned movement was predetermined by the preceding course of history, a series of major

developments of world significance, and primarily, by the Great October Socialist Revolution which ushered in a new era in the evolution of humankind. It was precisely the October Revolution that delivered a smashing blow at imperialism and paved the way towards the national and social emancipation of the oppressed peoples. Lenin predicted that the revolutionary experience in a country such as Russia "...will show them [the peoples of the East] that, weak as they may be, and invincible as may seem the power of the European oppressors, who in the struggle employ all the marvels of technology and of the military art—nevertheless, a revolutionary war waged by oppressed peoples, if it really succeeds in arousing the millions of working and exploited people, harbours such potentialities, such miracles, that the emancipation of the peoples of the East is now practicable."¹

The triumph of the October Revolution resulted in the combination of socialist and national liberation revolutions, and opened up for the oppressed peoples the prospect of national liberation and the creation of independent and equal states on the ruins of colonial empires.

The formation of the world socialist community was another event which exerted a tremendous ideological and political influence on the progress of the world today. The elimination of the shock forces of world reaction—Hitler's Germany and imperialist Japan—brought about a radical change in the alignment of forces on the world scene. A number of states in East Europe and Asia, in which people's democratic revolutions triumphed, broke away from the world capitalist system. A world socialist system has come into being and begun exerting a decisive influence on the course of world developments. It gave a powerful impetus to the further growth of the national liberation movement. It was the formation of the world socialist system that blocked the imperialist powers' colonial brigandage and forced them to reckon with the demands of colonial and dependent nations fighting for freedom and independence.

The disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism was the third, no less significant factor, which was closely connected with the first two. The great national liberation movement of colonial and dependent countries led to a radical change in the alignment of forces on the world scene in favour of peace, democracy and social progress. Dozens of countries, which imperialists previously kept out of world politics, became active participants in it. Suffice it to say that about 75 per cent of seats in the UN and its specialised agencies are held today by Asian, African and Latin American countries. As Lenin foresaw it, a new period of world history set in, "a period in which all the Eastern peoples will participate in deciding the destiny of the whole world".²

The imperialists, however, could not reconcile themselves with the loss of their colonial possessions and withdraw peacefully. They have been doing their utmost to preserve the old order in their former colonies and to seize new positions there. Under the cover of struggle against the "communist menace", imperialist powers are seeking to make a comeback in the newly-free countries as "guardians" of their sovereignty and to place their puppets in power there.

With these aims in view they began forging aggressive military blocs and bilateral military alliances: the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), or the "Manila Pact"; the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), the former "Baghdad Pact"; the Asian Pacific Council (ASPAC); the Organisation of American States (OAS); and the ANZUS grouping in the Pacific. Gamal Abdel Nasser gave a highly eloquent assessment to the imperialist blocs. Coming out against the "Baghdad

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, pp. 153-154.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 30, p. 160.

Pact" he stated: "Arabs are reluctant to have anything in common with the big prison built by imperialist powers in conformity with their goals. At first, this imperialist prison took the form of the domination of the imperialist powers themselves; then the imperialist prison acquired a new form of treaties and alliances. The 'Baghdad Pact' is the latest form of imperialist prison. Arabs realised that the new pact was a big prison, and it is only natural that they did not want to enter it voluntarily."³

US imperialism assumed the function of world policeman. During the postwar years Washington openly interfered in the internal affairs of sovereign states and made use of its armed forces more than 215 times. For three years, under the UN flag, American imperialism waged a bloody war against the Korean people in the bid to rout the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and establish a puppet regime there that would bend to Washington's will. The USA waged a long and cruel war against the heroic Vietnamese people, and committed numerous acts of armed aggression against revolutionary Cuba. It has been waging an undeclared war against Nicaragua and El Salvador. Washington has committed an overt aggression against Grenada and restored the colonial order there. More than once, US aggressors have struck with their fist against the patriots of Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, Chile, and Guatemala, and rendered substantial aid to Britain in capturing the Falkland Islands belonging to Argentina. These facts show that US imperialism does not intend to abandon its schemes for establishing its domination over many newly-free countries and peoples, and is ready to go to any extremes to block the road to freedom and independence for the peoples who are still languishing under the colonial yoke.

In order to repulse the onslaught of imperialism, to preserve and consolidate the freedom and independence they have won, the newly-free countries began looking for new forms of resistance to imperialism, to colonialism and neocolonialism. The young nation states were well aware that they could not withstand imperialists' military and political blackmail on their own and tried to find collective forms of rebuffing the imperialist encroachments and neocolonial aspirations of Western powers.

Back at the stage of the struggle for independence, representatives of colonial and dependent countries proposed various forms of coordinating their efforts on the world scene. For example, in 1945, President Ho Chi Minh of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, an outstanding leader of the international communist and national liberation movement, proposed to the government of Indonesia to adopt a joint declaration on united efforts in the struggle against colonialism. General Aung San, the founder of the Burmese state and prominent leader of the national liberation movement in Burma, favoured the creation of a single Asian front to oppose imperialist domination. In January 1947, he set forth the idea of creating an Asian community aimed at protecting young nation states' independence. He also favoured the formation of an economic alliance of countries of Southeast Asia.

Jawaharlal Nehru, the great son of the Indian people, made an immense contribution to the solidarity of Asian states. On his initiative, the 1st Asian Conference was held in Delhi in March-April 1947.⁴ It was attended by representatives of 27 Asian countries, among them public figures from the Soviet Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, observers from other states, including the Soviet Union and the USA,

³ *Pravda*, Sept. 29, 1956.

⁴ See *Asian Relations Report of the Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference*, Delhi, 1949, p. 8.

and from some international organisations (the United Nations, the Arab League).

The Conference participants made an attempt to draw the principles for uniting Asian states in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism, and to map out ways towards ensuring security by collective efforts. For example, the delegate of Malaya proposed to conduct cooperation between Asian peoples on the organised basis by setting up a neutral bloc of Asian states. The proposal provided for rendering assistance to the peoples struggling for their national liberation. It contained an appeal to prevent the forces of imperialism from using the economic resources of Asian countries for military purposes, and to eliminate military bases on their territories. The Indonesian delegate stressed that peace in Asia could not be separated from universal peace. Asian cooperation, he went on, should be directed towards reducing and finally eliminating conflicts by cutting short the activities of the reactionary imperialist powers in Asia, rather than towards expanding the sphere of conflicts.⁵

At the Conference the idea was put forward of setting up an organisation on Asian relations which would play the part of a secretariat with broad executive functions. Branches of the secretariat were opened in Burma, Ceylon, Malaya and Nepal. However, due to the effort by Guomindang China which opposed the convocation of the conference in Delhi and worked for the 2nd conference to be held in Nankin, the Organisation on Asian Relations set up at the Delhi Conference, as well as its national branches, did not develop on a broad scale.

The colonial powers which feared that Asian countries' joint efforts might turn into a real force capable of opposing Western interests in Asia also blocked the organisational establishment of Asian unity and solidarity.

A conference of Asian states at the foreign ministers' level was held in New Delhi in January 1949 in connection with the intensified aggression unleashed by the Netherlands against the Republic of Indonesia. It stated the need for the UN Security Council to take the necessary steps to halt the Dutch aggression and implement effective measures to make the Netherlands carry out its recommendations, should it fail to do so. The conference raised the question of setting up a permanent regional organisation of Asian countries to protect their security. In his opening speech Jawaharlal Nehru said that it would be only natural for the free countries of Asia to start thinking of an organisation more permanent than the conference in question, for effective mutual consultations and for joint efforts in attaining common goals.⁶

One resolution adopted by that conference pointed out that the participating countries should consult each other in order to study ways and means of setting up the respective regions' corresponding mechanism, to expand consultations and cooperation within the framework of the United Nations.⁷ The adoption of that resolution marked the creation of the Afro-Asian group, an organisational form of the young states' anti-imperialist and anti-colonial unity in the UN.

In connection with the quest for organisational forms of solidarity of the young states the problem loomed large of elaborating the basic principles of struggle for peaceful cooperation on the continent, and for the building of a new Asia free from imperialist domination and the oppression by foreign capital. Those should have been such principles and norms of relationships on which the newly-free countries could rely in

⁵ See *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁶ *The Conference on Indonesia (1949)*, Delhi, 1949, pp. 21-22.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

forming peaceful and sound contacts between the peoples of the continent and on a global scale.

The five principles of peaceful coexistence (*pancha shila*) were proclaimed by the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China in April 1954. The preamble of the agreement on trade and contacts between the Tibetan region of China and India contains these principles. They are:

- mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty;
- mutual non-aggression;
- non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
- equality and mutual benefit;
- peaceful coexistence.

These principles mirrored Lenin's idea of peaceful coexistence and co-operation between countries belonging to different socio-economic systems. The 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956) declared that "under the present conditions these principles are the best formula of relations between states with different social systems and they could be a basis for stable peaceful relations between countries throughout the world".⁸

Gradually the *pancha shila* principles became part and parcel of the everyday practice in international relations. The historic Bandung Conference (April 1955) expanded and developed them into a regular system representing a political and legal foundation for mutual relations between states with different social systems not only in Asia and Africa, but throughout the world. The declaration on promoting universal peace and cooperation adopted at the Conference reaffirmed the well-known provisions of the UN Charter that all countries should display tolerance, live in peace with each other as good neighbours and develop friendly cooperation. The following principles were set forth as the basis for that:

1. respect for the basic human rights, and also for the aims and principles of the UN Charter;
2. respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries;
3. recognition of the equal rights of all races and nations, big and small;
4. refraining from intervention and interference in the internal affairs of other countries;
5. respect for the right of each country to individual and collective defence in accordance with the UN Charter;
6. (a) refraining from using agreements on collective defence in the private interests of one of the great powers;
(b) no country must bring pressure to bear on other countries;
7. refraining from acts or threat of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country;
8. the settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the parties' choice and in conformity with the UN Charter;
9. promotion of mutual interests and cooperation;
10. respect for justice and international obligations.⁹

The extension and concretisation of the *pancha shila* principles and their being made into ten principles at the Bandung Conference promoted the codification of the legal basis of the peaceloving foreign policy pursued by the newly-free countries. This also promoted their unification on an anti-imperialist and anti-colonial basis.

The Bandung Conference was an instrument for protecting the rights of Afro-Asian peoples, and an important tool in their struggle against

⁸ *The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Moscow, 1956, p. 412 (in Russian).

⁹ See *Pravda*, April 25, 1955.

imperialist oppression, and for free and independent development. It contributed to the Asian, African and Latin American peoples' emergence onto the international scene as a well-organised force in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism. It is not fortuitous that every time the imperialist powers committed acts of aggression the world democratic public proposed convening a regular session of the Bandung Conference.

The specific feature inherent in international cooperation of Afro-Asian states consists in the fact that they never sought to create their own bloc which, in their opinion, could only aggravate international tension and whip up the cold war. Afro-Asian leaders sought to unite independent countries on the broad basis of struggle against imperialism and colonialism, for consolidating political and achieving complete economic independence, for creating favourable conditions for their development along the road of peace, democracy and social progress.

The movement of Afro-Asian peoples in the Bandung spirit did not develop further due to the obstructionist policy of the then PRC leadership pursued during the preparations for the second intergovernmental conference of Asian and African countries (the Second Bandung) which was to be held in Algeria. The Chinese delegation worked to expel the USSR from the general anti-imperialist front and push through a nationalistic concept on the specific "community of the historical destinies" of the peoples of Asia and Africa with China. Peking's actions were resolutely rebuffed by the overwhelming majority of Afro-Asian countries, and its attempts to expel the USSR from the Afro-Asian movement ended in failure. However, the PRC which began to openly oppose the convening of the Second Bandung succeeded in frustrating the conference. That greatly damaged the spirit of Bandung and the interests of the national liberation movement of Asian and African peoples. Nevertheless, the ideals and principles of defending the freedom and independence of Afro-Asian peoples, which were elaborated collectively, proved to be viable.

For example, some countries declared their nonalignment with blocs. The nonalignment doctrine was formed in the complex conditions of the cold war when NATO was set up, followed as a counterbalance to it by the countries of the socialist community which created their own defensive grouping, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. But, unlike the imperialist powers, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries never had, nor do they have now any military-political blocs in Asia, Africa, or Latin America. Consequently, when the newly-free countries faced the problem of acceding to the existing blocs or not it was only the matter of the imperialist blocs. That is why, from the very beginning, nonalignment signified nonalignment with the imperialist blocs.

This warrants the conclusion that the newly-free countries' refusal to accede to the imperialist blocs meant their departure in foreign policy from global anti-Sovietism and anti-communism, and from the bloc policy of the imperialist states.

Chronologically, India was the first nonaligned country, and Jawaharlal Nehru, its leader, was the first to formulate the essence of the nonalignment doctrine. Addressing in December 1947 the Constituent Assembly and expounding independent India's foreign policy Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru stated that the essence of foreign policy at the time was reduced to the general question: what grouping do you belong to? This was an extreme simplification of the matter. India, he added, was striving not to be tied up in its foreign policy activity and therefore it did not accede to any bloc.

Having analysed the situation, Nehru arrived at the conclusion that the young nation states could consolidate their freedom and independence if they take an independent stand in the world, i. e., would not accede to imperialist blocs and would not follow the foreign policy course pursued

by their former mother countries, a course which was openly anti-Soviet and anti-Communist in essence.

As Nehru saw it, nonalignment in no way meant that the nonaligned countries should keep "equidistant" from the opposing military political camps. According to him, it meant nonalignment with blocs in the sense of nonalignment with the bloc policy which ran counter to the interests of the newly-free countries. As Indira Gandhi later put it, "It is untenable to interpret nonalignment" only as a passive policy of "equidistance from the superpowers". She stressed: "On the contrary, nonalignment is something very positive. It means taking every chance to improve the outlook of peace and to adopt a clear stand on matters on which we have strong convictions. Take racialism and colonialism. Did not the so-called democratic West take obstructive positions on decolonisation and apartheid? Even now, looking at the support given to South Africa and Israel, its record does not shine. The Soviet Union's consistent stand on such matters has brought us closer together."¹⁰

In nonalignment, Jawaharlal Nehru saw an efficient means at the disposal of the newly-free countries to allow them to pursue an independent foreign policy. Such a policy enabled the nonaligned countries to opt freely for their positions as regards key international issues. This option, however, was made with due account of the fact that the interests of the struggle for independence, peace and progress objectively brought the newly-free countries closer to world socialism which worked to attain the same goals. On the other hand, the foreign policy aims of the young nation states were at loggerheads with the interests of the imperialist powers which tried to put the fetters of new colonial dependence on the newly-free countries instead of old colonialism.

Speaking in the Indian Parliament, Jawaharlal Nehru condemned the SEATO bloc, set up in 1954, and warned Western countries that they were pushing the world in the wrong direction. India's mere participation in the Manila Conference, Nehru believed, would mean that it was abandoning its basic policy of nonalignment.¹¹

Nehru did not confine himself to his own country. Moreover, he actively influenced international processes, working for the unification of all newly-free countries and consolidating their efforts in the struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism. He was seeking to ensure peace, disarmament, and avert war on the basis of unity and solidarity with all progressive world forces and movements. In his *Autobiography* he wrote that it was becoming increasingly clear that the struggle for freedom was a common struggle against a common enemy—imperialism—and it was desirable, for this purpose, jointly to elaborate a programme of action and take joint action as much as possible.¹²

It is to Jawaharlal Nehru's credit that, in elaborating the nonalignment doctrine, he took care not only of the interests of India, but also of those of the whole newly-free world. In setting out the nonalignment concept, Nehru regarded it as a means for the cohesion of the newly-free countries and creation of a united front of struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism.

One should bear in mind in this connection that in foreign and sometimes even in Soviet writings neutrality and nonalignment are often placed on the same footing. Such an approach has no scientific substantiation. Neutrality is a passive, rather than active attitude to international developments, while nonalignment is an active and militant political factor influencing the course of world politics. Indian Prime Minister

¹⁰ *New Times*, 1983, No. 9, p. 7.

¹¹ See J. Nehru, *Indian Foreign Policy*, Delhi, 1961, p. 85.

¹² *Jawaharlal Nehru—His Life and Activities*, Moscow, 1965, p. 12 (in Russian).

1. Gandhi emphasised that the nonalignment principle was not a declaration of indifference stemming from neutrality, but the expression of independent reasoning.¹³

To attach a more efficient nature to their policy of neutrality, some neutral countries started calling their foreign policy "positive" or "active" neutrality. However, these attempts to invigorate the concept of neutralism and make it more militant also could no longer satisfy the demands and requirements of the developing countries. Their foreign policies began to be transformed into a policy of active confrontation with the system of imperialist blocs, into a policy of active struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, and for consolidating peace and international security.

For some reasons, the young sovereign states were not able to win political freedom and economic independence simultaneously. The overwhelming majority of them remained within the orbit of the capitalist economy. This fact aggravated even more the contradictions between young states and capitalist powers.

The solution of the problems of newly-free countries' economic rehabilitation demanded close interaction between their foreign policy course and domestic economic policies. To successfully solve their socio-economic problems, the emergent countries needed a fresh approach to the solution of international problems, and a new foreign policy orientation.

In the majority of the developing countries, the national bourgeoisie, the progressive intelligentsia and the patriotically-minded section of the militarymen were most active social groups. In many countries, the liberation struggle was headed by national-bourgeois circles with a vested interest in eliminating the domination of foreign capital and the economy's colonial structure. They sought to replace the domination of Western monopolies by their own. With this aim in view, the national bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeois elements needed not only socio-economic reforms inside the country, but also had a vested interest in a new foreign-policy line.

Being dependent on foreign capital, the national-patriotic forces in a number of newly-free countries were afraid of being drawn into the struggle between the world's socialist system and the capitalist countries. They were looking for a middle road in their foreign policies. Since the former mother countries tried to keep the young states within the sphere of their domination, the latter sought cooperation and assistance of the socialist states. This forced Western powers to make concessions and to look for new, more camouflaged forms of exploiting the emergent countries.

The existence of the world socialist community was, as it were, a guarantor of the newly-free states' political independence enabling them to oppose imperialist powers' attempts to make a comeback to their former colonies under the banner of protecting them from the "communist menace". Addressing the 25th Congress of the CPSU, Fidel Castro stressed forcefully: "Had it not been for the Soviet Union, in conditions of a shortage of raw material resources and of an energy crisis the capitalist powers would have unhesitatingly launched a partition of the world. Had it not been for the Soviet Union, it would have been impossible even to conceive of the measure of independence now enjoyed by small states, the successful struggle of the peoples for the return of their natural riches under their control."¹⁴

¹³ See *Pravda*, Nov. 27, 1973.

¹⁴ *Our Friends Speak. Greetings to the 25th CPSU Congress*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1976, p. 34.

Although the extra-block doctrine and the nonaligned policy met primarily the interests of the ruling classes, it was spearheaded against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism and aimed at defending national interests and supporting peace. Therefore it met with a positive response among broad sections of the population in the newly-free countries and won vigorous support from the world progressive public.

The active part played by the nonaligned movement and its influence on world politics did not manifest themselves immediately. First, the movement's positive significance was expressed in weak but independent opposition to colonialists' intrigues in the UN and in the establishment, in spite of the pressure brought to bear by imperialist powers, of contacts with the socialist countries, and then in a more consistent rebuff to the policy of aggression and colonial enslavement.¹⁵

The universal character of the nonaligned movement's principles and goals which were formulated by Jawaharlal Nehru consisted in the fact that they began to win the support of an increasing number of developing countries in Asia and Africa, and then in Latin America.

Some other prominent leaders of Asian, African and Latin American states shared Jawaharlal Nehru's views, and together with him made great efforts to unite the emergent countries on the basis of nonalignment. They also contributed to the nonaligned movement. Among them were Ho Chi Minh, Pham Van Dong, Josip Broz Tito, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ahmed Sukarno, Kwame Nkrumah, Solomon Bandaranaike, Osvaldo Dorticos, Makarios, U Nu, Modiba Keita and other outstanding leaders of the national liberation movement. Later on, Indira and Rajiv Gandhi, Fidel Castro, Le Duan, Kim Il Sung, Mengistu Haile Mariam, Houari Boumediene, Sekou Toure, and many other well-known leaders from Asian, African and Latin American countries came to play an active part in the nonaligned movement.

Josip Broz Tito paid much attention to the nonaligned movement and its doctrine. Like Jawaharlal Nehru and some other leaders of the newly-free countries, he maintained that the nonaligned movement should not be confined to a narrow group of states. It would become an influential force in the modern world, Tito believed, provided as many countries as possible, which adhere to its principles and pursue its aims, join the movement. "It was necessary to work to ensure our joint efforts in order to defend the fundamental rights more successfully and to influence international events," Tito recollected. "Despite all differences, Nehru, Nasser and I, and later Sukarno, Nkrumah and others thought along the same lines and had one and the same goal; we took speedy steps aimed at setting up the nonaligned movement."¹⁶

In a bid to expand the nonaligned movement, Tito visited various countries of Asia and Africa to discuss the convocation of an enlarged conference of heads of state or government.

A preparatory meeting of representatives of Asian, African, European and Latin American countries took place in Cairo in June 1961 on the initiative of Nehru, Nasser, Tito, Sukarno and Nkrumah. Its aim was to prepare a conference of heads of state or government of the nonaligned countries, which was convened in Belgrade early in September 1961 in conformity with the recommendations of the Cairo meeting. The conference laid the foundations for the further development of the movement, and started a new important chapter in the history of international relations. The 6th Conference of the Nonaligned States (Havana, 1979) called for marking the 20th anniversary of the 1st Conference as an "historic anniversary of the movement's emergence". The foreign

¹⁵ See *History of Diplomacy*, Moscow, 1974, p. 362 (in Russian).

¹⁶ *International Affairs*, Belgrade, Nos. 704-705, Aug. 20, 1979, p. 15.

ministers' meeting at which preparations for a conference of heads of state or government of the nonaligned countries (New Delhi, 1981) were made, declared September 1, the opening day of the Belgrade Conference, Nonalignment Day, and recommended to observe it annually.

The historic significance of the 1st Conference also consists in that the preparatory meeting in Cairo elaborated the criteria for the countries willing to take part in the movement. These are as follows:

- a country should pursue an independent policy based on the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different political and social systems, and a policy of nonalignment or display an inclination towards pursuing such a policy;

- consistently support national liberation movements;

- refrain from joining multilateral military alliances concluded within the context of confrontation between the great powers;

- if a state has a bilateral military agreement with one of the great powers or is member of a regional defensive alliance, such an agreement or alliance should not be concluded exclusively within the context of confrontation between the great powers;

- if a country agreed that a foreign military base be set up on its territory, such a concession should not be granted within the context of confrontation between the great powers.

These criteria for participation in the nonaligned movement have remained practically unchanged up until this day. Their strict nature resulted in the fact that many countries which took part in the Bandung Conference were not admitted to the 1st Conference of the Heads of State or Government, and this lent a graphic anti-imperialist thrust to the movement from the very beginning.

Later on, countries with conservative regimes, succumbing to pressure from the West, sought more than once to "liberalise" or, to be more precise, to erode these criteria so as to thrust the door open for any country willing to join the movement. This would have provided access to the movement even to those countries which have direct links with imperialist blocs or have US and other Western countries' military bases on their territories.

On the whole, the above criteria are rather flexible. Nevertheless, they ensure the movement's internal cohesion, definite political homogeneity, which creates sufficiently solid foundations for the struggle to attain the goals and follow the principles of the movement.

It should be admitted, however, that despite these criteria, the movement was joined by some states which do not share completely its objectives and principles. This resulted in a certain polarisation among the movement's participants: alongside the progressive anti-imperialist nucleus there is also a consolidating antipode, i. e., a group of countries refraining from vigorous action against imperialism and neocolonialism. It is trying to impose opportunist catchwords and objectives on the movement, this running counter to the very essence of nonalignment.

Many members of the movement are faced with the following question: can countries which have US military bases on their territories or those which are pursuing a pro-imperialist policy be members of the movement? On the other hand, attempts are being made to isolate socialist countries in the nonaligned movement under the pretext that they are connected with the socialist community and allegedly belong to the Warsaw Treaty.

Thus, the struggle around the nonalignment criteria sometimes grows into an acute political struggle for changing the very essence of the movement, as well as of its goals and principles. It takes much effort on the part of the movement's progressive nucleus to repulse the attacks of the subversive elements and consolidate the movement on the anti-

imperialist basis, on the basis of the struggle for peace and social progress.

The nonaligned movement's goals and tasks were initially formulated back at the Belgrade Conference in 1961. The documents adopted by the Conference—the Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of the Nonaligned Countries and the Statement on the Threat of War and the Call for Peace—proclaimed war among the peoples to be an anachronism and a crime against humanity, the world community to be capable of organising its life without wars. The documents also said that relations between countries with different social systems should be based on the principle of peaceful coexistence as an alternative to the cold war and a possible world nuclear catastrophe. The Declaration stated that a lasting peace could be ensured only if colonialism, imperialism and neocolonialism in all their manifestations were destroyed completely.¹⁷

Other important tasks were: opposition to colonialism, neocolonialism, racial discrimination and apartheid; support for national liberation movements; dismantlement of foreign military bases on other countries' territories; a struggle for general and complete disarmament and for a ban on nuclear weapon tests; vigorous action to achieve economic equality and efficient economic and trade cooperation among developing countries.

As the movement grew, these objectives and principles were specified and augmented with new provisions in conformity with the international situation.

A major result of the Belgrade Conference was that, on behalf of the nonaligned countries, it officially renounced the bloc policy and proclaimed "nonalignment to blocs". The Declaration also stated that the nonaligned countries represented at the Conference had no intention of setting up a new block. They sincerely wished to cooperate with any government which strove to promote confidence and peace throughout the world.¹⁸

Thus, the historic significance of the Belgrade Conference was that it defined the criteria of nonalignment, formulated the essence of the nonaligned movement concept, its basic goals and principles.

Forty-seven states attended the Second Conference of the Heads of State or Government of the Nonaligned Countries held in Cairo in October 1964, i. e., almost 50 per cent of all independent countries in the world at that time. The Programme of Peace and International Cooperation, adopted in Cairo, particularly emphasised that peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems was the only possible means of consolidating peace. That major document reaffirmed that the right to complete independence and self-determination should belong to all people, that the sovereign right of states should be recognised and strictly observed, and that states should refrain from any threat or use of force spearheaded against territorial integrity and political independence of other states. The Conference demanded that each state should refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.

The policy-making document of the Cairo Conference declared that "if the colonial powers stubbornly resist the people's striving to implement their right to self-determination and independence, then the colonial people legitimately have every ground to resort to arms, defending their national interests". It also said that the participants in the Conference recognised the national movements as "the sole representatives of their peoples".¹⁹ This highly important provision served as a great stimulus

¹⁷ See *Two Decades of Non-alignment*, New Delhi, 1983, p. 5.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁹ *Nonaligned Movement in Documents and Materials*, Moscow, 1979, p. 74 (in Russian).

for intensifying the struggle waged by colonial and dependent peoples for their national liberation.

The participants in the Conference also agreed that all countries should contribute to the accelerated creation of a new, more just world system of economic relations.

The next forum of the nonaligned states was held in Lusaka in 1970. Representatives of national liberation movements attended it for the first time. The forum stated its full support for the peoples of Indochina fighting against the US piratical aggression.

The Third Conference gave a broader definition of the nonalignment concept. "The policy of nonalignment came into being as a result of independent countries' resolve to defend their national independence and the legitimate rights of their peoples. That the nonaligned movement has turned into a broad international movement surpassing the bounds of racial, regional and other barriers is a component part of the considerable changes within the entire structure of the world community... These changes are based on the even more ardent desire of nations for freedom, independence and equality as well as their determination to put up resistance against any form of oppression and exploitation. That was the essence and meaning of our struggle... At a time when the polarisation of the world community on the bloc basis was regarded as a permanent feature of international relations, and the threat of a nuclear conflict between the great powers haunted humanity, the nonaligned countries opened up new vistas to the contemporary world and paved the way towards detente".²⁰

The Fourth Summit Meeting of the Nonaligned Countries took place in Algiers in 1973. It played an important part in consolidating the ranks of the movement, and emphasised the importance of cooperation between nonaligned countries and socialist states and other peaceloving and democratic forces. The Conference in Algiers decided to set up a Coordination Bureau, whose functions, apart from carrying out the necessary preparatory work for regular conferences, included the coordination of action and the elaboration of the concerted standpoints the nonaligned countries adhere to at major international forums, the United Nations above all.

The Fifth Conference of the Nonaligned Countries took place in Colombo in 1976. Eighty four delegations from nonaligned countries, eight observers and seven guests attended it. The Conference proceeded at a time when detente became the leading trend in international affairs.

The delegates declared that "nonalignment symbolises humankind's desire for peace and security in relations among peoples, the resolve to create a new just international economic, social and political order".²¹ The Conference devoted much attention to elaborating a programme on security and disarmament problems. It also stressed the direct connection between the struggle for peace and detente, on the one hand, and the struggle against imperialism, neocolonialism, racism and apartheid, on the other.

The decision to set up a pool of information agencies of the nonaligned countries was a major result of the Colombo Conference. Such decision was aimed at limiting Western powers' freedom of action in spreading information in the emergent countries, as well as at consolidating the national mass media.

The Sixth Summit Conference held in Havana in 1979 in a complex international situation holds a special place. The forces of imperialist reaction went out of their way to torpedo the conference in revolutionary

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 302.

Cuba, seeking to split the nonaligned movement and sow confusion in its ranks even before the Conference was convened. However, the intrigues of the imperialist circles and their henchmen were a complete failure. The movement not only managed to preserve the unity of its ranks, but also consolidated it on the anti-imperialist basis. The Conference forcefully emphasised that peaceful coexistence was the only alternative to the danger of a military clash, that detente in Europe enhanced the security of all states, in particular, those which were not members of military alliances. The Conference in Havana examined profoundly and comprehensively the situation in Latin America and the Caribbean, voiced its complete solidarity with the struggle waged by the peoples of the region, and favoured the settlement of conflicts exclusively by peaceful means.

The results of the Havana Conference reaffirmed the strength and vitality of the nonaligned movement, its ability, despite imperialist interference, to solve the most complicated problems of the present day in the interests of peace and international security and on the basis of consensus among all participants in the movement.

The Seventh Conference, held in New Delhi from March 7 to 11, 1983 was the most representative one. It demonstrated that the struggle for peace and security, the halting of the arms race, and for disarmament, economic decolonisation and the ultimate elimination of colonialism and racism is the general line of the nonaligned movement.

Despite its enemies' predictions the Delhi Conference demonstrated the movement's unity, its ability to look for and find solutions mutually acceptable for all the participants on the basis of their joint struggle against imperialism and reaction. Fidel Castro stated at the Delhi Conference: "In the face of the nuclear tragedy threatening us, the drama of underdevelopment and exploitation and the economic and social crisis, there is no place for resignation or compromise. The only worthy choice is to fight".²²

A very brief analysis of the documents of the seven conferences of the heads of state or government, held between 1961 and 1983, clearly shows that the fundamental principles and objectives of nonalignment have not undergone any essential changes. They include:

- the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism and all forms of racial discrimination;
- the struggle for establishing the principles of peaceful coexistence in relations between countries with different social systems, for consolidating peace and international security, for halting the nuclear arms race, and for general and complete disarmament;
- the struggle for restructuring international relations on an equitable democratic basis and for introducing a new international economic order;
- the struggle against information imperialism, for a new information order;
- the struggle against imperialist or any other interference in the nonaligned movement, for consolidating its ranks on an anti-imperialist basis.

The desire of the member-countries to extricate themselves from the centuries-old backwardness is the force which unites the movement. Consciously or unconsciously, the majority of the movement's members realise that overcoming backwardness and strengthening their national independence lie in the consolidation of their ranks, in pooling their efforts and means in the fight against imperialism and neocolonialism which are mainly responsible for their social and economic backwardness.

A no less important, uniting factor of nonalignment is the desire for peace, for establishing the principles of peaceful coexistence as the norm

²² *New Times*, No. 12, 1983, p. 43.

Table

Status of representation Conferences	Participants		Observers		Guests	
	States	national liberation movements	States	national liberation movements	States	national liberation movements
First Conference, Belgrade, 1-6 Sept., 1961	25	—	3	—	—	—
Second Conference, Cairo, 5-10 Oct. 1964	46 ⁺	—	10	—	—	—
Third Conference, Lusaka, 8-10 Sept., 1970	54	—	9	—	—	8
Fourth Conference, Algiers, 5-9 Sept., 1973	75	—	8	12	3	—
Fifth Conference, Colombo, 16-19 Aug., 1976	84 ⁺⁺	1	8	8	7	—
Sixth Conference, Havana, 3-9 Sept., 1979	89 ⁺⁺	3	12	5	8	1
Seventh Conference, Delhi, 7-11 March, 1983	97 ⁺⁺⁺	2	10	1	10	—

Notes: The Table is drawn up on the basis of the conferences' final documents. The United Nations and its agencies, as well as regional and other organisations, are not categorised as guests and observers.

⁺ Without representatives of the revolutionary government of Angola in emigration.

⁺⁺ With the exception of the Belize which was granted special status.

⁺⁺⁺ Representatives of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, Saint Lucia and Chile did not attend.

of relations between countries with different social systems, and as the sole basis for international relations in general. The participating countries regard the preservation and consolidation of peace, deeper detente, the relaxation of international tension and the struggle against the arms race as a sine qua non of their social and economic development and the successful struggle against imperialism and colonialism.

The nonaligned countries come out more and more resolutely for the democratisation of international relations and equal participation in elaborating and adopting major decisions as regards the developing countries' vital interests. They demand the establishment of a new international order, the enhanced role of the UN and other international organisations in solving political, economic and other problems facing the developing world.

The popular character of the objectives and principles of the nonaligned movement and their great attraction enhance the movement's authority in the eyes of the entire newly-free world and the progressive world public, drawing into its ranks more and more countries, national liberation and other socio-political movements.

No wonder, therefore, that from the First Conference (1961) to the Seventh Conference (1983) the number of member-countries increased fourfold. Almost all African countries, 27 Asian states and 25 per cent of American countries were represented at the Delhi Conference.

The Table above shows the growth dynamics of the nonaligned movement: an increase in the number of member-countries, observers (states and national liberation movements) and guests (states and national liberation movements) which attended the nonaligned summits.

The rapid growth in the number of the movement's member-countries shows that its objectives and principles have withstood the test of time, inasmuch as they are just and democratic, and express the vital interests of the newly-free countries and peoples, as well as of those which are still fighting for their freedom and independence.

It would be wrong to maintain that the nonaligned movement has always been on the rise and never experienced any difficulties. As the movement extends, the number of problems it faces also increases. These problems are not always easy to solve, sharp internal contradictions emerge now and then between countries with different social systems and regimes, forces are polarized, and centrifugal trends come into being. One country even left the movement voluntarily (Burma in 1979).

The situation inside the movement is complicated by the departure of some leaders from the anti-imperialist positions. The setting forth of eclectic and opportunistic concepts exerts a certain negative influence on the content and orientation of the movement's foreign policy.

Indira Gandhi, one of the outstanding leaders of nonalignment, pointed to the existence of negative trends in the movement more than once. In her opinion, the movement had grown too broad, and some who did not adhere to its principles as firmly as they should had joined it.²³

However, the difficulties which the movement faces are quite understandable because of its extremely broad character and the fact that it is open to all newly-free countries and national liberation movements, and they introduce into it their own specific sentiments and complicated problems, insisting on their immediate solution. All countries, including newly-free ones and those which became independent prior to World War II, irrespective of their social system, the level of their productive forces, the size of the state and its geographic location can take part in the movement. The only criterium is not to join any multilateral or bilateral military alliance to which this or that great power is a party.

The intensification of opposing trends in the nonaligned movement is also due to the fact that new people have stood at the head of the movement, replacing the first generation of leaders who founded it. Whereas the first generation (Jawaharlal Nehru, Josip Broz Tito, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ahmed Sukarno, Kwame Nkrumah) saw the beginning of the national liberation struggle in their respective countries and led it, the present-day leaders formed their world outlook in the postwar period. They have naturally been introducing into the movement their own ideas and concepts which, as experience shows, are not always in line with the spirit of the times and the present-day reality. Certain leaders of the movement sometimes set forth purely pragmatic demands and are ready to make a compromise with imperialism for the sake of short-term benefits.

It goes without saying that ever greater efforts are required in such conditions to preserve and develop positively the movement's basic objectives and principles.

The situation in the world in recent years and its deterioration through the fault of the imperialists necessitate that the movement's members be consistent in implementing the above objectives and principles and in consolidating the movement on an anti-imperialist basis. The US administration's policy aimed at exacerbating the international situation shatters the foundations of the movement. The US aggressive measures against the staunchest adherents to the movement's objectives and principles are a component part of that policy. They can be seen most graphically in the recent policy of the USA and other imperialist powers vis-à-vis

²³ See *Washington Post*, Dec. 7, 1980.

Cuba which chaired the movement from 1979 to 1983, and India, which currently chairs it.

The strength and international prestige of the movement have invariably depended on the consistency with which its participants follow the principles they have themselves repeatedly declared in the final documents of their conferences, including the 1983 Delhi Conference. There, they wrote down in their political declaration that the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, apartheid, racism, including Zionism, and against all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony, against the great power policy and the policy of blocs, through which the division of the world into blocs is to be perpetuated, has always been the core of their policies.²⁴ They also reaffirmed their invariable loyalty to the principles and aims of the non-aligned movement. Moreover, they declared that the violation of these principles by any country is absolutely unacceptable and no circumstances can justify it.²⁵

It is taken for granted that the nonaligned movement, which arose under certain historical conditions, will evolve along with the changing world situation and the alignment of class and political forces on the international scene. In this sense, it is transient, but it will operate as an active socio-political force until the causes and circumstances which have brought it into being are eliminated.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that imperialism, being the main force opposing the nonaligned movement, does not give up its tactics. It will continue to do everything within its power to split the movement, tear the capitalist-oriented countries away from it, include the latter in its military-political strategy, isolate and expel from the movement countries with progressive regimes which lean towards world socialism, erode the anti-imperialist and anti-war basis of the movement, and place it at the service of imperialism's aims and interests. The imperialists are doing this in a more refined way and, if the situation allows, are resorting to outright force.

That is why one should not turn a blind eye to the fact that the movement has many vulnerable spots and weak points. There are quite a few reasons for this. These include substantial differences among the movement's members as to the level of their socio-economic and political development and, consequently, the heterogeneous nature of their goals; different approaches to the solution of urgent international issues; divergence in views on the very nature of the movement, and so forth. It should be also pointed out that the contradictory trends and even clashes of interests between separate groups of member-countries are largely determined by their relations with the two social systems, i. e., by the extent of the political and economic dependence of one group of countries on imperialism, and the firmness of another group's relations with world socialism. The conflict between the contradictory forces cannot but tell on the nature of the adopted policy-making documents which are frequently marked by compromises and mutual concessions.

Nevertheless, the nonaligned movement has succeeded in working out rather flexible and effective forms for coordinating actions of the member-countries and in creating a smoothly functioning system of agencies. The principle of consensus has proved to be the only acceptable means for overcoming differences and finding mutually acceptable decisions, inasmuch as the nonaligned movement, like any other international movement of a socio-political character, does not possess the necessary

²⁴ *Kommunist*, 1983, No. 7, p. 106 (in Russian).

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

sanctions or material means in implementing its goals and principles.

Regardless of their socio-economic systems, the level of their productive forces, their size and geographic location the movement member-countries, on the whole, are well aware that to achieve real successes in the struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism, secure their political and economic independence, they should act as a single organised force observing the fundamental principles and objectives of the non-aligned movement. And this is an earnest of the movement's further gains. Second, the movement's strength lies in the unity of its actions with those of all the anti-imperialist, peaceloving forces and progressive movements. Out to attain general democratic goals, the nonaligned movement objectively sides with world socialism and together with it delivers blows at the political, economic and ideological positions of imperialism because the latter is not only a force hostile to socialism, but also an implacable enemy of the freedom and independence of the peoples which have embarked upon the path of independent development. History convincingly shows that any departure from the basic goals of nonalignment, as well as a retreat from its chief allies, weakens the movement, slows down its development rates, and causes political stagnation. Fidel Castro stated: "Any attempt to stage a clash between nonaligned countries and the socialist community is profoundly counter-revolutionary and serves exclusively the interests of imperialism."²⁶

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries regard nonalignment as part of the world anti-imperialist front of struggle, and an important factor working for peace, social progress and healthier international climate.

The policy of cooperation and interaction of the world's two major political forces of our day—the socialist community and the nonaligned movement—acting at one with the world national liberation and workers' movements is an historically correct thrust of the struggle against imperialism and reaction, and for peace and international security.

In his speech at a dinner in honour of Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of the Republic of India, held in the Kremlin on May 21, 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, highly assessed the role and activities of the nonaligned movement in the world today. He said: "The emergence on the world scene of scores of Asian, African and Latin American countries, striving to overcome the pernicious consequences of colonialism, is one of the realities of the contemporary world. The overwhelming majority of these countries follow the policy of nonalignment. The emergence of the nonaligned movement and its becoming a major factor of world politics are law-governed phenomena of our day and age."²⁷

²⁶ *El Moudjahid*, Sept. 8, 1973.

²⁷ *Pravda*, May 22, 1985.

NEW STAGE OF 'MILITARISM' IN JAPAN CRITICIZED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 86 pp 81-89

[Article by A. P. Markov, doctor of historical sciences: "A New Phase of Japanese Militarization"]

Over the entire postwar period, Japan's rearmament and the revival of Japanese militarism have been issues attracting the close attention of the world public. Beginning in 1950 with the creation of a reserve police corps (which was reorganised into Japan's "self-defence force" in 1954), the process of militarisation reached a very high level by the early 1980s. Over these thirty years, the country's military expenditure grew from \$86,000,000 in 1951 to \$12,027,000,000 in 1984, while the "self-defence" force was transformed into a modern army equipped with all the latest types of weapons except nuclear ones. In 1985, Japan's military expenditure has been raised again by 6.9 per cent running into 3.14 trillion yen (\$13.4 billion dollars).¹ In September 1985, the government approved the new five-year plan for military spending for 1986-1990 which earmarked \$76 billion for military needs. Thereby, for the first time in postwar history the Diet-adopted principle stating that the military expenditures should not exceed 1 per cent of the GNP, will be violated.

Japan's "creeping militarisation", which its ruling circles, despite obvious facts, are seeking to deny, has been developing at an increasingly rapid pace. But at the turn of the 1970s, and particularly with the coming to power, in November 1982, of the Nakasone cabinet, this process has acquired qualitatively new dimensions. While on an official visit to Washington in January 1983, the Japanese Prime Minister said he would like to turn Japan into an "unsinkable aircraft-carrier"² and would spare no effort to achieve this aim.

Washington is, without doubt, pushing for the accelerated militarisation of Japan. Pursuing a policy of "total militarisation", the Reagan administration has been bringing wide-ranging pressure on the Japanese government in a bid to make them play a more active part in implementing this dangerous policy. Pressure from Washington, which has assumed harsh and sometimes insulting forms, meets with practically no resistance on the part of the Japanese leaders. Yet it is not American pressure alone that prompts Tokyo to adopt militarist decisions. Rather, the encouragement coming from Washington acts as a powerful booster for the activities of the most reactionary militarist forces within Japan itself, forces which have long been waiting to launch an offensive.

These forces have never reconciled themselves to Japan's defeat in World War II. In marking the 40th anniversary of victory over militarist Japan, it is worthwhile recalling some facts from those far-off days, which show how the forces which plunged Japan into a bloody war and which are now vigorously working for the revival of the country's military might accepted the defeat. Immediately after the capitulation in August

¹ *A Handbook on Defence*, Tokyo, 1984, p. 186 (in Japanese); *Pravda*, Dec. 30, 1984.

² *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Feb. 3, 1983.

1945 and on the eve of the Allied landing in Japan, numerous brightly coloured posters appeared in Tokyo and other cities, stating that the capitulation was merely an unpleasant episode in the country's history; it would be followed by a revival of the Japanese war potential, Japan would win back its former glory and power, and so on. On August 15, 1945, after reading out Emperor Hirohito's order for the capitulation of the Japanese Army, a radio announcer went on to make the following statement: We have lost, but it is only a temporary defeat. Japan's mistake was that it had inadequate material force, scientific knowledge and arms. We shall correct this mistake.³

In those days this passed almost unnoticed, for the future of Japanese militarism seemed to have been determined. But subsequent developments have shown that this was not so. Now that we are witnessing the revival of Japanese militarism, we cannot fail to notice that it is becoming increasingly dangerous, something that is influenced to a decisive degree by the fact that Japan has remained a typical imperialist country with all the hallmarks of imperial policy and methods of its implementation. It is ruled by a conservative bureaucracy and big monopoly capital, and the imperial striving to exploit and dominate other nations is, as before, at the very core of the policy they are pursuing via the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). It is this desire for exploitation and dominance that, to quote Lenin, "is, to put it briefly, the substance of imperialist policy".⁴ Militarisation, which is a logical consequence of this desire, is naturally inherent in the capitalist mode of production and war is the inevitable end which the expansion of its foundations leads to.⁵ The main content of Japanese imperialist policy has not changed since the war, though there have been some temporary changes in the methods used and in the time taken to achieve its expansionist aims.

At the turn of the 1970s, militarists and adherents of "decisive action" among the ruling élite and big business came to the fore again, with the "hawks" ruling the roost in the country's leadership. The USA, which had long insisted on the militarisation of Japan, was the force that made it easier for them to come to power. It should be noted that the differences between Tokyo and Washington concerning militarisation and Japan's involvement in US global strategy had to do, as in the past, with the scale and periods of implementing the objectives set, rather than with principles of the approach to the problem. Today these differences have been removed, and Japan is embarking on intense militarisation.

The qualitative changes in the political course of Japan at the turn of the 1980s were expressed in new decisions and practical steps taken by the government and parliament, and in their approach to the most important foreign and domestic policy issues, something that gave the country's political course a more overtly reactionary and militarist slant. These changes, which have marked Japan's slide into undisguised militarism, were introduced unobtrusively in the form of various accords and agreements, mostly between the defence departments of the USA and Japan, on individual, but not insignificant, issues "representing mutual interest". Reached without much publicity, these agreements and accords reflected very definite trends and aspirations of both countries. But their existence did not yet mean that Japan's new military policy had taken final shape or been accepted by its leaders.

³ W. Price, *Key to Japan*, New York, 1946, pp. 80-89.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 35.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. 26.

This came about in May 1981 as a result of talks between Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki of Japan and US President Ronald Reagan⁶, with the two sides working out a common stand on a number of fundamental issues related to the future military policies of Japan, a stand that reflected the interests of the most reactionary and bellicose sections of US and Japanese societies. For the first time the Japanese-American "security treaty" was recognised as a "military alliance" similar to that existing between NATO member countries.⁷

On his return to Tokyo, however, Suzuki sought to deny any change in Japan's policy, claiming that its alliance with the United States, mentioned in the communique, published after his talks with Ronald Reagan, did not mean an increase in military cooperation and placed no new obligations on Japan. But when asked to give an official explanation in parliament as to what he meant by "alliance" he refused to do so.⁸

It should be said that in the postwar years the Japanese government's stand on military policy matters has always been contradictory. On the one hand, it has taken vigorous steps to build up the military potential, while on the other hand, it has sought to deny the obvious facts, insisting that Japan has renounced militarisation once and for all and that its policy is aimed at promoting a stable peace and detente in Asia and the world over. This contradiction was revealed in a particularly graphic way during Suzuki's visit to Washington.

There are definite reasons for the inconsistency and contradictoriness inherent in the Japanese government's stand on military policy. One of these is the extreme unpopularity of militarisation and the strengthening of the military alliance with the USA among the Japanese and in the country's socio-political circles. Opinion polls conducted in May 1983 showed that nearly 70 per cent of those asked opposed the policy of militarisation and denounced Nakasone's statement concerning the "common destiny" of Japan and America as far as military strategy was concerned, 50 per cent were against revising the Constitution, and 30 per cent were in favour of discussing it.⁹ The April 1984 poll revealed that only 10 per cent of those asked supported Yasuhiro Nakasone's policy. This policy is causing anxiety and concern in Asian countries and is the butt of justified criticism by the Soviet Union and other socialist and developing countries.

Aware of Washington's extreme preoccupation with strengthening its military and political alliance with Japan, its leaders have shown considerable deftness recently in using this circumstance to help the country cope with its economic problems and assert its positions on world markets, including the American and Western European ones, without binding themselves by obligations to be directly involved in aggressive US policies. For a time, this stand brought certain rewards, since Washington, although openly displeased with the intractability of its partner whom it called a "stowaway", nevertheless thought it worthwhile to tolerate this situation, reluctant as it was to complicate the already difficult relations with Japan.

Yet, compelled by its unchanging goal, that of the "total militarisation" of Japan and its transformation into an armed "agent" of the USA in Asia, Washington moved towards gradually supplementing the Japanese-American "security treaty" with new bilateral agreements, documents, and accords. Taken together, they were, in fact, aimed at boosting military and political relations between the two countries to a higher allied level, forcing Japan to speed up its armament, gaining access for the USA to

⁶ Zenko Suzuki's visit to the USA took place between May 4 and 8, 1981.

⁷ *Asahi shimbun*, May 5, 1981.

⁸ *Pravda*, Nov. 16, 1981.

⁹ *Christian Science Monitor*, April 4, 1983.

Japan's advances in high-technology that could have military applications, and removing any obstacles to the coordination of joint combat operations in case of war. In other words, they were aimed at subordinating Japan to the interests of American global strategy.

The US administration's course towards the militarisation of Japan and its involvement in US military strategy met with full understanding and support from the Japanese "hawks" and reactionaries who wished to see the country become a military power. It was no longer a problem to put the "coinciding interests" of both sides into the form of appropriate agreements and accords. In June 1976, the USA and Japan set up a bilateral consultative committee (at the level of heads of military departments) to coordinate both countries' military and political steps in the context of joint military strategy. "The Committee is entrusted to work out principles for joint operations by the two countries' armed forces, to maintain contacts between military bodies, to differentiate the functions of the armed forces and produce recommendations for the Security Committee"¹⁰ set up in 1957.

Two years later, in 1978, the consultative committee worked out and submitted to the Security Committee the Guiding Principles of Japanese-American Cooperation on Defence Issues which envisaged the accelerated development of the Japanese armed forces as well as the opportunity for US troops deployed in Japan to take up combat positions at any moment, should serious complications arise in the region. It was also stipulated that the sides should develop plans of joint combat operations and exchange intelligence information about the forces of the "potential enemy". In case of need, the military bases on Japanese territory would be available for joint use by the armed forces of both countries.¹¹ Likewise, the Principles envisaged the creation in the future of a Joint Command Headquarters in Japan and suggested devising offensive tactics matched with US strategy in case a crisis situation should arise in the region.

A special group was set up in the same year to work out Japan's emergency legislation to back up legally operations by the "self-defence" force in case of an "unexpected attack from without". The Japanese-American Council on Arms and Technology concerned with the standardisation of both countries' armaments and exchanges of military technology and licences was inaugurated in 1979. Pointing out the importance of involving Japan in US military strategy, the Washington-published booklet *Japan's Contribution to Military Stability in Northeast Asia* demonstrated the country's exceptionally convenient geographical position for use in military ventures against neighbouring countries. Japan lies in the centre of the region at the intersection of the main trade and military routes, the booklet says. Therefore, it can provide a base for the naval forces, which will thence control military ships, and for the air force, which will find itself in favorable conditions for an air strike at targets in the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea.¹²

At the same time, a shift is taking place towards the accelerated rearmament of the country. In October 1976, the General National Defence Programme was adopted, which stressed the need for a further build-up of Japan's military might. Simultaneously, Japan negotiated the purchases of 100 US F 15 fighter-bombers and other military hardware worth a total of nearly one trillion yen. In 1978, a contract was signed which provided for the beginning of arms supplies to Japan.¹³

¹⁰ *Japan. Yearbook*, Moscow, 1981, p. 352.

¹¹ *Kokusai mondai shiryō*, 1979, No. 1, pp. 32-33.

¹² *Japan's Contribution to Military Stability in Northeast Asia*, Washington, 1980, p. 26.

¹³ See *Pravda*, April 9, 1978.

In keeping with the General National Defence Programme, more funds were invested in the late 1970s into military-related research and development. The overall sum added up to 154 billion yen, not counting the allocations of private firms.¹⁴ Japanese industry is increasingly shifting to the production of military hardware developed in Japan itself. The British *Financial Times* wrote in this connection that the annual rise in military expenditure, may reach 20 per cent of the budget. This is sufficient to make military production attractive. A more difficult question is whether the world is prepared to welcome the revival of Japanese military industrial potential. At some stage in the not so distant future Japan will have to remove its mask of complete pacifism.¹⁵

Thus, by May 1981, when Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki paid an official visit to Washington, where an agreement was reached on raising the level of Japanese-American military and political relations to the status of a military alliance with all the ensuing consequences, many important related issues had already been dealt with in practical terms at lower levels. It merely remained to dot the i's and admit what was, in effect, a fait accompli.

Nevertheless, on his return from Washington Zenko Suzuki showed what the US administration and the Japanese "hawks" described as "hesitation" failing to fulfil the obligations he had undertaken in his talks with Ronald Reagan with the required energy. His "indecisiveness" was to a great extent attributable to the public indignation aroused by the results of his talks in Washington and to protests from even the "moderates" in the ruling elite, to say nothing of the opposition parties, trade unions, and democratic organisations.

The Suzuki cabinet came under severe criticism both from the right and the left and resigned in November 1982. However, the results of the Prime Minister's talks, which conformed fully to the demands of the reactionaries and the military both in Japan and the USA, remained in force. They made things easier for the cabinet headed by Yasuhiro Nakasone, who has been vigorously pursuing the policy of building up the Japanese armed forces. He began his term in office by claiming that he was merely continuing with the policy of the Suzuki cabinet and was carrying out Japan's commitments exclusively for the "purposes of defence".¹⁶

The ruling circles in Japan, which sanctioned the extremely unpopular policy of intense militarisation, believed that, in order to implement it, they needed a politician who was prepared unhesitatingly to use decisive and even harsh measures against the policy's opponents. This politician was also to possess the necessary flexibility and a knack for demagoguery. Yasuhiro Nakasone was the most suitable candidate.

Besides this, Nakasone proved that he could find a common language both with the heads of the rival factions and groups within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the influential business circles and with the US administration whose favour is of exceptional importance for a politician in Japan today. Speaking at a press conference on the day of his inauguration as Prime Minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone made a statement entitled "My Political Belief" which reiterated his firm adherence to the idea of a "strong Japan", pursuing an active military policy in alliance with the USA, and his loyalty to the Japanese-American "security treaty".

¹⁴ *A Yearbook on Armaments of the Self-Defence Force*, Tokyo, 1980, p. 500 (in Japanese).

¹⁵ *Financial Times*, March 5, 1981.

¹⁶ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 5, 1983, p. 39.

His statement gained approval in the US capital. Speaking to one of Japanese businessmen, Secretary of State George Shultz expressed support for Nakasone's nomination to the post of Prime Minister.¹⁷

While preparing for the top post in the country's leadership, Yasuhiro Nakasone sought to gain the confidence of the US administration, American big business, the military and bureaucracy, in an effort to be acceptable to Washington. When on visit there as head of the National Defence Agency at the invitation of the then Defence Secretary Laird and again in the early 1970s as Minister of Foreign Trade and Industry in the Tanaka Cabinet, he made a secret offer to import nuclear weapons to Japan, something utterly at variance with the official position of the government which kept to the "three non-nuclear principles".¹⁸ For this he came in for sharp criticism both in parliament and in the press.

Encouraged by his Japanese counterpart, Laird came to Tokyo in July 1971 to put forward the "total force" concept providing for US armed forces as well as the armed forces of Japan, South Korea and a number of other Asian countries forming a "single whole" under overall US command.¹⁹ It was suggested that Japan should concentrate on strengthening its conventional arms, while the USA would devote itself to the development of nuclear and strategic weapons. Laird also proposed that the Japanese Navy should take over some of the functions of the US 7th Fleet.²⁰ Laird's proposal met with a negative reaction in Japan, China, and the ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines). Notably, in a report about Laird's talks in Tokyo China's Xinhua Agency pointed to the anti-Chinese aspect of the "total force" concept, justly noting that the USA was "scheming to push Japanese militarism forward to the front-line of aggressive policies in Asia". "This is the gist of the 'total force' concept, this is the gist of the 'Nixon doctrine'", the agency said.²¹

The "total force" concept was rejected by Japan whose government at that time preferred not to bind itself to the USA by specific military commitments. Tokyo's stand caused extreme disappointment in Washington: "Nixon hoped that Japan would become the cornerstone of collective security in Asia", wrote the Japanese historian Yiriye in this connection. "In view of Japan's opposition this idea was not to be implemented".²² M. Yiriye holds that Japan's refusal to help create a "total force" prompted Washington, in 1972, to change its policy in relation to China and give up its containment and isolation.²³ Today, in putting into practice what, in effect, is the same idea of creating in Asia a so-called total force involving the Japanese armed forces under US leadership, the Reagan administration has the support of the government headed by its "best friend" Yasuhiro Nakasone. Nakasone, wrote the paper *Asahi*, has sharply distanced himself from traditionally "restrained" Japanese diplomacy and sided with the most bellicose politicians forming the extreme right wing of NATO by openly backing practically all the foreign policy concepts of the Reagan administration.²⁴ Nakasone is in favour of strengthening military and political ties and contacts between Japan and NATO. He is advocating broader military cooperation with South Korea

¹⁷ Akahata, Dec. 26, 1982.

¹⁸ Akahata, Dec. 10, 1982.

¹⁹ *Washington Post*, July 10, 1971.

²⁰ *Asahi Evening News*, July 9, 1971.

²¹ *News Bulletin of the Xinhua Agency*, July 31, 1971, pp. 19-22.

²² M. Yiriye, *Japanese-Chinese Relations After Nixon's Visit to China*, Tokyo, 1973, pp. 16-17 (in Japanese).

²³ *Ibidem*.

²⁴ *Asahi*, Jan. 20, 1984.

and believes it is possible to set up a triple alliance between the USA, Japan and South Korea.

At the same time, there are some important aspects both of Nakasone's life and convictions, expressed at various times that make American political observers wary. In his book *Japan States* published in 1977, Nakasone, while arguing for the build-up of Japanese military might, called for a subsequent "withdrawal of American troops" from Japan and for an "alliance with the USA on an equal and reasonable basis".²⁵ Somewhat earlier, in 1967, he said: "With few natural resources and a small area, our country must have a reliable guarantee—the armed forces... Considering the constantly changing international situation, we should use the Japanese-American "security treaty" with flexibility and relinquish it altogether in the future".²⁶

Nakasone's motto is "the winner is always right, but it is he who has strength that wins", wrote the *Akahata*.²⁷ By giving in to Washington's demands for strengthening Japan's military potential and making it play a more active military role in Asia in alliance with the USA, Yasuhiro Nakasone hopes to transform Japan into a strong military power, capable not only of treating Washington as an equal, but also of enjoying a special position in Asia, where Japan has always claimed leadership. After all, it was rivalry over domination in the region that sparked off the Japanese-American war in the early 1940s. Referring to Nakasone's nationalism and his statements concerning Japan's "special role" in Asia the *Wall Street Journal* wrote that he was the Japanese Konrad Adenauer, the man who had paved the way to West Germany's rearmament in the 1950s. But if Nakasone was the Japanese Konrad Adenauer, he was also very likely the Japanese Charles de Gaulle. Previously Japanese policies had been made in Washington. Nakasone wanted them to come from Tokyo. He is, in the words of the *Wall Street Journal*, a long-distance runner...²⁸

Well aware of Nakasone's sentiments, the American administration demands his obedience and hopes to use his militarist aspirations and his popularity among reactionary bourgeois circles in order to secure the latter's active support in enhancing, under US control, Japan's military role in the Asia-Pacific region.

A fundamentally new feature of the Nakasone cabinet's policy is its desire to act as an "independent participant" in tackling the military and political problems existing in its relations with the USA and West European countries. It wants to be regarded as a "representative of Asia" who knows its problems better than the USA and the NATO countries. The *Chuo Koron* magazine wrote in this connection: "Japan belonging to a system, the leadership of which, in keeping with the "security treaty", was exercised by the USA, followed from its status as a peripheral power with a low level of civilisation. This alignment of forces has ceased to correspond to the development level of present-day Japan".²⁹ "The USA regards Japan as its military protectorate, rather than an ally", another Japanese magazine wrote.³⁰

In helping to militarise Japan, Washington sees its objective in "channeling" its growing military might against the USSR and other socialist countries, and in making its military potential primarily serve the aims of its own hegemonistic policy in this region. The essence of Reagan's policy in Asia is determined by the desire to set up an anti-

²⁵ Yasuhiro Nakasone, *Nippon wa sangon*, Tokyo, 1977, p. 32.

²⁶ *Komei shimbun*, Feb. 24, 1982.

²⁷ *Akahata*, Nov. 25, 1982.

²⁸ *Wall Street Journal*, Sept. 1, 1983, pp. 1, 14.

²⁹ *Chuo Koron*, 1985, No. 1, p. 108.

³⁰ *Asian Perspective*, Spring, Summer, 1983, p. 57.

Soviet coalition within the framework of a doctrine aimed at restoring US leadership in Asia, *U. S. News & World Report* wrote.³¹

Meanwhile, the policy of the Nakasone government pursues its own, quite definite aims: an economically strong and armed Japan rather than being merely a bridgehead in Washington's strategy, should be one of the political leaders of the capitalist world, exerting an influence on the mapping out of the Western bloc's general strategy which is conceived as the joint encirclement and exhaustion of the Soviet Union. At the same time, appeals for "solidarity with the West" conceal Tokyo's wish to neutralise and weaken protectionist trends in the USA and the EEC countries and to keep open to Japanese goods the markets of these countries as well as those of the developing countries which are in the sphere of influence of the imperialist Western states.

* * *

Though starting his career as Prime Minister with the statement of his wish to turn Japan into an "unsinkable aircraft-carrier", Yasuhiro Nakasone had soon to tone down his pronouncements and make increasingly frequent use of peaceloving phraseology. This became obvious after the early elections to the lower house of Parliament in December 1983 when his Liberal Democratic Party suffered a defeat and lost its parliamentary majority.

However, the essence of the LDP's military policy has not changed. Notably, while claiming that it would abide by the "three non-nuclear principles", the government did not prevent nuclear-carrying American ships from calling or stopping at Japanese ports and staying there; preparations went on unimpeded for the deployment on the Misawa base airfield of 50 nuclear-capable US F-16 fighter-bombers (their deployment has already begun; at the same time, stores for nuclear bombs are being built at Misawa); consent was given for the landing in Japan of US aircraft with nuclear weapons on board, based in South Korea. In other words, the government has clearly violated the "three non-nuclear principles". The *Akahata* wrote in this connection: "The Japanese-American military alliance has grown into a nuclear one, entering one of the most dangerous stages in its history".³² The Nakasone government gave orders for practical preparations to be begun for the Japanese Navy to patrol the sea-lanes and block the straits. Moreover, from the summer of 1983 onwards, Japanese ships have been sent to the straits to monitor the movements of Soviet vessels.

In early January, 1985, Yasuhiro Nakasone paid a visit to Washington where he gave his backing to the US Strategic Defence Initiative and expressed his full approval of the militarist policy pursued by the Reagan administration. In December 1984, prior to the Prime Minister's departure to Washington, General Watanabe, Chairman of the Joint Staffs Committee of the Japanese Armed Forces, and General Tixier, US Armed Forces Commander, signed a protocol on joint combat operations by the two states in an "emergency situation". Moreover, this document provided for joint American and Japanese armed action both in Japan and elsewhere. Apart from the staffs jointly working on relevant plans, the protocol envisaged the setting up of specialised bodies to coordinate their implementation. It also provided for the US Armed Forces using, in addition to their own bases, Japanese airfields, ports, stores and roads which might be needed for the logistic support of combat operations in the Far East.³³

³¹ *U. S. News & World Report*, Aug. 10, 1981, p. 36.

³² *Akahata*, May 23, 1982.

³³ *Pravda*, Dec. 29, 1984.

All this is accompanied by assurances from the Japanese leaders that nothing is the matter and that Japan supports peace in Asia and all over the world. This demagoguery provokes sharp censure in the Japanese press and in the press of Asian countries. The *Asahi* newspaper stated that speaking in parliament Yasuhiro Nakasone paid lip service to a peace policy, but that the question arises as to how this can be squared with the cabinet's military build-up?³⁴

Japan's transformation into a "military power" and a bridgehead for American imperialist action against the USSR and other socialist countries has been undergoing a qualitative change in the 1980s. Japan has eschewed its former restraint in carrying out Washington's demands. It has agreed to supply US nuclear submarines and other military vessels with intelligence information about Soviet defence measures in the Far East. The Japanese Navy has been systematically monitoring the movements of Soviet ships and submarines and passing the data obtained to the US Command.³⁵ The possibility is being debated of Japanese combat ships escorting US nuclear-carrying vessels. K. Tanikawa, head of Japan's National Defence Agency, stated: "Japanese warships may defend American vessels, irrespective of whether these have nuclear weapons on board or not."³⁶

In 1983, the United States and Japan were engaged in a total of 320 joint projects for the production of military hardware, including F-15 fighters, R 3C anti-submarine planes, etc. Japan bought US E 2C Hawk-eye radar planes, and ship-to-ship Harpoon missiles. Japan was producing under US licences heavy-duty helicopters and Patriot rockets. A total of 2,75 trillion yen was spent that year on the production of military hardware under US licences. The "recommendations" of a working group of NATO countries and Japan, set up in 1980, say that Japan and the USA ought to standardise their reconnaissance equipment, means of communication, logistical services, and transport systems in order for joint action to be possible in a complicated war situation.³⁷

In 1980, the two countries signed an agreement on military hardware exchanges. However, this agreement did not satisfy the Pentagon, since it did not place Japan under the direct obligation to pass on to the US its military technology. A new agreement was initialled in January 1983 at Washington's insistence, which was signed during Ronald Reagan's visit to Japan in November 1983. The agreement defined both the nature of military hardware and technology which the USA desired to obtain from Japan, and the procedure of their transfer. A bilateral commission was set up, to consider individual transfer issues. Advanced Japanese hardware and technology can be supplied to the USA both by governmental enterprises and research institutions and by private companies.

Militarist trends in Japan are growing. Ignoring the lessons of World War II, certain circles in Tokyo and Washington want to bring Japan's military might in line with its considerable economic and technological capabilities and to turn it into a "major military power" and a well-armed bridgehead of American and Japanese imperialist aggression in the Asia-Pacific region. The aim of Japanese progressive forces, which reflects the basic interests of the Japanese people and the peoples of other countries in this region, is to stop the implementation of these plans and to put an end to the policy of military build-up.

³⁴ *Asahi*, Aug. 9, 1983.

³⁵ *Japan Times*, March 9, 1983.

³⁶ *Asahi shimbun*, March 5, 1983.

³⁷ *NATO Review*, 1981, No. 2, pp. 12-16.

SOME TRENDS IN SEOUL'S FOREIGN POLICY

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 86 pp 90-101

[Article by O. V. Davydov and V. V. Mikheyev]

In the early 1980s the US intensified its policies in Asia. Considering the Asia-Pacific region of great importance to US global strategic interests, Washington wants to create there, just as in Western Europe, a new front to counterbalance the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and to fight against the national liberation movement. It has set itself the task of changing the military-political balance of forces in the region in favour of the US by setting up a new nuclear missile staging area in the Far East as close as possible to Soviet borders, tying up the military and economic resources of some Asian countries with the US military potential and establishing eventually a comprehensive military-political structure similar to NATO.

A policy like that cannot but evoke a negative reaction among most of the countries in the region. Under the circumstances the US has to look for new methods of enhancing its influence in Asia. It openly pins hopes on searches for and strengthening of Washington's strongholds in those Asian states whose rulers side with US policy. Drawn into the sphere of US influence, those regimes in their turn seek to use the situation in their own interests.

This is largely true of South Korea, whose economic potential, strategic position marked by proximity to the borders of the USSR and other Asian socialist countries and growing military-political options arouse constant interest on the part of the US which is out to involve Seoul ever more actively in its hegemonistic course in Asia and the Pacific. The South Korean rulers see close contacts with Washington as an important guarantee of the existence of their regime and, in recent times, as a favourable opportunity to try and extend its clout in regional affairs.

A product of the "cold war", the South Korean regime, whose emergence and existence were determined by the needs of Washington's imperial policy in Asia, has since the very outset been an obedient instrument of the imperialist forces. The foreign policy actions of the regime, which for many years has been parasitising on international tensions, are characterised by rabid anti-Communism and aggressiveness. Seoul's appeals to build up forces to "vanquish Communism" are attuned to the policy of rigid confrontation with the forces of socialism and progress pursued by imperialism, first and foremost American imperialism.

At the same time the mechanism of Seoul's cooperation with its imperialist partners, which had for a fairly long period been functioning unflinchingly, began to flounder as political climate changed in Asia in the mid-1970s. Seoul grew suspicious towards the restructuring of the imperialist military-political system in the Far East on the basis of the concept of the "regional balance of forces" and also towards Washington's and Tokyo's manoeuvres with respect to Peking. It feared lest Washington's "withdrawal" from Asia should inevitably shatter the American guarantees of the existence of the anti-popular regime in South Korea.

Under the circumstances the South Korean rulers undertook to work out some long-term foreign policy steps to compensate for the setbacks caused by the changes in the international situation unfavourable for Seoul and to ensure the regime's adaptation to the new situation in the region. The new strategy, in particular, boiled down to the idea to preserve the political and ideological principles of the regime intact and to ensure its survival by introducing certain changes in South Korean foreign policy. The strategy aimed at alleviating its isolation from the outside world and diversifying the foreign political contacts of the regime. The so-called "economic diplomacy" was to become the main instrument of Seoul's foreign policy, which in the opinion of South Korean leaders, should in fact work towards ensuring South Korea's preponderance in the countries, with which it has no diplomatic relations and towards strengthening its position on the international scene.¹

Shifts in the foreign policy pursued by the Park Chung Hee administration in the first half of the 1970s and also some discomfiture in Seoul's relations with its imperialist partners were also closely linked with changes in the South Korean socio-economic structure in the late 1960s-the early 1970s. Massive US economic "aid" was used by the Park Chung Hee regime to consolidate the economic and political bedrock of the government and to carry through the South Korean version of "white revolution", the bourgeois bureaucratic interpretation of the real needs of socio-economic development. As a consequence, political initiative was gradually taken over by the bourgeois bureaucratic circles, which set its sights on facilitating the capitalist modernisation of South Korea. Changes in the basis induced by rapid economic growth and industrialisation led to the emergence in South Korea of components of state-monopoly structures, to the development of the export-oriented economy and, as a consequence, to its active involvement in the world capitalist economy.

All these socio-economic processes were influencing Seoul's foreign policy. The need to enter worldwide economic relations and a search for new markets made it necessary to diversify international contacts and to pursue a foreign policy which would energetically satisfy the requirements of economic growth. As the specific interests of South Korean monopolies and big bourgeoisie were shaping up, its foreign policy evolved towards autonomy with external trappings of self-assertion and even with some ambitions towards imperialist allies.

These shifts, naturally, could not affect Seoul's pro-imperialist course on the international scene. What was becoming more and more obvious, however, was the desire of the Seoul authorities to use the increased economic, political and military potentialities of the country to accomplish certain foreign-policy objectives, namely, to enhance South Korea's prestige on the world scene, to secure better external conditions for the survival of the anti-popular regime, consistently to pursue a course towards isolating the DPRK, to counter more vigorously the forces of socialism and progress on the international scene and to gain more advantage within the US-South Korean alliance and in relations with Japan.

After a new leader, Chun Doo Hwan, had come to power in October 1979, South Korea's international course had not been radically changed. Generally speaking, the foreign policy strategy of the new administration was geared to accomplish the tasks inherited from the late dictator Park Chung Hee.

However, recently emphasis shifted to military means and the use of force in pursuit of foreign policy and attempts to use the growing military potential as the main tool of "invigorating" foreign policy became more obvious. At the same time Seoul's diplomacy is relying heavily on outright demagoguery in its foreign policy propaganda, on "peaceable" rhetoric

¹ *Korea Herald*, Nov. 26, 1977.

and even on some "anti-imperialist" slogans to offset a patently militaristic tilt in the foreign policy of the regime and to mask its true goals and methods.

The Seoul leaders are constantly trying to exploit the present-day international situation and world tensions to bolster their positions in the imperialist camp. They make no secret of the fact that their growing war preparations are a part of the overall military efforts of the West claiming that any military weakness displayed by the countries of the Western alliance will have a negative effect on the cause of world peace.² Advocating and supporting Washington's hard line towards the USSR, the DPRK and other socialist countries, South Korean leaders are holding up their own possibilities in pursuing a policy of containment of communism and struggle against "Soviet military expansion" on the regional level.

Seoul believes that South Korea can be made into a "regional force" through strengthening its alliance with the United States. The US strategy of coordinating the actions of its closest allies in Asia in a "crusade" against the forces of progress is fully shared by Seoul, which believes that South Korea's energetic participation in a multilateral military and political alliance that is being cobbled together by Washington in the Far East will become a major practical step in invigorating South Korea's foreign policy and in bolstering its relations with the West and with conservative regimes in Asia.

Right after its installation, the Chun Doo Hwan administration set out to smooth over certain differences in relations with Washington, which had emerged in the late 1970s in particular, because of President Carter's decision to withdraw US land troops from South Korea. It was with evident pleasure that Seoul reacted to statements made by senior US officials about the growing importance of the South Korean regime in Washington's strategy in Asia and the renunciation of the US plans to withdraw troops from South Korea. Chun Doo Hwan, for his part, stressed in one of his first speeches as the head of the regime, that contacts between South Korea and the USA had overgrown the framework of a mere military alliance and stated his regime's desire to have relations of mature and close partnership with the United States.³

The pompous celebrations of the centenary of the First American-Korean treaty and Chun Doo Hwan's visit to the USA in 1981 were called upon to signal the end of the "crisis" period in relations between Washington and Seoul and their transformation into "mature partnership". Reagan's visit to South Korea in November 1983, during which South Korea's importance to the USA both on a regional and on a global scale, became obvious, marked a new stage in strengthening strategic cooperation between Washington and Seoul. The joint communique on the results of the visit stressed, for the first time in the history of bilateral relations, that South Korea was vital to US security interests.⁴

The growing importance of South Korea in Washington's Asian policy is explained by the plans of the Reagan Administration to set the stage in the Korean Peninsula for tough confrontation with the USSR and the Asian socialist states and by the attempts to involve Seoul even more in its plans to build up an "Eastern Front" of imperialism. The USA today tends to reckon to a greater extent both with the increased economic, scientific, technical and military potential of South Korea and with the ambitions its leaders display wishing to play the role of a "new regional force" in Asia and the Pacific.

² *Korea Herald*, Aug. 20, 1983.

³ See *Korea Annual*, Seoul, 1982, p. 401.

⁴ *Korea Newsreview*, Nov. 19, 1983, p. 8.

The significance and functions of US troops in South Korea have been revised accordingly and they are viewed today as "a factor indispensable for maintaining peace not only in the Korean Peninsula but in Northeast Asia as a whole". The decision was taken to increase the troop contingent by 2,500. Under the resolutions of the 16th US-South Korean Consultative Meeting on Security in May 1984, the US airforce in South Korea was reinforced by a wing of advanced F-16 fighter bombers (72 planes), a squadron of A-10 attack planes (24 planes), and new Cobra and Blackhawk helicopters.⁵

The peaceloving public is worried by the Pentagon's plans to deploy in the Korean Peninsula new forward-based nuclear systems in addition to hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons which have been stationed in South Korea since the late 1950s. According to press reports, the USA is studying the possibility to introduce neutron weapons and Pershing-2 medium-range nuclear missiles in South Korea. Plans have been drawn up to increase the US military potential in the region with ground-based Tomahawk cruise missiles to "protect" international straits.⁶

Present-day US strategy towards the Korean Peninsula implies not only fortification of the South Korean staging area militarily by modernising the Seoul army and increasing US military presence. Another objective is to encourage military cooperation between South Korea and Japan and to organise close tripartite coordination in that field so as to lay the basis, as American strategists hope, for building up a "regional security system".

The "harmonisation" of Japanese-South Korean relations, in Washington's view, should become a landmark on this road. One of the causes of instability in South Korean-Japanese relations was mistrust the South Korean people and even some politicians showed in relation to the Japanese leaders. It had its roots in the ruthless colonial policy pursued by the Japanese military in Korea in the period up to 1945. Many South Koreans believe that the economic expansion of Japanese monopolies, which swamped South Korea after the establishment of diplomatic relations between Seoul and Tokyo, could lead to Japan's "second invasion". The approval by the Japanese authorities in July 1982 of new history textbooks, which grossly misrepresented the history of Japanese-Korean relations and falsified Japan's colonial policy in Korea, caused mass outrage in South Korea.

However, in recent time the efforts of Japanese and South Korean diplomacy to dampen contradictions between Seoul and Tokyo or at least to push them aside in favour of "strategic partnership" between Washington's two chief allies in the Far East, have been more and more obvious. Clearly, these efforts are being directed from the other side of the ocean.

A session of the Japanese-South Korean parliamentary union stated in Tokyo in December 1982, that the early settlement of the problems existing between the two countries would meet the interests of both sides.⁷ The visit of Japanese Premier Nakasone to South Korea in January 1983, was an attempt drastically to improve relations between Seoul and Tokyo. His talks with South Korean leaders centred on the invigoration of military and political cooperation between Japan and South Korea. According to the press, Nakasone made his militarist statements

⁵ *Korea Herald*, May 13, 1984.

⁶ *Ibidem.*, Jan. 20, 1983.

⁷ *Ibidem.*, Dec. 23, 1982.

about his readiness to make Japan an "unsinkable aircraft-carrier" of the USA and vigorously to contribute to a blockade of international straits right after his consultations with South Korean leaders. A four-billion-dollar loan officially meant to finance South Korea's next five-year economic development plan, is bound to lay material foundations for the emergent cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo in matters of security.

The shift of gravity to military and political cooperation in Japanese-South Korean relations became apparent after the first visit of the head of the Seoul regime to Japan in September 1984. The results of the visit were touted in Seoul as a major success of South Korean diplomacy, which had ushered in a "new age" in relations with Japan on the basis of the "common ideals of peace, freedom and democracy". South Korean propaganda had a field day extolling among other things the fact that the Japanese Emperor had said during his meeting with Chun Doo Hwan he "regretted" the "unhappy period" in bilateral relations and expressed the hope that the past would never return.

The main goal of the visit of the Seoul leader—"discussions on security problems"—well fitted in the "new chapter" of Japanese-South Korean relations. It was stressed by the South Korean side that, given the escalation of "the Soviet military potential and the North Korean threat" in the Far East, "Japanese-South Korean relations are the key to peace and security in the region". The Japanese Premier, for his part, spoke highly of Seoul's war preparations as "a contribution to maintaining peace in the peninsula". According to press reports, as the chiefs of staff of the Japanese and South Korean armed forces held talks on problems of military cooperation, they extensively discussed possible cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo in patrolling sea-lanes within a 1,000-mile zone around the Japanese Isles and in blockading international straits.

Relations of "mature partnership" between the South Korean ruling elite and imperialism presuppose not only a more concrete role and functions of Seoul in Washington's military-political strategy but also the former's active involvement in the implementation of major social and class-motivated tasks in the zone of the national liberation movement. Using the Seoul regime as its "agent" in the developing world, Washington is seeking to consolidate the pro-American orientation of a number of developing countries, to impose on them neocolonialist methods of solving the problems facing them and thus to shore up the positions of capitalism in the "Third World."

Pursuing these objectives, the USA is goading Seoul into a more energetic and outwardly better balanced line in international affairs. Washington is even prepared to recognise, within certain limits, the "autonomy" of the South Korean regime's foreign policy, naturally, guaranteed by imperialism, and to give its partner a free hand, again within specified bounds, in pursuing its own expansionist policy. The US strategists consider this approach promising also because Seoul diplomacy has lately stepped up its own efforts vis-à-vis the newly-independent countries. Attempts are being made to prove that South Korea is a part of the developing world, shares its interests and concerns and supports its efforts in the struggle for a new international economic order. Seoul is even stating its readiness to join the nonaligned movement.

Contacts with the developing world are viewed by Seoul not only as a factor of strengthening its international positions and increasing its "political weight" but also as a possible way of resolving its own economic problems. The intensified activity of South Korean companies on the markets of a number of Western states has dramatically aggravated ri-

valry between them and the monopolies of those countries. Tough protectionist measures recently introduced to check South Korean exports have been blocking access to those markets for South Korean goods and worsening the terms of Seoul's trade with its leading partners in the developed capitalist world. For instance, in the first half of 1984, about 43.8 per cent of the total South Korean exports to Western countries, worth about \$4,234 million, were subjected to restrictions, with basic export items hit particularly hard (63.8 per cent of textiles, 62.7 per cent of steel and 85.6 per cent of footwear). Protectionist measures introduced by the USA affected almost one half of the total South Korean exports (42.5 per cent in 1983). The damage was tangible because the United States, Seoul's major trade partner, absorbs about 37 per cent of South Korean exports.⁸

South Korea is particularly worried by its trade relations with Japan. Seoul voiced its displeasure with the "closed Japanese market" and with Japan's obvious unwillingness to share advanced technology and know-how with its partner. The chronic imbalance of bilateral trade remains an acute problem. In 1984, South Korea ran up a deficit of \$2.8 billion in trade with Japan, which is more than its surplus in trade with all the other countries. Seoul's total deficit in trade with Japan between 1965 and 1983 reached \$30 billion.⁹

Economic contradictions have caused frictions between the Seoul regime and Western countries, threatening the strategic partnership between the USA, Japan and South Korea.

In this situation Seoul diplomacy is seeking to diversify the country's economic contacts and to expand the operations of South Korean companies primarily in the markets of the developing countries. The expansion of South Korean monopolies into those countries is being carried out through joint ventures in the development of natural resources of the developing countries and also through the construction of projects in infrastructure and industries by South Korean companies. Between 1973 and 1983, the annual value of contracts secured by those companies to build projects abroad grew from \$174.3 million to \$10.400 million. By the end of 1984, they had concluded contracts for construction projects in the developing countries to the total value of \$73,300 million.¹⁰

This new trend in the foreign policy of the Seoul regime made itself felt particularly strongly in the results of Chun Doo Hwan's visit to ASEAN countries in the summer of 1981 and to several African countries in August 1982; according to South Korean propaganda those visits laid the foundations of a "new age" of Seoul's extensive cooperation with the "Third World" countries.¹¹ Banking on the struggle waged by the developing countries against neocolonialism and their efforts to overcome their economic backwardness, the leader of the Seoul regime stated the need to build "a multi-lateral system of South-South cooperation" on the basis of the principle of "collective self-reliance"; that system is meant to incorporate South Korea.¹² Seoul diplomacy also touted the South Korean "experience" of the capitalist modernisation of the economy and the regime's ability to render "broad assistance" to developing countries in their national construction programmes.

These statements of the Seoul leaders were backed with a number of practical steps, intended to demonstrate Seoul's "sincerity" with regard to newly-free countries. South Korea has been rendering "free economic aid" to a number of countries since 1975. Altogether, \$7 million were set

⁸ *Korea Herald*, Nov. 10, 1984.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1984.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Dec. 18, 1984.

¹¹ *Korea Newsreview*, Sept. 4, 1982, p. 6.

¹² *Ibid.*

aside for aid programmes in 1984 while the figure for 1985 is to reach \$10 million.¹³ In 1984, South Korea enrolled 865 specialists from developing countries for education and production training.

A special programme was drawn up in 1982 and a number of South Korean organisations are carrying out agroengineering, irrigation and regional development programmes in other countries, organising preparatory courses for students from the developing world and practising technology transfer to developing countries. At present South Korea has come up with a long-term comprehensive programme for "economic aid" to developing countries.

It is easy to see that Seoul's flirting with these countries is meant to secure support for the latest foreign-policy actions of the Seoul regime and also to set the stage in the developing world for the extensive operations of South Korean monopolies. Moreover, rhetoric about the need to broaden cooperation among developing countries and to establish a "front of development" belies the attempts of Seoul and its imperialist partners to prepare the ground for putting together a grouping of developing countries that would be dominated by South Korea and other countries with conservative pro-Western regimes. That grouping, oriented to "capitalist values" and close contacts with imperialism, could, in the view of its architects, become an alternative to the nonaligned movement and counter the national liberation movement.

At present the South Korean leaders are increasingly inclined to view the Asia-Pacific region as the main area of their economic and diplomatic activities. They believe that the consolidation of the regime's positions in the Pacific will help raise the international status of South Korea and increase its economic potential.¹⁴

The countries of the region today account for more than 50 per cent of South Korea's foreign trade, they supply 95 per cent of Seoul's rubber imports, 90 per cent of its tin imports and 80 per cent of its timber imports. In the early 1980s, South Korean companies were engaged in 50 joint projects with firms of Pacific countries, and showed particular interest in the joint development of natural resources in those countries.¹⁵ States of that region are becoming targets for South Korean building companies. In 1983 they accounted for 8.7 per cent (\$905 million) of the total volume of international building contracts. Now that fewer building contracts are offered by the Middle and Near East countries, the region is being viewed by Seoul as the second largest potential market of building contracts.¹⁶

Ever more persistent attempts have been made by the South Korean leaders in the recent period to expand their contacts with a number of Asian countries through involving them in military-political cooperation. They are trying to prove a "dependence" between the security of the non-socialist Southeast Asian countries and the stabilisation of the undemocratic South Korean regime, and the "community" of the strategic interests of Seoul and the ASEAN countries. Seoul diplomacy is trying to assert this interpretation of the character of relations with those countries on an intergovernmental level and is taking practical steps to further military cooperation with ASEAN countries.

¹³ *Korea Herald*, Jan. 9, 1985.

¹⁴ *Ibidem.*, Jan. 11, 1985.

¹⁵ See A. B. Parkansky, *US Economic Interests in Asia and the Pacific*, Moscow, 1983, p. 184 (in Russian); see *Korea Herald*, Dec. 2, 1982.

¹⁶ *Korea Herald*, July 15, 1984.

The Chun Doo Hwan administration believes it to be possible to increase its involvement in regional affairs by way of broader participation in the processes of regional integration and by facilitating economic and political cooperation with capitalist and developing countries in the Pacific on a multilateral as well as on a bilateral basis.

Seoul enthusiastically responded to Tokyo's proposal to establish a Pacific Community, by which Tokyo tried to reinforce its hegemonistic ambitions in the region. Without rejecting the Japanese initiatives, the South Korean leaders came up with their own doctrine. Since the early 1980s, the formulation of the regime's Pacific strategy has been a matter of special concern for the South Korean foreign policy agencies, while ideas which emerged in this context were tested in a series of contacts between governments. The communique on the results of the meeting of Chun Doo Hwan with Ronald Reagan in February 1981 stressed the desire of the sides to take joint efforts to broaden international cooperation in the Pacific.¹⁷

Chun Doo Hwan also offered the South Korean interpretation of the nature and characteristics of the "Pacific Age". In May 1982, the head of the Seoul regime came up with the idea to convene a Pacific summit conference, and in July formulated principles of cooperation in the region in the following way: the establishment of a permanent consultative body of the heads of state in the region; promotion of exchanges in trade, the economy and culture and exploration of the potentialities of the countries of the region; broader cooperation between the developed and developing countries of the region, and also among its developing countries. It was also stated that the hegemony of any country or group of countries was inadmissible and that the Pacific Community should not be allowed to become a political bloc.¹⁸ Proceeding from these recommendations it is planned to develop exchanges of information on long-term economic planning and personnel training, to practise joint financing and investment, to exchange knowhow, to launch economic development projects through the international division of labour and to expand mutually beneficial trade in the community.

Seoul obviously hopes that its political initiative will evoke more sympathy than proposals made by Western countries. Trying to reassure the countries of the region, which are growing suspicious and sceptical towards the South Korean concept of the Pacific Community, the Seoul leaders say that South Korea is not big enough to be mistrusted by Asian countries. They are trying to prove that the Community set up according to the South Korean scenario could help work out "a single approach of the South" to the developed countries of the region and that one of its tasks should be to build up the possibilities of the region's small countries in trading with big ones.¹⁹

Seeking ASEAN countries' support for its proposals, Seoul stresses that the Association would be a kind of "nucleus" of a broader regional grouping in the Pacific. For this reason relations between South Korea and ASEAN are characterised as the central axis of the Pacific Community and a model of mutually complementary economic cooperation.²⁰

Seoul's attempts to prepare the ground for a further rapprochement with non-socialist countries of Asia, especially with the ASEAN states, derives not only from purely economic considerations but also from the regime's ambitions to assert itself as the leader of the grouping of countries and territories which are outstripping the bulk of the Asian coun-

¹⁷ *Korea Annual*, 1981, p. 419.

¹⁸ *Korea Newsreview*, Jan. 1, 1983, p. 8.

¹⁹ *Korea Herald*, Dec. 22, 1982.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

tries in economic development. Seoul's claims to the "decisive role" in reshaping the Pacific situation are justified by the concept that South Korea as a "newly industrialised country" occupies intermediate position between the developed and developing countries of the region and is therefore destined to cement relations between them.²¹

Trying to implement these ideas in practice, Seoul is seeking a vigorous role in the system of "regional cooperation" in the Pacific, in particular, through private international economic organisations. The South Korean leaders hope that their active participation in creating the routine machinery of regional cooperation will secure them the role of "coordinators" of the system of the Pacific Community. At present South Korea is a member of the Conference for Economic Cooperation in the Pacific, the Economic Council of the Pacific Countries, the Confederation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Asia and the Pacific, and maintains close contacts with the Pacific Council for Trade and Development.

Although the South Korean leaders are touting the "independence" of their concept of the Pacific Community and even distance themselves from certain proposals made by the USA and Japan, it is beyond doubt that Seoul's initiatives are, on the whole, levelled with the efforts of Washington and Tokyo in that field and dovetailed with the militarist strategy of imperialism in the region. The imperialist forces clearly would like to intensify Seoul's economic and military-strategic cooperation with the ASEAN countries and other developing states in the region so as to create additional means of pressure on those countries, involving them in the arms race and eventually incorporating them into the imperialist strategy of military blocs.

It is symptomatic that the Seoul leaders are constantly claiming that South Korea and non-socialist countries of the region are being brought together not only by the need to usher in the great Pacific Age but also by their common interest in protecting their countries from the "communist threat".²²

Exposing the true goals the Seoul regime and its imperialist partners in Asia and the Pacific pursue, *Nodon Sinmun* wrote: "The United States is aiming at bringing closer together its allies in the region, including Japan and the puppet South Korean regime, so as to accomplish the following tasks: in politics—to establish a military bloc as a counterweight to the progressive countries of the region; in the economy—to put together a Pacific Economic Community based on the EEC model to impose an economic blockade on independent countries of the region; and in the military field to cobble together a military bloc similar to NATO to strangle by collective military intervention the struggle waged by the peoples of the region for independence."²³

The Seoul leaders claim that their course of participating in the setting up of a system of regional cooperation among the Pacific countries reflects the regime's commitment to "multipolar diplomacy", which presumably underlies the foreign policy strategy of the Chun Doo Hwan administration. Another important component of this strategy, according to official statements, is an "open-door policy" towards those countries with which Seoul has no diplomatic relations. Trying to camouflage the

²¹ *Korea Herald*, Dec. 22, 1982.

²² *Korea Herald*, Oct. 5, 1982.

²³ *Nodon Sinmun*, Jan. 28, 1983.

blatantly dictatorial regime with discourses on South Korea's contribution to "the cause of prosperity, development and friendship all over the world", Seoul is demagogically stating its readiness to develop relations on this basis and to trade with communist countries regardless of differences between ideologies and political systems.²⁴

In the context of the "open-door policy" emphasis has lately shifted on attempts to establish contacts with the PRC. This task is gradually becoming a priority in South Korean foreign policy. Seoul has decided that the possible involvement of South Korean diplomacy in the strategic manoeuvres of the USA and Japan with regard to China promises political and economic benefits for the regime and may contribute to "the advancement of South Korea into the focus of the international scene".

South Korea has lately toned down or even dropped altogether its criticism of the foreign and domestic policies of the Chinese leadership. Moreover, it even claims that China can contribute to regional stability by improving relations with South Korea.²⁵ Seoul also takes account of certain developments in the PRC's stand on the Korean problem, in particular, the softening of its former hard line with regard to the Chun Doo Hwan regime.

The first official contacts between China and South Korea took place in May 1983 following the hijacking of a Chinese civilian plane. A representative delegation led by Shen Tu, head of the Main Civil Aviation Administration of the PRC, paid a visit to Seoul. The joint memorandum on the results of the talks noted that both sides expressed the hope for the maintenance of the spirit of cooperation in case of emergency circumstances in the future which may concern the interests of both sides. Seoul characterised the fact of these contacts and their results as an event of immense importance and a precedent for further contacts with China on the governmental level.²⁶

South Korean diplomacy hopes to consolidate these developments through sports contacts. South Korean athletes take part in international competitions in China and a pointedly cordial welcome is extended to Chinese sports teams, which have lately become frequent visitors to Seoul. The South Korean regime is even prepared to sacrifice its traditional allies for the sake of "big politics." For instance, a Taiwan team walked out of an international junior basketball tournament in Seoul in April 1984 in protest against the participation of a team from the PRC. This fact, however, did not dishearten South Korean leaders in the least: they announced with pride that thanks to a series of sports contacts, the ice of mistrust in bilateral relations has been broken and exchanges through the "bamboo curtain" initiated.²⁷ There are signs, according to the Western press, that unofficial contacts between Chinese and South Korean representatives will be expanded and spread into other fields. The *Los Angeles Times* says, for instance, that China is prepared for broad contacts with South Korea in the style of "people's diplomacy".²⁸

The South Koreans believe that good opportunities for the development of relations with China are offered by the expansion of China's contacts with the USA and Japan and by the Chinese leaders' interest in speeding up the economic modernisation of the country. A special survey made by the South Korean Institute of Industry and Technology draws the conclusion that the expansion of China's trade contacts with those

²⁴ *Korea Herald*, Feb. 23, 1983.

²⁵ *Korea Herald*, Nov. 3, 1984.

²⁶ *Korea Newsreview*, May 14, 1983, p. 7.

²⁷ *Korea Herald*, May 1, 1984.

²⁸ *Los Angeles Times*, April 17, 1984.

countries will also boost trade between the PRC and South Korea. The South Korean companies hope to make inroads into the Chinese market through joint ventures with Japan or as subcontractors of Japanese and American firms which are trading with the PRC or investing in its economy.²⁹ Seoul is holding up for China seemingly tempting offers of "mutually complementary cooperation" in trade, capital investment, technology and construction.

The trend towards expanding indirect trade between South Korea and China has been strengthening since the late 1970s. South Korean businessmen see China as the potentially third largest market for their goods after the USA and Japan. The well-informed *Newsweek* has estimated that trade between the two countries has reached the value of \$800 million a year.³⁰ South Korean trade companies would like to import more mineral raw materials, especially oil and coal, and also grain, fabrics and food, from China and are willing to expand industrial exports to it.

The PRC is conducting about 80 per cent of its commercial operations with Seoul through Hong Kong, where 75 offices and branches of major South Korean trade and manufacturing companies and banks are situated at present.³¹ Direct contacts between Chinese economic officials and South Korean businessmen have become more extensive as well. For instance, the head of the influential South Korean manufacturing and trade company Taewoo paid a visit to the PRC in early January 1985. All this is giving the South Korean businessmen the hope that bilateral trade will keep growing and may become open at some point in the future.

It is beyond doubt that the growing activity of South Korean business in regard to the PRC is being directed and encouraged by the Seoul leaders, who want to put any contacts between South Korean juridical or private persons and China in the context of not only commercial benefit but of primarily political interests, namely, the consolidation of the domestic and international positions of the regime. Characterising the importance of growing contacts with China in "non-political" areas, Chun Doo Hwan claimed that change in Peking's attitude to South Korea was conducive to the stabilisation of the situation in the Korean Peninsula and around it.³²

The Seoul administration would like to establish centralised control over growing contacts with China and is now considering the setting up of a special coordinating body to oversee all contacts with China, including trade, cooperation in technology and knowhow, joint construction projects and cultural, sports and scientific exchanges.³³ The policy of the Seoul authorities towards China at the present stage therefore aims at developing a set of practical ties and establishing a mechanism of cooperation between South Korea and China so as to lay the foundations for the future expansion of bilateral relations and their transfer into the sphere of politics.

The efforts of South Korean leaders to develop relations with China are being made in close cooperation with their senior partners and with their vigorous support. Washington and Tokyo miss no opportunity to state their readiness to mediate in this relationship. Exploiting China's interest in achieving understanding with the West on the Korean problem, Washington is trying to open, with Seoul's participation, another area of strategic partnership with the PRC and to involve it in joint actions in the region. Senior officials of the US administration hint that "the defen-

²⁹ *Korea Herald*, Nov. 6, 1984.

³⁰ *Newsweek*, Jan. 14, 1985.

³¹ *Izvestia*, Jan. 29, 1985.

³² *Korea Herald*, Oct. 6, 1984.

³³ *Korea Herald*, Dec. 9, 1984.

ce efforts of Japan, China, and South Korea have the potential to affect the global balance of power more profoundly perhaps than those of any other countries..."³⁴

South Korea's foreign policy, aimed at teaming up and cooperating with US imperialism, is an additional factor that aggravates political tensions in the Far East as a whole and in the Korean Peninsula in particular. The war preparations of the Seoul authorities are posing an immediate threat to the peaceful development of the DPRK and blocking the reunification of Korea on a peaceful and democratic basis without outside interference, through the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea.

Attaching much importance to the relaxation of tension in the Korean Peninsula and in the Far East as a whole, the Soviet Union is pursuing a consistent policy of ensuring peace and security in that region. The USSR views the DPRK's foreign-policy line towards the reunification of the country as an important factor furthering peace, and is seeking to broaden political cooperation with the DPRK in the interests of our common security. The Soviet Union supports the DPRK's initiatives aimed at the reunification of two Koreas, at the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Peninsula, and its other foreign-policy actions aimed at containing Seoul's aggressive ambitions and preventing the emergence of a new military and political bloc in the Far East.

³⁴ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, No. 2, Jan. 12, 1984.

CERTAIN PROBLEMS OF THE CHINESE COUNTRYSIDE TODAY

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 86 pp 102-110

[Article by L. A. Volkova, candidate of economic sciences]

The rural economic reform, which started in the late 1970s, has gone through several stages of development. In 1979-1980, measures were taken to give production teams some economic independence and to restore to a certain extent the principle of material interest among the peasants. Introduced were such forms of production responsibility as fixed tasks for groups formed within teams and contracts to do certain types of work with remuneration according to the accepted quotas. In 1981-1982, this was replaced by the fixing of work tasks for peasant households and then their complete responsibility for production, referred to as household or family contract.

Addressing a conference of the secretaries of rural Party organisations in November 1982, Deputy Premier of the PRC State Council, Wan Li, explained the essence of the above-mentioned changes in the following way:

"...From payment for work with no account for the results of production to payment on the basis of such an account; from fixing tasks in individual types of work to fixing production tasks and further on to making peasants completely responsible for production; from the former ban on the fixing of production tasks for households to a subsequent acceptance of this organisational and economic form and to its development to the stage when households are made fully responsible for production. This practice is established as the main form of production responsibility in most of the country's regions."¹

The directive of the 12th CPC Congress (September 1982) to use different forms of economic management was implemented in the countryside through expanding the scale of using family contracts on the basis of the collective ownership of land and also through the legalisation and development of individual peasant farmsteads.

The family or household contract as a form of production responsibility tying remuneration with the result of production became established in the Chinese rural economic structure in 1983, as a result of which the economic functions of the people's communes were cancelled.

The period from 1983 saw growing economic independence of the peasant household. This development trend was sanctioned in directives adopted in 1983-1984. The CPC Central Committee's document No. 1 issued in 1983, "Some Problems of Economic Policy in the Countryside Today",² envisioned to allow peasants: 1. to sell and purchase farm produce freely after meeting the planned targets for supplies and obligatory purchases; 2. to undertake transportation of farm produce at big distances and also engage in small-scale trade; 3. to buy agricultural machin-

¹ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 23, 1982.

² *Renmin ribao*, April 10, 1983.

ery, implements and means of transportation; 4. to employ various forms of using money, machinery and workforce. In fact it was allowed to hire workforce in the form of "enlisting specialists", "giving aid", taking in relatives and so on. Domestic and small-scale industrial enterprises in the countryside were allowed to have from 7 to 11 apprentices.

The "Notification on the Work in the Countryside in 1984" passed by the CPC Central Committee in January 1984, the Chinese press informed,³ reiterated the basic directives of the previous document and deepened them in some aspects. This primarily refers to the extension of the term of contracting land allocated by the production team to a peasant family. It was extended from 3-5 years to 15 or more years. In regions with unfavourable climatic conditions and in remote and mountainous areas plots of land are given for longer periods, up to 30 years. For afforestation, plots of land can be contracted for 50 years and can be even inherited.⁴

Document No. 1 passed by the CPC Central Committee in 1984 stressed the need to "encourage the gradual concentration of land in the hands of experienced farmers".⁵ The document allowed the commune members whose families were short of hands to till the plots of land received on contract, and also those who did not want to engage in farming nor took land on contract or else who took but a small plot of land to transfer their plots to teams for further redistribution in a unified way. Peasants were also allowed to find on their own, with the agreement of the team, anybody willing to contract land allocated to them and to come to terms on the transfer of contract.

The main reasons for transferring contracts are shortages of workforce and finances to engage in farming, the impossibility to meet contract conditions for other reasons, and switching over to other agricultural sectors, subsidiary trades or urban jobs. For example, 40 yuan a year had to be paid for 1 *mu* (1/15 hectare) of land received on contract in the Hubei province,⁶ and 27 yuan in the Jiangsu province,⁷ which many peasants found beyond their means. According to a survey of the Putuan commune in the suburb of Ezhou, the Hubei province, 56.6 per cent of the total number of households renounced contracts for lack of workforce and finances to run their farms, many were unable to fulfil their commitments in delivery and selling farm produce specified in the team contract, while 43.4 per cent of households moved to other agricultural sectors or subsidiary trades or else sought urban employment.⁸

Document No. 1 of the CPC Central Committee of 1984 as well as the Chinese press stressed the need to give a certain compensation to peasants, who had invested in land, in case of the surrender of land contract.

The scale of the transfer of land contracts from some households to others was insignificant in the country as a whole. The process of concentrating land in the hands of "skilled farmers" specialising for the most part in plant-growing was unevenly distributed in the individual regions of the country and on the whole not very intensive. It was observed above all in densely populated and economically developed regions where plots of land given on contract were approximately half the medium size, in particular the Jiangsu, Hubei, Zhejiang and Shandong provinces. For instance, in the Muping district (Shandong province) 250 households specialising in grain-growing cultivated 21,000 *mu* of arable land in 1984,

³ See *Ibid.*, June 12, 1984.

⁴ *Ibid.*, June 15, 1984.

⁵ *Ibid.*, June 12, 1984.

⁶ *Ibid.*, April 5, 1985.

⁷ See *Nongmin ribao*, Jan. 5, 1985.

⁸ Calculated from *Hongqi*, No. 8, 1984, p. 24.

that is, each household had, on average, 84 *mu* of land.⁹ This is approximately 10 times the mean size of an arable plot per family (household) throughout the country. The Chinese press also pointed out that there appeared specialised households in farming which took on contract plots of 66 hectares and plots of similar area for afforestation.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the share of such households in the total number is so far modest, as is attested by the data cited by the Chinese press for individual regions.

In suburban areas where peasants, as a rule, have stable and considerable earnings from non-agricultural economic sectors, land contracts are transferred more frequently and on this basis land plots are concentrated faster than in other regions of the country. Thus, approximately 20 per cent of peasant households renounce land cultivation in the suburbs of some major cities in the economically better developed coastal regions of China.¹¹ In the Jiangmen suburbs (Guangdong province) 20,000 families cultivated about 5 per cent of ploughed land in 1984, with every family having on average a big plot of 20-30 *mu*.¹² Households with big contracted plots come into being quicker in the regions where there is much land, the mechanisation level of ploughing is comparatively high and contracted plots are, as a rule, situated in the same area. This primarily refers to provinces of Northeastern China. In the Yingkou county (Liaoning province), for instance, five per cent of the peasant households increased the size of contracted plots in 1984.¹³

In regions which are economically less developed, short of ploughed areas and which have plant-growing as a predominant branch in the production structure, peasants do not refuse to contract land but, on the contrary, seek to expand the area of their plots. In the villages where diversified agriculture is comparatively well developed peasants are normally unwilling to till more land than they contracted nor do they want to move to town. In such regions, they find it difficult to set up big farms and to concentrate contracted land. In some places they even resorted to the forced transfer of contracts from some households to others but it should be pointed out that such measures were criticised by the Chinese press.¹⁴

Growing independence of peasant households was promoted by the resolution to allow peasants to buy machinery and means of transportation (including lorries). At the same time farm machinery, first and foremost tractors, which formerly formed the collective property of teams is transferred on contract or sold to peasants. For example, more than a half of the 1,470,000 tractors formerly in collective property were transferred on contract to peasant families in late 1983.¹⁵

In the period from 1981 to 1984 peasants purchased or received the main types of farm machinery fairly vigorously. By late 1984, already 68 per cent of all types of tractors were at the disposal of peasants, including 280,000 or 32.7 per cent of the total number of large and medium tractors and 2.5 million or 75 per cent of small-size and manually operated tractors.¹⁶ As is seen, a bigger portion of the tractor fleet was owned and used by peasant families, including three quarters of the entire number of small-size and manually operated tractors. The number of lorries bought primarily by the peasant households specialising in transportation also grew fairly quickly. In 1983, the peasant households owned and used

⁹ See *Nongmin ribao*, Jan. 21, 1985.

¹⁰ See *Jingji ribao*, Dec. 19, 1984.

¹¹ See *Nongye jingji wenti*, No. 1, 1985, p. 50.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ See, for example, *Nongye jingji wenti*, No. 1, 1985, p. 50.

¹⁵ See *Zhongguo jingji nianjian*, 1984, Beijing, 1984, pp. V-7.

¹⁶ *Nongmin ribao*, Jan. 1, 1985.

89,600 lorries, that is about 33 per cent of the total 274,750 lorries used in farming.¹⁷ In 1984, the number of lorries in the hands of, above all, specialised transportation households grew to 120,000¹⁸ out of the total of 345,000 employed in farming,¹⁹ which amounted to approximately 35 per cent.

Statistics shows that in the countryside demand is primarily growing for farm machinery, means of transportation, equipment for processing branches and so on, in keeping with the scale of family farming.

Economic relations between a team and peasant households are regulated by a contract signed between them (and sometimes by an oral agreement). It defines the commitments made by both sides, though these are fairly frequently broken by them.²⁰ In some areas teams exercise minimal economic management of households, while in other regions, on the contrary, it turns into petty tutelage by cadre workers. The Chinese press raised the question of the need for formalising the status of different forms of economic organisation in the countryside. Great attention is also attached to contracts, which are to become "a legislative form of contract relations in agricultural production, to have the power of law compulsory for the participating sides."²¹

An important line of the rural economic reform is the transformation of the structure of agricultural production towards reducing the share of plant-growing and increasing that of stock-raising, subsidiary crafts and the products of rural industries in gross agricultural output. Speaking at the national conference on work in the countryside (December 1984), Deputy Premier of the PRC State Council Wan Li listed the reform of the structure of agricultural production, the development of rural industries and the improvement of trade and finances as the key tasks in agriculture.²² Great attention was paid to these problems in CPC Central Committee Document No. 1 of 1985, "Ten Directives of the CPC CC and the PRC State Council on Further Boosting the Rural Economy".²³ It was pointed out in the press that in 1984 the share of plant-growing in gross agricultural output fell by approximately 3 per cent as compared with 1983.²⁴

Specialised households are to play significant role in changing the structure of agricultural production and raising its marketability. The latter on average amount to 70 per cent as compared with 25-30 per cent of the branch in general.²⁵ The households specialising in growing technical crops, stock-rearing, fishing, subsidiary trades and other branches have higher marketability than those specialising in grain-growing. Specifically, according to the data provided by the Statistical Bureau of the Fuling region (Sichuan province) marketability in pig-breeding stood at 56.7 per cent, overall marketability of stock-rearing exceeded 70 per cent and that of sugar cane, tobacco and tung-oil exceeded 90 per cent.²⁶

The share of specialised households supplying the market with stock-rearing and agricultural produce is much higher than their share in the total number of the households. For example, seven households specialising in poultry farming (the Dahe commune, the city of Shaoxing, Zhejiang province) accounted for two-thirds of the urban market demand

¹⁷ *Zhongguo jingji nianjian*, 1984...., p. V-7.

¹⁸ *Nongmin ribao*, Jan. 23, 1985.

¹⁹ *Renmin ribao*, March 10, 1985.

²⁰ *Renmin ribao*, June 17, 1985.

²¹ *Wenzhai bao*, Jan. 3, 1985.

²² *Renmin ribao*, March 1, 1985.

²³ *Ibid.*, March 25, 1985.

²⁴ *Nongmin ribao*, Jan. 4, 1985.

²⁵ *Hongqi*, No. 8, 1984, p. 20; *Guangming ribao*, Feb. 12, 1984.

²⁶ *Nongye jingji wenti*, No. 11, 1984, p. 17.

for ducks and duck eggs.²⁷ Forty per cent of the households in the Huguang county (Shanxi province) engaged in pig-breeding met the county target figures in live pig output by 60.5 per cent, the households specialising in rabbit-breeding (3.57 per cent of the total number of households) accounted for 95.6 per cent of the sales planned for the county.²⁸

The Chinese leaders take certain measures to raise the number of specialised households and still their number grew insignificantly in 1983-1984, reaching 25 million by the end of 1984, while their share in the total number of peasant households was about 14 per cent.²⁹

Certain regions saw the appearance of the so-called specialised villages where the majority of the population is engaged for the most part in one production sector, i. e., is specialising in, say, vegetable-growing or transportation. Reports about such villages came from the Henan, Liaoning, and Shanxi provinces.³⁰ These villages are not numerous in the country as a whole and come into being primarily in densely populated suburban areas. Specialised households were set up both in different agricultural branches, such as farming and stock-rearing, and in construction, transportation, industry, commerce and the services. By early 1985, specialised households in farming accounted for 35.9 per cent of the total number of specialised households,³¹ reaching almost 9 million. Their share in the plant-growing sphere is much higher. Specifically, in the Shanxi province 310,000 peasant households (6 per cent of their total number in the province) specialising in grain-growing cultivated 10.8 per cent of the ploughed area and produced 16.1 per cent of the total grain harvest in the province in 1983. These households accounted for 37 per cent of state purchases of grain planned for the entire province.³²

A total of over 6 million households specialised in stock-rearing and fishing, accounting for 24.6 per cent of the total number of specialised households.³³

Beginning with the early 1980s economic associations involving above all specialised households were set up in the countryside mostly on the basis of specialised production. As far as the methods of their formation and operation are concerned, the Chinese press singles out two types of such associations: "horizontal" and "vertical". The former are represented by small-size associations of several ordinary contracted or specialised households. As a rule, they come into being spontaneously, have weak economic relations between each other and often unite relatives. These types of associations are in the form of mutual labour assistance, cooperation on the basis of the joint use of machines, pooling the finances, etc.

Economic associations of the "vertical" type are formed around state or cooperative enterprises, in particular, around supply-and-marketing cooperatives and encompass a comparatively broad range of specialised households. They can be exemplified by different types of specialised companies and servicing stations. They often include enterprises of processing industries, transportation, and supply-and-sales agencies.

Specialised households join similar associations to improve the conditions of processing and selling their output, to obtain scientific and technical information, market news, credits, to purchase the necessary means of production and so on. That was how associations were formed between specialised households and a supply-and-marketing cooperative undertaking to sell poultry and eggs produced by those households and

²⁷ *Hongqi*, No. 8, 1984, p. 20.

²⁸ *Zhongguo jingji nianjian*, 1984..., p. V-5.

²⁹ *Nongmin ribao*, Jan. 4, 1985.

³⁰ *Zhongguo jingji nianjian*, p. V-6.

³¹ *Jingji ribao*, Jan. 26, 1985.

³² *Hongqi*, No. 8, 1984, p. 20.

³³ *Jingji ribao*, Jan. 26, 1985.

to supply them with fodder, as well as associations for joint ploughing, crop cultivation, combatting crop diseases and pests. Sometimes several households pool their financial resources to organise some enterprise or a workshop. By early 1985, the number of such joint ventures exceeded 500,000 and involved 2 million peasants.³⁴ The revenues from their operation are distributed in keeping with the degree of work inputs and their cash contribution. A share-holder in a cooperative enterprise may not be directly involved in its work but limit himself to contributing money or some production means. In this case the share-holder's profit would depend on his investment in the cooperative.

A new form of cooperative economic management, economic associations, have so far failed to become widespread in the countryside. In late 1984, they involved 4.5 million households, which accounted for 18 per cent of the total number of specialised households.³⁵ or 2.43 per cent of the overall number of peasant households. Well-known Chinese economist Du Runsheng pointed out that as far as economic associations were concerned, it was necessary first to go through the experimental stage and "there was no need to issue a call and immediately set up a lot of them."³⁶

The growth of the individual sector became one of the aspects of putting into effect the course towards the coexistence of different economic forms in the countryside. It also became a consequence of organisational and economic restructuring. The development of the individual and the collective sectors is viewed as a "long-term strategic policy".³⁷ Some individual peasant farms engage in small-scale crafts, trade and haulage and are, as a rule, considered specialised in these fields. By early 1985, they accounted for 33.6 per cent of the total number of the specialised households, with 19.2 per cent of them engaged in transportation, trade, construction and the services, and 14.4 per cent in small-size industries, cottage production and crafts.³⁸ The Chinese press refers to them as the households dealing in industry and trade.

In 1983-1985, the peasants were encouraged to open workshops and shops in small administrative units and villages and were granted certain easy terms in crediting and taxation. The number of the households involved in small-scale industry and trade was growing especially rapidly. In early 1983, they numbered 1,270,000 and by the end of the year the figure nearly trebled.³⁹ In late September 1984, such households had already numbered 6,125,000, with the total number of those working in them exceeding 8.4 million people.⁴⁰ This accounted for 77 per cent of the overall number employed in Chinese private industry and trade.

In some regions the share of peasants with individual farmsteads was fairly high. In one of the production teams in the Dangxian county (Shanxi province) one-third of all the specialised households (17.5 per cent of the total number of the households within the team) operated on the individual basis in 1983.⁴¹

In some provinces, such as Jiangsu and Henan, peasants formed construction teams. They built housing, shops, enterprises and workshops not only in villages and counties in their own province but in other provinces as well. In 1983, more than 1,000,000 peasants in the Henan province were engaged in construction, which accounted for about 8 per cent of

³⁴ *Renmin ribao*, March 18, 1984.

³⁵ *Jingji ribao*, Jan. 26, 1985.

³⁶ *Hongqi*, No. 8, 1985, p. 19.

³⁷ *Jingji cankao*, Feb. 1, 1985.

³⁸ *Jingji ribao*, Jan. 26, 1985.

³⁹ *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 23, 1983; Feb. 18, 1984.

⁴⁰ *Zhongguo nongmin ribao*, Nov. 13, 1984.

⁴¹ *Hongqi*, No. 4, 1984, p. 28.

the province's workforce, with a half of them working outside their communes. More than 200,000 were involved in contract construction work in 16 provinces, cities and autonomous regions throughout the country.⁴²

Changes in the rural economic structure also affected the structure of those employed in different production branches.

Approximately one-third of workforce left farming for other agricultural branches, subsidiary trades, transportation and rural industry. There appeared entire provinces and counties where more than a half of the workforce abandoned farming. For instance, in the past 3 years (1982-1984) the share of the rural population in the Yangtze delta dropped from 70 to 20 per cent. A similar situation is also observed in the Zhujiang delta.⁴³ In 1984, from 60 to 80 per cent of rural workforce in the Guangdong province and the southern regions of the Jiangsu province found employment in rural industry, subsidiary trades, construction, trade and the services. In Guangzhou's suburban regions every third peasant "abandoned land"⁴⁴ and 28 per cent of workforce in the Peking suburbs were engaged in rural industry.⁴⁵ In the Chuhai village of the Moping county (Shandong province) 93 per cent of workforce abandoned farming.⁴⁶

In this connection the Chinese leaders attach great importance to the further development of rural industry which could absorb surplus labour in the countryside. At present the enterprises of villages and communities alone employ 60 million.⁴⁷ The report of the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fishing, "On the New Situation in Setting Up Enterprises in Villages and Communities", made public by the CPC Central Committee and the PRC State Council, said that by the end of this century rural industry, construction, transport and the services should absorb 100-180 million people.⁴⁸

At the same time the swift outflow of workforce from farming, first and foremost from grain-growing, breeds certain concern among the local Chinese leaders, as was eloquently demonstrated by speeches made by deputies to the 3rd Session of the Sixth National People's Congress.⁴⁹

The organisational and economic restructuring of the Chinese countryside played a certain positive role in stimulating the agricultural economy and raising production and the peasants' incomes. Sample studies show that, on average, per capita income in the countryside went up from 191.33 yuan in 1980 to 355.3 yuan in 1984, that is by 85.7 per cent.⁵⁰ Nevertheless the Chinese press pointed out that the "life of peasants improved to an unequal extent", while the share of peasants barely earning their food and clothes, as before, exceeded 80 per cent.⁵¹

Chinese authors consider households with an average per capita income of 500 yuan and more as well-to-do peasant households; households with an income of 200-500 yuan are considered self-sufficient in food and clothes, that is, are at a subsistence level; households with an average

⁴² *Renmin ribao*, April 3, 1984.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, Feb. 13, 1985.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 15, 1984.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept. 3, 1984.

⁴⁶ *Nongmin ribao*, Jan. 21, 1985.

⁴⁷ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 27, 1985.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, March 18, 1984.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, April 5, 1985.

⁵⁰ *Zhongguo nongye di guanghui chengji 1949-1984*, Peking, 1984, p. 145; *Renmin ribao*, March 10, 1985.

⁵¹ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 17, 1985.

per capita income of less than 200 yuan form the group of poor peasants. According to the Chinese press, well-to-do households accounted for approximately 12 per cent of the total number in 1983, those with subsistence income for 67.4 per cent, and the poor (with an income under 200 yuan) for 20.7 per cent of the households.⁵²

There is no doubt that to raise the well-being of the Chinese peasants, which form so big a group of the population, is a difficult problem requiring time. The Chinese press remarked that it would take more than 10 years of strenuous work or even a still longer period for the peasants to attain a level of relative prosperity.⁵³

Beginning with mid-1985, the Chinese press has been making practically no mention of the households, which "were the first to go rich", and which were widely publicised in 1983-1984. With their income of 10,000 yuan and more, these households, *Renmin ribao* admits, are but a drop in the ocean of nearly 200 million peasant households.⁵⁴

In 1984, the peasants spent on consumption 273 yuan in per capita terms, that is, 10 per cent more as against 1983, with the share of their spending on housing construction, durables and fuel growing especially.⁵⁵ Housing construction in the countryside grew by 20 per cent in 1984, as compared with 1980, with the volume of housing construction amounting to 600 million square metres, which is by 14.3 per cent less than the figure for 1983.

The dynamics of the structure of peasant family spending provides indirect evidence that in the past few years incomes grew predominantly in the families with a relatively high mean income in per capita terms. In 1984, spending on cultural needs and the services in per capita terms increased by 20 per cent, as compared with 1983, and by approximately as much on durables, whereas spending on foodstuffs went down.⁵⁶ Those were first and foremost families with a higher income that could afford to spend more on the former two items, whereas those in the low-income bracket which are half-starving raised above all their spending on food, if they had a chance. The living conditions of the peasants in distant and mountainous areas, in the regions inhabited by some national minorities, in border regions and those of the former revolutionary bases remain, as before, hard.⁵⁷ In 1984, the country had 14 million poor households with the population of 70 million, among whom approximately 22 million had incomes below the 100-yuan mark a year, that is, below the official poverty level.⁵⁸

The gravity of the condition of the poorest peasants was confirmed by "The Notification of the CPC Central Committee and the PRC State Council on Aid to the Poor Regions to Speedily Change Their Condition" passed in 1984.⁵⁹ The Notification stated that, to change their condition, the poor and backward regions should above all rely on their own forces and proceed from local peculiarities. The peasants in those regions were given greater economic independence, namely, the term of land contract was extended to 30 years, they were given the right to develop stock-rearing with no restriction on the number of live-stock and to sell their output on their own. It was envisaged to relieve the poorest households from agricultural tax for a period of 5 years beginning with 1985 and to levy it from the less poor families on easier terms during a period of 1-3

⁵² *Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1984*, Peking, 1984, p. 473.

⁵³ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 17, 1985.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, Feb. 22, 1985.

⁵⁵ *Nongmin ribao*, March 11, 1985.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem.*

⁵⁷ *Renmin ribao*, June 24, 1984.

⁵⁸ *Beijing Review*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 1985, p. 9.

⁵⁹ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 30, 1984.

years. Centralised purchases of all farm produce, including grain and timber, were cancelled in those regions. The agricultural enterprises set up in those regions were exempted from income tax for 5 years.

The calls for the enrichment of part of peasants: "let some peasants go rich first, let some regions go rich first",⁶⁰ widely publicised in the Chinese press in the past three years or so, and rural policy enforcing these calls have led to a growing gap in the incomes of the peasant households. In 1984, most of the peasants and part of the cadre workers persisted in their negative attitude to the specialised households that were the first to boost their incomes. This is borne out by numerous articles published in the central press, which called "to protect the legitimate interests of the specialised households", and also reports of their property being spoiled and plundered by peasants as well as of measures taken by local public security bodies to defend the rights of the specialised households.⁶¹ As a result certain social tensions occurred in the Chinese countryside. This found reflection in speeches made by some deputies to the 3rd Session of the Sixth National People's Assembly, who, on the whole, raised objections against stepped up propaganda of the high income households.

The basic directives concerning the economic and social development of the countryside, including the results of the economic reform, were approved at the All-China Conference of the CPC held in September 1985. They were reflected in the "Proposals of the CPC CC on the Compiling of the 7th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the Country."

The problem of streamlining the production structure of the countryside still remains a major issue. Apart from the positive changes as regards the growing share of non-agricultural branches in the gross agricultural output in the past years, there are also unfavourable moments.

Too much attention given in a number of regions to the development of agricultural industry, trade, and transport adversely affected the production of grain. Apprehension on this score was voiced by one of the CPC veteran members, Chen Yun, in his speech at the CPC Conference. "The provision of the one-billion-strong population with food and clothes is a big economic and also a big political problem for our country", he noted. "Chaos will set in without grain, and this should not be underestimated".⁶²

For the next, 7th, five-year-plan period the following tasks have been put forward, as far as agriculture is concerned: to secure streamlining of the production structure, gradually to achieve specialisation of production, enhance its marketability and technical equipment.⁶³

In the field of social policy in the countryside the former provisions have been preserved on the whole. It is planned to continue the line towards "enrichment of, initially, a part of regions, enterprises and people", and, at the same time, it is recommended to prevent "too great differences in the level of incomes".⁶⁴

This means that certain elements of social tension in the countryside remain because the share of peasants "who provide themselves only with food and clothes and the poor peasants experiencing difficulties, exceeds 80 per cent".⁶⁵

⁶⁰ *Renmin birao*, Nov. 7, 1982; April 16, 1984.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, June 20; Sept. 10, 1984; *Guangming ribao*, Sept. 22, 1984; *Jingji ribao*, Feb. 11, 1985.

⁶² *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 24, 1985.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 26, 1985.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 26, 1985.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, Aug. 17, 1985.

A PATENT SYSTEM SET UP IN CHINA

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 86 pp 111-118

[Article by V. P. Polyakov, candidate of economic sciences]

The Patent Law of the PRC went into force on April 1, 1985. It was adopted on March 12, 1984 at the 4th Session of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. This law is the legal basis of the patent system that is being set up in the PRC.¹

Along with the adoption of legislative and other acts concerning invention and patenting, the patent system that is being created within the framework of the overall economic reform in the PRC, provides for the setting up of a network of patent organisations and a patent agent service, for supplying enterprises, organisations and individuals with patent literature, for trading in licenses, for training patent specialists, for exchanging scientific and technical literature, etc.

As it was stressed in the Chinese press, the creation of the patent system will help Chinese enterprises and organisations to acquire the latest and most systematised information on scientific and technological achievements in the world.²

The patent system can enhance the import of advanced equipment and technology to the PRC, especially considering the PRC's striving in recent years to make an ever greater emphasis not on the import of machinery and equipment but on the purchase of licenses with the aim of starting its own production of the latest machinery and equipment.

Starting with the early 1980s the PRC has sharply increased purchases of licenses. Whereas in 1973-1978 the PRC concluded only 16 licensing agreements, the figure for 1979-1981 was already 116. The PRC has purchased licenses for the manufacture of power equipment (22 licenses), electrical machines and equipment (16), metal-cutting machine-tools (2), instruments (2), electronic devices (10) and other equipment.³

By 1982 already pilot samples had been prepared and batch production had been started of products under a third of the 132 licenses purchased in 1973-1981. Work to master and start the output of products has been started under the other licenses. The output of power sets with a unit capacity of 300 and 600 mWt, equipment for 500 kWt power-transmission lines, continuous steel teeming installations harvesters, slow-speed ship engines, coal cutters-and-loaders, scraper conveyors and other equipment has been mastered or is being mastered in the PRC under foreign licenses in recent years.

It was stressed in the Chinese press in connection with the adoption of the Patent Law of the PRC that the new law creates a legal basis for the transfer to the PRC of advanced technology by foreign firms. They will no longer fear that the latest technical achievements contained in the imported equipment will be used free of charge in the PRC.

¹ Published in *Renmin ribao*, March 14, 1984.

² About 1 million patent descriptions are published annually in the world.

³ *Zhongguo jingji nianjian*, Peking, 1982, p. V-285. Of the 132 licensing agreements concluded by the PRC in the period from 1973 to 1981, 35 were signed with the FRG, 26 with the United States, 20 with Japan, 20 with Britain, 13 with France, 6 with Switzerland, 2 with Belgium, 2 with Sweden, 2 with Denmark, 2 with Austria, 2 with Australia, 1 with Canada, and 1 with Italy. The FRG, the USA, France, Japan and Britain account for 86 per cent of all these agreements.

Earlier such fears compelled foreign sellers to include in the price the possible losses caused by the free use by a third party of the latest scientific-technical achievements received by the Chinese purchaser together with the imported equipment that had no patent protection in the PRC. As a result, prices of equipment imported by the PRC were jacked up.⁴

The patent system will help ensure the legal protection in other countries of exported Chinese goods thanks to the timely patenting in those countries of Chinese inventions, useful models, industrial designs and trademarks.

When the draft patent law was discussed apprehensions were voiced that the patent system would create obstacles to copying foreign products in the PRC. But, it was noted in the Chinese press, such fears are groundless for the following reasons: first of all, when a patent is issued this does not yet mean a simultaneous introduction of the patented invention into mass production, this sometimes requiring a rather lengthy period of time. So, after a patent is issued, the problem of copying does not exist. What does exist is the problem of signing a licensing agreement with the patent owner to organise the introduction of the patented invention into production. Secondly, the duration of a patent often expires before the invention is introduced in production and for this reason there is no longer any obstacles to copying the product containing the invention that had previously been protected by the patent.⁵

In the PRC the results of an inventor's endeavour are viewed as a commodity possessing value and consumer value, and this is regarded as the theoretical basis of the new patent system. "A technical invention," the newspaper *Renmin ribao* wrote on March 15, 1984, "is a product of labour. It embodies the creative work by brain of the inventor and in many instances also materialised labour in the form of instruments used for experiments and research, equipment and experimental materials, and a certain auxiliary physical labour. But the decisive role is played by creative work by brain. When used in production, a technical invention can ultimately turn into a productive force and yield an economic, technical and social effect. For this reason it has value and consumer value and should be protected as a valuable. Since commodity production still exists in conditions of socialism, the production and exchange of this commodity—the technical invention—should be developed in every way for the needs of socialist modernisation. This is the main theoretical basis of the patent system that is being created in China."

Earlier, Chinese laws dealing with inventions professed the principle that "inventions are property of the state" and for this reason are not a commodity. In accordance with this principle, outlined, for instance, in the Rules of Remunerating Inventions adopted in the PRC in 1978, any enterprise or organisation could use an invention free of charge. But now it is held in the PRC that the principle according to which inventions belong to the state obstructs the inventor or the enterprise that employs him from getting an economic advantage from the invention, does not promote the development of creative inventiveness on the part of the broad masses and individual enterprises, generates reticence in respect of inventions, and often is the cause of conflicting claims to ownership of inventions."⁶

The transfer of the right of ownership of inventions and other results

⁴ For instance, an industrial turbine manufactured by the West German firm Siemens was sold to the PRC for 4.8 million dollars while Japan, which has a patent system, bought a similar turbine for 1.2 million dollars.

⁵ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 7, 1983.

⁶ *Renmin ribao*, March 15, 1984.

of inventive endeavour from the state as a whole to individual enterprises, organisations and persons means the spreading of relations of ownership to a new extensive field where not only Chinese but also foreign juridical persons and subjects of law can be holders of patent rights.

In China the first legislative act bearing features of a patent law was published by the Ministry of Industry and Trade in December 1912 and was called "Temporary Rules to Encourage Handicrafts". A Patent Law was officially published in May 1944 and established three types of patents: on inventions, useful models and industrial designs. After the forming of the PRC the State Administrative Council issued Temporary Rules for Protecting Inventorship and Patent Rights providing for 6 types of inventorship and 4 types of patent rights.⁷

In November 1963 the PRC State Council published Rules of Remunerating Inventions. They were effective till December 1978 when the PRC State Council adopted new revised Rules of Remunerating Inventions.⁸ The State Committee for Science and Technology was charged with overall supervision of the entire work to remunerate inventions. Ministries as well as the provincial committees for science and technology, as well as committees of autonomous regions and cities directly under the Central Government were instructed to accept applications for inventions and to conduct their examination within the brief of the given ministries and regions. The Rules regulated the procedure of submitting inventions to receive material and moral rewards, the size of the rewards, their distribution in the team of authors of a given invention, the procedure of publishing the essence of the invention, determining the extent of its secrecy, etc.

But these Rules did not regulate many other questions connected with the development of the movement of inventors in the country, the protection of the rights of Chinese citizens and foreigners, and the use of foreign inventions. This gap in Chinese legislation concerning inventions became increasingly felt in recent years when the PRC, within the framework of the economic reform implemented in the country, actively began to develop economic, scientific and technical ties with other countries.

The PRC began creating its patent system in 1978 and already in March 1979 work was started on the draft of the patent law. In January 1980 the PRC State Council approved a report of the State Committee for Science and Technology on the creation of a patent system in the country and formed the Patent Agency of China.

The adoption of the Patent Law of the PRC was preceded by extensive preparatory work in the course of which the patent law of more than 30 countries was studied.

In September 1982 the PRC State Council again adopted a resolution on the creation of a patent system in the country. In his *Report on the 6th Five-Year Plan*, delivered at the 5th Session of the National People's Congress of the 5th Convocation, the Premier of the PRC State Council Zhao Ziyang noted the need "to draw up and adopt a patent law". A national conference on questions related to patents was held at about the same time. After discussing the matter for the second time the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress adopted the Patent Law of the PRC in March 1984 and in November of the same year decided that the PRC should accede to the Paris convention on the protection of industrial property. China officially became a party to it on March 10, 1985. The Chinese Society of Inventors⁹ was formed in October 1984 to encourage inventors in the country.

⁷ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 4, 1983. The Temporary Rules were abolished in 1963.

⁸ *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 25, 1979.

⁹ *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 11, 14; Oct. 14, 1984; March 19, 1985.

The Patent Law of the PRC provides for the patent protection of three types of inventive endeavour: inventions, useful models and industrial designs. As different from inventions, which are the highest form of inventive endeavour, useful models (sometimes they are called "minor inventions"), suggest new forms and design of machinery, equipment and other products. The creative level involved is lower than in the case of an invention, but useful models have a comparatively high value from the viewpoint of their application.

A patent for an industrial design can be issued for new aesthetical solutions applicable in industry and concerning the form, structure and colouring of the product or a combination of these features. The patent protection of this type of inventive creativity stimulates the creation of new attractive designs of various products.

Patents for inventions and useful models can be issued only if they meet the following three qualifications: novelty, level of inventiveness and practical applicability. They possess "novelty" if prior to the date of submission of the application no identical invention or useful model had been openly published in the PRC or abroad, if they had not been used openly in the PRC, if no other person had applied earlier to the Chinese Patent Agency describing an identical invention or useful model.

"Level of inventiveness" means that as compared to the technology existing as of the date the application was made the invention possesses outstanding substantial specificities and constitutes noticeable progress, while the useful model has substantial specificities and is progressive.

"Practical applicability" means that the invention or useful model can be manufactured, used and yield a certain effect.

To get a patent for an industrial design it is necessary for it not to be identical to or resemble any industrial design which was openly published in the PRC or abroad prior to the date the application was made or was openly used in the PRC.

The invention, useful model or industrial design for which a patent is requested do not lose their novelty in the course of six months prior to the filing of the application in each of the following cases: if they are displayed for the first time at an international exhibition organised or recognised by the Chinese government, if they are made public for the first time at a definite scientific or technical conference, or if they were disclosed by some person without the applicant's consent.

The duration of patents for inventions is 15 years and for useful models and industrial designs—5 years, counting from the day the application was made. On the request of the patent holder the duration of patents for useful models and industrial designs can be extended by three years. If the patent holder exercises the right of priority, the duration of the patent is estimated also from the date the application was made in the PRC. The patent holder is obliged to pay annual duties starting with the year the patent was issued. The patent is terminated in the event of failure to pay the annual duties or on a written application from the patent holder.

The Patent Law of the PRC distinguishes between inventions, useful models and industrial designs that are created by people when fulfilling assignments of enterprises or organisations to which they belong or are created by them using mainly the material means of these enterprises or organisations, and those made in "off-work time". In the former case it is these enterprises or organisations that have the right to apply for a patent. In the latter, that is when inventions, useful models and industrial designs are created in "off-work time", it is the inventors themselves who have the right to apply for and get a patent.

Acquisition of a patent right to an invention or useful model means

that not one enterprise, organisation or individual can use the patent without the patent holder's sanction, that is manufacture, use or sell the patented product or use the patented process in production or business. When a patent for an industrial design is issued, not a single enterprise, organisation or individual can manufacture or sell a product presenting an industrial design for production or business purposes. So, as different from patents for inventions or useful models, patents for an industrial design allow the use of a product containing the patented technical design.

But the right to the patent granted by law is not absolute. The relevant competent bodies of the PRC State Council and the people's governments of provinces, autonomous regions and cities directly under the Central Government can, in pursuance of the state plan, order any enterprise belonging to their system or a directly subordinated state enterprise that possesses a patent for an important invention, useful model or industrial design to allow certain enterprises to use the patented invention, useful model or industrial design. In this case these enterprises pay a certain reimbursement to the patent holder for using the patent.

Much attention in the Patent Law of the PRC is given to the question of issuing forced licenses. The law obliges the patent holder to manufacture the patented product or to use the patented method, or to authorise others to do this. If the patent holder fails for any valid reason to fulfil this duty in the course of three years from the date the patent was issued, the Patent Agency, acting on request of an enterprise that is ready to use the invention or useful model, grants a forced license for the use of the patent. This Agency grants a forced license also when the given invention or useful model cannot be used without preceding or subsequent inventions and useful models.

Forced licenses are issued to enterprises, organisations or individuals if they prove the impossibility of concluding a licensing agreement with the patent holder on reasonable terms. On getting a forced license they do not acquire an exclusive right to using the patent and cannot transfer this right to others. When a forced license is issued, the patent holder is to be paid a certain reward. The patent holder has three months during which he can appeal to a people's court against the Patent Agency's decision to issue a forced license for his patent.

The Patent Law of the PRC provides for the protection of the patent holder's rights also in the event of an unauthorised use of his invention, useful model or industrial design. In this case the patentee can apply to the Patent Agency or directly to a people's court with a request that the violator stop infringing on the patentee's rights and pay compensation for the inflicted damage.¹⁰

In preparation for the introduction of the Patent Law of the PRC the Patent Agency published on January 19, 1985 Rules of Application of the Patent Law of the PRC, that were approved by the PRC State Council. These rules specify in detail the general provisions of the patent law, the procedure of applying for a patent and of the application's examination, questions of issuing the patent, granting of licenses, payment of rewards for inventions made in the course of fulfilment of one's official duties, etc., and also the order and size of the payment of the patent duty.¹¹

A system of patent bodies is being created in the PRC to deal with patents. It was already in 1979 that the state officially undertook to conduct examinations of applications for inventions and to remunerate

¹⁰ Instructions of the Supreme People's Court of the PRC on the Court Procedure of Patent Cases were published in March 1985. See *Renmin ribao*, March 2, 1985.

¹¹ *Beijing Review*, January 1985, p. 7-8.

the inventions. In 1980 the State Council of the PRC approved the establishment of the Patent Agency which initially had a staff of only 200, including experts, researchers, patent agents and administrators.¹²

The Patent Agency of the PRC includes departments of experts to study applications for patents in the field of machine-building, electronics, power generation and the chemical industry; an administrative department, a patent search department which, on the request of experts and other individuals, searches for patent literature; a department of publications, a technical exchanges department; a legal department that drafts legislation and regulations concerning inventions and patenting; and an external relations department that in its time had sent more than 50 experts to foreign countries to study patenting.

China's Patent Agency develops cooperation with other countries in this field. An agreement between the PRC and the FRG entered into force on August 22, 1983. Under it the FRG undertook to give the PRC financial assistance to the sum of 12 million West German marks in 1983-1985 to pay for the import of office equipment and the training of personnel. In September 1983 a delegation of West German patent experts visited China on the invitation of the Patent Agency. The sides discussed a plan of cooperation in the field of patents in the coming five years.¹³

In 1984 the PRC State Council entrusted the Chinese Committee for the Promotion of International Trade, which is a non-governmental organisation, to perform functions of China's Patent Agency. In June 1984 this Committee set up a department of patent agents charged, among other tasks, with giving consultations to persons filing applications for patents, with the preliminary examination of applications, with acting as intermediaries between the applicants and China's Patent Agency, with trade in licenses and procedural questions involving the filing of applications in the PRC on authorisation of foreign citizens and enterprises and in foreign countries on authorisation of Chinese enterprises and individuals.¹⁴

It should be noted that the Chinese Committee for the Promotion of International Trade was charged with the duty of registering trademarks already way back in 1957. In the course of fulfilling this work the Committee established business ties with agencies and agents in many countries engaged in the registration of trademarks. The preparatory work for the registration of trademarks is performed in the PRC by a law office that was opened in Peking in July 1984 and specialises in legal matters pertaining to external economic and scientific and technical cooperation.¹⁵

There have also been reports about the establishment of a patent agent firm in Xiang Gang (Hong Kong). Its task is to distribute Chinese patents abroad and to help Chinese residents of Xiang Gang and Aomen (Macao) and also foreign citizens and enterprises in applying for patents in the PRC.¹⁶

China's Patent Agency and local bodies are conducting extensive work inside the country to set up patent bureaux assigned to give practical assistance in the observance of the patent law and in protecting the rights and interests of inventors and patentees. Thus, a bureau of inventions and patents was formed at the Ministry of Railways in 1980. It

¹² *China Business Review*, 1981, vol. 8, No. 3.

¹³ *China Economic News*, September 19, 1983.

¹⁴ *Renmin ribao*, July 14, 1984.

¹⁵ More than 84,000 trademarks, including 13,000 foreign trademarks, were registered in China by the end of 1982. The new Law on Trademarks went into force in the PRC on March 1, 1983 (*Renmin ribao*, Jan. 23, 1983).

¹⁶ Even before the patent law entered into force, this office got 800 applications (*Renmin ribao*, April 2, 1985).

conducts patent studies with the aim of establishing the expediency of patenting inventions in the PRC and abroad, determining the extent of novelty of foreign equipment and the expediency of importing it and also looking into the possibility of exporting products or displaying them at exhibitions.¹⁷ To conduct patenting work and supervise it, 49 organisations were formed in provinces, autonomous districts, cities directly under the Central Government and also in a number of branches of the country's economy. The creation of patent organisations has already been completed in many of the biggest administrative centres.¹⁸

Also being formed is a service of patent agents who, in accordance with requirements of China's Patent Agency, must have a higher education, not less than three years of practical work, and know at least one foreign language. In addition to this, they must know Chinese and foreign patent legislation, private and procedural law and international patenting. All patent agents must be registered with patent bureaus and have to sit for qualification exams. More than 600 patent agents were trained in China by early 1985.¹⁹ The Committee has also started to organise patent search. When scientific and technical workers are certified, more attention is now being given to whether they are capable of using patent literature in their work.

Patent information is one of the most important parts of the patent system now being created in the PRC. It is the main source of information on new inventions, useful models or industrial designs. As is known, only 5-10 per cent of information about inventions in the world can be found in various scientific and technical publications, the remaining 90 per cent being contained in patent literature.

To provide enterprises, research organisations and individuals with information on patents a centre to supply patent literature was set up in Peking late in 1981. It is subordinated to the national Patent Agency. The Centre's patent library has 20 million units of patent literature published in 15 countries and by two international organisations (70 per cent of the entire patent literature in the world). The Centre's service bureau searches for and copies patent literature on requests of enterprises and organisations. The Centre also has a department of patent classification that processes and stores patent literature to service the Patent Agency's experts. To search for patents the Centre has an electronic data bank that speedily provides the necessary patent material.

Also under the Patent Agency is the Patent Literature publishing house (Zhuanli wenxian chubanshe) that publishes patent literature, aids on patenting, references and also magazines and other materials concerning the patent system, patent legislation and other matters related to patents.

China's Patent Agency puts out a monthly magazine *China's Patents* (Zhongguo zhuanli) that publishes materials on the theory and practice of patenting (application for patents, license trade, the use of patent literature, the state of patenting in the world, etc). Another monthly magazine *Inventions of the World* (Shijie faming) presents articles on the state of patenting in various countries and the theory of inventing, reports on inventions in the PRC that won prizes, and materials on new industrial designs.

A reference magazine called *Information Bulletin on Patent Literature* (Zhuanli wenxian tongbao) is published to conduct research in the field of patent search. It publishes summaries and abstracts of patents and applications which were filed in ten countries (USA, Britain, France,

¹⁷ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 4, 1983.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Feb. 9, 1985.

¹⁹ *China Aktuell*, August 1983; *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 9, 1985.

Japan, USSR, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Switzerland, the FRG and the GDR) and by two international organisations—the European Patent Organisation and the “Treaty on Patent Cooperation” organisation. Thirteen issues of this bulletin containing abstracts and summaries of patents in various fields of the economy and technology were published in 1984.

The adoption of the patent law and the creation of the basis of a patent system are important events in China's modern life that will exert a definite influence on the country's economic development. Objectively they will promote China's scientific and technological progress and an expansion of its scientific and technical exchange with industrially developed countries. It is quite probable that they will play a rather substantial role also in the expansion of China's external economic ties, in providing patent protection of its export and in raising the quality of exported products, especially machinery and equipment. At the same time they enable China's foreign trade partners to protect more effectively the goods they export to China's domestic market and create more favourable conditions for them to offer China the use of their scientific and technical achievements on a commercial basis.

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CSO: 1812/94

SOCIALIST LAOS MARKS 10TH ANNIVERSARY

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 86 pp 119-122

[Article by A. M. Matveyev: "Glorious Anniversary of Socialist Laos"]

On December 2, 1985, the Lao people celebrated a significant event, the 10th anniversary of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, formed after 50 odd years of struggle for independence against the forces of imperialism, neocolonialism and expansion. The Lao people won freedom and independence for their country, and today they devote all their energy to laying the foundations of socialist society, work to facilitate the country's comprehensive development and to ensure the working people's well-being. Shoulder to shoulder with the other peoples of Indochina, they contribute to the struggle for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress.

Laos lies in the heart of Indochina. It is rich in mineral resources, but they are not yet explored sufficiently. There are considerable reserves of iron ore (the metal content is 60 to 65 per cent), tin, manganese, copper, lead, potash, coal, antimony, zink, gold, silver, platinum and other minerals. Nearly half its territory is covered by forests, a source of valuable timber and resins which Laos exports to other countries. As for hydro-power resources, it is one of the richest countries in Southeast Asia.

Laos is a multinational country inhabited by some 70 nationalities and tribes. Seventy per cent of the population belong to the Lao-Thai ethnic group. Most of the nationalities are rather close in terms of their language, socio-economic structure and culture. Some of them are at different stages of social and economic development. According to the 1985 census, the country's population is estimated at 3.6 million.

Since ancient times Laos has attracted the attention of aggressors. For many years it was under the domination of the French colonialists. But the heroic Lao people refused to tolerate the colonial rule and waged a ceaseless struggle for their independence.

The national liberation movement in Indochina developed under the great influence of the October 1917 Socialist Revolution in Russia. The Communist Party of Indochina (CPIC) was founded in 1930 under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. Its Lao section was formed in 1936. It led the people of Laos first against the French colonialists and later, during World War II, against the Japanese invaders. The defeat of nazi Germany and militaristic Japan, in which the Soviet Union played the crucial role, created favourable conditions for the foreign invaders to be ousted from the country. A provisional government was formed in Vientiane, the capital of Laos, on October 12, 1945, which proclaimed an independent and united Laos—Pathet Lao.

However, in 1946, the French colonialists launched an armed intervention into the country. The Lao people's liberation struggle brought them victory. The Geneva 1954 Accords recognised the unity and independence of Laos. The road of peaceful development was opened up to it. Soon, however, the right-wing forces, actively supported by the US imperialists, gained the upper hand in Vientiane, and a civil war broke out.

At that time the People's Party of Laos (since 1972, the People's Revolutionary Party of Laos) directed the Lao people's struggle against

the new enemy—US imperialists. It was set up in 1955 by former members of the Lao section of the CPIC. In 1956, all the patriotic forces of the country united, on the basis of the Front for the Liberation of Laos, into the Patriotic Front of Laos, Neo Lao Haksat, which had as its foundation the alliance between workers and the peasantry.

The armed struggle waged by Neo Lao Haksat gained scope, and by mid-1961, only a third of Lao territory was controlled by right-wing forces. This impelled Washington to agree to talks on the Lao question. The Geneva 1962 Conference decisions once again recognised the status of united and independent Laos and provided the necessary international conditions for its development as a peaceful sovereign state. Yet, these decisions were violated by a right-wing grouping strongly backed by the US. In May 1964, US aircraft started barbaric bombings of the liberated area of Laos, using toxic agents, napalm and phosphor bombs against civilians.

The Second Congress of the PRPL (February 1972) was of much importance for the Lao people's victory over the foreign invaders. It also mapped out the country's political line aimed at completing a national-democratic revolution and gradually switching over to socialist construction, bypassing capitalism. By early 1973, some three-quarters of the country's territory, and nearly a half of the entire population had been liberated. A new political system was formed in this zone, the economy was developed and the People's Liberation Army strengthened.

1973 was a turning point in the history of the heroic Lao people, as it determined their further destiny. An agreement was signed in Vientiane on the restoration of peace and national concord. It laid the groundwork for the formation of the appropriate bodies of power. The Vientiane agreement marked the end of the armed struggle in Laos.

The situation in the country had its specific features. There were three zones and three types of power in them: the liberated zone with a revolutionary government; the zone with a retained feudal order, ruled by the former Vientiane administration; and the neutral zone of Vientiane and Luang Prabang with a coalition government.

The victories the Vietnamese and the Kampuchean peoples scored in early 1975 created conditions for the completion of the revolution in Laos. A revolutionary situation arose in the zone of the former Vientiane administration. The Party immediately took the decision to launch a general offensive and seize power as soon as possible. A large-scale campaign was started in Laos to eliminate the former administrative, police and military institutions, and reorganise them along democratic lines. In August 1975, people's revolutionary bodies of local power were created throughout Laos. As a result of the November 1975 elections people's power was established in the country.

On December 2, 1975, the National Congress of People's Representatives was convened on the decision of the Central Committee of the PFL. It announced the overthrow of the monarchy and proclaimed the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR). This event was the crowning point of the stubborn and consistent struggle waged by the Lao people, and a new epoch set in, that of independence, freedom and socialism.

The young republic inherited from the past regime a backward economy. Agriculture, in which nearly 85 per cent of the population was employed, was dominated by small-scale production with natural economy elements. It failed to provide enough food to meet the population's requirements. Feudal forms of land tenure remained in a number of regions. Cottage craft industry prevailed. There were small factories producing cigarettes, soft drinks, footwear and matches. The war inflicted great damage upon Laos. US aircraft dropped as many as three million tons of bombs on Lao soil and sprayed it with poisons. As a result,

nearly 40 per cent of all arable land was not cultivated. War turned hundreds of thousands of families out of their homes, making them refugees.

The young republic had to rehabilitate its war-ravaged economy, primarily transport communications, and revive its trade, all this against a background of incessant intrigues by the enemies of the revolution who, supported by their foreign patrons, above all the USA, sought to regain their lost positions.

The PRPL managed to assess realistically the situation. It set two main and interconnected strategic tasks—the defence of the revolution and the building of socialism. Popular power embarked upon radical socio-economic changes in the country. It nationalised land, minerals, banks, some industrial enterprises, finances, transport, the mass media and means of communication. The state and the state-private sectors were set up, and cooperatives were formed in agriculture, commerce and handicraft production. These steps were aimed at ensuring higher living standards for the people and at forming a new kind of production relations, based upon the socialist form of property.

An important event for the country was the 3rd Congress of the PRPL, held in April 1982, the first legal congress of the Lao Communists. It defined the political course in the period of transition to socialism. One of the main tasks it set forth was "to consolidate constantly the dictatorship of the proletariat, ensure the monolithic cohesion of the working people of all nationalities", "simultaneously to carry out three revolutions: a revolution in the sphere of production relations, a scientific and technological revolution, and a revolution in the sphere of culture and ideology". The congress pointed out that "industrialisation was the central task of the transition period, the basis for the development of productive forces". But to develop industry, agriculture and forestry had to be promoted. Along with strengthening defences and state security, safeguarding the sovereignty, national independence and the new system, the task was set, "to defend reliably, shoulder to shoulder with the people of Vietnam and Kampuchea, the outpost of the world socialist system in the region, and to contribute effectively to the cause of peace, national independence, democracy and socialism throughout the world".

In celebrating the 10th anniversary of the LPDR, the people of Laos take legitimate pride in the achievements they have scored in building the new society. In 1980, the country produced enough foodstuffs to satisfy, in the main, the population's requirements. There was a bumper rice crop in 1984—1.3 million tons, that is: approximately 354 kilograms per capita, which meets the targets of the 1981-1985 national development plan (the corresponding figure for 1976 was 700 thousand tons). The number of cattle went up, reaching 1.5 million as against 900 thousand in 1976.

As many as 2,546 cooperatives were set up in the country by 1985, which unite 41 per cent of farmsteads, and cultivate 47 per cent of all arable land. The PRPL pursues the policy of organising peasant cooperatives on strictly voluntary principles. Cooperatives are given financial and technical assistance, fertilizer and seeds.

Much attention is given to the development of forestry. There are 25 timber felling farms in Laos which produce more than 200 thousand cubic metres of timber annually. At the same time, they are carrying out work on restoring forests of valuable trees.

Also built during the past decade were repair works for automobiles and farm machinery, a mixed fodder plant, brick-yards, a cannery, a large oil reservoir, and a vaccine-producing enterprise. The capacity of the country's biggest power station in Nam Ngym is estimated at 150 thousand kw.

The government gives due consideration to the development of commu-

nications. In view of the fact that Laos has no railways, automobiles are the chief means of transportation of goods between regions, and of commodities delivery from Vietnam's sea ports. The reconstruction of the old roads and building of new ones, linking key centres and regions, is yet another task facing Laos. Priority is given to road No. 9, leading to Vietnam, and to road No. 13, crossing the country from north to south. Roads are under construction to make it possible to transport farm produce from remote areas and supplying the population with necessities there.

Particularly impressive are the achievements scored by Laos in the sphere of education and public health. Prior to independence, more than 90 per cent of the population could neither read nor write. The literacy campaign was launched in liberated areas as soon as the invaders had been driven out of the country. General and vocational schools were set up there, and by late 1983 illiteracy had been done away with in the main.

The number of medical institutions grew from 406 in 1976 to 837 in 1984, of beds from 6,178 to 8,970 and of medical personnel—from 5,022 to 8,414. Free medical care was introduced in Laos in 1976. These measures led to a considerable decline in sickness and death rates.

The Lao leadership pointed out that the achievements could have been much more significant but for the need to preserve the country's security. The forces of counterrevolution which have taken refuge in neighbouring Thailand keep up their subversive activities against democratic Laos and are supported by the imperialist powers. There is also much room for improvement in relations with Thailand. In 1984, the Thai military staged an armed provocation against Laos and seized three villages. Having received a rebuff, the invaders had to retreat. Yet, part of Lao territory remains under their control.

The PRPL and the LPDR government work to secure the national sovereignty and security of Laos, relying primarily on the unity and solidarity of the three Indochina states—Laos, Vietnam and Kampuchea. The experience of the joint struggle against the common enemy vividly shows that revolutionary unity is a *sine qua non* of all the successes attained by the three nations in the cause of building socialism, in defence of their revolutionary gains. Their unity is an important factor for ensuring and promoting peace in Southeast Asia.

Along with fraternal Vietnam and Kampuchea, the Lao People's Democratic Republic works to improve the climate in Southeast Asia, to turn the area into a zone of peace, stability, goodneighbourliness and cooperation. Thus, at their 11th conference held in Pnompenh last August, the foreign ministers of the three states put forward new initiatives which could provide a basis for a dialogue between the Indochina countries and ASEAN.

Laos enjoys high prestige among peaceloving forces. It actively participates in discussions of pressing problems of the day, held at the UN, within the nonaligned movement and at other international forums. These problems include the struggle for peace and international security, prevention of a nuclear holocaust, and the restructuring of international economic relations on a just basis. Fraternal Laos invariably gives its backing to the Soviet Union's initiatives which are aimed at halting the arms race, at preventing its spreading to outer space and averting a nuclear war.

Last year, the Soviet Union and Laos marked the 25th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between them. At all stages of the heroic struggle for national and social liberation, the Lao people have enjoyed the comprehensive support and assistance of the Soviet Union and the fraternal solidarity of the Soviet people.

AMERICAN CONCEPTS OF CHINESE POLITICAL CULTURE CRITICIZED

Moscow PROBLEMY DALNEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, Oct-Dec 85 (signed to press 25 Nov 85) pp 123-130

[Article by Ye. V. Yakimova, candidate of philosophy: "Lucian Pye's Interpretation of the Chinese Political Culture (Procedural Questions)"]

[Text] The unique history of China's sociopolitical development and the need to predict contemporary political processes in the country have aroused the interest of a number of American Sinologists in the specific features of the Chinese political culture for at least two decades. "Political culture" is a relatively new term in the bourgeois social sciences. The history of its establishment is associated with the names of American political scientists G. Almond and S. Verba, who began elaborating the theory and methodology of comparative political studies at the end of the 1950's.¹

The development of comparative political studies focused the interest of bourgeois social scientists on the differing effects of the same political institutions and standards under the conditions of different cultures and social systems. The thorough study of this topic, according to bourgeois researchers themselves, was impeded by the prevalence of descriptive and empirical studies in American political science in the 1950's. The need arose to eliminate the existing gap between micro- and macro-levels in political studies--that is, to find the link between political psychology and cultural anthropology, which were concerned with the political behavior and thinking of the individual, on the one hand, and political sociology, with its analysis of social processes, institutions and structures, on the other. The concept of the political culture--a lasting set of specific cultural attitudes toward political objects--was supposed to be this connecting link, according to the supporters of the new theory.² Behaviorism and structural-functional analysis became the procedural basis of the theory of political culture, and there was a unique "synthesis" of sociological surveys with the techniques and methods of psychoanalysis on the "technical" level.

It is interesting that one of the first theorists and propagandists of the political culture theory was the prominent U.S. expert on Southeast and Chinese affairs, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Professor Lucian Pye.³ He was a member and then the chairman of the Comparative Political Studies Committee of the Research Council on the Social Sciences (1954-1963), a

research associate in the MIT School of Comparative Political Studies and an active researcher of the Chinese political culture. The works of L. Pye are a good illustration of contemporary American Sinology's characteristic expansion of its traditional framework with the aid of the procedural and ideological instruments of the bourgeois social sciences, including the techniques of interdisciplinary analysis.⁴ Soviet Sinology, which uses the scientific procedures of Marxism-Leninism, is distinguished today by the use of the achievements of materialistic philosophy, sociology and, in particular, social psychology. Aspects of the PRC political culture and the distinctive features of the contemporary functioning of traditional forms of political administration and power mechanisms have recently been topics of constant interest to Soviet Sinologists.⁵ Discerning analyses of the interdisciplinary studies of bourgeois Sinologists, including L. Pye's works on the PRC political culture, seem relevant in this connection. Marxist analyses of these studies are all the more necessary now that the political realities of present-day China with its relatively stable sociocultural traditions are providing some grounds for superficial analogies and historical parallels that often contain a tendentious approach to PRC history and anticommunism in various disguises.

Pye defines the political culture as the "set of relations, beliefs and feelings which give the political process order and significance and lie at the basis of the assumptions and standards governing political behavior."⁶ The political culture, in his opinion, is an important link in the chain of relations between political events and the reactions of individuals to these events. "We are not concerned with what happens in the objective world of politics," explains S. Verba, a colleague of L. Pye's, "but with what people believe about politics, how they perceive current political events and how they interpret political realities."⁷ In other words, in the interpretation of L. Pye, G. Almond, S. Verba, J. Coleman and C. Bier, the political culture is a "subjective dimension" of politics, a constant set of models of political perception, behavior and thinking, which express the meaning and significance of political processes to their adherents and define the content and limits of the political existence of these adherents.

The theories of American social scientists about the political culture have been analyzed quite thoroughly in Soviet philosophical literature, and all researchers have unanimously underscored the extremely subjective and excessively psychological interpretation of this concept by Western science.⁸ This indisputably justified appraisal of the bourgeois theory of the political culture applies completely to the works of L. Pye, where the term "political culture" not only defines the subject matter of specific research projects, but also defines the research method, thereby turning into a definite theory of PRC political history.

Pye's definition of the political culture includes primarily non-institutionalized aspects of the political process and is more likely to focus the researcher's attention on models of political behavior and thinking than on actual processes. Furthermore, in works on PRC history, the author deliberately separates his analysis from actual political institutions and ideological structures in an attempt to recreate the "spirit" of Chinese politics and construct an ideal model. Is this kind of abstraction justifiable from the procedural standpoint?

In Marxist literature there is still no unanimous view on the issue of the political culture, and the meaning of this phenomenon and approaches to its investigation are still being debated. Furthermore, some researchers view the political culture as institutionalized political forms (institutions, structures, establishments and legal standards) and non-institutionalized forms (political behavior, knowledge, values and sociopsychological attitudes).⁹ Others view the political culture as a set of stereotypes rather than as the actual set of behavior, attitudes and emotional reactions, but they acknowledge the need to adjust theories with the aid of analyses of political reality. The supporters of the last point of view see the political culture as "a unique sociopsychological sphere of the political system" and a "means of political existence and a form of political organization."¹⁰

Without going into the details of these debates, we can presume the validity of studies of politico-cultural phenomena from the standpoint of their internal, primarily sociopsychological content and the subjective "meaning" of politics for participants in this kind of activity. Obviously, this aspect of research must be included in the general theory of the political culture. Agreement must also be reached on the objective basis of the sociopsychological sphere of politics and on its relationship to political ideology--that is, on the factors determining the modification and development of the society's political culture. Here we find a fundamental difference between the views of bourgeois and Marxist social scientists.

Soviet researchers of the political culture underscore the indirect connection between this superstructural element of the social system and its socioeconomic basis and explain the class-related nature of cultural-political phenomena and their differing dependence on the prevailing ideology. In the works of L. Pye and other bourgeois political scientists, however, there is only the mention of the correspondence of features of the political culture to the reversals of social history and the personal-psychological "baggage" of its contemporary subjects. Furthermore, the national historical experience is isolated from socioeconomic dynamics¹¹ and the personal aspect is reduced (in the spirit of behaviorism, seasoned with the "psychology of the subconscious") to unconscious reactions to political stimuli. As for the influence of ideology, according to L. Pye and S. Verba, it is significant only if the society has no "distinct primitive beliefs."¹² In L. Pye's definitions, therefore, priority in the formation of the political culture belongs to unconscious impulses and elements of ordinary thinking, to the detriment of ideological and scientific factors. In line with this approach, the American political scientist ignores the social-class aspect of the political culture, subordinating class-related differences in political attitudes to their national "distinction." The historical aspect of politico-cultural phenomena is reduced in his works to the problem of transmitting the culture to different generations within the framework of general or political socialization. Furthermore, the historico-cultural experience is interpreted as the strict predetermination of timeless stereotypes of political behavior, setting inevitable limits on the prospects and parameters of historical development. "In some societies," L. Pye stresses, "the traditional political culture represents a perfect foundation for democratic evolution, while in others the prevailing tendencies are more compatible with authoritarian patterns."¹³

An analysis of L. Pye's beliefs about the political culture indicates their considerable theoretical limitations. The American political scientist ignores an aspect of the political culture as important as the influence of the changing social system on current politico-cultural and sociopsychological stereotypes. As a result, the sociopsychological aspect of the political culture, divested of objective assessment criteria, becomes a self-contained, "fatal" factor of social development. This approach leads to the extremely arbitrary interpretation of the meaning of social history and to the substitution of artificial, formal schemes for its objective laws. This tendency was also quite distinct in Pye's analysis of the PRC political culture.

The American Sinologist's works on this topic reveal two levels of research which are far from equal from the scientific standpoint. The first is the group of Pye's hypotheses intended to rearrange the facts of contemporary Chinese history to conform to his analytical premises. These hypotheses constitute a "theory" of the Chinese political culture, the abstract and speculative nature of which is acknowledged repeatedly even by the author.¹⁴ Specific facts about the country's history and culture (among which Pye includes his own memories of his childhood in China, the testimony of emigrants in Hong Kong, reports in the Chinese press and studies by American Sinologists) are assigned an illustrative role.¹⁵ The main function of his "theory" consists in presenting the events and prospects of PRC political history as the set of "national and personal features which formed and inspired the Chinese political culture since the time of the Manchurians to our day."¹⁶

In addition to this "theory," which arranges political processes in the country to fit the author's a priori hypotheses, several observations and remarks can be found in Pye's books and articles about the distinctive features and permanent characteristics of political practices in the PRC--that is, real elements of the Chinese political culture. This fragmented, and not always indisputable from the Marxist standpoint, but unquestionably interesting "portrait" of the Chinese political culture exists apart from the American political scientist's "theory" and sometimes even contradicts some of its premises.

The lack of correspondence between the "theory" and the "portrait" in Pye's works is the result of the inaccurate beliefs of bourgeois social scientists about the political culture and the laws of social development. The ideological aims of the American political scientist and his attempt to prove the impossibility of establishing an "orthodox-Marxist" social order in China also played an important role here. These are the main reasons for the shifting emphasis in Pye's works from "central hypotheses" to the periphery of isolated remarks about facts.

The "theory" of the Chinese political culture is explained primarily in two of Pye's works, related by a common intention and common procedural principles.¹⁷ The first book is a study of the "spirit" of Chinese politics after the Xinghai revolution (in isolation from specific political institutions and ideological systems)--that is, primarily the mass political culture. The second work concentrates on the political culture of the elite, the "dynamics"

of Chinese politics. In contrast to the first work, in which Pye mentions historical facts only in passing, in the second book his theorizing is based on an analysis of the political situation in the PRC after Mao Zedong. Even here, however, the sociopolitical context is only a supplement to his speculations.

The inaccuracy of the absolute isolation of models of the political culture, whether "elite" or mass, from their actual functioning in political practices was already mentioned above; it is precisely in establishments and structures that the changing social content of traditional behavioral stereotypes is "manifested." Declining to engage in an integral and concrete-historical study of the Chinese political culture, Pye advances a number of a priori hypotheses about the content and "driving forces" of politics in the PRC.

The reversals in contemporary Chinese history, the American political scientist suggests, revolve around the central problem of suppressing the "aggressive mental impulses of the masses" and finding a strong and authoritarian leader. The traditional Chinese culture, Pye stresses, imposed an absolute ban on any display of the "aggressive" impulses of the individual, subordinating the individual's desires to the needs of the social group. The Confucian ethic with its strict regulation of sociopolitical and family relations, glorification of the supreme authority and imperative of filial respect, the author continues, was a strong social precept restraining these aggressive impulses. The fear of "unleashed aggression" and "social chaos" compelled the Chinese who had been raised in the traditional spirit of Confucianism to submit completely to a strong authority, and this was regarded as a guarantee of their personal well-being and national grandeur. This was the origin, in the opinion of the American political scientist, of the main feature of the Chinese political culture--the assumption of political dependence.

The events of the early 20th century (the fall of the Qing empire, the internal strife between militarists, the struggle against Japanese aggression and the civil wars), Pye continues, led to extreme political instability in the country and to the decline of China's international prestige. The consequent lack of a strong and permanent authority, or what Pye terms the socio-psychological "authoritarian vacuum," had to be corrected as quickly as possible, especially since the traditional institutions of socialization were still cultivating the spirit of nationalism and the "authoritarian ideal" in the Chinese mind. Diverging from bourgeois Sinology's common interpretation of the Chinese revolution as a "revolt of the weak against the strong," the American political scientist sees the goal of the revolutionary actions of the Chinese masses as the establishment of a strict totalitarian regime and the acquisition of the desired political dependence. The 1949 revolution, he writes, was a "collective confirmation by the people of their need for a stronger authority"--a need which could not be satisfied by the militarists or the Kuomintang. This kind of authority was exercised, in Pye's opinion, by the Chinese communists led by Mao Zedong. Concluding his remarks on this subject, the author stresses that the Chinese had no other historical alternative but "communism," to which they were "predisposed" by virtue of their "national authoritarian crisis."

This is a general review of Pye's line of reasoning. It must be said that his ideological tendentiousness clearly prevails over his academic interest in the subject. This is specifically attested to by the author's selective approach to the explanation of politico-cultural phenomena. In essence, Pye asks relevant questions about the influence of the traditional cultural heritage on political behavior and thinking in present-day China. As Soviet Sinologists have pointed out, the relative autonomy of politics and the history of Chinese political affairs necessitate the analysis and consideration of the system of traditions, which occupy a prominent place in the country's political culture.

The American political scientist, however, deliberately confines the issue of politico-cultural continuity to the "fundamental" conformity and passivity of the Chinese people. "Whether the Chinese act as reactionary-traditionalists or revolutionary-reformists, they are always primarily conformists," Pye asserts. In this way, the author strives to substantiate the natural politico-cultural tendency toward the "authoritarian" form of political rule in contemporary China. Here he ignores all of the elements of the cultural-political heritage (the traditions of the peasant rebellions and national liberation struggle or the non-Confucian aspects of the mass consciousness, etc.) which contradict his thesis about the correspondence of the "totalitarian communist regime" to the centuries-old traditions of the Chinese people.¹⁸

The anti-Marxist thrust of Pye's theory even extended to an apology for Mao Zedong's socioeconomic "experiments." The author saw one of the Chinese political culture's characteristic features in the desire to avoid situations of choice and responsibility (as possible sources of conflict) by adhering to the canons of social behavior "sanctified" by Confucius or Mao Zedong. For this reason, Pye believes that the "excesses of the system," such as the "Cultural Revolution," should be ascribed less to the country's leadership than to the Chinese society's allegedly characteristic, "almost instinctive" submissive reaction to socially assigned programs of behavior.¹⁹ In other words, traditional Chinese psychological stereotypes are responsible for what the author terms Mao Zedong's "fanatical" political style.

In addition to displaying obvious political tendentiousness, these quotations from the American Sinologist's works attest to serious defects in his set of methods. The author equates the political and interpersonal levels of social interaction, confining the essence of politico-cultural phenomena to the imperatives of familial ethics. It is true that the Confucian regulation of roles played a significant part in the conflict-free regulation of interpersonal relations by helping the individual "foresee" his partner's accepted reaction in any given situation and facilitated the choice of "assigned" forms of behavior. It is probably accurate to discern signs of traditional behavioral stereotypes (actually maintained by the contemporary political system) in some features of the PRC mass political culture, but it would be absolutely wrong to confuse the cultural peculiarities of political behavior with deep-seated sociohistorical causes (as Pye does), which are connected with the class nature of society and its political system.

In Pye's works, psychoanalysis is substituted for a social-class analysis of political relations and the political culture, and it is from psychoanalysis

that the author derives the main arguments for his "hypotheses." Analyzing, for example, such features of the Chinese political culture as the developed sense of ethnic pride, the identification of personal immortality with national grandeur, the heightened sense of national humiliation and so forth, Pye talks about the "narcissism" of the Chinese national character, the distinctive nature of the Chinese people's "Oedipus complex" and other indispensable attributes of Freudian theory.

Obviously, the portrait he paints of Chinese civilization, based on "aggression," is just as far removed from real history as the classical Freudian arguments about Western Europe's pan-sexuality. But the reasons for the inaccuracy of Pye's arguments and hypotheses are not confined to his fascination with Freudian myths. The main role here is played by the obvious exaggeration of the importance of the sociopsychological factor in social development, and this is what turns Pye's theory of political culture into a variety of philosophical idealism. The American political scientist reduces the entire group of causes of the popular revolution in China exclusively to sociopsychological problems. He ignores the class and ideological content of the revolutionary process in the country and the authority and influence of Marxist-Leninist ideas among the masses and proclaims the "people's released emotional energy" to be the generator of Chinese history. Here Pye substantially distorts not only the emotional content but also the social thrust of progressive democratic movements in the country at the beginning of the century by comparing them to the unconscious "Oedipal rebellion" of youth against parental authority. Since, in Pye's opinion, the Confucian requirement of filial respect excluded the possibility of the resolution of the "Oedipal conflict" within the family, its psychological import was transferred to "abstractions" such as national independence, democracy and freedom. "The rigid, self-assured and naively moralistic style distinguishes the Chinese revolutionary spirit," the author concludes, "is probably directly related to the psychology of youthful rebellion."²⁰ The main purpose of this theory, just as others like it, is the misrepresentation of the actual content and purpose of the popular movement and its explanation in terms of irrational psychological factors rather than social causes. Pye's "explanations," therefore, are intended to confirm his main thesis about the fundamentally undemocratic nature of the political culture in China.

Pye's theory of political culture, in the form it had taken by the end of the 1960's, was based primarily on the traditional principles of intrafamilial socialization in old China, which, in the author's opinion, formed the political culture of the participants in the Chinese revolution and of its leaders. Even then, however, the American political scientist already foresaw definite changes in the sociopsychological atmosphere of the PRC and the inevitable reorientation of social aims and attitudes under the conditions of the Maoist (and post-Maoist) political system. Nevertheless, when he returned to this topic 13 years later, Pye continued to employ his earlier "hypotheses," this time to explain the accepted political standards of the Chinese elite.

The central idea in Pye's new work was that the eternal conflict between the need for universal conformity, dictated by the Confucian ideal of social harmony, and the desire of people for reliable interpersonal relations, which gradually lead to the formation of social groups or factions, violating the

principle of consensus with their private interests, lies at the basis of domestic political processes in China. This conflict, in Pye's opinion, is seen on all rungs of the social ladder in the PRC, from the CCP Central Committee leadership to low-ranking personnel on the local level, giving rise to the "factional style" of the elite political culture.

The American political scientist singles out the established Confucian principles of age and clan community among the factors influencing the formation of factions in China. In his opinion, bureaucratic and regional interests are less important because institutional or "geographic" privileges are too obviously in conflict with the traditional ideal of consensus.

As for political motives, in Pye's opinion, they do not play the leading role in the creation of factions in China, although they are important. Obviously, groups within the PRC usually have differing political leanings, the author remarks, but it would be wrong to conclude from this that factions in China arise as a result of the political attitudes of their members.²¹

According to Confucian tradition, Pye stresses, politics should reflect the moral perfection of the ruler. This is not the place for considerations of greed and ambition, which are precisely what lie at the basis of factional rivalry. The separation of "politics" from "power" in the national mind (on the level of social psychology) was promoted, in Pye's opinion, by the traditional principles of socialization: Ideas about wisdom and moral perfection were associated with the former, and guarantees of public and personal safety were associated with the latter (under the conditions of "suppressed aggression"). In turn, power relationships were regarded exclusively as the personal relationships between the subordinate and the superior. These peculiarities of traditional political perception gave rise, according to the American political scientist, to a feature as typical of PRC social reality as the elite's pretense of politico-ideological consensus, concealing the personal disagreements of leaders and the fierce battles of factions, which were reprehensible from the standpoint of the Confucian political culture.²²

Pye's line of reasoning is the following: The factional struggle in China is a struggle for power and, at the same time, a non-political struggle; factions in China are based not on political leanings but on personal ties, the principle of sociopsychological compatibility and the search for reliable interpersonal relations between the leader and the subordinate.

Pye's paradoxical thesis about the "apolitical" nature of factional conflicts in China is refuted by the content of his own study. As soon as the author begins a specific analysis of groups in the upper echelons of the PRC leadership, the politician in him triumphs over the theorist, and, contrary to his own theory, the author examines precisely the political and ideological content of factional arguments, ignoring the "psychological compatibility" of the members.

An analysis of the events of the past decade in China shows that the situation there is still unstable and contradictory and that rivalry, sometimes covert and sometimes overt, between groups is continuing. This is even acknowledged

by the official PRC press, which is now sounding appeals for the "complete elimination of factional interests among cadres, especially among those of administrative rank," and for "decisive measures to eliminate the remaining traces of exclusive group interests." Reports in the Chinese press on the current "regulation of party ranks" constantly stress the need for struggle against various deviations in the CCP and the importance of "securing the ideological and political unity of the entire party with the Central Committee."²³ Publications in the Chinese press, therefore, leave no doubt that factional disagreements in the CCP are political and ideological.

At the same time, there are some actual features in contemporary Chinese politics which are transformed in the American political scientist's false interpretation into the extravagant "hypothesis" about the non-political nature of the driving forces of Chinese politics. These are, first of all, a certain lack of principles in the factional struggle and, secondly, the historically engendered level of perception of political relations, characteristic of a number of countries, which are reflected in ordinary terms as primarily interpersonal relations. Furthermore, the objective political views of the members can be of secondary importance.

To some extent, these features are apparent in the PRC today, but this does not justify any reference to the politico-cultural inevitability of the factional style in China. The phenomenon in question is more sociohistorical than regional or specific. The conflict between the social ideal of politico-ideological consensus and the actual experience of the constant factional struggle in China stems from completely definite and specific historical causes and is therefore temporary.²⁴ References to "suppressed aggression" and other "psychogenic" aspects of the Confucian culture essentially raise political instability to the level of a permanent characteristic of PRC social development.

"The factional nature of Chinese politics," Pye asserts, "stems from certain fundamental features of the Chinese culture and personality."²⁵ In other words, according to the author's line of reasoning, traditional Confucian stereotypes have doomed the Chinese society to the eternal reproduction of this conflict, regardless of the social-class nature of the existing state.

The "hypotheses" presented above are essentially all there is to Pye's analytical interpretation of the Chinese political culture. Several of the author's remarks about the distinctive features of political reality in the PRC, however, remain outside the framework of his rigid a priori scheme. These remarks about the "nuances" of the Chinese political culture, the interpretations of which are sometimes more original than profound, make up the politico-cultural "portrait" of contemporary China in Pye's works. The American Sinologist's remarks about the role of ideology and the mass media in the PRC are of the greatest interest. The author stresses the extremely pragmatic nature of ideology in present-day China and sees its main function in disguising the continuous factional struggle. Ideological campaigns, according to Pye, are primarily of a symbolic nature in the PRC. They are supposed to reveal the potential adversaries of a given group and simultaneously conceal the trivial struggle for power behind a struggle between slogans proclaiming

the latest variety of politico-ideological "consensus."²⁶ In the opinion of the American political scientist, the ideological maneuvers of the PRC leaders are connected to some degree with their political programs, but it is quite difficult to determine where personal conflicts end and political considerations take over.

The ideological camouflage of the factional struggle, Pye says, is the job of the official press in the PRC, functioning less to inform the masses than to mobilize them in support of competing groups. This mobilization is accomplished with the aid of ideological symbols, code names, allegories and so forth. As a result, Chinese sociopolitical rhetoric acquires the appearance of fantastic hyperbole: The more incredible the current slogan sounds from the standpoint of common sense, the more easily the loyalty of leaders and their factions can be verified with its help. In this way, in the opinion of the American political scientist, a "symbolic political dimension" is being constructed in the PRC--that is, a special illusory world of symbols and allegories, sometimes quite far removed from political reality.²⁷

The author seeks the reasons for this in the specific nature of the Chinese political culture, in the "inevitable" struggle between elite groups. Although this interpretation is not entirely unjustified, it is nevertheless quite superficial. Attempts to symbolize political ideology are quite typical of China and of some other countries. This is partly the result of the need to adapt abstract ideological doctrines to the actual level of mass consciousness. To this end, the cause-and-effect relationships between complex ideological terms are replaced with symbols and metaphors to create a specific emotional mood, "cancelling" the need for theoretical explanations (for example, "American imperialism is a paper tiger" or "The east wind will conquer the west wind"). Furthermore, the effectiveness of these ideological symbols does not depend on their correspondence to the real state of affairs for some time. Of course, this does not exclude the possibility of the manipulation of ideological symbols in the interests of the power struggle, referred to by Pye.

Analyzing the distinctive features of the mass media in the PRC, the American political scientist mentions the pervasive and quite unique use of allegories and "code names," usually understandable to the broad masses before things can be called by their own names. In Pye's opinion, this game with the audience, which easily comprehends the underlying meaning of press and radio reports, is employed to produce the "effect of mass participation" in the current political campaign and accomplish "shared responsibility" for its results. The author also points out another characteristic feature of PRC politics--the predominance of moral criticism of disgraced politicians instead of references to their political mistakes. He sees the reason for this in the tenacity of the Confucian idea of the indissoluble connection between politics and morality. In present-day China, Pye believes, this tradition is reinforced by the strong taboo against the acknowledgement of objective political disagreements, which turns political arguments into a "moral-ideological" conflict.

Therefore, in the PRC political culture, Pye stresses, the bankruptcy of a policy line is associated primarily with the personal shortcomings of the policymakers. For this reason, moral exposure simultaneously signifies a

discredited political platform. The tendency to equate political and moral characteristics is also used by Pye to explain the arbitrary use of social-class labels in Chinese political criticism, which lose their objective meaning and become a means of political reprisal.²⁸ As for the public castigation of politicians, the author associates this practice with the traditional methods of socialization in China, particularly the educative role of shame and public censure.

Concluding this critical survey of L. Pye's studies of the Chinese political culture, we must underscore the fact that, in his interpretation, the phenomena of the Chinese political culture exist not only outside the specific socioeconomic situation, but also essentially outside current political events. The American Sinologist views the Confucian stereotypes of social psychology as specifically national constants of Chinese politics. This extra-historical interpretation of sociopsychological phenomena obviously cannot serve as a valid methodological basis for the scientific sociopolitical analysis of the PRC's present and future.

FOOTNOTES

1. G. A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS*, 1956, vol 18, No 3; G. A. Almond and S. Verba, "The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations," Boston-Toronto, 1963.
2. "Political Culture and Political Development," Princeton (N.Y.), 1965.
3. L. W. Pye, "Political Culture," in "International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences," N.Y., 1968, vol 12, pp 218-224; "Communications and Political Development," Princeton, 1963; L. W. Pye, "Southeast Asia's Political Systems," Englewood Cliffs, 1974; idem, "The Spirit of Chinese Politics," Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 1968; idem, "Mass Participation in Communist China," in "China: Management of a Revolutionary Society," London, 1972; idem, "Communications and Chinese Political Culture," *ASIAN SURVEY*, 1978, vol 18, No 3; idem, "The Dynamics of Chinese Politics," Cambridge (Mass.), 1981; L. W. Pye and N. Leites, "Nuances of the Chinese Political Culture," *ASIAN SURVEY*, 1982, vol 22, No 12.
4. L. A. Bereznyy, "The Theory of 'Political Culture' and Some Questions About Chinese Studies," *NARODY AZII I AFRIKI*, 1971, No 4; H. Harding, "The Study of Chinese Politics: Toward a Third Generation of Scholarship," *WORLD POLITICS*, 1981, vol XXXVI, No 2.
5. L. S. Perelomov, P. M. Kozhin and G. F. Saltykov, "The Traditions of Administration in the PRC Political Culture," *PROBLEMY DALNEGO VOSTOKA*, 1984, No 2, p 111.
6. L. W. Pye, "Political Culture," p 218.
7. S. Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in "Political Culture and Political Development," Princeton (N.J.), 1965, pp 515-516.

8. V. G. Grafskiy, "Criticism of the Functionalist Approach to the Study of the 'Political Culture,'" in "Mirnoye sosushchestvovaniye i sotsialno-politicheskoye razvitiye" [Peaceful Coexistence and Sociopolitical Development], Moscow, 1977, pp 59-64; V. V. Smirnov, "The Concept of the 'Political Culture' in U.S. Political Science," *ibid.*, pp 66-74; S. A. Yegorov, "The Contemporary Methodological Evolution of U.S. Political Science," in "Politika mira i razvitiye politicheskikh sistem" [The Policy of Peace and the Development of Political Systems], Moscow, 1979, pp 247-256; V. Yu. Smorgunova, "Political Culture as a Factor of Social Awareness. Author's Precise," Leningrad, 1981.
9. F. M. Burlatskiy and A. A. Galkin, "Sotsiologiya. Politika. Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya" [Sociology, Politics and International Relations], Moscow, 1974; Ye. Vyatr, "Sotsiologiya politicheskikh otnosheniy" [The Sociology of Political Relations], Moscow, 1978.
10. "Aktualnyye problemy sovremennogo politicheskogo razvitiya" [Current Issues in Contemporary Political Development], Moscow, 1982, p 110; V. Yu. Smorgunova, *Op. cit.*, p 10.
11. This significant shortcoming in the interpretation of the concept of political culture was also pointed out by the Western critics of L. Pye (S. van der Sprenkel, "The Spirit of Chinese Politics," *CHINA QUARTERLY*, 1969, No 37).
12. "Political Culture and Political Development," p 546.
13. *Ibid.*, p 11.
14. L. W. Pye, "The Spirit of Chinese Politics," pp VIII-IX; *idem*, "The Dynamics of Chinese Politics," pp XIII, 4-5.
15. We must agree with bourgeois Sinologists that Pye's methodological paradoxes cast suspicion on his research findings from the very beginning (S. van der Sprenkel, *Op. cit.*, p 143; David S. Goodman, "The Dynamics of Faction and Consensus in Chinese Politics," *CHINA QUARTERLY*, 1981, No 86, p 350).
16. L. W. Pye, "The Spirit of Chinese Politics," p VII.
17. *Ibid.*; *idem*, "The Dynamics of Chinese Politics."
18. L. W. Pye, "The Spirit of Chinese Politics," pp 32-33, 10, 96, 233. Although this work by L. Pye did not have great repercussions in bourgeois Sinology, many of his ideas, particularly the thesis of the political passivity of the individual in China and the organic status of the "Thought of Mao Zedong" in the Chinese culture, are quite popular today among Western Sinologist-social psychologists. Pye's conclusions are reflected to the fullest extent in an extremely popular work by R. Solomon, his student and follower (R. Solomon, "Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture," Berkeley, 1971).

19. L. W. Pye, "The Spirit of Chinese Politics," pp 159-160.
20. Ibid., pp 34, 71-76, 98-99, 123-124.
21. L. W. Pye, "The Dynamics of Chinese Politics," pp 4-5, 7.
22. Ibid., pp 137-138, 186-189.
23. RENMIN RIBAO, 28 February 1984; 1 July 1984.
24. The dubious nature of Pye's assertions about the "eternal" factional collisions in the Chinese elite was also underscored by some of his critics in the West (H. Harding, Op. cit., p 303).
25. L. W. Pye, "The Dynamics of Chinese Politics," p 239.
26. Ibid., pp 12-15, 162-168.
27. Ibid., pp 9-11, 17-21, 167-170; idem, "Communications and Chinese Political Culture," p 237.
28. L. W. Pye, "Communications and Chinese Political Culture," pp 229-230, 233-235, 241.

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CSO: 1805/4

U.S. DECISIONMAKING, POLICY ON CHINA EXAMINED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 86 pp 123-126

[Article by Yu. M. Ryakin: "Who Determines U.S. 'China' Policy and How"]

The problem of Sino-American relations is still one of the most actively and fiercely debated in Washington. In spite of the explicit top-level consensus concerning the general approach to US China policy, manifesting itself primarily in an endeavour to secure for Washington dominant positions, there are differences over the choice of specific ways to implement it. These differences, determined by certain subjective and objective factors, are not a matter of principle, yet they leave a clear mark on Washington's political actions and the tactics of conducting its strategy—the pursuit of American hegemony in world affairs. Of undoubted interest in this connection is the book by American Sinologist R. Sutter, which is reviewed here.*

Sutter's study examines the positions taken by various influential groups in official Washington over US China policy. It is characteristic that, having focused on the elucidation of this problem, the author virtually ignores the position taken on this issue by US academic circles (which is not generally typical of American Sinology), thus giving priority not to politologists but to politicians. It is also significant that, from 1968 to 1977, R. Sutter was himself a CIA consultant on the PRC's foreign policy and is today on the staff of the US Library of Congress Research Service. This, of course, allows him to take his bearings in the "corridors of power" and possess reliable information.

Sutter proceeds from the conviction, which sets the tone of his whole book, that "In broad terms, each American administration, from Richard Nixon's to Ronald Reagan's, has sought to use better relations with China as a means to position the United States favourably in the US-Soviet-PRC triangular relationship; to stabilise Asian affairs, secure a balance of forces in the region favourable to the United States and its allies and friends, and foster a peaceful and prosperous future for Taiwan; to build beneficial economic, cultural, and other bilateral ties; and to work more closely with the PRC on issues of global importance..." (p. IX). Thus, the author admits that the US China policy meant, by drawing China into US anti-Soviet combinations, to place the Soviet Union in a difficult military-political situation. At the same time, Washington intended to guarantee some kind of "future" for Taiwan. These plans were not, of course, only anti-Soviet in their essence; they also conflicted with China's real interests.

One cannot but agree with the author's premise regarding the strategic continuity of Washington's China policy, especially those hegemonic

* Robert G. Sutter, *The China Quandary: Domestic Determinants of US China Policy, 1972-1982*, Boulder, Colorado, 1983, 194 pp.

goals, which were set earlier, and which are today being pursued by American diplomacy.

Still, Sutter notes that there were "contradictions and controversy in the United States that have adversely affected Sino-American relations" (p. IX). Worried by this circumstance he even says that "divisions of opinion in the United States over Taiwan policy, US-Soviet-PRC relations, US-PRC economic relations, and the management of US China policy have threatened at times to upset the ongoing Sino-American reconciliation" (p. X). This is of course, a major exaggeration, because all the differences in the approach to the problem of Sino-American relations come down to the choice of specific political tactics and do not affect Washington's basic political principles. It is another matter that differences of opinion on the "Chinese problem" somewhat reduce the effectiveness of Washington's foreign policy course, hampering, in particular, its freedom of manoeuvre in the international arena.

Incidentally, R. Sutter himself states that the "bipartisan" support for "reconciliation", started by R. Nixon, remains on the whole intact today. At the same time, he underlines that Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford "were generally sensitive" to the definite mistrust towards their China policy, the turn about in which was rather abrupt, and took care not to "substantially exacerbate those tensions" (p. 1). There was also disagreement in the administration and Congress over James Carter's policy of alliance with the PRC. Under Ronald Reagan, the polemics over Taiwan have intensified. Let us note, in passing, that the author's analysis of the Reagan administration's position, its supporters and opponents, is presented less convincingly, there is a much greater focus on examining US relations with China under the Carter administration.

Sutter comes to the conclusion that in their policy towards China, Nixon and Ford "...emphasised common US-PRC strategic interests in opposing international 'hegemony' and encouraged closer US contacts with the PRC", but for reasons of domestic politics "they did not significantly alter formal US diplomatic and defence ties with Taiwan" (pp. 19-20).

Carter, according to Sutter, played a major part in the development of Sino-American relations, since "his historic decision to normalise diplomatic relations with the PRC opened the way to extensive Sino-American cooperation in economic, strategic, and cultural relations", up to establishing a "strategic 'alliance'" (p. 1).

Carter was obviously successful in pushing Sino-American relations in a certain strategic direction: suffice it to say that it was under him that the notorious "Chinese card" became, in Washington's thinking, one of the most important trumps of US global policy. At the same time, the line of rapidly activating Sino-American relations encountered some opposition from influential political forces of the USA. Sutter singles out four "opposition" groups.

The first, headed by Senator John Glenn, consisted of politicians who stood for the "value" of old allies and the strength of alliances made by the US. This group especially strongly denounced Carter's Taiwan policy. The second group was made up of politicians who objected to Carter's line of bringing pressure to bear on the Soviet Union by establishing "strategic" ties with the PRC and therefore opposed closer military links with China. The most authoritative member of this group was Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. The third group of Carter's critics included political figures who had traditionally been suspicious of China's communist system and her goals in East Asia and world-wide. This group was headed by Senators Barry Goldwater, S. Hayakawa and Jesse Helms. Finally, one more group opposed to Carter's policy included politicians who demanded that the American people be better informed and opposed the

administration's "secret approach" in the development of Sino-American relations. The most active in advocating an "open" approach towards China was Congressman Lester Wolff.

The author admits that "the objectives of Carter's China policy were in broad terms continuous" in respect to those of the two previous administrations and were as follows: "1) to position itself favourably in the US-Soviet-PRC triangular relationship; 2) to use improved relations with Peking to help stabilise Asian affairs, secure a balance of forces in the region favourable to the United States and China, and foster a peaceful, prosperous future for Taiwan; 3) to build mutually beneficial economic, cultural and other ties with the PRC; and 4) to work more closely with the PRC on internationally important issues such as world food supply, population control, and arms limitation" (p. 71). Thus, a desire to give Washington a decisive military-political edge was at the root of the US China policy.

So it comes as no surprise that the author dwells all the time on the point that, after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and the PRC and the adoption of the Taiwan Relations Act "American leaders began to turn their attention to the implications of improved Sino-American relations for broader US foreign policy interests, especially vis-à-vis the Soviet Union" (p. 10). As a result, a debate started in Washington regarding the possible consequences of the administration's policy for American interests in the US-USSR-PRC triangle. According to Sutter, these arguments finally came down to the problem of US military supplies to China. The author presents the following alignment of forces: the administration's spokesmen came out for "improved relations with China to gain greater leverage in America's continuing competition with the USSR. They have urged the United States to 'play the Chinese card'—a loosely defined concept referring to building closer US political, economic, technical, or military ties with the PRC to gain greater US advantage over the Soviet Union" (p. 11).

It was primarily a question of the United States gaining decisive advantages of a military-political nature. Simultaneously, plans were worked out to play "the Chinese card" in the sphere of the economy, in order to make the Soviet Union more complaisant, for example, in its domestic policy. The author gives the following example of the Carter administration's plans to use "the Chinese card": "Some officials claimed that by moving ahead in economic cooperation with China, the United States would prompt the Soviet Union to rethink its past position on the emigration issue and other controversies blocking US-Soviet economic cooperation and to adopt more forthcoming policies" (pp. 13-14).

Opposing this line were those whom Sutter calls "sceptics", arguing that China was still an "unpredictable power" and challenging the administration's premise that close ties with China in all spheres, including the military, was the best way of dealing with the USSR.

Another group of American politicians who disagreed with the administration, believed that priority should be given to "talks with Moscow" or to greater defence efforts by the US, but not to the development of relations with China, which did not rank uppermost in the system of Washington's foreign policy priorities.

Lastly, one more influential political group, distinct from the Carter administration, came out for a "balanced" US approach to both China and the Soviet Union.

In the final analysis, a somewhat simplified political picture of Washington, without excessive detail (which we believe to be justified in this case) looked as follows. President Carter's supporters, among whom the staunchest were Senator Henry Jackson and the President's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, advocated the use of "the Chinese

card" to pressure the Soviet Union. Their opponents, headed by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Congressman Lester Wolff, apprehensive of the possible consequences of this policy, came out against it [though not too vigorously.—Y. R.] and advocated a more balanced course.

As already stated, Sutter focuses less on analysing Washington's China policy under the Reagan administration than under the three previous administrations. He virtually confines himself to citing what he considers to be a sad fact: that Ronald Reagan "had pledged in the campaign to improve relations with Taipei, even though it might risk undermining the new US relationship with Peking" (p. 142).

Having come under pressure from the PRC seeking to prevent a revision of the agreements with Washington on the Taiwan issue, and facing the prospect of deteriorating relations with China, however, Sutter notes, the Reagan administration adopted a more cautious line over Taiwan (p. 142).

Indeed, for almost eight years Sino-American relations were on the ascent, reaching their peak under the Carter administration, but during Ronald Reagan's first term the climb slowed down somewhat. The reason was not so much the extent of the President's "pro-Taiwan" sentiments (by the way, time has not diminished them, it has only made them more reserved and less demonstrative).

A whole complex of factors came into play, above all the Soviet Union's foreign policy initiatives to improve the world situation. Also of certain significance were some changes in the PRC's foreign policy. The pause in Sino-American relations caused concern in Washington. On the whole, this concern is reflected in Robert Sutter's book. The Reagan administration, fearful of losing the foreign policy initiative, is once again trying to activate Sino-American relations along all lines, aiming to draw China into its manipulations in the international arena. Herein lie the "continuity" and "consistency" of Washington's policy towards China.

In general, US policy towards the PRC has been invariably determined by American hegemonic aspirations. In this sense it has been fully continuous under the four US administrations, from Nixon to Reagan. In fact, this is admitted by Sutter himself. As for the certain divergence of positions and opinions, or rather the existence of shades and nuances in them, which put the author on the alert, they arise from the desire of the US ruling circles to improve their tactics, without changing the basics of the strategy, on which no one casts doubt. Proof of this is provided by Robert Sutter's analysis, irrespective of his subjective motives.

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CSO: 1812/94

EVENTS IN CHINA IN 1945 RECALLED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 86 pp 127-139

[Article by Professor M. F. Yuryev]

Early 1945... World War II was drawing to a close, its outcome increasingly predetermined by developments on the Soviet-German front. The victorious offensive of the Soviet army promoted the success of the Crimean (Yalta) Conference of heads of state or government of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain (February 4-11, 1945), which adopted important decisions concerning the Far East, made public in 1946. In order to bring World War II to a faster end and ensure greater security for the USSR, the Soviet Union had undertaken to enter the war against Japan two to three months after Germany's surrender, on the following conditions:

1. "Maintenance of the *status quo* in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic); 2. Restoration of Russia's rights, treacherously violated by the Japanese attack in 1904, namely: a) return to the Soviet Union of the southern part of Sakhalin Island and all the isles adjacent to it; b) internationalisation of the commercial seaport of Dairen ensuring the priority interests of the Soviet Union at this port and restoration of the lease of Port Arthur as a Soviet military and naval base and c) joint exploitation of the China Far Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway, with an outlet to Dairen, through a joint-stock Soviet-Chinese company providing for the priority of Soviet interests in this company and for the retention by China of full sovereignty over Manchuria; and 3. The transfer of the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union." This decision envisaged the coordination with the Chinese Government, through the good offices of US President F. Roosevelt, over the points concerning Mongolia, the aforesaid ports and railways. The Soviet Union expressed its readiness to conclude "a Soviet-Chinese pact of friendship and alliance to assist China with armed forces in order to liberate it from the Japanese yoke".¹

Of late, reactionary Western leaders, including US President Reagan, and West German and Japanese revenge-seekers have been trying to question the decisions of the Yalta Conference. Chiang Kaishek's immediate reaction to the terms of the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan was negative, which might be explained by his class position. The Japanese edition of the book *Secret Notes of President Jiang*, reprinted in Taiwan, claims that "the seizure of mainland China by Communists and the wars in Korea and Vietnam are fruits of the Yalta Conference".² It is surprising that a similar attitude is shown in some publications printed in the People's Republic of China. For example, Zhang Hongyi, the author of the article entitled "The Secret Yalta Agreement and the Soviet and US Policies Towards China" alleges that the terms of Soviet entry into the war against Japan have affected China's sovereign rights and national interests,³ whereas the compiler of the book *Anti-Japanese War History*, though he admits that "The Yalta Conference played an

¹ *Pravda*, Feb. 13, 1946.

² *Secret Notes of President Jiang*, Vol. I, Taipei, 1974, pp. 30-31 (in Chinese).

³ See *The State of Affairs in World History Studies*, 1981, No. 10 (In Chinese).

important part in winning victory in the anti-fascist war", reiterates Chiang Kaishek's allegations that its decisions "affected China's sovereignty".⁴ Such claims are made even though it is well known in the People's Republic of China that the establishment of a joint naval base in Port Arthur, which the Soviet Union was entrusted to defend, as well as other Soviet assistance to China in liberating a large part of its territory and population from the Japanese, constituted a major contribution to the building of the Communist Party of China's military and revolutionary base in Manchuria, which ensured the victory of the Chinese democratic forces and the formation of the People's Republic of China. On the eve of the victory of people's revolution in China, Mao Zedong stressed that the Soviet Union had come to the China Far Eastern Railway and Port Arthur "not as an imperialist, but as a socialist force to defend common interests". "US imperialists", he continued, "sit in China to oppress, whereas the Soviet Union is in Port Arthur to provide defence against the Japanese militarists".⁵

Two simultaneous, inter-related historical processes were underway in China in the winter and spring of 1945, i.e., the anti-Japanese struggle and a democratic movement led by the CPC's slogan to dismantle the one-party Guomindang dictatorship and form a coalition government. The slogan was a catchword at mass meetings and manifestations, in the January Declaration of the Democratic League and even in the February issues of *Huaqiao ribao*, the newspaper of Chinese emigrants in the USA. In early 1945, 64 members of the National Political Council (a consultative agency of representatives of various parties and mass organisations, set up in 1938) called on the government to change its policy. In February, over 300 workers of culture in Chongqing published a statement in support of the CPC's appeal to convene a national conference and form a coalition government. Similar declarations were issued in Kunmin (March) and Chengdu (April) by 340 and over 100 public figures respectively. The 26th anniversary of The 4th of May, 1919 Movement against imperialism was marked by a 10,000-strong demonstration of students in Kunmin, demanding an immediate end to the one-party dictatorship and the Guomindang secret services, the abolition of censorship, the convocation of a national conference and the formation of a coalition government.

The foreign press and some US and British leaders associated the Guomindang's defeats in the war with its reactionary policies and the corruption of its civil and military leadership. On November 25, 1944 *Huaqiao ribao* wrote that the chief occupation of many Guomindang officers and generals was contraband and speculation. "If", the newspaper said angrily, "top-ranking officials are indeed involved in these shady deals and do not conceal it, how can they forbid the fighting generals to capitalise on the country's plight." *News Chronicle* reporter Stein testified that soldiers were poorly supplied with ammunitions and foodstuffs. At a press conference on February 1, 1945 at the US Army headquarters in Chongqing, even general Wedemeyer had to admit that "there are enough foodstuffs in China for good upkeep of the army. Food collection, storage and distribution between army units is the weak point". Foodstuffs were stolen and never reached the troops. On January 16, 1945 on his return from China, US Congressman M. Mansfield said the following of China's ruling party: "The Guomindang's popularity decreases day by day because of the fear instilled by its army and the behaviour of its tax collectors."

⁴ *History of the Anti-Japanese War*, compiled by Ma Zhonglian, Peking, 1983, p. 207 (in Chinese).

⁵ Cit. from O. Borisov. *From the History of Soviet-Chinese Relations in the 1950s* (Discussion of Mao Zedong in the PRC), Moscow, 1981, pp. 74-75.

The Guomindang pays lip service to democracy, but acts as a dictatorship." In a communique on war developments in China of January 5, 1945, the London China Relief Committee pointed out that the Chinese police used "Gestapo methods", disapproved by Guomindang left-wing liberals.

Broad sections of the public in China demanded the following programme of action: a lift of the blockade of the special Shenxi-Hansu-Ningxia area and the sending of the released troops to the front; recognition of all anti-Japanese military units and the authorities of liberated areas; abolition of concentration camps and fascist organisations; the release of political prisoners; annulment of laws designed to suppress popular rights; legalisation of political parties, an increase in pay in the army and provision of relief for the population in areas where natural calamities had occurred.⁶

Among the active supporters of a more democratic China was the all-China association of writers and men of arts.⁷

Opposition to the great-power nationalistic oppression in Xinjian was intensifying. As a result of an uprising in Kuldja, a provisional revolutionary government of the East Turkestan Republic was formed, which started to confiscate the capital of Chinese trading companies and the property of Chinese government officials, landlords, livestock-owners, merchants, and usurers. It lifted restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union, repudiated debts, introduced an 8-hour working day and carried out other democratic reforms. For a long time, however, there had been no relations between ETR and CPC leaders and neither side seemed interested. The leader of the movement's progressive wing, Ahmatdjan Kasymi, was opposed to the hostile policy towards non-Moslems supported by feudal clerical elements in the ETR leadership. At the government sitting on December 20, 1944 he said: "Is it right to regard non-Moslems as our enemies? No! All those who have taken part in the revolution, irrespective of the religion they profess, are our true friends... Some people suggest that we should declare our state a Moslem one; this is absolutely wrong and harmful. We must avoid discord in our ranks; instead, we must join hands and hearts in destroying our common enemy." On February 3, 1945 the ETR Government resolved to set up a regular army to liberate the whole of Xinjian. Towards the end of World War II, the ETR Provisional Government's national democratic rule had extended to the northeastern provinces of Xinjian. The strength of its National Army had increased to 30,000 men; it continued to advance to the East and the South. A guerrilla movement was unfolding in the areas still under the Guomindang rule. The Guomindang authorities had to sit down at the negotiation table with ETR representatives; the negotiations lasted for several months and resulted in the signing of a peace agreement on January 2, 1946.⁸

There was no formal relationships between the national struggle by the peoples of Xinjian and the overall Chinese democratic movement, but this struggle objectively weakened the Guomindang dictatorship in China, thereby deepening the crisis of Chiang Kaishek's regime. The crisis was used to the utmost by the CPC to expose the anti-democratic nature of the Chongqing government and its inability to defend the national interests of the Chinese people against the Japanese aggressor. The CPC sought to isolate the anti-democratic forces. In November, 1944 and

⁶ *Izvestia*, Feb. 18, 1945, *General History of the New Democratic Revolution in China*, Vol. 3, Peking, 1961, p. 340 (in Chinese).

⁷ See O. Bolotina, *Lao She. War Years' Writings, 1937-1949*, Moscow, 1983, p. 53.

⁸ See Z. Taipov, *In the Struggle for Freedom*, Moscow, 1974, pp. 74-111; V. Bogoslovsky, A. Moskalev, *Nationality Problem in China (1911-1949)*, Moscow, 1984, pp. 180-181; *China's Contemporary History, 1928-1949*, Moscow, 1984, pp. 234-236, *General History...*, p. 342.

January, 1945 Zhou Enlai left Yanan for Chongqing for talks with the Guomindang leadership. As a preparatory step towards the formation of a coalition government, the CPC suggested that a conference be called of representatives of the Guomindang, the CPC, the Democratic League and non-party leaders. Chiang Kaishek turned this proposition down. In his 1945 New Year message, Chiang Kaishek insisted on summoning the "national assembly" elected under the Guomindang's control in 1936. True, he also had to admit that "the military setbacks we suffered in the latter part of the past year have revealed our political drawbacks and mistakes. All party and government members ought to give it a thought... We must admit that our administration is inefficient; it lacks organisation and flexibility which fails to conform to wartime requirements". He was unwilling, however, to draw corresponding conclusions from this admission. Chiang's New Year message was sharply criticised by the CPC whose representative said that it would be a "national assembly of Chiang Kaishek's family". On March 1, 1945 Chiang Kaishek demanded that the CPC's troops and agencies of democratic power, set up on territories previously occupied by the Japanese, be placed under his control. As a return gesture, he promised to legalise the CPC and to "admit" its representatives to the government.

The CPC would not, of course, accept this proposal and let the Communists be disarmed and defeated. Through the Xinhua news agency and the *Jiefang ribao* paper, the CPC explained its position and criticised that of Chiang Kaishek.⁹ Late in April, 1945 Zhou Enlai described the stances of the CPC and the Guomindang as follows: "Chiang's policy and ours are poles apart. It may be said that today we are unanimous only in recognising the need for a war of resistance, but we cannot find a common language with him as to how it should be waged. We insist on victory, but only complete victory, on democracy, but only a new democracy, on cohesion, but only cohesion based on democratic principles, both domestically and internationally. The Guomindang, however, seeks compromise and capitulation instead of complete victory, so as to use Japanese money and arms in the future and reorganise the puppet troops for a civil war; it seeks dictatorship instead of democracy and a split instead of cohesion. On the international scene, it engineers intrigues in the hope that Britain and the USA will send another Skobi to China [In the autumn of 1944, British troops under Skobi's command drowned the Greek resistance movement in blood and restored the fascist monarchy in Greece.—M. Y.]. Such is the policy of the Guomindang".¹⁰

This statement reflected concern about possible US intervention in China. The anxiety grew stronger as the CPC's attempts to win the USA over to its side proved futile. Mao Zedong pinned serious hopes on the project, as he believed that, after Germany's defeat, it would take China and the allies some two years to defeat Japan and free China. In February 1945, Yanan requested General Wedemeyer, Commander of the US Troops in China, for a loan of \$20 million to buy arms for the CPC troops. The request was turned down. On February 28, 1945 a group of US diplomats and political advisers, connected with general J. Stilwell, former commander of the US troops in the Chinese-Burmese-Indian theatre, forwarded a memorandum to Washington proposing that unreserved support to Chiang Kaishek should be refused, in favour of support for all parties, including the CPC, as "the rout of Japan, as quick as possible, with the least American casualties, was the urgent objective of the US Far

⁹ See *Izvestia*, Feb. 18, 1945; *Materials on the History of the Chinese Revolution*, Vol. 4, Peking, 1959, pp. 364-371 (in Chinese); Zhou Enlai, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Peking, 1981, p. 264 (in Chinese).

¹⁰ Zhou Enlai, *Op. cit.*, p. 265.

Eastern policy". The memorandum was rejected by the US administration. President F. Roosevelt ordered its authors to be recalled from China. In March 1945, a decision was made to recall from Yanan the group of US observers—diplomats, officers and intelligence agents ("the Dixie mission") who favoured closer relations with the CPC¹¹ and, on April 2, US Ambassador to China Patrick Hurley announced in Washington his government's intention to cooperate only with the Guomindang. Inspired by this decision, the Guomindang leadership tried to step up its military and political pressure on the CPC.

The "Skobi version" was impossible in China because, in the first place, its international role had increased immeasurably as a result of the historic victories of the Soviet Union in the war against fascism, which applied to the Far East in general.

The CPC's expanding national influence, its growing prestige among various sections of the population and Soviet support for China's democratic forces were also mirrored in the fact that the Chinese delegation to the constituent conference of the United Nations Organisation (April 1945, San Francisco) included a representative from the liberated areas, CPC Politburo member Dong Biwu.

On the days when nazi Germany was about to collapse, the offensive action of CPC troops on Japanese-occupied territory intensified. In the first part of 1945, the 8th Army delivered a series of strikes on the puppet troops and Japanese strong points in Eastern Henan, set up another stronghold and established liaison with the New 4th Army. In East China, the 1st division of the New 4th Army crossed to the southern bank of the Yangtze and waged a guerrilla war in the Jiangsu-Zhejiang frontier area. An anti-Japanese stronghold with a more than one-million-strong population was also established in Western Zhejiang. Guerrilla actions were carried out by the local CPC branch in Fujiang, after the Japanese seized the city of Fuzhou and the sea coast. Several guerrilla detachments were organised in Guangdong. Simultaneously, both in Henan and Zhejiang, CPC troops had to engage with Guomindang formations.

In March 1945, Guomindang troops, supported by British, Indian and US units, captured the Yunan-Burma highway and were engaged in offensives in Yunan and Western Hunan. The Japanese were retreating from there to Vietnam.

After Germany's surrender, the Emperor's General Headquarters ordered on May 28, 1945 the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Hunan, Guangxi and Jiangxi, and from the Hunan-Guangxi and Guangzhou-Hankou railways, northwards to back up Japanese positions in Central and North China in case the Soviet Union entered the war in the Far East. Guomindang armies moved into the vacated areas and in the summer of 1945, occupied the cities of Nanning and Liuzhou, Fuzhou and Wenzhou (a port in Zhejiang), as well as South Jiangxi.¹² Almost all US airfields the Japanese had captured in the 1944 offensive, again came under the control of US troops.¹³

It was in this context that the two major parties of China—the CPC and the Guomindang—held their congresses (Seventh and Sixth, respectively) in the spring of 1945. The Seventh CPC congress was preceded by the Seventh Plenum of the CPC Central Committee, convened five and a half years after the Sixth Plenum, which was in session for whole eleven months—from May 21, 1944 to April 20, 1945. The Seventh Plenum

¹¹ A. Ledovsky, *The USSR, the USA and the Popular Revolution in China*, Moscow, 1979, pp. 30-34. Before their departure for Chongqing, representatives of the US observers' group met with Mao Zedong, Zhu De and Ye Jianying (June 9-11, 1945); see P. Vladimirov, *China's Special Area, 1942-1945*, Moscow, 1973, pp. 497, 610.

¹² See *History of the Anti-Japanese War*, pp. 191-204.

¹³ See *Pacific War History* (translated from Japanese), Vol. 4, Moscow, 1958, p. 77.

adopted a directive on Party activities in towns and cities. The task set by the directive was to drive the Japanese invaders out of China "by winning over [to its side.—M. Y.] the multi-million masses, puppet troops and the police, preparing armed uprisings and capturing cities and important communications". The directive indicated that the conditions for this were favourable as "the world war against fascism and, equally (1) China's war against Japan are nearing complete victory; the Guomindang is utterly corrupt and is suffering defeats, whereas our Party and our army are winning victories and holding their own over vast battle areas in the enemy's rear; the people of the whole country are becoming increasingly disappointed with the Guomindang and pin infinite hopes on our Party and our army".¹⁴ The directive laid down that as much importance should be attached to Party work in towns and cities as to its activities in the strongholds of the liberated areas in the enemy's rear. In practice, however, no uprisings of workers or other sections of the urban population were organised either in 1945 or later; the stake was made exclusively on the army.

The Seventh Congress of the CPC was held 17 years after its Sixth Congress. Over this period, the revolution in China went through two major phases—a civil war between the CPC and the Guomindang and a national liberation war of the Chinese people, against the Japanese invaders. Important changes took place in the CPC, in its position in the country, its numerical strength, social composition, leadership, ideology, military strength and foreign policy orientation. The congress was postponed several times because Mao Zedong and other leaders who supported him felt it "had not been adequately prepared". It was called only after the termination of the "campaign to improve the style".¹⁵ The congress sat from April 23 to June 11, 1945 in Yanan. By this time, there were 19 liberated areas in China, with a total population of 95.5 million, including the frontier area of Shenxi-Gansu-Ningxia where the CPC Central Committee had its headquarters; 6 areas in North China; 10 areas in Central China; and 2 areas in South China. The CPC regular troops totalled 910,000 men and its popular volunteer corps equalled 2.2 million.¹⁶ Thus, over the eight years of the anti-Japanese war, the CPC army had grown more than 20-fold, whereas the population of the CPC strongholds had increased more than 40-50 times which meant that, by the opening of its Seventh Congress, the CPC, with its more than 1.2 million membership, was a considerable national force.

The congress opened in an international atmosphere greatly influenced by the decisive victories of the Soviet Union over nazi Germany, and this was reflected, though not always fully, in the speeches given by Mao Zedong and many other delegates. In his report to the congress, Mao Zedong said that "the Soviet people, who have become a powerful force, have played the main role in defeating fascism".¹⁷ In his notes, P. Vladimirov cites Mao going on as follows: "Political reality and practice prove that, in the international arena, the Soviet Union is our only and best friend: all the rest are so-called allies." Li Fuchun said: "And we are not isolated; the Soviet Union supports us! The USSR has grown strong, more powerful; during the war it has gained many allies. The capture of

¹⁴ *Major Conferences in the History of the CPC*, part I, Shanghai, 1982, pp. 229-233 (in Chinese).

¹⁵ Contemporary historical party literature of the PRC points out that, in the course of the "cadre check-up campaign" (or "emergency salvation") which was part of the "movement to improve the style", "left errors" were made. See *Lectures on the CPC History*, part I, Hubei, 1981, pp. 173-174 (in Chinese).

¹⁶ Zhu De, *Concerning the Liberated Areas' Front*, Peking, 1983, p. 135 (in Chinese).

¹⁷ Mao Zedong, *Selected Works*, Vol. 4, Moscow, 1953, p. 462.

Berlin is a fact of immense significance. It is impossible to defeat the fascists without the Soviet Union." P. Vladimirov points out that, at the Seventh CPC Congress, "all the speakers displayed a clearly dual attitude towards the Soviet Union... It was a mirror-like reflection of the dual position taken by Chairman Mao himself". On the one hand, there was a desire to lean on the power of the Soviet Union; on the other, there was a drift away from friendship with the CPSU on the pretext of fighting "dogmatism". Mao Zedong criticised those "one-sided" speeches that expressed the hope that "the Soviet Union is sure to come out and is sure to help us". This stand was based not so much on an attempt to play down reliance on Soviet support, as to underestimate the role of the Soviet Union.¹⁸ Mao Zedong made the same mistake that many American and British politicians made; they thought the Soviet Union was unable to influence world developments because of the huge losses it had sustained in its self-sacrificing struggle against Nazi Germany.

Also indicative of Mao Zedong's attitude towards the Soviet Union was the fact that, in his closing speech at the congress (June 11, 1945), he made no mention whatsoever of Germany's surrender and the victory of the Soviet people and its Red Army, which was all the more strange next to the congratulations sent by Chiang Kaishek to the Soviet Government: "May we offer our most heartfelt and sincere congratulations on this happy occasion for all of us—the capitulation of the Nazis... We feel it our duty to do justice to the boundless fortitude of the peoples of the Soviet Union, who have been waging a hard struggle against the enemy for four years, notwithstanding fearful odds and sacrifices." On his arrival in Moscow on June 30, 1945 for talks with the Soviet Government, Song Ziwen, Chairman of the Executive Yuan and Chinese Foreign Minister, said: "I am especially happy to enjoy this opportunity of congratulating here the Army, the people and the Government of the Soviet Union upon the brilliant victory over fascist Germany."¹⁹

Despite the obvious protocol rhetoric, these statements were indicative of the leaders of the Guomindang government being mindful of the importance of relations with the Soviet Union. The Sixth Guomindang Congress (May 1945) openly declared it necessary to establish lasting friendly relations with the USSR.

The collapse of fascist Germany presaged the coming defeat of the Japanese imperialists. On April 5, 1945 the Soviet Government denounced the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact of April 13, 1941. Its statement said that since the signing of the pact "the situation has changed radically. Germany has attacked the Soviet Union, and Japan, as Germany's ally, has been helping it in the war against the Soviet Union. Moreover, Japan is at war with the USA and Britain, which are Soviet allies. In this context, the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact has lost any meaning and can no longer be extended".²⁰ The denunciation was one of the first results of the Yalta accords. It was interpreted in China as an omen of Soviet entry into the war against Japan. P. Vladimirov's comments on this event are as follows: "Yanan is jubilant. All these days Mao Zedong is happily excited. The decision of the Soviet Government at once raises the prestige of the CPC." In his report to the Seventh CPC Congress Mao Zedong said: "The USSR has already denounced the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact. This step has inspired the Chinese people and the peoples of the Pacific region."²¹ On April 8, 1945, the CPC Central Committee

¹⁸ See P. Vladimirov, *Op. cit.*, pp. 515, 563, 565, 601.

¹⁹ *Pravda*, May 12, July 1, 1945.

²⁰ *Soviet Foreign Policy in the Years of the Great Patriotic War*, Vol. 3. Moscow, 1947, p. 166.

²¹ P. Vladimirov, *Op. cit.*, p. 501; Mao Zedong, *Selected Works*, Harbin, 1948, p. 291.

newspaper *Jiefang ribao* wrote that this initiative of the Soviet Government "is the most important event in the present-day international situation" and that "for the Chinese people, as well as for the allied powers—the USA and Britain—it is a cause of inspiration and greater hope for a closer victory".

This is how the population of Shanghai, according to Chinese historian Peng Ming, reacted to the decision of the Soviet Government: "On learning about the denunciation of the pact, the population of Shanghai, languishing under the enemy's yoke, has been overcome with tremendous joy. On April 6 the streets of the city were gay with slogans. Many thousands thronged the square in front of the editorial office of the Soviet newspaper *New Life* to read the Soviet Government declaration. The words 'the dawn will soon come' went into every man's heart."²²

In anticipation of Japan's defeat, the two major military and political forces in China sought to strengthen their positions in case a civil war flares up again. The attention of the Seventh CPC Congress was, therefore, focused more on preparations for an imminent war with the Guomindang than on the problems of the continuing war with Japan. Mao Zedong's report stressed the rallying of all forces opposed to Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorship around the CPC. Hence the slogan of a coalition government "that would lead the liberated nation in building an independent, free, democratic, united, rich and powerful new China".

In his report on military matters, Zhu De pointed to the need to switch over from predominant guerrilla tactics to mobile and trench warfare by regular CPC troops.

In the introduction to his report on changes in the Party Rules, Liu Shaoqi said: "From now on, the Communist Party of China ought to be referred to as a new party!"²³ He meant not only the increased membership of the CPC (1,210,000 members as of that date). The chief new feature, announced Liu Shaoqi, was that the CPC had "its leader"—Chairman Mao, who "has adapted Marxism to Chinese conditions"; that it had developed "the system of Mao Zedong's thought", which represented "Chinese Communism", "Chinese Marxism".

In his notable contribution "Concerning the United Front", Zhou Enlai told the congress of the history of CPC—Guomindang relationships and gave the CPC leadership's assessment of the experience and lessons of the united front policy. While in general supporting Mao Zedong's approach, Zhou Enlai was inclined to be more flexible with regard to intelligentsia, as can be seen, for example, from his cable of January 18, 1945 to the Southern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, in which he did not approve of extending the "movement to improve the style" to non-Party workers of culture close to the CPC in the Guomindang-controlled areas in the "big rear" (West China).²⁴

The Seventh CPC Congress legalised the ideological and organisational changes that had taken place in the CPC over the previous decade and formulated the tasks of fighting against the Guomindang dictatorship.

The Sixth Congress of the Guomindang was held in parallel with the Seventh CPC Congress (May 5-21, 1945) in Chongqing. In the political field, the Guomindang congress rejected the urge for a coalition government, expressed by the CPC, the Democratic League and the broad public. To avoid charges of totalitarianism and despotism, Guomindang leaders headed by Chiang Kaishek told the congress that in November 1945 they planned to convene a national assembly which, they claimed,

²² Peng Ming, *The History of Sino-Soviet Friendship*, Moscow, 1959, p. 226. The *New Life* paper was published by the Society of Soviet Citizens in Shanghai.

²³ P. Vladimirov, *Op. cit.*, p. 566.

²⁴ See Zhou Enlai, *Op. cit.*, pp. 242-282.

would put an end to "political trusteeship" and "transfer the power to the people". In reality, this was a mere stratagem. In his opening speech at the congress, Chiang Kaishek declared that, after the transition to constitutional rule, the Guomindang's responsibility would increase rather than decrease.²⁵ At a press conference on May 17, 1945, Minister of Information Wang Shijie pointed out that the right to decide on the terms of reference and composition of the national assembly would rest with the Guomindang Central Executive or Standing Committee, which meant that the Guomindang leadership wanted to use the national assembly as a screen for its continued dictatorship. *Xin Zhongguo ribao*, the Democratic League's paper, objected to this: "May we ask what was the most characteristic feature of the period when elections to the national assembly were underway ten years back? It was a period when the power of the one-party dictatorship had reached its climax, when fascism was spreading throughout the world, when the voice of democracy in our country was muzzled and all opposition parties were outlawed."²⁶ The Guomindang's refusal to set up a coalition government was resented by various sections of China's population. Seeking to put down the wave of protest, the congress leaders declared they intended to solve the "communist problem" by political means. The economic platform approved by the congress was outlined in the "Programme for Industrial Reconstruction". It provided for the Guomindang state to monopolise key economic sectors, which antagonised the Guomindang not only to the working people, but also to non-monopolistic groups of the Chinese bourgeoisie.

A comparison of the political and economic programmes of the two congresses was clearly not in favour of the Guomindang. The Communists were quite obviously gaining the upper hand in their struggle to win over the masses and the right to be considered China's major patriotic force, and lead the country in its postwar development. The Guomindang government sought to counterbalance the growing influence of the CPC by using its superiority in troops and ammunitions. After Germany's surrender, it undertook a series of military operations to weaken the anti-Japanese strongholds of the 8th and the New 4th Armies. On May 23, two days after the closure of the Sixth Guomindang Congress, Chiang Kaishek ordered ten divisions, including US-trained elite troops, to attack the Jiangsu-Zhejiang frontier area. The commanding officer of the task force was Shangguan Yunxiang, a leader of the treacherous attack on the mobile headquarters of the New 4th Army. At first, the CPC troops retreated, avoiding an engagement, as this would play into the hands of the Japanese, but on June 19, when the Guomindang units had advanced 50 km into the territory of the base, the New 4th Army launched a counter-attack, which routed the invading divisions within five days.²⁷ In June-July 1945, the Guomindang troops, sometimes separately, sometimes jointly with Japanese units, initiated many large-scale operations against the popular armed forces.²⁸

The declaration of war on Japan by the Soviet Union radically changed the situation both in the Chinese theatre of operations and in China itself. The Soviet Union entered into the war in the Far East "to speed up peace and spare the peoples further sacrifices and suffering",²⁹ to ensure the security of the Soviet Far-Eastern borders, which had been repeatedly encroached upon and constantly threatened by Japanese imperia-

²⁵ See *The General History...*, Vol. 3, p. 360.

²⁶ *Izvestia*, June 3, 1945.

²⁷ *The General History...* Vol. 3, pp. 361-362.

²⁸ See *The History of World War II*, Vol. 11, Moscow, 1980, p. 105.

²⁹ The Declaration of the Soviet Government to the Government of Japan of August 8, 1945, *Izvestia*, Aug 9, 1945.

lists,³⁰ to fulfil its Yalta commitments, to restore and safeguard the historic rights of the Soviet State on the territories annexed by Japan from Russia, and to assist the peoples of East and Southeast Asia in their liberation struggle.

The Chinese Communists highly appreciated the historic importance of the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan. In a cable message to the Soviet Government on August 8, 1945 Mao Zedong and Zhu De heartily welcomed the declaration of war against Japan by the Soviet Union. In his article "The Last Battle against Japanese Invaders" Mao Zedong wrote: "Thanks to this step by the Soviet Union, the war against Japan will end much sooner. This war is already in its final stage: the hour of ultimate victory over the Japanese invaders and their myrmidons has struck."³¹

On August 14, 1945 a Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was signed. It envisaged joint action with other United Nations in the war against Japan, till final victory. The Soviet Union and China pledged to make every effort after the war to prevent Japan from being aggressive and violating peace; they agreed not to enter into alliances against the other contracting party and in their relations to follow the principles of mutual respect, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Concurrently, in pursuance of the Yalta Conference decisions the two countries signed agreements (for a term of 30 years) on the Chinese Changchun railway, Port Arthur and port Dalni; also, "an Agreement on relations between the Soviet Commander-in-Chief and the Chinese Administration, after the entry of Soviet troops into the territories of all the Eastern Provinces of China in connection with the current joint war against Japan". There was also an exchange of notes between the Chinese and Soviet Foreign Ministers on the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic.³²

On August 9, 1945 the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East started an offensive against the Kwantung army. On August 10, the Chinese Commander-in-Chief of CPC Troops Zhu De ordered the popular units to accept the surrender of the Japanese and puppet troops, to disarm them and, in the event of resistance, to destroy them; he also ordered them to take over all towns, cities and fortified populated areas and communications from the Japanese and puppet forces, to suppress attempts to resist or inflict damage. The next day, August 11, Zhu De ordered the former Dongbei army to advance towards Chahar, Rehe, Liaoning and Jilin "to meet and join the Red Army of the Soviet Union... and also to make ready to accept the surrender of Japanese and 'Manchurian' puppet troops". He Long's troops in Suiyuan and Ne Rongzhen's troops in Chahar and Rehe were ordered to advance northwards in order to meet and join forces with the Mongolian troops and to make ready to accept the surrender of Japanese and "Mongolian" puppet troops. The Chanxi liberation army was ordered to mop up the whole of the Datong-Puzhou railway line and the Fenghe river valley and to be prepared for the capitulation of Japanese and puppet troops, as well as for entry into Taiyuan. The same day, Zhu De ordered all CPC troops to launch a general offensive in order to establish control over all Chinese railways along which Japanese and puppet troops were deployed.

On August 14, Zhu De sent an ultimatum to General Okamura, the Commander of Japanese Troops in China demanding the surrender of

³⁰ See A. Savin, "Failure of Japan's Aggressive Plans Against the Soviet Union in 1942-1943", *Military History Journal*, 1983, No. 1. In three years alone (1936-1938) Japan violated the Soviet-Manchukuo border 231 times, including 35 large armed clashes (*World War II. A Short History*, Moscow, 1985, p. 17).

³¹ Mao Zedong, *Selected Works*, Vol. 4, p. 617.

³² See *Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1917-1957*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 196-206.

his troops to Ne Rongzhen in North China, Chen Yi in East China, Li Xiannian in Hubei and Hanan, and to Zeng Sheng in Guangdong. Chiang Kaishek tried to interfere with the CPC troops' right to accept the surrender and even incorporated 240,000 soldiers and officers of the puppet armies in the Guomindang armed forces.³³

Not all the objectives set in Zhu De's orders were achieved. For instance, the troops failed to capture the city of Taiyuan, the administrative centre of Shanxi province, though a larger part of it had been turned into CPC anti-Japanese stronghold throughout the war. US action prevented them from taking the main railways.

In the areas of the Soviet and Mongolian troops' advance, however, the 8th Army's positions were considerably improved. Thus, superior Japanese forces had surrounded units of the 8th Army commanded by Zhao Wenjin in Pingquan country (Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning area). "Our position was extremely difficult", wrote Zhao Wenjin to the commander of the 17th Soviet Army. "The enemy had concentrated far superior forces against us... The Soviet entry into Manchuria on August 9 radically changed the balance of forces. We were able to switch from the defensive to the offensive. Thus, the Soviet troops saved us from destruction and we were especially thankful to them".³⁴

Late in August 1945, units of the 8th Army in Shanhaiguang joined with Soviet troops to move northwards into Manchuria with their support. The fast rout of the one-million-strong Kwantung army, the major Japanese force in China, resulted in the liberation of North-East China, Inner Mongolia and neighbouring Korea. With Soviet support, the CPC troops became entrenched in Manchuria. Soviet successes in Manchuria created favourable conditions for successful operations by the 8th and the New 4th Armies to liberate a large part of North and Central China. Within a month (from August 15 to September 15), they liberated 158 counties, many important centres, including Zhangjiakow (Kalgan), Qinghuangdao, Weihaiwei, Yantai (Chifu) and Huaiyin—all in all over 190 cities and towns. Later, however, the Guomindang troops recaptured a number of cities liberated by the CPC forces. On August 23, on behalf of the Guomindang government, General He Yingqin ordered the Japanese command to defend to occupied territory from "illegal armed organisations", as he called the 8th and the New 4th Armies.³⁵ Growing clashes threatened to develop into a civil war.

Chiang Kaishek and Mao Zedong met in Chongqing late in August 1945 to interfere with this course of developments and discuss China's future. Their negotiations resulted in the signing of an agreement on October 10, 1945 to cease hostilities and call a political consultative council composed of representatives of various political forces. Aware of the unpopularity of a new civil war, the growing CPC influence and an essentially changed international situation in the Far East, the Guomindang leaders had to accept this compromise.

On September 2, 1945 Japan capitulated. World War II was over, the victory won by the anti-fascist coalition. Not only the popular masses in all countries, but bourgeois statesmen in capitalist countries acknowledged the decisive role played by the Soviet Union in defeating the alliance of fascist aggressors.

The Soviet Union does justice to China's contribution to the struggle against imperialist Japan. In his report "The Immortal Feat of the Soviet People", CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev said, on behalf of

³³ *Reference Materials on the History of the New Democratic Revolution in China*, Peking, 1951, pp. 401-402 (in Chinese).

³⁴ *World War II...*, p. 554.

³⁵ See *The History of World War II*, pp. 259, 384; *The General History...*, Vol. 3, pp. 369-374; *Reference Materials...*, pp. 401-402.

all Soviet people: "Completely loyal to its allied commitments in World War II, our country played a tremendous role in the defeat of imperialist Japan. We acted in close combat cooperation with the great Chinese people. Soldiers of the Mongolian People's Republic were actively involved in the battle against the common enemy. A stubborn struggle against the Japanese invaders was waged by patriots in Vietnam, Korea and other Asian countries."³⁶ The Japanese militarists who had launched their aggression against China as far back as the 1930s, failed to implement their predatory plans (to occupy China was not their only and final aim; they were building a springboard there for an attack on the Soviet Union). China had not surrendered and, by virtue of its resistance, had diverted and contained large Japanese forces. The strength of these forces varied from year to year, the available relevant data being controversial. Nonetheless, hundreds of thousands of Japanese officers and men were involved in military operations. Before the war, Japan had 17 divisions of land troops (22,000 officers and men per division), i. e., almost 380,000 servicemen, plus 4 secretly-formed divisions and a large well-trained reserve corps. Several million conscripts from 17 to 40 years of age, had served in the army before the war. A 400,000-strong Japanese army invaded China in 1937. The chief of the 8th Army staff Ye Jianying, announced at a press conference for Chinese and foreign correspondents on June 22, 1944 that, by March 1944, there were 34.5 Japanese divisions in China, i. e., 560,000 men.

The invaders were opposed by the armed forces of the Guomindang and the CPC. The Guomindang armies amounted to 3.5-4.2 million and the strength of the 8th, the New 4th Armies and the anti-Japanese column of South China increased towards the end of the war to 1,270,000 men; they were supported by a people's volunteer corps of 2.6 million.³⁷

The Chinese contribution to the struggle of the anti-fascist coalition against imperialist Japan might have been much more effective if two major political and military forces of the country had coordinated their efforts, but, as a rule, each of them acted on its own. Unlike the Guomindang, the CPC strove to encourage as many patriots as possible from among different sections of the population to help the army.

An important role in China's sustained struggle against the Japanese aggressors was played by Soviet assistance and support—moral, political, diplomatic, financial and economic, military and technical, including deliveries of aircraft and other armaments, and the dispatch of volunteer pilots, military advisers and other experts. These factors paralysed the capitulatory sentiments of Guomindang reactionaries and helped retain China within the orbit of the anti-fascist coalition until the victorious end of World War II.

China's toll of human lives in the anti-Japanese war was heavy. Its casualties in World War II exceeded 5 million men. According to modern Chinese writers the Japanese killed and wounded 18 million Chinese over the eight years of war, though many of these died of diseases and undernourishment.

From September 1938 to March 1945, the CPC troops killed and wounded over 960,000 of Japanese and puppet officers and men, and took over

³⁶ M. S. Gorbachev, *The Immortal Feat of the Soviet People*, Moscow, 1985, p. 14.

³⁷ See *The History of the Sino-Japanese War*, Vol. I, Taipei, 1968, p. 166 (in Chinese); *World War II*, p. 26; *Report on the General Military Situation of the Chinese Communist Party in the War of Resistance*. By Yeh Chiang-ying (s. l.), 1944, pp. 1-7; P. Vladimirov, *Op. cit.*, pp. 245, 272; *Proceedings of the 8th All-Chinese Congress of the CPC*, Moscow, 1956, p. 198 (Peng Dehuai's speech); *History of the Anti-Japanese War*, p. 221. *World Marxist Review* estimates the total strength of China's armed forces in World War II at 2.4 to 5.7 million (*World Marxist Review*, 1985, No. 5).

280,000 prisoners. More than 100,000 servicemen surrendered and went over to the side of the 8th and the New 4th Armies. All in all, according to this source, the enemy's casualties at the hand of the CPC troops approximated 1,360,000; if account is also taken of those put out of commission and those who surrendered at the end of the war, the figure is claimed to equal 1,700,000 officers and men. According to the statistics in the People's Republic of China, Japanese casualties alone on all Chinese fronts where the Guomindang and CPC troops operated (excluding Manchuria) amounted to 1,330,000 killed and wounded.³⁸

Prominent CPC military leader Ne Rongzhen wrote in 1951: "Of course, the successful outcome of the anti-Japanese war was inalienable from Soviet assistance. After the events of September 18, 1931 [when the Japanese imperialists occupied North-West China.—M. Y.] the Soviet Union was alone in the international arena in defending justice and condemning the Japanese aggressor. From 1937 to 1941, the hardest years in China's war of resistance, US and British imperialists supplied Japan with strategic materials to be used for butchering Chinese; they pushed the Guomindang government towards reconciliation with Japan and were plotting a Munich deal in the Far East. The Soviet Union, besides expressing boundless sympathy with the war of resistance in China, also rendered it all-round, effective assistance. Soviet pilots volunteered to help China in its war against Japan. How many heroic sons of the Soviet Union shed their blood in the skies over China! For 8 years of the resistance war in China, the Soviet Union stood vigilant and staunch guard over its Far Eastern border, containing the million-strong Kwantung army, the "flower" of the Emperor's armed forces, thereby easing the burden of China's war of resistance. In 1945, as soon as the Soviet Union had finished with the German monster by winning a decisive victory in the anti-fascist world war, it immediately declared war on Japan in order to help liberate China, to rout the Kwantung army and make it surrender, and to assist China in winning a war of resistance against Japan".³⁹

The experience of World War II indicates how important it is for both the Soviet Union and China, for their interests and peoples to cooperate in the struggle against the imperialist aggressive forces. As for the Soviet position, the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee emphasised: "The Soviet Union will steadfastly and persistently consolidate its relations and cooperation with other socialist countries, including the Chinese People's Republic".⁴⁰

³⁸ See *World War II*, p. 5; *The History of the Anti-Japanese War*, p. 221; P. Vladimirov, *Op. cit.*, p. 245; Zhu De, *Op. cit.*, pp. 147-148; *The History of World War II*, Peking, 1982, p. 718 (in Chinese).

³⁹ *Xinjiangshe*, 1951, Vol. IV, No. 4, p. 8.

⁴⁰ *Proceedings of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, April 23, 1985, Moscow, 1985, p. 25.

THREE BOOKS ON JAPAN REVIEWED

Growing Ambitions

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 86 pp 157-161

[Review by G. G. Morozov of book "Sozoteki gaiko-o mezashite" [Constructive Diplomacy] by Shintaro Abe, Tokyo, 1984, 320 pages]

In recent years, Japan, the capitalist world's second economic giant, is looming large more and more frequently on the international scene. Japan's economic, scientific and technological breakthroughs are beyond doubt. Its original culture is gaining increasing popularity the world over. But what strikes the eye are the continuous, regular attempts of its ruling circles to step up Japan's political influence on the international community to match, as they say, the country's increased postwar economic potential. The objective has been made official policy, with increasing priority being assigned to active foreign policy action as a means of achieving it.

The world community would welcome effective Japanese initiatives in favour of international peace and cooperation between states with different social and political systems, especially since Japan was the first victim of an atomic bombing and shortly after World War II, constitutionally renoun-

ced possession of armed forces and warfare. Yet the present leadership, as the facts show, sees its goal as the "final summing up" of World War II's results and is not at all anxious to contribute in any way to improving the international situation.

The publication of a book dealing with Japan's foreign policy in the 1980s and the country's present-day and longer-term diplomatic aims and tasks is undoubtedly of great interest, especially since its author is the current Japanese Foreign Minister — Shintaro Abe.

Strictly speaking, the book under review is not structured as a scientific work. It has a "question and answer" pattern. The questions are asked by N. Nagano, a correspondent of the *Tokyo shimbun* paper and a member of the influential Kasumi club of journalists accredited with the Japanese Foreign Office. The questions and answers are grouped in specific problem-based chapters and cover the whole range of Japanese

diplomacy — from global to regional problems with which Tokyo has to deal in the conduct of its foreign policy. The status and role of the Foreign Ministry in Japan's administrative machinery and higher efficiency of its operation are also highlighted.

The narration is free and easy, in the form of a lively dialogue, interspersed with occasional stories and episodes from S. Abe's diplomatic experiences, to step up the reader's "presence" effect and provide a human touch to this important political figure in present-day Japan, which is essential to his obvious future career.

S. Abe's career has been swift (his life story is given in detail in the book). Born in 1924, in the Yamaguchi prefecture (the southern part of the Honshu Island) he served some time in the Emperor's army; after graduating from the prestigious department of law of Tokyo university in 1949, for seven years he was on the staff of the political section of Japan's largest newspaper *Mainichi shimbun*. In 1956 he was appointed personal secretary to the Foreign Minister; the following year, S. Abe was assigned as personal aide to the then Prime Minister N. Kishi, whose elder daughter he married. S. Abe started on an independent political career in 1958, when elected to the House of Representatives on an LDP ticket. In subsequent years, he held top posts in the party and government, specifically, minister of agriculture, forestry and fisheries, general secretary to the cabinet of ministers and minister of foreign commerce and industry. As a prominent member of the Fukuda faction of the LDP and one of the "new leaders", S. Abe ran for chairmanship but lost to Ya. Nakasone. In 1982 Premier Nakasone appointed S. Abe foreign minister.

From the very outset, Nakasone's Cabinet has headed for Japan's military buildup and more extensive military and political cooperation with the USA and NATO. S. Abe's essential role as a key figure in the cabinet formulating these obviously anti-Soviet plans cannot be denied, as the book under review shows amply and convincingly.

Neither is the time chosen for its publication accidental. By the autumn of 1984, Abe-steered Japanese diplomacy had made enough "breakthroughs" to cause severe criticism of Nakasone's Cabinet at home and abroad. The book was intended as a broadside in the propaganda war against opponents of Japanese foreign policy and, at the same time, as easily available information "for consideration" by those who had not yet taken a clearcut stand on this point.

S. Abe's main purpose is to make potential readers believe that Japanese foreign policy is "good and right", just, democratic and independent.

To produce this impression, Abe assures the reader that the "major goal" of Japanese diplomacy in the 1980s is "peace and disarmament; then, settlement of regional conflicts; and, finally, improved relations between North and South".

It is noteworthy that the Foreign Minister is very reticent about Japan's role in the important sphere of disarmament. Saying that "war may break out accidentally" (p. 23) he actually absolves Japan of any liability for its unqualified support of the US aggressive policies with respect to a world nuclear conflict.

Abe's anti-Soviet leanings are more pronounced in his answers to tendentious questions (of which there are many in the book). He speaks profusely about the threat to Japan stemming from the "growing Soviet might" and seeks to intimidate the reader with the deployment of SS-20 medium-range missiles in Soviet Asia in the event that the Soviet Union and the USA agree to reduce them in Europe (p. 31). He completely disregards the declaration of the Soviet Government, made in 1983, to the effect that any missiles reduced would be dismantled, instead of being shipped to the Soviet Far East¹.

S. Abe claims that an alternative to the "threat" (of his own invention) is acceptance by the Soviet Union of Reagan's "zero option" (which is notorious for its full negation of the principle of equal security of both parties). Enlarging on the alleged threat of Soviet medium-range missiles to Japan, S. Abe suggests, in passing, that China is also "jeopardised".

He keeps mum, however, about the Soviet Union's unilateral pledge not to use nuclear weapons first.

S. Abe misses no chance to put the blame on the Soviet Union for the tragic crash of the South Korean spy plane in Soviet air space. He makes no mention, of course, of Japan's unseemly complicity in the incident.

Abe makes countless references to the hackneyed "increased Soviet threat" in an attempt to justify Japan's rapid arms buildup. According to him, the postwar peace and security of Japan were achieved mainly

¹ See *Pravda*, Aug. 27, 1983.

by the "deterrent force", composed of the Japanese "self-defence forces" and the US nuclear potential. He is sure, he says "this is the only way to ensure Japan's peace and security in the future" (p. 82). To sweeten the pill, he makes reassurances that this does not mean that Japan "will make war".

The future will show whether this is so or not. Meanwhile, large-scale war preparations in Japan are characterised, specifically, by major increases in the country's military budget. Last year's decisions by the Nakasone Cabinet may shortly result in the symbolic one per-cent GNP ceiling for military spending, set by the Japanese government in 1976, being exceeded, which is obviously the reason for S. Abe's deliberate evasiveness on this point: he wants room for manoeuvre in the future.

He takes a similar stand on Japan's compliance with the "three non-nuclear principles". S. Abe denies imports of US nuclear arms to Japan in violation of these principles, though the facts are common knowledge. He alleges that the US-Japanese "security treaty" system and the "three non-nuclear principles" "do not conflict with each other" (p. 88). He urges the Japanese people "to put right their misconceptions" about the unlawful presence of US nuclear facilities in Japan. The hypocrisy of these appeals is especially striking now, in the context of the 40th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Abe evades a straightforward answer to the "hot" home and international issue of the Japanese navy's potrolling of sealanes at a distance of one thousand miles off the coasts of Japan. All he says is: "this is natural for an independent country such as Japan" (p. 91).

Japan's intention to blockade, "in the event of an emergency", three international straits in the vicinity of the Japanese islands the Minister justifies by the right of the country to self-defence. In fact, it is an attempt by the Japanese government to reserve the "privilege" of violating, at its own discretion, international law, to which it willingly resorts when it suits its interests.

These plans are openly hostile to the Soviet Union, with which Japan maintains diplomatic relations. Discussing Soviet-Japanese relations, S. Abe gives a biased analysis of the causes of their present unsatisfactory condition. Paying lip-service to Japan's desire "to extend friendly relations

with the Soviet Union" (p. 149), he seeks to prove that their improvement is "hampered" by a "unilateral Soviet arms buildup" in the Far East, and the sending of a limited contingent of Soviet troops to Afghanistan at the request of its lawful government. The justified concern of the Soviet people over the rebirth of Japanese militarism, in S. Abe's opinion, is "sheer propaganda". The main obstacle to better Soviet-Japanese relations, according to Abe, is the "territorial problem" (?) to which, he opines, increasing international attention should be drawn. The Minister makes no mention of either the Soviet initiatives on confidence-building measures in the Far East or the proposal of the Soviet Union for a treaty of goodneighbourly relations and cooperation with Japan. The problem, he claims, is that the "USSR seriously errs concerning Japan's stance" (p. 78).

Despite his openly unfriendly thrusts against the Soviet Union, S. Abe holds that Japan should not reject a dialogue with its great Northern neighbour.

S. Abe qualifies "economic frictions" with the USA and Western Europe as "the major problem facing Japan" (p. 233). He leaves no doubt, however, that Tokyo is not going to make voluntary concessions to its competitors in the "economic war". He suggests that efforts should be made by "both sides". Counselling these countries on what should be done to improve their adverse balances of trade with Japan, he half-jokingly advises them "to make a better study of the Japanese language" (p. 235).

In spite of these differences, S. Abe never tires to re-emphasise that alliance with Washington is the backbone of Japanese diplomacy. He believes, however, that international cooperation with the USA in different areas must be effected "from independent positions", so that the actions of both countries are not identified in the eyes of the world public.

He considers, for example, that a different approach by the two countries to the rendering of economic "aid" to developing countries makes it more efficient, adding up to the respective efforts of Tokyo and Washington. He points out that Japan is becoming more and more important for the USA and explicitly warns that "should the USA lose a partner like Japan, its relative weight in the world will plummet" (p. 105).

In an attempt to demonstrate that Ja-

pan's "aid" is selfless and is rendered not only to those countries in which Japan is most interested because of their rich mineral resources, Abe mentions Paraguay — "an agrarian country with poor resources" — which gets more economic aid from Japan than from any other country in the world (p. 195). The example could not be more "unhappy", as the motives behind this aid are to bolster the fascist dictatorship of General Stressner, notorious among other things for concealing nazi war criminals from justice. The example cited by the Foreign Minister clearly illustrates both the political colouring of the Japanese "aid" and the extending geography of Japanese interests to a global scale.

Tokyo's interest in areas of traditional influence, such as Southeast Asia, has not waned either. Touching on the Tokyo-supported undeclared war waged by the Pol Pot bands against the People's Republic of Kampuchea, S. Abe commends Japan for being second to none in the world in providing "aid" to Kampuchean "refugees" who have found shelter in neighbouring Thailand (p. 52).

S. Abe stands for overthrowing Kampuchea's lawful government, which is supported by an absolute majority of the Khmer people, exercises control over the country, and is officially recognised by many states. Judging by everything, he is little concerned about what would happen to the long-suffering people of Kampuchea in the event of a comeback by the Pol Pot murderers. He says, in passing, that the Pol Pot clique's genocide of the Khmer people, though to be condemned, "is their own headache" (p. 53). He is much more vexed by Vietnam's internationalist assistance to the Khmer people in creating conditions for Kampuchea's peaceful development. To give weight to Japan's position, S. Abe says that "the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops" is also demanded by ASEAN countries and China.

At the same time, Abe asserts that Japan will continue to use its earlier established diplomatic relations with Vietnam, to continue a dialogue with this country. It must be noted that a dialogue of this kind is of no value to peace in Southeast Asia, as Tokyo actively supports the self-styled "coalition government of democratic Kampuchea" composed of Pol Pot's bloody butchers. It is an open secret, however, that lack of progress in relations between the ASEAN and Indochina suits Japan's interests per-

fectly, as it enables Tokyo, first, to exert pressure on the forces of existing socialism in Indochina with the aim of harrassing and weakening them; second, to enhance its political role in Indochina's affairs; and, third, to distract ASEAN countries from the urgent problems of their development, including those stemming from the non-equivalent economic exchange with Japan.

That this is so can be judged from S. Abe's equivocal reply to the question concerning Japan's reaction to the ASEAN countries' "expectations". Japan, he feels, ought to go on developing "cooperation", "dialogue" and "humanitarian exchanges" with them. Brushing specifics aside, he puts it plainly: "The ASEAN countries pin great hopes on Japan's political role in the Asian-Pacific region" (p. 137). Wishful thinking, indeed, as these countries take advantage of every convenient opportunity to remind Japan that the existing relations of inequality must be changed.

Not only the Soviet Union voices concern about Japan's military buildup. S. Abe is specifically sensitive to criticisms from ASEAN countries, which Japan considers as the main base for spreading its influence in Asia. Yet, except for a general statement carrying little conviction, to the effect that "Japan will not follow the prewar pattern of becoming a strong military power" (p. 94), the Minister has nothing to say to refute the facts that belie his words and the actual state of affairs.

Good relations with ASEAN countries are also important to Japan in the light of its ruling circles' new plan for a "Pacific Community" as, "at the turn of a new century, the Pacific Ocean is assuming much greater significance" (p. 144), points out the Japanese Foreign Minister. It follows from what he says that the "Pacific concept" is a basic principle of Japanese foreign policy today. It is important, adds S. Abe, that the plan enjoys President Reagan's personal support and ought to be further elaborated by Japan, the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and ASEAN countries. The Minister is pleased with the certain progress achieved of late in the "Pacific economic cooperation" imposed on ASEAN countries. American and Japanese strategists view it as the first phase in realising their imperialist designs of knocking together a new military and political bloc in the Pacific, spearheaded against the Soviet Union and its allies. If and when it emerges, the character of the

US-Japanese partnership may undergo a radical change. Without accentuating this point, S. Abe nonetheless remarks that "in the distant future, Japan should speak with the USA as an equal" (p. 110).

In pursuit of official recognition of Japan as a "great political power", the Japanese government pays special attention to its diplomacy in the UN. In his book, S. Abe claims permanent membership for Japan on the Security Council. Japan meets all the standards and requirements for this, he asserts, omitting, however, any reference to Japan's pro-American posture towards UNESCO which is detrimental to the functioning of this major United Nations specialised agency or, to be more accurate, is aimed at its abolition. Aware that getting a permanent seat in the Security Council may pose a few difficulties, S. Abe admits with regret that "it is a matter of the more distant future" (p. 205).

Meanwhile, every effort should be made now "to strengthen Japanese diplomacy". For this purpose Abe suggests an increase in the Foreign Office's budget (which is dwarfed not only by that of the USA, but also by West Germany, Britain and France) and staff (from 3,795 to 5,000 diplomats)².

More active foreign policy propaganda is another means for achieving greater efficiency of Japanese diplomacy, S. Abe believes Japan's funds for these purposes are also less than those in the above-mentioned countries. More emphasis in this work, he says, will be laid on "explaining" to other countries the "economic frictions" with industrial Western nations, the "economic cooperation" with developing countries and Japan's defence buildup.

Abe sums up what he wrote earlier in the book by formulating a sort of foreign policy platform of his own. He thinks that the far-reaching plans of the Japanese leadership can be helped along and accelerated through a "constructive diplomacy", based on the following principles:

First, "to keep on building relations of confidence and cooperation" with Western countries, specifically the USA.

Second, "to develop relations of friendship and cooperation" with the neighbouring countries of the Asia-Pacific region. "The stability and prosperity of this region", says S. Abe, "is of vital importance for the well-being and peaceful progress of Japan".

Third, "to form relations of mutual trust with Eastern countries by means of dialogue" [S. Abe means the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. — G. M.].

Fourth, "to promote the growth of developing countries through economic exchange with them".

Fifth, "to intensify diplomatic efforts towards disarmament and detente", including preventing the spread of regional conflicts.

Like the whole book, of course, these propositions have a heavy touch of propaganda rhetoric, as can easily be seen if we compare the words and the actual deeds of the Tokyo strategists. Nonetheless, analysis

of this foreign policy platform indicates that Japanese governing circles are rid of the "syndrome of World War II" instigated, among others, by Tokyo and, being confident of their increased potential, have decided to stake on revenge for the inglorious defeat forty years back. The idea whets imperialist Japan's insatiable appetite and nourishes its Gargantuan ambitions, which today constitute a serious threat to world peace.

In conclusion, S. Abe voices the idea that pursuance of these minute, narrow practical ends cannot but injure Japan's true national interests. There is no denying this inference. Yet, while Japan, in conjunction with the USA, continues to pursue a policy hostile to peace, goodneighbourly relations and just international cooperation, ways to win real prestige amongst the world community will be blocked to it.

² For comparison, the author cites the following diplomatic staff figures for individual countries: USA, 14,944; Britain, 9,261; France, 7,228; West Germany, 6,743; and Italy, 5,156. See S. Abe, *Op. cit.*, pp. 263-264.

Japan's Past, Present Military

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 86 pp 161-165

[Review by V. N. Khlynov of book "Vooruzhennyye sily Yaponii. Istoriya i sovremennost (k 40-letiyu razgroma militaristskoy Yaponii vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne)" [Japanese Armed Forces. Past and Present (On the 40th Anniversary of the Defeat of Militarist Japan in World War II)], Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury izdatelstva "Nauka," 1985, 326 pages, maps, illustrations]

The signing 40 years ago, on September 2, 1945, of the Act on Militaristic Japan's Unconditional Surrender finally brought the Second World War—the most devastating and blood-letting war in the history of mankind — to an end. Unleashed by nazi Germany, the war brought tremendous disaster and suffering for the people of the world, especially the Soviet people, who bore the brunt of that most horrible tragedy of our time. The Soviet Union lost 20 million lives and a third of its national wealth in that war. Even the most zealous falsifiers of history are powerless to refute this.

The Soviet people regarded the war as a Great Patriotic War. It ended in a historic victory over German fascism and Japanese militarism, a victory won by the most advanced social system, socialism, by the forces of peace and progress, which overcame those of reaction and war.

Japan entered the Second World War as nazi Germany's ally when it made a surprise piratical attack, on December 7, 1941, on Pearl Harbour, a US Pacific naval base. Japanese naval and air forces attacked it unexpectedly, even before war had been declared on the United States, and thus inflicted a serious moral and military damage to the country. Washington decided to "punish" Japan for this. At the very end of the war in the Pacific, when its outcome had already been determined as the Kwantung Army, Japan's basic force, had, in effect, been routed by Soviet troops, the United States committed an even more ruthless and unjustified act of modern vandalism. By needlessly using a terrible new weapon of mass destruction, the atomic bomb, which was unknown to the world at the time, the United States wiped two peaceful Japanese cities — Hiroshima and Nagasaki — from the face of the Earth, and deliberately doomed hundreds of thousands of their inhabitants to death and to physical and moral suffering that continues to this day.

These lessons from the history of the Second World War, like the war itself, cannot help but arouse deep reflection and apprehension today. They come to mind unwittingly. Under current conditions, when huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons have been accumulated in the world, the present US admi-

nistration is out to whip up international tension and nurtures insane plans for so-called "star wars". With the active support of Japan, the world's second biggest capitalist country in terms of its economic, scientific and technological potential, Washington is seeking to turn the Pacific Ocean basin into an eastern front of struggle against world socialism and the national liberation movement.

In this context, far from idle questions arise: Have the lessons of recent history been forgotten? Do the present-day leaders of Japan remember them?

The answers to these questions, which are the reason for deep concern of people all over the world today, can be found in the collective monograph under review, which features the history and present-day development of Japan as a military power. Among its authors are leading experts of the Institute for Military History Studies under the USSR Ministry of Defence and of a number of research centres of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

The authors examine the formation and development of the Japanese armed forces against the broad historical background and with due account of the social, economic, and political problems of the evolution of Japanese capitalism. The in-depth and comprehensive analysis of numerous historical facts and documents, some of which have been made public in this country for the first time, enables the authors to trace the formation and buildup of the Japanese armed forces step-by-step, from the period of the incomplete bourgeois Meiji revolution (1867-1868) and to the present day. The study is marked by unquestionable topicality, not only because the subject is important in itself, but also because the analysis is made from the position of our time, from the constructive position of the need to ensure peace and security on Earth and avert threat of nuclear war that looms large over humanity today.

The first part of the monograph deals with the history of the Japanese armed forces. In it, the authors feature a rather long and eventful period in the history of Japan and international relations, from the Meiji revolution up to the end of World War II. They prove convincingly that the period was characterised by a purposeful policy pursued by the Japanese militarists with the aim to create, constantly strengthen and use the armed forces for aggression against

other lands proclaimed "vitally important" to Japan and for capturing them. It goes to the authors' credit that they succeeded not to repeat known truths, but view historical facts thoroughly studied by Soviet historians and experts from a new and unconventional angle. These include the Japanese aggression against China (1884-1885), the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, Japan's participation in World War I, the Japanese intervention against Soviet Russia (1918-1922), aggressive actions by the Japanese militarists against the Soviet Union and countries of the Asia-Pacific region (1927-1939), that is, all the main events in the history of international relations in the years preceding the Second World War. Of major interest to readers, including military experts, will be the short, but very competent, analysis of the military preparations and operations (of a tactical and strategic nature) of the Japanese armed forces shortly before and during the events mentioned above. Instructive is a brief section of the research devoted to the military and ideological brainwashing of the population and the armed forces, which was systematically practised by Japanese militarist circles to achieve "unity of the nation against the common enemy" and justify the "legality" of acts of aggression against neighbouring countries and nations.

The authors analysed Japan's home and foreign policies prior to World War II, particularly its ruling quarters' deliberate efforts to create and constantly reinforce the Japanese armed forces as an instrument of aggression and suppression of their own people. This enabled the authors to arrive at the following conclusion: "By subjecting the population to heavy ideological brainwashing and by pursuing a policy of terror on a broad scale, the Japanese ruling elite succeeded in making the people obedient to the will of the exploiting classes and of the military-fascist regime. The armed forces were subjected to a particular pressure by the militarist propaganda, which turned them into an obedient instrument of the policy of aggression pursued by the Japanese military..." (p. 48).

A special chapter in the first part of the study features the performance of the Japanese armed forces during the Second World War. The authors have supplied it amply with documentary evidence and facts throwing light on the strategic plans entertained by Japan's leadership at the time, on mili-

tary operations carried out by the Japanese army, specific features of ground operations, the preparations for and conducting of operations in the Pacific Ocean, and the defeat by Soviet troops of the Kwantung Army—the main military grouping of Japanese militarism. The chapter logically ends with an analysis of Japan's unconditional surrender, which marked the end of World War II.

In analysing the causes of the defeat of Japanese militarism, the authors prove unfounded the proposition intensely advocated of late by some bourgeois scholars and military experts seeking to falsify the history of the Second World War. They assert that the US atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki played a "crucial role" in Japan's defeat and that the United States was "forced" to use nuclear arms. "The use of the atomic bombs", the authors write, "did not, the facts indicate, make Japanese ruling quarters decide immediately on the surrender. They continued manoeuvring, as before... In short, the atomic bombs were no substitute for massive armies, nor did they bring Japan to its knees immediately. With the still strong land forces at their disposal, the Japanese military continued putting up resistance. But when the Soviet troops dealt a smashing blow to the Kwantung grouping, even the most enthusiastic advocates, among the Japanese ruling quarters, of the war to be continued, at once spoke out unanimously... in favour of ending it. There was no other way out" (p. 92).

Stressing how important the rout of Japanese militarism was for the further march of world history, the authors of the monograph note: "The rout of the major Japanese army grouping by Soviet troops was of historic importance because it brought to a logical end the almost 50 years of predatory wars that the Japanese militarists had been waging against their neighbours—China, Russia, and then the Soviet Union, and against Southeast Asian countries" (p. 93-94).

That, in turn, radically changed the situation in the Asia-Pacific region. The national liberation movement of the peoples in East and Southeast Asia, who had themselves experienced the horrors of Japanese militarists' occupation, became unprecedented in scope. The defeat of militaristic Japan initiated the downfall of colonialism in Asia and created conditions favourable for the appearance of the first socialist states in that part of the world, including the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Later, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Kampuchea embarked on a road of building socialism. All this sharply tipped the balance of political forces in Asia in favour of peace and socialism.

Finally, the rout of Japanese militarism, as the authors of the book underline, exerted a tremendous influence on political developments within Japan itself. Japan had to accept the Potsdam declaration, which provided for the eradication of militarism, removal from power of those responsible for the aggression, and harsh punishment for war criminals. It also called for the establishment of a democratic order in Japan and for the proclamation of basic democratic rights and freedoms. The adoption in 1947, under pressure from democratic sections of society, of a new Japanese peacetime Constitution was a matter of exceptional significance for Japan's subsequent development. Article 9 of the Constitution forbids Japan to have armed forces and resort to war as a means for solving international disputes. In short, the defeat of Japanese militarism opened up for the Japanese people favourable conditions for a peaceful and democratic development.

The second, main part of the monograph, covers the entire postwar period up to the present day. It contains an analysis of the state of Japanese armed forces today. As in the first part, the authors do not confine their analysis to specific military questions, but give it against the broad background of social, economic and political problems facing Japan today. The authors consider such cardinal and important issues as the revival and development of the Japanese armed forces; supreme military command bodies; the system of recruiting and training of military personnel; the current state of the Japanese armed forces; arms production; ideological brainwashing of the "self-defence" servicemen and the Japanese population; and, finally, the main traits and stages in the development of Japan's modern military doctrine.

Together, these chapters give an objective picture of the current state of affairs in Japan and the prospects for the country's evolution not only as a military and political power, but as a centre of inter-imperialist rivalry, as the world's second biggest capitalist state as regards its economic, scientific and technological potential.

The authors stress, among other things, an extremely important historical fact—the

solemn pledge given by the US administration, the main occupying power, several days after the signing of the act of Japan's unconditional surrender. That pledge said that the disarmament and demilitarisation of Japan were the primary tasks of the military occupation and were to be carried through quickly and resolutely. Japan would have no army, navy, air force or secret police (p. 98).

Yet, even at that time, the American administration, while verbally pledging its "loyalty" to the principles of the Potsdam declaration, was, in fact, pursuing quite different aims. Analysis of documents and the US administration's practical steps in relation to Japan, that have been made public of late, the authors write, prompt the conclusion that the purpose of the changes introduced in the first postwar years was just to intimidate conservative military and political circles of the country by repressive measures, by the constant threat of punishment for the crimes committed and then to make them more compliant and easy to deal with by "pardoning" them and even inviting them to enter an "alliance". The demand for Japan's total disarmament, coupled with the artificially provoked talk about "a communist threat", was used by the American administration as a pretext for posing as the only "guarantor" of the security of the country that was to disarm itself, and as its "defender" against "aggressive communism" (p. 99).

In this context, it is obvious that the US was already hatching secret plans to preserve Japan's military potential and quickly restore it under American control, and thus make Japan serve the interests of the US global strategy.

By the beginning of 1948, the American ruling quarters had finally discarded the mask of "peace-makers" and embarked on a programme for the overt remilitarisation of Japan, viewing it as the main stronghold of anti-communism in the Far East and as the main jumping-off ground for their aggressive actions in Asia. Such a radical turn in US policy known as the "reverse course", coincided in time with the failure of Washington's efforts to slow down the revolutionary process in China and with the launching of the cold war policy against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

From that time on, a steady, comprehensive remilitarisation of Japan got under way, in defiance of its Constitution.

The Japanese-American "security treaty", signed in 1951 and revised for the worse in 1960, markedly intensified this process. Consequently, Japan has built up one of the strongest armies in Asia in terms of its fire power. Revived in the guise of "self-defence forces", this army has ground, naval and air forces equipped with the most sophisticated weaponry. Japan's outlays for military purposes increase by the year, their growth rates being the highest in the world. It has become ordinary practice for the Japanese armed forces to conduct military exercises, including bilateral and multilateral ones.

In recent years the Japanese ruling quarters have intensified the ideological brainwashing of the population. They are fanning military frenzy in every possible way, fostering anti-Soviet sentiments in the Japanese and intimidating them with the supposed "threat from the North". They are also trying to revive a spirit of nationalism and revenge in the masses. With the same purpose in mind, vigorous attempts are being made to introduce special legislation for the case of "emergency". The manufacture of arms is steadily increasing in Japan. All this serves to prove, the authors say, that Japan is being drawn, step by step, into the aggressive plans of the US regional and global strategy. The profound analysis of the basic traits and stages of Japan's modern military doctrine will, therefore, be of special interest to the reader.

Summing up their study, the authors stress that the Japanese armed forces, like those of other capitalist countries, "are the basic component of militarism, that is, of the system of political, economic and ideological methods used by the country's ruling quarters to build up its military might and meet the vital objectives of their home and foreign policies" (p. 270).

The authors point out, in this connection, that the rout of militaristic Japan in August 1945, to which the Soviet people and its armed forces made a decisive contribution, paved the way for the peaceful and democratic development of Japan. Yet the facts indicate that Japanese militarism was not totally rooted up. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Japanese rulers embarked onto the dangerous road of remilitarisation. Regarding Japan as its chief ally in the struggle against socialism and the national liberation movement in the Far East, Washington is sup-

porting Tokyo in this effort in every possible way.

Such a short-sighted and dangerous policy suggests that, ignoring the people's interests, the current leaders of Japan intend to bury the lessons of recent history in oblivion. They intend to do so despite the fact that Japan's militarisation, as these lessons testify, runs counter not only to the interests of its neighbours, but also to the vital interests of the Japanese themselves, and the interests of world peace.

These are the main conclusions drawn by the authors which make a big contribution to Japanese studies in the Soviet Union. Written from the constructive standpoint of the need to uphold peace and remove the threat of a nuclear war confronting mankind at present, the monograph contains extensive statistical data, diagrams and cartographical supplements. It will undoubtedly be met with great interest by the broadest sections of the Soviet reading public.

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Role of Shinto

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 86 pp 165-168

[Review by V. A. Vasilyev of book "Put bogov (sinto v istorii Yaponii)" [Path of the Gods (Shinto in Japanese History)] by G. Ye. Svetlov, Moscow, Mysl, 1985, 240 pages, illustrated]

The book under review is devoted to Shinto, the Japanese national religion, and its role in the social and political life of Japan at different stages of the country's history. This is the first detailed analysis of Shinto, ever undertaken in Soviet academic literature. It owes its topicality above all to the fact that for many decades prior to Japan's defeat in World War II, Shinto, then the state religion obligatory for all the Japanese without exception, was used to ideologically enslave the people, to inculcate the concepts of the "uniqueness" and "special" destiny of the Japanese nation. In effect, Shinto was turned into a tool of the predatory policy of Japanese imperialism. Today, reactionary forces are seeking "in some form or other to revive Shinto as the state religion, and to use Shintoist ideology to substantiate the need for a 'class peace' in the country and to revive the concepts of the 'special' nature of the Japanese nation and the 'uniqueness' of Japan's history, and to give substance to the claims made by the Japanese monopoly bourgeoisie on the international scene. Moreover, the dissemination of Shintoist spiritual 'values' is part of the policy towards a resurgence of militarist trends in the country, being currently conducted by the reactionaries" (p. 4).

G. Svetlov's book is based on a considerable number of sources. Not only does it bring together information about Shinto contained in works by Soviet and foreign, mostly Japanese, authors, but it also uses data scattered through little-known and often ba-

rely accessible Japanese publications. It presents a wealth of facts which are the result of the author's personal observations and his talks with Japanese, members of the clergy and laymen, believers and non-believers. This vast and diverse material is analysed on the methodological basis of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on religion and its role in society.

The author traces the ancient history of Shinto from its emergence to the present day. One of the initial chapters outlines the genesis of Shinto which became more or less fully formed as a codified religion only in the 7th and 8th centuries A. D., but which subsequently continued to develop. It shows how Shinto incorporated various tribal cults, as well as Tao and other concepts and rituals. The book contains quite a detailed summary of the Shintoist mythology. A separate chapter is devoted to the spread of Buddhism in Japan and the emergence of the specifically Japanese phenomenon of Shinto-Buddhist syncretism and "religious dualism". The author repeatedly stresses that at all stages of its evolution, including the earliest, Shinto absorbed both local and foreign beliefs and traditions. This point is of great significance since it shows the untenability of the attempts to substantiate the "uniqueness" of the Japanese national religion, Japanese national ideology and Japanese social relations as a whole.

The book reviews the attempts to elaborate the tenets of Shinto proper, which were

taken throughout the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries by the priests of the Ishe shrine, by Kitabatake Tikafusa (1293-1354), one of the earliest theoreticians of the "special path of Japan", and Shintoist theologian Yoshida Kanetomo (1435-1511). In considering the religious situation during the rule of the Tokugawa Dynasty (1603-1867), the author pays much attention, on the one hand, to various forms of Shinto-Confucian syncretism and the concept of the revival of ancient Shinto, which were later made use of by the opponents of the dynasty, and, on the other hand, to the emergence on the basis of Shinto of new religious movements which reflected in a specific form the popular opposition to the ruling regime.

In showing the evolution of Shinto against the background of historical developments, the author constantly keeps the relations between religion and politics within his sights. At the early stages of Japanese statehood, the country's rulers used Shinto, and its mythology in particular, to substantiate their own political "rights". The oldest Japanese written relics, the collections of chronicles and myths *Kojiki* (712) and *Nihonshoki* (720), compiled on the orders of the rulers of that time, presented the myths not in the form they had been recorded by the compilers, but in a tendentious manner designed to prove the sacred origins of the ruling dynasty and its descent from Amaterasu, the supreme deity of Shintoism. The further elaboration of this trend in the works of medieval Shintoist theologians resulted in the concept of the "divine" nature of both the reigning dynasty and of Japan as a whole. Shinto's connection with the policy of the ruling classes "goes many centuries back to the epoch that saw the formation of a single Japanese state", the author points out. "Since then, at various stages in the history of Japan, its rulers have sought to use Shinto to substantiate their political ambitions that had nothing in common either with the religious feelings of the majority of the Japanese, nor, moreover, with its vital interests" (p. 10).

This point is particularly characteristic of the period between the "Meiji restoration" (the incomplete bourgeois revolution of 1867-1868) and Japan's defeat in World War II. The section devoted to this period is, in essence, central to the book. The author provides a wealth of facts to show the gradual emergence of Shinto as a state religion, and a religious and political system created by

the ruling classes of the bourgeois and landlord monarchy which was what Japan became after the "Meiji restoration". Shinto was set apart from other religions as the state cult revolving around the person of the deified Emperor. The Emperor's 1890 decree on education which proclaimed loyalty to the Emperor to be the highest virtue of the subjects of the Japanese Empire was accepted as the canon of state Shinto. The rituals of state Shinto were geared to the task of exalting the monarchy and inculcating unquestioned reverence for the Emperor and his "divine" ancestors. The national educational system was based on myths about the "divine" origin of the Emperor's house. The concept of the "uniqueness" of the Japanese nation and Japan's glorification as the "country of Gods" ultimately produced the "theoretical" justification of Japan's "right" to rule over other nations. In this way the dogmas of state Shinto became tools to justify Japan's imperialist plundering and aggressive wars.

The author describes state Shinto as a specific religion whose dogmas were "based on a political doctrine expressing the interests of the ruling classes and ideologically substantiating their political supremacy" (p. 176). The rulers of prewar Japan deftly adapted the specific features of the Japanese national religion and traditional popular ideas to their political needs. The prevalence of rituals over the poorly developed system of dogmas and of moral and ethical views of Shinto made it possible for the ideologists of the bourgeois and landlord monarchy to imbue Shintoist rituals with the required content. The cult of Emperor was largely based on the concept of filial respect which had been traditionally held up as the chief virtue of the Japanese. The entire Japanese people was proclaimed to be one big family headed by the Emperor. The idea of the indissoluble link between the Shintoist deities and the Japanese served as a good ground for the emergence of the idea of the "uniqueness of the Japanese nation" which formed the core of the dogmas of state Shinto.

Apart from analysing these dogmas, the author dwells in detail on Shinto's rituals, cult institutions, and methods of dissemination, including such important secular channels as schools, the mass media, etc. The reader learns many interesting facts about the origins of many Shinto festivals observed in prewar Japan. The author gives a detailed account of the building of a number of new

shrines, which became privileged state religious institutions whose rituals expressed the main trends in the propaganda campaign conducted by the authorities. The Yasukuni Temple in Tokyo, which deifies the officers and men, who died in wars waged by imperialist Japan, is one of these shrines. The description of the Yasukuni cult makes it possible to understand why, today, this shrine remains the centre of chauvinist and militarist propaganda. Also of interest is information dealing with the spread of state Shinto in the countries captured by Japan. Shintoist shrines were erected in all the territories that came under the control of the Japanese colonialists and the military, they became ideological pillars of colonial domination and aggression.

The defeat of Japanese militarism in World War II spelled the end for state Shinto. In 1946, the Emperor publicly renounced his "divine" essence. The 1947 Constitution proclaimed the separation of the religion from the state. The Shintoist shrines lost the privileges which they had enjoyed as compared with the temples of other religions. But, beginning in the early 1950s, reactionary forces launched a movement for the restoration, in some form or other, of state Shinto. Moreover, these activities are becoming more vigorous as the militarist trends in the policies of the country's rulers become more pronounced and chauvinist sentiments among the population, utterly encouraged from above, grow in strength. The rulers take steps, in circumvention of the Constitution, to maintain the image of the Emperor as the head of the Shintoist cult. They have restored (though under a different name) the main festival of militarist Japan, Kigensetsu, based on the myth about the "great Japanese empire" having been founded in the 7th century B. C. by the "direct descendant of the Gods", the legendary Emperor Jimmu. The Shintoist clergy, who work hand-in-glove with the extreme right-wing elements in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, are becoming more active politically. Attempts are being made to introduce Shintoist myths into national school curricula, and in recent years right-wing forces have been campaigning to place the Yasukuni Temple under government protection, something that would amount to a breach of the current Constitution and give a new impetus to the campaign of indoctrination in the spirit of chauvinism and militarism.

These actions, the author says, "are all

the more dangerous as a considerable portion of the Japanese population today remains susceptible to the ideas preached by the present-day exponents of Shinto" (p. 217). Shintoist rituals still loom large in everyday Japanese life, accompanying as they do, the most significant events in the life of even those who do not consider themselves believers. Hence the sympathy that most Japanese feel for Shinto. Therefore, the author is quite justified in focusing on popular attitudes to Shinto and its rituals, and the nature of Shintoist rites themselves. This information is of considerable interest, being as it is based on the author's personal observations.

The specific nature of attitudes to Shinto determines the tenor of actions by democratic forces on issues connected with this national religion. They "lay emphasis not so much on opposing religious ideology as such, but on exposing the reactionary aspects of the activities of religious organisations, which threaten the democratic gains of the people... As for Shinto, protests by progressive forces are aimed primarily against the attempts to force on the people, in some form or other, the Shintoist 'supra-religion', rather than against the beliefs and traditions which form the basis of rituals at the Shintoist shrines" (p. 218). The book illustrates this point with a number of specific examples which demonstrate the forms and methods adopted by the democratic forces in their campaign against the revival of state Shinto. This campaign is closely linked with the tasks of general democratic and anti-war movements.

Thus, after tracing Shinto's complex evolution from its inception in the period of early feudalism through the subsequent epochs, each of which influenced it in a specific way, the author reaches the events of modern and contemporary history. He recreates the grim picture of the recent past, when Shinto became one of the most important elements in the reactionary ideology of Japanese imperialism, and describes the present-day situation, marked by the activities of the groups which have a stake in Japan's remilitarisation and, therefore, pin certain hopes on this religion. The integral and comprehensive work by G. Svetlov gives the readers a sufficiently clear idea of what Shinto—this complicated and important element of Japanese history—is all about, and subjects it to profound Marxist historical analysis.

Although, on the whole, this work merits high praise, it does contain a number of shortcomings that invite criticism. One of these is that the author, though speaking about the emergence of state Shinto and subdividing it into several strata (pp. 152—153), does not draw sufficiently clear-cut divisions between them and devotes too little space to the matter. He should have given a more detailed account of the structure of prewar Shinto which incorporates both state and non-state varieties. In this framework, it would have been expedient to single out Emperor's personal Shinto, palace Shinto, the Shinto of shrines (which other works often call temple Shinto), household Shinto, popular or vulgar Shinto, and, finally, sectarian Shinto. The book analyses practically all these categories, and many of them in much detail, but the reader unfamiliar with everyday Japanese life may find it difficult to establish the system of connections between them. A graph might be of help here that would show individual component types and the directions of connections between them, with a relevant commentary. These graphs are quite a common feature of works on religion and it is a pity this book has not found place for them.

As far as popular Shinto is concerned, the author deals with this mostly while describing the ancient sources of the cult, but says too little about the great extent to which these beliefs

and rituals continue to be practised today, and about the role they play in the life of the population, particularly in rural areas.

The book abounds in quotations from the most diverse sources. This makes it more vivid and enhances its documentary value, although one does feel that in some places the quotations are in excess. The author makes wide use of Japanese sources, but, in some cases, while quoting Shintoist books of canons and pronouncements by Shintoist theologians, he proceeds from the English translation, rather than the Japanese original. A consistent use of the Japanese original would have increased the documentary value of the citations.

The above remarks are of minor nature and do not detract from the general high assessment of the book. G. Svetlov's book treats this extensive topic, of which only individual aspects have been explored until now by Soviet specialists on Japan, in a sufficiently comprehensive way. The materials and analysis contained in the book, apart from helping to elucidate a number of aspects of Japanese social history, throw a new light on the ideological processes underway in present-day Japan. For this reason G. Svetlov's book is not only of historical, but also of considerable practical and political significance.

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FAR EAST INSTITUTE 1985 SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCES

Moscow PROBLEMY DALNEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, Oct-Dec 85 (signed to press 25 Nov 85) pp 185-186

[Report by V. F. Mikunov on scientific contacts of Far East Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, in 1985]

[Text] The Far East Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences maintains active scientific contacts with overseas research establishments, which are used by institute personnel for the exchange of opinions with foreign colleagues and the enhancement of the effectiveness of scientific work.

The IDV [Far East Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences] Board of Directors devotes constant attention to the establishment and development of mutually beneficial contacts with scientific centers in the PRC, especially the institutes of China's Academy of Social Sciences. In June of this year, 6 institute researchers returned from a year's assignment in the PRC, and in September a new group of 20 IDV personnel went to China to work on scientific and linguistic assignments. All of this is helping to establish direct scientific contacts between the IDV and Chinese scientific institutes. Officials from the PRC embassy in Moscow visited the IDV in August 1985.

The IDV has established close friendly relations with the Asia and Pacific Institute of the SRV Committee on the Social Sciences. Its director, Wan Chong, who came to Moscow as the guest of the IDV in 1985, and the Vietnamese researchers accompanying him had numerous conversations with IDV scholars on the political situation in the Far East and the Pacific region and on the methods and organization of fundamental research projects. The IDV is giving the Asia and Pacific Institute practical assistance in the training of scientific personnel, especially in the field of Sinology.

Scholars in the DPRK are interested in the work of IDV researchers on Korean affairs. In September and October 1985 the institute was visited by Director Kang Ung-ping of the Chuche Sasang Institute of the DPRK Academy of Social Sciences and Vice-President of the DPRK Academy of Social Sciences, Academician Kim Ul-hik. They commended the work of the IDV scientific collective and expressed a wish to establish closer contacts between scientific institutes in the DPRK and the IDV.

The institute's already strong and diversified contacts with scientific research centers in the European socialist countries, Mongolia and the Republic of Cuba continued to be developed in 1985. The exchange of guest conference speakers, the presentation of lectures and work with scientific materials gave scholars in the socialist countries a deeper understanding of the complex political, economic and social processes in various countries of the Far East and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. In 1985 the IDV continued to assist scientific establishments in fraternal countries in the training of highly skilled scientific personnel. For example, scholars from Bulgaria, Mongolia and Czechoslovakia worked at the IDV while they were completing their doctoral dissertations. The international scientific conference commemorating the 40th anniversary of the defeat of Japanese militarism in World War II, organized by the IDV in conjunction with the Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense, was an important scientific event in 1985. Guests of the IDV, experts from Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, the GDR, Cuba, Mongolia and Czechoslovakia, took an active part in the conference. Young scholars from socialist countries--post-graduate students from Bulgaria, Vietnam and Mongolia--continued their post-graduate studies in the IDV in 1985.

Increasing importance is being attached in the IDV to the study of the political situation in Japan and its role in international affairs in the Far East and the Pacific zone. Institute researchers, doctors of historical sciences V. F. Myasnikov and V. V. Pospelov, went to Japan on scientific assignments, learned about the work of a number of Japanese research establishments and the scientific projects of these establishments and exchanged views with a broad range of Japanese specialists. In turn, members of the Japanese scientific, political and business communities represented a significant percentage of the IDV's foreign guests in 1985. The scientific objectivity and sound arguments of the works of IDV researchers appeal to Japanese specialists, as Professor Mineo Nakajima from the Tokyo Foreign Language Institute, renowned Japanese Sinologist, commented.

Scientific contacts between the IDV and the leading centers of Oriental studies and political science in Western countries were maintained. Scientific debates with their representatives are focusing more and more not on the state of affairs in individual countries but on key issues in international politics--such as the Soviet proposals on security in Asia, confidence-building measures in the Far East, possible ways of achieving detente in the Pacific region and the issues of disarmament and the maintenance of the strategic balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. This was the nature of conversations with people who visited the institute as guests of the USSR Academy of Sciences: G. Sigur (the U.S. President's special adviser on Asian politics and director of the George Washington University Sino-Soviet Studies Institute), J. Lewis (director of the Stanford University Center for International Security and Arms Control), R. Solomon (head of the Department of the Social Sciences of the RAND research corporation), and other prominent American scholars, as well as with other institute guests--officials from the State Department, National Security Council and Congress of the United States H. Eise, M. Abramowitz, S. Sestanovich and S. Solarz.

Scholars from the capitalist and developing countries who visited the IDV in 1985 to exchange opinions with Soviet colleagues and to learn about institute research projects included V. Harle (Finland), M. Dassu and F. Cocci (Italy), R. Quested (England) and many others.

The IDV was visited by members of the diplomatic corps in Moscow. During conversations with them, institute researchers expressed their views on the situation in the Asia-Pacific region and told them of the foreign policy initiatives of the USSR and of the measures taken by the CPSU and Soviet Government to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations.

In addition to maintaining personal contacts with foreign scientists, the IDV engages in extensive scientific correspondence with overseas research establishments. The institute sends the works of its research associates, other scientific literature and the journal PROBLEMY DALNEGO VOSTOKA in Russian-, English-, Spanish- and Japanese-language editions to 150 addresses (in England, Bulgaria, Hungary, Holland, Hong Kong, Denmark, Singapore, the United States, the FRG, Sweden, Japan and other countries).

The IDV collective maintains active contacts with overseas colleagues on the assumption that these contacts are not only of scientific value but are also contributing to the mutual understanding of peoples and are of great importance in promoting the cause of peace and security.

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