



MAN 000

1. *Staphylococcus aureus*

WELCOME TO MAIN FILE

19991008 088

OFFICE OF TECHNICAL SERVICES
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

**Reproduced From
Best Available Copy**

U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
205 EAST 42ND STREET, SUITE 300
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

FOREWORD

This publication was prepared under contract by the UNITED STATES JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE, a federal government organization established to service the translation and research needs of the various government departments.

ATHEMETAT2 HOITUBHICD
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

JPRS: 3389

CSO: 3705-D

MARXISM VS FREUD:

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
Contemporary Soviet Commentary the Philosophy of Voluntarism and Freud's Psychoanalysis	1
Contemporary Soviet Commentary - Inter-Institute Conference in the Presidium of the Academy of Medical Sciences USSR on Problems of Ideological Struggle Against Contemporary Freudianism	24

MARXISM VS FREUD:

CONTEMPORARY SOVIET COMMENTARY

THE PHILOSOPHY OF VOLUNTARISM AND FREUD'S PSYCHOANALYSIS

Following is a translation of an article by V. M. Morozov in Zhurnal nerropatologii i psikiatrii imeni S.S. Korsakova (Journal of Neuropathology and Psychiatry imeni S. S. Korsakov), Vol. LIX, No. 5, Moscow 1959, pages 609-620.

Extensive writings have been devoted to Freud's psychoanalysis. It has been frequently mentioned in medical and philosophical literature that various philosophical and medical concepts had a considerable influence on Freud. In the opinion of German philosopher R. Eisler, Freud was strongly influenced by the psychology of I. Gerbart (mechanism of pre-sedations), Charcot (doctrine of Hysteria) and Kabbala (art of interpretation). R. Eisler characterizes psychoanalysis as partly medicine and partly psychological theory, which examines all human psychic life from an energetic-teleologic point of view. In addition, it has been indicated more than once in writings that S. Freud was influenced by the philosophy of Schopenhauer and F. Nietzsche. E. Ackerknecht writes in the "Short History of Psychiatry" that Freud, in his early period, was under the influence of G. Fechner. Later on he became acquainted with the philosophy of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche; their influence on Freud proved to be more substantial.

Freud himself maintained that psychoanalysis must not subordinate itself to a definite philosophical view of the world. In his speech at the Fifth Psychoanalytical Congress in Budapest, in 1918, Freud said: "let our respected friend D. Putnam, in unfriendly America, forgive us if we do not agree with his request that psychoanalysis subordinate to a determined philosophical view of the world and that it thrust this view upon a patient with a purpose for improving" (3, page 36). In 1904, in his speech at the Vienna Collegium of Medicine, Freud said: "Do not be afraid that we are lost in the deepest field of philosophy: our unconscious is not quite the same as that of philosophers. Besides, the majority of philosophers do not wish to know anything about the "unconscious psychic" (3, page 29).

From Freud's statement above one should conclude that psychoanalysis

does not impose on patients any philosophical beliefs with a psychotherapeutic view and that the majority of philosophers, contemporary to Freud, have not wished to know anything about the unconscious psychic processes.

Freud stressed that in creating his doctrine he remained entirely independent. He considered his theory of repression to be original until O. Rank pointed out to him the phrases in A. Schopenhauer's essay "The World as Will and Idea", in which the philosopher attempted to explain insanity. Freud wrote: all that this thinker says on resistance (opposition) to any painful manifestation of reality coincides to such an extent with the contents of my own theory of repression that I was able to make this original discovery only as a result of being poorly-read. (4, Page 25). But according to Freud, the theory of repression is a foundation upon which lies the whole structure of psychoanalysis, constituting its essential part (4, page 25). In his article "Difficulties of Psychoanalysis", Freud writes that it is entirely impossible to curb sexual instincts and that mental processes are unconscious in themselves, becoming accessible and subjected to the "ego" only as a result of an incomplete and imprecise perception. This equals the assertion that the "ego" is not master of its own house.

Freud indicates further that probably only very few people understand how important is the theory of unconscious mental processes for the future of science and life. Freud concludes: "But we hasten to add that psychoanalysis was not the first one to take this step. As forerunners, we can point to various prominent philosophers, chief among them being the great thinker Schopenhauer, whose unconscious "will" can be identified in psychoanalysis with mental instincts. Incidentally, this is the same philosopher who strongly reminded people that still not enough importance was given to their sexual instincts. The advantage of psychoanalysis consists only of the factor that it does not abstractly assert the psychic importance of sexuality and the unconsciousness of mental life - two painful conditions for narcissism - but proves it on the material related to each one individually, making the patient understand his relation to these problems. But this is precisely why psychoanalysis met with revulsion and opposition, which spared the name of the great philosopher because they were not strong enough (4, page 198).

Freud's indication that Schopenhauer's "unconscious will" can be identified with mental instincts, with the psychoanalytical explanation of mental instincts, speaks of a close relationship between the philosophy of Schopenhauer and psychoanalysis.

As is generally known, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche are voluntarist-philosophers (Latin voluntas - will). The term "voluntaristic" (voluntaristisch) was first introduced in philosophical literature by the German philosopher F. Tönnies in 1883 and then, later on, adopted by F. Paulsen.

We distinguish two types of voluntarism: antilogic (alogical) monistic metaphysical voluntarism, first expounded by Schopenhauer and, the more recent, logic empirico-psychological voluntarism represented by W. Wundt.

Schopenhauer's thesis "the world-my idea" is well-known. It is obvious for a man that he does not know the sun and earth, but knows only the eye, which sees the sun, and the hand, which touches the earth; that the world surrounding him exists only as an image, i.e. exclusively in relation to the other who perceives it, i. e. man. All that belongs and can belong to the world inevitably is doomed by this dependence on the subject and exists only for the subject. According to Schopenhauer, Berkely was the first to expound this truth and this constitutes his immortal service to philosophy (5, pages 3-4).

Although Schopenhauer considered Kant's ideas as the source of his philosophy nevertheless, in his opinion, Kant's first error was that he omitted the concept of the importance of idea.

Another theory of Schopenhauer's is the "world-my will". On the one hand, the world is entirely idea and, on the other, exclusively will. Whereas reality, which is not one or the other, but an object in itself (which Kant degenerated into a "thing in itself") is a fabricated tale, and its assumption is a will-o'-the-wisp of philosophy (5, page 5). A subject gathering perceptions in this world feels as an individual, i.e. his knowledge, which is a conditioning transmitter of the world, is of necessity dependent upon the body, the state of which serves as the starting point of the intellect for knowing the world. The essence of manifestations and actions of one's body, internal and incomprehensible to a perceiving subject, he would designate as a force or a character trait as it may please him, but ignore the rest. In fact the word for explaining the individual has been given, and this word is the will. The subject of knowledge, who in the strength of his identity with the body acts as an individual, acquires his body by two very different means; first of all, as an impression of the intellect's perception, an object among objects and subjected to their laws; and secondly, as something designated by the word will and spontaneously known by everyone. A voluntary action and the action of the body are one and the same, but acquired by two very different means: the first entirely spontaneously and the second by the perception of the intellect. The body is nothing else but an objective will; i.e., will as an idea. The body is the object of will. Will is knowledge of the body a priori, and body is knowledge of will a posteriori. Each action on the body is at the same time an immediate action on the will; as such, it is designated as pain when it is adverse to the will or as pleasure if it is gratifying to it. My body and my will are one and the same. That which I represent visually as my body I consider as my will inasmuch as I perceive it in an entirely special incomparable way (5, page 104-107). The physical world beyond an idea in itself and in its internal substance

is the same as we find in ourselves as will (5, page 110). The accompaniment of will by knowledge and its determination conditioned by motives are not related to its essence but only to its clear manifestation in animal and man (5, page 110).

Manifestation means idea and nothing else, but the object in itself is will, which as such is not an idea, but something distinct in its essence. The will manifests itself in every blindly acting force of nature, but it also manifests itself in the reasoned activity of man. The great difference between the first and second will consists only in the degree of manifestation and not in the essence of what is manifested (5, page 115).

Schopenhauer understands each force of nature as will. The will also acts there where it is not guided by knowledge and where the idea as a motive is not the necessary and essential condition for the activity of the will. (5, page 119). In all the functions of our body not guided by knowledge, the will acts blindly in many ways (animal and plant processes, digestion, blood circulation, growth and reproduction). Here, the action of the will is blind and is determined by stimulation and not by motives.

Stimulation constitutes the middle, the transition from a motive, which is the causation having passed through knowledge to motive. All knowledge in general, intellectual and visual, originates from the will. The will in itself is unconscious and represents a blind irrepressible impulse. The will always wishes for life. To day the will or the will to live is the same thing (5, page 283). To maintain the body with its own forces is a very insignificant degree of asserting the will. Our own consciousness and the power of sexual instincts have taught us that the most decisive assertion of the will to live is expressed in a pure sexual act without any mixed motives (such as the negation of other individuals).

As an inflexible and most forcible assertion of life, sexual instinct is the ultimate purpose and summit of life for a man close to nature or an animal. The inner essence of nature, the will to life, manifests itself the strongest in sexual instincts. The sexual organs, more than any other organ of the body, are subject to the will and not to knowledge. They are the real focus of the will and, therefore, at an opposite pole of the brain representing knowledge, i.e., the other side of the world, the world as idea (5, page 341). The concept of the will's primacy in relation to knowledge and consciousness is the most essential part of Schopenhauer's philosophy.

Will is an object in itself, it constitutes the true and indestructible essence of man; will by itself is without consciousness. Consciousness is conditioned by intellect and is a function of the brain; and the brain (together with its nerves and spinal cord) is a product of the organism, or even its parasite, inasmuch as it does not intervene

directly in the activity of the organism and serves only as the purpose for self-preservation of the latter, regulating the relation of the organism to the external world. Intellect is secondary and the organism is primary; will is metaphysical and intellect is endowed with physical properties; will is man's substance and intellect its accident. As knowledge in the consciousness of self it is the will that appears exclusively. All that constitutes pleasure (Lust) and pain (Unlust) is the activity of the will; this includes not only a desire or a decision but also all instincts, wishes, hopes, love, hate and fear. (6, page 224-225).

Intellect is a stranger to the decisions of the will and is only its supplier of motives. Intellect learns the results later through a posteriori reasoning. Intellect is excluded from the sphere of secret decisions and conclusions of the will. In some cases, persons may never guess the true motives of their acts, considering themselves incapable of them.

In this connection, Schopenhauer cites the aphorism of de La Rochefoucauld: self-love is more artful than the most artful man in the world (6, page 235). Man's intellect in relation to the will is as curb-bit and bridle for an indomitable horse. The body - the will's function (6, page 240).

In dreams, the will forces its servant - the intellect - to imagine an unfulfilled wish to gratify its master. The intellect directed to reality experiences compulsion and accepts a distortion of truth, so that it can, at least for a time, calm and lull to sleep the agitated and indomitable will (6, page 243). The brain with its function of cognition is nothing else but a sentinel put forward by the will. The sentinel upstairs in his watch-tower - the head - looks out and observes through the windows - the sense organs -, reporting everything to the will, which makes decisions (6, 272). It is important for us to indicate that Schopenhauer attempted to base his thesis of the brain in designating the brain as an auxiliary organ of the will (in which the brain objectifies a second time) by referring to the achievements of natural science and medicine of that time. Here we can see an example of how reactionary philosophy tries to use for its purposes the data of scientific progress.

Schopenhauer saw the confirmation of his view in the works of the English neurologist Marshall Hall (see Note) who, for the first time used extensively the theory of reflex in therapy and diagnosis. (Note) In his book "The Reflector Function of the Medulla Oblongata and Spinal Cord" (1833), M. Hall has demonstrated the difference between the voluntary movements and the unconscious reflexes. He indicated that the spinal cord is a chain of segments, the functional unity of which are separate reflector actions.

As a result of debates arising around his works, G. Prohaska's work and his theory of nervous activity became widely known (7). Schopenhauer

found M. Hall's book "Diseases of the Nervous System" to be excellent and considered that Hall's theory of involuntary movements confirmed his concept of the primacy and the distinction between the voluntary and the will (6, pages 290-292).

Schopenhauer also found the confirmation of his views in the works of the French anatomist and physiologist M. Bichat. He referred to Bichat's book "Sur la Vie et la Mort", in which Bichat advanced the conception of the organic and animal life. In Schopenhauer's opinion, Bichat's organic life corresponds to his will and Bichat's organic animal life to intellect. According to Bichat, the intellect has its seat in the brain and the organic life in the rest of the organism.

Schopenhauer considered that Bichat, as an anatomist and physiologist, came to the same conclusion as he, Schopenhauer, as a philosopher. Organic life starts earlier than animal and dies later. Affects and passions take place in the organic life, and intellectual processes in the animal. "Organic life is the limit to which passions reach and the center from which they originate" (Bichat). Only the animal life (cerebral function) is subjected to the influence of training, education, cultivation and habit formation whereas moral character belongs to the organic life, which is not subject to external modifications. This explains the unchangeability of moral character. Physical temperament and moral character are not capable of changing under the influence of education, which changes so surprisingly the activity of animal life. Character is the physiognomy of passions and temperament, of the internal functions. Education can strengthen the animal life so that it resists better organic impulses, but passions are the product of the action of the internal organs. Schopenhauer accepted these explanations of Bichat's with satisfaction (6, pages 296-299).

In the chapter "Insanity". Schopenhauer wrote that in order to clarify better the question of the origin of insanity, we should think how unwillingly we bring to our memory things, hurting our pride and infringing upon our interests and wishes. How difficult it is for us to decide bringing them to our intellect for a more detailed and severe scrutiny and, on the contrary, how easy it is to avoid this. The point where insanity may enter the mind lies in the will's resistance to pass on everything it opposes to the intellect for enlightenment.

Each new event, adverse to the will, must be assimilated by the intellect; i. e., it must find a place in the system of truths, related to our will and its interests. Always desiring to satisfy, the intellect aims at excluding events adverse to the will. If this is successful then the intellect suffers to a lesser degree. The operation of exclusion is frequently very painful and it is, for the most part, accomplished slowly. If the operation succeeds correctly then our mental health is preserved. In cases where the will resists and opposes strongly to defy the perception

of knowledge, the operation of exclusion cannot be completed. In such cases, certain events or circumstances remain suppressed from the intellect because the will cannot transfer their image. In the strength of the missing necessary links, the gaps which have developed are filled by any images and insanity appears. Intellect has lost its natural ability to please the will, consequently, the man starts imagining things which do not occur in reality. Insanity appearing in this way is the Leto of unbearable suffering; this is the ultimate remedy to help the frightened nature, i. e., the will. This constitutes the psychic origin of insanity. The substance of insanity constitutes the impossibility to remember consecutively and relatedly the past (6, pages 456-460).

Schopenhauer's theory of insanity was highly praised by Freud, who wrote that his concept of repression coincides fully with the determination of Schopenhauer. Nietzsche's aphorism is in accord with the above. "I did this" - says my memory - "I could not do it" - says my pride, and remains implacable. Finally, the memory gives way" (7, page 99).

Let us make some conclusions. The influence of Schopenhauer on Freud is particularly evident in the theory of the unconscious, repression, the significance of sexual instinct and of sexual development. First of all, we must point out that the basic idea was common to Schopenhauer and Freud. That which Schopenhauer designates as the primacy of the will over intellect, Freud calls the primacy of the unconscious over consciousness. He asserts that the psychic energy of an unsatisfied biological instinct accumulates in the unconscious and strives for its expression. Freud understands sexuality widely and uses the term "libido" for its description; this made it possible to refer to psychoanalysis as the psychology of libido. Psychic energy, related primarily to the biological instincts, is indestructible and dynamic. The modern conditions of civilization slow down most frequently manifestations of the sexual instincts; this leads to a large accumulation of psycho-sexual energy in the unconscious. In turn, this factor conditions the majority of our mental normal and pathological activities. The mental energy pertaining to sexual instincts becomes a general stimulus for all possible activities and is determined more widely than a direct sexual impulse. The libido is the source of energy for mental activities in general.

The later development of Freud's original theory of instinctual psycho-sexual libido consisted of relating death-instinct to sexual-instinct as the fundamental object of mental life, dividing topographically the personality into the "id", "ego" and "super-ego" (1927) and creating a new theory of "anxiety".

According to E. Ziskind, Freud prepared a system of psychology, which his followers transformed into a science of fundamental principles of behavior. This sciences takes in all fields of man's activity, including his mental and everyday behavior, the development of character, talents,

art, literature, folklore and human science, including anthropology, sociology and political science. In clinical field, this theory includes etiology, the formation of symptoms (psychodynamics) and even the classification of mental disorders (8, page 229). The American psychoanalyst Brill stated that with the appearance of psychoanalysis almost all the works pertaining to the mental field were written anew.

After the First World War, Freud revised his original theory of libido. The dreams of persons, suffering from traumatic battle neuroses, were clearly far removed from expressing unsatisfied sexual drives. Freud advanced the theory of a biological tendency to revert to the past, calling life to return to an earlier inanimate state. Two classes of instincts became the source of energy: sexual (Eros) and death-instinct (Thanatos).

Not all contemporary psychoanalysts adhere to Freud's theory of death-instincts. Originally, Freud considered aggressiveness to be conditioned by a repeatedly sublimated libido. In his new theory, aggressiveness (hostility) is a product of the primary instinctual force. He examines sadism and masochism as the expression of the erogenetic death-instinct (8, page 230).

According to Schopenhauer, the will to live, expressed most vividly in the sexual instinct, comes in the course of its development to the point of its renunciation; at this point, there develops the desire to return to non-existence. Schopenhauer shares the philosophy of Buddhism - Nirvana, an absolute peace stifling the will to live. He indicates that the symbol of nature is a closed circle. The circle forms the plan for the return of the general form found in nature, from death to the origin of organic existence. There is a deep relationship between Freud's dual theory of instincts with the recognition of the primacy of instincts and Schopenhauer's theory of the "will to live and the renunciation of life". According to Freud, the inherent tendency of instinctive forces to return and repeat (Wiederholungszwang) repetition-compulsion) corresponds to the closed circle and according to Schopenhauer, to the symbol of nature.

The next theory common to Freud and Schopenhauer is repression.

There is also a similarity between the conceptions of Freud and Schopenhauer on the theory of psychosexual development in the psychoanalytical explanation. According to Freud's theory, the libido-development is connected with sensations producing the feeling of pleasure, occurring in different zones of the body and in relation to the motor activity. He distinguishes the following phases: 1) early oral; 2) later oral; 3) early anal; 4) later anal; 5) phallic and 6) genital.

In the early stages, the libido is autoerotic. Character is a product of the transformation of libido by sublimation or reaction-formation.

The initial generalized sexual excitation becomes localized later on and is related to different somatic zones. For instance, the first pre-genital oral phase of libido is connected with sucking and its localization is limited to the mouth, lips and tongue. A psychoanalytical interpretation of normal and of pathological behavior ensues from the diagram of the development of infantile sexuality. The character and mental affections are conditioned by the dynamics of the different phases of infantile sexuality. The libido origin of character, psychoanalysis expresses in its classification of characters: oral, anal, phallic, urethral and genital (8, page 232). In the clinical classification one speaks of narcissistic, hysterical and obsessive types of character. The connection of the free libido energy with the somatic erotic zones corresponds to Schopenhauer's theory that the will, determined by excitation, acts blindly in all the functions of our body not determined by cognition; the will is the function of the body. Freud thinks that an instinct never acts as a momentary impact, but always as a continuous force. Schopenhauer describes the "will" in the same way.

According to Freud's theory, constant excitation of instincts inside the organism stimulates the nervous system to intricate consecutive activities, which change the outer world to such an extent that the satisfaction of the inner source of stimulation becomes possible. It is instincts and not external stimuli that are the forces in the progress that has raised the nervous system to its present high level of development and efficiency (4, page 106).

Each mental activity originates as unconscious and may remain as such or, developing further, it may penetrate into the consciousness depending on whether it meets an opposition or not (4, page 79). Mental processes are in themselves unconscious and the perception of them by consciousness can be compared with the perception of the outside world by the sense-organs. Freud indicates that a psychoanalytic assumption of the unconscious mental activity constitutes an extension of the corrections introduced by Kant into our conception of external perception. Freud wrote: "Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perception is subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with the phenomena perceived, but resisting to knowledge, so psychoanalysis bids us not to identify conscious perception with the unconscious mental processes". According to Freud, the correction of inner perception is not as difficult as that of the outer perception and an inner object is easier to perceive than the outside world (4, page 130).

This means that in speaking in the language of contemporary physiology, the sum of excitations of the organism's environment stimulates first of all the cerebral functions of the analysis and synthesis of excitations of the outside world, and is the true motive force in the development of the mankind. At the same time, a psychological analysis of the inner instinctual forces directed by consciousness permits us to

know them better than the outside world, or the environment in which the man lives. Later on Freud wrote that consciousness is excluded from the external world by the cranium whereas there is no such barrier between the unconscious and consciousness. The sense organs are similar to insect's feelers; they are only narrow slots admitting insignificant fragments to the inside. They serve as a shield protecting the consciousness. The cranium and sensory organs protect the brain and the cortex (9).

Freud and Schopenhauer introduce the same corrections into the theory of Kant. Schopenhauer considers that Kant's "thing in itself" is the will (the will to life) and that in the consciousness of oneself, it is exclusively the will that acts as knowledge. Freud thinks that psychoanalysis of the inner instinctual life makes it possible for us to know it closer and deeper than our consciousness can perceive the outer world. In both cases, an instinct, being of a primary nature, is more accessible to knowledge than its derivative - the activity of consciousness.

Schopenhauer cites the opinion of a German anatomist, F. Tiedeman, who was the first to assert that the central system can be compared to a parasite. Schopenhauer finds that this comparison is excellent (6, page 279). He states that the will is objectified directly in excitation and not in the sensation (6, page 283); it is objectified in a very immediate way in the blood, the nervous system being its auxiliary organ. The nervous system serves as feelers or antennae of the will, which the will puts out and draws in (6, page 290). Schopenhauer came out angrily against the French anatomist and physiologist Flourens, who asserted that the brain is the organ of the mind in the whole completeness of its function (6, pages 300-304).

We can see that the leading common conception of Schopenhauer and Freud is expressed in the same words.

According to Schopenhauer, the brain objectifies the will to knowledge in the same way as the foot objectifies the will to walk. Through the brain, the will acquires the ability to control itself and to be guided by motives and not by excitation. Therefore, the will of man manifests itself not only as a blind force. According to Freud, instinctive unconscious forces can be sublimated into one or another activity, our culture being the product of this sublimation. Schopenhauer asserts that intellectual development (Intelligenz), demonstrates a progressing replacement of intellect by the will, which exceptionally finds its reflection in genius (6, page 331).

The emotions and ideas of man are two necessary and inseparable aspects of the reflection of objective reality in the consciousness. Man's emotions and thoughts are different aspects of consciousness, the reflection of objective reality in the brain of man. The idealists Schopenhauer and Freud share the point of view of voluntarists and examine from their point

of view social relations and the entire problem of the development of humanity. Freud's theory of psychoanalysis is perhaps the most vivid example of the intrusion of voluntarism into the field of the science of nature and medicine. Perception of the outside world is interpreted in a subjective idealistic scheme and blind forces of instinct are found to be accessible for their perception by consciousness, which is very helpless in knowing the outer world. The ontological point of view consists in the primacy of will and instincts over intellect and consciousness and the gnosiological, in the recognition of the limitation and helplessness of intellect and consciousness in perceiving the external world. At the same time, the latter admits that there is a greater perception of instinctual impulses by consciousness and intellect, which in turn are declared to be something secondary, deriving from unknown instinctive forces.

This constitutes the general internally undetermined contradiction of Schopenhauer's and Freud's theories, which ensues from the subjective idealism and voluntarism of their systems.

Schopenhauer's voluntarism was as much hostile to natural sciences as Freud's to the modern progress of natural sciences and to I. P. Pavlov's philosophy. Schopenhauer wrote that M. Hall discovered that the reflector movements were related to the spinal cord and created the theory of involuntary movements. According to M. Hall, some involuntary movements are normal, or physiological; they include; contractions of the bladder and rectum sphincters, of the eyelids in sleep, of the larynx in choking, and yawning, sneezing, breathing, erection ejaculation, etc. Other involuntary movements are pathological and include stuttering, sobbing, vomiting and various spasms. Spasms constitute mutiny of the terminal nerves against the sovereignty of the brain; normal reflector movements constitute a legitimate autocracy of subject servants. All the movements are connected with the spinal cord and medulla oblongata. Schopenhauer demonstrates that M. Hall's conception fully confirms the theory of the will as the main motor force. Freud has recognized the scheme of the reflector movements. He wrote: "Physiology has given us the concept of stimuli and the scheme of the reflex arc, according to which an external stimulus applied to the living tissue (nervous substance) is transferred by action to the outer world. But instinctual stimuli differ from the other (physiological) stimuli, which influence our mind. (4, page 104). The reflexes of M. Hall have been used to strengthen the philosophical theory of voluntarism. Freud's recognition of the scheme of the reflex arc has given him the freedom of action in studying the instincts as psychological phenomena.

Schopenhauer strongly protested against all who considered the brain as the governing organ of mental activity. He brought down his anger on the Cartesian dualism of Flourens only because Flourens considered the brain as an organ of the mind and was against Bichat's theory that passions belong

to the organic life. The conception of Schopenhauer is deeply hostile to the principle of nervism. Contemporary psychoanalysis is also hostile to nervism and considers that scientific psychology and psychiatry can continue to develop without the participation of the physiology of the brain. (10). The fundamental ideas of Freud common with the philosophy of voluntarism were bound to reflect in the influence of other voluntaristic conceptions on psychoanalysis. The voluntaristic philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche had such an effect on psychoanalysis.

Nietzsche's voluntarism differs from Schopenhauer's by its militant irreconcilable spirit. Schopenhauer's "the will to life" is transformed in Nietzsche's philosophy into "the will to power". Striving for the return to death, by which Schopenhauer renounces the will to live, is in Nietzsche's philosophy the will to deny life by refusing evil and violence. Nietzsche understands the will of Schopenhauer's conception as abstract, a metaphor, whereas the will as a desire includes in itself many feelings and instincts, the fundamental of which is the will to power in the form of cruelty and violence. Higher civilization is based on the incarnation of cruelty.

This forms the difference between Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's philosophy.

It is important for us to indicate that Nietzsche gave more attention than Schopenhauer to the question of the psychology of the "will to power", formed by its instincts.

In the opinion of Nietzsche, Schopenhauer was lost among allegories and compared objects instead of examining them (11, page 295).

The similarity between Freud and Schopenhauer lies in the presence of their common scheme whereas that between Freud and Nietzsche is more evident in the explanation of psychodynamic mechanisms.

According to Nietzsche, memory is a function of the brain, which suffers most from sleeping. One cannot say that it disappears altogether but it reverts to the imperfect state in which it apparently existed in the waking state during the day in each person and in the primitive period of humanity. Voluntary and confused, it constantly mixes up things as a result of their fleeting resemblance. But men with the same volition and confusion have created poetical myths and, even now, travellers can observe how a primitive man is prone to forgetfulness, how his spirit starts oscillating after he strains his memory and how an ordinary dream, fabrication and nonsense, stimulate in him creativity. In dreaming, we all resemble this savage; we recognize poorly and compare wrongly, which leads to faulty conclusions of the dreams. In recalling clearly our dreams, we become afraid for ourselves, for all the nonsense concealed in us. Thus, in our sleep and dreams we do once more the mental work of the former mankind.

(11, page 25). Further he writes: "I assume that all mankind made conclusions in reality in the course of many thousands of years in the same way as the contemporary man concludes in the state of sleep. In dreams, comes to life in us that side of primitive man which is the foundation for the development of higher intellect and which continues to develop in each man. Dreams transport us to the distant states of human civilization and give us means to understand better these states. Our conclusions in dreams require such an insignificant straining of thought only because in the course of the long existence of mankind, we became very familiar with this form of a phantastic and coarse explanation of things by the first reason coming to the mind. These processes show us, how late the finer logic thinking was to develop as well as the strict comprehension of reason and action inasmuch as our mental functions still, at the present time, involuntarily revert to the primitive forms of conclusion and we spend in this state about half of our life. A poet or an artist also passes off certain reasons, far from right, to his moods and states; in this relation, they remind us of the former humanity and can help us to understand it" (11, page 26-29).

Psychoanalysis attaches much importance to the theory of Nietzsche on the state of sleep and dreams. Otto Rank, Freud's pupil, used for an epigraph of his article "Dreams and Myths" a quotation from Nietzsche: "Dreams transport us to the past states of human civilization and give us means to understand better these states" (12, page 368). O. Rank thinks that Nietzsche should be recognized as a direct predecessor of psychoanalysis and of the theory of sleep and dreams (12, page 347).

Freud wrote that regression in dreams is of three kinds: topical, temporal and formal. Regression not only leads us to a resuscitation of childhood experiences but also gives us an insight into the phylogenetic infancy, the evolution of mankind. Freud considers that Nietzsche's determination is excellent, in which Nietzsche says that in dreams, the primitive side of humanity continues to operate, the side which we can no longer reach by a direct path. (12, page 409). Psychoanalysis teaches that equal unconscious instinctual forces participate in normal and pathological mental activity; this is equally true in attaining highly valuable social achievements by individuals or nations. The teaching of psychoanalysis that the dreams are a source of artistic and mythical creation and that they are a form of reproduction of the archaic thinking and emotions ensues entirely from the theory of Nietzsche. O. Rank said that Nietzsche interpreted the relation of dreams to the waking life in the spirit of psychoanalysis, and that he intuitively anticipated the theory of psychoanalysis in an all-embracing way. This is particularly related to the thought of Nietzsche on hallucinatory gratification of instincts in dreams (see above). Nietzsche also gave to psychoanalysis the conception of regression. More than Schopenhauer, he contributed to the development of the theory of the psychodynamics of dreams, the unconscious and instincts. Schopenhauer considered that in dreams each individual speaks and acts in

a strict relation to his character, keeping even in dreams his moral nature (12, page 46). Psychoanalysis considers that dreams do not know anything about moral requirements (12, page 45).

Freud's classic psychoanalysis together with the theory of libido, infantile sexuality and Oedipus complex includes the concepts of the dynamic unconscious and opposition and transfers free associations and historic interpretations into the therapy and methods of dream analysis. The theory of death-instincts Freud included later. Freud distinguished several phases in the development of infantile sexuality. He also created a system for characters, ensuing from the transformation of libido. According to Freud, effects, thoughts and experiences censured by morality and social requirements are transferred into the unconscious, which is a dynamic field of suppressed desires and wishes constantly striving to find their expression in the consciousness. They manifest themselves in different masked forms of normal behavior or in neurotic symptoms or mental affections. Psychic processes, by means of which suppressed wishes and experiences are transformed and penetrate into the consciousness in a masked form, are designated as dynamisms. These psychic mechanisms of adaptation make it possible for an individual to operate without special perturbations (8, page 223-235).

Freud philosophized that the quantity of psychic energy always remains constant and that the question concerns suppressed impulses charged with dynamic freely transferrable psychic energy or libido. An endopsychic factor condemnation - actively intervenes with the repressed penetrating into consciousness. Freud distinguished between repression and suppression, i.e., an active conscious process by means of which we try to exclude unpleasant thoughts from our consciousness.

Dynamisms occur in normal and psychopathological life. They form the basis for the psychoanalytical interpretation of dreams, different forms of normal behavior and neurotic and psychotic symptoms.

In Freud's opinion, psychoanalysis differed up to now from psychology essentially in the dynamic conception of mental processes. Now he also takes into consideration the psychic aspect and attempts to demonstrate whether a psychic action occurs within the boundaries of a system or between systems. In this connection, the term depth-psychology was used. (Tiefenpsychologie) (4, page 132). The psychoanalytical structure of a person is connected with repression and the dynamic unconscious.

Freud distinguishes in a person the id, ego and super-ego. The "id" consists of primordial instinctual impulses and wishes. Its function is performed in the unconscious; the id is not subject to logic. The "ego" is that part of individual which coordinates conflicting tendencies issuing from the "id" (instinctual desires) and the "super-ego" (consciousness) as well as from reality. The "ego" functions in the conscious and unconscious spheres. Censorship forms a part of the "ego". The sphere of

action of the "super-ego" is conscious activity, including moral values and ideals. The "id", "ego" and "super-ego" take part in transforming the repressed into symptoms. In repressing an idea, which is a psychic correlation of instincts, we see that repression usually leads to the appearance of a substitute-formation, a symptom. Symptoms are a manifestation of the return of repressed and owe their appearance to other processes - dynamisms.

Thoughts, presentations and associations, related to instincts and endowed with a certain magnitude of psychic energy (libido) are subject to repression. Besides a presentation there is another important psychic correlation - an affect. An affect corresponds to an instinct inasmuch as it has separated itself from an idea and, in relation to its quantity, has found its expression in the processes perceived as affects. In the process of repression, a thought or an idea separates itself from its accompanying effect or emotion since the affect exists only in consciousness, whereas an instinct, impulse or desire exists only in the unconscious. An instinct is never conscious but can only be expressed by a thought or idea. The motive of repression consists of preventing an idea, connected with the instinct or impulse, from associating with a conscious emotion. A dissociation between the repressed idea and its affective component is manifested in the conscious activity in the form of a "vacuum" or in the form of exaggerating emotions with their thought component. Classic psychoanalysis explains the disappearance of the affect in conversion-hysteria as the symptom of a repressed unresolved Oedipus complex (8, page 305). Examples of the excessiveness of affects can be observed in sick phobias of a hypochondriac and in the aggressiveness of maniacs and paranoiacs.

Sublimation, projection, identification, introjection, rationalization, regression, phantasy, conversion, symbolism and the transference and formation of reactions are all included in psychic dynamics of Freud's psychoanalysis (8, pages 305-311).

Freud considers sublimation as a complete transference of the psychic energy of repressed infantile sexuality to conscious activity, which is often socially useful. In sublimation, the "ego" makes way for a stream of instinctual impulses. Each form of sublimation is characterized by desexualization. Freudians identified many types of activity with the sublimation of repressed infantile and aggressive instincts. For instance, they explain the activity of an artist by the sublimation of corpophilic desires, etc. In projection, we transfer our own instincts, which are taboo, on others. According to Freud, in paranoia the question concerns the projection of repressed homosexual desires on other people. Identification and introjection are close to each other. In introjection the object of attraction becomes absorbed by the individual; this gives rise to expressions such as "he always lives in my heart". A part of the outside world becomes a part of the "ego". Introjection occurs at an early stage

of the psychic development when objects of the external world are still perceived as insufficiently differentiated. Then introjection is an attempt of the "ego" to combine itself with a part of the outer world structure. Certain features or, in any case, a passionate desire for this earlier "objectless state" may continue throughout the whole life (oceanic feeling). The child loses the earlier state with which he connected the idea of his omnipotence and, by introjection, starts to identify omnipotence with adults. By introjection, he attempts to become once more omnipotent in relation to adults. "Religious ecstasy, patriotism and many social manifestations lie at the root of the desire to take part in omnipotence" (8, page 309). Rationalism does not require explanations. O. Rank thinks that repression cannot reach the intra-uterine existence. In conversion the question concerns the appearance of physical symptoms of a disease, which reflect repressed instinctual impulses. The physical prerequisite is total erotogenization, which permits every organ and function to express sexual stimulation. The necessary psychological prerequisite is introversion - substitution of real sexual objects by the phantasies of infantile objects. Symbolism is the language of the unconscious, the majority of symbols having a special meaning. Phobias are the most vivid illustration of the dynamics of displacement. For instance, Freudians interpret agoraphobia as fear displacement of the repressed child incestual sexual desires. Reaction - formation is the result of an opposition between infantile sexual and aggressive tendencies and social requirements.

Let us cite some examples; with the oral sexual stage can be connected fussiness about food, constant visits to dentists, participation in the movement against alcohol, etc; with the anal, extreme fear of getting soiled, pedantism, miserliness and irritability; with the genital-sexual, puritanism and modesty. Psychopathological examples are: a sick fear of either one of parents can be the result of the repressed hostile wish; in animal-phobia, the object of fear was earlier a source of pleasure of the libido, etc.

Depth-psychologists compare the human psyche with an iceberg, the part submerged in water corresponds to the unconscious and the part above water, to the conscious (the part above water of an iceberg equals 1/5 or 1/6 of that under water).

After these preliminary reminders let us pass on to Nietzsche as the direct precursor of psychoanalysis and of mental dynamics of the unconscious in the field of mental dynamics.

Above we have already mentioned O. Rank's thought on the significance of the views of Nietzsche on the sleeping state and dreams in the recent development of psychoanalysis. Regression in dreams with the resuscitation of the archaic forms of mental experience, the concept of mental dynamics formulated by Nietzsche, has also been transmitted to

psychoanalysis. Sublimation, one of the most important mechanisms, has been described in Nietzsche's works. In his determination, higher civilization is based on cruelty. His assertions that moral judgements are the means of expressing our affects by intellect in the same way as they are also expressed by the body movements (11, 296). According to Nietzsche, the ancients created gods because they personified in them their feeling of power and strength. Nietzsche wrote that the greatest force which motivates individuals and nations in general politics is the need to feel power. This feeling forces its way out not only from the minds of rulers but also from those of the people of lower classes. Minutes are repeated over and over again when a group of people is ready to sacrifice its possessions and its conscience and virtue in order to obtain the highest pleasure of power and to rule with will and tyranny over other nations as a conqueror. Then the sources of different moods well up profusely, such as generosity, self-denial, hope, trust, courage and imagination (11, page 98). Let us remember the psychoanalytical definition given above that religious ecstasy, patriotism and many other social manifestations lie at the origin of the desire to be in power and that this is determined by the psycho-dynamics of introjection and its related identification. Psychic mechanism - rationalization - is frequently found in Nietzsche's works. Nietzsche's definition of the "ego" is closely related to that of psychoanalysis, Nietzsche's "ego" is a combination of forces; one or another of which comes forward to observe the other forces in the same way as the subject observes the external world, which determines and influences him. We feel the degree of these forces as something close to us or far away, and represent this in the form of a landscape or a valley whereas, in fact, there are several forces of different degrees.

That which is preponderant we instinctively transform into the "ego" and that which is more distant in perspective, we designate as "thou". The nearest force calls itself the "ego". When passions are in conflict, the "ego" always goes to the winning side (11, page 286-287).

Nietzsche defines the "ego" as a combination of instinctual forces and, at the same time, he describes mental projections and transference as a psychoanalyst. Freud thinks that in the process of development of the "ego", the pleasure-principle is replaced by reality. This does not mean that the pleasure-principle, instant but doubtful in its after-effects, is renounced only to provide a more satisfying one although a postponed one. However, the inner mental impression of this substitution is so great that it has expressed itself in a religious representation. The teaching of the reward in the other world to compensate for a willed or forced denial of earthly pleasures is nothing else but a mythical projection of this mental reversal (4, page 87). According to Nietzsche when one passion rules over the other, as for instance fear in front of strong individuals or an inclination to social life, then morality steps in. Weaker passions can only be felt but not gratified. The reason of morality is to work, ignore instincts and pretend to ourselves that we strive for some purpose,

i.e., that we wish goodness. All that is in fact pleasant constitutes that which we consider goodness (11, page 289). Moral actions are the means, the purpose of which is unseen, and already now people derive pleasure from accomplishing acts per se (11, page 229). The general trend of Nietzsche's and Freud's thoughts is the same in relation to the dynamics of sublimation and projection.

O. Rank, Freud's faithful follower until 1924, later on developed a new psychoanalytic theory of "dynamic psychology of relations". He places the "will" in the first plan and considers that it is the primary motive force of man's behavior. Rank thinks that the will is the positive leading organization and integration of the "ego", which uses creatively instinctual impulses as well as inhibits and checks them (8, page 257). We will not analyze the dynamic psychology of O. Rank, but we will point out that Nietzsche's fundamental principle also stands out very clearly in this variety of neo-Freudianism.

In his work "Group Psychology and Analysis of the 'Ego' (1921), Freud on the basis of the data of Le Bon and Mc Dougall asserted that a group unconsciously attaches to its master the traits of an ideal "ego" and identifies itself with the master. This can explain fanaticism and blind obedience. The same identification took place in a primitive horde. Freud wrote that at the beginning of the history of mankind was the Superman whom Nietzsche only expected from the future (13, page 87-88).

G. Le Bon, a most reactionary French sociologist, considered that groups are identified with impulsiveness, suggestibility, intolerance and conservatism. They easily fall under the influence of strong individuals. Instincts and alogisms predominate in groups; individualism remains in the background. The unconscious and alogic form the collective mind of the group; this is the "law of mental unity of the crowd". In the same work, Freud compares the relations of mankind with the behavior of primitive beings in cold weather; he adopted this comparison from Schopenhauer (13, page 59). The term "id" Freud took over from Nietzsche, using the work of G. Groddeck, physician and writer (14) (B. Bykhovskiy). In the opinion of A. Mette, Freud was acquainted with the earlier works of Nietzsche, particularly with his work of tragedies (1871). There is a certain similarity between Freud's philosophy and the thought of this work. Nietzsche saw in the esthetic the means for alleviating suffering related to existence; Freud discovered the source of consolation in erotism (16, page 76). Mette indicates that the substance of Freud's psychology of the unconscious agrees in part with Schopenhauer's philosophy, in which the dark, deeply hidden and negative is imparted with great force. There is also in Nietzsche some similarity with the Dionysian beginning. In one of his letters to his friend Fliess, Freud wrote that he considered himself to be the representative of Dionysius and his friend, of Apollo (16, page 34).

The above demonstrates that Freud was well acquainted with the works of F. Nietzsche. Let us give one more proof of the influence of voluntarism on Freud.

Freud considered that instincts forcibly produce the earlier past conditions of the living matter (19, page 79). He saw the proof of death-instincts in the resemblance of the state of death following a complete sexual satisfaction and in lower organisms, in which the acts of reproduction and death coincide. These organisms die during reproduction since in sustaining Eros by satisfaction, the desire for death obtains freedom to be realized. According to Freud, death-instinct is an energetic tendency to discharge an over-stimulation, a subjective expression of which is the pleasure-principle. Life-instinct is an organic tendency contributing to an increase in excitation and its function corresponds to the "pain"-principle. A desire to reduce an excitation, keep it in a state of rest, and to cease an inner excitation and tension is expressed in the pleasure-principle. The presence of this desire is one of the most convincing motives that death-instincts exist. From this follows Freud's statement: "The aim of life is death" (17, page 36). Further Freud gives Schopenhauer's opinion and writes: "We cannot disguise another fact from ourselves, that we have steered unawares into the haven of Schopenhauer's philosophy, for whom death is the real result and aim of life, while the sexual instinct is the incarnation of the will to live (17, page 47). Freud's dualistic theory of instincts corresponds with Schopenhauer's philosophic conception.

It is generally known that K. Jaspers is an embittered adversary of psychoanalysis. He considered that Freud took over the conception of sublimation from Nietzsche and that Freud, at times, simply stated the views of Nietzsche. The latter has demonstrated that inhibitory instincts may operate in a disguised form and use symbolisms with the aim of satisfaction. They look for different forms of their manifestation. Instincts are opposed by resistance; unable to discharge outside they are directed inside. The majority of instincts (except hunger) can be satisfied by imagination. The discharge of instinctual impulse and affects can occur inadequately. Jaspers cites an expression of Nietzsche that every mind must have its "clock". The terminology and theory of sublimation was created by Nietzsche.

Jaspers indicated that Freud made use of Nietzsche's thoughts and, at the same time, distorted and vulgarized them (18, pages 304 and 452). It is obvious to us that Jaspers was certain that Nietzsche influenced Freud. We should add that the idealist Jaspers proved to be more vigilant in this relation than many materialists (including those of our country), who considered the rational content of Freudian concepts is only concealed by a voluntaristic layer.

The question of Nietzsche's influence on Freud continue to attract

even now the attention of some foreign psychiatrists. R. Bilz in his recent work gave examples of repression from the works of Nietzsche and Freud. Both Freud and Nietzsche connect the concept of repression with the action of affects. Freud wrote that in repression an idea, the embodiment of an instinct, vanished from the consciousness if earlier it was conscious or holds it back, if it is about to enter the consciousness. The difference, after all, is not important; it amounts to much the same thing as the difference between ordering an undesirable guest out of my front hall or, having recognized him, refuse to let him in. I need only add that I have to place a sentinel to keep constant watch over the door which I have forbidden this guest to pass, lest he should burst it open (4, page 97). Nietzsche compares an active forgetfulness with a portness keeping watch over our mental order. He writes: "the doors and windows of our consciousness close at times. Active forgetfulness leads to the more or less irreversible rejection of forbidden ideas and feelings." Bilz finds a similarity and, at the same time, a difference in the theories of repression of Freud and Nietzsche, but he does not doubt that they have much in common (19).

The one hundredth anniversary of Freud was observed in 1956. In this connection, many articles were published. In some of them, the originality and independence of Freud was stressed whereas in others, numerous influences of his predecessors and contemporaries on his thoughts were described. It suffices to mention such works as "Fechner and Freud", G. F. Ellenberger; "Janet and Freud", P. Bayley; and "From Aristotle to Freud", I. Ramsay. It was noted that Freud was subject to the influence of many people, for instance: Darwin, Schelling, Stuart Mill, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Gerbart, Leibnitz, Brucke, Breuer, Fliess, Meinert, Charcot, Bernheim and others (20). P. Bayley and Weigandt came out against Freud at that time. Weigandt stated that Freud's method was not a subject for scientific discussion but an affair of the police (20).

The Portuguese psychiatrist Seabra Dinis gave an analysis of social conditions which were the determinants of the development of Freud's theory and practice. The more civilized countries entered the new "phase of agony" of their development. Along with the technical progress, relations between the nations changed for the worse in the way of a growing hostility; man has lost the assurance of existing and ceased to be master of the situation. The feeling of uncertainty had also spread to the well-to-do classes of society. A reactionary movement had started against the mastery of reason and consciousness. It was found that reason cannot explain and decide oppositions. Rationalistic psychological concepts, ruling until that time, proved to be helpless in answering the questions tormenting people. Irrationalism gained wide dissemination in society. Psychoanalysis found answers to these questions by turning to the inner unconscious forces of man. The terrain for psychoanalysis was prepared by history and all the trends of irrationalism found a powerful ally in Freud. This explains the influence of Freudianism in philosophy, sociology, politics,

literature and art (20). From this we can conclude that certain eclecticism of Freudianism with its unsolved internal oppositions are explained by the influence of numerous kinds of philosophical and ideological irrationalism. We agree with the fundamental evaluation of the conditions for spreading Freudianism in the imperialistic era, as cited by Seabra Dinis, but we consider it necessary to emphasize that the most strong ideological motive of Freudianism was voluntarism. With all its eclecticism of irrationalism, Freudianism is closed to the voluntaristic philosophy Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. We have limited ourselves to this problem without the intention of analyzing all irrationalistic tendencies of Freudianism.

Freud drew the thoughts for his voluntarism not only from the "spirit of the age" but also from the works of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. We have not basis to consider that Freud was unacquainted with the works of these philosophers. Moreover, historically considered we cannot explain the appearance of Freudianism without taking into consideration the influence of his predecessors - Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Friedrich Engels wrote of adapting flat meditations of Schopenhauer to the spiritual level of the Philistine. (21). Freud called this philosopher, who dared to name a Hegelian the truly great representative of German classic philosophy, Caliban. Schopenhauer had great influence on Nietzsche, A. Bergson, W. James and Croce and, in the artistic field, on Wagner and symbolists. We were able to establish that he also had a deeply penetrating influence on Freud.

The subjective-idealistic tendency of voluntarism denies the objective mechanism and the necessity to give a deciding significance to the will of man. Voluntarism conceals the fact that it is inevitable for capitalism to die; in Nietzsche's theory it justifies the exploitation by the ruling classes and the oppression of the masses. The "philosophy" of German fascism issues from voluntarism with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche as prophets of its ideology.

Freudianism is the most vivid expression of the philosophy of voluntarism in psychiatry. There should be no compromise with psychoanalysis and it should be fully rejected. Freud said: "Lend a finger to psychoanalysis and lose the whole hand".

We can note with a feeling of deep satisfaction that Soviet psychiatry in the person of P. B. Gannushkin, one of the greatest Soviet psychiatrists, refused from the very beginning to apply psychoanalysis in the theory and practice of psychiatry. P. B. Gannushkin wrote: "Freud's method, with which attempts have been made to illuminate the genesis and clinic of psychopathy, appears to us as an unexplained and arbitrary method, too undetermined for applying it in any serious way to such a responsible and extensive problem" (22, pages 4-5).

Freud's voluntarism developed further in the contemporary

"psychological tendency" of sociology. In his article on this question, the Soviet philosopher Ya. A. Zamoshkin (23) indicated that contemporary psycho-sociologists have adopted their terminology and theories from bourgeois psychologists and psychiatrists of the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th and chiefly from Freudians, neo-Freudians and behaviorists. E. Jones, D. Harding, R. Monet-Kiri, V. Trotter and others belong with the group of psycho-sociologists adhering to the Freudian point of view. Among the group of psycho-sociologists, Freudians and behaviorists are closely related in their view of man. They take him as a biological being, determined in his behavior and feelings by certain inborn instincts, subconscious impulses or primitive mechanical reactions to the external world. It is characteristic of all psycho-sociological tendencies of sociology to aim at reducing all the intricacy and multiplicity of human acts, thoughts and feelings to a few always subconscious and simple motives and feelings, and to palm off these motives and feelings as the basic forces in the development of society. In the collected works published in 1951 in the USA "World Tension. Psychopathology of International Relations", war is described as a psychological phenomenon, the result of instinctual impulses. It is indicated that the cause of wars is at the root of human nature (23, pages 102, 103, 107). The tendencies of old voluntarism have been revived with a new force in contemporary psycho-sociology. Psycho-sociological Freudianism is a weapon for the policy of capitalistic monopolies, of modern imperialistic governments.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Eisler R. "Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe" 1929, Berlin, Bd.
2. Ackernecht E. H. "Kurze Geschichte der Psychiatrie, "1957, Stuttgart, S.
3. Psikhologicheskaya i psikhoanaliticheskaya biblioteka (Psychological and Psychoanalytical Library) (Edited by I. D. Yermakov), Vol. 4, 1923, Moscow.
4. Ibidem, Vol. 3.
5. Schopenhauer Arthur. "The World as Will and Idea." Vol. 1, 1916, Moscow.
6. Schopenhauer A. "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, "1916, Leipzig, Bd. 2.
7. Prokhazka Georgiy, Traktat o funktsiyakh nervnoy sistemy, (Treatise on the Functions of the Nervous System) 1957, Leningrad.
8. Nietzsche Friedrich. "Beyond the Good and Evil", 1900, Moscow.

9. Ziskind E. "Psychophysiological Medicine", 1954, Philadelphia.
10. Wells Harry K. "The Problems of Philosophy", No 6, 1956, Pge 107
11. Wells H. K. "Ivan P. Pavlov. Toward a Scientific Psychology and Psychiatry", 1956, New York.
12. Nietzsche Friedrich. "Complete Collection of Works", Vol. 3, 4, 5, 1901, Moscow
13. Freud S. "Die Traumdeutung", 1922, Leipzig-Wien.
14. Idem. "Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse", 1921, Leipzig.
15. Groddeck G. "Das Buch vom Es" 1923, Wien.
16. Mette A. "Sigmund Freud", 1956, Berlin.
17. Freud S. "Beyond the Pleasure-Principle", 1925, Moscow.
18. Freud S. "Jenseits des Lustprinzips", 1920, Leipzig.
19. Jaspers K. "Allgemeine Psychopathologie", 1948, Berlin.
20. Bilz K. "Nervenartz", 1958, Bd. 29, S.
21. Seabra-Dinis J. "An. port. psiquiatr." Vol. 8, 1956, page 111
22. Engels F. "Anti-During" 1948, Moscow, page 313
23. Gannushkin P. B. Klinika psikhopatii, sleh statika, dinomika, sistemotika, (The Clinic of Psychopathy. Its Statistics, Dynamics and Systematics) 1933, Moscow.
24. Zamoshkin Yu. A. Voprosy filosofii. (The Problems of Philosophy), No 2, 1957, page 101.

MARXISM VS FREUD:

CONTEMPORARY SOVIET COMMENTARY

INTER-INSTITUTE CONFERENCE IN THE PRESIDIUM OF THE ACADEMY OF MEDICAL
SCIENCES USSR ON PROBLEMS OF IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE AGAINST CONTEMPORARY
FREUDIANISM.

Following is a translation of an article by F. V. Bassin in
in Zhurnal Neuropatologii i Psikhiiatrii imeni S. S. Korsakova
(Journal of Neuropathology and Psychiatry imeni S.S. Korsakov),
Vol. LIX, No. 5, Moscow 1959, pages 636-639.

An Inter-institute Conference on Problems of the Ideological Struggle Against Contemporary Freudianism, organized by the Presidium of the Academy of Medical Sciences (AMS), USSR, took place on 17-18 October 1958. The conference was attended by representatives of the Institute of the Brain, AMS, USSR; Institute of Neurology, AMS, USSR; Institute of Psychiatry, Ministry of Health, USSR; Institute of Higher Nervous Activity, Academy of Sciences, USSR, as well as delegates of some Leningrad scientific research institutions - Institute of Neuropsychiatry imeni V. M. Bekhterev and Institute of Physiology imeni I. P. Pavlov.

As is generally known, the doctrine of S. Freud, which already at the beginning of the century met with a strong critical opposition on the part of representatives of the Russian clinical school of thought, was not able to take root in Soviet soil. Consequently, the struggle against this thought cannot be considered as an urgent problem of Soviet medicine. At the same time, Freudianism has considerably extended the sphere of its influence abroad and, in particular, in the USA, during the past ten years. Leaving the framework of medicine and psychology, it acquired its own character of a philosophical system, which presumes to explain not only biological but also social processes. Freudianism has been transformed into one of the most reactionary manifestations of bourgeois ideology, which is acutely hostile to any true social or scientific progress.

However, it would be wrong to think that this expansion of Freudianism in the West is not also accompanied by a growing opposition to psychoanalysis. On the contrary, an opposition already existing in the earliest

stages of the development of Freud's theory has become more distinct and profound in recent years. Soviet readers must be well acquainted with the names of such severe foreign critics of Freudianism as G. Wells, A. Mette, D. Furst and N. Mikhalov, whose works were published in our press. Codwell, Bartlett, O'Connor, Muller, Hageman, Telgiyezi, Wortis and many other writers are included among their number; they have convincingly demonstrated all the psychological primitiveness of psychoanalytical orientation and the pseudo-science of Freudian methods as well as the great harm this orientation causes in penetrating into practical medicine and its undisguised socio-reactionary role.

Along with this tendency to censure Freudianism in principle, another trend can be detected in foreign writings - that is, an attempt to legitimize in different ways some compromise with Freudianism. It aims at realizing a "synthesis" of Freud's ideas and of I. P. Pavlov's teaching. In the USA and England, certain neurologists (B. Russel, W. Penfield), adhering to a spontaneously materialistic convictions in other matters, spoke recently in defense of such a compromise. Even such a severe critic of Freudianism as O'Connor considers that it is possible to separate from Freud's theory certain valuable features, providing that they can be "purified from the mystical fog with which Freudianism shrouds them". The thought of the desirability of combining psychoanalytical and clinicophysiological lines of approach was expressed particularly strongly at the International Conference of Freiburg (FRG, 1957), which was devoted to the problem of interrelation between Freudianism and Pavlov's doctrine (in papers read by Saller, Mikorey, Terich, Sheinert and others).

This state of affairs presents a number of important problems for Soviet scientists and clinicians. To help foreign scientists in their fight against the mysticism and irrationalism of Freudian concepts, it is necessary to demonstrate clearly the inadmissibility of any compromise with these concepts and the unscrupulousness of any rapprochement with a psychoanalytical orientation based on an arbitrary explanation of a subjective experience on the and substitution of data of a scientific analysis with the results of introspection and intuition. As regards the arguments given by apologists in favor of such rapprochement (i. e. indications that it is only Freudianism that illuminates the pathogenic role of affective conflicts), there we must prove that a true analysis of these conflicts and factors is possible only from a position of dialectic and materialistic neurology and psychiatry and of Pavlov's teaching. This position must be based not only on methods but also concretely discovered in experiments and clinic. In accomplishing this task, we will remove the reason for discussing the scientific value of some individual theories of Freudianism and, in this way, help "hesitating" Freudians to realize the error of thoughts, which bring them close to the theory of psychoanalysis. It will also help us to disarm ideologically Freudians in the field which for decades they have considered as their monopoly.

It is precisely for these reasons that the Interinstitute Conference on Problems of the Ideological Struggle Against Contemporary Freudianism was called together at the Presidium of the AMS, USSR. At this conference (of two sessions) the following delegates delivered reports and speeches;

S. A. Sarkisov opened the meeting with a speech in which he described in detail the reasons above for calling together the meeting and the tasks confronting the participants. He pointed out that neo-Freudians aimed at utilizing the newest achievements of modern neurophysiology and by means of a pseudoscientific interpretation, they hoped to strengthen the doctrine of psychoanalysis by inference from the doctrine of the localization of the cerebral function. For this reason, an important component part in the criticism of contemporary Freudianism should be obtaining data on the tonicogenetic functions of the reticular formation of the brain stem and of the thalamus. Such an information will contribute to developing and deepening the Pavlov theory of cortical and subcortical interrelation.

S. A. Sarkisov stressed that the historical decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the Party, imposing on us the task of an uncompromising struggle for peace and friendship among the peoples and a peaceful coexistence of different social systems, so not indicate in any way that we must weaken the struggle for the consistency of our methodology, the purity of our ideology and combating any manifestation of foreign to us ideology. The work of the conference must be determined precisely along these lines.

F. V. Bassin read his report (the text of the report has been published in "Vestnik AMN SSSR" - Journal of the AMS USSR - 1959, No 1). The speaker said that it is characteristic of contemporary Freudianism to be one of the most reactionary manifestations of ideology of the bourgeoisie; he stressed that in forming a criticism on this tendency, we should proceed from Lenin's theory of double roots in philosophical idealism - social and gnosiological. He traced the main stages of Freudian doctrine and illuminated foreign critiques of Freudianism. He also described unlimited possibilities arising from Pavlov's physiology and contemporary Soviet psychology for the analysis of problems of the after-effects of an affective conflict and the role of unconscious factors in conducting the work of leaders of Russian clinical thought. In concluding, the speaker concentrated on refuting attempts of neo-Freudians to connect the basic theories of psychoanalysis with the data of electrophysiological research on the subcortical formations of the brain, which they evaluate methodologically incorrectly.

Ye. A. Popov, D. D. Fedotov, A. V. Snexhnevskiy, V. N. Myasishchev, P. K. Anokhin, O. V. Kerbikov, P. P. Bondarenko, N. G. Gartsshteyn, V. V. Andreyev, L. G. Pervov and I. Ye. Vol'pert took part in the debates developing from the report.

Ye. A. Popov expressed doubts in the correctness of a statement in

the report that Freud adhered to a mechanical interpretation at the beginning of his scientific carrier. He also expressed an opinion that a debate on the principles of the localization of cerebral functions does not have relation to the polemic on Freudianism but remains a subject for discussions inside the circle of materialists. Ye. A. Popov gave vivid illustrations of arbitrary and absurd conclusions made on the basis of psychoanalytical research and pseudoscientific assertions ensuing therefrom and related to psychiatry and literary criticism. He also gave examples of an extensive damage brought about by psychoanalysts when their activity intervenes in various forms of public practice and industrial work.

N. G. Gartashteyn presented in his paper a detailed picture of attempts to utilize Freud's ideas in the theory of borderline conditions. He traced the negative influence of psychoanalysis on the treatment of neuroses and psychogenesis in Western psychiatry.

D. D. Fedotov analyzed at the beginning of his paper the reasons why Freudianism could not spread its influence in our country. He stressed in this connection the value of works by I. M. Sechenov, I. P. Pavlov, V. V. Vvedenskiy, V. M. Bekhterev and other prominent representatives of Russian and Soviet physiology and Medicine, who prevented the penetration of idealistic concepts into our science. D. C. Fedotov indicated that some clinicians manifested an inadmissible idea of giving less attention to the problems of Pavlov's physiology. If their proposition were to receive a backing, it would undoubtedly merit a sincere praise from the side of Freudians. We must continue as before studying with great attention the legacy of I. P. Pavlov and carrying on an active struggle against psychoanalytical tendency, which still has one of the leading positions among reactionary bourgeois doctrines.

V. V. Andreyev concentrated attention on the necessity of studying in experiments various conditions of consciousness and of the processes designated as the unconscious. These conditions and processes appear when relations existing normally between the first and second signal systems become disturbed.

V. V. Andreyev joined P. Mikhailova in her critique of the so-called "determinism" of Freud. (Voprosy filosofii - Problems of Philosophy - 1958, No 3). In an article published in our press, P. Mikhailova described "determinism" as a manifestation of a vulgar mechanistic and metaphysical approach, which is particularly characteristic of all Freud's theory of dreams.

L. G. Pervov expressed the thought that it would be desirable to create a press organ especially designated for combating contemporary Freudianism.

A. V. Snezhnevskiy opened the discussions of the morning session of October 18. He gave a number of arguments against the statement in

F. V. Bassin's report that Freud adhered to mechanistic interpretations at the beginning of his scientific career. He also disagreed with the thought which he detected in the report that Freud's insufficient knowledge of physiology was an important reason for the development of psychoanalysis. A. V. Snezhnevskiy stressed the fact that Freud's references to the reflector nature of psychical processes had a pronounced subjective idealistic character from the very beginning; this can be seen in Freud's work "The Interpretations of Dreams". Nietzsche's doctrine was one of the philosophical sources of Freudianism; this was already evident in 1909. The theory of "unconscious behavior" cannot be widely used. This theory can be legitimately applied only in the examination of a pathological condition of the psyche-psychoses. When we speak of the unconscious behavior of a normal man, we blot out the qualitative difference existing between normal and pathological conditions and risk to follow Freud's line, which represents the propagation of irrationalism widely spread in bourgeois philosophy.

The tendency of drawing together Freud's ideas and I. P. Pavlov's theory, so popular abroad at the present time, is quite erroneous. The chief methodological difference doing away with such speculations lies in the fact that, according to Pavlov, the source of psychical processes is the external world and, according to Freud, it is subjective intrapsychical activity.

V. N. Myasishchev dwelt in his speech on the reasons contributing to the popularity of Freudianism when it was first conceived, and how this theory aspired to investigate the specific content of psychical conflicts.

V. N. Myasishchev pointed out that F. V. Bassin described in his report the three fundamental theories of Freudian school; the opposition of instincts to consciousness; the interpretation of instinctive behavior as the prototype of behavior in general and the thesis on symbolism. We must overcome the lack of attention existing up to the present time on the problem of the formation of conscious and the interrelation between the conscious and unconscious psychical processes. We should also give a correct explanation of the processes of symbolization encountered in the clinic. In this way, we will erase in principle and concretely the vestiges of Freudian school, which exist in our milieu, and deliver a fatal blow to dying Freudianism in the West.

P. K. Anokhin stressed the point that we should not simplify the problem of combating Freudianism. One could of course demonstrate many anecdotic situations illustrating the absurdity of Freudian theory, but we will not solve the chief problems of ideological struggle if we do not bring in opposition a clear materialistic interpretation to it. Up to now, we undoubtedly did not give enough attention to the unconscious as Freud designated it. Studying carefully reactions of the brain, we tend

to forget that beyond the focus of consciousness lies a tremendous load, which can be designated as the brain's memory. This load accumulates during the entire life and proves to be remarkably resistant as has been demonstrated in some hypnotic experiments. But do physiologists study to a sufficient degree the way these traces exist and their relationship to consciousness? We must admit, emphasized P. K. Anokhin, that these questions have been poorly explored in our country. As a result of this, our struggle against Freudianism seriously suffers. We must take this into account and correct correspondingly the line of our research, giving considerably more attention to the problems of the physiological theory of emotions. The conference should not result only in the critique of Freudian principles but also in the elaboration of plans for the experimental work of the future. The strength of criticism, which must be further developed, depends primarily on this factor.

O. V. Kerbikov indicated that the struggle against Freudianism cannot be reduced to just a general discussion. This struggle must be concrete, and it must include, in addition to uncovering the philosophical unfoundness of Freudianism, the explanation of the reasons for which more prominent representatives of psychiatry have persistently opposed the spread of Freud's theory. An examination of these problems would give a particularly rich material for revealing the speculativeness and pseudoscience of Freudian school.

O. V. Kerbikov stressed the necessity of the distinction between orthodox Freudianism and recent variations of psychoanalysis, which accentuate the conflict in pathogenic neuroses. These conflicts form when an unrealistic representation of the ego comes up against an objective reality. The more recent tendency should be investigated, otherwise all criticism of Freudianism may prove to belong to the past and not the present.

P. P. Bondarenko devoted his speech to analyzing the role of the struggle against Freudianism in philosophy and sociology. He dwelt on the views expressed by F. Alexander, one of the most prominent American psychoanalysts. F. Alexander drew an analogy between individual affective characteristics and political behavior of nations. As a result of these theory, he concluded that the exercise of trusteeship by "mature" nations over "immature" could be justified as well as other similar theses fully satisfying modern imperialists and colonists.

The school of the so-called psychosociologists deeply influenced by Freudianism plays a particularly reactionary role. Psychosociologists aim at reducing the problems of social law, politics, state and literature to psychoanalytical psychology. Freudian sociology justifies war and exploitation; it is connected with mystic concepts of the unconscious, which ruling the whole life of man remains unknown; it denies the existence of objective laws for the development of society and preaches an extreme subjectivism and irrationalism in philosophy and humanities. In substance

Freudian sociology means a denial of any attempts to analyze scientifically social processes; it disclaims the value of social progress and is permeated with great pessimism and decadence. In this relation, it is a typical expression of bourgeois ideology at the time when capitalism dies and there are no prospects of coming out of an impasse.

I. Ye. Vol'pert indicated that, for combating successfully Freudianism, definite organizational prerequisites are required. One of the most important is the publication of a journal devoted specifically to questions of light psychiatry, borderline conditions, medical psychology and psychotherapy.

N. I. Grashchenkov stressed in his report the danger of using terminology and ideas of psychoanalytical school. N. I. Grashchenkov pointed out that there is a close connection between Freudianism and idealistic philosophy and an incompatibility in principle between Freudian theories and Pavlov's philosophy and scientific methods of psychoanalysis in general. He gave a number of data on the history of the struggle of Soviet neurology against psychoanalytical movement in the prewar years.

In summing up the work of the conference, S. A. Sarkisov stressed its great significance. The struggle against Freudianism should not depend only on the results of a further experimental development of the problem of the unconscious. Such a position would be wrong. We already possess a rich material in this field and we must proceed with it more actively and more courageously. Further experiments and utilization of the already accumulated material must develop parallelly for the purposes of ideological struggle. It is desirable for the AMS, USSR, to establish closer contacts with psychiatrists and to extend further the facilities for publishing writings. This will render our struggle against Freudianism more successful. Definite organizational measures will be taken along this line.

The participants of the conference adopted a resolution, the contents of which will be published in the "Journal of the AMS, USSR" (Vestnik AMN, SSSR, 1959, No. 1).

F. V. Dassin

#5253

- E N D -