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Near East & South Asia

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Changes Seen in Soviet Mideast Policy

44230056A Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 23 Nov 89 p 7

[Article by Yoram Peri: "What Was Is No More"]

[Text] "One corner of the world, in which Israel is unfortunately located, has not yet been touched by the new winds that are blowing." This is the conclusion of Yitzhaq ("The sea is the same sea") Shamir's analytical study of the USSR's Middle East policy, which won him approving nods from his blind acolytes, such as the director general of his office, Yosi Ben-Aharon ("As far as the Israeli people are concerned—everything we've done has been the opposite of the world process...and therefore the rules applying to the rest of the world don't really apply to us"). And the Dan Quayle of the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem declared with the knowledgeable authority of an expert in antiterror war: Glasnost has not come to our area.

All this at the same time that Moscow hints, winks, says, and finally, shouts: There is a change. One has to be downright autistic not to hear Alexander Zutov, the USSR's ambassador to Damascus, who called to Syria to abandon "the concept of strategic balance of forces" and replace it with "a balance of interests between Syria and Israel," which in simple language means that Moscow will help Syria with its defense, but will not cooperate with it for attack purposes.

Zutov's statements this week should not have surprised anyone. Anyone following pronouncements by its official representatives must have perceived the changes in Soviet policy. A few days ago I had a very long talk with a senior Soviet diplomat. The man bears a very impressive title. He is in charge of the regional conflicts department and sits at the Soviet embassy in London. He is a close friend of Gennadiy Tarasov and represents the younger generation of Soviet foreign policymakers in Moscow.

The talk with Dr Alexander Glitzin proceeded at least like a talk with a Dutch or American diplomat. His frankness surpassed even that of British Foreign Office members. He sharply criticized Soviet traditional foreign policy, spoke quite freely about his bosses, was ready to admit mistakes, shortcomings, and failures of the past, and exhibited, both in words and gestures, the pattern of a new Soviet generation, the generation of glasnost and perestroika. His comments on his country's policy toward Israel and the Middle East sounded no less shocking than his analysis of the domestic issues currently worrying the Soviet Union:

On Attitude to Israel

"...For dozens of years the USSR painted a distorted picture of Israel. That was part of our ideological war against you, so everything you did was colored black. But a new generation has emerged in Soviet politics and diplomacy, which sees things differently. We are rewriting our history, and in this framework, our picture of Israel is much more balanced."

On Attitude to the PLO

"The PLO is the authorized representative of the Palestinians, and consequently, you must negotiate with it. Which doesn't mean that everything the PLO did was positive and everything you do is negative. One of our big blunders was when Andropov told 'Arafat, at a meeting in 1983, not to accept UN Resolution 242. His reasoning was that recognition could serve the PLO as an important trump card to obtain concessions from Israel. It was a mistake on our part, and it was a shame that such advice was given....With all your criticism of the PLO, you'd do well to remember that it is interested in a political settlement. If we lose 'Arafat there is a danger that the process will be halted for 10 years, if not longer."

On Recognition of Israel

"Conditions for recognition of Israel have changed within the framework of our new thinking. We want to be in a position to talk to both sides in the conflict. In the past we made resumption of diplomatic relations contingent on a complete Israeli withdrawal from the territories. Then we said we would recognize you if an international conference was convened, and we would do it at the opening session. Although we continue to support the idea of such a conference, today we are prepared to renew diplomatic relations with you even prior to that, as soon as there is a high level meeting between Israel and a PLO representative."

On Relations With Syria

"For some time now we have believed that Syria's stand on the conflict is anachronistic. Consequently, we thoroughly explained to Syria that they must give up the 'strategic parity' approach in favor of political solutions. We, at least, are changing our arms sales policy to Syria. We told Damascus that it must open contact with Israel, directly or indirectly, through us. In our latest talks with them we gathered the impression that the Syrians understood the change and were more willing than in the past to try some political move, within the framework of an international conference, for example. We found them more willing to listen to the possibility of political settlement in exchange for Israel ceding the Golan Heights."

On Attitude to Zionism

"Our support for the UN declaration that Zionism equaled racism is superfluous and the time has come to repeal it. We supported that decision because it was brought up in the United Nations at a time of an ideological struggle between us. That sort of wording belongs to the cold war period. At that time we talked of the PLO as a national liberation movement and of Israel as an aggressive, occupying force. The truth is that what we have here is two legitimate national movements. If we recognize the state that brings in Jews from the four corners of the world, we have to also recognize the ideology underlining it. Naturally,

Israel has its legitimate security interests, which must be taken into account in a political settlement. We must do away with ideological conflicts in interstate relations, just as in relations between individuals."

But have no fear, the prime minister's office will continue to mutter, "the sea is the same sea, and the Arabs are the same Arabs, and the Soviets are the same Soviets." As far as they know, the British have not even left yet.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

**Egypt Party Leaders Welcome Sudan Delegation,
Voice Support**

90OA0129A Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic
15 Nov 89 pp 1-2

[Article by Ahmad Sha'ban: "Party Leaders Conduct Dialogue With Sudan Delegation at House of Opposition Leader"]

[Text] Labor Party chairman Ibrahim Shukri stressed that all of Egypt stands solidly with the Sudanese people as it defends its land and interests.

He made his remarks at a dialogue session he held along with Egyptian parties at his house on [rest of paragraph missing]

[The session was attended by] representatives of Egyptian political organizations who emphasized their support for national rescue efforts and for what the dialogue conference accomplished in the interest of the Sudanese people.

Muhammad Mahdi 'Akif, member of the People's Assembly (Brotherhood) stated: "We stand behind you and call upon all forces to fully support the rescue government."

Dr. Na'man Jum'a, vice chairman of the Wafd Party, explained that because of the historical relations between Egypt and the Sudan, the Egyptian people have been careful not to interfere in Sudan's internal affairs, but are aware of the situation and hope that a democracy can be established for the enjoyment of all the people.

Mustafa Murad Kamil, chairman of the al-Ahrrar party, expressed reservations about the military government in the Sudan, pointing out that Egypt also suffers that type of rule.

Dr. Muhammad 'Abdallah, chairman of the external relations committee of the People's Assembly (National Party) emphasized that Egypt is aware of foreign plots against the Sudan and that the issue of the South is but a function of foreign meddling.

He pointed out that Egypt supports the Sudan in whatever steps it takes.

The Labor party was represented at the meeting by Mr. 'Adil Husayn.

Mr. Ibrahim Shukri had received the Sudanese National Dialogue Delegation at the Sayyidah Zaynab headquarters of the Labor party. The reception was attended by the party's leadership and executive committee members. At the end of the reception he invited the Sudanese to his house for a larger reception to be attended by all Egyptian political leaders.

Gulf Investors Praise Egyptian Dollar Bonds

90OA0129B Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM
in Arabic 26 Oct 89 p 9

[Article by Mahmud Salim: "Arabs Welcome New Dollar Bonds for Productive Projects, Exports, Suez Canal Development"]

[Text] 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Saqr, president of the Kuwaiti chamber of commerce, has emphasized that he is fully in favor of subscribing to the dollar bonds that Egypt will issue at the beginning of November. He told me that the concept would attract dollar savings, help establish a securities market in Egypt, and help accomplish development objectives. He asserted that he would endeavor to promote those bonds because of the good relations between Egypt and Kuwait.

Shaykh Salim al-Sabah, governor of the central bank of Kuwait, also asserted that those bonds would be highly successful in activating the securities market in Egypt. He said that cooperation between Egypt and Kuwait is undergoing considerable development on all levels and that Kuwait's capabilities will be at the service of Egypt in order to promote its development efforts.

Dr. Fahd al-Rashid, delegated member of the Kuwait Investment Authority, reiterated that thought, saying it was a good idea that will be supported by all Kuwaiti banks and financial houses. Ma'mun Hasan, general manager of the Arab Company for Investment Insurance in Kuwait emphasized that activating the capital market in Egypt sustains the economies of all Arab countries. He said that his company would dedicate all its efforts to promote the bonds.

The committee for the sales promotion of dollar bonds had dispatched three delegations for that purpose. I accompanied the delegation that went to Muscat and Kuwait. I spent 9 days with the delegation during which I experienced an economic trip that can only be described as a nationalistic mission with Egypt as its only focus.

The delegation was composed of 'Isam al-Ahmadi, general manager of Banque Misr; Jamal 'Abd-al-Muta'al, deputy general manager of the central bank; Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid, general manager of the Arab Investment Bank; Fatima Lutfi, deputy credit manager at the International Commercial Bank; and Jalal Salamah, auditing director at the Arab International Banking Corporation.

The delegation met in Muscat with 'Umar al-Zawawi, advisor to Sultan Qabus, who praised the idea and gave it his full support.

He anticipated that it will succeed in realizing development objectives, attracting savings, and establishing a securities market in Egypt. The delegation also met with chairmen and managers of major Omani banks and officials of several financial corporations.

The delegation held an important meeting with the Egyptian community in Muscat. The meeting was attended by Egyptian Ambassador Muhammad 'Abd-al-Khaliq Shalabi, who emphasized that the embassy would follow up on the initiative and pursue all avenues to promote the new bonds. He said that Egyptian diplomacy focuses its foreign activity on serving Egyptian development since politics serves economics and not vice versa. Dr Mustafa Hamzah, information counsellor with the Egyptian Embassy, reiterated the same concept saying he expected the bonds, because of their important features, to gain great acceptance by Egyptians working in Qatar.

In Kuwait, important meetings were held with governor of the central bank, [officials of] major banks, president of the Kuwait Investment Authority, president of the chamber of commerce, owners of major currency exchange firms, and other investment, insurance, and investment insurance companies.

I can only say [on the basis of] those meetings that confidence in the Egyptian economy continues and that all those whom we met are fully convinced that stability in Egypt, political or economic, will play an important role in accomplishing the goal of the new bonds.

What projects will the new bonds finance?

Mahmud 'Abd-al-'Aziz, vice president of the Federation of Egyptian Banks, said the bonds will not be dedicated to correct the balance of payments, for instance, or to import basic foodstuffs. Rather, [they will be used] to finance productive projects that would generate the foreign exchange needed to service those bonds. Suez Canal development heads the list of those projects. Preparing the Canal to receive large ships would cost about 90 million. The projects also include the construction of two new furnaces at the aluminum complex at Naj' Hammadi as well as the implementation of touristic and export-only projects. The projects have been extensively scrutinized by a special committee in charge of that assignment. He added that the committee would immediately approve any valid project proposed by the private sector.

The question is, how would an Egyptian or a foreigner purchase the new bonds and collect their coupon rate?

The head of the delegation answers: As of 1 November, any citizen may go to any Egyptian bank or an overseas branch and ask that a portion of his account be transferred for the purchase of bonds, or he could make direct payment to the bank with which he deals directly in Egypt. Egyptian banks will not charge commissions either for selling the bonds, cashing the coupons and transferring them to the customer's account, or even for holding the bonds at the bank for safekeeping.

Mahmud 'Abd-al-'Aziz says that a current study is exploring the future objective of turning bond holders

into proportionate shareholders of dollar bond-financed companies and projects once they stand on their own feet.

Libyan Trade Boosts Economy, Burdens al-Sallum, Marsa Matruh

90OA0144A Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 20 Nov 89 p 7

[Article by Ibrahim Ahmad: "Following Opening of Egyptian-Libyan Borders: Sallum a Business Market!"]

[Excerpts] Five months after reopening the borders between Egypt and Libya, the number of passengers who went through Sallum customs last October was about 45,000 persons coming in and 60,000 going out, using 5,724 private cars and taxis and 501 buses coming from Libya, and 6,000 private cars and taxis and 595 buses and trucks going to Libya.

Muhammad 'Ali Khamis, Alexandria al-Sallum customs chief, said that the value of Egyptian exports to Libya via al-Sallum last October amounted to \$4.2 million and gifts amounted to \$2.4 million. In other words, passengers take into Libya \$200,000 worth of Egyptian goods a day. So what kinds of goods and gifts are we talking about?

Muhammad 'Ali Khamis says: "These exports include vegetables, fruits, wood and metal furniture, plastic wares, auto spare parts, certain foods and canned products, juices and cookies in particular. Vegetables, aluminum, and plastic mats lead the list of exports to Libya. In order to get to know the state of trade between Egypt and Libya, we had to go to al-Sallum, the outlet through which all these goods pass. We began our trip from Manshiyah Square in Alexandria where most of the Egyptian merchants, who do business with Libya and with Libyans coming to Egypt, are concentrated. [passage omitted]

Most Libyans want to trade their worked gold for Egyptian-made gold jewelry, and they pay the difference for beauty, taste, modern design, and good work. It is common knowledge that most gold merchants are located close to Manshiyah.

Manshiyah merchant Muhammad Abu-al-Ma'ati says that he imports from Libya fine underwear made in Cyprus and Yugoslavia and exports to it popular cotton underwear to the tune of 1,000 Egyptian pounds a week. Libyan merchants come to Manshiyah to barter, where a single deal yields 30 percent of its value in profit.

Manshiyah merchant Ahmad al-Sayyid Sulayman says: "The one thing that promotes the export traffic to Libya is the fact that the Libyans bring with them dollars to buy Libyan dinars in Egypt at low prices! For it takes \$1,000 to buy 300 Libyan dinars in Libya, while the rate of the Libyan dinar here in Egypt is low, 2.5 or less than \$1.00 for one dinar. Consequently, the Libyan merchants make out in the difference in currency which generally pays for their travel and accommodations." Ahmad Sulayman says

that trade with Libya has become very popular in the market and the Libyan dinar must be put on the list of transactions allowed at official Egyptian banks, just like the Saudi riyal and the Kuwaiti dinar." [passage omitted]

25,000 People

It was inevitable that such a volume of trade should have social repercussions. In order to find about the developments that have taken place in the wake of the al-Sallum border reopening, we met with al-Sallum city chairman, Qasim Jabir, who said: "The reopening of the borders last June has caused the population to grow from 8,000 to 20,000-25,000 people. Merchants have begun to fix their shops to service people passing through. City services and utilities have begun to improve. The electric power problem has been solved, and the city now receives electricity for 20 hours a day and the customs outlet for 24 hours a day; hence the increase in utility services." He added: "Right now, the city receives three trains a week carrying 1,500 tons of water. There is now enough water to meet the needs of the city's residents and employees. Moreover, work has begun on the construction of a 3,000-ton rainwater reservoir, at a cost of 200,000 Egyptian pounds [LE], for regular household and laundry use, but not for drinking.

"In housing, two buildings have been built to house rangers and port security officers. Furthermore, 160 housing units are under construction to meet the needs of a growing workforce. Another 140 housing units will be built within the next 6 months."

Qasim Jabir also said: "With regard to telephone services, they were nonexistent because of the difficulty of making telephone contact even with Marsa Matruh. Now telephone lines have been set up nationwide and internationally via microwave.

"Moreover, a 140-kms two-lane highway is in the process of being widened from 17.5 to 10.5 meters at a cost of 29 million LE, and it will be widened once again to 20 meters."

Travelers Guides to Libya

At the top of the hill where the Sallum customs is located under the leadership of passport commissioner Colonel Musaddaq Mahmud, I asked the commissioner about crossing and passport procedures. He said: "Egyptians going to Libya must have a passport or an identity card or family card, besides a work permit for those going for work and an invitation to visit, or evidence that they have relatives in Libya. Investors must show evidence that they are engaged in free enterprise and these travelers receive special consideration. Government and public sector employees require permission from their employer (yellow card), and Egyptian wives have to have their husband's permission. Travelers under the age of 16 must have a passport and infants are not allowed to travel without a separate passport. The most important thing about passports is the presentation of a work

permit as well as a statement on military service status if the Egyptian traveler is of conscription age."

Sayyid Qinawi, general director of Sallum customs, says that customs are open 24 hours a day and the average daily number of passengers from both directions is between 4,000 and 5,000 persons. The daily car traffic averages between 400 and 450 private cars and 40 to 50 trucks and buses.

On the average, passengers carry with them from Egypt to Libya \$200,000 to \$220,000 worth of goods, inclusive of gifts and purchases made in Egypt.

Sallum customs revenues last October amounted to 405,000 LE.

Muhammad Anas 'Atiyyah Muni, director of Sallum National Bank, said that currency instructions prohibit travelers from carrying more than 20 LE and travelers coming in from Libya must list foreign currency, travelers checks, and bank checks on the customs declaration form.

The director of the national bank at Sallums customs says: "The bank transfers between \$50,000 and \$60,000 a day and Egyptian banks do not deal in the Libyan dinar. Accordingly, Libyan travelers take with them goods and services from Egypt without any hard currency getting into legal banks. Consequently, the Libyan dinar makes its way to the Egyptian black market." Hence his demand that a rate for the Libyan dinar be set at Egyptian banks just like other currencies.

Customs Is Innocent

We met with some travelers who went through al-Sallum customs, including 'Awad 'Abd-al-Raziq (Libyan free enterprise) who asked that customs formalities be reduced to make it easier on the travelers, for the road is long and arduous. Formalities take about 6 hours to complete and it is the passport lines that form the bottlenecks.

Fathi Faraj (Libyan teacher) says: "The distance from Darnah to al-Sallum customs took 6 hours, while customs formalities take 4 hours, keeping in mind that we had regular papers and were not carrying any goods. Also, it took a long time, about one hour, to change customs and passport shifts." Sayyid Qinawi, director general of al-Sallum customs, replied that problems are centered in the passport section and not in customs where formalities take only 15 minutes if all papers are in order."

General Predicts 10-Year Deadlock in Mideast

90OL0126B Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 6 Oct 89 p 15

[Article by Brigadier General Yo'el Ben-Porat: "Ten Years of Deadlock"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Thus, if we remember the words of Dayan, it is risky to speak today of "10 years of deadlock." Nonetheless, I dare to repeat Dayan's words of 1973 in relation to the chances of an agreement with the Palestinians and the danger of war in the next decade.

I am referring to the deadlock, not only in relation to the chances of a settlement with the Palestinians, but also in relation to the form of rule in Israel.

In the next few years, there is nothing to talk about with the Palestinians, and, as far as Israel is concerned, there will also not be anyone to talk with. There is no one who will talk about returning the occupied territories or even about territorial compromise because there is no national agreement—not in the Right, the Center, or the Left. I also do not believe that anything will come of the Israeli agreement and elections on the West Bank. Israel views a settlement agreement as meaning, autonomy more or less. The PLO sees it as a stage in the overall plan that we are bound to from the start, to create a sovereign state on the West Bank. They see it as a package deal. Even the hopes of cultivating leadership of "PLO Nablus," as opposed to "PLO Tunis" will eventually dissolve, like the "village associations" in their time.

The Palestinians, for their part, are not ready for realistic discussions because of the extremism of the past added to the catalyzing potential of the intifadah today. They are still in the maximalist stage, the stage that Jabotinsky's Zionism was in in the '30s when the two banks of Jordan were formed. They will have to pass through the stage of dealing with the frustrations of reality. Like us, they will have to go through things like the Peel plan of 1937 and the UN partition of 1947. They will have to face the frustration of there not being an Arab nation which will fight for them or divisions which will do it. And, finally, they will reach the bargaining table in a more sober state.

In the next 10 years, the situation in relation to Gorbachev's white revolution will become clear. It is likely, and to be hoped, that this will be successful and that the USSR will be more democratic and peace-loving in the next decade. And, when it divests itself of much of its nuclear power, hopefully this will lead to economic improvement. A Soviet Russia like that, which has already cooperated with the United States in solving regional disputes, will be a more effective mediating and connecting force than the United States because of its good relations (at least as they are now) with the PLO and Syria—unless Syria and the PLO get on the American bandwagon, and this is also quite possible.

In 10 years, Likud will have been in power for 22 years. Almost as many as MAPAI [Israeli Workers Party]. The processes of defilement and decadence will not pass over it. One can assume that it will go through a process of "Mapai-ization" to the end. Already there are signs of "Yadlinism" [not further expanded], corruption and

protectionism. Yitzhaq Shamir will, apparently, finish his tenure as prime minister in 7 years without a rival. After having been the loyal guardian of Greater Israel, he gets a bonus for vitality, perseverance, and a sense of mission. All these will make it possible for him to serve at least an additional term as prime minister. He has no competition in Alignment for now. He can handle his competitors from within the party.

If, however, a political reality develops which forces Israel to compromise about territory and to return some, it will not be Yitzhaq Shamir who will do this as prime minister. He would not return so much as a speck of earth from the hills of Samaria. If they closed in on him from all sides, he would hand over his power to one of his colleagues. Shamir, the orthodox revisionist, would not betray his path and his faith and would not want to leave his leadership position as one known to have returned part of the land of Israel. This reality is likely to develop in 2 or 3 years. Even if and when Shamir leaves, it will not necessarily be the end of Likud rule. It is likely to hold on nationally for at least one more term.

The Labor Party, if its wisdom and strength of spirit hold out and it throws itself into a process of transformation and basic radical reform, will become a conceptual "supermarket party" and pluralistic. And if, in addition, a young energetic leadership crystallizes, and if it also manages to get a part of the North African electorate, then it will succeed in gaining a stable majority in the Knesset. If, in addition, a substantial part of the orthodox support it, the Labor Party will be able to put together a coalition with a functioning majority even in relation to political arrangements which are subject to deep national conflict. Then it will be able to sit down at the negotiating table with young Palestinians, few of whom have seen Jaffa and Ramla with their own eyes, and who have been cured of dreams of "greatness," in a process which will be brought about by the obvious reality. This will occur after they drop the intifadah once it exhausts itself completely. Then, even the hawks in the two camps will be able to come to some agreement, whether independently or by means of mediation by the greater powers.

Israel, hopefully by then, will have attained economic independence as a nation. It will not be dependent on the United States and will not be forced to give in to economic pressures.

The big unknown is whether, during the next 10 years, there will be a war with the Arabs. In my humble opinion, barring something crazy like a pogrom against the citizens of the occupied territories or bombing a mosque on the Temple Mount, I see no reason for a war initiated by the Arabs. Preventing such happenings is possible and up to us. The Arabs, for the past 40 years, have not started a war. The last war they started was the big war of 1948. They initiated the crisis of the 6-Day War but were not the ones to open fire first. They went to war in 1973 when we provided them with a reason and

motivation. For if we had accepted the proposed agreement offered by Sadat in 1971, and returned Sinai to them in exchange for that agreement, they would not have had cause to attack. The Jordanians only attack when forced to. The Iraqis may find themselves caught between the past war with Iran and another war that Iran may initiate in retaliation.

Syria, then, remains. It wants to attack to get back the Golan. It wants to very much but cannot. Holding it back are Gorbachev, empty coffers, the Iraqis, and the strategic cooperation between Israel and the United States. And first and foremost, what is stopping it is Israel's strength. Of course, there is always the chance of crazy actions on the part of al-Asad, but he is the smartest of the Arabs in this century, the most sane and balanced. He has never shown signs of craziness like 'Abd-al-Nasir, Saddam Husayn, or even like King Husayn. And if he gets crazy and attacks, despite all the restraining factors, it will be a complete surprise.

Given that intelligence information is not responsible for predicting crazy actions, the author of these lines is also exempt from such a task. I do not propose that anyone with any intelligence build a conceptual framework based on acts of madness. Such things can happen in Syria, in Russia, in America, and even in a country we know well. No one is immune to this. Consideration of this is, therefore, irrelevant.

One can dare to estimate "10 years of deadlock" even in relation to the subject of the possibility of war, although one who was greater than us, Moshe Dayan, tried and failed. Everything depends on time and circumstances. One has to take into account the fact that this unreliable art, called assessing the enemy or evaluating intelligence information, is fraught with objective limitations on exactness and a history of failure. But what can we do? We cannot do without it.

The basic facts of our times in the inter-Arab and international arena allow us to predict 10 years of deadlock. Things could change for the worse, and we might have to face the possibility of having to prepare for a Syrian attack as soon as tomorrow morning, or face an eastern front in a year. Such things have happened. On the other hand, the facts are more likely to change for the better.

Study Assesses Role, Impact of 'NGO' in Arab World

900A0143A Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 20 Nov 89 p 7

[Article by Dr. 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Sharbini: "Arab NGO's in the Balance"]

[Text] Cairo has recently been the venue for many international, Arab, and regional conferences and forums concerning various subjects. Perhaps one of the most important of these meetings was the Conference of Arab Nongovernment Organizations [NGO's], which

was attended by senior statesmen and representatives of Arab nations and international organizations. The opening address was delivered by President Mubarak's wife. This was perhaps the first time that this important subject has been raised on the Arab regional level, since the important role that NGO's could play in economic and social growth, with regard to Third World countries, became clear.

The fact is that the interest in NGO's in the Arab world, as an important and basic framework for the development process, came only recently from the countries of Asia, Equatorial Africa, and Latin America, which were quicker than we were in recognizing three serious gaps in methods of economic and social growth in past decades, and the place that NGO's could occupy in plugging these gaps. The first gap was unbalanced and unjust distribution of profits from the development process, which led in many cases to increased distortion in distribution of income, despite the general rise in the level of national production. The second gap was the continued dependence on others and on abroad with regard to the development process, and the weakness of self-capability as the power to propel this process. The third gap pertains to the sustainability of the development process itself, and its stumbling, or rather, stopping when governmental or foreign support was withdrawn. It has become clear recently that an important aspect of these gaps is attributable in the first place to the neglect of the NGO's role in the development process and the weakness of popular participation in supporting the efforts of governments to promote economic and social development.

At the very beginning, it is important that we know the meaning of NGO's, which is not a well known term. NGO's are associations of various sizes, bringing together individuals who have a common interest of an economic nature, requiring joint efforts, which each member of the organization would be incapable of doing alone. From this limited definition, one can highlight the following main characteristics of NGO's.

1. The lead and initiative in establishing these NGO's must come from the group itself, in order to achieve the goals that the group has set for itself. In other words, any structure that is forced on the group from the outside, whether by the state or from elsewhere, would make it unqualified to come under the NGO's umbrella. For example, these organizations do not include agricultural cooperatives, which the state sets up to achieve the goals of distributing the production requirements and marketing the crops, because the fact of the matter is that cooperatives are governmental and not NGO's.

2. Any organization that is aimed in the first instance at defending the group's interests, such as trade union organizations, cannot be considered NGO's with regard to their main, developmental framework. The consideration is not to defend the group's interests, but is the common accomplishment of an action that has an economic or social development goal.

3. Moreover, volunteer work is not one of the necessary characteristics of NGO's. The group members share ordinarily their material resources and their labor to achieve the group's goals. They expect a compensatory return in exchange for this participation, which should be above the possible return obtainable by individual revenues and efforts. NGO's are not charity societies in the recognized understanding of that term.

4. The NGO's activities are marked by gradual progress, either in terms of size or with regard to variety and number of activities. The activity of a group of farmers, for example, might begin with the purchase of a vehicle to transport their crops to market. Then, the size of the group expands to include a number of vehicles. The activity might be expanded to include the establishment of shops for themselves, in order to sell directly to the people.

5. Elements of leadership play an important role in organizing the group. It is inconceivable that a NGO could be established spontaneously without one of its individuals having a special share in determining the organization's goals and basic structure, and in recruiting the membership.

6. One should not confuse the self-efforts that the NGO reflects with other types of self-efforts, such as the establishment of schools and hospitals through donations by specific groups of community residents, as happened recently in a number of governorates.

If we take these characteristics as basic factors in determining the makeup of NGO's in the Arab world, we will find that their scope is very limited in comparison with other societies in other Third World countries. That is clearly reflected in the latest noteworthy activity of a number of international bodies concerned with the economic and social development process, and their increasing concentration on NGO's in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Examples of that include the support of UN organizations to savings societies, such as the "Didar" Society in Bangladesh, which began with a handful of small farmers in 1960, and whose number has reached more than 40,000 at the present time. Moreover, several international organizations are assisting an association of female workers (SEWA) in India, which was established in 1972 and now has more than 40,000 members. One of the banks that the association members themselves established is financing the association. In El Salvador, international fiscal and development bodies are supporting the movement to develop communities, which had been established on a conventional basis, in which popular participation now plays a basic role in the activities of these communities. In Sierra Leone in West Africa, where rural women carry a heavy load in gathering wood for fuel and preparing meals, some women's associations have recently been established to purchase modern equipment to grind grain, which makes more effort possible for agricultural work and, consequently, increases productivity.

It is difficult for the student to find significant comparable examples of these new trends in the Arab world, especially after international organizations have begun to direct their attention to NGO's, in light of their failures in dealings with official agencies of Third World countries, as a result of the spread of bureaucracy, and the siphoning off of aid in many cases for various purposes other than the goals that had been agreed to with these agencies. The fact of the matter in the Arab region is that it is content with scattered and limited efforts with regard to NGO's, despite the fact that the Arab world's religious basis and social structure reflect tangible positive attitudes with regard to the possibility of establishing these NGO's. Many Koranic verses and prophetic hadiths encourage joint effort, mutual assistance and brotherliness. Moreover, the extended family system which prevails to a considerable extent in Arab society, presents a solid foundation for the creation of NGO's. Despite these propitious circumstances, the NGO movement is still in its infancy in the Arab world. Perhaps one could attribute that to four main reasons:

1. The political and administrative structure of the regime in most area nations does not provide a suitable climate for the establishment of NGO's which, by their nature, require a minimum of democracy and administrative interference in the affairs of the citizenry.

2. The security aspects, and the strict striving for stability of security and protection of political systems, might generate some fears with regard to the establishment of NGO's, or rather, might put many administrative obstacles in their path.

3. The educational and training systems, and work methods in general, stress the individual in society and do not contribute to the deepening of concepts of cooperation and common effort, as is the case with regard to educational and training systems in other societies that are concerned with joint training in the form of projects undertaken by teams of students or trainees.

4. The state apparatus does not have a clear policy or defined role with regard to providing a propitious climate for NGO's, or even with regard to assisting some of them when the group takes the initiative. One example of that is the process of introducing vital gas technology into the rural areas of a number of Arab nations. The experiment to distribute this important technology failed, despite its development in a compatible way with respect to circumstances of the countries of the region. However, at the same time, it succeeded beautifully in India and China. The failure in those Arab nations was the result of the weakness of the basic framework for NGO's in the Arab world.

A glance at the five-year plans of Arab area nations does not turn up any reference to the role of NGO's in mobilizing resources, or their use in terms of the general context of the plan. On the contrary, the fact that some chronic challenges might not be able to be met with

significant effectiveness, except through a strategy that would rely to a considerable degree on NGO's, was ignored.

If we are convinced of the strategic role that NGO's could play in promoting growth and meeting its chronic challenges, then one could work out a framework for action, aimed at activating these organizations, which would include the following elements:

1. Dealing with the financial aspect, since the existing banking and fiscal agencies are not prepared to support these NGO's. The experience of the "Gramin" Bank in Bangladesh gave us a useful lesson in methods of financially assisting NGO's that bring together small associations of poor people.

2. Preparing a suitable climate to establish these NGO's, such as establishing markets especially for the group, to enable farmers to sell their produce directly without going through a series of middlemen, to which they are currently restricted. The Democratic Republic of Yemen has been noticeably successful in this area.

3. Developing systems of education and training that would implant the concepts of cooperation, joint effort, and team spirit, and would avoid individualism. Moreover, the development of media programs along the same lines should be tied in with that. They unfortunately now confirm the concepts and ideas of heroic individual accomplishment.

4. Providing to the greatest possible extent popular participation in preparing, implementing, supervising and maintaining projects, so that this participation can be a basic element in designing these projects.

5. Searching for the leadership that could play an important role in forming these NGO's, and offering all possible support and assistance to achieve this role.

6. Granting international bodies and agencies permission to deal directly with the NGO's—if they deem that advisable—with safeguards for the state's right to general supervision over the activities of those bodies.

7. Establishing an Arab federation of NGO's to prepare a sufficient database with regard to the activities of these NGO's and an effective communications system to share in identifying successful experiences within the area and abroad. The federation could also hold periodic meetings and conferences aimed at designing a clear policy to activate these NGO's and cooperate with them on the regional and semi-regional levels.

Editorialist Condemns Living Standards of Egyptians in Iraq

900A0129C Cairo AKHIR SA'AH
in Arabic 15 Nov 89 p 56

[Editorial: "Egyptians in Iraq Have a Bad Time Of It"]

[Text] Rightfully, Egyptians in Iraq have turned into a public opinion issue for which a basic solution must be found on two levels.

The first level deals with Egyptians who are currently in Iraq. Their condition is worse than bad, according to fellow newsmen who traveled there. Their standard of living is so low as to be inhumane. It is not acceptable under any circumstances to see a university student—an Egyptian—turn into a vendor of stuffed vegetables at the Marba'ah section which the Iraqis abandoned and left for the Egyptians. It is similar to Afro-American neighborhoods in New York where Afro-Americans live barefoot with tattered clothes in collapsing homes replete with decay and spiders. Disabled Egyptians are in evidence on public squares either begging or performing marginal tasks of little value! Our sister newspaper AL-AKHBAR carried last Wednesday a news report, and then came out yesterday, Tuesday, with a feature [on the subject]. The former reported that 102 Egyptians died last month and that Cairo has received 1,048 cadavers in 1989 so far.

In truth, the printing of such figures and information is quite appalling yet timely, and should have been done years ago. Egyptian citizens, be they farmers, laborers, or university graduates, are entitled to them. One way or another, they should be aware of them before traveling to Iraq. Iraq is a sister country that suffers like we suffer. Going to Baghdad or Basrah is not like going to heaven or to a goldmine. I state frankly that Egypt has got a lot more going for it than Iraq—tens of times more. The sands of our homeland need our sweat and toil to transform the desert into farmland—into a paradise—in order for us to solve such major problems as the shortfall of wheat and corn harvests etc. resulting from the shortage of arable land.

A second measure which I advocate and which must be immediately implemented is to deny exit to Iraq, except for those with work contracts authenticated by the Egyptian Ministry of Human Resources and recognized within Iraq. Otherwise, agencies of the Interior Ministry must cooperate with the Ministry of Human Resources to prevent Egyptians from traveling [to Iraq] merely because they are guaranteed freedom of movement. Or is that a personal matter that touches the individual's personal freedom to travel to Iraq? We must also put a stop to random Egyptian travel to Yemen, Jordan, and Libya. The dignity of Egyptians in foreign lands is the responsibility of every official. An insult to any Egyptian is an insult to Egypt and to all officials. We therefore call upon General Zaki Badr, minister of the interior, and 'Asim 'Abd-al-Haq, minister of human resources, to stop the drain [resulting from] travel. Suffice it to say that uncontrolled travel to Iraq has inflated the cost of Egyptian labor to astronomical figures, and serves the interests of Iraqi projects. Meaning that Egyptians are employed by Iraqi projects for next to nothing. This is an injustice to be denounced by all Egyptians.

To repeat, Egyptians are having a bad time of it in Iraq. Before that, they used to, and still may, have a bad time of it in Jordan. Mistakes must be corrected before problems turn into catastrophes.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Proposed Palestinian Delegates Contrasted

90OL0124B Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 12 Oct 89 p 8

[Article by Pinhas 'Inbari: "A Delegation of Contradictions"]

[Text] The subject of "the Palestinian delegation" will not disappear so quickly, despite the crisis in Israel. But it's rather characteristic that no one has yet gone to the bride to ask what she thinks. No one also has been especially interested in what exactly is happening among that group of Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem from which most of the delegation, if it comes into existence, will be assembled.

It turns out that the list, whose contents have already been leaked, appears from the outside to be harmonious. It is composed mainly of supporters of 'Arafat, but it has within it not a few contradictions, which will determine whether or not there will be a Palestinian delegation. It is already worth paying attention to their nature, also because they may have a bearing on the diplomatic process in the future and also because already today they express contradictory lines of thinking and development in the Fatah organization "on the outside."

First of all, there is an obvious difference between the public figures who came to Cairo on the eve of the crowded "Palestine Week," whose peak was Rabin's visit there, and those who refrained from coming to the Egyptian capital. Those who came to Cairo and those who refrained from coming expressed in that way their support for or reservations about Mubarak's initiative, and this parallels to a great extent the same difference among the PLO leadership.

While the group that came to Cairo is involved intimately in the Palestinian activity that is being plotted there, the other group, headed by Faysal al-Husayni and Sari Nusaybah, who lately appear together often, do not hide their criticism of Egypt.

Al-Husayni's and Nusaybah's press conference on the subject of Bayt Sahur, an event that involved the controversial closing of an entire area of East Jerusalem, was held together with two central figures in the territories, Zahirah Kamal, who is considered to be a supporter of the Democratic Front, and Dr Ghassan al-Khatib, who is considered to be an activist of the Palestinian Communist Party. The latter two groups clearly oppose Mubarak's initiative, and their representatives at the press conference did not hide their negative position on the initiative.

Cautious About Egypt's Honor

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that in everything concerning the supporters of Fatah, it is not possible to say that we are speaking about an anti-Egyptian group. Faysal al-Husayni has visited Cairo, and even though he has met with anti-Egyptian groups, he has himself been cautious about Egypt's honor and does not speak against Mubarak's initiative, but rather hints indirectly at his dissatisfaction. That very same day the newspaper headlines came out with Mubarak's declaration that he supports an independent Palestinian state, but "for stability in the region" it would be better were the Palestinian state to enter into a confederation with Jordan. Al-Husayni also found it proper to speak the same day about "stability in the region," but, taking a swipe at Mubarak, he held that only the establishment of a Palestinian state would bring about that stability. He didn't make any mention of the confederation with Jordan.

Sari Nusaybah chose to voice his reservations about Mubarak's 10 points after Israel had rejected them. He said that Israel did not accept them even though they were essentially far from the Palestinian positions. The East Jerusalem weekly AL BAYADIR AL-SIYASI expressed the Palestinian reservations about the 10 points when it voiced the concern (in its issue of 16 September 89) that Egypt was sliding from its role as protector and supporter of the PLO into the role of an intermediary between the PLO and Israel. That is, the role of an intermediary, which must be neutral, impairs Egyptian support for the PLO's positions.

In striking contrast to these words of criticism and reservations, is the positive approach of Radwan Abu-Ayyash, who frequently stresses the role of the 10 points in the peace process. The question is whether the supporters of the Egyptian initiative within the Fatah are interested, given what was said above, in the United Command?

The name of Ilyas Frayj appears in the list of figures who comprise the delegation that was published by Palestinian sources in Cairo. Frayj has many merits, but it is impossible to speak of him as representing any trend within the leadership of the intifadah. To the contrary, no matter how hard he tries, he cannot remove the pro-Jordanian label. His inclusion in the list is liable to arouse much astonishment within the United Command concerning the PLO's intentions to leave the Command on its present basis.

On a previous occasion, we brought the open words of the Communist leader Bashir al-Barghuti on the subject of Jamil al-Turayfi's meeting with Shamir. "The husband is the last to know about his wife's unfaithfulness," said Barghuti, in order to express his dissatisfaction that on so central a matter the PLO leadership had not involved the United Command in its decisions. And, indeed, the negative position of the United Command on the Mubarak initiative is one of the main stumbling

blocks in the way of the supporters of this process within the Fatah, and, at their head, most certainly 'Arafat himself.

Mubarak's words in praise of the confederation with Jordan and his inclusion of Frayj on the list, are consistent with the trend not to leave Jordan out of the diplomatic process, which became evident in Egyptian policy after the Sanaa summit of the leaders of the "club of four"—Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and North Yemen—2 weeks ago. This is not a return to the "Jordanian option," but rather ensuring Jordan against Likud's vision of "Jordan is Palestine."

Partnership Between Jordan and the PLO

In Israel, the "Jordanian option" was mistakenly understood as using Jordan in order to suppress the Palestinians. But all the other international factors, including Jordan itself, understood the "Jordanian option" as a partnership between Jordan and the PLO in an agreed diplomatic demarche. This was reflected in the fact that until the intifadah, the lists of figures with whom the international factors consulted were composed equally of the supporters of Jordan and the supporters of the PLO. The new list first of all maintains a link with Palestinian groups.

While the trend of the supporters of the Mubarak initiative is to base the diplomatic process on the strong back of Egypt and Iraq—while recognizing that Jordan is an important link in that "club"—the al-Husayni group is not ready to accept the fact that the integration of the Fatah into the "club" will be at the expense of the links of the Palestinian left outside of the "club." The conclusion is that the trend to integration in the "club" is liable to cost the life of the United Command, and those elements in Fatah who unfavorably view the negative position of the United Command on the Mubarak initiative are ready to exchange the Command for the renewal of the dialogue with Jordan. They are also liable to interpret the tendency of the first group as the desire to imitate the Committee for National Direction, which was established at the end of the '70's, and which, in contradiction to the prevalent view in Israel, entered into severe confrontations with the PLO.

A New Revolutionary Content

The contradiction between the trend of the "club of four" and the trend of the "United Command" was reflected in the appearance last week of Leaflet No. 46. A few short days after the appearance of this leaflet, which for the first time in the history of the leaflets of the United Command contained barely one page, there appeared another leaflet, not numbered, of the United Command, that instilled new revolutionary content into the intifadah and breathed new life into it, by declaring a 5-day strike and the realization of the slogan "escalation of the intifadah." While the numbered leaflet had expressed a willingness for the withering of the United

Command, the nonnumbered leaflet expressed rebellion against this tendency and the taking of a new leadership initiative.

Very surprisingly, it was precisely Nabulus, the city that was supposed to be satisfied with the new revolutionary impetus of the nonnumbered leaflet, which showed signs of discomfort, and immediately with the distribution of the leaflet in East Jerusalem, loudspeakers going through the streets announced that Nabulus was not joining the strike. Only in the evening, after urgent telephone conversations with the "outside" PLO, was it decided in Nabulus to go along with the leaflet.

When one asks the Nabulusites about the meaning of their having stayed out of the strike, two answers are received. One—the city suffered greatly from the intifadah and many died, and no special strike was held "in its honor." The other answer has a more political content. Rightly or wrongly, in Nabulus the special leaflet is linked with Faysal al-Husayni's press conference, and going along with the leaflet in Nabulus would mean the acceptance of the leadership of al-Husayni, with everything that would imply concerning the differences between the two leading groups of Fatah supporters in the territories.

Between Nabulus and Jerusalem

Attention should be paid to the fact that it is precisely in Nabulus that there is a relatively large number of those who support the Egyptian line, while no one from the East Jerusalem leadership arrived in Cairo. In Nabulus they also point to the fact that the Bayt Sahur tax revolt is being led by left-wing fronts, mainly the Popular Front, and it is in contradiction to the pragmatic approach of the Fatah to recognize the Civil Administration in order to inherit it naturally with the establishment of the Palestinian administration in the independent state.

The group that crystallized around Faysal al-Husayni, which includes circles from the other left-wing groups, is not supported by the supporters of 'Arafat in Nabulus, and not only since yesterday. The diplomat Dennis Ross, for example, must hold two separate meetings with the two groups of the Fatah. Butrus Ghali was more careful of the feelings of the "pro-Egyptians" during his visit to Israel in the summer, and refused to meet separately with Faysal al-Husayni and his friends.

The reference is not only to internal contradictions, but also to basic differences in the approaches of the Fatah between those who seek the unity of the Palestinian camp, and who believe that it is necessary to proceed with the diplomatic process hand in hand with the Left, and those who believe that the alliance with the Palestinian left in the United Command is a burden that must be removed, and that the diplomatic process must be based on the "club of four," including Jordan.

It should be noted that the leaflets of the revolutionary circles in Nabulus also are not friendly to al-Husayni,

and include him with figures such as Abu-'Ayyash and Sari Nusaybah, for whom the intifadah sojourns in hotels.

The Inclusion of Frayj

The positive attitude to Jordan—not necessarily due to its special status in the Palestinian problem but due to its centrality in the “club of four”—is reflected in the inclusion of Frayj. The inclusion of Frayj has another important significance, which sheds light on the growing differences of opinion between Rabin and Shamir. As will be recalled, one of the surprises of Shamir's meetings with Palestinians in the territories was his avoiding a meeting with Frayj. Only now do sources close to the Prime Minister confirm the reason. The main idea of Shamir's talks was Likud's idea to establish the Palestinian state east of the river. One should know how to read Dov Goldstein's article in *MA'ARIV* (5 October 89), under the headline “Where will the Palestinian state arise,” where for the first time the Prime Minister's circles confirm what was published in *'AL-HAMISHMAR* immediately after the Shamir-al-Turayfi talks: that in these talks the establishment of the Palestinian state east of the Jordan was discussed.

According to the article, Shamir told his confidantes that it was the Palestinians who had raised the subject. But *'AL-HAMISHMAR* has learned that it was Shamir who hinted at the trend of his thinking when he said to them: “Husayn is tired and depressed. There is no future for the Jordanian monarchy.” The reason for the contradiction can be found in Goldstein. In Shamir's opinion, it is still forbidden to talk about it, and it is forbidden to reveal the fact that Shamir's real initiative is the establishment of the Palestinian state in Jordan. But the very publication of the things now is the first confirmation of what was asserted by *'AL-HAMISHMAR* immediately after the Shamir-al-Turayfi meeting.

The Likud and Labor Versions

Shamir now demands of Labor that it be patient until Husayn's regime falls. Is Labor willing to cooperate with him? Apparently not. When it was discerned in Labor that Shamir was refraining from meeting with Frayj, the Mayor of Bethlehem was invited for a talk with Minister Shahal, in order to calm Jordan. That is to say, the labor Party will not betray the years-long alliance with the Hashemites. Although Rabin vexed the Jordanians by switching Cairo for Amman as the axis of his Palestinian policy—this does not mean that Labor has adopted Likud's conceptions regarding “Jordan is Palestine.” Frayj went to Amman bearing his impressions of his talks with the leaders of Labor, which could be termed a “message” to Jordan, but not only to Jordan, but to the PLO, as well.

While Likud proposes to the PLO a Palestinian state in Jordan, Labor proposes to the PLO full autonomy in the territories within the framework of a tripartite confederation, which also takes Jordan into account. This is the

essence of Ze'ev Schiff's research for the Washington Institute for Middle East Policy, and the essence of a document that was transmitted to the PLO by the Americans, which is based on the same ideas, about which Schiff doesn't know.

Basic Differences in Approach

The inclusion of Frayj in the delegation reflects the desire of all the sides to go to the diplomatic process according to Labor's version, which leaves Jordan on its present basis, and not according to Likud's version, which would abolish Jordan and establish the Palestinian state in its place.

It is still difficult to see al-Husayni willing to sit in the same delegation with Frayj, and even with Sinyurah, and not because he has something personal against them, but because the composition of the delegation represents hidden differences of opinions and basic differences in approach within the PLO and within the entire inter-Arab system.

It may be assumed that the international understandings about the diplomatic process are what will determine for better or worse whether or not a Palestinian delegation will come into existence and what its composition will be—but an examination of the proposed lists allows us to understand the depth of the difficulties.

Instability Perceived in Fatah Camp

*90OL0124E Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 19 Oct 89 p 9*

[Article by 'Oded Zar'i: “A Fragile Diplomatic Arm”]

[Text] The heavy hand of the number two man in the PLO, Salah Khalaf (Abu-'Iyad), is still felt on the cheeks of the chairman's advisor, Basim Abu-Sharif. Two weeks ago in Tunis, Abu-'Iyad slapped Abu-Sharif's cheeks with his right hand, while cursing him with choice curses. “You'll travel to hell, and not to the conquered Jerusalem,” he said, in response to Abu-Sharif's declaration that he was willing to go to Jerusalem in order to speak with the Israelis.

Abu-Sharif swallowed the insult with a grimace, and satisfied himself by uttering weakly the word “scum.” Abu-'Iyad demanded explicitly from the chairman, Yasir 'Arafat, the immediate dismissal of Abu-Sharif. This demand came up again yesterday in Baghdad at the meeting of the PLO central council.

'Arafat, who, in the end, did not come to Cairo to meet with President Mubarak on the eve of the convening of the council, tried to clarify to his supporters that the time was not at all right for dealing with internal quarrels, and that the Fatah leadership had to unite in the face of internal opposition and opposition from the organizations of the front and the Communist Party in the PLO Higher Executive Committee.

The heads of the two organizations that are partners in the Fatah and constitute the PLO, the Popular Front, headed by Dr George Habash, and the Democratic Front, headed by Nayif Hawatimah, have announced their departure from "minimal consensus" with 'Arafat.

Dr Habash, on the eve of the convening of the council in Baghdad, called in Damascus for stopping all of 'Arafat's moves that do not conform to the partnership agreement in the PLO. The fourth, marginal partner in the PLO, Sulayman al-Najjab, who represents the Palestinian Communist Party, also sides with Dr Habash.

The situation within the leadership of the Fatah, which is 'Arafat's home organization and his main support, is far from stable. In recent days, Arab sources have revealed another bit of what transpired in the closed sessions of the last Fatah convention. It's becoming clearer and clearer that the deep differences of opinion that were revealed in those stormy sessions have not been resolved, but were instead deferred for the moment or papered over by 'Arafat.

These differences of opinion, which resurfaced yesterday at the PLO central council in Baghdad, concern not only the "diplomatic option," but also and mainly the future of the uprising, the dialogue with the United States, and relations with the Arab world.

'Arafat and his supporters repeatedly put forward the thesis that for the first time the Palestinians are successfully waging war against Israel "right at home," and are forcing it to give in to the diplomatic option. Only through this option is it possible to obtain "strategic balance, for when the Israeli long arm turns into a diplomatic arm, it will be possible to break it easily." Therefore, 'Arafat's men explain, the diplomatic tactic should be pursued "and the Israelis changed from militant creatures to diplomatic creatures."

The opponents no longer accept the explanations, and believe that 'Arafat and his followers have turned into "captives in the hands of the declaration of independence and the establishment of the State of Palestine on paper, and have forgotten the path of the struggle."

One of the members of the Fatah Revolutionary Council said that the change of 'Arafat's title from chairman (of the PLO Higher Executive Committee) to president (of the State of Palestine), have not in the slightest way changed the situation in the Middle East.

Prof Edward Sa'id, one of the two most senior academicians in the PLO, who is an American university lecturer of Palestinian origin and a member of the Palestinian National Council, has also joined the critics. He broke his silence for the first time through the Kuwaiti newspaper AL-QABAS, in the international edition that appears in London. Sa'id speaks not only in his behalf, but also in the name of the other senior academic member, Prof Ibrahim Abu-al-Lughod, who is not only a member of the Palestinian National Council, but also of

the Fatah Revolutionary Council. Sa'id and Abu-al-Lughod have been mentioned as the external candidates for the Palestinian delegation to the Cairo dialogue. According to him, the time has come for "internal criticism, for as one who has always been a partner in the Palestinian struggle, and as one who is an integral part of the PLO, I am very concerned for the fate of the uprising and the achievements that we have made due to it." He accuses the PLO of "neglect, failures, and corruption." In his opinion, there are today two main arenas in which the Palestinian issue will be decided: the arena of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the American arena.

As for the first arena, Professor Sa'id stresses his concern for the fate of the uprising, because, in the final analysis, the Palestinians are flesh and blood.

As for the second arena, which is today becoming the main arena, the PLO has demonstrated "ignorance." He presents the PLO handling of the American sphere as "groping among cronies for the spoils." He points with scorn to what is called in the PLO leadership the America committee, which is responsible for relations and for the handling of the American arena.

According to him, this committee, which has never met in Tunis, is composed of persons who have never seen the United States and who know nothing about American society. Every statesman in the world has a professional spokesman who guides him in his appearances in the American arena. Among us, he says, there is no such concept.

Professor Sa'id reveals that the heads of the PLO rely during their visits to the United States on assistance from elements connected with Israel, who argue that they support the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. He says that these elements work for the Israeli Labor Party in the United States. When he was asked to give an example, he noted the meetings in the United States of Yasir 'Abd-al-Rabbuh, a member of the PLO leadership and the head of the PLO delegation for dialogue with the United States, and the plan of his appearance before the Institute for Foreign Relations. According to him, all this was arranged by Drora Katz, who works for Aba Eban in the Israel Center for Peace in the Middle East. The appearance of 'Abd-al-Rabbuh before the Institute was cancelled at the last minute, and this was the reason for the anger of Sa'id, who places the blame on the incompetence of the PLO regarding the way it handles the American arena.

Palestinians Export Produce to Europe

*90OL0124C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
(Financial Supplement) in Hebrew 13 Oct 89 p 5*

[Article by Roni Shaked: "'Palestine Produce' Will Fly 'Blue and White'"]

[Text] Beginning in early November, once a week, an El Al cargo plane will make its way from Lod Airport to Marseille, Paris, and Rotterdam, carrying shipments of

vegetables from the occupied territories. The exports will be begin with a first shipment of 400 tons of vegetables: eggplant, peppers, zucchini, and cucumbers. The packaging will bear the legend "Produce of Jericho" in large letters. But in Europe, they will all already know that this should be read as "Produce of Palestine."

Even the intifadah has not interfered with this economic cooperation between Israel and the residents of the territories. Palestinian economists say that this is a model for the future cooperation between the Palestinian state, when it is established, and Israel. But beyond politics, the subject for both sides is business: The Palestinian farmer wants the European market and its possibilities, while El Al wants profits, and money, as is known, has no odor, even if it comes indirectly from the pockets of the PLO.

Immediately after the security checks are concluded, the lease contract for the plane will be signed by El Al and the agriculturists. The Palestinians' representatives already held meetings this week with the heads of El Al, and with personnel of the company's security department, and agreed on the manner of examining the produce, and on the security arrangements that will prevent, heaven forbid, the export of bombs instead of cucumbers.

The export contract was obtained by the heads of the agricultural societies in the territories, an institution considered to be the Ministry of Agriculture of the Palestinian state-in-the-making. The heads of the societies signed in Europe a contract for the export of 1,500 tons of vegetables, most of them from the Jericho region. The signing was done within the framework of the special agreement between the European Common Market and the State of Israel. The packaging, as was agreed in discussions between Israel and the institutions of the Common Market, will bear regional labels, without mention of the word "Israel."

"Large quantities are not yet involved," I was told by Khaled Al-Kutub, the secretary of the agricultural society. "We, the Palestinians in the territories, do not look at exports with a horizon of 1 or 2 years. We are looking to the distant future. Because, in the end, the European Common Market will be the market for our produce. And therefore, it is important to maintain and develop links with European buyers."

In the previous year, there was an attempt to export vegetables from the territories, mainly from the Jordan Valley. The attempt failed due to the use of surface shipping, and due to the lack of proper refrigeration. "We learned the mistakes. And the exports by air freight are part of the solution," says Al-Kutub.

The export of agricultural produce from the territories is more political than economic. The European Common Market, which politically supports the separation of the territories from Israel, is making its support concrete through economic measures in the field. Thus, the institutions of the Market appointed an export inspector,

whose role is to counsel the farmers in the territories in everything concerned with European standards, especially as regards packaging and marketing. The inspector, a citizen of France, comes every few months to the West Bank, advises and aids the agriculturists, and teaches them how to export.

The activities of the European Common Market on the subject of exports from the territories have been carried out in the last 1 and 1/2 years in full coordination with the institutions of the PLO, and according to priorities determined by the economic institutions of the organization. The PLO arrived at an agreement with the institutions of the Community, according to which any subsidy and any cooperation between the Community and elements in the territories will be done only with the approval of the PLO's representatives.

In coordination with the PLO, the institutions of the Common Market decided to give assistance to agriculturists and industrialists in the territories. To that end, the Common Market allocated \$2 million annually, to be given as grants and loans to agriculturists and owners of small businesses in the territories.

In order to institutionalize the transfer of the monies from the Common Market, two institutions were established in East Jerusalem: EDG (the Economic Development Group), a fund that engages in granting aid and loans to agriculturists, headed by the economist Ibrahim Matar from East Jerusalem; and the ADCC (the Arab Development and Loan Company), which makes grants and loans to small businesses, and is headed by the economist Hisham U'artani, of Al-Najah University in Nabulus.

The institutions of the European Community do not place economic hopes on business with the residents of the territories. Their investment is mainly political—aid for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories. It's hard for Israel to oppose this policy. For refusal is liable to bring about the suspension of the Community's contracts with Israel, and heavy economic losses.

Study Links Intifadah With Demographic Factors

*90OL0124D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 18 Oct 89 p 9*

[Article by Eliyahu Salpeter: "On Fertile Ground"]

[Text] The increase in the percentage of youths in the growing Palestinian population and the rise in their educational level in the '80's, while unemployment grew and the standard of living declined, were the background of the outbreak of the intifadah in 1987. This is asserted by Gad Gilber of the Dayan Center of Tel Aviv University in his study "Trends in the Demographic Development of the Palestinians, 1970-1987," which was published recently.

In the early 1980's, there was an increase in the growth of the population in the territories. This is striking and especially significant in the data on natural increase: In contrast to 2.2 percent-2.3 percent at the end of the '60's, natural increase rose to 3 percent and more in the '70's, and hit a peak in 1984—3.5 percent. In the Gaza Strip, the natural increase reached 4 percent in 1986. At the same time, the growth in GNP [gross national product] slowed greatly—from an average of 14 percent per annum in the first half of the 1970's to 7 percent in the second half of the decade.

“The average annual growth rate in the first half of the 1980's was 3.2 percent in Judaea and Samaria and 1.7 percent in the Gaza region....The result of such low growth rates in a period when the rates of increase of population rose was negative per capital growth rates.”

In the years 1981-85, in current dollars, per capital GNP declined in the West Bank from \$1,331 to \$1,215 (a decrease of 9 percent) and in the Gaza Strip from \$1,012 to \$855 (about 16 percent). From 1972-1984, the growth in per capital consumption in the territories had declined from 11 percent per annum to 1.8 percent. (In 1985-86, the growth in consumption turned upwards, but the rates were still only about one-third of the rates in 1972-73.)

These, then, are the demographic and economic components of the time bomb in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

At the same time, there was a considerable increase in the level of education of the population. In 1970, for the population aged 14 and over, the proportion of those with 9 or more years of education was 16 percent in the West Bank (for males, 23 percent) and 25 percent in the Gaza Strip (for males, 32 percent). In 1987, the proportion of those with 9 years of education was 38 percent in the West Bank (for males, 48 percent) and 49 percent in Gaza (for males, 54 percent). There was an even sharper increase in the proportion of those with 13 or more years of education. In 1970, the proportion was 1 percent in the West Bank and 0.5 percent in the Gaza Strip. In 1987—11 percent in the West Bank (for men, 14 percent) and 10 percent in the Gaza Strip (for men, 15 percent).

With the outbreak of the intifadah, there were about 44,000 persons with higher education in the 18-35 age group. “A considerable percentage of this age group was not employed during the '80's,” the study holds. Unemployment among educated persons in Judaea and Samaria and Gaza has grown a lot since then.

From the early stages of the intifadah, “the changes in the size of the young population and the growth of the

educated population were striking,” writes Gilber. “This holds for the three...main groups who are actually maintaining the uprising in the territories: in the leadership stratum (the unified national leadership), men in their late 20's and their 30's stand out...among them stand out the holders of undergraduate degrees in the social sciences and the humanities. They were trained, and some also were employed, as journalists and teachers. The lower leadership stratum...is also composed of young persons in their 20's and 30's, many of whom have secondary education and some of whom have high school and higher education. The third stratum, which comprises most of the ‘soldiers of the intifadah’...numbers tens of thousands of youths...between 16 and 34 years of age. In their educational level, they well represent the expansion of the educational system and the increase in the rates of participation in the period since the 6-Day War.

“Since 1967, this is the third group to lead the population. In the first years after the conquest, the traditional elite was still in place...at the head of the population. The municipal elections in 1976 allowed a younger generation from the class of upper middle class families to take over the leadership. In 1987-88, the youths...pushed out both groups of more veteran leadership. There is no doubt that the ability of this leadership to use successfully the generation of those in their teens and 20's is what allowed it to impose its will on the general population.”

The Palestinian population rose up twice in the last two generations, in 1936 and in 1987. There are important similarities between the two events, but there are also differences.

The central difference is “the ability of the group leading the uprising (the intifadah) to maintain its link in most of the fields linked to the struggle with Israel....Despite the deep divisions within the Palestinian camp outside the territories, the new leadership succeeded in imposing its will and preventing the outbreak of a severe internal struggle,” notes Gad Gilber.

The study refrains from expressing political opinions, but these may be inferred from its concluding section: “In both events, the revolt and the intifadah...the central authority did not act in the manner and with the force that would have moderated, let alone prevented, the creation of such strong economic and social pressures that led to a struggle against the government that had allowed the development of the pressures. This is especially striking with reference to the '80's, when the disturbance of the balance (between population and resources) was obvious a long time before the intifadah had become an inclusive and continuing phenomenon.”

ALGERIA

Members of FLN Central Committee

45000044E [Editorial Report] Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French on 15 December 1989 published the following list of National Liberation Front [FLN] Central Committee members on p 20:

Chadli Bendjedid, President du Front
Akhamokh Hadj Moussa
Ait-Messaoudene Saïd
Ait-Abdelmalek Ouameur
Ait-Ouazou Mohamed-Arezki
Arab Ahmed
Aoucherif Miloud
Amir Abdallah
Adjaoud Rachid
Bitat Rabah
Baki Boualem
Brahimi Abdelhamid
Brahimi Mohamed El-Mili
Bessaih Boualem
Belhouchet Abdallah
Belaid Abdessalam
Belayat Abderrahmane
Bouteflika Abdelaziz
Bouchaib Ahmed
Boumaza Bachir
Bouricha Mohamed
Boukhalfa Mohamed
Bouhadja Saïd
Bouhara Abderrezak
Boudina Mustapha
Benhamouda Boualem
Benzaza Mustapha
Benfreha Ahmed
Benmostefa Amar
Bendaoud Abdelkader
Benmohamed Ali
Bouguetaya Sadek
Belkhadem Abdelaziz
Bacha Abdelmalek
Bouguetaya Boualem
Belamane Ferhat dit Baghdadi
Belakhdar Tayeb
Belhadid Yahia
Bhoukerzaza Abderrachid
Belaid Abdelaziz
Benacer Abdallah
Belhadj Aïcha
Benali Yasmina
Boukaba Embarek
Bara Abderrahmane
Boussoussa Mahmoud
Boumahdi Ahmed
Boualag Mostefa
Bendouma Bouhni
Belbachir Hamida
Benabdelkrim Slimane
Boubakri Mohamed
Boucida Houes
Bouaza Belhabri

Boukofa Djib Abdelmadjid
Bouktef Mohamed Tahar
Bouhaddou Embarek
Benaouda Bakir
Bouhouche Abdelmadjid
Boukeriou Mohamed
Baghdadi Messaoud
Bencheikh El-Hachemi
Boulsane Abdallah
Benziada Tahar
Bouri Abderrezak
Bencherif Ahmed
Bradai Madani
Benmalek Abderrahmane
Benhoud Abdelkader
Bouchikhi Mehenni
Bounaadja Djelloul
Benomar Hadj-Mohamed
Beldjilali Ali
Bensafia Ameur
Benziza Omar
Belatar Abdessalam
Bouzeghti Mohamed
Benflis Ali
Bensafia Brahim
Belaroussi Lakhdar
Benbabouche Mahmoud
Benzina Bouhedjar
Brahimi Ahmed
Brahimi Abdelmalek
Tou Amar
Tikhmarine Lakhdar
Touati Tahar
Takida Khemis
Djeghaba Mohamed
Djenane Mohamed
Djellouli Nourredine
Djoghri Abdelaziz
Djaghroud Fatma-Zohra
Djouamaa Abdelaziz
Djezzar Mohamed
Hadjeres El-Hachemi
Hamrouche Mouloud
Hidouci Ghazi
Heraoubia Rachid
Habba El Okbi
Harnane Ibrahim
Hamrouche Saïd Hadj
Kouider Kouider
Hammani Mohamed Hadj
Ahmed Abdallah
Hmidaoui Mehdi
Hassani Slimane Mouloud
Khalef Abdallah dit Merbah

Kherroubi Mohamed-Cherif
Khakha Mohamed
Khodja Mostefa
Khadra Brahim Djelloul
Kheninef Miloud
Khoutri Mahmoud
Dellouci Boualem
Demagh El-Atrous Larbi
Dilmi Abbes
Daas Mohamed-Cherif
Deriche Ahmed Tidjani
Daadoua Layachi
Dahmane Ali
Dedjal Salah
Rekik Benaouda
Ramdane Mohamed Salah
Rouighi Mohamed
Ryahi Ali
Rahmania Youcef
Rebati Rachid
Ramdane Mohamed
Zebiri Tahar
Zaaf Mohamed
Zidouk Abdelkader
Zizeh Ahmed
Zehara Mohamed
Zehani Brahim
Saci Hocine
Saïdi Mohamed
Sebaa Ahmed
Souici Abdelkrim
Falleg Mohamed El-Hachemi
(Mohamed Salah)
Fassi Mabrouk
Fillali Mostefa
Fillali Mokhtar
Goudjil Salah
Gassa Aïssa
Guenifed Mohamed
Guïasse Ahmed
Gassi Ahmed
Gara Mohamed-Seghir
Guemama Mohamed
Guëssoum El-Mahi
Gassmi El-Aïch
Guitoun Ammar
Kehlouche Hassane
Kaouani Ammar
Keffous Ghalem
Kahlaoui Tayeb
Kabouya Abderrahmane
Karoumi Abdelkrim
Kermiche Mohamed
Ketfa Mohamed

Karm Zoubir
Karim Younes
Khediri El-Hadi
Labidi Bartal
Lakhdar Mohamed Lakhdar
Laadjal Amar
Loucif Salah
Lounis Ahmed
Labkiri Rachid
Lakhal Halima
Mehri Abdelhamid
Mazouzi Mustapha
Mohamed Ben-Ahmed Abdelghani
Messaadia Mohamed-Cherif
Malaika Djelloul
Mesbah Ibrahim
Mohammedi Mohamed-Salah
Mimouni Ali
Merzag Mokhtar
Manallah Cherif
Montassar Ounis
Mahiout Ahmed
Maatoug Abdelmadjid
Meftah Mohamed
Madjahed Mohamed
Malki Abdelkader
Messaoudi Ali
Madjahed Abdessalem
Mazouni Mohamed
Mechri Ahmed
Messeiria El-Amine
Mouayahia Moussa
Mouhoub Cherif
Merazi Bencheikh
Madoui Ali
Mechebek Abdelkader

Mellal Ahmed
Merkati Mohamed
Mekaoui Ahmed
Mokaddem Soleiman
Mamouni Ahmed
Menasri Hamida
Nait-Belkacem Mouloud-Kacem
Nabi Mohamed
Nemiche-Bakhti Djelloul
Nouaouria Abdallah
Nouai Abdelkader
Nadir Ahmed
Nadjem Aissa
Nedjadi Mohamed
Nahat Youcef
Naamane Ahmed
Helaili Mohamed-Seghir
El-Hachemi Seghir
Ould-Kada Lakhdar
Ould-Abbes Djamel
Ounes Belgacem
Ouali Mohamed
Yahiaoui Mohamed-Salah
Yazid Ahmed
Yaalaoui Youcef
Yakel Abdelkader
Sidi-Said Hamid
Sahli Abderrahmane
Cherid Ahmed El-Bahi
Cherchali Moussa
Chaibi Layachi
Chirouf Tahar
Chouchane Mohamed
Faradj Hocine
Chaa Aouad
Chiha Boubaker

Salhi Mohamed-Seghir
Souilah Boudjemaa
Sahraoui Bachir
Sabor Omar
Seddiki Tayeb
Seddiki Ali
Dhou Salah
Taleb Ahmed Ibrahim
Tiba Mohamed
Touahir Mohamed Abdelkader
Abada Mohamed
Ali-Ammar Mohamed
Amamra Badra
Ammar-Boudjellah Mekhlouf
Ainana Yahia
Alioua Mohamed
Abdesamed Ammar
Aouad Lakhdar
El-Aoufi Fatma-Zohra
El-Arbi Mohamed
Aouissi Said
Aichaoui Ammar
Abdaoui Aissa
Amiri Ahmed
Amrouche Ahmed
Amara Abdelkader
Aliouate Messaoud
Alouni Salim
Abadou Saïid
El-Aoufi Mohamed
Amamra Miloud
Ghozali Sid-Ahmed
Ghanem Khadi
Felioune Khadidja
Fadli Driss

**RCD Secretary General Comments on
Membership, FIS**

900A0175A Tunis LE MAGHREB
in French 17 Nov 89 pp 31-33

[Interview with Mustapha Bacha, interim secretary general and deputy leader of the RCD [Rally for Culture and Democracy], by Noura Borsali; date and place not given; first paragraph is comment by author]

[Text] "The Amazigh Berber Movement Is Organized," an article that appeared in the 16 November issue of LE MAGHREB, was an introduction to the following interview with Mustapha Bacha, interim secretary general of the "Rally for Culture and Democracy," the first Berber party to be legally established in Algeria. We had occasion to write it during our visit to Algiers at the beginning of October. This is a newly formed but powerful party in the Berber cultural movement. It is now represented in several provinces and is planning to hold its first congress in the near future.

[LE MAGHREB] What does the Algerian Berber community seek?

[Bacha] The Algerian Berber community wants to complete its status as citizens of Algeria. That involves reconciling Berber citizens of Algeria with themselves and the Berber community with itself. For a long time it was thought that, in view of the official definition of national identity, hiding the special characteristics of the Berber community would be a guarantee of the future. Now it has turned out that it is nothing of the kind. They have often told us that if we refer to the historical dimensions of the Berber community, this would create problems for national unity. Now, after the passage of so many years, we say that, on the contrary, it is the fact of our having hidden the historical dimensions of the Berber community that has created problems in terms of cohesion and national unity. On several occasions we have encountered difficulties for having done so.

[LE MAGHREB] However, in the new constitution of Algeria they continue to deny this historical dimension of the Berber community since in its provisions there is no reference to Berber culture or the Berber language.

[Bacha] Yes, but it must be admitted that in certain respects, as in the provisions concerning civil rights and

individual and collective rights, the new constitution covers many matters. The fact of the matter is that we exist as a community, thanks to this constitution. However, it should be pointed out that the constitution is as rigid as its 1976 predecessor, even in its preamble, regarding Berber identity. It continues to deny the specifically Berber character of our community, even in its linguistic aspect. It continues to recognize only Arabic as the national language. Now in Algeria we consider that there are two national languages: Arabic and Berber. Arabic is the official language. That is not the question. While the constitution goes on about certain aspects of society, such as the freedom to associate, to hold meetings, and to establish organizations, it is still rigid regarding the Berber question.

[LE MAGHREB] The RCD is in competition with the FFS [Front of Socialist Forces] under Ait Ahmed. It must be admitted that the FFS has provided the RCD with most of its leaders and also defends the Berber community. So what is it that really distinguishes the RCD from the FFS? Moreover, there is a Movement for Berber Culture (MCB), while a fringe group of supporters of Berber culture is opposed to any politicization of the Berber community and, therefore, has not joined the RCD.

[Bacha] Before answering your question I would like to clarify a few points. The FFS is a political organization like other, similar groups. Regarding your statement that most of the leaders of the RCD come from the FFS, you are mistaken. Personally, I myself am a member of the RCD from the extreme left and have never belonged to the FFS.

[LE MAGHREB] But Doctor Sadi was a member of the FFS!

[Bacha] At this point it is not particularly relevant whether Doctor Sadi was a member of the FFS and whether he left it for a number of reasons that he himself could explain.

I think that it is a mistake to say that the FFS provided most of the RCD's leaders. Other people will tell us that the FFS still exists because of its members who left it in 1982.

Regarding the MCB, when you speak of it or the RCD or the FFS, that presupposes the existence of a well-defined organization, program, and responsibilities. The MCB is the Berber Cultural Movement, which was established many years ago on the basis of an idea and not just since the 1980's. You can go back as far as the demands in support of the recognition of a specific Berber identity. It was Algerian citizens as a group who took those demands seriously. If they had not done so, there would never have been a specific program or a specific structure when you speak of the initials of the MCB.

Regarding your statement that the majority in the Berber movement is opposed to any kind of politicization, I think that a substantial number are to be found in the

RCD, which is also an outgrowth of the Berber Cultural Movement. The majority of the RCD leaders were active in getting the Berber Cultural Movement started. Even those who have described the situation in terms of a conflict between the RCD and the MCB are now changing their positions on this question, which came up in a specific context. Today and for more than 1 year, a certain number of members consider that the Berber Cultural Movement can no longer continue to function on a single basis. Berber identity exists in the framework of the struggle for democracy. And this is an eminently political question. How could you oppose an article of the constitution and say that you are not engaged in politics? That is nonsense. To say that Berber must be recognized as a national language involves attacking a provision of the constitution.

If this comment on the structure of things developed in 1988-89, it is because political conditions are hopeful now. Therefore, we say that the Berber question will find a solution in the struggle for democracy.

[LE MAGHREB] Are you optimistic about the present political situation in Algeria?

[Bacha] Very much so. Although our experience is fragmentary, nevertheless we consider that democracy is not just the only way to solve our problems but also is the basis for development that looks at mankind as its final purpose.

[LE MAGHREB] Is there not a risk that your movement will be limited to only a few regions of the country, such as Algiers, Kabylia, etc?

[Bacha] I do not think so for the simple reason that it has already spread throughout the country. At present we have branches in 39 provinces throughout the country. I can tell you that there are as many Arab speakers as there are Berber speakers in the RCD. We expect to begin the First Congress of the RCD, which will be held on 15-16 December, with representatives from all 48 provinces, not counting Algerians living overseas. We have branches in France, Canada, and in the Federal Republic of Germany.

[LE MAGHREB] You have spoken in favor of a secular state in Algeria. Do you think that this is possible in a Muslim country where the fundamentalist Islamic movement is so strong?

[Bacha] It was the FLN [National Liberation Front] that invented the expression, "Islam, the state religion." The concept of a secular state, meaning the separation of political and religious power, has always been the practice and the rule, not only in Algeria but in all the countries of the Maghreb. In reality, religion is not a secular force. You can go into any area of Algeria and you will see that the sheikhs and the imams of the various mosques are prohibited from becoming involved in public affairs. The religious leader or the sheikh has moral authority that does not involve the management of public affairs. The sheikh and the administration

represent two different kinds of authority. It is said that the concept of a secular state amounts to atheism. No, it is the separation of political and religious affairs. It amounts to freedom of conscience and the right to practice one's religion. And we say that this form of secular state will be established in cooperation with Muslims and not in opposition to them. Even when they talk about Islam as a state religion, in fact it is the Malekite rite that is dominant in Algeria. You have other rites that are not officially recognized: for example, the Zibadite rite and the Shi'ites who are not, in fact, very conspicuous. A secular state, therefore, would involve the recognition of all of these rites.

Since 1962 "Islam, the state religion" has been proclaimed to prevent any possibility of Islam being used by extremist groups. This has not prevented these groups from developing. And religion, because it is a part of the state, has been associated with all of the arbitrary, repressive measures that have been adopted. We have seen all kinds of things done in the name of Islam: they have burned the Koran, the national emblem. We say that a secular state would be of greater value to Islam than the concept of "Islam, the state religion."

In fact, religious practice in the Maghreb has always been rather tolerant in manner. This is what is called the Maghrebian practice of combining different religious beliefs.

[LE MAGHREB] What relationship do you expect to have with the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front]?

[Bacha] From the moment when the conditions for the exercise of democracy are respected by everyone we can only respect all political groups. We are absolutely determined regarding the use of violence. We condemn it, whatever its source.

[LE MAGHREB] Have you had to confront Islamic fundamentalists in some areas?

[Bacha] Confrontations with Islamic fundamentalists did not begin yesterday. They began before the RCD was established. For example, I would mention the events at the Ben Aknoun University Residence (in Algiers) on 2 November 1982. Kamel Amzal, a young, second-year student, was killed in the name of Islam by the fundamentalists for having dared to put up a poster calling on his fellow students to attend a meeting to prepare for the democratic election of the Ben Aknoun University Residence Committee.

Elsewhere, during the summer of 1989, an atmosphere of intolerance grew, particularly in the cities along the coast. After having terrorized summer visitors in Dely and Algiers, they said that they would "do the same thing" in Tizzirt on 4 August. In response to an appeal by local sections of the RCD, a meeting "to encourage tolerance, human rights, and democracy" was held on 3 August in the city stadium. Among other things, the speakers at this meeting called on the people to join together in defending the public parks of the city. On 4

August a number of "barbarians" arrived in the city. When they saw that neither their threats nor their presence had any effect on the habits of the summer visitors and in view of the determination of the young people not to let themselves be intimidated, they left the area after Friday prayers. There were no incidents.

And then it should be recalled that during the week following the establishment of the RCD the preachers in the mosques in Bab-el-Oued and El Biar expressed views unworthy of a place of worship. It was said that those participating in meetings of our movement were drunk and engaged in an orgy when the session ended. It was said that they ate a barbecued pig. Other mosques took up the same theme. In Oran, a veritable incitement to murder was issued on the feast of Id-ul-Fitri. We think that there is no reason for panic or for dramatizing the situation. The public authorities must apply the law whenever necessary.

[LE MAGHREB] The PAGS [Socialist Vanguard Party] (formerly the PCA) [Algerian Communist Party] is calling for the establishment of a united front. Would you participate in it? And what substance and form would you favor giving it?

[Bacha] The problem is not so much a matter of finding a structural form.

We say that right now we seek the broadest possible national consensus around a democratic constitution and with regard to current questions. Nevertheless, we should wait and see what proposals are made by various groups regarding democracy. Meanwhile, we support the PAGS proposal.

It should be recalled that in June 1989 a committee to promote interparty solidarity was set up, with six parties participating. However, some of these parties have left the committee, and this effort was, therefore, premature.

Berber Civilization and the Muslim World

The Arab conquest and the conversion of the Berbers to Islam had a long-term, decisive effect on their historical destiny. This conversion is only known from Arab traditions. However, it has been determined that Islam did not triumph definitively until the 12th century. The spirit of independence, the tendency toward extremism, and the puritanism often attributed to the Berbers explain why at times they opposed Arab domination and Islamic orthodoxy, adopted egalitarian Kharijite and Shi'ite doctrines, and fought against their Middle Eastern masters. However, this did not prevent either Islamization or Arabization among the Berbers. After the 12th century the Berber community became Middle Eastern in outlook.

The first, reliable classification of Berber tribes, valid for the second half of the 14th century, was prepared by Ibn Khaldoun, the Arab historian. In the East were situated the Lowata tribe in Cyrenaica, Tripoli, Djerid, and the Aures Mountains. In the West were the Branes and

Zenata tribes. The latter, who were great, conquering nomads who came to North Africa at the end of the Byzantine period, were the first to be Arabized. The Branes tribe, known by the name of Imazighen (free men), was reportedly the oldest Berber group. In the 14th century they included the Macmouda, who practiced sedentary agriculture in the Middle and High Atlas regions, and the Sanhaja (also known as Iznagan). The Sanhaja were divided between those settled in one place (the Qotama in the Kabylia area and the Ghomara in the Rif Mountains) and wide-ranging nomads in the Western Sahara region (the Lemta, the Lemtouna, and the Gouzoula).

This situation and this classification did not last for a long time. Arab immigration and the "Hilali invasions" strengthened the Arabization of the Berber tribes, at least in settled areas. The majority of the Berbers gave up their former names to attach themselves to a more prestigious Arab clan. However, other tribes, generally those living in the mountains, such as those in the Aures Mountains of Greater Kabylia, in the Rif and Atlas Mountains, although Muslims and reconverted to Islam on several occasions by Marabout hermits, kept their language and their customs.

In particular, it was their observation of these customs that made it possible to identify the origins of the Berbers. Berber origins were indicated essentially by the existence of customary law and a non-Koranic, judicial system. The two characteristics of Berber law included a collective oath as evidence and regulations and schedules of penalties, known as the "Iqanun." Justice was provided either by judges acting as referees or by village assemblies. However, Berber custom was not a purely secular form of law and was not in conflict with Koranic law.

For a long time it was customary to distinguish Berber traditions from the practices of Arabs of the Maghreb. Now the common features of both traditions appear to be at least as important. Social organization based on blood relationships, real or fictitious, the practice of collective labor on local public-works projects, and the use of community grain storehouses, in fact, are to be found among both Berbers and Arabs.

Politically, on several occasions the Berbers established independent states (for example, the kingdoms of Tlemcen, the Aghlabide kingdom of Kairouan, the Merinide Kingdom of Fes, etc). They even set up large, extensive empires covering all or part of the Maghreb (for example, the empires of the Almoravides and the Almohades). They had various kinds of political organization (for example, aristocratic, theocratic, and monarchical). They were not limited to the allegedly democratic system of the jama'a [community] which, according to some authors, characterized them. The jama'a assemblies appointed by clans or coiff in reality were a narrow oligarchy of elders, governing in the name of tradition.

(Extract from "The Berbers," an article in the "Encyclopedia Universalis," p 171)

Fourth Issue of EL-MOUNKID Appears

90OA0219B Algiers EL MOUDJAHID
in French 10 Nov 89 p 24

[Article: "Publication of EL-MOUNKID No 4"]

[Text] The fourth issue dated 16 November 1989, of EL-MOUNKID, the voice of the Islamic Front for Salvation, deals with a number of themes, in particular: "Believers Are Brothers," "The Seism of 29 October," "Liberation of a Few Prisoners," "Open Letter to the Head of the Government" (from six workers), "Carelessness in the Health Care Sector," "Foundation of Power in Islam," "Goals of the Islamic Party and Principles of Political Activity," "Pieds-noirs [Algerian-born Frenchmen] in the Country of the Martyrs," "The Islamic Soul of Revolution," and "Our TV and the Policy of Mind Alienation."

Increased Fiscal Authority for Local Communities

90OA0219A Algiers EL MOUDJAHID
in French 12 Dec 89 p 2

[Article by M. Semghouni: "Local Communities, Tomorrow"]

[Text] What will local communities be tomorrow? What responsibilities and prerogatives will they have? What planning should we recommend? Based on what?

To answer all these questions, we must review current data; this was the theme of a meeting held yesterday in Djelfa, and attended also by the governorates of Laghouat, Tissemsilt, Medea, M'Sila, and Tiaret.

The chairman was the minister delegate to local communities. Right from the start, Mr Henni set the tone. He introduced a new way of speaking, plain speech without flourishes of style. In a whirl of figures supported by a few brief comments the minister delegate to local communities told a few plain truths on the problems that face the country and on prevailing social and economic conditions.

The unofficial market, which has increased in scope in recent months and is practically getting the upper hand over the official economy, is draining about 40 billion Algerian dinars, an astronomical amount that evades taxes. Meanwhile, the country is struggling in an attempt to face the need to repay 70 percent of its foreign debt within the next 3 years. The problem of education and vocational training was also considered as well as the inadequacy of that sector, despite the fact that it has a budget of 20 billion dinars per year.

Some institutions were also declared practically ineffective, because they lack cadres. For instance, of the 600 employees of ONAMO [National Algerian Manpower

Bureau], only 5 cadres had college-level education. The same is true of the financial sector, where there are only 500 college graduates.

Speaking about housing, the minister had some frightening news: within the next 12 years, we must build over 3 million housing units, i.e., about as many as exist now. That means a new Algeria. In this respect, the OPGI will be converted into a local real estate company building low-cost housing under contract. As is known, the OPGI currently owes 4 billion dinars to the Treasury.

Concerning the problem of agriculture and water supply, these two sectors will be given practically unrestricted access to all the available financial resources required for their development.

The problem with the various offices existing in the agricultural sector is that currently they distribute wages, while in the future they will be involved in all investments concerning the sector.

In the future, local communities will be given a lot more responsibilities. They will have to fit their budgets to local resources, in particular, taxes. However, the State will still be there to ensure inter-regional solidarity. The goal is to prevent low-income communities from being penalized and larger, economically developed towns from being privileged. In addition, in order to enable local communities to cope with new operating, planning, and management methods, they will get many cadres, from 15 to 20 thousand. Note that in the next development plan, over 25 percent of the budget will be allocated to housing.

In 1990, a transition year, housing construction will be financed by the Savings Fund pending the creation of the Housing Financing Fund.

It was to reflect on all these problems that the six governorates met yesterday afternoon in a working committee. A second committee was created to work at implementing the reforms.

Governorate reports, notably for Tiaret, point to the underutilization of investments, in particular the airport, built at a cost of 38 billion dinars. Also, in the southern part of the governorate, there is an overutilization of driving terrains, which are not protected. Laghouat reported a delay in the construction of school facilities. M'Sila stressed the skimpiness of its local resources. Tissemsilt stood out with an unemployment rate of 31 percent, the national record. Medea complained about the lack of real estate promotion and of a household gas distribution network (except at Berrouanahia, the governorate seat). Djelfa, where the meeting was held, mentioned the shrinking of grazing lands, due to desertification.

This meeting, which will end Wednesday, will make it possible to identify the problems of all these regions and to find the required solutions in the future.

Family Code Failings Criticized by LADH President

90OA0219F Algiers EL MOUDJAHID
in French 15-16 Dec 89 p 5

[Article: "FIS [Islamic Front for Salvation] Members: 'Islam Preaches Tolerance'"]

[Text] Maître Ali Yahia Abdenour, chairman of the Algerian League of Human Rights [LADH], stressed that "the State is responsible for the security and safety of all citizens" and emphasized "respect for others." He also offered to the APN [People's National Assembly] a solution concerning the family code which, he said, is "unconstitutional." After hearing the delegation, Mr Bakhti Nemiche stated, among other things, that the APN is not responsible for ensuring the security of citizens, as that is the State's responsibility.

"We, too, have wives and daughters; we know what is going on in schools and lycees; we can only transmit your concerns to the authorities. We do not have Solomon's ring. We have only just started reforms and some laws that were drafted before the Constitution was adopted may be revised," he added.

An RAIS [expansion unknown] manifesto bearing hundreds of signatures, and several other documents were handed over to Mr Nemiche.

At the end of the meeting, small groups gathered and lively discussions took place between participants to the rally and FIS members who had come to explain that "Islam preaches tolerance and that violence is used only by a few extremists."

L'UNITE Journalists Affirm Commitment to Union

90OA0219C Algiers EL MOUDJAHID
in French 16 Nov 89 p 24

[Article: "Creation of Union of UNITE Journalists"]

[Text] On Monday 13 November, L'UNITE journalists held a general assembly at the magazine's headquarters to discuss the organic prospects of the profession. The meeting was marked by a democratic in-depth debate encompassing many questions of an organic and union-related nature. The participants also raised the question of relations between L'UNITE journalists and journalists of the news media.

They affirmed their conviction that only an organic structure emanating from the rank and file and independent from any supervision could reflect the professional and social concerns of journalists. After a broad debate, the journalists called for a vote to approve the creation of a democratic union of Algerian journalists. As a result, the L'UNITE local was installed after representatives had been elected in the most democratic manner.

It was noted that Channel-1 journalists had elected their local on 18 October, and that TV journalists had published a communique on Monday, announcing the creation of "a TV journalists union." Other news media will soon do the same in preparation for the Conference of Algerian Journalists, which will consist of representatives issued from the rank and file.

L'UNITE journalists expressed their wish for unifying work that will bring together journalists representing all points of view.

EGYPT

Planning Official Urges Involving Unions in Problem-Solving

90OA0187A Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH
in Arabic 4 Dec 89 p 5

[Article by Accountant 'Abd-al-Mun'im Yunis, chairman of the Planning and Budget Committee in the Local People's Council]

[Text] The existence of a union (professional and labor) organization in our country is doubtlessly deserving of appreciation and pride, because it affirms the democracy which we experience in our country. Accordingly, I believe that this organization has a very great role in the economic circumstances through which our country is passing, especially since no citizen in our country is not a member of one of these professional and labor unions. These unions can play a very great role in the following manner: We begin with the cohesion of its broad base of members. This [could be used] through projects presented to members according to a general national plan, so that this base could help to solve many problems which the government cannot address, given the economic circumstances which our country is experiencing. Among these projects: Housing.

For example, why could the unions not be responsible for creating suitable housing for citizens? Each union could plan and establish the necessary terms compatible with its members' circumstances and material capabilities to secure suitable housing. Also, why could the unions not be tasked with creating suitable work for their members? The unions could perform an internal and external labor market study [to determine vacant positions], and they could conduct the necessary training and courses to qualify their members for these positions.

They could also establish new projects and create employment opportunities for their members. There are many problems which the unions can help solve with praiseworthy efforts, such as efforts to limit waste in all of its different forms (energy, electricity, water, and the outer trappings of celebrations and funeral ceremonies). The unions also have a vital role in affirming and resuscitating several standards which we have lost, such as friendship and sincerity in work, self-sacrifice in

servicing the common good, distancing oneself from individualism, egotism, and self-love, and promoting the slogan Egypt first.

The unions can make help confront many problems impeding economic development in our country, especially since they are specialized and can contribute with opinions, debate, and advice regarding these problems so that we can make a carefully studied decision, which is considered the foundation of stability and economic progress. A sound decision is one of the pillars of economic development, which all are pursuing so that we can emerge from our economic crisis. The unions must help in enhancing their members' competence through periodic meetings between members to exchange experiences. Enhancing the competence of union members is in itself a way to enhance the competence of a large slice of the labor and productive power in our country. This will help to develop production and enhance this development mode. The unions could also play an efficient role in controlling the market and expelling from it merchants who are greedy, monopolistic, and exploitative of the people's food. They could do so by agreeing among themselves to boycott such merchants and others who damage our country's economy. In this regard, the unions could also issue publications for distribution to their members, with the aim of restoring market discipline, which expresses the characteristics of development in our current phase.

Opposition Front Committee Forms in al-Mahallah al-Kubra

90OA0098B Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 25 Oct 89 p 7

[Text] The permanent committee of opposition parties and nationalist forces was formed in the city and center of al-Mahallah al-Kubra during its founding meeting last Thursday, which was held at the headquarters of the Labor Party in al-Mahallah. It was attended by the following people: from the NPUG [National Progressive Unionist Grouping]; Muhammad al-Kahlawi, assistant secretary of al-Gharbiyah and member of the central committee, and Hamdi Husayn, the liaison officer between the party and the masses; and from the Labor Party: Naji al-Shahabi, member of the executive committee, and members of the steering committee of the Labor Party in al-Mahallah. It was also attended by a representative of the Nasirite Arab Socialist Party, attorney Jamal 'Abd-al-Hafiz, and it was also attended in a personal capacity by Hasan al-Ghanimi, head of the teachers' union in al-Mahallah and a member of the local council. The members of the committee agreed that its program would be to defend the interests and gains of the masses of al-Mahallah, to defend freedoms, and to combat the problems and afflictions of the masses which have resulted from the policies of the ruling establishment. An invitation was sent to the Wafd Party and the independent Marxists in al-Mahallah, and a meeting and a working symposium will be held tomorrow, Thursday, at the headquarters of the Labor Party in al-Mahallah at 7 o'clock in the evening.

Protesting al-Nubariyah Farmers Confront Security Forces

90QA0131A Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 15 Nov 89 p 10

[Article by Ashraf Khalil]

[Excerpts] Events moved quickly this week, and the problem of the squatters on 4,000 feddans in the region of western Nubariyah (branch 17 on the left side of al-Nasr Canal, between stations 4 and 5) came to a head. AL-SHA'B published the details of this problem in its last issue.

Last Thursday, 9 November, more than 600 individuals (including women and children) announced that they would stand fast, while 32 others (including 7 women) resolved to go on a hunger strike until the officials came and set down a comprehensive and just solution to the problem. Those holding out also issued a statement which was distributed to the newspapers and news agencies, in which they affirmed that "they have no life away from the land on which they have suffered much during 10 years of struggle, and they all refused to be the scapegoat for the failure of the minister's policies in settling the desert."

Death Before Eviction

AL-SHA'B has been with the resistance since the first moment when the strikers and those holding out gathered together in the early morning and spread themselves out on the ground in silence, listening to the Holy Koran, while the women sat weeping, refusing food, and seeming to be as attached to the land as they are to their honor.

All were convinced that the government wanted to destroy the land, "so let it destroy us with it, if not before." Nothing broke the silence except the performance of prayers, which had been preceded by ablutions with sand because there was no water. On the good, pure earth without prayer mats their kneeling and prostrations and supplications were to the One Almighty God, as they committed their problem to Him.

This resistance comes as a reaction to the events of Bloody Sunday, in which the forces of evil formed an alliance against the supposedly weak land reclaimers in order to carry out the wishes of Yusuf Wali. Security legions moved quickly with machineguns fully loaded and ready, accompanied by the water police with their equipment and the al-Buhayrah Corporation, and they surprised the peaceful people. Machines did away with all the irrigation sluices on the al-Nasr Canal which are depended upon for the irrigation of the land, and the four canals which the squatters had dug through their own hard labor (at a cost of a quarter of a million pounds) were filled in. The attack seized 63 irrigation machines (each one costing 3,000 pounds) and 10 pumps, and three homes were done away with, including a home where a woman who had given birth only a week earlier was lying.

A number of men (including a 8-year-old child) were arrested, and they were detained at the al-'Amiriyah police station for 48 hours until the force had finished its work. No charges were brought against the detainees. The women were not spared beatings and insults; four ladies were injured (the wife and daughter of Muhammad Hasan, the wife of Fathi 'Abdallah, and the wife of 'Abdallah Mihni), and the people were not able to make a report to prove these injuries.

To start with, one of the squatters mentioned that on Saturday evening a worker in the al-Buhayrah Corporation (which is the company allotted the land and waiting for it to be delivered), had assured him that equipment, excavators, and bulldozers were all poised to carry out the removal at dawn the next morning. [passage omitted]

A Slow Death

Muhammad 'Ali, who is known as Hajj Sayyid, said: "The force which came last Sunday concentrated all of its attention on the sluices and the canals so as to kill us slowly. This is the first phase in implementing the decision to remove all the farms and homes in the region." Hajj Sayyid added: "I have a farm for crops and fattening sheep, with 500 head. The machines came and blocked four springs that I have on the farm, and they demolished the reservoirs and broke the pipes. It's war in every sense of the word, a day that our grandchildren will not forget. Losses in excess of half a million pounds, and for what? Here I used to buy wheat at 40 pounds from the farmers here, while the government itself was selling it at 50 pounds, which means that we here supply the production and fight high prices."

It's No Use

Ibrahim Samahah said: "When the force came to me and destroyed the water reservoir, they asked me about the machine. I said, 'It's in the house.' They went inside and got the machine, and they did away with the room it had been in. They wanted to completely remove the house, but the senior officer refused, and he told the company engineer: 'We don't have an order to remove the houses, the time hasn't come yet, but hopefully next week the houses will come down on those who are in them!' I told them, 'Hey, fellows, don't do that. I'm willing to do whatever the government decides for me, but you've all seen with your own eyes the good tomatoes and corn which I have planted.' But it's no use talking to them." [passage omitted]

They Beat Women

At the home of 'Abdallah Mihni, where the force stormed into the women's quarters while the men were away, we saw the marks of the attack, for the door was broken and so was the window, because one of the vandals had entered through it, and because the women had not opened the door right away. Their lot was to be beaten and cursed, and the arm of 'Abdallah Mihni's wife was broken, while one of the officers dragged Fathi 'Abdallah's wife to the ground by her hair, and she was

also struck on the head by one of the attackers, causing blood to flow. At the home of Muhammad Hasan they broke the machine, and when his wife objected and asked the officer as they do in Egyptian serials, "Do you have permission to search?" he beat her and her daughter on all parts of their bodies and cursed her with words punishable by law (but those officers are above the law!)

We had to go to the al-Buhayrah Corporation because from its point of view the squatters are to blame for everything that happened to them, and it is also waiting to take possession the land. There we met with Engineer Muhammad Hamzah, who is in charge of the implementation of the project. He explained to us that this land of 4,000 feddans had been allotted by decree No. 710 of 1989 on 1 June 1989. "We began work on the location on June 29 to reclaim the land and build 580 homes, which were to be turned over to graduates on 1 November 1989." (That deadline has now passed).

No comment: in less than 4 months, the company was to reclaim 4,000 feddans and build 580 homes!

Engineer Muhammad continued: "When we came here we were surprised to find those citizens, who persisted in harassing us. We returned to the authorities, who told us that those people had taken over the land without a legitimate claim and that they have no legal deed. Because the authorities recognized the great efforts that they had made, it decided to give them an alternate piece of land in region number 20, where 6,550 feddans had been allotted to our company in decree number 1108 of 1989, dated 24 September 1989. When the committee came down on 1 October 1989 to inspect the situation and explain things to the people, members of the committee were attacked, and the engineer in charge was injured in the attack!

"So we took the issue to the minister, who decreed on 3 October 1989 that those people be forcibly expelled, but the decree has not been implemented yet. But the Ministry of Irrigation is responsible for what happened last Sunday, since the sluices which those people had installed on al-Nasr Canal were removed. Their act threatens to destroy this canal because they misuse it and take extravagant amounts for irrigation, all that at the expense of the state's plan and other lands to which the water does not reach. As for us, we have not yet cleared a single foot of ground, and we are still offering them the alternate land." We asked why the company does not go and reclaim in branch 20 and leave those people alone, but we have received no answer or comment.

The Eviction Is To Protect al-Nasr Canal

In the Directorate of Irrigation in al-'Amiriyah we met with the general manager, Engineer Mina Iskandar, who informed us that al-Nasr Canal had been implemented in the sixties according the state's plan, which intends to extend it to 180 km (it is now only 80 km long). It was designed to be used for drip irrigation and modern sprinkling methods which would save 75 percent of the

water used to irrigate one feddan. This canal has been designated to irrigate 360,000 feddans according to the state's plan and law 12 of 1989, paragraph 64. So any citizen who encroaches on this canal (that is, steals water from it) must be brought to account, the sluice that he installed must be destroyed, and his irrigation machine taken and held as security until the violator appears and pays the fine and cost of removal. That is exactly what happened on Sunday, 5 November 1989, in the region of the left bank of al-Nasr Canal, between stations 4 and 5. "I asked: "Why is the removal being done now, when those people have been there for 10 years? And where were you when they dug 4 canals 3 km long?"

The responsible engineer replied: "It is my job to yell about it and issue the removal notice, but security is the one that is dragging its feet and putting off carrying it out, so it is responsible for the terrible situation those people are in." Then he added that the method of irrigation followed by those people threatens to destroy the canal. "Should we stand by helplessly in the face of their defiance, not to mention the extravagant amounts that the violator uses to irrigate his land at the expense of the graduates and at the expense of the state's plan?" [passage omitted].

Merchants Complaint Commodity Quotas Favor Tourist Stores

090A1022A Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH
in Arabic 11 Nov 89 p 4

[Article by Isma'il Badr]

[Text] Tourist stores and markets have regularly been monopolizing weekly commodity quotas. Meanwhile, popular cooperative food stores are suffering from irregular commodity deliveries. These stores sometime have to wait 3 months before the goods arrive.

Experts have confirmed that a tourist store's weekly consumption is equal to that of 10 cooperative food stores in the popular areas.

In al-Shaykh store in al-Tur'ah district, Muhammad Kamal Fudah, the store director, said that the store had only a few grocery items such as jams, juices, and processed meat. It has received no subsidized commodities in about 3 months. In particular it does not have subsidized chicken and frozen fish. Subsidized chicken is sold for 2.40 pounds [per kilogram] while the price of chicken sold at the store is 3.60 pounds.

As for subsidized fish, which is sold for 75 piasters, the company has for a long time received none.

Furthermore, the store is also out of subsidized rice, sugar, or oil that are sold at 80 piasters [per kilogram], or flour and eggs. All these commodities are found in the tourist markets.

He added: "We have not received any of these commodities since the company expanded and developed into a supermarket that is now being opened."

Tourist markets opened by cooperative companies obtain the lion's share, while food stores in popular areas have become empty and contain nothing worth mentioning.

Speaking in front of the store, Haydi Kamil, a school teacher in Shubra district, said that she found no goods to buy other than white cheese. She bought one kilogram of white cheese for 2.60 pounds. She said that she and her family are forced to stand in line before supermarkets in other areas in order to buy chicken, fish, and rice.

At Khulusi supermarket, which was opened recently, we found people waiting in line for the arrival of subsidized eggs that are sold for 9 piasters per each. Eggs are delivered once a week on Tuesdays, lines for chicken occur every Wednesday, and lines for good quality meat that is sold at 6.50 pounds per kilogram is on Thursday and Friday. The distance between the supermarket and the al-Shaykh cooperative food store is only 500 meters.

Rice, sugar, flour, and oil are available once a month at least. People stand in long lines for these commodities.

In al-Burj outlet in Shubra, Faruq Mustafa, the cooperative store director, said that there are several popular food stores in Shubra that are better off closed or turned into supermarkets. It is better than letting us sit in the sun because goods are not available. The most important of these stores are al-Faramawi, al-Bal'athini, Tussun, Misarrah, al-Tawfiqiyah, al-Shakykh, al-Awqaf, al-Khazindarah, al-Azhar, and al-Afdal. All these have no subsidized food commodities, such as rice, oil, sugar, good quality meat, chicken, or flour. He added: "We used to sell all these commodities prior to the tourist market expansion. Now, after tourist markets have been opened, we only hear about these commodities."

He said that in 4 months the cooperative food store received no sugar, rice, oil, flour, or frozen fish that is sold at 75 piasters per kilogram. As for chicken, they arrive once a month and are sold at 3.60 pounds, as in the supermarket.

We did not see a single customer at the food store wanting to buy any goods. What we found was a number of people from the General Administration for "follow-up" at the al-Nil Company. They refused to give their full names. One of them was named Hamid. We understood from the outlet director that he is a director general at the administration. His colleague was named Yusri. They were on a surprise visit to the store.

Yusri, the "follow-up" administration representative, said that the company's present plan is to reduce by 75 percent all strategic commodities quotas to the new tourist markets set up by the company. These include rice, sugar, oil, flour, good quality meat, chicken, and fish. The company is in the process of turning its cooperative food stores into supermarkets.

He added: "The system of sale in the supermarket is that of loading; that is, a tin of Nesto cheese is sold with a tray of eggs which is sold for 2.70 per tray. Thus subsidy goes to the tourist market consumer."

'Azizah Husayn, a housewife from Shubra, said that every Tuesday morning she comes to stand in line in order to buy a tray of eggs from Khulusi supermarket—that is if her turn comes. She believes that eggs should be sold in accordance with the ration cards at the grocer shop. The price of an egg is 17.5 piasters, against 9 piasters in the popular cooperative stores. Cooperative food stores have no commodities. People daily stand in line at the tourist markets where the company offers all sorts of commodities while popular food stores are left without any commodities.

'Azizah Husayn added: "Subsidized commodities go to the supermarkets while the popular food stores sell only jams, juices, and pasta. It is as if this is their specialty."

Also, when subsidized eggs arrive at the supermarket two cans of Nesto cheese at 2 pounds each and two cans of chicken soup or a large olive can are loaded on the eggs.

She added: "There are also the middle women who know how to obtain commodities from the supermarkets in devious ways and in an illegal manner. We would see a woman emerging from the food store carrying a whole carton of eggs containing 30 trays while we stand in line in order to obtain a single tray."

In one of the new tourist stores opened about 3 months ago we found all kinds of food commodities, including all kinds of dairy products, meat, chicken, fish, canned food, vegetables, fruits and even pickles.

'Azizah Husayn added that she bought dressed fish for 4.85 [per kilogram], local meat for 6.50 pounds, ground meat for 2.90 for a half a kilogram tray. She also bought a 2-kilogram can of white cheese for 7 pounds, 750-gram packets of excellent white flour at 30 piasters per kilogram, and unrationed sugar for 90 piasters per kilogram.

Inside Lapaz Supermarket in Qasr al-Nil, which belongs to al-Nil Company for cooperative food stores in all the districts, we found ducks sold for 8.10 pounds per kilogram, rabbits for 8.75 pounds, shrimps for 7 pounds per half a kilogram packet, fresh fish for 8.25 pounds per kilogram, frozen meat for 5.75 pounds, sausages for 2.60 pounds per 400-gram tray, and pair of pigeons for 6 pounds.

A 4-kilogram tin of Nabatine butter is sold for 5.35 pounds, another 2-kilogram tin produced by a private sector company is sold for 6 pounds, a 950-gram can of tahina [sesame sauce] is sold for 3.50 pounds, another half a kilogram can of tahina is for 2.25 pounds, a 750-gram halva tin is for 2.50, and a 1.4 kilogram can of treacle is for 1.50 pound.

White cheese of all kinds is available, with prices beginning from 3.50 pounds. Starch is for 1.50 per kilogram, Greek cheese 8 pounds per kilogram, cheddar 10.30

pounds per kilogram, white cheese from Egypt Dairy Company for 1.80 pounds per half a kilogram, all types of local and imported sauces beginning with 70 piasters for a 70-gram can and 3 pounds for 860-gram can; and all types of tinned corned beef and luncheon beef with prices beginning at 100 piasters and up to 2.25 pounds. Tinned sardine is sold for 1.15 pound for a 145-gram tin and up to 2.25 pounds for a 340 gram tin. Packed flour is sold for 30 piasters per 750-gram pack.

Samaha Yusuf, head of Food Commodities Authority, promised to contact heads of companies of cooperative food stores in order to solve this problem so that the old popular cooperative food stores will be equalized with the tourist markets.

Study Surveys Expatriate Workers' Numbers, Opinions

900A0200A Cairo AL-AHALI
in Arabic 29 Nov 89 pp 3, 14

[Article by Ahmad Isma'il: "In Search of a Livelihood—3.5 Million Egyptians in the Arab States"]

[Text] At the end of 1987, 3.5 million Egyptians were working in the Arab states. During the preceding 10 years, these workers exerted in the labor market the blood-and-sweat equivalent of 33 billion Egyptian pounds, which entered Egypt through them.

We in Egypt have a ministry of labor, a ministry of emigration and the affairs of Egyptians abroad, a ministry of the interior that enumerates every bit of information about Egyptians' political behavior, a ministry of foreign affairs, with its ambassadors, ministers, commissioners, and consuls, and many other similar agencies. But these people have been preoccupied with more important things; not one of them has learned or tried to learn the numbers and conditions of these citizens—what they do, or what others do to them.

Professor Dr. Nadir Farjani is an individual Egyptian on a modest research team. A specialist in human resource development and quantitative development studies, he has done what all those big, imposing ministries and agencies have not done. He has presented the only basic field study about those who left their country and families "in search of a livelihood."

In this field study, which relies upon direct contact with Egyptians who worked in the Arab states, Dr. Farjani monitors the most important social and psychological phenomena that result from working outside Egypt. He monitors something even more important: Egyptians' attitudes toward Arab unity based on their personal experience working in brother countries.

Two years ago, the author of the study predicted that the Egyptian work force would return from the Arab states, but no officials noticed or read anything.

Scientific Prediction

Dr. Nadir Farjani, a professor and human resources expert, was the first to predict the return of Egyptian workers from the Arab states, especially Iraq. He did this in a pioneering field study in this area in 1987. The study was entitled, "In Search of a Livelihood: A Field Study of Egyptian Emigration in the Arab Countries."

The author says, "There is a recurrent fear that returning expatriates will have an unhealthy effect on Egyptian society. Results of the field study enable us to arrive at some estimates of the probable return of expatriates to Egypt and its probable impact.

"We present here an estimate of the amount of return immigration that can be expected during the period 1985-89, based on the hypotheses, and an assessment of the characteristics of the returning expatriates."

Regarding Iraq, the author says: "Iraq will not be able to dispense with all of its guest workers. This work force plays an important compensatory role in civilian activity as a result of the absence of a large part of the Iraqi work force on the battle front. Iraq will find sufficient resources by retaining this minimum required for the welfare of the domestic front. We estimate that this minimum equals one-half of the Egyptian work force that was present in Iraq at the beginning of 1985. This level of presence of an Egyptian work force is expected to be reached at the end of the eighties."

As for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the author predicts that "these two countries will continue to need Egyptian labor, but with a gradual decline until the end of this century. At that time, about one-third of the Egyptian work force that was in the two countries at the beginning of 1985 will remain. This means about an 8 percent decrease per year."

As for Jordan, the economic crisis will cause almost all the Egyptian workers there to return. By the end of the eighties, no more than one-tenth of the Egyptian expatriates who were there at the beginning of 1985 will remain.

Libya has settled its position toward the overseas market for Egyptian labor by mass deportation of Egyptian workers.

Based on the results, the author predicts that ½ million expatriates will return to Egypt during the 5 years of 1985-89, i.e., the equivalent of 43 percent of the potential for return at the beginning of 1985. This figure means an average final return of about 100,000 expatriates per year in the second half of the eighties.

Given that the size of the work force living in Egypt was between 14 and 16 million in the period from 1985 to 1989, the relative annual weight of returning expatriates comes to about 7 percent of the total work force. Thus, it is difficult for us to predict essential alterations in the Egyptian labor market. Unemployment [of expatriates]

at home will add no more than 0.2 percent to the rate of unemployment in the society as a whole. This is an insignificant increase.

Correct Figures

Eighty-five percent of Egyptian expatriate labor concentrated in five Arab countries.

Fifty-eight percent of the workers were without a work contract.

Fifty-six percent of them had no educational certificate.

Five percent of them returned after utterly failing to find a job.

For the first time ever, a scientific study is publishing correct figures about the Egyptian [expatriate] work force, which represented one-fifth of Egypt's work force and affected more than 15 million Egyptians at home, i.e., one-third of the population at the beginning of 1986.

For the first time ever, a field study team is going to various villages, districts, cities, and neighborhoods of the republic to investigate the condition of returning Egyptian expatriate workers and the effect of this on the life of the individual, family, and society.

What information and figures does this pioneer study contain about the Egyptian work force? What exactly is the size of this work force? What are its attitudes and characteristics?

Now that the author's 1986 prediction of a sudden return of workers has indeed materialized, can they be absorbed? Do they represent a danger to the Egyptian economy and its mechanisms at home?

Conflicting Figures

In 1985, the president announced that there were over 2.5 million Egyptians working abroad.

At the same time, statistics of the Ministry of State for Emigration said that there were 4.5 million Egyptians overseas.

In February 1986, a noted Egyptian university professor returned from Iraq and wrote that the number of Egyptians in Iraq alone was over 3 million.

Until this study was written in October 1987, there was no correct or nearly correct official figure for the size of the Egyptian work force overseas.

Even the 1986 census provided no information about the Egyptian work force overseas.

The two largest receiving countries, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, provide no exact information about the number of Egyptians in them. Saudi information about guest workers and their nationality is considered secret

because of the sensitivity of the question of the composition of the population and the work force by nationality.

Iraq provides almost no statistical information on the work force or on other fields, although the Iraqi security agencies have this information.

Journalistic exaggerations have played a role in the high estimate of the number of Egyptians abroad. The flimsiness of these estimates became clear after the mass termination of Egyptians' contracts in Libya. There were no more than 30,000 cases of return, according to official Egyptian statistics.

The question now is what exactly is the size of the Egyptian work force abroad.

Field survey estimates say that at the beginning of 1985 the number of Egyptians abroad who had left during 1974-84 was about 1.5 million. Of them, 1.25 million were workers. At the beginning of 1985, the number of Egyptians who had left during the period 1974-84 and had returned was about 2 million. Of them, about 1.6 million were workers.

Thus, the total size of the labor emigration from Egypt during the period 1974-84 was about 3.5 million. Of them, about 2.8 million were workers.

I.e., the rate of economic activity among the emigrants was about 80 percent.

Centers and Characteristics

Five Arab countries took in the great majority of the expatriate workers in 1985 and during the 1974-84 period.

Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and Libya received 85 percent of the expatriate workers.

The study indicates that 95 percent of these expatriates were male and were concentrated in the age group between 20 and 60.

In its general current, emigration is characterized by selectivity according to the type of education (for those with educational qualifications) and social status.

Among the returnees, we find a great increase in vocational education graduates, and a great decrease of business education graduates.

The proportion of intermediate certificates among expatriates is high because of the high demand for technical skills in the receiving countries.

Observations indicate that the current of emigration outside Egypt has become more selective according to educational status generally and that the share of those with the intermediate technical certificate has increased over time.

As regards social status, central groups in the survey were those engaged to marry or already betrothed. There were frequent cases in which marriage had not taken place even after a relatively long period of engagement or betrothal because the young man of marriage age lacked financial resources.

Thus, obtaining the money needed for marriage and setting up a home was one of the motives for expatriation. Results of the survey show that the percentage of bachelors among the returnees was low, while the percentage of engaged and married men was higher than among nonemigrants.

Majority From the Poor

Without question, the primary motive for emigration was "insufficient income generally." This was followed by "straightened living standards in general."

Strangely, the emigrants did not mention "insuring one's old age" among the reasons for their emigrating. This indicates that they were interested in shorter-term and more immediate objectives. The great majority of them were poor wage earners.

Average annual individual income before emigration was 750 pounds. While abroad, it rose to 10 times this figure or more. According to information from the survey, approximate annual income [overseas] was \$7,460.

Emigration led to a fundamental change in sources of income, since almost all the emigrants turned to selling their labor in the countries of emigration. Income from work represented 98 percent of income during residence abroad. Only 3 percent of returning emigrants had obtained income other than from work.

If we assume that all savings and investment in the country of emigration is liquidated upon return and is transferred to Egypt, one can say that returning emigrants finally transferred to Egypt the equivalent of 57 percent of their income abroad in cash, while total transfers in goods represented about 17.2 percent of income.

Thus, total transfers come to three-fourths of the income generated by expatriate workers.

Emigration and the Open Door Policy

Increased emigration for work coincided with Egyptian society's undergoing fundamental changes in social order as a result of the adoption of the economic open door policy. Furthermore, the decline of emigration to work outside Egypt coincides with attempts to review and rationalize the open door policy, now that the falseness of the outward economic boom which pervaded the country in the second half of the seventies and its unhealthy consequences have become apparent in the early eighties.

Thus, the phenomenon of emigration to work abroad, on the one hand, and the economic open door policy, on the other hand, were closely connected in timing and development. This makes it very difficult to separate the effects of these two phenomena on socioeconomic change in Egypt since the mid-seventies.

Just as emigrants have been a center of change in behavior patterns related to emigration, one notes the presence of nondomestically produced goods on a broader scale among emigrants. This is something to be expected. Emigrants have lived in societies that rely on importation for the majority of commodities offered for sale in them. When we examine the kinds of goods to which individuals in the [expatriate] work force have become accustomed, we notice a greater concentration on electrical goods among returning emigrants than among nonemigrants.

Thus, it turns out that emigration to work has clearly contributed to changing the emigrants' consumption pattern while they were abroad. This pattern leans toward luxury and display. Private consumption in Egypt rose from 2.5 million pounds in 1973 to 15.6 billion pounds in 1984—a rise of 624 percent!

Attitudes Toward Unity

The study's results regarding the attitudes of emigrants and returnees toward Arab unity were not what one would expect on first impression.

Although a large number of expatriates were in Iraq, expatriates and returnees do not favor Iraq on a scale of preferences. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were preferred to Iraq by a large margin.

As for unity, the results of the study showed that 70 percent of expatriates desire unity with Arab countries.

Saudi Arabia heads the list of countries with which Egyptian expatriates favor unity. This relates to bad economic conditions in Egypt and prosperous ones in Saudi Arabia.

The county next in preferences for unity is Egypt's historical twin, the Sudan. In the opinion of the author of the study, this indicates that emigration has not had a special role in changing this traditional feeling of brotherhood.

Then comes Kuwait in third place.

However, the neighboring country, the constant object of unity—Libya—had a preference rating less than Jordan's, especially among individuals outside the work force, and decisively so among the emigrants.

Emigration has produced negative feelings toward some Arabs, especially Palestinians. Returnees from Kuwait and Jordan, especially, and from the other Arab states in general had a high dislike for them.

Government Exaggeration

When emigration for work has been discussed in Egypt, remittances by Egyptians working abroad and their effects have received great interest.

This relates to the obvious nature of remittances, especially those in cash, on the one hand, and to the government's eagerness for them, on the other hand.

The author thinks that the importance of workers' remittances has been exaggerated, especially in evaluating the effects of emigration for work on the Egyptian socioeconomic order. This has been the result of an unacceptable ignoring of the country's overall economic context during the heyday of emigration.

Cash remittances, which were the most important part of expatriate worker remittances, were merely large spurts of foreign currency that entered Egyptian society without any corresponding domestic productive activity.

In fact, as a result of the open door policy, or as an accompaniment to its heyday, there were other large infusions of foreign currency in the form of loans and foreign aid into the Egyptian economy, without any corresponding domestic productive activity.

In addition, there were other sources of foreign currency that increased during the period of high emigration. These took the form of return on real property, as represented by revenues from oil, the Suez Canal, and tourism.

Thus, it becomes clear to us that cash remittances were but one of four sources of foreign currency that interacted comprehensively with the Egyptian economic order.

It is only logical that these four sources worked together to produce joint phenomena. What makes the matter even more difficult is that these four sources grew similarly at the same time, and all of them have started to face a decrease in recent years.

The value of remittances during the last 10 years was no more than one-third of the total value of the four sources. This means that one should not expect the contribution of remittances to be fundamental in producing phenomena in which sources of foreign currency derived from real property revenue played a part.

Without Currency Conversion

When remittances cross the borders of the Egyptian economy, one can divide them according to whether they take the nature of cash or material commodities.

Cash remittances are sums transferred through banking channels or arriving with Egyptians, whether declared in customs reports or undeclared, or by means of sums deducted from Egyptians overseas by currency dealers. The bulk of these sums finance the free market in foreign currency. They are used for the purposes of consumption

and savings, to finance import operations without currency conversion, and for speculation and the importation of illegal goods. Of these sums, only those that sustain importation without currency conversion can be determined. The latter can be determined exactly through private sector import authorizations by the Import Rationalization Committees of the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade.

One notes that the banks arrange only a small portion of importation without currency conversion out of their resources.

The study indicates that during the mid-eighties, the value of importation without currency conversion amounted to about 3 billion pounds out of total cash remittances. This was 36 times its value in the mid-seventies.

As a result, the share of importation without currency conversion in the value of total cash remittances increased from about one-fourth in 1975 to nearly two-thirds in 1985.

If we bear in mind that final remittances resulting from emigration for work totaled over \$33 billion during the survey period, we discover that they contributed at a rate of 25 percent directly to importation without currency conversion.

The question is why the government exaggerated the glorification of remittances.

The author answers that the goal was to introduce the parallel market. There was the incentive price for the dollar in 1973. Then the system of importation without currency conversion began. The incentive bonus for the dollar was increased in 1974, and permission to possess foreign currency was granted in 1976.

These are the features of the foreign currency policy that the government is following, and this is what happened!

Editorial Questions Mubarak-Political Prisoners Meeting

900A0098A Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 1 Nov 89 p 3

[Commentary by Mahmud al-Saqa]

[Text] Some of our well-intentioned brother writers have persisted in reminding us, from time to time, of that famous and memorable meeting which took place between President Mubarak and Egyptian opposition groups. It immediately followed their release from prisons and detention camps after the painful September decrees which had been pronounced by the "head of the Egyptian family" upon his sons. Events have shown that the educational decree contained the decisive blow and the hammer which landed on the head of the president, the "merciful father", bringing him crashing down to earth, forcing him, before the world and history, to lick the dust of the earth on his "wedding day," as some are pleased to call it.

Why the "father" president was induced to visit this calamity on his "sons," and throw them all, the "old and sick among them," without fatherly mercy, into the depths of the dungeon, is still unclear. The decree is shrouded in mystery! The making of the decree and its legal basis are even more mysterious. Selecting examples, taking precautions against them, according to the declaration of the arrest warrants, and their intellectual tendencies and political ideologies; all that is still a matter of conjecture when it comes to analyzing this painful event in its various aspects.

What is important is that we get away from this "historical drama" and open a new chapter with the vice president, face to face with the vice president, with him "noting that he was the first witness for the prosecution in all the painful, bloody events that have occurred."

And was there the meeting about which our brethren speak?

We will return to an assessment of this meeting, the only one of its kind in history. Perhaps we should mention the following issues:

The meeting took place entirely at the president's wish when he took over rule of the country. As is the habit of men of law, from whence comes the talk on the subject of interpretation. [We ask]: did this wish of the president at that time and on that occasion arise out of a sincere desire for that meeting? Or did it come to keep the people from comparing the tyranny of a president who makes the arrest warrants to the "mercy" of a president who makes gracious pardons and "visits?"

Did the meeting come as an expression of a political "program" whose seeds were sown from the moment the president first came to power? Or was it built on the special "feeling" that the rule of the previous president had been oppressive, and that oppression needs the kindness of justice, even in difficult political decisions?

What there is no doubt about is that "all Egyptians were happy with the release decree, and they were also happy with the president's visit at that difficult time in the history of the country."

On the other hand, what is clear and what makes analyzing and interpreting the meaning of the meeting more complex and mysterious with the passing of days and events, is that the president has not done any of the things which the opposition wanted and which it brought up in that famous, memorable meeting, the first and the last. At the top of the list of the opposition's "demands" at that time was that he be a president "to all Egyptians," and that he make room for the opposition in his "mind" after having made room for it that day in his "heart."

As days and events went by, the opposition, clinging to the illusions of that memorable, historic meeting, waited for their dream, which they had cast upon the doorstep during his presidential "honeymoon," to be fulfilled.

Days and events went by, but the president did not keep his promise to the opposition. Rather [he did] the complete opposite, for the president shut the door against them—especially since from the first day of his auspicious rule the government has proclaimed a state of emergency and adorned it with an emergency law, and used the "form" of legitimacy to have this inhuman law extended year after year by the "sickly" People's Assembly.

The opposition is patient and forbearing, waiting for the president to grant it a word, an appointment, or meeting at which it would cast at his doorstep its cares and woes, and "what it wants to tell the president directly without an intermediary."

The president forgot the opposition just as he forgot his promise to it; indeed he forgot everything that was said in the first famous, memorable meeting. He forgot that he told opposition groups that "his name is Husni Mubarak," therefore there would be no rigging of the elections, no counterfeiting the will of the people, and no violation of anyone's freedom, meaning anyone; that is no arrests!

Days and events went by, while the opposition sustained itself with the "tale" of the first meeting, which it had regarded as boding very well. So what was the verdict of the days and events?

The rigging became more artistic, and the arrests became more oppressive. The law was disregarded and its prestige and power were lost. The prisons and detention camps filled up with "all the people." Like Hell, their appetite has been whetted, and they say, "Is there more?"

Besides this picture with all its painful dimensions, I say in bringing out another final aspect, that the president, in "not keeping his promise to the opposition," throws to it from time to time the lost and forlorn remains of a tattered hope; thus we see him saying on some occasions that "the opposition is part of the system."

The days and events go by, but the opposition does not understand the content of this obscure, "negative" statement, since by all estimates there is no positive role for the opposition that would confirm the president's statement that it is part of the system. If the political or economic system collapses, then the opposition, cooperating in all misfortunes by offering "the greatest solutions for the welfare of the nation," must also collapse.

So much for assessing the meaning of the first meeting with the president, which so far is "the first and the last," as the common folk say. Moreover, the opposition is often driven by longing for another meeting with the president in which it would bring up its views, or as I said its "cares." This sort of thing happened when the president of the People's Assembly refrained from not implementing the final judicial rulings, and the opposition asked for a meeting of the president also to bring up directly with him, without obstacles or barriers, its

opinion of the elections for the Consultative Council and about the shameful rigging that afflicted this comedy and that tragedy. The days, months, and years have passed, and the president does not make known his opinion, whether he accepts or rejects a meeting with the opposition. Why? And how? As the expatriate poet Iliyya Abu-Madi said before in his poem "The Talismans," I say: "I do not know!"

Editorial Claims Cabinet Members Showing Socialist Leanings

900A0187B Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH
in Arabic 6 Dec 89 p 5

[Article by Muhammad al-Hayawan under "A Word of Love" rubric]

[Text] It is assumed that the MAYU newspaper is the newspaper of the National [Democratic] Party [NDP], and that the AL-AHALI newspaper is the newspaper of the communist, Nasserist, and socialist NPUG [National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party]. However, matters became confused last week. The AL-AHALI newspaper honored the government and defended several of its members, but not of course out of love for the NDP or the government. Rather, by doing so, it is announcing its satisfaction with the ministers who are implementing the NPUG's policy, and who are adhering to communism, Nasserism, and socialism, even though the communist world is proclaiming the collapse and fall of communism, and is ridding itself of projects which have destroyed its economy. We are ones who imitated socialism. We still cling to [types of] projects which have collapsed there and which continue to exist here. We adopted cooperative marketing from China. China has decided to eliminate it. We continue to adhere to it.

AL-AHALI's support of some ministers, without supporting other ministers, means that a division exists in the cabinet regarding the concept of government and the very method of governing. Some are behaving as socialists, and the AL-AHALI newspaper is defending them, such as [Culture Minister] Faruq Husni and [Industry Minister] Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab. Others are taking instructions from the AL-AHALI newspaper. Therefore, AL-AHALI devotes its pages to expressing its acclaim for them and its appreciation of their socialist activity.

In the latest issue of AL-AHALI, [Deputy Prime Minister] Dr. Yusuf Wali surrenders completely to the directives of the NPUG, announcing his displeasure with the private sector and raising the public sector's banner regarding imports and exports. Although we know that Dr. Wali is a leader of the free orientation regarding the economy and agriculture (for example, he rejected, the principle of pricing, wishing to leave the market to supply and demand, which is the same conclusion reached by the communist countries which have renounced communism—meaning the communists are renouncing their ideas), we are turning away from the principles of a free economy, because the NPUG

opposes a free economy, and because the government is taking its instructions from the NPUG, although it declares daily that it is operating with different instructions!

Dr. Wali is angry with the private sector because it is importing spoiled goods, though the blame must be placed entirely on governmental control agencies, inasmuch as agricultural quarantine, health quarantine, the chemical factories, and other governmental agencies approved the entry of these goods. The decisions made by these agencies contradict one another daily. An importer can obtain a certificate easily if he can open his mind; he can also obtain a certificate which is [initially] denied if he leaves matters to follow their natural course. The private sector purchases as it fancies, by the rules. The private sector wants to continue in the market. It does not want to profit and flee, and the adventurers are a minority. The government is responsible for controlling deviants and purging the market of private sector thieves. However, eliminating the private sector represents a dangerous course for the government, because it is a return to the socialist charter of the 1960s. Any call for an opening would fail if business persons believed that the private sector would be hit in this way.

All of the investment encouragement laws which we offer would be nullified if the government were to eliminate the private sector's role, if a socialist prosecutor were to impose a guard on any project, and if the administrative control [agency] were to submit a decision to jail business persons, and issued arrest orders. All of that renders calls to encourage investment mere words, mere smoke in the air.

A final question: Has the AL-AHALI newspaper become the mouthpiece of the NDP government? This is merely a question for Dr. Wali.

Editorial Suggests Using Arms Imports for Intifadah

900A0200B Cairo AL-AHALI
in Arabic 29 Nov 89 pp 3, 14

[Editorial: "Egypt, Palestine, and the Years of Amazement"]

[Excerpts] Here is a third year of admiration and amazement!

Yes, this is our position and the position of all the Arabs toward the Palestinian intifadah [uprising] which has now been going on for 2 years. We are amazed, or we marvel at a people who have been able to unite completely against the enemy—a people for whom the struggle for liberation is no longer merely the action of a revolutionary vanguard or an armed vanguard, but for whom it has become everyone's concern and business, from children, to women, and even to the stones of the street. [passage omitted]

We see all this with a look of admiration and respect. But the more important question is what have we offered to those whom only an imaginary line called "the border" separates from Egypt. Have we opened our schools and hospitals to them? Have we supported their trade, production, and enterprises, now that all these things have been subjected to a siege imposed by the circumstances of the intifadah? Have we contributed enough materially? Have we overcome the problems of airports and passports? Have we done away with the disgrace that an inhabitant of Gaza should carry an Egyptian travel document that does not allow him to enter Egypt, except with previous permission?

If we are hesitating in some of these measures that require normalization with Israel (such as trade and projects), have we stopped normalization in order to pressure the enemy, so that he learns right from wrong? Have we stopped the flow of tourists who bring a few pennies and spread through Egypt every year? Have we stopped agricultural cooperation? Have we stopped their claim that they have come to teach Egyptians how to farm? Have we looked for an alternative market to which to sell our oil, which supplies a large part of the Israeli economy and its war machine?

The same holds for the other Arab states. Political support means nothing if it is not strengthened by material measures. These begin with what we have called "supporting steadfastness" in the occupied territory and financial support of the intifadah. They extend to confronting the enemy politically, economically, and militarily.

In some years, weapons purchases in the Middle East region have reached \$27 billion. [passage omitted]

What do we do with these weapons, if the balance between the Arabs and Israel does not change? The issue here does not of necessity mean war; it is rather the possession of means of strength and a serious confrontation that finds its political translation, even if not a single shot emerges.

Also, the issue is not just the intifadah or the Palestinian revolution. The issue is the security of the Arabs. When Israel possesses rockets capable of carrying nuclear or chemical warheads and of reaching the remotest spot in Yemen to the south, Morocco to the west, and Iraq to the east—when this happens, the danger confronts everyone, and the Arabic proverb becomes true: "I was eaten the day the red bull was eaten" [as published]. If Israel eats up the intifadah and the Palestine front settles down for Israel, Israel will have nothing before it but the Arab scene as a place for expansion or as territory for hooliganism.

Editorial Criticizes Companies for Profiteering
900A0116A Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH
in Arabic 13 Oct 89 p 4

[Commentary by 'Abdallah Nassar]

[Text] Permission for companies to produce goods according to economic costs does not mean that some factories should exaggerate costs and make incredible profits as a result of successive price increases.

This happens often. In one case, a company receives a slab of aluminum from the aluminum complex at a cost of 2650 pounds a ton, and after one manufacturing step it offers this ton at a cost of 4090 pounds, which brings a net profit of 1440 pounds per single ton. At the same time, the manufacturing companies are offering sheets of aluminum at 4000 pounds, and it does not need rolling and is ready for manufacture and shaping.

That is not the end of the matter, rather this government plant imposes insurance of 80 pounds a ton, which counts as carrying the increase in the cost of a ton, because the workers get their money in loans from the banks with up to 20 percent interest on them, and they resort to adding it to the cost of the final production cost of the goods and it is borne by the consumer.

So how can this government factory go on making a net profit of 1440 pounds a ton for one manufacturing step? Does this factory get electricity at the world price? Does it pay its workers' salaries in dollars? And how can these hateful scenes go on, which affect the small factories and might lead ultimately to their bankruptcy? And why are some of the big factories forming a monopoly and imposing unjustifiable prices? There must be a fair cost, and a fair price for raw materials that will bring a margin of profit for all links of the manufacturing process.

ISRAEL

Both Likud, Labor Allegedly in Trouble

44230058D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 27 Nov 89 p 11

[Article by A. Schweitzer: "Shared Trouble"]

[Text] The number of pretexts tends toward infinite. The latest—if it is the latest, because by the end of the week new ones may very well be invented—is expected to answer the question, why, unlike in other parts of the world, is there no thaw in the frozen hostilities in our region? And here it is: In the Middle East there are no democracies; here people kill, not compromise. This excuse, however, is fundamentally wrong: History is full of examples of conflicts settled between nondemocratic countries. But when this nonsense is dished up to the public with a serious face by a young (in comparison to the prime minister, for example) Likud prince, chances are some people will buy it.

Yitzhaq Shamir returned home last week laden with failures; arguably no other Israeli prime minister ever won such a chilly reception in the capitals he chose to visit. And indeed, had it been anyone but Shamir, under whose guidance and steering Israel's status among the nations has fallen to the nadir, one would have felt pity for a weary old man who dragged himself such distances

to hear nothing but rejection and remonstrations from his hosts (including Jewish disapproval). But the half-truths he uttered to television interviewers right after he got off the plane sufficed to reassure us: He deserves what he got abroad, as well as what is still in store for him from his constraints colleagues.

The commander in chief is not the only one with no victories to show; so is his army. The Likud has managed to convince itself—with not insignificant help from recognized commentators or mere kibbitzers—that its foe, Labor, has been defeated and is in hopeless decline. But then came the Histadrut elections this naive belief was placed in question, followed by a fresh poll from a quarter that is not even hostile to Likud (to put it plainly), which claimed that there has been no shift worth mentioning in voters' preferences since the Knesset elections. It turned out that the one swallow of the elections for local authorities did not bring summer, although one could console oneself with the thought that, considering what is going on in foreign matters—and domestic, too, come to think of it—under the Shamir government, Likud should have lost even more heavily. Consequently, standing in place can be viewed as an achievement.

Better not to try to predict what kind of reception is awaiting the prime minister at his party's Central Committee, which contains more than a few members who are good not only at shouting, but also at looking around. Why not venture a prediction? Because quite possibly the Central Committee may not be convened at all, and if it is convened, some expect a frontal clash between Shamir and his constraining interdictors, and also expect Shamir to win. This may well happen, although historical examples prove the opposite, namely that Shamir will fold before that, and after the Central Committee is dismissed he will claim that what everyone saw and heard was actually not an event worth including on the agenda. And if about 6 months ago he could count on American indifference to the small print, this is even truer today: The world is too full of genuinely important events for Bush and Baker to spare time and attention for yet another Mideast farce.

The Likud can afford to remain serene, however, because the Labor Party's situation is not good, so much so that it is not capable of taking advantage of its rival's weakness and parading the talents of its men in government (see Peres' difficulties at Treasury, due partly to him and partly to his colleagues, or Rabin's difficulties dealing with Arabs in the territories), or to present itself to the public as an alternative deserving to be trusted. The party tried—more precisely, its chairman Peres tried—to form a narrow government without a sound electoral basis, with the ultra-Orthodox on one side and the left-wing on the other. As expected, it was demonstrated that the attempt was perhaps the most logical escape from the present political deadlock, but that it was not practical: The ultra-Orthodox, like the left-wing, are keener on material gains or ideological purity than on possible progress toward peace.

Having met its emotional needs by torturing its defeated leader, the Labor Party put its trust—according to the brilliant analytical advice of its second in command, Yitzhaq Rabin—in Shamir's peace initiative as a means of breaking through the political freeze. In the meantime 6 months or more passed and if facts have any significance at all, it is that peace with Shamir's help is no more practical than peace with the help of the ultra-Orthodox or leftist parties. It was only luck (or the less than remarkable intelligence of his friends) that has so far shielded Rabin from the cry: "This king doesn't have any clothes, either."

Its leaders down for years and itself holding no illusion of being able to rehabilitate itself either in power or in opposition, the Labor Party is now losing on both fronts. Whoever doubts that is invited to take a look at the praise being showered on Yisra'el Qeysar, who defended its position in Histadrut: Some may indeed believe that in him they have found the answer to the impoverishment plaguing the party leadership, except that we have already seen this show when Qeysar was elected secretary general for the first time: This nice man was and still is a Histadrut activist whose promotion will only reassert the fact that one can be promoted out of one's competence. In the meantime he has to deal with the bankruptcy of Koor and of the Working Settlement, not to mention the other aches and pains of the Histadrut.

The fear is thus grounded that Qeysar's fate will not differ from that of other past stars, like Mota Gur, to cite only one of the names that shone brightly for one day, a depressing vision, and there is no light visible at the end of the tunnel of our distress. What a pity that we cannot appoint a committee to efficiently run the state until its elected leaders prove that they deserve to lead and have earned the trust of the people.

Sharon Tours Gaza, Expounds on Views

44230059A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 17 Nov 89 p 9

[Article by Gid'on Levi: "Who Said Gaza Strip Was Crowded?"]

[Text] Gaza Strip is coming to life. This week two soldiers were ambushed there and attacked with firearms. It seems that throughout the political spectrum there are not many people who want to hold on to the strip, and almost any settlement calling for detaching Gaza from Israel is likely to win extensive support.

That is precisely what Ari'el Sharon fears. He knows that we have historical and religious links to the West Bank, as well as 80,000 settlers, not to mention the fear of katyusha fire on Natanyya and Kefar Saba'. Giving up the Gaza Strip, however, is far easier. Within the framework of his efforts to arouse renewed interest in his solutions for Gaza, he spent 1 day there in the company of a reporter with a view to presenting his plan to the public.

Sharon knows every stone here, every citrus grove, every well, and every hill since the days of raids with the 101st. Several times in the course of that long day he reminisced about those days, mixed with more recent memories from the famous time he introduced order here in 1971: 7 months, 120 dead, 800 prisoners, and several dozens deported. Then quiet.

So it was a very special excursion, selective, purposeful, and very Sharon-like: landscapes, groves, open spaces, beaches, and Jewish settlement. We spoke only with Jews. We flew past the main street and the market of Gaza, border police in front and behind us. He seemed to want to ignore the dark side of the strip, preferring to focus on the prettier sights: wonderful beaches, white sand, deep blue sea, palm trees, and a small and prosperous Jewish settlement.

Sharon's primary target was to show to one and all that the Gaza Strip is not crowded. In the car leaving the farm, he was already marshaling rather surprising data: 364 sq km inhabited by 600,000 people. The Dan region, he compared it to, measured 180 sq km and had 1.2 million inhabitants, including two universities, two airports, medical centers, educational centers, and a very high living standard.

A practical example in the field: He began the tour along the Ma'arekhet Highway, which runs parallel to the fence skirting the strip on the east. Fields, citrus groves, and more than a few uninhabited areas. Every time I noted down something, Sharon scolded: You can write in the office, now look, look around and get a feel for it. Once in a while Lili called on the car phone: Is the reporter convinced already? "Look at this landscape," the minister repeatedly broke out enthusiastically like a tourist seeing it for the first time in his life. "From here they loot the country," he thundered viewing the route along which stolen cars make it from Israel to the strip. It's also the route on which the killers of Avi Sasportas and Ilan Sa'adon escaped.

The fields that were turning green, abutting the eastern fence, and the fields belonging to farms in the area will never again be worked by their Jewish owners, says Sharon, if we leave the strip. "I'm talking about artillery terror, isolated Katyushas, which can be loaded on the back of a donkey to shell kibbutzim and farms here every day or every week. What do we do then? Bomb the refugee camps from the air? Shell? Wound American and French soldiers who will be undoubtedly sitting here within some international force? It will look to the world even worse than soldiers with clubs. We'll never be able to do that."

[HA'ARETZ] Maybe they won't want to attack us after they'll have their own state?

[Sharon] "Why did they want to attack in the 1950's?"

[HA'ARETZ] They didn't have a state then.

[Sharon] "Let's say we compromise with 'Arafat. What, in your opinion, will Jibril, Hawatimah, Abu-Musa, Abu-Nidal, and Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] do? Sit quietly? 'Arafat already is not in military control of the strip. Even those who want to abandon the strip don't have an answer."

And another fear, the fear of a free-trade zone and the fear of hoof and mouth disease: "What if they declare a free-trade region here. That could ruin Israel. And what if they don't vaccinate their animals and a hoof and mouth epidemic breaks out here. That could inflict a heavy blow on Israel, since we're talking open border here, aren't we?"

Here, you see, he reminisces at one turn in the road, we once attacked with the 101st and took an Egyptian jeep. Later there was a lot of correspondence exchanged with the general staff about what was to be done with the jeep. We finally came to a compromise—the jeep was painted in IDF [Israel Defense Forces] colors and stayed with the unit. What happened to the people in the jeep? Sharon did not remember.

And here Sharon was once wounded in his hip. Now, since the murder of Sasportas and Sa'adon, the IDF has been erecting cement barriers to prevent cars going through.

Sharon: "You see, it's not crowded here at all. If you look upon it as a mini state, then it may be crowded. But it isn't. Shim'on Peres goes around telling the world that this is the most crowded place ever. The orientation here must be along the lines of intensive industry and agriculture because of the increasing water shortage. As far back as 1967 I suggested that refugees be helped to settle here. At the time, Eshkol was against it; he said to me chidingly, the refugees are the only ones we'll be able to get out of here some day."

[HA'ARETZ] How will you solve the refugee problem?

[Sharon] "In 1971 I suggested that we eliminate the refugee camps, settle 70,000 refugees in neighborhoods to be built next to towns, and transfer 100,000 to Judaea and Samaria. We even began implementing it, and a few hundred were transferred...."

[HA'ARETZ] With no opposition?

[Sharon] "Almost no opposition. I also suggested that another 30,000, who had nothing to do with terrorism, be transferred inside the State of Israel, to Nazareth, 'Akko, and Lod."

[HA'ARETZ] A real implementation of the right of return.

[Sharon] "Not quite."

[HA'ARETZ] Where was the money to come from?

[Sharon] "From the Americans and Europeans. I recently talked to leaders of the European Community

and they said, Shim'on Peres was here before you and he told us that this is the most crowded place in the world."

[HA'ARETZ] But they won't give a penny as long as the Gaza Strip is under Israeli occupation.

[Sharon] "So they won't. So there won't be any improvements. But we must create alternative conditions—rehabilitating refugee camps as part of a more general Israeli peace program, that's something on which we must insist. Now, however, there is no one to do so, since both major political groups, Alignment and Likud, don't have any political plan at all."

[HA'ARETZ] Why do you want to solve the refugee problem to begin with?

[Sharon] "You can't leave an open wound."

And now the trip comes to its culminating point, from Sharon's viewpoint: we are visiting Jewish settlements in the strip. Some 3,500 Jews are established here in what looks like prosperous settlements: modern hot houses, lawns, schools, a closed hotel, an open resort village, and even a pub restaurant with a wonderful view. Sharon: "Look at these people, the women and the children, don't they have an effect on you?"

We scale the skeleton of a house in construction in Rafiyah-Yam. "Isn't it marvelous here?" he asks repeatedly. "Once the whole nation was excited when such a settlement was established. In 1971 I presented my settlement plan before a ministerial committee that visited here—it was based on creating a protective screen in combination with the Sinai, and four fingers of Jewish settlement across the width of the strip. You should have seen the light in the eyes of Yig'al 'Alon, Yisra'el Galili, Hayim Gevati, and the other ministers. The opposition began when I got to the point of settling the refugees. Dayan later called me in and said I shouldn't have brought up the subject."

For the rest of the day he showed me old fences, remnants of a fencing campaign erected at the time around Israeli land in the strip. "I fenced in 60,000 dunam, of which only 40,000 dunam are left today as a result of our weakness."

[HA'ARETZ] Why do we actually need settlements in the Gaza Strip?

[Sharon] "Because there is a difference between army presence, which can be temporary—the army is here today, gone tomorrow—and people living in the area, whose very existence here creates motivation to defend it and to stay. Try to threaten Eilat, you'll see what commotion would seize the country. On the other hand, if some outpost is in danger, people say: one outpost less, one more...."

Sharon brings historical examples—Giv'at HaNevyim and al-Hamah, which were in IDF hands, but were abandoned and ended up in Syrian hands—had there been settlements there, it wouldn't have happened.

[HA'ARETZ] But we had prosperous settlements in Pithat Rafiyah and Yamit, too.

[Sharon] "That's a completely different question. The decision to evacuate them was a political decision."

And one word about Arabs: "In the final analysis, Arabs always do what they say they will, even if it's not according to their initial timetable."

[HA'ARETZ] Well, now they're talking peace.

[Sharon] "That talk was never put to the test."

[HA'ARETZ] It's been standing the reality test for 12 years with the Egyptians.

[Sharon] "You should see what Egyptian newspapers write and what their intellectuals think. 'Uthman al-Baz is the man that symbolizes that, namely efforts to isolate Israel and to bring pressure to bear on it to withdraw to the '67 borders, after which the next stage is pressure on Israeli Arabs to attempt to shed Israeli rule, from there to the '47 borders, and from there to Israel's destruction it's only a question of time."

Sharon is against closing the Gaza Strip to Israeli traffic. What would they live on? he asks. He is also against pulling the IDF out of populated areas.

[HA'ARETZ] So we'll sit here forever?

[Sharon] "From the viewpoint of our right to maintain an army here, yes, forever. If there is no violence and terrorism here, then it's in our interests to reduce our forces.

"I'm offering them autonomy, almost without any interference in their self-government, and let them be citizens of a Palestinian state in Jordan. But this place must be given a different kind of attention by our public. I keep hearing that Gaza is a pain in the neck and we would be well rid of it. Peres says, what are we talking about, sand and people. It's difficult to rally people to a struggle if they're not aware of the reality. In Judaea and Samaria we're in a far more advanced situation from the viewpoint of propaganda. Here people don't know."

And so Sharon continued to lecture, trying hard to drum up enthusiasm. He plans to bring here soon Central Committee members, each time one bus-load with him as guide, for the day. Yes, even his own party doesn't grasp the importance of Gaza.

He lectured and lectured, and was quiet only when faced with the dismal poverty and neglect of Palestine Square and Gaza's main street, the terrible crowding of refugee camps, and the interminable lines of beaten-up Peugeot's, laden with junk on top and filled with wretched workers, waiting at roadblocks on their way back from work in Israel at the end of the day.

Arens 'Unpopular' With World Leaders

44230063A Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 24 Nov 89 p 24

[Article by Dani'el Ben-Simon: "His Inheritance Is Waiting"]

[Text] Arens' associates love to extol his gentle nature and the fact that he is free of far-reaching political ambitions. They point out that all the positions he has held came to him, rather than him chasing after them. Nevertheless, it is rather puzzling that a man with no muscle, no political ambitions, and no charisma, can find himself so close to the most powerful, important, and fateful political position, namely the premiership. How can a man like that, blessed with such "doubtful" qualities, end up in this situation?

Moshe Arens has always been an enigma, and he still is. Even his admirers fail to decipher the mystery surrounding this strange political creature. His foes say that he got where he is by chance and the day is not far when he will be regurgitated from the system. His admirers, on the other hand, claim that the route leading to the premiership is paved for him and all that's required is a signal from Yitzhaq Shamir. At the same time, the constraints ministers are waiting for him with drawn sword. David Levy loathes him, Ari'el Sharon despises him, and Yitzhaq Moda'i doesn't take him seriously. Those three gladiators are deploying heavy artillery to displace him from the party leadership, the level at which they will have to confront him one of these days and try to defeat him, if he is to be prevented from taking the lofty seat. One senior Likud minister told me this week that the constraints ministers cannot continue to restrict Shamir forever. Upon his return from abroad he will show everyone who's the boss. If they continue to bother him, Shamir will request an unequivocal decision from the Central Committee. "More than they work against Shamir," the same minister said, "they work against Moshe Arens' patiently waiting succession."

Among all veteran ministers, Moshe Arens is the only one to have been promoted, while the others were left marking time or even regressed. Levy wanted to be foreign minister, Sharon was hoping to reconquer the Defense Ministry, and Moda'i requested some portfolio worthy of his talents. But Shamir preferred Arens, the only one who to him symbolizes BETAR [Likud Youth Movement] values and Ze'ev Jabotinsky's philosophy. And thus, while the others are trudging in the domestic arena, Arens is traveling the world, skipping from one country to another and from one continent to the next.

At the Foreign Ministry Arens was given a warm welcome. Veteran ministry functionaries learned to appreciate and even like him. Two years of Shim'on Peres had left deep scars among ministry higher echelons. Peres and his people had created a narrow circle revolving around Yosi Baylin, Nimrod Nowick, and Uri Savir. The three had erected an almost impenetrable fence between the minister and the other employees. Every document and every piece of paper passed through the

three's filter before landing on Peres' desk. The latter had no patience for lengthy talks or analyses by various and sundry experts. After 2 years as prime minister, he was not inclined to adjust to the heavy and passive atmosphere of the Ministry. Arens, on the other hand, worked differently. As soon as he took over he mended the hurt pride of Ministry functionaries. He met with them frequently, consulted them, and asked for their professional advice. Arens knew that most of the senior functionaries identify with Labor views, but he made them feel wanted nevertheless. One senior official, who makes no secret of his identification with the Labor Party, told me that he was positively impressed with Arens' learning abilities and his relative openness. "The only problem with him is that he is dogmatic," the senior official added, "and he has difficulties digesting basic facts, but to his credit it must be said that he listens."

Arens' ideological dogmatism is famous. Some attribute it to lack of creativity, while others go as far as to refer to him as "thick-headed." This expression spread particularly in recent months, at a time of intensive political contacts around the Israeli political initiative. More than once or twice, Arens was accused of not understanding what is said to him. That was especially said in connection with things told him in English. Secretary of State Baker complained more than once that in the best case Arens doesn't understand what he says to him, and in the worst case he distorts it. Egyptian Foreign Minister 'Ismat Abd-al-Majid, too, voiced similar complaints, as did Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Whether intentionally or not, Arens is a product of the Baker initiative. At the time the Alignment proposal was put up for a vote at the famous cabinet meeting 2 months ago, Arens astonished everyone by delivering oral proposals allegedly received from Secretary of State Baker. Arens was thereby hoping to "divert" the Alignment ministers from their support for Mubarak's 10 points. Except that, together with the constraints ministers, the others requested to see Baker's proposals in writing. Arens said they were on their way to Israel. Baker, who had not originally intended to dispute Mubarak's plan, all of a sudden found himself confronting the Egyptian president's plan. Baker was furious with Arens for having pulled a fast one on him, especially for what Arens said in his name, that he allegedly gave Israel veto rights on the membership of the Palestinian delegation. To Arens' credit it must be said that his gamble was successful. Proof is that the cabinet agreed to the Baker initiative 3 weeks ago.

Arens doesn't get high marks from Alignment ministers, either. Peres and Rabin are contemptuous of his talents and unimpressed with his mastery of the English language. Abba Eban says about all the misunderstandings in which Arens has been involved that just because a person speaks English doesn't mean that he understands what is said to him. Arens is aware of the "thick-headed" rumors circulating about him, but is not making any special efforts to dispel them. In an interview for HADASHOT last week, the director general of the prime

minister's office, Yosi Ben-Aharon said: "Arens has many qualities as a foreign minister, but sometimes I think that, how shall I say it, he is an aeronautics engineer, with a mathematical approach to things, which doesn't always meet the needs of foreign policy. One would need far more flexibility and a lighter touch....Moshe Arens has never said anything silly. I would have expected him to say more." His aides see his engineering's brain as a source of wisdom and sharp understanding. "He judges everything like an aircraft engineer," one of them said, "the word 'approximately' doesn't exist for him. He believes that everything must be 'exactly' so."

In his party, which has always had a weakness for generals and professors, Arens is viewed as a valuable find. Even his delayed fall out from respectable academic promotion did not detract from his status in the party. Veteran BETAR and ETZEL [The Irgun] members admire his loyalty to BETAR ideology and Jabotinsky glory. Although it is difficult to accuse him of too much rhetorical talent and intellectual brilliance, in their eyes he is the man who best represents, after Shamir, the longing for the days in which their party was hiding in the underground and fed itself on hard and uncompromising ideologies. As far as that is concerned, nothing has changed for Arens; he has not moved 1 inch forward. In his heart of hearts he believes what his boss said, that "the sea is the same sea and the Arabs are the same Arabs." About 1 month ago he confessed to journalists that if he had to vote all over again on the Camp David agreements he would still be against them. "But since the government and the Knesset voted in favor, I have to align myself with the decision of the majority." That is probably the advantage of being an engineer in politics.

People around Arens believe that he is the man to whom Shamir will pass the baton when the time comes. His relationship with the prime minister has known ups and downs, but Shamir does not hide his liking for Arens. During his term as prime minister, the Foreign Ministry under Arens participated intensively in mapping out foreign policy and even implementing it. The two talk on the phone and meet frequently. They are in agreement on almost every issue. Arens has also managed to rally the support of the younger ministers, who, when the time comes, will work to prevent one of the constraints ministers from taking over the party and in favor of Arens. It is reasonable to assume that he will be chosen by others to his next position, too, as he was so far. That, assuming that the Labor Party doesn't spoil his plans and those of his party.

Orientation Toward West Examined

44230027D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 28 Sep 89 p 13

[Text] Approximately 900 years have gone by since the poet wrote: "My heart is in the East, and I, in the end, am in the West." If Yitzhaq Halevi were to write his poem

today, he would as a matter of course change the equation to: "I am in the East, and my heart, in the end, is in the West." That is generally the new Israeli reality. Situated in Levant, with a proclivity toward geographic and economic rapprochement with Europe, Israel from the point of view of cultural orientation strives to be American.

"To live like Americans," Israeli style, is mainly an expression that relates to consumerism. On the scale of fast food, Israelis consume the most external symbols of fast culture: jeans and Coca Cola, Superman and hamburgers—these accompany with yearning the American dream of a country of unlimited opportunities. It is no wonder that Israel was easily snared by American cultural imperialism. America, for its part, provides—like an efficient MacDonald's chain—cultural ingredients that are easy to absorb and easy to digest, that have already been fashioned for an immigrant society, the external symbols of which are easy for another immigrant society to copy. To the Israeli consumer, this was a very easy culture to absorb. In contrast with the deeply rooted European culture, wherein prohibitions are steeped in tradition and "don'ts" exceed do's, "American culture is basically founded on permissiveness. All these elements quickly found their way into our culture, personally imported by individual Israelis, but it was mainly movies and television that accelerated the process. Even our national television schedule included a balance of shows imported from Europe alongside American shows. It is clear that the impact of shows like "Dallas" and "Dynasty" would influence our collective consciousness infinitely more than shows like "I Claudius" or even "Bulman" [as published].

All these elements were accepted without internalizing the deepest American values, such as the superiority of the individual and the public's right to know, and without a broad infrastructure for actively implementing the American culture and the American way.

This general trend also influenced Europe, where they fear the spread of America's new imperialism. But in Europe, in contrast with Israel, there is a protective wall of culture and tradition. And just to be safe, the countries of Europe build additional protective walls, such as restrictions on importing television programs from the United States. One of the first decisions made toward uniting Europe was to require that the television network broadcast a clear majority of original programming. Europeans know that they have something to lose from a cultural point of view, while Israelis have not yet reached the stage of self-definition on this issue.

The finished product is an Israeli who may come from many different countries, on whom conflicting influences have been imposed and who has been called "the multidimensional man" by Prof Shlomo Aharonson. His basic components are: "a strong American influence, Polish nationalism in its modern version, a fundamentalist combining the heritage of the region with our traditions." According to Aharonson, the adult Israeli

today grew up in a youth group that is the product of a Soviet subculture, but was educated at the "Gan Rina" movie theater where he was exposed to the messages of an expansionist American culture. All these elements are accompanied by the influence of the Holocaust; the result is a man who stands, confused, between cultures. In many ways, this process is still continuing. What's more, says Aharonson, as part of his Americanization, today's Israeli has internalized a disregard for the European continent.

This disregard finds clear expression in Israeli politics. Recently, a group of senior European journalists gathered in the office of Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin. During the course of the discussions, one of them began a commentary with the words, "But in Europe they think..." Rabin cut him off and said: "It is not important what they think in Europe; what is important is what they are saying in America." The roots of this world view were planted in his days as ambassador to the United States, and as prime minister. Clearly, it is not a view that is unique to Rabin. Sources close to Peres say that despite his inclinations toward Europe and its culture, it was often difficult to convince Peres of the importance of visiting that continent as prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. A decided majority of Israeli politicians only see Europe as a stopping-off point on their way to the United States.

There is also no doubt that the \$3 billion in American aid helps to concretize the American orientation of Israeli politics. Many politicians have openly admitted that Europeans are willing to donate advice but are not willing to finance their good counsel to us. Further, Europe, which changed its position toward us after 1967, has yet to promise Israel the support and unconditional friendship that the United States has always offered, at least up to now. The Jewish mind learned quickly to adapt to the new reality and successfully maneuvered the line between "clear friends" in Europe and all the rest.

Even now, long before the finalization of a united Europe, that continent has a well coordinated political body. A source who frequents the corridors of European political activity related in this regard that: "An Israeli who at 10 am enters one of the European foreign offices has to take into account that the information he relates will reach all 11 other foreign offices in the Common Market within 2 hours." The political coordination that was lacking in the past and allowed us room to maneuver is coming together today with the help of a common political secretariat—a significant factor in the molding of Europe's policy, in decisionmaking vis-a-vis the United Nations and other international bodies. When the union is complete, Europe—even from a political point of view—will be a critical mass, whose weight will greatly surpass the current relative weight of each of the 12 countries separately. At this stage, it does not appear that this factor is being considered by the Israeli political system.

Assistant Treasury Minister Dr Yosi Baylin is aware of the problem from his previous position as general policy manager for the Foreign Ministry. When he raised, at the time, before the ministry's leadership the issue of our lack of appreciation and the omission of not appointing a special ambassador to the Common Market, his suggestion was brushed off as "not important." Only today, now that most countries maintain their largest embassy at the Community's headquarters are we considering the appointment of an ambassador to the Common Market.

Baylin sketches an almost comical picture of this situation. Israel's disregard for Europe has not gone unnoticed among those in charge of uniting Europe. In response, they simply mock us and speak cynically about the inconsequential visits conducted by various Israeli representatives to the European market—uncoordinated and lacking any broad planning.

During a visit conducted by Baylin recently to the Community's headquarters, a close friend said to him: "I do not understand you. When the Americans come to visit us, they arrive like a commando and finalize issues. You Israelis just come and visit. You have no idea what is going on. Things will close and you will not be on the inside."

Naturally, it is difficult for the Europeans, who are making tremendous mutual concessions to effect the union, to understand the depth of the breach between the Treasury (the Alignment) and the Economic Ministry (Likud), and between both of these and Ari'el Sharon's Ministry of Industry. Each assumes that the United Europe issue is his sole domain, but none of them are doing anything about it.

The Europeans, however, are better equipped to understand Israel's identity crisis. From more than one source, we hear ironic statements like: "You have to decide where you stand. You think you are American—but the Americans do not think you are. You are in Asia and you should remember that." Such comments accompany criticism on Israel's haughtiness, in terms which even the Americans avoid.

It is difficult to expect from politicians who jump from hurdle to hurdle, and from a population whose long-term thinking extends only to the next news broadcast, that they could absorb concepts like European unity in 1992. Of course, we all know that in the end, "everything will be all right," as the Levantine man is wont to say, and this story, too, will have a happy ending, as we have learned from watching American movies.

[Box, p 13] Singing in Europe, Kicking in Asia

The identity crisis, as well as political exigencies, have over the years divided Israel's affiliations with organizations and groups between two continents. Israel sings in Europe, in the framework of Eurovision, kicks a soccer ball in Okinawa, but sinks baskets in Europe. The national television network is a standing member of the European broadcasting network, but in weightlifting,

Israel is a standing member of the Asian Weightlifting Federation, whose main offices are in Tehran. And Israel's membership on certain European councils does not contradict our strange membership in the Organization of Arab Cities, whose seat is in Kuwait.

This data is taken from a list of hundreds of nongovernmental organizations in which Israel is a member. This division of identity has a long history. It began in the 1950s, when Israel wanted to demonstrate its inclination toward the geographic area in which it is situated, and became affiliated with scores of Asian groups. The concept did not withstand the test of reality. Many professional meetings and gatherings were cancelled because Asian countries were unwilling to host Israel, and due to Israel's inability to invite Asian colleagues to Israel. Even our activities in the context of UN organizations, working on a regional basis, where Israel ostensibly belonged to the Mediterranean region, were almost paralyzed for 30 years. Years of struggle in the end led to Israel's affiliation with labor and health organizations in Europe, on a "temporary" basis—in other words, until peace was achieved in the region.

The Foreign Ministry, by the way, defines Israel as part of the European region—a favor on the part of Israel to the international organizations, so as not to paralyze their activities in Asia. Notwithstanding, there is no doubt that Israel's affiliation with hundreds of European organizations has no small political benefit to Israel. These memberships deepen our ties with Europe, in the struggle between Israel and the Arab countries.

In this double game there is often a concrete loss. As a member of the World Health Organization in Asia, Israel was considered the most developed nation in the group, and received considerable monetary support. The move to the European region was a political victory, but a financial loss.

Poll Taken on Negotiations With PLO

44000158 Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 3 Jan 90 p 2

[Text] According to a poll conducted by Dr Avraham Diskin of the Hebrew University Political Science Department, 50 percent of Jewish Israeli citizens believe that ultimately, Israel will negotiate with the PLO, while 37 percent believe that it will not. The survey was conducted at the beginning of December among 1,000 respondents, who were a representative sampling of the urban Jewish population. In answer to the question, "Do you believe that ultimately we will have to negotiate with the PLO?" 15 percent of respondents stated "definitely yes," 35 percent "yes," 12 percent "perhaps," 22 percent "no," and 15 percent "definitely no."

Results of Histadrut Elections Analyzed

44230059B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 17 Nov 89 pp 4,5

[Article by Nahum Barne'a: "The Last Battle"]

[Text] A man shouldn't be judged in his hour of suffering, but neither in his hour of joy. At 0130 in the morning, Yisra'el Kaisar, 3 hours after the polls closed, is seated in the conference room of the Central Electoral Committee, at the head of the longest table in the Middle East, which would have sufficed for the Versailles conference but is hardly enough to seat the 39 (!) members of the Histadrut leadership. He is dressed in a dark-blue jacket and a white, open-necked shirt, MAPAI [Israeli Workers Party] style, and he feels pretty good.

Next to him sits his wife Mazal. "You know, we went together with NA'AMAT [Pioneer Women—Histadrut women's organization]," Kaisar said. "Now Mazal wants to represent NA'AMAT."

"I want to thank each one of you for helping Yisra'el," Mazal Kaisar said. "I'm an old woman. In the morning, when he leaves, I'm still asleep, and at night, when he comes home, I'm already asleep. I haven't worked enough for this, but I did do something: I didn't nag him. I didn't shout at him, I put up with this whole thing quietly, really quietly, and thank God, it's over."

The tone of Comrade Kaisar is familiar and intimate, and the public is warm and sympathetic. The Histadrut Executive Committee is one of those family businesses that are gradually disappearing from the country, from which one is not fired and one doesn't resign, and the life of the business is viewed as a long chain of weddings, bar-mitzvahs, condolence visits, and reduced-price hotel meals; everybody knows everybody else and intrigues may sometimes get to be too much, but the greatest taboo is spoiling the family atmosphere.

In that respect, that was a representative speech, in which Mazal Kaisar faithfully expressed the general feeling of the electorate to whom Yisra'el Kaisar owed his victory: the elderly. This population, who was seriously injured by the pension agreements, who has to struggle every day with Sick Fund ineptitude and rising staple prices, behaved just like Mazal Kaisar: didn't nag him, didn't shout at him, suffered in silence, really in silence, and on Monday voted for the Labor Party.

The Histadrut is an aging organization. This is the secret of Kaisar's power and the core of the problem that he will be leaving behind him. In the 4 and 1/2 years since the previous elections the number of people entitled to vote for the Knesset increased by about 250,000, but the number of people entitled to vote for the Histadrut dropped by about 50,000. Knesset Member [MK] Ra'anah Cohen (Alignment), who before the elections put together highly interesting statistics on the electorate, discovered that while the number of younger Histadrut members is dropping, the number of members 40 years old and over is increasing, and for the first time since the establishment of the Histadrut they are the majority. At least one-third of Labor voters in the present elections were 60 and over. As Pinkhas Lavon once said, it's a glowing victory in both senses of the word [the word for glowing also translates as warning].

The only weakness of this wonderful army of elderly-movement veterans is biological in nature. The Angel of Death refuses to stop at the gates of the Mish'an old age home; Ra'anah Cohen has calculated that some 60,000 Labor Histadrut voters passed away since the previous elections, compared to only 17,000 Likud voters. The veterans reservoir is dwindling and their grandchildren, the third historical MAPAI generation, often leave the Histadrut and soothe their guilt feelings at United and Maccabi Sick Fund facilities.

On the seventh floor of the building, people sang for Kaiser "A long life to this nation, how good that it is the way it is." But the truth is that most of the young members of this nation stayed home, and that was Labor's good fortune.

MK [Knesset member] Hayim Ramon (Alignment) was one of the many who didn't rejoice this week. We received about 420,000 votes for the Histadrut, he said. In order to win in Knesset we need 900,000; conclusion: Most of the votes we need are not to be found among the Histadrut.

The Last Kaiser

When Begin heard the results of the 1981 Histadrut elections his depression suddenly left him. He prayed the "Revival of the Dead" prayer and went on a tour of aggressive public speeches that brought him victory in the elections for Knesset and us the Lebanon war. In those Histadrut elections Likud lost almost 2 percent of its power, something that proved that electoral victory is at times a matter of perception rather than facts. When everyone expects defeat, a 2-percent loss is also a victory.

From this viewpoint the Labor has won a victory. The question how great and why is not that important. Practically speaking, the results gave the party everything it could wish for: absolute congress majority and rule over all the workers' councils. There was moral potential there, too. "We have exceeded expectations and have stopped the down-trend," said Secretary General Mikha Harish. "The Labor Party is once again fighting for its life."

Shim'on Peres, who followed this electoral campaign from a hospital bed like Menahem Begin in 1977, celebrated the victory, while Kaiser spoke of "signs of revival." Kaiser's attempts to impart national significance to the results sounded like hints of far-reaching personal ambitions. And indeed, on such euphoric occasions people tend to allow themselves to be swept away.

People are now asking how the election results will influence the future of the government. What impact will they have on internal Labor decisions, on forming a narrow government, early elections, and replacing Peres with Rabin, and how will they influence the constraints ministers' struggle against Shamir.

Chances are, they won't have any impact. If Yitzhaq Shamir was hoping that these elections would reinforce

his political stubbornness, he suffered a resounding defeat, but on the other hand, neither did Alignment's opposite position win endorsement. Likud's failure gave the constraints ministers some pleasure, and Alignment's relative victory saddened Labor's interim generation somewhat, but this modest display of emotions went nowhere. The voters' message focused on the polls address, namely on the Histadrut.

There are Alignment MKs (Ora Namir, for example), who compare the election results to the relative Alignment victory in the Knesset elections at the end of 1973; at the time, Alignment had just escaped the Yom Kippur fiasco by the skin of its teeth, and now it had a similar narrow escape from the failures of the Histadrut and the Workers Association. At that time, the punishment fully caught up with the party 4 years later, in the 1977 elections. In the Histadrut it will happen in 1993.

Kaiser received carte blanche to change the Histadrut system. He does not owe anything to any other parties or to his own. He doesn't even owe himself: According to the law, this is his last term. His public image is that of a positive man, reliable, without too big an ego, and innocent of ulterior motives and alien interests. The same thing used to be said about Shamir, until they stopped saying it. Kaiser will be required to show great determination, and should he find no ready source for it, he'll have to invent it.

Begin's Surprise

Ze'ev Binyamin Begin, the head of the Likud electoral staff, has a special talent to convincingly explain away failures that to others would not have happened at all. Likud made a grievous mistake in these elections in its choice of a candidate. In order to get people to vote one must create the illusion that the candidate stands a real chance of replacing the incumbent. That was the illusion that MAPAM [United Workers Party] successfully created around Ya'ir Tzaban. Ya'aqov Sham'ay, on the other hand, is the kind of man that doesn't allow for any illusions around his person.

Ovadia Ali or David Magen may have been more successful; Moshe Katzav, certainly, even Sham'ay, had he not burned himself out through years of strident and self-contradictory opposition. Popular estimates mention differences of up to 5 percent at the polls, which might have sufficed to give Likud its one-third and to make seeming Alignment victory appear like seeming Likud victory.

Begin explained that Likud's failure was in fact Kaiser's failure and that of the entire Alignment. "The major problem that we didn't manage to overcome was that many identified Likud members that the organizational apparatus even managed to reach, did not go out to vote.

"We asked people whether they were Histadrut members. They said, no, I only belong to the Sick Fund. Our members' sense of obligation to the Histadrut is lower than that of Alignment members.

"The significance is, I think—which surprised me—that there is a frightening amount of alienation among workers, among blue-collar workers and the Histadrut. Even we didn't succeed to break through it, or did not succeed enough. We did not break through the psychological barrier. And I ask, if we didn't succeed, what are the chances of a young man like Amir Peretz or Eli Ben-Menahem?"

"What else could we have done that we didn't? The prime minister came and spoke, so did Sharon; Beni Begin ran the staff, money was invested in inches (advertisements) and in the organizational machine. But it still didn't take off.

"After 12 years in power," Begin summed up, "Alignment is still viewed as establishment. It is a surprising notion."

Dar'i Lacked the Strength

Alex Biletzky, Alignment's public relations man, feels victorious: his client got what he wanted. All that he has to do now is translate his victory into well-padded contracts with Histadrut companies. Labor is his security.

But only politicians and journalists think that advertising was the main thing. Of far greater influence was a series of doubtful maneuvers, beginning with the violation of Histadrut regulations and voting systems, through irregular use of Histadrut companies for campaign purposes, and ending at the polling booths. At least three workers' councils—'Afula, Lod, and probably Qiryat-Malachi—were carried by kibbutz and moshav votes. On the eve of elections I was willing to bet that there would be a delay in recording poll results in Haifa. It seems that there is always a delay in recording results in Haifa: people are very creative there. And indeed, there was a delay, and a heavy cloud of uncertainty hang over the results until Thursday morning.

Kaisar wisely concluded a series of coalition agreements before the elections. MK Ya'ir Levi of SHAS [Torah Observing Sephardim] sat on the Alignment electoral staff. He claims that SHAS brought thousands of votes to Alignment; as an example he brings his own city, Tiberias, where SHAS voters tipped the balance. Mikha Harish, too, was involved in this agreement: Kaisar's photograph with Ovadia Yosef greatly helped Alignment propaganda in development towns.

SHAS did not run this time because Arye Dar'i and others after him said they didn't have the physical strength to swing another election, and were ready to keel over with so much success. In exchange for the photograph with Ovadia Yosef SHAS received a seat in the Central Electoral Committee and financial promises. Ya'ir Levi calculated that promises were worth more money to SHAS than what the CRM [Citizens' Rights Movement] was getting from the Executive Committee till for its 4 percent of the votes. Nevertheless, at the next elections SHAS is going to run alone. Its leaders have just

discovered that the Histadrut is an enormous source of money and jobs, and no one is going to take their toy away from them.

What will you demand, I asked Levi. To raise the level of kosher-food requirements at Histadrut company kitchens, he said, and added just to be on the safe side: for example.

Tzaban's Hot Seat

Ya'ir Tzaban, MAPAM, for his part, wants a kosher kitchen at the Giv'at Haviva Academy. He has already spoken to members about it. If we want to bring workers there, we must adapt ourselves.

Tzaban reaped a great personal victory in these elections. Less than 20,000 municipal Histadrut members voted for MAPAM at last year's Knesset elections. About 40,000 city residents voted for it now. They were won over by the promise that Tzaban will build them a new Histadrut. For the first time since the 1950's MAPAM won real city workers' votes. Those votes came in part from the fringes of Likud.

Now the real battle will start within MAPAM. The party has 180 workers on the Executive Committee and Workers Councils. Those people's salaries, secretaries, and cars depend on alliance with Labor. The National Kibbutz Movement has economic and political interests in this alliance, and everyone is sweating. Just before the elections they held back Efrayim Zhiloni, MAPAM's representative in the Electoral Committee, by force, so he wouldn't run to Kaisar and ask to form a coalition. Despite MAPAM's numerical victory, it did not fulfill its dream of becoming the balance pivot. "Without MAPAM," Ra'anan Cohen told Kaisar on the eve of the election, thereby winning a light and strictly temporary burst of applause. "Don't obligate yourself," Kaisar hastened to cool his enthusiasm.

The truth is that the voters sent MAPAM into the opposition. Only there will it be able to replace the tea-drinkers it now has in Histadrut and to create the public image of an independent party. If Tzaban wishes to rally the same voters in Knesset elections, he cannot treat them like disposable diapers, use them and toss them away. Or maybe he can. David Levy did that to Likud voters in 1981 and nothing terrible happened to him.

Pounded Like Meat

HA'ARETZ Nazareth correspondent 'Ata'llah Mansur claimed that the communist party had only itself to blame for the catastrophe it suffered in the Histadrut election: Every year the communists send their best sons to study medicine in East Bloc countries. When they come back and discover that there are no jobs for them with the Histadrut Sick Fund, they open clinics in Arab settlements in cooperation with Maccabi, Me'uhedet,

and Le'umit Sick Funds. Families and members follow them, and thus the backbone of the Communist Party leaves the Histadrut.

A captivating explanation, but it probably doesn't cover the full extent of RAKAH's [New Communist List] failure.

If I were with the General Security Service [SHABAK] I would follow this process with more than a little concern. According to the description of MK 'Abd-al-Wahhab Darawishah, who also suffered disappointment in the election, not only is RAKAH falling apart, but all its establishment forces are collapsing. The question is who will replace them.

Some 90,000 Arabs voted in this election, less than one-fourth of the Arabs who can vote in the next Knesset elections. The Labor Party, Darawishah said, received over 40,000 votes. The joint RAKAH, Progressive Party, and Darawishah list received some 35,000. The failure has probably killed chances of an alliance among those three parties against rising Islam.

Darawishah explained the failure through several tactical reasons, including RAKAH's stinginess: RAKAH refused to pay campaign workers, while Alignment did pay, and how. For Alignment voted those who always vote Alignment. The Islamic Movement, who allowed its members freedom to vote as they wished, helped the Alignment in the Triangle and in the Negev. We're not talking massive support, Darawishah said. Most Islamic Histadrut members stayed home or scattered their votes.

Three currents can be discerned in the Arab sector, said Darawishah: the communists, the fundamentalists, and the national secular current. At the next Knesset elections the Islamic Movement will appear on its own. Its requests will be monetary, not political. Not unlike Agudath Yisra'el.

I asked him if he is considering joining Shaykh Darwish's faithful, since they are the ascending force. He said he has been approached, but he cannot bring himself to, he and his family would have to change their life style. "Most Arabs prefer a secular life style," he said. "The religious are a minority among us, like among Jews."

Darawishah was angry. The Labor Party will deduce from this election that however much they may pound on Arabs, they can still buy their votes later.

Pound on them how, I asked. Like meat?

Like meat, answered Darawishah.

Just like the Jews.

RAKAH Changes Leadership, Representation

44230058A Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 30 Nov 89 p 8

[Article by Pearl Shahrar: "Wall of Secrecy Collapsing"]

[Text] The thunderous collapse of the Berlin wall has finally managed to put some cracks in the wall of secrecy surrounding the RAKAH [New Communist List] party. Little by little it began to transpire that something was happening in the Israeli communist party. The shocks traversing the party are the result of accumulating events that last week came to a head with the decision to replace the party's representatives in Knesset.

To realize the full impact of this decision one must recall that we're talking here about the oldest Knesset team. MK [Knesset member] Me'ir Vilner, 71, was one of the signatories of the Independence Charter, while Tawfiq Tubi, 68, served in the Knesset since its establishment. Senior party officials will undoubtedly point out that the major reason for this unprecedented decision to freshen up the leadership was due to the fact that in the last Knesset elections RAKAH won only four seats. "It never would have happened with five seats!" said one RAKAH official.

Reports that leaked out immediately after the elections said that one of the Central Committee's decisions called for rotation of the Knesset list and for the resignation of one MK so as to make room for the one following him on the list, who happened to be Hashim Mahmud, the former Umm al-Fahm mayor.

MK Charlie Biton agreed to be the candidate for rotation, on condition that he be given a good place on the Histadrut list. Biton, who had just been pardoned for the "bottle stealing" affair at the beginning of his activities with the Black Panthers, emphasized the importance of social issues and the need to focus on the struggle to eliminate social gaps. The agreement was not kept, and Biton retracted his willingness to resign from the Knesset. Nevertheless, the Central Committee members turned down Tawfiq Tubi's generous offer to cede his seat to Mahmud.

The party now intended to close its accounts with Biton, too, but the latter beat them to the draw and announced that he was establishing a one-man faction.

Just as the plot was thickening, Me'ir Vilner announced, at a press conference on his return from the Soviet Union, that the three MAKI [Israel Communist Party] MKs were willing to retire from parliamentary life. His announcement was received with skepticism; this week, however, it turned out that it contained more than a hint.

But that was almost the tip of the iceberg. The changes affecting RAKAH began at the party newspaper, AL-ITTIHAD. Editor in Chief Emil Habibi, who is also a well known writer, announced that he was staging a protest against the changes, including those in the party leadership. His protest took the form of not showing up for work at the newspaper. His deputy filled his place and was later appointed to replace him. Emil Habibi resigned from the party bodies, but not his party membership.

Habibi's step should not be viewed as a marginal event, especially since this is a man who in the 1940's was one of the founders of the National Liberation League—the Arab communist organization in the country—and of AL-ITTIHAD. Once Emil Habibi got up and left it was no longer possible to conceal conflicts inside the party.

Tamar Gorzinski, who, together with Hashim Mahmud and Muhammad Nahfa (a Druze writer from Bayt Jan, who is secretary of the League of Communist Youth) is slated to replace the old team in the Knesset, said there was no doubt that the changes occurring in the socialist world have their impact on party affairs, too: "Developments in the Soviet Union and the socialist world have undoubtedly brought to the fore the need to reexamine assumptions that in the past we accepted without questioning. I, personally, for example, never thought that a day would come when a governing communist party would lose power. Reality turned out much more complex. I thought that a just social system and the rule of the workers class ensure greater democracy. Now I discovered that a need for change toward greater democracy can arise under a workers' regime, too." Gorzinski stressed that the changes will be felt in the contents of the party's newspaper, too, which is a reflection of what is happening in the party: "The newspaper is more open; it contains various opinions, and there is closer contact between leadership and members. We decided that at the next congress we will change the party statutes. The members were invited to send in suggestions, and some of them were truly revolutionary as far as RAKAH is concerned. For example, there was a proposal to limit the number of terms that a person can serve in a senior position."

Emil Habibi is indifferently watching from the side. He claims that this is nothing but make-believe: "The leadership is not changing. Me'ir Vilner remains the party secretary general and Tawfiq Tubi will continue to be in charge of the secretariat." Habibi has been out of things for 6 months already, but he claims to have had his finger on the pulse and to have been watching for real changes, which failed to materialize: "There is no freedom of opinion in this party. Articles I sent to AL-ITTIHAD were never published. No one can now express any views different from the ones decided by the leadership. The changes that are currently carried out in the Knesset are designed to consolidate the existing system. It is still Vilner and Tubi who are preparing the Congress, and they will only reinforce their own position."

To that RAKAH members reacted by saying that congress elections are secret and there is no automatic hand count; no one is assured of anything.

Activists Demand Funding for Uprising From Drivers

44000156 Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 4 Jan 90 p 6

[Text] Drivers in the Gaza Strip have reported that masked men and intifadah activists have recently been stopping them and demanding NIS 5 [New Israeli Shekels] for funding of the intifadah. According to the

drivers, the masked men claimed that they had been sent by the Unified Leadership of the Uprising [ULU]. Most of the drivers pay the NIS 5, and some pay more. According to security sources, this indicates a lack of funds for the activities of the ULU, which have thus far come from outside Israel, especially Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Jerusalem Police Affected by Intifadah

44230058C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 16 Nov 89 p 13

[Article by Re'uven Shapira: "Jerusalem Claims Its Own"]

[Text] In the past 2 years, about once every 2 months, I, a police officer with one of the elite criminal investigation units of the police, packs a small bag with personal effects and goes to Jerusalem for at least 1 week to reinforce local police forces. Like many others from all police forces throughout the country, I, has served about 10 tours of 1-week reinforcement duty in Jerusalem since the beginning of the intifadah. Some of his colleagues have done it 15 and even 20 times already.

Every time he goes to Jerusalem within this framework (more precisely, within the framework of the "premeditated" campaign decreed by the police commissioner immediately after the onset of the intifadah), I, is compelled to leave behind a desk full of uncompleted investigation files and missions. He is also disconnected from field work and information collection, and from contact with his sources. No one replaces him during his absence.

This is only one of the aspects of the impact of the intifadah on police work and on the crime situation. The intifadah took the Israeli police by surprise. They were immediately required to provide a speedy solution for preserving security and order in Jerusalem and its surroundings (which were annexed to Israel and where the police is responsible for implementing law and order) and for dealing with disruption of the peace and violations of the law in various parts of the country, especially in the Arab sector, which were influenced by intifadah events in the territories.

Thus, solutions had to be devised despite already insufficient budgets and manpower shortages.

The strength of the police force has shrunk in the past 15 years. According to police figures, in 1976 we had 16,605 policemen, while in 1989 we had only 16,521. Added to that figure are 1,500 policemen paid by foreign factors and employed for specific tasks, who cannot be used for current police activities.

Even the increased internal police proficiency developed in recent years—which brought about changes in operational deployment and permitted the formation of new units—was not enough to solve problems. In 1980 only 9,733 policemen (56 percent) were employed in classical

police work in the field, including the territories. Today, after improvements, 12,999 policemen (72 percent) are employed in field work. Further cuts are not possible, say police sources.

Slots allotted to staff, management, and support jobs are already minimal. The intifadah required redeployment and made it necessary to funnel budgets to certain areas at the expense of others. The police sped up the establishment of four special patrol units designed for speedy intervention in massive disruptions of the peace in the Galilee, the valleys, Haifa, and in the Triangle. Each such unit is made up of 50 specially trained and equipped policemen with fast vehicles. A police station was opened in al-Taiybah in the Triangle, and four new border police companies were formed, two of which were stationed in Jerusalem. The special border police anti-terrorist unit was beefed up by dozens of new slots. For that purpose 670 slots were freed from the existing police forces (after releasing some that had been frozen following past budget cuts).

The new units were formed at the expense of reinforcement that had been planned for this year in the area of drug interdiction (about 200 slots had been earmarked for antidrug activities), and precluded expansion and reinforcement of cruising, traffic, and investigation units and more extensive deployment of such units in the Arab sector. That will have a negative impact on police operations in the coming years, since the intifadah did not contribute to reducing drug and crime problems throughout the country and may even have exacerbated them.

Since the main problems caused by intifadah events occurred in East Jerusalem and surrounding areas and villages, with extensions to the western part of the city, by the beginning of 1988 the police command decided to give top priority to reinforcing the capital. About 1,100 policemen from police stations throughout the country were dispatched to Jerusalem within the first few months under the "premeditated" campaign, which has since become routine procedure.

Jerusalem policemen are reinforced on a permanent basis by about 1,000 men from throughout the country on 1- to 2-week tours of duty, almost doubling the city's police forces. Each police unit allocates a permanent number of policemen and officers for this duty. They are deployed in permanent sectors, which they learn to know over time, with their problems and inhabitants. Reinforcement troops come to the city with their own commanders, communication equipment, and vehicles, of which field police units are, of course, deprived.

Dozens of police vehicles from various units are in Jerusalem on a permanent basis. In recent weeks, when 150 vehicles were set on fire, many of them in the western part of the city, the police forces were increased even further. Ten detective teams, a special patrol unit from Haifa, and additional antiterror units were added; their main mission is covert search for arson suspects.

Naturally, reinforcement troops are cut off from their own units and current crime-fighting jobs. Their stay in Jerusalem is for indefinite time spans.

The reinforcement troops have had a good effect on quieting the situation in Jerusalem, but their original units have been having problems. Police Commissioner David Kraus is aware of that fact: "Sometimes, as a result of the situation, we have trouble getting enough cruising cars out in accordance with regulations for each area. Consequently, reaction time to citizens' appeals is longer; there are not enough policemen in the field, and people who come to file complaints have to wait longer.

"There are not enough investigators to deal with cases. Fortunately, civil guard volunteers help us operate and man cruising cars. Case files are piling up at every police station in the country and in the territories. This month we were forced to cancel a national campaign to carry out execution orders, of which we had about 100,000 backed up. Hundreds of manpower slots and additional budgets must be immediately added to the police forces."

Jerusalem District Chief Deputy Commander Arye Bibi is pleased with the reinforcements. He stressed that in the past 2 years the police has become more proficient in the struggle against the intifadah. Operation tactics have improved and the police are better prepared for action. Extensive police presence in the city and its vicinity is bearing fruit. There is extensive covert action and information collection that serves to take rioters by surprise. There are fewer demonstrations and mass disturbances of the peace. According to him, Jerusalem police is acting only in accordance with Israeli law and is strictly observing shooting regulations. Policemen are capable of dealing with disturbances without using live bullets and there is no need, according to him, to shoot plastic bullets in the city, either. Gas and rubber bullets suffice.

Policemen have clear orders not to beat people, not to use violence, and not to destroy or damage property when entering homes. Each event and complaint are checked, he said, under microscope; an investigating officer is appointed and lessons are learned.

The intifadah events forced the police to take special logistical and supply measures and brought about unforeseen expenses. Special police expenditures are estimated at about 44 million shekels in the past 2 years. The money was spent on, among other things, 550,000 overnight accommodations for reinforcement troops in Jerusalem, special transportation, securing 500 police cars with special nets, and mounting polycarbonate coverings on about 250 border police jeeps and command cars to protect them from stones and Molotov cocktails. Funds were also expended on troop upkeep and equipment—for example, 1,200 winter jackets were ordered for border policemen, as well as helmets, clubs, shields, gas and rubber ammunition, and mobile phones. According to the police, only 29 million shekel were provided by the Treasury.

The special requirements raised by the intifadah and related events made training suffer. Some 38,000 training days for cadets at the Shefar'am National Police Academy and the main border police training base went to the intifadah. Another outcome was that local policemen in the territories resigned. More than 700 of the 900 local policemen who served in the territories at the onset of the intifadah resigned. Only 200 Israeli policemen, some of whom are Israeli Arabs, were recruited and stationed in the territories to replace them. According to senior officers, this seriously affected police operations in all sectors in the territories. Traffic policemen are taken away from inside the Green Line and dispatched to deal with traffic in the territories. In addition, inside the Green Line, traffic policemen can work alone, thus contributing to high efficiency, whereas in the territories traffic policemen must work at least in pairs.

At present, current police operations in the territories, especially where crime is concerned, are greatly limited. In order to carry out field investigations, the police need special preparations and previous coordination with the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces], which has to allocate security escorts. The army has its own priorities and cannot always spare troops for the police. A senior police officer said: "Sometimes, by the time you make it to the spot there is no longer any sense in proceeding with an investigation. Witnesses and findings disappear or are damaged. Finding witnesses becomes a problem, and suspects have time to escape."

The intifadah has brought about nationalistic manifestations inside the Green Line, too. Last year, 2,458 arson cases were recorded as compared to 1,771 cases in the year before the intifadah. (1,974 arson cases were recorded within the Green Line in the first 9 months of the year) Last year, 1,468 cases of stone throwing were recorded, as compared to 98 in the year prior to the intifadah, and 169 cases involving fire bombs, as opposed to 11 cases in the preintifadah year. Additionally, hundreds of files were opened for incitement and sedition, roadblocks, tire burning, displaying Palestinian flags, and inflammatory graffiti.

In the 21 months of the intifadah (until last September), the police arrested about 75,000 people as compared to 61,000 in the parallel period before the intifadah. This naturally increases the burden on detention facilities. Generally speaking, the level and extent of crime within the Green Line have not changed. This year there was a 6-percent increase in reported crimes; the increase in the Tel Aviv and Jerusalem areas was smaller: 1 to 2 percent only. A significant coefficient that has changed is the number of murder cases. In the first 10 months of the year there were 110 murder cases in Israel, compared to 56 in the same period last year. Some of the murder cases had nationalistic backgrounds. There was a great increase in murder cases in the territories. In the first 10 months of the year 125 murder cases were recorded,

compared to 38 in the same period of last year. Some of the murders involved elimination of people suspected of collaboration.

Since the beginning of the intifadah 100 percent less criminals were apprehended in the territories. While 70 percent of cases were solved before the intifadah, that percentage stands today at 37 percent. A significant drop was also recorded in the number of files opened in the territories for drug use and trade.

The head of the Investigations Department, Commander Kaspi, pointed out that despite the intifadah, cooperation between Israeli—Jewish and Arab—criminals and criminals from the territories continues to be extensive. Israeli criminals, for example, steal cars within the Green Line and pass them on to buyers in the territories, who pay for them in cash or drugs.

Jewish Settlements in Gaza Increase

44230030D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 8 Oct 89 p 13

[Article by Yerah Tal: "Nothing's New in the Wild West"]

[Text] "You are witnesses to an historic moment," declared Avi Farhan with pride, pointing to a group of surveyors at the edge of the road that runs between the 'Erez Roadblock and the settlement of 'Aley Sinai, exactly opposite Netiv Ha'asara, which was established by the evacuees from Yamit, next to the Green Line, but on the Israeli side.

The "historic moment" upon which we had happened by chance was the beginning of the work on the construction of the permanent site of Nisanit, one of 15 settlements of the Qatif Region and 6 additional ones that are planned for the near future. The person responsible on behalf of the regional council for the group of surveyors was not happy about the appearance of representatives of the media, and referred us to his superiors on the council. Menahem Beit-Halahmi, who is responsible for settlement in the Qatif Region on behalf of the regional council and also serves as the council's spokesman, had intended to maintain a "low profile" this time. "This is not connected with politics. From this viewpoint, we have no problems. We simply fear the evil eye. We've come a long way, full of delays and obstacles, until we arrived at this moment. People are already fed up with promises that weren't fulfilled, so we're careful about celebrating too soon," he says. Since 1984, the first 15 families of the settlement, which belongs to the 'Amana movement of Gush 'Emmunim, have been in a training camp where there had previously been a NAHAL [Fighting Pioneer Youth] outpost. The settlement has been given about 2,000 dunams of state lands in the vicinity of the training camp.

A fancy brochure that was prepared by the regional council states that 50 housing units will be built in the permanent settlement in the first stage. According to the

brochure, the settlement is planned to be a garden city with about 2,000 families. "The proximity of the settlement to 'Ashqelon (about 10 km) allows the rapid absorption of families while relying on sources of employment in 'Ashqelon. The settlement will be built next to the sea, and it will be possible to develop means of production also in the tourism field." Beit-Halahmi says that about 400 families had signed up for Nisanit, but most of them dropped out due to delays in the construction of the permanent settlement.

The Qatif bloc today consists of 15 settlements that are concentrated in three blocs of settlement. One is in the north of the region and includes 'Aley-Sinai, Nisanit, and a planned settlement—Dugit; a central bloc includes Kibbutz Netzarim, next to which will be built Netzarim B; and the largest of the three blocs is in the southern part of the region and includes 10 settlement points. The region now holds about 650 families, which number about 3,000 souls. The overall settlement plan calls for no less than 6,000 families in the year 2000, about 30,000 souls, a 10-fold increase in the Jewish population in the Gaza region. No less than six new settlements are planned to arise in that period in the Gaza region, one in the north of the region, one in the center, and four in the south.

Of the existing settlements, five are moshavei 'ovdim [small-holders' settlements], two are moshavim shitu-fiyim [small-holders' cooperative settlements], one is a kibbutz, and the rest are community settlements. About 80 new families will be absorbed in the region by the end of the year. According to Beit-Halahmi, only four families left the region this year, "none of them due to the intifadah," he adds.

Beit-Halahmi says that were it not for the method of absorption dictated by the Jewish Agency Settlement Department, the population of the Qatif Region would be much larger. A candidate for settlement must undergo a long series of tests and interviews, during which more than a few families are rejected and others are deterred from submitting their candidacy. "We've reached the conclusion that the method must be changed, and that we must go from the method of community absorption to urban absorption, to offer to the entire people of Israel to come live in the region. Only in that way can we attain a massive number of settlers," says the person responsible on behalf of the regional council for settlement in the Qatif Region.

Those who responded to the call and dreamt of a single-family home in the Qatif Region were disappointed. While it was under construction, they were required "to undergo basic training"—as one of the settlers described it: to live in trailer homes under difficult conditions until construction of the permanent settlement. Many dropped out on the way.

Judging from a quick visit, there is no feeling of transience in the settlements of the Qatif Region. Declarations in the style of "Gaza First" and Mubarak's 10-point plan have not caused any fears among the

residents. In the religious moshav of Ganey-Tal, which a few weeks ago celebrated the 10th anniversary of its going up on the land, there were those who interpreted the presence of President Hayim Herzog at the celebrations as government support for settlement in the region. This was despite the fact that the president, in his greetings, noted that no political significance should be ascribed to his visit. "I am convinced that here we will not repeat the Yamit story," says Ari Ben-Canaan, the secretary of the moshav.

Ganey-Tal is one of the few settlements in the Qatif Region that has experienced the intifadah. To this day one can see the stains of the heating oil that was splashed by unknown persons in the tomato and flower hothouses in the settlement. Hundreds of tons of heating oil caused damage estimated at hundreds of thousands of shekels. In a few hothouses, the growers had to raise their crops under plastic bags. The attack on the hothouses of Ganey-Tal is only one of a series of acts of sabotage against Jewish property that reached their peak with the arson at the regional packing plant. Jewish settlers destroyed in revenge dozens of hothouses of Arabs of Tel Zu'eyda, a village south of Gaza. The head of the Gaza Shore regional council, Tzvi Hendel, in attempting to justify the Jewish settlers' act of revenge, said immediately after the incident, "The Arabs must be shown that it is impossible to sabotage our hothouses, our orchards, to burn a modern packing plant at the height of the export season—and not get hurt." The few connections that existed between the Jewish settlers and their Arab neighbors have been almost broken off since the outbreak of the intifadah. "Once, our women went to Rafiyah for purchases and men went to local barbers. We would visit each other, but it's all over," says Menahem Beit-Halahmi, a resident of Neve Dekalim, the largest of the community settlements in the Gaza region, near Khan Yunus. The settlement is inhabited mainly by religious Jews. The settlement was built on sand dunes full of vegetation and palm trees and overlooking the sea. Operating there are the Yamit Yeshiva, a military yeshiva, a Torah research institute, a seminary, an institute of higher learning for rabbis, the Torah and Land Institute, and others.

Among all the settlement points in the region, Kfar-Yam, near Neve Dekalim, stands out as an exception. This "settlement" is inhabited today by one family and a bachelor. They repaired and settled in five abandoned buildings that had served as rest homes for Egyptian army officers. Two former kibbutz members—Nir Peleg (33), married and the father of two, and Shaya Deutsch, from 'Azorim—had looked for a new place in which to settle down. They were captivated by the charm of the seashore, squatted in the abandoned houses, and began to repair them at their own expense. The authorities approved their occupation of the place and, in exchange, they have to ensure that no one will squat in the abandoned buildings that stand along the seashore. They have been living there for 5 years, but electricity has not yet been connected. The regional council refuses to

finance electrification of the settlement. The refusal is due to the fact that many of the religious settlers do not like the eccentric group that has congregated at the place and has disturbed the social homogeneity that was cultivated in the region. Nir Peleg is angered when he is called a squatter. He prefers the word "settler." Nir has fixed up three buildings, and has taken over part of the beach and prevents visitors from taking over there. He says that he occupies the land legally. Up to 6 months ago, it was not possible to repair the other buildings due to an appeal to the High Court of Justice by an Arab resident in the vicinity who asserted ownership of the buildings and the land. The appeal was denied about 6 months ago.

Nir has no ideological problem with his residence in the place, despite his being a graduate of the labor movement and a former kibbutznik. He does not believe that he, and others like him, will be a barrier on the road to achieving a peace settlement. Such a settlement does not require, in his opinion, the removal of settlements and the return of territories.

In his opinion, it would have been possible to arrive at a situation of nonbelligerence (this, in his opinion, is the situation that exists today with Egypt) also without the return of the Sinai. It's a fact, he adds, that we also live in peace with Jordan without having returned territories.

"The settlement in Judaea and Samaria is more ideological than in the Gaza region. Therefore, when the time comes, when the question of the return of territories is on the agenda, it will be easier to evacuate the residents of the region. Understandably, in exchange for generous financial compensation, at least like what was received by the evacuees of Yamit," admitted one of the settlers in the region. "As one who has been through that story once, I am not sticking my head in the sand and I am not saying that the story of Yamit cannot repeat itself also in the Qatif Bloc," says 'Avi Farhan. But the chance that this will happen is smaller, because in Judaea and Samaria and in the Gaza region, according to him, there is a stable and more determined nucleus than there was in Yamit, and it will be very difficult to move them out. Farhan says that if the residents of Yamit had shown the same determination that emanates from the residents of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza region, the government would have been deterred and sought alternatives to their evacuation.

Up to the point of an evacuation, the settlers and those responsible for the region believe that it is possible to do good business there despite the intifadah. In the room of Menahem Beit-Halahmi, there are development plans for projects in tourism, industry, and commerce. There is an intention to reopen the Qatif Shore Hotel, which went bankrupt and is now in receivership. "There is economic justification for a hotel in a place on one of the nicest beaches in the country. The reason that it went bankrupt is not connected with a small number of guests but rather with the failure to fulfill commitments by several bodies that had undertaken to invest in infrastructure," say the responsible persons in the regional

council. They give as an example the youth hostel that operates nearby. Last year, it recorded more than 21,000 overnight stays. The hotel is to reopen after the Knesset Finance Committee approves the transfer of 16 million shekels to the Jewish Agency Settlement Department, which will purchase and operate the hotel. Another project is the development of the Shikma beach in the northern part of the region. The development plan includes the development of 1,200 meters of beach that will include hotels, a vacation village, a restaurant, and more. An organized bathing beach operates there today. Farhan rejects assertions that he has taken over the beach and made a fortune out of it. According to him, he won in legal bidding and has lost a lot of money.

In aerial photographs, 'Aley Sinai appears surrounded by cultivated plots. According to Farhan, these are lands that were taken over by local Arabs. "The time will come when we'll clean them out, too," he promises. The Jewish settlement has attracted Arab settlement. Everywhere that a Jewish settlement was built, the local Arabs began to work the land.

The agricultural settlements in the Qatif Region are worried by the smuggling of cheap agricultural produce by the Arabs of the Gaza Strip into Israel. In Moshav Ganey-Tal they tell of bills of lading that were sold to Jewish merchants for thousands of dollars in order to help them cover the smuggling of cheap Arab produce. However, most of the livelihood of the settlements depends not on the local market, but on exports. Eighty percent of tomato exports come from the hothouses of the Qatif Bloc settlements.

The Qatif Bloc does not show signs of transience. New cases are being established in the field every day. It is interesting whether the Minister of Finance, who proposed the "Gaza First" plan, knows that in the future he will have to finance the building of a national road the length of the region going from north to south, and several roads going from east to west, that will connect the Qatif Region with the western Negev. The same holds true with regard to the water system. The system depends today on local wells, and in the future it will be backed up by the National Water Carrier. The infrastructure and communications system that is being built in the region is intended to serve a much larger Jewish population than exists today. No efforts are being directed to rehabilitating the Arab population in the Strip. Up to now, most of the clashes have been between the Arab population and IDF [Israel Defense Forces] soldiers. But a senior source in the administration says that as the sense of frustration at the lack of a solution grows, confrontations between the Arab population and the Jewish population in the Gaza region will increase. "Even six more settlements and several hundred Jewish settlers will not be able to extinguish this fire, and will instead fan it."

In conclusion, it's like a picture taken from a Wild West film. At the 'Erez Roadblock, several Israeli citizens sit in front of the restaurant van. They are all wearing

pistols. The Arabs who pass through the roadblock after they present magnetic cards don't dare come close.

Poor Reportedly Getting Poorer

44230058B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 23 Nov 89 p 11

[Article by Lili Galili: "The Line Far Away From the Heart"]

[Text] Every Social Security report on poverty statistics in Israel stuns both the public and the authorities, although they should have known. Post-publication statements sound like reactions to the discovery of some remote tribe whose customs are for the first time revealed to the stirred Israeli public. The only problem is that this "tribe" of about half a million of our countrymen living below the poverty line are among us all the time, albeit out of sight and out of mind. A few days later, the national catharsis having passed, we go back to the things that really matter. Poverty is once again pushed aside to its natural place on the fringes of society.

One of the problems with Israeli poverty is the fact that it is not visible. The 223,000 children living below the poverty line do not wander the streets or rummage around in trash cans, as they do in ubiquitous pictures from the third world. The "bag women" of American experience, carrying all their earthly belongings in one bag, are not a familiar sight in our country, either. Even poor neighborhoods here don't look like typical slums, perhaps because of the country's newness. That is one of the reasons that it is so easy to ignore poverty and not even see it.

Poverty in the Israel of 1989 is not synonymous with hunger or homelessness, but that doesn't make it less widespread or painful. There is no definition of absolute poverty in the world; the term is relative, determined in comparison to the other strata of the population. Even if we agree that Israeli poverty does not imply starvation, we now know that in some cases this poverty causes serious nutrition deficiencies. Given Israel's social structure, poor families not only have low incomes, but they also have other vulnerable points. Among this population there are one-parent families, families whose bread earners are elderly, and families who live far removed from population centers. Their socioeconomic situation also deprives them of the knowledge or skill required to properly manage the little money they do have.

Similarly, we should not wonder that the number of poor in the country has increased by 32,000. More than this increase, we should be worried by the static nature of the situation.

In the past 5 years a permanent class of poor people has struck roots in Israel, and every eighth citizen belongs to it. They form a sort of closed club from which there is no outward mobility, only new membership.

The last year brought important changes in the cycle of poverty. The main change is that this class is no longer poor only in income, but also in services, deriving from the cessation of public services in the areas of education and health. The well off population has created for itself a system of alternative "gray" or "black" services, while the poor became the hard-hit victims of payments imposed on nursery infirmaries and mental health care. In the past Israel was almost at the top of the ladder in the area of child vaccinations—95 percent. Today, welfare workers report dangerous drops and speak of whole areas where only 70 percent of the children receive vaccinations. It is no figure of speech to say that in 1989 Israel is raising a physically and emotionally less healthy generation.

The saying, "it's very expensive to be poor," frequently heard in welfare parlance, is not a metaphor, either, and it has become even more true in the past few years. The poor, shoved out of the way into the physical and social periphery, have no access to the privileges enjoyed by the well off population in the form of contacts and jobs. Paradoxically, the very fact of being poor makes them even poorer.

Figures concerning the increasing numbers of children below the poverty line also dispel the entrenched Jewish-Israeli myth of great care for future generations. The new Social Security balance sheet shows that the welfare system, while not doing any better by the elderly, is doing less for children. According to more than just the latest report, children constitute the weakest population category. In almost every society, care for the elderly has become the measuring stick for how humane the entire society is. How children are treated, on the other hand, is no gauge for anything. Because of their age and dependency, children have no electoral clout or ability to organize into pressure groups. This leaves them exposed to the arbitrariness of the government. At the same time, precisely in the case of children, time is a critical factor. Being neglected at an early age creates irreversible damage. The 223,000 children living today below the poverty line ensure a fourth generation of poor people. The public education and health services of which they have been deprived also perpetuate their lack of chances to escape this vicious circle.

The proposal of Social Security Director General Mordekhay Tzipori to restore the first-born allowance is viewed by those in charge of the issue as a very important step, although not sufficient, in the effort to break the cycle.

And a footnote concerning the situation: The poverty line, as it has been defined (480 shekels per capita in 1988), is an arbitrary definition. According to data on the previous 2 years (which there is no reason to believe have changed significantly), another 1 million Israelis live slightly above the official poverty line, but in practice they are on the borderline. Chances are that in the next report we'll find them among the "statistics," too.

Conflict Reported Between Civil, Military Justice

44230058E Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 19 Nov 89 p 9

[Article by Gid'on 'Alon: "State Advocacy Acrobatics"]

[Text] The harsh reality prevailing in the territories since the beginning of the intifadah has been steadily eroding human rights. Meting out collective punishments by boarding up or destroying houses, sending up thousands of suspects for lengthy administrative detention without trial, and pronouncing sentences that are too light on Jewish settlers attacking Arabs, or lightly punishing IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] officers (like Colonel Yehuda Me'ir) who were not brought to trial at all although they ordered their men to break arms and legs of prisoners, raise the question whether the state advocate's office is doing everything possible to prevent injustice and verdicts that run counter to the law.

Senior and veteran jurists at the advocacy office admit that they never had to wage such hard and exhausting struggles with leaders of the defense apparatus, who claim that we are at war in the territories, and that require emergency rights.

"We're like circus clowns, having to do all kinds of acrobatics and to walk a very thin rope," say state advocates. "We are in the midst of a very serious conflict. When we request defense rights for homeowners whose houses are about to be destroyed, defense forces officials tell us that in special and very serious cases involving brutal killing it is important to carry out immediate deterrent actions, and consequently defense rights have to be denied, otherwise the effect of immediate punishment would be lost. We tried to convince them to permit defense rights, and certain regulations were laid down as a result of our endeavors. But they are not always observed. The defense apparatus claims that even under Shamgar and Baraq as attorney generals houses of suspects were destroyed without the exercise of defense rights."

Similarly, some cases of deportation for seditious activities are not approved by the attorney general. However, in contrast to having houses boarded up or destroyed, every request for deportation is sent to the attorney general's office for approval, and the latter studies the request and checks whether clear and unequivocal proof exists that the deportation candidate played a major role in hostile terrorist activities. In many cases (which have not been published so far), requests for deportation were not carried out because the state advocacy explained to the defense apparatus that they would not stand up before the Higher Court of Justice.

The same applies to administrative detention. State advocates admit that this is a complex and problematic issue. "Of course we are not happy that suspects are sent to jail for 6 months—sometimes 1 year or longer—without trial. We told the defense apparatus that this is not desirable," jurists said. "We requested appropriate

legal monitoring, as well as improved conditions in detention facilities, but we cannot claim that it is not legal, because the Supreme Court ruled that in emergency situations it is permissible, as an emergency measure, to put suspects in administrative detention, and the defense apparatus claims that it is an effective method." The decision to allow IDF soldiers to open live fire on masked men is equally complex. At internal discussions with Justice Ministry staff, members of the defense forces claimed that masked men spread dread and terror in villages. After lengthy debates it was decided to allow soldiers to shoot at escaping masked men, but only for the purpose of apprehending them. However, state advocates are worried that soldiers in the field may not always observe regulations and may abuse the permission granted them.

Relations with the military judge advocate's office are also very involved.

According to the law, the chief judge advocate enjoys a special status by virtue of the extensive prerogatives invested in him under military law. His duty is to oversee the implementation of the law in the Army, and to instruct the filing or cancellation of indictment writs. The state advocacy is not allowed to interfere in his considerations and decisions, only to advise and to try to persuade.

The only sanction that the state advocacy can exercise against the chief judge advocate is not to defend his decision in the High Court of Justice, but that is an extreme step, taken only in cases in which the judge advocate's decision is extremely unreasonable or illogical. The state advocacy has not come to the conclusion that Brigadier General Strashnov's decision not to put Colonel Me'ir on trial was unreasonable in the extreme, and that is why it decided to defend it in court.

State advocacy jurists are plagued by doubts, dissatisfaction with the situation in the territories, and enormous efforts invested in attempts to persuade and negotiate. They reject criticism directed at them from the two extreme ends of the political spectrum. Gush Emunim, Tehiya, and part of Likud claim that "This is Ishma'el's advocacy, worried primarily about the interests of Arabs in the territories." On the other hand, Peace Now, CRM [Citizens' Rights Movement], and MAPAM [United Workers Party] claim that they are too lenient toward Jewish settlers attacking innocent Arabs, and that the advocacy has adopted the tough line prescribed by Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin toward rioters and law violators in the territories.

"We don't make policies, but the legally elected government does," say state advocacy sources. "We are not a party in the conflict for the future of the territories. Our job is to check whether actions carried out are illegal. We have to try to persuade, advise, warn, and exercise some influence. But we are not defense experts and we don't have the means to suggest alternative punishments when

the defense apparatus claims that administrative detention, house demolitions, and deportation are effective. We are also conscious of the fact that the alternative to the present measures is more drastic ones, something that we want to prevent at any cost."

The legal system, headed by Attorney General Yosef Harish (who is not sufficiently involved and active in current contacts taking place behind the scenes between the state advocacy and the defense apparatus), may come to the conclusion that there is no other alternative but to cease to cooperate. In other words, to inform the defense minister and the chief judge advocate that it refuses to represent them in the High Court of Justice. "However, such an extreme sanction will be taken only if we come to the conclusion that the actions taken are not legal, that we cannot live with them, and that we cannot defend them in court," officials said. That is what happened in the SHABAK [General Security] affair when it became clear that SHABAK leaders had lied, fabricated evidence, and disrupted legal procedures; a serious rift was opened at the time between then Attorney General Prof Yitzhaq Zamir and State Advocate Dorit Beinish, and then SHABAK Chief Avraham Shalom and his legal advisers.

The state advocate's office hopes that in spite of permanently tense relations with the defense apparatus, which claims that it has difficulties carrying out its security missions in the territories under the legal restrictions imposed on it, no deep rift will occur to disrupt working relations, as occurred with SHABAK heads in 1986. In the meantime, senior state advocate's officials confess: "We don't sleep well at night."

Statistics on 1989 Immigration Given

44000161 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 Jan 90 p 5

[Text] According to Ministry of Absorption officials, nearly 25,000 immigrants arrived in Israel in the past year, as compared with some 13,500 in 1988. Half of the immigrants—12,795—are from the USSR, as compared with 2,250 in 1988. In December alone, more than 3,500 immigrants arrived from the USSR.

Precision Telescopic Sights Issued to IDF in Gaza

44000160 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 31 Dec 89 p 2

[Text] Special precision telescopic sights are currently being distributed to Israel Defense Forces soldiers in the Gaza Strip who are authorized to fire plastic bullets in order to increase their level of accuracy in shooting and enable them to hit rioters in the legs. The soldiers are now being instructed in the use of the new sights. Military sources noted that since the introduction of plastic bullets, a significant decrease has occurred in the number of people killed in the Gaza Strip.

Airports Authority Issues 1989 Statistics

44000157 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Jan 90 p 6

[Text] According to statistics from the Israel Airports Authority, 3,519,534 passengers passed through Ben-Gurion Airport in 1989. Of these, 1,749,493 entered Israel, as compared with 1,646,795 in 1988. The number of passengers leaving Israel through Ben-Gurion Airport was 1,770,041 in 1989, as compared with 1,660,744 in 1988.

LEBANON

Iran Reportedly Involved in Amal, Hizballah Clashes

45000040 London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 18 Dec 89 p 4

[Text] A source close to the Amal Movement leader has disclosed the active participation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in the bloody battles which have flared up between Amal and Hizballah in the western al-Biqa' [Valley], [Beirut's southern] suburbs, Corniches al-Mazra'ah and al-Musaytabah where the Iranian cultural attache's office is located, and the rest of West Beirut's axes, which have faced heavy shelling from the Revolutionary Guard during the fighting.

The Lebanese source indicated that the Guardsmen had entered Beirut in the uniform of Hizballah fighters with the aid of a high-ranking Syrian officer who had received a large bribe from the Iranian charge d'affaires in exchange for his allowing the Guardsmen to cross from Ba'alabakk to Beirut.

Before the clashes erupted, (still in the words of the source close to Nabih Barri), the Iranian Embassy witnessed intense meetings attended by the leaderships of Hizballah and the Revolutionary Guard cadres. Attacks were planned against the Amal Movement in al-Biqa' and Beirut during these meetings. The Iranian charge d'affaires, Hoseyn Niknam, assigned the task of managing the battles to Abu-Hasan Yaghi (western al-Biqa'), Husayn al-Musawi (on the Ba'alabakk axis), and Mohammad 'Asakir [last name as published] (from the Guard leadership) in Beirut.

The Lebanese source also attributed the concentration of Amal Movement militia attacks on the Salim Salam bridge and al-Musaytabah to the Amal leadership's having received information concerning the whereabouts of some hostages in the Iranian cultural attache's office building. This is the building which houses the Iranian intelligence center, directed by Mohsen Armin. When Amal Movement commando forces got to within

three meters of the Iranian cultural attache's office, Syrian forces surrounded the building and prevented their approach.

The Lebanese source concluded his statements saying that Tehran has failed to delay the implementation of the Ta'if agreement despite the assassination of President Rene Mu'awwad at the hands of the Iranian regime's agents. The decisionmakers in Tehran have incited the launching of a murderous war against the Amal Movement with the aim of controlling Shi'ite decisionmaking.

SUDAN

New Opposition Alliance Unveils Plan To Restore Democracy

90OA0141A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT
in Arabic 4 Nov 89 pp 1-2

[Article: "Sudanese Parties and Unions Issue Political Action Covenant; Call for Transition Period Led by Sovereignty Council"]

[Text] Eleven political parties, 8 professional unions and 23 labor unions, besides officers in the armed forces and other regular forces in Sudan, have called for a 5-year transition period to pave the way for restoring democracy.

Furthermore, a pact issued under the name "the Democratic National Grouping Covenant," a copy of which has been received by AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, called for the creation of a 3-member sovereignty council during the proposed transition period representing the armed forces, the unions, and the political parties. This is provided that the party representative is a native of the southern region.

Besides this council, the covenant proposed the creation of a national council, comprised of representatives from the Democratic National Grouping with its three arms (parties, army, unions), to assume legislative and general policy functions and to elect the sovereignty council and the cabinet.

The covenant also provided for the establishment of national and executive councils in the regions on the condition that the southern region shall be ruled under the Regional Autonomy Law.

The political parties, unions, institutions, and officers who signed the covenant emphasized that "the choice" our people have opted for is the democratic choice based on: the sovereignty of the people, the multiparty and multicultural system, independent and effective popular and factional organizations, an independent judiciary, the sovereignty of the law, the guarantee of fundamental liberties, and the protection of human rights.

The covenant added that "Notwithstanding the fact that the democratic choice had become manifest, our country continued to suffer an acute governance crisis and to go

in a vicious circle that begins with a popular uprising, evolves into parliamentary rule, and ends with a military coup. Consequently, this democratic choice has failed so far to express itself in firmly-established institutions that can consolidate and safeguard it. This is because the powers that set off revolutions and uprisings lacked the ability to hold the reigns of power, thus placing authority in the hands of other powers that shun the people's fundamental causes circumscribed in their revolutionary charters, in the forefront of which is the consolidation of democracy. Transition periods end with the issuance of election laws that pay no heed to new power representation and remove new powers from decisionmaking positions and that strip democracy of its societal mainstays, leaving the door wide open for new strikes against it."

In talking about some of the attendant problems of the democratic experience, the covenant said: "Ignoring the new powers, autocratic sovereignty, faulty democratic practice, and failure to grapple with the people's fundamental issues and the concomitant corruption will inevitably lead to failure, frustration, and intractable crises.

"In our judgment, in order to get out of this crisis and break this cycle, the three political powers—the political parties, the unions, and the regular forces—must participate in power at the legislative, sovereign, and executive levels during the transition period and the subsequent democratic rule."

As for the transition period's mission, the covenant defined it as ratifying a constitutional document outlining the structures of democratic rule on the basis of this covenant and in accordance with principles that guarantee fundamental freedoms: freedom of organization, thought, belief, expression, publication, and movement and human right guarantees. This is in addition to an independent judiciary, separation of powers, independent higher education institutions, and an independent union movement while reaffirming the nationalism of the armed forces, the police, and other regular forces, the civil service and the mass media and protecting them against political meddling so that they may fulfill their duties and perform their national missions.

The covenant also reaffirmed the adoption of a foreign policy that emphasizes national sovereignty and is based on the preservation of mutual interests, goodneighborliness, nonalignment and the rejection of axes.

According to the covenant, the transition government shall repeal all freedom-restricting laws, the September 1983 laws in particular, and shall adapt the 1974 laws, save for the penal code which shall be replaced with a law the bar association drafted in 1987.

Other proposed functions of the transition government are the abrogation of agreements that infringe upon national sovereignty; the legitimization of political parties, unions, and popular organization; the licensing of newspapers approved by the competent authorities; the release of all political, union, and regular army prisoners; the reinstatement of those fired for political or arbitrary

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reasons; calling to account all those who had a hand in undermining the democratic system, not to mention those responsible for the post-April 1985 corruption; the disarmament of militias; the convocation of a constitutional conference to achieve lasting and just peace; establishing law and order throughout Sudan; and, finally, drafting a permanent constitution founded on the constitutional conference's resolutions.

The covenant also talked about an economic reform program, about alleviating difficult living conditions, about reforming the banking system, and about reforming and raising the efficiency of the civil service. It also mentioned support for the armed forces, the police, and other regular forces.

The parties that signed the covenant are: the Democratic Unionist Party, the Ummah Party, the Communist Party, the Ba'th Party, the National Conference Party, the National Forces Union Party, the Socialist Labor Organization, Sudan African Congress [SAC], Union of the Sudan African Parties [USAP], and the Socialist Party.

The professional unions that signed the covenant included the General Banking Federation, the Engineers' Association, the Agronomists' Association, the Pharmacists' Association, the Khartoum University Professors

Association, the Veterinarian Association, the Social Securities and the Medical Association, the Farmers Union, the General Federation of Employees, in addition to 33 labor unions, represented by the General Federation of Sudanese Labor Unions.

On the other hand, former Sudanese minister of the interior and Ummah Party leading member, Mr Mubarak al-Fadil al-Mahdi, issued in London a communique on the covenant in which he said that the covenant was signed last October 31 to coincide with the silver anniversary of the October revolution.

In his communique, he said: "This covenant has been signed by political powers representing parties, institutions, and unions, in addition to representatives from the armed forces and other regular forces. These powers are the pillars of the loyal national movement in Sudan, on which hopes of stability, national unity and democracy in Sudan are inevitably pinned."

He indicated that the covenant included tentative points of agreement with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Sudan, and that contacts and consultations with the movement are now under way to get its opinion on the particulars of the policies stated in the covenant to pave the way for it officially, joining the covenant and other national forces in Sudan.

INDIA

Post-Election Reportage

Interview With Dubai Paper

46001125 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 4 Dec 89 p 1

[Text] Bahrain, Dec. 3 (PTI)—The Prime Minister, Mr V. P. Singh, has asserted that the Bofors company will have to refund to the Indian government the money said to have been paid to middlemen in the gun deal.

The government, he said, would try to find out who got bribes in the Bofors gun deal. "The law of the land will prevail if it was found that the former Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, received part of the kick-backs," he told the Dubai-based daily, THE KHALEEJ TIMES in an interview published today.

He said commission paid to Indian middlemen in the submarine deal with West Germany will also have to be investigated.

"Here we are on surer grounds. The Indian ambassador in Bonn had sent a telex message saying that a senior official of that country had informed him about the commission," he added.

Asked if the government would demand that Bofors refund the money paid to middlemen in view of the understanding that no middlemen should be involved in the deal, he said, "certainly, Bofors will have to return that money to India."

The Prime Minister said that the interests of the country have to be secured. "Much of the information that we have not been able to get in this case was because of the outgoing government's pressure on Sweden not to let the truth come out. Once that is removed, most of the information we want will come out without any difficulty," he added.

In reply to a question that Mr Rajiv Gandhi may be harassed by the present government the way his mother, Mrs Indira Gandhi, was harassed by the Janata Party government over a decade ago, Mr Singh said, "I want to make it clear that we will not be vindictive. No St Kitts-type of scandals would be cooked up against him. But at the same time, the law of the land has to be enforced."

Speaking on Indo-Pakistan relations, Mr Singh favoured a dialogue with Pakistan to ensure that a nuclear race does not start in the sub continent.

"We should certainly avoid the path of going nuclear. Otherwise, it is going to be a tremendous strain on our resources. We should make all efforts to ensure that a nuclear race does not start in the sub continent.

"There is no harm in having a dialogue (with Pakistan) on this," he said.

Mr Singh said, "We are going for nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. However, reports have come that Pakistan is well advanced in the art of making the bomb, therefore, I think a response should come from Pakistan," he said ruling out the possibility of nuclear co-operation between the two countries in the near future.

Such co-operation depended on the state of relations that would be developed in the days to come, he said.

The Prime Minister said that his government's efforts would be to improve India's relations with all its neighbours. Referring to India's ties with Nepal, he said "an undue shock was given to Nepal (by Rajiv Gandhi government). There has always been a good understanding between the two countries. Even if there are a few differences in our relationship, they can certainly be sorted out in an amicable way. This trauma which Nepal had undergone (due to dead-lock on the Indo-Nepalese trade and transit treaty) was quite unnecessary," he said.

About India's role in Sri Lanka's ethnic problem, Mr Singh said "in the first place, it was a mistake to have sent our troops there. The whole affair had started on a wrong note. We favour a phased withdrawal of the Indian troops from Sri Lanka at the earliest. We want our boys back home at the earliest," he said.

In reply to a charge that India is trying to be a regional bully, Mr Singh said "we must remove such fears" from the minds of "our neighbours."

Reservation Policy Declared

46001125 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 7 Dec 89 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, Dec. 6 (PTI & UNI)—The reservation system for scheduled castes and tribes will be extended for another ten years, the Prime Minister, Mr Vishwanath Pratap Singh, announced here today.

Appropriate amendments in the constitution would be made to ensure the continuation of this policy, he said while speaking at a function in Parliament House to commemorate the death anniversary of Dr B. R. Ambedkar.

The function was also attended by two cabinet ministers, Mr Ajit Singh and Mr Ram Vilas Paswan.

Admitting that reservation by itself was no permanent solution, Mr Singh said it had to remain till these people were provided the basic necessities like food, clothing and shelter.

Mr Singh also declared that all laws regarding land reforms would be included in the ninth schedule to take them out of the purview of courts by enacting a constitutional amendment.

Mr Singh said this constitutional amendment was necessary to ensure that the poor got their rights without being entangled in courts.

Legislation had been enacted to protect the interests of the landless, but experience had shown that the land distributed by the government remained a "paper formality" and the people failed to get actual possession.

Commenting on the prevailing situation in this regard, the Prime Minister said it was like asking someone to a feast and then telling him not only to bring the ingredients for it but also to do the cooking.

Criticising the developmental process so far, Mr Singh likened it to snowfall which he said fell only on high mountain peaks leaving other areas unaffected.

Good Government Expected

46001125 Madras *THE HINDU*
in English 2 Dec 89 p 8

[Editorial: "The New Prime Minister"]

[Text] In the eyes of most people, Mr. V. P. Singh as the leader of the Janata Dal and Prime Minister is a first class choice. The electoral verdict that amounted to a rejection of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's Congress(I) Government was in a large measure a vote for him. In the momentous developments leading to a change of government at the Centre, his was the most significant role. When he resigned as Minister two years ago on the issue of corruption in high places, the Rajiv Gandhi administration lost its shine and reputation for honesty. And the Opposition that was looking for an alternative leader to offer to the people rallied round Mr. V. P. Singh even if some of the leaders were not quite reconciled to his rise. When the time of reckoning came, a large part of the electorate, particularly in the North, which turned away from the Congress(I) saw in his integrity and sincerity something that was refreshing and strikingly attractive. Yet, if the National Front and the Janata Dal needed some time to achieve a consensus in the choice, it not only brings out the unbridled personal ambitions and jealousies of some of the other leaders but also the amorphous character of the Janata Dal. There were also disquieting reports of the play of money and non-political forces but these fortunately, and for the time being at least, have been shown their place. The strange sequence of Mr. V. P. Singh proposing and Mr. Chandrasekhar seconding Mr. Devi Lal who in no time thereafter proposed Mr. V. P. Singh seems to have been part of a plan for the nonce to play up to the personal ego of the one time "Young Turk" and leave him in the cold minutes later. And the statements soon after by Mr. Chandrasekhar who regards the election a coup of sorts go to show that the process of reconciliation is not going to be all that easy. Any other outcome would, of course, have amounted to robbing the November verdict of its real meaning. With his image that stands undiminished in the public eye despite the several attempts to smudge it in the recent period and his credentials for running the administration established by his highly successful stewardship of the Finance Ministry, the people can now look forward to Mr. V. P. Singh providing a good government.

Even the immediate challenges that Mr. V. P. Singh faces cannot be underrated. The serious business of government formation is to be viewed against the fact that the Janata Dal is an amalgam of distinct groups with ambitious leaders. And running it on the basis of support from the Bharatiya Janata Party, on the one side, and the CPI(M) [Communist Party of India-Marxist], CPI [Communist Party of India] and other parties of the Left, on the other, is going to be extremely tricky. Mr. V. P. Singh has been asked to seek a vote of confidence in the space of 30 days. If anybody can pull it off, it is Mr. Singh who, it is worth recalling, has been able to rally them all under his persuasive leadership before the elections. One would hope the new experiment succeeds and helps clean the Central administration of all the rubbish that has been accumulating over the last few years. A very important positive step would be to push for real reconciliation in Punjab—a task which, with the change of regime, should pose fewer problems. And the question of holding the regional balance, now that the South has voted very differently, is one which the Janata Dal has to approach with a great deal of sensitivity.

Cabinet Choices Praised

46001125 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 7 Dec 89 p 10

[Editorial: "A Good Team"]

[Text] The wisdom, and indeed shrewdness, with which Mr V. P. Singh has allocated portfolios in his cabinet of 18 is strikingly evident in his choice, for the first time since independence, of a Muslim, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, to take charge of the home ministry. There were no doubt weightier contenders for this key office but the Prime Minister has courageously opted for him to give a clear signal to Muslims and other minorities of his earnestness in fulfilling the pledge he gave to the nation last Sunday to preserve the country's greatest asset, its "emotional oneness". The Mufti can scarcely meet the challenge of the new job at this difficult juncture without the fullest support of his chief as well as other colleagues. Equally necessary is a measure of understanding from the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] whose co-operation the government needs as much to staunch the blood that has flowed in recent weeks as for its very survival. The assignment of agriculture to Mr Devi Lal is just as appropriate. Though some may see it as a come-down for him, the point to remember is that the rural sector has been identified by the government as one in which it stands committed to making major changes. Likewise, the choice of Mr Madhu Dandavate, a man with a reputation for sobriety and probity, for finance, will be lauded because he can be expected to adopt a pragmatic approach in dealing with the very difficult and tricky issues at the top of the government's agenda, among them soaring prices and a precarious balance of payments situation.

By assigning Mr Ajit Singh, a computer engineer, to industry, Mr Arun Nehru, a former business executive,

to commerce, Mr George Fernandes, long associated with railway trade unions, to railways, and Mr I. K. Gujral, former ambassador to Moscow, to external affairs, the Prime Minister has evidently tried, on the one hand, to make deft use of available experience and, on the other, to keep colleagues with bees in their bonnets out of the jobs in which they may create problems for him and the country. Another commendable feature is the endeavour to give allies within the National Front worthwhile portfolios to give them a sense of genuine participation—as in the case of Telugu Desam's Mr P. Upendra who takes charge of information and broadcasting. There will be regret, however, that no woman finds place in the first tier and that several parts of the country remain unrepresented. These deficiencies will perhaps be made up when the Council of Ministers is fully constituted. When this happens, Mr V. P. Singh will need to give serious consideration to diversifying the defence ministry to a full-time minister to leave himself time for his primary job of ensuring his government's overall performance.

Akali Dal Leader Mann, Others Released From Prison

Acquittal, Release

46001127 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 3 Dec 89 pp 1, 11

[Text] Bhagalpur, Dec. 2—The Akali Dal (Mann) president, Mr Simranjit Singh Mann, and his four associates were released from the jail here today after the withdrawal of all cases pending against them.

Later in the evening, Mr Mann left for Amritsar in a Punjab government plane. A Border Security Force (BSF) plane carrying the others followed. At least 500 people were at the airport here to see him off.

The court proceedings for the release of Mr Mann and four others, Mr Kammikar Singh, Mr Charan Singh, Mr Raghubir Singh and Mr Jagpal Singh, began at 2.45 pm when the prosecution counsel put up the petition for the release of the five.

They were acquitted of all charges in the interest of "public justice" and for maintenance of "public order and harmony" by the special judge, Mr H. K. Verma.

Earlier, the special public prosecutor, Mr Basudeo Prasad, had filed the withdrawal petition. "In view of the changed situation and atmosphere, to which the attention of the special public prosecutor has been drawn by the state government, it is in the public interest to withdraw from prosecution the accused persons of this case," it said.

Referring to the victory of the Akali Dal (Mann) in the general elections, the petition said: "That the general elections in the country were held in November 1989 and that the elections in Punjab were held in a peaceful manner without any violence and the accused, Mr S. S.

Mann, and his five party colleagues of UAD [United Akali Dal] (Mann) have been elected to the Lok Sabha, they are being acquitted."

Mr Mann and others were incarcerated at the Bhagalpur central and camp jails for five years from December 16, 1985, until their release today.

The government incurred about Rs 1-crore expenditure on account of their security, maintenance and court proceedings from the prosecution side, sources said.

Mr Mann and the others were arrested at Jogbani on the Indo-Nepal border in Bihar on November 29, 1985. He was lodged at the Bharatpur jail in Rajasthan at first. Sources close to him said that Mr Mann was in fine health, except for toothache and "other side-effects of torture at Bharatpur."

Outside the court, a crowd of autograph-seekers and curious spectators were waiting with marigold garlands when Mr Mann and the others stepped out of the court of the special judge.

Mr Mann was overwhelmed. "I feel very nice," he kept repeating to people. He also bowed his head and embraced whosoever came to greet him. Behind him the Sikhs and others raised slogans such as "Bhagalpur ke logo zindabad (hail the people of Bhagalpur)."

His older sister, Mrs Daljit Kaur, thanked the people of Bhagalpur because in their presence they never felt strangers.

In reply to a question as to what role he would play in Punjab and national politics, Mr Mann said: "I do not know."

PTI adds: Mr Mann declared that he and his party would follow the Gandhian path of non-violence and protect the integrity of India.

Just before boarding the plane, Mr Mann told newsmen that he would endeavour to bring Punjab to the democratic and national mainstream so that both Punjab and the country prosper and gain in strength.

Mr Mann was chosen leader of the party's group in the new Parliament, an Amritsar report said.

Mr Rajdev Singh Advocate, who was elected from the Sangrur constituency, was named as the deputy leader at a party meeting held at gurudwara Ramsar here.

The meeting was presided over by the acting president, Baba Joginder Singh, and attended by working committee members, district presidents, office-bearers and newly-elected MP [Member of Parliament]s.

Leaders of the All-India Sikh Students' Federation and the Damdami Taksal were also present.

Tohra, Badal Released

The Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee president, Mr G. S. Tohra, was released from jail in Sangrur district today.

Mr Tohra was facing trial in a sedition case and was kept at Nidampur rest house, which was converted into a jail, in Sangrur district.

Immediately after his release, Mr Tohra went to Dukhniwaran gurdwara at Patiala to pay obeisance.

Mr Parkash Singh Badal, former chief minister of Punjab, was released from the Dehradun jail, according to official information received here.

Mr Badal was released around 3 p.m. and he left for Chandigarh by road.

He had been arrested after the "Operation Black Thunder" when he tried to lead a protest march to Amritsar against the action of the government.

The Akali Dal (Mann) appointed a three-member committee to take action against Mr Charanjit Singh Walia, former Member of Parliament and a senior Akali Dal leader.

Talking to newsmen, Mr Manmohan Singh, party secretary, said the committee comprises Mr Darshan Singh Mand, Mr Baldev Singh Lung and Master Amrik Singh. Mr Manmohan Singh said the committee had already issued a show-cause notice to Mr Walia, as directed by yesterday's meeting, for his statement on party policy affairs at Patiala a few days ago and summoned him to be present before the committee on December 10, to clarifying his stand.

Mr Mann has thanked the deputy Prime Minister, Mr Devi Lal, for lending support for an early solution to the Punjab problem.

According to a Haryana Janata Dal release today, Mr Mann has hoped that a right atmosphere would be created for an early solution to the problem.

Mr Devi Lal has sent the Haryana home minister, Mr Sampat Singh, as his emissary to Mr Mann.

The additional sessions judge, Ms Usha Mehrerhas, adjourned till December 8 hearing on the application of Ms Bimal Khalsa, the widow of Mrs Indira Gandhi's assassin, seeking a directive to the authorities to return her husband's personal belongings.

Ms Bimal Khalsa, who was recently elected to the Lok Sabha, had moved an application in the court seeking return of her deceased husband's personal belongings which included a wrist watch, a kirpan, a purse, a golden bangle, a golden ring, an album and several audio cassettes.

Mr Atinder Pal Singh, recently elected to Lok Sabha from Punjab and an accused in the Indira case, today

refused to talk to newsmen in the maximum security court room of the Tihar jail, reports PTI.

Mr Singh, when approached by reporters, immediately after the court proceedings, shook his head to say "no" to a request for his comments regarding the government's decision to withdraw cases against him and three other accused in the case.

Mr. P. N. Lekhi, counsel for Mr Singh, told reporters that he had asked him not to talk to the press.

Jathedar Rachhpal Singh, president, Akali Dal (Tara Singh), urged the Prime Minister, Mr V. P. Singh, to give top priority to the solution of the protracted Punjab problem.

As a first step, the Jathedar said, a general amnesty should be announced for all terrorists and others who had been involved in cases since 1978 when he Sikhi-Nirankari clash vitiated the atmosphere in Punjab.

Mann Speech, Tohra Remarks

46001127 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 4 Dec 89 p 22

[Excerpt] Amritsar, December 3 (PTI)—The Akali Dal (M) president, Mr Simranjeet Singh Mann, today called upon the Prime Minister, Mr V. P. Singh, to remove long-standing irritants of the Sikh community by holding talks with representatives of Sikh bodies.

In his maiden speech at the Akal Takht, after his release from Bhagalpur jail, Mr Mann alleged people of Punjab were "tortured and harassed" during the last five years.

He asked the new government to hold an inquiry and expose the role of certain intelligence agencies and Punjab police in order to bring peace to the state.

Mr Mann said the constitution should be studied to find out if it contained a solution for Sikh problems.

"We would be free to follow suggestions made by the Sikh Panth," he said.

In the opinion of Mr Mann, the acceptance of Anandpur Sahib resolution could solve many Punjab problems.

Mr Mann said killings at the hands of the police and the security forces in Punjab during the last five years were "sorrowful events." These should be stopped as nobody could tolerate them, he said.

Mr Mann wanted prosecution of those responsible for causing damage to the Akal Takht.

He was awarded "Saropa" at the Akal Takht by the former Akal Takht head priest, Bhai Jasbir Singh Rode.

Mr Mann also toured his Tarn Taran constituency to thank voters.

Amnesty Urged (PTI from Ludhiana)

The SGPC [Sikh Temple Management Committee] president, Mr G. S. Tohra, today urged the National Front government to give general amnesty to the arrested people of Punjab.

Addressing his first press conference following his release from the Nidampur makeshift jail in Sangrur district yesterday, Mr Tohra said general amnesty can help in solving the Punjab problem.

He said the government should ensure installation of a popular government in the state by holding elections to the assembly. Regarding the SGP elections, Mr Tohra said he would welcome them also.

Mr Tohra questioned the decision of the Akali Dal (B) president, Mr Jagdev Singh Talwandi, to expel five partymen for six years for their anti-party activities. "The five, Mr Sukhjinder Singh, Mr Surjan Singh Thekedar, Mr Basant Singh, Mr Hira Singh Gabriel and Mr Gurdip Singh Bhaini, have been most loyal to the party throughout," the SGPC chief added.

He said he would soon meet Mr Mann and Mr P. S. Badal, presidents of two factions of the Akali Dals released yesterday, to achieve unity.

Mr Tohra said he would not say anything about the controversy regarding the "real head priest of the Akal Takht." Such issues have been cropping up even earlier," he added.

Meanwhile, Mr Sukhjinder Singh told newsmen that holding of assembly elections in the state would not solve the Punjab problem. [passage omitted]

Officials Describe Plans, Growth in Indian Navy

Chief of Naval Staff Interviewed

46001135 *Madras THE HINDU*
in English 3 Dec 89 p 5

[Text] The Indian Navy has now become a well-balanced force with capabilities in all major areas of naval combat such as missiles anti-submarine warfare, mine-sweeping, maritime reconnaissance, submarine and amphibious operations, according to the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral J. G. Nadkarni. On the eve of Navy Day (December 4), Admiral Nadkarni told THE HINDU that the emphasis of the Navy in the coming decades will be on ensuring that this balance was not disturbed and modernisation proceeds as planned. He said the Navy would now like to ensure that its fleet develops a greater reach and capability to carry out its task in the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea.

The criticism in some sections of the world media arises from the fact that for the first time a littoral Indian Ocean country was building up a significant naval capability, Admiral Nadkarni said. Since the 15th century, the Portuguese, the Dutch, the British and in recent

times the two superpowers had dominated the Indian Ocean. The growth of the Indian Navy was threatening their ability to influence events in the region. "Whether the chorus is orchestrated or not, I cannot say," he added.

The Admiral said the approach of the big powers was usually a two-stage affair. Initially they would try to curtail the naval expansion through criticism and subtle and not-so-subtle propaganda. Failing this they would "come to terms with the regional power, which we are in this part of the world."

He hoped the other countries in the region realised the nature of this propaganda and accepted the fact that India was only pursuing its legitimate national interests. In any case, he said, India had to be steadfast in its aim of enhancing its ability to look after its maritime interests.

On the goals of the Indian Navy, he said that unlike the threat scenario on land which could come only from adjoining countries, naval threat could come from any source. "We define maritime threat scenarios, in relation to the maritime interests of the country," he said.

India, he said, had a 7,500 km-long coastline, 2.25 million sq km of exclusive economic zone and a merchant marine with a cumulative tonnage of 7 million tonnes. The biological and mineral resources of the ocean bed would become important in the next 20 years and the emphasis of the country's security would shift from the north and north-west to the south, south-east and south-west.

On the resource crunch affecting the defence services as a whole, Admiral Nadkarni admitted that it was hurting. "This is the third year running we are facing the resource crunch, and the options we exercised to tide us over are slowly being exhausted." However, till now the operational readiness of the Navy had not been affected, he said. Though the Navy had to reduce its sailings and used computer simulations and simulators for training, "the limit had been reached." He stressed that "a sea-going navy has to go to sea and not sit in the harbour."

Outlining the problem, he said 1985-86 was a "golden period" for the Navy and a number of orders were placed for construction of ships, but now the bills were coming in and there would be an adverse impact on the ship-building industry if these commitments were not met on time.

Referring to the manpower issue which was a major problem with the Army, the Admiral said the Navy was, by the Government's own policy, a growing force. Whereas the parameters of the Air Force in terms of squadrons and the Army in terms of divisions had been laid down and met, the naval goals had not yet been achieved. A Government policy paper of 1964 had laid down a requirement of 26 frigates for this period, while the Navy still had only 15. However, he said technological changes, such as fully automated engine rooms, etc.,

would have an impact on manpower requirements. He said that the new complement of ships were getting 60 to 70 crew.

Touching on the indigenous construction programmes, the Admiral detailed the steps being taken to make the Indian Navy a "builders' navy."

"The major landmarks are the commissioning of nine ships in the last one year. But the launch of the first indigenously built SSK submarine and the commissioning of the Type 25 corvette, INS Khukri which has been giving an excellent account of itself by the reports I have seen, stand out.

"While we have made substantial progress in design, machinery, radars and other things, we are not sufficiently advanced in areas such as missiles and weapons control equipment. These are still imported.

"The final landmark is the signing of the agreement with the French of the concept design of the sea-control ship (aircraft carrier) which we hope to start building by 1990-91 end," he said.

Admiral Nadkarni said these were not the only ships being made. The Project 15 and Project 16A frigates were also being built and the first of the Project 15 frigates would hopefully be launched next year. The yards were also making the Vir class corvettes as well as a Landing Ship Tank (LST). Survey vessels were also being made as were off-shore patrol vessels.

On future projects, he said the resource crunch made it difficult to start anything new. The Navy's effort was to ensure that on-going projects were completed. He, however, said that the ships being commissioned now had been ordered by his predecessors. The impact of the resource crunch on naval construction, he warned would be felt four to five years from now.

Regarding a possible submarine project, Admiral Nadkarni said the Mazagaon Dockyards had to curtail the production of additional SSK submarines because the Deutsche Mark had gone up from Rs. 4 to Rs. 9 resulting in the materials required being costlier. However, the dockyards had the machinery and the experience to construct submarines and the Navy was examining options to carry on the production. "Provided the option is economical and funds are available and we are able to get a satisfactory agreement, submarine construction could carry on," he added.

More Details Given

46001135 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 1 Dec 89 p 5

[Text] New Delhi, Dec. 4 (PTI)—The chief of the naval staff, Admiral Jayant Ganpat Nadkarni, has said that the navy would soon acquire a squadron plus of the jump jet Sea Harriers fitted with Sea Eagle air-to-surface missiles and about 15 more Sea King anti-submarine helicopters to give the navy more teeth.

The admiral said yesterday the navy was also examining options open to it to counter the Pakistan navy's threat after it was armed with the U.S.-made P-3 Orions air early warning aircraft which would be available to Pakistan by early next year.

The naval chief said an acute resource crunch was hitting the naval modernisation programme. "If the new government does not release funds in the current financial year, ship-building would adversely be affected at a critical stage." Adm. Nadkarni, however said he was confident that the government would rectify this.

The naval chief said the country's first indigenous submarine was undergoing seaworthy trials and would be inducted into the navy in the next 12 to 14 months.

He said the navy had acquired new dimensions with the commissioning of the indigenous Corvette, INS Khukri, which had completed all trials. He said the vessel carried considerable punch.

Adm. Nadkarni said four more of these Corvettes would be commissioned next year. He also spoke of the agreement concluded with a French ship-building yard for the design of the country's first aircraft carrier.

He said till this carrier was ready till the turn of the century, the country's first aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, had been remodelled and redesigned to take more Sea Harriers and be seaworthy for another decade.

He also said that work was progressing well on the type-15 and type-16 frigates, a programme which had been taken up after the successful conclusion of the Leander and Godavari class frigates.

The new frigates would be of heavier DWT and carry a more lethal punch, including surface-surface missiles and surface-to-air missiles, according to Adm. Nadkarni.

Pondering over the threat perceptions to India's large coastline, he rebutted repeated allegations levelled by western mediamen and some countries in the Far East of the Indian navy posing a threat in the Indian Ocean region.

Adm. Nadkarni said Pakistan and China with a much smaller coastline and economic zone to protect had similar or larger naval strength, but added that as things stood today, the Indian navy could deal with any threat to the country's coastline.

He said Pakistan's acquisition of ten more frigates, two Leander-Class from the United Kingdom and eight Brooke and Gracey class ones from the United States, matched the Indian surface fleet strength.

He said but what was more alarming was Pakistan forging ahead than India by acquiring the capability to fire anti-ship missiles from submarines and air-to-ship missiles from long-range patrol aircraft.

The naval chief said to counter these, the Indian Navy was yet to look for French or British missiles. He said the decision to this effect could only be taken by the new government, which had to also take into account the broader national resource crunch being faced in the country.

The Khukri Corvettes were comparable to the best in the world in this class. As for the future, Adm. Nadkarni said the navy was going in for three major indigenously-designed warship classes under construction today in different shipyards.

He admitted that the navy for the past year had faced some teething problems with the testing of wire-guided torpedoes, but claimed that this had now been overcome. He said the navy's first nuclear-powered submarine, INS Chakra, was giving good results in training purposes.

He described as "wishful," reports in prestigious maritime magazines that the submarine was a nuclear hazard.

Plans for Fighter Planes

46001135 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 1 Dec 89 p 5

[Text] Bombay, Nov. 30—A naval variant of the light combat aircraft (LCA) is now under consideration.

The aircraft being planned will be launched by a catapult and have fixed delta wings. The naval version of the LCA will of course follow the one now being developed by the Bangalore-based Aeronautical Development Agency for the Indian Air Force (IAF).

In an informal talk with reporters after his formal news briefing, vice-admiral S. Jain, Flag Officer Commanding-in-chief, Western Naval Command, said the naval headquarters is in touch with the Aeronautical Development Agency on this issue.

Admiral Jain said that no sooner the Defence Research and Development Organisation begins production of the surface-to-air "Trishul" missiles than they would be installed on Indian naval vessels.

With the development of the indigenous aircraft carrier, hopefully by the end of the next decade, the possibility of having a naval version of the Soviet-built MiG-29s on board this vessel was also being considered, naval officials said.

Earlier, addressing a news conference, he said, the project definition phase of the indigenous aircraft carrier was in its final stages and would shortly move on to the drawing board level. He said the project was delayed primarily due to lack of funds and slight delay in developing the design concept.

Admiral Jain said the two-year INS Vikrant refit programme had been completed and the aircraft carrier should once again become an effective part of the Indian Navy by mid-January.

He admitted the cost of refit had exceeded the cost of purchase and now it will have an operational life of another decade. At the end of this period a review will decide either to further extend the life of the vessel or retire it, he said.

The changes in the aircraft carrier will cater to Sea Harriers and the Sea King helicopters having sophisticated avionics, he said. Several sections of the electronics and communication equipment have been replaced and the radar refurbished. The action information system in the aircraft carrier's operation room is also being updated, he said.

In addition, the strength of the Sea Harriers is augmented and the new aircraft would begin joining the fleet from next month, he said.

Admiral Jain said that in the coming years the responsibility and role of the Indian Navy will further go up because of increase in maritime activity. "Power blocs are changing and their co-operation among regional countries will help the growth of the navy, inhibiting any intervention from other countries," he said.

In 1961, after the Chinese aggression, financial resources of the Indian Navy dipped from 10 per cent to three per cent of the total defence budget. Now it has gone up to 12.5 per cent of the total defence budget.

Admiral Jain also outlined some of the past achievements of the Western Naval Command and its various welfare activities.

Officials Report on Aircraft, Missile Production

Light Fighters, Agni Missile

46001136 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 4 Dec 89 p 5

[Text] Bombay, December 3—India's prestigious Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project crossed an important milestone last month when the design of this futuristic fighter was readied for full-scale engineering development and fabrication of prototypes.

This announcement, by none other than the LCA programme director, Dr Kota Harinarayana, at the 41st annual general meeting of the Aeronautical Society of India, sets aside doubts by sceptics that the project may after all remain on the drawing board.

Speaking to *THE TIMES OF INDIA* after his presentation, Dr Harinarayana said that since the project was ready for full-scale engineering development it also meant that the first metal of this much-needed fighter, which will mark a revival of Indian aeronautics, would be cut in the near future. The roll of the aircraft will be towards the end of 1993 and the first flight in 1994.

The LCA project, which was formally launched in 1983 is being handled by the Bangalore-based Aeronautical Development Agency.

In an informal talk with reporters yesterday afternoon, the programme director described some of the features of the LCA. He said that the fighter is a light-weight, single-engine multirole combat aircraft with advanced technologies contemporary to any fighter of its class that would be flying in the airforce of the world towards the end of the century.

The aircraft would have intakes under the wings. According to him, among the advantages of the shielded intake is that it guards against bird-hits to a considerable extent. Also, a shielded intake has a less radar cross section. "Certain amount of shielding is necessary for close-combat aircraft. The French fighter Rafale has a small shielding and the American F-16 has also got a shielded intake," he said.

Dr Harinarayana said that the maximum Mach number (speed) of the aircraft would be 1.6 operating at a flight ceiling which would be not less than 50,000 feet. It would carry four tonnes of fuel—two tonnes of external fuel in addition to 2.5 tonnes of internal fuel.

The compound delta shape of the LCA has been dictated by the requirements of light weight and small size striking a balance between subsonic and supersonic performance. "It is a reasonable compromise," he said.

He said that recently specialist groups dealing in aerodynamics of the aircraft, structures and flight controls made a detailed study and finally gave the green signal for the engineering fabrication to begin. Currently an extensive amount of wind tunnel tests were in progress, he said.

Regarding the flight control system, he said, that it would have a digital fly-by-wire system aimed to provide full performance even after two failures. "Safety and survivability are the major design parameters," he said.

It would have what he called a "pilot-friendly cockpit" which will not cram the pilot with too much information. There will be basically three display surfaces and a centre-stick which is one of the main advantages in "man-machine interface." The total cockpit has been designed for compatibility with night vision goggles for pilots, he said.

Asked why there was no canard (a foreplane), Dr Harinarayana said that the LCA will not have this because it would increase the radar cross-surface and above all add to the complexity of the entire system. Further, it also exposed it to bird-hits, he added. "The flight control system will become more complex with more surfaces," he said.

While the fighter's fly-by-wire system is being jointly developed by the defence research and development organisation (DRDO) and a foreign agency, the powerful multi-mode radar, mission computer and electronic counter-measure were, on the other hand, being developed indigenously.

In addition, he said that the LCA will also have what is known as the "utility systems management" to monitor the health of the aircraft.

The LCA will contain one twin-barrel gun, but the emphasis will be on missile and bomb-loading capacity. "The avionics and weapons system are software driven providing flexibility for integration of future weapons likely to be developed during the operational life of the aircraft," he said.

Nearly 30 per cent of the aircraft will be made of composites. He said full technology of damage repair to composites was now available.

Along with the regular aircraft, a trainer and a naval variant of the LCA were also on the cards. In the naval variant the fuselage would be slightly strengthened taking into consideration the loads that would be encountered during take off and landing. In addition, this version would have a new landing gear and more control surfaces to reduce the landing speed.

In his presentation, the director of the Aeronautical Development Establishment, Dr K. G. Narayanan, said that a fixed base simulator for LCA has been built in his institution which is being used increasingly for what is known as the "control law evaluation."

The director of the Bangalore-based Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), Dr Arun Prasad, explained the development of the GTX-35VS engine for the Indian fighter. Initial prototypes of the LCA will be powered by the powerful General Electric GE404 engines which will be replaced by the GTX-35VS engines being developed by the GTRE. The GTX-35VS would be ideally suited for Indian conditions, Dr Prasad said.

Hyperplane Possible

46001136 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 14 Nov 89 p 9

[Text] Bangalore, Nov. 13 (UNI)—India could successfully develop the futuristic aircraft, "Hyperplane" using the consortium approach applied for indigenous fabrication of the "Agni" missile, the Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL) director, Dr A. P. J. Abdul Kalam said while delivering the 26th Mysore Engineers Association commemoration lecture on "Missiles—high technology goals" here, he said:

Hyperplane, or the hypersonic platform for air breathing ascent to near-earth orbit, could take off from any airport, enter the space for satellite launch or contact with a space station, and return to the earth for a horizontal landing.

Dr Kalam said oxygen liquification system for the hyperplane could also be developed using the consortium approach. The hyperplane concept envisages generation of liquid oxygen, the fuel for the aircraft, from the atmosphere during the flight.

The Bharat Dynamics Limited, Hyderabad, has conceived the hyperplane, he said.

He said the DRDL had formed a consortium of industries and scientific research organisations and scientific research organisations to develop components for the "Agni" missile as no developed country was willing to part with the technology for manufacture of these components.

This approach had paid off well as scientists had indignously developed the heat shield for the "Agni" missile and infra-red band radar for the "Nag" missile, he said.

Dr Kalam said the mass production of "Trishul" missile would begin by the middle of next year. As many as 11 test flights were carried out so far, and the success had given scientists the confidence to go ahead with production. The test flights would continue every alternate month, he added.

He said the missile was a versatile weapon that could be used like the water-skimming Exocet missile.

Commentary Views Indian Ocean 'Crisis'

90O10049B New Delhi JANSATTA
in Hindi 26 Oct 89 p 6

[Editorial: "The Indian Ocean Crisis"]

[Text] The heads of the governments of the Commonwealth countries, apart from making an appeal to the developing nations to make changes in their policy in order to solve their economic problems, in their joint communique have also put emphasis on declaring the Indian Ocean a peaceful zone. In this context, a necessity has been felt to convene an international conference. It is true that because of the superpowers' military interference, the Indian Ocean has become an unsafe area. This affects the coastal countries. But responsibility for this does not lie only with the United States or the USSR. Because of the military ambitions of China, tension is on the increase in this area. As a reaction to this, countries such as India have to strengthen their navy in order to safeguard their coastal areas and islands as well as their trade routes. The dependence of Pakistan on Western military aid has also made U.S. interference in the area possible. Singapore follows a policy of providing facilities to the superpowers' militaries. The Philippines has recently opposed the use of her military bases by the United States, only because she is being paid less rentals for their use. For the Philippines, the issue does not relate to her defense but to her economy. Therefore, if the Commonwealth countries want to free the Indian Ocean from military maneuverings, they should not overlook these problems. If the coastal countries themselves continue to provide excuses to the superpowers for their interference in the area, it will not be easy to make the Indian Ocean a peaceful zone.

However, even by declaring the Indian Ocean a peaceful zone it is not possible to make it safe. This ocean has

been a major route for trade activities from the beginning of civilization. But, because of industrialization in the West, traffic has greatly increased in the area recently. The oil business has increased pressure on the ocean substantially. Every year thousands of ships carry oil through this route. Apart from oil, ships loaded with chemicals pass through it continuously. The problem is that huge oil tankers do not even obey the safety rules that are made for carrying such hazardous materials. Because of their carelessness, tons of raw oil spill into the ocean every day. Several oil tankers are even washed with ocean water after getting unloaded. As a result of this, not only do layers of oil form on the surface of the ocean, but also oily refuge substances accumulate on its floor. In the last hundred years, the India Ocean has been dangerously poisoned. This has affected not only the ocean animals and other creatures, but is also harming the coastal countries. Because of layers of oil scattered on the surface, the ocean flora and fauna do not get enough oxygen. The commonwealth countries must also pay attention in this direction. The rules made for the oil tankers should be critically examined, and new rules should be enforced strictly. The ecology and economic progress of most of the Commonwealth countries depend on this ocean. Both of the countries should be extra careful and cautious in regard to this shared treasure.

IRAN

Young King on New Armed Forces Appointees

90O10074C London KEYHAN in Persian 23 Nov 89 p 2

[Text] Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, in a message condemned the appointment of incompetent individuals by the regime for posts in the army staff and that of the navy. He pointed out that such appointments will be considered as a serious danger for the security and independence of Iran and a threat for the nation's army as well.

24 Aban 1368 [15 November 1989]

My Dear Countrymen:

In my talks with you I have on many occasions pointed out the blows which have been inflicted on the defensive structure of the country during the past 11 years and I have always warned that the vengeance of the Islamic Republic regime's leaders toward the army, particularly its experienced and patriotic officers, on the one hand and the ever-continuing debilitation of the financial structure of the country on the other, may once more lead our dear country toward horrible catastrophes.

Recent changes at the higher echelons of command in the Iranian armed forces, especially the appointment of non-military and unqualified individuals to the position of the chief and deputy chief of staff of the armed forces and that of the navy is all a sign of the transformation of the regime's old vengeance toward dangerous plots.

Clearly, the intention of the regime's leaders is that through breaking down the hierarchy of commandantship, by trampling on the customary rules and regulations, through continuation of the policy of execution, threat, humiliation, and purging weaken the morale of the patriotic and experienced commissioned and non-commissioned officers of Iran. It is their intention to destroy the remnant of the independence and professionalism of the three armed forces of Iran, and thus transform these forces—which ought to lead the nation in guarding the country's borders—into an instrument for carrying out their own political goals. The leaders of the regime, who have so far not found the courage to announce the official dissolution of the army, practically and gradually through various disguises are intent to reach their horrible and anti-nationalistic objective.

My Countrymen:

Today's defense issues, the weaponry systems and the sophisticated war machinery which are available to the small and large nations throughout the world, are so complex and sensitive that even the most experienced military professionals can, through the slightest error, inflict the greatest damage to their country and its armed forces.

If the leaders of the Islamic Republic's regime had taken the defense of the independence and sovereignty of our country as a serious responsibility, they would never have appointed individuals who have neither the knowledge, nor the experience, nor have they gone through various stages of military training—thus such individuals can never win the trust and confidence of the commissioned and noncommissioned officers or even the privates who are going to be under their command.

Besides, did not the experienced and patriotic commanders and officers of Iran in the war with Iraq show enough courage and sacrifice? Was it not a result of their competence and experience which caused the enemy to retreat? Is the reward for such self-sacrifice and competence for these officers the commandantship of some inexperienced individuals?

My Dear Countrymen:

Eleven years ago at the beginning of its reign the Islamic Republic regime, through destruction of the order of army's commandantship, execution and firing of thousands of the armed forces officers, created a situation where the complete sovereignty of Iran was violated by a neighboring country which was no match for us in any conceivable field.

Hereby, I warn the leaders of the regime not to repeat that horrible experience and once more expose Iran's sovereignty to new dangers.

My warning to all the Iranian people who have once witnessed the result of a disordered army and who have seen with their own eyes the death and homelessness of millions of their own countrymen, consider the measures

taken by the regime for weakening the power of the armed forces of Iran as a serious threat to the independence and complete sovereignty of our country. The people should not allow that once more the very existence of Iran become a toy in the hands of those individuals who have no other intention except continuation of their own destructive and self-fulfilling goals.

May God save Iran.

Majles Approves Particulars of Exemption Bill

90O10061A Tehran KEYHAN in Persian
23 Nov 89 p 18

[Text] Yesterday morning the Islamic Consultative Majles held an open session presided by the house speaker, Hojat ol-Eslam Mehdi Karrubi. During this session, the particulars of the plan for motivating retired teachers to continue their cooperation with the Ministry of Education, the second hearing of the bill for recovering the costs of services rendered by the Ministry of Roads and Transport, the generalities of the bill for exempting devotees employed in the public and private sector production, service and industrial units as well as exempting private sector employers from insurance premiums, the determination of the early retirement age of devotees, and the double-urgency motion for reducing the construction budget allocated to institutional housing for the Islamic Consultative Majles were approved.

The following is a report on the agenda of yesterday's session of the Majles:

Following the Izeh representative's speech and a reading of the representatives' memos addressed to the state executives, the Majles went into deliberation and continued to review the plan for motivating retired teachers to keep up cooperating with the Ministry of Education—an issue that had remained from the previous session. The Economic and Financial Affairs Committee suggested the addition of a note to this bill—for which votes were cast and which was approved. Thereafter, the single article and the notes added to the bill were read and subjected to votes. They were approved as follows:

The Plan for Motivating Retired Teachers To Continue Cooperating With the Ministry of Education

Article 1—Permission is granted to the Ministry of Education to allow the continuation of service of teachers covered by the job classification plan, who waive their right to retire after 30 years of service, based on the ministry's need (and discernment) or the need and discernment of the ministry's subsidiary units for the service of such teachers, to teach educational courses or teacher training centers, or to provide guidance and direction to their newly employed colleagues, or to work in management and programming, and to triple the amount of their job allowances.

Note 1—The weekly teaching duties of teachers covered by the regulation hereof shall be 18 hours.

Note 2—No retirement deductibles shall be withdrawn from such teachers' salaries and fringe benefits; related taxes shall only be assessed on the basis of fixed job allowances paid to them.

Note 3—The job allowance increase covered by the regulation hereof shall not be affected by the purports of the note to Article 38 of the Civil Recruitment Law.

Note 4—Teachers throughout the nation who are covered by the job classification plan and who have retired prior to the approbation of the regulation hereof, shall benefit by the advantages contained hereof, if called to serve by the Ministry of Education.

Note 5—The regulation hereof shall be indispensable in the case of teachers holding bachelor's or higher degrees who are willing to serve in high schools, technical schools, regular, technical or vocational training centers, teachers colleges, on-the-job training facilities, as well as in administrative and executive departments.

Note 6—Within 2 months of its approval, the practice code of the regulation hereof shall be codified by the Ministries of Education and Plan and Budget and the National Civil Administration and Recruitment Agency, and shall be sanctioned by the Council of Ministers.

Recovering the Costs of Services Rendered by the Ministry of Roads and Transport

The next item on the agenda was the second deliberation on the bill for recovering the costs of services rendered by the Ministry of Roads and Transport. The house reporter for the Housing and Urban Development and Roads and Transport Committee offered some explanations on this bill and said that it was discussed and examined during the session held on 27 Tir 1368 [18 July 1989] and was approved with the addition of a note to it.

Thereafter propositions on the bill were propounded.

Behzadian and Movahhedi-Saveji moved for the elimination of paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 as well as for the deletion of the wordage "expending the said credit will be made based on the law of the mode of allocation of funds in exclusion of the Public Accounts Law approved in 1364 [21 March 1985 - 20 March 1986] and the relevant code of practice." Proponents and opponents spoke about the two proposals. The government representative and the relevant house committee reporter offered some explanations before the propositions were subjected to votes, but neither one was approved.

Afterwards, the single article was read, subjected to votes and was approved as follows:

Article 1—As of the approval date of the regulation hereof the Ministry of Roads and Transport is permitted to recover funds from applicants as per tariffs approved by the Council of Ministers based on the proposition of

the High Council of National Transportation, in lieu of rendering the following services, and to credit such funds to the account of the national treasury:

1. Issue of transit and carriage of special (from the viewpoint of traffic and volume) freight.

2. Issue of commuting booklets for heavy transport vehicles.

3. Issue and reissue of permits for the operation of transportation companies and institutions.

4. Issue of international transit permits.

5. Issue of drivers' work permits.

6. Rendering of extra service.

Note 1—The Ministry of Roads and Transport is permitted to withdraw the equivalent of 0.050 of the credited funds up to the amount of 500 million rials allocated in the annual budget, for the development and betterment of road and transportation services on the basis of a practice code to be proposed by the High National Council for the Coordination of Transportation and to be approved by the Council of Ministers. The expenditure of the said credit will be made on the basis of the credits expenditure mode without the public accounts law and its code of practice approved in 1364 [21 March 1985 - 20 March 1986].

Note 2—The Ministry of Roads and Transport is bound to send a report on operations and expenditures in connection with plans executed out of the said credits, to the Islamic Consultative Majles committees for housing and urban development, roads and transport, and plan and budget, once every 6 months.

Devotees' Exemption From Insurance Premiums

The next issue on the agenda of the initial deliberations of the session which was propounded was the bill for exempting employed devotees in public and private sector production, service and industrial units, as well as the private sector employers from the payment of insurance premiums, and the determination of the early retirement age of devotees.

The house reporter on the Labor and Social Affairs Committee offered some explanation about this bill and said that it had been referred to the Labor and Social Affairs Committee, was reviewed over repeated sessions and was finally rejected due to the following reasons:

The Labor and Social Affairs Committee is of the opinion that until an attempt has not been made toward the preparation and codification of a comprehensive and coordinated law, and until a body consisting of the committees involved has not made an overview of the entirety of existing related ratifications, plans and bills that are being examined, the problem shall continue to prevail. For this reason the Committee on Labor and Social Affairs shall refrain from studying such plans and

bills, and does hereby declare its preparedness to arrange for an all-encompassing plan.

Afterwards the opponents and proponents of rejecting the bill spoke. The government's representative as well as the relevant committee's reporter offered some explanations regarding the bill. Then the general aspects of the bill was subjected to votes and was approved.

Plan for Reducing the Credit for Building Institutional Housing for the Majles

In following up yesterday's session the double-urgency motion for reducing the credit of constructing institutional housing for the Islamic Consultative Majles was propounded in the presence of the members of the Council of Guardians.

Seyed Reza Akrami, a cosigner of the plan, offered some explanations and said: We have a problem with the provision of funds for the necessary expenditures of the Majles which we may be able to solve with either one of two ways:

Either the government should introduce a bill to provide for our necessary expenditures, or—we have an entry for the construction of institutional housing for the Majles; since part of the plan has been stalled and relegated to the future—we may reduce the amount of this entry to some extent in numbers and figures and allot the funds to the necessary expenditures of the Majles.

Then Dr Sheybani, Sadeq Khalkhali, Movahhedi-Saveji and Yusefpu spoke as opponents; Mostafa Fareq, Nurollah 'Abedi, Shafe'i, and Sadaqiani spoke as proponents.

Thereafter the generalities of the plan were subjected to votes and were approved. Then propositions concerning the single article were propounded. Movahhedi-Saveji suggested that the sum of 22 million tomans be reduced to 11 million tomans.

The suggestion was subjected to votes and was rejected. Later the single article was discussed, read, and subjected to votes. It was approved as follows:

Plan for Reducing the Credit for the Construction of Institutional Housing for the Islamic Consultative Majles

Article 1—The sum of 220 million rials is withdrawn from the credit allotted to the development plan for the construction of institutional housing for the Islamic Consultative Majles (classification No 30802355) and it is added to the ceiling of the current budget of the Islamic Consultative Majles for 1368 [21 March 1989 - 20 March 90].

Plan for Amending Paragraph D of Note 51 of the Budget Law

At the end of the session the two-starred priority plan for amending paragraph D of Note 51 of the Nationwide

Budget Law for 1368 [21 March 1989 - 20 March 1990] was propounded and one of the cosigners of the plan offered some explanations.

Then some representatives proposed that the double-urgency motion of the plan be reduced to a single-urgency motion. Movahhedi-Saveji offered some explanation on the issue.

Then votes were cast as to reducing the priority of the plan to a single priority. This was rejected. Continuing discussions on the issue was postponed to the next session.

The open session of the Majles terminated at 1215 noontime and the next session was decided to be held on the morning of the coming Sunday.

Defense Industries Comprise Greatest Investments *90OI0074D London KEYHAN in Persian 23 Nov 89 p 4*

[Text] Following the news regarding the restart of arms and ammunition sales by Italy to the Islamic Republic, some time ago the international trading source of weaponry disclosed that the Islamic Republic and Iraq have so far concluded several significant deals in the world's arms market. The aforementioned sources added that the Islamic Republic and Iraq during the last few months through signing of confidential agreements with some of the arms-producing countries of the West and the Far East, have so far purchased a large quantity of destructive arms and the preliminary details for the delivery of these weapons have been gradually ironed out.

At the beginning of last week an official close to the Italian Ministry of Commerce revealed that Italy has secretly and far from the uproar of the policies with regard to the boycott of the sale of weapons and war-machinery to the Islamic Republic and Iraq, has concluded some agreements with both countries so much so that one can expect partial delivery of the order by the Islamic Republic—with some Augusta helicopters at the top of the list—to take place very soon. The aforesaid source further added that the recent trip of Mehdi Nawab, deputy foreign minister of the Islamic Republic, to several European countries such as West Germany and Italy, ensued secret conclusion of agreements regarding expansion of trade and resale of weaponry as well.

Along with the restart of purchase of arms and weaponry by the Islamic Republic, on various occasions the regime's officials have also announced that the domestic defense industries are also continuing the production of various light weaponry. And at the present time, the Defense Industries Organization—an affiliate of the Ministry of Defense and Support of the Armed Forces—through utilization of extensive financial and foreign exchange possibilities, has also been busy in producing similar light weaponry. An expert in the military affairs of the region stated that the Islamic Republic in recent months by announcing the fact that it intends to transfer

progressive technology and utilize the new technical data with regard to the production of weaponry, has taken steps to conclude secret agreements with some Western countries and two other Asian nations as well.

Torkan, minister of defense and armed forces logistics, some time ago while participating in a promotional seminar regarding the merging of the domestic defense industries of the country, openly pointed out the signing of a new agreement for the production of weaponry and said: The transfer of technology forms the basis of our work, and at the present time we have concluded several agreements with regard to the expansion of defense industries, of which the entire foreign purchases revert to this objective.

The minister of defense and support of the armed forces of the Islamic Republic in part of his statement announced: The volume of production of the defense organization before the process of merging, in comparison to the highest volume of production before the advent of the Islamic revolution has increased by ten-fold.

Tavala'i, managing director of the Defense Industries Organization, who had also participated in the seminar, in a speech regarding the 5-year plan for the expansion and merging of the defense industries of the country stated: During this short period after the advent of the revolution more than 212 new military products have been produced and the largest investments belong to the defense industries of the country.

The economic observers consider the statements made by engineer Tavala'i, managing director of the Defense Industries Organization, with regard to the volume of investments in the area of weaponry as a clear sign for apportioning large segments of the foreign exchange of the country to the production of arms and at the same time the negligence of the regime with regard to non-military industries.

Oil Digs Platform To Be Erected in Caspian Sea

90O10074E London KEYHAN in Persian 23 Nov 89 p 4

[Text] Several contractors from various countries—with Finland at the top of the list—will soon start the erection of a floating oil excavation platform in the Caspian Sea.

According to the statement by a technical official from the Islamic Republic's Petroleum Ministry the erection of the said platform—which will be more advanced than the similar floating platforms in the Persian Gulf—will cost about \$130 million.

Karimzadeh, the representative of the Islamic Republic's Ministry of Petroleum, who had participated in the administrative council session of Mazandaran Province, while announcing the news regarding the erection of the first oil excavation platform in the Caspian Sea also stated: Thirty-five locations in the Caspian Sea have

been chosen for excavation of which the necessary geological surveys have also been completed. In case we strike rich oil reserves, we will construct a refinery in the north region.

The aforementioned official went on to say: The contractors of this project comprise several international institutes of which Finland has been chosen as the major contractor. The Ministry of Petroleum representative also mentioned that the excavation platform in question will have three legs which can penetrate to a depth of 125 meters below the surface.

The Tehran KEYHAN which had carried the news, in part of its report had added that a marine industries company called "Sadra" has also concluded an agreement with the Ministry of Petroleum for the construction of a joint plant of shipbuilding and platform erection at the shores of Neka. The aforementioned newspaper quoting the representative of the said company wrote: About 14 hectares of the coastal area near Neka's power station have been considered for this purpose, and from about 2 months ago work on the preparation of the site has begun. The erection of the platform at this plant will begin 20 months from now.

The representative of the marine industries company further added: Three ships will be built for the Ministry of Petroleum of which two [each with 4400 horsepower] will be used for towing the floating platforms to their final destinations and another one [with a capacity for 100 people] will be used as a personnel carrier.

The aforementioned official in part of his statement said: Eighteen more locations in various parts of the Caspian Sea have also been selected for oil excavation, through execution of this work and utilization of foreign exchange investment we will be able to attain favorable results with regard to economic self-sufficiency in the Caspian Sea.

Clash Reported Between University Students, Security Forces

90O10074A London KEYHAN
in Persian 23 Nov 89 pp 1, 11

[Text] Following the attack by a group of students from Tehran's Polytechnic University (Industrial University of Amir Kabir) on a building belonging to the Organization for the Mobilization of the Oppressed, which had resulted in the interference by the Guards Corps and an ensuing clash between the students and the security forces of the Islamic Republic's regime, the government has put its security forces on alert so as to be prepared to face any probable student revolt and unrest.

This event created an atmosphere of excitement in other universities of the country and, through the medium of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, the government has asked the students to be quite careful

not to create similar events in the future, since recurrence of such events is not going to be to anyone's benefit at all.

The aforementioned council has expressed its displeasure with the recent event and its unpleasant aftermath and thus appointed a board to follow up the investigation thereof. According to some news agencies, 2 weeks ago about 70 non-resident freshmen students of the engineering school of the Polytechnic University, who had not been able to secure rooming quarters in Tehran, attacked a building located at the corner of Kakh and Elizabeth II Boulevard—which is being forcibly occupied by the Organization for the Mobilization of the Oppressed—and took control of the building. Before the advent of the revolution this building was rented by the Non-military Defense Organization; however, after the advent of the new regime the building was confiscated and put at the disposal of the Organization for the Mobilization of the Oppressed. The attack by the students began at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, but a group of Hezbollah women who were present at the building stood in the way of the students. Thereafter, the students threw out the Hezbollah women and expressed their intention to reside in the building. A few hours later, some units of the Revolutionary Komiteh and that of the Guards Corps were sent to the said building and started beating up the students. The clash and hand-to-hand battle between the students and the Guards Corps continued until 9 o'clock and in the meantime some of the students sustained some injuries and the rest took to their heels. The attack on the building for the Mobilization of the Oppressed seriously shook the authorities, since the aforementioned structure has strategic and security significance. In addition to housing a few units of the Mobilization for Women, it also serves as the Scientific Services Headquarters for the warriors, the Headquarters for the Mobilization Encampment, as the Financial Affairs Office of the Staff for the Attraction and Guidance of Popular Assistance to the Front. Furthermore, it houses a group of Hezbollah women who are members of the regime's security forces, namely the members of the first district of "Sarallah," in fact the building serves as a military staff headquarters.

Following the clash between the students and the security and disciplinary forces of the regime, Rahmani, supervisor of the unit for the Mobilization of the Oppressed of the Guards Corps, said: During non-business hours and at a time when our mobilization sisters were busy preparing for Mobilization Week, a group of students from Amir Kabir University attacked the building with the intention of occupying the premises while some of our resident sisters prevented their entry. Upon noticing the mobilization women, some of the students left the premises, however some other students despite all the warnings entered the building and began breaking down the doors. Thereafter, as a result of the interference by the security forces, the remaining students were thrown out of the building.

Rahmani who was talking to IRNA, stated: Unfortunately, as a result of our follow-up investigations it became clear that some of the students had rooming quarters there and some were even graduates who did not need rooming facilities at all. Rahmani further indicated that the attack on the building belonging to the Guards Corps, despite the fact that it does not have any connection to being a rooming headquarters, was somewhat intermingled with political causes. He pointed out that the students should be quite careful and not let some politically motivated individuals take advantage of the sincerity and honesty of the students who have always been a bulwark of the Islamic revolution against anti-revolutionary individuals.

Following the speech of the supervisor of the Guards Corps' Mobilization Unit of the Oppressed, the Polytechnic University's deputy director of student affairs, together with a group of students who were involved in the attack, took part in a press interview and explained the reason for this occurrence. 'Ezatollah Hejazi, a student from the aforementioned university, in answer to Rahmani's claims stated: The main fact is that what took place was the action by the students who did not have rooming quarters. Thereafter, he censured the attack and pointed out that some of the students who already have rooming quarters also took part in the event as a way of supporting their classmates, but there were no graduates involved in the process at all.

Hamid Reza Amini, another student from the Polytechnic University, told reporters: From the viewpoint of finance, the students are at the bottom rung of the financial ladder in the society, and they enjoy the least possible creature comforts and even during times of illness, as a result of a lack of finances, they cannot go to a doctor. There has to be a way to help the students.

Shams, deputy director of student affairs at the Polytechnic University, also supported the students' cause and said: Personally, on several occasions I have written to many of the organizations which can, in one way or another help the students, but so far I have not been able to secure rooming quarters for them. He went on to add: The majority of the students of this university consist of the mobilization warriors and members of the martyrs' families who through the use of the 45 percent quota system have been admitted to the university. Thus they expect certain things from us, but with regard to the ever-increasing university attendance, unfortunately nobody pays any attention to other required possibilities at all. Today as a result of a lack of proper rooming quarters, one of the students put in a request to discontinue his education.

Thereafter, Shams stated: For the purpose of securing rooming quarters for this university's students we have so far asked the Foundation for the Oppressed, the Martyrs Foundation, and the Khomeyni Relief Foundation to either give us land or buildings, but until now none of the aforementioned organizations has given us a positive answer.

Protest in Majles

The story of the students' attack on the mobilization building and the barbarous counterattack by the Guards Corps created harsh debates at the Islamic Consultative Assembly in which the behavior of the Guards Corps and Komiteh members and also the inattentiveness of the government toward the deranged and disordered situation of the students came under intense scrutiny. Alireza Farzad, representative from Taft, stated: Following the occupation of the building in question, the security forces took steps to drive out the students in a very undesirable manner and far below the dignity of the revolution. Most certainly all of the people's representatives here are well aware of the beatings and harsh treatment dealt the students. Since we consider this type of behavior below the dignity of the existing system, the government, this Majles, and the revolution, thus we express our protest and displeasure.

In his speech, the Taft representative emphasized: The need of a group of students for rooming quarters, after long period of drifting and batting around—when for instance in one case more than 70 students were housed in the basement of a building—led to the occupation of the building for the Mobilization of the Oppressed. Revolutionary patience and forbearance have their limits and we must pay necessary attention to the fundamental problems of the various strata of our society and the needs of the students for living and sleeping quarters.

Thereafter, Alireza Farzad asked that according to Article 49 of the Constitution the buildings belonging to large property owners, big capitalists, and other similar structures belonging to certain organs and establishments be sequestered and put at the disposal of the students, so as there would not be any need for an unlawful confiscation/sequestration of such properties. On the other hand, Mohammad Taqi Ranjbar, the representative from Sume'eh Sara, defended the government and accused the bankrupt politicians and other political entities competing with the government as accomplices in the event.

He went on to say: The martyr-nurturing nation of Iran considers the unpleasant daily occurrences by the disenfranchised individuals who have been sitting around round tables and announcing their worries with regard to the government's performance during these past several months the result of the prevailing political situation. They are trying to beguile their followers by calling themselves anti-Americans and revolutionary to the core. The judicial force, without the slightest tolerance, will deal with absolute authority with all those individuals who try, under various names, to create an atmosphere of unrest and insecurity in our Islamic society. He further added: The assailant students should know that there are some individuals who, with cunning sympathy, will support them, although those individuals have no intention other than fanning the flame, creating an

atmosphere of insecurity, and weakening the government's position. I have no doubt that in a collective movement, a group of hypocrites with political motives enter the arena in order to muddy the water. Hereby, I would like to ask the Ministry of Information to conduct a serious investigation with regard to the occupation of the Mobilization Building which has grieved many of our authorities.

Mehdi Karubi, president of the Islamic Majles who had become worried to see such harsh words exchanged in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, in order to put an end to the revelatory debates, expressed his sorrow at the harsh behavior of the Komiteh members and said: I will not condone the clash which has taken place at that building; however, the attack and occupation of a building where our mobilization sisters are quartered is the wrong thing to do. Thereafter, he asked the representatives to shut their mouths: That they should not bring forth such subjects in Majles debates without any reason at all, thus instigating the wrath of other individuals.

Just as the representative from Sume'eh Sara revealed in Majles, at present the occurrence of savage events and the people's protest to the Islamic regime have become a normal daily chore, and the government is faced with many protests and demonstrations which are not being reflected in the mass media. However, some events like the students' attack on the building for the Mobilization of the Oppressed and the demonstrations at Mowlavi Square found their way in the domestic and foreign mass media.

Technical, Industrial Cooperation Agreement With USSR

90OI0061B Tehran KEYHAN in Persian
23 Nov 89 p 17

[Text] At the conclusion of talks held between the economic and industrial delegation of the USSR and our nation's heavy industries officials, a protocol was signed yesterday afternoon regarding cooperation between the two countries.

The protocol highlights the execution of press and heavy tool machine projects by the USSR in Iran, the execution of water and steam (vapor) turbines, cooperating in the manufacture of a variety of railroad wagons and exporting them to the USSR, the development plan for semi-light profile manufacturing companies, and expansion of the Arak auto plant by the USSR.

The protocol was signed by Safa'i Farahani, Iran's deputy minister of heavy industries, and by Arutyunov, the Soviet deputy machine building minister.

Also, yesterday afternoon an auxiliary protocol was signed between Engineer Ahmadi, an aid to the minister of heavy industries, and a representative of the USSR's heavy machines industry concerning the erection of glass, rubber, and concrete manufacturing plants, as well as for the purchase of machinery for the production of corrugated cardboard.

PAKISTAN

Text of Anti-Bhutto Pamphlet Published

90OI0054A Islamabad HURMAT
in Urdu 19 Oct 89 pp 34-36

[Full Text of Pamphlet, Allegedly published by the Punjab Government, Listing Bhutto Administration's Wrongdoings]

[Text] The pamphlet published by the Government of Punjab a few days ago has been the subject of discussion in various circles. Mr Javed Jabbar, the former federal Minister of Information and Broadcasting, has held the additional secretary of Punjab Haji Mohammed Ikram, Dr Safdar Mahmoud, and Chaudhry Manzoor Ahmed responsible for the publication of this pamphlet. Mr Javed Jabbar has also accused them of deviating from their official duties of promoting the aims and objectives of a political party. As retribution for this, they have been ordered to immediately report to Islamabad. On the other hand, the former advisor to the travelling department of the federal government, Nawaid Malik, has accepted to be the author of this pamphlet. Knowing that many people could not get the opportunity to read this controversial pamphlet and keeping in mind the interests of our readers, we are publishing the full text of this pamphlet.

Preparations for a Thousand Years of Bondage

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto used to talk about one thousand years of war, but his daughter has been paving the way for one thousand years of slavery under Indian hegemony. If she has her way, then we will face the same kind of humiliation Sri Lanka and the Maldives have been facing.

She has failed to establish peace in her own province, Sindh. When she feels political and public pressure against the incompetent government there, then, under the pretext of saving democracy, she will not hesitate to call in the Indian army. This will give the Indian army the same freedom to do, on the sacred Pakistani soil, the things they did as an aggressive army in East Pakistan in the past, and what they are doing in Sri Lanka today.

As a result of her actions, we will lose our freedom and become the slaves of the same Hindus who were our worst opponents at the time of Pakistan's establishment. But they failed because during this century's world history we gave unprecedented sacrifices for our beloved homeland. The Hindus will most certainly try to avenge themselves for the one thousand years of slavery they spent under Muslim rule.

Did India Bring Her Into Power

For Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the freedom of the homeland does not mean anything. Just as said earlier, Asif Zardari told me that Benazir Bhutto was named prime minister when the Indian army took up positions on the Sindh border. In other words, despite claiming to

be the elected representative, Benazir Bhutto believes that she is indebted to Rajiv Gandhi for coming to power. The high circles of the Pakistan People's Party [PPP] claim that if an attempt is made to deprive her of power, India will once again appoint its army on the Pakistani borders.

The practice of promoting friendship with Rajiv Gandhi started immediately after she came into power. Pakistan's military attache, Brigadier Zaheer Abbasi, was arrested, beaten, and mistreated. But the prime minister considered this an insignificant matter and did not bother to take any action in response. Actually, evidence of this incident was destroyed so as not to displease Rajiv Gandhi who was scheduled to visit Islamabad to attend the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] summit and no consideration was given to the country's dignity.

Rajiv Better Than Everyone

The SAARC summit was held in December 1988. Pakistan's worst enemy was accorded the best reception and the best hospitality, and this was done at the cost of Pakistan's best friends. The prime minister openly praised Rajiv Gandhi's mother, who was responsible for destroying Pakistan, right in front of the other heads of state who were opposed to her. Rajiv Gandhi was the only head of state privately invited to dinner. The friendly heads of state were clearly in the majority, but their fault was that they openly expressed their feelings on the death of president Ziaul Haq, who would have been the host (had the fatal incident not occurred) and with whom years old relations of enmity were established and which the prime minister could not tolerate. The heads of state of Bangladesh and the Maldives, who attended the conference, were not permitted to offer prayers at Faisal Mosque so as to prevent them from paying their respects at the last resting place of President Ziaul Haq.

Special Performance of the Indian Embassy

According to Mian Zahid Sarfaraz, leader of the Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad [IJI] and a member of the National Assembly, the number of workers appointed to supervise the Embassy has been reduced from fifteen to one. This kindness could not be shown to the most friendly country. He says that the wife of the Indian ambassador told a lady member of the National Assembly about Lieutenant General Hamid Gul's transfer 3 months prior to the actual date. The same lady member was offered the post of federal minister if she joined the PPP. The Indian embassy used its influence in getting its supporters key positions in information and cultural organizations. Important posts in radio and television are now held by Indian well-wishers. Fahmida Riyaz, who is a singer specializing in inferior emotions and who for many years, while in India, worked against Pakistani interests, has been appointed the director of the National Book Council. Ahmed Faraz has already been made the director of the Academy of Letters. The journalists

supporting India have been made editors in the National Press Trust and other official publishing institutions. A member of the Indian lobby has been made the head of Pakistan's Associated Press.

Indian influence is rapidly increasing in the literary and cultural circles. Invitations are being extended to Indian singers, actors, writers, and journalists so that they may come and increase their influence, and Indian well-wisher Pakistanis are being sent to India so that they may renew their allegiance. There are talks about giving permits for exhibiting Indian films in Pakistan.

Treaties With India

There was a lot of uproar about three treaties signed with India during the SAARC conference. These included double taxation on National Airlines, cultural exchanges, and not attacking each others nuclear installations. But there was not mention of president Ziaul Haq (the real architect) in whose regime the drafts were already completed.

Providing Classified Information

According to a report published in London's THE OBSERVER, Mr Aitzaz Ahsan was sent to India (presumably on the orders of Benazir Bhutto) so that he could get some information about documents pertaining to Sikh groups, most certainly to provide them with information about groups working for Khalistan, which they do not have and which was collected by Pakistani intelligence. According to THE OBSERVER report, which it published on the basis of information provided by Indian intelligence, such cooperation was made possible between the two countries on matters of security, an example of which cannot be found in the past. Benazir Bhutto who claims to support the oppressed and victims of tyranny has helped the Sikhs supporting Khalistan.

Treaty for Exchange of Criminals

As if it was not enough to defraud the supporters of Khalistan, a treaty was signed between the two countries for exchanging wanted criminals. There was no need for Pakistan to sign such a treaty immediately. India who wanted to lay its hands on the Khalistani and Kashmiri fighters deemed such a treaty necessary, so that it could catch the freedom fighters who had fled to Pakistan to save their lives. Now, the Khalistanis who are in Pakistan for hijacking planes can be handed over to the Indian authorities for trial.

RAW and the Prime Minister's House

Benazir Bhutto has more confidence in RAW [Research and Analysis Wing—India's intelligence agency] than our own intelligence. She requested Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's assistance in locating and removing secret instruments installed in the prime minister's house by the ISI [Inter Services Intelligenc]. Even if they have not found any secret instruments, it is certain they

must have installed their own. Now, Rajiv Gandhi's men can listen to every word of the conversations in the prime minister's house.

Dorab Patel's Defeat

Justice Dorab Patel was made Pakistan's candidate for the post of World Judge in the hope that India would not place the candidature of any other judge in place of its deceased judge. Aitzaz Ahsan was sent to New Delhi so that he could ask for Rajiv Gandhi's support. But the Bhutto family's great friend flatly refused.

Desai's Award Cancelled

Former Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai, in the tradition of the dignified statesman, refused to attack Pakistan against the Soviet Union's instigation against Kahota. President Ziaul Haq, just 3 days before his martyrdom, announced that he would reward him with "Nishan-e Pakistan". He was to be given this award on 23 March this year. But Benazir Bhutto, casting aside all traditions and regulations, cancelled this award. According to regulations, announcement of this award meant that this award would have been given to this person and after announcing this award it could not have been rescinded except action could be taken against its awardees. Mr Morarji's only fault was that he was among the opponents of Rajiv Gandhi's mother (Indira Gandhi) and he believed that the death sentence given to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was Pakistan's internal affair.

Failure To Help Nepal

Despite being the SAARC chairperson, Benazir Bhutto did not say a word in support of Nepal, which India wanted to crush under its economic pressure. India has purposely kept quiet over commercial and transit treaties. Provision of basic essential goods to Nepal has been stopped. Nepal has always been a good friend of Pakistan and has helped Pakistan in its dealings with Afghanistan and has even voted in favor of Dorab Patel. All the former governments of Pakistan, whether democratic or autocratic, would have strongly condemned India's action. But Benazir Bhutto did not bear to speak in the case of Nepal for the simple reason that Rajiv Gandhi would not have liked it.

After a great delay, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan was finally sent to Nepal so that he could assure the Nepalese government of Pakistan's support. But even so he did not condemn India's action and no concrete steps were taken to help the friend who had become a victim of India's excesses.

Failure To Help Sri Lanka

The new president of Sri Lanka, Premadasa, has been urging the withdrawal of Indian forces from Sri Lanka. His demands are exactly in accordance with the bilateral treaty states between India and Sri Lanka. The treaty states that the president of Sri Lanka can demand the withdrawal of the Indian forces whenever he so desires.

But Rajiv Gandhi is not prepared to listen to any demands made by the president of Sri Lanka. This is why Sri Lanka's president boycotted the SAARC ministerial conference, as a result of which the conference had to be postponed. Any government which feels that what the Indian forces did after invading East Pakistan will support Sri Lanka's demand. Despite the fact that India continues to intimidate Sri Lanka, Pakistan is not prepared to say a single word in support of Sri Lanka. The fact is that government envoys tried to coax Sri Lanka to forego her right to demand the withdrawal of Indian troops and instead lay down its arms in front of India.

Defense

Prime minister Benazir Bhutto is trying to weaken Pakistan's defense system, which could result in the country not being able to withstand one more attack from its worst enemy. For example, we will be fighting the next war in total darkness because we will not know about our enemy's ability, capacity, and the size of its army.

With due regard for Rajiv Gandhi's wishes, Benazir Bhutto, under the name of "New Organization" [Tanzim Nao], has left no stone unturned to destroy the ISI. Intelligence activities in India have been stopped with immediate effect, funds have been frozen, and all personnel recalled.

By appointing retired General Kallue as head of ISI a new tradition has been established of appointing civilians as head of this organization. In other words, the necessary groundwork has been prepared for appointing any important PPP personality for this post. According to the "Urdu Digest," the president was not consulted on making changes in the ISI. It can also be said that the day General Hamid Gul was dismissed, India's Interior secretary, who is also the head of the Indian Intelligence Service, was present in Islamabad.

Silence Over AGNI

After completion of India's successful demonstration of AGNI missiles, capable of dropping atomic bombs, no corner of Pakistan is safe from Indian attack. Even the United States has called this an action that will destroy the balance of power in the region. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who is also the defense minister, has for sometime been completely silent on the issue.

Readiness for Reduction of Army Personnel

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, in an interview with the Calcutta magazine SUNDAY, said that she is ready to negotiate reduction of forces with Rajiv Gandhi. She did not say that India should keep her military expenditures within limits. She openly spoke of reducing Pakistan's defense expenses. It appears that Rajiv Gandhi has told her that there is no cause for anxiety and she has begun to feel secure.

Abandoning Nuclear Operations

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto used to say that we will eat grass but we will make atomic bombs. But during his visit to the United States he disavowed his statement. Pakistan's stand has been that as long as India does not abandon its attempts to make nuclear weapons and does not sign the nonproliferation treaty, Pakistan also will not sign the nonproliferation treaty. India exploded an atomic device in 1974 and certainly possesses a nuclear bomb.

Since the PPP came into power, if we were to assess the position within 7-8 months it will become clear that the Bhutto family is firmly of the opinion that it is India which has brought it into power and it is only India which can keep them in power. In return for this, she [Benazir Bhutto] is prepared to safeguard Indian interests and she is prepared to do all this on the basis of mutual understanding and establishing peace. In reality, it is something else. It is the beginning of a practice which will end with one thousand years of slavery.

Sindh Assembly Discusses Law and Order Situation

46000053A Karachi MORNING NEWS
in English 28 Nov 89 p 8

[Article by staff reporter: "Law & Order: Accusations and Counter Accusations"]

[Text] The Sindh Assembly yesterday continued discussion on the law and order situation in the province as the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] and MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] members accused each other of contributing in aggravating the situation.

While the discussion was in progress the session was abruptly adjourned when quorum fell. The Deputy Speaker Mr Abdul Razzik Khan who was presiding over session order ringing of the bells but it failed to produced any result and subsequently the House was adjourned. The debate will resume today.

Yesterday as many as seven speakers belonging to the ruling PPP and the opposition, MQM took part in the debate.

While the PPP members bitterly criticised the MQM and accused it of destabilising the democratic process to weaken the PPP Government. The MQM members hit back with equal vehemence blaming the ruling party of not taking genuine and sincere efforts to improve the situation. One PPP member said that MQM was creating a situation overtly or covertly to partition Sindh in urban and rural territory.

Chief Minister's Adviser for Jail Manzoor Hussain Wassan held MQM squarely responsible for causing setback to the law and order situation in the province. He asked who are the persons hurling threats to Governor of the province and other persons. He said in the garb of protest against desecration of Babri Mosque in India the MQM was creating law and order situation.

Refuting the allegation of migration of Mohajirs from interior of Sindh the Adviser said about 600 Sindhi families consisting 12,000 persons have been forced to migrate from Latifabad and Qasimabad in Hyderabad, Liaquatabad, Gulshan-i-Iqbal and Nazimabad in Karachi.

He said there should not be any misgiving that the PPP was not capable of controlling the law and order situation in Sindh. Mr Wassan also refuted the allegation that Sindh's Minister was directly involved in seeking the release of criminals and dacoits from custody of the police. On the contrary he said the women "gheraoed" police station in Hyderabad to force release of women detainees and it is known who were the persons behind this agitation.

The MQM member Shamim Akhtar said that there was no rule of law and urged the Government to provide justice to all citizens. He alleged illegal arms have been amassed in the interior of Sindh and Government should take cognisance of it. He charged hostels have been turned into dens of terrorist activities and the police had been dragged in politics.

The member of Treasury Bench, Mir Hassan Khan Khoso denied that any migration has taken place from interior of Sindh. He said if any person was coming to Karachi he was doing so in search of a job. The member urged the Government to sternly deal with the lawless and terrorist elements.

The minority member Mr Jagdesh Kumar denied the allegation that Hindus living in Sindh were working against Pakistan. He suggested all illegal arms be seized to restore peace and normalcy.

Mr Izhar Hussain (MQM) complained law and order situation in the province was worsening as the Government had failed to check crimes and violence. He said MQM was being made target of attack without any justification. He said before seizing illegal arms it was responsibility of the Government to provide arm licence to law abiding citizens for their personal protection and security.

Ms. Rasheeda Panwar (PPP) accused MQM of resorting to terrorism. She said the MQM was the creation of military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq.

Participating in the debate the MQM member Mr Irshad Ahmed said the law and order was creation of neither PPP nor MQM but it was the legacy of past 11 years.

He alleged that Chief Minister's Advisers are involved in killing and taking shelter at the Chief Minister House. He said whenever any incident takes place either in Karachi or Hyderabad the MQM men are falsely involved and booked. He also accused the Government of providing protection to secessionist elements and those raising anti-Pakistan slogans.

Mr Asif Hafeez (MQM) speaking on the motion said the PPP Government instead of maligning past 11-year rule

of General Zia should take stock of its own performance in the one year since it came to power.

Punjab Government Promises Probe Into Bahawalpur Aircrash

4600052B Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES
in English 3 Dec 89 p 12

[Text] Faisalabad—The President of IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] and Chief Minister, Punjab Mian Nawaz Sharif has said that the Punjab Government would conduct inquiry into the air-crash in which President Zia-ul-Haq and senior Generals of army were killed near Bahawalpur.

Addressing a mammoth public meeting at Toba Tek Singh on Saturday, he said the investigation report of the air-crash would be made public. He said the Federal Government had stopped the investigation of the air-crash. He said that FIA [Federal Investigation Agency] was approached by the Punjab Government to provide the evidences and the allied information which it had collected after this incident but the FIA refused to provide the evidence which tantamounts to grave national offence. The Punjab Chief Minister said now the citizens of Punjab are awake and no one could detract us from the right path which we have adopted for the renaissance of Islamic values and implementation of the ideology of Pakistan in letter and spirit. He said that the conventional political trend in our country had changed and the patriotic politicians and people were all out to safeguard the ideological and geographical frontiers of the motherland. He said the country which was achieved after offering great sacrifices would be protected at all costs. Mr. Nawaz Sharif said that he could not be intimidated by anyone because he believed in Islamic teachings and prostrates before Almighty God. Explaining the background of no-confidence motion, he said, it was not tabled owing to personal differences. He said that we believed in cooperation but would not like to be intimidated by any person, and would not bargain on principles.

Lashing out at policies of the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] he said that it raised catchy slogans of "Roti, Kapra and Makan" for the welfare of the peoples, but during the last one year, it had created dearness and the poor peoples have suffered a lot due to the price hike.

He said the PPP immediately after coming into power had released hundreds of criminals and disruptionists involved in hijacking, criminal assaults and murderers. The criminals also made attempts to disturb the law and order situation in Punjab. He said the previous PPP regime was so keen to gain the power that it dismembered the country. In case it had accepted the mandate of the people it was the moral duty of the founder of PPP to offer the Premiership to Sh. Mujibur Rehman to avoid fall of Dhaka. This crime could not be forgiven, he remarked.

Mr. Nawaz Sharif said the Federal Government was talking about Indian hegemony and so much so it had removed the board of "Kashmir House" during the visit of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi to Islamabad. He said such a weak government could not take up Kashmir issue with the Indian government. The people should be thankful to God Almighty that in this country strong leadership has emerged which knows how to protect the ideological and geographical frontiers of the country. The patriotic people of this country would foil the evil designs of those forces which did not believe in Pakistan ideology. Mr. Nawaz Sharif declared that the IJI leadership would hesitate to offer any cause of national integrity and not hesitate to offer any sacrifice for the national cohesion and strengthening the democratic institutions. He said people should be aware of those elements who were creating problems for the people and the country. Such elements would be crushed, he added.

The Chief Minister said that PPP had contested general elections in Sindh province on the basis of Sindh-nationalism which played a key role to defeat those candidates who believed in national integrity and Federalism. In Sindh, he added, non-Sindhis were being victimised and dacoits had made the lives of the people miserable. Posing a question to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, he said, why she had not been able to control the crime situation in her own province? Criticising the policy of Federal Government on Wuller Barrage, he said that PPP Government was counselling the Indian government on this issue but its details were being kept secret from the people. He cautioned that in case the Wuller Barrage was built on river Jhelum the fertile lands of the Punjab would become barren. He said no compromise would be made in the national interest and the patriotic people of Pakistan would not accept the Indian hegemony.

Earlier, Deputy leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly, Ch. Abdul Ghafoor, addressing the meeting said that the PPP government tried its optimum to topple the Punjab Government by offering bags full of currency notes, but the members of the Punjab Assembly did not fall prey to this temptation. He said the no-confidence motion was actually a charge-sheet against the Federal Government because it had done nothing for welfare of the people. The Wuller Barrage was being discussed but the Federal Government was not paying any heed to Kala Bagh Dam which is vital for the promotion of national economy. The zamindars of Punjab he added were going from door to door in search of fertilizers because, all essential items for agricultural purposes had been diverted to Sindh province. Earlier the Chief Minister laid the foundation stone of Sultan Higher Secondary Girls School at Toba Tek Singh. The project will be constructed at a cost of Rs. 2 crore.

PPI adds from Gojra:

On a demand, the Chief Minister approved the local sewerage scheme for Gojra which will be completed at a

cost of Rs. one crore. He also sanctioned the construction of a sports stadium at Gojra.

Mr. Nawaz Sharif also explained in detail the policy decision of the government to grant proprietary rights to all the occupants of the State lands who were holding possession since establishment of Pakistan. This will benefit more than 20 lakh people in the province.

Later, the Chief Minister was given a rousing welcome on arrival at Toba Tek Singh.

The Punjab Chief Minister announced a special grant of Rs. 50 lakh for the construction of sports stadium and setting up of a green park at Toba Tek Singh. He also announced a grant of Rs. 50 lakh on the demand of Mr. Abdul Sattar, MNA [Member of National Assembly], for cementing tails of the canals in Toba Tek Singh to provide sufficient irrigational facilities to the zamindars of the area. He further announced a 3 Merla scheme for shelterless people of Toba Tek Singh under which they would get plots for the construction of their houses.

A new building for the Government Degree College, Toba Tek Singh will also be constructed and it would be equipped with new furniture. Mr. Nawaz Sharif also announced that shopkeepers of new market of Shore Kot Bazar and Sumandari Market Toba Tek Singh would get proprietary rights of their shops.

Socio-Political Tension Analyzed

*46000053C Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES
in English 6 Dec 89 pp 4-5*

[Article by Brig. Usman Khalid: "Ideology, Vision & Policy—II"]

[Text] PPP [Pakistan People's Party] is a party which serves Muslims of Pakistan and promotes the well being of all Muslim states and communities all over the world by supporting the forces of peace and harmony and devising ways for their socio-economic advancement. The Party needs to redouble its efforts to enlarge and focus that image. And it needs to contrast itself with those who serve Islam by dividing the Muslims into mutually warring factions and promote internecine war. They we must assert, neither serve the Muslims nor Islam. They damage the cause of Muslims and hurt them much more than any enemy of Islam.

While ideology is a double edged sword, the vision of a leader is a powerful vehicle for accelerating the socio-economic advancement of a country. A vision could encompass a social revolution and seek to transform the attitudes and values of a society; or it could seek to change the structure of objectives without change in the

value system. The first kind of vision aims at bringing about a complete social revolution and is rarely led by politicians. Sages and scholars of high eminence define the intellectual parameters for the unfolding of such a vision. Allama Iqbal is perhaps the only scholar of the sub-continent in the recent times to belong to that class of visionaries.

The vision of political leaders usually encompasses the articulation of a new structure of objectives or a new approach/method to achieve the same objectives. In consequence of successful pursuit of those vital objectives the 'vision' of the leader becomes the 'experience' of the people; a transformation of attitudes occurs which creates new relationships within the society as well as between states. Such visionaries are recognised in History as statesmen. Quaid-e-Azam and Bhutto Shaheed have been the two leaders of Pakistan who outlined and evolved new objectives and pursued them with success.

We subscribe to the tried and tested value system of Islam. Our structure of objectives has also been decided for us by our history. What is needed is to organise the institutions of the state so that they become effective instruments for the realisation of our national aspirations. The dictate of our history and geography is that we are the principal element of resistance to Indian imperialism; and we want to be a democratic society. The two factors permeate every national endeavour. Mr. Bhutto was the only Pakistani leader thus far who understood this and he made us all proud of being Pakistanis. Thus stated, our national objectives appear clear and uncontroversial. Yet, for most of the time since independence we have been confused whether Islam is our value system or objective.

It appears to me that whereas other Muslim countries have learnt to relate rationally to the rest of the world, the socio-political growth has been stunted by our fixation with India and Hindus. I think we should begin to think of ourselves as a Middle Eastern nation and open our society to socio-political influence of other Muslim states, particularly Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan. That way we would not only feel closer to those we share history and culture with, we would also feel closer to Europe.

Pakistanis view the changes in Europe with optimism and hope. We should want to be a vehicle of similar changes in our part of the world. However, this is not so easy in view of the contradicting interests of various power factions. Pakistan was run as an establishment state by Gen. Zia. Since he himself was an outsider, he was not comfortable with the existing establishment. In the 11 years of his rule, he changes its composition materially. Zia was an illegitimate ruler. Therefore, only the most desperate—usually criminals of various hues—stayed loyal to him throughout.

Many countries are run as establishment states. Communist countries have been such states of the totalitarian

variety. India is an establishment state of the pluralist variety. But Pakistan under Zia had been unique in that it was the only state where 'new money' and the criminal elements dominated the establishment. Zia even excluded what is described as 'old money' from the establishment. One could not hold high political office in Zia administration unless majority of one's wealth and income came from stealing—usually from the public purse.

At the time of restoration of civil government in Pakistan, the United States had a lot of influence with the establishment. They used that influence to keep some of the luminaries of Zia regime in office—ostensibly to maintain continuity and stability. In addition, the 8th Amendment to the Constitution passed under duress has not worked well with a civilian as president. During the year since restoration of multi-party democracy, two areas of constitutional hiatus have emerged very clearly:

1. *Federalism does not work.* Military dictators treat the provinces as administrative units and not political units. The administration is more efficient and serves the people better because it has to respond to a single political will and direction. The present chaos in the Punjab and the misery suffered by its people shall be the rule rather than the exception if the provinces continue to be considered political units.

2. *President with executive authority is a disaster for democracy.* Gen. Zia ran the country through his provincial governors and the federal government from the GHQ. His authority was based on the crime he committed on night 4/5 July 1977. The 8th Amendment granted legitimacy to the fruits of his crime. It confirmed that President Zia was subordinate to General Zia. On the office of the COAS and the president being split, the hiatus emerged immediately.

The source of sovereign power is now the National Assembly. But the President, not unnaturally, wants to enjoy the same executive power as Gen. Zia. This he cannot, for his authority is drawn from the parliament the leader of which is the prime minister. Checks and balances are the hallmark of any modern Constitution, but the check on excesses of the executive branch, in parliamentary democracy, is exercised by the judiciary and the legislature—not the presidency. When the president and the prime minister are from different political parties, without the two parties being in coalition, even a president without executive powers would be an encumbrance on the system. With executive authority, he can be a positive nuisance. The sacking of Mr. Junejo as prime minister was a shocking exhibition of the 8th Amendment having created a situation in which it is the prime minister who needs protection from excesses of the president.

In a country like Pakistan, where political activity has been banned most of the time, the political parties are weak. And the parties depend a lot on the image of their principal leader for their electoral popularity. A leader

with a vision can command affection and loyalty of the populace unimaginable in the West. This adulation puts the national leader in a position to accomplish a lot. If the President or the provincial chiefs are to become the competitors of the head of the national government, federal government cannot even function let alone accomplish anything.

I think we can lay the blame for the socio-political tension in Pakistan exclusively on the legacy of Zia—IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad], the 8th Amendment, the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement], and the culture of crime. However, it would not be enough to undo his legacy; it would be necessary to go further. I am of the view that it will not be enough to defeat IJI and MQM and reverse the Amendment; we will have to reconstitute our polity on unity-faith-democracy. Like our immediate Muslim neighbours, Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan, we have to make the provinces purely administrative units. If we do not do that, and follow the example of the Soviet Union or India, Pakistan would yet again split—with provinces becoming independent countries.

The whole world, not merely the people of Pakistan, are excited about the prospects of Pakistan under the leadership of Benazir Bhutto. However, great opportunities invariably come in company with great crises. While the problems she faces from the supporters of a despotic order aided by ethnic and sectarian strife, are immense, the opportunities which might open upon restoration of peace in Afghanistan are equally immense. Given continued warmth of friendship with Iran and Turkey, we can look forward to a bright future for Pakistan. But we could throw it all away if we do not unite behind the Prime Minister we have elected, and prevent her from using her charisma, intelligence and energy for the design and implementation of a vision for the future. We do her no favour by making her an object of our prayers and good wishes; she is the principal instrument of our aspirations, and our support and goodwill are the principal instrument with which she can fulfil those aspirations.

Quite often in history we find that the solutions we promote exacerbate rather than solve the problems. That is the sort of situation we are confronted with at the present time. While our experience tells us that provincial politics is a threat to our national unity, we seek more 'provincial autonomy'. Having pursued the path of self-destruction so long, it will need the vision of a statesman to reverse the political direction.

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has clear policy objectives. She wants a political consensus to emerge in Afghanistan; and she wants to rid the country of the political legacy of Gen. Zia. Both objectives would serve the interest of democracy in the region and prospects of peace in the world. USA has considerable influence and leverage with the parties involved to make both the objectives less hard to achieve. Prime Minister Benazir

must have a free hand in the orchestration and implementation of a political consensus in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan.

After 11 years of prevalence of obscurantism, social divisions have become sharper and polarisation is getting worse. We have discovered new avenues and instruments for oppression, the principal victims of which are women. Egalitarianism as a goal—in all walks of life—is even more pressing a need than it was to decades ago when PPP was founded.

It is recognised that bureaucratic management of state-owned industry is not the best way forward. However, it has been seen that in the hands of professional management, several state sector industries have done much better than the privately owned industry. There is a need to explore other avenues and partners to improve product quality, increase labour productivity, and to utilise capital more efficiently. Perhaps the most promising area is joint ventures by the state with foreign companies, local companies, and sometimes with both.

The political problems of PPP are obvious. IJI has made it clear that it is their objective to undermine the PPP government and that they would make every vote a vote of confidence. That precludes any serious legislation. Over the years, the people have been driven to think that politics is much the same game as is played between the landowners in the villages of the Punjab. It is not. And we shall pay a very heavy price to leave politics exclusively to politicians. The people will have to assert themselves to regain their sovereign power and restore their democratic freedom—the freedom lost by the people of the Punjab to their police.

In the environment of constitutional hiatus that exists, there is little likelihood of any vision twofold or the ideology to bear any impact other than sharpening divisions. The lieutenants of Zia are still entrenched in the establishment. The war waged against despotism may not be over. To overturn the 8th Amendment, and to rout the legacy of Zia in the Punjab, we may yet have to struggle long and hard.

Commentary Laments Political Naivety

90010095A Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT
in Urdu 3 Dec 89 p 10

[Editorial: "Political Naivety; An Impediment in the Way of Democracy"]

[Text] The people heard President Ghulam Ishaq Khan's speech as it was broadcast directly from the united meeting of the parliament. The previous night the prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, had also broadcast a speech to the nation without a previous announcement. Both leaders stated their own views on the subject of democracy. The people are free to draw their own conclusions. Both leaders have deplored the widespread confrontations between the ruling party and the opposition, which is endangering the very existence of democracy. In her

speech, the prime minister asked the opposition for their cooperation, but at the same time made some very bitter remarks against them. The president, in his speech, asked the conflicting parties to remember their democratic obligations. It was both a charge-sheet against them and a warning for them. We can also call it a foreword for another speech to come. All the political groups should do some soul-searching to find out why they have failed to save the democratic parliamentary system. Is there an alternative system by which the unity and integrity of the country can be saved? We cannot accept the autocratic rule of one man, nor do we want a military dictatorship. We have tried it off and on for 30 years, between 1958 and 1988, and lost half of our country in that experiment. Now the army, by deciding to keep away from politics, has led the politicians into a dilemma. In our country, democracy is still in its probationary period. Will it be a success? It all depends on the character and conduct of the two groups, the Pakistan People's Party [PPP] and the united opposition. It is a diabolical fact that both of these groups have failed to prove their worth. Now, whether we like it or not, the way is being paved for another period of military dictatorship. If this happens, we will not have democracy, we will not have politics, and this has no connection with Islam. Our recent history shows us that a military autocrat talked about Islam, but did not have the grace to bring Islam in the country. Still, we have no reason to be discouraged, but 30 years is not a long period in the history of a nation. Still, our country is in danger. We are again in the grip of the provincialism that led to the holocaust of the fall of Dacca. In the place of one Pakistani nation we are calling ourselves Punjabis, Baluch, Sindhi, and Muhajirs. Recently a member of the ruling party gave notice of creating a Saraiki Province. These provincial and linguistic prejudices have destroyed our national unity and paralyzed political activity. Ironically, the leaders of both political parties are inexperienced, impulsive, and naive. They are completely lacking in mature political thinking. Their advisors, too, behave like teen-agers. Recently the prime minister, who herself is young, said at Lahore Airport that she considered Nawaz Sharif to be the opposition's true power. Though Nawaz Sharif, in a statement, denied having any such power, he must have felt pleased at the prime minister's remark. The prime minister considers herself to be all-powerful in the country. The party has a chairperson, but Benazir has the last word in every matter, whether connected with the party or the government. All of her ministers have been called teen-agers. Though some "uncles" were included as special aides, but according to the latest news, their resignations have been accepted. Even the opposition's iron man is politically immature. Chaudhari Shujaat Hussain, Chaudhari Nisar, Sayeda Abida Hussain, and Sheikh Rashid—all of them are fearless, passionate, and politically immature—still they insist on making all the decisions for the opposition. Some experienced hands have joined the opposition recently, but they seem to have failed to influence the opinions of the younger people. Thus our politics has deteriorated into a children's game,

and our politicians, like spoiled children, do not even know how to play the game. It is a pity that neither our young politicians nor the old ones seem to realize that time waits for nobody. If they do not make quick decisions they will have to pay a very high price. In 1958 and 1977 they missed the bus. This time they are going to miss the airplane. Things will get out of control as they did in India, where the corrupt and inexperienced leadership was overthrown in 1947. Did the name of Nehru and Indira help the congress party that claimed to have country-wide support? The will of the people has brought India to the same condition as we have in Pakistan. But there is a difference. During the last 42 years, the democratic institutions have become strong in India. They can survive a jolt or two. With us, democracy has just started. We are still frightened of the bogey of martial law. We have yet to learn the traditions and values of democracy. Even a slight mistake can do us irreparable harm. If the politicians do not change their attitude, the people will lose all faith in politics and democracy. After that what will happen? It is unthinkable....

Commentary Voices Concern Over Law and Order in Punjab

*90O10092A Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT
in Urdu 1 Dec 89 p 9*

[Editorial: "Destruction of Peace...Solutions!"]

[Text] Mr Suleiman Qureshi, Inspector General of the Punjab Police, said recently that, "the situation in the state is becoming the same as in Sindh and the police administration has weakened because of its use by politicians. The youth are getting more involved in crime, and the politicians are protecting the criminals. It is not possible for the police to control such a situation until all members of our society help us." This admission of helplessness by the head of Punjab's police department is a cause for concern. The situation is bad in the whole country, however, the daily incidents of murders, robberies, and blackmail in Sindh have made the lives of the citizen there unbearable. It looks like there is no government in Sindh. Now, for some time, even in a peaceful state like Punjab, the feeling of insecurity is on the increase. Just like in Sindh, robberies take place, students are kidnapped, murderers walk around freely, and taking the law into one's own hands is considered an honorable thing to do. Why are the police and the administration helpless in this situation? The head of the police says that the main cause of this situation is the political duties imposed on the police. He also demands cooperation from all components of the society. We believe that there are many other reasons for this law and order situation. The administrative structure of the police department also contributes to this situation. The structure is very old, its rate of action extremely slow, and it does not meet the needs of our people. Instead of becoming service providers in a democratic country, the police are trained to become oppressors with a colonial mentality.

SOUTH ASIA

The greatest danger the citizens feel is from the police itself. No honest and peaceful citizen in his right mind would go to the police station. Police stations have become centers for extortion, plunder, corruption, and torture. We notice many incidents in which the police themselves start trouble and violence. Time and again we are forced to remember the painful Nawabpur incident. The police, however, are willing to reform their structure. The accusation of political duty is true to an extent. There are, however, many police officers who voluntarily offer their services for political duties to get promotions. They demonstrate zeal and efficiency in subduing the political opponents of the government, even though it is not part of their duty. There was a time when Inspector General Qurban 'Ali had established a parallel government. After the 1977 elections, the police went berserk in being the enemy of the people. The police officers who had "served" well during that time were rewarded with positions such as ministers and advisers. There is no doubt that some police officers played a similar role during the 1988 elections. The new government also considers them its wise advisers. The federal government made some police officers the target for revenge and transferred them to various places abusing the federal powers.

At times, the police's inefficiency is blamed on the lack of adequate resources. This is true to an extent, and the police should not be put in a position to complain about the inadequacy of their resources. It is important that the police be equipped with modern weapons to control the increasing crime rate. However, the police also fail to make good use of the supplies they get. Despite acquiring fast cars and modern weapons, the special police never manage to arrive at the site of an incident on time. Cars are stolen everyday, and the criminals manage to disappear. The police do not even see their dust. Robberies take place during broad daylight, and no criminal is

caught. The police, instead, have taken over the responsibility of annoying innocent citizens and women.

The interest of the youth in crime has become a problem not just for Pakistan, but for the whole world. The youth just cannot be kept immune from the the nation's environment. We cannot expect but crime from the young people when all of the political parties depend on colleges and universities for their existence. Political parties are proud of their student "militias" and provide them with money and modern weapons. These "militias" are becoming a problem for the people. The other group involved in criminal activities is composed of people who are unemployed after finishing college or reckless young people belonging to some alleged upper class families. They are very greedy and avaricious. They restore to theft and robbery to acquire money to support their extravagant life style. Most of the young people in police custody belong to this category. We cannot deny the allegation that some politicians protect the criminals. We should even say that some politicians are themselves criminals. Actually, thieves, robbers, and other anti-social elements have found a niche in politics. Political rallies are not considered successful without flaunting kalashnikov rifles. Kalashnikov rifles are also seen behind the dark glass of the cars belonging to the National Assembly and Senators. Weapons hidden in such cars are used for revenge in broad daylight on important streets in state capitals. The police do not even dare to look at them because these people are part of one government or another. The politicians cannot succeed without their help. Against this background, discussion about establishing peace in the country are not practical and just intellectual exercises. However, this problem cannot be solved if we stop trying out of frustration. If the elements that encourage crime check themselves, there is no reason we cannot establish peace. The first duty of a civilian, democratic, and civilized government is to establish peace, and we should not ignore this duty.

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