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No. 1477

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JAPANESE POLICIES ON TRADE WITH USSR CRITICIZED

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 25 May 83 pp 1-4

[APN item: "Digest of M. Krupyanko's article 'Japan. Trade Is the Key of Good-Neighborliness,' AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA No 5, 1983"]

The Soviet Union is working tirelessly to develop normal and friendly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation with all countries, particularly with Japan, its close neighbour and commercial partner in the Far East.

Until recently, the USSR's relations with Japan developed successfully. In the quarter of a century since the restoration of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan, both interested sides have done much to develop economic links. In 1957-1980 Soviet-Japanese trade grew almost twice as fast as Japan's overall foreign trade--32 percent and 18 percent, respectively. The USSR's trade with Japan grew from 2,600 million roubles in 1966-1970 to 6,100 million roubles in 1971-1975 and 12,100 million roubles in 1976-1980. In 1981 this trade stood at 3,000 million roubles.

This progress of the USSR's trade and economic ties with Japan was promoted by a number of objective factors. First place among these factors goes to the complementary character of foreign trade patterns of the two countries. Featuring prominently on the lists of Soviet goods exported to Japan are basic industrial raw materials and energy products. This accords with Japan's import policy aimed to diversify the sources of crude products and fuel. At the same time, Japan has a capacious Soviet market for its manufacturing industry, which is especially advantageous to Japan, whose products meet with protectionists hurdles on the markets of industrial capitalist nations.

Second, the extensive use of Japanese manufacturers is an additional factor that promotes the intensification of the USSR's economic development. In the past few decades, machinery and transport facilities have accounted for a considerable share of the Soviet imports from Japan.

Third, in the recent decades the stable interest of Japanese industrialists in Soviet contracts has been an important factor behind the growth of Soviet-Japanese commerce. In particular, Japan is greatly interested in supplying the USSR with iron and steel products, mechanical engineering goods, particularly with complete manufacturing plant.

A number of collaborative projects, effected by the USSR and Japan on a buy-back basis in the 1970s, resulted in a marked increase in trade between them.

In the early 1980s it became obvious that the scale of bilateral economic cooperation was lagging behind the level of the economic, scientific and technological potentials of the USSR and Japan and that the results of trade and economic exchanges between the two countries were beginning to noticeably fall behind the level of the USSR's relations with a number of West-European countries. Once a main Soviet commercial partner in the group of the developed capitalist nations, since 1979 Japan has moved from second to fifth place in Soviet foreign trade, having been overtaken by West Germany, Finland, France and Italy. As a result, Japan's share in overall Soviet foreign trade fell from 3.8 percent in 1975 to 3.2 percent in 1979 and 2.8 percent in 1981.

The reason for this state of affairs is the position of the Japanese ruling quarters which openly politicize all aspects of economic contacts with the Soviet Union.

This vividly manifested itself in Japan's support for the American policy of the "economic deterrence of the Soviets" which led to anti-Soviet "sanctions." False pretexts of the military and political character are used to artificially decelerate or even stop mutually advantageous trade, economic, scientific and technological exchanges in some fields. A policy of "sanctions" has been in use for the third year now. Assuming a stable character, it is becoming a permanent element of Japanese-Soviet trade and economic relations. Yielding to pressure from the Reagan administration, Japan applies anti-Soviet "sanctions" more stubbornly and extensively than Western Europe.

Tagging behind the U.S. policy of "sanctions" turns for Japan into direct economic damage, the loss of many advantageous contracts that pass into the hands of West European firms. Besides, the United States, while being the inspirer and organiser of this campaign, does not at all mind receiving commercial benefits to the detriment of its partners in military-political blocs. Thus the relative increase in the volume of U.S. trade with the USSR for the first three months of 1980 (the start of the operation of "sanctions"), as compared with the corresponding period of 1979, for example, exceeded by 3.5 times the same index for Japan.

Well known is the desire of the Japanese side to "save from sanctions" a number of what it sees as advantageous projects and contracts concluded with the Soviet Union. But it does not mean an attempt to take a position more independent of the United States on economic ties with the USSR. Regrettably, the facts of the recent period show that Japan's trade policy toward the Soviet Union continues to be largely determined by the ambitions of the country's more aggressive circles, their interest in supporting the anti-Soviet strategy of the USA. Moreover, Japan itself, along with other industrially developed capitalist countries, has begun to take an active part in the elaboration of a new economic policy in regard to the USSR.

Within the framework of the American trade strategy toward the Soviet Union, the government of Japan early in 1982 introduced new "sanctions" in addition

to the already existing ones. They envisage a refusal to participate in the work of the scientific and technical cooperation subcommittee of the bilateral committee on economic cooperation, a ban on increasing the staff of the Soviet trade mission in Japan and a refusal to allow the establishment of an office of the Soviet trade mission in Osaka.

Thus, one can say with full grounds that the most important factor hindering the normal development of Soviet-Japanese trade and economic ties is the striving of the most conservative, militaristic circles in Tokyo to back up the strategy of the United States, aimed at using economic leverage for the weakening of the world socialist system. Of course, Japan is trying to derive maximum benefits from its relations with the USA on this account, as the latter quite often makes concessions to it in the economic field, demanding in return the support of its global policy of "deterrence" against the USSR.

On the other hand, one must also note the fact that there are forces in the business circles of Japan and among its scientific community that are advocating the pursuit of a truly sovereign, independent-of-the-USA trade policy in regard to the socialist countries. The Japanese business circles' line of expanding reciprocally advantageous contacts with the Soviet Union was again demonstrated during the visit of a representative (over 250 members) Japanese economic delegation to Moscow in February 1983.

All participants of the meeting were unanimous in the appreciation of the fact that trade and economic cooperation occupy an important place in the entire complex of relations between the two neighbour countries. Successful development of Soviet-Japanese trade and economic ties, they emphasized, not only benefits both sides from the point of view of commercial interests, but also is an important factor helping to create a basis for mutual understanding and good-neighbourliness.

CSO: 1812/243

CAUSES, ACTIVITIES OF ASIAN 'LEFT EXTREMISM' DISCUSSED

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 5, May 83 pp 13-16

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences V. Fedorov: "'Left' Extremism in the Political Life of Eastern Countries"]

[Text] Aggravation of the political struggle in developing Eastern countries is often accompanied by intensification of left extremist tendencies in the ideology and practice of various petty bourgeois organizations, radically disposed intelligentsia and students and individual workers' trade unions as well as some leftist parties. Despite the variety of forms and manifestations of ultraleftism, it is nevertheless also possible to distinguish general features characteristic of all representatives of the left extremist trends that make it possible to define the role and place of "left" extremism in the political life of Asian countries.

First of all, it is necessary to point out the community of ultraleftism's social base, which is formed under the influence of objective reasons which are linked, above all, with features of the socioeconomic development of Eastern countries. The impoverishment of peasants combined with the ruin of small business operators and artisans-craftsmen leads to the appearance in cities and rural areas of a great number of people who are deprived of means for earning their living and, naturally, manifesting dissatisfaction with their situation.

It is precisely the rebellious mood of this entire mass of the despaired who are permeated with a feeling of hopelessness and uselessness and incapable of waging a struggle for changing the existing order by an organized means that feeds the ultraleftist trends. Being the social base of left extremism, the paupers and lumpens also influence the mood of the working class to which they are drawn closer by the disastrous situation and a desire to change the existing order in a radical manner. As a result, a certain part of the army of hired labor (especially its strata that are semiemployed) because of poor organization and political immaturity finds itself prone to ultraleftist influence.

Left extremist moods are also traditionally manifested among petty bourgeoisie. As V. I. Lenin pointed out, a small owner, a small proprietor under the conditions of capitalism "easily shifts to extreme revolutionism, but is incapable of manifesting endurance, organization, discipline and staunchness."* The

* V. I. Lenin, Complete Works, Vol 41, p 14

unstable economic conditions of existence of this social section of the developing countries generates a psychology of despair among a considerable part of it, a striving for revolutionary adventurism and incites them toward reckless political actions.

The social base of ultraleftism in the Eastern countries has considerably expanded during the past few years at the expense of intelligentsia. A sharp increase in the number of graduates of higher and secondary educational institutions has resulted in a relative "overproduction" of workers engaged in intellectual pursuits and the shift of a considerable part of them to a situation of "certified" unemployed or semiemployed, whose social psychology is rich soil for the perception of left extremist ideas. The strengthening of left extremist feelings among students and pupils is also promoted by their disillusionment in the bourgeois ideals, dissatisfaction with the repressive and antipopular activity of the ruling circles and lack of progress in the sphere of socioeconomic transformations as well as by their striving to prevent the erosion of national culture under the influence of ideological expansion of the West.

And, finally, the ultraleftist ideas find rich soil among the most oppressed groups of peasantry (agricultural workers, backward tribes and lowest castes), which, as indicated by the experience of (naksality) movement in India, can be drawn into extremist armed actions and terrorist activities against the government.

However, one of the main reasons of appearance of extremism (the "left," "ultra-revolutionary" as well as the right, counterrevolutionary) in the political life of the developing states, in our opinion, is linked with mass impoverishment and the enormous scale of unemployment. According to rough estimates, from one-fifth to one-third of the population in the Afro-Asian world is either completely or partially unemployed.

Pauperization influences the aforementioned sections and groups of the population and evokes among them a "sociopsychological degradation," which is expressed in indifference, spiteful isolation, lack of faith in all ideals and scientific theories and a striving to immediately and fundamentally change the existing sociopolitical system.

The dissemination of left extremist views in the liberated countries is also promoted by some other factors, such as the small number and poor organization of the working class, political immaturity and sometimes also the erroneous strategic line of left organizations and parties and intensification of the policy of coercion on the part of repressive regimes.

It is extremely difficult to define the typology of ultraleftist groups and organizations in connection with the diffusion and eclecticity of their ideological and political views. Conditionally the entire diversity of ultraleftism in the East can be divided into two directions.

The first of them is represented by the ultraleftist trends which are openly hostile to Marxism, wage an uncompromising struggle against it and advance their own conceptions and programs for "revolutionary" transformations of the society (the intelligentsia, which is under the influence of the "new left" from the European countries, the United States and Japan and the left extremist terrorist organizations--"city partisans"--and other groups which were lately stirred to activity in some states).

The second direction includes various groups which cover their activity with Marxist-Leninist phraseology and very often pass themselves off as the only lawful representatives of Marxism (organizations heading the left extremist insurgent movements, first of all, in the Southeastern countries, Trotskyist groups in student and trade union movements and other organizations under the influence of petty bourgeois and pauperist revolutionaism).

Left extremism in the political life of the liberated countries has some features in common with similar trends as regards their form in the West. However, the specific content of its ideology and policy in the Eastern and Western countries is different.

The stirring up the activity of "left" organizations and groups in Europe, the United States and Japan is explained, above all, by the deepening of the critical phenomena of capitalist development, while the social sources of ultraleftism in the East are the contradictions connected with the formation and development of capitalism, the continuing process of national liberation revolution and the further increase of anti-imperialist struggle.

While the movement of the "new left" in the West reflects intensification of dissatisfaction and protest and includes the middle sections, mainly the intelligentsia and especially its younger generation, then the left extremist trends in the Eastern countries, as indicated earlier, are fed by another, much broader social section which was engendered mainly by pauperization and degradation. Their goals are different, though their ideological positions may be in common.

Experience indicates that the theoreticians and leaders of the "ultraleftist" organizations (from the terrorist groups of "city partisans" to the "revolutionary" organizations heading the insurgent movement in the rural area) in the developing world are usually representatives of the intelligentsia. Their ideological views are formed not only under the influence of objective internal factors but also under the influence of theory and practice of ultraleftism in the West. Therefore, the theoretical concepts of "left" extremists in the Eastern countries are to a great extent built on the ideological platform of neo-Trotskyism, anarchism and Marcionism. Hence the diffusion of their political programs as well as the rapid change of conceptions and views depending on developing situations and up to actual shift to the positions of open counterrevolutionary forces.

At the same time, a rebellious-critical attitude toward the existing sociopolitical system and a striving to struggle against capitalism and imperialism with the aim of achieving immediate and decisive changes is characteristic of all ultraleftists. Therefore, though in a distorted form, they do express potentially revolutionary feelings of certain sections of workers, the degraded mass and a part of the intelligentsia.

This potential of social dissatisfaction of the aforementioned groups of the population under conditions of intensification of social contradictions and the growth of consciousness of workers could also be used by progressive forces and directed into a channel of organized class struggle and thereby acquire a positive sense of purpose. But a serious obstacle in the given instance is the "super-

revolutionism" that is characteristic to this part of the population as well as the cult of violence and destruction, which feed anarchism and voluntarism in the policy with the help of ideologists of left extremism.

All representatives of ultraleftism are united in their denial of the role of the working class as the basic and leading force of the revolution, the role of the party of the working class and workers' mass organizations in the revolutionary process. In some cases the pauperized and degraded mass (the "ideal proletarians") is proclaimed as the leading force of the revolution, in other cases it is the peasantry or only its poorest part and still in other cases it is the "revolutionary vanguard" of intelligentsia and students.

The views of Herbert Marcuse and other ideologists of the "new left" in the West have exerted certain influence on the theoretical precepts of left extremists regarding the moving forces of revolution in the East. Most enthusiastically received by them was Marcuse's thesis on the loss by the working class in the capitalist countries of its revolutionary role and the shift of the revolutionary torch to marginal sections, young intellectuals, the degraded masses and the peoples of the "third world." Arming themselves with these views, the "leftist" ideologists allude to the smallness of the working class in the developing countries.

During the past few years, some left extremist groups, first of all the ultraleftist organizations in such countries as the Philippines, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand and others, forced to consider the growth of the army of hired labor and the stepped up labor movement, began to recognize in words the significance of the proletariat as a social force but in practice continue to allot it a role of a passive observer in the revolution, which must be accomplished by the "revolutionary vanguard" from the nonproletarian sections.

The underestimation of the role of the working class, the role of the party and the political mobilization of the masses takes its source directly from the views of the ultraleftists about revolution being an armed action as a result of which the old society could ostensibly be transformed into a new one by violent methods. Therefore, their tactics of actions aimed at "accelerating," "prompting" the revolutionary process actually lead to its sharp deceleration as well as to a break of real links with the working class and other forces which are capable of transforming the society.

Ignoring objective conditions and the existence of a revolutionary situation, the ideologists of left extremism in all cases advocate stepping up "direct actions," believing that revolution may be accomplished only by an "active minority" and "revolutionary" insurgent and terrorist groups whose actions and revolutionary slogans should lead to a social outburst. In expsing such tactics of pseudorevolutionaries, F. Engels noted in a letter to A. Bebel: "Revolutionary hysterics... during complete unpreparedness of the masses is sheer absurdity and scares off the proletariat."*

As indicated by experience, the enthusiasm of ultraleftist groups and organizations for violent actions is identified by them with the insurgent struggle or

* K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, Vol 36, p 394

terrorist tactics. From the viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism, an armed struggle may be successful if it is waged according to objective laws of development of the society, that is during the periods when conditions have developed for it, when such a revolutionary situation has developed which requires armed forms of struggle. If there are no such objective conditions, then the selfless actions of individual groups will not gain support among the people and are doomed to failure in advance.

Undoubtedly, in certain instances, especially in countries that have military-dictatorial and fascist regimes, well-organized actions by armed antigovernment detachments even on a limited scale can be an important addition to the political efforts in mobilizing the masses. As indicated by experience, during existence of a revolutionary situation these forms of struggle may develop into an armed peoples struggle on a broad scale against reactionary, proimperialist dictatorships. Therefore, genuine revolutionaries regard one or other forms of violence justifiable if they are an organic composite part of the revolutionary mass movement against social and national oppression and accordingly a response to the violence of repressive antipopular regimes.

"Left" extremists, making a fetish of violence, proclaim armed struggle as a high form of class struggle that is capable of ensuring "immediate transition to socialism." Many of them for this reason have welcomed the notorious thesis to the effect that "war is mother of the revolution," that war determines the progress of history and therefore revolution ensues only from war.

Thus, the ideological and political views of the ultraleftists in all basic questions of strategy and tactics of revolutionary movement contradict Marxist-Leninist teaching. It is not surprising that they are all united in the hostile attitude toward scientific socialism, the international communist movement and the countries of real socialism. Moreover, they regard their hostile position against forces which adhere to genuine Marxist views as "revolutionary" as the struggle against capitalism and imperialism. However, in practice this left extremist ideology and policy objectively serves imperialism for it is directed at a struggle not only against the international communist movement but also against cohesion of all anti-imperialist, progressive and democratic forces.

Attempts by left extremists to unleash a "revolution" artificially without a revolutionary situation have led, as a rule, to diverting a part of the socially active groups into a completely hopeless and even dangerous channel of political struggle. Quite often the extremes of leftist groups pushed representatives of petty bourgeoisie toward supporting reactionary neofascist movements. The irresponsible violent armed actions more often than not contributed to disorganization in the ranks of the working class and its allies and provided the ruling circles with arguments for discrediting the progressive, general democratic movements as a whole.

Reactionary forces were convinced that the ultraleftists, who had no support in the masses, are incapable of heading a revolution, but on the other hand they can split up the revolutionary forces. There are numerous examples when local reaction and imperialist circles assumed control of left extremist (especially terrorist) organizations and even directed their activity in their

own interest in order to justify strengthening the old and creating new repressive organs, strengthening control over the population, limiting workers' rights and expanding military interference by imperialism in the internal affairs of the developing countries under the pretext of struggle against the "threat of communism."

Being under the control of reactionary forces, the organs of mass information quite often create an aura of "heroism" around the ultraleftists and simultaneously stress in every possible way the statements of these groups about their devotion to the "cause of revolution" and also tactics of "direct actions" and terror. Imperialism unites the ultraleftists in its propaganda into a single "front" with communists and other progressive forces so that in advancing accusations of terrorism against them, they use military-terrorist methods against all detachments of national liberation and workers movement.

Let us examine some specific examples of the political practice of ultraleftists in the Eastern countries.

The activity of left extremist groups in Turkey has caused great damage to the organized workers and democratic movement. As regards the scale of organized political terror, which was carried out by right nationalist and profascist organizations as well as leftist groups, Turkey occupies a special place in the developing world. Moreover, the activity of ultraleftists in its methods and forms resembles the activity of "left" terrorists in European countries, in particular it reminds one of the tactics of the so-called "red brigades" in Italy.

A sharp rise in political terror in Turkey began in 1976 and reached especially great scale during the 1978-80 period as a result of stepped up activities of right nationalist as well as "left" extremists. In 1979, 2,200 political assassinations were committed, and nearly 5,000 during the first 8 months of the following year. The military were able to take advantage of the terror unleashed by the extremists and seized power in September 1980. The workers and democratic movement was placed under control of the military administration. Under the pretext of struggle against terrorism the authorities subjected worker activists and trade union figures to judicial persecution.

The activity of ultraleftists in Sri Lanka is very demonstrative. In April 1971, the "Peoples Liberation Front," a left extremist youth organization, made an attempt to seize power here by proclaiming as its goal the building of "pure socialism." Its leaders declared that the revolution in the country in the developing situation would supposedly be successful even without leadership of the revolutionary party, believing that active armed actions of militant groups would draw the working class and peasantry into the "revolution." However, the adventurist actions of the armed youths, which manifested themselves in attacks on police posts and government institutions, were doomed to failure from the very beginning. Several thousand young people perished in action, whose sincere desire to achieve progressive changes was directed by leaders of the "front" into a channel of hopeless, armed adventure that was isolated from the workers' class struggle.

The Trotskyist and other ultraleftist groups in Sri Lanka have made and are making attempts to direct the workers movement as well along the path of extremist actions. Thus, in 1977 they attempted to provoke a general strike despite its obvious untimeliness and lack of preparation.

Much harm to organized anti-imperialist, democratic movement was caused in the seventies by the activity of left extremists groups in the Philippines, India, Thailand, Bangladesh and other Asian countries.

The analysis of "left" extremism's negative influence on the national liberation, revolutionary movement on the Asian continent, probably, would not be complete without even briefly examining its manifestations in the most disgusting, fascist forms in the policy and practical activity of the Pol Pot group in Kampuchea during the 1975-78 period. First of all, it is extremely important to clarify the question of the Pol Pot group's social support.

Pol Pot and his supporters have declared that the basic support of the revolution is the poorest peasantry. However, the Pol Pot regime was unable to draw to its side not only the peasantry as a class but even its poorest part. Pol Pot's main support up to 1975 as well as after assuming power were the most backward in socioeconomic and cultural sense part of the Khmer peasantry and representatives of national minorities. From among them Pol Pot followers selected the basic cadres for their organization and army. Inhabitants of these regions were entered into a grade of "basic" population while all other Kampucheans were subject to "reeducation" or even annihilation.

However, even among the aforementioned groups of the population Pol Pot strived to rely mainly on the callow youths whom it was easier to "break away" from the patriarchal and religious norms of morals and to accustom to "uncompromising revolutionary violence" supposedly for the sake of rapid and radical rebuilding of the society. Nationalist and chauvinist views, false patriotism and a feeling of pride in belonging to a "revolutionary elite" were instilled in youths. It is precisely these people, who were "liberated" by Pol Pot not only from the morals of the old society but also from morals common to mankind which hampered manifestation of "extra revolutionality," that made up the backbone of Pol Pot's machine of violence.

Thus, the main support of the Pol Pot group were those sections of the population which by their position could be compared with the pauperized mass and whose social protest, which was repeatedly intensified by internal political upheavals and U.S. aggression in this country, was directed by the Pol Pot group into a channel of destruction and violence for rapid building of "barrack communism."

The realization of methods of "revolutionary violence," which assumed a form of genocide against own people, was accompanied by militarization of the entire life of the Kampuchean society. The armed forces and security organs became the stewards of the ruling group's policy in the political, economic and social fields. Methods of persuasion and political mobilization of the masses were replaced with military administration and repressions.

The pseudorevolutionary, and actually counterrevolutionary theory and practice of the Pol Pot group, in which methods of fascism and eastern despotism were added to "extra leftism," could in no way be viable. Therefore, the bankruptcy

and downfall of the Pol Pot regime were natural, and the fact that most reactionary forms of imperialism continue to render support to the remnants of "Red Khmers" clearly speaks of whose interests this "revolutionary movement" has objectively served and continues to serve.

As a whole it may be stated that the activity of "left" extremists during the past few years has demonstrated the insolvency of their ideology and policy. The ultraleftist groups and organizations were unable to achieve successes in any developed country in their attempts to lead somewhat broader sections of the population. Progressive democratic forces in the Eastern countries are being convinced that theory and practice of "left" extremism in their essence do not have anything in common with Marxist-Leninist teaching and that the groups which come forward under pseudorevolutionary slogans objectively serve the interests of reaction and hamper unification of anti-imperialist, democratic and revolutionary forces in solving vital tasks facing the developing world.

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RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN SOCIALIST-ORIENTATION STATES STRESSED

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 7, Jul 83 pp 14-16

[Article by B. Starostin, candidate of philosophy: "Revolutionary Democracy and Religion in the Countries With a Socialist Orientation"]

[Text] The religious issue is becoming especially acute at the contemporary stage, when, despite existing difficulties, the countries with a socialist orientation are intensifying socioeconomic and political reforms and are creating avant-garde parties of the workers, which function in accordance with the principles of scientific socialism. These countries have especially difficult tasks: On the one hand, they must neutralize the most reactionary wing of the clergy, which is hostile toward the revolutionary reforms, and on the other, they must support those members of the clergy who demonstrate loyalty with respect to the policy conducted by the state and accept the changes realistically.

It should be borne in mind that the religious situation is not the same in all the countries with a socialist orientation and consequently, the policy conducted by the revolutionary democrats with respect to religion and to the ministers of religion also differs. In some states--in Afghanistan, Algeria and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, for example--the Sunnite sect of Islam is predominant. In others--in Angola, Mozambique, the Congo and Madagascar, for example--most of the population profess local religions. There are also nations in which Christianity predominates over the other faiths. In Ethiopia under the emperor, for example, the Monophysitic Christian faith was officially acknowledged as the state religion. Catholics are predominant in the Republic of Cape Verde.

The revolutionary democrats understand the strategic importance of performing constant political and indoctrinational work and its role in the spread of the progressive, materialistic Weltanschauung among the population.

The National Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the Revolutionary Council of the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] have taken a flexible line with respect to Islam since the beginning of the new stage of the April revolution. In April of 1980 the Revolutionary Council enacted the "Basic Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan," a document which served as the country's main law until a constitution was adopted. It states, among other things: "Afghanistan's development from backwardness to socialism, to economic and cultural progress, is being effected under the leadership of Afghanistan's National

Democratic Party--a party of the working class, ... of all the country's workers... while steadily following the sacred religion of Islam." At the same time, it notes that "no one has the right to use religion for purposes of antinational or antipopular propaganda or for committing other actions hostile to the interests of the DRA and the people of Afghanistan."

The Afghan leadership's balanced policy toward religion has already produced good results. The first conference of ulema (clergymen-and-scholars) and mullahs was held in Kabul in the summer of 1980. The more than 800 delegates discussed matters pertaining to the clergy's participation in the nation's public life. The delegates greeted with approval the order creating a main administration of Islamic affairs under the Council of Ministers of the DRA and adopted a decision to establish a higher council of Afghanistan's ulema and clergymen.

Bakhtar, Afghanistan's information agency, has reported that 29 mosques and prayer centers were built in the country in 1981-1982 and that several million afghanis were allocated for repairing and rebuilding temples destroyed by counter-revolutionary elements. The state pays large amounts of money in the form of subsidies to religious figures each year.

A religious awareness is fairly widespread in the states with a socialist orientation, and this is taken into account by the authorities when they effect important social reforms. These are frequently carried out in a form which is understandable and acceptable to the believers. In Afghanistan, for example, with 90 percent of its population unable to read or write, a campaign to eliminate illiteracy has been launched with the slogan: "A real Moslem must be able to read the Koran."

The religious situation which has developed in Algeria has substantial distinctions. The National Liberation Front (NLF), for example, has repeatedly stressed the fact that it has always stood for and still advocates the rebirth and preservation of cultural-religious values, regarding them as a means of mobilizing the people for the building of a new society. The slogan "Islam is my religion; Arabic is my native language; Algeria is my homeland," has become popular. The constitution of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria proclaims Islam as the state religion. The nation's program document, the National Charter of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, contains a special section entitled "Islam and the Socialist Revolution." "As an inseparable part of our historical individuality," the charter states, "Islam functions as one of the powerful means of combatting all attempts to deprive Algeria of its originality," Islam defends the "hoble concept of human dignity" and condemns racism, chauvinism and man's exploitation of man. The charter stresses the fact that the nation's rebirth is only possible through social revolution and basic reform of the social structures.

At the same time, right-wing Moslem groupings in Algeria are attempting to activate the society's Islamization under the guise of Arabization, to strengthen their ideological and social positions. Reporting on the arrest of a group of Moslem extremists, the newspaper EL-MUJAHID, the central press agency of the NFL[National Liberation Front], the ruling party, wrote at the end of 1982 that all manifestations of "religious fanaticism, which constitutes a serious danger

to our society's development and the implementation of the Arabization campaign" must be stamped out. The Algerians, in whose life Islam continues to play an important role, support the actions of the government, which is directing the process of Arabization into a progressive channel and preventing the Islamic traditionalists from stepping up their activities.

The religious issue has an important place in the nations with a socialist orientation in Tropical Africa. Here, as in other states on the continent, Islam and Christianity coexist with animistic beliefs, traditional magic and ancestor worship. Various syncretic religions like the Afro-Christian trends of Kimbanguism (named after the "prophet" S. Kimbangué) and others have also emerged. Political differentiation of the clergy is occurring as the progressive socioeconomic, ideological and cultural reforms intensify: On the one hand, there is an increasingly identifiable reactionary, counterrevolutionary wing, and on the other, that part of the clergy prepared to support the progressive social reforms.

The religious issue became an especially acute political matter in Angola, for example, following the first congress of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] in December of 1977, which adopted a decision to transform the MPLA into an vanguard party guided by the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. The Constitutional Law of the People's Republic of Angola proclaims the total separation of religion institutions from the state and guarantees the "preservation of the church, places and objects of worship, on the condition that they are not in conflict with the laws of the state" and assures "the inviolability of freedom of conscience and religion." The leaders of the Catholic Church, however, with support from outside, began openly interfering in the affairs of the state and the ruling party and undermining the progressive political course. In 1978 in an official statement on the situation with respect to religion in Angola, the Catholic episcopate made crude attacks upon the MPLA-the Labor Party, and its leadership, and launched a slanderous, antigovernment campaign in connection with alleged cases of repression of the church and believers by state agencies. The Catholic Church rejected the party's invitation to take part in the 1980 elections to the National Assembly and provincial assemblies, announcing that it had refused "to collaborate with the communist regime."

Unlike the Catholics, Angola's Council of Evangelical Churches takes a generally neutral position with respect to the policy conducted by the revolutionary democracy and even indicates a willingness to support the social and political processes occurring in the nation. The council takes an active part in public life in the People's Republic of Angola: Several religious figures have been elected deputies to the National Assembly and members of the provincial assemblies, and a representative of the council participated by invitation in the special congress of the MPLA-the Labor Party in December of 1980.

In accordance with their program, the leaders of the vanguard party intend to use every means possible to help spread the materialistic Weltanschauung in the nation and to combat reactionary ideological trends, including religious ones. Chapter 2 of the party's rules states that a party member must "resolutely combat customs and prejudices born of ignorance, religion and traditional beliefs."

In preparations for the first national conference of the MPLA, the Labor Party, held in September of 1983, a great deal of attention was devoted to the further strengthening of unity in the ranks of the avant-garde party and the enhancement of its guiding role in the society, including the more extensive and active conduct of ideological and indoctrinational work.

Like the constitutions of many other countries with a socialist orientation, the Constitution of the People's Republic of Benin, which was ratified in August and went into effect in September of 1977, guarantees freedom of religion. Article 135 states: "Citizens of the People's Republic of Benin have freedom of religion. They are free to profess no religion." M. Kerekou, chairman of the Central Committee of the Popular Revolutionary Party of Benin and president of the republic, stresses the fact that "the Dahomean revolution maintains a position of strict neutrality toward religion to the extent that its manifestations are not barriers to the development of our revolution.... No one has the right to preach against the Dahomean revolution under the guise of protecting religion."

In an attempt to discredit the policy of the revolutionary democrats in countries with a socialist orientation, internal reaction together with imperialism frequently resorts to insinuations pertaining to alleged oppression of believers and ministers of religion. What a lot of libelous statements have been made in the West regarding the revolutionary authorities in Afghanistan! The propaganda campaign against Ethiopia, which was stepped up in 1981 and 1982, is an example of such slander. The thoroughly false nature of this slander becomes obvious as soon as one becomes familiar with the facts.

The revolutionary government of that country does not oppress the adherents of a single religion, not one of the religious sects. It proclaimed the separation of church and state, equality of all believers and freedom of religion, on the condition that the ministers of religion do not speak out against the principles upon which the state is based or against its laws. The Program of National Democratic Revolution in Ethiopia stresses the fact that "no citizen will enjoy any sort of privileges, political, economic or social, based on religion or sex." Some religious organizations engage in antistate activities, however, attempt to inflame hostility among the ethnic groups and tribes, disseminate counter-revolutionary literature and take part in smuggling operations.

The leaders of the two largest religious communities--Orthodox Christians and Muslims--which account for more than 80 percent of all the believers, approve of the government's religious policy. In March of 1982 (abuna Tekle Khaymanot), patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, stated that since the revolution the government has devoted greater attention to the preservation of religious treasures and that the situation of the clergy has improved from what it was under the emperor. He said that more than 2,000 churches have been built or repaired. The patriarch refuted reports by the mass media in the West to the effect that Ethiopian authorities persecute citizens for their religious convictions.

Mohammed Sani Habib, leader of the Ethiopian Muslims and imam of the Anvar Mosque in Addis Ababa, stated in January of 1983 that "discrimination against Moslems is a thing of the past in Ethiopia today." The nation's revolutionary leadership, he commented, has made restitution for the damage inflicted upon the

Islamic community by the former regime, permitted nationwide celebration of the 1,456th anniversary of the birth of the prophet Mohammed and established three Moslem holidays among the 10 official annual holidays. "Prior to the revolution," the imam said, "in response to any expression of dissatisfaction, members of the Moslem community could expect the cruelist of retaliatory actions.... Our believers now have land, and Moslems serve in the army and the militia and defend their country like all the other citizens, and the inclusion of Moslem holidays in the number of official national holidays constituted recognition of our situation of equality."

Let us recall that during the military operations in Ogaden in 1977-1978, when the Somali aggressors called upon the Ethiopian Moslems to join them in the "holy war" against Addis Ababa, the community rejected the appeal and cooperated with their fellow, Christian countrymen to help the army defend the country's territorial integrity and drive the invaders from its borders.

In the People's Republic of the Congo Catholic and Protestant churches have considerable influence, but the religious leaders refrain from entering into open confrontation with the revolutionary democracy, although they retain their concealed hostility toward the Congolese Labor Party, which has declared its adherence to the concepts of scientific socialism. In one of his articles Professor (S. Makosso-Makosso) of Brazzaville University states that the latent tensions in relations between the church and the state are actually religious and not political, that they reflect the hostility of the reactionary members of the clergy toward the atheistic party and attest to their fear of losing the rich church property.

The state does not oppress the church, while at the same time doing everything possible to prevent its politicalization. The Constitution of the People's Republic of the Congo guarantees freedom of conscience and religion to all citizens and freedom of church functioning in matters of religion, but forbids the creation of religious organizations of a political nature. The law provides for the possibility of halting the control of a cult by a religious organization, if its actions are directed against public order or public morals. Under this law the 2nd Congress of the Congolese Labor Party, held in December of 1972, condemned the subversive activities of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect as being detrimental to national unity and to the implementation of the party's program.

The party and state leaders of the Congo are involving the churches which make up the Congolese Ecumenical Movement in public activities and in the movement of the proponents of peace. Representatives of the Catholic, Evangelical and Kimbanguist churches, for example, are members of the Presidium of the Congolese Association of Friendship Among Peoples and are on the national commission for legal reform. The clergy, in turn, are beginning to understand and properly appreciate the policy conducted by the authorities toward the church. In connection with the 10th anniversary of the Congolese Ecumenical Movement, the Catholic newspaper (SMEN AFRIKEN) noted that the "authorities are attempting to involve the church in the resolution of the nation's most important problems" and expressed its hope that the Congolese Ecumenical Movement would help to unite the country's people.

The National Union of Traditional Congolese Healers was created to control the cult and healing activities which thrive on the basis of local traditional beliefs, and to find ways to eradicate the practices of witch doctors, magicians and fetishists, which are detrimental to the people's health. The union is expected to establish cooperation between traditional and modern medicine, but also to combat the pseudohealers and religious obscurantism.

The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar proclaims: "Freedom of conscience and the profession of religion is guaranteed by the state's equal treatment of all religions. Religious cults are organized and function freely in accordance with the law." Taking advantage of its substantial influence in the country, the Catholic Church occupies a generally critical position toward measures undertaken by the Malagasy revolution. Friction between it and the state has occurred in recent years against the backdrop of unsettled or even intensified economic problems facing the country. In January of 1982 Democratic Republic of Madagascar President D. Ratsiraka announced that the Catholic Church was involved in a plot against the government and that certain Catholic priests had been arrested as a result.

Local traditional beliefs, mainly ancestor worship, still have deep roots in the nation. The Malagasies believe that the spirits of their ancestors live among them and influence all the deeds and actions of their descendents. The Charter of the Malagasy Socialist Revolution devotes considerable attention to the emancipation of the mind, alteration of the Malagasy's way of thinking and liberation of the individual from the "deathgrip" of backward traditions, which is an important condition for his active participation in the society's reorganization.

Everything we have said demonstrates that the revolutionary democracy understands that atheistic concepts can be established in the public awareness only as a result of lengthy, systematic work. The profound socioeconomic and cultural reforms are narrowing the objective basis for religion's reproduction.

The overcoming of ethnic, tribal, clan, caste and religious barriers, which have always caused substantial harm to the unity of the workers, is an important area in the struggle for social progress. When representatives of the Mozambique Liberation Front became members of the transitional government in 1974 following the cease-fire in Mozambique, Samora Machel, now president of the nation, spoke to them as chairman of the party. He stated: "No one should consider you as members of a certain race, ethnic group or religion. You represent the working people, all of the people, from the Ruvuma to Maputo. None of us has fought for a certain area, for a certain race, tribe or religion. We have fought and continue to fight for a united nation."

Experience with the socialist orientation has demonstrated that the religious feelings of the believers cannot function as barriers, as the imperialist ideologists frequently attempt to depict them, to the implementation of broad progressive reforms.

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ROUNDTABLE VIEWS CLASH BETWEEN TRADITION, WESTERNIZATION IN ASIAN STATES

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 7, Jul 83 pp 33-41

[Roundtable discussion by G.F. Kim, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences (Institute of Oriental Studies), Doctor of Historical Sciences N.A. Simoniya and Doctor of Historical Sciences V.G. Khoros (Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences), and Doctor of Economic Sciences V.L. Sheynis (Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences), of material prepared by Candidate of Economic Sciences L. Birchanskiy and N. Rusanov: "Traditions and Modernity in the Social Development of Nations of the East"]

[Text] G. Kim: We have gathered here to exchange opinions on a problem which is undoubtedly one of the keys to understanding the contemporary situation in the developing nations of the East.

During the period of the colonial system's final collapse Western experts on problems of the nations of Asia and Africa began actively developing models of future development for the liberated states and their integration into the capitalist world. By inventing various methods for the "assimilation" of the West's economic, political and cultural patterns into the structures of the Eastern societies, they counted on accelerating the process of the developing nations' transformation into bourgeois states. The groundlessness of their designs became apparent fairly rapidly, however. A number of new states selected the non-capitalist path of development, and this was due in great part to the influence of real socialism's experience. And in the nations which took the capitalist road the forced modernization along bourgeois lines encountered serious obstacles of a social and economic nature.

In other words, the crisis of the bourgeois "growth models" was caused by the non-conformity of the technical and economic structures of developed capitalism, which were introduced into the Afro-Asian world from outside, to the precapitalist, archaic structures prevalent there. This nonconformity resulted in glaring social contrasts (in Iran under the shah, for example) and drove acute social and economic problems into impasses.

The development of various political trends in Asia and Africa arose as a result of the policy of forced bourgeois modernization, a feature of which was a return to traditions, to the local social and cultural heritage. At the present time

this is serving as a source of ideological and political self-assertion for all the social groups and political parties, without exception, putting them closer to the masses and enlisting the masses on their side. And so, the central problem of the liberated nations, the conflict between the traditional and the modern in the East, as well as their optimal synthesis, has become more and more clearly and extensively outlined.

In the nations of Asia and Africa an acute struggle is presently underway about how the cultural heritage should be used in the interest of national liberation progress, about what part of their heritage from the past is obsolete and what must be preserved and strengthened by combining it with modern achievements. The handling of this problem determines in great part the extent of the demarcation between conservative and progressive forces, between bourgeois elements and those who advocate socialism.

The fact should be underscored, that despite the modernization of today's Asian and African states within historically brief periods of time, their growing world ties and the transformation of their former institutions, interest in their traditional social and cultural heritage is not weakening but, on the contrary, is more and more insistently drawing the attention of their communities to the civilized distinctions inherent in the countries and regions of the East. At the same time the influence of modern values, which are eroding the traditional principles and concepts, is also perfectly apparent.

The growing difficulties in the social and economic development of the Asian and African nations require that the scholars comprehend the qualitative uniqueness of the Eastern societies, which is frequently inseparable from their historical civilization and social and cultural values functioning as agents, as it were, of the continuity and integrity of those societies. It is not surprising that the "movement toward modernization" in the Afro-Asian world is being accomplished more and more frequently and markedly by "adjusting" suitable elements in their legacy from the past to fit it.

One of the important problems (which is being resolved in different ways by progressive and conservative forces) consists in finding those forms of social and cultural self-determination within the framework of which it will be possible to withstand "alien" Western orientations and to reveal internal strengths which will help the developing societies enter the modern world. And so, the task of eliminating backwardness is closely linked to the problem of what is to become of the traditional. Its difficulty lies not only in the rapid assimilation of modern achievements in industry, science, education and other areas of life, but also in the determination of the social, cultural and spiritual form which modernization will assume in the former "provinces"; whether it will converge with capitalism or socialism; whether the broad popular masses, which are still closely linked to relics from the past, are to be actively involved in the process. Otherwise--that is, without participation by the broad masses of workers in the process of modernization--the "updating" will not be real and complete, the development will be restricted to narrow boundaries and lead to a growth of social contrasts.

I feel that what I have said is fully adequate to make clear the great complexity of the process of combining the traditional and the modern in the developing

world and its diversity, and how greatly the different elements--economic, social, political, cultural and ideological--which are interwoven in it, vary. Can we expect ready answers for the accomplishment of this extremely complex task from anyone? No, of course not. The answer will be provided primarily by life, by the real historical experience of the liberated states. However, the scholars are capable of analyzing the basic trends in the development of nations of the East and attempting to determine possible future variations.

Soviet scholars have devoted considerable attention to the problem of traditions in the East in recent years. At the present time a group of authors of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences is preparing our nation's first summary work on the synthesis of the traditional and the modern in the developing nations of Asia and North Africa. Nodari Aleksandrovich, since you head this group of authors, I am turning the floor over to you.

N. Simoniya: The definite rise of traditionalism in a number of nations of the East cannot be explained otherwise than by the hastiness of attempts (made over a period of two or three decades) to resolve basic problems of national renewal with bourgeois modernization within the framework of "Westernization" concepts, that is, the excessively rigid and open, excessively forced, uncritical borrowing of Western forms of state and public organization, value orientations and way of life. Historical experience has brought out the groundlessness of this rigid concept, based, I would say, on the absolute polarization of the traditional and the modern, whereby the development of the modern was thought of in terms of total destruction of the traditional.

The crisis of the "Westernization" concept forced some Western sociologists to reconsider their approach to the problem. The traditional began to be viewed as a source of modernization, as a phenomenon capable of self-modernization and self-development. The husband-and-wife team of Sussane and Lloyd Rudolf should be mentioned among the founders of this new school. They published a monograph entitled "Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India" in 1967. The authors turn even to Marxist methodology, to the tenets having to do with the creative role of social conflicts, to the law of negation of the negative, and so forth, to support their views. It seems to me, however, that this was a superficial process, since it did not take into account fundamental differences in the nature and the stability of the formative development of modern nations of the East and those of the European capitalist states. As a result they attach independent or even self-prevailing importance to the traditional. Its strength and capacity for modernization is actually presented as an absolute. It is therefore not surprising that in their reasoning the authors place the stress only upon possibilities for the interpenetration, interaction and mutual influence of the traditional and the modern. The dominant role of the latter is either downplayed or is ignored altogether. The main factor--i.e., the fact that the traditional in the East is beginning to be transformed and modernized precisely by pressure from the modern--is left in the background.

Independent of the authors' subjective intentions, such concepts have a perfectly definite social intent. They play into the hands of both the retrogressive and conservative groups within the Eastern nations and neocolonialism. In the former case such concepts are used for opposing the conservative version of bourgeois

evolution, which gives reactionary forces real power in the social and political area (it is not surprising that S. Rudolf has been accused of sympathizing with the Jan Sangh [Party]). In the latter case pro-traditional concepts objectively replace the "Westernization" concepts, since they serve the same purpose of retaining the developing nations as imperialism's exploited colonies.

V. Khoros: I agree, Nodari Aleksandrovich, that the traditional and precapitalist is not a source of development. You would hardly deny the fact that the traditional is one of the development factors, however. Naturally, one can see a certain internal contradiction even in this formulation of the question. Are "traditions" and "development" not exact opposites? Does the traditional not serve as a brake to development? If this is a contradiction, it is a dialectical one, however: The categories mentioned (or more correctly, the phenomena and processes behind them) actively correlate to each other in the real historical process. A.I. Gertsen once stated that "development in general takes place in the form of various combinations of two interacting courses, traditions and the ideal."¹ The humorous saying "the new is the old, well-forgotten" therefore makes a certain kind of sense, for any new historical development contains an element of the past, of the traditional. New social forms and institutions can only grow out of former institutions and forms, on the basis of their transformation, natural or deliberate, inherent or through a process of transplanting "tissue" from outside as a result of revolution or evolution. I should mention the unique law of the preservation of "social matter." We find confirmation of this even from V.I. Lenin, who stated that communism can only be built "out of that material left us by the old society."² Is this good or bad? I believe that it is ultimately good, because communism is only conceivable as a creative synthesis of the progressive achievements of human culture. No real development is possible without "retaining" them.

We have had more than one individual in history, to be sure, who reasoned like Turgenev's Bazarov ("first we have to clear the space") or "who threw" Pushkin off the "steamship of modernism." To some degree their writings might sometimes be of historical benefit. Most frequently, however, social and cultural nihilism have destructive consequences. We do not have to go far for examples. The "times of trouble" of foreign invasions and internal internecine wars, which were accompanied by the intensive destruction of all social structures, produced the nightmare of the Pol Pot regime, which functioned as a blind negating force with respect to elementary standards and values of human life. As a result the population was deprived of its customary social and cultural links.

How did the Western civilization, the most extensively studied civilization, develop from the standpoint of the interrelationships between the traditional and the modern? The ascending, relatively organic development of the European nations is not at all due to the fact that they managed to radically and rapidly eliminate the traditional structures. Precisely the contrary--this development proceeded comparatively effectively and progressively from the 14th to the 19th century, because it was based on a permanent synthesis of elements of the traditional (social institutions, legal standards, cultural value heritage, including religion) and "the modern" (the elimination of obsolete institutions, the growth of science and technology and secularization). Consider Roman law, as an example; the concept of the individual, which was founded by Christianity; the polis

democracy of antiquity; the rationalistic trends of medieval scholasticism, which prepared the way for scientific understanding; Protestantism, not just as the ideological prerequisite for capitalistic accumulation but also as a factor in the development of the political structures of bourgeois democracy. Ideologists of the rising European bourgeoisie repeatedly turned to these concepts, institutions and values; these and similar elements of the social and cultural tradition were fitted into the bourgeois social system. This synthesis was historically primitive, to be sure. It was basically an objective, spontaneous, "unseen" process, and it was only learned in retrospect what was "traditional" in the process and what was "modern." We can fully establish this today, however.

V. Sheynis: Or how the modern became a part of tradition, became firmly established therein and modified it.

V. Khoros: Precisely so. It is especially important not to ignore the traditional in the contemporary developing nations of the East, which have such an ancient and rich cultural heritage. And not only because the traditional is still firmly rooted in Asia and Africa, is vital, and close to the vast majority of the people.

The enormous gap between the levels of social, economic and cultural development, the limited historical period "allocated" to the new states for eliminating that gap, the heritage of colonialism and suppression by neocolonialism--all of this is putting the developing world into a state of social pressure. The solution is a complete and organic synthesis of the traditional and the modern. This means the optimal combination of the traditional and the modern sectors of the economy--if only to provide employment for the enormous and growing excess workforce--and the employment of the mechanisms of traditional egalitarianism, because, as experience has taught us, "Western-mold" individualism in the developing nations results in the society's acute polarization and the brazen robbing of the people by a handful of nouveaux riches. ("Oil-rich" Iran was an especially graphic example of this pattern.) Finally, it is the achievement of a certain balance between the powerful current of ideas from the developed nations and the heritage of traditional culture.

And so, the problem is not one of accelerating the elimination of cultural traditions. On the contrary, the "Asian drama" is occurring in great part because the cultural traditions are not being included in the development process with adequate vigor and activeness. As a result, modern ideas, structures and institutions brought in from the outside are not finding suitable cultural soil there.

V. Sheynis: Nodari Aleksandrovich has correctly pointed out that the limitation, the ineffectiveness and even more, the apparent unfeasibility of "Westernization" models have produced a unique reaction of "disengagement" in the East and given birth to the traditionalist "alternative." One could say that one extreme alternative (foreign) gave birth to another ("of the soil"). But perhaps the middle alternatives are best suited for resolving the problems of the developing nations?

It would seem that the solution to the problem lies in the synthesis of the "best traditions" with "appropriate" innovations. This has only the appearance

of a solution, however, because it is not clear how the economy (the criteria of which are productivity and effectiveness, and the mechanism competitive selection) can be combined with an economic organization the viability of which is determined by the total product, the ratio of vital means to the population and employment of the upcoming generations, even in little-productive work. There is a no less serious problem in the social and cultural area. The problem is how to synthesize two different types of social integration, if one of them is based on the structures of a civil state (certain possibilities have developed within their framework for the shaping of self-made social organizations, the frank comparison of diverse cultural values and relatively broad freedom for the individual), while the other is based on state structures, rigid stratification and individual ties traced to a communal system. It would be presumptuous to say that we already know the basis on which and the way in which the synthesis of tradition and modernism can be effected within the social reality of the developing nations. We can only attempt to outline that economic and social space--extensive but not infinite--within which this synthesis is possible. It is easier to imagine within the framework of simplified contrasting of traditions and innovations, those elements of the new without which it will hardly be possible for any sort of society to exist long in the 21st century.

In general outline these elements appear approximately to be: an industrial (and scientific and technological in the future) system of productive forces; urbanization; the principle of material interest, expansion and enrichment of the structure of demands by those participating in production as the most important components of mechanism of social development; general enhancement of the role of labor in the social life--the complex types of labor, among others--and social division of labor in particular; the development of market ties (as a counterbalance to the natural performance of management) and the levers of state economic regulation; the expansion and intensification of the individual's personal freedom coupled with personal selection, personal responsibility, and so forth.

It is considerably more difficult to imagine those elements of the traditional order in the Afro-Asian societies, which can be synthesized with modernization adequately to generate a civilization developing on its own foundation and constantly renewing itself. The culturally neutral elements of traditions fully combine with modern economics--the characteristics of artistic style, decorative designs, cuisine and so forth, for example. But the nuclear layers, the system-shaping principles, are the determining element in all deeply rooted social traditions. As B.S. Yerasov demonstrated, however--and extremely convincingly, in my opinion--the reverse (but extremely limited) side of the interpersonal local solidarity inherent in a number of Eastern civilizations is formed of xenophobia and fierce rejection of "foreign things," egalitarianism is accompanied by hierarchism, and so forth.

Vladimir Georgiyevich feels that tradition itself can become a development factor. Some Soviet and foreign authors share this point of view, citing this or that historical experience whereby elements of the traditional social and cultural system have become involved in economic modernization. Japan is ordinarily

the favorite example. Great Britain's historical experience at the beginning of the capitalist era is also mentioned. In my opinion, these examples demonstrate not so much the independent role of traditions as development factors as much as their adaptation to existing development factors, which function the more successfully, the better they are disguised as "tradition," and the more tradition contains what Karl Marx referred to as loopholes "for breaking up tradition within the framework of tradition."³

No society can effect a historical transition, no matter how drastic, while totally rejecting all of its traditions. After a time certain features of the past emerge in what appear to be newly devised forms of social life. The well-known British traditionalism, long since forced into areas of social life which have no (or almost no) points of contact with economic development, is one thing. Traditions in Japanese culture are another. Some of them are combined to a greater or lesser degree with a specific version of economic growth (and have made their own mark, not always progressive, on it). The traditions of many non-European civilizations differ in a crucial way from both of these. In some cases they actually contribute to the dynamic processes (this was recently demonstrated by Ye. B. Rashkovskiy, using India's experience⁴); in other cases they create major barriers to these processes; and in still others, they nurture those rebelling against the modern society. The assertion that traditions should be used for rapid economic development, that they demonstrate, as it were, the flexibility of scientific (or political) thinking, is essentially an attempt "to conceal the very acute problem of the gaps between economic modernization and the conservatism of persistent stereotypes of mass awareness.

V. Khoros: Let me explain--for one thing, so that Viktor Leonidovich does not consider me to be a "fundamentalist" and retrograde.... Seriously speaking, the theory of the traditional as one of the development factors does not mean that we equalize the importance of the traditional and the modern in the process of their synthesis, which is taking place today in the countries of the East: The modern factor is unquestionably the dominant factor here. It would hardly be correct to consider the traditional to be some sort of insignificant adjunct, however, an ideological convention. Just what is the actual problem? Various forms of modern industrial civilization, introduced into the developing world from outside, should "be neutralized" there. That is, they should remain a purely enclave and elite phenomenon. This is only possible when the modern (corresponding value orientations, stereotyped behavior and institutions) assume certain accustomed, traditional features familiar to the masses, when dynamic elements of the traditional (egalitarian "peasant" democracy," for example, certain features of coporative collectivism, together with the individual's economic independence; which emerged in the precapitalist structures, and others) are actively included in the development process. Only then can the synthesis of the traditional and the modern "work."

I will again make a comparison with the cultural history of the West. We know that the Renaissance and the Reformation played a large role in the development of the ideological and cultural prerequisites for the bourgeois civilization in Europe. But while the Renaissance occurred mainly within the elite culture, the influence of the Reformation involved the masses. Why was this the case? The advance under the Reformation was made in the bastion of traditional awareness--religion--by appealing to "genuine" religious values. This is why Protestantism

with its demand for religious freedom functioned so effectively in previous bourgeois revolutions, clearing the path for "secular" bourgeois liberties in general.

G. Kim: It also seemed to me, Viktor Leonidovich, that you underestimate the importance of synthesis. You recognize it, but mainly in that version in which tradition is only "ornamentation." The realities of life, however, have shown that the synthesis of the traditional and the modern which we observe in the nations of the East includes not only formal elements of the traditional, but substantive elements as well. There is no developing nation today, in which any of the extreme versions of social development--"Westernization" or traditionalism--has actually been realized. It is not a matter of the declarations or intentions of the leaders, after all, not one of recommended development concepts or even of government programs.

The synthesis or more correctly, even a symbiosis, of structurally heterogeneous components or structural elements exists today at almost all "levels" of the society--at the basis (economic and social) and in the superstructure (political and ideological). It has been this way during the almost 40 years since World War II; the situation is the same today and it will continue for many more decades. This synthesis constitutes a forced compromise between the old and the new. It always comprises the main element in transitional periods of social development and cannot itself be an "alternative" for public development ("a third path"). Alternative versions of this synthesis are perfectly possible, however. This depends upon what sort of structural element dominates in it and defines the general direction of its evolution. This means, in the first place, that the synthesis cannot be regarded as a static thing; it is motion from the old to the new, dialectical motion, through unity and a struggle of opposites. In the second place, equal coexistence is not possible. The traditional and the modern cannot play identical roles in the synthesis. One must be subordinate to the other.

N. Simoniya: I would like to say a few words about a comment made by Vladimir Georgiyevich. I believe that we can hardly call it a "good thing," when the society is forced to be content with the basic material which it has received from the old world. This is simply a harsh necessity, a reflection of real difficulties. It certainly does not follow from all of this that the traditionalist "construction blocks and materials" perform an active system-shaping and modernizing function. You can tear down an old building, brick by brick, and build a new one. It will be synthesis of new architectural design and old construction materials used out of necessity. If this situation continues for long, it will begin to hamper real progress in construction. We know that the first manufactured machines were created manually and using the traditional tools of the craftsmen, but real industrial progress started the moment machines began to be made by machines. If we follow your logic, Vladimir Grigoriyevich, we will have to admit that it is a good thing for new houses to be built of old materials, and machinery to be created with manual labor.

V. Khoros: We are dealing with a special "old material" here, Nodari Aleksandrovich--general human culture, which also includes the precapitalist "high"

civilizations of the East. They contain numerous values and a great deal of knowledge still recognized as such today. General human culture is that foundation on which all development will be based.

N. Simoniya: You are bringing in another aspect of the question, the civilization aspect, while we are discussing the problem of the traditional and the modern on the level of formative development. This is a special subject, and a large one. Far be it from me, of course, to deny any social benefit from the traditional. It seems to me, however, that this benefit is limited mainly to an auxiliary functional role during transitional periods of social progress.

The experience of most nations in the East has shown that the new (ideas, institutional forms, technology and so forth) has been introduced into them "from above." They were first assimilated by a relatively limited group of the local intelligentsia, which then attempted to introduce these new things into the everyday practices of the broader masses. Because of certain conditions of life, however, the direct habituation of these masses to the new things proved impossible in most cases because the masses reacted with "rejection." In response some members of the intelligentsia closed themselves off in their "enlightenment," separating themselves from public advancement; others went to another extreme, becoming fervent (sometimes even ecstatic) adherents of traditionalism, while a third group adopted the traditional form for the sake of achieving the modern goals.

M.K. Gandhi, it seems to me, was one of the most brilliant historical figures of this kind. He was able to find a language understandable to the traditionalist masses and to formulate ideas which got through to their hearts and minds, and the historical goal which inspired Gandhi conformed to the most progressive aspirations of the time--to arouse the awareness of the masses and motivate them for the national liberation struggle. In this sense Gandhi's work is an example of how the Indian people were able to unite two currents within the framework of the general anticolonial struggle: the modern national liberation and traditionalist movements.

The problem of achieving the smoothest possible inclusion of those groups in the society which are affected into the modernization process remains, after independence has been attained in nations of the East, and it can reach great intensity both in the states developing along capitalistic lines and those which have taken the path of socialist orientation. Innovations in political, social and economic life will be accepted by the traditionalist-minded masses (but not by the population in general) more easily and rapidly in a form acceptable to them.

G. Kim: It seems that all of the participants in the discussion are inclined to accept the need for a synthesis of tradition and modernity, although they have different ideas regarding the nature of that synthesis. Disappointment in the results of economic and social development in recent decades, however, has resulted in a situation in which the idea of a "new paradigm" has become popular in the West and the liberated nations--that is, development based on new approaches to social and economic reality. Is this not simply a name for a new version of the synthesis, though? Also, just how feasible is the replacement of the basic directions in reality, and not just in words (there are two of these, of course--one leads to socialism, the other to capitalism)?

V. Sheynis: I regard the possibility of a radical "change of paradigm" by a significant number of the developing nations with a large measure of scepticism. In the first place, because the models proposed specify an extremely peculiar kind of "synthesis"--the combining of those elements of tradition, which, in my opinion, can not be combined with modern productive forces in general. In addition, we cannot ignore the fact that the inertia of the development which has become established in recent decades is very great.

Nonetheless, ideas about a "new paradigm" did not come out of nothingness. The transition from primitive tool-making to the industrial system of productive forces, state capitalistic modernization (which reinforces the duality of the socioeconomic system), contact with social and cultural standards, values and motives born in another civilization, which is distinguished by exceptional dynamism and is based on deep social antagonism--all of this generates profound and extremely painfully felt inconsistencies, imbalances and gaps in the social life of the developing societies.

Reacting with "rejection" to everything alien to the traditional way of life is perfectly natural in this situation. This appears more frequently in the area of ideology, but it sometimes moves into the practical area as well.

Simple economic arithmetic shows that the developing nations as a whole cannot approach the production and consumption standards of the developed nations within the foreseeable future. This is motivating the new states to step up their efforts to alter their place in international division of labor, to restructure their hierarchy of social goals and individual aspirations and to switch to a "new paradigm" which is coordinated with traditional values and opposes the development of recent decades, and is interpreted as a development of "catching up."

Proponents of the "new paradigm," "alternative model," "different path of development" and their diverse variations (such as "Islamic economics") declare the goals of the social and economic strategic of recent decades to be faulty (they are frequently assessed as a "race for indicators") and the results to be unsatisfactory. This criticism is justified to some degree, although it is overly categorical in certain cases. In its general form--therefore, hypothetically--the "new paradigm" can be described in the following manner: alteration of the product structure by increasing the portion of goods and services satisfying "basic needs"; an orientation not toward large-scale, capital-intensive, labor-saving equipment, but toward "small-scale mechanization" means, labor-intensive production and expanded employment at the expense of productivity; the inclusion of powerful redistribution mechanisms providing for preferential growth of incomes for the bottom strata of the population; stress on the collective forms of production (especially in the villages) with state support; the achievement of a greater degree of "self-support" and the curtailment or at least, the limitation of ties with the outside market. The latter has the triple goal of relieving them of the pressure of competition in the world market, where the developing economy is almost always in a weaker position; to reduce the disproportions generated by the turbulent processes of the world capitalist economy and, correspondingly, to increase the degree of control of the national economy.

The "new paradigm" also includes alteration of the social and psychological climate: restabilization of such traditional social values as solidarity based on interpersonal ties and egalitarianism, strict social discipline and absolute subordination to the "elders," intensified contrasting of the spiritual, "higher" factors in the society's development to the material, "lower" factors, and so forth; stressing the ethnic, religious and cultural traditions to counter-balance cosmopolitan trends penetrating from abroad; the contrasting of the qualities of the "Islamic man," the "African man," the pious Indian, and so forth, with their "natural" ability to dissolve into the collective, self-denial, patience, religiousness and so forth, to the individualism and activeness of the personality shaped by the traditions of a market economy and a civil society, which makes its own decisions and bears personal responsibility for them.

And so, the "new paradigm" is linked with hopes for a "second breath of life" for the non-European civilizations, which will permit the creation of viable and more or less "self-sufficient" societies oriented toward tradition to a much greater degree than they now are. This is the program. To what degree has it been corroborated by practical experience? How are the modern and the traditional "worked into" the process in reality?

V. Khoros: The traditional is undergoing transformation in the East, although slowly. The process is also occurring in that area which is rightly considered to be the "last bastion" of the traditional--religion. The process is being accomplished in Hinduism by eliminating the caste system.

V. Sheynis: Excuse me, but it seems to me that a considerably more complex process is occurring in the life of the Indian castes. This was very convincingly demonstrated in the works of Ye. Rashkovskiy. This process can be assessed in different ways, but the word "eliminate" is hardly appropriate. It is not a matter of a term. When we say "eliminate," we mean that the caste system is becoming nonexistent. Is this so, however, even in the long-term trend? Or perhaps the transformation of which you speak is leading to a certain revitalization of the traditional structures?

V. Khoros: This is true to some extent, of course--we know that traditional structures have a great capacity for adapting to social changes. Despite this, it seems to me that with respect to the castes in India, we can identify a trend--perhaps not "elimination," I'm not going to insist on that word--but, in any case, a certain weakening of their influence, a loss of their former social and cultural status. This trend is a result of ideological factors (criticism of the caste system by many important Indian thinkers, beginning with Gandhi), legal aspects (official abolishment of castes by the Indian government) and finally, the altered social and cultural climate in the nation. It is another matter that de facto castes and caste relics have been preserved and will be retained for an extremely long time. It is an interesting thing that the partial "revitalization" of the caste relics--I use your term, Viktor Leonidovich--is taking place in India perhaps more noticeably "from the top" than "from below": Members of the political elite, for whom caste affiliation has had no great significance in their interrelations for a long time, still actively use the caste factor for manipulating the electoral element in the lower classes.

Other Eastern religions besides Hinduism are being undermined by corrosive processes. The appearance of concepts of "Buddhistic socialism" in Buddhism have produced a trend of religion's more active participation in the social area. The politicalization of religion is moving to the fore for Islam, in the process of which new values are penetrating into the religion and the attitudes of the believers are being changed.

The "converging" of past and contemporary values, attitudes or institutions, is ordinarily spontaneous. The contemporary French scholar G. LaPiere, for example, has established the fact that the cult of private ownership ("tromba") has become so firmly rooted in the rural communities of Eastern Madagascar that it has become established in religious rites and ceremonies. Here we have an example of subjective synthesis of the traditional and the modern. In the present era, however, when the importance of the subjective factor in the historical process has increased so greatly, the synthesis of the traditional and the modern is frequently deliberately planned. I shall limit myself here to one extremely urgent area of this synthesis.

I refer to attempts to use the traditional communal collectivism in the process of noncapitalist (socialist) reform in the rural areas. This is not a new problem by far. Karl Marx dealt with this problem 100 years ago. He considered it possible for the Russian community to evolve along noncapitalist lines if the Russian revolution were supported by a general European revolution.⁵ Certain national democratic regimes, the programs of which describe ideological trends of a populist type (Mali in the 1960's, Guinea, Tanzania and others) are attempting to effect this sort of synthesis on the practical level.

The largest experiment of this kind has been conducted in Tanzania, where cooperative villages were created on the basis of traditional African collectivism, "ujamaa," in almost all of the rural population. What did this experience prove? First of all, it demonstrated the objective difficulties of such a synthesis. These were distinctively reflected in the Tanzanian leaders' overestimation of the degree of closeness between communal and socialist collectivism. As the Swedish expert on Africa G. Hyden has noted, "ujamaa" as a system of collective production and distribution actually existed in the traditional village life, but only within the extended family. Another principle, "ujima," functioned between families. It allowed for labor cooperation and mutual assistance only in certain cases (during the harvest, when a family was completing the construction of a house, and others) and to a comparatively small extent. The collective fields were a new concept not entirely understandable to the peasants. Overall the "ujamaa" campaign was not successful. Indirectly, even the authorities are forced to admit this. In many cases they are now breaking up the former "ujamaa" villages and are dividing the collective fields up and turning parcels of land over to the peasants for their personal use.

G. Kim: Does this mean that in this case the synthesis of the traditional and socialist collectivism was hopeless?

V. Khoros: I feel that it would be premature to draw such a conclusion. The fact is that in the Tanzanian experiment, strange as it sounds, one of the elements of the synthesis--traditional collectivism--was actually missing, despite

the oral references to it, and a second element--socialist collectivism--was frequently introduced rigidly, by force. The very resettling of the peasants (under pressure in many cases) in the amalgamated villages, sometimes exceeded the populations of the former villages by 8- to 10-fold (so that it was a problem for the peasants to even get to their plots or collective fields), resulted in the substantial alteration of traditional relationships. The most important thing, however, was the fact that the mechanism of the traditional communal self-government--"informal democracy," joint discussion and public affairs, was absolutely suppressed in the process. All activities, management and others, were ordinarily prescribed from above, and the village committees which were created essentially became optional institutions.

We shall not discuss why this occurred right now. We shall only make the statement that no synthesis was achieved, since communal collectivism was actually suppressed by bureaucratic leadership. And this is the problem with many experiments of its kind.

Nonetheless, it seems to me that we can still not discard the idea of using traditional collectivism in the structures of noncapitalist development. While establishing those features of the traditional institutions which can be used in progressive reform practices, the scientists note, for example, that members of the traditional groups work together far more willingly and productively than in isolation, that the most powerful stimulus in their work is not material reward but public acknowledgment, approval on the part of their fellow villagers. I repeat, however, that in order for the experiment to work, it must be based on at least some of the elements of communal democracy and self-endeavor.

There is another point of view, of course. Polish scholar L. Dzigel, for example, believes that communal collectivism--a derivative of the integrated structure of traditional relationships--results from a number of factors, particularly the mutual focus of personal services. This collectivism will simply not work when it is "inserted" into other management systems.

It should be pointed out that this is a fairly widespread argument. Is it justifiable? In my opinion, only the first part: Traditional collectivism is an element of a specific system of social ties. With respect to the conclusion, it is only convincing in appearance. The fact is that history has repeatedly demonstrated the viability of communal traditions. Even when the forms and institutions themselves disappear, the corresponding habits and stereotyped thinking remain. Socialism does not need communal forms in and of themselves (in their protogenic form they are unquestionably not applicable today), however, but the habit of "cooperation" which Karl Marx spoke of. In precisely this case historical inertia might prove to be beneficial.

Soviet and foreign literature is still discussing the fate of traditional collectivistic institutions and the possibility of "transplanting them" onto the tissue of societies developing along the noncapitalist path. Diverse, sometimes polarized, points of view are expressed. I believe that this controversy can only be resolved by actual historical experience in the Afro-Asian and Latin American nations.

G. Kim: The reserved attitude toward Western civilization is due not just to force of tradition in the Afro-Asian societies, but also to the fact that capitalist progress gave birth to numerous conflicts in those societies. There are fairly powerful factors at work in the developing world, however, which are undermining traditions and strengthening "innovations." Let us consider which of these factors preventing the "replacement of the paradigm" deserve the most attention.

V. Sheynis: The first one would be the "population explosion." It is not just the need for development, but also the need to simply survive for hundreds of millions of people, which is making criticism of the "race for indicators" to a significant degree pointless. I would mention the fact that an average annual growth rate for VVP [gross national product] exceeding 6 percent, which is not such a high figure, was achieved between 1950 and 1979 by nations whose populations comprise 26 percent of the developing world (a rate of more than 8 percent was achieved by those with only 1 percent of the population), whereas more than 45 percent of the population of the entire developing world and around 73 percent of the populations of countries with a low per capita income had growth rates of less than 3.5 percent. With such a growth rate even a drastic alteration of the distribution systems will produce little change in the situation of the masses (perhaps only for a very short time, and at the expense of future possibilities). Growth of labor productivity based on modern technology and oriented toward imported resources is an indisputable requirement for satisfying even "basic needs" and not just "prestige" consumption.

Current international relations--economic, social, informational and others--have, in turn, acquired inertia, fairly persistent, although less deeply rooted than the traditional way of life, and have taken on the logic of self-development which it will not be an easy matter to destroy. A total of 105 developing nations and territories have populations of less than 10 million, and 54 of them have fewer than a million people. It is naive to assume that successfully functioning, closed--without maximum outside development--national economic complexes can be created within such boundaries. Furthermore, so far no one has been able to force a genie back into a bottle, and the genie of demonstrated effect has already exhibited omnipresence, if not omniscience.

Influential social groups have arisen in most of the developing nations, which have already tasted the blessings of modern economics and way of life. The existence of these groups reflects the dynamism in the development of modern sectors of the economy. A vast parasitic "train" is drawn behind these sectors. This does not mean, however, that these groups (as well as blue- and white-collar workers employed at modern enterprises) can be removed from social life in a manner painless to the entire society or even "made equal" with the bulk of the population according to the traditional criteria. All such attempts have ordinarily ended up as only personal displacements.

The arms race and militarization, which developed extensively in many of the developing nations in the 1970's, is a relatively new process, also hampering the replacement of the "paradigm." All of this is destroying the isolation of those nations.

Is it possible to find an alternative based on a fundamentally different material and technical base? It exists in the area of politics and economics, in which the developing nations are choosing between socialism and capitalism. A socialist society can not be built on a primitive material foundation, however, in international isolation and on the basis of collectivism going back to the patriarchal. Any alternative which opposes both the movement toward socialism and capitalist modernization is obviously not an alternative of development but one of stagnation, not the solution but the exacerbation of problems.

The radical replacement of the "paradigm" of the economic development occurring in most of the developing nations in recent decades would appear unlikely. With respect to the social integration of the society, it is extremely possible that this will continue to be based to a significant degree on traditionalist attitudes, ties and institutions. In other words, the decisive role in the synthesis may become firmly attached to the rigid state organization and unified beliefs (including those views of the world which can be traced to scientific understanding but have avoided complex sociopolitical collisions and acquired a powerful element of religious ecstasy), and not to self-organization based on the civil society's institutions. "Stalactitic" (directed from above) and not "stalagmitic" (growing up from below) sociopolitical structures are acquiring the crucial role. While helping to resolve (and sometimes not unsuccessfully) certain of today's problems, this form of social integration entails a serious danger of ossification of all social structures and the emergence of alternatives which have historically led to impasses.

N. Simoniya: I totally agree that hopes for some sort of traditionalist version of social development in pure form are unrealistic. Furthermore, attempts to implement such a version lead down historical blind alleys and most frequently end tragically. However, it seems to me that you, Viktor Leonidovich, somewhat underestimate the role of the "stalactitic" version in the formation of sociopolitical structures, including the contemporary capitalist society in a number of European nations, especially nations with the secondary model of capitalism. In Italy and Germany (and Japan in the East), for example, since the middle of the 19th Century there has been a typically "stalactitic" process of capitalist development molded in phases. The nations of the East have the tertiary model, which differs from its predecessors in both its origin (the forced colonial version) and its historical era. It seems to me that the development of capitalism in nations of the East is characterized by two specific features: a) the continuous replacement of increasingly more complicated synthesized models and b) the bound-type development of society from phase to phase, including development through possible dead-end situations with revolutionary ways out (from the bottom and from the top).

If these opinions are valid, the conclusion logically follows from them that the idea formulated by the Marxists in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Century--specifically, either the democratic development of capitalism growing up from the bottom and expanding ("stalagmitic," to use your term), which takes the society in a specific phase toward bourgeois-democratic parliamentarianism; or the development of capitalism from the top, whereby authoritarianism of a lower order is supplemented by authoritarianism of a higher order, is inapplicable to the contemporary nations of the East. A different type of alternative is possible today: either a leap directed and controlled from the top, detouring

around certain phases and stages of capitalist development, or a departure from the framework of bourgeois social revolution and an orientation toward socialism. There is no third alternative, although an enormous diversity of specific historical models is possible within the framework of the first alternative, including diversities produced by different ratios of the elements of democratic spirit and reaction within them.

The matter of the diversity of specific models of capitalist development for nations of the East is not just of theoretical importance but also of practical importance today (especially in light of documents from the 26th CPSU Congress), and the diversity of models depends to a certain degree upon the specific nature of the synthesis.

It is no longer enough to simply verify the existence of a synthesis of the traditional and the modern. We need a more thoroughgoing analysis, which would make it possible to develop a scientific typology of the developing nations on the basis of social and historical criteria.

In fact, a synthesis of the traditional and the modern is to be found in both Saudi Arabia and India. However, this tells us nothing about the real level of formative development. Nor are we told a great deal by the fact that Saudi Arabia is at the very upper level of states with a high per capita income, whereas India is among those nations with a low income level. In this case it is important to consider basic differences in the nature of the synthesis. There are various types and various levels of synthesis, after all. It can be formal, in which case it borrows a form, which is still filled out with traditional substance. The modern form may be used in the interest of traditionalism. To a significant degree this is what is occurring in Saudi Arabia. Many benefits of the modern bourgeois civilization are being borrowed and introduced into the Saudi society, but they are subordinated to traditional value orientations. On the whole (at the macrolevel) the state remains a feudal state. In this case we are dealing with a particular model of neocolonial, absolutist statehood.

Formal synthesis does not lead to real social progress even in the bourgeois understanding. The society will inevitably find itself in a blind alley, and the way out may be revolution. The experience of many nations has shown that different versions of revolution are possible, including revolutions "from the top." The very fact of the inevitability of a revolutionary shift in political power, however, graphically demonstrates the fact that the traditional has no potential for self-advancement, self-modernization. At best (and even this, under pressure from external circumstances) it is capable of reforms "from the top," the purpose of which is not one of transformation but one of intensifying the traditional orders (it is another matter that this leads to objectively conflicting results, contrary to the will and the intentions of the traditional leadership).

India has a completely different situation. There we can easily detect synthesis at practically all levels and in practically all areas of the Indian society's life, including the state. The introduced form of statehood (bourgeois-democratic parliamentarianism) is not adequate for the extremely fragmented and multifarious structure of Indian society, in which we find various elements of the traditional alongside modern elements. The main thing, however, lies in the fact that the

traditional aspects of statehood are subordinate to the modern aspects and that overall bourgeois statehood, which is a symbiotic model, is the main system-shaping factor in modern India.

We should add to this the fact that even within the framework of a single nation the processes of synthesis do not proceed in the same way at all levels. Let me explain this. In India, at the macrolevel, the modern form of the official state--a parliamentary republic--is partially made up of traditional elements (communalistic orientations on the part of a significant portion of the electors, a fragmented and extremely contradictory structure of mass parties, an enhanced role for the leader, manifestations of patron-client relations, and so forth). Also at the macrolevel one can frequently find a form borrowed from traditionalism filled with modern elements. The system of panchayats, for example, was fairly effectively used in many states of India by kulak elements and prosperous peasants from the so-called middle castes for purposes of enriching and solidifying their dominant role in the village.

Bourgeois democratic parliamentarianism did not take hold in many other nations of the East--in Indonesia, the Philippines and Bangladesh, for example--and was swept away by state revolutions, to be replaced by peculiar neo-Bonapartistic regimes. In this case the specific ratio of the modern and the traditional is reflected in the subordination of the second element of the synthesis to the former. That is, it is yet another variation of bourgeois statehood.

On the whole, the situation in the East from the standpoint of the traditional and the modern is approximately the following: There remains only a small group of nations (ordinarily with small populations) in which the substance of the synthesis of the traditional and the modern conforms to the absolutist phase of feudal statehood and the modern is therefore still subordinate to the traditional (a number of nations in the Persian Gulf area, Brunei and others). In the vast majority of nations of the East, however, specific types of synthesis indicate various levels of bourgeois statehood and therefore, various levels of transformation of the traditional structures. The difficulties and the failures produced by the bourgeois modernization of this group of states may still bring a reaction of "rejection" more than once. Nonetheless, there is no alternative in the form of a traditional model of development. The only alternative (in cases of crises of bourgeois modernization) could be one or another form of revolutionary transition to socialism.

V. Sheynis: I agree with you in great part, Nodari Aleksandrovich. The developing world has a large variety of transitional models and undeniably, the traditional may become dominant over the modern elements under certain conditions. The general historical scheme, however, into which you are apparently inclined to fit all (or almost all) of the different versions of synthesis, appears perhaps too "good," in my opinion. Many facts of recent decades do not entirely fit into it.

Synthesis, or more precisely, symbiotic structures, in which the old assumes dominance over the new are fairly widespread in the developing world. These structures are not formal ones; they are substantive. We are not talking about a simple restoration of traditions, which, I agree, is not likely, and is in any case only a local phenomenon.

Let us return to an image which we have already used in our discussion today: the architectural plan and the bricks from which the building is constructed. The situation is frequently such that the nature of the material is determined in great part by the plan itself. A dilapidated building is reconstructed, but not according to a modern plan. We have asked whether it is good or bad to use existing construction materials. This is also a controversial subject, but in the process we go from problems of knowledge to problems of values, and the researcher's value orientations do not always coincide with those of the society which is the object of his study. The egalitarian aspirations so widespread in the developing societies should not be idealized, in my opinion, which is apparently what Vladimir Georgiyevich is inclined to do.

Something else is important, however. The building is rebuilt in some certain way in the traditional manner. It is possible that the building will be a fairly solid one (in any case, compared with the decrepit structure inherited by the builders). To what extent does it conform to the modern living conditions of the people, however, and to what extent can it be further modernized? What we frequently find is not the basically progressive (although contradictory) development of capitalism "from the top," but the combining of two social phenomena: the historical tradition of Eastern despotism and antidemocratic, centralized bureaucratic trends characteristic of the society of modern state-monopolistic capitalism transplanted into the developing world. This combination can produce a fairly solid alloy. The main defect of such social structures lies in their small capacity for further change and their excessive regulation, which leads the society into historical impasses. I see in this an important distinction between the "stalagtitic" reforms "from the top" occurring in 19th-century Italy and Germany, which paralleled the development of institutions and relations of the civil society, and that which is observed today in many developing nations.

This sort of "synthesis" does not always bear the bourgeois stamp. Let us return to the phenomenon of Kampuchea during the period 1975-1979. We see not a total break with traditions but a monstrous hybrid of traditions (which lacked an adequate concept of the value and uniqueness of each separate individual, of the sovereignty of the individual, but there was a hypertrophied egalitarian and collectivistic basis) and ultramodern reform plans. The Pol Pot situation has no precedent in history, of course. There is a certain universal principle in it, however--an attempt to bypass modern progress and resolve the real problems of backward countries: uncontrolled urbanization--with the elimination of cities; social inequality--with forced equalization; improvement of the economic structure--with a return to primitive management; the restructuring of foreign economic ties--with withdrawal from international division of labor; the influence of the demonstrative effect--with the physical destruction of everyone "infected" with it; the destruction of all foreign ties, and so forth.

And so, the social reality of the developing nations can sometimes produce unexpected versions of the synthesis, which do not fit into any concepts of staged progression created from any historical material. Vladimir Georgiyevich has done a good job of demonstrating how the European civilization was formed in the process of a synthesis of traditions and innovations. Unfortunately, we can still not trace the path of the Eastern civilizations in this manner.

G. Kim: Permit me to briefly summarize our discussion. Naturally, we did not set ourselves the goal of analyzing all aspects of such a large problem. I feel, however, that we have managed to outline its dialectical boundaries, to demonstrate the enormous difficulties linked with the need for the most rapid "modernization" of the East, the viability of traditional (and post-traditional) institutions, and different alternatives for using the viable, dynamic elements of the past in the progressive development of the Asian societies. An urgent task for future research, I believe, consists in compiling a scientific typology of the cultural-historical development of nations of the East, thoroughly clarifying the concept of "traditions" in the Eastern society and attempting to explain what is not "good" or is "bad" in the nuclear strata of traditions, but is combinative or is not combinative with the demands of the contemporary era. Our ideas about possible (or impossible) versions of the synthesis will also become more specific as a result.

Apparently, we need a more substantive (and I would say, a separate) analysis of the set of problems pertaining to the synthesis under the conditions of socialist development, when this process is purposively regulated by the most important state institutes.

In conclusion, I would like to express my hope that the discussion we have had today will be continued by other Soviet orientalists and by specialists from the other socialist nations. A comparison of various points of view and creative argument will undoubtedly help us to take various approaches to this problem--an extremely complex but vitally important problem.

FOOTNOTES

1. A.I. Gertsen, "Sobr. Soch. v 30 tomakh"[Collected Works, 30 Volumes], Vol. 15, Moscow, 1959, p. 146.
2. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch."[Complete Collected Works], Vol. 41, p. 301.
3. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch."[Works], Vol. 45, p. 311.
4. Ye. Rashkovskiy, "Traditions and Modernity in the Works of the Indian Sociologists (70's and 80's), AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, Nos. 11, 12.
5. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol. 19, pp. 251, 305.

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THIRD-WORLD NATIONAL-LIBERATION PARTIES NATIONAL, NOT CLASS-BASED

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 8, Aug 83, pp 2-5

[Article by V. Maksimenko, candidate in historical sciences: "Lenin's Conception of Political Parties and the Liberated Countries"]

[Text] The Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee held in June and devoted to the current problems of ideological and mass-political work of the party noted in its resolution that "in the international arena there is an acute exacerbation in the struggle between two social systems, two diametrically opposed ideologies unprecedented in the entire post-war period. The historical achievements of real socialism, the growth of the authority and influence of the world communist and labor movement, the progressive development of countries who have thrown off the yoke of colonial oppression, the elevation in the national-liberation struggle, and the huge scope of the anti-war movement are having an ever greater effect on the consciousness of peoples throughout the world." In the gigantic, ever more complex battle of ideas, the progressive forces of the planet are guided by the foremost, constantly developing Marxist-Leninist theory. The great successor of the work of K. Marx and F. Engels, V. I. Lenin, comprehensively developed the theory which they created and enriched it with new ideas applicable to the historical conditions of his time. This relates primarily to the position of Marxism on the hegemony of the proletariat, on its allies, on means of transition to socialism, and on the place and prospects of the national-liberation movement. The concept of political parties developed by V. I. Lenin has great theoretical and practical significance.

The national-liberation revolution in the East, having caused a radical break of the old political superstructure of colonial and semi-colonial government, gave great impetus to the formation of new political relations, one of whose elements are parties. Along with numerous proto-party (and quasi-party) forms, along with that which V. I. Lenin called "semi-political unions,"¹ in the developing countries there have been formed and are functioning a great number of modern political parties characterized by a certain organizational structure, program and ideology.

The growth of party membership in a multi-structured social environment gives great complexity and variability to party-political life. The parties which exist here are extremely varied, while the level of their careful study falls

behind the degree of their popularity and influence. Having emerged in the course of the national-liberation struggle, political parties in the developing countries have crystallized in their majority from broad anti-colonial associations (fronts, congresses, blocks, conventions). Some of them, transformed under conditions of growing social differentiation, to this day bear traces of their "frontal" past in their names (the Algerian National Liberation Front, the Indian National Congress, etc.).

While in Europe and the United States the inception of modern political parties in the 19th century was associated primarily with the polarization of two basic class powers of capitalist society, with the development of the universal right to vote and the system of bourgeois democracy, in the former colonial and dependent countries the situation was different. Here political parties historically arose as organizations for an all-national anti-imperialistic struggle, subordinating their purposes to one main goal -- liberation from foreign rule and attainment of political sovereignty. This genetic peculiarity (parties are not organizations of "civil war" of the classes, but organizations of patriotic unity of various social-class powers against a common external enemy) explains many things in the evolution of party structures in the East (particularly the long preserved tendency toward a one-party system or a system of one dominating party). However, does this mean that the well-known position of political science presented by V. I. Lenin at the beginning of the century which states that the party struggle is "the most valuable and complete formulated expression of the political class struggle"² has lost its meaning? Or is it, on the contrary, that an analysis of the party structures and party relations in the developing countries in light of Lenin's ideas on the place of political parties in societies is capable of enhancing our understanding of the specifics of the revolutionary process in the East and the formational uniqueness of Eastern countries at the current stage?

The key to this answer is found in Lenin's ideological legacy. It is quite evident that a mechanical application of the statements made by V. I. Lenin several decades ago to the modern reality of the liberated countries is impossible. However, a comparison of monotypic phenomena in a different historical environment is not only possible, but also necessary. It is always useful to compare that "general scientific criterion of repeatability"⁴, which is applied particularly to political happenings of different epochs, with the "political facts from party life,"³ whose empirical accumulation in oriental studies has already advanced quite far.

"In the 20th century," it was noted in the collection of materials from a special session of the 11th All-World Congress of Political Science, "the further specific Marxist analysis of one or another political situation is unthinkable without the creative mastery of V. I. Lenin's contribution to Marxism," and particularly his "concepts of relations between classes and parties".⁵ This position of Marxist-Leninist political sociology is wholly applicable also to general theoretical oriental studies. The purpose of this article is to outline and as yet fragmentally note the methodological potential of this Leninist conception, and its possibilities as an instrument for analyzing party-political relations in the liberated countries. "The processes which are occurring in them," noted CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Yu. V.

Andropov at the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "are complex and non-synonymous, and it is important to understand them correctly." Here we must not allow any "amateurism, diletantism, second-hand or hearsay information"⁶ in treating Lenin's legacy. It is important to understand the spirit and the dialectics of Lenin's thought, the exceptional ability of Il'yich to subordinate scientific analysis to the goals of revolutionary transformation, to learn from events, turning the lessons into invaluable theoretical experience.

* * *

Eighty years ago for the first time in world political practice, the new type of Lenin's proletarian party was created. Its creator compared the new party organization to a "great school," bringing the political alphabet to the masses and at the same time presenting questions of "higher knowledge of the revolution."⁷ Lenin's idea of the party signified a qualitatively new stage in the revolutionary process. Lenin's ideological-political platform during the period of the struggle to create the new type of party has two crucial resting points: organization and theory. "The proletariat has no other weapon in the struggle for power other than organization,"⁸ and also in this struggle the "independent development of Marx's theory is particularly necessary, without which there can be no "strong socialist party."⁹

Even in exile (1899), Lenin theoretically traced the connection of party and class. The clash of different interests in society, he believes, turns into a political struggle in the same measure as it becomes a class struggle, created by the consciousness of those who struggle of their unity against another class. The party is the organizer of such a class resistance in the interests of the huge mass of workers. Only the working class, organized into a party, can "unite... all the democratic elements of the country," writes V. I. Lenin, "and complete the stubborn struggle of an entire series of past generations by a final triumph over the hated regime."¹⁰

Lenin's conception of the revolutionary party of a new type (from which the entire complex of Lenin's notions about the nature of party-political relations subsequently stems) was first worked out for such a political delimitation which reflects the struggle of a unified front of the poor led by the proletariat and unification around a revolutionary party of a great majority of people to storm the absolutist authority. The rapid development of revolutionary events alters the appearance of this account. The Russian year 1905 gives new impetus to the development of the Leninist conception. "Up until now," writes Lenin in February of that year, "we were speaking almost alone, now there are hundreds of other voices. Tant mieux! Events teach us... The political grouping of the tumultuous epoch teaches us."¹¹ The main innovation of the political moment is the emergence of a number of party organizations and movements never before seen (in September of 1906 Lenin counted over 10 types of parties alone), the appearance of a "variegated string of parties."¹²

In this situation, Lenin rebukes those comrades who limit themselves to a repetition of general formulas and decisively announces: "Revolution demands from us an ever more persistent application of the Marxist method and Marxist theory to the illumination of that deep and interesting process of party forma-

tion which is taking place in Russia, for understandable reasons more rapidly and acutely than ever before."¹³

"The revolution demands..." -- and Lenin answers this with an in-depth analysis of new party-political events.

What is the soil on which the "different parties begin to be built"? The open action of various classes, says Lenin. Only certain social conditions make it open. It is only because the class division stands out as "the deepest basis for political grouping,"¹⁴ that it is not always discernible on the surface and is expressed most clearly in revolutionary situations.

For Lenin the theoretician the revolutionary crisis manifests and exposes the connection between parties and classes which is often not recognizable and not clear in periods of relatively crisis-free development. For a researcher introducing the principles of this connection into political science, a specific analysis of the situation takes on primary importance. It is important, stresses V. I. Lenin, that "behind the empty phrases and the general places" of undifferentiated evaluations, the main thing does not disappear: the distinctions, the differences of the basic types of party-political groupings.¹⁵ Without a strict theoretical determination of these distinctions and differences, there is not and cannot be a reliable strategy of political unions in revolution. V. I. Lenin presents the task of "understanding the true meaning of the party," and for this "it is necessary to look not only at the placard."¹⁶

In the methodological aspect, the true meaning of parties consists for V. I. Lenin in the fact that they are "at the same time both the condition and the indicator of political development."¹⁷ This important Leninist conclusion (1917) dialectically combines class, political and party beginnings. The struggle between classes becomes political only "at a certain stage of its development"¹⁸ and takes on greatest expression in the struggle of the parties. This is why the development of parties and party relations is an important indicator of the maturity of formative class-forming processes. At the same time, at a certain stage of social evolution this is one of the conditions for political development. The latter requires clarification.

For Lenin the level of party membership is scientifically measurable and is characterized by class stability, political organization, and political determinacy. A higher level of party struggle signifies that the masses recognize more clearly and precisely "the interests, tasks, slogans, points of view and methods of action of various classes." This is an "indestructible result", says Lenin, which is "prized above all else" by the revolutionary vanguard.¹⁹ And this is no accident, since it overcomes the ideological illusions by which the ruling class holds the masses prisoner. In 1906 Lenin explained the significance of the institution of parties as conditions of political development using the example of the activity of two party movements in the Russian bourgeois democracy -- the Cadets and the Workers. "In the face of the Cadets," he wrote, the people are overcoming the first bourgeois illusions; in the face of the Workers they are overcoming their last bourgeois illusions."²⁰ Overcoming these illusions, i.e., the progress of class consciousness attained in the party struggle, is the most valuable and "indestructible" result.

V. I. Lenin reduces the entire variegated picture of political parties to several typological bases. The revolution, in his opinion, outlines the major types of political parties corresponding to all the basic social classes in a very short time.²¹ The principle correspondence (as the determining tendency) does not mean coincidence, however. Moreover, the periods of exacerbation of the revolutionary struggle, "when the grouping according to the economic indicator... is naturally crossed by political grouping," shows the non-correspondence, the non-coincidence of the "political formations to the economic and class divisions."²² The idea of cross grouping leads V. I. Lenin to the concept of the "social type,"²³ in which the general connection between classes and parties, between economics and politics, is concretized.

The specific social types (for Lenin they often bear individualized characteristics such as: "conscious peasant," "typical bourgeois intelligentsia and partly even a liberal landowner," "bourgeois dealer," who "spits on the intelligentsia"²⁴, etc.) may break up the social classes into fractions and may unite fractions of different classes. If the structure of classes in a given society is determined by its formational content, by the content of revolutionary processes taking place in it, then the "assortment" and structure of the social types is more varied, mixed, and richer. The social types are compiled (on the basis of the place they occupy in social production) under the influence of a complex of relations to various forms of exploitation and to the existing authority, they bear an expressed stamp of group psychology, etc.

The enrichment of the concept of interrelation between classes and parties with the idea of the "social type" made it possible, for example, for V. I. Lenin to analyze the specific phenomenon of the party, which is not associated exclusively with some single class and is not a "definite class organization."²⁵ V. I. Lenin also studied the phenomenon of the "extra-class parties," associating it with the fully determined stage in the formational development of society.

The Leninist conception of parties underwent new development in the post-February days of 1917 under conditions of deepening of the social content of revolution. V. I. Lenin formulates the understanding of the revolutionary crisis as a "class shift" closing one and opening another "cycle of development of party relations."²⁶ In the radically and rapidly changing socio-political circumstances, Leninist thought finds signs of a new political form ("the explosion of the revolution and counter-revolution together"²⁷). All the political meanings change radically, the independent political line of the petty bourgeois parties is annulled, and the party of Cadets, which in 1905 was a part of the revolutionary bourgeois democracy, advances already as the main political force of the bourgeois counter-revolution. Thus, the events brilliantly confirm the theoretical conclusion of V. I. Lenin: a change in the interrelation of classes at a new stage in the revolutionary process (class shift), expressing itself in a crisis, also determines the new cycle of development of relations between parties.

* * *

The teachings of Lenin on parties may serve as a reliable reference point in

analyzing the party relations at the current stage of the national-liberation revolution in the countries of Asia and Africa. Methodologically significant here is the fact that the analysis of a broad spectrum of party organizations (reformist, liberal, conservative, openly counter-revolutionary parties) is implemented by V. I. Lenin from the standpoint of revolutionary party membership, based on the possibilities of intensifying the revolutionary process as a whole and under historical conditions of each individual country.

✓ The Leninist approach to parties as a condition and indicator of political development helps to clarify the characteristics of the current stage of the revolutionary process in the East, confirming the conclusion drawn earlier by Soviet scientists regarding the growth of the national-liberation struggle into a movement for the social liberation of the workers. A new cycle of development in party relations also corresponds to this stage. Party membership as an idea and a principle of political organization in the liberated countries is today on the upswing.²⁸ We may say that in the 70's and 80's this process is proceeding in the zone of national-liberation revolution (as in Russia at the beginning of the century) "more rapidly and acutely than anywhere ever before." This is deeply symptomatic, since, according to Lenin, it presupposes the growth of a class and political self consciousness of the masses.

Western scientists, studying the political problems of liberated countries, frequently and eagerly write about the fact that politics here are "devoid of any ideological content," the political process is without alternative, and the political parties are "a sort of uniform to be put on or taken off." These and other similar evaluations denying the political development in the liberated countries, migrate from one work to another. Today they appear if not ultimately anachronistic, then at least one-sided.

The political dynamics of the Afro-Asian world at the boundary of the 70's - 80's is evidence of the fact that the revolutionary process in this part of the planet is entering (or has already entered) a new stage of development. Its characteristics are, first of all, the growing inclusion of great masses of people into politics (the socio-political crisis in India in 1974-1975, the mass political demonstrations in Iran in 1978-1979 -- in all these tumultuous events the number of participants in the movement approached the millions); secondly, the politization of tradition ("Islamic boom"²⁹, the growth of communalism, etc.), very often turning to the "language of mass social protest" against the extremities of accelerated modernization in the capitalist fashion.

The dynamics of party relations at the new stage of the national-liberation revolution in general and on the whole is determined by the alternation of two repeating cycles, two extreme tendencies: the emergence, in the words of Lenin, of a "variegated string of parties" (when the number of parties announcing themselves as such may reach several tens³⁰) and the artificial limitation of party membership by means of prohibition of political activity and pronouncement of the parties to be illegal. In our view, the change of these cycles reflects the dialectics of the struggle in the developing countries not of the singular, but of the decisive forces in politics ("organized force of government" and "the spontaneous force of the peoples masses"³¹), which even in the countries of the East (with all the activities of the group, family-clan, and communal-

istic interests present there) ultimately determine the outcome and the main direction of development at each stage.

A widespread means of authoritarian suppression of activity by party and quasi-party forces (whose activity on the wave of mass discontent often takes the form of a left shift) in the liberated countries has become the military takeover or the declaration of a state of emergency. Such authoritarian methods seem to hinder "national disintegration" in terms of the struggle of numerous parties and groupings. However, in reality they usually facilitate a consolidation of a new common character of class type based on the governing positions. The state of emergency or the military takeover in many liberated countries of capitalist development were for the ruling and dominating groupings a means of emerging from the crisis by non-revolutionary means. The very crisis behind the facade of party and group struggle hid the threat of such an introduction of the masses into politics which would have openly modelled the class resistance of the two decisive forces in politics -- the "organized force of the state" and the "elemental force of the people's masses" (in this resistance the existing form of social supremacy is always tested for strength, and in 1979 in Iran, as we know, the absolute monarchy which rested on the strong military-police apparatus, did not withstand this test).

Why is it, however, that as the contours of class polarization are ever more clearly defined at the current stage of the revolutionary process in the countries of the East (the class of the poor against all types of propertied classes), nowhere does there emerge a stable two-party system of the "western" type?

The quantitative growth of participation by the masses in politics and the qualitative growth of political (class) consciousness in the liberated countries in the 70's and 80's are evident. However, this process is far from linear. In political development as V. I. Lenin envisioned it, progression is realized cyclically, while the discontinuity of evolution by revolutionary crises each time presents in a new manner the question of power, of the participation of various parties in it, their blocking and divergence. In the liberated countries of Asia and Africa this dialectics of political development is determined primarily by the great numerical predominance of masses of peasantry and working petty bourgeoisie. Such a structure of the population, stressed V. I. Lenin, delineates a very broad "amplitude of political fluctuation"³² of the small producer. At the same time, this social type "is specifically that variable value"³³, in the expression of V. I. Lenin, which by its behavior is capable of determining the outcome of the revolutionary process (which, of course, in no way negates the role of the revolutionary proletarian vanguard, but merely stresses the complexity of its party task).

On the background of the two extreme tendencies noted above (hypertrophy of artificial multi-party proliferation and authoritarian suppression of party activity), the general rule for the liberated countries at the current stage of their development is a sort of "dosed pluralism" (a certain degree of non-party affiliated social conflict), or more precisely, a multiplicity of channels of political expression regulated by the authoritarian state, among which the party (or parties) are not always the main one. This regulated multiplicity exists in

places where and so far as the material conditions of life do not permit clash of the groupings, religious-ethnic communities, etc. to grow into an open demonstration of social classes (i.e., to give a higher degree of social maturity).

Yesterday colonialism, and today neocolonialism lead to the formation and preservation of such a social structure in the countries of Asia and Africa under which the duality of industrial and pre-industrial productive forces, the class and pre-class types of social connection correspond to a deep duality of political culture, the combination of two beginnings -- the social and the communal. This clearly shows the incompleteness (and incompleteability, at least in the neo-colonial forms) of the bourgeois social turnover in the developing countries. The general tendency in the politics of these countries becomes the situation where the traditional (communal) ties are reborn by means of modern political culture, of which the party is one of the main ones. This unique phenomenon serves as a "concentrated expression" of such a fundamentally dualistic economy which under existing social relations is not brought to a singular formational basis. And at the same time (here is a real, not an imagined contradiction!), through such peripetia of development, current class consciousness and the class struggle are beating an ever surer path in the liberated countries.

A necessary link in understanding these very complex mechanisms is the reference to Lenin's legacy, which holds shining examples of the independent development of Marxist theory. The new events which are brought on today by the deepening revolutionary process in the East gives rich material for such development.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye Sobraniye Sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 12, p 233.
2. Ibid., p. 137.
3. Ibid, Vol 13, p 58.
4. Ibid, Vol 1, p 137.
5. "Lenin Kak Politicheskiy Myslitel'" [Lenin as a Political Thinker] Moscow, 1981, p 9.
6. PRAVDA, 4 February 1983.
7. V. I. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 10, p 358.
8. Ibid., Vol 8, p 403.
9. Ibid., Vol 4, p 184,183.
10. Ibid., p 359.

11. Ibid., Vol 9, p 406.
12. Ibid., Vol 14, p 22.
13. Ibid., p 21.
14. Ibid., Vol 7, p 344.
15. Ibid., Vol 13, p 59.
16. Ibid., Vol 23, p 290.
17. Ibid., Vol 32, p 190.
18. Ibid., Vol 12, p 137.
19. Ibid., Vol 19, p 111.
20. Ibid., Vol 13, p 147.
21. Ibid., Vol 14, p 26.
22. Ibid, p 27.
23. By formulation, the development of this concept is concluded in "ocherednyye zadachi Sovetskoy vlasti" [Priority Tasks of Soviet Authority] (see Complete Works, Vol 36, p 207), but already in the "Opyt Klassifikatsiyi Russkikh Politicheskikh Partiy" [Experience in the Classification of Russian Political Parties] (1906), V. I. Lenin presents excellent examples of the analysis of specific social types, on the basis of which five types of parties were formed during the revolution of 1905-1907.
24. Ibid., Vol 14, p 25.
25. Ibid., Vol 12, p 233.
26. Ibid., Vol 34, p 12.
27. Ibid., Vol 32, p 430.
28. The author of the first comparative study of political parties in the developing countries, Thomas Khodkin, presents around 150 names of parties existing in Africa in 1945-1960. The reference work, published in the USSR in 1981, deals only with all-national parties and contains over 220 names according to countries of Asia and Africa (see "Politicheskiye Partiyi. Spravochnik" [Political Parties. A Handbook], Moscow, 1981, p 111-255). The last foreign handbook of this type, which includes not only national, but also regional party organizations, gives a description of approximately 350 political parties in the developing countries of the East.

29. It is notable that the activation of Muslim political groupings is accompanied by a noticeable increase in their party membership. "Islam," announced one of the leaders of the Movement for Islamic Direction in Tunis, "is a party, and not a five-time prayer and fasting." The strengthening of the party spirit (for example, the introduction of the institute of political commissars in the army) is also evidenced by the activity of the ruling Party of the Islamic Republic in Iran.
30. In Thailand, for example, 30-40 parties participated in the elections of 1976 and 1979. In Nigeria, after the ban on political activity was lifted in 1978, around 40 parties were created. In India, no less than 50 political parties are active at the level of the individual states alone, etc.
31. C.f. K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, Vol 21, p 447.
32. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 14, p 24.
33. Ibid.

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INFORMATION ON AUTHORS OF ARTICLES IN JOURNAL

Moscow RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNY MIR in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 83 p 189

[Text] Gus Hall--	-- General Secretary of the U.S. Communist Party
Loginov, Vladlen Terent'yevich	-- Doctor of historical sciences, docent in the Institute of Social Sciences
Arsen'yev, Eduard Arlen'yevich	-- candidate of historical sciences
Veber, Aleksandr Borisovich	-- candidate of historical sciences
Zaborov, Mikhail Abramovich	-- doctor of historical sciences, sector manager in the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the International Workers Movement
Medvedev, Boris Ivanovich	-- Candidate of economic sciences, associate of the CEMA International Institute for the Economic Problems of the World Socialist System
Sautkina, Vera Alekseyevna	-- Scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the International Workers Movement
Berezina, Yuliya Iosifovna	-- Candidate of geographical sciences, senior scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the International Workers Movement
Gavrilov, Vladimir Mar'yevich	-- Candidate of economic sciences, editor of the economics department of the journal LATINSKAYA AMERIKA
Zhuykova, Galina Gennadiyevna	-- Post graduate student in the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the International Workers Movement

Sharonov, Mikhail Semenovich

-- Candidate of historical sciences,
senior scientific associate of the
USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of
the International Workers Movement

Velikovskiy, Samariy Izrailevich

-- Doctor of philosophical sciences,
senior scientific associate of the
USSR Academy of Sciences Institute
of the International Workers Movement

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REGIONAL

NEW STAGE FOR FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY'S STRUGGLE FOR WORKERS' INTERESTS

Moscow RACOCCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYI MIR in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 83 pp 32-48

[Article by E. A. Arsen'yev: "The French Communist Party Is at a New Stage in the Struggle for the Workers' Interests"]

[Excerpts] During recent years, the French workers movement has been developing in the new political situation which was created in France as a result of the success of leftwing forces during the presidential and parliamentary elections of 1981 and their creation of a governmental majority with the participation of the communists.

This victory in the elections was not accidental. It reflected the serious social, economic and political changes that had occurred in modern-day France and was the result of the persistent struggle of the working class and all workers for their vital interests, for social progress. The success of the leftwing forces would have been impossible without the persistent and purposeful activity of the French Communist Party which waged a protracted struggle to unite all workers and democratic forces and which made an important contribution to the creation of conditions under which a serious defeat was inflicted on rightwing forces for the first time during the years of the Fifth Republic within the framework of a bourgeois democratic regime.

The political situation in modern-day France, however, has an exceptionally complicated and contradictory nature, opening up new opportunities and prospects for the workers and democratic movement and, at the same time, posing new and complicated problems for them.

The class struggle in the country has been significantly aggravated. From the very beginning, the policy of the government of the leftwing forces has run into the bitter opposition of all the rightwing forces who are holding on to the main positions in the economy, many links of the state apparatus and mass information media and who are relying on the support of international capital. The genuine "revenge front", which has been created by these forces, is sabotaging the social and economic reforms that are being made and trying to split the leftwing majority, isolate the Communist Party, and thereby inflict a blow on the workers and democratic movement.

The leftwing majority came to power and is operating in the deep economic crisis that has hit France just as other capitalist countries. It received a difficult "inheritance" in the form of a decrease in production, mass unemployment, an increase in inflation, a high cost of living, a chronic foreign trade deficit, the decline of entire industrial branches, etc.

From the point of view of arranging and aligning political forces within the new government majority, the losses of the Communist Party in the 1981 elections also created serious difficulties for the struggle of the working class for profound democratic changes. As the French Communists pointed out during their 24th Congress (3-7 February 1982), "We did not succeed in increasing the number of those who speak in favor of a real solution to the problems facing the people and the country; moreover, the number of our party's supporters, who are in favor of such a solution, decreased. The gap between the high level of the solutions, which must be implemented in order to get out of the crisis, and the actual level of the goals, to whose support it is possible to attract the broad masses under present political conditions, increased".¹

Moreover, the transformation of the socialist party into the ruling one made the supporters of social reformism more active. The ideological struggle was significantly aggravated and attempts were increased to shatter the ideological and political base of the Communist Party and to integrate the French Communist Party into the existing political system. The creation of a leftwing majority not only did not weaken but, on the contrary, aggravated the ideological struggle between the revolutionary and reformist currents in the worker's movement in a situation where the bearers of the ideas of reformism, especially the Socialist Party and the reformist trade unions, received new influence levers in their hands.

As V. I. Lenin pointed out, the manifestation of revisionism and opportunism in the worker's movement can assume "infinitely diverse forms" and any "new" question or any unexpected and unforeseen turn of events will evoke some variety or other of revisionism.²

Finally, the activity of the leftwing majority began at a time of a sharp worsening of the international situation as a result of the growing aggressiveness of imperialism and its desire to shift to a counter-offensive against the positions of progressive and liberation forces throughout the world, including Western Europe. Interfering in the internal affairs of the French people, the ruling circles of the United States and NATO tried to prevent the formation of a leftwing coalition with the participation of the Communist Party and exerted and are continuing to exert economic, military and political pressure on France in order to subordinate its policy to the interests of NATO. International imperialism is increasing its militarization, intensifying subversive activity and "ideological warfare" against the worker's and democratic movement, and is unleashing ever newer anticommunist and anti-Soviet campaigns. Under these conditions, the problems of coordinating the struggle for democracy and socialism with participation in the antiwar movement and with the struggle against the arms race, for peace and security and for an independent policy have risen with special sharpness before the French worker's movement. The

struggle of the working class for its vital interest has become even more closely connected with the struggle for peace and disarmament and with the struggle against threats of a nuclear war.

At the same time, the activity of the leftwing government majority reflects a new stage in the French worker's movement in which the reorganization of the country's economic and political structure on an antimonopolistic basis and the participation of communists in the solution of national tasks and in the management of the country have become an objective necessity. For the Communist Party itself, participation in the left wing parliamentary and governmental majority results from its entire political strategy which has been directed toward uniting all worker and democratic forces and toward the struggle for profound antimonopolistic reforms. It testifies to the recognition by a wider mass of the people of the political role of the Communist Party as the most decisive and consistent fighter for the interest of the working people and as a constructive force which promotes a democratic alternative to the regime of state monopolistic capitalism. The participation of the communists in the governmental majority struck a blow against anticommunism and the attempts of domestic and international reaction to isolate the Communist Party. It is objectively creating more favorable conditions and opportunities for the workers' further struggle for their vital interests and for democracy and social progress.

How are the French workers using the new opportunities in the struggle for their class interests and what policy is the Communist Party following in the present situation? It does not seem possible in one journal article to reveal, even in condensed form, the content of the French Communist Party's policy on all important questions. The author has assigned himself the goal of analyzing the activity of the French Communist Party only along the two most important avenues: the struggle to get the country out of its economic crisis and the struggle to expand the democratic rights of the workers.

* * *

The question of ways to get out of the deep economic crisis has become one of the central questions of the class struggle in modern-day France. The fate of the leftwing governmental coalition depends in no small degree on whether it will manage to cope with the serious economic difficulties and prove the effectiveness of the economic solutions being offered by it.

In the documents of the 24th French Communist Party Congress and in a number of other materials, the crisis of capitalism its causes and nature, and the consequences of the crisis for the working class have been thoroughly analyzed from class positions and an answer about ways to emerge from the crisis has been given. Contrary to the reformists and supporters of a "leftwing" policy of strict economy, the 24th French Communist Party Congress oriented the workers -- and its enormous political significance is this -- on the struggle to emerge from the crisis not by a class indeterminate "third" or "middle" way, but by making profound democratic reforms that could open the way to socialism.

The congress pointed out: "The crisis was engendered not by the juncture of difficulties, not by foreign causes, and not by political mistakes. It is a crisis of the capitalist system itself. It is impossible to get out of the crisis without the advancement of society along a socialist path. There is no other way out" (p 122).

The congress pointed out that what is new in the policy of the French Communist Party on this question during the present stage is the fact that socialism is being regarded not only as a strategic goal but also as a problem which is on the agenda of the class struggle. "Every communist must clearly realize the following: For the first time in the history of France, socialism is on the agenda -- and moreover not as a remote and abstract prospect but as a specific answer to the vital problems facing our society" (p 113).

During recent years, French communists have intensified their theoretical search for more effective ways and means to wage the fight for democracy and socialism and have proposed quite a few interesting ideas during this. Not all of the results of these searches and discussions are indisputable and confirmed by the experiences of the international worker's movement. French communists themselves point out that several of the considerations, which have been put forward by them, need more precise definition and revision. In general, however, the French Communist Party is orienting French workers toward the struggle to shift from capitalism to socialism, considering the specific historic conditions of France, and is performing a great deal of diverse work to unite the French worker's movement with scientific socialism.

The new economic strategy, which has been put forward by the French Communist Party during recent years and which is closely connected with the struggle for both the immediate interests of the workers and a socialist future, is also in the channel of the creative searches and work for the most effective actions aimed at insuring a democratic way out of the crisis. Several of its ideas were stated in "the plan for the struggle against the crisis and for democratic changes", which was put forward by G. Marchais during the pre-election campaign in 1980 and even earlier in his book "Nadezhda segodnya" [Today's Hope]. This strategy was expressed in the decisions of the 24th French Communist Party Congress and thereby was placed at the basis of the French Communist Party's economic policy during the present stage. A detailed analysis of this strategy is given in the recently published book by Ph. Herzog, a member of the French Communist Party Politburo.

This strategy has an innovative nature and proposes a number of principles and goals whose implementation under the conditions in contemporary France would signify a shift to a "new type of economic development" based on the gradual introduction of "new criteria of economic and social effectiveness" qualitatively different from the principles of capitalist profit and strict economy at the expense of the workers. Priority in them is allotted to social goals, especially to the solution of employment problems. This strategy also puts forward such principles as increasing the workers' standard of living, the all-round development of national production, "winning" and expanding the domestic market, developing and incorporating advanced national technologies,

a ruthless struggle against the wastefulness in the use of capital investments and the disproportion in the development of the economy that are engendered by capitalism, and a new labor productivity based on expanding the rights of workers in enterprises and on increasing their qualifications.

When under pressure from international big capital the French government adopted in March 1983 a new program of "strict economy" which inflicted harm on the workers' standard of living and which -- at the same time -- did not affect the incomes of the big bourgeoisie, the communists announced their disagreement and put forward proposals aimed at normalizing the economic situation and responsive to the workers' interests. The communists specifically demanded that taxes on large incomes and fortunes, including taxes on land, be raised and that energetic steps be taken against those guilty of "losing" capital and those who refuse to invest the profits, which are received in enterprises, into industry.

The leadership of the World Confederation of Labor also announced its disagreement with a significant part of the government's program and demanded its revision. A. Krazyuki, general secretary of the World Confederation of Labor, declared: "These measures are far from those that should be required from French moneybags in the present situation".¹⁰

The appeal of the French Communist Party to "win the domestic market that had been lost", which was supported even by the government, does not mean that the Communist Party is coming out in favor of shutting itself off from the world market and following a policy of protectionism. It primarily reflects a desire to end the political curtailment of national production which would lead to entire branches of the national economy being sacrificed to the international monopolies. In fact, during the last 10 years French industry has lost approximately 15 percent of its sales volume in the domestic market; one-third of this has been taken by imported goods according to the estimates of official circles¹¹ -- at a time when the foreign trade deficit reached more than 60 billion francs in 1981, primarily with the FRG, the United States and Japan.

Measures, which are aimed at strengthening economic independence and organizing a rebuff to the pressure of international capital and the economic aggression of the United States and to all the attempts of international financial circles to weaken France's economic position and its ability to compete in the world market and thereby force the government to give up the implementation of progressive social and economic measures, occupy a significant place in the new economic strategy of the French Communist Party. The French Communist Party is demanding a resolute struggle against the export and outflow of capital and against all kinds of financial profiteering and is coming out in favor of the bold development of new and balanced forms of cooperation with all foreign countries and the decreasing of foreign trade deficits by replacing imported goods with national products. Measures have been outlined within the framework of the French Communist Party's economic strategy to develop an equal and equivalent economic exchange with the developing countries and to expand economic ties with the socialist countries.

A leading role in the implementation of the new economic strategy is being allotted to the nationalized enterprises. It was said during the 24th French Communist Party Congress: "Nationalization -- this is not some mania of the communists. If we attach a vitally important significance to nationalization, it is because it is necessary to effectively solve the urgent problems of such a developed country as France" (p. 22).

Pointing out that the nationalized sector is still not playing a leading role in normalizing national production under present conditions, the French Communist Party considers it necessary to alter the economic orientation of these enterprises, especially by democratizing their management and by the participation of the workers in it. The French Communist Party considers that the strength of its proposals on expanding nationalization, which were contained in the "plan for the struggle" that provided for the nationalization of 23 primary industrial monopolies and the entire banking sector (11 industrial groups have now been nationalized), is still being preserved. Aware of the internal contradictions and limitations of nationalization under capitalism, the democratic forces of France regard it, at the same time, as an important method for the struggle against the rule of the monopolies, as a powerful factor in insuring economic activity and the rational use of state resources, and as one of the slogans capable of rallying wide sections of the workers around the working class.

The new economic strategy of the French Communist Party is orienting the workers on the struggle to increase the role of the working class in production and to democratize the management of the nationalized enterprises, proceeding from the fact that the social and economic effectiveness of the activity of these enterprises will primarily depend on the degree of influence of the workers here. The French Communist Party is specifically coming out in favor of worker representatives forming a majority in the administrative councils of the enterprises and the chairmen of the councils being elected by the workers and not appointed by the government.

In general, the new economic strategy of the French Communist Party reflects an intensifying realization of the incompatibility of the growing social and political demands of the workers with the logic of capitalist society. It also reflects the strengthening protest of the working class against the crisis and abnormal type of economic development and its pernicious consequences for the overwhelming majority of the population and for the national economy.

In a word, we are talking about an economic strategy which is designed for the conducting of far-reaching antimonopolistic reforms coming close to anti-capitalist measures and the establishment of workers control in the enterprises.

It was said during the 24th French Communist Party Congress: "To think that it is possible to insure a new economic growth under conditions where big capital is in the key position is absurd" (p. 22).

It was pointed out in the decisions of the 41st World Confederation of Labor Congress: "In order to be firm and effective, each adopted measure must be inserted into an anti-capitalist demarche".¹²

Thus, in joining the government majority, the French Communist Party is not confining itself to supporting the government's positive social and economic measures or criticizing those measures with which it does not agree. In the complicated situation of the economic crisis where the problems of the economy have acquired special sharpness, the communists have put forward their own program for getting out of the crisis and an innovative economic strategy, and they are mobilizing the workers to struggle for its implementation. The independent and class line of the French Communist Party, which is contributing to increasing the awareness of the working class and its political role, has been expressed in this.

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During recent years, the struggle to expand the workers' democratic rights and their political and trade union organizations, especially in enterprises and establishments, i.e., at their place of work and in production, has occupied a large place in the French workers' movement.

It says in the report of G. Marchais to the 24th French Communist Party Congress: "At a time when capital is trying to suppress and trample freedom in order to save its privileges, we are defending these freedoms, even those which are sometimes called bourgeois, as we defend labor's weapon against the destroyers. We want to preserve them, enrich them, and fill them with new freedoms and new rights. We are striving to do this because it is necessary in order to achieve socialism" (p 27).

Amidst the sharp class struggle and having overcome the obstruction of the rightwing parties, the leftwing parties adopted during August-November 1982 four laws that considerably updated French labor laws. Although these laws received the name "the "Auroux Laws" from the name of the labor minister--a socialist, more than half of the new and most essential clauses, especially on the rights of trade unions, were introduced on the initiative of the World Confederation of Labor and the Communist deputies.

In developing and strengthening the 1968 social achievements, the new clauses on the rights of workers and their organizations in enterprises considerably surpass in their political significance and scope that which had been achieved by the French workers' movement previously in this area.

At the same time, it is necessary to take into consideration when evaluating the new social legislation that it reflects the existing alignment of forces in the country and in the leftwing majority and has a compromise nature. Many clauses in the new laws are narrow and contradictory and at times touch on secondary matters. Nevertheless, these laws create new and broader opportunities for the struggle of the working class for its interests and for the activity of trade unions in enterprises. The Leninist principle of the struggle and participation of communists everywhere where there are workers

and where it is possible to speak with the workers and influence the working masses lies at the basis of the French Communist Party's policy in this matter.¹³

For the first time in the history of the French workers' movement, the right of the workers to create and operate trade unions in enterprises, where less than 50 people work, has been recognized. This affects the interests of more than six million people who work in medium-size and small enterprises, and it testifies to the large reserves for expanding the trade union movement, especially when considering the fact that only one-fourth of the workers are members of trade unions in contemporary France.

The socialists and rightwing parties voted down the proposal of the communist deputies to permit the activity of political parties in enterprises. Just as before, only the activity of trade unions is officially permitted on the territory of enterprises. Political figures, including deputies and even the mayors of cities in which some enterprise or other is located, can visit them only with the consent of the administration; the conducting of measures by the French Communist Party in enterprises and institutions is officially not permitted.

Let us point out that the right of trade union organizations in enterprises to invite trade union figures, who do not work in that enterprise, without asking the administration's permission was especially provided for in the new legislation on the request of the World Confederation of Labor. Previously, the owners had repeatedly broken up with the help of the police the meetings of trade union leaders with the workers on the territory of the plants and factories.

Enterprise committees have received the right to conduct meetings with the workers not only on questions concerning the activity of the enterprise itself but also "on other urgent problems" i.e., on social and political questions of a general nature. This expands the capabilities of the committees not only in the economic but also in the political struggle of the working class.

The expansion of the social and economic role and rights of enterprise committees, which has been provided for, and the election of worker representatives to the administrative councils of the nationalized enterprises provide an opportunity for democratic forces to influence to a certain degree the solution of a number of questions that affect the interests of the workers.

In the estimation of French communists, the new social legislation is an "important turning point" in the very concept of an enterprise committee.¹⁸ New opportunities are arising to achieve the protection of the workers' interest more effectively and to increase their social and political role. For the first time, the working class has achieved definite capabilities for influencing not only the solution of questions touching on their salaries and working conditions but also those which touch upon several important aspects in the activity of an enterprise, specifically the movement and functioning of capital. With the active use of the new capabilities for the workers'

struggle, these social achievements for all their partial and compromise nature can become an important means for increasing the political awareness and role of the working class in its struggle against monopolistic capital and for the establishment of workers' control in an enterprise.

Lenin emphasized the importance of "energetic participation in all questions concerning work legislation" for a revolutionary party and its representatives in a bourgeois parliament. Cautioning against the "opportunistic distortion of this function of its activity" and the desire "to elevate parliamentary activity to the main, fundamental self-sufficing thing", Lenin called for "not shortening our slogans and the demands of our party's minimum program, but developing and introducing our own social democratic bills (and also amendments to the bills of the government and other parties) in order to reveal the hypocrisy and mendacity of the social reformers to the masses and in order to attract the masses to an independent, mass, economic, and political struggle which alone is only capable of providing real gains for the workers or converting the half-way and hypocritical "reforms" into strong points of the progressive workers' movement on the path¹⁹ to the complete emancipation of the proletariat based on this system".

This Leninist approach to the problems of the struggle for social legislation in the interests of the workers under a bourgeois system has kept its topicality. Many of the bills or decrees, which are now being adopted or discussed in France, represent the demands of the French Communist Party's minimum program or the joint governmental program of the leftwing forces which was adopted in 1972. During the discussion of bills during the first year and a half of the activity of the leftwing government, the communists achieved the adoption of about 200 amendments which improved the drafts in favor of the workers.

It is no accident that the big bourgeoisie and rightwing parties have come out from the very beginning with special fury against those social innovations which the leftwing forces have now managed to strengthen in a legal regard. As A. Peyrefit, one of the leaders of the rightwing opposition, has said, the new laws "have introduced the class struggle into enterprises."²⁰

The reaction threatens to repeal them if it manages to get revenge. Under modern conditions, the bourgeoisie is delaying and sabotaging by every means and method the implementation of the new social legislation or, if this does not seem possible, is trying to emasculate its progressive content and integrate the committees, which have been created in the enterprises, into the existing system.

The working class and the French Communists are attaching exceptional importance to the new social achievements. They are examining the achievement of new rights for workers in enterprises in the context of the struggle not only for social justice but also for the introduction of new social and economic effectiveness criteria which are responsive to the interests of social progress and the struggle against unemployment and inflation and for an increase in the workers' living standards. Communists have always regarded enterprises as the main field for the class struggle and have endeavored to contribute to increasing the political role of the working class and strengthening the influence of the party in enterprises.

As was said in G. Marchais' report during the 24th French Communist Party Congress, "The cell in an enterprise by its activity can best reveal the class content of demands, achieve the participation of workers in the struggle, and demonstrate the importance of the successes that have been achieved, explaining at the same time their limited nature and pointing out the means required for further advancement" (pp 76-77).

At the same time, the communists are pointing out that with the present alignment of forces nothing can be considered achieved once and for all and especially irreversibly and that only the active pressure of the workers' movement can insure the implementation of the laws which have been adopted. The working class is still inadequately acquainted with the new social laws, has not fully realized the importance of the new opportunities which have been opened up, and has not felt their influence on their social and political situation. For example, the fact that during a public opinion poll conducted by the newspaper HUMANITE-DIMANCHE the answers to the question about what reforms of the leftwing majority the greatest significance should be attached to, were divided into the following according to their order of importance: the allocation of pensions at 60 years of age; the introduction of a system of free trade training at an age of 16-18 years; increasing the purchasing power of the lower paid layers of the population; the allocation of a fifth week of paid vacation; the increase in family allowances; the decrease in the work week to 39 hours; the establishment of taxes on large fortunes; the repeal of the death penalty; social security payments for abortions; and the decentralization in the departments. And only then -- the new rights of workers in enterprises and the nationalization of banks and the monopolies.²¹

The adopted laws themselves have an inconsistent and contradictory nature. It is clear that the adoption of the laws on the new rights of workers and their trade unions in enterprises -- for all their positive significance -- is only a beginning. It is necessary to see to their implementation in practice and to overcome on this path the desperate resistance of the bourgeoisie who are trying under the changed conditions and with the help of reformist trade unions not only to prevent an increase in the role of the workers in enterprises but also to use the new prerogatives of the enterprise committees for the purposes of class cooperation.

As Maks Gallo, a socialist and official representative of the government, admitted, "It is possible to cite hundreds of cases where under the conditions of 1983 workers and employees have been dismissed, insulted, jeered at, and isolated at work for their leftwing convictions. It is possible to talk about how, after the adoption of the 'Auroux laws', workers were compelled to go on strike in order to achieve the implementation of the 1945 laws on enterprise committees."^{21a}

At the same time, the communists point out that it would be a mistake on the part of trade union activists and all worker and democratic forces not to use the enormous achieved potential and not struggle for its effective application since they are creating new political and material conditions in the struggle for the workers' interests and against the ideas of "a social consensus" and reformism.

The workers have recently achieved a certain expansion of their rights and capabilities in several other areas also. For example, the National Assembly adopted on the suggestion of the communists in May 1983 a new law on the status of state employees in its first reading. This law considerably expands and develops many clauses in the law on state employees which was adopted in 1946 on the initiative of Maurice Thorez. Anicet Lepors, communist minister for civil service and administrative reform, made a large contribution to the development and adoption of this document.

The new status repeals the prohibition, which had been introduced by right-wing forces, against civil service workers resorting to strikes in order to protect their interests. The application of the new clause has been extended to four million people or one-fifth of the gainfully employed population: state apparatus bureaucrats and employees of the nationalized institutions, local and regional governmental bodies, hospitals, training institutions, etc. It defines the rights and duties of state employees; provides for certain rights in matters concerning working conditions, pay and professional training; expands the rights of trade unions; and eliminates several discriminatory conditions for entry into the National Civil Service School which prepares personnel for the different links of the state apparatus. In principle, the new law prohibits any discrimination based on political motives when hiring for work in state establishments.

The expansion of the rights and authority of local governmental bodies and the development of regional and local autonomy and originality are an old demand of the French Communist Party which reflects the interest of wide sections of the population. The communists supported the decentralization reforms, which were made on the initiative of socialist Defferre, although they did not fully correspond to the recommendations of the French Communist Party. The latter supports the allocation to local authority bodies of wider authority and the necessary resources which provide an opportunity to solve all the main questions, which affect that oblast or city, at the lowest level, i.e. as close as possible to the population.

Several changes were also introduced into the election law. The communists require that the principle of proportional representation be applied in elections to all government bodies. This demand is also in the program of the socialists. The main election law still remains unchanged. However, the municipal elections in March 1983 were held according to a new hybrid system: the first round according to the majoritarian system, and the second one according to the proportional system. The French communists think that, although the new election law does not completely correspond to the proposals of the French Communist Party and does not basically alter the former anti-democratic system, it is, nevertheless a step forward. Although the leftwing parties lost about 30 cities with a population of more than 30,000 people during these elections, the number of their municipal councillors grew significantly: for the communists, from 23,000 to 26,910; and for the socialists -- from 43,000 to 50,940. In many of the country's rayons, Communist Party candidates for the first time joined the ranks of municipal councils where formerly there had not been any representative of the French Communist Party.

One of the important demands of the working class in the field of democratic freedoms is the right to truthful information and access to the mass information media, especially radio and television. This is acquiring special significance in the present situation where the ideological struggle is being aggravated. Formally autonomous but really subordinate to the government, the management of the state radio and television of France was reorganized after the 1981 elections; persons, who were close to the president and the Socialist Party, were appointed directors of the main radio and television companies. The ideological orientation of the radio and television broadcasts did not essentially change; it was and remains anticommunist. This is evoking the indignation of the workers and democratic forces. As before, the policy of the Communist Party is distorted and subjected to slanderous attacks, and the communists extremely rarely have an opportunity to state their point of view. The state radio and television systematically participate in anti-Soviet campaigns.

The communists have repeatedly demanded an end to the subordination of the mass information media, especially the state radio and television, to the interests of the "ideological war" against the Communist Party and socialism. The French Communist Party addressed the following appeal to the French people in December 1982 during a customary revelry of anti-communism in the mass information media: "Liberate information!". It was said in this appeal: "They are poisoning you, they are lying to you, you have the right to truthful information. The rightwing does not have the right to dictate their laws to radio and television:." ²⁴

The French Communist Party has emphasized the danger for workers and for the interests of democracy and peace engendered by the disinformation and slander methods that are being widely used on radio and television, and it has demanded an end to this anti-democratic practice and ideological aggression against the Communist Party in which the socialists are also taking part. The Communist Party is demanding that the mass information media be placed at the service of a policy of democratic reforms, peace and friendship between peoples.

Among the other measures that have been adopted by the leftwing forces in the plan to democratize political and social life, it is necessary to point out the expansion -- at the French Communist Party's initiative -- of the amnesty, which was announced by the president, to the victims of anti-worker repression. Despite the sabotage of the owners, many trade union activists, who were dismissed from work, have been restored to their job. Big capital, however, continues its policy of repression with respect to worker activists in enterprises.

In addition, the most odious clauses in the so-called Peyrefit law on matters concerning the assurance of security, which was adopted in 1980, have been repealed. Under the pretext of a struggle against terrorism and gangsterism it provided for several measures which were essentially directed against democratic organizations.

At the request of the workers, the Victory Day holiday, which was celebrated by them as a day of struggle for averting the nuclear threat and against

fascism and which was repealed by Giscard d'Estaing, was restored. For the first time in France, a decision to officially celebrate Woman's Day-- 8 March -- has been adopted.

All these and several other measures became possible in the new political situation thanks to the persistent struggle of the workers for their vital interests. The working class and other sections of workers have come out in favor of further moving along the path of democraticizing political life, relying on the results that had been achieved.

* * *

The French working class and its Communist Party possess enormous experience in the class struggle and in participation in the different elected bodies -- from the National Assembly to local government bodies -- and in different public organizations. Experience also exists in the participation of communists in the government, but under different historical and political conditions (1944-1977). For the overwhelming majority of communists, however, the shift of the French Communist Party from the role of an opposition force to a position of a party, which is participating in the government, is a completely new experience that requires a considerable reorganization not only of the party's political and organizational work but also of certain habits and psychology.

We are talking about the actually new experience of communist and socialist cooperation in a government coalition in a developed capitalist country under complicated domestic and international conditions. This cooperation is complicated by the fact that the socialists, who enjoy an alignment of forces that is favorable for them, are trying to weaken the Communist Party and its influence among the workers and to lead it to the path of "social reformism," and the rightwing of the French Communist Party leadership is achieving a break with the Communist Party. In addition, in places and in many of the country's rayons the socialists are continuing to operate from anti-communist positions and relations between the communists and socialists remain strained.

The French communists have developed and are using in practice a new concept of the union of leftwing forces which considers both the lessons of the experience, which has been accumulated over 70 years, and the distinctive features of the present situation. In this regard, they are proceeding from the fact that, despite the serious disagreements that exist between communists and socialists, a rather broad basis for the joint actions of workers and democratic forces and for the cooperation of the leftwing parties on many urgent questions affecting the interests of the workers remains in the country. We are talking about combining the independent activity of each of the leftwing parties with their cooperation in the spirit of the principles of the political agreement that was concluded in June 1981 and about the development and strengthening of this cooperation during the struggle for the workers' interests.

FOOTNOTES

1. "XXIV s"yezd Frantsuzskoy kommunisticheskoy partii" [The 24th French Communist Party Congress], Moscow, 1982, p 5 (further cf. the pages of this publication in the text).
2. Cf. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 17, p. 24.
7. Cf., for example, G. Marchais, "The French Challenge to the Crisis of Capitalism", KOMMUNIST, No 1, 1983.
8. Cf. G. Marchais, "L'espoir au present", Paris, 1980.
9. Ph. Herzog, "L'economie a bras-le-corps", Paris, 1982.
10. L'HUMANITE, 30 March 1983.
11. Cf. LE MONDE, 11 June 1982.
12. LE PEUPLE, No 1135 - 1137, 1982, p 187.
13. Cf. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 39, p 222.
- ✓ 18. Cf. "CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME", No 1, 1983, p 21.
19. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 19 pp 25-27.
20. LE MONDE, 27-28 February 1983.
21. Cf. HUMANITE-DIMANCHE, 18 February 1983.
- 21a. Cf. LE MONDE, 9 April 1983.
22. Cf. CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME, No 1, 1983, pp 18-19.
23. Cf. L'HUMANITE, 15 March 1983.
24. Ibid., 21 December 1982.

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DEVELOPMENTS DRIVE WESTERN TRADE UNIONS TO LEFT

Moscow RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNYI MIR in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 83 pp 131-149

[Article: "The Trade Union Movement in Developed Capitalist Countries (Some Tendencies of the Evolution in Early 80s)"]

[Excerpts] At the present time when an enormous threat hangs over the world due to the fault of the ruling circles in the United States and their partners in NATO, trade unions as the most popular organization of the workers are realizing to a greater and greater degree their responsibility for averting a new war and they have become an integral part of the broad movement of the peace advocates. This is graphically being demonstrated at the national, regional and international levels.

In pointing out that the struggle for peace, relaxation and disarmament is now as urgent as never before and that the problem of insuring peace in the North, in Europe as a whole and throughout the world is a problem to which not a single person or social group can be indifferent, the Central Trade Union Organization of Finland (TsOPF), the most popular organization of workers in the country, wrote down the following in its fundamental program: "A durable peace and friendship among peoples is the goal of the trade union movement." H. Hansen, the chairman of the largest Danish trade union for specialized workers, has declared: "What will be the benefits from our successes in the labor struggle if we lose the struggle for peace".

The enormous expenditures for military purposes are not solving the problems of employment and at the same time are aggravating inflation. The research, which has been conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (United States) confirms this. It follows from it that capital investments in peaceful industry create significantly more jobs than investments in military production. Thus, for every one billion dollars, which are invested in the arms industry, it is possible to create 75,000 jobs today. At the same time, the same sum could create: 187,000 jobs in the educational system; 139,000 -- in the health care system; 100,000 -- in construction; 92,000 -- in transportation; and 87,000 -- in the administrative apparatus and social services.

The scope of the antiwar movement, which is unprecedented in the history of the United States, testifies that thousands of American workers and many of their

trade union organizations are becoming more and more aware that military orders do not guarantee work and, having been awakened from many years of inertia, are decisively coming out against the aggressive foreign policy of the United States. Thus, for example, the machine builders' trade union, which operates in the United States and Canada and which occupies one of the leading places based on the number of those employed in military industry, is now more active in the struggle for peace and for shifting resources to civilian construction which creates more jobs.

"Down with nuclear war!", "Work and not bombs!", "Work and peace!", "Food for the hungry and not rockets for the military!"-- these slogans express the essence of the struggle of the majority of trade unions in the capitalist countries -- a struggle in which hundreds of millions of both organized and unorganized workers are participating. The 113th British Trades Union Congress (BTUC), which was held in September 1981, declared for the first time in the history of this association that the antiwar struggle is the most important problem for humanity and one of the main directions in the activity of trade unions. This was fixed in the resolution "General Peace and Nuclear Disarmament" which was adopted during the congress. FRG trade unions have promoted an active struggle against the siting of new American medium range missiles on the country's territory. Many trade unions, such as the trade unions of the metal-workers; trade, banking and insurance workers; printers; teachers; and wood-working industry workers, have adopted a resolution demanding that the decision to install such rockets in the FRG be repealed.

Belgium's General Federation of Workers has developed its own antiwar program which provides for mass antiwar demonstrations to convert Western Europe into a nuclear-free zone, halt the production of nuclear weapons and destroy existing stocks. The International Center of the Swedish Trade Union Movement headed by the present prime minister, O. Palme, was created several years ago in Sweden. In the words of J. Ansel'son, the chairman of the Swedish Central Association of Trade Unions, this organization sees one of its main tasks to be the supporting in every possible way of a policy of peace, detente and disarmament and organizing and participating in the antiwar movement. Trade unions are actively participating in the many thousands of antinuclear meetings that are being conducted in Japan. A total of 30 million Japanese have already put their signatures to the demand to eliminate nuclear weapons.

In France, the General Confederation of Labor is struggling not only against political but also against economic pressure from without. This is why the confederation is actively coming out in favor of expanding mutually beneficial cooperation with all countries as an important precondition for the struggle against crisis and unemployment, why it has played an important role in the failure of the U. S. ban on deliveries of equipment for the Siberian-West European gas pipeline. As a result, the American dictates were rejected by the government of France and by many other European states. American economist V. Perlov writes: "Reagan's anti-gas-pipeline campaign was the largest fiasco in the history of U. S. economic wars. Washington's representatives were compelled to ask its allies for tin-plating, even if only a symbolic one, but this also went unanswered. It is completely clear that the times of the

Marshall Plan, when American imperialism could dictate its economic policy on weakened West European capitalism and impose direct police control on its allies in the area of trade, have sunk into oblivion".

The fact that although the leadership of the AFL-CIO does not support the movement for halting the nuclear arms race but has nevertheless been compelled to retreat from its traditional position of unqualified support for the Pentagon's demands, testifies to the new situation in the American trade union movement. Despite Reagan's demand to increase military expenditures by 10 percent, many influential members of the executive committee -- the leaders of the trade unions for automobile workers, food industry workers, trade workers, tobacco workers, textile workers, and local government body employees, in which there are more than one-third of all AFL-CIO members -- have demanded that the growth in military expenditures not exceed five percent.

The international trade union movement has contributed a great deal to the fact that the peace advocate movement has begun to link the arms race directly not only with the aggressiveness of the most reactionary circles of imperialism but also with its offensive against the economic and social achievements of the workers and the fact that the insuring of the people's peace and disarmament is beginning to be regarded as the most important item in social progress. The 28th Session of the World Federation of Trade Unions, which was held at the beginning of 1983, addressed an appeal to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, General Confederation of Labor, and other trade union organizations to halt the arm race and preserve peace on the planet through the joint efforts of the entire international trade union movement.

With all the complexities and contradictions of the trade union movement in capitalist countries which is conditioned by the distinctive features of their historical development, traditions and social structure; by the level of the state's influence on social and economic processes; by the strength of the party of the working class, especially communist parties; and by the orientation of the trade unions, the activity of the latter is being directed to an ever greater degree against the system itself of state monopolistic capitalism.

The progressive forces in the trade union movement are proceeding from the fact that, under present conditions and especially in countries where the pendulum of political life has swung to the right, it is not at all sufficient to conduct discussions with the government and with the patronage; the decisive success in the struggle for the workers' interests can be achieved if the masses are continuously directed toward action. In other words, among the most important tasks, which now face trade unions in the capitalist countries at all levels, are the development of the masses' activity so that the government and patronage will continuously feel pressure from the workers, especially in enterprises, and the improvement of the forms and methods of the struggle.

Another very important characteristic feature of the trade union movement at the beginning of the Eighties is the fact that the trend of moving to the left is being strengthened in the trade union movement, including in some associations

of a reformist orientation, to an ever greater degree based on a critical regard for the capitalist system. The very accumulation in the masses of a potential for discontent with the political power of monopolies, even if it does not automatically make all workers supporters of the class struggle, nevertheless is leading trade unions of a reformist orientation to an ever greater degree toward the recognition of a need to replace capitalism with a more progressive system and to an understanding of the importance of a joint struggle for the workers' interests for these purposes.

Many differences and divergencies exist among the different detachments of the international trade union movement, but they also have many important points of contact on a broad range of questions. During the 10th World Congress of Trade Unions which was held in Havana in 1982, delegations from 338 trade union organizations in 138 socialist, developing and industrially developed capitalist countries, which unite 269 million workers, i.e., the overwhelming majority of the overall number of 340 million workers organized in the world, came to a unanimous conclusion concerning what the most important tasks facing trade unions in the Eighties are and outlined ways to solve them.

Unfortunately, because of ideological pluralism and the absence of unity other international trade union centers and even national union centers in many capitalist countries have still not worked out a program for joint action or a unified policy which would help the workers to effectively resist the onslaught of state monopolistic capitalism and the power and resourcefulness of trans-national corporations. The split in the trade union movement is a serious barrier on the path of further expanding the antimonopolistic struggle. That is why, under conditions where imperialism is exerting active efforts to deepen the split in the international workers' and trade union movement in order to achieve its goals, it is necessary more than ever to insure the unity of the actions of working people and their mass organizations.

The material, which is published below, reflects several trends in the development of the trade union movement in the industrially developed capitalist countries during the beginning of the Eighties.

The changes in the nature of the relations between French government authorities and trade unions after the formation of a coalition government of leftwing forces where -- according to a declaration of the General Confederation of Labor (VKT) -- the government has been transformed from a traditional enemy into a partner, could not fail to have an effect on the content and forms of trade union activity. The domestic policy of the leftwing coalition has significantly expanded capabilities for trade unions to really participate in economic and social life.

After the victory of the leftwing forces, the question of the forms for the trade union struggle became a very important tactical question under the new conditions. At first (1981- beginning of 1982), the number of strikes and severe social conflicts was sharply decreased in France. The rightfulness of employing the strike movement as such came into doubt. However, in the documents

of the 41st General Confederation of Labor Congress and in its practical activity, the confederation has affirmed that, being a class organization, it reserves for itself the right to resort to any forms of the struggle if this is justified by the situation. This was expressed in the strike movement, which began during the second half of 1982, and in the subsequent numerous demonstrations of the workers to carry out the obligations adopted by the government.

The growing role of the trade unions and their common striving to expand the rights of the workers and to improve their living conditions is sharply raising the question of unity of action in the struggle against capital and for the implementation of a policy of social and national progress. However, the pluralism in the French trade Union movement and the differences in the views and political sympathies of trade union leaders are creating complications and lowering the effectiveness of trade union action.

The General Confederation of Labor is the largest and most influential trade union center in the country. However, the leftwing reformist French Democratic Confederation of Labor (CFDT), the "Fors ouvrier" that stands on the right, the moderate National Confederation of Education Workers (NFRP), and the conservative General Confederation of Personnel (VKK), taken together, are practically not inferior to the General Confederation of Labor. Inimical to the class positions of the General Confederation of Labor, they are continuously creating a threat to deepen the split in the country's trade union movement. True, their own differences are not allowing them an opportunity to come out in a single front against the General Confederation of Labor and to compete seriously with it among the working class. The General Confederation of Labor, having pointed out in its 41st congress that it "is by its nature a trade union of unity" and that "unity of action by the trade unions is now more necessary than ever before", is trying to adjust its relations with other worker organizations. It regards the achievement of unity of action with the French Democratic Confederation of Labor, the second in importance of the country's trade union centers, as one of the most important tasks of the moment. In the General Confederation of Labor's orientation document, it is said: "The struggle for reforms in the country and the activity of the General Confederation of Labor can arouse the French Democratic Confederation of Labor and other trade unions to adopt a position and line of conduct which will contribute to the achievement of unity of action".

An attempt to come together with the French Democratic Confederation of Labor was undertaken after the last congresses of the confederations (the French Democratic Confederation of Labor in May 1982 in the city of Metz and the General Confederation of Labor in June 1982 in the city of Lille). The first high level meeting since January 1980 was held on the initiative of the General Confederation of Labor. During it, an analysis was given of the economic situation and the prospects for the struggle to defend the workers' vital interests, against unemployment, to increase wages, and to insure social rights. Although no concrete results were achieved, this meeting showed -- according to the admission of the leaders of the French Democratic Confederation of Labor -- that "after a long period of bitter polemics and clashes, there is an opportunity to try, at the very least to adjust relations."

The fact is that a whole series of questions of a social and economic nature, that arose during the Eighties, have required the joint actions of the trade unions. In the first place, there is the struggle against the anti-people's policy of patronage in the field of social security and also the defense of the workers' interests in the face of the continuation of the "strict economy" policy, which was proclaimed by the government in March 1983 and which threatens the decrease in unemployment that had been noted in the country by the end of 1982.

However, the steps, which were taken during these years by the General Confederation of Labor to arrange unity of action in the country's trade union movement, either ran into the inconsistency of the leadership of reformist trade union centers, including the French Democratic Confederation of Labor, or even encountered a direct refusal to take joint actions.

As usual, the "Fors ouvrier" remains on the extreme right and usually impedes the realization of the government's progressive reforms. However, in the opinion of the General Confederation of Labor's leadership, it sometimes occupies on some questions, including the question of its attitude toward the "strict economy" policy, positions that provide a basis for hoping for joint action. In refusing to cooperate with the General Confederation of Labor, the General Confederation of Personnel is showing itself to be a force that is adverse to all the initiatives of the leftwing government and is doing everything possible to keep "personnel" in opposition. It has repeatedly emerged as the organizer of protest demonstrations against the government's social and economic policy. Concerning the National Confederation of Education Workers, it often shares the positions of the General Confederation of Labor and acts jointly with it on a number of specific questions. However, restraint regarding many proposals of the General Confederation of Labor is characteristic of it.

The French trade union movement is bearing the imprint of the complicated social and political atmosphere in the country, especially that aggravated by the March 1983 municipal elections where the increased activity of rightwing forces led to a certain loss in the left's positions. The trade unions have expressed their dissatisfaction with the "strict economy" plan that was promulgated by the government, considering that the main weight of it lies on the workers and not on the representatives of big capital. The General Confederation of Labor and the French Democratic Confederation of Labor have proposed their own counter-proposal against the plan, which in their opinion, "should be revised and amended." E. Ner, the general secretary of the French Democratic Confederation of Labor, has said right out that the government's plan was compiled "without considering social problems". In a statement published 28 March 1983 the General Confederation of Labor "expresses its disagreement with a significant part of the decisions that have been adopted by the government and demands that "social justice be adhered to" in the conducting of an economic policy.

At the beginning of the Eighties, Italy's trade union movement encountered a whole series of serious problems of both an objective and a subjective nature

which exerted considerable influence on its development. It had to struggle in a situation that was considerably more complicated than in previous years -- under the conditions of a social and economic crisis (the most serious during the entire postwar period) and a massed offensive of the monopolies against the working class and the trade unions. In addition, serious difficulties of an internal nature, which the trade union leaders qualified as a manifestation of crisis in the movement, arose in the trade union centers themselves, including the leading and strongest one of them -- the Italian General Confederation of Labor. We are talking here primarily about the decrease in the membership of the trade unions; the lowering of the activity of the rank and file members; their display of² disillusionment, apathy and distrust towards the policy of the trade unions; and the worsening -- especially during the last two years -- in relations between the workers and the trade unions which is more and more frequently being expressed in the disagreement of the trade union's rank and file members, especially those of the Italian General Confederation of Labor, with the policy of the trade union leadership which is at times making rather considerable concessions to the owners and the reformist elements in the trade union movement.

To a considerable degree the trade unions themselves, in whose work there are a number of serious derelictions, are guilty of these difficulties. There is, first of all, the imperfection of trade union democracy, the inadequately differentiated approach toward the different categories of trade union members, the alienation of the trade union leadership from the masses of the rank and file workers, and the strengthening of bureaucratic elements in it. That is why the overcoming of mistakes and the difficulties of an internal nature has become a problem of no small importance for Italian trade unions, especially the Italian General Confederation of Labor. The situation in the Italian General Confederation of Labor became considerably more complicated during 1982-1983 because of the increasing differences between the communist and socialists within the trade union center in connection with the aggravation of inter-party polemics between the Italian Communist Party and the Italian Socialist Party.

In such a complicated situation, the development of an alternative program by the trade unions acquired special urgency -- the more so since the renewal of collective contracts for 12.5 million workers in the main branches of the economy was on the agenda in 1982.

As L. Lama, general secretary of the Italian General Confederation of Labor has pointed out, the discussions of the new trade union program, which were conducted in the enterprises by the workers, showed that the problem of employment was the most important problem for them -- and not that of wages and the inflation level. In connection with this, the trade unions began to pay considerably more attention to this problem, placing it at the center of their collective contract policy. (Before this, the discussion on the collective contract platform took place exclusively on the question of raising wages.) Questions concerning the reorganization of industry, working conditions and employment became the main ones during the discussions of the United Federation of Trade Unions with the Confederation of Industries and the government. These,

however, did not provide any positive results. Moreover, the Confederation of Industries, which had begun an offensive against the trade unions, demanded too large concessions from them, threatening to reject the sliding wage scale. On 12 June, it announced the breakdown of the 1975 agreement on a sliding scale (this decision was to go into effect on 1 February 1983) and the refusal to renew the collective contracts.

In connection with the rigid positions of the owners and the government and the failure of the dragged out negotiations, the United Federation and the trade unions, which had joined it, took a more active position and resorted (for the first time in four years) to a series of national and general branch strikes in support of the trade union demands. The most significant one of them was the eight-hour national strike on 25 June 1982 in defense of the sliding scale, employment and the collective contracts and for the development of the south and the reconstruction of earthquake zones. This was the largest strike since 1969 against the challenge of the owners. A total of 90 percent of the workers participated in it. On that same day, a demonstration of 500,000 people was held in Rome with the participation of workers from all over Italy. It was the largest of the entire postwar period. Thus, a definite intensification of the activity of Italian trade unions was noticed during the spring and summer of 1982. In Italy, the newspaper UNITA wrote in connection with this that "the workers' movement is again gathering strength".

Many spontaneous demonstrations of the workers had an anti-trade union nature. During these demonstrations, sharp criticism rang out addressed to the trade union leaders, especially the representatives of the Italian Labor Union, who were accused of conciliations and protecting the interests of capital. During meetings and plant gatherings, workers and employees demanded immediate action from the leadership of the trade unions. After long and strenuous discussions, the leading committee of the United Federation of Trade Unions called upon the workers to stage a general strike of industrial workers on 18 January 1983, on whose success greatly depended whether trade union unity would be maintained or not.

The success of this strike (approximately eight million people participated in it) made certain corrections in the development of the complicated internal political situation in Italy. It considerably strengthened the positions of the trade unions before a series of meetings of the United Federation of Trade Unions leadership with the government and owners. As the bourgeois newspaper IL GIORNO pointed out, the mass participation of the working class in the strike "of course permitted the trade unions not to make any concessions". However, the agreement on "labor costs", which was concluded 22 January 1983 between the trade unions and the Confederation of Industries with the help of the government, has a clearly expressed compromise nature: Having rejected their initial demands, both the owners and the trade unions made concessions. This agreement, which was the result of prolonged and complicated negotiations (actually, they continued for more than a year) and which ended the longest conflict in Italy's history between the United Federation of Trade Unions and the Confederation of Industries, touches upon a whole number of very important questions, including limiting inflation and manpower costs, extra wage charges, the conclusion of new labor contracts, and the length of the working day.

The agreement, which was achieved, limits the operation of the sliding scale mechanism, providing for lessening the automatic action of wage increases by 15-25 percent (instead of the 10 percent that was proposed by the trade unions) depending on the increase in the cost of living, and for the maintenance of a 13 percent inflation level in 1983 and a 10 percent one in 1984, guaranteed by the government. The Confederation of Industries agreed to a half-hour shortening of the work week.

However, the trade unions -- and this especially concerns the Italian General Confederation of Labor-- made too large concessions to the government and the patronage. This evoked dissatisfaction among many categories of workers who thought that "conciliatory" trends were again appearing in the trade union movement. In general, the Italian Communist Party gave a positive evaluation to the fact that an agreement was signed, pointing out during this that the trade unions had not completely defended the workers' interests on some important questions.

In the FRG, two main problems were at the center of attention of the workers and their trade unions at the beginning of the Eighties: 1) the struggle against the lowering of living standards was a result of the heavy growth in unemployment, the decrease in real income, the curtailment of state expenditures for social needs, and the massed offensive of the monopolies against the social, economic and democratic achievements of the working class; 2) the recognition of the need to intensify the struggle for peace and disarmament in connection with the approaching time for implementing the NATO decision to deploy new medium range nuclear weapons on the territory of West Europe. The change of government in the country, which took place in the autumn of last year and which was strengthened during the federal elections in March 1983 as a result of which a coalition headed by conservatives -- the main parties of monopolistic capital: the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union -- came to power, attached special urgency to these problems.

FRG workers are daily feeling the fatal consequences of the economic crisis. This is making it easier for the forces of capital and their mass information media to wage a campaign directed toward achieving the goals of the "strict economy" policy at the expense of the workers. They are trying to prevent the successful expansion of the trade union's struggle for the workers' vital interests and to lower the red-hot heat of the strike movement. At the same time, the trade unions cannot fail to consider that a further worsening of the workers' social and economic situation is fraught with a decrease in the magnetic force of the trade unions themselves in the eyes of the workers and with a growth in anti-trade union attitudes.

Thus, both the objective situation and the requirement to strengthen the positions of the German Trade Union Federation (DGB) among the working class are compelling its leadership to search for an active policy in defending the workers' social, economic and political interests. This was specifically demonstrated during the 12th German Trade Union Federation Congress which was held in May 1982 in West Berlin. The speakers during the congress pointed out the development of centripetal trends in the alliances of owners in the area

of tariffs to which only the coordinated tariff policy of all trade unions can insure a counterweight. The substance of the concept "joint tariff policy" was defined concretely in a unanimously adopted resolution. It directed the branch trade unions to strive "to coordinate the tactics of joint action and mutual help". The plans of the individual trade unions must be coordinated with the German Trade Union Federation and with branch trade unions before the beginning of tariff negotiations. The adopted decisions on a "joint tariff policy" undoubtedly reflect the desire of the FRG working class for worker unity of action. They can play a role in overcoming the workers' shop and professional disconnection which still exists in the workers' and trade union movement of the FRG.

After the coming to power of the Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union and Free Democratic Party coalition, the struggle of the trade unions for the workers' social, economic and political interests acquired several new features. First, this struggle became noticeably more active and is being conducted in mass forms. Thus, for example, approximately 600,000 German Trade Union Federation members participated in several demonstrations that were held in the largest FRG cities at the end of October and the beginning of November of last year. E. Brait, the new chairman of the German Trade Union Federation who was elected during the West Berlin Congress, sharply criticized the 1982 government statement of the new chancellor H. Kohl, calling it "antisocial". In the words of E. Brait, the implementation of the aims, which are contained in it, will lead not to a decrease but to an increase in unemployment in the country.

Along with this, the struggle of the trade unions for the social and economic interests of FRG workers is more and more being interwoven with the struggle for interests of a political, ecological and other nature. Thus, the German Trade Union Federation organized a number of demonstrations of a multi-purpose nature during the fall of 1982. In particular, a 15,000-strong demonstration was organized during September in Frankfurt under the slogan "Peace and Work for All". Definite attempts have also been made to normalize relations and achieve joint actions with ecological movement organizations.

The attitude of the German Trade Union Federation toward the problems of war and peace has noticeably changed. In particular, a resolution, which called for preventing the deployment of new American medium range missiles on European territory, i.e., forcing the government to reject the NATO "dual decision" on "re-arming", was adopted during the German Trade Union Federation Congress.

The large antiwar demonstrations, which were held on 1 September 1982 once again demonstrated this. It is noteworthy that not only the youth organizations of the trade unions but also the German Trade Union Federation and the branch trade unions forming it emerged for the first time as their organizers. More than 20,000 persons participated in the demonstration in Hamburg. The creation of production committees for the struggle for peace in several enterprises, including those turning out weapons, was an important new factor in this city in the development of the struggle for peace. More than 15,000 persons participated in a demonstration in Bremen. Kh. Getts, a member of the management board of the trade, banking and insurance company worker's

trade union who spoke during the meeting, declared that the trade unions must occupy a position, which is appropriate for them, in the gigantic and ever growing movement for peace. Any deviation from it and any decision that the trade unions must stand aside from the antiwar movement will only harm the great cause of the struggle for peace, disarmament and security. On that same day, the German Trade Union Federation conducted 34 meetings in the cities of Schleswig-Holstein, and meetings were held in 20 cities in Bavaria.

The fact that the entire series of antiwar demonstration on 1 September were conducted jointly with antiwar organizations is also important. This signified a considerable step forward toward the rapprochement of the antiwar and the trade union movements. An even more noticeable step forward was taken during the preparations and conducting of the 1983 Easter marches -- the largest antiwar actions in the country during recent years. In particular, the preparation for the Easter marches were conducted jointly with the German Trade Union Federation and the antiwar organizations in one of the largest FRG lands -- Baden Wurttemberg. This would have been unrealistic a year earlier.

The craving for unity of action by the entire working class in the struggle against the monopolies and for cooperation with other democratic peaceloving forces, for example, within the framework of the antiwar movement in the country is growing among trade union ranks. The fact that FRG trade unions are to a certain degree moving away from explanations -- which are objectivist in form and non-class in essence -- of the reasons for the present aggravation of international tension is also important. The growing criticism of NATO and of the present coalition government's foreign policy is an expression of this. However, only the further practical activity of the German Trade Union Federation headed by its new leadership can give an answer to how much the more favorable preconditions, which were created by the 12th congress of the federation and by the subsequent development of the trade union movement in the country for the struggle of the working class, will be realized.

At the beginning of the Eighties, the trade union movement of Great Britain ran into serious problems in practically all areas of the country's economic, political and social life.

The problem of mass unemployment was one of the most urgent ones. In May 1979 when the Tory government came to power, there were 1,344,000 unemployed in the country; at the present time their number has reached 3.2 million people according to official information. This is 13 percent of all workers. The British Trades Union Congress, however, estimates the overall shortage of jobs in the country at almost five million. Considering the catastrophic situation in the employment area, the British Trades Union Congress has developed an alternative program for restoring the British economy. It provides for the creation of 680,000 jobs by appropriating 8.3 billion pounds sterling from the state budget and for a number of other measures. The British Trades Union Congress is also devoting special attention to the creation of special centers for the unemployed in order to strengthen their contacts with local trade union organizations and to involve them in the struggle against the governments' economic policy. More than 70 of these centers had been organized in the country by 1982.

The British trade unions are coming out more and more actively against the denationalization that is being conducted by the government, considering the return of the denationalized companies and branches to state ownership without compensation to be necessary. The 114th congress of the British Trades Union Congress, which was held in September 1982, adopted a special resolution on this question. Resistance to the denationalization policy is also being expressed in the form of direct actions; for example, the strike by city management employees in Birmingham during the fall of 1982 testifies to this.

The energetic opposition by Great Britain's trade unions resulted in the "law on hired labor" which was adopted in 1982 by the conservative government and which not only curtails the rights and capabilities of the trade unions but also essentially undermines the very basis of the country's trade union movement. The law sharply limits the right to strike and rewards those who refuse to join a trade union, thereby undermining one of the important accomplishments of British trade unions -- the "closed shop" principle. The British Trades Union Congress has declared that this law has a purely political goal-- limiting the influence of the trade unions -- and has pointed out that its adoption will lead to conflict situations.

During an extraordinary conference of trade union leaders (April 1982) which was devoted to coordinating a plan for the struggle to protect trade union rights and freedoms, the General Council of the British Trades Union Congress was empowered to create a special solidarity fund and to coordinate all the appearances of organized workers against the anti-trade union legislation. Not only leftwing and moderate but also rightwing trade union leaders came to a single opinion on the need for decisive actions. The 114th congress of the British Trades Union Congress demanded the repeal of the "law on hired labor" and called upon the trade unions "to resist most resolutely the application of the law, including the use of strikes".

The rightwing forces in the British Trades Union Congress are endeavoring to use the complicated situation in the British trade union movement to weaken the position and influence of the leftwing forces. In particular, it is possible to consider the decisions on changing the General Council election procedure which consists of the fact that the trade unions, which number more than 100,000 members (there are about 25 of them in the British Trades Union Congress, automatically receive representation in the General Council, which were adopted by the 114th congress, to be a victory for the right. Thus, the large trade unions, which contributed to the election of the leftwing leaders of small trade unions to the General Council, will not participate in the voting. The new General Council election procedure goes into effect with the next congress. As a result of the adopted reform, many prominent leftwing trade union figures must be deprived of membership in the General Council. Among them are A. Sepper, R. Bakton, communist Dzh. Gay, etc. It is difficult to fully foresee the consequences of the reform's adoption because they will greatly depend on the alignment of forces and on the leadership of the appropriate trade unions in the future. The magazine MARXISM TODAY points out that the problem formally

consists of the relations between the trade unions, which form the British Trades Union Congress, and the General Council, but it takes the shape of an encounter between the leftwing and right-center forces in the worker's movement.

The growth of attitudes in favor of peace and disarmament is an important and positive trend in the development of the British trade union movement. It is reflected in the desire to develop an alternative to military production, in joint wider participation with other social forces in the struggle against the arms race, and in the adoption of its own concrete programs in this area. The 114th congress of the British Trades Union Congress affirmed its support for the trade union call for the unilateral nuclear disarmament of Great Britain. The resolution "Peace and Nuclear Disarmament" contains the demand to reject the plans for equipping the country's submarine fleet with Trident missiles and locating American cruise missiles on British territory and to liquidate all nuclear bases on the territory of Great Britain or in its waters. The resolution calls for fully supporting the campaign for general nuclear disarmament and also for conducting "research, seminars and exchanges of opinion at a European level" on the question of shifting military branches toward peaceful tracks.

The disarmament problem was at the center of attention during the national conferences of the country's trade unions during 1982. The majority of the conferences convincingly demonstrated how much serious support the idea of unilateral nuclear disarmament had found among the trade unions of Great Britain. Trade union organizations with an overall membership of more than eight million adopted resolutions in which they called for unilateral nuclear disarmament. The decisions, which have been adopted by many trade unions on joining the Movement for Nuclear Disarmament, are an important indicator of the level which the direct participation of the trade unions has reached in the struggle for peace and disarmament. It is characteristic that the majority of these trade unions previously did not belong to the followers of this movement. According to information in the magazine LABOR RESEARCH, trade unions with an overall membership of six million have joined the Movement for Nuclear Disarmament.

A new phenomenon in the trade union movement for peace was the participation in it of the trade union committees for the unemployed. Thus, the committees for the unemployed and local sections of the trade unions, Communist Party and other organizations were the initiators of one of the marches for peace which was held during November 1982 in Merseyside and which embraced such large cities as Liverpool and Manchester.

The position of the British trade union movement on the questions of nuclear disarmament and the country's defense policy was stated during a meeting of a delegation from the British Trades Union Congress General Council with F. Pim, the secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, at the beginning of 1983. The General Council declared that the new Soviet initiatives for decreasing the number of medium range missiles in Europe and cutting the intercontinental missile arsenals of the USSR and the United States by 25 percent as well as the other proposals of the Soviet Union on strengthening

confidence measures between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries deserve the most serious study and a positive reply from the West.

The opposition of the British trade unions to the government's military policy is now acquiring a more and more specific nature. As the British Trades Union Congress points out, it will be reflected in all of the coming struggle of the trade unions for economic and social progress.

The first third of the Eighties was an extremely complicated period and a turning point for the trade movement in Spain. It was a period of the trade union's deep preoccupation with the serious difficulties which the Spanish economy, which had been seized by the crisis, continued to experience. They were displayed in the stagnation of industrial production, which has remained at the same level for the last three years; in the state budget deficit, which has approached six percent of the gross national product; and in the growth of unemployment and the high cost of living, which has turned into a sharp worsening of the workers' living conditions. The inability of the former coalition government headed by the bourgeois Union of the Democratic Center Party to achieve a normalization of the economy with a consideration for the working people's interests foreordained the intensification of the active participation of the progressive trade union centers-- the Professional Confederation of Worker Commissions and the General Union of Workers -- in the struggle of the leftwing forces to remove from power the rightwing forces that were striving to insure the class interests of the ruling circles and drag Spain into NATO.

As a result of the victory of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party in the parliamentary elections during October 1982 which was reinforced by the success of the leftwing forces during the May 1983 elections to the municipalities and parliaments of the autonomous regions, a new political situation took shape in Spain. New opportunities were opened up for increasing the role of the trade unions in the struggle to carry out democratic social and economic reforms in order to lead the economy out of its crisis conditions, distribute income justly and improve the situation of the workers. In the words, of M. Camacho, the general secretary of the Professional Confederation of Worker Commissions: "The worker commissions at the present time consider it necessary to struggle against the results of the crisis and at the same time to develop a mass class trade union movement, which would possess greater creative strength, and follow a policy of class responsibility both in a national and in an international regard".

It is necessary to point out that the socialist government headed by F. Gonzalez, which was formed on 3 December 1982 -- the first one in Spain since the time of the civil war -- selected a careful and pragmatic path for implementing its program of reforms for the better which had been promised in the pre-election platform of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party.

During 1982 and the beginning of 1983, the progressive trade union centers actively supported the political demonstrations of the workers which had become traditional. The powerful opposition of the trade unions greeted the decision of the former government of K. Sotelo on Spain's entry into NATO.

The leading trade union centers -- the Professional Confederation of Worker Commissions and the General Union of Workers --and the political parties of the working class organized widespread demonstrations by the workers throughout the country. During them, the struggle for their vitally important interests was linked more and more with demands for Spain's withdrawal from NATO, a decrease in military expenditures and the elimination of U.S. military bases on Spanish territory. I. Marin, the general secretary of the Madrid Federation of Metalworkers, stated: "In defending our interests, we are not forgetting about the need to wage a struggle for democracy and the strengthening of peace on earth. You see, these two problems are linked in the closest way with our struggle against the exploiters."

Thus, very important problems, which are connected with the complicated economic and internal political situations in the country, face the working class of Spain. By orienting the working class and the broad masses of the workers on the struggle to satisfy their most important requirements, to defend the constitution won during stubborn battles, and to expand political and trade union rights, the progressive trade unions are making an important contribution to the solution of these problems. The question of the unity of its ranks is being posed to the trade union movement under these conditions.

Recognizing the growing disaffection of the workers with the worsening situation and trying to take these considerations into consideration to some degree, many trade union leaders in the United States feel compelled to criticize various aspects of the Reagan administration's economic program sharply. In February 1982, the AFL-CIO Executive Committee described the government's social and economic policy in the following manner: "The catastrophic economic problems, which have been created by the administration, are being aggravated more and more by a cruel regressive ideology which rewards the rich, forgetting about the unemployed; punishes the minority; and ignores the poor". When Reagan tried to show that some government indicators are providing a basis for assuming that the time for a rise in the economy is approaching, L. Kirkland, the chairman of the AFL-CIO, objected, stating that the administration "is passing the desired for the actual". He declared: "One would have to be a completely naive person in order to draw optimism from this".

During the last months, relations between the U.S. administration and the trade unions have become more and more aggravated. In May 1982, the NEW YORK TIMES newspaper stated: "The relations of President Reagan with the trade unions or, in any event, with the majority of the leaders of the large trade unions -- judging from everything -- are now worse than they have been during the last 50 years under any former president -- both republican and democrat".

Along with this, it is necessary to point out that, in criticizing the administration's social and economic program, the AFL-CIO leadership is not calling the workers to active actions against this program. Moreover, it is coming out in favor of curtailing the strike movement and the demonstrations of the unemployed.

The American trade union movement is today characterized by two contradictory trends. One of them -- the dominant one -- is aimed at adapting the trade unions to the two-party system and expanding cooperation with it. The second one, which is slowly but steadily opening a way for itself, is aimed at getting the trade unions out from under the political and ideological control of the bourgeois parties and at their promotion of their own social and political program and is connected with a growth in the activity of the working class, the strike movement and the workers' desire for ever more unity of action within the organized worker movement.

The recognition of the need to force the Reagan administration to pay attention to the catastrophic consequences of its militaristic policy found clear embodiment in the movement, which was expanded at the beginning of the Eighties, to achieve a Soviet-American understanding on freezing the production and deployment of nuclear weapons -- a movement which includes the progressive detachments of the U. S. trade union movement -- and in the calls to halt the new offensive of the ruling circles on the working people's vital interests.

The American trade unions have joined the protest movement against the unrestrained arms race which was unleashed by the Reagan administration. Thus, during a press conference that was organized in Washington at the end of April 1982 in support of the movement for freezing nuclear weapons arsenals, a resolution, which was unanimously adopted by the Executive Committee of the Amalgamated Labor Union of Food Industry and Trade Workers which numbers 1.2 million workers, was read. The document of the trade union's leading body contains an appeal to "freeze the development, production and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons, to continue negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, and to continue efforts aimed at decreasing international tension and at averting conflicts".

During 1982-1983, dozens of trade union organizations participated in the mass movement which had developed in the United States for a mutual freeze on nuclear arsenals and for halting the production of new types of weapons of mass destruction. Thousands of automobile workers, metallurgists, teachers and medical workers are emphatically protesting against Washington's militaristic policy. During the million-strong demonstration in New York that was held 12 June 1982 (many trade union members were among its participants), the workers demanded immediate steps from the government aimed at decreasing the huge Pentagon budget and the use of the freed resources for solving the country's urgent social and economic problems. Demonstrations of organized labor in Boston, Detroit, New York, Chicago, and several other American cities took place under the same slogan on the Day of Trade Union Action for Peace which was celebrated 1 September 1982 at the call of the 10th General Trade Union Congress and also on 6 September -- Labor Day.

The beginning of the Eighties has shown that time is forcing AFL-CIO leaders to maneuver ever more strenuously, to adapt to the changing situation and at times to even associate itself with the workers' mass protest movement. This period also confirms the indisputable fact that the credo of rightwing U.S. trade union leaders -- cooperation with the ruling class in many matters of domestic and foreign policy -- remains unchanged.

Anxiety is growing in Canada's working movement because of the practically continuous worsening of the country's economic situation. A deep economic crisis has embraced all branches of industry. Curtailment of production and mass bankruptcies have led to a further growth in unemployment which, according to official data, reached 12.5 percent at the end of 1982. An inflationary growth in prices was an important factor in lowering the population's incomes and the workers' real wages. The introduction of a high interest rate level in the United States has led to the derangement of the market in monetary capital and in the financing conditions of the investment process.

The crisis manifestations in Canada's economy that have been pointed out, the government's anti-trade union policy, and internal processes in the trade union movement itself have contributed to the movement of national economic policy questions to the center of the Canadian workers' struggle. The introduction in 1982 of controls on the wages of state employees inseparably linked the struggle for the satisfaction of economic demands with the political demand to repeal the anti-trade union legislation.

A characteristic feature of the Canadian trade union movement at the beginning of the Eighties is the striving for the consolidation of the leftwing forces both within branch trade unions and on the scale of the trade union movement as a whole. During the preparations for the 14th Congress of the Canadian Worker's Congress, 15 trade unions of the workers in the most important branches of the country's economy created a "caucus of actions", having united around a program for fundamental economic reforms and the struggle for a strong and dynamic Canadian Worker's Congress. The influence of this group on the course of the congress was undoubted. The trend toward creating bodies for directing the actions of the trade unions was strengthened in connection with the introduction of controls on the wages of state employees. In July 1982, four federal employee trade unions created a United Front for the Struggle Against Controls on Wages. United fronts were created within a number of province labor federations by provincial employees. The United Front of Quebec, which three province trade union sectors have joined, conducted its first general strike on 10 November 1982 as a sign of protest against the adoption of a law which provided for cutting employee wages by 20 percent. A second general strike began on 26 January 1983 which employees joined in stages. By 1 February, more than 300,000 state employees were participating in the strike.

The growing level of politicalization of the trade union movement is reflected in its attitude toward the problem of war and peace and the prevention of a thermonuclear war. The trade unions and many labor federations have supported the petition of the Canadian Congress for Peace "Peace -- the Job of Every One". The trade unions have actively joined in the struggle for relaxation and the prevention of a thermonuclear war. In a number of industrial sectors, trade union members and retirees have created Committees To Defend Peace. Trade Unions have taken an active part in such antiwar actions as the protest march against the testing of cruise missiles in the province of Alberta.

When pointing out the undoubted change to the left in the Canadian trade union movement, one cannot fail to see the serious obstacles on the path of transforming it into a truly national militant force in view of the fact that moderate reformist elements are playing a large role in the leadership of the Canadian Worker's Congress and also in view of the unceasing intrigues by rightwing reactionary groupings in the trade union movement itself. AFL-CIO interference in its affairs is also having a negative effect on the Canadian trade union movement. The international trade unions of builders, who have been conducting subversive work for a long time in the Canadian Worker's Congress itself, trying to impose on it the reactionary AFL-CIO foreign policy and to change the democratic structure of the congress and representation in congresses, have become weapons of this interference. In the end, the Canadian branches of these trade unions left the Canadian Worker's Congress and created a separate organization in March 1982-- the Canadian Federation of Labor which is based on principles of class cooperation.

The employment problem was considerably advocated in Japan during the beginning of the Eighties because of the accumulation of economic difficulties and the slowness of the economy's development rate and its structural reorganization and modernization based on technological updating. According to official data, the number of fully unemployed reached 1.72 million in March 1983, i.e., three percent of the country's labor force.

The growth of unemployment led to a decrease in the number of trade union members in the metallurgical, chemical and textile industries and in transportation. However, during the beginning of the Eighties, the decrease in the overall number of trade union members, which had been observed since 1975, was halted basically by the trade unions of workers that were employed in trade and in the service area in general, and it was restored in 1982 to 12.47 million people (in 1975, there were 12.59 million people).

During the second half of the Seventies and the beginning of the Eighties, the activity of the leaders of the rightwing, conciliatory wing of Japan's trade union movement, which headed the trade union associations Domey (All-Japan Confederation of Labor) and the Japanese council of the International Federation of Metal Workers -- which includes the trade unions of the largest enterprises in the private sector -- intensified.

The trend toward more active work by rightwing forces in Japan's trade union movement has had a negative effect on the militancy of the workers' spring demonstrations to increase wages and to defend their other vital rights. The idea of "self-regulation" of wages in accordance with the concept "economic adaptation", which was put forward by the Domey leadership, is being popularized. Reflecting the desire of the leadership of trade unions in large private enterprises to maintain the competitive ability of Japanese monopolies in the world market, this concept expresses the essence of a "united worker front headed by private enterprise trade unions".

Besides a certain lowering of the workers' activity in the struggle for their economic interests, the trend toward the right of Japan's trade union movement is having a negative effect on their demonstrations against the Japanese-American

security treaty and the Nakasone government's policy of increasing the country's militarization.

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Thus, a number of important trends, which were caused by factors of both a domestic and international nature appeared during the beginning of the Eighties in the trade union movement in capitalist countries. An analysis of them shows that the development of the class struggle in the citadels of imperialism is posing new and complicated problems for the worker and trade union movement and, at the same time, is revealing favorable prospects for a more rapid and broader uniting of all progressive forces on an antimonopolistic basis. The professional organizations of the workers occupy by right an important place in this struggle.

The trends, which today characterize the development of the trade union movement in the developed capitalist countries, convincingly reflect the general laws of peaceful development and are an organic part of those general large-scale reforms that characterize the present stage of the class struggle. At the present time, a number of new problems which have been caused to a significant degree by the scientific and technical revolution and the realities of the nuclear age, are facing humanity. These problems, which have acquired a global nature are very directly related to the competency of trade unions and have already occupied an important place in their activity. Along with the struggle against the threat of a new war, we are talking about the struggle to defend man's living and working environment, master new sources of energy, conquer the cosmos, master the resources of the world's oceans, eliminate the most dangerous diseases, rationally and fully use natural resources, and apply the achievements of scientific and technical progress to the good of humanity.

All working people throughout the world, regardless of party affiliation, religious belief and convictions, are vitally interested in the positive solution of these social, economic and political problems. In connection with this, the responsibility of trade unions for solving all the vitally important problems, which are facing the working class and the broad working masses, is steadily increasing.

The modern trends in the trade union movement in developed capitalist countries reflect the growing role of the working class and its most popular organizations-- the trade unions -- in society's social and economic life. Despite the opposition of monopolistic capital and the bourgeois state, the trade unions are proving their capability for active mass actions in the struggle for social progress and peace on earth.

FOOTNOTES

1. For more details, cf. "The Strike Movement of Workers in Industrially Developed Capitalist Countries: Basic Trends During the Beginning of the Eighties (An Analytical Survey)", RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYIY MIR, No 2 1983, pp 110-120.

2. The workers' discussions of two trade union programs (in January and October 1982), in which only half of all the interested workers participated and only 70 percent of those present at the meetings (in January) and 89 percent (in October) took part in the voting, demonstrate this with complete obviousness.
3. In 1980, the real wages of West German workers decreased by 0.5 percent, in 1981 -- by 1.4 percent, and in 1982 -- by no less than 2 percent.

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BOOK ON REVOLUTION IN CHILE REVIEWED

Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNNY MIR in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 83 pp 186-187

[Review by A. A. Sokolov of book "Chiliyskaya revolyutsiya. Problemy i diskussii" [The Chilean Revolution: Problems and Discussion] by Yu. N. Korolev, "Mysl'", Moscow, 1982, 239 pages]

[Text] Soviet Latin American specialists (the author of the book being reviewed is among them) have repeatedly turned to an extensive study of the problems of the revolution in Chile, including the trying to understand and interpretation of its lessons in light of the sharp ideological and theoretical struggle around its ideological and political legacy. An attempt to analyze a series of very important problems during the period 1970-1973 as the component elements of a single whole-- of the phenomenon of the Chilean revolution itself -- has been undertaken in the work being reviewed by summing up the "problems and discussions" connected with the Chilean revolution.

Yu. N. Korolev's monograph has a problem-solving theoretical nature. At the same time, it is based on rich factual and documentary material and on the previous analytical and research work that has been done both by Chilean revolutionaries-- especially the communists among them -- and by the international communist movement as a whole and Soviet and progressive foreign Latin American specialists.

¹Cf., for example, Yu. N. Korolev, "Chili: problemy yedinstva demokraticheskikh i antiimperialisticheskikh sil" [Chile: Unity Problems of Democratic and Anti-Imperialist Forces], Moscow, 1973; same author, "Chili: revolyutsiya i kontrrevolyutsiya" [Chile: Revolution and Counterrevolution], Moscow, 1976; M. F. Kudachkin, "Chili: bor'ba za yedinstvo i pobedu levykh sil" [Chile: the Struggle for the Unity and Victory of the Leftwing Forces], Moscow, 1973; M. F. Kudachkin, A. V. Borisov and V. G. Tkachenko, "Chiliyskaya revolyutsiya: opyt i znachenie" [The Chilean Revolution: Experiences and Significance], Moscow, 1977; "Problemy i dvizhushchiye sily revolyutsionnogo protsessa v Latinskoj Amerike" [The Problems and Motivating Forces of the Revolutionary Process in Latin America], Moscow, 1977; "Uroki Chili" [The Lessons of Chile], Moscow 1977; and M. F. Gornov and V. G. Tkachenko, "Latinskaya Amerika: opyt narodnykh koalitsiy i klassovaya bor'ba" [Latin America: the Experience of Popular Coalitions and the Class Struggle], Moscow, 1981.

Let us look at some of the main problems examined in the work. One of these problems is the people as the main functioning character and as the creator of the revolution and its reforms. The author has managed to clearly show the effect of the political activity of the masses on the direction and course of events and on the connection of the mass movement with the political struggle at the level of party and institution power. The dynamics of the class and political forces in the revolutionary process, which developed, is presented impressively. The problem of the "majority" in the revolution as a constantly and internally changing category, which is in no way determined only arithmetically but primarily by the appraisal of the place of the different classes and social groups in public production, their influence in political life and their degree of organization, is treated in an interesting and well-reasoned manner in the book using very rich and specific material in this regard.

One of the central places has been allotted to an elucidation of the leading role of the working class in the Chilean revolution. An organized proletariat was its spirit. As is convincingly shown in the book, its activity and transforming activity affected to an enormous degree the conduct of the non-proletarian working masses and the middle layers. At the same time, the author also pays attention to the factors that hindered the proletariat's successful performance of the role of the revolution's leading force: the unequal organizational level of its different layers and groups and involvement of them in the political structure, the differences in the level of class consciousness, the influence of economism, and the orientation toward different political forces. The problem of the middle class as the ally or enemy of the proletariat is revealed in the book as the main social and political problem of the Chilean revolution. The loss by the working class of its influence on the middle class within the changing composition of the "majority" during the revolution, in the final analysis, caused its defeat.

In connection with the problem of the middle class, an independent and extremely prominent place in the book has been allotted to the Christian Democratic Party; to an explanation of the factors which determined its political line and its evolution from support of the candidacy of S. Allende in the congress to active participation in the overthrow of the National Unity government; and to casting light on the positions of the Christian Democratic Party after the September military fascist coup in 1973. This plot line in the book is one of the most thoroughly worked out ones.

The author's intense attention is attracted to the problem of the revolution's political vanguard whose role in Chile "was played not by one party but by an alliance of leftwing political parties and organizations" (p 130) headed by the Communist and Socialist Parties. This circumstance created an additional complication for the leadership of the revolutionary process. It was aggravated even more by the presence of differences between the Communist and Socialist Parties on a number of questions of strategy and tactics. "The mistakes of the revolutionary leadership led to a decrease in the leading role of the working class in the revolutionary movement and of its ability to lead the broad masses" (p 220). At the same time, Yu. N. Korolev demonstrates the

services of the Communist Party of Chile as the leading and rallying force in the revolutionary camp and its historical correctness as the theoretician of the Chilean revolution since the concept of the revolutionary process and the political line of the party were completely confirmed during the period being examined. Even after the defeat of the revolution, the Communist Party made a more valuable contribution to the attempt to understand its experiences and the causes and lessons of its defeat. This has enormous importance for the further development of the antifascist and revolutionary movement in Chile.

Yu. N. Korolev singles out two things from the general theoretical problems that acquired special importance for Chile during 1970-1973; the conditions and opportunities for the peaceful development of the revolution; the relationship between economics and politics. In the treatment of these, just as that of other problems, the author relies on Lenin's legacy. In the first case, let us point out only one factor: The author directs one's attention to the fact that a peaceful path inevitably and naturally assumes not a lessening but an aggravation of the class and political struggle. Revolutionaries must foresee this and must be prepared for it (pp 219-220). In the second case, the essence of the analysis is revealing -- in the author's words -- the "critical points" in the country's economic development during 1970-1973 and in the government's economic policy from the point of view that "economic policy should have contributed to the solution of the question of power ..." (p 60). The author thinks that in a political respect they "did not manage to solve the main economic task" although at the same time "the National Unity's economic policy could basically be considered successful..." (p 65).

The Chilean revolution, it seems, raised an important and complex problem which was not finally solved: the problem of the alignment -- and to a certain degree of the interrelationships -- of party-political and "state" leadership of the revolution, considering the complexity of the situation in the National Unity bloc. Attention is paid in the book to this aspect of the matter; however, the question deserved more detailed treatment.

More attention should have been paid to the peasants as the ally of the working class and to the small National Unity parties who are generally "not lucky" in the literature on Chile.

A number of important aspects of the subject being investigated, which are connected with the characteristics of fascism in Chile and with the revealing of its specific nature -- especially questions on its mass base and ways to organize politically and to mobilize "from above" the petty bourgeois layers who played the role of the shock forces of the counterrevolution from a social viewpoint -- are touched upon in the book. However, the questions to what degree fascism was "intended" -- theoretically, ideologically and politically -- to be the leadership of the exploiting classes and armies and what was the alignment of "the upper strata" and the "lower strata" during the stage of the struggle to overthrow the National Unity, have not been singled out. The arguments on the conditions for the victory of fascism and on the nature of the fascist regime, which do not correlate to historic reality, appear rather abstract and thus not quite convincing (pp 215-216). It is not clear what is

hidden behind the formula of the possibility of "a dictatorship in the interests of the developing national bourgeoisie" in present-day Latin America (p 212).

The treatment of the scientific, ideological and political discussions, which have unfolded around the problems of the Chilean revolution, is an integral component part of Yu. N. Korolev's monograph. Attention is directed to the fact that the author provides for the first time in Soviet literature a critical analysis of the entire spectrum of non-Marxist concepts: Besides researchers (of different orientations), Chilean political parties, their leaders, and political and state figures who are heroes and anti-heroes of the revolution, have "been attracted" to participate in the polemics on the book's pages. At the same time, unfortunately, the thesis that bourgeois historiography of the Chilean revolution is undergoing a crisis remains practically untreated since its main manifestation -- "the unusually dramatic clash of trends" (p 10) -- is not exactly pointed out.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that Yu. N. Korolev has managed in the main to solve successfully the task that was presented to him: to show the non-transient significance and greatness of the Chilean revolution. The work is sufficiently weighty in a theoretical regard and from a practical political viewpoint. It was written with sufficient content, sharply polemically, truly interestingly, and -- as they say -- expertly. The author is not only a researcher of but also an eye-witness to many of the described events.

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ARMS RACE BURDEN IN DEVELOPING WORLD

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[Article by Yuri Alexeyev, Cand, Sc. (Econ)]

[Text]

However insignificant the magnitude of the arms build-up in individual Asian, African and Latin American countries may seem, globally it is obtaining a growing importance and is not only acquiring its own internal momentum, but is also influencing different aspects of the military and economic activities of the leading world powers.

The arms race in the newly-free countries is caused by a number of internal and external factors, the latter undoubtedly playing the supreme role.

CAUSES

The counteroffensive staged by the ruling quarters of the United States and some other imperialist powers against detente during the latter half of the 1970s, and the enhanced aggressiveness and adventurism of their foreign policies brought about an aggravation of the international situation both in the world in general and in the developing regions in particular.

The stake on the war machine in the struggle against socialism and the national liberation movements is accompanied by the modernisation, construction and lease of US military bases and strong points in many areas of the world. A so-called rapid deployment force numbering over 200,000 officers and men has been put together, measures have been taken to expand direct American military presence in the Middle East and in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and "assistance" to the reactionary regimes following in the wake of the Western militaristic policy has been increased.

The US brass hats' eagerness to bolster their position by accelerating the arms race creates a great threat to peoples of the young states, and hinders their struggle for ultimate economic and social emancipation, forcing them to allocate additional and often unbearable sums for military purposes.

A multitude of internal factors linked with the specifics of their socio-economic and political processes which, more often than not, are closely intertwined with external factors or stemming from their colonial past, push the newly-free countries onto the road of greater military preparations. The following major factors which relate both to the internal and external spheres can be singled out.

—Political and social instability due to the amorphous character of the class structure and to economic backwardness. Some regimes adhering to pro-Western orientation are trying to overcome this instability by militarising social processes. As socio-economic contradictions and class struggle become more intense, these regimes ever more frequently resort to military force (and coercion in general) to preserve their position. Since the second half of the 1960s, the struggle against the revolutionary and national liberation movements—both inside a country and in the subregion—was the main reason for the steady growth of military expenditures in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and some other countries. Regular troops were used on a large scale to suppress actions by working people.

—Outstanding territorial and national-ethnic problems. The arbitrary division of states and peoples during colonial rule which was formalised when Asian and particularly African countries were granted independence, continues to be a serious source of mutual territorial claims, religious, tribal and communal contradictions and clashes. Border conflicts interlaced with the problem of national minorities were and continue to be a common phenomenon in a wide range of countries.

—Differences in the ways of development of the young states, of their forms of government, methods of guiding political and socio-economic activities, of official ideologies and foreign policies. The existence in a neighbouring country of a regime which differs basically from one's own is rather often regarded as a threat to security. Moreover, imperialist quarters have been seeking to set countries of socialist orientation and those following the capitalist road of development against one another, thereby creating definite friction between them and leading to the growth of their military-economic activities.

—The rivalry between biggest and relatively developed countries for leadership in regions or subregions in the developing world.

One should also bear in mind that many countries are waging a struggle, armed struggle included, against apartheid, for the right to independent development within their borders and within the framework of their national cultures, and for the elimination of neocolonial exploitation and dependence. The just struggle waged by the peoples of Namibia, Angola, Lebanon, Syria, Libya,

the Arab people of Palestine and others demands not only mobilisation of their own military resources, but also international support on the part of all anti-imperialist forces.

In any event, however, (to say nothing about the countries which blindly subordinate themselves to the policy of imperialist quarters) even when the military and economic preparations are well justified and are conducted for the sake of safeguarding independence and the sovereignty of young states, it is a heavy burden on their people, who face the truly formidable task of overcoming socio-economic backwardness.

SCOPE

In the 1960s, the average annual rates of growth of military expenditures in the developing countries topped seven per cent, a figure more than twice the world average during this period.¹

In the 1970s they continued to rise, reaching an average of 9 per cent (including 2.9 per cent in Africa, 4.6 per cent in South Asia, 9.3 per cent in the Far East, and 13.5 per cent in the Middle East), or 5.4 times the world average. At the same time, the gross national products (GNP) of those countries scored annual increases of only 6.6 per cent. Thus, as a result of the growing spending of resources for non-productive purposes, the growth of military expenditures outstripped the development of the material foundations of their societies.

The growth of military expenditures was particularly rapid in the countries involved in the Middle East conflict, in the oil-producing states, and also in some countries of Southeast Asia (in Kuwait by 12.6 per cent annually, in Syria—12.8 per cent, Oman—15 per cent, Saudi Arabia—19.5 per cent, Malaysia—12.9 per cent, South Korea—14.1 per cent, and in the Philippines—17.8 per cent). As for per capita figures, they also continued to grow in all regions without exception: in the Middle East—11.2 per cent annually, the Far East—6.9 per cent, South Asia—2.3 per cent, Latin America—1.7 per cent, Africa—0.2 per cent, and in all developing countries—6.6 per cent. For the OPEC countries the figure was 8.7 per cent.

In the developed capitalist states and in the world as a whole the per capita growth rate of military expenditure during that period scored a slight decrease which, however, does not signify a slower process of militarisation. What happened was that the arms race in the industrialised countries acquired new features: though the mass of accumulated and current expenditures is tremendous, the main role has come to be played not so much by the overall volume of military spending (although it is also important) as by its structure, quality and uninterruptedness, all of which are closely connected with the use of the latest scientific and technological developments.

The per capita gap in the amount of military allocations among the leading capitalist states, members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, on the one hand, and the developing countries, on the other, decreased during the abovementioned decade from 19.6:1 to 9.5:1, and between the former and the OPEC countries—from 7:1 to 2.8:1.

In absolute figures the average per capita amount of military spending in the young states is \$25 a year (\$87 in the OPEC countries), varying from several dollars in states like Burma or Cameroon (\$4 and \$6, respectively) to amounts which considerably exceed the expenditures of the developed industrialised countries: \$1,088 in Saudi Arabia, \$930 in Oman, \$270 in Iran, \$130-180 in Singapore, Iraq and Syria against \$302 in the FRG, \$215 in Britain, and \$93 in Italy.

The overall spending of the developing countries for military purposes amounted to \$65 billion in 1980, having thus almost trebled since 1969. All in all, from 1969 to 1980 they spent \$450 billion for military purposes, which is equal to the total of the GNPs of all African and South Asian countries for 1980.

For a number of reasons it is possible to calculate only approximately the young states' share in the world expenditures on armaments. At the same time, the data available makes it possible to describe the trend of its change: 6.2 per cent in 1969, about 12 per cent in 1978, and approximately 16 per cent in 1980. If we take the

Table 1
Military Expenditures in the Developing World by Region
(in per cent)

Regions	Years		
	1969	1978	1980*
Africa	16.1	9.5	11.0
Middle East	39.0	55.4	53.0
Far East	14.7	14.9	19.0
South Asia	12.6	8.5	6.9
Latin America	17.6	11.7	10.1
Total:	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Estimated

Calculated on the basis of *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969-1978*. US Government Printing Office, December 1980, pp. 1-7; *World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1981*, London, 1981, pp. 156-161.

non-socialist world alone, the figures will be 11.9 per cent, 28.2 per cent and about 35 per cent respectively.

The distribution of the military spending in various regions changed as follows (see Table 1).

In the 1970s as a result of the curtailment and discontinuation of war in Indochina and the relative stabilisation of relations between Pakistan and India after the 1971 conflict, the share of South and Southeast Asian countries in the aggregate military spending went down. A similar trend was registered in Africa and Latin America, while the share of the states of the Middle East, many of which had been drawn into the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict, sharply increased. The "contribution" of Iran and Saudi Arabia is particularly impressive: in 1969 and 1978 these two countries accounted for 20 per cent and 37 per cent, respectively, of military expenditures of all young states.

If Iran and Saudi Arabia are excluded from the 25 developing countries that are strongest militarily and the data on the military spending in 1969 and 1978 is compared, one can note a smaller concentration of these expenditures, and their evening out among the leading countries in separate regions. For example, in 1969 the top three developing countries in military spending accounted for 24 per cent of all such spending, another five countries—for 35 per cent, fifteen—for 60 per cent, and twenty-three—for 68 per cent. In 1978, the top three countries accounted for only about 15 per cent, fifteen—for 45 per cent, and twenty-three—for 53 per cent.

The levelling out of constantly growing military budgets both in the developing world as a whole and in different regions, is essentially another aspect of the arms race. The stabilisation of the military and economic preparations at a new, higher level is inevitably fraught with greater destabilisation. In view of the contemporary atti-

tude to a "threat", the developing countries, sometimes even unwillingly, acquire additional reasons for regional, subregional, group and other kinds of rivalry.

Being behind the developed countries, in the absolute amount of military allocations, many young states maintain a high level of resource mobilisation for military purposes relative to their economic potentialities. By 1974 they had caught up with the developed capitalist countries in the per cent of the GNP allocated for military spending, afterwards surpassing them with the exception of the USA and Britain. In 1978 the young states were channelling 4.4 per cent of their gross national product to the military sphere (on the average), or 20 per cent more than the OECD countries (see Table 2).

Table 2.
Military Expenditures as a Share of the GNP of the Developing Countries and the Countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (in per cent)

Regions	Years		
	1969	1974	1978
Africa	3.4	2.7	2.9
Middle East	7.8	9.1	11.2
Far East	4.0	3.8	4.4
Latin America	1.7	1.8	1.4
South Asia	3.3	3.2	3.3
All Developing Countries	3.6	3.9	4.4
including OPEC countries	6.0	6.7	7.9
OECD Countries	5.3	4.0	3.6

Calculated on the basis of *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers. 1969-1978*.

Military allocations as a share of the GNP fluctuates within a rather broad range—from 0.4 per cent to 16 per cent. The "upper echelon" consists of the countries producing energy raw materials: Saudi Arabia (16.1 per cent), Iran (14.2 per cent) and Iraq (9.1 per cent); the countries bearing the brunt of the Middle East conflict: Syria (15.7 per cent) and Jordan (12.5 per cent), as well as some countries and territories drawn into the global militaristic plans of imperialism (Taiwan, South Korea, Pakistan, and others). The lower echelon includes Ghana (0.4 per cent), Mexico (0.5 per cent), Zaire and Columbia (0.7 per cent), Niger (0.8 per cent), Brazil (0.9 per cent), and a number of small countries.

Differences among regions are also very prominent. The share of the Middle East countries has grown immeasurably: it exceeds the average index in the developing world by 150 per cent.

At the turn of the 1980s the developing countries earmarked more than 20 per cent of their aggregate state budgets for military purposes, including Middle East countries—25 per cent, South Asia—20 per cent, Africa—15 per cent, and Latin America—13 per cent. On the whole, the young states began spending on military preparations the same share of the budget as the industrialised capitalist states and even exceeded the latter in recent years. According to the above index, the biggest military spenders are Oman (47 per cent), Taiwan (34 per cent), Argentina (30 per cent), South Korea (28 per cent), Iran and Saudi Arabia (27 per cent).

These allocations are mainly spent on the maintenance of the armed forces and purchases of military hardware abroad. The numerical strength of the armed forces of the

developing countries increased by 80 per cent in 1963-1979, and reached 8.6 million officers and men. Today there are four servicemen per each ten workers employed in the manufacturing industry. Imports of arms grew on average by 16 per cent annually in the 1970s topping \$13.5 billion worth by the end of that period.

AFTERMATH

While referring to different quantitative estimates, many Western analysts assert that, while the economy is undergoing relatively rapid growth, state expenditures on

social needs are being increased and a surplus of labour exists, all of which are characteristic of the newly-free countries, military spending does not adversely affect either the rate of economic growth or the sphere of social infrastructure. Moreover, it has been frequently voiced that those expenditures have a "positive" influence on industrialisation, employment, education and state construction. Obviously insufficient attention is paid to the far-reaching economic consequences of military spending which distorts the priorities of development, or this subject is ignored altogether.²

Military expenditures of the young states contain in themselves a much greater element of "lost opportunities" than is the case in the developed countries. The less the economic and industrial basis of society is developed, the heavier is the actual burden of formally equal (as regards the GNP) military expenditures, and the stronger is their pernicious influence on the national economy.

Greater investments as a result of a reduction of military budgets could have substantially accelerated the rates of economic growth of the developing countries and diminished the gap between them and the developed states. Estimates show that to eliminate extreme poverty and bridge the gap in the per capita income from 1:13 to 1:7, the volume of capital investments in the young states should be increased by up to 30-35 per cent of the GNP by the end of the 20th century.³ Today military expenditures in those countries amount to 20-30 per cent of the gross domestic investments in civilian branches. This antagonistic competition is exacerbating as greater investments become necessary in housing, reconstruction of cities, medical care, education, agriculture, power industry and environmental protection.

Military spending by the developing countries swallows approximately as much money as is earmarked on education and medical care taken together.⁴

Military expenditures (to be more precise, the money paid in the form of salaries to the servicemen, and of wages to those employed in the sphere of military production and maintenance of the army) are inflationary in the sense that the recreation of additional purchasing power is not accompanied by an increase in the production of consumer goods. The incompatibility between demand and possibilities of its satisfaction results in increased prices in all spheres of economy. When the military spending is paid for by means of deficit financing, inflation results due to the corresponding increase of money in circulation and the growth of the state debt.

There are those in the West and in the developing countries who to this day argue that military spending is an efficient method for maintaining and increasing employment or, at least, for alleviating the consequences of unemployment. In fact, military expenditures contribute to the growth of unemployment, rather than diminish it. The view that they create employment to the same extent as civilian expenditures is false. Of late this view has been subjected to ever stronger criticism. From the standpoint of using manpower resources, it should be noted that the growing number of skilled workers and specialists are being involved in production and

development of armaments and military hardware. As a rule, the educational and professional level of workers directly or indirectly employed in military industry is higher than the national average and, consequently, they could have ensured a higher labour productivity in the civilian branches of economy.

Substantial purchases of arms abroad are a heavy burden on the trade and payment balances of the young states. Unlike the imports of civilian commodities, they in no way promote either growth of production or consumption. More often than not, the meagre export earnings that could have been spent on purchases of new technology and the payment of external debts and credits are spent on arms.

The undermining of relations among states is the crucial aftermath of the arms race.¹ The drawing of the newly-free countries into the global military confrontation engenders an atmosphere of tension and mistrust in many regions, creates grounds for unity between the right-wing regimes and imperialist blocs and alliances, for direct or indirect interference in the domestic affairs of other states, and touches off conflicts which, in turn, whip up military-economic activities.

The growing role of the military factor in the domestic policies and international relations of many young states deprives them of the favourable prerequisites for a peaceful settlement of disputes, and the strengthening of political and economic cooperation. Thus, for example, the implementation of the programme of economic cooperation between the developing countries, adopted at the Group-77 Conference in Mexico in 1976, is hampered. The same is true of creating close interaction at a sub-regional and regional levels.

The intrusion of the military and strategic considerations in the sphere of trade reduces the latter's volume and distorts its structure. More often than not, the granting by Western powers of aid for development has political and military strings attached. The aid is frequently regarded as a means of intensifying militaristic trends in the young states, obtaining military bases, and gaining access to the strategically significant areas and sources of raw materials.

The growth of military expenditures in the newly-free countries on the whole competes substantially with the programmes of economic and social development, aggravates disproportions in the economy between the civilian and the military spheres in favour of the latter, worsens the living standard of the population, and undermines prospects for development. It can hardly be imagined that, while the arms race is under way, a just international division of labour and mutually beneficial international trade can be secured, when all countries, without any discrimination on a military, strategic or other basis, could have equal access to credit markets, sources of raw materials and other means of economic development and cooperation.

Consistently and purposefully, the Soviet Union has been struggling for a reduction of the military and military-economic activities throughout the world. Andrei Gromyko, Member of the Political Bureau, CPSU Central Committee, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, noted at the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in June 1982: "Disarmament is a reliable road not only to safe, but also to more prosperous living conditions of the peoples. Progress in the field of disarmament would make it possible to save huge means by freezing and even reducing military bud-

gets." Disarmament would not only put an end to the unproductive squandering of resources by the developing countries themselves. Part of the means saved by the leading powers in the military and economic spheres could be given as aid to the developing countries.

Ever broader awareness in the newly-free countries themselves concerning the negative impact of the arms buildup on socio-economic development makes them natural allies of the USSR and other socialist states in the struggle for a discontinuation of the arms race and for disarmament. The initiatives set forth by the peaceloving Asian, African, and Latin American countries are close to many provisions of the Soviet Peace Programme for the 1980s, adopted by the 26th Congress of the CPSU. They primarily include the halting of the strategic arms race and of all nuclear tests; the convocation of a world conference on disarmament, whose main task would be to secure universal and complete disarmament under an efficient international control, primarily, the banning and elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction; creation of zones of peace in different areas of the world; dismantling of imperialist military bases on other countries' territories; putting an end to the inflow of conventional weapons to non-nuclear states that threatens the security of nonaligned countries and creates tension in some developing regions; prevention of the militarisation of the ocean floor, etc.

There is growing conviction in the young states that the discontinuation of the arms race and disarmament which would make it possible not only to avoid a thermonuclear disaster, but also to switch their resources from the military sphere to the needs of socio-economic and cultural progress, both globally and on a regional scale, is an objective must of our day and age.

This view was voiced by spokesmen of the newly-free countries at the World Assembly for Peace and Life, Against Nuclear War (June 1983) where they opposed the senseless wasting of material and spiritual wealth of the mankind which the latter needs urgently to fight famine, disease, illiteracy and to resolve social, energy, raw material and economic problems.

¹ The data on military expenditures of the developing countries, the rates of their growth, their share in the world spending, and so on, which we are citing, differ from those which can be found in the well-known statistics published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the London Institute for Strategic Studies since these organisations place the socialist countries of Asia, Cuba, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania and some South European states and Israel in the category of developing states. Here and after, all cost indices have been calculated by the author on the basis of the abovementioned sources in 1977 prices.

² See, for example, E. Benoit, *Defence and Economic Growth in Developing Countries*, Lexington, 1973; D. K. Whynes, *The Economics of Third World Military Expenditure*, London, 1979; S. Newman, "Security, Military Expenditures and Socio-Economic Development: Reflection on Iran", *Orbis*, 1978, No. 3, pp. 569-594.

³ See W. Leontieff et al., *The Future of the World Economy*, New York, 1977, p. 11.

⁴ For details see Yu. Alexeyev, "Disarmament and Development", *Asia and Africa Today*, 1981, No. 4.

⁵ For details see *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures*, UN, New York, 1978, pp. 58-71.

THE PENTAGON'S PLANS FOR THE RED SEA

Moscow ASIA AND AFRICA TODAY in English No 4, Jul-Aug 83 pp 15-17

[Article by Nikolai Tarasov]

[Text]

More than eleven years ago, in December 1971, the 26th Session of the UN General Assembly adopted a Declaration on proclaiming the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. However, neither this idea, nor other peace initiatives concerning the Indian Ocean and the Middle East have been realised as yet due to the militaristic policy of the imperialist powers, above all the USA. This country's activities demonstrate that based on the Camp David accords and outside the framework of this deal, the US seeks to expand its presence in Southwest Asia and Northeast Africa, including the Red Sea. This inevitably leads to infringements upon the sovereignty of the states situated in that area and constitutes a clear threat to their security.

The Red Sea,¹ as a natural extension of the Indian Ocean at the junction of Asia and Africa occupies an important place in the global strategy of the USA, dedicated to the struggle against the USSR and its allies. Despite the fact that, as admitted by US Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf are close to the Soviet Union and far from the United States (a reality that one would be hard put to deny!), they have been proclaimed "a sphere of vital interests" of the USA.

The myth of a "Soviet military threat" has been used repeatedly as an ideological cover for Washington's military preparations. A certain document, "New Inter-American Policy for the '80s", prepared by the so-called Santa Fe Committee for the Council of Inter-American Security in May 1980, that is, long before Ronald Reagan's final nomination as Presidential candidate from the Republican Party,

stated that America should seize the initiative in the region, for the threat of losing Middle East oil supplies and the potential blockade of sea routes across the Indian Ocean (?) along with the alleged luring of mineral-rich Southern Africa into the Soviet orbit as a satellite, were but a prelude to the "Finlandisation"² of Western Europe and the alienation of Japan.

Having come to power, the Reagan Administration emphasised the build-up of American military might near the Persian Gulf area, and decided to augment considerably and promptly implement the Carter Plan to acquire military bases on the approaches to the Arabian oilfields, and to create a "rapid deployment force"—a militaristic tool of the present-day colonialist policy intended to serve as an international policeman and to invade alien territories. The Pentagon has started feverish activity in the Red Sea, listed as the "third central strategic zone"

for the USA (the other two being Western Europe and the Middle East).

According to the French paper *Le Monde*, the United States is seeking to fill in the "strategic vacuum", allegedly formed as a result of "unfavourable turns of events for Washington", among which the paper singles out the departure of Great Britain from the south of the Arabian Peninsula and the overthrow of the monarchy in Ethiopia. Thus the Pentagon immediately set out to acquire and build military and naval bases intended to become "strong points" of American control over the Red Sea and the northwestern part of the Indian Ocean—regions the US Defence Department considers, according to the well-known specialist on the law of

the sea M. Besborois, to be an ideal bridgehead for deploying missile systems against the Soviet Union. All the bases situated on the territories of Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Oman, and Kenya should interact, not only with each other, but also with the base on Diego Garcia Island which the Pentagon has made a central link and a key point for the deployment of US nuclear weapons.

Moreover, the United States has set itself the task of linking the Indian Ocean with the Atlantic and Pacific in a global military system under its direct control. As one magazine put it, the US goal here is one of "closing the jaws of a gigantic crocodile", i. e. connecting the military bases and fleets of the USA into a continuous arc stretching from West to East across the three oceans.

Undoubtedly, the main US ally in the Middle East is Israel, with which an agreement on "strategic collaboration" was concluded in September 1981; shortly afterwards, a memorandum on mutual understanding in the sphere of strategic collaboration was signed. From the very beginning, the progressive Arab and African public has been aware of the link between the Camp David "settlement" and the US intention to knock together an even broader military and political alliance in the Red Sea area under its aegis.

During the working out of and particularly after concluding the Camp David deal, Egypt became one of the largest recipients of American military aid and an important US partner in the Middle East and in Africa. Over the last seven years, the United States granted Egypt loans and subsidies to the tune of \$ 8.7 billion, and in 1982 Egypt ordered \$ 3.5 billion worth of American weaponry. Since 1975, US warships have called to Egyptian ports more than 200 times. Whereas in 1980 two thousand officers and men of the US armed forces took part in joint exercises on Egyptian territory, in 1981 their number nearly tripled, and since April 1982, the rapid deployment force has been stationed in the Sinai on a permanent basis and constitutes the backbone of the so-called "peace keeping force" introduced there upon the withdrawal of Israeli troops. The Egyptian government cannot unilaterally demand their removal since, under the Camp David deal, this requires the consent of Washington and Tel Aviv. In this fashion, along with the expansion of military aid, the US is seeking to bind Egypt closer to itself, which explains US fears following the

death of Sadat, who was known as a true champion of White House policies.

In addition to the strategic bridgehead on the Sinai, the USA intends to keep military personnel who went into Lebanon in August 1982 during the Israeli aggression, although this personnel was officially to remain only 30 days to supervise the withdrawal of the Palestinians from besieged West Beirut. Israel is helping its patron—actually an accomplice in the aggression—"open up" yet another military bridgehead.

Simultaneously with the signing of the Camp David "peace treaty", Tel Aviv and Cairo defined the framework of collaboration between their intelligence services. According to information leaked to the press, the secret services of Israel, Egypt and South Africa held a conference in Egypt in September 1981 to examine plans for coordinating their intelligence and counter-intelligence activities, in particular, for creating a mobile secret network of agents in the Red Sea states for the special purpose of penetrating their military circles at all levels.

The Pentagon attaches great importance to the Egyptian Ras-Banas base on the Red Sea coast, assigning it the role of a trans-shipping point for the rapid deployment force. It will be reconstructed to accommodate, if need be, 16 thousand troops. According to the American press, the US has already allocated \$ 400 million of a total \$2.6 billion planned for the modernisation of Ras-Banas: this will be the most costly project of the US military abroad since the Vietnam war. "Special rights" are being negotiated for American servicemen at the base beforehand to make them practically exempt from Egyptian legislation.

The Washington Post wrote that the Ras-Banas base is necessary not only to Egypt, but also to Saudi Arabia and the entire region (from the American point of view, of course). Nor has Saudi Arabia, the largest oil producer and exporter in the developing world, been left out of the USA's militaristic plans for the Red Sea. The Pentagon has officially notified Congress of its intention to sell to the Saudis ten tactical reconnaissance planes and five Phantom-5 fighter planes in addition to the Air-Borne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and other military hardware worth a total of \$8.5 billion, which have already been delivered. All in all, El-Riyadh has spent more than \$35 billion for the purchase of American armaments in the postwar period, while the servicing of all this hardware requires the presence of 500 US servicemen in Saudi Arabia.

In March 1982, the then US Secretary of State Alexander Haig, outlining to the Senate the draft American foreign-"aid" programme for the 1982-1983 fiscal year, stated bluntly that the Reagan administration regarded this programme as an important element for the attainment of its strategic goals in various regions, including the Red Sea. The chief recipient of this "aid" is again Israel which will get about \$ 2.5 billion of the \$ 13.3 billion total. Haig described the strengthening of the Sudanese regime's military machine also as "vitally important" to US interests; some \$230 million has been allocated for this country.

The Sudan, ruled by the anti-popular dictatorship of Jaafar al-Nimeiry, is, territorially, the largest African state, with an extended coast line on the Red Sea and common borders with Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Chad, Egypt, and Libya. In the opinion of Pentagon experts, it occupies a key strategic position in Northeast Africa. The Arab press has repeatedly reported that US and Egyptian naval and air bases are already functioning along the Sudanese strip of the Red Sea coast. Some of them have been designed as "non-traditional" facilities intended for the early accumulation and storage of armaments for the rapid deployment force and in particular for the American contingent of the multinational force in the Sinai.

Washington is encouraging the development of military collaboration between Egypt and the Sudan, which signed a "mutual defence" treaty in 1976. "Egyptian deliveries of missiles to the Sudan," says the Paris magazine *Afrique-Asie*, "should be evaluated only in the context of the global strategy of the USA."

In October 1982 the Sudan and Egypt agreed on integration in the political, socio-economic and military fields. The two countries' "Unification Charter" envisages, among other things, coordination of actions in the international arena and the implementation of a "single strategy" in the sphere of defence and security. The

process of integration will be completed within a decade.

Al-Akhal, published by the Egyptian National-Progressive (Left) Party, voiced its alarm over the part of the Charter concerned with "questions of strategy". Thus, the Egyptian Defence Minister stated that the two countries will have a "containment force", since allegedly, there is a threat to their security from the Horn of Africa. Actually this means, Al-Akhal wrote, that Egypt will support the Sudan in any military conflict, including those into which Khartoum plunges the country every time internal disorders arise.

If one adds to this that questions of military cooperation (even including the establishment of a joint command) have been repeatedly discussed of late by top officials of Egypt and Somalia, one begins to discern increasingly clearly the contours of a potential, largely real, military alliance between Egypt, the Sudan and Somalia, in which the USA would probably like to involve Saudi Arabia as well. Of course, bearing in mind the events in Lebanon and the Arab world's reaction, it is too early to tell how Washington's idea of creating a bloc of Red Sea states will shape up organisationally. But this idea has not yet been relegated to the archives.

Stretching along a narrow strip of the Red Sea coast south of the Sudan is the Ethiopian province of Eritrea. As the London-based *The New African* magazine pointed out, situated between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, controlling the passage from the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb into the Gulf of Aden, and with an 800-kilometre-long Red Sea coast and two large ports, Eritrea is of tremendous strategic value. But, what a thorn in the side of the Pentagon! In 1978, at the insistence of the Provisional Military Administrative Council of Socialist Ethiopia (PMAC), the United States was forced to abandon its Asmara base, leased from the imperial regime under a 1953 "mutual defence" agreement. The USA allocated the Emperor \$65 million for its construction. The base, permanently manned by a 1,500-strong US contingent served, according to the September 1981 issue of *Meskerem* magazine published in Addis Ababa, "as a station for monitoring Soviet missiles and strategic communication", and also for aiding the monarchic regime in suppressing anti-government actions by the predominantly Muslim population of Eritrea.

Following the Ethiopian revolution of 1974 and the PMAC's adoption of a democratic programme for resolving the nationalities question in the country—a programme envisaging autonomy as a form of Eritrean self-determination—the separatist movement, formerly objectively spearheaded against the feudal-absolutist regime, completely lost any progressive content and was directed against the stability and territorial integrity of revolutionary Ethiopia. It was precisely for this reason that the separatists began enjoying ever broader support from Arab states with conservative regimes and, secretly, from the United States, which thereby made an about-turn on its Eritrean policy. The PMAC justly regards outside

aid to the few separatist groups still operating in the province as "direct interference by imperialism and Arab reactionaries in the internal affairs of Socialist Ethiopia".

Apart from the "Eritrean issue", the country's leadership has to give much attention to the "Ogaden problem" for the desire of Somali ruling circles (despite the crushing defeat sustained by the Siad Barre regime in the aggressive war of 1977-1978) to create a "Greater Somalia" incorporating the Ethiopian Province of Ogaden, as well as parts of the territories of Kenya and Jibouti. This ambition of Somalia is still a source of tension in the interstate relationships in the Horn of Africa. The USA is giving every encouragement to these annexionist claims. From June to September 1982 it provided direct support in the form of arms deliveries (via the Diego Garcia-Mogadishu airlifts) to the Somali regime when its existence was seriously threatened by insurgents fighting for the democratisation of the country and against the American military presence. The Pentagon is continually enlarging the Somali port of Berbera as a base for the rapid deployment force and US navy vessels.

The joint Soviet-Ethiopian communique on the results of a visit to the USSR by PMAC Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam in October 1982 emphasises: "Having studied the situation in the Horn of Africa, the Soviet Union and Socialist Ethiopia ... declare that they come out resolutely against the creation of foreign bases in the Horn of Africa and adjacent regions. They believe that deliveries of American arms to Somalia constitute a direct and grave threat to Ethiopia and also to the peace and security of the countries of this region."

It is only natural that Ethiopia is taking defensive measures in response. In August 1981, it concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Libya and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Article 4 of that document states that the three countries "will oppose the machinations and intrigues of the participants in the Camp

David accords". A political committee set up under the Treaty expressed the firm resolve of the parties to oppose the aggressive course of the United States and to take the necessary measures for countering the conspiracies of international imperialism, neocolonialism, and Zionism.

In summary we must note the increasing aggressiveness of US policy as regards the Red Sea area and the

fact that certain conservative or openly reactionary regimes are playing into the hands of American imperialism; fearing for their home stability these regimes see no other way out than to reject the lip-service they formerly paid to "anti-imperialism" to deceive their own peoples; they have subsequently gone over to full-scale collaboration with the United States, which is eagerly offering its service.

This is nothing but a manifestation of "local imperialism", a tendency noted by Lenin on the eve of the First World War in comparatively small and weak states dependent on major imperialist vultures to conduct "their own" imperialist policies in some particular region. At the same time, this broadens US opportunities for direct militaristic actions, since the aforementioned regimes appeal to it. "Global" and "local" imperialisms are not simply interconnected—the former directs and determines the latter. The tasks of the struggle against them are the same.

The harder Washington tries to militarise the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, the greater the force countering these dangerous designs must be.

Urging the speediest implementation of the UN Declaration on proclaiming the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, the Soviet Union, like all peace-loving littoral states, backed the UN Resolution to convene a conference on the matter in the first half of 1983. To realise the idea of turning the region into a zone of peace, the solidarity and persistence of all the inspirers and champions of this initiative are especially needed now.

¹ The Red Sea (actually a gulf of the Indian Ocean up to 165 nautical miles wide and 1,045 nautical miles long) and the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, whose coasts provide nine Arab and African states with outlets to the sea, serve as a natural extension of the sea lanes from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal. These are international waters open for free navigation, recognised as early as 1888 by the Constantinople Convention aimed at regulating navigation through the Suez Canal—one of the most important sea shipping arteries which greatly shortens the route from Europe to Asia and Australia, as compared with the previous route around Africa. The Constantinople Convention has no expiration date.

² This apparently refers to the good relations that have historically developed between the USSR and Finland.

ISRAELI ECONOMIC INVOLVEMENT SEEN HARMFUL TO LEBANON

Moscow ASIA AND AFRICA TODAY in English No 4, Jul-Aug 83 pp 18-20

[Article by Alexei Fyodorov]

[Text]

There is a border post at the extreme south of Lebanon, near the town of Naqura. Shaky wooden gates, a fence with barbed wire.... Somewhat farther, on a small hill, the muzzles of heavy machine-guns are seen looking over the sacks with sand. That is the territory of Israel. On this side, at the entrance to the Lebanese territory, there is a dirty board on the gates with an inscription made by somebody in Arabic: "Welcome".

And in June 1982 the Israeli tank columns were moving through Naqura for three hot days running, being certainly unwelcome.

More than 19,000 Lebanese and Palestinians fell victim of the aggression, about 32,000 were wounded, and 600,000 remained homeless. The material losses incurred by the Lebanese economy amount to \$4 billion. However, according to M. Atallah, Chairman of the Presidential Council for the Development and Reconstruction of Lebanon, the country will need no less than \$12 billion to make for the losses sustained in the war. According to the estimates of the Beirut Trade and Industrial Chamber, Lebanon's GNP in 1982 fell by 25 per cent over 1981, i. e., to the late 1960s level. This means that the Israeli aggression hurled the economy of Lebanon back 15 years.

Today Tel Aviv favours a "normalisation of relations" with Lebanon. However, it even does not think to discontinue its occupation of Lebanon's southern areas. The former Israeli Defence Minister A. Sharon, who became a skilled hand at "developing" Arab lands while being Minister of Agriculture, stated: "Today all keep talking about a withdrawal of the troops.... I for one believe that it is the normalisation that matters now."

What did the Zionist "hawk" who is responsible, together with Begin,

for the bloody outrages in Lebanon have in mind? "Normalisation", Israeli style, is, among other things, "the opening of the Lebanese borders to the Israeli commodities", "the right to control the Lebanese territorial waters and air space", and so on. This is precisely how the Israeli terms are formulated. It was not by chance that they were regarded in Beirut as an infringement on the sovereignty of Lebanon and a direct threat to the latter's economy.

The Israeli troops occupy the land right beyond the southern suburbs of the Lebanese capital. The road signs in Arabic disappeared from the road leading via the ancient towns of Saïda (Sidon) and Sur (Tyre) to Naqura. Now one comes across inscriptions in Hebrew at the crossroads and the entrances to villages and towns. At the border (it is considered to be officially opened by Israel since December 17, 1982) one can see huge trailers carrying tanks to Lebanese territory. They are followed by trucks loaded with bananas. Nearby Israeli workers are widening a Lebanese section of the road leading to the border. Behind these purely external impressions there is a phenomenon which is nothing but economic aggression.

Israeli leaders instigated the armed invasion in Lebanon out of the desire to ensure "peace for Galilee", that is, for the northern areas of Israel. Even then there were very few people who doubted that, while talking about the "security" of Israel, Tel Aviv and Washington were seeking to deliver a crushing blow to the PLO and the Lebanese national-patriotic forces, and to impose on Lebanon a "peace" of the Camp David type. One of the chief components of such a "peace" is the expansion of Zionist capital, which is cramped not only within the borders

of Israel, but also within the Arab territories which it is "developing", and the consolidation — of course, at somebody else's expense — of Israeli economy.

I recollect the days just before the aggression was launched. Spring arrived late in 1982, and the peasants grew concerned about the harvest. The city dwellers were also alarmed, for the villages feed the towns, and should misfortune occur in the countryside, then the people in towns, who live a hard enough life as it is, would suffer from new price rises and fresh hardships and difficulties.

However, spring came, exuberant and luxurious. People chuckled in the streets and coffee houses of Beirut while smoking their hookahs: the merchants would be unable to raise the prices because every day the countryside just flooded towns with vegetables and fruit.

The Lebanese felt complacent: almost a year had passed since they had been subjected to aggression from Israel; that cruel southern neighbour of theirs apparently left them alone. Life was flowing more or less smoothly, and hopes for a better future, fragile like the early spring sprouts, began to appear.

However, the Lebanese have never lived by hope alone. They are enterprising and energetic people. As soon as the political skies became clearer, businessmen started their quest for profits that (and local businessmen know this) must be snatched in Lebanon during periods of calm. Tower cranes mushroomed in Beirut, and new buildings were being built wherever possible. Of course, the life of the Lebanese was different: somebody earned millions, others went bankrupt. Whatever it might be, there was brisk business activity.

Since the very first days of their invasion in Lebanon the Israelis plunged into trade. As soon as they had seized the south of Lebanon, the occupationists began bringing in different commodities across the border. Bank

Leumi began opening offices in south Lebanese towns. In July, i. e., at the peak of hostilities near Beirut, representatives of Israeli companies, seeking to outstrip one another, began penetrating the western sector to offer their "services" to local businessmen.

I am turning over the pages of my diary of the war days. Here is an entry dated June 20: "In a US television interview Begin said that he hoped to soon conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon. Israeli Minister of Economics Y. Meridor was even more specific: he hoped to meet his counterpart from Lebanon 'in several days' to start governmental-level negotiations on cooperation. But Israeli

businessmen did not desire to wait. During the two weeks since the invasion they sold in Tyre, Saida and Nabatiye, 50,000 litres of fuel, dozens of tons of flour and potatoes. The former attaché on agricultural matters to the Israeli Embassy in Washington was entrusted to coordinate trade with the occupied parts of Lebanon."

Today, after the so-called peace treaty imposed on Lebanon with US aid has been concluded, trucks with commodities from Israel are passing the Naqura border point every day. Lebanese producers feel strong Israeli competition at the local market. One can witness the unloading of fruit boxes bearing Hebrew inscriptions at shop entrances in Beirut. True, the package has often been changed before. According to the data provided by the Board of the Commerce and Industry Chamber of Beirut, a number of Lebanese businessmen conduct illegal import via the Israeli port of Haifa, thereby inflicting considerable damage on the economy of Lebanon and reducing state treasury currency earnings from custom dues.

It is the Lebanese agriculture that suffers most from the influx of Israeli goods. Local intermediaries ceased to purchase agricultural produce from peasants. The prices dropped lower than the production costs. Al-Safir reported that in mountainous regions of Lebanon and in many other areas quite a few farmers found themselves on the verge of bankruptcy.

...Suf was once a most beautiful and wealthy district of Lebanon. The majority of the peasants here derive their main source of income from the famous Lebanese apples. Last autumn they harvested a bumper crop but there is no joy in the eyes of the gardeners. "We are unable to sell our produce," says Shukri Wazen, a farmer from Beit-al-Din. "The roads to Arab countries — Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait — have been closed down since Israeli aggressors are bossing around in the northern part of Be'ca valley near the border with Syria. Until recently neither sea nor air transport was in operation. It is not always possible to get to Beirut too, and of course, there are no customers on the spot." Gandur Hanna, his neighbour, is also of the opinion that the season is lost for the farmers because of the Israeli invasion and occupation. "We suffer great losses because apples, grapes, pears, and plums are harvested and brought to our market from Israel earlier than Lebanese fruit", he adds.

Lebanese have a special attitude to the olive, a quite hardy tree which they call a "widow's tree". However, the harvest had not yet been reaped when Israeli olives and olive oil were on sale at the local market.

Imad, an old acquaintance of mine, an official from the Ministry of Education, arrived from Rasheiyah at the foot of the Jabal ash-Shaykh Mountain (Hermon) in the occupied South. He said that Israel's economic expansion was developing along the two following lines: first, the export of Israeli goods, and, second, the encouragement of imports by the Lebanese merchants of products from third countries via the Israeli port of Haifa, where the custom dues — only for Lebanese imports — are 25 per cent lower than in the Beirut seaport. Moreover, the Israelis are in a hurry to build three ports in the zone controlled by their puppet Haddad.

Due to the "open-doors" policy pursued by the occupationists in Lebanon, hard times have come not only for agriculture. There are rumours that some enterprises of the food industry will be closed. This would pose a threat for thousands of people employed in that branch.

It is indicative that Israeli goods in Lebanon are cheaper than local ones. Why is it so? In replying to this question, Tallal Marabi, MP, stated that the Israeli government subsidised exports to Lebanon, i. e., covered the difference between the actual and the dumping

prices. During the six months after the invasion of Lebanon the subsidies amounted to \$50 million.

This is done at the time when in Israel itself the prices are permanently sky-rocketing, and the fiscal year completed on the 1st of April was marked by a huge deficit. This actually implies a deliberate undermining of the Lebanese national economy by Israel. In an interview to the Beirut weekly **Monday Morning** the Lebanese Minister of Economics Ibrahim Halaoui stated that the illegal sales of the Israeli agricultural produce would ruin many Lebanese farmers and workers in the agrarian sector. The sales of Israeli industrial goods, he added, might result in the closure of Lebanese factories and greater unemployment. There is an impression that Israel has not given up its long-standing claims on the water resources in the south of Lebanon.

After the conclusion of the US-Israeli-Lebanese agreement, the new, "businesslike" forms of Israeli expansionism vis-à-vis Lebanon, an invariably aggressive and hostile policy covered up in Tel Aviv by the rhetorics about "normalisation", are becoming increasingly clear.

BEIRUT

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POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF ALGERIAN LEADER BOUMEDIENNE PUBLISHED

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[Article by Elena Mironova, Cand. Sc. (Hist.), and Igor Smirnov, Cand. Sc. (Hist.)]

[Text]

Associated with the name of Houari Boumedienne (1932-1978), one of the organisers of the People's Revolutionary Army and a leader of the liberation struggle of the Algerian people, an outstanding statesman and politician of independent Algeria, are many years in the history of that country which has embarked on the road of deep-going socio-economic transformations.

Houari Boumedienne (his real name is Mohamed Boukharouba) was born on August 23, 1932,* near the town of Guelma in the northeast of Algeria. The elder child in a family with another five children, Mohamed early learned the burdens of poverty. His father, a ruined peasant, had to work at the farms of European colonialists. Though the family could hardly make ends meet, he managed to send his elder son to a "native school". Mohamed was thirteen when the Second World War came to an end. In 1945 the colonialists bloodily suppressed a peaceful demonstration which the Algerians organised on May 8 to mark the victory of the countries of the anti-Hitlerite coalition over Nazi Germany. This event determined all his future life. Mohamed Boukharouba realised that nothing but the armed struggle can liberate his compatriots.

At fourteen, continuing his education at the Kettania madrasah (the town of Konstantine), Mohamed Boukharouba became an activist of the proscribed Party of the Algerian People (since October 1946 it resumed legal activities under the title of the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Freedoms). This party, which united petty-bourgeois elements and part of the Algerian proletariat, demanded the granting of independence to Algeria and the implementation of progressive

socio-economic reforms. During those years M. Boukharouba devoted much time to schooling, amazing his associates by his perseverance and singleness of purpose in acquiring knowledge. After three years of study at the madrasah, Mohamed entered the Muslim university of Zitouna in the city of Tunis. At the same time he attended classes at the Khaldounia lyceum where instruction corresponded to the curricula of French educational establishments of this type. In Tunis M. Boukharouba lived only a year before moving to Egypt to continue his education at the famous El Azhar University in Cairo. He patiently and persistently studied Arabic, literature, philosophy, economy and history. In that same period M. Boukharouba learned the principles of military sciences.

In November 1954, when the Algerian people rose in armed struggle against the colonialists, Boukharouba without hesitation joined the National Liberation Army (NLA). In February 1955, together with a group of young Algerians, he delivered secretly a batch of weapons from Alexandria for NLA soldiers. From that time on and to the end of the national liberation war in 1962 Mohamed Boukharouba, who adopted the name of Houari Boumedienne, fought in the ranks of the National Liberation Army. He was a member of the insurgent detachment in the region of the town of Tlemcen (1955), was an assistant to Boussouf—the Commander of the 5th Military District (1956) and then replaced him in that post (1957). Since 1958 H. Boumedienne headed the Western Headquarters of the National Liberation Army and in 1960 was appointed the Chief of the General Staff of the NLA, formed in accordance with a decision of the session of the leadership of the National Liberation Front (NLF).

As Chief of the General Staff, Houari Boumedienne carried out much work towards the organisation and consolidation of the Army. He enlisted students and other youth and military specialists to the NLA, promoting rank-and-file NLA fighters to leading posts.

Under the leadership of H. Boumedienne and his associates the Army turned into a mighty and politically-conscious force of the Algerian revolution which acted as a reliable shield of the revolutionary gains not only in the struggle against the colonialists, but also during the postwar instability and strife between various political forces in the country.

As long as the liberation war went on, the NLF put forth general democratic slogans aimed at the unification of the nation, such as eliminating colonial oppression, electivity of supreme bodies of power, higher living standards for the population, etc. It was only on the eve of the official proclamation of independence that the NLF could tackle in earnest the elaboration of its socio-economic programme. The draft programme was discussed in June 1962 at a session of the National Council of the Algerian Revolution in Tripoli. Serious controversies over Algeria's future sprang up among the NLF delegates representing different strata of the population. Yet the programme adopted, known as the Tripoli Charter, proclaimed a socialist orientation of independent Algeria and outlined deep-going socio-economic transformations in the country.

Later on these controversies gave birth to two trends in the national liberation movement—the revolutionary and the conciliatory, and this resulted in a differentiation within the NLF leadership, threatening the social and political orientation of the young independent Algerian state. H. Boumedienne and his associates regarded the content and methods of A. Ben Bella's policies with increasing criticism, seeing in them "a time-serving and publicity-type socialism", and then, on June 19, 1965, removed him from the leadership. Power in Algeria was taken over by the Revolutionary Council headed by Houari Boumedienne.

All practical activities of Houari Boumedienne as head of the Algerian state were aimed at deepening the national democratic revolution, at creating not merely the material, but also the socio-political and intellectual prerequisites for the transition to socialism.

They began in one of the most difficult and important periods in the history of independent Algeria. Only three years before Algeria had gained independent statehood. The winning of sovereignty put on the agenda economic questions as well, which had to be

resolved under the most difficult conditions, at a time when the country just began to emerge from the chaos of economic dislocation. Owing to the mass exodus of Europeans, the young state was denied technical personnel and skilled workers. Economic dislocation caused mass migration of the population. The peasantry moved to the cities, thus increasing unemployment and worsening the housing problem. Algeria's position as a country that had launched deep-going democratic reforms, was complicated further by its heavy economic dependence on France. The former colonial power provoked crisis situations in the young republic with the purpose of bringing political pressure to bear upon it. The elimination of the consequences of colonialism required the mobilisation of all national effort in combination with the experience and support of developed countries.

In the policies of H. Boumedienne, a patriot and revolutionary, the struggle for economic progress was subordinated to the two main goals of the Algerian revolution—national and social emancipation of the people. The head of the Algerian state associated their attainment with the gaining of economic self-reliance, which in the long run secured for the young republic genuine independence from imperialism. Being a firm proponent of planning principles and their introduction into the construction of a national economy, he guided the country's economic development towards the building of an up-to-date diversified complex intended not only as the material base of the new social system, ridding the working people of direct exploitation by indigenous and foreign capital. The creation of such a complex would emancipate the state from indirect neo-colonialist forms of exploitation by international monopoly capital.

The basic propositions of H. Boumedienne's socio-economic strategy were formulated in his speeches already in 1967. Later his concept of development found concrete embodiment in

Algeria's economic and social development plans and was also laid down in the National Charter of 1976.

Industrialisation was a key link in the strategy of development worked out by him. Industrialisation or, as it is described in the National Charter, the industrial revolution is called upon to ensure Algeria an equal status in the world economy and bring about a steep increase of social labour productivity and a rise in the people's living standards. It was to serve as a basis for overcoming industrial and territorial disproportions in the development of the productive forces inherited from the past; agriculture was to be modernised and complete employment of

the population secured so as to overcome in the long run the overall technical and economic backwardness of the country.

Regarded by H. Boumedienne as an essential precondition for implementing the vast industrialisation plans was the establishment of state control over vitally important branches and spheres of the economy. The policy of ousting foreign capital out of the crucial branches of the economy assumed under H. Boumedienne's leadership a purposeful character and was implemented in parallel with an all-out consolidation and expansion of the state sector.

H. Boumedienne attached tremendous importance to the improvement of the economic mechanism and management of the state sector's enterprises. Giving direct attention to the development and improvement of the management of the state sector, he, as no one else, felt the danger that loomed in the conversion of the top echelon of economic leaders into an exclusive elite, alien to the aspirations of the popular masses. Associated with the name of Houari Boumedienne is the introduction of a new managerial mode at state enterprises, known under the name of "socialist management". It presupposes the combination of centralised economic management methods with the broad initiative of worker collectives in controlling the activities of the management and improving the managerial mechanism. Already at this stage, having involved a considerable part of state-owned enterprises, "socialist management" opened to Algerian working people broader opportunities for participation in managing production and, on the whole, created prerequisites for its democratisation. H. Boumedienne believed that this new system "will allow the working class to become a productive force operating for the good of the revolution, will put an end to contradictions between the revolutionary government and the working class".

One of the main directions of the Revolutionary Council's domestic policy, as H. Boumedienne saw it, were radical transformations in the Algerian countryside. In the period of fierce political struggles in the second half of the 1960s over the system of self-management, Boumedienne came out in its defence and affirmed this principle of management on the farms of the former colonists. The self-management sector, which sprang up at the initiative of the toiling masses in the very first months upon the proclamation of independence, was seen by the majority of revolutionaries as a symbol of the new society for the building of which they joined the struggle against imperialism and internal reactionaries.

Just as other radically-minded revolutionary democrats, H. Boumedienne discerned in the emergence of the self-management system one of the most important socio-economic achievements of the Algerian people at an early stage of independence.

However, the existence of a self-management sector as such could not solve independent Algeria's land problem. This sector provided the means of subsistence for only one-eighth of the rural population which, therefore, found itself in a better situation than millions of land-hungry peasants of the traditional village characterised by appalling poverty and technical backwardness. On the initiative of Houari Boumedienne a Charter of Agrarian Revolution was drawn up in 1970. It outlined a programme for reforming agrarian relationships and measures directed at the modernisation of agricultural production. The preparation of such a document indicated that transformations specifically in the interests of the broad popular masses were brought forth on the agenda.

On November 8, 1971, H. Boumedienne signed a law on the "Agrarian Revolution" which proved quite a landmark in the history of independent Algeria. The law envisaged a redistribution of landed property in favour of landless and small-holder peasants, the creation of cooperatives, the construction of socialist villages, the intensification of agricultural production, stepping up technical equipment and improvement of the supply and marketing services for the countryside.

The strategy of socio-economic development elaborated under H. Boumedienne's leadership could only be implemented given a sound state mechanism ensuring the maximum concentration of forces and assets on the basic directions of revolutionary transformations. Boumedienne was a convinced opponent of blindly copying foreign models of statehood and methods of state organisation, though, as we see from the Algerian reality, he widely utilised the positively interpreted experience of a number of countries, above all, that of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Houari Boumedienne was able to complete the administrative reform, including the reorganisation of the highest bodies of state power. The results of this work were confirmed by the 1977 Constitution, which granted great authority to the elected organs of state power, having expanded in particular the competence of local administrations, and guaranteed broader representation of working people in them.

Problems of party construction featured prominently in Houari Boumedienne's activities. Being a genuine revolutionary, he endeavoured to make the NLF, which during the national liberation war united representatives of different social groups and political trends, a strong and effective organisation, prepared to shoulder the role of the prime mover of the revolutionary process.

The need for building such a party was realised by the Revolutionary Council from its very first days in power, but it was only after the differentiation of class forces among the Algerian leadership led to the victory of the revolutionary wing, that H. Boumedienne put forth the programme of building a vanguard party. His speeches in that period urge the consolidation of forces loyal to the ideals of socialism. "At present, when we are preparing to launch a new phase," Boumedienne said, "we need a vanguard political party, created of socialist cadres only, rallied behind a clearly defined programme and a single political line."

The socialist base of the party, the President believed, should be made up of the peasants, the working people of the towns, the revolutionary intelligentsia. This social composition points to his desire to turn the NLF into a true representative of the working people's interests. H. Boumedienne's ideas underlay the relevant sections of the National Charter—the detailed political programme of social development towards socialism.

During the last two years of his life H. Boumedienne bent intensive efforts towards the reconstruction of the party organs. Both the central apparatus and the national commissariates were subjected to reorganisation. In the course of a broad campaign for the revision of the personal files of NLF members the task was posed of getting rid of "anti-socialist elements alien to the party" and of drawing into the party of firm supporters of the socialist choice. These measures signified the practical implementation of a course towards limiting the political influence of the exploiter classes and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

In general, the adoption of such a document as the National Charter and practical measures for reorganising of NLF created, still during H. Boumedienne's lifetime, an ideological and political base for the future emergence on the political scene of a strong party, capable of mobilising the masses for the struggle for social progress.

The deep-going socio-economic transformations implemented in Algeria under H. Boumedienne's leadership were closely associated with the

overall content of his foreign-policy course.

Already in the 1960s Algeria won an international standing by its independent anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist course. At the same time it did not limit itself to the condemnation of racist colonial regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America, but rendered tangible practical aid to national liberation movements. It is common knowledge, for example, that Algeria throughout the years gave moral support and material aid to the national liberation struggle of the Angolan people and in November 1975 was one of the first to recognise the People's Republic of Angola upon its acquisition of independence. Amilcar Cabral highly appreciated in his time this role of Algeria, having stated that "Algeria is the Mecca of revolutionaries".

Houari Boumedienne attached great importance to his country's contribution to the solution of problems facing the Arab world. The central task here, he believed, was helping Arab countries to solve the Palestine problem. "The Palestine problem," H. Boumedienne used to say, "is the concern of every Arab, wherever he dwells."

The head of Algerian state took a resolute stand on a Middle East settlement, the basis of which he saw in the withdrawal by Israel from all occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, and the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestine Arab people, including its right to the creation of an independent state under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. He resolutely condemned the separatist Camp David deal. In his speeches at the time H. Boumedienne stressed the need to strengthen unity of actions by progressive forces in the Arab world for dealing a blow at the imperialist plans for a "solution" to the Middle East crisis.

H. Boumedienne always stressed his adherence to the ideals of Arab unity and urged the need for establishing relationships based on the principles of friendship, cooperation and mutual trust between the countries of the region. At the same time he was extremely cautious in regard to attempts of different forms of political unification unless they rested on a firm and realistic foundation. He regarded the establishment of good neighbourly relations with all Maghrib countries as a priority foreign policy task. This, however, was largely obstructed by such factors as the incompatibility of the ideological principles and different socio-political orientations of the existing regimes and their territorial claims to Algeria and, which is quite important, the machinations by imperialist forces seeking to destabilise the situation

in the region and, in the long run, to deflect Algeria from the road of progressive development.

H. Boumedienne believed that the struggle against the neocolonialist system of plunder will bring real fruit only in case all developing countries pool their efforts and follow single tactics and strategy of struggle in defence of their interests. Therefore he urged the newly-liberated countries to fight the international monopolies, to establish effective control over their own natural resources and over prices on raw-material commodities. As the President of the APDR repeatedly emphasised, these countries "will be unable to become true masters in their own homes as long as the monopolies hold the levers manipulating extraction, export, and prices".

Houari Boumedienne made a hefty contribution to the nonaligned movement, to enhancing its anti-imperialist orientation.

During the 4th Conference of the Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Algiers in September 1973, H. Boumedienne and F. Castro rebuffed all attempts to oppose the nonaligned states to the Soviet Union, and highly evaluated the socialist countries' support to the national liberation struggle.

Houari Boumedienne regarded the establishment of firm and diverse ties between Algeria and the USSR and other socialist countries as an important factor in overcoming backwardness and accelerating his country's development.

Already at an early stage in the independent development of Algeria it enjoyed political, economic, technical,

scientific and military aid from the USSR, and cultural ties between the two countries were also initiated. Towards the end of the 1960s Algeria took second place among Arab countries for the scale of its cooperation with the Soviet Union. This allowed Algeria to utilise effectively the technological and scientific achievements of the socialist countries in economic construction and in tackling many concrete problems faced by Algeria at an early period of its economic development. Soviet aid was used in most diverse spheres of the Algerian economy, facilitating the growth of the state sector, the solution of the problem of industrialisation, the development of natural resources, strengthening its defence capacity, training national personnel, etc. H. Boumedienne regarded this diverse and timely aid as the Soviet Union's tangible contribution to Algeria's struggle to overcome economic backwardness and gain genuine independence.

Houari Boumedienne had repeatedly visited the Soviet Union. His meetings with Soviet leaders facilitated the establishment of understanding between the two countries and the consolidation of Soviet-Algerian relations.

All progressive forces in Algerian society see in the person of Houari Boumedienne a model of a staunch fighter for his country's liberation from all forms of imperialist oppression, for translating into reality socialist ideals. His heritage remains a sound foundation for repelling reactionary machinations and stepping up the struggle for carrying on the revolutionary transformations in Algeria.

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WPC HOLDS ASIAN PEACE, SECURITY CONFERENCE IN MONGOLIA

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[Text]

Two years ago the attention of all those who cherish peace was attracted by the initiative of the Mongolian government, which proposed that the Asian and Pacific nations should conclude a convention on non-aggression and the non-use of force in their relations between themselves. This initiative found support not only among the public but also governments of some Asian countries. It is therefore natural that Ulan Bator, the Mongolian capital, has hosted the regional conference "For Peace and Security in Asia and the Pacific". Representatives of the peace-loving forces of more than 30 countries and delegates of international organisations met on the initiative of the World Peace Council and the Mongolian Peace Committee to discuss the following questions: how to ensure peace and security in the region, ways of averting the danger of a nuclear war and of eliminating the seats of war and tensions in Asia, measures to step up and broaden the struggle for peace and cooperation between nations.

The message of greetings by Yumjaagiyn Tsendenbal, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) and Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Great Hural, read by J. Batmönh, Politburo Member of the Central Committee of the MPRP and Chairman of the MPR Council of Ministers, pointed out that Mongolia has invariably been working to ensure stable peace in Asia by promoting mutual trust and cooperation among the states and nations of the continent.

Romesh Chandra, President of the World Peace Council, emphasised the great importance of the Mongolian initiative for the cause of peace on the continent, the initiative complementing the efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to promote peace and security in Asia and throughout the world. He also called for the unity of all the peace-loving forces of the globe.

Practically all the participants in the discussion stressed that the conference was held against the background of the worsening international situation. The conferees were unanimous in their view that US imperialism was above all to blame for tensions in Asia. Pinning hopes on direct American military presence in this region, the Reagan Administration is trying to place a considerable part of the military spending on its allies and other states bound to the US by military or other commitments.

The imperialist policy of stepping up the danger of war and forcing the arms race is consistently opposed by the socialist countries and the peaceloving forces on all continents. Speakers pointed to the historic importance of Soviet peace initiatives for the destinies of the people on earth, in particular the Soviet Union's commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Participants in the discussion also spoke highly of the Mongolian peace initiative to conclude a convention on non-aggression and the non-use of force among the states of the region, the proposals by Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea on the normalisation of relations between the ASEAN and the Indochina countries, the constructive proposals by the People's Democratic Republic of Korea on the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea, and other peace initiatives by socialist countries.

Much attention was paid to the role of the nonalignment movement in promoting peace and security, in particular to the Delhi Forum. Favourable comments were heard on India's contribution to maintaining peace in Asia.

Many participants stressed that peace was indivisible. Romesh Chandra paid special attention to this idea during the discussion and pointed out that it was necessary to work towards peace simultaneously everywhere. It is impossible to hope for success without uniting the different sections of the peaceloving forces. The unity of action by states, political, public and religious organisations is called for.

Speakers said that the forces of imperialism, above all the US, were seeking to disunite peace champions, and making efforts to prevent their joint actions.

The conference unanimously denounced Tel Aviv's aggressive policy against the Palestinian and the Lebanese peoples and other Arab nations. Its participants stressed that Israel's flouting actions became possible only owing to American military, political and economic support.

The conferees also condemned the intrigues of the US imperialists and their accomplices around Afghanistan and Kampuchea and the militarisation of South Korea. They called on the peace champions to strive to put the anti-war movement in Asia on a permanent footing and to expand it, involving into it the broadest possible social strata, different political parties and organisations.

A number of documents were adopted as a result of the discussion, among them the Final Declaration that formulated the urgent tasks of the anti-war movement. Special resolutions dealt with the problems of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and with those of the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the Pacific region, Korea, Turkey, Cyprus and the situation around Afghanistan.

The representative forum in Ulan Bator, held shortly before the World Assembly "For Peace and Life and Against Nuclear War", has, beyond doubt, made a tangible contribution to the struggle for peace and against the danger of a nuclear catastrophe.

I. BOURTSEV

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ROLE OF CASTE SYSTEM IN INDIAN HISTORY, SOCIETY CONSIDERED

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[Article by Yevgheni Rashkovsky, Cand. Sc. (Hist.)]

[Text]

FIRST ARTICLE

The balance of traditionalism and modern trends is a question of tremendous theoretical and practical value for present-day India. Sociology has yet to come up with a theory for understanding how semi-traditional societies of Africa and Asia enter the present-day reality. In the light of this, the views of Indian sociologists are even more important since of all African and Asian countries India has the most representative school of sociology.

The practical importance of this problem is also obvious since neither the decision-making bodies whose prime task is to set social and economic targets and priorities of scientific and technical progress, nor political parties whose leaders have to adjust to the changing face of society in their struggle for influence on the masses nor leaders of class, regional, ethnical, religious groups and castes, can afford to disregard the intricate mechanism of the forces involved. Factors of the autonomous self-organisation of social divisions among Hindus play an important role in the country's life. The problem of traditionalism and modern trends which would seem strictly academic at first sight, most intimately concerns the lives of hundreds of millions of people. In the early 1970s R. Kothari roughly summed up the essence of the problem as follows: what are the possible ways of transplanting all that has been created by world culture and essential for Hindus into the Indian socio-cultural soil without destroying the latter?

So, what is the actual basis of the socio-cultural soil of present-day India? In the opinion of Indian sociologists, this is the Hindus' attachment to the unique and purely Indian form of society's self-organisation which is customary called the system of castes. No other modern Oriental society practices such a refined and multifarious system of self-organisation as presented by the Indian castes, whose existence is due to peculiar development lasting several thousands of years. Studies of the caste system are also of a general Orientological interest. Indeed, a detailed study of the majority of modern societies in Asia and Africa suggests the presence of many more or less similar features of the caste system in many of them. These societies, as a rule, abound in a large number of mutually isolated and frequently hostile socio-cultural (tribal, racial, ethnical, professional and religious) groups. These

groups are rooted in age-old traditions of communal solidarity, an intricate art of identifying themselves and their "friends" through definite religious or tribal symbols or an even more intricate art of maintaining contacts with the surrounding world while setting themselves apart from it.

The ideas of tribal unity and solidarity of people's groups could be advocated in temples, philosophical societies and at public rallies for dozens and even hundreds of

years. Although they could partly mitigate sharp intra-group antagonisms, still it was only on extremely rare occasions that they became part and parcel of people's social experience.

Therefore, studies of India's caste system and its functioning today, when the world is saturated with a multitude of all-embracing systems of intensive socio-economic and information links, and when the world's image in many respects is shaped according to internationalist and egalitarian ideas, are in fact invaluable.

Whenever any writers or researchers refer to the hierarchy of the four age-old socio-religious divisions of Indian society or varnas (Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vashyas, Sudras and, finally, Harijans, the society's outcasts) while defining the essence of the Hindu caste system, this raises objections on the part of Indian sociologists. Many castes do not yield themselves to a precise identification in accordance with the varnas system, for the majority of Hindu castes are separated by internal ethnical, linguistic and religious barriers. Many believers in monotheistic religions who live in India and whose religion does not recognise the varnas hierarchy (Moslems, Christians, Sikhs and Judaists) have also assimilated the caste partitions that are not always covered by the Hindu caste system.

In everyday life the overwhelming majority of Indians have to deal with jati or sub-caste subdivisions, which presuppose the unity of ethnical origin, the tongue (or a local dialect) and, until recently, a common trade and a place of residence, rather than with varnas or even castes (in a broad sense of the word).

Thus, the essence of the caste system lies in the hierarchy of social, professional and ritual relations. And this, according to M. N. Srinivas, is the most general regulating principle.

In traditional India noticeable changes in the caste status and roles were a rare, sporadic and extremely slow affair. In a rigidly hierarchical and socially stagnant society

the caste-dominated way of life was actually recognised as the only one possible. What seems self-evident has never been questioned by people's consciousness.

Indian and world literature contain numerous theories on the socio-historical roots of Hindu castes. India is a vast and rich country which has always been open to waves of emigres and diverse linguistic, racial, religious and cultural influences. On reaching the Indian subcontinent each group of new arrivals, initially unable to culturally dominate the local population, tried nevertheless to safeguard and perpetuate its identity and find a suitable *modus vivendi* with the surrounding communities. Historically, the social integration of Hindus developed by way of a multi-tier functional and hierarchical self-organisation of village communities with Brahmins, or priests, Kshatriyas, or warriors, Vashyas, or ordinary community members, Sudras, or servants and small-time artisans and finally, the "untouchables", or the people who were the progeny of dark-skinned indigenous population or who were once expelled for one reason or another from the caste structure and whose lot was to perform the lowest and dirtiest jobs. All this motley population was broken down into a multitude of small hereditary professional and ethnogamic groups within each village community. The powerful forces of cultural integration were also at work apart from the forces of social differentiation or sometimes in accord with the latter. Historically, Hinduism interpreted the caste fragmentation as the earthy and empirical expression of the mysterious unity of the Universe. According to several Indian sociologists, it is no coincidence that it is difficult to visualise and understand India's social image without studying the history and contents of Hinduism.

In the early seventies R. Kothari made an attempt to give a sociological interpretation to the interrelation of the religious and philosophical origins of Hinduism and the social basis of traditional Indian society. According to R. Kothari, an individual in traditional Hindu society is loyal first to his large family, and second to his clan, village and caste. In such a situation an individual is fairly well protected, for any of his primary groups bears willingly a part of his responsibilities. The same group may assume some of his outside functions, such as his relations with the village authorities, taxes, etc. Individuals and groups are likely to constantly underscore their mutual blood relations.

In the religious aspect these relations assume the form of, and are codified by, the all-embracing notion of the *dharma*. In relation to an individual this notion expresses the entity of his commitments—personal, social, moral and religious. In effect, *dharma* is the individual's universal "logic of conduct" or a daily code of behaviour, ritual bans and duties which has been meticulously spelled out in the Brahman sacred books. But R. Kothari stresses that "the concept of *dharma* is more than the codification of duties and functions... It involves a kind of *Weltanschauung*...—the world-view of *anasakti* or non-attachment. In considering various duties and functions, the devout Hindu is enjoined to think of them objectively, without any sense of attachment or interest. For the supreme *dharma* (and here it is also can be translated as "religion") is the salvation of one's soul... In trying to reach that state, however, and so long as the ties of this world were not given up altogether, *dharma* consists in a faithful pursuit of the duties endowed to one's role and station in life. Because the principal emphasis is on "duties" rather than "rights", it was good to be satisfied with one's lot and not to crave for what did not belong to one. Hence, the Hindu's emphasis on a limitation of wants and contentment with his lot, on tolerance rather than revenge, and on restraint rather than exuberance".¹

This explains the low standards of expectations from a social milieu and the authorities as well as low demands made on them by a traditional Indian society.

This, however, does not mean that the history of Brahman-Indian society is unfamiliar with spiritual protest movements. The history of Hinduism—from Buddha's time until the nineteenth century—had always been marked by spiritual movements aimed at mitigating the extremely harsh Brahman codes and at emancipating the individual to a certain extent. These movements also produced a paradoxical effect, for by questioning extremes of Hinduist civilisation they staved off its degeneration and ossification. This way or another, R. Kothari ponders, India is the only historical civilisation which has survived without having set up a nationwide and stable political centre—the

centre of secular power. This civilisation was propped up not by political but by powerful and flexible cultural and symbolic forces. This does not mean that India and her *socium* were unaware of the secular and political elements, but in conditions of India these elements most frequently presented themselves as alien and oppressive.

The establishment of British colonialism in India meant drastic historical turnabout in the history of the caste system. It made the system more dynamic, problematic and, at the same time, awakened its abilities to adapt itself to the changing socio-historical conditions. It also gave rise to powerful resistance forces. Colonialism brought along many features which, at first sight, undermined the domination of the caste system in India, namely the growth and modernisation of productive forces as well as the introduction of capitalist elements in economic relations; the rudiments of centralised state power and the formal legality of political and legal relations; elements of modern education and scientific thought. Contacts of Hindu intellectuals with the West in the information and cultural fields made India a ground of continuous influences of egalitarian and socialist ideas of Europe, America and Russia. In these conditions the Indian intellectuals could not fail rediscovering the problem of castes whose visualisation, as something sinned and wrong, began secretly entering the people's consciousness thanks to the national and social protest movements.

And yet, in conditions of an Oriental colonial society, all these socio-historical trends, although objectively directed at undermining the caste system, did not act in a straightforward manner. Moreover, in the final analysis, the colonial regime brought about the establishment of more flexible and refined forms of the caste system. The castes partially buffered the bureaucracy's pressure on society and partially served as a means of collective adjustment to the changing life. Moreover, the very system of colonial rule could only operate in oppressed society thanks to the caste system.

The works by M. N. Srinivas and R. Kothari contain a most profound sociological and historical analysis of these developments which are crucial for understanding the situation in India today.

As M. N. Srinivas notes, in the late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century the modernisation elements of India's social life resulted in the fact that many of the most enterprising segments of Indian society began intensively mastering the European-style economic and social institutions. These, however, most frequently had a definite caste tinge: caste credit societies and trading firms, caste hotels and shelters, caste newspapers and even political parties.

In many respects the traditional caste system ensured a certain succession in the country's social history. Thus, people engaged in modern trades and occupations come, as a rule, from the Brahman castes; the traditional castes of warriors formed the backbone of the present-day Indian

army and its officers corps, as well as the traditional commerce served as a basis of present-day business operations. And, finally, the British colonial policy of involving people from the lowest caste and social strata into modern economic relations contributed in many ways to the formation of the Indian working class. The works by Indian historians and sociologists contain numerous evidence of how painful it was for the lowest categories of Indian society to witness and be involved into the partial destruction of trades and handicrafts. No less painful was the driving out from the countryside into towns of parts of the peasantry.

In analysing the caste and class factors M. N. Srinivas views them as a source of rather rigid social hierarchy involving both the traditional and modern conceptions of man's status, on the one hand, and a powerful source of egalitarian strivings and egalitarian protest, on the other.

For any reaction to the modern forms of social injustice certainly casts doubts on the rightfulness of age-old caste rules and regulations, inasmuch as any protest against the harsh caste relations definitely acquires traits of a class protest.

The question of the attitude of the Hindu national liberation movement to the caste system is a complex one which, as R. Kothari points out, is difficult to analyse without taking into account one significant trait of Hindu civilisation, namely, its peculiar modus of self-development through the assimilation of newly-arrived social and spiritual realities as well as the ones born inside it. The essence of this modus is roughly such: any significant spiritual or social novelty is not, as a rule, rejected outright but is incorporated into the multifarious socio-cultural structure of Hindu society as one of the possible ways of the nation's collective search for the truth. It is then assimilated by this society and enters with the latter into a long and uneasy interaction which may last for several centuries. In addition, spiritual protest movements having roots in the country's precolonial and colonial past insisted on a broad-scale replenishment and improvement of traditions, rather than on their rejection.

Thus, the introduction of something outrightly new into the age-old traditions of Indian life is customary for India. This explains why relatively recently the Indian ruling elite easily accepted the idea of introducing the Western parliamentary and democratic forms and the corresponding patterns of political consciousness into Indian society. And how these forms and patterns have been assimilated by the social and cultural life in India is another story. In this respect, at the time of Gandhi and Nehru the Indian National Congress, which played an extremely important role in the anti-colonial struggle and in the proclamation of independence, proved itself to be a natural outcome of the Hindu civilisation by revealing its direct link with the latter's "powerful Mother nature". Indeed, Kothari argues that the mobilising political power of the Congress during the first six odd decades of this century can be attributed to the fact that it was a compromising political entity which, thanks to the favourable historical circumstances, timely slogans, the smoothly operating political machinery and the charismatic leaders, has managed to unite and subjugate diverse social, class, ideological, caste and ethno-linguistic spheres. In this sense, the history of the Congress Party at the time of Gandhi and Nehru is a part of the general history of mobilising the cultural and religious traditions of Hindu society for the sake of modern socio-political goals, a history of extremely difficult and controversial transformation of traditionalism into modern-day realities.

It goes without saying that the years of struggle for national independence and the country's period of inde-

pendent development introduced several new aspects into the life of Indian society. The former justification of society's rigid stratification for the sake of all-embracing cosmic dharma has been challenged by modern views of society as something essentially secular and dynamic which is supposed to exist on the basis of equality among its members. Among those who laid the foundations of socio-political ideas of present-day India were devoted believers of Hinduism such as Tagore, Gandhi, Sri Aurobindo, V. Bhave, Radhakrishnan and J. Narayan. But all of them saw the main spiritual value of man's life not in rites and passive observance of group behavioural modes but in the sacred religious experience of an individual. They therefore considered "secularism" (which is understood in India as a religious neutrality of society and the state) as an essential condition of spiritual freedom.

Among the guiding principles of modern Indian society there exists one more fundamental difference in respect to the former Hindu civilisation. The latter was in fact unaware of the profound social introspection and used to adjust to all new conditions of life purely empirically. Modern India has well-defined political priorities. R. Kothari sums up these priorities as follows:

- 1) integration of a gigantic and exceedingly intricate complex of social relations;
- 2) economic development whose most important task is to raise the living standards of the lower strata;
- 3) the achievement of social equality in a society that has been based for centuries on glaring inequality;
- 4) orientation to the principles of political democracy.

It is for the sake of these aims that the Indian ruling elite, engaged in modernisation, undertook to mobilise the lower strata by placing a stake on the secular and democratic components which are possible inside the caste system itself. It would be more correct to say they are within the changed intra-caste and inter-caste relations which are associated with the trends of modernising the economy, society and legal relations in the course of last decades. Universal suffrage, a system of political parties, the introduction of modern education and elements of state regulation in the social and economic spheres have become the instruments of this policy.

Indian sociologists note that the country has entered a stage of turbulent development of modern statehood, economy, science and culture in conditions of retarded and depended capitalist development and in conditions of a relative immaturity of secular society. In such a situation the managerial and party-and-political bureaucracy, linked with the modernised upper crust of national bourgeoisie, has assumed willy-nilly the historical function of a leading social class by partially and objectively placing itself in opposition to the rest of society. In this case the caste system of Indian society operates at full capacity: concentration of the main power strings and mass media channels in the hands of the bureaucracy; corporate responsibilities; use of the English language, a modernised life style and high educational standards. All this turns the bureaucratic upper crust into a special caste of sorts.

Independent India was forced—for the sake of strengthening its well-being and defences—to pursue a priority development of material production and scientific and technical development to the detriment of social and cultural development. This produced good results for the country in general and for millions of its citizens. But, as R. Kothari points out, these measures simultaneously resulted in negative consequences such as the remaking of the caste system, unrestrained consumer demand, a crime wave and the public neglect for the need to help the country's poor and dying. And all this is taking place against the

background of persistent poverty, despair and oppression of the lower strata of society. It is obvious that Indian modernisation needs democratic reforms in public relations and culture.

This is a harsh evaluation of the situation in Indian society. However, a sociologist is not just a scholar conducting his research into social problems (although purely academic methods and procedures must represent the essential tools at his disposal). As a rule, an Indian sociologist assumes the functions of an educationalist and social critic in front of the country reading public and brings to it alarming news sometimes in an exaggerated form. In the 1970s and 1980s Indian sociologists have stated with alarm that the problem of castes is still awaiting its final solution. Moreover, over the last few years it has assumed new specific features which require a special consideration.

¹ R. Kothari, *Politics in India*, N. Delhi, Orient Longman, 1970, pp. 27-28.

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PRIMAKOV SURVEYS HISTORY OF SOVIET ORIENTAL STUDIES

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[Article by Academician Yevgheni Primakov, director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences, and Ashot Baziyants, Cand. Sc. (Hist.)]

[Text]

The history of Russian and world Oriental studies is subdivided into the two stages. The first covers the period prior to the Great October Socialist Revolution, while the second begins since October 1917 when there emerged a basically different government approach to the problems of the national liberation struggle of Oriental peoples, their historical destinies, to the state, economic, and political interests of countries and peoples of Asia and Africa, to their cultural, scientific and literary legacy, and to their contribution to world civilisation.

The initial periods in the development of the Russian and West European Oriental studies were close to each other as to the time of their origin, methodological principles and contents, while, after the Great October Socialist Revolution, their courses became diametrically opposite, differing radically from one another in their theoretical basis and practical goals. It should be noted that the methodological foundations of new, socialist Oriental studies were laid down long before the October Revolution, and they are determined by the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin on the nationality and national-colonial questions, problems of national liberation movement, and also by the place and role of the latter in the proletarian revolutions. Of paramount significance in Lenin's legacy are his works dealing with the attitude toward the cultural past of countries and peoples, national culture of class societies, and scientific achievements.

While speaking of the opposite directions in the development of the Soviet and Western Oriental studies, we in no way deny the existence of the

two directions in the latter—bourgeois and Marxist-Leninist. The October Revolution gave a fresh impetus to the development of social sciences in the West, including Oriental studies. It consolidated theoretical foundations of its Marxist-Leninist trend, having enriched the latter with the examples of national rebirth of the peoples of the Soviet East, and with the works by Soviet scholars on the problems faced by African and Asian countries. However, it is the bourgeois trend that dominates the Oriental studies in the capitalist West, which is being supported by the entire might of the government machinery and subsidies by the monopolies.

The present-day development of Soviet Oriental studies is determined by Marxist-Leninist methodology, the fundamental unity of the government and scientific approach to the basic issues, including the struggle for peace, goodneighbourly relations between states with different social systems, against class, political, racial, national, and religious oppression, for equality of all peoples, and respect for scientific and cultural legacy and for the specifics inherent in the development of all nations, big and small.

After the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Oriental studies in the USSR were becoming not only a science studying the East, but also a vigorous force in the political and cultural rebirth of the peoples of the USSR in the socialist construction; a force actively promoting the achievements in the national liberation movement of the oppressed peoples in

the colonial East, and contributing to the implementation of the Leninist nationalities policy, and to the carrying out of the tasks faced by Soviet diplomacy. The latter circumstance made it necessary to train diplomats and employees of Soviet embassies and missions in Oriental countries. The solution of this important task during the first years of Soviet power was closely connected not only with the problem of teaching, but also with the sum total of questions determining the process of studies (curricula, teaching aids, and so on).

Thus, the upsurge of Oriental studies in the Soviet Union was in general not only predetermined historically, but also was practically vital for the realisation of foreign policy, trade and economic ties, as well as for the enlightenment of the broad masses of population, and the upswing of education and culture. Oriental studies have been devoted unremitting attention after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, when science became a concern of the state, party and people.

Before the revolution Oriental studies were not subdivided clearly into separate branches of science. At that time they boiled down mainly to historical, philological and textual research. Notwithstanding the certain universal character of research done by the scholars before the revolution and its merits, this method not always proved scientifically grounded under the new, more complicated conditions, when science faced the task of studying economy, modern and contemporary history, class struggle, the national liberation movement, politics, and so on. A scholar who actually worked alone had to be replaced by a team of specialists having a long-term plan of studies.

On the initiative of Lenin, a basically new socio-economic cycle of sciences was introduced in the institutes of Oriental studies, thereby stressing the need for studying the class structure and the alignment of class forces, the character and prospects for the national liberation movement in the East.

At the same time, under the grave conditions of the Civil War and economic dislocation, lack of means and material resources, the Soviet government did everything it could to preserve and expand the Oriental studies centres, which were already in existence in Moscow and Petrograd, and create new ones in the republics of the Soviet East. Lenin warned about the need to display allround caution while reorganising the Academy of Sciences, and display tact and concern for the

scientists. The Asian Museum in Petrograd (now Leningrad) was replenished with specialists, a decision was made to give it new premises, and money was allocated to publish its works and purchase books on Oriental studies in European countries.

At the same time the organisation of education, enlightenment and science in Russia at large was radically restructured. A new system of public education and research began taking shape since the first days of the October Revolution. Let us note that prior to 1917 there was not a single higher educational establishment either in the Transcaucasia or in Central Asia.

It was at that time that the training of specialists on the sciences which had not been represented in the Academy of Sciences began, and the forms of organising research changed. The broader tasks faced by science at that time demanded the studying of not only separate facts, phenomena and certain written monuments, but systematised allround research in the socio-historical, political and cultural development of the peoples in the East.

To their credit it can be said that the overwhelming majority of Orientalists from the Asian Museum, the Oriental Department of Petrograd University and the Moscow Lasarev Institute of Oriental Languages accepted Soviet power without any reservations and did all they could to give their knowledge and energy to the people. Among them were such prominent scholars as Academician N. Marr, Academician and Scientific Secretary of the Academy, Director of the Asian Museum S. Oldenburg, Academician V. Bartold, Academician P. Kokovtsev, Honoured Academician A. Veselovsky, Corresponding Member of the Academy F. Sherbatskoy, and also B. Vladimirtsov, A. Krymsky, and I. Orbely.

For example, Anatoli Lunacharsky, People's Commissar of Education, noted the "powerful support" on the part of the Academy of Sciences "to introducing literacy in the mother tongue for the nationalities which had no written language altogether or had it in embryo". The 1920s saw the completion of the transition of written languages from Arabic letters unusual to the Turkic and Iranian languages to the Latin alphabet, and this important undertaking was carried out with the most active participation of Orientalists. Great are the achievements of the Orientalists of Petrograd and Moscow in the development of Oriental studies and organisation of higher schools in Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Within a short span of time they prepared and published teaching aids, readers and dictionaries on many Oriental languages and literatures. N. Marr, V. Bartold, and A. Samoylovich took

trips abroad, in particular to Turkey, to deliver lectures and give scientific consultations. It would be no error to say that all leading Orientalists of Moscow and Petrograd took a direct and most active part in the activities of the World Literature Publishers founded by the great Soviet writer Maxim Gorky. They translated literary monuments of Oriental peoples, edited them and wrote scientific commentaries.

With the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the All-Russia Scientific Association of Orientalists set up in December 1921 was transformed into an All-Union Association. Its mouthpiece—the *New East* magazine (the first issue came off the press in 1922) did a great deal in popularising Oriental knowledge.

The 1920s which were crucial for Soviet science saw the emergence of the organisational principles of the institutes of Oriental studies, their structure, curriculum, and scientific problems.

In 1922 an Oriental Department of the Azerbaijan State University with two branches—historical and philological—was set up in Baku. History, economy, philosophy, the languages and literature of the peoples of the Middle East were studied there. Such prominent scholars as V. Bartold, N. Marr, A. Samoylovich, I. Ashmarin, A. Gubaidulin and B. Choban-Zade delivered lectures there. Since its inception the Oriental Department has become a centre for training researchers.

Enjoying tangible help from Moscow and Petrograd scholars, the Turkestan Oriental Institute was set up in Tashkent in 1918, with the aim of carrying out "research of Turkestan, its history, everyday life, culture and languages of the local population as well as those of the neighbouring countries which are most closely linked with it culturally". Later on, in 1924, the Turkestan Oriental Institute merged with the Central Asian State University where the Oriental Department with ethnological, linguistic and pedagogic branches began to function.

Since the 1920s, mainly due to the efforts of Academician I. Djavakhishvili, Oriental studies in Soviet Georgia began to develop intensely.

Since 1923 in Armenia the Oriental sciences began to be taught in Yerevan State University. Somewhat earlier, on 5 February 1921 in Echmiadzin at Matenadaran—a museum having a richest deposit of ancient manuscripts—an institute of history and culture was established.

In 1930 the Orientalists of the Academy of Sciences were united into

a single institution—the Institute of Oriental Studies. The research work began to be planned, providing for the studying of modern and contemporary history, the national liberation movement, and the problems of economy of Eastern countries. The researchers at the Institute have scored impressive results in studying, alongside the historical and cultural works, the sources of the history of the peoples of Central Asia (materials on the history of the Turkmens and Karakalpaks), the monuments of culture, life and work of the eminent thinkers and poets of the Medieval East.

The team of Leningrad Orientalists carried out quite a few brilliant studies

in the 1930s. Among them was the study of the Tangut philosophy by N. Nevsky. The works by V. Alexeyev, A. Barannikov, V. Bartold, E. Bertels, P. Kokovtsov, I. Krachkovsky, I. Orbeli, N. Pigulevskaya, A. Samoylovich and V. Struve became well known in the Soviet Union and abroad. During that period, alongside historical research, dictionaries, textbooks and grammar books of a number of Oriental languages were compiled. The Orientalists of the Academy of Sciences took a most active part in creating alphabets for the peoples of the Soviet Union which had no written languages before. The Leningrad scholars made an immense contribution to the training of Orientalists in the USSR, especially text experts and specialists in little-studied and dead languages.

During the Great Patriotic War waged by the Soviet people against Hitler Germany many scholars rose in arms to defend their Motherland. Those few scholars who remained at the Leningrad Institute of Oriental Studies concentrated on preserving unique manuscripts, books, libraries and archives of their comrades who had perished in the besieged city. A group of scholars from Leningrad who moved to Tashkent, headed by Academician V. Struve, together with the local colleagues, carried out fruitful work on the history of culture of the peoples of Central Asia, and on description of manuscripts.

As for the development of Oriental studies in the republics of the Soviet East from the 1930s and up to the end of the 1950s, it exerted palpable influence on the study of the problems of ethnogenesis, national history of culture, languages, literatures, epigraphy, and written monuments of the peoples of the USSR. At that time the study of the foreign East was not yet singled out in the republics as a special scientific direction. This happened later, at the end of the 1950s, when the new situation that had taken shape after the rout of German nazism and Japanese militarism in the Second World War, the upsurge of the nation-

al liberation movement in Eastern countries, and the emergence of sovereign national states on the ruins of colonial empires faced Oriental studies with new tasks. The problem arose of reorganising the entire system of research in the USSR, changing basically the plan of subjects and creating new scientific trends and branches.

The Institute of Oriental Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences, moved to Moscow in 1950, while its branch remained in Leningrad. The transfer of the Institute to the capital was supposed to promote its studies of the problems of modern and contemporary history, the character and specifics of the national liberation movement, political and socio-economic development of Eastern countries; it was also planned to use the research centre more actively in the interests of implementing the Leninist foreign policy and successful activities of Soviet diplomacy. It was meant not merely to unite under one roof people with different Oriental specialities, but integrate the activities of specialists in different fields of knowledge—historians, sociologists, economists, philologists, and so on—in a single research process.

The East today is a most complex organism, whose development is determined by the specific features inherent in the reproduction process, the regularities of the world economic and international political ties, the dialectical interaction between traditions and the present, the peculiarities of the revolutionary situation and the motive forces of the revolution. At the same time apparently there was no period throughout the entire history of the East comparable with that which set in after the winning of political independence by the former colonies and dependencies, as to the speed, scope, and depth of the socio-economic and socio-political changes under way now.

The advanced group of Afro-Asian countries either embarked on the road of socialism or opted for a socialist orientation. Other newly-free countries which continued their movement along capitalist lines are becoming increasingly differentiated as to the level of their development, the degree of preserving feudal prejudices, and the stage of formation of new classes and social strata.

Far reaching and clearcut differentiation has probably become a major sign of the former colonial world. It became particularly intensified in the 1970s. The heterogeneity of the post-colonial East makes itself felt not only in the different ways of development or the extent of progress, but also in the political line pursued by the newly-free countries, which is either independent or pro-imperialist. The Report

of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union stressed the multifarious character of this heterogeneity and furnished a Marxist analysis of the international situation at the junction of the 1970s and 1980s. As far as the newly-free countries were concerned, the Report stated that they "are very different. After liberation some of them have been following the revolutionary-democratic path. In others capitalist relations have taken root. Some of them are following a truly independent policy, while others are today taking their lead from imperialist policy. In a nutshell, the picture is a fairly motley one."

By virtue of its methodological narrowness, prerevolutionary Oriental studies were primarily deprived of an opportunity to foresee the course of historical development. The task facing science today is as follows: to study carefully, deeply and comprehensively all aspects of the socio-political life of a country, a region, international relations, and be able to determine the chief trends in the development of the post-colonial East.

The researchers of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, the Africa Institute, and the Institute of the International Workers' Movement have been making an impressive contribution to the studying of the socio-economic and political processes occurring in the developing countries, the regularities of, and prospects for, their development, the history of the international workers' movements, its character and trends of development.

The Institute of the Far East studies the outstanding problems of a vast region in the East of Asia.

The restructuring and certain re-orientation toward the study of problems of our day and age in no way presupposes an arrogant attitude to the traditional cycle of Oriental sciences, i. e., the so-called classic Oriental studies. It is self-evident that the studying of the written monuments of Ancient East, and Medieval Studies—the entire cycle of the sciences relating to the classic Oriental studies—is developing independently. However, it is also evident that the traditional complex cannot develop without discharging functional tasks connected with the study of the present. Moreover, the second function of the traditional cycle, which is of applied nature, is becoming increasingly complicated, and its importance is growing. This happens due to objective causes, for there is growing understanding that it is inconceivable to study properly the present-day processes in the East without assessing the influence of traditional patterns.

The study of historical developments of the past and especially of recent decades in the development of Oriental countries requires a profound, all-embracing, and comprehensive scientific approach. A broad network of research and educational establishments dealing with Oriental studies has now been set up in the Soviet Union. They include departments, chairs, and branches. Specialised journals such as *Peoples of Asia and Africa*, *Asia and Africa Today*, *Far Eastern Affairs*, *Soviet Turkology*—are put out. The following figures testify to the popular nature of Oriental literature. During the quarter century of its existence, since 1957 up to 1981, the Chief Editorial Office of Oriental Literature at

the Nauka Publishers put out 11,756 titles of books and pamphlets, or approximately 470 titles a year. The overall circulation of all publications amounts to 675,110,000 signatures. The three-volume monograph *Foreign East and Contemporaneity*, written by a team of authors, is a result of the many years of research of specific features and trends of development of Oriental states. It examines problems bearing on the contemporary situation in these states: the tendencies in the industrial development of these states; how the problems of employment are solved; what the people obtain from the land reform; what is the part played by religion in the social life of these countries; what successes have been scored by the peoples of the East in the field of culture, and so on.

The researchers at the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations have published a host of works dealing with topical problems of the developing countries. The authors provide an allround analysis of the socio-economic processes in the developing countries, describe the role played by these countries in world economy, and deal with trends and prospects of their development.

The collection of articles *Revolutionary Process in the East: History and Contemporaneity* is devoted to the specific conditions of the development of the national liberation and revolutionary movements in Eastern countries.

The pupils of V. Struve, one of the founders of the Soviet school for the study of the Ancient East, continue to study the problems of the emergence of class society, and the specifics of the development and change of pre-capitalist formations in the East.

Large-scale research is also being conducted along the line of traditional Soviet Oriental studies, the study of texts in particular. Of great scope is the work performed by the researchers of the Leningrad branch

of the Institute of Oriental Studies, aimed at deciphering and describing ancient Oriental manuscripts, their translation into Russian and publication with scientific commentaries attached. These manuscripts are, undoubtedly, of great cultural and scientific importance, inasmuch as it is inconceivable to write profound works on philology, culture and history of the peoples of the East without studying and publishing the monuments of written language. In recent years a facsimile publication of a unique manuscript by Shirafhan Bidlisi, a Kurdish historian of the 16th century, *Sharaf-Name*, was put out, as well as selected chapters from a treatise of a

Medieval Arab philosopher Abu-Hamid al-Ghazzali, *Resurrection of the Sciences of the Faith*. Efforts continue to be made at the study of the ancient Indian epic *Mahabharata*, and Turkic runic texts. Leningrad linguists are making a tangible contribution to the study of the languages of the peoples of the East, the typology of Indo-Arian languages, the history of linguistic trends, and the studying of the language of *Avesta* an ancient Iranian religious manuscript.

The results of linguistic studies done by Soviet Orientalists are published in the series, "Languages of the Peoples of Asia and Africa", which now numbers over 150 books in Russian and English. The priority of the Soviet school of Oriental linguistics is well known, and it is therefore no wonder that foreign publishing houses display keen interest in this series.

The contacts between Soviet Orientalists and scientific organisations and specialists throughout the world are becoming ever broader with every coming year. Joint research is conducted and seminars and conferences are held. For example, last summer Moscow played host to the scientific and political conference, "Current Problems of Contemporary Asia", which was attended by more than fifty outstanding scholars, public and political figures from twenty Asian countries. Very close contacts have been established with Orientalists from socialist states.

When on July 22, 1980, the Institute of Oriental Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences, a leading research centre in the USSR studying history, economy, politics, sociology, culture, literature and languages of Asian, North African and Pacific countries was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labour, the Soviet public regarded it as a manifestation of deep concern displayed by the Soviet government about the development of Soviet Oriental studies and recognition of the achievements of Soviet science. The Biruni

Institute of Oriental Studies in Tashkent with its vast collection of manuscripts in many eastern languages, the Tsereteli Institute of Oriental Studies in Tbilisi where Semitology and Byzantine studies are especially successful, the Institute of the

Peoples of the Middle East, the Nizami Institute of Literature and the Fund of Manuscripts, Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences in Baku, the Institute of Oriental Studies in Dushanbe where young and gifted scholars are studying unique Iranian manuscripts, and the Institute of Oriental Studies and the famous Matenadaran in Yerevan have all become authoritative research centres.

A great deal of research is being carried out at the Institute of Asian and African Countries at Moscow State University, at the Oriental Department of the Leningrad University, where Corresponding Members of the USSR Academy of Sciences M. Bogolybov and D. Olderogge work, as well as at the Azerbaijan, Vladivostok, Yerevan, Tajik, Tbilisi and Uzbek Universities.

Soviet Orientalists regard it as their scientific duty to contribute to the Leninist policy of peace and friendship among Asian peoples and among the whole world, pursued by the Soviet government, and to the struggle against racial, national, religious and any other form of intolerance and discrimination. ■

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ILL EFFECTS OF WESTERN-ORIENTED ECONOMIC POLICIES ON ZAIRE VIEWED

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[Article by Vladimir Golubev]

[Text]

Some time ago the London magazine The New African melancholically stated that one could see no end to the problems of Zaire and that at times it seems a wonder that, in spite of everything, the state somehow manages to eke out its existence. And one is tempted to add: "And its people — to survive, by some miracle."

In the opinion of the American Professor Guy Gran, the West created the world's most inhuman economy in Zaire. The tremendous majority of the 28-million Zaireans already hardly make ends meet, comments the Washington Post on this assessment.

ONE THOUSAND AND ONE WOES

In the sensational open letter addressed in 1981 to President Mobutu, 13 Zairean MPs revealed absolutely appalling facts: 42 per cent of the country's children suffer from malnutrition which is conducive to the spread of most dangerous diseases — pellagra, kwashiorkor, TB, typhoid fever, malaria and others. Infant mortality had increased 50-fold since 1960. Hunger compels Kinshasa residents to use for food cats and dogs overrun by the traffic. Quite frequent are cases of fainting fits and death from hunger right in the streets. Moreover, there is only one physician per every 30,000 of Zaire's population. No wonder, life expectancy is less than 41 years.

Over half of the able-bodied population are jobless, and they receive no unemployment benefit. Inflation continues on the rampage. Prices are soaring so high that the working people's real incomes have plummeted to below colonial times.

The country's agriculture is simply a shambles. Many peasants have mo-

ved to cities and the price of maize has grown fivefold in the last two or three years. The staple food of ordinary citizens today is protein-poor manioc. Yet there was a time when

Zaire, with its excellent soils and a climate favouring the cultivation of most diverse crops, exported agricultural products on a wide scale. At present it has to spend \$400 million a year for food imports, the bulk of which is stolen by officials or semi-starving soldiers, since their officers appropriate without a qualm the pay of their subordinates, and dispatch the provisions allocated them to be sold on the black market. Quite frequently the lower ranks block up the country roads and rob the peasants of the produce they are taking to market.

Ruined railroads, high prices on fuel, the bad highways hinder the delivery of foodstuffs from the provinces to the towns. Whereas in 1960, when independence was proclaimed, the country had 88,000 miles of all-weather highways (for example, with a bitumen coating), today only 6,600 miles of them remain in good repair.

Added to this are the difficulties experienced by Zaire's industry. The enterprises, including agro-industrial complexes, are operating to about one-third of their capacity because of the shortage of raw materials, spares and foreign currency to import them. Zaire's foreign debt is \$5 billion.

Concerned with keeping the country solvent, the Western powers have established rigid control over its state expenditures through the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Zaire's fatal economic dependence on the West is emphasised by the fact that payments for cancelling the debt will amount between 1981 and 1986 to \$4.5 billion, \$1.7 billion of which is

interest alone. After 1987 another \$2.1 billion will have to be paid out, not counting interest. At this rate, wrote the US Journal of Commerce, one may expect a complete collapse of the economy.

Of course, the IMF is taking measures to keep the Zaire "milch cow" from dropping dead. Thus, in June 1981 it agreed to grant Zaire credits to the tune of \$1.1 billion for the next three years and the terms for partly repaying its external debt were once again revised. Something is being done in the framework of bilateral relations with Western countries.

All this, however, by no means alleviates the plight of the people. Due to the further deterioration of living standards workers ever more frequently go on strike. Office employees, teachers, medical staff and students get involved in strike actions.

One of the documents of the Zaire opposition says: "There is no policy on prices, no policy on wages and salaries. The Congo [Zaire-V. G.] has turned into an arena for profiteering, into a paradise for adventurists of every stripe who import and export any commodities and fix tariffs as they please."

What, then, are the causes that Zaire, as this document puts it, "is going through the most difficult period in its history" and that "a deep crisis has struck all the strata of the population and every walk of life"?

THE ROOTS OF THE EVIL

The present situation, with the Western press openly speaking of Zaire's "recolonisation", of its financial and economic bankruptcy, did not develop overnight. Certain moves by its government gave grounds to believe, in their time, that the country's development would follow the road of restricting the omnipotence of imperialist monopolies, of strengthening the role of the state and local capital in the development of the national economy.

Thus, 1973 saw the beginning of the implementation of a number of measures which were labelled "Zairesation". In accordance with the well-pronounced petty-bourgeois character of the doctrine of the time, that of "true Zaire nationalism", the Kinshasa regime sought primarily to create a broad social base of small and middle Zairean entrepreneurs.

For instance, on October 4, 1973, President Mobutu proclaimed the establishment of state control over the branches of Belgian companies and the handing over to Zairean ownership of foreign commercial enterprises, the nationalisation of the network of oil-product-sale outlets. Fifty per cent

state participation was envisaged for all new concessions.

However, the transfer of Belgian property into the hands of members of the ruling elite actually signified the latter's rapid enrichment, the accelerated formation of big bureaucratic bourgeoisie, rather than small and middle. The Zairean new rich, or the state organisations which proved a fantastic bonanza for high-ranking bribe-takers and embezzlers, at times laid their hands on multi-million enterprises. This is indirectly confirmed by the compensation charged by their former owners. For example, the Cometra oil-extracting company estimated its property at 900 million Belgian francs, the construction firm of CFE—at 1.7 billion.

It is noteworthy that whatever the motives guiding the country's leaders, the "Zairesation" drive was first of all a factor of separating the ruling elite from the petty-bourgeois masses, not only because of the educational quota or ethnic origin, but also because it instantly accumulated tremendous wealth. Professor David Gold of Pittsburgh University, USA, noted that because of this campaign two thousand Zaireans became huge property owners in the matter of days, some of

them becoming millionaires. The first to enrich themselves were the President's associates and fellow-countrymen, top officials and the brass hats.

The campaign was conducted by methods which doomed it to failure before it started. In some cases an enterprise belonging to foreigners would be visited at night by delegates empowered to effect "Zairesation" right away or by stages. The incompetence of the "new elite", rampant corruption among them compromised the new initiative very soon. Hardly anyone was responsible for the productive and profitable functioning of the enterprises.

Particular losses and damage were inflicted on the former Belgian plantations. Chasing quick profits resulted in that pregnant and newly-calved cows were slaughtered without discrimination, the entire harvest was squandered without leaving seed stocks. The new owners put up for sale all the stocks of commodities and raw materials, without a care for what happens after. They were interested in nothing but making money on the black market and the opportunity to acquire luxuries, Mercedes cars, etc.

In its 1974 Report, the Bank of Zaire admitted that "Zairesation" meant a disaster, especially for agriculture, that it had led to the concentration of property in the hands of a small number of persons and to the emergence of "a new class of Zairean men of property".

Thus, the "Zairesation" suffered a fiasco. The same lot befell also the next economic drive, which is known under the name of "radicalisation of the revolution".

This was announced on December 30, 1974. This time the "Zaireised" property, in particular large commercial, transport, construction and farming enterprises were handed over to the state so as to eradicate "individualism and egotism of certain citizens". Special state officials—"general delegates" were appointed to manage these enterprises. As a rule, they were young university graduates without the least managerial or economic experience. But for all this, they belonged either to the top bureaucracy or to the President's "tribal clan". Just as their predecessors, they at once set about enriching themselves, embezzling public assets.

Thus, the "radicalisation of the revolution" merely widened the gap between the small and middle bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the big capitalists, on the other.

Even after coming under the rigid control of the IMF, following the civil wars in Shaba in 1977 and 1978, the Zairean new rich kept indulging in all kinds of machinations. Thus, they established a fraudulent "Swiss" company which was entrusted with selling for cash 200 tons of cobalt (one-sixth of the annual extraction). Having made a profit on the difference in the prices for payments in cash and by instalments, the "company" extracted, it could be said, out of thin air \$8.4 million and promptly deposited them on their private accounts in Swiss banks.

The phenomenon of universal corruption and "mutuality" can by no means be ignored when analysing Zaire's state problems (we are speaking by no means of the impoverished masses, but only of persons with positions in the government apparatus). President Mobutu himself had to admit at the 1977 Congress of the ruling party—the People's Revolutionary Movement (PRM)—that the heads of state organisations were turning, directly or through substitutes, into suppliers of foodstuffs, building materials and other commodities, at unimaginable prices. The President went on to say that everything in the country was being "sold and bought" and that the "untouchables" [high-ranking politicians—V.G.] had shown themselves to be not only exploiters of the people, but a caste perverting and trampling upon the most cherished values of the "Zairean revolution". The President spoke also about the "invisible" taxes and extortions extracted everywhere from the population by the officials.

Corruption (seen by the monthly *Genève-Afrique* as the creation or consequence of Zaire's economic decline deliberately organised and controlled by the ruling oligarchy and its overseas partners, for they derive from its backwardness more than from encouraging economic development) was one of the main causes of the failure of "Zairesation" and the "radicalisation of the revolution", soon followed by the "new return" of the expropriated foreign enterprises back to their former owners.

Special mention should be made of the role of foreign capitalists who encouraged this corruption and bribing of officials. At the same time they used economic and financial pressure to stifle all attempts by Zaireans to become masters in their own home. In the long run, all such attempts were brought to nothing by the monopolies which resorted to such tested means as destabilising national economy, disrupting supplies, denying credits, etc.

The situation was further exacerbated by miscalculations on the part of Zairean leaders who based their plans on the continued high demand for copper, the country's main export commodity, on the world market. The drop of copper prices dealt a crushing blow at these plans, further undermined by the energy crisis—Zaire lacks the amount of mineral energy resources it needs. The uprisings of the people in Shaba, the main ore-extracting region of the country, in 1977 and 1978 resulted in the closure or non-operation of the main quarries and mines.

Interference by NATO countries—France, Belgium, the USA and also by Morocco and Egypt—in the Shaba events created conditions for the Zaire regime's surrender to the united might of the monopolies, i. e. the economic demands of the IMF. The leaders of the country shaken by the wars in Shaba and the deepening crisis of the late 1970s, requested credits to the tune of a billion dollars. Yet the IMF, the IBRD, the EEC and ten Western creditor-countries provided much less. They elaborated a special programme ("The Mobutu Plan") which envisaged the "rehabilitation" of the Zairean economy, the "curbing of corruption", a rise of agricultural production, the increased extraction of minerals and the development of transport. Rigid imperialist control was established over the Bank of Zaire, the country's finances and government expenditures. The French *Le Monde* wrote in this connection that "Western terms for improving the situation ... closely resemble an ultimatum".

Moreover, the still continuing payment of compensations to Belgians,

whose property was nationalised and not given back, is another heavy burden borne by the Zairean economy.

In the long run, all plans for reviving the national economy in Zaire, for normalising its economic life are upset by foreign capital's self-interest, as firm as a rock. Such is the logic of "recolonisation", made possible by taking the country along the futile road of dependent capitalist development, aggravated by corruption and the avarice of the ruling elite, the anti-popular policy of the emerging bourgeoisie class.

In this connection it is worthwhile to take a glimpse at the changes taking place in the structure of Zairean society.

THE SOCIAL PYRAMID

If one sums up the works by Western and African scholars concerning the social structure of Zaire, it may be represented in the shape of a pyramid topped by the President, and his immediate entourage right beneath him: a few scores of people, mainly members of his family and clan, as well as loyal associates entrenched in the topmost sinecures, controlling all the levers of the political machine.

The second, wider circle is composed of the "ruling brotherhood" which includes, along with members of President Mobutu's tribe, people hailing from the equatorial region and neighbouring Upper Zaire and Northern Bandundu. According to the criterion of loyalty to the regime, the "brotherhood" may include representatives of other ethnic groups too. The two aforementioned strata make up the nucleus of the neocomprador bourgeoisie living at the expense of the state apparatus and imperialism paying for its services.

The third circle is composed of the rather numerous "potentially big" bourgeoisie, which theoretically may supplement the upper circles. It includes the MPs, persons with university diplomas, the big and middle merchants who derive fantastic benefits from inflation and the shortage of goods, industrialists, shareholders of the branches of transnational monopolies, a certain part of the officials, freelance professionals, a large number of army officers, and technocrats. This intermediate stratum making rich by corruption, taking advantage of the economic dislocation and anarchy, gives birth to elite becoming its reserve. Yet the rapid promotion of this stratum is hindered by competition of foreign monopolies which have seized the levers of economic management, and the "elite's" tribalist policy.

The aforementioned monthly *Genève-Afrique* stresses the fabulous

wealth of the new rich. The entire state debt of Zaire could be wiped out if the ten wealthiest citizens had set aside for this purpose part of their fortunes, now outside the country. Such an accumulation of wealth occurs, the journal notes, only in the oil-producing countries.

Describing Zaire's bourgeoisie as one of the "most cynical" in the developing world, the American Professor R. Lemarchand quotes the example of a booklet by a certain Tchitegni-Nzembele *Get Rich Quick* which describes with perfect candidness the motives behind the behaviour of the Zairean bourgeoisie. The key to personal enrichment, the author writes, lies in freeing the mind from all doubts regarding the legitimacy of material wealth. The reader is urged, among other things, to turn money making into an obsession, to take the necessary risk, to make use of other people's money for amassing one's own fortune, etc.

Tchitegni-Nzembele believes that the country's economy should be promoted by the "systematic rearing of millionaires". Every month Zaire could easily create from 30 to 40 native millionaires, that is, some 400 a year. "This would be an excellent realisation of our national development programme." In chasing riches the author himself became a diamond expert with the Bitmond-De Beers Corporation of London.

Let us note that in view of the Western authors, political power in Zaire is a precondition for enrichment; and wealth, in turn, serves as the main factor of "self-preservation" and promotion in one's career. All the upper crust of Zairean bourgeoisie are linked, one way or another, with foreign capital. The so-called "ore-mining" group adheres to a pro-Belgian orientation. It includes representatives of the ore-mining districts educated in Belgium and maintaining close contacts with Belgian financial and industrial quarters. There is a group oriented toward big American capital and urging pre-eminent collaboration with the USA.

The bureaucratic and neocomprador bourgeoisie, the distinction between which is rather hazy, gives birth to the "entrepreneur" (according to Western authors, "economic" or "national") bourgeoisie and native capitalists. Having consolidated their positions, they may claim greater political influence in the affairs of state and a share in supreme power. Already today a veiled struggle is going on between the ruling elite and the young "entrepreneur" bourgeoisie.

The President is by no means running the country alone or with a bunch of associates. Under the slo-

gan of the "unification of the motherland" an extended state system is created which combines monarchy with a rather broad local apparatus. The President rules in the centre and in the localities through members of the PRM Central Committee and Political Bureau, the governors of the provinces, city mayors, commissioners of sub-provinces, zonal and other commissioners, big merchants, cattle-dealers, plantation owners, etc., whose personal well-being is vested in the regime and quite frequently in the dominant foreign capital.

It is very important to define the place occupied by the petty bourgeoisie in the social pyramid, for categorised as such are usually those who exploit the labour of five to ten hired workers who produce surplus value. As a result the owners of tiny workshops, craftsmen and artisans with apprentices and "family workers" cannot formally be classed with the petty bourgeoisie. However, the distinction is very difficult to draw, especially in Zaire. Small traders, owners of cafes, bars, dwelling houses, garages, taxi cabs, etc., partly use family labour, partly hired workers at times owning not one but several trading outlets, bars, etc. So far as officials are concerned who do not belong to the category of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, they practically belong to the petty-bourgeois stratum, and not only because of their petty-bourgeois world outlook and living standards. As a matter of fact, when defining social categories one should take into account a factor most important in Zaire: that of allround corruption, owing to which officials of the middle and low echelon have several sources of income, accumulate assets and put them in circulation, frequently registering small enterprises under the names of relatives, co-tribesmen, etc.

On the whole, the condition of the intermediate strata, the petty bourgeoisie included, is rather grave; their interests come into contradiction with those of the ruling oligarchy and foreign monopolies.

So far, accurate information on the size of the "elite" and the "ruling brotherhood" has not appeared in print; however it may be indirectly assessed by scattered remarks of observers and data on the number of officials. It is believed that residing in Kinshasa are 15,000 members of the ruling oligarchy and neocomprador bourgeoisie. The London journal *Quarterly Economic Review* points to a bloated official apparatus numbering about 400,000 persons, whereas only 150,000 are actually required.

The foundation of the pyramidal structure of Zairean society examined above is made up of the peasantry, the workers, small officials, policemen and soldiers, the urban unemployed, compelled to reconcile themselves to a bare minimum of benefits. The most active part are hired labourers, including the proletariat of Kinshasa and the Shaba province.

Unfortunately, no data on employment in Zaire's individual industries have been published since 1968. From all the employed numbering 8,300,000 (the majority being peasants) only 12 per cent are hired labourers.

The number of workers remains stable on the whole (about 500,000), while the number of those employed in the services has grown considerably. Working people are seeking a way out of their plight in the traditional system of relief and small trade, though they are taking part ever more frequently in spontaneous strike actions, which testifies to the extreme social tension in the country and demolishes the myth of "true Zairean nationalism", of the political and ideological homogeneity of Zairean society. Very large in the cities is the marginal stratum of jobless, lumpens, and proponents of tribalism. It is they who at times exert a negative influence on the formation of class consciousness by the proletariat.

The changes in Zaire's social structure demonstrate an increasing class differentiation, mounting class contradictions fraught with explosions, the strength of which is so far difficult to predict.

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TRIBAL, POLITICAL SITUATION IN BALUCHISTAN EXAMINED

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[Text]

After a short take-off the Pakistan Airways Fokker Friendship left behind the Islamabad Airport and set course for Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan.

With an area of 347,000 square kilometres, Baluchistan is the largest province in Pakistan, stretching 700 kilometres from the east to the Iranian border in the west and nearly 450 kilometres from the north to the Arabian Sea in the south. The fact that this country is covered mostly by mountains and rocky arid plateaus, that summer temperatures sometimes reach as high as 50°C, and that it is almost completely arid, makes this land extremely inhospitable. Travellers may ride tens of kilometres over its gently rolling thorny hills without encountering a single brook or tree. According to historians, when Alexander the Great's army was returning from India by way of Baluchistan every other soldier died of thirst and privations. To obtain water nomads dig several oblique wells converging in the same place where drops of fresh water are collected. The chore takes between two and four hours daily.

In mountain valleys, in contrast, with their life-giving glacier-fed streams, the eye feasts on green fields and blossoming gardens.

Baluchistan's population is a little more than 4 million, or nearly 5 per cent of Pakistan's total.

After thirty minutes of flight emerald-green wheat, maize and mustard fields of Punjab give place to sun-scorched steppe, and grim mountains begin to loom from three points of the horizon. Soon their jagged peaks are quite near. Its engines roaring, the Fokker picks up altitude. A few minutes later another, even higher mountain chain forces the plane to climb again. Finally, clearing the last ridge safely, the plane begins its descent. Below appear haphazardly strewn blocks of

adobe houses and islets of scant vegetation.

THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL

Although Quetta's population tops 285,000, it is not a modern town. Rather it is an agglomeration of narrow dusty streets, one- and two-storey buildings, and jerry-built shanties. Only downtown Quetta boasts several three- and four-storey buildings lining the main street. Landmarks include the university campus, the hospital and the medical college. Only about 40 per cent of the population have running water, and sewage is practically non-existent.

Viewed from the mountains, Quetta's northern part reveals itself to be a pattern of rectangular blocks of barracks. This is the local cantonment. In the middle of the last century this was the encampment of the British colonial army sent to put down the insurgency of the fiercely independent Baluchis and Pushtu tribes. In 1891 Quetta's population topped 10,000. The construction in the early 20th century of the strategic railway and highway to Chaman, Nok Kundi and Koh-i-Taftan connecting Quetta to the Afghan and Iranian borders and to the port of Karachi gave a boost to the town's growth. Soon it became the province's main trading centre. Its bustling bazaars draw customers from far and wide. Local merchants do a brisk trade in an uncanny variety of goods: such basic necessities for the nomads and mountaineers as quilts and tinware are displayed side by side with expensive Japanese coffee services of fine china, and yashmaks and traditional robes—with deeply décolleté evening gowns. The contrasts of the local market have a simple explanation—the bulk of the goods is smuggled.

There is also a traffic in smuggled goods brought over narrow mountain paths: transistor radios, cigarettes,

fabrics and many other items. (This is quite common here.)

—You may call it smuggling, a local tradesman told me, but for us it is normal trade.

The southern outskirts of the town is an industrial park of sorts; it contains small textile, worsted, glass, furniture, and wood-working factories, an oil mill, auto-repair and hardware workshops. It might be added that this handful of factories accounts for nearly one half of the province's processing industry.

Economically and socially Baluchistan is perhaps Pakistan's most backward province. The succession of central governments in the years of independence did next to nothing to advance its development. The province actually has no industry, its per capita annual income is \$184, its mortality rate is high, the literacy rate among adult males is 22 per cent, and among females—4.6 per cent.

"Baluchistan", I was told by Khwaja Idjaz Sarwar, Director of the local government's Information Department, "has enormous potential for development practically in all key spheres of national economy. Although the prospecting of its mineral wealth has barely begun, it is already known that it has industrial deposits of coal, gas, copper, lead, magnesite, sulphur, gypsum and so on. Their development is hindered by lack of funds, unskilled local workforce and poor management. Nevertheless, Baluchistan accounts for two-thirds of Pakistan's coal, 80 per cent of chromite and 85 per cent of natural gas production. Onyx and marble mined in the province are processed in Karachi.

Since there is no mechanisation, work in the mines and quarries is arduous. "Frequently there is no timbering in the galleries," I was told by Mian Abbas Ali, Baluchistan's chief mining inspector, "as a result accidents are almost a monthly occurrence, with many miners losing their lives. The rock is rich in methane and the industrial safety service is practically non-existent."

A MEETING WITH A SARDAR

Baluchis constitute nearly 50 per cent of the province's population. They are a people that live by their own centuries-old traditions and laws. Their ancient legends trace their origins to times before the birth of Prophet Muhammad, when they inhabited the mountains around the Syrian town of Aleppo. In the 7th or the 8th centuries the Baluchis had to flee to the East. Subsequently they settled in the inaccessible and inhospitable mountains between the Indus in the East and Sistan in the West. According to a different version, the Baluchis hail from the Southern coast of the Caspian Sea and

are related to the Kurds. Many centuries of daily struggle for survival shaped the Baluchis into a hardy, proud and independent people.

The social mainstay of the Baluchis is the tribe headed by the sardar. For centuries these hereditary rulers exercised supreme military, administrative, and judicial power over their tribesmen. In the four Baluchi principalities—Kalat, Makran, Las Bela and Haran—the princes were also supreme owners of land. They collected rent from tenants and raised taxes from nomad cattle-breeders. The largest tribes are the Marris, and the Bugtis. The tribes consist of clans, the latter of paros or large families.

The traditional form of government, that is the power of sardars survives despite all attempts of the central government to break the hold of the sardars and to introduce central rule from Islamabad. The Pakistan Times admitted that the influence of central administration in Baluchistan does not extend outside its local office buildings.

Tribal traditions have firm roots: the people cherish their loyalty to their clans and their sardars.

I was lucky to meet Muhammad Akbar Khan, sardar of the Bugtis. He had come to Quetta from his ancestral village of Dera Bugti to attend to some business and received me in his own centrally located house.

In a large room, thickly carpeted with precious Persian rugs, but completely devoid of furniture, I was shown to the place reserved for guests of honour—a pile of cushions under a shield with crossed swords.

Baring their feet and making low bows, manservants placed bowls with almonds, sultanas and other Oriental sweets on the carpet before us. Choosing almonds with thin shells which could be broken easily, the grey-haired chief in a snow-white turban and robes, pushed them toward me, joking,

—With Bugtis hospitality is as sacred as a blood feud.

Stroking his silvery finely-curved beard majestically, he told me about himself and his tribe.

Bugti lands occupy an area of 4,000 square miles. Their closest neighbours are the Marris. Although no population censuses have ever been held, 55,000 Bugtis took part in the 1971 general elections. The tribe consists of seven clans, each clan includes seven paros. The old traditions and many survivals of the past are still very strong, such as blood feuds, sparked by fights over women, pasture land or water. Some sardars have a stake in continuing backwardness of their people and purposely block the spread of education. "What is the use of schools?", they reason. "If men learn how to read, they may forget how to fire a rifle."

Muhammad Akbar Khan himself has ruled the tribe since 1939. He became sardar at the age of fifteen, after his father's death. He went to school in his native village, and continued his education at Karachi and Lahore universities.

"My status puts me in the class which is usually referred to as the exploiters," Akbar Khan told me, "but I view myself as a progressive, because I favour the establishment of a progressive social order."

Reappearing, the servants brought a basin, a jug of warm water, a towel and soap. The unhurried and silent procedure of hand-washing was the necessary preliminary to a repast: the servants brought in trays with steaming pilaw, spicy meat curry, chapatis and fruit.

The conversation turned to events around Afghanistan. Most of those present approved of the April Revolution. The consensus was that the time had come to recognise Babrak Karmal's government and to establish normal relations with it.

"Some people say that the Soviet Union seeks access to the warm seas," somebody observed.

My reaction was forestalled by Akbar Khan.

"The West raises hue and cry on the subject, but this is a US propaganda ploy. The Soviet Union came to Afghanistan's help at the request of the Afghan government. In contrast to the United States which has not stopped interfering in the affairs of other peoples, the Soviet Union has never been guilty of foreign expansion. The United States backs up all sorts of stooges, reactionary regimes and military juntas."

Those present, including the mullah, nodded their approbation.

THE PROBLEM OF AUTONOMY

For centuries the Baluchis have been waging a desperate struggle for independence. Their old folk songs and ballads speak of the numerous wars they have had to wage against the Persians, Arabs, Mongols, Hindus and other invaders.

In the 15th century the legendary tribal chief Mir Shakar Rind succeeded in building a union of Baluchi tribes on the territory stretching from the Makran foothills to what is today Quetta, although it did not last long. The Kalat Confederation, created in 1666, was a more durable entity. Nasir Khan, the sixth Khan of Kalat, who ruled in the second half of the 18th century, rallied around him a Baluchi state which won the greatest degree of independence ever. It had a Wazir (Prime-Minister), two legislative councils and an army. For nearly one

hundred years Kalat enjoyed complete sovereignty.

In the 19th century Baluchi lands were conquered by the British and incorporated in British India. They were governed by a so-called Governor-General's Agent, whose authority was backed by the bayonets of numerous garrisons.

With calculated disregard for traditional ethnic and cultural links the British colonial power arbitrarily divided the Baluchi lands; the territory west of the Goldsmith line went to Persian Baluchistan, that north of the Durand line—to Afghan Baluchistan, and that south of the Durand line—to British Baluchistan.

The upsurge of national liberation struggles in colonial India also added strength to the Baluchis' national movement. Its leaders—Yusuf Ali-khan, Mohammed Khan Achakzai, Kazi Mohammed Isa and several others—supported the idea of the formation of Pakistan, believing that the Baluchis would be granted autonomy within it, which would mean an end to their political rightlessness. In 1947, when the British were beating a hasty retreat from the region, the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan Balloch won sovereignty for his principality. However, in March 1948 Pakistan's troops moved into Kalat. The Baluchis' opposition was crushed and Kalat became part of Pakistan.

The Baluchis' search for their national identity ran into the wall of official Pakistani ideology. The country's ideologues asserted that Pakistan is a one-nation Muslim state, since the decisive criterion of national community is religious community, not linguistic, territorial, economic and other factors. This official policy was used to justify the complete integration of the four Baluchi principalities with Pakistan in 1955. In October of the same year the central government passed a decree on transforming West Pakistan into one province. Under the decree Baluchistan became district Quetta, and the territories of the former principalities—district Kalat.

It was not until 1970, when the decree was repealed, that Baluchi territories were granted the administrative status of a province, with a provincial government formed two years later.

Repeated and acute conflicts flared up between the emerging Baluchi national bourgeoisie, intellectuals and tribal chiefs, on the one hand, and the central government, on the other. In 1958 Pakistan's army had to occupy Kalat for the second time. The early 1960s saw the appearance of Farari, a guerrilla organisation of Baluchi separatists, headed by Sher Muhammad Marri. It had bases all over Baluchistan.

Later on Farari was joined by representatives of different political parties, a development culminating in the creation of the Baluchistan People's Liberation Front (BPLF). By 1977 the Pakistani army losses in this undeclared war topped 3,300 killed alone.

The central government succeeded in stopping the bloodshed only in 1977 when it declared an amnesty and released about 6,000 movement supporters, including its leaders, from prisons.

A temporary lull set in. But how long was it going to last? Pakistan's ruling quarters still refuse to reactivate the provincial legislative assembly. Few Baluchis are allowed to take part in governing the province, with the key administrative posts still held by representatives of Punjab's bureaucracy.

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HEAD OF INDIAN PEACE ORGANIZATION INTERVIEWED

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[Text]

Our correspondent Dmitry Kasatkin met with Mr. Om Prakash Palival, General Secretary of the All-India Peace and Solidarity Organisation (AIPSO), and asked him a few questions.

— Will you please tell our readers about the activities of the organisation you head.

— The AIPSO is an influential mass public organisation functioning successfully in many states of the country, and has branches in nearly all the large cities. The goals it sets itself is to mobilise the Indian people towards the struggle for a lasting peace and international security, in support of the struggles waged by the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism and colonialism, for consolidating national independence, and for development along the path of progress. The organisation holds meetings, rallies and manifestations, whose participants expose the dangerous plans of Washington and of its allies in the aggressive NATO bloc aimed at preparing a new world war.

The AIPSO is making a hefty contribution to the Afro-Asian solidarity movement. The Indian people, which has experienced lasting colonial domination and has shed a lot of blood in the struggle for its freedom and independence, cannot remain indifferent to the suffering and misery of other nations, nor to the aggressive actions by the forces of imperialism and reaction. For example, when Israel, financed and encouraged by Washington, began a wide-scale aggression against the Lebanon in the summer of 1982, the AIPSO called mass meetings and gatherings up and down the country, at which the Indians sternly condemned the invaders and their patrons, the US imperialists, demanded an immediate end to the lawlessness, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanese territory and the granting to the Arab people of Palestine the right to create their own sovereign state.

The AIPSO gives much attention to ensuring a lasting peace in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The Indian public is pressing for the implementation of the well-known UN resolution on turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, something vigorously opposed by the USA. The Indians demand the elimination of the US military base on Diego Garcia Island where Washington has deployed nuclear weapons and so-called rapid deployment force intended for the suppression of the peoples' national liberation movements, and for interference in the domestic affairs of independent states. The Indian public comes out resolutely against the "Central Command" set up by Washington, whose active sphere includes 19 countries, the area of the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. This is a new instance of gross US interference in the affairs of Afro-Asian countries, a new grave threat to their

independence and peace in the region. Our Organisation sees it as its crucial task to mobilise Indian public opinion against the dangerous plans of American imperialism.

Taking part in the work of the AIPSO are representatives of broad strata of the Indian population: workers, artisans, traders, students, teachers and doctors.

The fact that the people itself contribute to the financing of its activities, serves as proof of the Organisation's prestige among the masses. On the eve of this or other large political campaign the AIPSO collects money among the population. Everyone who supports its aims feels it to be his or her duty to contribute a few rupees or paise to this fund.

Broad public circles may acquaint themselves with the activities of our Organisation through the monthly journal Peace and Solidarity we publish in the English language in Delhi and the languages of the Indian peoples in many States.

— What role is played by Indian public organisations in developing and promoting friendly relations between India and the USSR?

— Quite a number of public organisations, such, for example, as the AIPSO, the Indian-Soviet Cultural Society, do a lot along these lines. They are guided in their work by the ideals of humanism, friendship among peoples and peace. We know that the same ideals underlie the foreign-policy course of the Soviet Union.

Our Organisation explains to the Indians the importance of the USSR's peace policy for the consolidation of universal peace. The Indian-Soviet Cultural Society has many good deeds to its merit. Last year it was thirty years old. Activities by public organisations help to build an atmosphere of friendship for the Soviet Union in the country, and evoke a response in the hearts of millions of Indians.

Indian public opinion highly values the political, economic, scientific and cultural relations which are successfully developing between the two countries. This found reflection in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between India and the USSR. Indians are gratified that the

positions of the two states on the main issues of our time are either close or identical. This is conducive to the successful struggle of the peoples for a lasting peace and security.

Relations between mass public organisations of our two countries are developing vigorously. The All-Indian Peace and Solidarity Organisation maintains close contacts with the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and the Soviet Peace Committee.

Speaking of the development of good relations between India and the Soviet Union, I cannot but recall the words of Jawaharlal Nehru, one of the architects of Soviet-Indian friendship who said that the Soviet Union had given India many gifts but the most valuable of them all is friendship.

— How do you assess the peaceful initiatives of the socialist countries outlined in the Political Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty Member-States?

— This is a document of tremendous historical importance. The socialist states came out with it at a critical moment when the forces of world imperialism led by the United States have sharply exacerbated the situation on the planet, pushing the world towards a destructive nuclear war.

The USSR and other socialist countries have put forth a realistic alternative to mankind's slipping towards a nuclear catastrophe. This actually is the whole point of quite a number of initiatives contained in the Political Declaration and, in particular, the proposal of the Warsaw Treaty states to NATO countries on concluding a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and on maintaining peaceful relations.

The peoples of the developing countries see in the Political Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty states a promising road towards removing tension in different parts of the planet. For example, the proposals of the document on turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, on restricting and eventually ceasing military activities there appeal very much to Indian public opinion. The realisation of the socialist countries' peace initiatives would provide an atmosphere of trust and normal good neighbourly relations between all countries.

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SOVIET AID IN CONSTRUCTION OF WUHAN BRIDGE, STEEL PLANT IN PRC RECALLED

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[Text]

As a correspondent in China, the author travelled thousands of kilometres in that vast country, visiting many big cities and small settlements associated with its history and culture. Much of what he has seen is described in his book SEVENTEEN YEARS IN CHINA, recently published in the Soviet Union. Below are Mikhail Yakovlev's reminiscences about Wuhan, one of the biggest cities in the People's Republic of China. It is noteworthy because it is actually a group of three cities—Hankou, Wuchang and Hanyang—lying on both banks of the Yangzi River and its left tributary, the Han-shui.

The wide Yangzi embankment, washed clean by rain, steams under the rays of the sun. The huge dike, seemingly covered with a carpet of verdure, conceals from the human eye the legendary river which makes an indelible impression on anyone who sees it. Its waters carry a great deal of silt and sand which, settling to the bottom, raise the level of the river, and thus bring on destructive floods at the times of high water. For centuries the population fought the Yangzi by building earthen dikes wherever it burst its banks. The silvery waters of the river flow into the Procrustean bed formed by earthen dikes which run for dozens of kilometres along the road to the city. The reactionary ruling classes in old China practically did nothing to protect the city from floods. In mid-1931, even before the height of the flood season, the Yangzi overflowed its banks. Its flood waters then took a toll of more than 30,000 human lives.

The flood in 1980, almost 50 years after, was the biggest in the latest 100 years. In the Hankou area the water level in the Yangzi rose to the

27.76-metre mark. But the reservoir of the Danjiang Hydropower Station with the capacity of 17,000 million cubic metres took in the flood waters, and this made it possible to escape disaster. When one is atop the dike, one physically feels the might of the colossal mass of water which weighs heavily on the earthen embankments. The right bank is lined with the mansions of former foreign concessions. Today these "monuments" testify all the more clearly to the birth of the new industrial Wuhan.

As the day advanced, the heat became less oppressive. The sun, setting slowly, was nonetheless still sending hot rays through the filmy clouds. The neat rows of tropical trees lined the asphalted road on either side and ended abruptly before the wide and smooth concrete surface of the Big Wuhan Bridge across the Yangzi.

I was standing on its upper deck. There were cars and lorries speeding past, trolley buses rustling by, a great many cyclists pedalling away, two-wheel carts with huge rubber tyres rolling slowly and noiselessly, and pedestrians feasting their eyes on the mirror-like grey surface of the mighty river. On the lower deck trains rumbled along the double tracks.

This does not surprise anyone, everything looks normal, everybody is accustomed to it. And yet things were altogether different only a while ago.

The Guangzhou-Wuchang railway line runs to the Yangzi from the south and the Peking-Hankou line from the north. From time immemorial rice, sugar, fruit and valuable kinds of timber travelled north from the subtropics in the south, and after the Liberation ores and rare metals in increasing quantities. And the north supplied the south with wheat, ferrous metals, coal, timber, and machinery. In Wuchang and Hankou these goods crossed the river by barge or ferry and were then again loaded into railway vans, or the

vans themselves were ferried across. This, however, not only took a lot of time, but was fraught with difficulties, for the unpredictable river was full of danger. For centuries the Chinese people dreamed of the time when the Yangzi would be spanned by a bridge. The need to build such a bridge was repeatedly discussed after the Xinhai Revolution.

The well-known Chinese engineer Zhan Tanyou twice proposed to build a bridge across the Yangzi, in 1911 and 1913. In 1913 graduates of the bridge-building department of Beiyang University, together with a German professor, first made surveys of the place where it was proposed to erect the bridge, but their enthusiasm evoked no response from the warlords ruling the country then. After that there was no more talk about building the bridge for almost 20 years.

It was only in 1930 that an American specialist in bridge-building offered the Guomindang government to set up an organisation to make the necessary preparations. An active part in it was played by a group of Chinese engineers. Eight holes were drilled within half a year in the Yangzi and two in the Hanshui, and that was the end of it. Six years later preparatory work was resumed by engineer Mei Yangchun. A raising of funds for the construction

of the bridge was announced, but it did not produce the required sum.

After the victory of the Chinese Revolution in 1949 the question of building the bridge was put on a practical plane. In the following year the PRC State Council ordered that survey and design work be undertaken, and in February 1954 it adopted a decision to build the Big Wuhan Bridge across the Yangzi. The first group of Soviet bridge-building specialists arrived in China at the invitation of its government in July of that same year. Soviet engineering works were asked to produce the necessary metal sections for the bridge in the quickest possible time.

In a letter to the workers of the Kuznetsk Iron and Steel Works in Siberia, the Dneprodzerzhinsk Iron and Steel Works in the Ukraine, and the rolling-mill operators of the iron and steel plants in the Urals, the builders of the bridge wrote: "To help fraternal China you have built a large-sheet mill, and for that you had to lay aside the fulfilment of orders for your own country, draw up a new production plan and overcome a number of technical difficulties. You have sent us splendid rolled metal, made by thousands of your golden hands, on time... We have overfulfilled our plan only because you have helped us with your labour... This gigantic installation is the product of our joint labour—that of Soviet specialists and Chinese bridge-builders.

That is why we often call it 'a bridge of Chinese-Soviet friendship'."

Next to the bridge rises an obelisk in honour of the builders of this gigantic installation. The inscription glorifies the achievement of the Chinese bridge-builders and expresses gratitude to the Soviet people for their assistance.

Among those who built the Wuhan bridge was Konstantin Silin, a well-known Soviet engineer and the first man in the world history of bridge-building to propose a new method of erecting piers in the conditions of a great depth and rapid current. Thanks to this method, building work went all through the year and this made it possible to cut production time and save a great deal of money. The steel giant rose over the river within 25 months, two years ahead of schedule.

The Soviet specialist's method was later employed in the building of other bridges in China. The bridges across the Yangzi at Chongqin and Nanking and on other rivers were patterned after the Big Wuhan Bridge. Chinese historian Peng Ming wrote in one of his articles: "Soviet specialists gave us enormous assistance in developing the bridge-building industry in New China. We are deeply grateful to the Soviet Union and Soviet specialists for their heartfelt assistance."

Twilight was falling over the most majestic and biggest bridge not only in China, but in the East in general. Junks and barges, resembling large bugs in the semi-darkness, were gliding on the black surface of the river far below. Lights were switched on in the city and within a moment the contours of the bridge were brightly lit up. The hush that descended together with twilight did not last long—life came into its own again.

A giant iron and steel works, which was supposed to be second only to the Anshang mill, the firstling of the Chinese metal industry, was built on the basis of Soviet plans in vacant lots and peasant fields, not far from the city. The huge fire-breathing blast furnaces rise high, while the buildings of the six open-hearth furnaces, five coking batteries, refractory plant and the blooming mill stretch out for hundreds of metres.

"The works were built very fast," Chen Zhenji, one of the managerial staff, told me. "The first section was commissioned ahead of schedule. This was possible not only thanks to the building workers' enthusiasm and the support given by the entire people, but also because of the Soviet Union's assistance."

In Wuhan I visited another big enterprise which provides Chinese engineering plants with automatic 20-ton and 100-ton vertical planing machines, vertical-milling and gear-milling machines, rotary-table and boring machines bearing the trade mark of the Wuhan Heavy Lathe Works. A whole army of skilled engineers, technicians and workers had grown up there, and 120 of them had gone through practical training at Soviet plants in Novosibirsk, Leningrad and Moscow.

There is another monument to friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples in Wuhan. It was erected in memory of the Soviet volunteer flyers amidst evergreen trees in the Jiefang gunian Park which was laid out after the liberation of China.

Soviet volunteer flyers came to China's aid in the difficult days of 1938, when the Japanese invaders were smashing their way into the Chinese hinterland. Together with Chinese flyers they defended Chinese cities from savage attacks, raided Japanese air bases, bombed Japanese warships on the Yangzi and bases in North Taiwan. More than 200 Soviet flyers gave their lives fighting for the freedom of China.

I stood for a few moments at this monument and the grave of Soviet flyers. The red flowers around seemed to be aflame under the rays of the sparkling sun. Inscribed in gold in Russian and Chinese on the white marble of the obelisk was the following: "In 1938, when the Chinese people were savagely attacked by the Japanese fascists, the Soviet people selflessly sent their best sons, volunteer flyers, to China to help its people in the great and just struggle against the Japanese invaders.

"Together with the Chinese people, Soviet volunteer flyers performed numerous feats in the struggle against the Japanese fascists. Stationed in the area of Wuhan, they staged air attacks on the northern part of Taiwan, bombed enemy warships on the Yangzi River and took part in the battle for Wuhan, dealing devastating blows to the brutal enemy. Many Soviet volunteer

flyers lost their lives in bitter air combats...

"The blood of the fallen Soviet volunteer flyers and the Chinese fighting men was spilled jointly for the cause of China's liberation from the imperialist yoke. The memory of Soviet volunteer flyers will live for ever in the hearts of the Chinese people.

"May this lofty internationalism, characteristic of the working class, always develop and strengthen the fraternal and indestructible friendship of the Chinese and Soviet peoples!"

In his book *The History of Chinese-Soviet Friendship*, the abovementioned Peng Ming thus wrote of those years: "The Chinese people must never forget that while the American capitalists were supplying Japan with petrol and scrap metal, thus helping the Japanese imperialists to bomb the Chinese people, Soviet heroes were spilling their precious blood for the Chinese people in the air space over our country."

I left Wuhan a few days later. The straight line of the lights of the Big Wuhan Bridge and the glow of the blast furnaces of the giant iron and steel works were reflected in the still waters of the Yangzi. A warm night was falling on the city. I looked at its lights out of the window of the railway carriage and thought of everything I had seen in those days and the people I had talked to about workaday Wuhan and its future.

All this is alive in my memory now, when efforts are being made to normalise Soviet-Chinese relations and restore friendship between our two great neighbouring nations. Soviet people remember very well the days when their country and People's China were bound by ties of friendship and comradesly cooperation. The Soviet Union has stated time and again that it is ready to negotiate without any prior conditions on mutually acceptable measures to improve Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of respect for each other's interests, non-interference in each other's affairs and mutual benefit, and, of course, not to the detriment of the third countries. ■

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BOOK ON 'BOURGEOIS' CONCEPTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REVIEWED

Moscow ASIA AND AFRICA TODAY in English No 4, Jul-Aug 83 p 62

[Book Review]

INTENSIFICATION OF IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE

[Text]

V. KOLLONTAI, *The Crisis of Bourgeois Concepts of Development of Newly-Free Countries*, Moscow, Mysl Publishers, 1982, 173 pp.

V. M. Kollontai's book is mainly a critical analysis of the latest bourgeois concepts of "industrial society" and "alternative development", and the whole complex of approaches offered by Western economists for transforming international economic relations.

The book shows that present-day bourgeois concepts have not emerged by chance; they are the final links at the current stage in the chain of neocolonialist ideology, which has been formed over the decades parallel to the disintegration of the colonial system and which is now in a grave crisis. A broad analysis of the evolution of neocolonialist theories from the concepts of "catchup development" and "economic growth stages" of the 1950s to the present-day concepts of "vicious circles", "bottlenecks", "big push", "zero growth", "balanced and unbalanced growth", "outside-oriented development", etc., shows that these theories have inevitably reached a state of crisis. They have failed to withstand the test of practice and have always stood counter to the interests of liberated peoples and the objective tendencies of economic development. The latest concepts, tackled here for the first time as the subject of serious Marxist analysis, reflect the general crisis of neocolonialist ideology.

Having employed an historical approach toward critical analysis of modern concepts, the author has been allowed to firmly conclude that "theories expounded by neocolonialism display inner contradictions between its strategy and tactics, and an inability

to solve the complex problems facing Asia, Africa and Latin America" (p. 53).

The book points out that progressive public figures, young economists and sociologists of the newly-free countries have stepped up their sharp criticism of neocolonialist theories, denying in the process the need for their countries to develop along Western lines. They also heap criticism on the Western way of life, setting out in search for an alternative that could help the newly-free countries avoid all the negative aspects which were suffered by North America, Western Europe and Japan in the course of their development. One alternative offered for developing countries is the "post-industrial society" concept, which is allegedly free from all the vices of the "industrial age".

The book in succession exposes this utopian concept and the entreaties of its proponents that developing countries should keep out of the international division of labour and scientific and technological progress. Dispelling the illusion of "escaping from society", the author notes that "alternative development" ideas based on the experience of the USSR and other socialist countries (p. 79), are gaining greater influence in developing countries, and are essentially a refutation of the capitalist way of development.

The book acquaints the reader with the views of African, Asian and Latin American economists, such as S. Amin, A. Herrera, M. ul Haq, M. Halty, I. Abdalla, A. Benachenhou and others, who oppose neocolonialist theories antagonistic to their people.

Since international economic relations have become the main factor of the clash of economic interests between the emerging nations and neoco-

lonialism, an intense ideological battle has unwound around questions connected with their transformation. The book points out that Western economists try hard to subject the transforming of international economic relations to the task of raising world production efficiency. People in the developing countries now realise much more clearly that this would actually mean intensified neocolonialist exploitation. They therefore reject this task, seeing as the aim of the transformation of international economic relations the protection of their own economic interests and the maximum reducing of losses from trade with industrially developed capitalist states.

The book does not cover all the latest concepts of development and the participation of the young states in world economy. The author merely chose those which he thought determine the intensity of the ideological struggle today.

*M. VOLKOV,
Dr. Sc. (Econ.)*

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FRG BOOKS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA, KENYA REVIEWED

Moscow ASIA AND AFRICA TODAY in English No 4, Jul-Aug 83 pp 62-63

[Book Review]

[Text]

**FOREIGN CAPITAL
IN THE ECONOMIES
OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES**

T. RAUCH, *Das nigerianische Industrialisierungsmuster und seine Implikationen für die Entwicklung peripherer Räume*, Hamburg, 1981, 398 S.
R. HILBERT, *Ausländische Direktinvestitionen als Entwicklungsdeterminante Kenias*, Frankfurt/Main, 1981, 246 S.

The books under review written by West German authors examine the influence of direct Western investments on the development of industry in Nigeria and Kenya. The analysis of the real role played by foreign capital in the economies of these two African countries is all the more topical since they are often referred to in the writings of bourgeois economists as examples to be imitated, and as "showcases" of the capitalist way of development.

T. Rauch's monograph *The Nigerian Pattern of Industrialisation and Its Introduction in Periphery Zones* and R. Hilbert's book *Foreign Direct Investments as a Determinant in the Development of Kenya* have a clear-cut critical character and are marked by a historical approach to the processes they analyse. For example, both authors are quite right in paying attention to the fact that the dependent nature of the Nigerian and Kenyan economies is preconditioned by Great Britain's colonial policy. The setting up of certain enterprises in the manufacturing industry by colonialists, which mainly produce import-replacing consumer goods was determined by the desire of the colonial power to hamper the infiltration in the economies of its colonies by the capital

of other imperialist powers, and an urge to keep the African market under British control. Moreover, both authors point out that no essential prerequisites had been created to change the archaic economic structure of African countries which was lopsidedly geared to the exports of raw materials, neither was any foundation laid down for establishing an independent economy. This conclusion eloquently refutes the bourgeois concoctions, whose authors regard colonialism as a "progressive" stage in the history of African peoples, which allegedly contributed to their "prosperity" and brought them closer to modern civilisation.

After Nigeria and Kenya won political independence, relatively high rates of growth of industrial production were registered in these two countries. However, the authors are quite right in noting that this was growth without development. In both countries foreign capital created mainly enterprises of consumer industry, whose output was chiefly meant for meeting the demand of the well-paid strata of the population (in Kenya, for example, there are approximately 20 per cent of families which Hilbert calls "consumer elite"). As a result of a large-scale introduction of Western-type products into the local markets, dependence intensified on the import of the necessary industrial raw materials, capital-intensive technology was used, the traditional African handicrafts vanished, a forced transition to the use of expensive imported goods was registered, and the time of their use was reduced.

The West German economists stress that neither in Kenya nor in Nigeria does foreign capital create means of production, while the enterprises they build maintain technolo-

gical and other contacts with each other, separating themselves from the national production. This leads to the formation of industrial enclaves which depend completely on the world capitalist market of raw materials and equipment. Moreover, joint activities of the subsidiaries of the international concerns which struck root in Kenya and Nigeria are carried out by means of joint investments, common management (some managers hold up to 60-80 director posts simultaneously) and agreements on the division of the market. As a result of such well-coordinated policy, monopoly high prices are being fixed, thereby ensuring an exceptionally high rate of profit for foreign investors. For example, the average rate of profit for foreign manufacturing enterprises in Kenya is 28 per cent more than that for local companies. The capital-intensive technology used by subsidiaries of international concerns, as well as their policy in the sphere of employment intensify the process of the marginalisation of the urban poor. Among the other negative factors engendered by the activities of foreign capital, the authors also mention the growing outflow of profit which fact adversely affects the balance of payments and the fund of African countries' capital investments; greater regional disproportions; the growing socio-economic polarisation of African society, stagnation in agriculture which is not provided with the means of production by industry, and so on. This is why the two West German economists are quite right in stating that direct investments of imperialist powers in the developing countries result in the emergence of such socio-economic structures which hinder development rather than stimulate it.

The unquestionable merit of the two works under review is that the activities of foreign capital are analysed in close connection with the policies pursued by the national governments, policies which also predetermine the dependent type of development. This is also promoted by an exclusively liberal investment climate and the absence of the necessary control on the part of the developing countries over the production and monetary-financial activities by the subsidiaries of international concerns. Moreover, these two books show, graphically and convincingly, the close interconnection between the interests of the state machinery in Kenya and Nigeria and foreign private companies. According to T. Rauch, "There are many signs demonstrating that the function of state interference [in the economy. — S.B.] in Nigeria consists only in ensuring profits for the government bureaucracy" (I, pp. 344-345). It should be pointed out that

the book dealing with Nigeria examines mainly the period from 1965 to 1975. In the latter half of the 1970s, the situation in the country changed considerably, as a result of a stronger government control over the activities of foreign capital. However, in spite of the fact that foreign capital is compelled to take part in the building of heavy-engineering and manufacturing enterprises in Nigeria, this makes no contribution to the lifting of the country's foreign economic dependence.

The TNCs change their methods, while retaining the principal strategic goal of neocolonialism—to ensure the deepest possible integration of the economies of African countries in the world capitalist economy, having the status of weak and dependent partners. International concerns pay higher salaries to their African partners who have well-established contacts with the government. In turn, the creation of favourable conditions for the activities of foreign capital also ensures additional incomes for the government bureaucrats who have invested their capital in the enterprises belonging to western firms. "Without removing this unity of interests between foreign capital and the class possessing state power," R. Hilbert writes, "there is no ground to expect in the foreseeable future the overcoming of the two structural signs of dependent development—the process of reproduction, which depends on the world market, and structural heterogeneity" (II, p. 240).

T. Rauch is of the same opinion. From the viewpoint of the two West German authors, fundamental political changes are indispensable. However, the West German scholars actually fail to tell the reader what changes in the superstructure would make it possible to transform the economic basis of African countries. This is a manifestation of their bourgeois narrowmindedness, and unwillingness to touch upon the key issue of ownership relations. That is why their recommendations are either abstract, or at best are of technocratic character. A grave shortcoming of both monographs consists in the attempt made by their authors to claim without any grounds the "unacceptability" of the Marxist theory of development for the newly-free countries. The methodological untenability of the monographs under review undoubtedly reduces their scientific value. At the same time, the wealth of facts which are sometimes unique and disclose graphically and convincingly the negative character of the impact exerted by foreign capital on the economies of African countries, can be used by many specialists.

S. BALASHOV;
Cand. Sc. (Econ.)

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UK BOOK ON EAST-WEST COMPETITION IN AFRICA CRITICIZED

Moscow ASIA AND AFRICA TODAY in English No 4, Jul-Aug 83 pp 63-64

[Book Review]

[Text]

BOURGEOIS POLITOLOGY: CONCOCTIONS AND MISCALCULATIONS

A. GAVSHON, *Crisis in Africa. Battleground of East and West*, London, 1981.

Representatives of bourgeois politology grossly distort the essence of Soviet foreign policy, in particular in its relations with African countries. The hotbeds of tension in Africa are often assessed by Western politologists as conflicts in which the strategic interests of "superpowers" clash, the superpowers which have turned the continent into a "sphere of acute geopolitical rivalry".

It is precisely this concept that keynotes the book by Arthur Gavshon. The author examines the developments in Africa during the past decades through the prism of the imperialist interpretation and understanding of the so-called geopolitical objectives of the USSR and its allies, on the one hand, and the leading Western powers, on the other. Here, Gavshon claims to criticise impartially both sides.

The facts cited in the book show that, while declaring its loyalty to the cause of liberating colonial and dependent peoples of Africa, the United States actually sides with the former metropolitan countries granting them large-scale political, economic and military support. The author is forced to describe the "new" African policy of the USA, pursued by Washington since 1960 as "dual", in other words, hypocritical, which it remains till now.

Gavshon makes an attempt to reveal the reasons for US setbacks in Africa and the successes of the USSR. He deals at length with the ideological immaturity of African peoples (p. 149). He devotes special attention to the activities of Henry Kissinger which, in the opinion of many observers, resulted in the drop of US prestige in Africa. And Andrew Young, who was assigned, in accordance with Carter's designs, to rectify the errors made by the Nixon-Ford administrations, is described as his opposite.

Referring to Washington's "vital" interests in Africa, the author stresses that, in the final analysis, the leading among them are strategic ones: gaining access to the sources of raw materials and "ensuring the security" of the main sea routes along the African continent. However, Gavshon notes that within the context of confrontation between the superpowers, Africa is of special interest to the United States also due to the ever growing possibilities that the Soviet Union will win on that huge territory (p. 163). This is how the achievements of the national liberation movement and African independent countries are posed as "Soviet victories". Real developments are replaced by a false thesis which then comes to justify imperialist interventions.

Noteworthy are the frank utterances by the author, in particular, when they bear on the tasks of the US policy in Africa which official Washington depicts as the desire to "ensure justice" and "well-being" of African peoples. The essence of the current US foreign policy vis-à-vis Africa, based on Reagan's assertion that any African problem is a weapon in the

hands of the Russians, targeted at the USA (p. 21), boils down to a desire to oust the Soviet Union from Africa by any means (p. 165). Such ambitions of US imperialism come at variance with the spirit of the international situation in the 1980s when the overwhelming majority of governments support detente and the policy of coexistence of states with different social systems.

In analysing the situation in the areas which, in the opinion of the author, are the "hotbeds of tension", Gavshon brings the reader to the conclusion that the revolutions in Ethiopia and Angola, as well as the subsequent developments, were nothing but miscalculations of the USA in its struggle against the Soviet Union for domination in Africa. The author admits that it was the USA that gave South Africa the "green light" for invading Angola (p. 230). He furnishes evidence that the United States gave direct assistance to the

aggressive actions of South Africa in Angola, which were manifested, among other things, in the deliveries of armaments and financing of operations conducted by the Angolan factional forces supported by Pretoria.

While criticising certain aspects of US policy in Africa and justifying it as a whole, Gavshon remains on the platform of a bourgeois ideologist. His class approach to African issues stands out in the boldest relief when he analyses the policies of the Soviet Union and Cuba. For example, in a bid to examine some "aspirations of the USSR" in Africa, the author claims that they allegedly in no way differ from the goals of the West (p. 95).

The book distorts the selfless assistance given by the Soviet Union to African countries.

V. VOLNOV,
T. TUTOVA

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INSTITUTE BOOK ON AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEWED

Moscow ASIA AND AFRICA TODAY in English No 4, Jul-Aug 83 p 64

[Book Review]

[Text]

**SOVIET SCHOLARS
ON AFRICA AND
THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD**

Africa and the World Today. Views of Soviet Experts from the Institute of Africa, Novosty Press Agency Publishers, Moscow, 1982, 120 pp.

The book under review, prepared by a group of leading scientists from the Institute of Africa, the USSR Academy of Sciences, is an analysis of urgent problems of development of the African continent and the contemporary world, their interconnection and interdependence.

Using cogent argumentation, the authors show that Africa, like the entire world, is living through a period of revolutionary renovation, no matter how hard the imperialists and reactionaries are trying to reverse the course of history. One vivid example of this historical process in the African continent is the fact that the positions of newly-free states that have chosen socialist orientation are increasingly gaining strength both in domestic and international affairs.

The authors acquaint the reader with the process of implementing the ideas of scientific socialism in African countries, with the tendencies and prospects of the capitalist mode of production there, with possibilities of opposition to the imperialists' neocolonial policy in the newly-free states.

Of particular interest is the section of the monograph dealing with the experience of socialist construction in the Soviet Union and its significance to the young nations facing very complicated social and economic tasks in eliminating the colonial aftermath. The authors provide graphic evidence that the African countries'

equitable and mutually beneficial co-operation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, loyal to their internationalist duty of giving support and help to peoples fighting against all kinds of national and social oppression, is an important factor for African countries in their effort to revive nationally and create an independent and stable economy.

In response to the African public's sweeping interest in the socialist way of life, the authors note the international significance of peaceful and creative labour of peoples of the socialist community.

Much attention is paid to the influence the present-day complicated situation in the world exerts on developments in Africa. The authors point out that the striving of the imperialist circles, primarily the United States, for military superiority over the socialist countries, and drawing the world into a new, still more dangerous round of the arms race, imperils independent development of young African countries and world civilisation as a whole.

Therefore, the authors conclude, it is vitally important for the peace-loving humanity to draw their ranks still more closely and to block the inhuman schemes of world imperialism. The book is keynoted by the idea that a lasting peace and international security are indispensable to peoples of Africa and other continents for accomplishing their tasks.

The book provides the reader with a wealth of information and evokes meditation. Its publication is another proof that Soviet specialists in African studies fulfil their duty of promoting friendship between the Soviet Union and African countries, to rendering African peoples more assistance in their struggle against imperialism, for peace, democracy and social progress.

A. BYKOVSKY

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MARK CITED ON ROLE OF NATIONALISM IN ASIAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 8, Aug 83 pp 12-20

[Article by G. Kim, Corresponding Member, USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text]

We are living in a time of great revolutionary transformations when radical social changes triggered by the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917 have transformed the entire make-up of the globe. The essence of the colossal changes in the present-day world, naturally, awaits to be interpreted. What are their principal underlying ideas and motive forces? We can, of course, name several enormous spheres, in which ideological battles are waged and which involve great masses of people.

These include religious doctrines, all sorts of bourgeois reformist ideas, petty-bourgeois Utopian theories and a host of other broad-based ideological movements. In their own way every one of them has affected and will go on affecting the course of history. However, the focal point of the ideological struggle today lies elsewhere. It is the battle of the two worlds and two fundamental ideologies that epitomize the two opposite social systems.

The historical experience has shown that Marxism is espoused by all the progressive forces consistently rejecting social and national oppression. It is Marxism that has been and will always be the most powerful ideological source of human progress.

Today, too, the universal human value of Marx's ideas is evident. "...There is nothing resembling 'sectarianism' in Marxism," Lenin wrote, "in the sense of its being a hidebound, petrified doctrine, a doctrine which arose *away from* the high road of the development of world civilisation."¹ This is precisely what gives Marx's ideological and theoretical heritage its epoch-making importance. His theoretical analysis always centred on the most burning and far-reaching problems of human society and his interest lay with the destinies and the future of not only individual nations, be they the most advanced ones, but the whole of humankind, which accounts for the unflagging and ever growing popularity of his ideas.

The international applicability of the Marxist class theory is its key characteristic which attracts to it not only the proletariat but also members of other walks of life and wins it advocates not only among the conscious elements of a society in which the antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat has already become the mainspring of social development, but even in those where this contradiction is only emerging. The founders of scientific communism believed that the main goal—the communist transformation of society—could be attained in the victorious revolutionary struggle of the working class led by its party. But they never contrasted the class interests of the proletariat with the democratic

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 23.

aspirations of the people or isolated them from each other either in theory or social practice. It is only natural, therefore, that Lenin called Marx and Engels "the greatest representatives of consistent nineteenth century democracy, who became the teachers of the revolutionary proletariat."² This commonly known truth should be kept in mind by those who want to limit the impact of Marxism to some social milieu or a geographical area or time.

Marx's internationalism and consistent democratism were particularly manifest in connection with the oppressed and exploited peoples of the East. Karl Marx, who thoroughly analyzed the capitalist mode of production as a stage of the socio-economic development of mankind being progressive in comparison to feudalism, not only did not share the liberal-progressist and Europocentric views of the historical process dominant in the last century but was also a principled opponent of them. The founders of Marxism at the time were among the few who took a highly critical attitude towards colonial methods of making the peoples of the East "a part" of higher social productive forces.

Marx became interested in the East in the late 1840s—early 1850s when he developed the fundamental ideas of the social emancipation of the peoples. One of the key problems—the role of the peoples of the East in the world struggle against capital and in mankind's social emancipation is central to Marx's writings. As it is impossible to name his major works on problems of the East, let alone discuss them in an article of this size, I will confine myself to but a few aspects of his versatile interest in the colonial problem of the East.

At the time bourgeois historians for the most part regarded the East as some "mysterious" and "stagnant" phenomenon that allegedly had to be brought into contact with European civilization even at the cost of colonial conquest. Marx pondered on the "mysteries" of the East, the reasons behind its stagnation and backwardness and the interaction between the West and the East. He devoted much of his *Chronological Notes* to problems of the East. Analyzing milestones of world history, he studied the mechanisms of the East-West relationship and interaction, and formulated general historical laws of human progress.

It was largely by studying the main characteristics of colonialism and the history of colonial countries that the founders of scientific socialism worked out the theory of socio-economic formations, the heart of historical materialism viciously attacked today by the bourgeois critics of Marxism.

It should be pointed out that, in a bid to refute Marx's theory of formations, the opponents of Marxism often quote the experience of the East, onesidedly emphasizing its specifics. A realistic picture is, of course, called for: quite a few peculiar characteristics distinguishing the countries of the East from those of the West are indeed coming to light as the East is playing an ever bigger role in world history and its own history is being studied extensively. Hence the conclusion about the "special road" for the East, the "inapplicability" of Marx's doctrine of formations to the Eastern countries and Marxism being "outdated" in general. In this connection it is important to cast another look at certain aspects of Marx's probing into the problems of the East.

Marx and Engels outlined the theory of formations in the most general form in the 1840s (*The German Ideology*, *The Manifesto of the Communist Party*, etc.), drawing primarily on the historical experience of the

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 21, p. 104.

European nations. Needless to say, the theory of formations was further enriched and acquired new dimensions when Eastern problems were included in the scope of the undertaken study. We can quote, for instance, Marx's well-known maxim from *The Critique of Political Economy*: "In broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois, modes of production can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society."³ This idea of Marx stimulated thought-provoking discussions that continue unabated among today's Marxists-Leninists. It was also an indisputable step forward both in terms of grasping the specifics of Eastern formations and from the point of view of their universality and their being part of world history.

Marx had a realistic idea of the specific characteristics of the East. Analyzing the relationship between the general and the particular in Eastern social structures and their evolution, he came to the conclusion about the various ways of historical progress that cannot be squeezed into the Procrustean philosophical and historical model, "whose highest virtue is its being above history." In his letter to the editors of the *Otechestvennye Zapiski* (in response to an article by N. K. Mikhailovsky, "Karl Marx Facing the Verdict of Mr. Zhukovsky") he vigorously opposed the idea of turning his model of the emergence of capitalism in Western Europe "into a historical and philosophical theory of the general path which all peoples are fatefully doomed to take, no matter what historical conditions they live in, so as to eventually arrive at an economic formation which ensures, together with the utmost flourishing of the productive forces of social labour, the fullest development of man."⁴

The most significant manifestation of Marx's deep scholarly interest in the East was his treatment of the topic in the *Capital*, in which we find ever new aspects of his interpretation of the sociology and political economy of Afro-Asian precapitalist structures. A comparison of the guild and caste systems, the role of private and state property in the West and the East, the meaning of "antiquated types of capital" in the transformation of traditional society, specifics of the natural-ecological environment of reproduction and the agrarian system in Asia were among the numerous problems Marx analyzed theoretically on the basis of concrete historical examples in his major work. Pointing to the stagnant nature of the old modes of production and the conservative institutions of Oriental despotism as compared with dynamic Europe of the 19th century, Marx in no way absolutized that stagnation, and cited many examples of progress made by the productive forces in Asia prior to the advent of the colonialists. Among other things he wrote: "It is the necessity of bringing a natural force under the control of society, of economising, of appropriating or subduing it on a large scale by the work of man's hand, that first plays the decisive part in the history of industry. Examples are, the irrigation works in Egypt, Lombardy, Holland, or in India and Persia where irrigation by means of artificial canals, not only supplies the soil with the water indispensable to it, but also carries down to it, in the shape of sediment from the hills, mineral fertilisers."⁵

As a scholar and revolutionary, Marx focused his attention on the results and forms of the interaction of Asian precapitalist society with Western colonialism and especially capitalism rather than on an abstract model of that society. With the acumen of a genius he foresaw that the destruc-

³ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 504.

⁴ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 120-121 (in Russian).

⁵ Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 481.

tion of the old basis of Asian society by capitalism, the emergence of some elements of the modern bourgeois mode of life in the Eastern countries and the anticolonial revolutions against the parent states would all have far-reaching consequences for the destinies of the whole of mankind. Nevertheless he did not overestimate the possible rates of such changes and was completely aware of the grave objective obstacles they might encounter, obstacles rooted not only in colonial and capitalist exploitation and oppression but also in the specifics of socio-economic relations historically inherited by the Asian countries.

"The obstacles presented by the internal solidity and organisation of pre-capitalistic, national modes of production to the corrosive influence of commerce are strikingly illustrated in the intercourse of the English with India and China... The substantial economy and saving in time afforded by the association of agriculture with manufacture put up a stubborn resistance to the products of the big industries..."⁶ Using India, one of the more developed colonies and semi-colonies of the East at the time, Marx expounded the fundamental idea that the colonial form of contact with world civilization was not effective. What is more, genuine social progress presupposes the elimination of colonial exploitation. Such a view of social history is a far cry from economic determinism, which is ascribed to Marxism by narrow-minded or biased bourgeois critics.

Marx's ideas about the relatively organic synthesis of traditional and modern factors in the historical progress of the East are of tremendous importance now that the problem of the role of traditional institutions has become extremely acute as a result of the decolonization of Afro-Asian countries.

Attempts at modernization without due account for traditional institutions have in some cases led to an "explosion" of traditionalism, as is, for example, well exemplified by the growth of the religious (Islamic) factor in the political life of the developing countries. Social practice of these countries once again corroborates the truth that many traditional institutions cannot be ignored, just as it is equally impossible to idealize them:

The idea of the need to unite the national liberation struggle of all the oppressed peoples with the struggle waged by the proletariat in the developed countries is central to Marx's doctrine, despite all the assertions by bourgeois ideologists to the contrary. In this respect Marx paid much attention to working out the strategy and tactics of the proletariat on the complicated national question, and his efforts turned out to be highly productive. Small wonder that Lenin observed "the deep insight of genius" in the ideas of the founders of Marxism on the national question and "...a splendid example of the attitude the proletariat of the oppressor nations should adopt towards national movements".⁷

Marx and Engels outlined the general approach to the national question already in *The Manifesto of the Communist Party*. As the proletariat of all nations has "the common interests... independently of all nationality"⁸, proletarian internationalism becomes highly important, as well as the course towards a socialist revolution, which will also help to put an end to national enmity. The reason is that "...as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end."⁹ The forthcoming proletarian revolution, Marx ex-

⁶ Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, pp. 333, 334.

⁷ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, pp. 436, 442.

⁸ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 120.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

plained, will simultaneously become a decisive factor in liberating the colonial and dependent countries.

Marx set forth and substantiated his brilliant ideas in this respect, having analyzed the liberation struggle of the Eastern nations. It was in connection with the future of India and the prospects of its winning independence from foreign capital that he wrote his famous pronouncement: "When a great social revolution shall have mastered the results of the bourgeois epoch, the market of the world and the modern powers of production, and subjected them to the common control of the most advanced peoples, then only will human progress cease to resemble that hideous, pagan idol, who would not drink the nectar but from the skulls of the slain."¹⁰

At the same time developments in the East set new tasks to the international workers' movement. National self-consciousness was taking shape among Eastern peoples in special, early forms beginning with the mid-19th century, and nascent mass social liberation movements could be observed in Asia and North Africa. Needless to say, the founders of Marxism followed with unflagging attention these early manifestations of awakening of the East and showed great interest in the social structure and peculiar historical type of precapitalist Eastern society, which evoked popular protest under the impact of colonialism and capitalism; the nature and trends of these popular movements; and their possible effect upon social development of advanced countries and entire humanity. Marx and Engels studied the anticolonialist movement from broad historical and social positions and recognized both the historical necessity and legitimacy, and the inevitable limitations of the early liberation movements of oppressed Asian nations.

Listing the religious, dynastic and national forms of the liberation movement as typical, Marx pointed out, among other things: "It is a curious *quid pro quo* to expect an Indian revolt to assume the features of a European revolution."¹¹ Engels called the anticolonial activities in China in 1857 "a popular war for the preservation of the Chinese nationality" and added that the means employed by the rebellious nation "should be assessed not from the standpoint of the accepted rules of regular war or some abstract criterion, but only from the standpoint of the stages of civilization which this rebellious nation has reached."¹²

When Marx critically analyzed Benjamin Disraeli's speech about the Sepoy Rebellion in India, he placed special emphasis on the British politician's conclusion that "the present Indian disturbance is not a military mutiny, but a national revolt."¹³ Marx believed the national liberation movement of the peoples in the colonial and dependent outlying areas to be a profoundly progressive historical phenomenon.

He branded the apologists of colonialism, who insisted on the Eastern peoples being "barbarous" and allegedly having no right to refuse to accept the "civilizing mission" of European powers. He hit the mark when he spoke about the bankruptcy of the "Christianity-canting and civilization-mongering British Government" that forced the cultivation of opium on Bengal, "to the great damage of the productive resources of that country" and then cashed in on smuggling that opium to China.¹⁴

¹⁰ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980, p. 222.

¹¹ K. Marx, F. Engels, *The First Indian War of Independence 1857-1859*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p. 57.

¹² Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, p. 222 (in Russian).

¹³ K. Marx, F. Engels, *The First Indian War of Independence 1857-1859*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p. 47.

¹⁴ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980, p. 19.

Marx resolutely refuted all claims to portray colonialist activities as a cultural mission. When President of the Board of Control for India Charles Wood declared hypocritically that "we must look at India with somewhat of an Indian eye", Marx sarcastically remarked: "which Indian eye seems to have the particular gift of seeing everything bright on the part of England and everything black on the side of India".¹⁵

Marx consistently upheld the right of the oppressed peoples to resist the predatory policy pursued by the "civilized" European enslavers. Denouncing the ruthlessness of the British colonialists in China, he wrote that "the quelled fire of hate which erupted against the English during the opium war has flared up in China as flame of ferocity which, in all probability, no declarations of peace and friendship will be able to extinguish."¹⁶ He called the Taiping uprising "one formidable revolution," which, even though it had a religious undertone, was characterized by social and national trends.¹⁷ Marx had a similarly high opinion of the Indian people's struggle for independence in 1857-1859. He said that the struggle united Moslems and Hindoos and ascribed it to the general discontent of great Asiatic peoples with the English rule.¹⁸

In his articles—"Afghanistan," "Algeria," "Burmah", etc.—written for *The New American Cyclopaedia* he showed warm approval of and sympathy with national liberation movements. For the Arabs and Kabyles of North Africa "...independence is precious and hatred of foreign domination a principle dearer than life itself..."¹⁹ The correctness of this judgement was fully confirmed a century later when the Algerian people succeeded in winning their national independence as a result of the heroic years-long war against the French colonial army.

Marx taught Western revolutionaries to render internationalist support to the Liberation struggle of the Eastern nations. Contemplating on the ways of liberating the colonial countries, Marx and Engels at first placed emphasis on the revolutionary initiative of the European proletariat, above all that of Britain or France, which, after liberating themselves, would help emancipate the colonial and oppressed nations. Later on, however, they revised the issue and recognized in principle the possibility that, say, "the Hindoos themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off the English yoke altogether"²⁰.

According to Marx, the struggle of the oppressed peoples was not merely historically progressive in itself. It became a powerful concomitant factor of the socialist revolution carried out by the proletariat in the developed capitalist world. Marx called the revolutionary developments in Eastern countries a spark thrown into "the overloaded mine of the present industrial system".²¹ That was why, when studying, for example, the growing liberation struggle in China, he pointed out that a social revolution in that country and the liberation of the Chinese people from the shackles of feudalism would have "the most significant results for civilisation."²²

¹⁵ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980, p. 121.

¹⁶ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, p. 170, (in Russian).

¹⁷ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980, p. 93.

¹⁸ See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, p. 24 (in Russian).

¹⁹ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982, p. 67.

²⁰ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980, p. 221.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

²² Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p. 267.

In another work Marx said that "in the event of a major revolutionary upsurge on the European continent, England, whose troops and ships have been diverted by the Chinese war and the Indian uprising", would be unable to retain its role of a drag to the revolution, the role it played in 1848-1849.²³ The same idea was voiced in his letter to Engels of January 14, 1858: "With the drain of men and bullion which it must cost the English, India is our best ally..."²⁴ *Worked out by the founders of Marxism, the ideas of unity and interrelationship within the world revolutionary process became subsequently an important strategic principle governing the international proletarian struggle.*

Under imperialism, when national and colonial problems became especially pronounced, Lenin repeatedly cited Marx's stand on the national question (in particular, in connection with Ireland). "...in contrast to the Proudhonists who 'denied' the national problem 'in the name of social revolution', Marx, mindful in the first place of the interests of the proletarian class struggle in the advanced countries, put the fundamental principle of internationalism and socialism in the foreground—namely, that no nation can be free if it oppresses other nations."²⁵

In the new historical conditions, as Lenin brilliantly proved, the national and colonial questions drew closer together on a worldwide scale, and the liberation revolutions in colonial and dependent countries found a natural ally in the proletarian and democratic movements in the developed countries. This alliance of the anti-imperialist forces reached its highest level after the first socialist state was formed in Russia, ushering in a new epoch in world history, the epoch of the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism. Owing to the organic unity and interaction of world socialism and the national liberation movement, our time has witnessed epoch-making developments—the downfall of the entire colonial system and the formation in lieu of former colonies of more than 100 new sovereign states which constitute an important factor of today's international life and introduce many new elements in the progressive development of the whole of humanity.

According to Marx, the interaction of the revolutionary forces of the West and the East was ensured by the fact that both the struggle waged by the proletariat in the developed countries and the national liberation movement of the oppressed peoples were directed against one and the same adversary—international capital. The essential problem arose, however, of these two revolutionary movements being synchronous or, to put it more precisely, of congruence between their socio-economic, formation objectives, a problem not at all to be solved easily at the time when the barrier separating the East and the West seemed to many to be insurmountable. Small wonder that it became a cause of serious thinking for Marx and a "difficult question" for quite a while. Indeed, he asked Engels in his letter in 1858, whether or not the proletarian revolution in Europe could "be crushed in this little corner, considering that in a far greater territory the movement of bourgeois society is still in the ascendant?"²⁶

²³ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, pp. 244-245 (in Russian).

²⁴ K. Marx, F. Engels, *The First Indian War of Independence 1857-1859*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p. 180.

²⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 149.

²⁶ K. Marx, F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p. 104.

It took years of titanic efforts and quests of new facts and arguments for Marx and Engels to resolve that "difficult question." The answer was prompted by a fundamentally new, dialectical approach to the world historical process—by recognizing the possibility for the underdeveloped peoples to traverse a *shorter* road to socialism from the precapitalist or early-capitalist stages of their development when socialism emerged victorious in the developed countries. In this way the hypothesis was voiced of the possibility to bypass the bourgeois stage, that is to say, of the non-capitalist development if socialism exists in practice and ensures the conditions for the Eastern peoples, taking a "short cut" to socialism by setting an example and rendering ideological and material aid.

Even though these ideas were largely worked out with respect to Russia in the late 1870s-the early 1880s (a letter to the editors of the *Otechestvennye Zapiski*, the draft letter and final reply to V. I. Zaslulich, etc.), the facts show that the problem itself had been on Marx's mind for quite a while. Marx demonstrated that for a country such as Russia, the prospect of bypassing capitalism would be the "best chance", as in the country of late bourgeois development disproportions between the already existing (primarily borrowed from the developed countries) forms of developed capitalism and the as yet "unprepared" traditional structures promise society "dreadful vicissitudes", "Caudine Forks" and major social upheavals.

On the other hand, non-capitalist development is promoted in principle by the retaining communal or other forms of traditional, precapitalist collectivism. "The fact that the peasant is accustomed to *artel* conditions of labour makes it easier for him to effect the change from a parcelled system of economy to a co-operative one."²⁷

Marx believed, however, that this prospect could be conditioned by the interaction of the revolutionary processes in the developed countries and in the world "backwaters." This was clearly formulated in the foreword to the Russian edition of *The Manifesto of the Communist Party* written by Marx and Engels in 1882: "If the Russian Revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West... the present Russian common ownership of land may serve as the starting point for a communist development."²⁸ Only when the victorious proletariat in the socially and economically advanced countries shows other nations "how to do it", will non-capitalist development be historically guaranteed.

It was on this issue that Marx's stand differed radically from the ideas of the Narodniks, who tended to idealize the village community and its "socialist" nature. Marx was also perfectly aware of the negative, conservative features of communal institutions, which "had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism" and "restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition."²⁹ For this reason the founders of scientific socialism in no way perceived non-capitalist development as a mere "skipping" over the positive achievements of bourgeois civilization and primitive egalitarianism. It is not by chance that Marx mercilessly lashed out against various manifestations of "crude communism", which "has not only failed to go beyond private property, but has not even reached it."³⁰ The guiding role of the international proletariat was also called for in this respect, to preclude the danger of a primitive revolutionary spirit.

²⁷ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 156.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 100-101.

²⁹ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980, p. 132.

³⁰ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, International Publishers, New York, Moscow, 1976, pp. 295, 296.

The aforementioned ideas of Marx about non-capitalist development (just as about the national and colonial question as a whole) are important not so much from the standpoint of concrete historical landmarks, as from the standpoint of methodology—the *idea of the unity of the world revolutionary process and the interaction of the revolutionary movement in the developed and backward countries. It was this aspect of Marx's legacy that proved to be of constant value subsequently, especially in the present-day conditions.*

At a new historical stage Lenin developed the idea of non-capitalist development. At the Second Congress of the Communist International he said that "the Communist International should advance the proposition, with the appropriate theoretical grounding, that with the aid of the proletariat of the advanced countries, backward countries can go over to the Soviet system and, through certain stages of development, to communism, without having to pass through the capitalist stage."³¹ Needless to say, the problem of non-capitalist development and the corresponding ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin are extremely topical now that more than a score of the newly-free Asian, African and Latin American countries have embarked upon the road of socialist orientation.

Now that the advocates of Marxism-Leninism constitute a formidable public force in the newly-free countries, that the Communist Parties of the developing states are part and parcel of the world communist movement and that the vanguard parties of the working people, which have named Marxism-Leninism as their ideological foundation in their programme documents, have emerged and are gaining momentum, the timeless value of Marx's theoretical legacy is especially evident. It has imparted a powerful impetus to revolutionaries of many generations. But it is only now that Marxism has progressed from the realm of scientific theory to that of everyday practice for dozens of countries and hundreds of millions of people that its great life-asserting power becomes manifest in its entirety.

³¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 244.

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