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26 January 1983

SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

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SIM VAR QUESTIONS PRC SUPPORT TO CGDK

Paris MOUL KHMER in French Nov 82 pp 4-6

[Article by Sim Var: "Are Beijing's Promises Still To Be Trusted?"]

[Text] According to press agency reports, Zhao Ziyang, premier of the People's Republic of China, reportedly said, upon receiving Son Sann, prime minister of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, on 20 November 1982, that "China supports all three patriotic forces of Kampuchea and has no intention of establishing a zone of influence in Kampuchea. We hope that the three forces of Kampuchea want this coalition and will develop it in the interest of the solidary anti-Vietnamese struggle. We hope to see an independent, peaceful, neutral and nonaligned Kampuchea, a Kampuchea that will have a national coalition government made up of all patriotic forces."

What Cambodian who loves his country ever so slightly would not be lured by such a declaration of support? Our comrades, who have been fighting for four years with almost bare hands against a North Vietnamese occupier superior in numbers and materiel were awaiting nothing more in order to double their efforts and regain the land of their ancestors from that occupier. Although Beijing claims that the goal of its support is to prevent the Vietnamese *fait accompli* in Cambodia, they know that the People's Republic of China cannot not grant it without failing in its duty, especially when it feels surrounded by the USSR.

And yet, how many times, when Chou En Lai, Chinese premier, was still alive, did we hear similar statements made by Beijing? Statements accompanied by unconditional gifts with the promise of giving us the support of 900 million Chinese in case of outside aggression in order to safeguard the independence of our country, its peace, its neutrality and its nonalignment! But they have finally put us to sleep with the same old refrain and gradually we are moving from our position of neutrality toward North Vietnam, which fought the United States. The result? Prince Norodom Sihanouk's little Cambodia has pulled off the tour de force, in Beijing's wake, of rising up against the world's two superpowers: The United States and the USSR, based on its great confidence in Chinese support. Even better, it has succeeded in being swindled by North Vietnam, which it took for a sure and unselfish ally, even though for centuries, the latter has openly coveted our territory.

Since we are used to judging people on their actions and not on their quite hollow words, we have the right to ask whether Beijing truly wants to help us pull our country out of the abyss it finds itself in. If this is so, why does it support those old offenders rejected by all the Khmer people, given the fact that in only three years of an undivided reign, they decapitated over 3 million persons, half of the Cambodian population, without the slightest protest from their advisers? We wonder -- once bitten, twice shy -- whether the support they promise us now is but a horse remedy which, instead of curing the patient, might deal him the fatal blow? We ask these questions because, despite the universal censure of which they are the object, these criminals continue to be held up by the People's Republic of China, to such an extent that it is generally thought, in Cambodian circles in France, that being the pets of the Chinese, they would be assured of regaining power with the support of their protectors, judging by the ostentatiousness of the welcome extended to Khieu Samphan, a welcome even more grandiose than the one given to the other two leaders of the Cambodian coalition. This is a symptom that cannot deceive.

If this were the case, then the movements of Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann would only constitute makeup forces for the Khmers Rouges in their fight to regain power.

Indeed, since they fled to the jungle, they have tried to put on a new face, calling themselves "patriots" and introducing more democratic principles into their political program, but it was in order to deceive their people.

As for their nature, it remains the same. Proof of this is the fact that it is Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan and Son Sen who have taken it upon themselves to apply the program. And when they do apply it, they will do with it what they want, depending on their whim and not according to the letter of the law. Therefore, if they should regain power, they would hasten to finish their task as outlined in their initial program, which is to keep among the living only a million inhabitants, hand-picked, cleansed of any trace of Western civilization but capable, in their opinion, of rebuilding the Cambodian nation on a healthier and more solid basis!

In the meantime, the North Vietnamese stand by, rubbing their hands in glee, knowing that the Khmers Rouges are working for them.

But can one turn wolves into lambs overnight? Only the Chinese think it possible. For us, wolves will always be wolves. Even if they wanted to be taken for sheep, it would not be possible because having committed so many crimes in their lifetime, they have made so many enemies that they cannot retreat any further before their task. Then they will have to flee also to save themselves. How can there still be people to take them for patriots, when they cold-bloodedly kill their fellow countrymen for the North Vietnamese? One is speechless in the face of such cynicism. Responsible for the deaths of over 3 million persons, nothing could justify these assassins, who cannot take up the title of "patriot" with impunity. And the Chinese who support them in this sad task will have their work cut out for them, they who speak of helping the Cambodians to fight the Vietnamese occupiers! What kind of a game are they playing?

As for the North Vietnamese themselves, if they were more intelligent, they would save themselves a war, since the Khmers Rouges by themselves would do the job of ridding Cambodia of all its human resources for them! And when those resources are gone, then the burgeoning Vietnamese population will peacefully overflow into our country with no one to stop them. That is the work of the Khmers Rouges patriots!

We do want our country to be independent, peaceful, neutral and nonaligned, but in the currently extremely hostile environment, this could last eternally only in the minds of dreamers. Unless it is placed under the tutelage of the five great powers that are permanent members of the UN Security Council as long as necessary for reconstruction, our country would very quickly fall prey to the neighboring nations that covet and have always coveted its territory.

Therefore, if Beijing were sincere in its promises, Moscow should be able to demonstrate as much sincerity in its relations with our country. Our nation could only safeguard its independence, peace, neutrality and nonalignment if actually guaranteed by the five great powers that are permanent members of the UN Security Council, for in order not to be jealous of one another, these five great powers would have to have tutelage jointly. Naturally, our country would have its sovereignty curtailed, but the survival of Cambodia and of its people can only be obtained at that price.

At any rate, that is the compromise that we can hope for for our country instead of the subterfuges proposed by certain powers with ulterior motives.

What then will happen if Beijing does not keep its promises this time?

11,464

CSO: 4219/24

BIOGRAPHY OF BOU THANG

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 18 Dec 82 pp 1, 4

[Text] Comrade Bou Thang was born on 15 August 1934 to a poor farmer family of Ratanakiri Province. Early in life he became aware of the Khmer Issarak revolutionary movement which was led by the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party. At the age of 15 he joined an armed propaganda unit of the Issarak forces against the French colonialists and their running dogs to regain freedom for the fatherland.

During the years of direct American imperialist intervention into Kampuchea (1970-1974) when he served as commander of the Ratanakiri Province Military Command and with headquarters of the North East Military Region he stood shoulder to shoulder with the soldiers and people in fighting against the Americans, for national salvation and for the well being of the people.

Clearly recognizing the anti-Party, anti-popular and anti-national nature of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique, in 1974 he, together with a number of other commanders and soldiers loyal to the revolution, based themselves on the Kampuchea-Vietnam-Lao tri-border area and organized to lead the people in a determined resistance against the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique.

From 1975 to 1978, placing his reliance on the Kampuchea revolutionary people's forces and the fraternal assistance of Vietnam and Laos he built up his military and political forces participating actively and making important contributions to the establishment of the Kampuchea Front for National Solidarity and National Salvation to free the people from the cruel oppression of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique. Bou Thang was selected to be a member of the North East Region revolutionary movement mobilization committee.

In 1979 at the 3d Congress of the Kampuchea Revolutionary People's Party, he was elected Member of the Central Committee and Head of the Propaganda and Training Department of the Central Committee.

In 1981 at the 4th Party Congress he was elected member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. In February 1982 at the 2nd Session of the 1st National Assembly of the PRK he was elected Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of National Defense of the PRK.

BISHOPS BLAMED FOR PROLIFERATION OF REBEL PRIESTS

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 9 Jan 83 p 2

[Article by Mel Paralel]

[Text] Cebu City, Jan 8--Bishops in the country's dioceses, plagued with rebel infiltration were blamed yesterday for the proliferation of wayward priests in their respective jurisdictions.

The indictment was made by Julio Cardinal Rosales, who, without mentioning names, said the falling to the underground movement of certain priests could have been averted if bishops concerned asserted their leaderships in their areas.

The 76-year-old prelate, recuperating from a liver operation in the United States, received a party of military men led by Maj Gen Josephus Q. Ramas, army chief, who paid him a visit.

Rosales told the delegation of Ramas and defense and military reporters that the infiltration by rebels of the church has been going on for a long time even before the revelation of Fr Edgardo Kangleon.

The rebel infiltration of the church was brought to the open only upon the arrest of Kangleon last October, who testified before defense minister Juan Ponce Enrile and church representatives about the use of church facilities by rebel infiltrators.

Kangleon has since been detained and is now under the custody of the military vicar.

Rosales suggested that there is a crisis of leadership plaguing some Catholic dioceses.

He narrated other private matters related to the infiltration problem of the church, but asked that these details not be published.

Rosales expressed belief that despite a shortage of Catholic priests, the problems posed by the refusal of some priests to say mass in protest against the arrest and detention of Fr Kangleon can be resolved.

"God will provide," Rosales said.

He recalled in past experiences, lay leaders took over the religious duties of some priests who failed to report or to say Mass for health reasons.

He said Fr Kangleon cannot demand or petition for his release "since he himself declared his affiliation with the underground movement."

Rosales thinks that releasing Kangleon at this stage would pose serious security problem for the military.

Kangleon had earlier refused to go back to his Catbalogan parish for fear of his life. He had made testimonies damaging to the underground movement to military authorities.

CSO: 4200/295

MILITARY LAUNCHES NEW CAMPAIGN AGAINST REBELS

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 4 Jan 83 p 18

[Article by Mel Paralel]

[Text] The battle between government forces and the underground movement for the people's hearts and minds is expected to take new form in 1983, with both sides employing new strategies.

While defense and military establishments felt that the government is on top of the situation, information gathered from intelligence sources showed that dissident leaders were waxing optimism their movement is "far from finished."

Reports that certain top dissident leaders have moved to the Bicol region to direct anti-government operations there led observers to predict that the Bicol region would be a major battleground this year.

The reported transfer of hardcore elements of the New People's Army to beef up existing rebel bands in the Bicol region prompted military authorities to send reinforcement units to the area.

The military also changed its field command in the region now headed by Brig Gen Pedrito de Guzman who was pulled out from his post in Mindanao. De Guzman was reputed to have "neutralized" rebel elements operating in parts of Mindanao.

Days after De Guzman was moved to the Bicol region, a rebel band ambushed and killed an 11-man PC patrol, including a PC lieutenant.

The massacre was seen as an attempt to cow De Guzman's command.

But De Guzman said "that is not the way to fight." He convened his field commanders and drew up "new battle plans." Details were withheld.

The "attack-and-run" tactic being employed by rebels is expected to be matched by government forces with a shift of emphasis to "small units operation."

The military plans to stop the use of vehicles by government patrols.

In a series of strategy courses for field commanders, Maj Gen Josephus Q. Ramas, army chief, called attention to findings that patrols using vehicles "are easy prey" to rebel ambushers.

But the bigger battle for popular support will take place in every barangay, town and city throughout the country.

The government has laid down a grand plan to be launched nationwide to insulate the people from "propaganda bombardment" by the underground movement.

Gen Fabian C. Ver, AFP chief of staff, said the program would convert every soldier into "ambassadors of goodwill" for the government. It has the blessings of the President.

They will also serve as "public relations men" under "Operation Katagan."

The task of clothing soldiers with "civilian orientation" was given to Brig. Gen Alexander Felix, AFP civil relations service commander, who mobilized all AFP civil relations officers throughout the country for the job.

CSO: 4200/295

PHILIPPINES

NOT ALL ACTIVIST PRIESTS ARE REBELS

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 10 Jan 83 pp 1, 6

[Text] Davao City--The president of the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines is seeking a clarification on the role of the church amid growing government pressure to crack down on alleged subversive priests.

Rev Antonio Mabutas, Archbishop of Davao, said in an interview with the Associated Press at his residence that the Church is not interested in a so-called "blacklist" of dissident priests which has been drawn up by the military.

Mabutas said the government needs to realize there is a difference between activist and subversive priests. He said he was not convinced that an arrested priest who confessed rebel ties is really a communist.

He cited the example of Rev Edgardo Kangleon, who, he said, "was apparently under great psychological pressure from the military."

Mabutas acknowledged that some church programs might be infiltrated by communists, but he said the government is also in danger of infiltration from the right and subject to graft, corruption and abuses.

Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile has asked the Church to take "concrete action" against priests engaged in political activity to condemn those who have advocated violence and to stop diversion of Church funds to communists.

It is unknown how many priests are in detention, but in recent months the military has arrested or sought to arrest about 25 priests, nuns and lay church workers accused of sympathizing with or aiding communist insurgents in rural areas.

Enrile also proposed, in a formal letter to the bishops, that the clergy and the military work together to preserve human rights and said the Church should continue to inform authorities of military and police abuses.

Mabutas said some of Enrile's responses to a list of church suggestions are "evasive."

The Church had asked that President Marcos stop issuing Presidential Commitment Orders which can keep people in jail indefinitely even without charges because they are "against the spirit of the Constitution." Enrile said that was up to the President.

The Church also asked for a clearer definition of subversion. He said that was up to the courts.

The Church-state dialogue is to resume in Manila at a still unspecified date. (AP)

CSO: 4200/296

CHURCH URGED TO DISCIPLINE SAMAR PRIESTS

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 8 Jan 83 p 1

[Article by Jose de Vera]

[Text] Cebu City, Jan 7--Julio Cardinal Rosales, former archbishop of Cebu, urged Samar church authorities today to impose discipline on 16 priests who went on protest leave in the province last November.

Rosales said the Pope was disheartened over the action, saying this was a violation of the canon law.

The 76-year-old cardinal, who is now recuperating from a liver surgery in the United States last December, was interviewed by defense and military reporters during a call on him by Maj Gen Josephus Q. Ramas, Philippine Army chief.

Ramas made the call before he left for Mindanao to visit field troops, particularly those assigned in former rebel strongholds in Balabagan, Lanao del Sur and in Dinaig, Maguindanao. His party included Brig Gen Benjamin Divinagracia, commanding general of the 3rd Infantry division based here.

Rosales, who retired last year, said Pope John Paul II was disheartened when he learned of the 16 Samar priests who had abandoned their apostolic work.

The "pastoral leave" (boycott of the masses), according to him, was unnecessary because "it's the people, the faithful, who were penalized."

The priests went on leave to demand release of Catholic rebel priest, Fr Edgardo Kangleon.

Rosales also noted an "acute" shortage of priests in the Philippines, pointing out that the present ratio of one priest for every 10,000 people was short of the ideal of one priest to every 3,000 people.

CSO: 4200/296

PHILIPPINES

CPP PROPAGANDA LEADERS CAPTURED

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 9 Jan 83 p 1

[Text] Three suspected brains of the propaganda offensive of the Communist Party of the Philippines were captured by government operatives in separate operations in Baguio City.

The capture, regarded as a major breakthrough in the government's counter-insurgency drive, came after a nun, Sister Genoveva Laoagan, surrendered to the military last Dec 23. Under interrogation, she disclosed the underground links of the captured CPP propaganda officers.

They were identified as Romulo Tuazon alias "Guido"; Benjamin Briones, alias "Benjie", and Cristina Versola.

Documents show that Versola was allegedly one of the rebel officers running the CPP propaganda and education bureau for Northwest Luzon.

According to the same documents, Briones and Tuazon were senior staffers of the publications bureau of the CPP regional committee for Northern Luzon.

Documents found in Sister Genoveva's possession indicated that she was one of the women linked to Fr Zacarias Agatep and heads the CPP regional committee on education and propaganda.

Her surrender was negotiated by her sister, Mrs Glorio Estejo, who lives in Salcedo, Ilocos Sur.

Sister Genoveva told military authorities that she was recruited by Fr Agatep and one Alfredo Cesar alias "Doming," who was killed with the renegade priest in a gunbattle with PC intelligence agents.

On instruction of Brig Gen Victor Asada, PC Region I commander, search warrants were taken out for suspected hideouts of rebels in the area.

CSO: 4200/295

PIRATES HOUND FISHERMEN

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 10 Jan 83 pp 1, 18

[Article by Pons Basan]

[Text] Davao City, Jan 9--Piracy has become a major problem of six coastal towns in South Cotabato and has rendered jobless some 20,000 fishermen in the area, who have abandoned their main occupation in fear.

No official record is available as to the number of fishermen who have been victims of hijacking, robbery and killing in the high seas by pirates. However, their number keeps increasing.

Hardest hit by the rampant piracy problem are small fishermen who cannot afford to hire armed civilians to protect them at sea.

The bigtime fishing magnates are more fortunate because they can afford to employ armed escorts when fishing.

In the fishing villages of Maitum, Kiamba, Maasin, Glan, Malapatan and Alabel, hundreds of motorized fishing boats have been left rotting by small fishermen who have shifted to marginal farming rather than risk their lives in the hands of sea marauders.

One victim, Librado Paghubasan Sr., of sitio Mabay, Maitum, South Cotabato, said that he has already lost to the sea pirates two pumpboats secured through a "biyayang Dagat" loan, two sons-in-law, a brother-in-law and a nephew for the past two years. Their bodies were never recovered.

The pirates, suspected to be members of the fragmented Moro National Liberation Front, are active in the rich fishing grounds off the Moro Gulf, Sarangani Bay and the Celebes Sea. They usually victimize defenseless fishermen whom they divest of their catch and valuables and sometimes kill them.

The sea brigands are usually called the "Ambak, Pare!" (Jump, Pare!) gang because of their modus operandi. They give their victims the chance to jump from the pumpboat into the sea to drown or leave the fishermen at the mercy of sharks. At other times the fishermen are fired at with armalites. Many fishermen gambled on the former.

The pirates, armed with high-powered weapons, frequently used two or three high-speed motorboats making it difficult for pursuers to catch up with them.

They steal everything from the fishing boat engines, cash, fishing gear, the day's catch to anything of value.

Authorities said that the pirates have intensified their operations to secure more funds to sustain the MNLF movement and to retaliate for punitive military operations conducted against the Muslim rebels.

CSO: 4200/296

PIRATES TERRORIZING TRADERS, PASSENGERS

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 5 Jan 83 p 24

[Article by Romy V. Mapile]

[Text] Masbate, Jan 4--Businessmen from the coastal towns and barangays aired an appeal to Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Lt Gen Fidel Ramos to rid their areas of pirates victimizing businessmen and passenger boats plying the route of Masbate, Samar, Cebu and Iloilo.

Speaking through Barangay Captain Antonio J. Zafra, traders King Suan, Roberto Alhombro, Rainier Belleza, Napoleon Villasis, Ching Ou, Rodolfo Buenapos, Honorio Uy, Jaime Uy, Tina Tan and Carlos Marcaida, stated that the piracy cases have paralyzed business with the neighboring provinces, passenger boats have stopped sailing and industry is at a standstill.

The affected areas are Barangays Calumbang, Bongcanaway, Quinayangan Daco, Quinayangan Diutay, Lumucab, Pangirahan and Hanggan, according to the complainants.

The group particularly cited the April 14 massacre on board a motorboat from Masbate to Iloilo, of ten persons which included businessman Valeriano Go Lopez, owner of the boat, M/L Ready. All the passengers were hogtied, robbed of cash and valuables worth P1,400, killed with armalite rifles and blasted with dynamite, together with the motorboat.

The case was solved by the NBI with the filing of piracy with multiple murder against Roberto King Chua, a Chinese millionaire, Artemio Betita, Jr., Paquito Betita, Renato Catalan, Antonio Cenal, Luis Cenal and a John Doe.

A warrant of arrest against the gang has since been issued by Judge Vicente Lim Yu, but up to now not one of the accused has been arrested.

Pending their arrests, the residents of the barangays are constantly living in fear since the incident, it was averred. The appellants said normalcy will return only upon the arrest of Roberto King Chua and his co-accused who are believed responsible for series of piracy cases.

According to Zafra, prior to the massacre at the M/L Ready, Roberto Chua has been collecting P50 monthly from businessmen purportedly for the PC

According to Zafra, prior to the massacre at the M/L Ready, Roberto Chua has been collecting P50 monthly from businessmen purportedly for the PC detachment in the area. Other victims of pirate attacks were Glecerio Niepen, Emmanuel Tan, Severo Francis, Efren Dahuya, Florencio de la Cruz, Nestor Cabatingan, and Jooly Tupaz.

CSO: 4200/296

ENRILE SCORED FOR TERRORIZING INTERVIEWERS

Cebu City VISAYAN HERALD in English 4 Jan 83 p 4

[Article by David Ompoc]

[Text] A dialogue between the rulers and the governed is essential to establish rapport and understanding. The existence of a communication gap between the government and the people produces no advantage and benefits to the nation as a whole. Consequently, government leaders should circulate more freely in the rural and urban areas and tell the people what the government has been doing for them and what it intends to do on any given problem. The rulers conducting the dialogue must be sincere and honest. They must tell truthfully what they can do and what they cannot. Resorting to lies, half-truths or at the worst, intimidation, will not make the dialogue a success.

The case of Minister Juan Ponce Enrile who came to Cebu recently for a multi-sectoral dialogue is a case in point. Insofar as initiating the said dialogue, the Minister made one step in the right direction. However, the media people who attended the meeting alleged that what took place was not a dialogue but a monologue. It was Minister Enrile who performed most of the talking and during the open forum he browbeat and bullied most of the participants into submission by witty insults and innuendos and repartees. Above all, the Minister was said to have used threatening language with emphasis on the resources of the government to chop off the heads of the enemies of the state.

With that kind of atmosphere, it is expected that the less courageous and outspoken cowered in fear and did not ask questions, especially considering that the Fairview room and the outlying premises of Magellan Hotel were littered with gun-toting military personnel. That dialogue in the opinion of most who attended it would have been more fruitful and beneficial if it were conducted in an amiable and friendly manner. It is a fact that the majority if not all who participated in that dialogue are pro-establishment. All that they desire is the correction of certain injustices obtaining in our society with the objective in mind to save this establishment of which we are all a part and parcel away from the clutches of the violent subversives.

There is no debate on the imperativeness and propriety of cabinet ministers and other subordinate officials by giving them additional tasks of going to the battlefield on the mission of winning the hearts and minds of the people. After Martial Law, it cannot be denied that untold resentment and rancour have been lying dormant in the conscience of multitudes of our brothers and sisters. If we want to forgive and forget thus achieving national reconciliation and unity, let us disregard the use of naked power and hawkish threats but instead we must proceed to have an honest-to-goodness dialogue with the people for the purpose of finding solutions to the problems that plague our country. Verily, the deportment of Minister Enrile in that dialogue did not enhance the desired unity and reconciliation that all of us are dreaming. A rolling stone gathers no moss, so an intimidating tongue gathers no friends.

CSO: 4200/296

PHILIPPINES

SOLDIERS DIE IN AMBUSH

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 8 Jan 83 p 1

[Article by Primo Esleyer]

[Bacolod City, Jan 7--Six Constabulary soldiers, including two officers, were killed and two others were wounded when they were ambushed by armed men believed to be New People's Army (NPA) rebels yesterday in sitio Kalaklan, barangay Ginayawan, Cauayan town, some 130 kilometers south of this city.

Killed were a certain First Lieutenant Alemana; 2nd Lieutenant Maramut, Corporals First Class Reyes and Angulawan; and two still unidentified troop troopers believed to be commissioned officers also.

Wounded were Capt Reynaldo Javier and C2C Victorino Bartolome, both confined at the provincial hospital here. Javier is commanding officer of the Long Range Patrol (LRP) under TFK.

Reports said the five PC men died on the spot while one died on the way to an emergency hospital in Kabankalan town.

Javier and Bartolome were airlifted by helicopter from Kabankalan to Bacolod.

The armed group took all the firearms and wallets of the fatalities and burned the jeep of the PC troopers.

The soldiers were on their way to Hinoba-an town from Bacolod with supplies when fired upon at 8:30 a.m.

Javier and Bartolome were saved when a passenger bus, Ceres Liner, arrived immediately after the ambushers fled.

CSO: 4200/296

PHILIPPINES

NEWS OF MILITARY CONTROL PANICS TOWN

Cebu City VISAYAN HERALD in English 4 Jan 83 p 9

[Text] Malaybalay, Bukidnon--"There's no truth to the rumor that the municipality of Valencia will be placed under full military control by the Philippine marines," this was the assurance of Mayor Absalon Catarata after having been informed that thousands have already fled their homes for the last three days because of mere false information they received from word of mouth.

Catarata told the Office of Media Affairs provincial office here that there has been panic and tension among the barangay folks in some barangays of Valencia which resulted to mass evacuation and loss of properties to residents.

The panic was triggered off by false information from several barangay folks who reported to the mayor that the marines are coming and that they should leave their homes as soon as possible.

Catarata said there are now at least 500 people reported to have sought refuge in barangay Lurugan and some 1,000 in the barangays Batangan and Laligan. The evacuees came from the nearby barangays.

The mayor said these people have already sold their farm animals and other properties at very low prices just to make their way out of the place which they strongly believed would soon be occupied by military men.

The people have already left their homes before I knew it and I have to tell them that there will be no cause for panic and alarm and that they should go back to their respective places, the mayor said.

The municipal government of Valencia is doing its best to protect these people, Catarata said.

He said he had already informed Gov Carlos O. Fortich about the situation and other government officials.

He also urged the local media to help disseminate proper and correct information to these people so that they can be persuaded to go back to their respective barangays. (RT. Magbanua, OMA 10)

CSO: 4200/296

PHILIPPINES

IMPORTS TO COST MORE

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 7 Jan 82 p 10

[Article by Loreto Cabanes]

[Text] Businessmen yesterday estimated the new government edicts imposing a three per cent additional ad valorem tax on all imports and requiring the advance payments of customs duties and taxes on the imported material would have the effect of increasing the landed costs of imported goods by approximately 8.0 percent to 12 percent.

Added to the increased cost of 12 percent on imports resulting from the de facto devaluation of the Philippine peso from its level a year ago imports would now cost between 20 percent to 24 percent more than last year's, most businessmen pointed out.

These businessmen, whose reactions to the new import policies of the government were sought yesterday by the Bulletin, said that the added cost of importations would further make their operations difficult, suffering as they are now from the effects of the worldwide recession.

Companies engaged in the manufacture of consumer durables will certainly have to pass on the added cost to consumers.

Other companies importing raw materials and intermediate goods for processing into products for exports would be less affected since the added cost of imports could be offset by more pesos to be earned by their export dollar receipts.

The business community was caught by surprise by the new government policy.

The Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI) learned about P.D. No. 1853 which took effect last Jan 1 only last Wednesday afternoon when its representatives were called by the Central Bank to present their views on a proposed rules and regulations to implement the decree.

The decree provided that customs duties and taxes due on any imported item should be paid in advance at the time of the opening of the import letter of credit with the commercial bank.

Previously, such customs duties and taxes on the imported goods were paid at the time of the release of the imported material from customs.

This means that an importer will have to advance his payment of customs duties and taxes for imported goods which will arrive in the Philippines in a period of about 30 days at the earliest to five to six months depending on where the goods are shipped from.

He will therefore be deprived of the interest earnings on his money which he would have paid for duties and taxes only at the time of the arrival of his goods.

Firms that will be severely hit by the new regulation are those which rely on supplier's credits and deferred payment schemes for their imported items. Usually, firms resort to such forms of payment to take advantage of the credit extended for 180 days to 360 days by the supplier.

Under the decree, customs duties and taxes on importations made under these payment arrangements are likewise to be paid in advance.

CSO: 4200/296

PHILIPPINES

AUSTRALIAN COAL IMPORTS

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 5 Jan 83 p 10

[Text] The Philippines will import at least 250,000 metric tons (245,000 tons) of coal from Australia this year to meet increased demands caused by the shift of many local industries from bunker oil to coal, the Ministry of Energy said.

Although local coal production is expected to reach one million metric tons (980,000 tons) compared to slightly more than half a million tons this year, it will still be insufficient for industries, the ministry added.

The conversion of cement and other industrial factories to coal-fired plants starting in 1981, and the expected shift of other firms this year to the more economical fuel made importation necessary, the ministry said.

The government announced last November a plan to build a 130-km (81-mile) "slurry process" pipeline that would carry powdered coal mixed with water or a cheap liquid fuel from coal ports in Batangas province south of here to cement plants in the Manila area.

The pipeline was meant to cut down on the costs of handling and hauling coal from the ports.

The Philippines posted a 19 percent reduction in its oil bill last year with petroleum imports pegged at 2,100 million dollars compared with 2,600 million dollars in 1981.

CSO: 4200/296

PHILIPPINES

TWO INDUSTRY PROJECTS DROPPED

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 7 Jan 83 pp 1, 6

[Article by Rosario A. Liquicial]

[Text] The government has dropped two of its 11 major industrial projects for economic reasons.

Prime Minister Cesar E.A. Virata disclosed this Wednesday even as he added that the decision on the fate of the \$800 million integrated steel project will be made soon.

The two projects dropped are the petrochemical complex and aluminum smelter plant, Virata said during the first of monthly meetings organized by Daily Express senior editors and senior reporters at the DE conference room with prominent public and private personalities.

Other projects lined up by the government for implementation are the copper smelter plant; copper fabrication plant; fertilizer complex; diesel engine project; pulp and paper project; heavy engineering project; alcogas program; cement industry expansion and modernization program and coconut industry rationalization plan.

Nine of the projects are already in various stages of implementation, construction or negotiation, Virata said.

The copper smelter is ready to operate April this year, followed shortly by the fertilizer complex. The first phase of the dies 1 engine project is taking off next year, he added.

Virata explained that prevailing economic conditions, coupled with the "belt-tightening" program of the government have made the \$1-billion worth petrochemical and aluminum projects "unviable."

Saudi Arabia, for one, is reported to be expanding the capacity of its petrochemical complex which could supply 80 percent of the world's requirements for chemical products.

The government has not been successful in finding a suitable foreign partner for its project.

It had talks with Mexico, Brunei and Saudi Arabia, but all were unsuccessful.

In the case of the aluminum smelter, the American company, Reynolds International, which had expressed willingness to take part in the project, asked for discounted power rates which the government-owned National Power Corp turned down.

CSO: 4200/295

GOVERNMENT IMPROVEMENT OF KKK MARKETING

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 7 Jan 83 pp 1, 6

[Article by Samuel V. Senoren]

[Text] The Government will develop and pursue a major marketing program for products turned out by participants in the Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran starting this year, according to Prime Minister Cesar F.A. Virata.

In a dialogue with Daily Express senior staff Wednesday, Virata said that the marketing program constitutes the second phase of the national livelihood movement.

He said that since the KKK was launched about a year ago, more than 200,000 individuals and enterprises have used the technical and financial facilities of the program.

A total of P900 million has already been lent to borrowers under the KKK program. The initial repayment efficiency is 40 percent on the first year, he said.

The repayment rate is considered to be generally good since most of the loans have not matured.

Virata added that the full impact of the KKK on the nation's economic life will be assessed by the end of this year.

He also alleged fears that KKK funding would be converted into some kind of a "pork barrel" to finance local politicians.

Should this happen, he said, the program is bound to be a failure.

To ensure that the funds are properly disposed of KKK officials have instituted strict monitoring of government funds.

In the same dialogue, the Prime Minister also said:

--The move to integrate cost of living allowances in basic wages should be approached with caution and on an industry-to-industry basis.

--He is not in favor of legislating national wages but conceded that minimum ceilings be maintained.

--The tripartite meetings among the government, employers and labor sectors may have to be discontinued because they have been converted into national bargaining units.

--Wage increases should be courses through proper collective bargaining negotiations, approached on an industry scale, and should be tied up with worker productivity. In other words, he said, the worker who produces more or who plays a more major role in achieving profits should be rewarded more.

CSO: 4200/295

PHILIPPINES TO BORROW TWO BILLION THIS YEAR

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 7 Jan 83 p 1

[Text] The Central Bank authorized last night new foreign borrowings amounting to \$2 billion this year to service urgent and high priority needs of industry and the government.

Central Bank Gov Jaime C. Laya said the new loans include about \$1 billion in commercial credit and another \$1 billion worth of official development assistance or soft loans.

Aside from the \$2 billion in six-term credit, the Central Bank also authorized an estimated \$1.2 billion in revolving credit which refers largely to trade financing, particularly oil importation.

Last year, the Central Bank authorized a total of \$2.4 billion in foreign loans which raised the country's total foreign debt to almost \$16 billion, Laya said.

This year's projected foreign borrowings do not include about \$510 million worth of loans being tapped from the International Monetary Fund to finance the deficit in the balance-of-payment and the drop in the prices of major export products.

The country is also borrowing some \$300 million structural adjustment loan from the World Bank to finance priority development projects. This amount is not included in the 1983 foreign debt ceiling, Laya said.

Laya said this year's new foreign borrowing ceiling will be reviewed and increased in the middle of the year to accommodate the needs of government and industry.

CSO: 4200/295

FUNDS EARMARKED FOR HOUSING PROGRAM

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 6 Jan 83 p 10

[Text] The National Home Mortgage Finance Corp (NHMFC) is setting aside P2.7 billion this year to finance the construction of new housing units and home improvements under the government-sponsored housing program.

The amount will be used to purchase home mortgages from financial institutions which usually advance funds needed by prospective homeowners.

There are 76 financial institutions authorized to provide initial funding for homeowners. These institutions have committed to advance as much as P1 billion in housing loans.

Extending its first loan in March 1980, the program has benefitted some 10,570 borrowers who bought a total of 7,634 housing units. Of the number of loan beneficiaries, 7,633 are Pag-IBIG member-borrowers accounting for 71.31 percent of total loans; 1,512 are awardees of Bagong Lipunan Sites and Services (BLISS) or 13.25 percent; and 1,425 under the open-housing loan scheme or 15.45 percent of total availments.

To sustain the housing loan requirements under the program, the Ministry of Human Settlements through NHMFC sold P896.935 million of Bahayan Mortgage Participation Certificates. Proceeds from this sale are used to purchase home mortgages representing housing loans extended by accredited financial institutions.

Funds generated from the sale of mortgage-backed BMPCs are augmented by the Home Development Mutual fund (Pag-IBIG Fund) collections now amounting to P732.94 million, and direct government equity contributions of P195 million.

Increased private participation in shelter finance has been spurred by the incentive programs of the two other housing agencies involved in the aspects of shelter savings and credit insurance and guarantee, complementing the fund generation and mortgage purchase programs under NHMFC's secondary mortgage market system.

With the establishment of the Pag-IBIG Fund as a savings system for home acquisition, Pag-IBIG members have served as an organized homebuyer's market for the accelerated production volumes in housing construction by real estate developers and contractors.

The loans extended under the program are in turn guaranteed by the Home Financing Corp. which has provided a total of P2.1 billion in developmental, homebuyers' loan and other guarantees.

CSO: 4200/295

FIFTEEN NEW OIL WELLS THIS YEAR

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 8 Jan 83 p 10

[Article by Rosario A. Liquicial]

[Text] Investments in oil exploration and development in the country this year is expected to reach \$120 million, Bureau of Energy Development (BED) Director Wendeslao de la Paz disclosed yesterday.

He said existing service contractors including Philippine Cities Service, Inc (PCSI) and American Oil Co (Amoco) have committed to drill 15 wells this year.

PCSI is scheduled to re-drill South Galoc well in addition to two new exploratory wells within the same oil reservoir to determine the extent and properties of the area, the BED official said.

Galoc wells are situated in deep-water areas believed to be an oil reservoir. PCSI will install an early production system (EPS) in the Galoc oilfield to delineate the property of the oilfield instead of the conventional platform type of production facilities which cost much.

The oil company De la Paz explained, will be spending only about \$60 million in the next three years to install an EPS instead of investing about \$950 million for a conventional production platform system.

The conventional-type of production facilities can only be set up by PCSI once it is sure that oil in the area is of commercial quantity. PCSI also operates Nido and the Matinloc oilfields.

AMOCO, on the other hand, is slated to drill another well in the Cadlao area to enhance production from the existing oilfield. The company is also expected to re-drill another well in Malajon situated in offshore Northwest Palawan, De la Paz said.

De la Paz also disclosed that the government is expected to grant soon geophysical survey contracts to two interested foreign exploration companies.

These firms are Union Pacific, a subsidiary of Allied Chemicals of the US; and White Stone also of the US in partnership with Multi-Natural Resources and Drilling Corp., a local company.

The two are eyeing the Sulu Sea as site for their exploratory drilling activities.

Last year, service contractors drilled a total of 17 wells, four of which were re-entry wells (or those which were previously drilled) and 13 were exploratory.

Some \$116 million in investments were sunk into these exploration projects last year.

CSO: 4200/295

EXPORT OF COCONUT OIL PERMITTED

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 7 Jan 83 p 9

[Article by Resty Perez]

[Text] The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) has reportedly issued new rules allowing some of the 40 mills tapped by the government to supply the coconut oil requirements of the coco-diesel program to export part of their output.

These mills were previously banned from exporting their output and were instead required to sell their oil to the Philippine National Oil Co (PNOC), which implements the coco-diesel program.

But under the new rules industry observers believed that only "very few" of the 40 mills can qualify as oil exporters.

The new rules provide that only mills which exported at least 6,000 metric tons of oil in 1982 will be allowed to export.

The government prohibited the mills from exporting oil starting only last September which gave them eight months to meet the 1982 export performance requirement.

Under the same rules, the mills are only allowed to export the equivalent of their actual deliveries to PNOC this year.

Earlier, the PCA thought of allowing these mills to export coconut oil in excess of their quota to be set by PCA.

The quota system, however, was dropped after the industry pointed out that the actual lifting of coconut oil from the smaller mills may not be economical because PNOC's barges are too big to regularly lift oil from small mills most of which are capable of delivering only about 100 tons per day.

CSO: 4200/295

PHILIPPINES

EDITORIAL CALLS FOR IMPROVED CATTLE PRODUCTION

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 6 Jan 83 p 4

[Text] A very disturbing bit of news is the information that the Philippines imports at least 95 percent of its beef and dairy requirements. If this is correct and it must be because the information came from the Ministry of Agriculture, we indeed have a long way to go before we can become self-sufficient in cattle meat and dairy products.

This is a pity because we have attained self-sufficiency in rice, vegetables, fruits and other food items. In rice, we have been so successful that we have transformed from a rice-importing to a rice-exporting country in the span of a few years. Our success in agricultural productivity through multi-cropping and rice-fish farming has become a model for some Third World countries.

The National Food Authority says that the government has stockpiled 609,000 metric tons of rice. This has been made possible by the introduction of modern technologies and the government's intensive palay procurement program. The output of 331,400 metric tons in 1982 was a big boost to the government's stockpile of rice. In 1981, total rice production was 423,000 metric tons. Because of the record harvest in 1982, our rice requirements can be filled up to May 1983, with plenty to spare.

Even the Maisagana or corn production program has fairly succeeded. Corn production for crop year 1982-1983 is expected to hit 137,000 metric tons, an increase of 4.1 percent over the previous year's 131,600 metric tons. The program is designed to provide the basic animal feed ingredient for the country's livestock industry.

Unfortunately, the country's livestock industry has shown a dismal output. We have done much better in pork and poultry.

Surprisingly, we have some good programs in cattle-raising and cattle-fattening and dairy production. But something seems to be holding back the programs. The Philippine Dairy Corporation, a government agency, is only now starting to operate although it was created by law a few years ago.

Cattle-raising and cattle-fattening projects are being undertaken by various government agencies and financial institutions. The biggest of these projects is the Bakahang Barangay program of the Ministry of Agriculture which provides farmers with credit for backyard cattle fattening.

According to available figures, the Bakahang Barangay program now covers 68 provinces with P528.959 million granted in loans to 134,160 farmers. The loans were supposed to finance the acquisition of 242,500 head of cattle.

But where are the cattle? Why do we still import 95 percent of our beef and dairy requirements? The answer is obvious. We are still not raising enough cattle. There is, therefore, a clear need to exert stronger and more serious efforts in improving local cattle production.

CSO: 4200/295

INCENTIVES SOUGHT FOR AGRICULTURAL VENTURES

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 6 Jan 83 p 10

[Article by Rosario A. Liquicial]

[Text] Industrialist Enrique Zobel, headman of the Ayala group, said yesterday the government should redirect its efforts towards agricultural projects and provide more incentives to them instead of concentrating too much on export industries.

Zobel said there is an urgent need to fully develop agriculture because it is the basic sector from which industries develop. He pointed out that the agricultural sector's development is being hampered by lack of incentives.

The Ayala headman explained that incentives are needed to enable investors to get an appreciable return on investments considering that agricultural projects are highly sensitive to uncontrollable factors such as typhoons and weather problems.

Ayala is heavily involved in agribusiness. It is engaged in poultry raising, piggery and corn production. Agricultural ventures are high on Zobel's priority list.

On the economy, Zobel said 1983 would be a difficult year but he declined to elaborate.

"It is government's role to find solutions to the country's expected economic difficulties," he stated.

On his proposal to convert Mactan island into a Hongkong-like free trade zone, Zobel said this is now being studied by Prime Minister Cesar Virata and Central Bank Gov Jaime Laya.

According to him, the proposal was submitted to President Marcos and was passed on to Virata for review.

As envisioned, Mactan island in Cebu will be a self-contained domestic and international business community with its own set of laws on taxation.

It will be exempt from present and prospective Philippine taxes and from tax treaties the country has with other nations. Although operating as an autonomous business center, the Philippine flag will fly over it and a Philippine representative will oversee it.

CSO: 4200/295

FUNDS FOR SUGAR INDUSTRY

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 4 Jan 83 p 7

[Text] Cebu City, Jan 3--The government was urged today to set aside at least ₱2 billion to save the ailing sugar industry. Assemblyman Jesus T. Villegas (Pusyon Bisaya, Region 7) warned that the industry would collapse like those in other countries if the government fails to act immediately.

Villegas, who is the minister of finance and economics in the opposition's shadow cabinet at the Batasang Pambansa, reported the Philippine National Bank is posed to foreclose many sugar farms because their owners had continually failed to update loan payments.

Villegas charged that the government had earlier cornered the windfall when sugar prices were high in the world market, through its National Sugar Trading Authority.

The proposed ₱2 billion rescue fund is to be deposited at PNB to enable it to restructure the planters' loans.

The assemblyman said he had submitted this proposal to the Batasan along with 12 Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) assemblymen from Western Vasayas, the country's primary sugar producing region.

He assailed Prime Minister Cesar Virata for withdrawing the deposit of the Philippine National Oil Company amounting to ₱2 billion from the PNB. Virata reportedly transferred the fund to the Development Bank of the Philippines.

Villegas said the sudden withdrawal of the fund from PNB forced it to plan the foreclosure of the planters' loans.

"If the government could dole out ₱3.8 billion to selected distressed companies, there is no reason why it could not shell out ₱2 billion to save a whole industry," he said.

Villegas said he was sure the Central Bank has the money for the purpose if the government is really sincere in propping up the sugar industry.

CSO: 4200/296

TRIBAL MINORITY, CPT DEVELOPMENTS ON BURMA BORDER NOTED

Bangkok THE NATION REVIEW in English 18 Dec 82 p 14

[Text]

OVER TWO YEARS have passed since the Policy Order No. 66/B.E. 2523 — politics take precedence over military suppression — was announced and, admittedly, the policy has caused considerable erosion in the status quo of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). Yet, recent events which included the assassination of a senior communist defector in the South, has caused serious concerns among advocates of the policy pronouncement.

Senior government officials this week did not conceal their concerns over how much the policy has been implemented among low-level officials. They also hinted that something must be done to ensure that the policy and guidelines will be more strictly abided by.

National Security Council (NSC) Secretary General Squadron Leader Prasong Soonsiri said in a seminar attended by officials from the southernmost areas this week that the past practices involving the implementation of the policy order must be reviewed and evaluated.

He also warned unscrupulous government officials to turn to the right courses as envisaged in the policy and other policies involved in the maintenance of the security of the country. And at times, the NSC chief even openly threatened to take punitive actions against those who failed to adhere to the government policy.

In an interview with *The Nation*, Fourth Army Region Commander Lt Gen Harn Leenanonda admitted: "The past performances of government officials are still far

from satisfaction. Many of our officials still don't clearly understand the essence of the policy pronouncement and sometimes, they even acted against the order."

"Our major stumbling bloc is the authorities who implement the policy, and not the policy itself, as the policy has been clearly laid down," he stressed.

Lt Gen Harn, the spearhead in establishing the major policy order and his Tai Rom Yen policy, which is an adapted version of the order for the situation in the South, has admittedly caused a substantial change in the southern situation. However, recent events in the South have underscored the fact that the policy has not been strictly implemented in some areas.

Commander of the Civilian-Police-Military Unit 42 (CPM-42) Col Yuenyong Wattanavikorn, who is responsible for the security in Surat Thani, said the communist-infested areas under his jurisdiction still comprises many "Red Zones" dangerous to government authorities.

"There are still many obstacles hampering the efforts in getting local authorities adhere to the Policy Order No. 66/B.E. 2523. A large number of officials are acting against the essence of the policy, thus fermenting conditions of which communist guerrillas could make use of in spreading their armed struggle," he said.

One of the events in recent months which has caused headache to the CPM-42 commander was the killing of a senior communist defector. The gunmen are still at large and this incident was a blatant vio-

lation of the policy order, which stipulates, among others, that the government will treat communist defectors as compatriots, try to make them understand the government policy involved in the problem, and help them have a peaceful life.

"I do not take the murder lightly. I have instructed officials concerned to conduct an investigation into the case to trace down the people responsible for the killing," Col Yuenyong said. He added that if the gunmen could not be arrested, the credibility of the government would be damaged and the efforts to woo communist insurgents to defect and refrain from their armed struggle would be seriously checked.

The unidentified senior communist defector was shot dead in the hail of bullets last month. The weapon used in the killing was an M16 assault rifle. The incident clearly underscores the still strong outlawed influence in the South, although it is the aim of the policy order and the Tai Rom Yen policy to eradicate the outlawed influence.

The concerns have prompted the Fourth Army Region to plan a large-scale seminar among government officials from all the 14 southern provinces. The seminar is aimed at educating senior provincial officials, from governors downwards, on the essence of existing policy orders involved, said Col Suban Saengpan, chief of the civilian affairs of the Fourth Army Region.

Advocates to the order also criticized a public statement of Interior Minister Sitthi Chirarojana who has said that many communist defectors might still be working for the banned party and

that the spate of mass defections in recent months could be only designed to serve the party's new strategy to concentrate its subversive activities in the urban areas.

"I was shocked at the public statement. Of course, he could be sceptical, but he must understand that the communist fighters in the jungles are also sceptical over the sincerity of the government in welcoming them. This public statement only makes the situation get worse," a military officer, who asked not to be identified, said.

"In a democratic rule, we cannot prohibit people from having different notions over the ideal community they want our country to be. Of course, when they think society is still not good enough, they would exert efforts to improve it. What we can and should do is to confine their struggle into political campaigns," he said.

He said nobody knows whether a communist defector is sincere towards the government, but the point was that if government officials continued oppressing them, the situation will revert to the past when people were forced to take up arms to fight the government from their jungle bases.

A well-known communist defector, Weng Tochirakarn, recently told *The Nation* that he decided to return to the embrace of the government because he could not bear the dictatorship within the outlawed party and partly because of the Policy Order No. 66/B.E. 2523.

"We feel that the policy is a good one, if it is strictly implemented. What we are afraid of is the sincerity of the government towards communist defectors. If the government is sceptical, then we are in a very difficult position," he said.

MUSLIM EXILE TO RETURN

Bangkok THE NATION REVIEW in English 20 Dec 82 p 3

[Text]

FORMER Muslim leader Amin Tomina who is now in self-exile in Singapore for fear of attempts on his life is expected to return to Thailand soon after he was assured of his security by a senior Thai army official.

Commander of the Fifth Division of the Fourth Army Region Maj Gen Panya Singakda told *The Nation* last week that he recently had a meeting with Amin in Malaysia to talk about his security.

Amin fled the country in April last year because of fear that a "death squad" sanctioned by local authorities were planning to assassinate him. The incident led local Muslim people to cast doubts over the government's sincerity toward the Muslim community.

"We met each other and had a frank discussion about the situation in the South. I also assured him about his security if he returns," said Maj Gen Panya who is in charge of the military affairs in the five southernmost provinces.

He said he was convinced that after the talks Amin will return to Thailand soon.

Amin, 52, was a leader of the Muslim community in Pattani before his flight out of the country. He was accused by local authorities of being the leader of a secessionist movement and was blacklisted.

Meanwhile, Amin's younger brother, Den Tomina, said yesterday he will have a meeting with Maj Gen Panya this week to discuss details for Amin's return.

Den, who is a Democrat Party MP representing Pattani, told *The Nation* that he will offer to be a "go-between" for the commander and his brother.

"We have to talk things over in detail before we will go to see

my brother together," he said.

Den also said that he will urge Maj Gen Panya to pay more attention to a series of murders of Muslim people in the South. "I will show him a list of murdered Muslim leaders. In some cases we have evidence that local officials were responsible for the killings," he said.

He said the murders ran counter to the Thai Romyen policy of Fourth Army Region Commander Lt Gen Harn Leenanond which seeks to ensure peace and security for the Muslim people.

Though Den admitted that the situation in the South had improved to a considerable extent after Lt Gen Harn took office, he said he believed that the so-called "death squads" still exist.

CSO: 4200/298

PRINCESS OFFICIATES AT LIBYA BUILDING OPENING

Bangkok THE NATION REVIEW in English 16 Dec 82 p 17

[Text]

HRH Princess Soamsawali will preside over inauguration ceremony of the Libya Building at the Muslim Women Foundation of Thailand for the Welfare of Orphans today at 4 pm.

HRH Princess Soamsawali on behalf of His Majesty the King, will preside over the inauguration ceremony of the Libya Building at the Muslim Women Foundation of Thailand for the Welfare of Orphans, this afternoon at 4 pm.

Its event will also mark the 21st anniversary of the Thai Muslim Women Foundation of Thailand for the Welfare of Orphans.

In 1978, Khunying Snagdao Siamwal-
la, president of the Thai Muslim Women Foundation of Thailand for the Welfare of Orphans was invited by the President of Libya Women Federation to attend the International Women Federation Meeting at Tripoli, Libya.

During this trip Khunying Sangdao was given the honour of meeting Col Muammar Kadhafy the president of Libya during which discussions were held with regard to Their Majesties works dedicated towards the welfare of Muslims in Thailand and the foundation's activities.

Following Khunying Sangdao's visit

to Libya, the same year, through the Islamic Organization of Libya, Col Kadhafy donated US\$1,120,000 (22,780,000 baht) for the construction of the building within the foundation's premises.

The facilities include classrooms, a refectory, exhibition hall, audio visual and language labs, general and linguistic libraries, and a chapel.

One of the main features of the building is the language laboratory equipped with the most modern technology, which will be used for teaching the world's major languages namely Arab, English, French, Chinese, Japanese and German.

REMITTANCES FROM OVERSEAS GROWING STEADILY

Bangkok THE NATION REVIEW in English 21 Dec 82 p 10

[Text]

THE RATE of increase of the amount of money sent home by Thai workers overseas has been spectacular. Within six years, according to Bank of Thailand's statistics, the amount has jumped twenty-fold.

Here the Bangkok Bank's *Monthly Review* looks into the situation and the impact of foreign remittances from Thai workers abroad on the Thai economy.

GAUGING FROM FIGURES released by the Bank of Thailand, the amount of money remitted home by Thai workers overseas is quite startling. The latest figure released in 1981 was Baht 10,428.2 million. The rate of increase is even more spectacular. In 1976 remittances totalled only Baht 485.1 million. Thus within six years they have increased twenty-fold.

The government has been in favour of the export of labour because it supplements earnings from exported commodities. For 1981, total export income registered at Baht 150,186.3 million, of which these remittances made up 6.9 per cent. This has indeed helped to offset a reduced rate of earnings from overall exports. With a policy of continuing to encourage workers going overseas, the government plans to increase their number to one million in a few years' time and if this is achieved remittances will certainly grow markedly. The

question is whether the future holds promise for Thailand as far as the market for labour in the Middle East is concerned, since the majority of earnings come from workers there. The answer depends on many factors but at present Thailand already faces competition from other countries, namely, the Philippines, Indonesia, India, Pakistan and Korea. Also, some limitation on imported labour is predicted in the Middle Eastern countries now that the oil surplus money is shrinking and projects are getting somewhat fewer.

Where the remittances come from

At present close to 300,000 Thais are working overseas. The trend started in the early sixties when Thai students and professional people, mostly in the medical field, found jobs in the United States either while pursuing their studies or after graduation. A fairly large number of people obtained American immigrant visas then. Between 1966 and 1977, an estimated 23,000 Thais were issued visas at the US Embassy.

Lately, Thai-owned businesses (mostly restaurants) have been established in large numbers in US cities, particularly in Los Angeles. Remittances from the US grew over the years with the increasing number of Thai workers there. In 1976 the amount remitted was only Baht 367.4 million. This increased to Baht 1,842.4 million in 1979 and Baht 2,358.5 million in 1981. The amount for 1981 was approximately 22.6 per cent of total remittances. It should be noted, however, that the official figure of remittan-

Remittances by Thai Workers Abroad						Million Baht
	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Bahrain	-	-	-	0.4	0.1	-
Cyprus	-	-	-	0.3	0.7	0.2
Jordan	-	-	0.1	-	1.6	4.3
Kuwait	-	0.2	2.7	10.8	29.8	57.2
Libya	-	-	0.1	-	21.2	231.3
Qatar	-	-	5.8	7.1	22.2	39.9
United Arab Emirates	0.1	2.2	16.5	5.4	14.6	10.6
Oman	-	-	0.9	7.6	16.2	27.7
Egypt	-	-	0.2	2.3	3.8	9.9
Iran	3.0	9.3	16.5	36.6	8.8	0.6
Israel	0.3	-	0.1	1.3	181.1	358.0
Lebanon	-	-	0.2	0.1	0.7	1.8
Saudi Arabia	11.6	76.0	468.4	1,212.2	3,874.5	5,814.4
Syria	-	-	-	0.3	0.1	-
Iraq	-	-	0.2	11.6	47.2	190.5
Yemen	-	-	-	-	21.3	231.1
Sub-total (Middle East)	15.0	87.7	511.7	1,296.0	4,243.7	6,977.5
USA	367.4	591.5	1,189.0	1,842.4	2,161.3	2,358.5
Singapore	8.1	12.1	25.0	37.5	107.3	110.1
Others	94.6	220.3	385.9	642.4	1,190.7	982.1
Total workers' remittances	485.1	911.6	2,111.6	3,818.3	7,703.0	10,428.2

Source: Bank of Thailand.

ces from the US exceeds actual remittances from those working there since a certain amount from the Middle East goes through US financial channels before reaching Thailand and is thus counted as being of US origin.

It is unlikely that the number of Thais seeking jobs in the United States will increase very much in the future since the US has ceased to grant permanent residency to Thais and strict visa regulations are being enforced.

Thais also sought jobs in certain European countries, in particular Britain. At the beginning of 1972, a large number of Thai workers were sent there. In 1977 over 1,700 Thai workers were in Britain.

The Middle East:

It was only seven years ago that Thai workers began to go to the Middle East in substantial numbers. The economic boom resulting from colossal oil revenues in the Middle Eastern countries, in part, took the form of construction of infrastructure and various industrial and business facilities requiring skilled and unskilled labour which was lacking locally.

In 1975, the number of Thai workers who went to the Middle East through employment agencies was recorded at 984 but this jumped to 3,870 in 1977. From 1980 onward, the average number of workers sent has been about 25,000

a year. Initially, the countries that received workers from Thailand were Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia, but from 1977 onward, countries welcoming Thai workers included Iran, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Yemen, Jordan, Iraq and Israel. Libya now has the second largest number of Thai workers although it only opened its doors to Thai workers in 1980. In 1981, workers from Libya sent Baht 231.3 million home, the third largest amount after Saudi Arabia and Israel. (For more details see accompanying table).

Workers from Thailand have all been men ever since the Labour Department imposed a ban on the export of female labour to the Middle East. Approximately 40 per cent come from the Northeast. According to the Bank of Thailand Udon Thani tops the list, then come Bangkok, Lampang, Nakhon Ratchasima, Chonburi, Tak, Khon Kaen, Nong Khai, Samut Prakan

and Nakhon Sawan. The age range is between 25 and 35 and the maximum education in the case of a very large number is Prathom 4. According to records most workers are married with large families which explains in part why they feel the need to earn higher incomes abroad. Other reasons for their rush overseas are unfavourable economic conditions and high unemployment at home.

Singapore opened its doors to Thai workers in 1979 when the Labour Department sent 1,251 workers there. In the following years, however, the number of Thai workers going there was limited as a result of Singapore's restrictions on foreign labour.

A large number of female workers go to Singapore while others find employment in Japan, Macao, Europe and the USA.

The use of foreign remittances

A major proportion of income earned by Thai workers in foreign countries is sent back to support their families. Though it certainly helps to ease hardship it is doubtful whether the money is being wisely utilized. According to surveys conducted, much of the money is not being spent economically. A large amount goes towards the purchase of luxury goods such as home appliances, whereas it could have been invested in farms to raise productivity and hence real income in the long run. Also, since most of the products purchased are imported, the money spent represents an

outflow offsetting much of the foreign income sent into the country by Thai workers.

A proposal to let Thai trading companies take over the business of sending workers abroad was studied by the government early this year. One of the recommendations worth considering was a clause on workers' repatriated capital which proposed the creating of a payments system under which the trading company would be given a certain percentage of the workers' monthly earnings to invest on their behalf. This would guarantee a certain amount of the repatriated funds was put to productive use.

At the moment it seems some workers also gamble their money away during their idle periods and on their return may find themselves in a worse situation than before going.

Planning for a better future:

Although there are pros and cons for labour exports, Thailand seems to benefit much more than it loses on the whole. This being so, the authorities are becoming more active in ironing out difficulties and solving problems. At the beginning of July, the Prime Minister ordered the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) to undertake a study on the establishment of a Labour Management Organization. This organization will concentrate on solving labour problems, with emphasis placed on the

promotion of labour exports, particularly to the Middle Eastern countries. Other duties of the organization will include an attempt to participate in international bidding for overseas construction, and the development of labour skills so that Thailand will have more workers in higher paid jobs. At the end of August an agreement to establish two labour agencies was reached in a meeting of Economic Ministers chaired by the Prime Minister. One agency will be attached to the Prime Minister's Office and will be responsible for the promotion of exports of Thai labour. It will work closely with private firms to help them get more job contracts. The other agency, attached to the Labour Department, is to be called a "One Stop Centre," which will be responsible for speeding up services for Thai labourers and for protecting them from exploitation by job placement firms. A labour consul will also be appointed in each of the countries where there is a large concentration of Thai workers to handle problems they face there.

If these agencies perform their duties in accordance with the policies of the government, the problems that workers face today should be minimized and workers will be better assured of jobs in foreign countries as well as a better life upon returning home. If the workers are better trained and hence earn higher incomes overseas, the amount of remittances should then increase, to the benefit of the workers, their dependents here, and the nation's balance of payments.

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

NORTHERN BORDER MILITIA ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 5 Nov 82 p 3

[Exchange of Opinions column by Nguyen Van Ho: "The Activities of the Centralized Militia and Self-Defense Forces in the Border Area"]

[Text] The centralized militia and self-defense forces are a key component of the militia and self-defense forces, a component that is organized and built in accordance with the pressing requirements of the task of maintaining combat readiness with a view toward protecting the party, protecting the government, protecting the people and protecting production within the locality, thereby helping to firmly protect the sacred northern border of the fatherland.

Although they do not have much experience and are encountering many difficulties in their daily lives, the centralized militia and self-defense units within the various localities have, with the concern, guidance and inspiration of the party organization, government and people of the locality and the assistance of the troop units stationed within the area, recently put their operations on a regular basis. Many units have recorded achievements. Cadres and unit members have matured more with each passing day, thereby earning the trust and respect of the people. Some cadres and unit members have had the honor of being admitted to the ranks of the party or Youth Union.

However, at a small number of places, localities have organized centralized militia and self-defense units but have not clearly defined their tasks, mode of operation or the measures to be employed in their buildup or localities have not made full use of time to train these forces or forge them in production. The failure of the military agencies on the upper level to conduct inspections, correct mistakes and provide assistance on a regular basis has led to ineffective activities.

In order for the centralized militia units to perform their task well and conduct more activities as they grow, it is first of all necessary to improve the teaching of politics and ideology. The local military agency must closely coordinate with the propaganda and training agency to help installations organize the militia and self-defense forces of centralized units in the study of the positions, lines and policies of the party, such as the nationalities policy, the

enemy proselyting policy, the policy toward POW's and enemy troops that surrender and the Constitution and laws of the state. It is necessary to properly organize the study of the new situation and tasks, expose the schemes and tricks of the enemy by means of vivid examples and, on this basis, give everyone a clearer understanding of the enemy and the immediate combat objective and heighten their revolutionary vigilance, deepen their love of their native village and country and deepen their hatred of the enemy so that they are ready to die for the sake of defending the fatherland. At the same time, it is necessary to organize the study and review of military subjects in order to constantly improve the command skills and the fighting skills of cadres, of unit members, of the entire unit.

The time that they spend performing their centralized task is time when militia and self-defense forces have the conditions needed to study, to train and engage in productive labor; therefore, the localities must take specific steps and provide both the time and the cadres needed to help these forces. It is necessary to clearly explain to these troops that the centralized militia and self-defense forces are not a mass armed organization that is divorced from production. The centralized militia and self-defense forces have favorable conditions for carrying out production, thereby reducing the contributions that must be made by the people and improving their own living conditions. The district military agency must assign a deputy commander or competent cadre to observe and assist these units so that their activities develop in the correct direction and truly yield high results. It is necessary to provide more experienced cadres and more party members and Youth Union members to lead, command and serve as the nucleus in the activities of these units. On the other hand, through the realities of the activities of these units, we must train cadres and develop new party members to serve as the nucleus of the militia and self-defense movement.

One of the measures for maintaining the operations of the centralized militia and self-defense units on a permanent basis is to closely coordinate the performance of their military and security tasks with productive labor where these units are stationed. Under the conditions of the centralized militia and self-defense units, it is not easy to organize the production of rice or subsidiary food crops, the planting of vegetables, the raising of hogs, ducks, chickens and so forth. However, these forces are able to do this well; all that is needed is for the locality to give appropriate attention to the matter and create additional conditions and for the commanders on the various echelons to take positive measures and adopt precise, detailed plans. The good experiences that have been gained in coordinating combat alert duty and training with productive labor within centralized militia and self-defense units must be widely disseminated and applied.

The centralized militia and self-defense units must closely coordinate with friendly forces, with the locality, seek all available assistance, humbly study valuable experiences and cultivate the spirit of unity and coordination in recording collective feats of arms.

The units and commanders of the regular forces stationed within the locality must adopt plans and measures for helping the centralized militia and self-defense units, especially with regard to military training.

After each phase of work, the localities must take steps to conduct preliminary and final reviews and gain experience concerning successes and concerning areas that are still weak in the buildup of centralized militia and self-defense forces in order to adopt precise guidelines and conduct activities consistent with the situation. It must be fully understood that the centralized militia and self-defense units can only perform their task well and successfully complete their work on the basis of a strong national defense-security movement of all the people.

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CSO: 4209/108

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

EXPERIENCES IN BUILDUP OF MILITIA RELATED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 12 Nov 82 p 3

[Exchange of Opinions column by Nguyen Viet Dung: "Building Strong, Stable Militia and Self-Defense Forces and Helping To Win Victory over the Multi-Faceted War of Sabotage of the Enemy"]

[Text] Over the past several years, the militia and self-defense forces have begun to display their tremendous strength and capabilities in combat against the multi-faceted war of sabotage of the Chinese expansionists.

Along the northern border, with the militia and self-defense forces on the basic level serving as its nucleus, the movement of all the people to fight the multi-faceted war of sabotage has formed everywhere and has gradually been strengthened. The villages and installations in which people of many different age groups and ethnic minorities are participating and coordinating with the border security militia and troops and other forces in exposing and apprehending commandoes and spies, managing the border and so forth constitute a rather high percent of the total number of villages and installations. In Hoang Lien Son Province, 19 of the 25 border villages and villages near the border have apprehended commandoes and spies; in 1981, the province captured 59 spies and commandoes, 28 of whom were captured by militia and self-defense troops. X. District in Lang Son province mobilized the local armed forces to surround and snipe at enemy forces at elevation 400 (from June to November, 1981), killing 433 enemy troops, 131 of whom were killed by militia and self-defense forces. The combat operations of the militia and self-defense forces have maintained and developed upon the combat and production spirit of the people of the various ethnic minorities and formed a dense, multi-layer network to surround, capture or kill enemy forces, commandoes and spies, to attack enemy troops encroaching upon and occupying our land, thereby helping to control the border.

A system of combat mountain villages, villages, enterprises and so forth coordinated with the deployment of units of standing forces has resulted in the formation of an interconnected and more stable people's war battle position and has increased the strength of the defense line on the northern border.

As regards the task of maintaining political security and maintaining social order and safety, which is an extremely important task in winning victory over the multi-faceted war of sabotage of the enemy, the militia and self-defense forces have closely coordinated with the people's public security force and the other forces in the fight against the spy war, against the psychological war of the enemy, have promptly thwarted each scheme of sabotage of domestic reactionaries, have punished criminals, have maintained the security of the fatherland, especially along the border, along the seacoast, on the islands and in strategically important areas, and have maintained social order and safety.

In conjunction with the activities mentioned above, the self-defense and militia forces in strategically important areas have continued to make preparations to deal with schemes of aggression of the enemy in every situation.

In coordination with maintaining combat readiness and engaging in combat, many militia and self-defense units on the basic level have fulfilled their key, assault role in production and in fighting natural disasters and have set good examples in carrying out socialist transformation and implementing the positions and policies of the party and state.

The achievements recorded by the militia and self-defense forces over the past several years once again confirm the important strategic position, the tremendous strength and the tremendous capabilities of the militia and self-defense forces in the work of strengthening the national defense system and protecting the socialist fatherland.

In order to build increasingly strong, stable and widespread militia and self-defense forces for the immediate purpose of helping to win victory over the enemy's multi-faceted war of sabotage, many localities have gained a number of good experiences with regard to guiding militia and self-defense forces.

To begin with, they have demanded that the various levels of leadership and guidance within the locality become thoroughly familiar with the revolutionary situation and tasks, with the position and specific requirements of the local people's war within the war to protect the fatherland. On this basis, they have brought about a strong change in thinking concerning responsibility for strengthening the leadership and guidance of the militia and self-defense forces in every area of their buildup and operations.

Secondly, they have consolidated and built installations that are strong and stable in every respect, especially politically. Recently, many provinces and municipalities within strategically important border and coastal areas have sent a rather large number of cadres consisting of cadres from the various sectors and military cadres to key installations to conduct many continuous phases of activity of a comprehensive nature: remolding the thinking of the masses, primarily clearly distinguishing between the enemy and ourselves, and strengthening the party base, government and mass organizations, especially the contingent of core cadres; building and strengthening the militia and self-defense forces and building combat mountain villages, villages and enterprises; strengthening the

people's public security force; launching a movement of all the people to maintain the security of the fatherland; and strengthening the collective production organization, accelerating production and stabilizing the standard of living of the masses.

Through the strengthening of installations, the number of above average installations has increased and the number of weak and deficient installations has markedly declined.

Thirdly, they have guided the buildup and the operations of the militia and self-defense forces in a manner consistent with the basic combat plan of each area and each installation. For example, the militia and self-defense forces in the northern border area and along the northern seacoast must first meet the requirements of the task of fighting the multi-faceted war of sabotage and must always be ready to deal with a war of aggression launched by the enemy.

The militia and self-defense forces in the provinces within the rear have been concentrating on successfully carrying out the task of maintaining political security, maintaining social order and safety and preparing to reinforce the frontlines. Many localities have organized militia and self-defense detachments that specialize in coordinating with the public security forces in maintaining order and security and which have achieved good results in this effort.

Fourthly, they have carried out the "display the fine nature and increase the fighting strength" campaign of the people's armed forces in a manner coordinated with the characteristics of the buildup and the activities of the militia and self-defense forces within each locality.

Many places have attached importance to teaching and cultivating the will to fight, have re-examined their forces and assigned additional party members, Youth Union members and demobilized military personnel who meet the necessary requirements to the militia and self-defense forces in conjunction with fully implementing the combat training program in coordination with the combat and security task of each area. Closely coordinating the buildup of forces with the guidance of the militia and self-defense forces, they have accelerated every activity involved in maintaining combat readiness and conducting combat operations, in the maintenance of political security and social safety and order, in the key, assault role played in production, in fighting natural disasters and in setting good examples in socialist transformation; on this basis, they have gradually strengthened and improved the quality of the militia and self-defense forces. Deserving of attention is the fact that many localities have given their attention to creating the conditions for militia and self-defense units to fulfill their combat alert task while participating in production to improve living conditions, thereby reducing the difficulties being encountered by their families. Some places have closely linked the effort to increase the fighting strength of the militia and self-defense units with the development of districts into fortresses protecting the fatherland.

Fifthly, they have appropriately strengthened the guidance provided by the provincial military agency, the district military agencies, the subwards, villages,

enterprises and agencies of the buildup and the operations of the militia and self-defense forces as seen in the use of the installation as a battle position, the assignment of a commander to take charge, the full development of the responsibility of the staff, political, rear service and technical agencies in accordance with a unified plan for each period of time, the prompt recognizing of model units and knowing how to increase the number of model units.

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CSO: 4209/108

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

THIEVES, IMPERSONATORS OF POLICE ARRESTED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Nov 82 p 3

[Article by Van An, Haiphong: "On the Security Front: Many Thieves Nabbed by the Law"]

[Text] The freight train left the port of Haiphong, rolled through the railroad station and headed toward Hanoi. As the train passed lane 148 in the darkness of the night, someone on the train suddenly flashed a red signal light three times. The door of one of the cars was opened very quickly and someone threw several full, white bags from the train. The door was then closed. The train began to pick up speed and was soon far away.

Several persons who had been waiting at the spot quickly emerged from the shadows and hurriedly carried the bags into house number 103 some 20 kilometers away. Although everything happened very quickly, nothing escaped the watchful eyes of the persons who were laying in ambush. One of them was about to fire a shot to intimidate these persons who were stealing goods belonging to the state and then apprehend them. But a hand suddenly reached out and stopped him:

"Don't be in such a hurry, we need to nab the entire gang!"

Then, three other dark shadows entered the lane from the main street. They went directly to house number 103. A number of other persons followed them. In the yard of house number 103, the persons who carried the bags from the railroad were washing their hands and preparing to eat.

The three strangers pushed open the gate and introduced themselves:

"We are public security personnel and market management cadres who have come to inspect the goods that you have there. We know that you conspired with someone to have those bags thrown off the train. We have been watching you. Now, we have caught you red-handed!"

The three to whom they were speaking appeared frightened. The old woman who owned the house pulled out some chairs and said in a hospitable way:

"Yes. But first sit and have some tea with us. I beg your forgiveness for everything we did, sirs."

A pack of fragrant cigarettes was opened. The three persons who called themselves authorities smoked and one of them slowly said:

"We sympathize with you. If you want to get this matter over with, pay us 10,000 dong and we will ignore what you did. Otherwise, you will lose your goods, be fined and be sent to jail."

One of them opened a leather sack from which he took a notebook and pen as though he were going to take notes. As the two sides were haggling over the size of the bribe, a voice rang out:

"Everyone sit still!"

A number of persons appeared with pistols pointed at the thieves and the persons impersonating authorities that were demanding the bribe. When they saw the uniforms of the troops and their public security insignia and saw that they were accompanied by cadres from the subward government, everyone was dumbfounded. After conducting an inspection, writing up a report on the entire amount of goods that had been stolen or were being stored within the house and taking the statements of the criminals, all of them were led away to the public security station.

The next day, at 1700 hours, the four persons who had masterminded the scheme to throw cargo from the trains arrived at house number 103 to receive their money as they had every time before.

As they were bragging over the price that each item would bring, a total of 35,000 dong, public security soldiers emerged from the house and handcuffed each of the criminals.

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CSO: 4209/122

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ARMY PAPER STRESSES ADHERENCE TO REGULATIONS

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 4 Nov 82 pp 1,2

[Article: "Strictly Complying with Orders and Raising the Level of Combat Readiness"]

[Text] The level of combat readiness and the powerful fighting strength of a revolutionary army are two concepts that are inseparable. Regularly maintaining a high level of combat readiness is a factor that determines fighting strength. When not at war, high fighting strength must be expressed in a high level of combat readiness. Combat readiness is not some vague, general slogan, rather, it is a very concrete concept. The concreteness of combat readiness lies in the fact that it is closely linked to the will to fight and spirit of vigilance, to the political level, the military level and the specialized and professional skills of military personnel and closely linked to the lifestyle, training, recreation, combat alert duty and so forth within the various units. Every person in the military has many specific jobs that he or she must perform each day.

Among these persons, among the various components and units and between military personnel and military weapons and equipment there is always a binding relationship. Therefore, one of the basic requirements in maintaining combat readiness is to always implement the regulations and rules contained within army orders well. This is also the prerequisite to a military organization achieving a unity of action and the strength needed to take action.

The regulations and rules of our army have been and are being promulgated and implemented throughout the army. The rules and regulations that have the largest and most direct impact upon the maintenance of combat readiness are those that deal with combat alert duty, training and the fulfillment of the duties of military personnel and the duties of commanders.

The purpose of maintaining combat readiness is to be able to go into combat whenever it is required by the situation. Consequently, in order to maintain combat readiness well, it is necessary to organize combat alert duty well and comply with combat alert regulations and orders. Within the air defense troops and the air force, the navy and the army, there are regulations and rules governing duty,

combat alert duty, reconnaissance, information, communications and alerts that apply to each type unit within the service in different combat operations and under different combat conditions. However, those military personnel and collectives who, regardless of their service or branch, regardless of their echelon or unit, are at a combat alert position and standing combat alert duty are persons who are standing guard for the entire unit, persons who are observing the actions of the enemy, ascertaining the events that occur within the scope of their regulations, immediately engaging in combat in accordance with the mission assigned to them and insuring that everyone, that the entire unit goes into combat in a prompt and effective manner. Therefore, on the basis of the level of combat readiness of the military personnel on combat alert duty and the combat alert forces on each echelon and within each unit alone, we are able to precisely evaluate the level of combat readiness of the echelon or unit itself.

Regardless of whether it is applied to each person in the military or to an entire unit, the concept of combat readiness encompasses the sense of vigilance and readiness in terms of organization, personnel, weapons, equipment, food, ammunition, information and command operations and so forth. In actuality, there are many causes for each of the following phenomena: a flight of aircraft on combat alert duty at an airport that lacks a pilot; a tank detachment on combat alert duty that lacks fuel; an artillery unit on combat alert duty that lacks ammunition of the correct size; a company or rotating combat alert duty on the frontline that sends dozens of soldiers to perform other jobs with the result that they are not present at their combat position; and a regimental or division headquarters on the frontline that cannot rapidly establish communications with subordinate components. However, it must be realized that one basic reason for these phenomena is the failure to strictly comply with the combat alert regulations and rules of the army.

The purpose of maintaining combat readiness is not only to be able to fight immediately, but also to win victory. As a result, the organizational and command skills of officers together with the tactical and technical proficiency and the level of fighting skills of troops become a basic index of combat readiness. This index is closely linked to combat training and is the direct result of combat training. Therefore, in order to raise the level of combat readiness and improve the ability to maintain combat readiness, it is clearly necessary to provide good combat training and to comply with the policies and regulations on training. There are policies and regulations on training subjects and training time, on the percentage of troops that must participate in training, on the selection of training grounds and the methods employed in training, in maneuvers, etc. Training must be consistent with combat requirements, with battlefield conditions and training must be provided in those skills required by war. The more serious training is, the less sweat and blood must be shed by troops to win victory in combat and in war. Good training must not only be provided in the rear, but on the frontlines as well, where training must be provided each day, even at defensive positions, in accordance with the combat task and plan.

A unit cannot be considered to be at a high level of combat readiness if the results of its training are of poor quality. If only 70 percent of the training program is completed, if 75 percent or more of the unit's healthy cadres and

soldiers must participate in training each day but only 50 to 60 percent actually do and if the time allocated for training is reduced so that other jobs can be performed, how can good results be achieved in training, how can the training orders and directives of the upper echelon and the regulations within training be implemented correctly? Or, perhaps there is a commander who speaks very highly of the fighting skills and combat readiness of his unit but who actually dedicates more time to guiding the unit's crop and livestock production than to thinking about, guiding and inspecting military training. Regardless of how well versed he is in the complex tasks that his unit must perform, we must realize that such a commander has violated the regulations and rules governing a commander in the training of troops and in raising the level of combat readiness of the unit, consequently, it is difficult for him to create the strength needed to meet the requirements of combat readiness.

Also because of the fact that the purpose of maintaining combat readiness is to be able to retaliate against the enemy immediately and win victory, the fulfillment of the duties of military personnel and the duties of a commander is of major practical significance. Within a missile unit, it can easily be seen that there must be very close coordination among the soldiers and officers of the different components, such as the power source component, the plotting component, the tracking component, the command component and so forth so that, when necessary, a brief command is all that is needed to direct the entire strength of the system toward a target that has come within range. Within an infantry unit at a defensive position, it can also be readily seen that combat alert duty, time off, training, the repair of fortifications, the production of food by the unit and so forth must be organized in such a way that everyone can, in time of combat, rapidly go to his combat position in accordance with the predetermined plan. On this basis, we can say that maintaining combat readiness is a scientific labor project requiring very detailed research, organization, planning, operation and inspection. This scientific labor project will surely be carried out well if each member of the unit, especially each commander, is well versed in and performs, in the best possible manner, those jobs that are part of his duty.

Every commander, be he on the upper echelon or the lower echelon, in a large unit or a small unit, is a person who has the task of teaching, training and organizing the messing, shelter, recreation and other activities of troops and the task of tightly managing and keeping abreast of the situation surrounding the activities of each individual and each collective within the unit in order to insure that he is able to promptly mobilize every cadre and soldier under his command for combat and win victory in combat. All of the jobs that are involved in the official duties of the commander are recorded in army orders. Therefore, it can be said that the maintenance of combat readiness involves the fulfillment of duties and orders. If he does not fulfill his duties, a commander might still be able to very correctly describe policies, tasks, intentions, plans and guidelines but he will not know what the cadres and soldiers under his command are doing, not know where the unit's weapons and equipment are, not know the quantity of weapons and equipment, not know their quality or

level of readiness and not know which problems must be resolved and which jobs must be performed so that, if combat becomes necessary, the entire unit can proceed to its combat position within a certain number of hours or minutes and be assured of victory.

The combat readiness of the army is the result of activities in many areas. It demands thorough practical organizational work and a unity and coordination of efforts in the implementation of orders and regulations. There must be strict, reasonable compliance with orders and regulations on the upper echelons and the lower echelons, in agencies as well as units, on the frontlines and in the rear, at times when there are many jobs that must be quickly performed and at times when favorable conditions exist, in tense situations as well as at times when the situation is not tense and so forth. It is easy to understand that any small mistake, any minor violation of regulations in any element of the unified, coordinated chain of activities within the combat readiness system, be it intentional or unintentional, can have an adverse impact upon the effort to employ fighting strength, take the initiative and win victory over an enemy aggressor on the very first line of combat.

In the process of maintaining combat readiness, there are still many jobs that must be performed. For this reason, efficiently scheduling which jobs must be performed first, which jobs must be performed last, which jobs can be performed while others are being performed and so forth is very necessary in order to insure uniformity and coordination in compliance with orders and regulations. Everyone can see that it is very important to organize the material and spiritual lives of troops well; however, having troops increase the production of food or building barracks by reducing the amount of time spent in training, taking persons from combat alert duty or simplifying combat alert work in a haphazard manner are contrary to established rules and regulations. It is necessary to maintain a normal, comfortable atmosphere at battle positions; however, reducing tension should not be an excuse for relaxing our vigilance, relaxing our effort to observe the enemy, being lax in the training and management of troops or violating combat readiness rules and regulations.

Maintaining combat readiness must become a habit, an instinct on the part of each person and collective within the army. Therefore, complying with the rules and regulations governing combat readiness must become part of the life of troops, must become part of their thinking and actions, must develop from something that is compulsory to something that is voluntary, to an indispensable need, to a regular practice encompassing education, organization, maintenance and inspection.

In one respect, combat readiness inspections are inspections of compliance with combat alert regulations and the fulfillment of the duties of military personnel. For this reason, it is first of all necessary to inspect the commanders and the command agencies on the various echelons to determine how well they have organized combat readiness within their units. Inspections must reveal what has been done, what has not been done, what must be changed or supplemented and the amount of time available for these changes to be made. The observations that are made on

the basis of an inspection must set forth by strengths and weaknesses and reflect unanimity from the upper echelon to the lower echelon and among the members of the inspection group. The observations that are made on the basis of an inspection must be accurate and serious but not trivial; they should not be made on the basis of being afraid to cause disappointment or on the basis of wanting to express sympathy for the difficult circumstances and conditions of the unit and they must always be made on the basis of respecting the principles and requirements of combat readiness. Together with conducting inspections, it is necessary to observe and supervise the repair and supplementation process of the unit. Only in this way is it possible for inspections to fulfill their function as a tool that effectively encourages compliance with orders and regulations, thereby raising the level of combat readiness of troops.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

SUPPORT OF PEOPLE SEEN AS CRUCIAL IN ANTI-SABOTAGE EFFORT

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 10, Oct 82 pp 20-31

[Article by Major General Tran Hai Phung: "Ho Chi Minh City Is Resolutely Defeating the Multi-Faceted War of Sabotage of the Enemy"]

[Text] Ever since they were defeated in the two wars of aggression they waged on the two borders of our country in 1979, the Chinese reactionaries, with the support and assistance of the U.S. imperialists, have been waging an intense, multi-faceted war of sabotage in a vain attempt to weaken and annex our country. This is a very malicious strategic scheme of the enemy. In this scheme, Ho Chi Minh City is an important, strategic area in which the enemy is making every effort to conduct acts of sabotage.

Ho Chi Minh City is a major political, economic, cultural, scientific-technical and international communications center of the country. The city, which plays a very important role in socialist industrialization and in the work of building and protecting the socialist fatherland in the southern provinces, performs the task of the great rear area of the entire country and performs an international task.

Ho Chi Minh City has a population of nearly 3 million. Its people possess a high spirit of patriotism, possess a staunch revolutionary tradition and have a continuous revolutionary movement. The working class, which numbered about 180,000 persons prior to liberation day, now includes more than 330,000 persons; there are more than 500,000 highly skilled handicraftsmen and artisans. The farmers of the city, who number more than 1 million, possess a tenacious revolutionary tradition and are very close to the revolution, to the localities, as typified by Cu Chi, Hoc Mon and so forth. The stratum of intellectuals now includes more than 35,000 persons. The cadres, manual workers and civil servants of the state staff now number more than 330,000.

However, after liberation day, Saigon, the city that was the capital of the puppets, underwent major political, economic and social upheavals that we have been unable to thoroughly transform in a short period of time. Prior to 30 April 1975, Saigon, whose economy was totally dependent upon the United States and supported the war of aggression of the United States, had more than 300,000 unemployed, hundreds of thousands of prostitutes, 200,000 hoodlums and vagrants,

200,000 orphaned children, tens of thousands of beggars and many other social ills.

The United States had established within the city a ruling apparatus extending from the central government to the precincts, subwards and wards, one that included a rather tight system of control consisting of public security forces, police forces, civil guard forces and inter-family teams. In the more than 20 years of their aggression, the United States changed its strategy for opposing the revolution in the South five times, creating many new strata of lackeys with each change. Therefore, the socio-economic base left behind by the United States was rather complex.

--The puppet army numbered more than 468,000 men, 443,000 of whom turned themselves in to the authorities; of this number, 24,800 were officers, 8,530 of whom ranked between company grade and field grade (not including the 140,000 civil guard troops).

--The puppet government consisted of 37,656 persons, more than 3,000 of whom were high ranking officials and more than 35,000 of whom were police personnel, 19,000 of whom were special police; there were also 1,732 intelligence agents of all types (not including informants).

--The reactionary political parties had many different types of organizations that consisted of more than 3,000 ringleaders and more than 450,000 members.

--Catholics, who accounted for 13.6 percent of the city's population, had 198 churches and there were hundreds of bishops and priests and thousands of monks. Of these Catholics, 92.2 percent had emigrated from the North to the South in 1954.

--There were more than 60,000 Buddhists, including thousands of nuns, bonzes and venerable bonzes, 546 temples and 8 Buddhist clans.

--Persons of Chinese ancestry numbered more than 480,000, accounting for 14.7 percent of the city's population. In the "overseas Chinese victims" incident fabricated by the Chinese reactionary authorities in 1978, more than 81 percent of the persons of Chinese ancestry asked to leave Vietnam. At present, the majority of these persons have not received people's identification papers...

The enemy is making every effort to organize, exploit and take advantage of the major political, economic and social upheavals mentioned above together with sending new forces to infiltrate the city in order to oppose us. In addition, the fact that, after liberation day, we accepted into the state administration a large number of manual workers and civil servants who worked for many years under the old system; the acute difficulties being encountered with the economy and in everyday life; our shortcomings and weaknesses in economic and social management and so forth, all of these difficulties are being used by the enemy in order to sabotage us. For this reason, the multi-faceted war of sabotage of

the enemy that is taking place within the city has created a very tense and urgent situation in every field. The struggle of our people against the multi-faceted war of sabotage of the enemy in Ho Chi Minh City involves the close coordination of the struggle to maintain national independence with the struggle to clearly resolve the question "who defeats whom" which exists between socialism and capitalism and the struggle against negative phenomena and degeneracy within every agency, every department, every sector, every locality and installation.

I. The Schemes and Tricks of Sabotage of the Enemy in Ho Chi Minh City

It can be said that the enemy has been making every effort to use all of the forces opposed to national independence, opposed to socialism, both in and outside the city, and has coordinated them with one another in order to sabotage us. These forces include the intelligence agents of the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists and the U.S. imperialists who were inserted into the country long ago or recently and who are coordinating with the intelligence agents and spies of a number of imperialist countries and other lackeys. They include former members of the puppet army and government who have refused to truly transform themselves; the system of old, reactionary political party organizations that have not been wiped out; reactionaries masquerading as religious persons, especially within the Catholic and Buddhist religions; professional hoodlums and aggressive gangsters who specialize in fraud, robbery and murder; the reactionaries within the former exploiting classes and the ringleaders who specialize in profiteering and disrupting the market in an organized fashion; and persons within our state apparatus who are decadent, deviant and take action to oppose the revolution, oppose socialism and commit serious violations against socialist property. They also include reactionaries among persons of Chinese ancestry, including Vietnamese and Khmer of Chinese ancestry. Of all these persons, the most dangerous are the intelligence agents, spies, aggressive gangsters, professional hoodlums, persons who have become decadent and deviant and persons who engage in the organized and serious theft of socialist property. Due to the duplication between the targets of the multi-faceted war of sabotage of the Chinese expansionists and the "post-war plan of the U.S. imperialists to oppose the revolution in our country, there has been increasingly close collaboration, coordinated actions and the initial stages of a division of labor between the Chinese reactionaries and the U.S. imperialists within Ho Chi Minh City in order to sabotage us in many areas.

II. Political and Ideological Sabotage

The assault by the enemy is being directed first toward the leadership of our party, the leader and organizer of every victory of our people in the city. Using every means at their disposal, they distort the line and policy of the party and the laws of the state, speak poorly about our system and slander communists in a vain attempt to sabotage the prestige of the party, shake the confidence that the masses have in the party, reduce the revolutionary will and determination of the masses, sow the seeds of negativism and procrastination and eventually provoke our people into opposing the party, opposing the system.

They have sown division among the people, created hostility between the party and the masses, between the army and the people and among the forces of the dictatorship of the proletariat, sown divisions among the nationalities, attempted to destroy the special solidarity of the three countries on the Indochina peninsula and attempted to isolate and slander Vietnam in the international arena. They have been making every effort to contact and rally all reactionary forces in and outside the city and have brought counter-revolutionaries back from foreign countries in order to create a base in a vain attempt to foment rebellion and topple the revolutionary government.

For the immediate future, the enemy has established their specific targets in the field of political sabotage as limiting the impact of the basic level government and rendering each person and component within the government ineffective so that their people can find a safe hiding place among these persons and within various areas in order to conduct their activities while enticing a number of persons and components within the state organization to work for them in order to conceal their local reactionary forces and create the conditions for spies and commandoes to return to the country to build and organize forces with which to foment rebellion.

The political and ideological sabotage tricks of the enemy are very malicious and diverse. In conjunction with psychological warfare, with poisoning our people with decadent culture, literature and art, sowing the seeds of the decadent, slovenly lifestyle and undermining the solidarity of all the people, they look for ways to insert persons into our organizations, to entice and buy elements within the state apparatus who have degenerated and become deviant and use them as lackeys. Of these efforts, the psychological war is considered by them to be the most important means for provoking the masses, distorting our line and policies and weakening the confidence of the masses. They employ "white propaganda" by reporting matters that are harmful to us but beneficial to them; "gray propaganda" by speaking half-truths; and "black propaganda" by distorting the truth. In Ho Chi Minh City, they have attached importance to using black propaganda to distort the truth and discredit us. For example, when we organized the inoculation of school students, they immediately distorted the program by saying that we were taking blood from students in order to save the lives of wounded soldiers. This caused suspicion and concern among more than a few gullible families who have children attending school; the enemy spread the rumor that "the Buddha had appeared amidst the high waves and wind to save "refugees" in order to provoke persons into emigrating from the country and so forth.

III. Economic and Social Sabotage

The enemy seeks to destroy the infrastructure of socialism and undermine our socialist transformation and construction in order to achieve their reactionary political goals. They know full well that our people throughout the country as well as our people within Ho Chi Minh City are experiencing acute economic difficulties. Consequently, they are engaged in intense activities designed to

take full advantage of this weakness in a vain attempt to cripple our economy, prevent the economy from getting back on its feet, cause society to deteriorate and disrupt order.

The methods most commonly employed by them are:

Creating military pressure along the border. They do this in order to cause us to devote very much manpower and money to the nation's defense and make it impossible for us to concentrate our forces on economic construction; on the other hand, they seek, by this method, to pose the constant threat of a major war, provoke the attitude of fearing war, causing a lack of order and security and exacerbating the difficulties we are encountering with the economy and in everyday life.

They have sent an increasingly large number of foreign goods into the city in order to sabotage our economy. This is a very malicious trick of the enemy. They have taken advantage of and encourage emigres to send goods back to their relatives. At present, there are more than 180,000 households in Ho Chi Minh City that are receiving goods sent from relatives overseas. Practically all of these goods, which are worth tens of millions of dollars each year, are luxury goods from Japan, the United States and the western countries. Foreign goods enter the city by many different channels. According to information revealed by Thailand, in 1979 and 1978 the goods smuggled by them into Indochina were worth 25 tons of gold. The influx of many foreign goods has revived the market of U.S. neo-colonialism; they have had an adverse impact upon the development of domestic goods, disrupted the market, disrupted prices and so forth. Also among these goods that are being sent to the city are very many pieces of espionage material and poisonous cultural products. The infusion of luxury goods has caused a number of persons to become accustomed to a luxurious lifestyle, to live as parasites and worship the American style of life and has inspired them to leave the fatherland, consequently, the number of illegal emigres is constantly growing. The influx of many foreign goods has created a stratum of persons who specialize in selling foreign goods and smuggled goods, persons who do not work but live a life of leisure and luxury, thereby creating the attitude of serving the United States and causing a lack of political security, a lack of social order and safety and so forth. As we all know, if it did not benefit them, the imperialists and the reactionaries would not readily permit and encourage emigres to send goods back to the country to their relatives on such a large scale.

With the encouragement of Beijing and the U.S. imperialists, Chinese bourgeoisie continue to exist under many different forms and are still the most powerful economic saboteurs in Ho Chi Minh City at this time. They still have economic might and are the persons who command, guide, control and plan the activities of the other non-socialist segments of the economy in opposing the socialist economy, thereby placing many difficulties and obstacles in the way of socialist transformation and construction within the city.

The enemy has also employed every possible method to lay their hands on our gold and precious gems and send them overseas. The CIA has a document that provides

instructions in how to obtain gold and precious gems with a view toward sabotaging our economy on a long-range basis. They are always trying to make an impact upon the psychology of the people in conjunction with disrupting the market and taking advantage of profiteering and smuggling so that our economy is always in a state of fluctuation, so that prices and living conditions are unstable.

The enemy has also attached importance to stealing economic and technical secrets, buying scientific and technical cadres and persuading them to flee the country and inserting persons into our economic and social installations in order to sabotage us from within.

The enemy makes use of and encourages the activities of professional hoodlums and thieves. They have been involved in many criminal cases, including murders and robberies, in a vain attempt to create the atmosphere of a constant lack of social order and safety and cause the people to go about their daily lives, to travel from one place to another with a feeling of fear.

Another one of the malicious measures employed by the enemy is to thoroughly exploit and take advantage of the actual difficulties being encountered in everyday life and our weaknesses and shortcomings in economic management and social management in order to distort the situation and use the normal, legitimate aspirations of the masses to attack the leadership, the line and the policies of our party and state. Clearly, the enemy is carrying out a very insidious scheme to sabotage us economically and socially. However, we have not given our cadres and the masses a full understanding of this matter, instead, they only see our difficulties, shortcomings and weaknesses in economic management and social management.

IV. Sabotaging the Security and National Defense Systems

The enemy seeks to directly attack our military potentials, to sabotage the people's armed forces and the people's public security forces. In addition to sowing internal division, to dividing the army from the people, the army from the public security sector and sabotaging our national defense potentials, they have been making a concerted, vain effort to reduce the confidence that our people have in the army and the public security sector, to erode the will to fight, weaken the organization and undermine the discipline of the army.

Their most commonly employed method is to create, by means of propaganda, a psychology of fear toward fulfilling the military obligation by threatening that war will lead to death, will exacerbate the difficulties and shortages being experienced by our troops in their daily lives. They spread such reactionary arguments as "very many lives are sacrificed, many losses are suffered" and "you will be working for the profit of others" in order to distort the fine combat objectives and ideals of a soldier in the people's army. They use decadent literature, art and culture to corrupt the souls of our cadres and soldiers and encourage the decadent lifestyle of individualism. During inspections conducted

at a number of units, we confiscated decadent books, letters and pictures. They use material things to win over some of our cadres, soldiers and public security troops, to encourage a debauched lifestyle and cause these persons to be led far from the corps by their desire for pleasure; a few army soldiers and public security personnel, who became degenerate and subjected to disciplinary action, have joined bands of robbers and reactionary organizations or stolen military weapons, ammunition and equipment in order to sell it. They have also bribed and enticed soldiers and public security personnel into "emigrating" with them; they have inserted decadent elements into the armed forces and the people's public security force in a vain attempt to render individual persons and components within these forces ineffective. They have organized acts of sabotage against storehouses in order to inflict losses of technical materials upon us and create an adverse political influence among the people.

In addition to these tricks, the Beijing reactionaries, with the support and assistance of the U.S. imperialists, have also planned to establish "secret zones" in remote, wilderness areas to serve as bases for preparing for a protracted "guerrilla war" and foment rebellions. In N. District, we discovered and apprehended an enemy organization that was planning an armed rebellion, an organization that included persons inserted by them who were working as state personnel at an important place.

V. Several Basic Measures for Defeating the Multi-Faceted War of Sabotage of the Enemy

1. Correctly recognizing and evaluating the enemy.

Prior to the 5th Party Congress, a large number of cadres and people within the city did not have a full or correct understanding of the insidious schemes and malicious tricks involved in the multi-faceted war of sabotage of the enemy. Some sectors and levels maintained that because Ho Chi Minh City lies deep within the great rear area, the enemy activities within the city do not warrant being called a war of sabotage. For this reason, importance must be attached to conducting political and ideological work, to giving all cadres, the entire army and all the people of the city a thorough and deep understanding of the 5th Party Congress, the country's situation and the two strategic tasks, building socialism and defending the socialist Vietnamese fatherland, as well as a deep understanding of the schemes and tricks employed by the enemy to carry out their multi-faceted war of sabotage against our country and especially against Ho Chi Minh City. Everyone must be made clearly aware of the fact that being determined to defeat this multi-faceted war of sabotage is the urgent political task of the entire dictatorship of the proletariat system, of the various levels and sectors, of each citizen. This task must be closely linked to the daily tasks of maintaining combat readiness, working and producing and must become part of the consciousness and awareness of each person.

Through educational activities, everyone must be made to clearly recognize the enemy, to clearly recognize the collaboration between the Beijing reactionaries and the U.S. imperialists in this multi-faceted war of sabotage. The Chinese

reactionaries are relying upon the U.S. imperialists in order to strengthen their forces in a vain attempt to realize their dream of expansion; the U.S. imperialists are relying upon the Chinese reactionaries to provide the base and the conditions for implementing the "post-war plan" to oppose Vietnam and the countries of Indochina. We must recognize and be fully vigilant against the scheme of the U.S. imperialists of collaborating with the Chinese reactionaries. Because, the U.S. imperialists built and established a base here long ago. Moreover, since the time that they were totally defeated, they have been making preparations to create the opportunity and the conditions needed to return someday to Vietnam. A number of persons within U.S. ruling circles have revealed their ambition to patiently wait, to wait for 15 to 20 years, to wait until after the communist parties have disappeared, for this opportunity to arrive.

In conjunction with clearly pointing out the scheme of the enemy, it is necessary to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy and realize the inevitably victorious strength that lies in our people, realize the strength that lies in our people's role as the masters of the country in this struggle. The enemy, although they are aggressive and have many clandestine, malicious schemes and tricks, are dishonorable; their fatal weakness is the fact that they are reactionaries, are aggressors and are sabotaging the peaceful labors of our people and going against the laws of history. Moreover, they are waging this multi-faceted war of sabotage against our country after many of their old strategies failed, including the strategy of using military strength and directly invading our country. It can be said that this multi-faceted war of sabotage is a product of defeat and weakness. It has further revealed their extremely bitter, bellicose and obstinate nature in their scheme of annexing our country. However, we cannot underestimate the enemy because they are a dangerous enemy, are the largest reactionary power of our times, are collaborating with the ringleader of imperialism and have material forces, have certain political, social and economic bases among the old forces that have remained within the city since liberation day. They are making every effort to exploit and utilize all of these forces in order to simultaneously undermine us militarily, politically, economically, culturally and socially, undermine us both from the outside and from within.

As for ourselves, although we still have certain difficulties and shortcomings, especially in the field of the economy and living conditions, we possess very basic strengths. These strengths are the fact that we have an independent, unified country that is advancing to socialism; we have a dictatorship of the proletariat that is becoming more stable and strong with each passing day; we have a large force of laboring people who are the masters of society and are becoming more politically aware with each passing day; the position and power of the Vietnamese revolution are stronger today than ever before; the position and power of the three countries of Indochina have also never been stronger. Our people also have the sympathy and support of the progressive people of the world, especially the effective assistance in many areas from the community of socialist countries, led by the great Soviet Union.

It is also necessary to clearly show the army and people of the city the decisive, complex and long-range nature of the struggle against this multi-faceted war of

sabotage of the enemy. It is closely linked to the day-to-day performance of the two strategic tasks of successfully building socialism and maintaining our readiness to fight to firmly defend the socialist Vietnamese fatherland on every level and within every sector. At the same time, this struggle must be waged together with the struggle against every negative phenomenon and manifestation of degeneration within every agency, enterprise and basic unit, even within every family and person.

2. Achieving a combined strength for fighting the enemy.

The enemy is conducting sabotage against us in many different areas and by means of many different forces and many different insidious tricks. We can only defeat the enemy by utilizing the combined strength of all the people, of the entire dictatorship of the proletariat system, the strength of collective ownership of the masses at each installation, each department and sector under the centralized, unified leadership of the various party committee echelons. We must correct the misconception that fighting the war of sabotage of the enemy is only the task of the public security sector, army troops and the various levels of government while the specialized departments and sectors only concern themselves with their work and production. This outlook is incorrect and very harmful.

Above everything else, we must strengthen the leadership effectiveness of the various party committee echelons in this struggle. The various party committee echelons must adopt a detailed leadership resolution, must correctly evaluate the schemes, forces and tricks of the enemy within their locality and must adopt appropriate guidelines and plans for dealing with the enemy. This must be considered an important political task, a concrete expression of the fact that the two strategic tasks of the revolution at this time that were set forth by the 5th Congress are thoroughly understood and are being carried out. Only when the party committee attaches appropriate importance to this task and adopts a resolution for providing comprehensive, correct leadership is it possible to fully tap the strength of all the people, of the organizations within the dictatorship system, and possible to create a unity of action and close coordination among forces. In the specific guidance they provide, the party committee echelons must clearly define the specific and the general and conduct preliminary reviews and final reviews in order to gain experience during each period of time and on each front.

As has already been decided by the Political Bureau, it is necessary to form the unified military command on the various levels to display the fullest possible responsibility and serve as the staff of the party committee echelon. The unified military commands must properly fulfill their role as the nucleus in the mobilization of every capability of the army, the public security sector, the Communist Youth Union, the Women's Union, the Trade Union, the Association of Collective Farmers, the Front Committee, etc. The unified military commands on the various levels must fulfill their assigned duties, establish a system of regular activities and adopt a detailed operating plan.

It is necessary to fully utilize the strength and power of the state government on the various levels, especially the basic level governments. The government is

not only the place that embodies the party's leadership of all of society, but is also the place that vividly manifests the right of collective ownership of the working people in the tasks of building and protecting the fatherland. In this struggle, the strengths that we have that overwhelm the enemy are the broad masses possessing revolutionary awareness, the law and the government with all the effective tools of dictatorship that it has at its disposal. With a strong government, especially a strong basic level government, it is easy to uncover and promptly suppress acts of sabotage of the enemy. A strong government is also a strong base upon which the masses can struggle against and denounce saboteurs.

The state regulates every activity of society by means of law. We must mobilize the masses to fully comply with the law and must, at the same time, be determined to punish those persons who do not respect the law. The special characteristic of this war of sabotage is that the enemy make their way into and hide, conceal themselves and disguise themselves within the ranks of our people, in every aspect of social life, in order to sabotage us from within. Therefore, through the law and by means of scrupulously enforcing the law, the masses can easily and immediately determine who is dishonest, who is law-abiding and who is earning a living in an illegitimate manner. On this basis, we can find the hiding places and expose each act of sabotage of the enemy. The experience of Ho Chi Minh City has shown that the adoption of a correct and timely regulation by the government and the determined organizing of the implementation of this regulation are frequently all that are necessary in order to uncover and stop a scheme of the enemy. It is necessary to make well coordinated use of educational, legal, administrative and economic measures in this struggle. The tools of force of the government, such as the army, the public security sector, the militia and self-defense forces, the courts and the organs of control must be strengthened and their strength must be fully employed as the nucleus in the struggle against the war of sabotage of the enemy.

We must fully tap the strength of collective ownership of the masses. The masses are the masters of the entire country, the masters of the locality, the masters of the places at which they live and work. There is not one thing or one person that escapes the eyes of the masses. If the masses are enlightened, if they are vigilant and well organized, we will have good conditions for promptly exposing and suppressing the enemy, thereby protecting the revolution.

3. Building and protecting our forces well in order to attack the enemy.

This is both a basic measure and a guideline of ours in the struggle against the multi-faceted war of sabotage of the enemy. We must build and protect our forces well so that we have the strength needed to win victory over the enemy and, at the same time, prevent the enemy from sabotaging us. The process of fighting the enemy is, at the same time, the process of building each of our forces so that they become larger and stronger with each passing day. For this reason, the attack against the enemy must be closely linked to building and strengthening our forces, building our organizations, from the organizations of the party, government, armed forces and security forces to the mass organizations and the other economic and social organizations. These organizations must be

pure and strong both ideologically and organizationally. The fight against the enemy must be carried out in conjunction with fighting negative phenomena and degeneration within our organizations, guarding against and fighting spies and purging opportunists and persons who intentionally violate the policies and laws of the state. The fight against the enemy must be closely linked to socialist transformation and socialist construction; determined steps must be taken to change the comparison of forces, develop a base of operation that is favorable to us and eradicate the potential conditions and the conditions that can be used by the enemy to oppose and undermine us on a long-range basis. The fight against the enemy must be closely linked to teaching, mobilizing and revolutionizing each stratum of the people and launching a mass movement to maintain security, strengthen the national defense system and build increasingly solid and strong armed forces and public security forces for the city.

This involves an entire process of establishing and upholding the right of collective ownership of the masses on all fronts, within each locality and at each installation; a process of painstakingly implementing the policies of broad national unity in coordination with taking suitable steps in socialist transformation with a view toward changing the comparison of political forces, changing the base, making our forces increasingly strong and reducing the scope of and eventually eliminating the activities of the enemy; and the process of closely coordinating the struggle to protect our national independence with the struggle to resolve the question "who defeats whom" which exists between socialism and capitalism and the struggle against negative phenomena and degeneration within our organizations.

In the task of building and protecting our forces, Ho Chi Minh City must pay special attention to the role of the basic organizations and to the interior of our organizations. This is because the basic units are the places that directly implement each line, position and policy of the party and government; moreover, they are also the focal points of enemy efforts in their war of sabotage. Their effort to insert persons into our organizations, to entice and bribe persons and to render our state apparatus ineffective primarily begins in the basic units.

In a manner closely linked to the building of strong, solid basic units, the city is also endeavoring to build the districts into units that are strong in every respect, into socialist fortresses protecting the fatherland, fortresses that have a firm political base, a constantly growing economy, stable living conditions, a progressive culture and strong security and national defense forces. In the immediate future, we must build these fortresses so that they are strong enough to defeat the multi-faceted war of sabotage of the enemy; over the long range, they must possess the strength needed to win victory over the enemy in any war situation and fulfill the task of a unit within the country's great rear area.

4. Researching scientific and creative methods of fighting the enemy.

The war of sabotage is a part of the new strategy of the enemy to oppose the revolution in our country and the countries of Indochina. Compared to the previous wars of aggression, it is new in terms of targets, forces and mode of operation.

It is a secret war, a war in which military forces are not the main forces used to annihilate the opposition, a war that is being carried out under various forms of sabotage in many areas of our country's life, a war which, although silent, is extremely malicious and insidious. The modes of operation of the enemy are very diverse: coordinating exerting pressure and supporting forces from the outside with continuously causing disruptions in many areas on the inside; coordinating many types of sabotage conducted at the same time within each area; using persons who are on-the-spot, who are within the locality in coordination with newly inserted spy and commando forces; exploiting and taking advantage of the remnants of the old society; taking advantage of our difficulties and weaknesses in economic management and social management in order to provoke the masses into opposing the revolutionary government; doing everything possible to cause our cadres to degenerate and become deviant and everything possible to render our management mechanisms and organizations ineffective; and coordinating sabotage within Ho Chi Minh City with sabotage in the other provinces of the South. For this reason, researching ways to fight the enemy in this kind of war is a serious and pressing requirement.

To begin with, we consider this to be a task of leadership and, at the same time, an important task in military scientific work. This effort must be tightly organized so that we can develop a basic and detailed knowledge of the enemy, a knowledge of everything from their strategy to their specific measures and tricks. On the basis of understanding the enemy, we must research and creatively apply methods of fighting that are truly effective. We must review the valuable experiences we gained in the war of resistance against the United States and the puppets, especially the experiences gained in political activities within the city in past years, including the experiences of commando forces, special operations forces, security forces and so forth. We must also research the experiences of our enemy during those years in managing the city and organizing forces to oppose our operations in order to enrich the effort to research our methods of fighting. In our study of the enemy, it is also necessary to guard against them using the experiences we gained in our previous operations within the city against us.

We must research guidelines and modes that will enable us to achieve a combined strength by coordinating the launching of mass movements with the utilization of the specialized forces; coordinating covert forces and overt forces; coordinating administrative measures with economic, security and national defense measures; coordinating management at the place of residence with management at the workplace; coordinating one locality with another locality, coordinating routine investigations with unscheduled inspections on highways as well as within each ward; and coordinating the activities of Ho Chi Minh City with the activities of the other provinces and municipalities...

Key areas must be defined so that we can adopt appropriate guidelines for building our forces and attacking the enemy. Ho Chi Minh City has 12 urban districts consisting of 255 subwards and 6 suburban districts encompassing 83 villages, which include remote villages, areas in which the majority of the population is religious persons, areas in which persons of Chinese ancestry are

concentrated, areas in which there are many political and social complications, areas in which matters are complicated by criminal affairs, areas in which economic activities are concentrated, areas in which there are many nerve centers that must be thoroughly protected; Duyen Hai District, which has a coastline and a bay to the ocean, etc. It is necessary to conduct basic investigations and research to fully ascertain the special characteristics of each type area so that we can adopt correct guidelines for building our forces and effective guidelines for attacking the enemy.

The enemy's activities are very clever and sophisticated. Within each area and on each front, even in each specific case, they are always changing the methods they employ in their acts of sabotage in order to make it difficult for us to ascertain the laws governing their activities, difficult to discover their liaison bases and the participants in their activities. For this reason, we must attach importance to organizing an effort to gain experience with regard to both learning about the enemy and fighting the enemy, to protecting and building our forces during each period of time and after each incident.

Together with the people of the entire country, being determined to defeat the multi-faceted war of sabotage of the enemy is an urgent political and military task of the army and people of Ho Chi Minh City. The above mentioned laws governing the activities of the enemy and basic measures of ours only reflect our initial thinking. We are organizing the fight while conducting research and gaining experience in order to fully ascertain the laws governing the activities of the enemy, develop the most effective ways to fight the enemy and win the largest possible victories. Under the leadership of the Municipal Party Committee and clearly aware of their position and responsibility, the army and people of Ho Chi Minh City are developing upon their strengths, overcoming their remaining weaknesses and making every effort to move the city strongly forward in every respect in order to work along with the rest of the country in a determined effort to defeat the multi-faceted war of sabotage of the enemy while always being ready to win victory over them in any situation and firmly protect the socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

It is our hope to study the experiences of and exchange experiences with the other localities, especially with the other large cities of the country.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

APPLICATION OF SCIENTIFIC ADVANCEMENTS WITHIN ARMY DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 10, Oct 82 pp 1-7

[Article by Lieutenant General Bui Phung: "Accelerating Scientific and Technical Work Within the People's Armed Forces"]

[Text] The Political Report of the Party Central Committee at the 5th Congress of the Party pointed out that "accelerating scientific and technical work is a very important part of the scientific-technological revolution, the revolution that occupies the key position among the three revolutions"; at the same time, it sets forth the major requirements involved in accelerating scientific and technical work within the various fields of activity of the national economy.

Our armed forces must have a thorough understanding of the basic directives of the congress concerning accelerating scientific and technical work with a view toward better developing military scientific and technical potentials in order to competently support the buildup and the combat operations of the entire army, thereby helping to successfully complete the two strategic tasks of the revolution.

To begin with, we must utilize, repair, store, maintain, manufacture and improve the weapons and equipment of the army.

Our army now has a large quantity of weapons and equipment of an increasingly modern nature and of many different types. However, we are not making thorough or efficient use of them; we are not storing, maintaining, repairing or managing these weapons and pieces of equipment well.

The use of existing weapons and equipment must yield high returns in order to achieve fighting strength. This is the most important and pressing task in all of our military scientific and technical work at this time.

We must quickly gain a full understanding of the technical and tactical properties of the various types of weapons and equipment, review the weapons and equipment situation and evaluate and reach accurate conclusions concerning the strengths and weaknesses of our weapons and equipment. On this basis, we must adopt a plan

for making efficient use of weapons and equipment and propose improvements that should be made as well as new directions of research. Our review of the weapons and equipment situation must be carried out in conjunction with reviewing the methods for using weapons and equipment in a manner consistent with technical and tactical requirements. We must provide good training to cadres and soldiers, primarily to the command cadres on the detachment level, in order to deepen their knowledge of weapons and equipment and improve their ability to utilize them. We must quickly put the use of weapons and equipment on a regular-force basis and combat every manifestation of liberalism and the habit of doing as one sees fit.

In a situation such as the present one in which our weapons and equipment have been and are being changed in terms of their quantity, quality and types, efforts must be focused on researching and learning about the new kinds of weapons and equipment that we have and about those types whose properties we have yet to fully utilize; we must acquire basic, complete and coordinated knowledge of these weapons and pieces of equipment and put this knowledge in the form of uniform instruction manuals for the entire army.

Within the field of troop command and management, it is necessary to apply scientific and technological advances and modern means in order to improve the quality and the effectiveness of command support work and supply, in a timely and accurate fashion, perimeters, information and materials to help command cadres make accurate decisions; cybernetics and mathematics must be used to support troop command and management operations. At the same time, importance must be attached to gradually improving the equipment used to support command operations and process information on the tactical level in combat that is coordinated among the various branches and services and to applying scientific and technological advances in information work and the transmission of orders and notices from the command posts on the various levels to the basic units and vice versa. This is a difficult task, one that must be successfully carried out in orderly stages but which must be very positively coordinated with stages of rapid development by means of comprehensive deployment while focusing appropriate efforts on key areas.

In the field of production and economic construction, scientific and technical work have the task of helping to support the production of grain and food products, the production of consumer goods for the entire army and the capital construction tasks of the units specializing in production and economic construction. Every effort must be made to provide cadres and soldiers with economic knowledge in order to insure that everyone, primarily those cadres who guide and manage production, has a full understanding of economic laws, a firm grasp of the science of organizing production, organizing labor and so forth. We must make full use of every scientific and technological achievement and apply them in an effective manner in production and economic construction with a view toward raising labor productivity, product quality and economic efficiency. This is not only the task of the agencies and units specializing in production and economic construction, rather, it is also the task of all scientific and technical forces within the army. Plans, measures and policies must be adopted

to assemble and mobilize large numbers of cadres and all scientific and technical agencies and national defense factories to actively contribute to researching and resolving scientific and technical problems in order to support the production activities and economic construction work of our army.

In the field of supporting and improving the living conditions of troops, it is necessary to improve our ability to meet the daily needs and maintain the health of troops. The persons who perform scientific and technical work must delve deeply into resolving problems regarding food, clothing, shelter and health care for troops and concerning emergency treatment for wounded and ill soldiers in both peace time and war time.

In conjunction with organizational and management measures, we must apply scientific and technological advances in order to gradually improve the living conditions of troops and improve their physical conditioning, especially in combat units, units working on the frontline, in the mountainous jungles or on the islands, modern technical units and so forth.

We must research and apply a number of scientific and technical measures for the purpose of improving the quality of disease prevention, epidemic prevention and control, diagnosis and medical treatment, correcting the disabilities of and rehabilitating persons suffering from wounds received in war and researching and successfully resolving the problem of soldiers wounded on combat fronts; at the same time, we must initiate research into ways to deal with weapons of mass murder, especially chemical weapons, microorganisms and so forth. Research must be conducted into improving the quality of troop health care in a manner consistent with the nature and the characteristics of combat tasks, work tasks and the environment in which troops live and consistent with the economic capabilities of the country. We must research military medical support and environmental protection and research ways to maintain the quality of food in every situation. We must accelerate the effort to combine modern medical science with national, traditional medical science and must closely coordinate military medicine with civilian medicine. We must achieve greater self-reliance in the production of medicines on the basis of developing and utilizing domestic pharmaceutical materials.

We must accelerate the processing of grain and food products in order to maintain the present standard of eating and must, at the same time, promote the research into gradually improving the diet, research and process various types of dried food for combat operations, investigate nutritional requirements and establish eating standards suited to a number of special cases. Efforts must be focused on resolving the problems of providing frontline units (units on the borders, on the islands and in highland areas) with potable water, water for daily activities, fuel and lighting. Scientific and technological advances must be applied to improve the quality of capital construction, the transportation and storage of petroleum products and so forth.

The storage and maintenance of weapons and equipment must be effective in order to insure that the weapons and equipment at units and within warehouses

do not lose their quality and are not lost; we must take urgent steps to overcome shortcomings in storage and maintenance operations and must be determined to put these operations under regulations. We must promptly reorganize the organizations that guide storage and maintenance operations on the various echelons, build and improve the system of warehouses and try to meet the minimum needs for storage materials (especially for the storage of modern weapons and equipment, such as tanks, armored vehicles, aircraft, missiles, warships and so forth); at the same time, importance must be attached to applying scientific and technological advances in storage and maintenance operations under the tropical climatic conditions of our country.

Good repair work will make an important contribution to maintaining the quantity and the quality of weapons and equipment. Therefore, we must make the fullest possible use of the existing capabilities of the army and full use of the capabilities of the industrial installations of the state and the localities in order to carry out repair plans and tasks. On the other hand, we must gradually organize and build an efficient, complete system of repair stations and factories and organize a good division of labor and division of echelons in repair echelons.

In order to strengthen material-technical bases and improve our technical support capabilities, one task of important, basic and long-range significance as well as pressing significance is that of reorganizing and increasing the capacity and the output of the system of national defense factories and enterprises so that national defense enterprises are worthy of the key role they play in the task of building material-technical bases and in gradually building the national defense industry of the country. We must provide closer guidance and make every effort to improve the management of production on the basis of the cost accounting system. We must formulate and fully implement economic-technical standards and quotas, perform good work in the field of weights and measures, calculate production costs thoroughly and provide good quality control. We must strengthen and expand a number of old factories and initiate the construction of a number of new production projects in accordance with the new requirements of the technical support task and in order to gradually build the national defense industry. A plan must be adopted for accelerating the production of spare parts in order to promptly and fully meet the very large and pressing requirements we now face.

One important matter is that of providing training and improving the scientific and technical qualifications of cadres and soldiers.

Personnel and weapons are the most decisive factors of fighting strength. As a result, in conjunction with providing additional weapons and equipment, every effort must be made to increase the scientific and technical knowledge, especially the military scientific and technical knowledge, of cadres and soldiers. We must take the initiative and adopt a plan for providing cadres and soldiers with new knowledge that is consistent with modern technical equipment and modern war. Only in this way can cadres and soldiers become fully qualified to be the masters of technical weapons and equipment in order to complete combat, construction and production tasks.

As regards soldiers, the most important and decisive requirement is the need to establish training programs, subject matter and plans which insure that everyone has a full understanding of, is proficient in the use of and properly maintains the weapons and equipment assigned to them in order to achieve high efficiency in combat, high quality in training and high productivity in productive labor.

As regards command cadres, political cadres, rear service cadres and technical cadres, importance must be attached to providing them with advanced training in order to constantly increase their knowledge of modern military science and technology and constantly improve their ability to use advanced technical equipment, their ability to organize, guide and manage troops and their ability to perform party work - political work and perform rear service support and technical support work under the conditions of modern war.

As regards cadres who are involved in economic construction, it is necessary to regularly hold training classes and to adopt basic training plans which insure that all echelons and all types of cadres achieve a specific level of qualification regarding the science of managing and guiding production, their special field or profession and the technology involved in specialized production.

Thus, here, training activities must be comprehensively developed but must be selective, must focus and concentrate on scientific and technical matters that directly support the primary political tasks of each type unit and each type cadre. When establishing programs and subject matter, we must research, select and coordinate basic, long-range requirements with specific, immediate requirements. When providing training, we must gradually progress from one subject to another, completing each subject and then applying it in practice and then improving upon the knowledge that has been learned.

In the process of providing training, special importance must be attached to improving the quality of the elementary and advanced training of the corps of scientific and technical cadres; we must be determined to make centralized use of this corps in our primary tasks.

In the immediate future, it is necessary to utilize the existing corps of scientific and technical cadres in the sectors for which they were trained and necessary to utilize their capabilities. Competent cadres must be assigned to primary tasks, with priority given to the schools, the key research programs and the technical support work of frontline units and the technical services and branches.

In conjunction with reorganizing the utilization of forces, every effort must be made to improve the quality of the classroom and the on-the-job training of the corps of scientific and technical cadres. At this time, increasing their scientific and technical knowledge means improving their practical skills and increasing their knowledge of military, production and social realities. At the same time, we must quickly adopt a plan for training additional cadres and supplementing the corps with the number of cadres that it now lacks in order to

rapidly strengthen the corps of command cadres, management cadres and technical cadres within units, strengthen the corps of engineering and industrial cadres, production management cadres and scientific and technical management cadres on the various echelons and train cadres to lead sectors who are fully capable of presiding over important scientific and technical tasks.

As regards the corps of technical workers and personnel, the pressing issue at this time is the need to attach more importance to providing them with training in order to improve their skills, utilizing them in an efficient manner, developing upon their talents and adopting appropriate systems and policies for providing advanced training to and maintaining a corps of skilled technical workers and personnel to provide long-range support within the army.

One of the facts in the successful training and building of the corps of technical cadres, personnel and workers is the rapid replanning of the system of technical schools. The academies, the command, technical, specialized and professional officers schools and the schools training technical personnel and workers must be strengthened so that they are strong and stable in every respect and in order to fully implement the Political Bureau resolution on educational reform with a view toward constantly improving the quality of instruction, study and cadre training.

In conjunction with the elementary and advanced training of scientific and technical cadres, it is necessary to accelerate scientific and technical research. We must reorganize the system of military scientific and technical research organizations and accelerate research efforts in accordance with our key tasks and programs. On the basis of the main task of each sector and echelon, we must establish a truly detailed research program that sets forth the subjects that must be researched, establishes a clear division of labor and division of tasks in order to conduct research and cooperate in the research of each subject and establishes a specific deadline. Research projects must be clearly registered and approved by the council; a component must be established that tightly manages research projects.

Every effort must be made to concentrate research forces on a number of subjects and key projects on each echelon. Together with organizing forces to promptly meet pressing, immediate requirements, we must coordinate the completion of immediate tasks with preparing the potentials and gaining the experience needed to successfully carry out a number of long-term research programs.

In order to accelerate scientific and technical work, it is necessary to successfully implement the following primary measures:

1. Improving the Planning of Scientific and Technical Work Within the Armed Forces

The realities of scientific and technical activities in the recent past have confirmed that in order to tap the creativity of the masses, of scientific and technical cadres, develop scientific and technical potentials in accordance with correct guidelines and objectives and achieve good results, we clearly must

improve our management, with the most important aspect being improving the management provided by means of the plan. We must strongly improve planning, that is, must insure that the plan becomes an effective tool of management, in order to increase the effectiveness of scientific and technical activities. All scientific and technical plans within the army must be based on and closely linked to the plans for the buildup of the army as well as the combat and production plans of the army and must be designed to resolve the central problems and meet the pressing requirements raised by these plans. On the other hand, importance must also be attached to making good scientific and technical forecasts, formulating long-term plans and formulating plans for each period. A separate plan must be adopted for each field of activity and, at the same time, an integrated plan must be adopted that balances such conditions as capital, supplies, equipment, manpower, etc.

2. Attaching Importance To Managing and Making Full Use of Existing Material-Technical Bases and Gradually Building New Material-Technical Bases, Thereby Creating the Conditions for Scientific and Technical Activities To Develop

One of the important factors of the scientific and technological potential within the armed forces is the constant growth of material-technical bases. For this reason, in order to meet the increasingly high requirements of military scientific and technical work, we must adopt a plan, measures and policies for making appropriate investments in strengthening material-technical basis in depth as well as breadth. On the other hand, we must be determined to reorganize and centralize material-technical bases for central tasks instead of allowing them to remain decentralized and spread out. We must make very economical use of and very tightly manage supplies, equipment and finances to insure that military scientific and technical activities yield practical results and must combat all waste and misappropriation. Each sector and each echelon must carefully calculate and make good use of investments in military scientific and technical activities in order to insure that their equipment is adequate and well matched and insure a proper ratio between immediate requirements and long-range requirements.

3. Scientific and Technical Information Is an Important Part of Scientific and Technological Potentials, a Part That Must Be Developed into a System with an Efficient Division of Labor and Division of Echelons

In conjunction with building the necessary organization, we must take steps to intensify information activities and the dissemination of military science and technology and promptly supply information and materials for leadership and guidance and for military scientific and technical activities. We must reorganize the libraries and the scientific and technical bookcases in a number of sectors and units. By means of diverse, suitable measures, we must further improve the collection, selection and use of news and materials concerning science and technology at home, science and technology within the army and science and technology overseas. We must gradually begin to make use of advanced methods of collecting and processing information in order to improve the quality of military scientific and technical information activities.

4. It is Necessary To Expand the Scientific and Technical Cooperation Within the Army and Increase Our Cooperation with the Scientific and Technical Agencies of the State in Accordance with Tight Regulations

We must strengthen our cooperation with the armies of the fraternal countries, primarily with the Soviet Union; at the same time, we must seek to establish relations with other countries and advanced scientific and technical organizations in the world in order to keep abreast of and selectively utilize the latest advancements in military science and technology.

We must research and apply a number of systems and policies designed to provide incentive for the acceleration of scientific and technical activities within the armed forces, the application of scientific and technological advances in the realities of the combat, buildup and production of the army and the strengthening of scientific and technical cooperation with a view toward training and creating the conditions for the scientific and technical forces of the army to continue to improve their qualifications and display creativity in scientific and technical activities.

5. We Must Improve the Party Work and Political Work in Scientific and Technical Activities

Science and technology are also a field into which the party organizations and the commanders on the various echelons must delve. Party work and political work must have a direct impact upon scientific and technical activities, must insure that these activities are conducted in exact accordance with the line and viewpoint of the party, with the guidelines and tasks of the armed forces. We must uphold and develop upon the right of collective ownership of the mass of cadres, soldiers and technical workers and personnel in scientific and technical activities by means of suitable forms of organization and tight regulations. We must develop upon the role played by the Youth Union and the Trade Union, closely coordinated ideological work with organizational work and encourage troops and manual workers to participate in scientific and technical activities, primarily by guiding and encouraging everyone to use, maintain and repair existing weapons and equipment well.

In light of the present situation of our country's economy and the overall qualifications of our technical cadres, soldiers and personnel, scientific and technical activities within the armed forces are still encountering many difficulties and obstacles. However, we have the correct and creative line set forth by the resolution of the 5th National Congress of the Party to guide us. We have a rather large corps of scientific and technical cadres, a corps that is increasing in both size and quality with each passing day, together with a certain number of material-technical bases and material-technical bases that will be established. We also have the wholehearted assistance and the increasingly close cooperation of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries. With the tradition of heroic struggle, the intelligence and the creativity of the Vietnamese, with the practical experiences that have been gained in the nearly 40 years of continuously supporting the combat and buildup requirements of

the armed forces, we will surely strongly develop the scientific and technological potentials of the country, of the army, so that the scientific and technical activities conducted within the armed forces overcome every difficulty and meet the increasingly high requirements of the buildup and combat tasks of the people's armed forces in the work of successfully building socialism and firmly protecting the socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

REQUIREMENTS OF COUNTER-OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGNS OUTLINED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 10, Oct 82 pp 8-19,48

[Article by Colonel Nguyen Phu Chut: "Counter-offensive Campaigns"]

[Text] A counter-offensive is a type of warfare that emerged long ago in the history of the armed struggle of our nation as well as many other nations in the world. The phenomenon that today is called a counter-offensive campaign (modern) only emerged in the middle of the 19th century. As regards theory, in the course of the formation and development of counter-offensives, many different opinions have emerged concerning the nature of and the characteristics involved in preparing for and conducting counter-offensives, in general, and counter-offensive campaigns, in particular.

A number of foreign military theoreticians have maintained that a counter-offensive is in the category of a defensive operation; others maintain that a counter-offensive is a form of an offensive. Some persons hold to the view that counter-offensives occupy an extremely important position and that counter-offensives conducted on the strategic and campaign scales even determine victory in war. A number of other military theoreticians maintain that a counter-offensive is merely the inevitable conclusion of a defensive operation or that a counter-offensive is, in essence, an offensive operation, consequently, there need not be any separate theory for counter-offensives. These different viewpoints reflect differences in the level of organization of the army, weapons, technical equipment and so forth, differences in the specific historic conditions of each nation and country in the different wars, differences in military thinking, military theory and so forth.

According to the Soviet Military Encyclopedia (volume IV, 1977, Moscow), "A counter-offensive is a special type of offensive operation in which troops that were on the defensive shift to a counter-offensive in the course of or after retaliating against attacking enemy forces. The objectives of a counter-offensive are to rout the attacking enemy forces, crush their offensive blows, occupy important strategic areas (and lines) and seize the strategic initiative. Counter-offensives are generally carried out on the strategic scale and sometimes on the campaign scale..."

In the Soviet Union's Great War of National Defense (1941-1945), the Soviet Army conducted large-scale strategic counter-offensives in which a number of regional armies participated. The counter-offensive waged at the doorstep of Moscow in December, 1941, by the Kalinin Army and the western and southwestern armies defeated the main battle group of the "Central" force of the German fascist army and defeated their "blitzkrieg" plan, thereby making it possible for the Soviet Red Army to take the offensive on the main strategic front, the Moscow front. The counter-offensive in Stalingrad in November, 1942, by the East River Army, the Stalingrad army and the southwestern army surrounded and crushed a 330,000 man enemy force and led to a basic turning point on the Soviet-German front as well as in the entire course of development of World War II (1939-1945). The largest strategic counter-offensive in the history of the national defense war of the Soviet Union, which occurred at "Cuoc-xco" [Vietnamese phonetics] in 1943 and was carried out by the central army, the Voronezh army, the Bryansk army and the southwestern army, routed 30 well trained divisions of Hitler (7 of which were tank divisions), thereby giving complete strategic initiative to the Soviet Army and forcing the German fascists to shift to the defensive, where it remained until the end of the war. The history of war has recorded these counter-offensives as strategic counter-offensives conducted under the unsurpassed guidance of the Soviet Supreme Command.

Another special feature of the strategic counter-offensives of the Soviet Red Army was that each began as a strategic defensive operation. However, the opportunities and the conditions for shifting from a strategic defensive operation to a strategic counter-offensive operation were not identical in these three battles. The first strategic counter-offensive, which was conducted in the Moscow area, occurred after the Red Army had been forced to mount a strategic defensive and wage eight strategic defensive campaigns. In Stalingrad, the strategic counter-offensive occurred after four defensive campaigns. The strategic counter-offensive in "Cuoc-xco" occurred after the Supreme Command conducted only one victorious defensive campaign.

The experience of the Soviet Army shows that the shift from defensive operations to counter-offensive operations is dependent, to a very important degree, upon the results of the effort to build new forces even in the process of conducting defensive operations, forces that consist of large reserves of technical materials, in order to deliver strong, annihilating blows to the enemy force when shifting to a counter-offensive and regain the strategic initiative. And, a counter-offensive can only be launched after the attacking forces of the enemy have been dealt heavy losses and the enemy has used all of their nearest campaign reserve forces and cannot mount a defensive operation in time.

The experiences of the Soviet Red Army and Navy in counter-offensives show that surprise attacks must be directed at those places which insure that the main attacking forces of the enemy can be surrounded and crushed in the shortest possible amount of time, thereby creating favorable conditions for developing the offensive along a broad front and deep into enemy territory. The universal mode of campaign warfare is to launch surprise attacks against both flanks while launching an attack behind the attacking enemy forces in order to surround and annihilate them. The counter-offensive art of the Soviet Army attaches very much

importance to the factor of maintaining secrecy and surprise. In order to secretly assemble the large forces participating in a counter-offensive, from the staff agencies to the units, it is necessary to act in a skillful manner, not reveal the intention to counter-attack and thoroughly comply with regulations, such as only moving troops at night, prohibiting the use of the command radio network, deploying forces, using camouflage and decoy troops to deceive the enemy and so forth.

In the history of the wars of liberation and the defensive wars fought by the nation of Vietnam, counter-offensives occupy a very important position. The valuable and diverse experiences gained concerning counter-offensives have helped to supplement and perfect our military art.

In ancient times, our forefathers, by means of skillful counter-attacks, struck fear into the hearts of the enemy and won victories of extremely important strategic significance. For example, in the victorious wars of resistance against the Nguyen-Mong aggressor armies, our army and people conducted very fierce counter-attacks many times, counter-attacks that reflected the unique strategic genius of the army and people during the Tran Dynasty.

During the first war (1258), due to the unfavorable balance of forces that existed at the start of the war, the enemy generals Ngot, Luong, Hop and Thai led their forces in occupying the city of Thang Long in 9 days, a city which we deserted as part of our plan. At precisely the time that the enemy forces were becoming confused because they had exhausted their food supply, our army launched a decisive counter-attack at Dong Bo Dau. The enemy was forced to hastily flee along the Red River toward the northwest. At Quy Hoa, the local people, under the command of the mountain region's national hero Ha Bong, launched a surprise attack, blocked the enemy, inflicted heavy losses upon enemy forces and forced them to run for their lives back to Van Nam.

In the second war of resistance (1285), in the face of the strong position that had been temporarily achieved by the more than 500,000 man army that had attacked us, our army had to make a temporary, strategic withdrawal from both the South and the North in order to preserve its forces. Once again, enemy forces occupied the capital and many large areas of our country. However, militia forces operating in close coordination with the decentralized forces of the army of the Imperial Court continuously attacked, harrassed, wore down and annihilated each component of the enemy's forces. Our people everywhere, implementing the slogan "the family can fight the enemy by not having a garden," thoroughly destroyed their sources of food. In addition to being attacked continuously and being unable to develop their offensive, the summer weather caused more and more Chinese soldiers to become sick. The aggressor army had been greatly weakened. Meanwhile, as a result of staging a skillful strategic withdrawal and utilizing the strength of the entire country in the fight against the enemy, our army and people not only preserved their main forces and developed their resistance war forces, but also gradually pushed the enemy into a desperate situation. As a result, we created an extremely favorable opportunity and conditions for a counter-offensive. Under the brilliant command of the national hero Tran Quoc Tuan, the strategic counter-offensive that was launched by the army of the Imperial

Court in close coordination with militia forces and the armies of the various provinces involved strong attacks against the enemy camps at A Lo, Tay Ket, Ham Tu and Chuong Duong, the destruction of the temporary defense line of the enemy along the Red River, the encirclement of Thang Long and a fierce attack upon Thang Long. With large contingents of their forces having been annihilated, the enemy was forced to withdraw to their country in order to avoid total annihilation. By means of the major ambushes conducted at the Cau River, Van Kiep and so forth and widespread attacks by mountain militia forces to harass, block and war down enemy forces, the majority of the aggressor army was annihilated. Toa Do was beheaded on the battlefield. Thoat Hoan had to squeeze himself into a bronze vessel in order to escape back to his country.

In 1785, Nguyen Hue, the outstanding leader of the Tay Son Peasant Revolutionary Movement, closely followed the activities of the army of Siam that had landed at Gia Dinh and launched a war of aggression against our country. Skilled in mobilizing his forces quickly, Nguyen Hue rapidly moved his forces by sea to My Tho. At that time, the army of Siam had occupied western Tien Giang and was preparing to attack the bases of the Tay Son Army in My Tho and Gia Dinh. Using knowledge of the tides and taking advantage of the enemy's complacency and arrogance as a result of their initial victory, our army provoked the enemy and drew them into a large ambush that had been prepared along the My Tho River from Rach Gam to Xoai Mut. When the fleet of warships of the enemy arrived at the ambush site, Tay Son artillery troops suddenly opened fire, the enemy's formation fell apart and our naval and ground forces charged forth from their ambush positions to kill the enemy. Every enemy warship was sunk. Nearly 40,000 Siamese troops died in the battle, including the entire traitorous army of Nguyen Anh. With the victory of Rach Gam-Xoai Mut, our army and people crushed the scheme of intervention of the Siamese feudalists and appropriately punished the Nguyen Anh clique for the act of "welcoming the enemy."

The salient feature of the above mentioned counter-attacks waged by our forefathers was that counter-attacks were used as attacks to annihilate the main forces of aggressor armies. That is, these counter-attacks were carried out at the initiative of our forefathers, were independent of other operations and were carried out at the places selected by our forefathers and at the most propitious time. They did not involve defensive operations and did not develop from defensive warfare. And, another characteristic deserving of attention is that the victory of these counter-offensives was primarily guaranteed by the fact that we knew how to select the correct opportunity and employ a method of fighting more suitable than creating a superiority of army forces.

In the wars of resistance against the French colonialists and the U.S. imperialist aggressors, counter-offensive campaigns emerged and developed on an increasingly large scale, thereby contributing to the completion of the different strategic tasks of the various stages of our war of liberation.

The Viet Bac campaign (1947) was the first counter-offensive campaign in the resistance against the French. In the autumn and winter of 1947, French forces launched a large-scale offensive involving five mobile infantry regiments, five tank-armored companies and two paratroop battalions in two large pincers in a vain attempt to surround and annihilate the nerve center of our resistance war

effort. At that time, our revolutionary armed forces, which were only beginning to be built, consisted of independent companies and battalions and a number of main force infantry regiments that had poorly developed fighting skills and weak material bases and which relied primarily upon local sources of supplies. However, as a result of employing correct methods of fighting and utilizing the widespread guerrilla operations of local forces coordinated with concerted attacks by battalions and, at some places, regiments, we killed or wounded more than 6,000 enemy troops, thereby thwarting their dangerous offensive against the Viet Bac base area. Some persons have maintained that we should give our attention to studying this as a strategic counter-offensive, not as a counter-offensive campaign; however, this strategic counter-offensive was on a low level of development and its strategic mission was accomplished directly by means of battles (by tactical means), not by means of a campaign (in the strict sense of the word).

In late 1953, under a scheme to regain the strategic initiative and in a vain attempt to thwart our preparations for the 1953-1954 winter-spring offensive, the French army assembled a large force consisting of 16 infantry battalions, 3 paratroop battalions and 2 armored battalions to attack southwest Ninh Binh in order to put our 320th main force division out of combat and destroy our storehouses and the springboard for our attack against the Red River Delta. By that time, our armed forces consisted of all three elements of the military and had become strong. Our main force troops had grown into divisions and had gained combat experience. As a result of correctly predicting the enemy's scheme, we made preparations in advance and promptly retaliated against their attack by coordinating widespread attacks to wear down enemy forces with concerted attacks by regiments. The southwestern Ninh Binh counter-offensive campaign killed 1,500 enemy troops, crushed their offensive operation and preserved our main force staging area. Compared to the counter-offensive campaign against the enemy forces in Hoa Binh in 1952, in which we attacked enemy forces that were attacking us but had to temporarily halt their offensive operations and even shifted to defensive operations in some areas, this counter-offensive campaign attacked enemy forces that were in the process of attacking us.

In addition to counter-offensive campaigns conducted by main force troops, we have also seen the emergence of factors of counter-offensive campaigns by local troops (with the participation of some main force troops), militia troops and guerrilla forces to defeat large-scale sweep operation conducted by the enemy.

In the war of resistance against the United State for national salvation, the army and people of the South never drew back or shifted to defensive operations in the face of an enemy with strong, modern military might and a large army, rather, they took the initiative and conducted many offensive campaigns and counter-offensive campaigns that continuously defeated the offensive operations of the Americans and the puppets in the 1965-1966 dry season and the 1966-1967 dry season.

The counter offensive campaign waged by the army and people of eastern Nam Bo to crush the "Johnson City" operation of the U.S. and puppet armies on 2 April 1967 is an example. The enemy threw into these operation some 45,000 troops comprising three divisions and four brigades of the U.S. Army and vassal armies and three puppet divisions supported by 1,200 tanks and armored vehicles, 500 helicopters and

combat aircraft and 250 pieces of large artillery in a vain attempt to crush the base and the nerve center of the war of resistance of our people in the South, annihilate our main forces in eastern Nam Bo and so forth. Our local armed forces only consisted of the cadres, personnel and soldiers working in the agencies of the Central Committee of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, two battalions that protected the base and coordinated with the 9th main force division of the region and so forth. Our army bravely and tenaciously waged a counter-offensive campaign for 53 days and nights, killing very many enemy forces, protecting our base and agencies and completely crushing the operation being conducted by the U.S. aggressor army and its lackeys. This was a typical counter-offensive campaign: the counter-attacking forces, which were the direct target of the attacking enemy forces, defeated the enemy using only one-third the forces being used by the enemy; operating under circumstances in which there were virtually no people to support us, we skillfully organized our forces and created the three arms of the military in order to utilize the method of fighting of the people's war, closely coordinated mobile forces with stationary forces, closely coordinated main force troops with local troops and guerrillas, coordinated attacks on the enemy from within with attacks on the enemy from the outside, coordinated attacks to block and wear down the enemy with concerted, annihilating attacks at selected positions and so forth.

The Route 9-southern Laos counter-offensive campaign in 1971, which was also comparatively typical of this type of campaign, routed the Lam-Son 719 operation of the puppet army.

The enemy mobilized a very large force comprising three infantry divisions, three infantry brigades, four armored battalions and 13 artillery battalions of the South Vietnam puppet army.

The U.S. forces that coordinated with the puppet forces and protected their rear area consisted of 12 infantry and mechanized infantry battalions and 7 artillery battalions supported by 1,000 aircraft of various types (600 helicopters, 300 jets, 50 transport aircraft and 50 B-52 strategic aircraft).

The forces of the Lao puppet army that participated in this combat operation consisted of two mobile infantry regiments and nine infantry battalions.

The enemy was trying to sever our strategic transport roads at their origin, attack and destroy our storehouses and, on this basis, weaken our armed forces in the South so that they could easily carry out their "Vietnamization of the war" program.

Our Route 9-southern Laos counter-offensive campaign was carried out under circumstances in which our main force units had become strong and our infantry divisions had been equipped with relatively modern equipment and had gained experience in relatively large-scale combat operation coordinated among the various branches. We also had a stockpile of technical materials on the battlefield and direct support from the North. Widespread combat operations by local forces to block and wear down the forces of the enemy created a favorable

battle position and a favorable opportunity for the mobile main force divisions to annihilate one enemy front after another.

Compared to the counter-offensive campaign that defeated the Johnson City operation, the Route 9-southern Laos counter-offensive campaign was conducted primarily by means of mobile forces. Our counter-attacking forces were not the main targets of the attacking enemy forces. For this reason, this counter-offensive campaign was conducted as an offensive, was a counter-offensive that had the purpose of attacking the enemy. In the people's war against the war of destruction waged by the U.S. imperialists against the North, we saw the emergence of a new form of counter-offensive campaign. It was an air-defense campaign conducted by the air defense and air forces in coordination with the air defense forces of the three elements of the military to retaliate against air attacks by the U.S. imperialists, to protect political, economic and communication centers, protect strategic communication axes, and so forth.

On the basis of the profound realities presented above, it is possible to define several special characteristics of counter-offensive campaigns and counter-offensive campaign art in our recent wars of defense and liberation:

Our counter-offensive campaigns thoroughly reflect the thinking of an offensive strategy and are conducted in accordance with the thinking of using a counter-offensive as an offensive, of carrying out a counter-offensive in order to attack the enemy; our counter-offensives do not develop from defensive operations. This reflects the specific historic conditions of the people's war in our country. Our country is not very large and it is not very densely populated; however, aggressors have always been larger than us and have always possessed stronger economic and military might. In order to defeat large aggressor armies that invade our country or are already in our country, we cannot mount an ordinary defense, rather, we must thoroughly practice revolutionary-offensive thinking, take the initiative and continuously attack the enemy by means of the combined strength of the people's war, with our attacks directed toward the weaknesses and shortcomings of the enemy. In other words, we have used counter-offensive campaigns and counter-offensives as offensives, have conducted counter-offensives in order to attack and defeat attacking enemy forces. A unique feature of our counter-offensive campaigns in the two wars of liberation was that we conducted victorious counter-offensive campaigns without conducting defensive campaigns first. The typical counter-offensive campaigns of our people's armed forces in the recent wars were counter-offensive campaigns that were organized and carried out in a positive manner. This was because we had strong local armed forces, were the masters of our locality, attacked the enemy as soon as they stepped foot into the locality, clung to the enemy and fought them utilizing every force and every weapon, blocked their advance, pinned them down, isolated their offensive formation and forced the large but decentralized enemy forces to deal with us everywhere, thereby making it possible for our centralized, main force military corps to stage a counter-offensive and launch attacks against the enemy in directions in which advantages were in our favor. This is the unique strength of the efficient strategic deployment of the three elements of the military on the battlefield, of the interposed battle position and the battle position of collective mastery of the Vietnamese people's war.

Our counter-offensive campaign art has skillfully coordinated offensive combat with defensive combat but offensive combat has been the universal and primary form of combat. At the same time, we have organized and conducted a number of defensive battles for the purpose of blocking enemy offensive thrusts, protecting important targets and staging areas for counter-offensives and dividing their offensive formation. In counter-offensive campaigns, defensive operations are only tactical in nature but they occupy a very important position and are designed to create the conditions for main force units to promptly move and for deploying the forces needed to stage a successful counter-offensive.

Our counter-offensive campaign art is the combat art of main force military corps closely coordinated with local armed forces.

The special characteristic of our counter-offensive campaigns is that they are of a very highly integrated nature. The decisive strength in a modern counter-offensive campaign, in a counter-offensive campaign coordinated among the various branches, is created by the main force military corps. However, the local armed forces participating in the campaign have a very important position and role. They are forces that fight the enemy primarily on a small and medium scale and sometimes on a large scale; they attack the enemy everywhere, on the front and in the rear at the same time; they attack the rear bases, storehouses and airfields, cut the communications and cut the transport and resupply lines of the enemy in accordance with a unified plan and under the common command of the campaign commander. Local army units of battalion and company size can, as a result of knowing the terrain well and employing diverse, flexible methods of fighting, weaken and thwart the offensive thrusts of the enemy; protect important targets and areas; wear down and annihilate each small component of the enemy forces; and use decoy forces to lead the enemy into areas in which we have prepared the conditions needed for main force military corps to stage key battles, destroy large and important components of the enemy's forces and eventually totally defeat their offensive. In a number of counter-offensive campaigns that have been conducted in sparsely populated, mountainous jungles where our local forces have been small and weak, we have, when necessary, used a main force component and had the military, civilian and governmental agencies of the locality perform the task of local forces (as was the case in the counter-offensive campaigns that defeated the Johnson City operation and the Lam Son 719 operation of the enemy), as a result of which we created favorable conditions for the main force military corps to win a major victory in the campaign.

This is a concrete expression of our thorough understanding and creative application of the mode of warfare of the Vietnam people's war: coordinating combat operations by the main force military corps with the local people's war, coordinating main force troops and local troops, mobile troops and stationary troops within a counter-offensive campaign.

Our counter-offensive campaign art creates a superiority of forces in order to deliver decisive blows under conditions in which our troop strength and weapons are not superior to those of the enemy.

In their offensives against us, the enemy has usually enjoyed a superiority of troop strength, weapons and modern technical equipment. For this reason, our counter-offensive campaign art attaches very much importance to establishing an effective battle position from which to destroy the offensive position of the enemy while focusing our efforts on creating a superiority of forces in order to win victory over the enemy on the decisive front and in each key battle of the campaign for the purpose of annihilating each important component of the enemy's forces, each of their fronts and eventually totally defeat the enemy's offensive. The experience gained in past counter-offensive campaigns shows that as a result of taking positive steps to control or destroy the strengths that the enemy had in their artillery, aircraft, tanks and so forth while taking full advantage of the weaknesses that the enemy had in their fighting spirit, their easily divided formation, their resupply difficulties and so forth, we quickly weakened the offensive capabilities of the enemy. On the other hand, the widespread attacks on the enemy by local forces within the area of operation of the campaign forced them to decentralize their forces in order to deal with us; as this decentralization increased, their strength on each front, the strength of each of their thrusts became increasingly weak. As a result, our main forces, although not as large as those of the enemy, were able to assemble forces strong enough to deliver decisive blows at decisive places and opportunities.

The above reflect the characteristics of the Vietnam people's war of using few forces to fight many, using small forces to win victory over large forces as they are embodied in the strategy of a counter-offensive campaign.

Having inherited and developed upon the experiences presented above, we can present a number of the main elements of counter-offensive campaign art in a war to protect the fatherland.

In order to have a correct understanding of the latest developments in counter-offensive campaigns, we must have a full understanding of the special characteristics and nature of our people's war to protect the fatherland, the line of the party on waging a war, the strategic determination of the party, the mode of warfare and the objective of warfare together with the new circumstances of our army and country.

In a war to protect the fatherland, a counter-offensive campaign can be considered a universal type of campaign conducted by main force military corps in close coordination with local armed forces for the purposes of annihilating the main attacking force and defeating the offensive of the enemy; protecting or attacking and occupying important strategic areas; seizing campaign and strategic initiative; and creating favorable conditions for the subsequent offensive campaign or for improving the new defensive posture. A large-scale counter-offensive campaign can occur during the initial period of a war and is closely linked to the various forms of offensive and defensive campaigns.

To begin with, as regards theory, it must be determined to which category a counter-offensive belongs, that is, is a counter-offensive offensive or defensive

in nature? Under the new conditions of a war to protect the fatherland, it can readily be seen that a counter-offensive is closely related to defensive operations. The ultimate objective of defensive operations is to create the conditions for shifting to a counter-offensive or an offensive. Preparations for a counter-offensive are made in the process of defensive warfare. This is one point that differs from the war of liberation of past years. However, this does not mean that a counter-offensive belongs to the category of defensive operations. Counter-offensives are a type of independent warfare conducted on a strategic or campaign scale that was utilized by our forefathers in antiquity and has today become an important element of Vietnamese military art. The military theory and art of the Vietnamese people's war consider a counter-offensive campaign to belong to the category of offensive operations. Our counter-offensive campaigns embody the thinking of an offensive strategy, the thinking of conducting a counter-offensive in order to take the offensive. A counter-offensive campaign differs from an offensive campaign in the fact that the target of a counter-offensive campaign is enemy forces that are attacking us, and it is this that is the salient characteristic of a counter-offensive. Along with offensive campaigns, counter-offensive campaigns occupy an important, decisive position in defeating aggressor forces during the initial period of a war and throughout the course of a war. A counter-offensive can develop from a defensive campaign (which differs from a war of liberation). However, a counter-offensive might not develop from defensive operations (as is the case in a war of liberation). Attention must be given to the fact that new forms of counter-offensive campaigns might emerge, such as campaigns conducted against enemy troops staging an airborne landing, a campaign against enemy troops staging a seaborne landing and so forth. Counter-offensive campaigns in a people's war to protect the fatherland will be carried out by means of the greatest possible combined strength of the main force military corps and the local armed forces, of the two modes of warfare employed on the basis of the battle position of collective mastery of the socialist system.

The art of winning victory in modern counter-offensive campaigns centers around the following matters of key importance:

--It is the art of organizing and preparing for a campaign in a very short amount of time, the art of engaging in combat and completing every preparation for the campaign at the same time.

In the case of a counter-offensive campaign that develops from a defensive campaign, preparations for the campaign usually have to be made in a very short amount of time. As a result, the work of organizing and preparing for a counter-offensive campaign is usually carried out in two stages. Ordinarily, the first stage of preparations lasts for a long time but full preparations cannot be made during this stage; only when the enemy has launched an offensive and their forces and activities on the battlefield have become known to us can we quickly supplement and perfect each preparation made for the campaign on the basis of actual campaign developments.

In modern warfare, the amount of time that is directly allocated for preparation for a counter-offensive campaign is very short, so short that it is calculated

in days and, in some cases, even in hours. Consequently, one important problem that faces the commander is the need to select methods of working that enable him to make the most efficient use possible of available time. The experience gained in maneuvers has shown that formulating the campaign plan by the parallel staff work method, planning the work of the commander and the agencies, organizing the labor of the command agency officers in a scientific manner and so forth are the best ways to achieve high work efficiency in a short amount of time, thereby giving the lower echelon much time to prepare for combat and insuring victory in the campaign. The campaign commander and campaign command agency must focus their efforts on the main jobs and not allow themselves to be drawn into jobs of secondary importance, thereby affecting the preparations for the counter-offensive. On the other hand, they must realize that if they do not perform related jobs well, they will not be able to successfully shift to a counter-offensive.

To our troops, the phenomenon of a counter-offensive campaign developing from a defensive campaign as well as the phenomenon of performing the work of organizing a counter-offensive campaign in the process of a defensive campaign are new and very complicated matters in the armed struggle of a war to protect the fatherland. We must research this matter in a basic and comprehensive manner in order to resolve it well. At the same time, in a war to protect the fatherland, it is also possible for counter-offensive campaigns to be carried out in an independent manner, in a manner independent of a defensive campaign. We have gained some experience in organizing and conducting counter-offensive campaigns of this type but we must review these experiences and develop them to a new level consistent with the new conditions that exist.

It is the art of rapidly creating a superiority of forces on the decisive front of the counter-offensive.

In contrast to offensive campaigns, the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy in counter-offensive campaigns is usually one in which our forces are inferior to those of the enemy, especially at the start of a campaign. The problem facing counter-offensive campaign art is to force the enemy to decentralize their large forces in order to gradually weaken their strong assault power, cause them to take the offensive even if they took the initiative and launched an offensive and so forth. The experience we have gained in our victorious counter-offensives shows that closely coordinating mobile forces with stationary forces multiplies the strength of each force. As Le Duan said: "Nothing is as fast as pre-deployed stationary forces. Nothing is as fast as fighting on the basis of already controlling the locality." Our local forces are ready to promptly retaliate against the enemy from the very outset, crush their surprise activities, widely attack the enemy throughout the area of operation of the campaign, attack their front, their rear and their flanks and force the enemy to decentralize their forces in order to deal with our local forces everywhere. In this way, we can weaken the superior forces of the enemy that are attacking us.

The larger the enemy force is, the larger is the quantity of materials consumed by it. The more modern the equipment of the enemy is, the quicker they become bogged down in a weak position when local forces attack their system of storehouses, airfields and vehicle depots, destroy their bridges, attack their roads, destroy their stockpiles and cut their resupply lines.

Our campaign mobile forces, which consist of the already organized main force military corps and the newly mobilized reserve units, must quickly be organized into strong assault groups and must be sent, at the correct time, to the primary decisive front in the campaign. Our experience in war has shown that in a counter-offensive campaign in which we have a relative superiority of infantry and artillery forces over the enemy on the main front, we can rapidly attack and systematically annihilate enemy forces, thereby totally crushing their offensive.

In order to create a superiority of forces over the enemy on the decisive front, we must, in addition to rapidly organizing strong assault groups, also resolve the problems of insuring timely, safe and secret force stability and select a direction for an assault that is favorable for bringing in forces and deploying them quickly.

"Time is a force." Making use of time is of very important significance, sometimes of decisive significance, in creating the superior position of a counter-offensive campaign.

It is the art of creating an opportunity and promptly seizing the opportunity to shift to a counter-offensive.

The best opportunity for conducting a counter-offensive is when the attacking enemy forces have been dealt heavy losses and do not have the strength to continue their offensive and their reinforcements from the rear have not yet arrived. Generally speaking, this is the time when the offensive of the enemy is in a state of chaos and it is difficult for the enemy to continue their offensive but they are not yet ready to shift to defensive operations.

Creating an opportunity for a counter-offensive is the art of putting the enemy on the defensive, weakening the enemy and creating a better position and stronger forces compared to the enemy's in order to shift to a counter offensive. Position and forces are the prerequisites to and the basic factors in creating the strength for fighting the enemy in our campaign art. When, in the general comparison between ourselves and the enemy, we do not enjoy an absolute superiority over the enemy in such areas as troop strength and modern weapons and technical equipment, our counter-offensive campaigns usually must begin with positive activities designed to create the position and create the forces for a counter-offensive. These activities include blocking the enemy, maintaining or attacking and occupying areas in which the main counter-offensive force is being deployed and important terrain areas, dividing the enemy formation, pushing the enemy into an unfavorable position, isolating them from their rear forces and creating the conditions for the deployment of

our campaign mobile forces. If, in a certain situation, the above mentioned requirements are not met to the degree necessary, the campaign commander must take the initiative and employ resolute combat measures in order to rapidly create a position and avoid becoming passive and waiting, which could lead to the loss of the campaign initiative.

In the process of combat operations to create a position and make the necessary preparations for a counter-attack, special attention must be paid to maintaining secrecy. Everyone from the campaign command to the detachments must act in a skillful, secret manner; the intention to stage a counter-offensive absolutely must not be divulged. The organizing and deployment of the formations of the various assault groups must avoid observation and reconnaissance by the enemy. The transportation of troops must be carried out at night and decoy troops must be skillfully utilized in order to deceive the enemy.

When the opportunity emerges, we must promptly seize it in order to quickly shift to a counter-offensive. In a counter-offensive campaign, the situation changes very drastically, consequently, opportunities appear very quickly and also disappear very quickly. Every preparation must be carried out in a well coordinated manner and must be completed by the stipulated deadline; in particular, we must promptly move and deploy forces to provide the materials, ammunition and fuel needed to complete the immediate mission and the subsequent missions of the campaign.

Under conditions in which weapons of great killing power are being used, we must also attach importance to scheduling the start of a counter-offensive for a time that insures that the greatest possible killing power of the various types of weapons can be employed for the purpose of inflicting the heaviest possible losses upon the enemy and preventing them from shifting to defensive operations as well as withdrawing to previous defense lines or fleeing.

It is the art of flexibly applying the various methods of warfare, campaign fighting methods, in a manner consistent with the forces of the enemy in a counter-offensive campaign.

Depending upon each enemy force, the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy, the terrain and so forth, we must select the most efficient fighting method. In modern counter-offensive campaigns, this fighting method must be combat coordination among the various branches and services and a close coordination between the combat operations of the main force military corps and the local people's war. We can flexibly employ assaults and the method of encircling and annihilating the enemy, closely coordinate assaults and the encirclement of the enemy and coordinate frontal assaults with deep penetrations of the enemy's formation; we can effectively utilize a campaign battle position consisting of both battle lines and positions in between enemy positions, both mobile forces and stationary forces in order to rapidly encircle, isolate and annihilate the enemy.

It is necessary to seize the factor of surprise and insure a high rate of attack in counter-offensive campaigns. A counter-offensive involves attacking enemy

forces in order to take the offensive, attacking the enemy at a time when their deployment is undergoing a change. Our assaults and attacks must be strong and must be rapidly carried out so that the enemy cannot mount an organized resistance, cannot change their deployment and cannot bring in new forces to change the situation. Therefore, the general requirement is to select targets for attacks and methods of fighting that are suited to developing the offensive at a high rate of speed and quickly bringing the campaign to a victorious conclusion.

The most widely employed combat operation in a counter-offensive campaign is the attack, including attacks that are carried out during operations to move troops from one place to another. At the same time, campaign forces must be ready to annihilate enemy components that temporarily occupy highpoints, towns and so forth and are impeding our advance along main roads. If it is possible to go around the enemy, the best tactic is to surround the enemy in order to maintain the speed of the attack and leave these enemy forces to be dealt with by units in the rear. In the course of a campaign, there are also times when it is necessary to conduct a number of defensive battles in order to maintain favorable terrain or retaliate against enemy forces conducting a counter-offensive. Special importance must be attached to controlling or destroying enemy artillery positions and organizing widespread positions to fire on enemy aircraft and tanks.

Regardless of the method of fighting employed in a campaign, we must always remember to employ the tenacious, resistant and diverse fighting strength of local forces. Relying upon their mastery of the locality and the battlefield, the militia and self-defense forces, local troops, border defense troops, special operations forces and some main force troops that are in between enemy forces take the initiative and attack the enemy everywhere by means of every method of fighting and every weapon. This will make it necessary for the enemy to deal with us in many different ways everywhere, make it impossible for the enemy to move large forces and put the enemy into a confused, defensive position. Their coordination will be broken and their forces will be divided into individual components and isolated, thereby making it possible for our main force military corps to annihilate each large and important component of the enemy's forces and bring the counter-offensive campaign to a resounding conclusion or shift to an offensive campaign.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

DATA PROCESSING TECHNOLOGY SEEN AS NECESSARY IN COMMAND WORK

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[Article by Captain Le Tu Thanh: "Several Matters Concerning Automated Command Operations"]

[Text] Within our army, automated command operations have been in use for many years but many persons still do not have a clear idea of what automated command operations are. Below are several matters concerning automated command operations.

1. The Process of Formation and Development

From the viewpoint of cybernetics, command operations are a process of receiving information (information concerning ourselves, the enemy, the terrain, the population, the weather and so forth) and then storing and preliminarily processing this information (in the form of force statistical charts, calculations of stockpiled materials and so forth) so that the commander can, on this basis, make decisions and disseminate them in the form of orders, directives and instructions (including requests for new information) to subordinate units and agencies.

In the "period of mechanized warfare," due to the application of many scientific and technological advancements within the military field. Combat operations have been expanded in scale, the forms of warfare have become more complex and diverse, the rate at which combat operations move from one place to another and develop has increased and the forces participating in combat are large, consequently, the commander must have a complete staff to assist him in the process of commanding troops. This staff has become increasingly large in order to meet the information needs of the commander in accordance with the development of the various processes involved in war.

At the end of World War II, there was, at one time, dissatisfaction within the Soviet Army with the work efficiency of the large staffs. The very large number of persons on these staffs caused management to become complex and failed to meet the requirements of commanders. Therefore, there is a limit to how many persons can be added to a staff when the requirements of the commander increase.

Research showed that the largest component of this staff was not involved in helping the commander make decisions in order to command troops (work which involves thinking and creativity) but only in receiving and preliminarily processing information (repetitive work that is performed by pre-determined methods). Consequently, it was possible to automate some of the elements of the command process.

Today, in order to be able to make timely decisions, the commander must be able to obtain, in a short amount of time, a very large quantity of information, information that is well coordinated in many areas. Therefore, information has become the dominant element in command work. The commander has been forced to shift from leadership by response to organized leadership. The quality of command, especially from the campaign echelon upward, is dependent primarily upon the quality of this command support organization. At present, according to foreign military experts, there is an antagonism between the virulent development of modern weapons and technical equipment, including weapons of mass murder, of troop mobility and of fighting forces and existing command methods. Investigations have shown that due to time limitations, the commander and his staff make decisions in commanding combat using only about 30 percent of available information (reconnaissance and report information) and that the information they utilize is not the best information.

Thus, the problem arises of improving the quality of the command support organization (the staff organization). The quality of an organization is evaluated through the task facing the organization and the means of organization, the methods of organization that are employed and the personnel within the organization. Improving the quality of an organization involves a new, larger task based on applying new organizational methods and utilizing advanced means and personnel who possess new knowledge. One organizational means of an epochal nature is automated data processing. Here, data is understood as a specific form of information used for this means. Special purpose or general purpose computers are used in automated data processing. With them, it is possible to store and process a very large volume of information with a high degree of accuracy in a relatively short amount of time. This capability has led to the emergence of the command support automated data processing organization.

We define the automating of command operations as the process of replacing the command support organizations that primarily employ manpower and mechanized equipment by an automated data processing organization for the purpose of improving the quality of command staff work and achieving high efficiency in this work. Clearly, the use of computers does not, in and of itself, mean that automated command operations have been achieved; however, such operations have been achieved when an organization utilizing computers to support command operations have been created. The advantage of practical significance of this organization does not lie in the rationalizing of the existing organization. In order to make efficient use of new means, it is necessary to have new methods of organization and necessary to equip the personnel within the organization with new knowledge. For this reason, the development of automated command operations, despite the strides forward that were made in the 1960's and the

1970's, still lags behind the progress that has been made in the field of computers.

The process of development of automated command operations is divided into three stages. The first stage, which is called the separate stage, is characterized by:

--Resolving the separate problems, the individual problems, within each specific field of work with a view toward streamlining the labor force and economizing on time;

--Computing the problem that was solved as 100 percent;

--Organizing automated data processing in a manner consistent with the old organization plus a number of minor improvements.

An example of an automated command operation established in this stage is the system for computing the number of artillery shells needed for a campaign. On the basis of the type of campaign and the campaign strategy of the commander, we calculate the total number of shells needed for the campaign and break down this number by the various types of artillery. Because less and less time is available to prepare for a campaign and because the number of cadres at campaign headquarters is limited, the work of computing the number of shells needed for a campaign is performed on a computer with minor improvements being made, such as establishing a system of uniform symbols (a code) for the various types of artillery, the various types of ammunition, units and so forth. All of the jobs that are automated are jobs that are entirely familiar to the cadres within the organization. However, the work methods employed within the organization are improved. Ammunition assistants no longer need to concentrate their efforts on computing the amount of ammunition needed, rather, they can concentrate on coordinating the transportation of artillery shells and the deployment of the network of stations to support the basic missions and situations of the campaign. In this stage, the personnel within the command support organization become familiar with automated data processing. As they perform their job, their knowledge of automated data processing is increased and they develop a fuller and clearer understanding of the matters, which serves as the premise for the next stage.

The stage of coordination, which is the stage in which improvements are made to the separate stage, has its own special characteristics:

--The creation of compatibility among the separate automated command systems and the coordination of the operations of these systems;

--The specific percentage of the problem that is resolved is about 80 percent;

--The automated data processing organization is no longer suited to the old organization.

In this stage, related problems are resolved in a manner reflecting better coordination. For example, there is coordination between the automated support

of the transportation of ammunition, equipment and supplies for the campaign and the system of automation supporting the movement of troops. Both of these systems involve information concerning roads, important communication centers, staging points along the line of departure and the deadlines by which preparations for the campaign must be completed. In addition, the various transport convoys can also be considered units that operate on roads, as a result of which it becomes necessary to resolve the problem of traffic jams and to organize operations. Coordinating the activities of these two systems is clearly a rationalization. But is there not still an organizational problem that must be resolved? We cannot simply merge transport components and the troop transport components within one organization. These two components perform many different jobs.

Having made full preparations within the stage of coordination, we then proceed to the systems stage, which has the following characteristics:

--The implementation of well coordinated automated command systems within many fields of work;

--The specific percentage of the problem that is resolved is only about 10 percent;

--The automated data processing organization is a totally new one.

With these automated command systems, the command cadre and especially the staff are freed from work of a repetitive nature that is performed by pre-determined methods so that they can concentrate on jobs involved in the commanding of troops that require creative thinking. However, in order to be the masters of these systems, cadres must learn much more so that they can make quicker, more accurate decisions. Therefore, the matter of improving the quality of the command and staff organization as well as the quality of the persons within the organization and the matter of standardizing this organization will become more pressing. Thus, we see that automated command systems help us perform work better and with higher efficiency, consequently, the requirements of the persons utilizing these systems are also higher.

2. The Fundamental Elements of Automated Command Operations

The conditions that are needed in order to initiate automated command operations within the army are:

--The emergence of an actual need for automated command operations;

--The ability to equip with automated data processing technology;

--Fully preparing command cadres and their staffs politically and ideologically and improving their qualifications so that they are ready to initiate automated command operations.

Of these conditions, the first two are objective conditions and the last is a subjective condition.

The first condition is the cause underlying the formation and development of automated command operations. In order to determine whether or not this condition exists, we must examine the actual situation. We all know that our commanders have, for many years, been forced to accept a situation in which the work efficiency of their staffs has not kept pace with the development of combat or the development of modern technological equipment. At certain times and in certain battles, the work efficiency of the command organization has been low but steps have not been taken to improve or rationalize the command organization. To meet emergency command requirements, staffs must work very intensely, even work overtime, but are still unable to fully meet the requirements they face.

In order to initiate automated command operations, we must also determine whether or not the sources of automated data processing technology are permanent and stable. The usual sources of this technology, the computer industry of the state or fraternal countries, must be extremely dependable. Because, the supply of data processing technology for use in automated command operations must fully meet the need for matched equipment and spare parts in accordance with the plan and with emergency requirements in time of war. On the basis of the extent to which this condition exists, we can determine the degree to which we can employ automated command operations when a real need arises.

The third condition is clearly created by us. We know that certain political and ideological conditions are needed for the application of any scientific or technological advancement within the military field. The two processes of preparing cadres and soldiers politically and ideologically and applying scientific and technological advances are dialectically related to and stimulate each other. The same is true with regard to automated command operations. However, higher requirements are involved in preparing cadres politically and ideologically for automated command operations. Ordinarily, a scientific or technological advance is put into use in the form of a specific weapon or piece of equipment. Its superior nature in training and combat lies in the fact that it is so strongly persuasive that it can triumph over the conservatism of old organizations and help the commander decide to employ a new method of organization consistent with the use of this new weapon or piece of equipment. However, automated command operations cannot be immediately employed, rather, they must first be implemented by command cadres and their assistants with the active support of automated command cadres. As a result, the commander and his assistants must have a thorough understanding of automated command operations so that they can be utilized with a view toward improving the quality of command, not utilized as a machine is utilized. The requirements involved in making political and ideological preparations for automated command operations do not stop at building the determination of cadres. In addition to determination, cadres must also be equipped with the necessary knowledge so that they are prepared to implement automated command operations; only then can we consider ourselves to have made good political-ideological preparations. The realities of the implementation of automated command operations within the National People's Army of the GDR showed that automated command plans (automated

command systems that are in the process of development are called automated command plans) that were only implemented by the various groups of automated command cadres but did not have the active participation of commanders were a complete failure.

The purpose of automated command operations is to free the commander and his staff from jobs that are performed by pre-determined methods so that they can concentrate on jobs that require creative thinking and, on this basis, bring a new quality and high efficiency to command staff work. Consequently, in their initial stage, automated command operations, which primarily involve the repetition of the processes of receiving, storing and processing command information that were performed by means of manpower or which man recognized but could not perform because of limited manpower, are more complete and quicker due to the use of computers and special purpose transmitting equipment.

The need for automated command operations emerges in an objective manner. As a result, we must, whether we want to or not, initiate automated command operations. However, we must also fully examine various matters in order to determine the most efficient time for initiating automated command operations.

The first matter is that of making political and ideological preparations. If we fail to make good preparations in this area but still initiate automated command operations, we will encounter very large obstacles that could lead to a defeat, obstacles caused by:

--Cadres who lack confidence and, as a result, also lack determination;

--Cadres who lack knowledge and, as a result, view the matter in an erroneous, onesided manner, which leads to them resolving problems incorrectly or ineffectively;

--Cadres who are conservative or who want to maintain their position and, as a result, look for ways to postpone the implementation of automated command operations and supply incorrect information, thereby causing artificial difficulties.

The second matter is that of the forces, time, finances and means that are needed. The formulation of the automated command operations plan, of course, requires initial expenditures and these costs are sometimes relatively high. We must establish a balance between the day to day work of the unit and the formulation of the automated command operations plan, which frequently requires the concern and assistance of the upper echelon.

The third matter is that of meeting the new requirements arising from the use of the automated command operations system, such as the requirement that the information receiving system for an automated staff must be unified and tightly organized and meet strict time demands; the requirements involved in meeting the combat needs of an automated staff on the campaign echelon; the requirements regarding maintaining secrecy and fighting the electronic war; and the requirements regarding the corps of cadres of an automated staff.

And, finally, the implementation of the automated command operations plan itself is also a matter of major importance that must be carefully considered. Everything from the application of results of mathematics, cybernetics or the system's organization to determining the results of organizational measures to be taken and the plan for improving or establishing new organizations must be thoroughly considered and must be creative in nature.

Thus, in order to build an automated command operations system, determination alone is not enough, rather, we must also plan and calculate if we want to establish automated command operations systems that truly help us to improve the quality of command work. In the separate stage, the first stage in the implementation of automated command operations, incorrect viewpoints have emerged, such as considering the automated command operations system to be a "kind of ornamentation," such as computers must be used in our work but we need not concern ourselves much with efficiency and so forth. Such viewpoints have resulted in major waste. Therefore, commanders must examine their present requirements and the requirements they will face in the future in order to establish automated command operations systems that are truly of assistance in command staff work.

3. The Results We Have Achieved in the Field of Automated Command Operations

In order to fully evaluate the results that have been recorded, we must first examine the conditions under which we are carrying out automated command operations.

In the war of liberation, many troop units operated independently far from their commanders on the battlefields in positions located amongst enemy positions. As a result, the flow of command information was irregular and incomplete and the accuracy of this information was limited. Staff operations had to be extremely flexible and creative and could not be prescribed in advance. The commander had to command troops by dealing with situations as they arose. As a result, the need for automated command operations did not arise.

In a war to protect the fatherland, we have the conditions for making the army a more regular-force and modern army and providing it with an increasingly full, accurate and timely supply of command information, consequently, the command information requirements of the commander are higher. However, we cannot make the command of the army a regular-force and modern command in a short period of time.

On the basis of the actual situation, we clearly saw the need of our army for automated command operations, clearly saw the guidelines for performing this work as well as the guidelines for preparing troops politically and ideologically and providing the corps of cadres with training. At the same time, we have learned valuable lessons concerning specific organizational measures, such as defining the steps for carrying out an automated command program, organizing forces for formulating a program, organizing an information receiving network and so forth. These lessons had to be learned from actual practice, no one taught them to us.

We have established a corps of automated command cadres who are qualified and experienced and who are gradually becoming able to meet the requirements of modern automated command operations within the army in the near future. In its day to day work, this corps of cadres has displayed increasing initiative, overcome its difficulties and helped the command cadres and a number of staff agencies on the strategic level successfully implement a number of separate automated command programs while helping to successfully meet a number of the requirements in the buildup of forces of the party and state. This corps of cadres is spreading relatively widely within the various branches and services.

A number of automated command systems have gone into operation and have yielded initial results. These results are not only the product of the extraordinary efforts made by automation cadres, but also the product of the diligent study by many cadres in charge and their assistants in a number of fields of work within command staff agencies on the strategic level.

Our country is in a situation in which "it is at peace but must contend with a multi-faceted war of sabotage being waged by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists; at the same time, we must be ready to deal with a possible large-scale war of aggression launched by the enemy." Thus, our army must maintain combat readiness and build up its forces at the same time. The technical equipment of a more modern army, more uniform standards for staff size, troops strength and equipment and a standardized corps of cadres will cause more needs for automated command operations to emerge and cause these needs to be more obvious. However, this process will develop gradually. We have the time needed to implement automated command operations in a gradual and steady manner and create the conditions for long-range development. The main task we have now is to meet the requirements of agencies in the management of cadres, troop strength, finances, equipment, materials, weapons, ammunition, military gear, food for the military and so forth and a number of military technical requirements. Combat staff work is usually complicated work that is dependent upon a large number of factors that usually cannot be quantified, consequently, we must conduct research, the sooner the better, because results cannot be achieved in only a few years. In order to meet these requirements, we must first attach importance to the following specific jobs:

--Formulating a plan and leading the implementation of the plan for implementing automated command operations throughout the army;

--Gradually preparing command cadres and their assistants political and ideologically through the academies and schools and through on-the-job training;

—Building a corps of automation cadres who specialize in data processing and also have basic knowledge of military science and the management profession;

--Gradually perfect the system of agencies that assist and guide automated command operations.

With the technical equipment that we now have and the modernization of this equipment that will gradually occur as a result of the development of our country's economy and our national defense technology and as a result of assistance from the fraternal countries and with our advanced military science and art, with our corps of command and staff cadres who were forged and challenged in the realities of combat against the French and the Americans, who now must deal with and win victory over the war of aggression of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists and who are always diligently studying to improve their qualifications and their knowledge in the fields of modern military science and military technology, our army will surely build an increasingly modern command organization, one that fully meets the requirements involved in the buildup and the combat of our army at present and in the future.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ARTICLE DESCRIBES GROWTH OF ARMED FORCES IN KAMPUCHEAN PROVINCE

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese Oct 82 pp 57-66

[The Armed Forces of the Fraternal Countries feature by Nhu Phong: "Svay Rieng Province Successfully Builds the Local People's Revolutionary Armed Forces"]

[Text] In the more than 3 years that they have been building their forces and conducting combat operations under the correct leadership of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party, the people's revolutionary armed forces of Svay Rieng Province in Kampuchea, which were born in the revolutionary struggle of the masses to topple the genocidal Pol Pot regime and build and defend the country, have matured rapidly and become one of the leaders of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Armed Forces.

The local troops of the province, the local troops of the districts and the armed units engaged in mass agitation together with the guerrilla units of the hamlets and villages form the people's revolutionary armed forces, form the nucleus of the movement of all the people to fight the enemy, protect the fruits of the revolution and build the new life of the province. The provincial and district troop units have been coordinating well with the Vietnamese troop units performing their international task within the locality and have conducted independent combat operations with increasingly high efficiency. Guerrilla forces, which have been established in virtually all hamlets and villages, have, in concert with the people, maintained order and security and fought the enemy to protect the life and property of the people. Over the past several years, the people's revolutionary armed forces of Svay Rieng Province have fought hundreds of battles; killed, captured or forced the surrender of thousands of enemy troops and routed many armed units and reactionary political parties; confiscated hundreds of weapons of all types; and protected the revolutionary government, thereby providing increasingly good security for the people of the province in their life of working to build the country. The cadres and soldiers of the armed forces have actively participated in the mobilization of the masses, the buildup of revolutionary forces, productive labor, the building of the new life and the maintenance of social order and security, thereby proving themselves worthy of being a key force in the revolutionary movement of the locality and winning the love and respect of the people. As a result of the achievements mentioned above, the people's revolutionary armed forces of Svay Rieng Province have received appropriate awards.

In 1980, Battalion 16A of the provincial local army was awarded the Third Class National Defense Medal and the Award Banner of the Ministry of National Defense. In 1981, the people's revolutionary armed forces of Svay Rieng Province were rated one of the outstanding units of the country and awarded the Rotating Banner of the Ministry of National Defense.

The armed forces of Svay Rieng Province have only experienced slightly more than three years of combat and building their forces under the extremely difficult and complex circumstances of a country, of a locality, that lived through the reign of genocide and terror of the Pol Pot regime. On the basis of the rapid growth they have made qualitatively and quantitatively in all areas of activity, in the buildup of forces, in combat operations and in their work, we can begin to relate the profound, useful lessons that have been learned and the matters that are in the nature of principles in the buildup of the revolutionary armed forces.

Relying Firmly upon the Revolutionary Movement of the Masses in Order To Build the Revolutionary Armed Forces.

Under the genocidal Pol Pot regime, every revolutionary organization, every revolutionary force that the people of Kampuchea had built during the resistance against the United States was betrayed, slandered and turned into reactionary tools by the Pol Pot clique, into tools for opposing the people and serving their counter-revolutionary goal.

For this reason, following the tremendous victory won on 7 January 1979, one of the first tasks of decisive significance of the Kampuchean revolution was to quickly rebuild the revolutionary forces and revolutionary organizations to serve as the nucleus leading the people in building the country, fighting the enemy, maintaining the achievements that had been recorded and advancing the Kampuchean revolution. To accomplish this, it was necessary to propagandize, enlighten and mobilize the masses. To do this, the revolutionary government mobilized the cadres on the various levels to go to the hamlets and villages, go to each family and each person in order to propagandize and enlighten the masses. By means of appropriate, easily understood forms of organization, cadres led the various strata of the people in studying the line, studying the positions and policies of the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation many times so that they recognize the victory won by us, recognize the defeat suffered by the enemy and are able to discern among enemies, friends and ourselves in the new stage of the revolution.

The effort to propagandize and bring revolutionary enlightenment to the masses has always been closely linked to the efforts to organize and stabilize the life of the people within each area, each hamlet, village and family, accelerate production, fight famine, treat disease and implement the programs and policies of the front well in order to benefit the masses in a practical way. In this way, the masses have been shown that the new system is truly one that exists for the benefit of the people, exists to protect the people and is completely different from the Pol Pot genocidal regime.

In order to launch the revolutionary movement of the masses, another very important matter, in conjunction with teaching the people in order to raise their level of political awareness and organize good compliance with the various policies designed to improve their living conditions, has been that of liberating the masses from the control of the thinking of the enemy

Although the ruling apparatus of Pol Pot has been crushed, the Pol Pot clique, instead of accepting its defeat, has looked for every way to counter attack the revolution. Taking advantage of the fact that the revolutionary government is still young and taking advantage of the psychology of fear of the Pol Pot genocidal regime that still exists among some persons, the routed enemy forces within the country, collaborating with remnant forces outside the country, have looked for every way and trick, including acts of terrorism, to control the people and threatening anyone who eagerly participates in the work of building the new life and actively supports the new system. In order to break this control exerted by the enemy, the revolutionary government has intensified its propaganda and educational efforts in order to clearly show the masses the irreversible nature of the victory won by the revolution on 7 January 1979, give them confidence in the new system and promptly expose the deceptive, distorted propaganda of the enemy. A widespread movement has been launched within each stratum of the people and within each family to denounce the old and new crimes of the Pol Pot genocidal clique and closely unite with the revolutionary government, with Vietnamese troops, in order to firmly protect the fruits of the revolution. On the other hand, an effort has been organized to pursue and mop up remnant enemy forces still hiding in the forests, capture hoodlum ringleaders who are living among the people, thoroughly destroy the sources of their armed activities, protect the peaceful labors and the lives of the people, liberate them from their fear of the enemy and, on this basis, gradually teach the people the thinking of being the masters of the country, the masters of the hamlet and village, the masters of their own lives.

As a result, the knowledge that the masses have of the revolution, of the new system, of the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation headed by President Heng Samrin has gradually been deepened. The patriotism and the tremendous capabilities of the masses have been tapped.

At the same time, the building and organizing of revolutionary forces have been carried out in a very urgent and tightly controlled manner. The revolutionary government has been established from the provincial and district levels to the hamlets and villages, thereby providing the masses with a base of support in their work of building the new life. The mass organizations of youths and women have gradually been established and have drawn youths and women into social activities. In particular, production solidarity teams, which have been rapidly and widely organized, have assembled and mobilized every farmer in the countryside to display love for one another, actively engage in production, build a life of comfort for themselves and help to build the country.

As a result, the revolutionary spirit and movement of masses have been mobilized. The masses have been enthusiastically participating in building the revolutionary government, accelerating production and building the new life and have been actively participating in the fight against the enemy and the establishment and maintenance of order and security within the locality.

As regards production, the amount of area under the cultivation of rice and rice yields have constantly increased. With confidence in the economic development programs and policies of the party and state, the people have worked very hard, both day and night; at many places, the masses volunteered to disarm mines in order to make fields (in 3 years, nearly 6,500 mines have been disarmed, thereby clearing nearly 7,000 hectares of land). The artisan and handicraft trades, such as cloth weaving, the production of palm sugar, the production of consumer goods, farm implements and so forth, have also begun to be restored.

As regards the fight against the enemy, the armed forces and the people have fought hundreds of large and small battles against the enemy, killed, captured or forced the surrender of thousands of enemy troops and forced the surrender of thousands of other persons who have confessed their crimes to the people. Today, in Svay Rieng Province, the units and organizations of the reactionary political parties of the enemy have been virtually annihilated and routed.

In education, whereas there were only 362 schools consisting of 1,013 classes with an enrollment of slightly more than 45,000 students in 1979, in the 1981-1982 school year, there were nearly 400 level I schools and kindergartens and 4 level II schools consisting of 1,400 classes and nearly 90,000 level I, level II and kindergarten students. One of every three citizens is attending school.

In public health, the province has a hospital with more than 300 beds. The districts have infirmaries with 30 to 40 beds. All villages have medical aid stations.

As the revolutionary movement of the masses has grown, mass organizations have been formed, strengthened and developed in a widespread manner, thereby creating an intense revolutionary spirit among the masses. This is the firm foundation underlying the birth and growth of the people's revolutionary armed forces of Svay Rieng Province.

Attaching Importance to Cultivating and Teaching the Revolutionary Nature, the Popular Nature of the Armed Forces

The realities of the history of the Kampuchean armed forces have proven that cultivating the revolutionary nature, the popular nature of the armed forces is a matter of decisive significance.

In order to cultivate the revolutionary nature of the armed forces, the leadership organization of the province has given very much attention to teaching cadres and soldiers that the revolutionary nature of the revolutionary armed forces at this time is the nature of the working class, led by the party of the working class. The highest goals of the people's revolutionary armed forces are to serve the people, serve the fatherland and advance to socialism. Their combat objective is to successfully implement the revolutionary line set forth by the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party.

At the same time, studying the line, programs and policies of the party and state of the Republic of Kampuchea has always been considered the primary, central element in teaching politics to cadres and soldiers.

On the basis of Kampuchea's actual situation, while cultivating and teaching the revolutionary nature of the armed forces, the leadership organization has given its attention to deeply analyzing and showing to cadres and soldiers the betrayal, the anti-revolutionary, anti-popular nature of the army during the period of Pol Pot and has always stressed that the revolutionary armed forces must, in every situation, maintain their working class nature, be loyal to the undertaking of the party, be ready to fight and die for the interests of the nation, closely unite and establish a close militant alliance with the two fraternal countries of Vietnam and Laos and unite with the community of socialist countries. Being remote from the masses, being against the people and against friends is contrary to the revolutionary nature of the revolutionary army.

By means of historic evidence, the leadership organization has showed cadres and soldiers that the army during the Sihanouk period was a tool of dictatorship of the feudal-bourgeois state and was the "father" of the people; the army of Pol Pot, although it bore the label of a people's army, was, in essence, a tool for suppressing the people and going against the interests of the nation; the people's revolutionary armed forces of today, which were born and have grown up in the fight waged by all the people against the genocidal Pol Pot regime, are the children of the people of the various nationalities living in Kampuchea. This army fights and dies for the interests of the people, consequently, it always respects the people and protects the life, property and right of ownership of the people. The cadres and soldiers of today's armed forces must be the worthy inheritors of the glorious tradition of close unity with the people of the It-xa-rac [Vietnamese phonetics] troops and absolutely must not place themselves above the people or bother the people.

The revolutionary nature of the revolutionary armed forces has not only been cultivated by means of teaching politics, but also by means of organization. All of the cadres and soldiers of the local troops of the province and the districts and of the hamlet and village guerrilla units in Svay Rieng Province are activists within the revolutionary movement of the masses who bear a deep hatred of the Pol Pot regime, have the love of the people, have been introduced, selected and evaluated by the mass organizations and have been purified in the realities of the revolutionary struggle.

In order to cultivate the revolutionary nature of the armed forces, the leadership organization of Svay Rieng Province has attached very much importance to forging troops in the realities of the performance of tasks. The armed forces, regardless of where they are and regardless of the job they are performing, must display a high sense of serving the interests of the people and protecting the property and life of the people. They must always respect and maintain close ties with the revolutionary government within the locality and maintain strict civilian proselyting discipline.

The leadership organization of Svay Rieng Province has established the following regulations: when not training, engaged in combat or resting, units must use the time that they have to send their troops among the people to learn the thoughts and aspirations of the people and propagandize and agitate for the revolution among the masses. Troops must be organized to disarm the mines and grenades remaining from the war against Vietnam in order to free arable land for production and insure the safety of the people in production. Troops must be sent into the hamlets and villages to help the people stabilize their lives, rebuild their homes, clear land for gardens, clean up areas, build schools, build bathhouses and give haircuts to children. Troops must share what they have and help people when they are experiencing shortages, must treat the people when they are ill and must care for them more than they do for the persons within their own families. In this way, troops gain an even deeper understanding of the life of the people, develop a deeper respect and love for the people, become closer to the people and are ready to fight and die for them.

Whenever a troop unit is transferred to another place, it holds a meeting with the local people and government so that the people can contribute their opinions concerning the development of troops. Cadres and soldiers who violate the code of discipline in civilian proselyting are promptly brought before the unit and the people and harshly criticized. As a result, the people have developed an even deeper love of troops and realize even more clearly that today's troops are truly the children of the people, truly fight for the sake of the people. The relationship between the army and the people has become increasingly warm and close.

Building and Forging Forces at the Same Time and, Through the Forging of Forces in Reality, Improving the Quality and Increasing the Number of Forces

With a full understanding of the functions and tasks of the revolutionary armed forces, the leadership organization of Svay Rieng Province has pointed out that the establishment of the local troops of the province and its districts, of the hamlet and village guerrilla units not only has the purpose of performing the tasks of guarding and protecting agencies and meetings or escorting cadres on the various levels to assignments, rather, the main task is to fight and be ready to fight to protect the fruits of the revolution, protect the people and be the nucleus in the performance of the political tasks of the entire country as well as the locality. On the other hand, due to the special features of the situation surrounding the Kampuchean revolution, a situation in which although the enemy has been defeated and the country is at peace, the Beijing expansionists, the imperialists and their lackeys are resurrecting and assembling forces at home and abroad and employing every conceivable malicious method, including accelerating armed activities, in order to oppose and undermine the Kampuchean revolution, it has been necessary to rapidly forge the revolutionary armed forces in the realities of the revolutionary struggle of the entire party and all the people, considering this to be an important principle in improving the quality of the revolutionary armed forces of the province.

Here, the forging of the armed forces in the realities of the struggle has been carried out in an effective and determined manner under the guidelines of immediately

utilizing newly organized forces in activities, immediately applying all lessons that are learned in training and applying these lessons in a manner progressing from the small to the large, from a low level of development to a high level of development. On the basis of applying the lessons that are learned in everyday practice, the awareness and the actions, the political level, the sense of organization and discipline, the technical and tactical proficiency, the physical conditioning and so forth of forces are strengthened and improved. Also through the forging and challenging of forces in reality, cadres and soldiers have been purified, key leadership and command organizations have been strengthened and the overall quality of the armed forces has been improved.

In order to implement this principle in the buildup of forces, the leadership organization of the province has taken many steps to forge armed units in the realities of the struggle. These steps have included sending troops into hamlets and villages, especially in strategically important areas, to mobilize the masses, build the revolutionary government and help the people carry out production and stabilize the various areas of their lives; in this way, the revolutionary nature and the spirit of serving the people of the armed forces have been forged, thereby making the relationship between the army and the people an even closer relationship. These steps have included organizing troops and guerrilla units in operations to disarm mines and grenades along the border between Svay Rieng and Tay Ninh in Vietnam in order to restore arable land, insure the safety of farmers and travellers and, in this way, teach the spirit of bravery, the spirit of serving the interests of the people without fear of sacrifices or hardships while improving the technical skills of cadres and improving their ability to organize, command and manage troops. These steps have included gradually sending troops into actual combat with the enemy. Beginning by coordinating with Vietnamese units in attacking enemy forces hiding among the people, attacking them during the day, the troops of the province advanced to the point where they were ambushing enemy forces moving into hamlets and villages from the jungle at night and then to the point of conducting independent combat operations to pursue and mop up enemy forces in the jungles. They have developed from fighting the enemy within their locality to fighting the enemy in other areas in coordination with friendly units and in accordance with the requirements of the upper echelon. They have developed from attacking individual groups of enemy forces to attacking their bases in the jungle; developed from independent armed forces attacking the enemy to armed forces coordinating with the political forces of the masses, armed forces coordinating combat operations with attacks and military proselyting in phases of operation in the nature of an integrated offensive campaign of the people's war within the locality. These steps have also included having troops coordinate with the armed work units in the hamlets and villages to mobilize the masses to expose underground enemy forces as well as enemy elements that are working on both sides in the government and the in the revolutionary mass organizations, expose and support the capture of enemy forces coming from the outside to infiltrate the people, make contact with bases, receive supplies and so forth.

As a result of being forged in combat and work, the organizations within the armed forces have gradually been strengthened and the various areas of activity, such as political activities, staff activities, combat readiness

training and rear serve work, have been developed and have gradually been put on a regular basis. The command cadres on the various echelons have quickly learned necessary and useful lessons concerning the command, management and training of troops, concerning organizing reconnaissance and combat operations. A stratum of cadres and soldiers has emerged who are loyal to the revolution, are filled with zeal, are brave in combat, are active in their work, love the other members of their units, love the people, possess the sense of organization and discipline and diligently study technology, tactics and command work. This stratum is a source of cadres to supplement the command cadres on the various echelons. More and more hamlet and village guerrilla units that conduct good combat operations have emerged as have more and more district and provincial local units that have recorded outstanding achievements in both combat and work.

In keeping with the requirements of the development of the revolution and as a result of being forged in the realities of the revolutionary movement of the masses, the troops of Svay Rieng Province have grown from 1 battalion to several battalions encompassing such necessary branches as the combat support branch, the information branch, the engineer branch, the reconnaissance branch, the transport branch and so forth. The province has also supplemented the main force troops with one strong battalion. In all districts and cities, one to two local army companies that fight rather well have been established. Hamlet and village guerrilla units have been widely established; each hamlet has from one to two squads and each village has a platoon that are politically dependable because they have been challenged and purified in combat.

With the Revolutionary Armed Forces Serving as the Nucleus, Launching a Movement of All the People To Fight the Enemy, of All the People Participating in the Buildup of the Armed Forces

The leadership of Svay Rieng Province has maintained that the revolutionary armed forces alone are not enough to defeat every malicious scheme and trick of the enemy, rather, it is also necessary to mobilize all the people to participate along with the armed forces in the fight against the enemy.

Relying upon the revolutionary spirit of the masses following their liberation and the remolding of their thinking, Svay Rieng Province launched a movement of all the people to arise and, together with the revolutionary armed forces, fight the enemy in order to protect their homes, protect their lives.

The province has mobilized all the people to participate in the "four no's" movement: do not maintain relations with the enemy, do not resupply the enemy, do not conceal the enemy, do not join the enemy. The people have exposed to the armed forces and the revolutionary government many obstinate enemy forces hiding among the people in order to oppose and undermine the revolution. Many persons who were once controlled by the enemy have now voluntarily severed their ties with the enemy and no longer go into the jungles to resupply the enemy with food, no longer supply information to them, rather, they are guiding troops whose mission it is to ambush, pursue and mop up enemy forces. The people and the

guerrilla units stand guard every night to protect their hamlets and villages. In areas that adjoin the mountainous jungles, the various strata of the people have been actively participating in the movement to encircle combat villages. In Ro-me-hec District [Vietnamese phonetics] there are 24 hamlets within the 8 combat villages.

The movement of all the people participating in enemy proselyting activities has received enthusiastic response from the people and has played a major role in routing the enemy's forces. Some wives have carried their children all the way to the camps of the enemy in the jungle to appeal to their husbands to join the revolution. Many families have had relatives of theirs who once served as lackeys of the enemy but who are no longer under enemy control nor following a life of crime present themselves to the revolution and confess their crimes to the people. Some persons have taken the weapons of their husbands and sons who support the enemy and turned them into the revolutionary government. Elders and school students have also eagerly participated in encouraging enemy soldiers to join the revolution and have taken enemy weapons and turned them over to the armed forces.

In combat, the armed forces have closely coordinated with the people and made flexible use of enemy proselyting in many battles with good results. For example, in the drive to pursue and mop up enemy forces in March, 1980, thousands of people coordinated with the armed forces in fighting the enemy. When troops opened fire, the people in the vicinity of the battle held a meeting to display the strength of their forces and appealed to the enemy to surrender, to join the revolution. In some battles, the people have encircled enemy forces, beat drums and wooden fish and burned torches throughout the night while appealing to the troops of the enemy to return to the people, thereby creating strong pressure for the armed forces fighting the enemy within the encirclement to use.

As a result of launching the movement of all the people to fight the enemy and protect their native villages, all of the large and small battles waged by the local troops of the province and the districts and by the hamlet and village guerrilla units have been highly efficient battles that have resulted in the killing of enemy forces and the capturing of weapons. Large underground bases of the enemy among the people or in the jungles have been destroyed and enemy forces, having no where else to hide, have been forced to surrender. The Hoang Gia Division led by the reactionary Chan Xao was routed and Chan Xao was captured. The reactionary political party organizations and units within Svay Rieng Province have been smashed to pieces.

In military recruiting, Svay Rieng Province has fully adhered to the slogan: Svay Rieng Province will provide whatever armed forces are needed and insure that these armed forces meet political standards. In all phases of military recruiting, Svay Rieng Province has exceeded the norms assigned by the upper level. When recruits are being turned over to the army, the people and the various mass organizations have held ceremonies to bid farewell to their sons joining the army, ceremonies that have been like local festivals, thereby making a good impression

upon the persons joining the army as well as those remaining behind and creating an attitude of being ready to join the army, being ready to leave to fight in defense of the country, in defense of one's native village.

Although many difficulties are still being encountered in everyday life, under the leadership of the local party organization, the people of Svay Rieng Province, especially the production solidarity teams, have made an effort to implement the army's rear area policies. All families that have sons in the armed forces are fully cared for spiritually by the revolutionary government and the people; when they are encountering difficulties in their material lives, the people share what they have with them; when they lack labor or tools, the production solidarity team gives priority to assisting them. Each family of military personnel has been issued by the revolutionary government a letter entitling them to priority medical treatment at hospitals. These actions have had a profound impact upon the thinking and actions of the cadres and soldiers of the armed forces, have encouraged and motivated them to record outstanding feats of arms in combat and work and build increasingly strong and large armed forces.

Constantly Cultivating and Building Close Militant Solidarity with the Army and People of Vietnam

This has been a very important factor in the rapid and steady growth of the people's revolutionary armed forces of Svay Rieng Province.

In the process of building the people's revolutionary armed forces within the locality, Svay Rieng Province has attached full importance to teaching the people and teaching the cadres and soldiers of the armed forces to be fully imbued with the close militant solidarity between the people and army of Kampuchea and the people and army of Vietnam, considering this to be a tremendous source of strength for defending and building the country.

By means of vivid historic evidence, the various levels of leadership within the province have shown cadres and soldiers that the growth of the revolutionary armed forces of Kampuchea has been closely linked to the invaluable assistance provided by the people and the People's Army of Vietnam. Many of the present command cadres of the revolutionary armed forces in Svay Rieng Province are patriots who were once controlled by the Pol Pot regime but fled to Vietnam where they were supported by the people of Long An and Tay Ninh and trained by the Vietnam People's Army. This militant solidarity has been constantly strengthened and developed since the victory of the Kampuchean revolution and, in keeping with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two countries, Vietnamese troops have stood shoulder to shoulder with Kampuchean troops in the fight to protect and build the country of Kampuchea. Today, close unity with Vietnam is not only a matter of sentiment and reason, but is also expressed in concrete actions in the life of building and fighting of the cadres and soldiers of the armed forces of Svay Rieng Province.

In the fight, the troop units of Svay Rieng Province have closely coordinated with Vietnamese troop units in order to attack the enemy. Whereas Vietnamese troops are ready to charge forth to the places of greatest violence and difficulty in a battle, the cadres and soldiers of the armed forces of Svay Rieng

do not fear sacrifice and have closely coordinated with Vietnamese troops to pursue and attack the enemy.

In training and in the buildup of their forces, the cadres and soldiers of the armed forces of Svay Rieng Province have not feared the difficulties or hardships involved in exchanging experiences with and learning from the experiences of Vietnamese troops. The command cadres of the units of the armed forces of Svay Rieng Province have always closely united and cooperated with Vietnamese military specialists, sincerely exchanged experiences concerning training, the organization of combat operations, combat and troop management and discussed plans for coordinating combat operations and work.

In their daily lives, sympathizing with the fact that the cadres and soldiers of Vietnam are living far from their fatherland, far from their native villages in order to fulfill their international obligation in Svay Rieng, the cadres and soldiers of the armed forces of Svay Rieng Province always create every possible favorable condition for the Vietnamese units to complete their tasks well. The cadres and soldiers of the Svay Rieng provincial troops wholeheartedly assist Vietnamese troops when they come into contact with the Kampuchean people and are performing civilian proselyting work. The cadres and soldiers of the Svay Rieng provincial troops always inquire about the well being of and present gifts to Vietnamese troops on the occasion of the celebration of holidays and Tet by the people and armies of the two countries.

The graves of the cadres and soldiers of the Vietnam People's Army who have died in Svay Rieng Province are being well cared for by the people and the armed forces of Svay Rieng Province.

The cadres and soldiers of the armed forces of Svay Rieng Province, imbued with the pure sentiment of international solidarity, are not only conscious of always combating the distorted arguments and propaganda used by the enemy to divide the peoples and the armies of the two countries, but also explain and show to the people the tremendous sacrifices being made by the people and army of Vietnam for the sake of the Kampuchean revolution, for the sake of Svay Rieng Province, thereby thwarting the counter propaganda of the enemy among the people.

The leadership organization of Svay Rieng Province has observed that their achievements as well as their experiences in the buildup of the people's revolutionary armed forces are only initial achievements and experiences. The revolutionary situation and tasks are constantly developing throughout the country as well as within Svay Rieng Province. The people's revolutionary armed forces must urgently be built and made increasingly strong in order to keep pace with the new developments of the revolution.

The matter of cultivating the revolutionary nature of the people's revolutionary armed forces is the matter of decisive significance in the buildup of the revolutionary armed forces of Kampuchea; the revolutionary nature of the armed forces must constantly be cultivated and strengthened, must become part of the consciousness of each cadre and soldier and must be expressed by means of concrete actions in the daily life of each cadre and soldier.

Strengthening the leadership of the armed forces by the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party, which primarily involves making every effort to build the party organization and accept new party members within units, is a pressing matter. The elementary and advanced training of a corps of cadres who possess good personal qualities and are competent must be carried out in a planned manner so that these cadres can serve as the nucleus of the effort to build units and buildup the armed forces.

The training of troops and guerrillas also must be further accelerated in order to raise the technical and tactical proficiency, the level of combat readiness and the combat skills of the armed forces.

The new tasks also demand that the sense of organization and discipline of the cadres and soldiers within the armed forces be constantly forged.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

5TH MILITARY REGION REVIEWS WAR AGAINST UNITED STATES

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[Article based on the review of the war or resistance against the United States by the 5th Military Region: "The Local People's War on the Battlefield of the 5th Military Region in the War of Resistance Against the United States for National Salvation"]

[Text] The local people's war on the battlefield of the 5th Military Region in the resistance against the United States for national salvation developed in a very profound manner. Below are a few experiences that were gained with regard to strongly developing the strategic role of the local people's war in the people's war of national liberation in the 5th Military Region.

1. The Party Must Cling Tightly to the People, Must Lead and Organize the People in Participating in the Local People's War

The fact that large numbers of people in the countryside and the cities were determined to arise in struggle was a factor that determined the existence and the development of the local people's war in the war of national liberation. From the very start of the war of resistance against the French, the guerrilla war being waged in Zone 5 had the participation of large numbers of people in both the mountains and the lowlands, people who participated in this war to many different degrees and made worthy contributions to the glorious victory of the entire country. During the war of resistance against the United States, although the war was much larger in scale and much more fierce, the Zone 5 party organization led the people's war steadily forward. Between the time of the Tra Bong uprising in August, 1959, and the uprising in the mountains in late 1960 and the lowlands in 1964, the guerrilla war and the local people's war had become a mode whereby the masses arose, seized and maintained control, built combat villages and hamlets and so forth. The local people's war continued to develop in the years from 1965 to 1968 and in 1972, 1974 and 1975, not only in the countryside, the mountainous jungles and the lowlands, but also in the cities, in the areas into which the enemy had herded the people, thereby gaining control of many areas within enemy territory and close to their large bases. The local people and the local armed forces continuously attacked the enemy everywhere; at the same time, they organized "campaigns of the local people's war" to attack and counter attack the enemy in order to expand and maintain their control

and help to liberate the locality when a major opportunity arose, thereby contributing to the common victory won by the entire region.

An indispensable factor in the masses accepting the line of the party was the leadership role of the party organization, especially the basic party organizations. The party had to maintain deep roots among the masses in every situation, had to educate and organize the masses in the struggle on an increasingly high level. As the fight became increasingly fierce, it became increasingly necessary for the party organization to show party members the need to cling to the people, to organize and teach the people and to stand shoulder to shoulder with the people in the fight against the enemy without fear of sacrifice, without regret for the loss of blood. Throughout the resistance against the United States, even at the most arduous and difficult times, such as 1956-1957, 1963 and 1969-1970, party members, cadres and the armed forces, most importantly party members, clung to the people; as one line fell in battle, another took its place and continued to cling to the people. When our regular forces were temporarily unable to stand their ground, the party members, cadres and armed forces on the basic level (guerrillas) continued to cling to the people. If they were very heavily attacked by the enemy and temporarily forced to leave, they were determined to find a way to return to their positions. When citizens were herded into the cities, into concentration camps, party members and cadres did everything they could to stay with them. At those places at which party members remained with the people, be those places in the mountains, the rural lowlands or the cities, there was a political base, there were guerrillas, there was a struggle and there was a local people's war.

The All-Military Region Guerrilla War Conferences reached the following conclusions: the party must cling to the people, the people must cling to the land, guerrillas must cling to the enemy and the upper level must cling to the lower level; party members must have deep roots among the people and must mobilize the people to struggle against the enemy. This was a valuable lesson, was the secret to the victory of the local people's war in the 5th Military Region.

2. Building Up the Local Armed Forces To Serve as the Strong Nucleus of the Local People's War

In order for the local people's war to develop steadily and fulfill its missions in every situation, it had to have a strong nucleus. Therefore, we had to concern ourselves with building the local armed forces in a well coordinated manner to serve as this nucleus. In the uprisings of the masses, only with nucleus components that had been educated, trained and equipped to the necessary degree was it possible to complete the task of annihilating hoodlums and spies and create the conditions for successful uprisings by the masses. At all places, even at places at which extremely favorable opportunities existed, it was absolutely necessary to have basic political forces and basic armed forces to serve as the nucleus in order for the masses to stage an uprising. The realities on the battlefield of the 5th Military Region proved that the local people's war only developed in a steady fashion when the political forces provided a strong, solid base and the local armed forces were organized and trained well, were

organized and trained in a manner consistent with the requirements of each stage of the war. These armed forces had to be well coordinated, had to include both centralized armed forces and basic level armed forces, both mobile forces and stationary forces. Separating these two forces or giving light attention to one of these forces created difficulties and limited the victories won by the local people's war. Each force, each element of the military had its own position and function; at the same time, they were closely linked to one another within the system of revolutionary political and armed forces, consequently, one force or element could not be utilized to perform the function of another force or element and light attention could not be given to any force or element.

Relying firmly upon the organized political base of the masses, every effort had to be made to develop the armed forces on the basic level, develop them into large forces of high quality. The armed forces on the basic level, which consisted of masses who possessed revolutionary awareness and who voluntarily participated in the armed struggle, were the nucleus of the armed struggle and the uprisings on the basic level. Throughout the course of the war, the 5th Military Region attached importance to building the local armed forces on the basic level. In 1965, when the liberated zone was expanded, the zone party committee and the military region party committee promptly launched a movement of all the people to participate in the guerrilla war. The zone party committee issued the following resolution: "On the basic level, 100 percent of cadres and party members must participate in the fight and 100 percent of Youth Union members and 70 percent or more of party members must join the guerrilla militia." This resolution, which was scrupulously implemented, helped the local people's war to develop strongly and survive, even in the cities and concentration areas, at times when the movement was encountering difficulties (such as 1969 and 1970). The military region also gave its attention to building widespread armed forces on the basic level within the various strategic areas and areas of vital importance, consequently, we developed an offensive position from which we could draw out and wear down the forces of the enemy.

Attention had to be given to building local army units of high quality and suitable size, units that included components of the necessary branches. A special operations detachment or an infantry company of ours that was of high quality could destroy an enemy company within fortifications even if the forces of the enemy were two or three times larger than our forces. If they possessed high quality in combat, one or two of our provincial battalions together with district troops and local guerrilla militia could organize a phase of activities in the nature of a small offensive campaign in the local people's war, an offensive campaign encompassing a few villages, to destroy a battalion and a number of local companies of the enemy. Clearly, if the military region had not built and developed its local troops into district battalions and provincial regiments by the end of 1974 and the start of 1975, we surely would not have had the forces needed to take advantage of the opportunity to coordinate with the masses in their uprising to liberate their own locality in the general offensive and uprising of the spring of 1975.

We had to take positive steps, steps that were based on the combat requirements of each period and each locality and our actual capabilities, to build the local

army so that it not only consisted of infantry forces, but also included components of the branches and necessary specialized units, and in order to gradually increase the scale of the organization of district troops from companies to battalions and the scale of the provincial units from battalions to regiments and larger so that they were capable of defeating the local units of the enemy and even main force enemy units stationed within the locality, were capable of expanding their operations and liberating the locality on their own when a strategic opportunity appeared. In conjunction with developing our forces, we also had to be concerned with providing local troops with good training throughout the course of the war. This was an indispensable prerequisite to improving the quality of the combat operations of local troops. Actively, skillfully and closely coordinating the buildup of forces and combat operations was a practical experience gained on the battlefield.

The provincial armed forces had to be built so that they were strong enough to wage the local people's war within the scope of the province. The local people's war had to be carried out by local armed forces and the local people. Only in this way was it possible to promptly deal with every trick of the enemy forces attacking the locality; only in this way was it possible for the main force units of the military region to build their forces and concentrate on annihilating more and more enemy forces, and killing large numbers of enemy troops was the most effective way for main force troops to support the development of the local people's war.

The province is a strategic area, is the highest echelon responsible for guiding the local armed forces in the local people's war and guiding the coordination between armed forces and political forces in order to achieve a combined strength within the locality. Therefore, it was necessary to build, in a well coordinated manner, the local armed forces of the province, the various elements of the military and the various units and agencies so that all of them were strong. Each district had to be a strong combat zone and each village had to be a solid battle position of the local people's war. We had to build provinces that were strong in every respect, build provinces that were strong militarily, politically and economically and that had a strong and solid rear area.

3. Developing Inter-Connected, Offensive Battle Positions in All Three Strategic Areas Utilizing a Wide Variety of Modes and Forms of Combat Operations and Constantly Increasing the Strategic Effectiveness of the Local People's War

The battle position and the fighting methods of our local people's war were unique in many ways. On the basis of the experience of the 5th Military Region, the following several points can be cited:

Strong attacks were launched everywhere in all three strategic areas in order to thoroughly develop upon the main strength of the local people's war. In the resistance against the United States, the main strength of the local people's war on the battlefield was its widespread, decentralized battle positions that drew the enemy out and depleted the enemy's forces strategically. The small-scale, continuous and widespread armed activities of the masses everywhere, even within

enemy territory, forced them to spread their forces thinly in order to deal with us and created for us such strategic effectiveness that the forces of the enemy, although they were large and had many weapons, could not endure our attacks. As the local people's war developed more highly and spread throughout all three strategic areas (the mountainous jungles, the rural lowlands and the cities), the strategic effectiveness with which we wore down and drew out the enemy became increasingly large. Becoming aware of this fact at an early date, the zone party committee and the party committee of the 5th Military Region launched a widespread people's war. Shortly after the start of the local people's war, this war had developed in the mountains and lowlands, consequently, we established a solid battle position, established a strong offensive position, one that caused the enemy to become very confused and to be on the defensive. By the time of the widespread uprising movement in the lowlands of Zone 5 in late 1964, the local people's war had spread to the outskirts of the cities and, in early 1965, together with the political struggle, the local people's war began to emerge in the cities, thereby forming the inter-connected offensive battle position of the local people's war in all three strategic areas. From then on, although the movement fluctuated, this inter-connected offensive battle position was, generally speaking, maintained and constantly developed.

In the local people's war, each strategic area had a different position and conditions during each period of time as well as throughout the entire war. Therefore, it was necessary to have a firm grasp of the laws governing the development of the war within each area so that we could take the initiative in building and strengthening the inter-connected offensive battle position of the local people's war in all three strategic areas.

Experience also clearly showed that when the local people's war developed in all three strategic areas, it formed the inter-connected offensive battle position by itself. However, in order to effectively utilize this inter-connected offensive battle position, it was necessary to build a strong movement within each area and necessary for each area to take the initiative in supporting the other areas. Building the inter-connected offensive battle position in all three strategic areas was a basic factor in the art of guidance and command, one that had the purpose of achieving the full strategic effectiveness of the local people's war. On the basis of the inter-connected offensive battle position in all three strategic areas, positive steps had to be taken to develop the diverse modes and forms of combat of the local people's war. Fighting methods change very much; the modes and forms of warfare of the local people's war change even more and are even more flexible. As the Zone 5 Guerrilla War Conference held on 5 September 1969 pointed out, there is no standard mode of fighting that can be applied at each different place and time.

The "leopard skin" deployment even emerged and developed within enemy territory in the form of areas controlled by us and even "underground bases" of ours on the outskirts of the cities and close to the large military bases of the enemy. In those areas, although the forces of the enemy were large and densely concentrated, the masses still maintained their legal control. This was a very favorable battle position from which to launch surprise attacks upon the enemy even within their own territory at times and places at which they were the weakest and by means of the most suitable methods of fighting.

The modes and forms of combat could not be devised by the upper echelon and imposed upon the masses, rather, they had to be promptly drawn from the diverse realities of the struggle being waged by the masses. The Zone 5 Guerrilla War Conference held in November, 1967, reviewed the diverse combat experiences of the local people and local armed forces over a period of many years and concluded, on a preliminary basis, that 12 methods of fighting existed, which had the effect of strongly stimulating the development of the modes and forms of combat of the local people's war. The Zone 5 Guerrilla War Conference held in September, 1969, conducted another review and pointed out in addition that the modes of warfare of the guerrilla war (the local people's war) must thoroughly reflect the thinking of taking the offensive and must meet the three requirements of annihilating the enemy, winning over and keeping the support of the people and winning and maintaining control, thereby creating the conditions for developing our real strength and the revolutionary movement, with the most basic factors being winning over the people and winning control.

Positive steps had to be taken to develop the use of small-scale, widespread, regular attacks while developing effective fighting methods utilizing well trained forces and launching battles in phases, in campaigns. The local people's war is, above everything else, a movement of the masses to fight the enemy, consequently, developing the use of small-scale, widespread constant battles by local forces is a basic necessity. However, if we were to stop there, the strength of the local people's war would be limited. In the resistance against the United States, the local people's war in Zone 5 developed forms of widespread, constant and continuous fighting and, at the same time, involved many effective battles (such as the self-defense battle that destroyed the Dong Phuoc ammunition dump in Da Nang in April, 1969), phases of operations and campaigns to attack or counter attack enemy forces, expand and maintain our territory (as in the years 1972 and 1974) and the liberation of localities at major opportunities created by our main force troops (the spring of 1975), thereby raising the local people's war to a new level of development.

On the basis of developing the use of small-scale, widespread, constant attacks, appropriate attention had to be given to effective fighting methods employing well trained forces and upgrading the combat operations of the local armed forces to phases of combat operations, to campaigns. This was an essential law in the development of the local people's war in the war of liberation.

In order to develop and constantly increase the strategic effectiveness of the local people's war, it was necessary to establish close coordination between the annihilation of the enemy and winning over and keeping the allegiance of the people, winning and maintaining control.

In offensive operations as well as in counter-offensive operations against "pacification," the matter of winning over the people, of winning and maintaining control was the most basic issue of the local people's war. Of course, in order to win over the people and keep their allegiance, we had to defeat all of the measures and tricks employed by the enemy to attack and control the people, the key to which was destroying the troop forces of the enemy. Only by eradicating

the hoodlums and spies was it possible to mobilize the masses to stage an uprising. Only by destroying enemy police stations was it possible for the masses to win and firmly maintain control. Only by defeating the regimental and division size sweep operations of the enemy was it possible to maintain the movement of the people and maintain the control being exercised by them. However, in the local people's war, annihilating the enemy was secondary to winning over and maintaining the allegiance of the people. Because, the local people's war could only be waged when the people arose to win and maintain control. The people of Zone 5 recorded many good experiences in coordinating the annihilation of enemy forces with winning and maintaining control, such as employing the three spearheads to kill enemy forces and destroy the strategic hamlets of the enemy, which were sometimes located right next to enemy posts, in such a way that we maintained our legal position, the enemy had to resign themselves to accepting defeat and the people were not terrorized.

Only on the basis of thoroughly practicing the thinking of taking the strategic offensive, only by establishing the correct relationship among annihilating the enemy, winning over and keeping the allegiance of the people and winning and retaining control, between offensives and uprisings and developing, on this basis, many suitable, diverse and flexible modes and forms of combat operations of the local people's war in all three strategic areas and closely coordinating them with the concerted combat operations of main force troops was it possible to achieve a combined local strength and constantly increase the strategic effectiveness of the local people's war.

4. Strengthening the Leadership of the Local People's War by the Party Organization and the Guidance and Command of the Local People's War by the Local Military Agency.

This involved strengthening the centralized, unified leadership provided by the various party committee echelons and the entire party organization, developing the role and the effectiveness in guidance and command operations of the local military agency and developing the role and responsibility of the various sectors and mass organizations as regards the local people's war for the purpose of organizing and encouraging the entire party, all the people and all army forces within the locality to devote their efforts to the war, the main element of which was the armed struggle. We could not give light attention to any level or sector; however, special attention did have to be paid to strengthening the basic level, strengthening the military sector.

We had to strengthen the leadership of the local people's war by the basic level party organizations because the basic level party organizations led the masses on a day to day basis in the face to face struggle against the enemy for survival. Only with tenacious basic level party organizations that are skilled in providing leadership can the struggle being waged by the masses win victory. In the war of liberation, the military region was not always able to provide day to day leadership and guidance to the lower levels and there was even a time when such communications were cut, consequently, it was even more necessary for the basic party organizations to be of high quality. For example, in Hoa Hai Village, a village that was located next to the Da Nang military complex, the

movement was firmly maintained for three decades (through both the war of resistance against the French and the war of resistance against the United States), despite the very fierce conditions under which the struggle was waged, as a result of the village having a strong basic level party organization. There, the political struggle and the armed struggle were developed in a comprehensive manner and, even though the enemy terrorized the village and inflicted many losses upon it, the movement steadily grew and the corps of basic level party members and cadres continued to grow in size and quality. The village also sent thousands of outstanding persons, party members and cadres to the various levels, the various sectors and the armed forces.

In war, the main element of the struggle is the armed struggle, consequently, the personal qualities and the leadership skills of the corps of party members on the basic level must be expressed in the exemplary, vanguard role they play by participating in the fight against the enemy, protecting production and the lives of the people and joining the armed forces. Only in this way is it possible to gain the enthusiastic participation of the masses in the local people's war.

It was also necessary to strengthen and develop the role played by the local military agencies on the various levels in providing guidance and in commanding forces. Strong military agencies help to increase the effectiveness of the party's leadership of the local people's war, thereby creating the conditions for the party organization to establish the political and military policies and tasks of the locality in an accurate and swift manner. Strengthening and developing the role of the military agency in providing guidance and commanding forces helps the various party committee echelons to avoid taking over everything and becoming bogged down in administrative work; however, this is no reason for the party committee echelon to leave the military task entirely up to the military agency. We must first concern ourselves with strengthening the military agency so that it is able to successfully command local forces while closely guiding the people's war on the basic level. The provincial and district military agencies must be strengthened so that they can perform the following two jobs well: helping the party committee echelon guide the widespread armed struggle by the masses on the basic level while commanding local troops in their buildup and combat operations and in carrying out victorious campaigns of the local people's war. This also strengthens the party's leadership of the local people's war.

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CSO: 4209/107

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

BRIEFS

ILLEGAL DEPARTURE STOPPED--Employing propaganda to provoke and sow panic among the people while conspiring with one another and organizing attempts to flee the country, reactionaries have been searching for ways to illegally leave the country. The army and people of Quang Nam-Da Nang Province have been and are taking many effective steps to promptly stop and apprehend reactionaries attempting to leave the country by sea. One of the most positive and effective measures employed by Quang Nam-Da Nang has been to establish plans for coordinating the various coastal armed forces, such as naval forces, coastal defense forces, public security and civil guard forces, militia and self-defense forces and the people engaged in fishing at sea, thereby creating a network that prevents reactionaries from fleeing. [Excerpt] [Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 12 Nov 82 p 3] 7809

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VIETNAM: SEVEN YEARS AFTER UNIFICATION

Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 17 Dec 82 p 8

[Article by Rikiji Ito]

[Text]

HANOI
SEVEN years after the two halves of the country were finally reunited, the rulers of Vietnam are still picking up the pieces from years of war.

American bombers are long gone, but the scars of shattered buildings still remain.

For the people in the north, the prevailing peace enables them to take a first step toward economic reconstruction. But in the south, hundreds of thousands of people, mostly wealthy ones of the Chinese origin or with intellectual background, have taken to the boats since the fall of Saigon, worried about their future in the communist system.

The communist rulers in Hanoi, the men who spent over a quarter of a century getting rid of the French and Americans, admit that their country's economy is still in difficulties.

"After long years of war, life here is still difficult," said Hoang Tung, a member of the ruling Vietnam Communist Party secretariat. "Economically, we are about 100 years behind the industrialised world."

Signs of austerity are everywhere, telescoped most tellingly for foreign visitors at Vietnam's gateway — Hai Bai International Airport in the suburbs of Hanoi.

The airport building is a shabby two-storeyed structure, more like an army barracks than a national gateway.

PULP-LIKE

Overhead electric rotor fans churn lazily while arrivals are processed through Customs, gingerly filling out forms lest an unintentional scratch tear up the pulp-like documents.

"It feels like walking out of a time-tunnel, straight back into the immediate post-war years in Japan," said a Japanese visitor.

Former urban centres in the north, destroyed by over a decade's bombing by the Americans, have been restored but remain in shabby conditions.

In the south, babies are still sometimes born deformed, allegedly the effect of chemical defoliants sprayed by the American forces.

The death toll has been staggering. Almost half of the party cadres were killed in action or died in prison through the wars against the French and Americans.

What is more, the Vietnamese rulers are finding that the gap left by 21 years of national partition is very hard to bridge.

For one thing, people of the south still live in a different economic pattern from the north. Even in Ben Tre — the rich Mekong Delta province where the National Liberation Front known as the Viet Cong first sprang to life — farmers have not yet been collectivised.

Up to 90 per cent of the Ben Tre farmers still plant and own their plot of land. "We have no immediate plans for forming collectives like those in the north," said one local official.

In fact, life in what used to be South Vietnam appears not to be as bleak as the number of "boat people" fleeing the country would indicate.

In Ben Tre, officials say that annual output of paddy rice has increased by almost 30 per cent to 320,000 tons a year from the pre-1976 average of 250,000 tons.

Meanwhile, visitors returning for a visit to Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) after seven years are more surprised by the lack of apparent changes that had taken place.

Life appears to be not much different from other Southeast Asian capitals. The girls are still dressed in fashionable Western clothes and the men favour popular baseball caps rather than the helmet-like headgear men in the north wear. Even the svelte Vietnamese national costume *ao dai*, which is worn on ceremonial occasions in the north, is part of everyday life in the south. And expensive imported apparel still is seen more frequently than in Hanoi.

In shops in Ho Chi Minh City everything from Japanese television sets and stereo systems to imported fashions are plentiful, although at greatly inflated prices. A pair of man's trousers made of foreign texture, for example, may cost as much as US\$100 (about 2,300 baht), over half-a-year's income for an average government worker.

It is little wonder the perceived fall in living standard has created much discontent among some people in the south.

"Our economy is still poor and we can't afford any affluent style of life. They must live in the same condition as us," said one official.

If the people in the south find life harsh and severe, those in the north apparently have never had it so good.

GONE

Life is still austere even in major cities, but most of the belt-tightening measures that lasted throughout the war years are gone. Farmers go about their work without having to carry a rifle on their backs.

Women peddle foodstuffs on the roadside and housewives take their time to haggle over prices in noisy, well-stocked marketplaces. And children, though busy helping out or making extra money for the family, are evidently healthy and well-fed if not nicely clothed.

"The farmers are quite well off now," said one urban cadre. "In fact, I should like to take a farmer's daughter as a bride myself."

According to official figures, grain output is expected to top 16 million tons for the coming harvest, compared to 15 million tons collected last year.

Western sources in Hanoi agreed that food and basic necessities are becoming more plentiful and Vietnam has more or less recovered from the near famine

in 1977-79 when the country was hit by three consecutive years of natural disasters.

But if Vietnam's war against famine and general shortage is finally abating, its confrontation with China across its northeast border is far from over.

PEACE

The Vietnamese welcome the prospects for a thaw in Sino-Soviet relations, because they say it could contribute to peace and stability of Southeast Asia. They are keenly watching the Peking-Moscow talks lest they themselves should be affected in the process of Sino-Soviet rapprochement.

In support of what Hanoi insists to be a "mutually beneficial partnership" with Moscow, Vietnamese officials say that most of the Soviet aid to Vietnam, estimated to run to \$1 million a year, is merely long-term loans which Vietnam must repay some time in the future.

As regard to the various joint ventures with the Soviet Union, like the development of the offshore oil field and the construction of a natural rubber plant, the Soviets will regain their investment and technical assistance through output sharing, Vietnamese officials say.

Billboards containing what the Vietnamese say was the last teaching of the late President Ho Chi Minh are still displayed everywhere: "There is nothing more valuable than independence and freedom." — Kyodo

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

VCP FOREIGN POLICY DISCUSSED

Hanoi GIAO DUC LY LUAN in Vietnamese No 5, Sep-Oct 82 pp 6-17

[Article by Hoang Tung: "The World Situation and the Foreign Policy of Our Party and State"]

[Text] In the 1970's, especially in the "post-Vietnam" period, the world situation underwent rapid and profound changes, changes that benefited peace, national independence, democracy and socialism. However, the development of the situation involved many complex issues, issues that have given rise to different opinions in the examination and evaluation of the situation, issues which demand that we maintain a clear class viewpoint and know how to apply the methodology of Marxism-Leninism, the material dialectic, to analyze the situation. If we do not take the correct stand and do not employ the correct methodology, our observations will be onesided and incorrect, we "will not see the forest for the trees" and we will only see the part, not the whole.

In order to fully understand our country's revolution at this time, we must correctly understand and correctly evaluate the domestic situation as well as the world situation in order to, on this basis, clearly see the correctness of the domestic and foreign policies of our party and state as well as the close relationship between domestic policy and foreign policy.

On a worldwide scale, no socialist revolution in any country is divorced from the global struggle between socialism and capitalism. The same applies to our country's revolution: there is always a oneness between the struggle being waged in our country and the struggle being waged on a worldwide scale. When examining the situation, we must always do so against the background of the global struggle to resolve the question "who defeats whom."

A sharp struggle is occurring in the world in the period of transition in the history of mankind from capitalism to socialism. This is a comprehensive class struggle to resolve the question "who defeats whom" which exists between socialism and capitalism. This sharp struggle is unprecedented because the forces of communism and the forces of capitalism have never before been as nearly equal as they are today. The issue of "who defeats whom" which exists between the two social systems on a worldwide scale is a sharp issue that controls all

aspects of international life, has an impact upon the vanguard corps of the world proletariat, has caused complex trends to emerge and so forth. The period of transition from capitalism to socialism, from the capitalist mode of production to communism is the period of most complex struggle in the history of mankind, is a period in which the struggle occurs within each country as well as on a worldwide scale.

The world is living in tense times as a result of the increasing threat of war posed by the reactionary, arms race policy of the Reagan administration and the other warmongering imperialist circles, who are collaborating with the Chinese reactionaries. The question of war or peace faces all mankind. Never before has capitalism possessed such huge material forces and never before has capitalism experienced a crisis as serious as the one it is experiencing today. The imperialists, led by the United States, are vigorously pursuing the arms race. The Reagan administration has adopted such radical policies as cancelling the SALT II Agreement which the United States signed with the Soviet Union in 1979 and producing the neutron bomb and has adopted the largest military budget in the last 40 years: 300 billion dollars per year. Reagan thinks that, in this way, the United States can free itself from the economic crisis, win back the strong military position it lost and regain the right to lead its allies. On the other hand, the Reagan administration has also created tension in international relations with a view toward pressuring the allies of the United States in western Europe and Japan to increase their military budgets and impeding the process of the improvement of relations between these countries and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Finding themselves in positions of weaknesses and crisis, the United States and China began to collaborate with each other. This collaboration between the two largest reactionary powers in history is a salient characteristic of the present international situation. This has caused the world situation to become increasingly tense and complex, has increased the threat of war and has seriously threatened world peace and security. Of crucial importance is the fact that the Reagan administration has given official permission for the sale of weapons to the Chinese reactionaries and openly talks about Sino-American military cooperation. However, the situation has shown that Sino-American relations are not smooth in every area. While collaborating with each other to oppose the Soviet Union and the world revolution, both the United States and China, finding themselves in weakened positions and facing crises, are pursuing separate strategic interests and both want to use the other for their own private gains. The strategic objectives of the reactionary Chinese authorities are to join with the United States in opposing the Soviet Union, opposing the world revolutionary movement, with a view toward setting the United States and the Soviet Union against each other, undermining East-West detente, undermining detente in Europe and fomenting "rebellion" in the world and with a view toward acquiring capital and technology from the West for the modernization of China so that China becomes the number one superpower in the world and realizes its dream to be the ruler of the world. The U.S. imperialists, who are in a weakened position in the "post-Vietnam" period, have found in China a new ally that can help them oppose the Soviet Union and the world revolutionary movement. The

United States is also using the betrayal by the reactionaries within Chinese ruling circles to help the United States to maintain the remaining positions that it has in Asia and the world in the situation in which the United States has had to withdraw its military forces from the Asian continent but must maintain U.S. interests in this region; the United States is also using the Chinese market to resolve a portion of the crisis of the United States. America is also playing the China card with a view toward creating for itself a stronger position in its relations with the Soviet Union. Sino-American collaboration has gone through many stages and each stage has proven that this collaboration is the product of a weak position and is replete with contradictions. The fact of the past several years have shown that in view of the fact that the balance of power in the world has shifted in the favor of peace, national independence, democracy and socialism, Sino-American collaboration, although it has made the situation more tense and complex and has caused the struggle being waged by the people of the world against imperialism to become more intense, cannot reverse the trend of history in the "post-Vietnam" period. The adventurous policy of the warmongering imperialists and the international reactionaries has posed more than a few difficulties and complications to the struggle of the people of all countries but it cannot impede the strong development of the three revolutionary currents, cannot impede the inevitably victorious struggle of nations for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism. To the contrary, the enemies of peace must now deal with an anti-nuclear war movement which, in essence, is the largest display of peace forces since the war of aggression waged by the United States against Vietnam, a movement that has attracted hundreds of millions of persons of all political views, religions, races and cultures throughout the world. Deserving of attention is the fact that this movement even has the participation of a contingent of the ruling circles and parties in western Europe. Struggling to achieve peace, block the threat of war and bring a wholesome atmosphere to the world is a task of strategic importance of the world revolution, of all persons on this planet.

The development of the world situation in the recent past has drawn even more attention to the struggle between the two lines in international relations. One line, the line of peace, of resolving international disputes by means of negotiations, is the line of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, the line of the peace-loving countries. The opposite of this line is the line of the U.S. imperialists, who are collaborating with the reactionaries within Chinese ruling circles, of accelerating the arms race, launching a cold war and using force and imposing their will in international relations. Clearly, the line of pursuing the arms race, creating tensions and going against the interests and aspirations of the people of the world is being defeated. The line of peace, friendship and cooperation of the socialist countries, especially the peace platform of the Soviet Union, have been and are strongly inspiring all progressive forces in the world to struggle for peace and international cooperation and repulse the threat of nuclear war. In this struggle of foremost importance, the forces of revolution are constantly being strengthened and constantly growing and world peace is being strengthened more with each passing day.

In Southeast Asia, due to the continuous efforts of the three countries of Indochina and the forces that desire peace and stability, the situation is

undergoing positive changes even though many obstacles still exist. The trend toward a dialogue and a reduction of tensions among the countries within the region is developing. The policy of instigating military conflicts in Southeast Asia and encircling and isolating Vietnam that has been adopted by the reactionaries within Chinese ruling circles, who are collaborating with the U.S. imperialists and the other reactionary powers, has gradually been defeated. Although they are encountering many difficulties, the people's of the three countries of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea are continuing to move steadily forward and are making every effort to struggle for peace in Southeast Asia and achieve the goals of each country. The Kampuchean situation is becoming more stable and developing better with each passing day. The solidarity and comprehensive cooperation between the militant Vietnam-Laos-Kampuchea alliance and the Soviet Union are constantly being strengthened. World opinion and many persons within the ruling circles of the ASEAN countries are increasingly recognizing the threat to the peace and stability of the region posed by China's policy of expansion and hegemony. The key issue in Southeast Asia is to abolish the threat posed by China to the three countries of Indochina; the only correct line for establishing peace and stability in Southeast Asia is the line of detente and peaceful coexistence between the countries of Indochina and the ASEAN countries without external intervention.

During the past decade, the countries within the socialist system rapidly increased their strength in every respect, constantly improved the socialist production relations, developed production forces to a new scale and a new level of quality and constantly improved the material and cultural standard of living of their people, thereby clearly reflecting the superior nature of socialism, a system within which the laboring people are the genuine masters. and the highest goal is the happiness of man.

The economies of the socialist countries still maintained their stable development at a relatively high rate. The annual rate of growth of industrial production was twice as high as that of the developed capitalist countries. The position of the socialist countries was constantly strengthened in the world economy. In 1950, the member countries of CEMA, whose total population equals slightly more than 10 percent of the world's population, produced only 18 percent of world industrial output; by 1978, this percentage had been increased to one-third. During the decade, the Soviet Union more than doubled its fixed assets compared to the preceding 10 years. The economic development gap between the Soviet Union and the United States was reduced; in 1950, the industrial output of the Soviet Union only equalled 30 percent of the industrial output of the United States; by 1978, this percentage had been increased to more than 80 percent. In 1980, the Soviet Union ranked first in the world in petroleum, natural gas, steel, fertilizer, tractor and cement production.

Constantly strengthening their solidarity and comprehensive cooperation through various forms of multilateral and bilateral cooperation within their strong, stable revolutionary alliance, the socialist countries built strong, stable economies and national defense systems and developed the scientific-technological revolution in both breadth and depth, thereby recording many outstanding cultural and social achievements, creating a beautiful lifestyle and guaranteeing the legitimate rights of man.

The new feature of the growth of the socialist system was that the Soviet Union strengthened its economic and national defense potentials, thereby changing the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States. Economic growth permitted the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries to continue to maintain a stable balance of strategic weapons and defeat every attempt by the imperialists to upset this balance.

Brandishing the banner of peace and revolution, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries adhered to a strong offensive strategy, maintained and strengthened the process of international detente and strengthened world peace while constantly expanding the position and influence of socialism.

Today, the socialist countries are not only bright examples for all nations, but also have the ability to use their material strength to have a direct impact upon the course of the revolutions of nations. The victories of the revolution and peace in the recent past have been closely linked to the tremendous efforts and sacrifice of the Soviet Union. The socialist countries are still encountering a number of significant difficulties, such as a shortage of labor and a shortage of some raw materials, and are being affected, to some extent by the economic crisis of capitalism. On the other hand, the effort to perfect the economic management mechanism must be continued; the application of science and technology is not commensurate with existing potentials; the development of agriculture is not stable; and production efficiency, product quality and labor productivity are low in some areas. Besides this, the imperialists are making every effort to carry out their scheme for "peaceful change" and coordinating provocation from the outside with acts of sabotage conducted by hostile forces on the inside in a vain attempt to topple socialism in a number of countries.

Despite this situation, the socialist system has continued to move forward and has created a combined strength superior to that of the imperialists and reactionaries. With the Soviet Union as its pillar, the socialist system has played an increasingly strong role as the factor determining the trend of development of mankind, as the strong citadel of peace, as the dependable base of support of the revolutionary struggle of the people of the world.

Why has socialism been able to develop its forces so rapidly? It has been able to develop its forces so rapidly because imperialism, while engaged in the historic contest to resolve the question of "who defeats whom," has been trapped in specific tests of strength that have weakened it. It has been able to develop its forces so rapidly because the socialist economy is much more dynamic than the imperialist economy, because a planned economy has abundant vitality. On the other hand, since World War II, the imperialists have continued to follow the course of war, which has caused them to become bogged down in neo-colonialist wars. Between 1950 and 1980, the expenditures by the imperialists on military forces were very large, up to 3 trillion dollars. More than 20 percent of their budgets have been allocated to increasing their military forces, especially their strategic weapons and military bases in the world. The rivals of imperialism are socialism and the three revolutionary currents; therefore, in this decisive struggle, imperialism must pursue the arms race. However, the more it has pursued

the arms race, the more it has lost its superior position and shown itself to be increasingly passive.

After World War II, the British imperialists resigned themselves to losing all their colonies (prior to the war, Great Britain was the imperialist that had the most colonies). The French imperialists suffered the heaviest losses in the world war, and, following the war, were toppled from their position as an imperialist power by the wars in Indochina and North Africa. The other imperialists also gradually lost all their colonies. The war in Southeast Asia was the war that inflicted the heaviest losses upon world imperialism.

Following the historic conflict between world fascism and Soviet socialism, the balance of power in the world changed. The world socialist system was formed. And, the tense stand of developed between the two world systems: imperialism and socialism.

However, a conflict did not break out in Europe between the two hostile powers of our times (formal logic would indicate that the basic antagonism between socialism and imperialism would lead to a direct conflict between them, with the conflict beginning first in the "hot European" area), rather, it broke out in indirect areas, in areas far away (the struggle for independence and freedom). This is another form of the clash between the two world systems. Southeast Asia has been the scene of this conflict for the past 40 years and became a "hot spot" in history. And, the imperialist powers have continuously been defeated in Southeast Asia. The U.S. imperialists, who allocated a large portion of their forces to the conflict in Southeast Asia, ultimately were unable to stop the revolutionary current in this region.

Following the defeat of the United States in Vietnam, a series of chain-reaction defeats for imperialism occurred everywhere in the world, in Nicaragua, in Mozambique, in Angola, in Iran and so forth.

Why has the United States continued to suffer such defeats since the test of strength in Southeast Asia?

As we know, in the 1930's, especially during World War II, the United States developed very strongly and became wealthy during the war, thereby becoming an imperialist super power. The strength of the United States was the strength of its dollars and the strength of its weapons. It was thought that after World War II, the United States would rule the world forever through "American centuries" and "American eras"! The victory of the Chinese revolution created a new threat to imperialism but this threat evaporated in only a few years.

The United States waged the Indochina war for the purpose of building a bridgehead from which to occupy Southeast Asia. They spent hundreds of billions of dollars, deployed one-half million troops, employed countless strategies and tactics but still met with defeat in the end. The United States and China collaborated, relied upon each other and pinned very many hopes upon each other, but, in the end, they were unable to keep any lackey clique in power. Both the bosses and their

hirelings had to pack up and leave. The defeat suffered by the United States in Indochina was a comprehensive defeat, one that revealed the shortcomings of the armed forces of the United States and weakened and clearly showed the limits of their economic might. This defeat was the defeat of an important strategy, one that has caused at least one generation of youths to no longer harbor any illusions about the so called "American century." The revolution then broke out everywhere and the United States was no longer able to play the role of international gendarme. During the 20 years that the United States was bogged down in Vietnam and Indochina, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries achieved a position of stability in a new period of development, thereby bringing about a profound change in the comparison of forces in the struggle between socialism and capitalism on a worldwide scale, a change in the favor of peace and socialism.

Under the circumstances of the new balance of power, the struggle between socialism and imperialism, between the two opposing systems, has now assumed the form of an intense arms race being waged by the United States for the purpose of very vigorously opposing the Soviet Union, Vietnam and Cuba in all areas and returning to the period of the cold war. This policy originates in the class nature of the international bourgeoisie with its huge military-industrial complex. On the other hand, following their defeats in Kampuchea, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Iran and so forth, they have made every effort to prepare forces for new counter-attacks. The "human rights" campaign that they launched failed to create any strength for them and forced them to put a bellicose power, such as the Reagan clique, into office for the purpose of stimulating the narrowminded nationalism of a portion of the American population. Actually, the capabilities of the United States still have limits.

Reagan's rise to power in the United States is creating an atmosphere of tension and an increased threat of nuclear war. However, mankind is arising in a struggle with the purpose of creating a real force for repelling the threat of war and preventing nuclear war. This capability has increased along with the growth of the Soviet Union, the pillar of world peace, and the growth of the socialist community, of the three revolutionary currents of our times. The imperialists, who are led by the United States, must also take into consideration the fact that if, in view of the present balance of power, they recklessly launch a new world war, a nuclear war, the ones who will be annihilated will not be the Soviet Union or the socialist system, but the imperialists themselves.

Peace or war is an issue in the struggle among the counter-revolutionary forces in the present period. The struggle between the two social system is a very decisive struggle in all areas: politics, ideology, culture, economic activities, military affairs and so forth. The socialist countries cannot give light attention to military strength; however, it must be realized that, at this time, the struggle is most sharp within the political and ideological fields. Each day, several dozen radio stations of all types focus their efforts on broadcasting slander and distortions, provoking counter-revolution and so forth, with their special targets being the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Cuba and Poland. This struggle,

which is a very protracted and complex struggle, does not permit us to be complacent, to relax our vigilance.

The fundamental foreign policy of imperialism is to oppose socialism, with the strategic focal point of this policy being opposing the Soviet Union. In this struggle, the imperialists want to unify their forces; however, due to their nature and due to their irreconcilable antagonisms, especially with regard to economic interests, their forces cannot be unified. The United States is an imperialist power and although it has declined and although it is weak and no longer enjoys the same trust of its allies, it still wants to take command, still wants to be the international gendarme. Japan, which is moving toward becoming a leading economic power during this decade, will surely not tolerate being inferior to the United States in many areas of the trade war. The countries of western Europe clearly cannot endorse the U.S. embargo against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Despite the U.S. embargo, work on the Siberia-Western Europe Gas Pipeline is still being accelerated. The corporations of western Europe have been ordered to continue to cooperate with the Soviet Union. They consider this to be "a project of the century," a "concrete expression of detente." On the other hand, the strategic coordination of the United States with China is dangerous. The betrayal by the reactionaries within Chinese ruling circles has further complicated our struggle. However, it will be a long time before these traitorous forces, these new strategic allies of imperialism, become an economic power, not to mention a military power. The recent tests of strength on the southwestern border and the northern border of Vietnam proved China's economic weakness and military inferiority. That for which the United States is relying upon China, namely, additional strength with which to oppose communism, is clearly not very intimidating.

During the past decade, together with the growth of the Soviet Union and the socialist community, the liberation and national independence movements have developed a new strength, a new stature, a new quality and are now sweeping away the final positions of old-style colonialism and dealing heavy blows to neo-colonialism. Having won their national independence, many countries have united with the socialist countries, brandished the anti-imperialist and anti-international reactionary banner, gradually abolished the positions of foreign monopolistic capitalism and the classes of exploiters at home, established people's governments and carried out economic reforms for the sake of the interests of the laboring masses, thereby leading their countries down the path of non-capitalist development. The increasing closeness between the national independence movement and the world socialist system has created a new strength for revolutionary and progressive forces. The situations in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East are changing in a manner unfavorable to imperialism.

In the capitalist countries, the struggle by the working class and the other strata of laboring people is a widespread, intense and continuous struggle that takes many different forms. The decisive struggles against unemployment, against exploitation and against social ills are closely linked to the struggle against the suppression of democracy, the struggle for the political rights of the laboring people, the struggle against the arms race and the struggle for a

foreign policy of peace, friendship and cooperation among countries. The communist and worker parties in a number of countries have been playing an important role in the political life of their country and are the main force brandishing the banner of peace, democracy and social progress against monopolistic, capitalistic governments.

In the present arduous and complex struggle to resolve the question "who defeats whom" which exists between socialism and capitalism on a worldwide scale, many types of opportunism have emerged within our ranks. Opportunism is in the shadow of revolutionary forces throughout the course of their development, when the movement is surging as well as when the movement is ebbing. Opportunism encompasses the various forms of the petty bourgeois tendency among revolutionary forces. Whenever the situation changes, these intermediary forces, due to their nature, vacillate, hesitate or compromise with one side or the other.

Because the world situation is undergoing rapid and profound changes, because the revolutionary movement is developing strongly and because the struggle between the two international systems is rather complex, a special kind of opportunism has emerged. It is the opportunism of a party that is in political power. This is a new form of the struggle.

When the proletarian revolution develops and wins victory within a country and the proletarian revolutionary movements develop strongly, the representatives of the petty bourgeoisie, especially the petty bourgeois intellectuals in the cities, readily accept scientific socialism but do not necessarily closely align themselves with the worker movement. Mao Zedong was a petty bourgeois nationalist who used scientific socialism, used workers and peasants, used the meritorious service of others to gradually rise to the supreme position within his country. Maoism is both a sophisticated and a brazen type of opportunism. It is the greatest betrayal in history. A number of other powers within the international communist and worker movement have degenerated, become deviant, vacillated and wavered. Nationalism is a special characteristic of opportunism; it places national interests against international interests and pursues a selfish national policy, one that is foreign to proletarian internationalism. Maoism is even more foreign to proletarian internationalism. It is not only the nationalism of the great Chinese emperors, but has also developed into expansionism and hegemony, into aligning with imperialism and the international reactionaries to form a force hostile to socialism, to the world revolution and to peace and friendship among nations. Thus, while making every effort to struggle to maintain peace, achieve detente in the international relations among countries that have different political systems, oppose the arms race and oppose preparations for nuclear war, one of our pressing tasks is to thoroughly criticize Maoism, to oppose every manifestation of opportunism and the other unwholesome tendencies that are emerging within the ranks of communists. The schemes that have emerged in recent years to "update" the path to be followed to socialism and communism are, in actuality, actions that are foreign to socialism, to Marxism-Leninism. The persons who place national interests into opposition with the international interests of the working class deny the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, deny the fundamental laws of the socialist revolution and socialist construction, emphasize nothing but national characteristics and say nothing at all about the fundamental characteristics

of our times, the transition from capitalism to socialism on a worldwide scale and the fact that the working class and the system of socialist countries are the unified international force determining this historic transition. The course of development of the history of man that was charted by Marx is a compass that provides us with guidelines and the communists of each country must develop the specific forms and stages of development of their country's revolution. However, this is no reason to deny the historical lessons in the nature of laws that have been learned by a country, such as the Soviet Union, that has been building socialism for more than 60 years. Therefore, the central role and position of that great country, if the place that ushered in the era of freedom of mankind, must be acknowledged.

This great truth reminds communists that they have a responsibility to do everything in their power to protect the purity of Marxism-Leninism, protect the Soviet Union and protect the socialist community, the brilliant achievement of Marxism-Leninism and the world working class.

When appraising the world situation, mention must be made of the situation in China. Within China, there has been a lack of political, economic and social stability for many years. The reactionary superstructure has distorted the socialist infrastructure that had been established. China's foreign policy is an extension of its domestic policy, is the product of a state system; therefore, it cannot be examined in a manner independent of domestic policy nor can we, as some persons maintain, consider China's foreign policy to be reactionary but its domestic policy to be progressive! Economic difficulties and social injustice are causing the struggle for power among the rulers of China to become increasingly sharp. The Deng Xiaoping faction is in power for the time being but this power is limited. The "cultural revolution" faction headed by Hoa Quoc Feng is in a weakened position but one-half of the party members and forces that rise to power in the cultural revolution are still in power in many localities, especially in the countryside and within the army. Within the Chinese army, there are many persons who do not support the policy of the Deng faction. Even within the Deng faction, not everyone feels the same. Another phenomenon is the crisis of confidence and the rather sharp opposition by the masses in the policies of the authorities. Another important fact must be pointed out, namely, that there has not been any indication of a change in the guidelines of the Chinese leadership and, as a result, there has not been any sign of a change in the relations and the strategic cooperation between the United States and China. The leadership circle is continuing to adhere to Maoism and engage in strategic cooperation with the United States against the Soviet Union and Vietnam.

The scheme of the Chinese reactionaries and the United States is to exploit our present difficulties and assembly counter-revolutionary forces within our country in coordination with staging multi-faceted attacks against us from the outside, thereby creating a multi-faceted war of sabotage in a vain attempt to undermine our dictatorship of the proletariat, our socialist economy and our socialist culture and corrupt the vanguard corps of our revolution. They are doing everything possible to sabotage and disrupt our work of building the country. Together with their schemes and actions against Vietnam, China and the United States are collaborating in assembling lackey reactionary forces and drawing the ASEAN countries into the effort to oppose and undermine the Kampuchean revolution and the Lao revolution. All of these hostile actions are part of

China's strategy to oppose national independence and socialism in Vietnam and even in all three countries of Indochina in a vain attempt to weaken and prepare to annex our country and the entire region. On the basis of the observations presented above, we must always be highly vigilant against the U.S. imperialists, the basic enemy of the world revolution, and the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, the immediate, dangerous enemy of the Vietnam revolution and the Indochina revolution as well as the dangerous saboteur of the world revolution.

In the international situation described above, we must make every effort to implement the foreign policy of our party and state that was set forth by the 5th Congress of the Party in order to create favorable international conditions for building and protecting the country. We are determined to defeat the policy of big country expansionism and hegemony of the reactionaries within Chinese ruling circles who are collaborating with the U.S. imperialists in a scheme to weaken and annex our country. We are determined to defeat their multi-faceted war of sabotage and thwart their scheme to launch another war of aggression in order to strengthen the peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia.

The foremost issue in the foreign policy of our party and state is to strengthen our militant friendship and expand our cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism. Uniting and cooperating comprehensively with the Soviet Union is always the foundation of the foreign policy of our party and state. Maintaining close relations with and cooperating in a comprehensive manner with the Soviet Union is a principle, is a strategy, is a revolutionary sentiment of ours. We will continue to develop the militant solidarity and comprehensive cooperation between Vietnam and the Soviet Union in an even stronger manner for the sake of the interests of the peoples of the two countries and the victory of the world revolutionary cause.

Strengthening our special solidarity with the two neighboring, fraternal countries of Laos and Kampuchea, our party considers this to be a firm guarantee of the independence, freedom and successful socialist construction in each country and at the same time, considers it to be an extremely important factor in maintaining peace and stability in Southeast Asia. On the basis of the principle of respecting one another's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, we will wholeheartedly fulfill our international obligation to the two fraternal countries and will, at the same time, closely cooperate with these two countries and assist one another in every area in order to support in an increasingly effective manner the efforts by each country to strengthen its national defense system, maintain security and build its economy and culture. From one generation to the next, our people will preserve the pure friendship and the tradition of solidarity among the three nations and the three parties and will constantly strengthen the special relations and the militant alliance among the three countries because these special relations are a law in the development of the revolutions of the three countries, are a matter of survival in the destinies of the three nations.

The militant solidarity and the fraternal cooperation between our country and the other countries within the socialist community have reached a new level of development since our country became an official member of CEMA. We are sincerely

grateful for the tremendous and generous assistance provided to our people by the fraternal socialist countries; on the other hand, we are determined to do everything we can to contribute to the strengthening of the socialist system on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism.

We confirm our sincere solidarity with the Polish United Workers Party, with the communists and people of fraternal Poland, and wholeheartedly support the correct and determined measures taken by the Polish Military Council for National Salvation to defeat every scheme of sabotage of the U.S. imperialists and reactionaries, restore order and security, restore and develop the economy, preserve and develop upon the achievements of Poland's socialist revolution and maintain the alliance with the Soviet Union and the countries within the socialist community.

We unite with and resolutely support the heroic people of Cuba in their work of building and protecting the Republic of Cuba, the strong bastion of socialism in the western hemisphere. We strongly denounce the schemes of the U.S. imperialist aggressors and their threat to attack and commit aggression against the Republic of Cuba.

Our party has actively contributed to strengthening the solidarity within the international communist and worker movement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. By means of the historic, epochal victory of the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation, by means of the glorious victories won in the two recent wars to defend the country and by means of the present tenacious struggle against Chinese expansionism and hegemony, we have been and are making positive contributions to the struggle against Maoism and have been and are protecting the purity of Marxism-Leninism.

Continuing to develop multilateral relations with the Republic of India, with the non-aligned countries and the developing countries while expanding our relations with the other countries and the democratic international organizations for national independence and social progress, for peace and friendship among nations are an important part of the foreign policy of our party and state.

Our people confirm their solidarity with and strong support of the just and inevitably victorious struggle by the Palestinians and Arabs for their sacred basic national rights and resolutely demand that the Israeli aggressors and U.S. imperialists immediately and unconditionally withdraw from Lebanon and respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

Our people totally support the just struggle being waged by the people of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America to achieve their basic national rights and build lives of prosperity and happiness. We will do everything we can to contribute to the solidarity of the non-aligned movement, to develop upon the role played by the non-aligned countries in the struggle against imperialism for peace, national independence and the establishment of a new world economic order.

As regards the countries of Southeast Asia, our party and state have confirmed that our policy is designed to achieve detente, mutual coexistence and cooperation

among the countries within the region. The unilateral agreement reached by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea to withdraw some Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea, the new peace proposals made by Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the three countries held on 7 July 1982 and the recent visit to a number of ASEAN countries by the foreign minister of the SRV once again reflect the policy of peace and the attitude of good will of the three countries of Indochina and have been supported by widespread public opinion in Southeast Asia and the world. The bellicose powers within Chinese ruling circles, who are collaborating with the U.S. imperialists and the other reactionaries, are fabricating the so called "three faction coalition government" in order to conceal the genocidal face of the Pol Pot clique and deceive world opinion in a vain attempt to retain the seat of the reactionaries at the United Nations. It must be pointed out that each of these vain and disguised efforts to use the Pol Pot clique to oppose the revival of the nation of Kampuchea only serves the schemes of hegemony and expansion of the Chinese in Southeast Asia and further complicates the attempt to resolve the issues within the region. Our people hope that the ASEAN countries, for the sake of their basic interests, for the sake of peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the world, join with the countries of Indochina to remove every obstacle, engage in dialogue and negotiations on the basis of respecting one another's legitimate interests and eventually establish a Southeast Asia of peace, stability, friendship and cooperation.

As regards China, our stand, a stand that is based on principle, is to wage a determined struggle to defeat each scheme of annexation and aggression of the reactionaries within Chinese ruling circles against our country; however, we still hold feelings of friendship for the Chinese people. Despite the hostile attitude of the Chinese reactionaries, our people still want to restore the long standing, traditional solidarity and friendship between the peoples of the two countries, considering this relationship to be an extremely important factor in peace and stability in Southeast Asia. We have frequently proposed the signing of a Peaceful Coexistence Treaty between Vietnam and China and have made many constructive proposals with a view toward normalizing the relations between the two countries on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, respecting each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and resolving disputes by means of negotiations. To date, the Chinese side has not replied and continues to pursue a policy that goes against the interests of the Chinese people. Despite this, we continue to stand behind these proposals. On the basis of our policy of friendship and our good neighbor policy toward the Chinese people and until the tremendous obstacles mentioned above are overcome, we stand ready to meet with the Chinese side on any level and at any place in order to work with the Chinese side to develop measures acceptable by both sides that are designed to improve the environment to one that is conducive to the normalization of relations between the two countries and is consistent with the aspirations and interests of the peoples of the two countries, with the interests of peace in Southeast Asia and the world.

Loyal to their international obligation, our people will strengthen their solidarity with the revolutionary and progressive forces of the world and strongly support the struggle by the peoples of all countries against the

warmongering and aggressive policy of the U.S. imperialists and the international reactionary powers for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress.

August 1982

7809

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PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

PARTY SECRETARIAT DIRECTIVE ON CADRE TRAINING

Hanoi GIAO DUC LY LUAN in Vietnamese No 5, Sept-Oct 82 pp 1-2, 5

[Article: "Directive on the Training of Theory Cadres at the Nguyen Ai Quoc Advanced Party School"]

[Text] On 5 August 1982, the Party Secretariat issued directive 06 CT/TW on the training of theory cadres at the Nguyen Ai Quoc Advanced Party School. Below is the complete text of that directive:

"Over the past several years, in keeping with Political Bureau resolution 52-NQ/TW dated 26 March 1962 and Party Secretariat directive 54-CT/TW dated 2 November 1978 and together with implementing the plans for the training of high level and middle level leadership and management cadres of the party, the Nguyen Ai Quoc Advanced Party School has made many efforts to train Marxist-Leninist theory cadres who have a college level education, thereby making a worthy contribution to the training of party cadres.

In the present stage of the revolution, the task regarding work involving theory is larger, especially with regard to helping to implement the resolutions of the 5th Party Congress. In the advance from an agricultural country in which small-scale production predominates directly to socialism without experiencing the stage of capitalist development, the socialist revolution in our country faces many problems regarding theory and practice that must be researched in a comprehensive and systematic manner. We must also research and summarize the profound experiences that have been gained by our party in the more than one-half century of revolutionary struggle; we must examine the latest achievements in the field of theory recorded by the fraternal parties and countries and must contribute to the general development of the storehouse of world revolutionary theory by summarizing the experiences of our revolution. One increasing demand is the need to regularly train theory cadres who possess a relatively high level of scientific education, that is, cadres who hold M.A. or M.S. degrees or higher degrees and are capable of performing the task of providing elementary and advanced training to cadres within the system of party schools, cadres who will supplement the agencies engaged in meteorological work, theoretical research and the social sciences, supplement the departments and sectors on the central and local levels and eventually supplement the corps of leadership cadres of the

party in positions that require high qualifications in the field of theory.

In order to fulfill the requirements and the task mentioned above, the Nguyen Ai Quoc Advanced Party School must raise the training of research students to a new, regular-force level, one that is reflected in scientific dissertations that are defended in exact accordance with state regulations. For several years to come, in addition to the regular modes of training, the school and the Department of Propaganda and Training of the Party Central Committee must continue to employ suitable forms of training (special classes, special sections and so forth) with a view toward meeting the immediate requirements regarding the corps of theory cadres and supply these cadres to the propaganda-training system, the party school system and the other agencies engaged in work involving theory.

The training of research students at the Nguyen Ai Quoc Advanced Party School must meet the goals set forth in the resolution of the 4th Party Congress: 'Training, in a basic, systematic manner reflecting high quality, a corps of theory cadres who possess good political qualities, are very loyal to the undertaking of the party, possess high scientific qualifications, have a firm grasp of the methodology of Marxism-Leninism and the latest achievements of the social sciences and are capable of supporting the party in researching and clarifying the complex issues regarding revolutionary theory and the process of development of modern society.'

To perform the task described above, it is necessary to resolve the following specific problems well:

1. It is necessary to establish a suitable training program and a suitable mode of training, ones that insure that the necessary requirements regarding scientific qualifications are met, that unify theory with practice and that closely link instruction with scientific research, thereby helping to shed light on and resolve the problems raised by the realities of the revolution.
2. As regards the recruiting of students, prospective students must be cadres who meet all standards regarding political qualities, who have experience in practical revolutionary work, have a college level education, have completed the basic program in the theory underlying the subjects of Marxist-Leninist science, are in good health and have passed a strict entrance examination.

Attention must also be given to cadres who have been forged in the realities of production and combat, have some experience in party work and leadership work and possess both the aspiration and the ability to perform work involving theory.

It is necessary to establish a student recruiting council headed by the Organization Department of the Party Central Committee and the Nguyen Ai Quoc Advanced Party School. The list of students who have been accepted must be examined and approved by the Party Secretariat.

3. We must build a corps of instructors of sufficient size and quality, of instructors who eventually must hold certain scientific degrees (in the immediate future, due to the need to put the training of research students on a regular basis, we must quickly appoint veteran instructors who are qualified and experienced to science posts) and who are fully capable of providing scientific guidance to research students in the course of their work of researching and writing their dissertations. The persons who provide scientific guidance to research students must be highly specialized in certain subjects of Marxist-Leninist theory, in matters of theory and practice regarding socialist and communist construction, in historic experiences and matters regarding the domestic and foreign policies of the Vietnam Communist Party and in the revolutionary experiences of the fraternal countries and parties.

The departments and sectors on the central level and the agencies of the party and state engaged in work involving theory and science must appoint leaders, scientific cadres and skilled specialists to help the school instruct research students in specialized subjects of theory and scientific subjects, introduce matters of practical value to them and participate in guiding research students in the writing of their dissertations.

4. The training of research students in the subjects of Marxist-Leninist science raises new requirements concerning the material base needed to support instruction and research. The Department of Finance-Management and the Office of the Party Central Committee must, together with the school, examine and resolve each specific problem in order to provide the conditions needed for training, such as the food, shelter and work of research students, equipment supporting instruction and research, the organization of the information and data systems, etc.

5. The organization and management of research students must be improved:

The school must put qualified and competent cadres and instructors in charge of organizing the training and management of research students. It is necessary to establish a code of official training regulations and to organize the implementation of this code well.

The Department of Organization of the Party Central Committee and the Nguyen Ai Quoc Advanced Party School must propose regulations and policies concerning the organization of training at the party school.

The concerned agencies of the party and state must coordinate with the school, must create every condition needed to rapidly put the training of theory cadres on a regular basis and successfully carry out the above mentioned task.

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PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

MORE AUTHORITY FOR SUBWARD GOVERNMENT URGED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Nov 82 p 3

[Article by Pham Ke: "The Subward Level in Hanoi"]

[Text]

Hanoi presently has 85 subwards, 3 of which are in Son Tay City. The subward government, which is the basic level government of the municipality, is elected by and works directly with the people. The Hanoi subward level, which was established more than 1 year ago, has achieved a number of initial results. The subwards in Hanoi differ in many ways from the subwards in the other localities. Even the 82 subwards in the four urban wards of Hanoi differ from the three subwards of Son Tay City, even though they are all subordinate to the same municipality. The subward, which was established to correspond to the village level government, is the basic level government. However, whereas the average village in the Red River Delta has a population of 5,000 or 6,000, a subward of Hanoi has a population of about 13,000. The nature of the population also differs. The population of a Hanoi subward consists primarily of cadres, manual workers, intellectuals and their dependents and many handicraftsmen, artisans and small merchants. High ranking leadership cadres of the party and state and ordinary citizens live on the same street, in the same ward. There are also many high level and middle level cadres. Dong Xuan Subward, which is the busiest commercial subward in Hanoi and is the subward in which the Dong Xuan Market and the Bac Qua Market are located, only has 831 households engaged in commerce, which encompass some 1,500 persons licensed to operate counters and stores, while the total population of the subward is 2,500 households with 10,630 persons. Practically all of the mercantile households mentioned above are families of manual workers, civil servants or troops. In the other subwards, the number of mercantile households is lower. Clearly, the foremost task of the subward government in Hanoi is to care for the material-spiritual lives of the people, the majority of whom are employees of the state; this task includes caring for the people's food and shelter, education, political security, social order and safety, disease prevention sanitation, cultural, literary and art activities, physical culture and sports and many other matters. The subward is like a funnel through which the programs and policies of the party and state are received and implemented. The subward must also concern itself with

resolving the many problems that arise in the day to day life of society. Only with strong subward governments can the district governments and the municipal government be strong and effective. At present, the subward governmental apparatus of Hanoi only consists of 6 to 8 cadres within the state administration, cadres whose level of education and management skills are limited. In addition, within each subward there are about 20 other cadres and personnel sent by the specialized offices and sections of the district to "assist in management." There are many jobs in which the subward government only "participates" in management because it does not have the authority to provide direct management. There are many times when people bringing matters to the subward government for examination and action are told: "The subward does not have the authority to decide this matter, we will have to forward it to the district and the municipality for a decision." And, the levels of government above the subward generally do not act on such matters quickly.

In correspondence number 1408 dated 15 April 1982, the municipal government defined the tasks of the subward governments. However, these regulations are still very general in nature and make it impossible for the subward level to clearly recognize its specific responsibilities and authority. With such an assignment of responsibilities, the subward government cannot fulfill the tasks of satisfying the desires of the people.

Many chairmen of the subward people's committees have observed that in many fields of activity within the subward, such as the distribution of grain, food and housing, disease prevention sanitation, health care, the development of small industry and the handicraft trades, the management of commerce businesses, the maintenance of political security and the maintenance of social order and safety, the subward government can do nothing more than accept suggestions from the people and forward them to the upper level for action. Even such very basic administrative jobs as verifying marriages, births and deaths and providing copies of these certificates, have not been turned over to the subward.

Therefore, the subward is a basic level of government of the municipality, is the level closest to the people, but does not have the authority to promptly meet the pressing requirements in the daily lives of the people.

All subwards have grain, food, vegetable and fruit stores that serve the people but all of these stores receive their tasks directly from the district level. When the subward sees that the distribution of grain and food products is inconvenient or unfair, it can do nothing more than forward a proposal to the upper level, even when it uncovers a negative phenomenon in the distribution and sale of goods. On paper, the subward manages the private production teams and households of laborers producing small industrial and handicraft products; in actuality, however, the subward can only sign papers for presentation to purchase supplies or raw materials but everything from production guidelines and plans to the sale of products is under the guidance of the district. Managing housing, land and urban projects have been defined as part of the responsibility of the subward; however, many aspects of precisely what is involved in this responsibility and what the scope of authority of the subward is have not been clearly defined.

The illegal occupation of housing is a problem in every subward. In Hang Buom Subward and Dong Xuan Subward, dozens of houses have been illegally occupied for more than 3 years without anything being done to correct this situation. Although the principle is that there must be a housing rental contract and permission from the district public security force in order to change one's census registration, this step is frequently taken without going through the subward government. Subward governments know about such phenomena as buying, selling or trading houses for a "commission" and illegally occupying land and building a house; however, the subward government can do nothing more than issue a warning and file a report with the upper level requesting that it take action in the matter but without ever knowing when this action will be taken. Even the job of maintaining clean streets has not been turned over to the subward. If the sanitation corporations undertook the work of picking up and transporting garbage and the subwards were given the task and the funds needed to pick up litter and maintain clean streets, the subwards could rely upon the neighborhood teams to keep the streets cleaner than they are being kept now. The subwards know each household of private merchants, know the volume of their business and know which households should and which households should not be issued business licenses. However, the subwards only have the right to make proposals at a time when tax collection norms are assigned by the district. The Dong Xuan Subward People's Committee once took the initiative in rearranging the seating spaces of nearly 300 persons who sell cloth, clothing and mats along Cao Thang, Nguyen Thiep, Hang Khoai and Nguyen Thien Thuat Streets, as a result of which it earned more than 200,000 dong in taxes and more than 30,000 dong in space rental for the state each month. The subward is able to collect much more in taxes for the state but it has not been assigned this task.

The four urban wards of Hanoi are very large and contain a very large number of subwards. Hoang Kiem Ward has 18 subwards, Dong Da Ward has 26, Hai Ba Trung Ward has 23 and Ba Dinh Ward has 15. In a large and important city, such as the capital Hanoi, which encounters many new problems that must be promptly resolved in the course of its development, it is obviously difficult for the ward government to do everything. Would it not be a better and more efficient division of labor and echelons if the subward level could work more effectively, could achieve more practical results and could resolve matters within the subward more quickly?

Cadres, the Matter of Key Importance

In order for the subward level to operate well, be worthy of the expectations of the people and help to manage the lives of the people in a civilized, sensitive and skillful manner, it is necessary to establish a corps of skilled, good cadres on the subward level.

Some of Hanoi's subwards do not have the stipulated number of cadres. The majority of the cadres within the corps of subward cadres in Hanoi have a number of years experience in working within the precinct administrative committees of representatives and have some experience in street management. Many of these comrades are devoted to their work. Some have matured rapidly and show many good prospects. Generally speaking, however, the present corps of subward cadres

does not meet the requirements of its tasks. Managing a subward in Hanoi is extremely difficult work that requires well-educated, competent cadres who possess revolutionary qualities. Of the key cadres on the subward level in Hanoi at this time, only one person receives a specialists salary; generally speaking, these cadres are grade 3 and grade 4 party affairs cadres.

It has come time to provide the subward level with many skilled cadres taken from within the apparatus of the central agencies or the municipal level and to establish satisfactory regulations and policies, such as enabling them to retain the same salary that they had at their former place of work. Providing additional competent cadres who possess the qualities and skills needed to perform the key task of the subward government in coordination with providing advanced training to the corps of cadres now working on the subward level are the key to increasing the strength and the effectiveness of the subward government.

The cadres working in the subwards, who work very hard and perform many complex, unforeseen jobs, must have suitable salaries, bonuses, vacations and health care. Each month, Hanoi pays an allowance to the subward party committee secretaries and chairmen, the deputy party committee secretary of the subward, the subward vice chairman, the chairman of the subward front, the Youth Union secretary, the head of the chapter of the Women's Union and the heads of the specialized committees within the subward. This represents a major effort but it is not enough to help subward cadres overcome each of the difficulties they face.

Direct, close leadership by the party committee echelon will create the conditions for the subward government to complete its tasks. It is necessary to increase the number of party members working at agencies and enterprises who participate in activities and work on the streets. The party committees of the subward must make good use of the force of retired party members. Depending upon their circumstances and health, party members who have a skill in one area must be assigned suitable work, such as participating in the specialized subcommittees, serving as the head or assistant head of a neighborhood team, looking after and teaching teenagers and children, helping to maintain security, resolving quarrels, etc. The subward level is an extremely important level of government, especially in Hanoi. It is our hope that the party and state will adopt new, specific and strong programs, policies and measures for further strengthening the subward level because whether or not this level performs its work well immediately affects the life of each family.

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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EXAMINED

HANOI GIAO DUC LY LUAN in Vietnamese No 5, Sep-Oct 82 pp 23-28

[Article by Le Hong Tiem: "Several Matters Concerning Coordinating the Central Economy with the Local Economy"]

[Text] The 5th Party Congress set forth 10 major socio-economic policies. One of these policies is: "Correctly coordinating the building of the central economy with the strong development of the local economy within a unified national economic structure." (1) In order to advance our economy, an economy in which small-scale production still predominates, to large-scale socialist production, we absolutely must employ two methods: we must appropriately centralize our forces to build modern, large-scale production installations by means of capital accumulated domestically in conjunction with expanding our international cooperation. On the other hand, we must move forward on the basis of our existing cooperativized agriculture, small-scale industry and handicraft technology.

The economic achievements that have been recorded over the past several years confirm that the central economy has formed centralized areas encompassing many modern enterprises in the electric power, coal, mechanical engineering, chemical and other sectors. A number of new economic zones and new state farms have undergone significant development. The development of the local economy has intensified the development of raw materials and the opening of sectors and trades, thereby providing jobs to millions of persons in Thai Binh, Hanoi, Ha Nam Ninh, Ho Chi Minh City and so forth. The provinces of An Giang, Cuu Long and Dong Thap, having achieved good results in their purchasing operations, have increased the sources of goods and increased the revenues of the state and the locality. In the mountains, along the seacoast and in the midlands, many cooperatives have given attention to meeting their own needs for clothing and shelter by accelerating the development of the subsidiary household economy, thereby caring for the lives of the people better and strengthening the already strong socialist production relations. The sense of ownership of many installations in the work of formulating and implementing production plans, in the work of building material-technical bases and, in particular, in fully utilizing favorable conditions in order to increase the sources of export goods has been heightened.

At present, the provinces are concerning themselves with accelerating the development of agriculture and the various sectors and trades; however, they

have not boldly assigned responsibility for guiding agriculture to the district so that more manpower can be concentrated on building industry with a view toward stimulating and competently supporting the development of agriculture and the consumer requirements of the locality. In industrial development, the localities have not carefully calculated their natural resources, labor force or capital, consequently, they want to build every sector and expand every enterprise. Even in some sectors, such as mechanical engineering, high grade building materials and so forth, at a time when the large central enterprises with modern technology and unused equipment capacity are experiencing a shortage of raw materials, a shortage of spare parts, a shortage of energy and so forth, localities are continuing to invest in their enterprises of this type.

Some localities that have not fulfilled their obligation to deliver products to the central level have used raw materials, products and merchandise to trade with other localities or with foreign countries. The phenomena of localities competing with central enterprises in the purchase of raw materials, thereby raising purchasing prices, competition among the localities for products and goods to export and even competition to kick one another out of the exports market has caused many disruptions.

In addition, many localities are not coordinating their activities in order to create mutual cooperation between central enterprises and the economic activities of the locality and there are even some localities that consider these economic installations to be a heavy burden upon the locality.

As for the ministries, the central sectors are not providing specific guidance to the localities with regard to planning and developing production. The ministries are not successfully fulfilling their function of managing the entire sector throughout the country and have not concerned themselves with closely coordinating the central enterprises with the local economy.

The matters of guiding the localities in building enterprises, establishing cooperation and increasing the economic trade with one another have not been raised in a positive manner. The economic activities of localities with foreign countries are not closely guided or inspected. Many regulations and policies are still lacking in detail and do not encourage localities to make investments, operate businesses or be more independent. In many cases, the central level has failed to properly implement two-way contracts with localities.

In summary, the main problems in the relationship between the central economy and the local economy are problems encountered in implementing the principle of democratic centralism as regards the economy. These problems are manifested in the following contradictions:

- + The localities want to have their authority increased in many fields so that they can take more initiative in managing production and business and want the central level to abolish the regulations that prevent the granting of more authority to the localities in production and business.

- + Conversely, the central sectors tend to want to achieve a high level of centralization and are afraid that increasing the authority of the localities

will lead to unorganized decentralization, will make it difficult to implement plans well, difficult to inspect and control production and business activities, difficult to control the sources of goods and difficult to insure uniform regulations and policies throughout the nation while creating very large differences among the various localities in production and standard of living.

Because this contradiction has not been resolved, bureaucratic centralism continues to exist; on the other hand, unorganized, decentralized operations are increasing rather than declining.

To overcome the situation mentioned above, we must first of all have a thorough understanding of the economic line of the party and must "formulate general charts on the growth and apportionment of production forces"(2) on the basis of our long-term economic strategy. We must fully recognize the role played by the central economy and the role of the local economy and correctly understand the organic relationship between them in order to develop the economy in a manner consistent with the country's conditions.

The central economy consists of economic-technical sectors that are directly managed by the central level. These are the key economic sectors, are the sectors that form the backbone of the national economy, are sectors of a national nature and have a profound impact throughout the country. The development of the central economy determines the existence and development of the national economy and has an impact upon the standard of living of each person in society. For this reason, we must insure that the central economy plays the leading, dominant role as the lever stimulating the development of the entire national economy. This role is expressed in the following:

--In determining the economic strategy and tasks of the entire country for the long range as well as for each period in the immediate future;

--In determining the major balances and major norms of a nationwide nature of the national economy;

--In determining the major policies of the state and unifying the basic norms governing labor, finances, supplies and capital;

--In appropriately centralizing capital in order to carry out expanded reproduction throughout society and accelerating the development of the key economic sectors;

--In creating the conditions for the localities and installations to take the initiative in developing their production and meeting the production and consumer needs of the locality and installation.

Whereas the central economy is directly managed by the central level, the local economy is directly built and managed by the governments of the various localities on the basis of responsibility granted to them by the central level. However, the governments of the localities not only represent the local people, they are

also the representatives of the central state within the locality who are responsible for building and managing the local economy; therefore, they must not only serve the interests of the local people, but the common interests of the people of the entire country as well. Consequently, the local economy is an integral part of the national economy. It is an important element of the entire system of division of social labor and can be considered to be the concretization of the tasks of the central economy within the locality. To fulfill this role, the local economy must perform the following several tasks very well:

1. On the basis of the common strategic guidelines of the central economy and its own specific conditions, the locality must take the initiative in building a suitable economic structure, make full use of labor, develop its natural resources, develop the sectors and trades and accelerate production with a view toward achieving the highest possible economic returns.
2. It must take the initiative in resolving and meeting the locality's needs in production and in the material and cultural lives of its people.
3. On the basis of the regulations and policies of the central level, it must take the initiative in concretizing and improving the mode of business management, rationalize production, improve the mode of distribution and circulation and insure that the production and consumption needs within the locality are served.
4. It must complete the tasks assigned to it by the central level while actively participating in the effort to perform the common tasks and overcome the common difficulties of the national economy.

In the process of economic development, the local economy and the central economy are closely related to each other. As the local economy becomes larger and stronger, it creates increasingly favorable conditions for the development of the central economy; as the central economy becomes increasingly stable and strong, it creates an increasingly strong foundation for the rapid growth of the local economy. In actuality, the unity of the central economy and the local economy within a structure of the national economy is seen in the following points:

1. There is not one economic installation directly subordinate to any locality that is not part of one sector or another, that is not closely linked to the economic installations that are directly subordinate to the central level and form unified, nationwide economic-technical sectors.
2. Conversely, there is not one economic installation directly subordinate to the central level that is not located within a certain locality, consequently, the economic installations subordinate to the central level cannot help but have certain economic relations with the local economy.

Therefore, in leading and guiding as well as in building the new economy, each sector, each locality and each installation must recognize and fully comply with the following several principles:

1. Unity of planning and plans: the sector and the locality absolutely must correctly fulfill the objectives and guidelines of the state plan; each production-business unit, regardless of whether it is subordinate to the central level or the locality, must be included in the unified planning and plans of the sector.
2. Technical unity: in investments in new construction or in the restoration and development of production, each installation must be under the technical guidance of the sector. The use of new technology, the improvement of existing technology or the application of scientific and technological achievements must be based on the opinions of the sector and must be carried out in full compliance with the regulations of the sector.
3. Both the sector and the locality have the responsibility to train cadres and manual workers; the modes of training can differ but training programs, objectives and standards must be unified and must be managed by the sector.
4. Unity of labor quotas, technical supply ceilings and major policies and regulations: each locality and each installation can flexibly apply these quotas, ceilings, regulations and policies but may not violate stipulated principles.
5. Unity in distribution: the distribution regulations, standards, quotas and principles that have been established by the state for the entire country must be fully complied with by each installation, each locality and each sector. The locality should not be considered as having an exclusive right to use the products produced by it. Because, the locality is only a part of the national economy; the locality must use the tools and other products of the entire country and must, moreover, support the exports plan and the national defense task. Consequently, the production-distribution plan that is assigned to the locality must be correctly implemented otherwise it will pose an obstacle, will create an imbalance within the economy.

In order to insure the unity of the structure and avoid a situation in which the central economy and the local economy develop at cross purposes or duplicate each other's development, it is first of all necessary to rapidly plan the development of the central economy and the local economy. The objective of this planning must be to implement the guidelines for long-range economic development, namely, building a modern industrial-agricultural structure, beginning with a rational industrial-agricultural structure. Focusing our efforts on strongly developing agriculture, considering agriculture to be the front of foremost importance and advancing agriculture one step toward large-scale socialist production are the central task in the present stage. However, agricultural production is dependent upon the natural conditions, the climate, the arable land and the labor of each locality, consequently, agriculture is the main and immediate task of the local economy.

Generally speaking, in planning, the sectors can be divided into three types:

--The sectors that must be primarily developed by the local economy but must, at the same time, also be built by the central economy, such as agriculture.

--The sectors that must be primarily developed by the central economy but must, at the same time, also be developed by the local economy, such as heavy industry.

--The sectors that must be developed by both the central economy and the local economy at the same time, such as the consumer goods industry and the building materials industry. However, in order to insure high economic efficiency, planning must clearly state which installations should be constructed by each sector and in which localities should these installations be constructed; which installations in which sectors should be constructed by each locality; and, to which level is each installation subordinate.

On the basis of overall planning, on the basis of the guidelines for the development of the national economy and on the basis of the characteristics of the natural resources, labor, arable land, sectors and trades of their locality, each province and district must formulate relatively long-range planning for the economic development of the locality with a view toward rapidly establishing a rational economic structure. In general, the economic structure of the province is an industrial-agricultural structure while the economic structure of the district is an agro-industrial structure, forestry-agro-industrial structure, agro-fishing-industrial structure and so forth. The purpose of establishing such a structure is to virtually meet the food, clothing, shelter, transportation, education, health care and entertainment needs of the local people through local efforts. To achieve this objective, the locality must first establish its own production guidelines, establish an efficient, scientifically based allocation of crops and livestock and develop the sectors and trades within the locality in order to make full use of all arable land, make full use of the capabilities of each sector and trade, make full use of labor and achieve the highest possible economic returns.

The district is a unit that plays an important role in building the economic structure because it is the base that directly coordinates agriculture with industry, directly coordinates national ownership with collective ownership. Le Duan said: "Each district is a basic economic unit consisting of many production and business organizations that practices independent cost accounting but is linked to the other districts within a structure that forms the foundation of the provincial and central economies." (3) "We must realize that building district agro-industrial economic units lays the foundation for the economic structure of the province, the municipality and the entire country and that building the new system within each district lays the foundation for the new system throughout the country." (4)

In coordinating central economic construction with local economic development, we must resolutely struggle against both the tendency toward restrictive bureaucratic centralism and the tendency toward unorganized decentralization. The general principle that must be thoroughly understood is the principle of democratic centralism which closely links the top and the bottom together. We must first implement the principle of correctly coordinating management by sector with management by locality. This coordination is manifested in a vivid, fundamental way in the close coordination between the sector plan and the local plan. "The sector plan must reflect the correct strategy for the development of

the sector on a nationwide scale, must be consistent with the general socio-economic strategy, must constantly raise the level of scientific and technological development of the sector and must, by means of implementing cost accounting and socialist business practices well, carry out expanded reproduction, thereby contributing to the development of the national economy and helping to meet the needs of all of society." "The local plan (which consists of the plan of the province and the plan of the district) must be designed to develop the capabilities and strengths of the locality, expand trade relations with the various sectors and the other localities and, through export-import activities, meet the needs of production and everyday life, thereby contributing more and more to the revolutionary undertaking of the entire country."(5)

Although they have different bases, both the sector plan and the local plan have the objective of carrying out the common tasks of the state plan. The sector plan is based on the demand for the type of product that the sector has been assigned to produce; the local plan is formulated on the basis of the comprehensive needs of the locality and the requirements involved in the rational development and utilization of the natural resources, the labor and the strengths of the locality. Only by implementing the sector plan well is it possible to implement the local plan in a manner that yields high returns. Conversely, only when the plan of the locality is implemented well are the conditions created for the sector plan to be successfully completed. This relationship demands that when the sector plans to build an enterprise within a locality, it must discuss this with the locality to insure that the enterprise is of the correct size and is being constructed at the right place and time in order to avoid a situation in which many sectors plan to build an enterprise at the same place. Conversely, the plan of the locality must include the tasks that the locality must perform for the central enterprises and even seek assistance in the form of production capacity and technology from the central enterprises. The sector and the locality have joint responsibilities to each other's enterprises. However, the locality must still perform the following two tasks:

--It must take charge of building and managing the local economy under the leadership of the central level.

--It must participate in the management of the installations of the central economy that are within the locality by, for example, supplying raw materials and labor, organizing, regulating and coordinating the economic activities within the locality and inspecting the implementation of policies and regulations of the party and state by the installations of the central economy.

Conversely, the sectors of the central economy have two tasks to perform:

--They must directly manage the central enterprises of which they are in charge.

--They must provide sector-wide economic-administrative management (of local enterprises as well) in the areas of scientific-technical and cadre training planning, plans, policies and regulations.

In addition to obeying the leadership of the local leadership level, the economic installations of the central level that are located within the various localities must contribute a certain percentage of their profits to the locality for use as funds to build public welfare projects and assist the development of the local economy.

In view of the fact that the number of installations of the central economy and local enterprises is constantly increasing, the sectors and localities can discuss the establishment of production federations in order to make full use of equipment capacity and production capacity and support and stimulate the development of both the central enterprises and local enterprises, thereby producing additional products and strengthening the trade relations among the localities. The sector can also take the initiative and hold discussions with the various localities concerning giving each locality the responsibility for specializing in the production of one part of the sector's product (such as assigning one place the responsibility for producing bicycle frames, another place the responsibility for producing bicycle chains and so forth). This will create cooperation in production among localities and rapidly optimize the technical standards of products.

Therefore, together with stipulating the tasks and authority of the various levels, it is necessary to promulgate policies that encourage and compel each ministry to concern itself with all the enterprises, both central enterprises and local enterprises, of which its sector is in charge; at the same time, a policy must be adopted that encourages and compels the various local leadership levels to concern themselves with all the enterprises within their locality.

The central economy and the local economy are constituent components of the complete, unified structure of our country's socialist economy, in which the central economy plays the dominant role and serves as the lever stimulating the development of the entire national economy. In the present situation, the local economy occupies an extremely important position. However, developing the local economy is not merely the task of the locality, it is the common task of the entire country as well. The development of the local economy will create favorable conditions for the development of the central economy. With close coordination by means of specific programs and plans of the sectors and the various local levels and with the newly promulgated regulations and policies, the coordination between the building of the central economy and the strong development of the local economy will surely bring about a strong change that will cause the entire economy to record large victories.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Proceedings of the 5th National Congress of Delegates, Volume 1, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, p 63.
2. Ibid.
3. Le Duan: "Building a Strong and Stable Local Economy," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1981, pp 152-158.
4. Ibid.
5. The Proceedings of the 5th National Congress of Delegates...pp 80-81.

AGRICULTURE

RECORD RICE YIELDS REPORTED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Nov 82 p 1

[Article: "As of 15 November, Practically All Provinces and Municipalities of the Country Had Recorded Bumper Crops"]

[Excerpt] As of 15 November, according to the Statistics General Department, the provinces and municipalities of the North had harvested 930,000 hectares of 10th month rice, or 71 percent of the land planted with 10th month rice. During the past 10 days, the rate of harvesting has been rather rapid. According to initial reports from the people's committees of the various provinces and municipalities, practically all localities in the North are recording a rather high yield, exceeding their plan quotas and producing more 10th month rice than last year. A number of provinces and municipalities, such as Thai Binh, Hai Hung, Haiphong and Ha Son Binh, might record yields of 25 to 30 quintals per hectare. The two provinces of Vinh Phu and Ha Son Binh are recording their highest 10th month rice yields ever.

Together with harvesting 10th month rice, the provinces and municipalities of the North have planted 137,000 hectares of winter crops (55,000 hectares less than had been planted by this time last year), thereby completing 39.1 percent of their plan quota. The amount of area under the cultivation of some export crops, such as tobacco and garlic, is significantly higher than last year. At present, western potatoes, vegetables and beans can still be planted. The cooperatives are continuing to adjust their supply of western potato cuttings, vegetable seed and bean seed in an effort to make full use of the time remaining in the planting season and meet their plan quotas on the amount of area under cultivation.

Recently, rainstorms crushed and ruined many new vegetable plantings. Some places are encountering difficulties with vegetable seed and western potato cuttings. The provinces and municipalities of the North are urgently preparing for winter-spring production by plowing 5th month fields, sowing seed for seedlings, sowing duckweed on fields and producing and processing organic fertilizer. The slow rate at which 10th month rice is being harvested has affected these preparations. Deserving of attention is the fact that nitrogen fertilizer is being supplied slowly to the various localities. The southern provinces have harvested 146,000 hectares of early 10th month rice. Many places have recorded a rather high yield.

LIGHT INDUSTRY

INTENSIVE PRODUCTION OF RATTAN, BAMBOO WARES ADVOCATED

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 5 Oct 82 p 3

[Anon: "Consumer and Export Goods: Ordinary Rattan, Big Rattan and Bamboo"]

[Text] Articles made of ordinary rattan, big rattan and bamboos are one of the categories of export goods which are rather salable on the international market and are, at the same time, very necessary to the consumption needs of our people. The production of these goods involves 7,250 principal laborers and thousands of auxiliary laborers most of whom are handicraftsmen in the agricultural sector, especially in many traditionally professional villages belonging to the districts of Thanh Tri, Tu Liem, Thach That and so forth where both young and old people know how to make rattan and bamboo wares of good quality for export. For export purposes alone, this year handicraftsmen in Hanoi have agreed to deliver to the state a volume of products worth 20 million dong in total (according to the formerly fixed price). Every year, many professional handicraft cooperatives composed of fairly many skillful laborers have delivered to the state hundreds of thousands of sets and separate units of export goods worth 1 or 2 million dong; these cooperatives are the Kien Thiet [Construction] Cooperative in Hai Ba Trung Precinct, the Hanoi Rattan Chairs Cooperative in Dong Da Precinct, the Huu Bang Cooperative in Thach That District, etc.

In the vast rural areas of Hanoi, every district and village grow large quantities of bamboo trees and many localities have begun to grow rattan on a large scale. This situation is very favorable to the development of the production of rattan and bamboo wares. In the first 8 months of this year, the purchase price of raw materials bought right at the vicinity of forests has increased manifold in comparison with the past, the transportation and handling cost has soared up and cash payments have become very difficult. However, with their determination to put Hanoi in a strong and stable position with regard to the production of this type of goods, almost all installations have displayed a high spirit of self-sufficiency, taken the initiative to explore additional sources of raw materials and actively and fully used the amount of bamboo and rattan grown in gardens to produce goods. As a result, apart from producing a volume of goods worth millions of dong to meet the consumption needs of the city people, handicraftsmen in the rattan and bamboo sector have handed over to the state an amount of export goods worth more than 18 million dong and larger by nearly a half than their output during the

same period last year. The rattan and bamboo ware business in Hanoi still has fairly great potentials in view of the fact that many traditionally professional villages are still limiting production and have not yet boldly recruited additional laborers for professional training because they have experienced difficulties in exploiting and purchasing raw materials or because their managerial mechanisms are still burdened with irrationalities. Especially noteworthy is the fact that with the abundance of rattan and bamboo trees and the presence of many skillful handicraftsmen, the vast rural areas of the city can meet the consumption needs of the city people by providing them each year with tens and even hundreds of thousands of fairly durable and nice bamboo beds and bed mats. However, this potential has not yet been fully exploited for production purposes because attention has not been paid in organizing and guiding the production and consumption of goods. This problem gives us food for thought and must be raised soon in order to reduce the difficulties encountered by the city in bringing in wood from afar to make beds for the people, and also to provide more jobs for peasants in the rural areas of the city and consequently improve their living conditions. To develop vigorously the production of rattan and bamboo articles for export is to know how to do business because raw materials are available domestically and locally and because by doing so we will be able to use the labor force fully and rationally and to derive a manifold benefit.

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CSO: 4209/125

LIGHT INDUSTRY

DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL INDUSTRY, HANDICRAFTS REPORTED

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 6 Oct 82 pp 1, 4

[Text] In the first 9 months of this year, despite numerous difficulties with material supplies, raw materials, electricity and so forth but with their high determination and owing to positive measures and efforts, the small industry and handicrafts sector in Hai Ba Trung Precinct has manufactured a volume of products worth 37,956,000 dong fulfilling 78.9 percent of the yearly plan, representing an output increase of 11.3 percent over the same period last year and including a 7,545,000-dong worth of export goods. Like other industrial sectors, many principal trades have achieved a fairly high output and have fulfilled 160 percent of the yearly plan entrusted. The wood, rattan and bamboo ware sector has fulfilled 82.2 percent of the yearly plan, etc.

All installations subordinate to the sector have taken the initiative to expand the sources of exploitation and have actively and fully used 1,881 tons of raw and discarded materials and 20 cubic meters of scrap timber to produce goods, thereby providing additional jobs for thousands of laborers. To overcome difficulties with the electric supply, almost all cooperatives and cooperation teams in the sector have organized different shifts according to the availability of power supply, readied machines for use and tried to improve tools and to manufacture additional ones of the improved models with the objective of using the tools' capacities fully and satisfactorily whenever power is supplied. They have also wisely employed laborers in simple jobs requiring little electric power. As a result and despite the fact that the power cut-off time is equivalent to 477,440 work-days (and that if the raw material shortage period plus the prolonged Tet holidays are taken into account, the number of workdays lost will be 638,940 with the ensuing reduction of the gross output value by more than 7,367,000 dong), many cooperatives and cooperation teams have continued to forge ahead and to provide regular jobs for laborers. In particular, though faced with many difficulties but resolved to follow the path of long-term business and services, many installations subordinate to the sector have started producing 27 more kinds of goods and have even produced some of them in large quantities such as the bicycle disk rods (made by the Tu Cuong Machinery Cooperative), the export bicycle saddles (manufactured by the Viet Phu Machinery Cooperative), the ornamental enamel bricks (made by the Hoa Mai Cooperative), the desk lamps (fabricated by the Dong Ba Cooperative) and so

forth. The entire sector has opened 29 courses to train people in the production of Venetian laceworks and rattan and bamboo wares for export and has thus trained 790 new laborers for production purposes.

In order to be able to deliver to the state this year a volume of consumer and export products totaling 60 million dong in gross output value which will exceed the yearly plan entrusted by the state by 4 million dong, the management board of the Federation of Small Industry and Handicrafts Cooperatives has held an enlarged conference to discuss more specific and positive measures to be taken in the last 3 months of this year. The wood-rattan-bamboo ware sector has agreed to produce above and beyond the plan norm a volume of goods worth 1 million dong as gross output value, thus raising the yearly plan norm to 4,350,000 dong. The whole sector has expressed the determination to try to attract and train 1,450 more new laborers in the production of Venetian laceworks and rattan-bamboo wickerworks for export. Many specific measures have been set forth to expand the emulation movement to fully exploit and use raw and discarded materials in production, to try to consolidate cooperatives and so forth.

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CSO: 4209/125

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

EDITORIAL ON RURAL ROAD NETWORK

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Nov 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Developing Rural Communications and Transportation"]

[Text] The rural communications and transportation movement is becoming a mass movement in all localities and is yielding practical economic returns.

The northern provinces have constructed more than 400,000 kilometers of roads and tens of thousands of bridges and sluices of various types and have begun to establish a convenient communications network that links the hamlets to the village centers and the village centers to the main roads of the locality. In coordination with improving their fields and building water conservancy projects, the cooperatives have constructed systems of area and plot embankments that enable mechanized vehicles and rudimentary vehicles to travel all the way to fields. The localities have also given appropriate attention to the development of rudimentary and improved rudimentary means of transportation and have organized transport cooperatives and specialized transport sections and units within agricultural cooperatives. In many villages, many families with improved vehicles and bicycles have helped to provide transportation in circulation and in production; calculated per unit of land under cultivation, transportation only accounts for 10 to 15 percent of the total manpower invested in production. Since liberation day, the southern provinces have rapidly transformed private production forces and gradually restored main roads in order to support the production and daily lives of the people. Many places have closely coordinated this effort with the transformation of production relations and the construction of water conservancy projects in order to develop rural communications and transportation.

The salient characteristics of the movement to develop rural communications and transportation and the positive application of the guideline "the state and the people working together" and the use of primarily local raw materials and supplies and popular technology. By means of flexible, diverse forms of organization, many localities have mobilized rather large amounts of local manpower and materiel. With a small amount of assistance from the state in the form of funds, Tu Loc District in Hai Hung Province mobilized the people to collect enough stone and broken bricks in the locality to improve the entirety of the district's main road. Thuy Hoa District in Phu Khanh Province has mobilized its people to

perform the necessary excavation work and build a 300 meter bridge to link a village resembling an island to the mainland. Recently, the movement has been developing rapidly and uniformly in the provinces of former Zone 5. In the Mekong River Delta, there are also many good, model units in Hau Giang, Long An, Minh Hai and so forth and, to one degree or another, every province and district has a movement of the people to build rural communications projects.

Actual experience has shown that if, in view of the fact that the economy is still encountering difficulties, we tap the spirit of collective ownership, perform good organizational and educational work and adopt correct policies for mobilizing the people, we can rapidly turn our potentials into living reality and develop rural communications and transportation to support production and everyday life. At those places at which the movement is underdeveloped, it is primarily the result of the thinking of relying upon or waiting for investments by the state and the result of not giving attention to providing the districts and villages with additional professional and technical cadres to guide and assist the movement.

The resolution of the 5th Party Congress pointed out: "We must highly focus the strength of the entire country on the comprehensive development of agricultural production..., beginning with accelerating the production of grain and food products, considering this to be the center of every economic activity, to be the point of convergence of the efforts and the area that reflects the strength of all sectors and levels..." Rural communications-transportation work must have agriculture as its foremost target of support and use the district and the village as the base for the development of rural communications. The northern provinces and former Zone 5 must, on the basis of the communications and transportation planning of the district, improve the quality of roads, bridges and sluices, insure the correct implementation of technical standards and codes, make full use of local materials in the improvement of road surfaces and strengthen road maintenance and repair forces in order to provide safe and convenient transportation. It is necessary to strengthen and develop the transportation cooperatives and the specialized transportation forces within agriculture while accelerating the development of means of transportation among the people, considering this to also be a component of the household economy, so that every family has some means of transportation.

In the southern province, especially in the Mekong Delta, it is necessary to continue to restore the roads that were destroyed during the war, dredge and open rivers and streams and build wharves in order to utilize water routes. There must be close coordination between the transformation of production relations and the construction of water conservancy projects for the purpose of building area and plot embankment roads and linking hamlets and the center of the village by roads. We must continue to improve production relations within collective transport forces and must transform private transport forces, with the efforts of these forces being directed toward supporting agriculture and undertaking the task of bringing goods to central locations within the locality while delivering goods from these centers to the markets of the districts, villages and hamlets, thereby creating the conditions for large means of transportation to quickly and systematically transport goods from the locality.

As the rural communications-transportation network is expanded, increasing conditions exist for helping to stimulate the development of agricultural production, reducing the amount of strenuous labor that must be performed, improving the cultural life of the people, improving the countryside with each passing day and helping to maintain security and the defense of the nation.

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CSO: 4209/122

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

NORTH-SOUTH TRANSPORTATION IMPROVED

Hanoi GIAO THONG VAN TAI in Vietnamese 30 Sep 82 p 1

[Article by Nguyen Phu: "New Changes in North-South Transportation"]

[Text] Over the past more than 2 months, the North-South transportation task has obtained some results and made a noteworthy progress. Because the sources of goods to be carried to the north have been limited, the overall transportation output of the entire line has not shown any increase over the average output achieved in the first 6 months of this year; nevertheless, the south-bound transportation of goods has been intensified and has achieved a monthly increase of 8 percent. Owing to a concentrated guidance, the transportation of many important goods has been carried out fairly well. The grain produced in the Nam Bo delta has been carried away as soon as it is made available. The grain produced in Region 5 and the sundry goods and food-stuffs produced in Ho Chi Minh City have been carried to the north. The volume of salt produced in Region 5 and carried to the north in nearly 3 months has more than doubled in comparison with the volume transported in the first 6 months of this year. More than 10,000 tons of export salt have been concentrated and are ready to be picked up by the incoming foreign ships. As for fish sauce—a kind of merchandise which is relatively difficult to transport—the railroad sector has continuously overfulfilled the transportation plan in the past 2 months.

The campaign launched to boost the transportation of the Lam Thao phosphate fertilizer to the Mekong River delta has been carried out satisfactorily thanks to a close coordination between the railroad and sea transportation sectors, the ports sector, the transportation corporations and agencies, the Lam Thao Phosphate Fertilizer Plant and the various ministries which are the merchandise owners; as a result, the volume of goods transported in the past 70 days is 2.25 times larger than that achieved in the first 6 months of this year.

Generally speaking, good developments can be seen in the state of north-south transportation. The reason is that initiatives have been taken to organize the exploitation of certain important goods produced in key areas and to transport them promptly in order to reduce their stagnation. The organization of various lines and the work assignment between the sea and railroad transportation sectors have been stabilized and rationalized gradually according

to a trend to vigorously develop the sea shipping capacities for the purpose of carrying voluminous goods, to concentrate and fully use the railroad capacities to carry scattered goods of small volume whose consumption requirements are even at all times and to strictly limit long-distance automobile transportation. Shouldering personal responsibility for transportation, the various transportation sectors have actively exploited and organized the sources of goods to be carried and are gradually determining responsibilities between the owners of goods and the transportation sectors in order to coordinate the activities of both sides to carry out the transportation task satisfactorily. The organization and direction of the transportation sectors are also being strengthened with the objective of firmly grasping the state of goods, promptly mobilizing means and making quick decisions to cope with different situations such as to carry another kind of goods when that which is to be transported is unavailable, thus avoiding the need to keep transportation means waiting. Regional transportation guidance committees have been set up and are exercising their effect.

Based on the above-mentioned initial progress, the various transportation sectors are trying to develop it continuously. It is certain that the north-south transportation task will be carried out ever more satisfactorily.

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CSO: 4209/125

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

VIETNAM-CZECHOSLOVAK SHIP REGISTRATION AGREEMENT SIGNED

Hanoi GIAO THÔNG VAN TAI in Vietnamese 30 Oct 82 p 4

[Article by Nguyen Van Ban, of the Vietnam Registration Department:
"Vietnam-Czechoslovak Cooperation in Registration, Technical Inspection and
Classification of Ships"]

[Text] At the invitation of the Vietnam Registration [Department], a delegation of the Registration [Department] of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic led by Eng Josep Stastny, department director, came to visit Vietnam from 29 September to 4th October 1982.

During its stay in Vietnam, the Czechoslovak Registration Department delegation visited the central organ and some branches of the Vietnam Registration Department. Both sides discussed and exchanged views on certain problems relating to the task of formulating regulations and carrying out technical inspection and ship classification and also on some scientific topics on production promotion and of mutual concern such as tropicalization, river transportation and handling of coal, etc.

On 3 October in Hanoi, Eng Dinh Van Khai, director and representative of the Vietnam Registration Department, and Eng Josep Stastny, director and representative of the Czechoslovak Registration Department, signed an "Agreement on Proxy for Technical Inspection and Classification of Ship."

Present at the signing ceremony were, on the Vietnamese side, Nguyen Nam Hai, vice minister of Transportation and Communications, the representative of the International Cooperation Department, and so forth.

The talks took place in an atmosphere of friendship, mutual understanding and professional cooperation.

The delegation returned home on 4 October 1982.

According to the agreement signed, the Vietnam Registration Department will act on behalf of its Czechoslovak counterpart in technically inspecting and classifying Czechoslovak seagoing and hinterland ships whether they are being newly built, repaired, renovated or operated and also in inspecting raw materials and products used in building and repairing ships in Vietnam or a third country and vice versa.

At present, Czechoslovakia is a country which manufactures a large amount of machines and equipment for the seagoing and river ship building sector and which exports huge quantities of these machines and equipment to the socialist countries, in particular, every year our country imports a very large volume of ship machines and equipment from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

The signing of this agreement marks a new development in the Vietnam Registration organ's relationships of international cooperation in technical inspection and classification of ships.

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CSO: 4209/125

HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE

VOCATIONAL EDUCATION DEVELOPED WITH FOREIGN AID

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 6 Oct 82 p 3

[Text] By 1982, there are throughout our country 328 vocational schools with nearly 10,000 teachers. To date, more than 1 million workers of 280 various trades have been trained. There are four schools to train workers as vocational teachers and one school to give advanced training to managerial cadres. There have emerged recently a number of vocational schools at the district level and in handicraft cooperatives in addition to private vocational courses.

Following is the number of vocational students and teachers who have been trained from 1966 to date with the aid of the socialist countries:

--The Soviet Union has helped train 16,640 persons including 15,712 vocational students, 498 vocational teachers and 430 managerial cadres. Of these persons, 15,214 have returned to our country. From 1955 to date, the Soviet Union has helped train 72,600 people.

--The GDR has helped train 12,460 people including 11,840 vocational students and 620 vocational teachers of whom 9,170 have come home.

--Czechoslovakia has helped train 11,314 people who are all vocational students and of whom 2,123 have returned home.

--Bulgaria has helped train 4,900 people of whom 3,658 have returned home.

--Hungary has helped train 1,000 vocational students who have [all] gone home.

--Poland has helped train 3,500 vocational students who have [all] returned home.

Following are the vocational workers' training schools and vocational normal schools which have been or will be built for us by other countries:

--The Soviet Union has built and fully equipped four technical workers' schools which are the Electric Machines Technical Workers' School of Phu Tho, Vinh Phu; the Agricultural Technical Workers' School of Tam Diep, Ha Nam

Ninh; the Mechanized Construction Technical Workers' School of Xuan Hoa, Hanoi and the Electric Machines Technical Workers' School of Uong Bi Mine, Quang Ninh.

Three vocational normal schools have been reequipped: They are the Technical Normal School 2 of Nam Dinh, Ha Nam Ninh; the Technical Normal School 3 of Vinh, Nghe Tinh and the Technical Normal School 4 of Cuu Long, Cuu Long Province.

From 1981 to 1985, three vocational normal schools and five technical workers' schools will be built and fully equipped.

--The GDR has given aid by equipping three technical workers' schools which are the Mechanical Technical Workers' School of Pho Yen, Bac Thai; the Construction Technical Workers' School of Vinh, Nghe Tinh and the Orthopedic Technical Workers' School of Ba Vi, Hanoi.

--Hungary has given aid under the form of equipment for two technical workers' schools which are the Mechanical Technical Workers' School of Ba Vi, Hanoi and the Posts and Telegraph Technical Workers' School 1 of Phu Ly, Ha Nam Ninh.

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CSO: 4209/125

POPULATION CUSTOMS, AND CULTURE

CRACKDOWN ON SUPERSTITION REPORTED

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 2 Oct 82 p 2

[Text] After catching flagrante delicto and burning to ashes the paper articles used in superstitious practices at houses No 10-21 Hang Ma Street and No 7 Hang Chai Lane, the control unit of Hang Ma Ward (Hoan Kiem Precinct) recently met to draw experiences and to set forth a new action plan.

The Ward People's Committee has taken firm educational measures to continue to check the commercial dealings in superstitious paper articles and to prevent their manufacture because it requires a large amount of paper of various kinds and because these articles will ultimately be burned down uselessly.

In Vinh Tuy Ward (Hai Ba Trung Precinct), the Regulations Control Unit recently discovered a clandestine den of trance practice at house No 211-Unit 9 where Nguyen Thi Quy, 42, had established a temple of worship. In the house, there were 25 people including young female manual and office workers who were gathering around a "woman in trance and praying to her for happiness and prosperity."

At the sight of this deceitful trick and of credulous people who completely forgot about the realities of life and became blindfold, the Regulations Control Unit gave explanations on the spot and drew up a report. Thi Quy had to plead guilty and promised to give up this illegal business.

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CSO: 4209/125

POPULATIONS, CUSTOMS AND CULTURE

STATISTICS ON NORTHERN ETHNIC GROUPS REPORTED

Hanoi TAP CHI DAN TOC HOC in Vietnamese No 1, Mar 82 pp 39-44

[Article by Khong Dien: "The Ethnic Composition and Pouulation Distribution in a Number of Northern Mountain Provinces"]

[Text] In this article, in order to help gain an understanding of the socio-economic life of the ethnic minorities in the border highlands and in order to help meet the requirements and carry out the tasks facing the different scientific sectors, we shall present some of the general characteristics of the ethnic composition and population distribution of the mountain provinces of the North: Quang Ninh, Lang Son, Cao Bang, Ha Tuyen, Hoang Lien Son and Lai Chau.

The six provinces mentioned above measure about 68,000 square kilometers and, although they only account for about 20 percent of the country's total territory, they occupy an especially important position, not only with regard to the economy and the national defense system, but also in other areas, such as politics, the culture, society, etc.

Economically, this is an area that has both forest resources and ocean resources. The blessings bestowed by nature upon man in this region are truly rich. In addition to various types of precious wood and other valuable agricultural and forestry products, industrial and fruit crops of high economic value are also found within this area, such as Lang Son anise, Cao Bang and Lang Son tobacco, Quang Ninh cinnamon, Ha Giang tea, Sa Pa peaches, etc. Besides these crops there are various types of very valuable pharmaceutical materials, such as pseudoginseng, opium and cardamom. In addition, we must also mention the "storehouses of precious materials" lying either on the surface of the ground or deep underground that have been or are being investigated or developed. The valuable minerals in the area have long been closely associated with the individual names of the localities, such as Quang Ninh coal, Tinh Tuc tin, Son Duong tin, Lao Cai apatite and so forth, names that are known both at home and abroad.

Due to its position along the border of the fatherland (from Mong Cai to Muong Te, there is nearly 1,200 kilometers of border with China), the area was, in ancient times, the scene of challenges in wars against the northern feudalists. Place names such as the Chi Lang Pass, the Le Hoa Pass, Ma Yen Mountain, Dan Xa

Mountain, the Nhu Nguyet River, the Lanh Cau River and so forth are recorded in the history books of the entire nation. In the period preceding the uprising as well as during the years of the resistance against the French colonialists, the area not only had the reputation as being the "crucible" of the revolution, being the "revolutionary base," but was also the scene of brilliant feats of arms that are associated with such historic names as Bac Son, That Khe, Dong Khe, Song Lo and Dien Bien Phu.

Today, due to the policy of big country expansion and hegemony of the Beijing clique, the situation along this border of the fatherland has become very tense, with the highpoint being the general offensive conducted by the aggressors along the entire northern border of our country in February, 1979.

As regards population, the present population of this area is about 3.6 million, or only about 6.8 percent of the country's total population; however, the population consists of very many ethnic minorities. If we include the ethnic minority populations of 100 persons or more, there are 30 ethnic minorities within the area (55.5 percent of the ethnic minority population of the entire country) in seven different language groups:

1. Viet-Muong (the Viet and Muong ethnic minorities)
2. Mon-Khmer (the Kho Mu, Mang, Khang and Xinh Mun ethnic minorities).
3. Tay-Thai (the Tay, Nung, Thai, San Chay, Giay, Lao, Lu and Bo Y ethnic minorities).
4. Hmong-Dao (Hmong, Dao and Pa Then ethnic minorities).
5. Hoa (the Hoa, San Diu and Ngai ethnic minorities).
6. Tang-Mien (the Ha Nhi, Phu La, La Hu, Lo Lo, Cong and Si La ethnic minorities).
7. Ca Dai (1)(the La Chi, La Ha, Co Lao and La Chi [as published] ethnic minorities).

The demographics map clearly shows the uneven distribution among the various areas of the region. While the population density is quite high in the cities and towns, the density of the population in the border highland areas is very low; the valleys at the base of the mountains in the eastern provinces are rather densely populated even though they are small valleys; conversely, the broad western valleys are rather sparsely populated. The characteristic of the population distribution in the northern mountains of our country is that the ethnic minorities are very closely intermingled and there are no large areas in which only one ethnic minority lives. However, it is possible, to some extent, to distinguish the various ethnic minorities and ethnic groups by means of the altitudes at which they reside. The majority of such ethnic minorities as the Viet, Muong, Tay, Nung, Hoa, San Diu, Thai and so forth reside in lowland areas or valleys at the base of mountains at average altitudes of roughly 300 meters.

Ethnic minorities such as the Dao, San Chay and so forth usually reside on the sides of mountains at an altitude of about 1,000 meters. The highland areas are the primary place of resident of Hmong minority and a number of ethnic minorities within the Tang-Mien language group, such as the Ha Nhi, Lo Lo and so forth. As for why these phenomena exist, many persons maintain that they are the result of the process of migration whereby the ethnic minorities that arrived first settled in lowlying areas of relatively good soil while the minorities that arrived later settled at higher attitudes where the fertility of the soil is less. However, if we use this opinion as our only basis, it is difficult to say anything about the following cases: ethnic minorities such as the Khang and La Ha are still considered to be the primary ethnic minorities in the northwest before the migration of the Thai in the 7th to 14th centuries A.D.(2); the subgroups of some minorities, such as the Nung, Dao and so forth arrived in our country rather late but reside in areas of rather low terrain and good soil that lie deep within the hinterland.

Therefore, in our opinion, in order to explain this distribution of the population, it is necessary to conduct research in many areas and from many different points of view in the fields of history, geography, economics, sociology and so forth within the large region that is northern Indochina, which is inherently an ethnic region.

Another characteristic is that the ethnic segments of the population are not uniformly distributed among the various provinces. The province that has the most ethnic minorities in the country is Lai Chau while the province that has the fewest is Lang Son.

Below, in order of size, we have presented the composition and distribution of the ethnic minorities in the provinces mentioned above. Within each province, the ethnic minorities are also arranged by size, beginning with the largest.

I. Lai Chau Province

At present, the province has 20 ethnic minorities, which account for 37 percent of the ethnic minorities in the country and more than 66 percent of the ethnic minorities within this area.(3) These minorities are:

1. The Thai (who constitute nearly 34 percent of the province's population); this ethnic minority is present in all districts and cities but the largest populations are found in the two districts of Dien Bien and Tuan Giao.
2. The Hmong (28 percent of the province's population); Hmong reside in virtually every district, with the largest concentrations being found in the districts of Tu a Chua, Phong Tho and Dien Bien and the smallest number of Hmong residing in Muong Te District.
3. The ethnic Vietnamese (slightly more than 21 percent of the province's population); of the various districts, including Lai Chau City, the ethnic Vietnamese only constitute the highest percentage of the population in Dien Bien

District (accounting for nearly 38 percent of the ethnic minorities within the district). In some districts, including Muong Te and Tua Chua Districts, this percentage is quite low.

4. The Dao (slightly more than 7.1 percent of the province's population): although rather widely scattered, relatively large concentrations of this ethnic minority can be found in the two districts of Phong Tho and Sinh Ho. Conversely, in the two districts of Dien Bien and Tuan Giao, there are less than 1,000 persons of this minority in each district.

5. The Kho Mu (slightly more than 2.5 percent of the province's population): this ethnic minority resides primarily in Dien Bien District; in addition, they are scattered about the three districts of Tuan Giao, Muong Lay and Tua Chua.

6. The Ha Nhi (2.4 percent of the province's population): nearly 70 percent of the Ha Nhi are concentrated near the Sino-Viet border in Muong Te District; there are also roughly 2,000 persons of this ethnic minority living among the other ethnic minorities in Phong Tho and Sin Ho Districts.

7. The Giay (nearly 1.7 percent of the province's population): the Giay are also an ethnic minority that lives along the Sino-Viet border; in Lai Chau, practically all of them live in Phong Tho District, among whom are included an entire group of persons who were once called Pu Na (nearly 2,000 persons).

8. The La Hu (1.3 percent of the province's population): in Lai Chau, in particular, and the entire country, in general, this ethnic minority resides in only one district, Muong Te District.

9. The Lao (slightly more than 1 percent of the province's population): the members of this ethnic minority are concentrated in only a few places within the two districts of Dien Bien and Phong Tho (in Phong Tho District, they constitute two-thirds of the population).

10. The Lu (slightly more than 0.9 percent of the province's population): aside from the two districts of Phong Tho and Sin Ho, the Lu reside nowhere else in our country.

11. The Mang (nearly 0.8 percent of the province's population): although their population is not very large, the members of the Mang ethnic minority are distributed rather widely. In addition to Sin Ho District, they are also present in other districts, namely, Muong Te and Muong Lay.

12. The Khang (about 0.7 percent of the province's population): the Khang population is perhaps a matter that should be examined in further detail. However, present data does show that the members of this ethnic minority are relatively widely scattered throughout many districts. These districts are: Tuan Giao, Muong Te, Sin Ho, Muong Lay and Phong Tho.

In addition to the 12 ethnic minorities mentioned above, Lai Chau has a number of other ethnic minorities with rather small populations (about 1,000 persons apiece).

Below are the names of these minorities and the localities in which they reside:

13. The Hoa (scattered about the districts of Tua Chua, Phong Tho, Muong Lay and so forth).
14. The Cong (Muong Te, Muong Lao).
15. The Tho (Dien Bien, Lai Chau City and Muong Lay).
16. The Xinh Mun (Dien Bien).
17. The Tay (Dien Bien, Phong Tho and Tuan Giao).
18. The Si La (Muong Te).
19. The Nung (Dien Bien).
20. The Muong (Lai Chau City and Dien Bien).

In addition, two other ethnic minorities, the Lo Lo and Phu La, although each has a population of less than 100, are also ethnic minorities with rather small populations compared to the other ethnic minorities in the country.

II. Ha Tuyen Province

At present, the province has 16 ethnic minorities; they are:

1. The ethnic Vietnamese (about 33 percent of the province's population): with the exception of the three districts of Me Vac, Xin Man and Hoang Xu Phi, where the ethnic Vietnamese constitute a rather small percentage of the population, this ethnic minority constitutes a rather high percentage of the populations of the other districts and cities within the province. In the three districts of Son Duong, Yen Son and Ham Yen as well as in the two cities of Tuyen Quang and Ha Giang, the ethnic Vietnamese constitute the largest percentage of the population.
2. The Tay (nearly 25 percent of the province's population): here, the Tay have intermingled relatively uniformly with the other ethnic minorities. They are present in all districts and cities within the province. In the districts of Bac Quang, Na Hang, Chiem Hoa and Vi Xuyen, the Tay constitute the largest percentage of the population.
3. The Hmong (more than 15 percent of the province's population): it can be said that Ha Tuyen is the province that has the largest Hmong population followed by Hoang Lien Son Province. However, they are concentrated in a few districts, such as Dong Van, Meo Vac, Yen Minh and Quan Ba. In the other districts, there are only a few thousand Hmong; in such districts as Dong Duong, Ham Yen and so forth, there are only a few dozen Hmong per district.

4. The Dao (more than 11 percent of the province's population): compared to the other provinces of the country, Ha Tuyen has the largest Dao population. Because they are traditionally nomadic, the Dao live in practically all midland and mountain provinces in the North (and even in western Thanh Hoa and Nghe Tinh Provinces). This fact is also reflected within the scope of one province, such as Ha Tuyen. That, the Dao are present in practically all districts and cities of the province, with the largest concentrations occurring in Bac Quang and Vi Xuyen.
5. The Nung (about 5.7 percent of the province's population): this minority is concentrated in the former Ha Giang area. In Hoang Xu Phi and Xin Man Districts, the Nung constitute the highest percentage of the population.
6. The San Chay (nearly 4 percent of the province's population): the Son Chay reside in the provinces of Viet Bac, with the largest concentration living in Ha Tuyen. Within Ha Tuyen, they live primarily in the three districts of Son Duong, Yen Son and Ham Yen.
7. The Hoa (nearly 1.6 percent of the province's population): the districts in which many Hao live are Son Duong, Chieu Hoa, Ham Yen and Yen Son.
8. The Giay (1 percent of the province's population): at present, Ha Tuyen has the second largest Giay population of the three provinces (Hoang Lien Son, Ha Tuyen and Lai Chau). Within Ha Tuyen, the Giay live primarily in the two districts of Yen Minh (more than 60 percent) and Vi Xuyen. In addition, a few hundred Giay live in each of the following districts: Dong Van, Meo Vac and Quan Ba.
9. The La Chi (more than 0.7 percent of the province's population): the majority of this ethnic minority resides in Xinh Man District (nearly 80 percent), followed by Bac Quang and Hoang Xu Phi Districts.
10. The San Diu (nearly 0.7 percent of the province's population): although their population is not very large, the San Diu in our country are rather widely scattered throughout a number of midland and mountain provinces of the North. However, in Ha Tuyen Province, practically all of the San Diu live in Son Duong district.
11. The Pa Then (nearly 0.3 percent of the province's population): this ethnic minority includes the group of Thuy residing in Chiem Hoa District (a fact that has not been fully addressed in recent books and newspaper articles). The Pa Then are only present in the districts of Bac Quan (where the majority of them reside), Chiem Hoa and Yen Son.

In addition to the 11 ethnic minorities mentioned above, there are also ethnic minorities within the province that have a population of 1,000 persons or less. They are:

12. The Co Lao (in Hoang Xu Phi, Yen Minh, Dong Van...)
13. The Lo Lo (Meo Vac, Dong Van).
14. The Bo Y (Quang Ba)

15. Phe Pu Peo (Dong Van).

16. The Muong (Yen Son, Son Duong, Ham Yen).

III. Hoang Lien Son Province

Although it lies along a main road and consists of 15 districts and 3 cities, Hoang Lien Son has approximately the same size population and ethnic composition as Ha Tuyen Province. The province has 15 ethnic minorities:

1. The ethnic Vietnamese (46 percent of the province's population): constituting a rather high percentage of the population, the ethnic Vietnamese are present in all districts of the province. However, they only constitute the highest percentage of the population in five districts, Tran Yen, Bao Thang, Van Yen, Yen Binh and Tan Yen (this does not include the two cities, in which they constitute the vast majority of the population).
2. The Hmong (more than 13 percent of the province's population): the Hmong constitute the largest percentage of the population in the following districts: Mu Cang Chai, Tram Tan, Bac Ha, Sa Pa, Muong Khuong and Bat Xat. In addition, there are also rather large concentrations of Hmong in the districts of Than Uyen, Bao Yen and Van Ban.
3. The Tay (more than 12 percent of the province's population): there are a few thousand Tay in every district of the province except for a few in the West and the Northwest, where only a small number of Tay live. The largest concentrations of Tay are found in Luc Yen, Van Chan and Bao Yen Districts).
4. The Dao (more than 10 percent of the province's population): only 2 of the province's 15 districts have no Dao residing within them. Mu Cang Chai District and Tram Tan District; the Dao reside in virtually every district, with the smallest number, slightly more than 1,000, living in Than Uyen District and the largest number, approximately 12,000, residing in Van Yen District.
5. The Thai (nearly 9 percent of the province's population): whereas the majority of the Tay and Nung ethnic minorities have congregated in the eastern and northern districts of the province, the Thai are primarily present in the western and southwestern districts of the province. These districts are: Than Uyen, Van Chan, Van Ban and Tram Tan.
6. The Nung (3 percent of the province's population): this ethnic minority is only present in the following districts: Muong Khuong, Luc Yen, Bac Ha, Yen Binh, Bao Yen and Bao Thang.
7. The Giay (nearly 1.9 percent of the province's population): in Hoang Lien Son Province, as in the two provinces of Lai Chau and Ha Tuyen, the majority of the Giay live in the northern districts. These districts are: Muong Khuong, Bat Xat, Bao Yen, Van Ban...

In addition to the seven ethnic minorities mentioned above, there are five ethnic minorities in Haang Lien Son with populations ranging from 1,000 to 10,000:

8. The Muong (in Van Chan and Tran Yen Districts).

9. The Phu La (Than Uyen, Bao Thang, Bac Ha, Muong Khuong, Van Ban, Van Yen...).
10. The San Chay (Yen Binh, Tran Yen).
11. The Hoa (Yen Binh, Luc Yen, Tran Yen and Van Chan).
12. The Ha Nhi (Bat Xat).

And there are three ethnic minorities with populations in the hundreds:

13. The Bo Y (Muong Khuong).
14. The Lao (Than Uyen).
15. The La Chi (Bac Ha, Bao Yen).

IV. Cao Bang Province

In order of size, the eight ethnic minorities within the province are:

1. The Tay (more than 40 percent of the province's population): the largest concentrations of this ethnic minority are in Trung Khanh, Hoa An and Quang Hoa Districts while the smallest number of Tay is found in Thong Nong and Nguyen Binh District (6,000 to 7,000 persons per district).
2. The Nung (more than 35 percent of the province's population): this ethnic minority is present in all districts and cities of the province. The districts in which the largest numbers of Nung live are still Quang Hoa, Ha Quang and Trung Khanh Districts.
3. The Dao (nearly 10 percent of the province's population): compared to the other districts of the province, Nguyen Binh is the district in which the largest number of Dao reside, followed by Bao Lac, Thong Nong and Thach An Districts.
4. The Hmong (more than 6 percent of the province's population): Bao Lac District (nearly one-third), Ha Quang District and Thong Non District are still the places where the largest number of Hmong reside within the province.
5. Ethnic Vietnamese (roughly 6 percent of the province's population): here, ethnic Vietnamese constitute a lower percentage of the population than in any other province of the country. The ethnic Vietnamese in Cao Bang Province are still primarily concentrated in the cities and towns and a number of district towns. The district that has the largest population of ethnic Vietnamese is Hoa An.

In addition to the five ethnic minorities mentioned above, there are three other ethnic minorities in Cao Bang that have relatively small populations (1,000 to 5,000 persons each); they are: the Hoa, Lo Lo and Ngai.

V. Quang Ninh Province

At present, there are eight ethnic minorities within the province. Ethnic Vietnamese constitute a rather high percentage of this population (more than 70 percent of the province's population). In order of size, the ethnic minorities within the province are as follows:

1. Ethnic Vietnamese;
2. Hoa;
3. Dao;
4. Tay;
5. San Diu;
6. San Chay;
7. Nung;
8. Ngai.

VI. Lang Son Province

Compared to the six provinces mentioned above, Lang Son has a relatively small population (its population is only larger than the population of Lai Chau Province) and the same situation exists with regard to the number of minorities. The province presently has seven ethnic minorities:

1. The Nung (more than 44 percent of the province's population): Nung are living in all of the districts within the province and even the districts with the fewest Nung, Dinh Lap District, Bac Son District and so forth, have populations of 2,000 to 3,000 persons of the Nung ethnic minority. The largest number of Nung are concentrated in the districts of Huu Lung, Chi Lang, Van Lang and Van Quang.
2. The Tay (more than 36 percent of the province's population): only Huu Lung District has a small Tay population (approximately 5,000); the other districts have populations of 10,000 or more. The Tay populations do not vary very much from one district to another within the province. However, there are also districts in which there are rather large concentrations of Tay, such as Loc Binh, Bac Son and Chi Lang.
3. Ethnic Vietnamese (more than 15 percent of the province's population): the district with the largest number of ethnic Vietnamese is Huu Lung (about 40 percent of the ethnic Vietnamese within the province) followed by Lang Son City and Chi Lang District.
4. The Dao (nearly 3 percent of the province's population): at present, the Dao reside in six districts within the province, with the largest concentrations being in Tran Dinh, Loc Binh and Binh Gia Districts.
5. The Hoa (nearly 0.8 percent of the province's population): in addition to Huu Lung District (where they constitute about one-third of the population), the Hoa are present in practically every other district of the province (with the exception of Dinh Lap).
6. The Hmong (more than 0.1 percent of the province's population): practically all of the Hmong are concentrated in Trang Dinh District.
7. The San Chay, who number slightly more than 100, are primarily only present in Dinh Lap District.

Clearly, as stated above, this area does not have a large population but it does have a rather large number of ethnic minorities. In order to obtain and overview, we have prepared the following chart on the ethnic composition of the entire area:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Ethnic Minority</u>	<u>Percentage of the Minority Nationwide</u>	<u>Percentage of the Population of the Six Provinces</u>
1	Ethnic Vietnamese	3.7	47.20
2	Tay	70.3	17.6
3	Nung	76.8	11.90
4	Hmong	81.3	9.30
5	Dao	79.2	7.60
6	Thai	22.8	4.90
7	Hoa(1)	?	?
8	San Chay	54.7	1.20
9.	Giay	99.6	0.80
10	San Diu	25.9	4.80
11	Ha Nhi	100.0	0.30
12	Muong	0.11	0.20
13	Khomu	0.3	0.20
14	Phu La	94.5	0.20
15	La Chi	100.0	0.16
16	La Hu	97.5	0.12
17	Lao	58.8	0.11
18	Lu	100.0	0.08
19	Lo Lo	100.0	0.07
20	Mang	98.0	0.07
21	Pa Then	100.0	0.06
22	Khang	95.6	0.06
23	La Ha	58.4	0.06
24	Bo Y	100.0	0.03
25	Ngai	92.3	0.02
26	Co Lao	100.0	0.02
27	Gong	100.0	0.02
28	Xinh Mun	6.6	0.01
29	Si La	92.5	0.01
30	Pu Peo	96.0	0.00

(1) To date, we do not have complete data on this ethnic minority.

In summary, the northern mountain provinces of our country are large, their terrain is complex, they are sparsely populated and they not only have a large number of ethnic minorities, but, in the past, these ethnic minorities were constantly being intermixed as a result of emigration across the national border (the open border).

In the two wars of resistance against the French colonialists and the U.S. imperialists, as a result of adopting correct policies, we mobilized the combined strength of all of the ethnic minorities of the country, in general, and the mountain minorities, in the North, in particular, thereby recording tremendous feats of arms and winning victories of an epochal nature; today, more than ever before, it has become extremely important in the work of building socialism and protecting the fatherland to continue to strengthen and build the solidarity and unanimity of the ethnic minorities throughout the country, especially those along the northern border that stand face to face with the enemy day and night.

One of the important tasks in increasing the strength of this solidarity is to rapidly create the conditions for accelerating the process of bring the ethnic minorities closer together in the basic area of constantly developing production and improving the standard of living of the mountain people, beginning with achieving the settlement of nomads in the highlands and redistributing labor throughout the country with a view toward bringing the mountain region to the level of development of the lowlands economically, culturally and socially.

FOOTNOTES

1. According to:
P. Benedict: "The Thai-Kadai and Indonesia, a New Classification in Southeast Asia," "American Anthropologist," Vol. 44, No 10-1942.
Truong Van Sinh: "The Kadai Language," Ethnic Studies Bulletin, 3-1973.
In the book "The Ethnic Minorities in Vietnam(the Northern Provinces)," Hanoi, 1978.
This group is in the part of the South Asian family called the other South Asian groups.
2. "The Ethnic Minorities in Vietnam(the Northern Provinces)," Social Sciences Publishing House, 1978, p 23.
3. Here, only minorities with a population of 100 or more are considered.

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CSO: 4209/82

BIOGRAPHIC

INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES

[The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisked job title indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.]

Cao Thụy Anh [CAO THUYJ ANH]

Head of the Transportation Draft Power Institute, Ministry of Communications and Transportation; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

~~Đ~~[~] ~~Đ~~[~] ~~Đ~~[~] Bắc [DOOX DUWCS BAWCS]

Deputy Head of the Cloth and Cellulose Research Institute, Ministry of Light Industry; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Văn B[~] B[~] [NGUYEENX VAWN BAAYR]

Head of the Analysis Institute, Ministry of Public Health; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn B[~]át Can [NGUYEENX BATS CAN]

Head of the Hygiene Institute, Ministry of Public Health; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Phan Thanh Cao [PHAN THANH CAO]

Head of the Electric Power Science and Technology Research Institute, Ministry of Power; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Cấn [NGUYEENX CAANJ]

Head of the Institute for Protection of Mothers and the New Born, Ministry of Public Health; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Trương Văn Cầu [TRUWOWNG VAWN CAAUF]

Acting Head of the Rare and Precious Non-ferrous Metallurgy Institute, Ministry of Engineering and Metallurgy; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Hữu Chất [NGUYEENX HUWUX CHAATS]

Acting Head of the Rubber Economics and Technology Institute, Ministry of Agriculture; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Hoàng Bảo Châu [HOANGF BAOR CHAAU]

Head of the Hanoi Institute of Folk Medicine, Ministry of Public Health; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Hồ Văn Chức [HOOF VAWN CHUWCS]

Acting Head of the Food Institute, Ministry of Food; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Vũ Đình Cử [VUX DINHF CUWJ]

Head of the Tropical Technology Institute, Vietnam Institutes of Science; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Phan Đình Diệu [PHAN DINHF ZIEEUJ]

Head of the Computer and Cybernetics Science Institute, Vietnam Institutes of Science; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Đoàn Trí Dũng [DOANF TRIS ZUNGX]

Head of the Telecommunications Economics Institute, Telecommunications General Department; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and

technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Văn Đạo [NGUYEENX VAWN DAOJ]

Head of the Mechanics Institute, Vietnam Institutes of Science; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Đào Trọng Đạt [DAOF TRONGJ DATJ]

Head of the Veterinary Medicine Institute, Ministry of Agriculture; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Diên [NGUYEENX DIEENF]

Head of the Agricultural Implements and Mechanization Institute, Ministry of Agriculture; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Trần Đức [TRAANF DUWCS]

Head of the Research, Planning and Norms Institute, State Planning Commission; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Minh Đường [NGUYEENX MINH DUWOWNGF]

Head of the Vocational Training Science Institute, Vocational Training General Department; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Trương Minh Giản [TRUWOWNG MINH GIANR]

Head of the Vegetation Protection Institute, Ministry of Agriculture; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Từ Giây [TUWF GIAAYS]

Head of the Nutrition Institute, Ministry of Public Health; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Phạm Minh Hạc [PHAMJ MINH HACJ]

Head of the Educational Science Institute, Ministry of Education; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Dương Xuân Hảo² [ZUWOWNG XUAAN HAOR]

Acting Head of the Geology and Minerals Institute, Geology General Department; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Xuân Hân [NGUYEEN XUAAN HAAN]

Acting Head of the Industrial and Fruit Crops Institute, Ministry of Agriculture; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Vũ Công Hậu [VUX COONG HAAUJ]

Head of the Vietnam Institute of Agricultural Science and Technology, Ministry of Agriculture; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Đặng Trung Hiếu [DAWNGJ TRUNG HIEEUS]

Head of the Broadcasting and Television Technology Institute, Broadcasting and Television Commission; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Văn Hiếu [NGUYEENX VAWN HIEEUJ]

Head of the Vietnam Institutes of Science Branch Institute, Vietnam Institutes of Science; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Văn Hiếu [NGUYEENX VAWN HIEEUJ]

Head of the Physics Institute, Vietnam Institutes of Science; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Vũ Tuyền Hoàng [VUX TUYEEN HOANGF]

Head of the Institute of Grain and Food Plants, Ministry of Agriculture; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Văn Hối [NGUYEENX VAWN HOOIF]

Head of the Agricultural Machinery Design and Fabrication Research Institute, Ministry of Engineering and Metallurgy; his name was included in a roster of

SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Đình Hương [NGUYEENX DINHF HUWOWNGF]

Head of the Central Tuberculosis Institute, Ministry of Public Health; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Vũ Khiêm [VUX KHIEEM]

Acting Head of the Higher and Vocational Education Research Institute, Ministry of Higher and Vocational Education; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Hữu Khôi [NGUYEENX HUWUX KHOOI]

Director of the Dalat Science Research Center, Vietnam Institutes of Science; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Đào Khương [DAOF KHUWOWNG]

Head of the Water Conservancy Technology Research Institute, Ministry of Water Conservancy; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Mạnh Kiêm [NGUYEENX MANHJ KIEEMR]

Head of the Building Science and Technology Institute, Ministry of Building; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Như Kim [NGUYEENX NHUW KIM]

Head of the Central Science and Technology Information Institute, State Science and Technology Commission; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Đinh Bá Lãm [DINH BAS LAMX]

Head of the Worker Safety Science and Technology Institute, Vietnam Confederation of Trade Unions; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Lê Văn Lâm [LEE VAWN LAAMX]

Acting Head of the Physical Education and Sports Science and Technology Institute, Physical Education and Sports General Department; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Ngọc Lê [NGUYEENX NGOCJ LEE]

Head of the Cutting Tools and Implements Research, Design and Fabrication Institute, Ministry of Engineering and Metallurgy; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Vũ Biệt Linh [VUX BIEETJ LINH]

Acting Head of the Forestry Science and Technology Institute, Ministry of Forestry; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Quang Long [NGUYEENX QUANG LONG]

Head of the Financial Science Institute, Ministry of Finance; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Hoàng Lộc [HOANGF LOOCJ]

Head of the Oil and Gas Research Institute, Oil and Gas General Department; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Lữ [NGUYEENX LUWJ]

Head of the Labor Science Institute, Ministry of Labor; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Ngô Thị Mai [NGOO THIJ MAIJ]

Acting Head of the Food Industry Institute, Ministry of Food; her name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Văn Mãn [NGUYEENX VAWN MAANX]

Head of the Construction Materials Institute, Ministry of Building; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Trần Đại Nghĩa [TRAANF DAIJ NGHIA]

Head of the Vietnam Institutes of Science; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Hoàng Thủy Nguyên [HOANGF THUYR NGUYEEN]

Head of the Epidemiological Hygiene Institute, Ministry of Public Health; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Lê Văn Nguyên [LEE VAWN NGUYEENJ]

Acting Head of the Industrial Chemistry Institute, Chemicals General Department; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Tống Công Nhi [TOONGS COONG NHIJ]

Director of the Central Metrology Center, State Science and Technology Commission; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Vũ Nhiễm [VUX NHIEEMJ]

Head of the Statistical Science and Economics Information Research Institute, Statistical General Department; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Đoàn Thị Nhu [DOANF THIJ NHU]

Acting Head of the Pharmaceutical Institute, Ministry of Public Health; her name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Phạm Hoàng Ninh [PHAMJ HOANGF NINH]

Head of the Textile Weaving Institute, Ministry of Light Industry; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Vũ Thị Phan [VUX THIJ PHAN]

Acting Head of the Institute of Malaria, Parasite and Insect Transmitted Diseases, Ministry of Public Health; her name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Lê Trọng Phan [LEE TRONGJ PHAANS]

Acting Head of the Oceanographic Research Institute, Vietnam Institutes of Science; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Hữu Phong [NGUYEENX HUWUX PHONG]

Acting Head of the Mining Science and Technology Research Institute, Ministry of Mines and Coal; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Phạm Văn Phúc [PHAMJ VAWN PHUWCS]

Head of the Communications Technology Institute, Ministry of Communication and Transportation; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Ái Phương [NGUYEENX AIS PHUWOWNG]

Head of the Central Highlands Microbe and Epidemiology Institute, Ministry of Public Health; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Đàm Trung Phương [DAMF TRUNG PHUWOWNGF]

Head of the Joint Construction Planning Institute, State Capital Construction Commission; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Tư Qua [NGUYEENX TUWR QUA]

Acting Head of the Econometrics Institute, State Planning Commission; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Văn Quý [NGUYEENX VAWN QUYS]

Head of the Meteorology and Hydrography Research Institute, Meteorology and Hydrography General Department; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Trần Văn Quý [TRAANF VAWN QUYS]

Acting Head of the Ferrous Metallurgy Institute; Ministry of Engineering and Metallurgy; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and

technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Quang Qu[~]ynh [NGUYEENX QUANG QUYNHS]

Head of the Commercial Economics and Technology Institute, Ministry of Home Trade; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Ngô[^] Tao [NGOO TAOJ]

Acting Head of the Construction Standardization Institute, State Capital Construction Commission; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Cao Minh T[^]an [CAO MINH TAAN]

Head of the Pasteur Epidemiological Hygiene Institute, Ministry of Public Health; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Lê Minh T[^]an [LEE MINH TAAN]

Head of the Ho Chi Minh City Institute of Folk Medicine, Ministry of Public Health; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Khúc V[^]an Th[^]ành [KHUCS VAWN THANHF]

Head of the Capital Construction Economics Institute, State Capital Construction Commission; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Đ[^]ang Th[^]ành [NGUYEENX DAWNG THANHF]

Head of the Machine Fabrication Science and Technology Research Institute, Ministry of Engineering and Metallurgy; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn K[^]inh Th[^]ảo [NGUYEENX KINH THAOR]

Head of the Forestry Industry Institute, Ministry of Forestry; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Phạm Xuân Thăng [PHAMJ XUAAN THAWNG]

Acting Head of the Transportation Economics Institute, Ministry of Communications and Transportation; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Lê Ngọc Thăng [LEE NGOCJ THAWNGS]

Deputy Head of the Construction Mechanization and Handicraft Institute, State Capital Construction Commission; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Phạm Thế [PHAMJ THEES]

Head of the Institute for Research in Raising Brackish Water Aquatic Products, Ministry of Marine Products; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Hồ Sĩ Thoảng [HOOF SIX THOANGR]

Head of the Chemistry Institute, Vietnam Institutes of Science; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Trần Thế Thông [TRAANF THEES THOONG]

Head of the Southern Institute of Agricultural Technology, Ministry of Agriculture; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Đình Thức [NGUYEENX DINHF THUWCS]

Head of the Marine Products Research Institute, Ministry of Marine Products; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Trình Trọng Thức [TRINHJ TRONGJ THUWCJ]

Head of the Electric Power Design and Economics Institute, Ministry of Power; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Hữu Thức [NGUYEENX HUWUX THUWOWCS]

Acting Head of the Biology Institute, Vietnam Institutes of Science; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Văn Thuộc [NGUYEENX VAWN THUWOWCJ]

Head of the Capital Construction Science and Technology Institute, State Capital Construction Commission; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Văn Thương [NGUYEENX VAWN THUWOWNGR]

Head of the Animal Husbandry Institute, Ministry of Agriculture; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Hữu Tiên [NGUYEENX HUWUX TIEENS]

Director of the Agricultural Machinery Research and Development Center, Ministry of Agriculture; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Lâm Toán [NGUYEENX LAAM TOANS]

Head of the Agricultural Economics Institute, Ministry of Agriculture; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Lê Bá Tôn [LEE BAS TOON]

Head of the Mechanical Handicraft and Subcontracting Methods Research Institute, Ministry of Engineering and Metallurgy; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Đào Xuân Trà [DAOX FUAAN TRAF]

Head of the Central Eye Institute, Ministry of Public Health; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Đặng Đức Trạch [DAWNGJ DUWCS TRACHJ]

Acting Head of the Vaccines and Serums Research and Production Institute, Ministry of Public Health; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Thế Trâm [NGUYEENX THEES TRAAM]

Acting Head of the (Pasteur) Epidemiological Hygiene Institute, Ministry of Public Health; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and

technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Văn Trần [NGUYEENX VAWN TRAAN]

Head of the Economics Research and Management Institute, Council of Ministers; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Cảnh Tuấn [NGUYEENX CANHR TUAANS]

Acting Head of the Telecommunications Science and Technology Institute, Telecommunications General Department; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Hoàng Tuy [HOANGF TUYJ]

Head of the Mathematics Institute, Vietnam Institutes of Science; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Đình Tú [NGUYEENX DINHF TUWS]

Head of the Nuclear Research Institute, Council of Ministers; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Trần Hữu Tước [TRAANF HUWUX TUWOWCS]

Head of the Otorhinolaryngo Institute, Ministry of Public Health; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Chu Văn Tường [CHU VAWN TUWOWNGF]

Head of the Institute for the Protection of Children's Health, Ministry of Public Health; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Trần Trinh Tường [TRAANF TRINHJ TUWOWNGF]

Head of the Construction Economics Institute, Ministry of Building; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Mạnh Tường [NGUYEENX MANHJ TUWOWNGR]

Director of the Inland Aquatic Products Research Center, Ministry of Marine Products; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Vy [NGUYEENX VY]

Acting Head of the Pedology and Agrochemistry Institute, Ministry of Agriculture; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Trần Thanh Xuân [TRAANF THANH XUAAN]

Director of the Aquatic Products Research Branch Institute No 1, Ministry of Marine Products; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Trình Xương [TRINHJ XUWOWNG]

Head of the Watercraft Research and Design Institute, Ministry of Communications and Transportation; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

Nguyễn Trọng Yêm [NGUYEENX TRONGJ YEEM]

Acting Head of the Earth Sciences Research Institute, Vietnam Institutes of Science; his name was included in a roster of SRV scientific and technical research and development institutes. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Aug 82 pp 40-45)

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