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15 February 1983

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

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SIGNIFICANCE OF ARAB DELEGATION'S VISIT TO MOSCOW NOTED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 303, 11 Dec 82 p 18

[Article by Sabir Amin: "Arabs Reach Diplomatic Solution through the Gateway of Second, Third Superpowers"]

[Text] What happened in Moscow and Beijing with King Husayn and the seven ministers?

For a few days and evenings last September when the Fes Summit Meeting for Arab kings and heads of state was convened after Lebanon's ordeal, the consensus among the Arabs was that they were to ask for advice and present the matter even to China. However, geographically, historically and ideologically, the road to Beijing had to go through Moscow.

Hence was the beginning. It was a beginning which King Husayn had planned with skillful diplomacy so he could shake the hands of representatives of over 1.5 billion persons between Amman, Moscow, Islamabad and Beijing. This is what he [wanted to do] when his airplane took off on Thursday, the 2nd of December. He was accompanied by five Arab ministers of foreign affairs; perhaps the most prominent of them was Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, Saudi Arabia's minister of foreign affairs.

When the delegation arrived in Moscow the same evening, some people were driven to say, "Yesterday is so much like today!" This yesterday was only half a century ago. About 50 years ago--in 1932 to be specific--Prince Faysal, the second son of the founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 'Abd-al-'Aziz Aal Sa'ud and the father of the present minister, Sa'ud al-Faysal, arrived in Moscow and was welcomed by senior Kremlin officials. In a matter of hours the young prince, who later became king, was on his way to the Kremlin where he was received and welcomed by a grey-haired teacher whose spectacles and grey beard made him look like Russian intellectuals of the past century. This man was no other than (Mikhael Kalnin), chief of the Soviet state at that time.

Half a century of the world's history went by, and King Husayn's airplane landed [in Moscow] where it was welcomed [by officials] headed by Vasiliy Kuznetsov, first deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Soviet Union. Kuznetsov looked at the king and those around him, and he found himself facing a young man whose height and Arab costume made him stand out among the others. Everyone shook

everyone's hand, and it was as though they were meeting after a lengthy absence. Some began to make comparisons [between what had happened 50 years ago and what was happening now], but they were surprised by the fact that the prince, the son, looked exactly like his father.

"He who resembles his father has committed no outrage." Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal committed no outrage by coming to Moscow with the Jordanian monarch even though diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Moscow have been almost at a standstill since the last Soviet ambassador to Saudi Arabia left that country. This was orientalist scholar, Professor Kerim Khakimov, the last Soviet ambassador to Saudi Arabia. Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal committed no outrage by opening a Saudi Arabian door to the socialist world which makes up one third of the world's population. Thus, since the Jordanian monarch arrived in Moscow it became evident that Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal was the most imposing and the most discerning intermediary for an Arab ruler. There was a flurry of questions and observations, but Jordanian diplomacy affirmed that King Husayn and his companions would not have come to Moscow had they not been given assurances that they would meet people in the highest levels of government and the party. One and a half hours after the king's arrival many of these questions faded. Alone and accompanied only by his strong argument, the king sat in one of the halls of the Kremlin in front of Andropov, the new chairman of the party. To his right was Andrey Gromyko, the Soviet minister of foreign affairs; to the left of the chairman sat Dr Alexandrov, his assistant for international and universal affairs.

It was said that the talks which went on for one hour and a half included discussions on bilateral relations between Jordan and the Soviet Union and discussions on the Middle East problem. The discussion also included consideration of other subjects. Among these subjects may have been that of the war between Iraq and Iran; the situation in the Gulf; and the implications of the arrangements that will be discussed at the expanded meeting between Soviets and Arabs that is to be held at noon on Friday, the 3rd of December. For organizational and official considerations that Friday was a memorable day in the history of the Arab nation.

--The first one of these observations was that Mr 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, Syria's minister of foreign affairs, and Mr Ibrahimi, Algeria's minister of foreign affairs, had caught up with the five other ministers. Khaddam met with Gromyko, and the meeting was described as friendly. That meeting was held before Gromyko attended the meeting that was held Thursday evening between King Husayn and Andropov.

--Second, in his meeting with King Husayn and the Arab ministers Andropov included Tikhonov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Gromyko, minister of foreign affairs and head of the Far East and Near East Department in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

--Third, this was the first time for Andropov, chairman of the party, to deal in detail with the question of the Middle East. He had not dealt with that question in detail in the three speeches he made since he was charged with the task of chairing the party on the 12th of November. This was also his first opportunity to meet with Arab officials from both the eastern part and the western part of the Arab world.

--Fourth, this was an opportunity for Arab officials to follow accurately and knowledgeably in a manner that had not been available to anyone before the manner in which the Soviet party's new chairman forms and conveys ideas and makes decisions.

--Fifth, Mahmud 'Abbas, member of the PLO's Executive Committee, and Chadhli Qalibi, the secretary general of the Arab League, joined the Arab support front in meeting the Soviets. Mr 'Abbas's presence refuted an announcement that was made in Washington and London about conditions for a meeting between a PLO representative and Arab officials in Moscow.

The Kremlin issued a communique about that meeting: the most important [points] of that communique were:

1. The arrival of such a high-level group in the Arab world to the capital of the Soviet Union was considered an extremely indicative [occurrence].
2. The principles of the settlement which were approved by the Arab Summit in Fes were actually identical to the question and those principles of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East that were announced by former President Brezhnev last 15 September.
3. Andropov reiterated the Soviet proposal of convening an international conference to settle the question of the Middle East. All concerned parties, including the Liberation Organization, would take part in this conference.
4. Communications between the Soviets and the Arabs concerning the question of settling the problem of the Middle East were to continue.
5. Andropov avoided making any reference to Arab differences over the Camp David Accords and the consequences of those differences on the Arab and Soviet levels. This may have been due to the fact that reference to that subject was made elsewhere.

After the meeting Gromyko hosted a banquet for King Husayn and the seven ministers during which he reiterated the Soviet position to support the Arab position.

He concluded by saying the following:

First, [Gromyko said] that the Jordanian monarch, King Husayn, had succeeded in bringing the Soviets and the Arabs closer together, on the one hand; on the other hand, he had also succeeded in bringing the Arabs closer to each other. The evidence for this lay in what he did last month: [his efforts] to bring Cairo and Moscow closer together. At the present time King Husayn is trying to bring Moscow and Riyadh closer together despite the fact that Soviet-Saudi relations may remain as they have been. However, it would be difficult to declare with certainty that these relations will deteriorate in the future. At least they will not deteriorate in the media, as was the case in the sixties of this century.

Second, [Gromyko said] that despite difficulties the Arabs had shown the world that they were not a group of governments and scattered peoples; in front of the second and the third superpowers they did have something in common--we are referring to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Hence comes the

second step in the journey of a thousand miles from Moscow to Beijing. This was followed by another tour with the prime minister of China and the secretary general of the Communist Party in China.

The following facts about the visit of King Husayn and the seven ministers to Moscow attracted attention.

First, there was a difference in that the sharp tone of the Soviet communique was reduced: the communique did not allude to the United States or to its policy of supporting Israel. The Soviet communique looked for realistic, pragmatic and practical solutions. However, the sharp tone was heightened in the statement that was issued by the Chinese news agency when it dealt with the history of the Arab-Israeli struggle. The Chinese statement also strongly condemned aggression, expansion and murderous crimes.

Second, the Soviet communique left room for a peaceful solution to the Middle East problem that is basically linked with the ground of the parties that are fighting Israel. The Chinese statement, however, urges Arab countries to join in solidarity as though there were to be a new stage of Arab struggle against the common enemy.

Third, any hints that Moscow and Beijing were accusing each other on the Arab Middle East disappeared.

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NEWSPAPER OFFERS COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL OPINION POLL

Background on Polling Procedures

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 31 Dec 82 p 12

/Text/ For 2 years, AL-AHRAM has had the custom of running its big poll on "the outcome of the year that has passed and the expectations for the year to come," sending out questions on a printed form to a group of prominent personalities in more than one field, which they proceed to reply to. However, the experiment has produced a number of observations, perhaps the most obvious being that the persons giving the answers are somewhat embarrassed to have the determination of events, the listing of their importance and mention of the expectations they have, from their point of view, openly attributed to them. Scientific expectations might become mixed up with personal hopes, and science might become mixed up with dreams! In addition, the confusion of life might sometimes make people forget what is going on in the whole world, and touchy points and corrections might arise! Thirdly, while "selected samples" might express a certain degree of veracity, it is difficult to state that they express the society they come from. If that is the case, to what extent and by what proportion do they express it?

This year, in light of this consideration, AL-AHRAM is starting a new experiment in the Arab press, one which is first and last based on the scientific method, exploiting the resources of advanced technology available to it in the AMAK computer center which, for instance, has computers each of whose memories contain 2 million letters in the storage programs of the operation it carries out, and can store 2.85 billion letters, that is, about 570 million words, and, when information is requested of it, print out more than 60,000 words per minute!

At the same time, AL-AHRAM, through the poll, has created a scientific bond with the Faculty of Social Services at Hilwan University, since an agreement has been reached with the president of the university, Dr Isma'il 'Alam-al-Din, and the dean of the faculty, Dr Salah Hawtar, to have a group of last-year students take part in the poll as practical academic training.

The samples have been set out to include:

1. One hundred leadership personalities from the four parties in Egypt, at a rate of 25 personalities per party. However, unfortunately, the forms sent to the Grouping Party by a lady colleague who is a prominent member of that party did not

reach us, in spite of our insistence in using them--indeed, we delayed submission of all the forms to the computer while waiting for those, and, more than that, were prepared to make a special frame for them. However, they did not arrive, so the total sample came to 75 forms for 75 personalities from the National Democratic, Socialist Labor and Socialist Liberal Parties.

2. One hundred personalities in the form of workers and peasants. They were chosen from various jobsites, from the labor unions, major production sites, small and craft industries, and villages and hamlets in Greater Cairo, Giza, al-Qalyubiyah, al-Minufiyah, al-Gharbiyah, al-Daqahliyah, North Sinai, al-Isma'il-iyah, al-Minya, Asyut, Sawhaj and Aswan.

3. One hundred university students. Care was taken that they be of both sexes and that they represent all currents and tendencies among the various social and economic classes and student leaders and different faculties in the universities of Cairo, 'Ayn Shams, the Suez Canal, al-Azhar, Tanta, al-Minufiyah, al-Mansurah, al-Zaqaziq, Alexandria, Hilwan, Asyut and Sawhaj, as well as students in the higher institutes.

4. One hundred public personalities, including politicians who do not belong to parties and those who are trying to establish new parties and a number of thinkers, literary persons, writers, artists, professors in various universities in the capital and the provinces, leaders of professional unions, a number of former ministers, heads of companies, some people in the liberal professions, doctors, engineers, some media leaders, and so forth.

5. Fifty young Arabs. There is a small number--no greater than the fingers on one's hand--of young Arabs working in Egypt. The majority are young people studying in Egyptian universities, male and female students from Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, North and South Yemen, the emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the Sudan; that is, people from all the Arab countries /are sampled/ so that the "opinion" will be an Arab one, expressive of the young people in the Arab nation, out of the consideration that they are more free in expressing frank opinions, especially since the form does not compel people to write down their names.

6. Fifteen newspaper correspondents for news agencies and television and radio stations, from the United States of America, the Soviet Union, Japan, West Germany, Britain, France and Italy.

Thus the total number of people participating in the poll comes to 440. It had been assumed that this number would have been larger, with the participation of Arab political commentators and journalists and foreign political figures, but that was not the case, for a number of considerations, among them the element of speed, although we would have referred to some of what we received in individual form.

While we are perforce committed to scientific integrity in mentioning the results of the poll, from the actual material in the forms and the computer, we will try to exercise our own judgment in analyzing them. Before and after the analysis,

the fact remains that "the truth" is fixed and embodied in the results so that anyone who has an opinion or individual idea can look at it through his own vision and subject it to his own tools of analysis.

Thus the results have been derived through a purely scientific method. Thus one can say, without exaggeration, that they express public opinion, or the trend of the majority of the public. Therefore, their analysis must not stop with an initial, transitory glance. Rather, it is mandatory that it pause at length to consider the figures, which are not the "efforts of an individual" but rather a "collection of views." The figures are not deaf and dumb, but constitute a living pulse which speaks for the ideas of the people who have set them down, the people who represent the real force in the society.

Views on Recent Events

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 31 Dec 82 pp 12, 13

/Article by Mahmud Murad/

/Text/ AL-AHRAM's poll confirms the sensitive nature of Egyptian public opinion and its specific positions regarding the events witnessed during the year to which we are bidding farewell this morning. From the political standpoint which governs, and is reflected in, the course of national action, public opinion devoted the maximum degree of attention to the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai last April and at the same time sided with President Mubarak's refusal to visit Jerusalem from the premise of rejecting Israel's incorporation of it and the process of turning it into a capital. Public opinion also supported the recall of the Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv in protest against the aggressive invasion of Lebanon and gave its approval to Egypt's renewed pursuit of its role in the non-aligned group.

In the context of domestic activity, public opinion welcomed the resumption of the issuance of party papers, for the sake of the exercise of true democracy, and gave great importance to that. It also gave the same degree of importance to the release of the detainees, and the degree of receptivity toward domestic production in industry and agriculture was intense, on grounds that that constitutes the true structure of the society, the establishment of a sound economy, and the solution to various problems. Proceeding from the same premise, the interest in combatting corruption and prosecuting people who were the cause of corruption was intense.

While these were the positions of Egyptian public opinion, the opinions differed according to each of the groups and classes contributing to the samples involved in the poll.

Along with the results which underlined the features of Egyptian thinking on what is going on in Egyptian society, there are results that are no less important regarding what is going on in the Arab nation, of which we are a basic part, and what is going on in the world, on which we have an influence and by which we are influenced. There also are conclusions of the utmost sensitivity and importance

regarding the positions of Arab youths, the people to whom all of tomorrow belongs, and the positions of the foreign correspondents, on grounds that they are neutral "eyes" that see, observe, and have a point of view!

Without going on further, let the language of figures judge.

First: In Egypt

The completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai on 25 April 1982. 91 percent of public opinion in Egypt considers that that was very important, 6 percent considers that it was important, 2 percent considers that it was of average importance, a similar number considers that it was not important, and just one out of the whole sample, that is, about 0.25 percent, did not write down an opinion!

However, the details regarding this general breakdown, in accordance with various categories, as follows, are of significance:

The National Party: 96 percent, very important, 4 percent, important.

The Labor Party, 60 percent, very important, 12 percent, important, 8 percent of average importance, 16 percent not important, and 4 percent, no response.

The Liberal Party: 100 percent, very important.

That is to say, regarding the withdrawal, the three parties state, in a proportion of 64 percent, that it was very important, 5 percent that it was important, 3 percent that it was of average importance and 5 percent that it was not important, and 1 percent gave no response!

If we deal with the other classes, we will find that:

Of the workers and peasants, 93 percent state that the withdrawal was very important, 6 percent consider that it was important, and just 1 percent says that it was not important!

Of the students in universities and higher institutes, 90 percent consider that it was very important, 7 percent that it was important, and 3 percent that it was of average importance.

Among public personalities, as with the workers and peasants, 93 percent said that it was very important, 4 percent that it was important, 2 percent that it was of average importance and 1 percent that it was not important!

Young Arabs and Foreign Correspondents

There remain two sets of opinions, those of the young Arabs and the foreign correspondents: 74 percent of the young people consider that the withdrawal was very important, 14 percent that it was important, 6 percent that it was of average importance, and a similar number that it was not important. Of the correspondents, 87 percent considered that it was very important and 13 percent that it was important.

2. President Husni Mubarak's refusal to visit Jerusalem:

In the opinion of 69 percent of Egyptian public opinion, this act of refusal was a very important event; along with that, 17 percent say that it was important, while just 8 percent say that it was of average importance and 7 percent consider that it was not important. Just one person out of the entire sample did not respond.

The positions, in detail, show that 84 percent of the three parties state that the act of refusal was very important, 9 percent that it was important, 3 percent that it was of average importance, and 4 percent that it was not important.

Among workers and peasants, 64 percent said that it was very important, 15 percent that it was important, 13 percent that it was of average importance and 8 percent that it was not important.

Of the students in universities and institutes, 54 percent said that it was very important, 24 percent that it was important, 9 percent that it was of average importance, and 12 percent that it was not important, while 1 percent did not respond.

Of the public personalities, 77 percent said that it was very important, 16 percent that it was important, 5 percent that it was of average importance, and 2 percent that it was not important.

Next comes the opinion of the young Arabs. We see that 92 percent of them consider that the act of refusal was very important, 2 percent consider that it was important, 4 percent consider that it was of average importance, and 2 percent consider that it was not important.

Just 47 percent of the foreign correspondents consider that it was very important, and 53 percent consider that it was important!

3. The recall of the Egyptian ambassador from Israel:

Sixty-seven percent of Egyptian public opinion considers that this was a very important matter, 21 percent are content to consider it important, 8 percent consider that it was of average importance and 4 percent hold that it was not important. Out of this general breakdown, we find that 71 percent of the people from the parties said that it was very important, 19 percent said that it was important, 8 percent that it was of average importance and 3 percent that it was not important.

Of the workers and peasants, 70 percent consider that it was very important, 17 percent that it was important, 7 percent that it was of average importance and 6 percent that it was not important.

The students differ in their attitude, since 67 percent of them consider that it was very important, 25 percent that it was important, 13 percent that it was of average importance and 2 percent that it was not important.

Meanwhile, 92 percent of the young Arabs assert that it was very important and 6 percent that it was important, and 2 percent did not respond.

Of the foreign correspondents, 27 percent consider that it was very important, 53 percent that it was important, and 20 percent that it was of average importance.

4. The clear restoration of Arab solidarity and the pursuit of contacts to support the Palestinian cause:

Of the Egyptian public opinion, 77 percent asserts that this was very important, 16 percent says that it was important, 4 percent considers that it was of average importance and 3 percent considers it unimportant.

With respect to the parties, we find that 87 percent of these consider that it was very important, 9 percent that it was important, 1 percent that it was of average importance and 3 percent that it was not important.

Next come the workers and peasants, of whom 79 percent say that it was very important, 13 percent that it was important, 5 percent that it was of average importance and 3 percent that it was not important.

Students in universities and higher institutes follow this breakdown closely, since 77 percent consider that it was very important, 17 percent that it was important, 3 percent that it was of average importance, and a like number that it was not important.

Of the public figures, 68 percent say that it was very important, 23 percent that it was important, 7 percent that it was of average importance and 2 percent that it was not important.

However, 88 percent of the young Arabs consider that it was very important, 10 percent consider that it was important and 3 percent that it was of average importance.

Foreign correspondents are distinctive in taking a differing view: just 20 percent of them consider that it was very important, while 47 percent consider that it was important and 27 percent that it was of average importance, and less than 7 percent did not respond!

5. Egypt's renewed pursuit of its role in the nonaligned group:

Sixty percent of Egyptian public opinion says that that was very important, 26 percent that it was important, 10 percent that it was of average importance, and 3 percent that it was not important, while 1 percent did not answer.

Regarding the opinions of people belonging to parties, it was determined that 72 percent said that it was very important, 23 percent that it was important, 3 percent that it was of average importance and 3 percent that it was not important.

Of the workers and peasants, 66 percent said that it was very important, 22 percent that it was important, 10 percent that it was of average importance and 2 percent that it was not important.

Of the students, 54 percent said that it was very important, 27 percent that it was important, 12 percent that it was of average importance and 5 percent that it was not important, while 2 percent did not reply.

Of the public personalities, 51 percent said that it was very important, 32 percent that it was important, 14 percent that it was of average importance and 3 percent that it was not important.

After that, we come upon the Arab youths, 42 percent of whom say that it was very important, a corresponding percentage said that it was important, 4 percent said that it was of average importance, and 12 percent said that it was not important.

Finally, just 13 percent of the foreign correspondents said that it was very important, while 33 percent said that it was important, 40 percent that it was of average importance, and 13 percent that it was not important!

6. The reappearance of party newspapers and the release of most detainees:

Sixty-four percent of Egyptian public opinion said that that was very important, 20 percent said that it was important, 10 percent that it was of average importance and 5 percent that it was not important, while 1 percent did not respond.

Of the party members, 83 percent agreed that that was a very important matter, while 12 percent said that it was important and 4 percent that it was of average importance, and one person, or 1 percent, did not respond.

With regard to workers and peasants, 62 percent said that it was very important, 25 percent that it was important, 8 percent that it was of average importance, and 5 percent that it was not important.

Meanwhile, just 41 percent of the students said that it was very important, 26 percent that it was important, 19 percent that it was of average importance and 11 percent that it was not important, and 3 percent did not reply!

Of the public figures, we find that 74 percent said that it was very important, 16 percent that it was important, 9 percent that it was of average importance and 1 percent that it was not important.

Of the Arab youths, 50 percent said that it was very important, 18 percent that it was important, 14 percent that it was of average importance and 18 percent that it was not important.

Of the foreign correspondents, 33 percent said that it was very important, 47 percent that it was important and 20 percent that it was of average importance.

7. The orientation of Egyptian policy toward domestic production in agriculture and industry:

Eighty-six percent of the public opinion in Egypt said that that was very important, 12 percent that it was important, 1 percent that it was of average importance, and a like percentage that it was not important.

Of the party figures, 89 percent said that it was very important, 8 percent that it was important, and 1 percent that it was of average importance, while 1 percent did not respond.

Of the workers and peasants, 91 percent said that it was very important, 8 percent said that it was important and 1 percent said that it was not important.

In the case of the students, 80 percent said that it was very important, 17 percent that it was important, and 3 percent that it was of average importance.

Of the public figures, 80 percent said that it was very important, 15 percent that it was important, 1 percent that it was of average importance, and a like amount that it was not important.

Ascertaining the opinions of the young Arabs, we find 66 percent saying that it was very important, 30 percent that it was important and 4 percent that it was of average importance.

Of the foreign correspondents, just 20 percent said that it was very important, 33 percent that it was important, 13 percent that it was of average importance and 33 percent that it was not important.

8. Fighting corruption (the cases of Rashad 'Uthman, Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy and 'Ismat al-Sadat):

Eighty three percent of public opinion in Egypt considered that this was a very important matter, 9 percent considered that it was important and 5 percent considered it of average importance.

Of the people from the parties, 85 percent considered that it was very important, 11 percent considered that it was important, and 3 percent that it was of average importance, and 1 percent did not respond.

Of the workers and peasants, 87 percent considered that it was very important, 6 percent that it was important, and 6 percent that it was of average importance, while 1 percent did not reply.

In the opinion of 83 percent of the students, it was very important, 4 percent said that it was of average importance, and 5 percent said that it was not important.

Eighty percent of the public figures said that it was very important, 5 percent said that it was of average importance, and 2 percent that it was not important, while 1 percent did not respond.

Fifty-four percent of the young Arabs said that it was very important, 14 percent that it was important, a like number that it was of average importance, and 18 percent that it was not important.

Forty percent of the foreign correspondents considered that it was very important, 47 percent that it was important, and 13 percent that it was of average importance. Thus the overall result of the poll is that 79 percent considered that fighting corruption was a very important matter, 11 percent that it was important, 6 percent that it was of average importance, and 4 percent that it was not important.

Second: In the Arab Nation

1. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the massacre of Sabra and Shatila and the departure of the Palestinian fighting men from Lebanon:

Seventy-seven percent of Egyptian public opinion said that that was very important, 12 percent that it was important, 2 percent that it was of average importance, and 6 percent that it was not important, while the answers of 3 percent were not clear.

In the case of the three parties, 88 percent said that it was very important, 8 percent that it was important, and 3 percent that it was not important, while the answer of 1 percent was unclear.

Of the workers and peasants, 63 percent said that it was very important, 19 percent considered that it was important, 3 percent considered that it was of average importance, and 10 percent considered that it was not important, while the answers of 5 percent were not apparent.

Of the students, 78 percent said that it was very important, 10 percent that it was important, 4 percent that it was of average importance, and 4 percent that it was not important, while the answers of 4 percent were not apparent.

2. Integration between Egypt and the Sudan:

Fifty-six percent of Egyptian public opinion stated that that was a very important occurrence, 26 percent that it was important, and 13 percent that it was of average importance.

3. The Fez summit conference and the Arab initiative it endorsed:

Twenty-one percent of Egyptian public opinion said that that was very important, 35 percent that it was important, 23 percent that it was of average importance, and 20 percent that it was not important, while the responses of 1 percent did not appear.

The results of the responses give us greater detail. We should realize that 20 percent of the party personnel considered that it was very important, 43 percent that it was important, 23 percent that it was of average importance, and 13 percent that it was not important, while the answers of 1 percent did not appear.

Of the workers and peasants, 36 percent said that it was very important, 33 percent that it was important and 24 percent that it was of average importance.

Twenty percent of the students said that it was very important, 31 percent that it was important, and 22 percent that it was of average importance.

In the view of 16 percent of the public figures, it was very important, in the opinion of 36 percent it was important, in the opinion of 24 percent it was of average importance, and in the opinion of 24 percent it was not important.

Fifty percent of the young Arabs say that the conference was very important, 38 percent that it was important, 12 percent that it was of average importance, and 8 percent that it was not important.

In the case of the foreign correspondents, 40 percent said that it was very important, 47 percent that it was important and 13 percent that it was of average importance.

Third: In the World

1. The war in the Falklands:

Fourteen percent of Egyptian public opinion said that it was very important, 24 percent that it was important, 34 percent that it was of average importance, and 26 percent that it was not important, and the answers of 2 percent did not appear.

2. The fall of Haig, the American secretary of state, and Carrington, the British foreign minister:

Twelve percent said that that was very important, 25 percent that it was important, 34 percent that it was of average importance and 27 percent that it was not important, while the answers of 2 percent did not appear.

3. The continuous execution of opposition members and politicians in Iran:

Thirty-three percent said that they were very important, 26 percent said that they were important, 27 percent said that they were of average importance, and 13 percent said that they were not important, while the answers of 1 percent did not appear.

New Year Expectations

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 31 Dec 82 p 13

/Text/ Fifty percent of the Egyptians expect that the new year will witness further democracy and permits for the establishment of parties and the issuance of newspapers. In specific form, this is expected by 56 percent of the National Party, 60 percent of the Labor Party, 48 percent of the Liberal Party, 53 percent of the workers and peasants, 50 percent of the students in universities and higher institutes, and 69 percent of the public personalities.

While that is what public opinion in Egypt is anticipating, the young Arabs anticipate it to a ratio of only 42 percent, and only 27 percent of the foreign correspondents agree with this expectation.

Regarding the problem of Taba, expectations do not portend that it will be solved in 1983. Only 46 percent of the Egyptians expect that it will be resolved. Sixty percent of the National Party, 20 percent of the Labor Party, 56 percent of the Liberals, 53 percent of the workers and peasants, 36 percent of the students and 51 percent of the public figures share it, although only 28 percent of the Arab youths hold this expectation and, along with them, 47 percent of the foreign correspondents.

The same unoptimistic position applies to the subsidy problem. Just 32 percent of the Egyptians expect that it will be solved. From the National Party, only 38 percent anticipate a solution, from the Labor Party 12 percent, and from the Liberal Party 20 percent, and 39 percent of the workers and peasants, 32 percent of the students and 33 percent of the public figures. Similarly, just 42 percent of the young Arabs and 7 percent of the foreign correspondents anticipate a solution.

Aside from that, 23 percent of the Egyptians expect constitutional and cabinet changes in Egypt, the appointment of a vice president and changes in higher positions that will strengthen democracy and increase the popularity of the presidents. This is stated by 24 percent of the people from the National Party, 52 percent of the people from the Labor Party, 24 percent of the Liberals, 18 percent of the workers and peasants, 13 percent of the students and 30 percent of the public figures. Eight percent of the young Arabs and 7 percent of the foreign correspondents share this view.

The economic issue absorbs people's attention, since 30 percent of the Egyptians consider that the new year will witness a serious beginning to the solution of economic problems and increased agricultural and industrial production. Holding this opinion are 33 percent of the people from the National Party, 16 percent of the ones from the Labor Party, 8 percent of the Liberals, 4 percent of the workers and peasants, 33 percent of the students and 26 percent of the public figures. Twelve percent of the young Arabs share this view.

With the solution to the economic problems, 11 percent state that the battle against corruption and the exposure of people causing the corruption will continue. Sharing this view are 12 percent of the people from the National Party, 32 percent of those from the Labor Party, 32 percent of the Liberals, 8 percent of the workers and peasants, and 13 percent of the public figures. Agreeing with them are 4 percent of the young Arabs and 7 percent of the foreign correspondents.

However, 10 percent of the Egyptians consider that new problems will arise in society and grow larger. Most of these are related to utilities, sanitary drainage and housing. This is stated by 4 percent of the people from the National Party, 4 percent of those from the Labor Party, 8 percent of those from the Liberal Party, 13 percent of the workers and peasants, 14 percent of the students and 5 percent of the public personalities. Eighteen percent of the young Arabs and 27 percent of the foreign correspondents agree with them.

As regards Egyptian politics, 23 percent of the Egyptians consider that the year 1983 will witness an improvement in Arab relations and the return to normalcy in relations between Egypt and more than one country. In addition, meetings will

take place between President Mubarak and Arab leaders. This is underlined by 20 percent of the people from the National Party, 40 percent of the people from Labor, 32 percent of the Liberals, 19 percent of the workers and peasants, 28 percent of the students, and 17 percent of the public figures. Agreeing with them are 30 percent of the young Arabs and 47 percent of the foreign correspondents.

The Arabs and Israel

In the context of the Arab world, 47 percent of Egyptian public opinion anticipates that Israel will evacuate from Lebanon, although some of them expect that the withdrawal will be partial. In detail, we find that 72 percent of the people from the National Party expect this, along with just 16 percent of the people from the Labor Party and 52 percent of the people from the Liberal Party. That is, the average for the parties is 47 percent, same as the overall percentage. As for the other groups, those expressing the same view consist of 63 percent of the workers and peasants, 40 percent of the students, and the same percentage for the public figure. The rate drops to 38 percent in the case of young Arabs, then rises to 53 percent in the case of the foreign correspondents.

Those expecting that Israel will not withdraw from Lebanon constitute 39 percent of the Egyptians. Roughly the same proportion (37 percent) is embodied in the view of the three parties, although the discrepancy among them is obvious. In the National Party, 20 percent say that there will be no withdrawal, as compared with 60 percent of the people from Labor and 32 percent of the Liberals. Meanwhile, 30 percent of the workers and peasants, 39 percent of the students, and 48 percent of the public figures hold this view. Among the young Arabs, 50 percent hold this view, while 47 percent of the foreign correspondents anticipate that there will be no withdrawal.

The status of the Palestinians is related to this development. Will they declare a government in exile? Only 30 percent of the Egyptians say so, which is the same percentage as those in the parties who hold the same view, although just 28 percent of the National Party expects this, as compared with 40 percent in the Labor and Liberal Parties.

Among the workers and peasants, 42 percent hold this view, along with 29 percent of the students, 37 percent of the public personalities, 46 percent of the young Arabs, and just 13 percent of the foreign correspondents.

In addition to that, a question arises about future relations between the Palestinians and Jordan. Will the new year witness the declaration of some sort of federation between them? Forty-seven percent of all Egyptians expect that and 65 percent of the people from the parties--76 percent of those in the National Party, 56 percent from the Labor Party and 64 percent of the Liberals. Meanwhile only 45 percent of the workers and peasants, 31 percent of the students and 51 percent of the public personalities expect that, as compared with 48 percent of the young Arabs and 13 percent of the foreign correspondents.

The Arabs--Where to?

The other problem involving the Arab nation is the Iran-Iraq war. Forty-one percent of the Egyptians expect that it will end during the new year and the members of parties share this opinion to the same degree, since 36 percent of the people in the National Party, the same percentage in Labor and 52 percent of the Liberals hold this view. In addition, 47 percent of the workers and peasants, 36 percent of the students and 41 percent of the public figures, as contrasted with just 30 percent of the young Arabs and 33 percent of the foreign correspondents, hold this view.

While the Arab nation has experienced many events during the past year, the new year is coming upon it in the midst of numerous threats and it is in the grip of severe labor pains. Therefore 49 percent of the Egyptians expect that some Arab regimes will fall, and 51 percent of the people in the parties agree with this view, since 60 percent of the people in the National Party, 56 percent of Labor and 36 percent of the Liberals endorse it. It is supported by 51 percent of the workers and peasants, 41 percent of the students, 52 percent of the public personalities, 56 percent of the Arab youths and 40 percent of the foreign correspondents. Thus the overall result of the poll among Egyptians, Arabs and foreigners is 49 percent.

On the other hand, 61 percent of the Egyptians expect Arab solidarity to take more effective form. Sixty-seven percent of the party members are in agreement with this view--80 percent of the National Party, 60 percent of the Labor Party and 60 percent of the Liberals. Of the workers and peasants, 67 percent anticipate this, and 49 percent of the students, 62 percent of the public personalities and the same percentage of the Arab youths agree with them. However, only 20 percent of the foreign correspondents support this.

After that, there come numerous expectations on the part of the people covered by the poll. For example, just 6 percent of the Egyptians expect armed conflicts and disputes among Arab countries, fragmentation, disturbances or the assassination of some leaders. Although this is an overall percentage, none of the political parties contribute to it. However, it contains 3 percent of the workers and peasants, 8 percent of the students, 11 percent of the public figures, 4 percent of the young Arabs and 13 percent of the foreign correspondents. That is, six percent of the total people polled expect those events.

Assassinations, Aggression and Tension!

In the same context of turmoil, 4 percent of the Egyptians consider that Israel will launch a new aggression against one or more Arab countries and will incorporate new territories. Nine percent of the people in the parties hold this view--four percent from the National Party, 20 percent from the Labor Party and 4 percent of the Liberals. Just 1 percent of the workers and peasants, 3 percent of the students, 4 percent of the public figures and 4 percent of the young Arabs agree with them. The ratio rises to 20 percent in the case of the foreign correspondents, and thus the general result is 5 percent.

Three percent of the Egyptians consider that the Palestinian cause will not reach a solution, that tension will increase in the occupied Arab territories and that military force will be used to impose a fait accompli. Four percent of the people in the parties hold this view--of them, 4 percent of the people from the National Party, 8 percent of the people from Labor and no one from the Liberals--along with 1 percent of the workers and peasants, 6 percent of the students, 3 percent of the public figures, 4 percent of the young Arabs and 7 percent of the foreign correspondents, for an overall proportion of 4 percent.

The people who are optimistic about a solution to the Palestinian issue and the attainment of peace between Israel and one or more Arab countries total 5 percent of the Egyptians. Four percent of the people from the parties hold this view--8 percent from the National Party, 4 percent from the Labor Party and no one from the Liberals--in addition to 6 percent of the workers and peasants, 6 percent of the students, 4 percent of the public personalities, 2 percent of the young Arabs and 7 percent of the foreign correspondents. That is, the general result totals 5 percent.

The poll moves over to the whole world. Thirty-seven percent of the Egyptians anticipate a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. Forty percent of the people in the parties state this, among them 48 percent of the people from the National Party, 24 percent of those from Labor and 48 percent of those from the Liberals, as do 39 percent of the workers and peasants, 37 percent of the students, 31 percent of the public figures, 34 percent of the young Arabs and 33 percent of the foreign correspondents, or a general proportion of 36 percent.

In addition, 49 percent of the Egyptians consider that the coming nonaligned conference will be a success and that a more positive stage in the movement will begin. Sixty-seven percent of the people in the parties take this view, including 84 percent of the people from the National Party, 60 percent of the people in the Labor Party and 56 percent of the Liberals, as well as 46 percent of the workers and peasants, 39 percent of the students, 49 percent of the public figures, 62 percent of the young Arabs and just 20 percent of the foreign correspondents, producing a general result of 50 percent.

What, however, of a worldwide problem such as Afghanistan? Thirty-two percent of the Egyptians expect that the Soviets will withdraw from it while 43 percent expect them not to withdraw and 25 percent did not respond. In the opinion of 32 percent of the people in the parties (that is, the same proportion as for the Egyptians as a whole) there will be a withdrawal, 52 percent do not anticipate a withdrawal, and 16 percent preferred not to respond. The views of the party members are as follows:

The National Party, 44 percent for a withdrawal and 44 percent for no withdrawal.

The Labor Party, 28 percent for a withdrawal and 52 percent for no withdrawal.

The Liberals, 60 percent for a withdrawal and 44 percent /sic/ for no withdrawal.

Among the workers and peasants, 39 percent said there would be a withdrawal and 26 percent that there would not, the students, 32 and 37 percent /respectively/, the public personalities 26 and 48 percent, the young Arabs 32 and 42 percent, and the foreign correspondents 13 and 67 percent. That is, the overall results were that 32 percent said there would be a withdrawal and 43 percent that there would not.

A Year of Terror or Peace?

Then the expectations varied. For instance, 14 percent of the Egyptians anticipated that the waves of international terror would increase and wars and economic crises would occur. Holding this view were 13 percent of the people from the parties, 12 percent of the workers and peasants, a like number of students, 16 percent of the public personalities, 10 percent of the young Arabs and 13 percent of the correspondents, making an overall proportion of 14 percent.

However, just 5 percent of the Egyptians expect that the wars will end and the road to the solution of crisis and a stage of international detente will begin. Agreeing with this view were 9 percent of the people in the parties, 6 percent of the workers and peasants, 4 percent of the students, 2 percent of the public personalities, 6 percent of the young Arabs and 13 percent of the foreign correspondents, or an overall rate of 5 percent.

Menachem Begin assumes special status: 3 percent of the Egyptians expect that he will die or fall. Agreeing with this are 3 percent of the people from the parties--specifically, 8 percent of the people from the Labor Party and no one from the other parties. In addition, 3 percent of the workers and peasants, 4 percent of the students, 2 percent of the public personalities, 6 percent of the young Arabs and 13 percent of the foreign correspondents hold this opinion: that is, the general result of the entire poll is 4 percent.

Thus the expectations follow, one after the other, as they bid farewell to a year which they are not looking at in anger, no matter what its events might have been, but are just drawing lessons from as they are opening their arms with an open heart and mind, and at the same time with strength of will, so that we may benefit from the days as we wish, in the interests of the country, the nation, and all the people.

11887

CSO: 4504/138

PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY DISCUSSES DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 17 Jan 83 p 2

[Text] MEMBERS of the People's Assembly yesterday urged the government to secure a suitable climate for the five-year development plan to be executed according to schedule so as to increase production.

People, the members said, should be encouraged to support the plan. Meanwhile, the government should reduce its dependence on foreign loans, which should not be added to the revenues side of the state budget.

The assembly continued to discuss for the second day running, the draft five-year development plan drawn up by the government. At yesterday's session the members asked the government to reconsider the investment laws.

They pointed out the fact that tax exemption should be confined to productive projects. Meanwhile the members appealed to the government to make foreign banks working the country allocate part of their deposits to five-year plans projects.

Commenting on the remarks of the People's Assembly members, the Minister of Planning, Dr Kamal el-Ganzouri, said that the government's foreign loan debts amounted to LE 13.000 million, which would reach LE 16,200 million by 1987, the year when the plan is to be completed.

About housing, one of the most acute problems the country is facing, the members said that the government should consolidate the potential of the construction sector so as to enable it to undertake housing projects.

The government should also back the economy class housing schemes included in the development plan, in addition to increasing the funds for housing so as to cater for the building of 800,000 flats.

Dealing with taxes, the People's Assembly members urged the government to reconsider the taxation legislations in such a way as to ensure the contribution of the wealthy sectors of the Egyptian community towards increasing state revenues and alleviating the burdens which the majority of people suffer from.

Price policy on agricultural crops must also be reconsidered in view of the actual cost of production. This is a necessary step to encourage the farmers to increase their production.

SURPLUS IN ENERGY OUTPUT EXPECTED

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 16 Jan 83 p 2

[Text] EGYPT will witness for the first time in the following months ahead a surplus of electrical energy output estimated to be 30 percent of the present energy production, stated Mr Maher Abaza, the Minister of Electricity and Energy.

This surplus will serve as a buffer stock to cover all energy demands in factories, production units, and new towns in the future, Mr Abaza remarked.

Mr Abaza, who was inspecting the final experiments for the first stage of Abu Kir Power station yesterday, also declared that new power generators will be introduced in Abu Kir, Mahmudia, and Ismailia next March.

The capacity of the three stations will amount to 400,000 kilowatt/hour. Other electric power generators are currently being installed to begin production in succession this year.

These stations are located in Seyouf, Alexandria and Ataq, Suez in addition to other expanding works being done in Kafr Edawwar, Shubra el Khaima; Caliu-bia, and the second power station of the Aswan Dam for which the total energy production in Egypt will rise from 22 billion, to 43 billion by the end of 1986.

Following the experimental works of the Abu Kir station which will have an electrical capacity of 150.000 kilowatt/hour the Minister said that the implementation programme of the station will be divided into four stages, the first of which is already complete will be followed by the other three stages completed in three consecutive months.

CSO: 4500/69

ARTICLE FOLLOWS UP ON GAS DISTRIBUTION PROJECT

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 13 Dec 82 p 3

[Article by Khalid Jabr: "What Is the Truth on the Experiment To Bring Natural Gas into People's Homes?"]

[Text] Yesterday's conversation with Eng Ahmad 'Izz-al-Din Hilal, the deputy prime minister and minister of petroleum, dealt with all the people's questions on Egyptian natural gas resources and the use of these resources. Today we are continuing this conversation concerning one question, which is What is the truth on the experiment to introduce natural gas into people's homes?

Every experiment has its problems.

However, behind every problem there is an actual state of affairs which we must investigate.

In the year and a half in which natural gas has been going into homes in Hilwan, as a first stage in the development of Egyptian homes, and in the 6 months in which it has been going into homes in Madinat Nasr and Heliopolis, more than one problem has arisen.

During this stage, natural gas has been going into 160,000 dwellings in Hilwan, al-Ma'adi, Madinat Nasr and Heliopolis. So far, gas has been introduced into 50,000 homes, meaning that there are 50,000 problems or questions on this new experiment on the part of the owners of these dwellings, and thousands of other problems and questions on the part of people who are waiting their turn [to partake] of this experiment.

These problems and questions revolve around four basic points.

The Prices Are Outrageous!

The first of these complaints, and the one that receives the most attention from citizens -- be they citizens of Hilwan, Heliopolis or Madinat Nasr -- is the question on gas prices and how they compare with the prices of bottled butane. Whereas citizens had been paying 65 piasters for a cylinder [of bottled butane], or less than 2 pounds if they consumed three of them, which is the average consumption per family, gas consumption bills have started to exceed 10 pounds sometimes, and, on rare occasions, to go as high as 30 pounds. While some people can pay this price in full, the majority cannot.

Subsidies to People Who Are Entitled to Them

To this question, Eng 'Abd-al-Hamid Abu Bakr, chairman of the Petroleum Gas Company, has a reply. He says, "The project was drawn up on a basis where the prices would be subsidized by stages, by categories, so that the toiling classes, the majority of the consumers, would pay the lowest possible sum which would have the effect of carrying out the government's policy aimed at getting subsidies to the people who are entitled to them and having the income from the gas cover the expenses of operating the system once the hookup of gas to all homes, factories and electric power plants was completed and put into operation at maximum capacity.

"The World Bank, which has financed the project with an interest-free loan, has emphasized that the government is not to continue to subsidize any service project, on grounds that its revenues must cover its operating expenses.

Four categories

"Consumption has been broken down into four categories. The first is for a quantity of 22.5 cubic meters of gas, which is equal to one and a half butane cylinders (the volume of a cylinder is 15 meters of gas in liquid form); the cost of a cubic meter in this category is 55 milliemes. In other words, people consuming the equivalent of one and a half cylinders will pay 123 piasters, for which the government will provide subsidies of 5.5 pounds. That is what the consumer actually used to pay. We have kept the subsidies at their original level, so that they can get to the people who are entitled to them.

"The second category amounts to a full cylinder, or 15 cubic meters, starting with the first 22.5 cubic meters and going up to 37.5 cubic meters. The price per cubic meter is 4.5 piasters -- that is, the total price in this category is 2.175 pounds, and the government subsidize it to the tune of 233 piasters. (One should note the small size of the subsidy.) Consumers of both categories together (two and a half cylinders) pay 341 piasters, for which the government pays subsidies of 7.83 pounds.

"The third category consists of one full cylinder also, starting with 37.5 cubic meters and going up to 52.5 cubic meters; the price per cubic meter is 18 piasters -- that is, the value of this category is 2.77 pounds, and the government provides it with subsidies of 1.8 pounds. Persons consuming the equivalent of three and a half cylinders pay 6.11 pounds and the government provides it with subsidies of 9.63 pounds.

"The fourth category starts at 52.5 cubic meters (that is, after the first three and a half cylinders); the price per cubic meter totals 30 piasters, and the price per cylinder in this category comes to 4.5 pounds. In this category, the government does not provide 1 millieme in subsidies, on the grounds that people consuming this amount are not entitled to a government subsidy, since subsidies should be directed only toward people who consume less, who are in reality in greater need of subsidies.

"That is to say, consumers pay 8.36 pounds for four cylinders, 12.86 pounds for five, 17.36 for six, and so on."

The strange thing, as Eng 'Abd-al-Hamd Abu Bakr says, is that the complaints started only when the gas went into the Heliopolis area, since some of the inhabitants in this area have "loud voices," have benefitted from subsidies for many years, but are not entitled to them. Furthermore, consumption by the residents of this area is to be considered high. However, during the year in which the experiment was introduced into the Hilwan area, not a single complaint was made.

80 Percent Do Not Complain

That is not mere talk; figures confirm it. All last year, 80 percent paid an average of 72 piasters, 14 percent paid an average of 2.13 pounds, 4 percent paid an average of 4.66 pounds, and just 2 percent paid an average of 11.72 pounds. What does this point to? It points to the fact that the overwhelming majority of consumers (80 percent) do not complain, but accept their rights and subsidies from the government, and that the complaints come just from the 2 percent, although they have "loud voices."

Where Is the Security?

The second of these complaints, which is no less important than the first, relates to security problems. Some people presenting these complaints are very uneasy about the danger they might face from escaping gas or explosions in pipes. Most of these people who are asking about security measures are people who are awaiting their turn [for service].

However, Eng 'Abd-al-Hamid Abu Bakr also responds to these questions with the whole truth. He says, "The hookups that have been made, and are being made now, are at the highest level [of competence], and we have received assistance in them from the British firm Williams Brothers, which is the biggest international gas firm, under the supervision of the British Gas Council as a consulting body.

"Pipes are laid from the street behind the outer wall into the kitchen. Then we put in the meters and make a hookup from those to the gas oven, and from that to the water heater by a pipe half an inch in diameter. The installation is not done inside the wall, so that we can avoid doing any damage to the apartment, and also so that the facility can be maintained and observed. One should bear in mind that it does not in any case disturb general appearances. The pipes are made of steel and have no attachments on them. If they do need attachments, they can be handled very safely and tested by putting air through them under a pressure equivalent to that of the natural gas, to eliminate the least chance of leaks.

Heaters Which Do Not Conform

"In the bathrooms, which in our homes are generally narrow and not well ventilated, we have also found that 90 percent of the heaters do not conform to specifications. Some of them do not have vents, and the British Gas Council has refused to bear the costs of repairing these heaters, so we have allocated 5 million pounds to change the vents at our own expense.

"We have also repaired some bottled butane equipment produced by the private sector which has parts that are not at all fit or safe. In some of these, we have found that gas lines are made of rubber and are susceptible to all forms of leaks, but in general we do not refuse to hook up gas or repair any flaws in any hookups or equipment in apartments.

"In addition, the maximum operating pressure in the main gas line does not exceed 30 percent of its minimum permitted load. These pipes are also coated with insulating materials. The pipes in the distribution systems are made of corrosion-proof polyethylene, the best sites in which to construct the installation have been chosen, and the whole system has been tested before being put in operation.

"The consumer must realize that natural gas systems breathe, just the way people do, and need clean air. In order to avoid all forms of danger it is necessary that there be adequate openings for ventilation, especially in bathrooms, that there be vents for heaters, and that heaters without vents not be used.

"In the event citizens detect any gas odor, they must turn off all light switches and not use them."

Periodic Maintenance

Here the third question arises, that is related to periodic maintenance related to crises that might suddenly occur.

The chairman of the Petroleum Gas Company says, "The company carries out constant periodic service in the areas that use natural gas. There are daily visits to and inspections of the main gas transmission lines and the gas distribution system, using gas detection equipment, and preventive maintenance is carried out in all parts of the system. In addition, there is an operations room in each operating area to receive citizens' complaints which is equipped with fast first aid vehicles. In Hilwan, for example, there are four fully equipped vehicles operating 24 hours a day that pass by houses, because telephones do not exist in every house. The authority provides this for a charge of 30 piasters which the citizen pays every month, and the company performs the repairs free of charge, if there are any. With thanks to God, so far not a single problem has occurred, and all maintenance procedures have been normal."

Consumers Pay for Additions

The fourth question concerns Hilwan, where the gas experiment is nearly 2 years old. During these 2 years, a large number of citizens have bought heaters, whereas they did not have heaters when the project was being carried out. When these people demanded that heater hookups be installed, they were surprised to find the company asking them for an amount ranging from 100 to 200 pounds, to be paid in a lump sum, as the cost of these connections. They ask that the company share the cost with them, on grounds that this was national project, or that the sum be apportioned out in easy instalments.

Eng 'Abd-al-Hamid Abu Bakr says, "The fact is that the contract between the firm and the Williams Brothers Company will end when the installations are completed, and therefore we are not responsible for hooking the gas up to heaters that are installed after the hookups are completed, and it is enough that the government

has paid out from 500 to 600 pounds in expenses for installing a hookup to each apartment and has taken nothing but the empty cylinders."

11887

CSO: 4504/131

HEALTH MINISTER DEFENDS FAMILY PLANNING BEFORE PARLIAMENT

Cairo AL- AKHBAR in Arabic 13 Dec 82 p 3

[Article: "The Health Minister Declares at the People's Assembly: \$78 Billion in Aid for Family Planning"]

[Text] The family planning issue dominated the People's Assembly Session yesterday in which Dr Sufi Abu Talib and Sayyid Zaki, the assembly vice chairman, alternated as chairmen during the discussion of a number of drafts of important laws and decrees.

Dr Muhammad Sabri Zaki, the minister of health, declared that the volume of foreign aid that Egypt has received for family and town planning and the population explosion has come to \$78 million and that a new arrangement has been set out requiring that in each governorate there be a director responsible for family planning, which will be considered a major issue for which the Health of Ministry alone should not be responsible but in which, rather, the diverse ministries and governorates should take part, on top of the total supervision of family planning by governors.

The minister added, "The rate of increase in births in 1981 was about 100,000 less than the increase in 1980, which shows that we are starting out on the proper road."

The members demanded that road discussions be carried out on family planning, that the Egypt Tomorrow conference to discuss the future of Egypt and the population increase be held, and that a detailed statement on the different aspects of spending of the family planning aid be put at the assembly's disposal.

The assembly agreed at the beginning of the session to the draft of a law organizing some provisions of the Law on Military Verdicts.

The assembly then gave its agreement to the draft of a law establishing secondary military schools, which will have the goal of providing the necessary numbers of people for military faculties. The draft spelled out the conditions for enrolling in these schools, stating that they were to be the same as those for enrollment in general secondary, namely that the student have got 85 percent in the English language and mathematics in the preparatory diploma.

Details of the Session

At the beginning of the session, the assembly gave agreement to the draft of a law amending certain provisions in the Law on Military Verdicts. The assembly then agreed to close the door to discussion, agreed to the draft in principle, then agreed to the draft without any amendments.

Secondary Military Schools

The assembly then gave its agreement to the draft of a law amending certain provisions of the law bearing on the establishment of military secondary schools. Kamal Henri Badir presented the report requiring that military secondary schools be established with the goal of preparing military faculties with students who had acquired a diploma of completion of general secondary school in all branches and were qualified to serve in the armed forces. This stipulated the same conditions for admission to the first year of military school as those for admission to the first year of secondary education and stipulated that the student's age, on admission, not exceed 17 and that the student's grades in the English language and mathematics not be lower than 65 percent.

The Population Explosion

The assembly then moved on to discuss the Health Committee's report on the question presented by the member Ahmad Khalil to the minister of health regarding the ministry's plan for dealing with the problem of the population explosion.

The committee demanded that a detailed statement on the various aspects of the disbursement of aid, including the sums allocated to the Information Department, the American University and the Family of the Future, be placed at the assembly's disposal so that the assembly could be reassured that this aid was realizing the goals that were to be attained in the area of the population problem.

A Responsible Director

Then Dr Muhammad Sabri Zaki, the minister of health, followed, stating that the Health Ministry had received \$46 million of the total aid Egypt received for family planning, which was \$78 million.

A new system has been set forth calling for the installation of a director in charge of family planning in each governorate, alongside the director of health! the governorates will have to take part in supervising family planning, and the governors will be responsible for that themselves.

He said, "The increase in births in 1980 relative to that in 1981 was 1,261,000 in 1980 as compared with 1.67 million in 1981 [sic], which shows that we are at the beginning of the road."

The minister added, "We have introduced a new system as part of the health insurance program where we will be monitoring the family planning process through

workers' health insurance. There is a new contraceptive on which experiments are being done, and after its success and suitability for our society have been proved, we will make an announcement on it."

The assembly gave its approval to the committee's report, on the proviso that the recommendations the committee produced and the discussions that took place be submitted to the government so that it could proceed to carry them out.

The session was adjourned, to reconvene this morning.

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CSO: 4504/131

ARMY BOOSTING BREAD OUTPUT

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 11 Jan 83 p 2

[Text] THE Prime Minister Dr Fuad Mohieddin, yesterday commended the efforts of the Armed Forces to boost bread production in various parties of the country. He was speaking at the opening of the third complex of semi-automatic bakeries installed by the army in May 15 city near Helwan.

The new complex produces 750,000 loaves daily and will be operated by the Armed Forces. Meanwhile the Army is catering for the needs of bread industry by training more workers.

The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Field Marshal Abdul Halim Abu Ghazala accompanied the Prime Minister on a tour of the bakery which has power-generating units and water tanks.

Kiosks

The outlets for such bakeries are the responsibility of the Ministry of Supply, said the Prime Minister who assured that a new bakery will open every month "which is a great achievement." The Minister of Defence also announced that the military factories have so far manufactured 50 kiosks to be delivered soon to the Ministry of Supply.

The Defence Minister also said that the Armed Forces are not only interested in bread production but are also increasing egg production "We will be producing 48 million eggs annually," Field Marshal Abu Ghazala said.

The Army, he said, is also sharing in the strenuous efforts to construct Sinai. "We are taking part in most of the industrial housing, educational and tourist projects on the peninsula," the Field Marshal said.

CSO: 4500/69

PARTIAL SHURA SHAKE-UP IN SEPTEMBER

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 10 Jan 83 p 2

[Text] THE Prime Minister, Dr Fuad Mohieddin, yesterday announced that this year will be a year for elections of the general trade unions of the country. "This will begin during the month of July" said Dr Mohieddin.

In the course of these elections about 20000 syndical committees will be raised to the level of the General Trade Unions Federation. The elections will go on throughout the country and are expected to be completed in October.

Shura Council election to renew the membership of fifty per cent of the members will be made in September. Half of the Council's members are changed every three years by virtue of the constitutional provisions organising the activity and formation of the Shura Council.

It is scheduled for the Shura Council to hold its first meeting after the partial formation in November this year, the Prime Minister said at the opening meeting of the 12th session of training the leaders and cadres of the National Democratic Party.

The local council elections will be made this year, said the Prime Minister "and we, in the National Democratic Party, are ready to run for the elections on bases of the declared policy and principles of the party."

"Also in 1983 we will complete the organisational structure of the NDP," Dr Mohieddin who is also the Secretary General of the NDP said to the trainees. In this respect he added, the youth will practise a leading role.

The Prime Minister moreover said that the present stage of party activity depends on more mingling with the masses of people. The problems of the people should be given top priority, Dr Mohieddin added.

For the time being said Dr Mohieddin, we have to be well aware of the main aspects of Egyptian policy, that is maintaining the country's belonging to the Arab nation frankness purity and planning.

CSO: 4500/69

POWER CAPACITY TO INCREASE SUBSTANTIALLY

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 5 Jan 83 p 2

[Text] MORE than 1,000 million kilowatt per hour will be added to Egypt's unified power network during 1983, as a number of new power stations will come into operation said the Minister of Energy, Mr Maher Abaza.

The two power generators of Abu Sultan power station will be in operation in March and July at a total capacity of 300,000 kilowatt per hour while the first generator of the Abu Kir station will start work in March and the second unit will open before the end of the year. The total capacity of these two units is expected to come to 25,000 kilowatt hour, said the Minister.

At El-Salhia, said the Minister a new power station with a capacity of 100,000 kilowatt per hour will start work in the first half of the year. He added that one El-Mahmoudia power Station, Beheira Governorate, will open in July with a capacity of 200000 kilowatt per hour.

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The Minister also said that 19 power transformer stations with different capacities will be inaugurated this year in Cairo Lower Egypt Upper Egypt and the Suez Canal to cope with the increasing energy consumption in the governorates.

Mr Abaza also affirmed that this year Egypt's power network will improve as the network control centre, which cost \$50 million that was extended by the US Agency for International Development, will open in April.

CSO: 4500/69

POPULAR DEVELOPMENT, FOOD SECURITY PROJECTS CRITICIZED

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 4 Jan 83 p 8

[Article by 'Abd al-Qadir Shuhayb: "Truth of Popular Development Projects; Latest Innovation in Popular Development Is Transformation of Public Money into Private Money"]

[Text] "Food security" is a lie we are living. The truth is that its name is food scare and not food security. It is scaring the people in terms of their food and where food is concerned, people are weak. They allege that the people are starving and that with their food security, they will fill the people's stomachs.

With these words and with others, Counselor 'Abd al-Hamid, the assistant socialist public prosecutor, has strongly criticized the food security and popular development projects during his prosecution proceedings against escaped millionaire Tawfiq 'Abd al-Hayy whose trial began last week [words missing] popular development and security in his capacity as one of the stars of the food projects.

The words of Counselor Husni 'Abd al-Hamid, who describes himself as the man of surprises, were an actual surprise to those present whose ears have been accustomed throughout the past years to hearing nothing but praise and applause for the food security and popular development projects which are supervised by Engineer 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman. What is more, matters had reached the point where former Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat used to personally propagate these projects in his press and television statements and speeches.

Large-Scale Propaganda

The large-scale propaganda campaign organized for the popular development projects was boasting the enormous speed with which projects were being set up and completed and lauding the enormous capability to supply the money necessary for them and the big contribution of the national Egyptian capital and foreign capital to the projects--a contribution reducing the burden to the public money and to the exhausted public sector companies which are experiencing financial difficulties. This propaganda was also promising the Egyptian people, especially the poor and those with limited income among them, that the popular development is what will bring them prosperity--a prosperity for which we have been

waiting for long but which has not come yet. One of the officials in charge of popular development has gone as far as saying that it is the only way to build Egypt.

So what is the truth of the popular development and food security projects? Have they actually contributed to building Egypt, have they brought the people out of the hole, as we have been told, and have they encouraged the private sector to participate in productive development projects? Have they lightened the burden of the state budget or have they failed in all this?

To put it very briefly, all these questions can be summed up in one question: Are the popular development projects already set up our path to prosperity, as the wise men of the ruling party and the people in charge of the Popular Development Committee promise us, or are they a big lie, as revealed by Counselor Husni 'Abd al-Hayy, one of the stars and pampered children of the popular development?

One Example

Counselor Husni 'Abd al-Hamid, the assistant socialist public prosecutor, has personally answered this question and has cited as an example the Suez Canal Bank, one of the most prominent and first popular development projects, according to "Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman himself who said this a week ago in AL-MUSAWWAR magazine.

The assistant socialist prosecutor has said:

The investigation of the Public Funds Prosecution have revealed that this bank, from which Tawfiq 'Abd al-Hayy was able to get 9 million pounds, was set up jointly by the Egyptian Insurance Company, the Bank of Egypt, the Bank of Alexandria and the Egyptian National Bank. The monies of this bank have been described by economic experts as private monies to which the public banks have contributed 90 percent of the share, with the rest offered for subscription and covered. Counselor Husni 'Abd al-Hamid added:

If we discount the monies contributed by the Engineers Union from the pension and insurance fund to the popular development investments, the public monies' participation will rise to more than 65 percent whereas the private capital's participation will drop to less than 35 percent.

In-Kind Contributions

The public monies' and the public sector companies' contribution to the popular development and food security projects has not been confined to just supplying money and providing capital but has extended to in-kind contributions embodied in equipment supplied to the new popular development companies despite the shortages and breakdowns experienced by the public sector companies. These companies have supplied land, installations, equipment and production machinery [to the development and food security companies]--all of which means, as the Accounting Agency has discovered, that these contributions have been made at the expense of the public sector companies and have affected these companies' activities.

The Accounting Agency experts have checked the value of the in-kind shares contributed by the public sector companies to the investment projects, including popular development projects reported in AL-WAQA'I' AL-MISRIYAH [Egyptian Chronical] and the Egyptian Gazette. The examination has revealed that the public sector companies' participation in one of the popular development projects, namely the Egyptian Reconstruction Project, has amounted to 21.5 million pounds [words presumably dropped] no less than one half million pounds. The same applies to the 10 Ramadan Construction Company whose entire capital has been supplied by public monies.

Government, not Popular, Development

As for the food security projects, most of them have been commercial, i.e. commodity distribution outlets and not commodity production projects. These projects have taken control of the distribution outlets of the public consumer cooperatives. Several months ago, Husni Hassan, the chairman of al-Ahram Consumer Cooperatives Company, and Samahah Yusuf, Company chairman, submitted a complaint to the Cairo Governorate Local Council over the seizure of the new sites prepared for the construction of food distribution outlets and the delivery of these sites to the National Food Security Company. The same thing had also happened in Alexandria when Tawfiq 'Abd al-Hayy, with the help of the popular development officials, seized the distribution centers there.

Thus, all the aid advanced to the development projects has been shouldered by the public sector and with public monies fundamentally. They have not come as a result of individual initiatives, popular efforts or private monies. Consequently, this is a very private government development and not a popular development. Most of the gains of this development don't even go to the people.

The so-called investment banks are, very regrettably, banks established under the canopy of investment law No 43 of 1974. Their capital is private capital. They [al-Sadat regime] then embroiled the national banks, compelling and forcing them to become a partner in these investment banks so that public money may for the first time in history, and in implementation of the investment law, turn into free private money.

This example cited by the assistant socialist public prosecutor exposes the falsehood of the claims circulated regarding the popular development projects, claims alleging that the projects have been set up to participate in development and in building Egypt, that they have been established to encourage the individual initiatives and private money and that they are built on the shoulders and with the money of the private sector fundamentally. The private capital's contribution to the Suez Canal Bank, the first act of the ruling National Party's Popular Development Committee, has not exceeded 10 percent of the bank capital, with the remaining 90 percent contributed by the public money. Despite this, the bank's monies are considered by law private monies! Those in charge of the bank act as they wish and give one millionaire a sum of 14 million pounds [in loans]--a sum with which he flees. When they are subjected to some censure, they say: It is our money and we do what we want with it.

True Nature of Lie

But the Suez Canal Bank is just one of the examples with which the popular development projects abound and which confirm Counselor Husni 'Abd al-Hamid's conclusion that these projects are a lie.

The popular development projects founded so far amount to 159 projects ranging from firms to national banks with a capital of 606 million pounds. It is estimated that their investments will amount to 1,547,000,000 pounds.

According to the latest report submitted by Yusuf Sabri Abu Talib to the Council of Ministers, 43 of these projects and companies with a capital of 158 million pounds and investments of 579 million pounds have begun their production, including 24 food security companies, 12 housing companies and 7 companies operating in the field of services. Sixteen other companies, with investments estimated at 143 million pounds, have begun equipment installation.

There are also 28 companies with a capital of 109 million pounds and investments of 321 million pounds that are now in the process of completing the steps for their establishment.

The remaining projects, numbering 78 projects or more than one half of the total number of popular developments projects set up under the ruling party's supervision, have not even started implementation, despite the special care they have enjoyed and the vast resources they have been given.

Vast Resources

The public money has contributed a large share, amounting to 90 percent, to some of these projects. A report by the Central Accounting Agency cites a number of examples of such projects, including Isma'iliyah Egyptian Poultry Company where the public money's contribution has amounted to 87 percent, the Isma'iliyah Egyptian Agricultural Development Company where the public money's contribution has amounted to 91 percent and the Arab Contractors Investment Company in which the public money has participated by 95 percent.

Moreover, the Accounting Agency's report points out that the public money has covered the entire capital of some of these companies, including the Egyptian Reconstruction Company and the Ramadan Construction Company. Yet, these companies are considered, by law, private sector companies.

All this shows that the private capital's participation in the popular development is a meager and marginal participation at times and could have been dispensed with. The Accounting Agency's report also says in connection with the "public money's participation in the capital of the joint projects" that this participation has not exceeded 1.9 percent of the capital of the Egyptian Isma'iliyah Poultry Company and just 0.7 percent of the capital of the Egyptian Isma'iliyah Agricultural Development Company. The number of constituent individual members in the first company has amounted to 21 individuals while dropping to 19 individuals [in the second company]. This also shows the

failure to realize the slogans which the popular development leaders had been boasting, namely to attract the private sector investors, particularly small investors, to the popular development projects.

Falsifications

The official documents of the Ministry of Popular Development supplied to the National Party say that the public money's and the public sector companies' contributions to the capital of the popular development projects have amounted to just 30 percent whereas the private money's contributions, or what they call the popular participation, has amounted to 70 percent.

But these papers contain an obvious falsification which conceals the true nature of the public money's contribution to the capital of the popular development and food security projects. This falsification is exposed by a report from the Accounting Agency which says that they [Ministry of Popular Development] calculate as part of the popular contribution, or the private capital's participation, the monies contributed by a number of the funds of workers of the public sector companies and public authorities, such as the fund of the Arab Constructors Company, the fund of the Suez Canal Authority and the University Studies Fund, even though the monies of these funds are public monies by nature.

These funds' participation is estimated at 53 percent of the private capital's total participation. By recalculating correctly, it becomes obvious that the public money's participation in the popular development projects rises to 65 percent whereas the private capital's participation drops to 35 percent.

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CSO: 4505/146

HIGH SEAS FISHING FLEET TO RESUME OPERATIONS

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 6 Jan 83 p 9

[Article by Husayn Shahbun: "After 7-Year Interruption, First Journey of Egyptian Fleet for Fishing in High Seas Begins Today"]

[Text] Finally, life has returned to the Egyptian fleet for fishing in high seas. After an interruption of nearly 7 full years, the first of the fleet's boats will leave Alexandria today (Thursday) on its way to the Atlantic waters across Mauritania so that the Egyptian boats may start fishing anew and so that a stop may be put to the drain caused by food importation--a drain that destroys every effort exerted to lighten the burden of the balance of payments and that devours all the endeavors made to supply inexpensive food to the people.

Within the next 10 days, 4 more boats will sail for the same waters in implementation of the agreement concluded between the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture and the Mauritanian Government. All the boats are scheduled to operate at full production capacity. The volume of fish to be caught in the next 6 months is estimated at 12,000 tons equalling nearly 10 percent of Egypt's annual fish production.

For the beginning to be correct, let us start with the story from the onset as experienced by the Economy Page, by the fleet workers and according to the official documents. The beginning came in 1967 when the state moved in the direction of self-reliance in supplying the fish needed to meet the rising demand for fish as a result of the ceaseless rise in meat and poultry prices--a rise taking the form of successive leaps.

According to Dr Yahya Hasan, the adviser at the Ministry of Agriculture and the chairman of the ministry's Projects Committee, the [fishing] company faced as of the start of its activities a number of problems which led to the total suspension of fishing in 1977. The immediate cause at the time was the difficulty of fishing in the Somali waters, which are considered amongst the best fishing waters in the world, because of the unsuitability of the company's boats for this area and because of the Maruitanian Government's failure to permit the Egyptian fleet to fish in its regional waters despite the presence of a proven fish reserve of no less than one million tons and despite the

problems which the fraternal Mauritanian Government was facing with the foreign fishing companies at the time and its failure to collect reasonable revenues for the fishing done in its waters. The company's board of directors was unable to do anything in the face of those circumstances and was content to let the boats stay in Alexandria even though the proven costs of maintaining the boats in good shape amount to 250,000 pounds annually. In 1978, the boats were sent to Italy for overhaul and repairs without a specific agreement with the company carrying out the work. Consequently, problems have developed and are still before the international arbitration committees. Upon the return of the boats in 1980, the board of directors found no way to utilize them other than to use them for freezing fish caught by foreign companies for the benefit of others.

Dr. Yahya Hasan adds: The natural result of all this has been rising debts for the company which has been faced with the threat of complete stoppage. Incentives for most of the workers have almost disappeared and voices have been rising in complaint and demanding that the company assets be sold and that the company be liquidated. But Dr. Yusuf Wali, the minister of agriculture, has issued his instructions that the company's conditions and the means to solve the company's problems and to restore life to the fleet's boats and to the company itself be studied.

Captain Muhammad Samih al-Khudari, the company chairman and the man who has assumed the responsibility of implementing the plan to restore life to the company, has said: The conditions to which the company has been exposed are unacceptable and the board of directors' first task is to formulate the fundamental features of an urgent plan to re-operate the fleet at economic efficiency.

Despite this, the company is still facing some problems which hamper its progress toward achieving the higher national goal of stopping the importation of fish. It is true that the plan calls for the production of nearly 12,000 tons in the next 6 months. But why shouldn't the national goals be achieved and why shouldn't we stop the importation?

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CSO: 4504/146

IMPACT OF BUILDING CODE VIOLATIONS IN ALEXANDRIA DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 5 Jan 83 p 6

[Article by Sami Rayad: "Citations Against Violating Buildings, But in Alexandria; 1,494 Violating Landlords Arrested, Including 1,274 Who Constructed Their Buildings Without Permits; Number of Violating Landlords Have Paid 2 Million Pounds in Fines; Sentences Issued Against 10 Landlords Requiring Them to Work in Police Stations to Pay Their Fines"]

[Text] In Alexandria, a hot confrontation is going on between the governorate's executive agencies and the landlords who have violated their construction permits in order to wipe out this phenomenon and to present the violators to the courts. The fines levied last October alone amounted to 2 million pounds.

In the same month, 500 sentences were issued against a number of other violating landlords, some of whom paid the fine stipulated by the law and ranging from 10,000-50,000 pounds while others were unable, or claimed to be unable to pay these fines. So sentences were issued against the latter requiring that they work in the police stations for a period of 3 months and for daily wages of one pound to be deducted from the levied fine, amounting to 10,000 pounds!

The urgent question is: Has the law realized its goal, namely to wipe out the phenomenon of unlicensed and chaotic construction and building elevation on the Egyptian street in order to protect the citizens' lives from the greed of some landlords?

All the parties concerned shake their heads negatively.

Last October, Fawzi Ma'adh, the governor of Alexandria, declared a state of emergency in all of the city's 6 quarters through a "very important and urgent" memorandum he addressed to the quarters' chiefs asking them to conduct a comprehensive survey of the buildings constructed without permits and of buildings violating the licensing conditions and exceeding the elevation set for them and demanding that the chiefs provide him with a detailed report every Thursday outlining the legal measures taken by every quarter against contravening landlords.

Within 2 months, the report file ballooned and provided strange and amazing examples of the violations.

In October alone, the survey committees reported 1,494 violators. In November, they reported 78 more landlords.

Some of the landlords had constructed their buildings without permits, others exceeded the elevation set for them in the permits, with the violations ranging from one room or floor to 14 floors!

Most of the cases were located in al-'Amiriyah Quarter where the violations have amounted to 1,274 violations, followed by al-Muntazah Quarter with 88 violations, Wasat Quarter with 80 violations and each of Gharb and al-Jumruk with 18 violations. The smallest number of violations has occurred in Sharq Quarter, with 16 violations committed in October alone.

Interesting Examples

These examples include a contractor who obtained a permit to build a ground floor, a storeroom, a janitor's room and an entrance and before you know it, the man has built 14 floors without a permit!

Another landlord in Sidi Bishr obtained a permit to build a ground floor and 6 more floors above it but went on to exceed the permit allowed him, building 10 extra floors without a permit!

Another person in al-Raml area built a 12-floor building without a permit.

The examples contained in the file on the desk of Alexandria governor are so many that they constitute a phenomenon.

The contravening landlords defy the law openly, despite the warnings from the said quarters, and rush to build more floors knowing that the revenues from the extra floors, whether by sale or lease, will exceed by tens of times the maximum fine that they may be sentenced to pay, namely, 50,000 pounds.

The question is: How are the agencies concerned facing this defiance of the law?

Fawzi Ma'adh, the governor of Alexandria, says: We have declared a state of emergency in all the quarters among the housing engineers and the utility police to contain and wipe out this phenomenon with utter firmness.

The officials in the quarters are conducting a comprehensive survey of the violating buildings, citations are issued against the landlords and the utility police officers impound the construction equipment and materials. We notify the utility authorities to cut off water and electricity from the violating properties and the citations are sent to the police stations which then refer them to the prosecution offices concerned which, in turn, refer the violators to the courts in a speedy manner.

The governor adds that numerous sentences have actually been issued in accordance with the law, levying fines ranging from 10,000-50,000 pounds, depending

on the dimensions of the violation and the size of the property. This is in addition to the payment of doubled licensing fees and court expenses.

As for the extra floors constructed in violation of the law atop buildings whose foundations cannot support such extra elevation, thus posing the threat of the collapse of these buildings and endangering the citizens' lives, the governorate, according to the governor, forms committees from the housing [department] or from among specialized university professors to determine the ability or inability of the foundations to withstand the extra elevation. If a committee's report proves the inability to withstand, then we immediately order suspension of the construction work if it is not completed, demolish the extra floors and present the property owners for urgent trial.

But it seems that the material temptation motivates some landlords not to observe any law. To achieve their goals, these landlords corrupt the conscience of some base-minded officials in charge to turn a blind eye to constructing the buildings in accordance with the terms of the permits. With such conduct, the landlords also arouse suspicions around many of the honorable officials of the housing agencies. The landlord, as revealed by the investigations of the initial prosecution agencies--usually resorts to one of the quarter's [official] housing engineers to prepare the building blueprints under a different name in order to make it easier to obtain the permit, to insure that the construction materials, such as cement and reinforcement iron rods, will be delivered and that a blind eye will be turned to the violations against the permit.

The various prosecution offices are currently investigating a number of quarter engineers in connection with the violations committed by some landlords.

Arrest of Landlord and Engineer

The greed of some landlords has led them to defy the law in an astonishing manner. Fayiz 'Uthman, the chairman of the East Alexandria Quarter, says: In Jalim area, for example, a landlord obtained a license for a 12-floor building but despite repeated warnings he kept on building higher and higher until he reached 19 floors.

The quarter chairman issued a decision to stop the construction by force and water and electricity were cut off from the building.

But the landlord, using private means, tried to resume the construction. A force of the utility police, commanded by Brig Gen al-Sayyid al-Banawi, impounded the construction materials, instruments and equipment and arrested the landlord and the executing architect who were referred to the prosecution which released them on a 500-pound bail each. The quarter chairman issued a decision banning everybody from entering or approaching the building until the judiciary issue the sentence levying the proper fine. This is how far defiance of the law has gone.

Landlords Working in Police Stations

Some contravening landlords are unable, or claim to be unable, to pay the fines stipulated by the law. Brig Gen al-Sayyid al-Banawi, the utility police commander, says that the campaigns conducted by housing engineers and the utility police last October resulted in the arrest of 10 contravening landlords and their referral to the prosecution agencies and courts concerned. They declared that they were unable to pay the minimum fine stipulated by the law. So they were sentenced to work at the police stations (within labor detachments) for a period of 3 months and for wages of one pound daily. At the end of the period, their pay is added up and deducted from the 10,000-pound fine! They are then subjected to administrative impoundment. In most cases, they cannot pay the fine and the sentence is dropped upon the passage of 5 years.

Despite these concerted campaigns by the executive agencies to curtail this phenomenon, all the parties concerned believe that there is a dire need for new legislation compatible with the dimensions of the crime, with the subsequent planning chaos, with the damage done to neighboring buildings, with the pressure exerted on the public utilities and with the rise in land prices--a rise reflected in the rent of the units or in their sale price when they are sold. This is in addition to the danger to which the inhabitants' and the citizens' life is exposed as a result of these illegal elevations [added floors].

Fayiz 'Uthman, the Wasat Quarter chairman [name and title as given], says: These illegal elevations in hundreds of buildings which violate the licensing terms drain the public utilities to the point where a number of citizens in Sharq Quarter have begun to complain for the first time that water does not reach the top floor.

Moreover, these excessive elevations have raised the price of land generally, and in the choice sites such as (al-Saq'), from 400 or 500 pounds to 700 or 800 pounds per square meter. This is subsequently reflected in the value of the unit's rent or sale price.

However, the concerted campaigns to curtail this phenomenon have resulted in a considerable decline in the price of land and in restoring this price to normal levels.

Current Law Is Inadequate

Despite these exhausting efforts, the law in its present form is no longer adequate.

Fawzi Ma'adh, the governor of Alexandria, says: I believe, as the minister of housing and Reconstruction has already stated, that we need a new legislation compatible with the dimensions of these violations and of their consequences. The governorate is in the process of preparing a report on this phenomenon to be presented to the Council of Ministers, the minister of housing and the Local Government Secretariat so that they may exert efforts to amend the legislation in a manner compatible with this serious phenomenon so as to confront it decisively--an amendment providing, for example, for the right of expropriating the floors built in violation of the permit, if it is impossible to demolish them,

and of using them in the interest of the state so that the contraveners may realize that it is not financially beneficial for them to defy the law and that crime does not pay.

Prevention and Cure

Counselor Sami al-Barbari, the East Alexandria public prosecutor, believes that despite the major efforts exerted by the executive agencies to confront this phenomenon, there is a dire need for a new legislation that stiffens the penalty to the degree where those defying the law will reap no benefit and will receive just punishment.

The control [agencies] must also have a role. Counselor Sami al-Barbari says that the experiment of warning the citizens not to purchase or rent units in the new buildings or the buildings scheduled to be constructed before consulting with the housing departments in the quarters to find out the true nature of the specifications of the property and of its compliance with the official permit--an experiment started by the East Alexandria Quarter and adopted by the other quarters--has been received with a positive response by a large number of citizens.

This warning, announced in the press and in the local broadcasting station, will by necessity have an impact on landlords building illegal extra floors. If these people realize that they will not find a buyer or a tenant for the floors built in violation of the permits, they will not take the risk of building them. To them, the issue is ultimately one of profit and loss.

8494

CSO: 4504/147

BRIEFS

RESTRICTIONS ON AL-GHAZALI TRAVEL--The passport police at Cairo Airport has prevented Zaynab al-Ghazali from going abroad. Zaynab al-Ghazali, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, had received an invitation from the fifth annual conference of the Arab Muslim Youth League in the United States. After completing the travel procedures, she was surprised by the passport officers preventing her from leaving the country, without explaining the reasons. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 27 Dec 82 p 1] 8494

INFLATION RATE--Report by Hilmi Salim--The Liberal Party General Secretariat asserted in its meeting last Tuesday under the chairmanship of Mustafa Kamil Murad, the party chairman, that the inflation rate of 18 percent reported by the five-year plan is an imaginary rate and that the actual rate is 28 percent. The General Secretariat has said that the family income will rise 10 pounds monthly according to the imaginary rate whereas the actual inflation rate will devour this increase as a result of the rise in the prices of goods and services. The secretariat added: The private sector must be encouraged to invest and the proper psychological and economic climate for such investment must be created. It further asserted that the private sector cannot participate effectively in building the national economy under the canopy of special laws. The secretariat added: The five-year plan allocates only five percent [of its investment money] for new projects while allocating 70 percent for completion of the previous plan's projects and 25 percent for replacement and renewal. This demonstrates the inability of the government agencies, in their present form, to implement the plan. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 27 Dec 82 p 2] 8494

SUEZ TUNNEL OPEN ALL DAY--THE Ahmed Hamdi Tunnel will be open to traffic 24 hours a day as from tomorrow. This measure is to facilitate the transport of tourist groups, food, building materials and workers to Sinai, the Director of the Tunnel, Mr El-Sherbini El-Disoki, said. He added that an average of 500 cars use the tunnel every day. [Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 7 Jan 83 p 2]

SOCIAL INSURANCE ROLLS LENGTHEN--THE number of citizens enjoying social insurance has reached 7,741,000 citizens during 1982 with an increase of 600,000 over 1981, according to a report issued recently by the General Authority for Social Insurance. During 1982 said the report an LE 351 million has been used to cover pensions to government and public sector workers with an increase of LE 129 million over 1981. The report also said that investments in the field of social insurance reached LE 2,648 million during 1982. [Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 11 Jan 83 p 3]

PAPER CASTIGATES LIBYANS FOR LACK OF REVOLUTIONARY FERVOR

London AL-ZAHZF AL-AKHDAR in English 14 Jan 83 p 16

/Text/

LIBYANS HAVE been celebrating Christmas, or so it would seem judging by the behaviour of some Libyans during the Christian festive season. How does this behaviour tie in with the ideology of the Revolution? Equally important, how can Libyans behave in this way and ignore important political events at the same time when the Libyan Jamahiriya is an Islamic country?

It was generally believed that following the television address given by Muammar Qadhafi on the subject of the then forthcoming session of the Basic People's Congresses, Libyans would immediately respond to the calls made by the Leader of the Revolution. They would take part in serious discussions on the agenda of the latest BPC session, particularly the all-important programme for total mobilisation adopted at their fifth convention last year.

This was at least the general expectation. Libyans would leave their universities, schools and offices and enroll for military training in the service of the revolutionary objective of arming the people. This would enable the abolition of the Law of Compulsory Conscription. It was also the general belief that the Leader's address would encourage hundreds of thousands of Libyans to voluntarily help to unload the scores of ships which wait off Libya's ports, while others would take part in campaigns to clean towns, villages and public health facilities.

It was further believed that producers would remain in the factories to work overtime, taking on extra shifts, especially as today there are no more employers or laws which allow exploitation. Society would benefit from this voluntary action through the extra output generated and also because such action would have helped do away with foreign labour. The millions which foreign workers send abroad each year could instead be used to finance future projects of strategic importance to the Libyan Jamahiriya.

The general belief was that the Leader's exhortations would have made many cast off their Parisian clothes and vow to boycott such imports in the future. Instead, they would carry their axes and head towards the countryside to till and reclaim the land. This would have given new momentum to the agricultural production programme and would have further reduced the country's import bill, allowing Libyan society to mark the beginning of a new year of challenge and total mobilisation.

isation in the face of the imperialist, Zionist and reactionary threat.

But what, in fact, happened? Alas, the majority, after hearing the Leader's address, took to the People's Markets to empty them of their goods and hoard the clothes, tinned foods, electrical goods and furniture. Others stood in long queues outside passport offices and municipal offices, waiting to obtain exit visas to Europe so that they might take part in the seasonal celebrations and, in the case of some, spend time in Europe's vice dens. Others still prepared for days to hold drinking parties in their own flats and villas in celebration of Christmas, effectively turning their homes into little outposts of Europe on Libyan soil.

In so doing, they of course reject all the values of Libyan Arab society. Buying and decorating Christmas trees is not a good way of expressing commitment to either Islam or the Arab cause. It would have been more appropriate if these people had instead celebrated the birth of the Prophet Muhammed, may God have mercy upon his soul, by planting a tree in the quarter where they live or at some agricultural project. Such cultivation would have helped greatly in the national task of expanding the area of land under cultivation and available for agricultural use.

If people are simply going to attend the Basic People's Congresses in order to obtain a signature on some membership card or for fear of the impact of non-attendance on their careers then this will render the

people's democracy meaningless. Avoiding the national task of taking part in serious political debate is a cowardly action, for it delays the attainment of national revolutionary goals. Hypocrites who say one thing and then do another cause untold damage to the Revolution.

Fostering regionalism

Then there are those separatists with the mentality of men like Abdul Hamid Bakkoush, who look upon our Arab brethren in the Jamahiriya as aliens and foreigners, as if they are to be classed in the same category as non-Arab workers in the Libyan Jamahiriya. This ignores the belief that all Arabs are one and the same and that all Arabs are welcome in the Jamahiriya, which is as much their country as it is the Libyans'.

If fostering regionalism is one crime, then living the high life while the masses remain loyal to the Al Fateh Revolution and at the same pay time and again for others' greed is an even worse crime. Libyans must abandon luxuries and concentrate on national tasks in the national interest.

The revolutionary committees have a particular responsibility to guide Libyans in this direction and promote serious discussion of the issues facing the Jamahiriya. We can dismiss the celebration of Christmas which has just consumed so much time and money by saying that it does not contribute in the slightest to the attainment of our national goals.

BA'TH PARTY ISSUES COMMUNIQUE CONDEMNING REGIME

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 22 Nov 82 p 3

/Article: "Letter from the Nile Valley: The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party Organization in the Sudan: Glory to the Sudanese October Revolution: May the Will of the People Triumph"/

/Text/ On the 18th anniversary of the Sudanese Arab 21 October revolution, the organization of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party in the Sudan issued a mass declaration calling on the Sudanese masses to intensify the struggle to eliminate tyrannical individual rule, out of loyalty to the blood of the martyrs and the long, hard fight the masses of the Sudan have waged to wrest away the national independence the regime has been gambling with and offering on a platter as a gift to the American oil companies.

21 October 1964 is the date in which the forces of the people moved to sweep away 'Abbud's dictatorial regime. It came about as a consecration of a broad mass movement in which the students, professors and various classes of the people offered martyrs and sacrifices. The 21st was the zero hour, when the students of Khartoum University gathered and the authorities stood against them and brought a hail of bullets down on them. As a consequence of that, a number of martyrs fell, including the student martyr al-Qarashi, to whom the masses of Khartoum bade farewell on 22 October. On the following day, the 23rd, the squares, mosques and open areas turned into places of mass gatherings calling for the fall of the regime, in a spite of the military mass formations that stood against them with bombs and bullets. Then there occurred the strike of 25 October and the march of the 26th, which cried out for the long life of the people and the fall of 'Abbud. That was accompanied by the establishment of the national front of bodies that had called out the slogan "To the palace, until victory," and the will of the masses triumphed on 28 October 1964 /when/ the page of 'Abbud was turned and a government was established which undertook to act in accordance with the demands of the people.

We are publishing herewith the statement by the party's organization in the Sudan on this immortal occasion in Sudanese history.

/Signed/ The editors.

Masses of our fighting people:

On this day, 21 October 1964, 18 years ago, the revolution of the heroic Sudanese people burst forth, challenging the first military /force/ in all its tyranny, triumphing over it and laying the foundation for the construction of a democratic socialist Sudan. However, evil hands stretched out to abort this unique revolution, paving the way for the return of the military in May 1979, when the imperialist reactionary scheme was completed and May emptied the slogans of October of all substance and content through its false claims that it was an extension of this revolution.

Masses of our People:

Today the anniversary of October is coming as our country is laboring under dictatorial powers which have oppressed the people, sat on their chest with the force of iron and fire and fascist organizations, stripped away people's inviolable rights and laws, and turned our country into a great prison in which noble nationalist forces and noble fighting men are persecuted and opportunists and the agents of the enemies of the peoples roam about at will.

These authorities, which have lost all the positive attributes for survival, have failed to realize the simplest requirements of the nation and the citizens and have been unable to realize the welfare, prosperity and justice the people have wished for. Indeed, they have turned our country into an unendurable hell of inflation, interminable suffering, bleeding misery, degeneracy, the destruction of people's integrity and conscription in the service of foreign powers, by rushing wholeheartedly into the embrace of international imperialism, have turned the Sudan into an outlet for imperialism to carry out its criminal designs in the Arab and African area, have taken ludicrous and cowardly positions regarding Arab and African causes, and have ignored the Arab and African liberation movements, foremost among them the Palestinian revolution and the Eritrean revolution, /while engaging in/ subservience to the isolated treasonous regime in Egypt, seeking protection from the wrath of the masses.

Masses of our fighting people:

As the October anniversary comes, the Arab nation is faced with the vilest imperialist Zionist aggression, to which thousands of the best children of this nation have fallen the victim, in sight of the whole world--this Nazi onslaught which America has planned for and which its instrument in the area, Israel, has carried out, for the sake of liquidating the Palestinian cause and rendering the Arab revolution impotent by liquidating its nationalist progressive forces, at the forefront of which is the combative Syria.

However, the historic perseverance of the resistance, the Lebanese national movement and the Syrian Arab army, which stood alone in the face of the aggression, stress the inevitability of the triumph of the Arab nation, in spite of the spiritless voices that are calling for capitulation.

Masses of our fighting people:

Let us make the October anniversary fuel for our struggle against tyrannical individual rule and, out of loyalty to the October revolution, let the efforts of the nationalist and the progressive forces join ranks to bring it down today, not tomorrow, so that the Sudan may return to its natural place in the center of the countries that are fighting against imperialism and Zionism. Let us restore to the Sudan its usurped dignity and freedom, and let us put a limit to the distortion of the good repute of the nation and the citizens.

Greetings to the masses of our people on the glorious October anniversary, and glory and immortality to the martyrs of our people through the various stages of their struggle.

Glory and immortality to the martyrs of our Arab nation.

Greetings to the noble fighting men in the prisons and concentration camps.

Long live the anniversary of the glorious October revolution, death to the traitors and agents, long live the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, and may our mission be immortal.

/Signed/ The organization of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party.

11887

CSO: 4504/137

ARAB AID SOUGHT

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 2, 10 Jan 83 pp 6-7

[Text]

Sudan last week announced that it was seeking "a unified Arab strategy" involving financial aid from Arab development funds and governments to help offset its crippling balance of payments deficit, which is now estimated at \$1 billion.

The announcement, made by Finance Minister Ibrahim Monem Mansour shortly after he arrived in Kuwait for talks with officials there, followed a statement from Washington that Sudan would receive no financial aid from the US this year. In recent years, US assistance to Sudan has reached about \$200 million a year, but the US Congress has cut back sharply on the aid programme for 1983 and Sudan is one of the victims.

Mr Mansour said that he would be conferring with the heads of Arab development funds in order to "work out a joint Arab strategy for helping Sudan in preparation for an international conference on Sudan to be held in Paris at the end of this month." The decision to hold the conference was taken after a recent visit to Khartoum by the heads of Arab development funds who learned there of the opposition of some Sudanese officials to conditions imposed on the government by the International Monetary Fund.

These included the 50 per cent devaluation of the Sudanese Pound (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, November 22, 1982) upon which the IMF insisted if it was to consider reactivating a standby credit arrangement suspended last May.

Despite the warnings of some officials that eliminating subsidies on certain basic commodities in line with IMF recommendations could provoke civil unrest, the government in Khartoum last week announced new increases in fuel and gasoline prices. The Ministry of Cooperation, Commerce and Supply said that the price of normal benzine had been raised from SL 1.75 (\$1.31) per gallon to SL 3.00 (\$2.5) while the price of super had gone from SL 2.00 (\$1.50) to SL 3.50 (\$2.62).

Similar rises were announced for gasoline and kerosene prices, while fares on public transport vehicles were increased.

As this newsletter has reported in recent issues, officials in Khartoum do not believe that increasing fuel prices will appreciably dampen demand for petroleum products; it is, however, increases in the cost of crude which are primarily responsible for Sudan's growing trade gap. In 1981, the last year for which statistics are fully available, Saudi Arabia topped the list of Sudan's trading partners, with two-way exchanges reaching a value of SL 203 million (\$406 million in 1981 prices) and the surplus in Saudi Arabia's favour topping SL 48 million (\$96 million). Trade with Kuwait, the fifth-ranking partner, in that year was worth SL 57 million (\$114 million), all but \$1 million of it accounting for sales of Kuwaiti crude and refined products to Sudan.

The cut in American assistance to Sudan was the result of a budget-cutting spree by Congress, which not only slashed the amount of funds available to the administration but also specified how most of them were to be used. Reports from Washington last week quoted one State Department official as saying "we have never been in a worse position" and adding that he hoped that Secretary of State George Shultz would recommend to President Reagan that supplementary aid be sought.

The administration had asked Congress to approve direct credits (that is, loans which do not have to be repaid) to Israel and to Egypt totalling \$500 million and \$200 million respectively, but Congress decided to increase the allocations to \$750 million to Israel and \$425 million to Egypt; this meant that the \$557 million which the Reagan administration had requested for other countries was slashed to \$290 million and all but \$20 million of it was earmarked for specific purposes. "We have promised a number of our allies - Pakistan,

South Korea, Thailand and Tunisia, for instance — substantial amounts of credits and we're simply unable to deliver because of what Congress did," lamented the State Department official.

The cutbacks also affected what are known as guaranteed credits, loans which must be repaid; here the Congress lopped \$700 million off what the administ-

ration had asked for, leaving only \$3.6 billion to be disbursed. Commenting on the reductions, the *New York Times* pointed out that Sen Robert Kasten Jr, who heads the Senate's Appropriations sub-Committee on foreign operations, and Rep Clarence D Long, who chairs the House of Representatives' counterpart committee, were both very powerful and pro-Israeli.

CSO: 4500/62

PRIME MINISTER OUTLINES ECONOMIC POLICY

LD230410 Tunis TAP in English 1321 GMT 22 Jan 83

[Text] Tunis, 22 Jan (TAP)--After the adoption of the Finance Act for 1983, Tunisia's Premier Mohamed Mzali said this year will be characterized by work, production at all levels and social justice.

Out of these objectives, Mr Mzali pointed out the growth of the G.D.P., the increase in the volume of exports, the growth of savings and social peace. It is a question of taking up a challenge: That of overcoming the economic crisis all over the world, fighting against inflation and protectionism of the West through austerity and increase in production in an atmosphere of social peace and justice, for we must at all costs spare the country anarchy, trouble and strikes which have baneful effects on national economy.

The government is convinced of the need for connecting productivity and policy of wages and of going on with dialogue and consultations between social partners concerning all the statutes and collective conventions.

In order to reach its aim, the government is here and now determined to freeze the prices of some products and to create new industrial poles all over the country productive of jobs.

The agricultural sector will be promoted by structural reforms. The taxation system will be used to establish social justice through a fair distribution of resources and a necessary balance between people and regions.

These are the main lines of the economic and social policy--how to implement them? This action assures several aspects:

--Fighting against artificial inflation caused by speculators (industrialists and trades people),

--calming people following the rumours of an increase in prices,

--fighting against abuses in the calculation of some products prices and [word indistinct] tax evasion.

In order to reach these objectives several means have been used such as: Economic control and closing down of some shops and enterprises for illicit rise in prices..., clarification of the taxation system, reduction of incomes....

As regards economic control, it already started in May 1981 with the creation of a mission of assistance to industrial enterprises, composed of experts, engineers and inspectors, aiming to improve the quality of products and reduce production costs in November 1982, the Ministry of National Economy started an operation of "industrial control" relating particularly to the quality and prices of goods; a similar operation was launched recently (mid-January) with the objective of improving quality and displaying legal prices. This operation is going on, affecting various sectors:

- Detergents, perfumery, cosmetics
- electric domestic appliances
- textile
- leather and shoes
- building materials
- food products

This control campaign is taking place at a hard time for Tunisia's economy especially in the sector of agriculture and food industries.

In addition to the control of prices, the taxation system has been reexamined in order to establish social justice. (Fair distribution of resources, clarification in matters of taxes.) An efficient system of control has been set up to avoid tax evasion. Therefore all citizens are obliged to pay taxes and trades people and industrialists will no longer be able to include in the calculation of their products' cost price taxes which they have never paid and which they reflect anyway on consumers, thus artificially increasing prices.

In matters of fight against inflation, wages and all sorts of revenues will be [word indistinct] in parallel with a decline in prices so that consumption might not exceed the available means. It is a question of improving production and exportations especially in the field of agriculture. This action will be based on loans to help [word indistinct]. In this respect, President Bourguiba agreed recently upon the creation of a national bank for agricultural development.

In the industrial field, oil and industrial units are expected to be put into service and 50,000 jobs to be created. Therefore, it seems that 1983 will be the year of economic recovery through austerity, work, production and fight against inflation, abuses and tax-evasions.

CSO: 4500/70

UNIVERSITY PROTEST LEADERS CALL FOR REFORMS

Tunis AL-SHA'B in Arabic 24 Dec 82 p 5

/Article by Othman Yahiaoui: "At a Press Conference: The University Persons Call for a Restoration of the University's Good Name"/

/Text/ University persons of various categories entered into their third strike since the beginning of the academic year on Tuesday 21 December. It is an ongoing strike and, on the second day of the strike, the Union of Higher Education and Scientific Research and the Union of Lecturing Professors and Professors in Higher Education held a press conference in their headquarters which was headed by the secretaries general of the two unions. In particular, this included the following:

Our Brother Jounaidi Abdeljaouad:

"We are holding this press conference on the second day of the third strike in the course of 6 weeks. This is a strike which has taken place for the same old demands /that have been made/ of the government for years concerning the material and professional condition of the people in higher education and scientific research in various categories, as represented by the amendment of private grants, so that their 1976 value may be restored starting with the beginning of January 1983, including these grants in the computation of retirement pay, and also the opening of new negotiations to review and modify the stipulations in the order related to the charter in accordance with the recommendations of the Tunisian General Federation of Labor.

"At the end of the second strike, approval was reached to enter into an ongoing strike that could be resumed starting 16 December 1982 if the government did not respond to these two demands, the material and professional ones. However, in the meantime, contacts took place on a number of levels, on the levels of the unions and on the levels of the federation, which was connected to the government, to make progress in the negotiations to settle the two issues. It so happened that the prime minister promised our brother the secretary general of the union that part of the demands concerned with 1983 would be carried out, once we, as unionists, had retreated on the matter of the value of the increase of the private stipends, /lowering that/ from 50 to 25 percent, provided that this difference be made up in future years. In addition, it was agreed that a start would be made on negotiations regarding the charter, a matter that the council of staffs that met on 13 December 1982 considered a deficient resolution which did not respond to the

demands of the university personnel. However, on the basis of this reception, and in order that the negotiations might continue, the council delayed the strike on 16 December 1982 and considered it appropriate to carry on the negotiations and keep minutes of the session regarding the matters that were agreed on. However, the authorities went back on all that, and the ongoing strike is to defend our demands, which are not narrow professional demands but enter into the framework of the restoration of the status of the university and the university persons and raising its reputation, now that the university has become one of the government's very secondary 'concerns.'

"We consider that the university is deserving of attention; and that it will play its national role in full only if the university people enjoy good conditions which will enable them to uplift the university and to devote themselves to investigating its problems in a serious manner, especially since the university's role in creating generations who will be of use to the nation is not to be ignored. It is unfortunate that the authorities have met this role with an indifference which has reached the degree of disdain for people in the university and their union organizations, causing everyone to be offended with this position, which is one on which they are united, one which is becoming prominent through the recent strikes, since the university people have all expressed their readiness to defend the university and the gains it has won on the people's behalf.

"We have sought to negotiate in an atmosphere removed from strikes in order to realize ordinary, normal demands which other categories of public positions enjoy at present--demands which do not even amount to more than an improvement in the material situation and the issuance of a charter which will respond to the aspirations of the university people and serve the interests of the society. It is unfortunate that the government has met that with rejection, engendering great anger in the ranks of the university persons, and that has manifested itself in this comprehensive strike in all faculties and higher institutes. It is an anger which has reached the level of an administrative strike in order to draw people's attention to the need to seek assiduously to deal with these problems in a serious manner, now that the union organizations have reached the verge of a rift with the authorities. This is a situation which will have only the most grievous consequences. Our strike constitutes a cry by the university people directed toward the people concerned, and, so that the nation as a whole may wake up to the true state of the university people, the government must come back and listen to the university people's demands, which are as far removed as can be from narrow guild demands."

Our Brother Mohamed Zouaghi:

In the comments he presented, he supported the contents of the statements which our brother Jounaidi Abdeljaouad had made and put the recent strikes, and the current one, in their proper, correct context, drawing a lesson from them and expressing a number of observations, among these:

"We have held three strikes since the start of the university year. We were compelled to enter into them. They were not directed against anyone at all and were not aimed at embarrassing anyone. Rather, they were purely defensive strikes, in

order to defend the dignity of the university and the academic profession and consequently to provide a defense for the sake of giving the young people of Tunisia the proper, good training that would enable them effectively to serve the people.

"This strike has occurred at a time when the imposition of marginal status on the university has reached its peak. It is no secret to anyone that for 10 years the university has been failing to receive the care it deserves. Following the relative material improvements that took place in 1976, no improvements have been made; as a result of this, university personnel are in an unworthy situation that threatens their research and education output.

"It should be noted that the government, for a number of years, has been reviving higher institutes, then eliminating them without consulting with the university people and without any comprehensive study. It has been dropping provisions and issuing orders without negotiating with the intellectual community in the form of the university persons and students, turning the university today into a name without a designation, one of the very secondary elements of the government's 'concerns.' This is something which is happening in an era of technology and science which cannot be imported but must be acquired from the ground up. There is no doubt that the entity that is qualified for this task is the university, with all its organizations, and, if the university is a secondary matter, it is certain that the harm to the nation's development and the improvement in the living conditions of the people will be great.

"The members of the union have been sensitive to this matter for 10 years, when they felt that matters were going in the wrong direction, and they sounded the warning bell and pointed out that the foundations of the university were being threatened with collapse, which would entail the destruction of the people's powers. Nonetheless, the government continued to adopt decisions without study and without consulting with the people who were concerned with the matter.

"The result has been that today we have reached a crisis, and it is an actual fact and not a stage or fad to describe this state of affairs as a 'crisis.' We see that the university people have been compelled to mount a number of strikes. That is something we regret, but we are not responsible for it. It is our hope of the students and their honored guardians that they will, understand our demands, which are embodied in the defense of the university and the future of the country. We have resorted to the strikes by force, and not by choice, in order to defend the profession and good university education and to train an elite of young people who will serve the interests of the nation, since university people who are needy in the material sense and are in a state of moral collapse cannot perform good work.

"We postponed the strike, which had been set for 16 December 1982, when we sensed some hope in the government's promises, which could lead to results, in spite of the tone of obvious deficiency in which the promises were presented. However, it came as a complete surprise to us, on Monday 20 December 1982, when the government retrenched in contempt for our demands; that is something we absolutely cannot accept, and is the direct cause of the intensification of the anger of the university people.

"We are calling upon the authorities to return to serious negotiations, to resolve these problems as soon as possible, and to arrive at a solution which will be the beginning of a solution to the university crisis, in view of the status the university enjoys in the service of the nation--a status which must occupy the center of one's concerns, since it is truly disdainful of the government to give the excuse that it cannot find the time to discuss the problems of the university."

In addition, our brother Mohamed Zouaghi cited some examples of indifference toward the people in the university, among them the order issued by Official Rule 76 stating that all categories of employees were exempt from taxes on stipends except for university personnel, while, whenever the situation involved a deduction, the university people were in the forefront.

In response to questions from our journalist colleagues, the two secretaries general of the university persons' unions stressed that the strike was comprehensive and fruitful. All university professors of various categories and affiliations had responded to it. The university unionists considered, with respect to research centers or research councils, that useful results demanded study before one could venture on any experiment of this kind and considered that it was necessary to support the research organizations that exist now rather than increasing them in a chaotic manner. The commitment of the General Tunisian Federation of Labor to support the university persons' strike was asserted also, both in the recent administrative board of the General Federation and in the context of the entire executive bureau, out of the federation's deep awareness of the university's place in the society.

The University Members Assert Their Determination To Continue the Struggle

The Unions of Higher Education and Scientific Research, and Lecturing Professors and Professors in Higher Education, held a joint general meeting following the strike of 21-22 December. That was attended by a large number of university people who were on strike and representatives of all the faculties and higher institutes.

After a review of the results of the general branch meetings and an evaluation of the strike, and the brilliant success it met with, the unity of ranks displayed by university members and the solidarity with their union organizations which that stressed, in defense of the status of the university and in protest against the policy of procrastination and fait accompli and the stand of indifference, which has reached the level of threatening this important national asset with decline and elimination, the people taking part in the general session unanimously agreed to the following:

1. To continue the strike for a period of 2 more days (23-24 December), with a meeting before the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research on Friday 24 December 1982 at 1030 hours in the morning and the convening of a joint general meeting to evaluate the activities and assess the forms of continued struggle with the goal of achieving the demands.

2. To protest the ministry's intentions regarding the deduction of /pay for/ the days of the strike and to agree to boycott all additional hours in execution of this measure, which was aimed at limiting the right to strike.

3. To intensify the media campaign, to respond to every action that was aimed at distorting the university persons' struggles and legitimate demands before public opinion, and to make the authorities bear the responsibility for the intensification of the estrangement and the grievous consequences that was leading to.

11887

CSO: 4504/143

PROGRESS OF UNIVERSITY UPRISING EXTOLLED

Tunis AL-TARIQ AL-JADID in Arabic 25 Dec 82 p 6

/Article: "The Anger of the University People Continues"

/Text/ The people in the university have embarked on their third strike in a period of no more than 5 weeks. What is happening? Why has the anger of the people in the university reached this level?

Anyone who attended the general meeting held Wednesday 22 December, which was called by the two unions of higher education, can evaluate the situation. The meeting was as packed with people as it was angry. The people in the university are striking for the third time for the same demands--demands which have been raised for years--but the government remains unmindful of them. All the observations offered during the general meeting expressed the university persons' condemnation of this government position and their adherence to their demands, and they protested the government's retraction of the promise it had recently made. The two unions had postponed their strike, which had been set for Thursday 16 December, in exchange for this promise, although this promise would have realized /only/ part of their demands.

In order to clarify the matter before public opinion, the two unions of higher education organized a press conference on Wednesday 24 December in which Messrs Mohamed Zouaghi, and Jounaidi Abdeljaouad described the crisis situation and its causes. After Mr. Jounaidi Abdeljaouad, the secretary general of the Higher Education and Scientific Research Union, had mentioned the university persons' demands, embodied in the restoration of the validity of the special stipends for 1976, as dictated by /current/ purchasing power, and the university persons' rejection of the charter which the ministry had issued without consulting the union members, he asserted that these demands were not narrow professional ones but entered into the context of the demand for the consideration of the delicate role the university plays, since it has become clear that the university has become a secondary concern of the government's, as proof of which one need consider only the position of indifference toward university persons, union organizations and students' problems. That is the cause of the university anger in all the faculties and higher institutes, some of which joined the administrative strike.

Mr Mohamed Zouaghi asserted that these strikes were not aimed at embarrassing anyone and that the demands were not debilitating, because the government had given

agreement to some of them, then reneged on that. He also asserted that these strikes were purely defensive and that their purpose was to defend the dignity of the persons in the university, the university profession and the university. He then stated that for 10 years the university had been marginal and that the incomes of the people in the university had not advanced since 1976, while prices had risen greatly, causing the university persons' buying power to decline all during those years. He pointed out that the authorities ignored the situation of university people on many occasions. They eliminated higher institutes without consulting with them and without comprehensive study, and they unilaterally issued legal stipulations without taking note of the position of the students or the professors (the charter and registration in the university). He also observed that the university today was almost a name without a designation and that the strike was a defense of the university, the rights of young Tunisians and the educational level.

Mr Mohamed Zouaghi, the secretary general of the Union of Lecturing Professors and Professors in Higher Education, urged the authorities to return to serious negotiation, emphasizing the possibility of arriving at a solution, or the beginning of a solution, to the crisis.

As regards the continuation of union activity, the general session that met last Wednesday decided to continue the strike on Thursday and Friday, and it called for a meeting Friday morning in front of the headquarters of the Ministry of Higher Education, with another meeting to take place at 1600 hours in the afternoon in the building of the Tunisian General Federation of Labor to review different ways of continuing the struggle from now on and all the changes that might occur in the authorities' position.

Ben Dhia: Ready To Alter the Charter after It Is Put in Effect. The same day the strike by people in higher education was started, the minister, in a long speech, responded to the points the members of parliament had raised during a discussion of his ministry's budget. Mr 'Abdelaziz Ben Dhia presented his answer before an almost empty chamber, breaking the problems of the people in higher education down into two segments:

1. The problem of the charter. On this point, the minister stated that the dispute was "restricted to a single point which is embodied in normal promotions, which is what the ministry and the government have rejected." In spite of that rejection, the meetings continued and the issue of promotions remained the only one on which no agreement was reached.

Regarding the union's demand that the new charter not be put in effect before negotiations on it took place, the minister said that he did not want to go to prison, because freezing the stipulation of the law, as the Union of Higher Education and Scientific Research was requesting, fell under the jurisdiction of the Penal Code.

Regarding the material demands, the minister said that it was a cause of anxiety that the strike by people in higher education should be taking place in these circumstances specifically and that classes should be suspended, even though the social negotiations were still going on.

11887

CSO: 4504/140

RECENT MEETINGS OF STUDENT PROTESTERS REVIEWED

Tunis AL-TARIQ AL-JADID in Arabic 25 Dec 82 p 5

/Article: "News of the University"/

/Text/ The Tunisian University has witnessed much activity this week, including some related to the publicity activity of certain movements and some that could be included under the heading of elections for student representatives to faculty councils.

As regards the former activities, the Islamic Movement took the initiative of holding a general meeting in the Law Faculty with the goal of explaining the proposal for the charter which it has come up with (see the record of the meeting below), while the communist students held a discussion group in the Faculty of Sciences whose focal point was an explanation and discussion of the contents of the statement they had distributed, titled "In order That the Current Year May Be a Year of Democratic Transformation!"

The remaining activities were centered on the elections of student representatives to faculty councils. We observed that the race which took place in a democratic, responsible atmosphere, was confined to two slates, one presented by the Islamic Movement and the other presented by the group of movements and independent students belonging to the General Federation of Students of Tunisia. Although the slate of people belonging to the General Federation of Students of Tunisia won all the seats in the Faculty of Letters, the voting activities had not been completed in the case of the other faculties by the time these lines were written.

The Communist Students and the Faculty Councils

The communist students joined the slate of people belonging to the General Federation of Students of Tunisia. In it, they issued and raised a clarification on their participation, stating, in particular, "Our support for this slate is occurring in the framework of a general conception, since we have always sought to sanctify the traditions of joint action as an expression of the unification of the will of the students in coping with their union problems. Through our support for this slate, we do not intend to sanctify a polarization which is aimed at hostility toward one tendency to the exclusion of another."

It was also stated, with respect to the danger of polarization, "We have always warned of the danger of this notion, which will lead us to a proliferation of unions, and that will not serve the unity of the student movement." The statement did not neglect to direct an urgent appeal for a broad student dialogue on the union organization. On this appeal, it stated, specifically, "With an awareness of the need to move the discussions on the principle of the union organization in directions far removed from polarization and far removed from a proliferation of unions."

Excerpts from the Grouping Slate

We, the masses of the students, who are present today, Tuesday 21 December 1982, in the general gathering held in the Faculty of Law by invitation of the Islamic Movement to study the current situation in the university and the dimensions of the transgressions, have carefully studied the critical, delicate situation the student movement is going through, which is essentially characterized by:

The fact that the existing regime bears direct responsibility for the deterioration of material, academic and political conditions in the university. We demand the immediate rescission of all arbitrary laws, especially the Law on Registration of August 1982, and demand that thousands of our colleagues be enabled to have their rights to additional appointments. We also demand that the military be removed from university sections and institutions, especially the police blockade that has been set up around the Faculty of Letters.

We consider that it is not possible to solve the problems that have accumulated in the absence of an immediate, urgent solution to the organizational issue, which will take the facts of the current situation and aspirations for the future into consideration and will guarantee that student activities are united, as one waits for an agreement over a free democratic student organization which will represent the broadest segment of the masses.

The accumulation of the students' material and academic problems (the freeze on grants, the restriction of registrations to the first level, the military in the Letters /Faculty/, and the closing of the door to the teachers in the Higher /Institute/ in Bizerte).

The lack of a free democratic organizational representative instrument which will guarantee that student activities are unified and that the immediate, strategic missions facing our movement are carried out.

11887

CSO: 4504/140

FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES MIDEAST TOUR

LD220105 Tunis TAP in English 1423 GMT 21 Jan 83

[Text] Tunis, 21 Jan (TAP)--Tunisia's Foreign Minister Beji Caid es-Sebsi returned to Tunis on Thursday after a 2 week tour which took him to Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and Lebanon successively and during which he conveyed messages from President Bourguiba to these six countries' sovereigns and heads of state. The minister also held talks with these countries' officials on bilateral relations and current issues.

At each one of the six legs of his tour, Mr Caid es-Sebsi stressed in his statements to the press that his tour complied first of all with Tunisia's care to keep direct contacts with Arab brother states, to keep on consulting them with respect to questions with mutual interest including notably the Middle East question and especially to strengthen the cohesion of Arab ranks at the eve of a stage which promises crucial.

It seems that the stands of Tunisia and the six countries visited by the minister have proved identical with regard to the problems dealt with. The officials Mr Caid es-Sebsi met have been very attentive to the news provided by Tunisia's foreign minister in his capacity as a member of the Arab Committee of Seven entrusted by the Fez summit with explaining the Arab peace plan to governments of the Security Council permanent member countries.

During the interviews and press conferences he held, Mr Caid es-Sebsi qualified as unacceptable the conditions imposed by Great Britain on the visit of the Arab delegation to London. In this respect he gave to understand that Tunisia can only approve of the measures taken by some Arab countries against Great Britain and notably the request made by Riyadh to Foreign Office Secretary Francis Pym to cancel the visit he intended to pay to Saudi Arabia.

Tunisia's Foreign Ministry also appreciated the realism which his interlocutors gave proof of notably as regards the settlement of the Middle East issue. At each stage of his tour, every one was convinced of the determinant role the United States can and must play to resolve this problem on account of the pressure they can bring to bear on Israel in order to lead it to recognize the Palestinian people's legitimate rights to self-determination and to establish an independent and sovereign state. The minister

and his interlocutors were unanimous in saying that Arab countries should defend the peace plan adopted by the Fez summit and that it is not realistic to ignore Reagan's plan "which inspite of gaps, it occupied some positive points."

Moreover the question of Egypt's return within the Arab family was raised more than once during the minister's tour, notably by countries favorable to it. With the sultan of Oman as file leader, Mr Caid es-Sebsi stressed again that Egypt's return should be decided by an Arab summit.

As regards the minister's talks in Riyadh, Muscat, Manama, Doha and Kuwait, they focused, as we could think on the war in the Gulf. Saudi, Omani, Bahraini, Qatari, and Kuwait officials pointed out the dangers threatening the region on account of the extension of the Iraqi-Iranian conflict. The foreign minister reaffirmed to his interlocutors Tunisia's support to any mediation aiming to bring the two belligerent countries to settle their dispute amicably.

But the most noticed visit was that of Beirut, not only because it is the first official visit of an Arab foreign minister to Lebanon since Israel's invasion, but also because Mr Caid es-Sebsi's visit to Lebanon took place at a critical stage of its history, characterized by hard negotiations with the Zionist occupied, continuous war in the al-Shuf and efforts to reorganize administrative and political structures.

In the statement he made upon his arrival in Beirut as well as during his talks with Lebanese officials, Mr Caid es-Sebsi insisted on pointing out that the aim of his visit was first of all to show Tunisia's support to Lebanese legality and to Lebanon's efforts to end Israeli occupation.

The minister reaffirmed to his Lebanese interlocutors that Tunisia's Government would support any measure Lebanon intends to take in order to secure Zionist troops, withdrawal and extend constitutional legality all over its territory while remaining part and parcel of the Arab nation. It seals what Lebanese leaders reaffirmed to Mr Caid es-Sebsi that Lebanon will keep its Arabity wishing to see Tunis and Beirut go on with their consultations.

It has been reported in this respect that President Amin Jumayyil will pay an official visit to Tunisia, the date of which will be fixed according to the evolution of the situation in Lebanon.

CSO: 4500/70

INTERIOR OFFICIAL ACCUSES GOVERNMENT OF IGNORING ARAB SECTOR

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 15 Dec 82 p 6

[Article by Amir Rosenblitt: "Koenig: The Government Refuses To Deal With the Problems of Israeli Arabs"]

[Text] "The government refuses to deal face to face with the problems of Israeli Arabs. They have always swept them under the carpet in one way or another. This is also the reason why there has always been fear of dealing with the existential problem of the Judaization of the Galilee through settlement." These are the words of the person in charge of the Northern District in the Ministry of the Interior, Israel Koenig, in a symposium that took place at Ben-Gurion University in the Negev, dealing with the Negev and the Galilee.

The symposium, conducted by the Israeli Geographic Association, lasted 3 days and ended yesterday.

"David Ben-Gurion never paid a state visit to the Arab sector in the Galilee, since he could not look an Arab farmer whose land was taken away in the face. This conflict of leadership has influenced all government activities in the north since 1965. All the talk about developing the central Galilee and the western Galilee was the result of pressure and necessity. It is no accident that Levi Eshkol called his operation At Long Last, said Koenig.

He argued that the policy of previous governments has turned the Galilee into a marginal area in terms of public awareness. "I believe that such awareness has harmed the Galilee more than the lack of physical development," he said. He added that the settlements that have been established over the years were built on rocky soil that could not support the inhabitants and it is hard to find more than eight moshavim that only live on agriculture.

Daily Challenge

"One of course should not overlook the human problem of the Arab population in the Galilee. This is a daily challenge and even an hourly challenge. We should deal directly with difficult problems.

"We do not always have the will power to deal with such problems," said Koenig.

"The non-Jewish population should also be given proper employment. When it comes to allocations, we have to decide how to distribute them so that this population can also receive its due. The more we improve the situation the more the problems become apparent, and our public should come up with an immediate solution. But along with the many problems, the national objectives are taken care of, albeit late," said Koenig.

In speaking about the Judaization of the Galilee he said: "If anyone still entertains the thought that we can have a Jewish majority in the Galilee, he is mistaken. At least in the next 5 years. Too fast means making mistakes. This is what happened in the development towns that were established in order to provide labor for the old towns. No one imagined that a year later that population would rise up and say it was treated like second class citizens. We have a serious problem here. It is true that we have had mass immigration and we had no choice. But this problem has been going on for 30 years.

"If the State of Israel does not want to have a Lebanon in a few years, it should see to it that Jews do not only settle there but also live there, including the second, third and fourth generation."

9565

CSO: 4423/74

MOSHAV MOVEMENT ANGERED OVER ARAB LABOR DEBATE

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 10 Dec 82 pp 17, 47

[Article by Aharon Dolev: "'Arab Labor' Stirs Up Moshav Movement; Movement Accuses Two Moshavim, Mishmeret and Herut, of South African-Style Apartheid, After the Two Have Created Decent Sleeping Quarters for Gaza Farm Hands; Attacked Moshav Members Call It Hypocrisy, While Moshav Movement Secretary Mordekhay Ozilevsky Says It Is 'Arab Settlement' Inside Green Line, Since Wall and Tower Also Started in One Room..."]

[Text] "Apartheid in Sharon!" moshav movement mouthpieces shouted this week. "Labor camps for territorial workers in the moshavim!"

The collective settlements' establishment has launched this week one of its conscience attacks, but it stands to reason that once they have given seasonal lipservice to the idea of a family farm based on self-labor, using sensational language, the storm will subside and the moshav politicians will fold the banner of social principle about to become 60 years old.

Hundreds of moshavim in Israel who consider this principle an anachronistic decree no longer applicable to them, will continue to hire outside people instead of folding. They will shout "hypocrisy" at their movement and will go about their business as usual.

However, the latest crusade of the moshav movement will leave behind a large and strange question mark. When a lofty idea of the turn of the century has been trampled on for years because of a changing reality, when hundreds of moshavim have given it up, when only one-quarter of them still works its own fields, why did the movement go after two particular moshavim in the Tel Mond bloc, Mishmeret and Herut?

Herut, overgrown with the orchards of the coastal region of Sharon, is one of the oldest moshavim in Israel. Last year it celebrated its fiftieth anniversary and to this day it has remained part of puritanical minority among the moshavim--all the family owned farms live exclusively on agriculture. This week Mishmeret and Herut were singled out for criticism by the moshav movement. All attempts to find out why those two were picked when so many others are affected by the virus of hired labor have failed.

Laugh or Cry?

Deputy secretary of the moshav movement, Mordekhay Ozilevsky, led the way by comparing the sleeping accommodations for hired workers at moshav Herut to the "Apartheid policy of South Africa." In a conversation Ozilevsky said that "the workers from the territories have a 4 pm curfew, are not admitted into the movie theaters of the two moshavim etc." The members of the moshavim, who since the beginning of the week have tried to recover from the shock and the insult, did not find it difficult to destroy the deputy-secretary's credibility. If Ozilevsky was there and checked the facts of the workers' employment and sleeping arrangements, it is hard to understand how he came up with such statements. His moshav hosts are angry and hurt by the attitude of the movement towards generations of agricultural settlers whom he is supposed to represent. They say that in Herut the members and their hired workers did not know whether "to laugh or to cry."

Ozilevsky's attack reminded the moshav board members, Yitzhaq Yeshu'a, Shim'on Sharir and Hanina Regev of the famous joke that ends with the punch-line, "Go and tell them you don't have a sister." As for the accusation that the hired Arab workers are not admitted into the moshavim's movie theaters, a quick check reveals that they have no movie theaters. The oldtimers do not recall the last time a movie was shown in their moshav. In the evening, says Regev, who is a second generation member, "the members fall sleep in front of the television."

As for the Apartheid policy, allegedly applied to the Arabs, what do the latter have to say about it?

Yunis Ibrahim Abu Samra (41), father of seven, and Muhammad Salim Ali Drabi (30), father of six, both from Beit Lahiya in the Gaza Strip, are experienced farm workers who speak Hebrew and work for Ehud Gay (36), second generation at Herut. Ali Drabi takes his room key out of his pocket. His residence was remodelled at the beginning of the year and was given electricity, shower and hot water. He says, "Here is the key to my room. No one ever takes it away from me. Who says I am locked up here after work and not allowed to go out? No such thing."

Prior to living at the moshav facilities, the Arab workers say they had lived at the neighboring Arab village of Tira where they had to pay high rent and make do without electricity, toilets and water.

This Is Arab Settlement!

Ozilevsky responds: "Outside labor and our dependency on it disturb me. But what disturbs me even more is the fact that with our own hands we are building Arab settlements inside the green line. It was not for this purpose that so much Jewish blood was spilled for the Tel Mond bloc.

"Aren't you exaggerating? After all, these are only day laborers whose living conditions were improved for humanitarian reasons."

"No, I am not exaggerating. The Wall and Tower settlements also started with one room. This is the beginning of Arab settlement. If we do not put an end to it, no power in the world will be able to prevent it."

"Is it better to house workers in stables and warehouses, or in shameful conditions, like the neighboring Arab villages?"

"No, but labor camps like the one in Tel Mond bloc are another step in a dangerous process. All over the world and here too the rule is that the land belongs to whoever works it."

"But the hired workers are vital for the moshavniks who work alongside with them. Is it better to go out of business?"

"In the long run we will have to find a solution to the problem of depending on hired labor. In the meantime we have to stop the process of Arab settlement in Israel. I demand that the workers be given transportation to and from work, no matter what the cost is. Building this country has cost a lot more."

"A round trip of 200 km?"

"What are 200 km compared to losing the right of our fight for this land?"

The first settler, Third Aliya member Avraham Ben-Hayim (78), who says he ploughed the first furrow in Herut, still goes out every day and works a full day in pruning, watering and fruit picking, along with his three Arab workers. Ben-Hayim clasps his hands in sorrow: "The moshav movement decides that I, one of its first members, do not deserve to be a member? I am shocked. This is terrible injustice. I would like to see a moshav which does not use hired labor. We all work hard along with our workers. The leaders of the movement know that without outside labor the fruit will remain on the trees and we will go out of business. So what do they want?"

They Make More Than I Do

Ben-Hayim came from the Ukraine in 1923. "When the Revolution started we thought it was salvation for the Jews, and it turned out to be a catastrophe. We organized the Halutz movement and we came to Israel illegally." Ben-Hayim paved the Sharon roads and became sick with malaria when he dried the swamps of Hedera. In time he became the champion of the Sharon orchards. "He is the best orchard grower in Israel," the young members of the moshav say proudly, referring to high large crops. Ben-Hayim is proud of his achievements. Moshav board member Yitzhaq Yesu'a (50) says admiringly: "If the national average of Shamuti oranges is 3 tons per dunam, Ben-Hayim gets double that yield, even from his old orchard which he planted back in 1931."

Ben-Hayim agrees. As has happened with 50 other farms in the moshav--nearly half of all the farms--he did away with his vegetable and dairy production, when his two sons left home--the older one started his own farm and on the moshav and the younger one joined a kibbutz in the Negev. Since then he has

been making a living from his 30 dunams of orchard, which necessitates many working hands. In recent years the "best grower" finds it difficult to live on citric exports. The devaluation of the shekel, the inflation and the gaps in the exchange rates have reduced profitability and brought about a growing crisis.

Citrus growers are talking about liquidating orchards. The orchard is the apple of Ben-Hayim's eye. He clings to it and says he lives on an income of 10,000 shekels per month. His pride was wounded when his movement, the moshav movement, slandered his moshav: "What kind of talk is it about Apartheid and labor camp in moshav Herut? We have improved our workers' quarters. Our hired labor is well organized. The employment office gets a full report. My workers make more than I do. You don't believe me? Ask them yourself..."

Abu Samra and Ali Drabi compute their income at moshav Herut according to two sources--70 days of piece-work during the harvest season, and 7 months of farm work. During harvest they fill six containers and get 150 shekels per container, or 900 shekels per day. Net pay, Abu Samra points out. The employer pays the difference and takes care of social security, health insurance, vacation time etc.

Ali Drabi doubles his daily pay of 900 shekels during the 70 days of piece-work, and makes a total of 66,500 shekels. During the other 7 months of their work at the moshav they receive a daily net of 350 shekel and their monthly income drops to less than half of the harvest season. "In the orchards of the Gaza Strip," the two say, "you cannot make more than 200 shekels per day during harvest." Adds Abu Samra: "If the work here stops and we all go back to Gaza the pay will be even lower. We heard someone doesn't want us to work here. This is not our affair. We want to continue."

Really Satisfied

Ali Drabi says: "We certainly do. We are satisfied. Really satisfied."

"With what?"

"With working conditions, our pay, the people. Everything is good. Look, we have left the Arab village of Tira and came to live with Jews. Why? Because we did not live like human beings among the Arabs. No water, no electricity, no toilet, and on top of it they hate us and give us trouble. Why? Because. Because Israeli Arabs don't like us, because we are from Gaza, we are worth less...."

The conversation reveals an Arab class system with three social levels, clearly defined. The Israeli Arabs are the upper class. The Arabs of Judea and Samaria are in the middle, and those from Gaza are at the bottom. They are treated like dirt.

Abu Samra and Ali Drabi smile when they hear the words labor camp. They invite me to tour the place. In Mishmeret old buses were converted into a residence. In Herut an abandoned house in the middle of the orchards was

remodelled and connected to the electric line. There are six rooms, each with five cots. Near the house are the toilets, showers and water heater. No great luxury, only a place to sleep. The two workers say:

"This is good. It is near work." They were all glad to leave Tira, where they had paid high rent, lived ten in a room, in ruins and abandoned shacks, without electricity, water or toilet, and were mistreated.

"They hate us," the two keep saying.

"Why?"

"Because."

In early March last year the situation became intolerable. The workers showed up at their employers' home all beaten up and injured. They said they had escaped from Tira. A local resident was murdered and they were immediately accused of the crime. When the police arrived it turned out that it was a family feud. In the meantime the villagers had already raided the workers from Gaza and worked them over. They asked their employers for their pay and said they wanted to go back to Gaza and not come back to work.

Speechless

"We were speechless," says Shim'on Sakhir (47), son of founders. "Much of the fruit was still on the trees. Even if the women and children had helped us pick it we would not have been able to meet our deadline. On the other hand, we did not want to do what other moshavim do, namely, put up the workers in stables, barns and cow sheds. We did not want to treat them the way they were treated in Tira."

Some moshav members were sent to nearby Qalqilya, on the other side of the green line, rented rooms and gave a downpayment. But the workers refused to stay in Qalqilya for fear of a replay of what had happened in Tira.

The moshav members were forced to drive the workers 200 km late at night to their homes in the Gaza Strip, then back to the moshav. They did it for one month and had to stop. It was too costly and the workers were too tired. They work from 3 am to 8 pm. They were now working less hours and making less.

Both employers and employees agree that the commuting is long, exhausting and expensive, and does not make sense. But Ozilevsky of the moshav movement disagrees. It is better to commute after a day's work than do what Mishmeret and Herut do, he declared, and shocked the moshavniks and their Arab workers, since his words had a clear message--to hell with the workers getting tired, to hell if they make less and the moshav pays more, and to hell even with the principle of self-labor, since it appears that the moshav movement is willing to accept Arab labor, as long as they work during the day and go home at night.

The Ministry of Agriculture Cautions

The moshav movement does not deny the fact that the television program last Saturday night about the "labor camps" in Herut and Mishmeret was the first step taken by the movement in its public crusade against the moshavim. Through the initiative of the moshav movement the dormant law of not allowing Arabs from the territories to stay overnight inside the green line was reawakened. Indeed, 2 weeks ago moshav Herut received a warning from the Ministry of Agriculture saying:

"Subject: Warning according to Section 6(a) of the Agricultural Settlement Law (rules for use of agricultural land and water) 1967. Since it has come to my attention that you are making illegal use of agricultural state land in violation of the Agricultural Settlement Law (rules for use of agricultural land and water) 1967--sleeping quarters for aliens--I warn you to desist immediately from all illegal activities.... If you do not advise us that you have complied with this notice, the Minister of Agriculture, or anyone empowered by him may demand before the deciding body to withdraw your right to the land to your water quota given for that land."

The association of moshav Herut did not advise the ministry about "desisting from its illegal activities" since that would mean death to the farming. "This is the reality--we totally depend on hired labor," the farmer of Herut say emphatically. Hundreds of moshavim throughout Israel confirm this fact of hiring Arab workers, few of whom are Israeli citizens.

In arranging sleeping quarters for their workers on their agricultural land, Herut and Mishmeret were accused of three violations. The first has to do with security, forbidding territory residents to stay in Israel between 1 am and 4 am. The second, changing farm land into residential land. The third, violating the principle of self-labor of the moshav movement, which prompted that movement to invoke the first two violations long overlooked by the law.

The idea of self-labor of the founders of the moshav movement will soon become 60 years old. All agree that in fact if not in theory this is a historical anachronism, a social ideal which has long become an abstract rule the farmers in Israel can no longer live with.

When Ben-Gurion Was a Hired Hand

David Ben-Gurion was the first one who started it, they remind you at Herut. They tell you how Ben-Gurion introduced hired labor in the early years of the state, and explain the "flexible principle" dating back to that time. Hananya Regev (44), second generation member of Herut, recalls how Ben-Gurion himself had to hire himself as farm hand when he had no bread to eat at the turn of the century. Regev's grandfather, Avraham Ragochevsky, employed Ben-Gurion for daily pay in plowing at his farm in Sejera. Forty years later Ben-Gurion came out against taking bread away from tens of thousands of families in the newcomers' camps in the rural areas of Israel.

"Ben-Gurion stated at that time that the newcomers would have no food to eat, while the moshavim were hiding behind principles." Because of Ben-Gurion's authority the principle was bent forthwith. The government gave the moshavim employment quotas, the moshav movement allowed the employment of newcomers, and hired labor in the moshavim continued undisturbed and for 10 years helped integrate the big immigration in Israeli society.

"The principle was kept until Ben-Gurion's aggressive intervention not because of respect for him but because it agreed with the needs of the small farms that did not provide a livelihood. "My father," says Shim'on Sharir, "went to work in the orchards of Tel Mond. All the founders of the moshav looked for a day of work outside the moshav in order to make some money and expand their farms. There was no question of self-labor. It was easy to keep the principle."

The sudden growth of Israel's population doubled and tripled the demand for farm produce. As demand grew so did production. Agriculture became professionalized and the farms grew far beyond the limitations of self-labor. The principle of self-labor was self-defeating because of internal conflicts and ideological dogmatism. A moshav like Herut could no longer keep the sacred principle while maintaining orchards, vegetables, flowers and poultry. It would have meant a gradual liquidation of the farm and the moshav.

Says Yitzhaq Yeshe'a: "When the land quota is 30 dunams including the yard, you have to get the maximum out of your farm in order to survive. There is no substitute for orchards, flowers and chicken, all of which require many working hands. No ideological acrobatics is going to work when you have to get 200 tons of fruit in 500 containers each day during harvest time. No adherence to the principle of self-labor will meet the needs of the moshav. The fruit will remain on the tree, and the moshav will be ruined." Why?

No Jewish Workers

Sharir and Regev illustrate Yeshe'a's assertion. "If we put to work the entire family, women, children and elderly, in order to pick 850 containers (400 kilo each) during the 3 months of harvest, an average of 5.5 people per family will work, and we may get the fruit off the trees. But this would mean that everything else will come to a halt, nothing else will get done, not even the loading and unloading of the fruit.

"I am telling you without any hesitation, we work much harder than our hired workers. We do not live off hired labor. We use it because we have no other choice."

Until the Six Day War Herut and Mishmeret used Jewish hired workers from the newcomers' camps of Tel Mond, then from the housing projects that replaced them. The prosperity following the war caused Jewish workers to quit, since this is hard seasonal work with a relatively low income. The gap was a cause for concern, but soon Arab workers began to fill it.

In the Tel Mond bloc, for example, local Arab workers filled the gap, mostly from the neighboring village of Tira, but this did not last long. They soon found out it paid to expand their own farm land. With government help they dug wells and grew crops, mostly strawberries, which required working hands. At one time they employed workers from Gaza and from Judea and Samaria.

Moshe Dayan is mentioned in the moshavim as one who foresaw the economic and security advantages of the sources of work inside the green line. The workers from the territories flooded Israeli farms, and a class of parasitic "bosses" flourished in Arab villages in Israel, where Israeli Arabs provided farm workers from the territories and sucked their blood.

Workers Free from Bosses

"At first we objected to the boss system," Regev says. "We considered them leeches. They took 50 percent of the worker's wages. We freed our workers from the leeches, but we were still disturbed by their living conditions and their mistreatment in Tira, where they spent their nights."

The relations between employer and employee in Herut are described by both sides as "pleasant and humane". Matar Rashid Umeisi, an old worker in Regev's farm, says that when his home in the Gaza Strip was connected to the electric line Regev gave him a used refrigerator in excellent condition. He adds that his oldest son, a student at Cairo University, died in Egypt during an operation, and Regev paid him a condolence visit. Regev has similar stories. When Regev's father died in the summer, when all the workers are gone, Umeisi came to the funeral and stayed for the whole week of mourning and helped with various chores. When Regev wanted to pay him he was offended and refused to take anything.

Many of the farmers have similar stories. The good relations became even better when the moshavniks provided the workers with better living conditions and saved them from Tira.

"What is our sin, that the movement is coming down on us," asks Yeshu'a. "We had held a meeting and we decided not to do what many fine moshavin do, that is, housing their workers in yards, sheds, chicken coops and abandoned cow sheds. We said we would take care of them. We will treat them like human beings. We will spend the minimum, but we will make sure we do it right for the common good.

"Why then are they punishing us with denunciation and suspension? For years our workers lived in Tira under shameful conditions, and no one's conscience was disturbed. As soon as we take them out of the dirty holes and, instead of putting them in yards, sheds or barns we spend money on improving their living conditions, there is a big outcry."

What Kind of Slavery?

The general feeling at Herut is that the attack by the movement is "first class hypocrisy."

Ehud Gay and Amos Pikarsky were appointed liaison with the 70 seasonal workers. "Our job," says Ehud, "is to take care of assigning work, supervising sanitary conditions at the dwellings and taking care of the workers' personal needs." A tour of the dwellings reveals that the needs are met and the sanitary conditions are supervised.

It is easy to see that the Arab workers are embarrassed to be caught in the middle of this righteous outcry which they neither need nor understand.

"We like it here," says Abu Samra. Ali Drabi shrugs, laughs and lets his friend speak on the workers' view of the outcry about exploitation, Apartheid and labor camp. "What kind of labor camp? Slavery? We have left an Arab village in order to come here to sleep, because we like it better here. We can go home tomorrow if we want to. No one is keeping us from doing it. As long as the work is good and the people are good we will stay...."

9565

CSO: 4423/74

KUWAITI-FRENCH RELATIONS EXAMINED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 303, 11 Dec 82 p 51

[Article: "France To Provide Kuwait with Mirage 2000 Airplanes; the Industrial Diversification Policy Encourages Kuwait To Develop Advanced Technological Industries; Kuwait's Deposits Abroad Are the Safety Valve for the National Economy"]

[Text] After a period of time--throughout the first half of this year--during which France's relations with Kuwait had been cool, France's minister of foreign affairs, Claude Cheysson made an official visit to the Kuwaiti capital in mid November. As his visit ended Mr Cheysson had turned a new leaf in bilateral relations between the two countries.

Actually, despite the fact that French-Kuwaiti relations have been cool, that subject continued to be an important one for Paris for several reasons. The most obvious of those may be [the following]:

--The Nature of the Kuwaiti Market:

From now and until the year 2000 everything in Kuwait will double, beginning with the population which is now 1.4 million persons; 45 percent of Kuwait's population are aliens. It is expected that by the year 2000 the population of Kuwait will amount to 3.3 million persons.

The enormous resources that Kuwait obtains from its oil exports enabled it to develop its industrial and agricultural sectors, to carry out major public sector projects, set up a series of construction plants and at the same time make use of the most modern means of technology in the world.

In industry, Kuwait applies a policy of industrial diversification in which it focuses particularly on developing advanced technological industries which require an abundant supply of labor.

Recently Kuwaiti authorities took strict measures to limit the immigration of foreign workers into the country. About 800,000 aliens are now living in Kuwait: 300,000 of them are originally Palestinians and 50,000 are Lebanese. In addition, there are large numbers of Iraqis, Jordanians, Syrians, Indians, Iranians and Indonesians.

The Emirate of Kuwait, which is known as the Switzerland of the Gulf because of

its excessive wealth and its traditional neutrality in Arab disputes, has become a candidate for financial drain from all sides. Oil production fell for the first time this year in Kuwait's history; it fell to 650,000 barrels a day. This made Kuwait's budget show a slight deficit for the first time in the figures for 1982-1983. However, returns on Kuwaiti investments abroad were added to 1982 returns, and these returns will even be slightly higher in 1983. Thus, Kuwait's deposits abroad constitute a safety valve for the national economy.

--France's Position in Kuwait

Relations between France and Kuwait were somewhat cool as a result of France's political positions on Israel, particularly President Mitterand's visit to Israel. This visit caused negotiations on a number of contracts with French companies to be suspended. It is known that Kuwait adheres strictly to the provisions of the Office To Boycott Israel [in its dealings with] French companies that do business with Israel. However, it was France's most recent position on Israel's invasion of Lebanon and its participation in the multi-national force that improved relations between Kuwait and France again and paved the way for a visit to Kuwait by France's minister of foreign affairs, Claude Cheysson.

France's share of the Kuwaiti market is still small: it is between three and four percent only. It cannot be compared with Japan's share, which is 21.9 percent, or with the United States' share, which is 13.6 percent.

Most of the investments that France seeks are those in which advanced technology guarantees it a clear edge over its competitors. This is actually the case with regard to French contracts for building bridges and exporting electrical appliances and cables. The best example of giving preference to the French technological incentive is the project to build a bridge between Kuwait and Bubyah Island. The bridge is being built by the French company Bouygues, which is using innovative engineering technology that would guarantee a stronger bridge and a 30 percent savings in costs over the traditional method of construction. Final costs for construction of this bridge [are expected to be] 350 million French francs.

On the occasion of Cheysson's recent visit to Kuwait the French government expressed its willingness to provide the emirate with advanced weapons that may include F-1 fighters and perhaps the Mirage 2000. It is known that Kuwaiti troops use French equipment such as the 155 millimeter recoiling Howitzer guns; the F-1 S Mirage airplanes; the 2F-1B Gazelle and Buma helicopters and the (Jo Jo Matra) missiles.

--The Capacity of the Kuwaiti Market

There is room for more goods in the Kuwaiti market. Kuwait has the highest per capita income in the world. Large quantities of consumer goods, particularly food, toys, textiles and furnishings are imported into the Kuwaiti market.

Advanced electronic industries are very popular in Kuwait. In this regard Kuwait is negotiating with the (Matra) Company for the purchase of Videotex devices to develop the means of information and communication. It is also negotiating with the (Cable) Company to set up a telecommunications system that would be operated by radio waves.

Customs fees on imports are still small: no fees are collected on essential materials, such as food and cement, and no more than a 4 percent fee is imposed on other goods. It is known that when it becomes necessary to protect national production, those fees may go as high as 15 percent.

Despite the fact that the Kuwaiti market is an attractive market, some French companies are still wary of entering this market. Some of these companies that had stayed away from this market are now regretting the fact that they lost the opportunity. In practice, the primary credit for showing the importance of Kuwait's market to French investments goes to the Alisthom Atlantique Company which committed itself to the establishment of a water desalination plant in 1972.

At the present time the construction and public works sectors [in Kuwait] are flourishing noticeably. Among the projects that are to be carried out are construction of a hospital with 260 beds; completion of an international highway; construction of a new terminal for Kuwait Airport; construction of a power plant; expansion of the port of Sawikh; and construction of a bridge on a section of the railroad line between Baghdad and Oman.

Repercussions of the al-Manakh Market: As a result of the recent collapse of the al-Manakh Market a financial crisis emerged that forced Kuwait for the first time in its history to turn to its special reserves to buy a number of shares from the market and compensate their owners. This is despite the fact that the government had assumed a stern position on this question to ensure that frantic speculations such as those seen by the market do not recur.

Because of the financial burdens entailed by the collapse of the market, the government decided to postpone implementation dates for a number of public projects, such as construction of a telecommunications tower, an athletic stadium for the 1985 athletic competitions and Kuwait's modern university.

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NEWSPAPER CALLS FOR CORPORATE REFORM

Merging Similar Organizations

Kuwait AL-RAY' AL-'AMM in Arabic 25 Dec 82 p 9

/Article by Muhammad al-Barjasr/

/Text/ Through a glance at the list of names of the companies that have been given the designation of Gulf companies, which created for themselves a special stock market, which is sometimes called the parallel or "al-Manakh" market, as a fait accompli, we will find that from the purely numerical standpoint there are five banks, as follows:

Banks

The First Bank of the Gulf, the United Gulf Bank, the Bank of the Coast, the Bank of Bahrain and the Middle East, and the International Bank of Bahrain.

Investment Companies

There are 11 investment companies, whose objectives, in general, are all similar, although their names may differ. These are:

1. The Gulf Financial Center.
2. The Kuwait and Gulf Financial Center.
3. The al-Lu'lu'ah Investment /Company/.
4. The Gulf Investment /Company/.
5. The Arab International Development /Company/.
6. The Coast Investment /Company/.
7. The Arab General Investment /Company/ ("Shu'a").
8. The Bahrain and Qatar Investment Center.
11. The al-Sharjah Group.

Insurance Companies

The number of insurance companies totals five. These are as follows:

1. The Gulf International Insurance /Company/.
2. The al-Sharjah Insurance /Company/.
3. The Gulf Insurance Federation.
4. The United Insurance /Company/.
5. The Arab International Insurance /Company/.

Cement Companies

The Gulf cement companies are as follows:

1. The al-Sharjah Cement /Company/.
2. The al-Fujayrah Cement /Company/.
3. The 'Ajman Cement /Company/.
4. The Umm al-Qaywayn Cement /Company/.
5. The Ra's al-Khaymah White Cement /Company/.

Industrial Companies

The Gulf industrial companies are six in number, as follows:

1. The Gulf Industries /Company/ (brick).
2. The Iron and Steel /Company/.
3. The Investment Mines /Company/.
4. The Gulf United Industrial /Company/.
5. The Gulf Real Estate Industrial /Company/.
6. The Light Industries /Company/.

Pharmaceutical Companies

There are two companies specializing in pharmaceutical industries:

1. The Gulf Pharmaceutical Industries /Company/.
2. The Medical Projects /Company/.

There is a single poultry company, the Ra's al-Khaymah Poultry /Company/, a single company specializing in technical production, the al-Sharjah Technical Production /Company/, a single real estate company, the Gulf Real Estate Company, the Oil Products Company, and a hotel company, (the United International Hotels /Company/).

Why a Merger?

Now that we have presented a general picture of the situation of the Gulf companies, a basic question arises: Why a merger of the companies? Before we start to answer, we would like to present some general and special rules on drawing up a system for defining business activities. These are:

1. Competition: If the competition among companies with similar objectives is very great, and reaches the "cutthroat" level, at that point a merger will be an important cause for eliminating harm and annoyance.
2. Market capacity: If the market is too great for companies of limited capacity to respond to its demands, a merger will be a means for assembling a greater capacity, one that will be able to meet the demands of the market.
3. Profitability: If there are obvious savings to be realized through a merger, those savings may be observed, for example, by obliterating the boards of the merged companies and consolidating the financial, technical and marketing departments, which will help reduce expenses and outlays and increase profitability.

Following what we have mentioned above, let us turn to the existing Gulf companies and raise this question: Can the local market, or even the Gulf market, support

the existence of 11 general investment companies, six cement companies, and five insurance companies? Determining the degree to which the market can absorb this number, or whether they should not exist, would require an expanded market study.

However, a very important thing is clear from obvious features of the objective aspects of the market and what has happened recently in the market. That is that the companies that were founded on paper just for the purpose of stock speculation /must/ disappear from the market, and, likewise, some companies that have similar objectives must be reduced in number through mergers, or else they will have lethal competition, an unsuitable market and wasted profits.

We will follow up on this notion today with some of the economic activities dominating the managers of Gulf companies, and we will try to observe their opinions. Then tomorrow we will present the sum total of those opinions to AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM.

Businessmen's Views on Mergers

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 26 Dec 82 p 9

/Article by Muhammad al-Barjas/

/Text/ Yesterday AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM followed up on the subject it had presented concerning the "merger of Gulf companies," and the general repercussion on this subject was good, although people's views regarding it differed.

Today we will present the opinion of the engineer Sabah al-Rayyis, chairman of the Gulf Investment Company, with regard to this issue.

Eng Sabah says, "The fact is that the idea is a good one, in principle, as one way of hearing people's views, although I had believed that there were no problems at all requiring a merger of Gulf companies. If we want to talk about investment companies, in my capacity as board chairman of the Gulf Investment Company, I can assert that the scope for investment is very great and that it is big enough for all existing investment companies, especially if the companies are aware of the best means for managing their investments, whether in terms of time or in terms of quantity.

The Cement Companies

"The cement companies that exist in the Gulf market are to be considered industrial firms. The minimum life of any industrial company during which you can measure the extent of its success or failure is 3 to 5 years. Most of these companies have not reached that age. Consequently, to judge their success or failure is a process that might not take all aspects of the truth into consideration. However, that should not prevent a cement company, after a period of time, from buying a company in a similar area, especially if that company is facing difficulties and obstacles, be they technical or administrative.

"These things are normal in the realm of commercial activity. For example, the Arab Insurance Company, a company owned by a group of Kuwaitis that is operating

in Jordan, bought another company, the Middle East Insurance Company, which was also operating in Jordan, because it was facing certain technical and administrative difficulties."

After that, Eng al-Rayyis talked about paper companies, stating, "Let us assume, at the beginning, that certain company is integrated. After that comes the role of the Ministry of Commerce, to investigate its affairs, in other words, to oversee its budget and its activity, so that it will be possible to pass judgment on it. The shareholders' money is not a game in the hands of exploiters. The Ministry of Commerce must tell all stockholders the truth about every Gulf company, so that these people may have confidence regarding their investments. When the Ministry of Commerce feels that a 'paper company' has been established for the sake of speculating and exploiting the citizens' money for 'personal interests,' at that point its duty is to make this apparent to everyone. It can compel the founder of that company to buy the shares of all the stockholders, so that the rights of the stockholders will be preserved and their money will be returned to them, or is in its power to exercise total supervision over the company, establishing a new board to manage it and preventing the members of the former board from entering into it. In other words, a big role is required of the Ministry of commerce vis-a-vis that type of company, which you have called paper companies."

The Banks

With respect to the banks, Eng al-Rayyis said, "Competition among banks in the area is desirable, if we want to turn this area into an international commercial center, if we want to turn this area into an international commercial center. I believe that even the number of banks in Kuwait is small, in comparison with the Gulf Banks. All the banks in Kuwait realize profits, and increasing their number will help create a developed form of competition. For this reason: the number of Gulf banks is not so great that they must be merged."

The Company Management

Eng Sabah al-Rayyis then said, "If we assume for example that we have merged the following investment firms--the Coast, al-u'lu'ah and Gulf Investment /Companies--who will manage the new company? How will we be able to judge his ability? The lives of all these companies are short in comparison with the accepted lives of long-term investments, which are 3 to 5 and even sometimes 10 years. I would state that the Gulf companies will need more time if we are to be able to judge their ability and consequently the importance of merging them or not."

Jasim Budi and Another Opinion

Mr Jasim Marzuq Budi, the vice chairman of the Securities Group Company and member of the board of the Commercial Bank, states the following opinion on this subject:

Merging Gulf Companies

"The issue of merging Gulf companies is a multifaceted one and it has many effects. In order to come up with the best opinion on this matter, we must view it from two different standpoints at the same time:

"A. The purely economic standpoint (the conditions of the competitive market, the condition of the companies and so forth).

"B. The investment standpoint (that of owners of and dealers in company shares).

The Economic Standpoint

"If we look at the issue from the economic standpoint and the condition of the companies themselves, we will find, in brief, that there is a large group of companies that have similar goals, whether they are industrial or investment firms; in a single market whose absorptive capacity may be much less than the combined size of these companies, and that will lead to the following:

"A. Severe, unhealthy competition among these companies to assert their presence; the consequence of that ultimately will be a drop in the levels of profit of the companies and the inability of some of them to survive for long periods.

"B. Severe competition, as well, among companies with similar goals to attract technically and managerially competent people in a market in which capable people, especially technically competent people, are rare. Such competition will always have bad aftereffects.

"In order for us to arrive at an optimum solution, it will be necessary first to study the market in this area thoroughly, with regard to each type of company, so that we will be able accurately to specify the size of the market and its absorptive capacity. On the basis of that, we will be able to determine the maximum number of companies this market can accommodate, and, if the companies that exist now are greater in size than the capacity of the market, we will seek recourse to combining the companies in order to come up with the optimum number of companies that can function in this market without a monopoly, and that will lead to sound, healthy competition among these companies, so that they can realize their objectives in a manner that will inevitably be reflected on the profitability of the companies and the shareholders' benefit from them.

The Investment Standpoint

"The al-Manakh market in Kuwait was considered to be the biggest of the unofficial Gulf company stock markets. The great number of companies with similar purposes that dealt in this market, and on which for the most part one could not obtain abundant information, was one of the reasons that led to the collapse of this market. In the face of this tremendous bulk of similar companies, the investor could not distinguish between what was good and what was not. At this point the notion of merging the companies enters in, so that the investor can ultimately choose among a reasonable number of companies with similar purposes in a manner that is based on a thorough study of the type of company, its profitability, and its strength, in a manner that will lead to the creation of a conservative, orderly market for Gulf stocks that will guarantee that what happened in the al-Manakh market this year will not be repeated.

"In conclusion, the information available on both the economic and investment viewpoints indicates that it is necessary to merge certain companies of similar objectives and leave the determination of the identity and number of these companies, which is feasible only through a field study of the absorptive capacity of the market in the region, /to such a study/. I consider that such a field survey should be carried out by a body which enjoys facilities and authorities that embrace all the countries in the area, and the best of those that possess these characteristics and have these authorities is the Gulf Cooperation Council. I wish that an economic technical agency had been established in it to assume charge of this task--it would thereby have performed an obvious service for the region."

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GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES CONCERNING PALESTINIAN PRESENCE EXAMINED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 305, 25 Dec 82 pp 22-24

[Article: "The Palestinians in Lebanon: The Struggle to Return in the Face of Israeli Prodding for Settlement"]

[Text] Few are the days that pass without a foreign ambassador or important official from an embassy without exception undertaking a visit to the General Department for Palestinian Refugee Affairs in Lebanon to meet with the general director Mr. Yusuf Sabra, or with the council president, Mr. Shafiq Shatila. And perhaps it is quite strange that the two biggest Palestinian refugee camps in the Lebanese capital, Sabra and Shatila, should bear the names of the families of the most important officials in this Lebanese administrative department which concerns itself with the affairs of the Palestinian refugees.

Suddenly life has once again begun to pervade the bureaus of this department and so transform it to a beehive of movement and activity, after years had passed, especially the last eight years of war which witnessed the setting of the star of the Lebanese state and of its legal authority. In that time the Palestinian Liberation Organization assumed the custody and administration of the affairs of all the Palestinians dwelling in Lebanon, after the organization itself had been transformed into an authority capable of interesting itself in many Lebanese affairs, including of course the conditions of the Palestinian refugees.

After Israeli invasion of Lebanon unto Beirut, the capital, and the departure of the PLO along with all its political and military institutions, the administration of refugees department returned to practice its crucial role by overseeing the affairs of the Palestinian refugees whose presence on Lebanese soil as refugees is legally recognized. The Palestinians once again began to pursue their affairs with the aid of this official administrative organ.

It is a daily scene which has been re-occurring for a long time. A group of officials has returned with persistence each morning as usual, and a large number of refugees with petitions are gathered together as they have been since morning and will be till the office hours end.

Perhaps what characterizes this constant activity most is the stream of foreign ambassadors coming to visit the general director and the president of the council. This is all part of a noticeable international interest in the condition of the "Palestinian refugees" in Lebanon after the eight years of war in which the PLO was a basic actor, the departure of the organization and the Palestinian fighters from Lebanon, and the Israeli invasion which brought Lebanon to a turning point.

This foreign diplomatic interest is intended to elicit information concerning the condition of the refugees in the camps after the destructive war launched by Israel against them and the butchery which was perpetrated in the two camps Sabra and Shatila. But perhaps the most important question the foreign diplomats are seeking to answer is: first of all, what will be the fate of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in human, social and legal terms; and, second of all, what will be the fate of the camps, both in the south and in Beirut, which were set up at the beginning of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon after the disaster of 1948? Shall these camps be returned to their prior state in the same places in the south and in Beirut, or will some other arrangement be made by the Lebanese government? Thirdly, if the Lebanese government ultimately decides to act as host to the Palestinian refugees, will this decision include every Palestinian now present on Lebanese soil, or will it remain limited to those refugees who came to Lebanon in the disaster of 1948 and to those enrolled in the registers of the Lebanese state (the General Department for Palestinian Refugee Affairs) and in the registers of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA, the section for Palestinian refugees)?

These are very important questions which lead to other questions complementary to them. Some of these have official answers because they are in the domain of those things to which the Lebanese government has committed itself. Others have no answers and have become linked to the future of the current situation in Lebanon and the future of the Middle East crisis.

Up until now, there has been no official Lebanese position defining the policy of the state. However, the dominant belief is that the unannounced policy is for Lebanon to continue to act as host to those Palestinian refugees who emigrated to Lebanon during the disaster of 1948. Some go further and state that the Lebanese state would accept in time the permanent settlement of the 1948 refugees if the comprehensive settlement demanded that, just like the other Arab states which host the refugees.

Though it may be premature to give the details and background of this final possibility, official Lebanese policy rejects allowing the Palestinians who illegally entered Lebanon after the disaster of 1948 and during the recent events to remain, and accepts the responsibility of hosting and taking custody of the 1948 refugees only.

In this connection, the general director of Palestinian refugee affairs, Mr. Yusuf Sabra, says: "We, as an official and obedient government administration, do not work with anyone but those refugees recognized by the United Nations, and relevant definition begin: 'every individual who used to dwell in Palestine and left it during the two years prior to the disaster of 1948, losing in Palestine his home and source of income and coming to one of the following countries: Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Egypt and the Gaza Strip, which is to say the countries bordering Israeli.'"

Mr. Sabra says: "These are the Palestinian refugees according to the international definition of them, and this is the definition which forms the basis of our work as an official Lebanese administrative body with the refugees."

We asked Mr. Sabra about the official number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon who are recorded in the registers of the department and of the UNRWA. He answered: "Immediately after the disaster of 1948, the Red Cross took over custody of the affairs of the Palestinian refugees. After it, UNRWA took over the job' according to the international arrangement decided upon. However, both the Red Cross and UNRWA drew up their statistics on the basis that any Palestinian working in their administrations was not to be considered a refugee and did not deserve to benefit from the advances and aid from UNRWA. Then in 1952 the Lebanese state decided to carry out an official count of the number of refugees present in Lebanon, and the count showed their number to be about 145,000."

But how many are recorded in the register of the department and officially recognized?

Mr. Sabra's answer: "The number of refugees registered with us in the official registers according to the international definition we noted is currently approximately 280,000."

We returned to the question: the number of Palestinians in Lebanon today is many times greater than the number recorded in the official registers. How did he intend to deal with them?

Mr. Sabra answered: "As for these additional numbers, the matter of their affairs and situation and the future of their presence on Lebanese soil is outside the scope of our competency as a department. The settling of this topic is within the competency of Public Security and the ministry of the interior."

We asked Mr. Sabra: "Do you have any idea of the total number of Palestinians present in Lebanon, minus their armed forces which are still in the north and the Beqaa valley?"

He replied: "Before last June, which is to say prior to the Israeli invasion, the total number was 650,000, but I think it decreased during the last months, so that it is now only around 550,000."

During the campaign of raids undertaken by the Lebanese security apparatus recently in Beirut, the total number of Palestinians arrested was between 420 and 450, most of them by far being among those who entered Lebanon illegally and without recognition as refugees. Therefore, it is the intention of Public Security to remove them from Lebanon so that they will go back to where they came from, either inside the occupied territories (the West Bank and Gaza) or the neighboring Arab states. This is the procedure to be carried out with regard to all Palestinians living in Lebanon in an illegal fashion and without being recorded in the registers of the Lebanese refugee department. The Lebanese state has continued to hold fast to this procedure up until now, despite pressure being exerted by the Arab states for some time on the Lebanese state calling for it to give up the idea and allow every unarmed Palestinian in Lebanon to remain.

It seems that these pressures have not borne fruit up till now. While a Lebanese official was in one of the Arab capitals ' he was addressed on this subject to the effect that this burden which Lebanon is carrying could be ameliorated by an increase in Arab aid to Lebanon. But the Lebanese officials' reply was a sharp rejection of all these pressures. He said that Lebanon's situation, after all that had happened to the country, could not endure absorption of such a large number, and that Lebanon, in its current circumstances, could accept the 1948 refugees only. He stated that the Arab aid, if it were tied in one way or another to the issue of allowing the large additional number of Palestinians to remain, might be given up by Lebanon, no matter what the circumstances and the results.

The Lebanese official said in that Arab capital: "Why do you always want to make Lebanon bear what it can't endure? And why do the Arab states want the Palestinians who came to Lebanon, to us, to remain, when these same states do not ask them back and take them in, despite the fact that the social, political and sectarian situation of these states differs completely from that of Lebanon, which, after years of tribulation, is no longer able to accept this matter or tolerate it under any circumstances?"

Just as these things seem to be decided as far as the Lebanese are concerned, and to be firmly incorporated in the highest policy of the Lebanese state, so the fate of the camps destroyed by the Israeli forces when they swept over Lebanon, especially in the South and in Beirut, seems shrouded in obscurity. Shall these camps remain where they are, or will they be transferred to other regions of Lebanon, while the fate and rights of the Palestinian people are finally decided within the context of the comprehensive solution to the crisis of the region?

Since the first days in which the occupation began to stabilize, Israel opened a dialogue with the Lebanese state via UNRWA which until the last remained conflict-filled, and ended without having achieved any results. The dialogue dealt with the topic of the camps and the places of refuge for those refugees driven away by the war of the camps, especially in the south.

The failure to settle this issue was not caused only by the presence of a fundamental disagreement between the position of the Lebanese government and that of the Israeli government concerning this subject. Rather, there was another reason, namely that neither Israel nor Lebanon as yet have a firm policy regarding this subject, since it depends on the Israeli army evacuating all of Lebanon.

Merely a quick review of this dialogue, in which UNRWA played the role of intermediary, makes it clear how the Israeli position at every point was fluctuating and being reversed in accordance with circumstances and the development of events.

During last July, the Israeli government sent a letter to UNRWA in which it demanded that houses be constructed for the refugees, since it refused to allow tents to be erected for them again in the camps.

UNRWA informed the Lebanese government of this request from Israel, and Lebanon replied by refusing it and informing UNRWA that it insisted on restoring what had been, within the confines of the camps, which is to say that it intended to reconstruct the camps and rebuild the Palestinian houses which were destroyed, without permitting buildings or new houses to be constructed as a substitute for the tents.

UNRWA replied with an official communication in which it confirmed that it received its instructions from the Lebanese state.

Israel resumed saying it would give the refugees ready-made mobile homes to live in. It then retreated from this position and said it would give the refugees building materials such as cement so that they themselves might build their homes. UNRWA assented to this offer on the condition that the cement be given to build foundations for the new tents, and not for construction purposes.

In the face of this position, Israel renewed its offer to supply ready-made houses to the refugees on the condition that they pay for them, but this time the offer met with the refusal of the refugees themselves, in view of how costly these ready-made houses were.

In all this Israel wanted to realize a certain basic goal more than anything else: the policy of wiping out the camps. One foreign diplomat explains this by saying that the Palestinian who continues to be a refugee constantly yearns to return to Palestine. In order for Israel to eventually wipe out this psychological condition, it saw that it had to remove the Palestinian concentrations in the camps, and scatter them in individual houses built in various places and regions, as a part of its policy of wiping out the yearning to return and of imposing the principle of permanent settlement.

By refusing to let houses be built, the Lebanese state was indirectly refusing to accept the principle of permanently settling the Palestinians outside their rightful land and was insisting that they remain refugees and temporary inhabitants awaiting the final and comprehensive solution to their problem.

Despite the fact that the Lebanese state and especially President Amin al-Jumayyil now have an integrated program dealing with the subject of the camps with regard to their reconstruction and the substitute places they are to be erected in, the state is insisting on waiting to submit this program, in expectation of the end of the phase of negotiating for withdrawal, so that Lebanon will not be forced to open secondary battles, since the battle of governing is now equivalent to total liberation. It is also feared that a program like this, whose context is connected to the crisis of the region, might lead to a suspension of the negotiations or to the creation of new, additional goals for them which would obscure the main issue: liberation and complete evacuation.

At any rate, discussion concerning this topic is continuing. Important parties have started trying to exert pressure, some of them on Israel's side and some on Lebanon's, a fact which means that the battle of the future of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, its old and newer parts alike, is not over. Israel is preserving in a policy with a variety of goals, desiring from Lebanon a Lebanese price for withdrawal from its land. This price is a security/peace agreement, in preparation for a political peace treaty. In addition Israel wants a Palestinian price from Lebanon--granting the Palestinian presence the character of a natural, permanent presence, in order to wipe out the idea of return and impose settlement.

12224

CSO: 4404/181

SALIM AL-HUSS REVIEWS RECENT PROBLEMS, FUTURE PROSPECTS

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 294, 20-26 Dec 82
pp 37-40

[Article by Salim al-Huss, former Lebanese prime minister: "Lebanon, the Arabs, and Arabism: The Arabism of Blind Obedience and Subordination Has Been a Failure, and the Arabism of Playing a Leadership and Pioneering Role Is What Is Suitable for Lebanon"]

[Text] The time has come for the Lebanese to make their country a truly independent one and thus set an example which the Arabs would demand to follow by rising up to its level.

The Lebanese are more suitable than many to lead the Arabs toward a better future.

If Lebanon chose to abandon the family of Arab nations, it would become a free-for-all arena for an open struggle in the Middle East among the Arabs as well as between the Arabs and Israel.

After the barbarous war which Israel waged against it, Lebanon was overcome by a fierce reaction against everything that was Arab. It was the sort of reaction which went beyond the level of mere rebuke and, in its intensity, was more than just anger. It was an expression, by the Lebanese, of the bitter disappointment which they felt when the Arabs did not take a stand. In fact, it was a result of the Arabs' disgraceful feebleness, shameful negligence, and scandalous failure to undertake to do their brotherly duty toward their fellow-Arabs who were going through severe tribulation because of their location and position vis-a-vis an enemy who was thought to be a common enemy.

It was a normal reaction, and one should have expected no other reaction from the Lebanese after they were subjected to more than a human being could endure. And the Lebanese are, above all, human beings. They found themselves alone in the middle of a storm which was exterminating their nation, destroying all the values which they held dear, ruining all the hopes and dreams which they cherished, and doing away with what few worldly goods they possessed.

The Political Dimension of the Reaction

We would not be pausing to deal with this phenomenon if it had not become convenient material to be systematically exploited in an effort to strip Lebanon away from the domain of the Arab world—an effort undertaken by those who have an interest or purpose in carrying out this deed. They are doing this by means of mercilessly opening up the wound of bitterness which the war left behind so that, with time, the wound will be transformed into a deep chasm of hatred, resentment, and enmity.

We do not expect the Arab leaders to really understand the feelings of the Lebanese who have become tormented because of them. We merely ask that they respect these feelings and correctly assess them. And if the Arab leaders' assessment of this phenomenon reflects the fact that they feel some measure of guilt, then this is the most that we can hope for.

It should not be held against the Lebanese if their disappointment turns into rebuke or explodes in the form of anger. But the thing that must be prevented is having this feeling of blaming the Arab leaders be transformed into a feeling of rejecting the Arab world or having the Lebanese fall into the danger of seeing their resentment against the Arabs be transformed into a criterion for patriotism—and consequently the danger of having their shunning of the Arabs be transformed into an accepted political policy which would serve to increasingly alienate Lebanon from the Arabs, with the end result being the breaking off of relations between them or something of the sort.

President Amin al-Jumayyil was quickly endeavoring to prevent this from happening when, during his inaugural address on 23 September 1982, he said: "Lebanon belongs to the Arab world not because this is a condition that has been imposed upon us, but rather because Lebanon freely chooses to do so due to its actual situation, its interests, its pioneering role in the Arab world, and its membership in the Arab League." By saying this he headed off the outbreak of any fruitless debate concerning Lebanon's identity between those who support Lebanon's Arab identity and those who, either traditionally or of late, reject Lebanon's Arab identity. While some people were embarking upon using all possible means to burn Lebanon's bridges to the Arab world, President al-Jumayyil was embarking upon repairing some of these bridges by undertaking visits to some of the Arab capital cities.

Some people have found fault with President al-Jumayyil's formula for defining Lebanon's Arab identity, saying that this definition is not a formula which organically commits Lebanon to being a part of the Arab world, but is instead the expression of a free choice which can be reversed in the event that a given assessment of Lebanon's interests, under certain circumstances, calls for this or in case the Lebanese government, for some reason or other, decides to withdraw from the Arab League. The fact is that, when mistrust takes hold of a person, he tends to misinterpret things. But there is no reason not to interpret the Lebanese president's remark as meaning that Lebanon's Arab identity is a result of the will of the Lebanese people rather than merely a cold fact taken for granted. This is something which shows

strength, rather than weakness, when it comes to expressing Lebanon's affinity to the Arab world.

Dichotomy and Schizophrenia

We cannot see how Lebanon could have been an Arab country on the eve of the outbreak of the Israeli war against Lebanon last June and then could have become a non-Arab country at the end of the summer after the war came to an end. We do not understand how Lebanon's identity as an Arab country can be considered an elementary and accepted fact in the document of [national] accord principles, which was made public in April 1980 and then signed in June 1980, in the presence of the Lebanese president and prime minister, by the representatives of all the Lebanese factions who thereby demonstrated their approval of the document—and then this can no longer be true after the hot summer of 1982.

It is possible for a friend to not remain a friend, and it is even possible for a friend to become an enemy. But a brother cannot cease being a brother, no matter how the relationship between two brothers develops and no matter what happens concerning how they treat each other. A brother remains a brother, even though he may be repudiated, just like a son remains a son, even though he may be disobedient.

I once said that a patriotic Lebanese is unfortunately destined to experience a type of dichotomy or schizophrenia in his attitude—not to mention schizophrenia in his personality. He is in favor of Arabism, but is against the Arabs. He is in favor of the Palestine cause, but is against the PLO. He is in favor of having a legitimate Lebanese authority, but is against the Lebanese government. This, of course, is a result of the existence of a great gap between a given cause and those whom it involves, and this has compelled patriotic Lebanese to be in favor of a given cause and, at the same time, against those whom the cause involves. When those whom a cause involves are not on the same level as their cause, in terms of honest commitment, high morals, and integrity in one's actions—whether it is the cause of Arabism, the Palestine cause, or the cause concerning having a legitimate Lebanese authority—then a person can be forgiven if he chooses to have an attitude of dichotomy or schizophrenia in his views concerning such a cause and those whom it involves.

We should also not be misled into forgetting another elementary fact, which is the following: If a Christian becomes sick of the world's Christian leaders, and a Muslim becomes fed up with the world's Muslim leaders, this does not mean that this Christian has renounced his Christianity or that this Muslim has renounced Islam. The Christian might condemn Christian leaders, but he will remain a Christian, just as the Muslim might condemn Muslim leaders, but he will remain a Muslim. The same principle is true regarding Lebanon, the Arabs, and Arabism. That is, a Lebanese might become furious at the Arab leaders, but he will still remain an Arab. Condemning some [Arabs] does not mean renouncing one's Arab identity. One should not draw mistaken conclusions.

Now then, what has happened to Arabism in Lebanon to make it such a convenient target for the arrows of conservative, sceptical, and biased individuals? What has happened to cause it to be put on the bench of the accused and make it necessary for its adherents to defend and protect it? Why has the idea reached the point where we are required to provide a rebuttal and a justification for it?

The Source of the Problem

If we could sum up the problem in just a few words, we would say that the heart of the problem is that what we have is Nasserism without Nasser. No matter how we assess the consequences of his epoch--concerning which different people had different dreams--it remains true that Nasser, while alive, was a giant figure who captured the hearts of the Arab masses everywhere because of the role he played in the Arab world, because of the status he occupied in the Third World, and because of his resounding voice which was heard in the international arena. The Arab masses rallied behind him, and as he marched along his path they felt that they were experiencing the dignity, greatness, and power which they so thirsted for. Since Arabism was the bond which linked together the Arab masses in the different and vast areas of the Arab world, Nasser's presence during the years of his rule in Egypt was something which kindled Arab nationalist feelings and unleashed the giant spirit of Arabism. In those days Arabism was synonymous with Nasserism, and it was of course tinged with the quality of requiring obedience to Nasser as a leader.

In 1970 Nasser died, but Arabism in its Nasserist form survived. Arabism survived in Lebanon after Nasser was gone, and the idea of obeying the leader which characterized it during Nasser's lifetime and which was imposed on the Arabs by Nasser's personality and charisma with the masses also survived. But obedience to whom? If not to Nasser, then to his successor. This is where there is a problem. Nasser had no successor. He had successors in the sense that, after he died, some people aspired to be his successor. The Arab world then lived through a period of more than 10 years which was dominated by the struggles engaged in by some Arab leaders to push their way up to the position of being the Arabs' overall leader. The result was that the Arab nationalists in Lebanon became divided into groups because of their obedience to these different leaders, and their struggles reflected conflicts in the Lebanese arena which soon erupted in the form of violent clashes between the various groups of supporters.

The situation has been one of Lebanon undergoing an ordeal because of Arabism and, simultaneously, Arabism undergoing an ordeal because of Lebanon. It is Nasserism without Nasser. It was Nasserism in terms of meaning obedience to Nasser, but then explosive conflicts cropped up in the Lebanese arena after Nasser died and not a single real successor to Nasser emerged. These conflicts then interacted with the factors governing the Lebanese crisis, became intermeshed with them, aggravated them, and complicated them.

This aspect of Arabism—the aspect of blind obedience or misguided subordination, the aspect of being led without having a leader to do the leading, or being led by more than one leader—is the aspect which was responsible for Arabism contributing toward the aggravation and complication of the Lebanese crisis. This aspect is the one which the Lebanese have a right to renounce and should abandon. If they do this, then in what sense will Lebanon remain an Arab country? What aspect of Arabism could Lebanon adopt? Why, basically, should Lebanon insist on being an Arab country, no matter which aspect of the concept of Arabism Lebanon chooses to adopt?

What Arab Identity and Affiliation Means

I once said that Arabism in Lebanon naturally means many things. It could mean playing a role in the political, economic, cultural, and other fields inside the Arab world. It could also mean undertaking a cultural and civilizational mission in the world as a whole. And it could also mean being committed to common causes. With the Lebanese it does not mean unity [with other Arab nations]. Although it is alleged that Lebanon is an Arab country, the Lebanese also alleges that Lebanon is a free and truly independent country. In practice, Lebanon's Arabism means rapprochement, solidarity, mutual dealings, and interaction.

Within the context of this concept of Arabism we should not hesitate to say that Lebanon is an Arab country.

If we accept the premise that solidarity means strength for both the whole Arab family and for each member of it—and for Lebanon in particular—then the role which must be assigned to Lebanon to play in the achievement and maintenance of Arab solidarity becomes both clear and obligatory. In the past, Lebanon's role in this realm was generally a negative one. It used to be wary of [showing any] initiative in the field of [joint] Arab action, and it played no role and undertook no initiatives in the realm of Arab solidarity. However, Lebanon also was never the cause of rocking the foundation or bringing about the collapse of Arab solidarity. Lebanon attempted to follow the path of neutralism in the maze of Arab alliances, although, in most cases, this attempt was not successful. Quite often Lebanon appeared to be neutral, but actually favored this or that bloc. But, on the other hand, Lebanon never attempted to play a role in closing the gap which existed between conflicting alliances. This is something which would have necessitated striving to achieve or maintain Arab solidarity and is something which Lebanon could have been utilized to achieve, both for the sake of its own interests and the interests of others, because of its unique position in the Arab world and its special status in the international community—a condition which is responsible for the fact that the presence of the Lebanese is felt throughout the Arab world in all walks of life.

Lebanon's economic role in the life of the Arab world is something which has been attested to. It has been attested to by the human presence of so many Lebanese in the various areas of the Arab world, and it has been attested to by the deep-rooted integration which binds the Lebanese economy to the

economies of the other Arab nations in the Arab East. There is hardly any Arab country which does not have its community of Lebanese who work hard and conscientiously in the various fields of production in their host country and contribute their share toward the growth of this country. One could also say that the Lebanese economy has grown and developed in a spontaneous and impulsive way which has perhaps caused it to become more integrated with, and more mutually dependent on, the economies of its neighboring Arab nations than has been the case between any other two Arab nations among the nations which have rallied around the banner of the Arab economic unity agreement or the Arab common market--and Lebanon is not a party in either of these two arrangements. This integration clearly shows up in the degree to which Lebanon relies on the markets of the Arab countries when selling its industrial and agricultural goods and when operating its tourism, banking, and other services.

Lebanon also plays a role in the educational and cultural fields due to the headstart which it has had in some of these realms in comparison with many of its fellow-Arab nations. However, Lebanon's role in this regard has not reached the height that it should have reached in view of Lebanon's capacities, potential, and Lebanon's vital interest in having it do so.

Lebanon is a crossroads of numerous cultures and its people have a headstart in many various cultural fields. Because of its lack of natural resources it has concentrated on developing its human resources. It has a brilliant record in the field of cultural achievements in the modern history of the Arab world. Furthermore, it has broad and ramified bridges--consisting of human beings--with both the Arab world and with Lebanese communities in various areas of the rest of the world. A Lebanon of this sort, which has a cultural and civilizational mission to perform, cannot and must not give up this mission. It is a mission which should be granted a special status in the front door of the Arab world which faces the rest of the world.

Lebanon's Arab role in its various aspects and its cultural and civilizational role in the Arab world are the two foundations which, if Lebanon will anchor itself to them, will enable Lebanon to become such a giant, will enable it to be on a scale so much greater than its geographical area and its total population, and will enable its influence to spread so far that the rest of the world will not be allowed to ignore Lebanon's existence or discount it, and this will enable its voice to be so loud that the world will not be allowed to close its ears to it or to its echoes.

Those who seek this role and this mission in Lebanon's Arabism are people who are not content to have Lebanon be a land of isolation for them to squat in. They want Lebanon to be a land of dignity, greatness, and power. Whoever is striving to deny Lebanon this role and mission might not be aware of the fact that, by doing so, he is endeavoring to stunt Lebanon's growth and keep the genie in his bottle.

Of course if we accept as a fact that Lebanon is an Arab country, then we must realize that this will entail commitment to Arab causes such as the Palestine cause, the cause of development, the cause of [Arab oil], and, in

general, causes of political, economic, and social liberation. And the cause of Lebanon, with all of its dimensions and ramifications, ought to be in the forefront of the Arab causes. It is a vital cause which all Arabs should be committed to just as Lebanon should be committed to all the other Arab causes. Lebanon's interest in being affiliated with, and identifying itself with, the Arab world is a matter which is so obvious that it allows no room for dispute or debate. Some people are trying to picture the interest in this affiliation as being one which is merely a matter of calculating profits and losses in terms of dirhams and milliemmes. But it is more than that. It is tantamount to being the sum total of a combination of everything we have already talked about concerning Lebanon's role and mission and the commitment of the Arabs to the cause of Lebanon. Our interest vis-a-vis the Arabs is a matter of a tree rather than a matter of fruit on a tree. It is a matter of a tree which we nurture, take care of, and water with our sweat as well as the juice and sap of our efforts and ideas. Such a tree will then grow and take root, we will then be able to find a place in its shade, protect ourselves behind its trunk, and eat its fruit, and the tree will be evidence of the greatness of our generosity, the ampleness of our production, and the glory of our place in the sun.

The Idea and the Path

In the reaction against the Arabs which followed the Israeli war against Lebanon, there was no objection to Arabism in the concepts that we have discussed above. In fact, it is impossible to object to these concepts. Our opinion is that the objection was instead to the path followed to put Arabism into actual practice. It involved subordination and obedience to conflicting Arab regimes, and conflicts between these regimes exploded in the Lebanese arena and then interacted with, aggravated, and complicated the factors of the crisis. If we accept the concepts, what path can then be followed which would preserve the true concepts of Arabism in Lebanon?

The core of the problem was blind obedience and subordination. The Arabism of blind obedience and subordination has been a failure, and the Arabism that should be adopted by Lebanon is the Arabism of playing a leadership and pioneering role.

The Lebanese, whether in all humility or even without feeling any sense of humility, are entitled to feel that they number among the best of the Arabs and thus that they--like the others or even more than many of the others--are suited to play a pioneering role in leading the Arabs toward a better future.

Among other things said concerning this matter is the following: "The time has come for the Lebanese to make their country a truly independent one and thus set an example which the Arabs would demand to follow by rising up to its level. Lebanon should no longer be expected to be a part of any so-called Arab unity which is adopted by some Arabs--who are fighting each other--for the purpose of providing a cover for intervention in the affairs of others or to settle accounts with their enemies. In fact, the Arabs themselves

should be expected to rise up to Lebanon's level and become aware of Lebanon's degree of freedom, democracy, justice, and originality. The time has come to acknowledge the fact that Lebanon—only by means of well-planned, careful, and voluntary nonalignment with the Arab factions which are fighting each other—can play the role of setting the pattern for the Arabs in terms of being an independent model democracy, can play the role of the cultural and informational forum which is the most experienced and most effective in serving Arab causes, can be the richest source of developmental potential and technical personnel, and can be a pioneering human laboratory." (Excerpts are from an article by 'Isam Nu'man, AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 19 July 1982.)

Concerns at This Stage

How nice it is to say that it is necessary to separate the issue of Lebanon from that of the Middle East [as a whole]! But the question is, can this be done in practice? This separation can be accomplished in practice by means of reaching a complete solution for the Lebanese problem before solving the problem of the area as a whole—and in complete isolation from the latter problem. The Lebanese problem could be completely solved if the Israeli forces would unconditionally evacuate the Lebanese territory which they are occupying, if all the other non-Lebanese armed forces, which are still in some areas of Lebanon such as the Biqa' Valley and North Lebanon, would withdraw [from Lebanon], and if a national accord could be reached in Lebanon within the framework of a formula of reform which would serve to decide all matters of dispute among the Lebanese under the aegis of an effective democratic system which would be based on the principles of justice, equal rights, and equal opportunity for [all] Lebanese and would involve no shameful acts of discrimination or sectarian favoritism in public life, whether in politics or on the job—that is, in [public] administration, the judiciary, and the army.

All of this is possible and all resources should be utilized on all levels to work toward this end, in spite of the difficulties which stand in the way of this job. If all of this took place, then separation of the two problems or issues could be accomplished to a large degree—in the sense that the situation in Lebanon would no longer be linked to, and sharply affected by, the everyday developments relating to the Middle East problem.

Up till 1970 Lebanon appeared to be immune from the effects of the developments that were taking place in the Middle East crisis. In fact, it seemed as if Lebanon was able to create for itself a situation in which it allowed itself the possibility of taking advantage of the negative phenomena of the unstable situation in the Middle East and turning them into positive phenomena which showered down upon them as if from heaven. Beirut grew as a port for the Middle East, its airport grew to become the international aviation junction for the entire Middle East, the oil outlet locations for Iraqi oil in North Lebanon and Saudi oil in South Lebanon both experienced development, and all the other facilities in Lebanon grew more than was necessary for Lebanon's own requirements and thus they came to serve the entire Middle

East. Lebanon thus came to be based on an open-door economic policy and on reliance on the other countries of the area and their markets when it came to Lebanon's industry, trade, tourism, summer resorts, banks, and communications and transport. The same thing was true of some of the other, non-commercial fields such as education, medical treatment, etc., and this was even true in the realms of exporting all types and all levels of human expertise and capacities. Whenever anything happened in the Middle East, such as a coup d'etat in one country, a political shake-up in another, or nationalization in still another, either capital or human resources--or both at once--streamed into Lebanon.

This trend continued after 1970, and the positive phenomena which had been growing out of the negative phenomena of the Middle East situation since that time began to be accompanied by negative repercussions in terms of Lebanon's security situation as the armed Palestinian presence grew. Israel attacked the Beirut Airport; the Israelis launched attack after attack against the villages in South Lebanon, clashes occurred between the Lebanese Army and the armed Palestinian groups, and the spectacle of armed clashes reached ever more dangerous proportions. But economically things remained mostly positive. The year 1974, which was just before the great crisis exploded, was perhaps one of Lebanon's most prosperous, active, and productive years in terms of its economy. Beginning in 1975, though, negative phenomena began to outweigh positive phenomena--until the time came when apparently only negative phenomena resulted from the factors affecting Lebanon via its neighbors in the Middle East--or at least this was almost the case. At this time virtually Lebanon's entire concern came to revolve around security and political matters.

If Lebanon today managed to separate its problem from the Middle East problem--by having the Israelis evacuate Lebanon, by having all the other non-Lebanese armed forces leave the country, by putting an end to the existence of non-legitimate armed Lebanese groups, and by achieving a comprehensive national accord formula--would this mean that the situation in Lebanon would become totally isolated from all the repercussions of the developments of the Middle East crisis? Would Lebanon become totally immune to all the effects of what is taking place in the Middle Eastern arena?

It seems to me that Lebanon, if it chose to abandon the family of Arab nations, would run the risk of remaining a free-for-all arena for an open struggle in the Middle East among the Arabs as well as between the Arabs and Israel--and even among the world's superpowers. But if Lebanon chooses the path of being part of the Arab family or, perhaps I should say, if it becomes its destiny to do so, then Lebanon will be able to surround itself with many factors of immunity which will enable it to resist the negative influences which might sweep into Lebanon from its neighboring countries due to developments in the Middle East crisis. But no matter what Lebanon does, it cannot totally isolate itself from the concerns of that crisis as long as the issue is an Arab family issue and as long as Lebanon is a member of this family. How can a member of any family isolate himself from the concerns of his family? Lebanon's situation would then become similar to the situation of

any other Arab nation--with the exception of the confrontation states facing Israel. That is, Lebanon's situation, in general and in the best of cases, would not be unlike that of one of the Gulf Arab nations or North African nations as far as its position with regard to the Middle East crisis would be concerned. None of those nations claim that they are not concerned with the Middle East issue or that they are not somehow affected by the developments of the crisis in the Middle East. Therefore separating the issue of Lebanon from the Middle East problem, according to this concept, does not mean that Lebanon will wash its hands of the Middle East problem, nor does it mean that Lebanon, which is a part of the Middle East, will be isolated from the concerns of the Middle East. What it means is that Lebanon will co-exist with the Middle East crisis and protect itself with a degree of immunity which will prevent the developments of the situation in the Middle East from causing political and security crises inside Lebanon.

Let us take this opportunity to mention the fact that Egypt went so far as to sign a separate peace treaty with Israel, but it still was unable to escape the mire of the Middle East crisis. In fact, Egypt may have fallen even farther into this pit, although from another standpoint.

There are those who demand that Lebanon be declared neutral, as a means of isolating Lebanon from the Middle East problem once and for all. Without delving into all the dimensions of this way of thinking--which does deserve exhaustive study of the type that we have not yet had a chance to do--I nevertheless feel that it is necessary to make some remarks concerning it. On the one hand, there is no doubt that Lebanon is no longer able to bear the burden of having any more military operations be mounted either inside its territory or using its territory as a launching point for attacks, no matter what the nature, size, or objective of the operations might be. If this is what is meant by neutralism, then the matter is settled and decided, and there can be no discussion about it. But if neutralism means, as far as Lebanon's stance with regard to the Middle East issue is concerned, maintaining the same distance between Lebanon and the Arab countries as between Lebanon and Israel, then this is something which we cannot even consider. If neutralism means that Lebanon is committed to a policy of nonalignment as far as international blocs are concerned and takes a middle position between this or that world superpower, this is, in principle, an attractive pursuit, but today it is very unrealistic since Lebanon now is counting totally on the U.S. [to help Lebanon] in its resistance to Israel aggression. But if neutralism means that Lebanon is committed to a policy of keeping its distance from all the Arab blocs, then this is a correct pursuit if it is the only avenue open. The other avenue which we would prefer is [to have Lebanon engage in] tireless efforts to close the gap between the Arab blocs, whenever it appears, so that Arab solidarity can be achieved. This is the role which we envision for Lebanon in our concept of Lebanon's commitment to the Arab world, and of course we feel that Lebanon should also, at the same time, always endeavor not to slide back into the situation of being subordinate to any bloc or melting into it [and thus becoming a part of it]. Would this Lebanese neutralism be positive neutralism--if one may use that expression?

Conclusion

Lebanon is an Arab country, but it is also a truly independent country.

Lebanon's Arabism and Arab identity do not mean being united with, or merged into, its surrounding Arab world, and they do not mean subordination to any other Arab nation or to any Arab bloc. Lebanon's Arabism is the Arabism of playing a leadership and pioneering role in the Arab world.

Lebanon's Arabism and Arab identity mean that Lebanon has a complex role to play in the Arab world, has a cultural and civilizational mission to fulfill, must be responsibly committed to Arab national causes, and has common interests with the Arab world.

9468

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PRIEST-DIPLOMAT PROSELYTIZES FOR PLO

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 304, 18 Dec 82 p 29

[Article: "Palestinian Issue: To Preach Justness of Cause, Father 'Ayyad Tours Palestinian Places of Emigration"]

[Text] Father 'Ayyad a Palestinian National Council member, is the man of sensitive missions that require composure, patience and silence. Every time the Palestinian revolution wanted to address the West's human conscience or wanted to rebuild the bridges between the Palestinians, especially those who emigrated before the usurpation of Palestine and those who have been evicted by force, the appeal has always come from the revolution leadership to a few workers, including Father 'Ayyad.

During his stopover in Paris between one station and another, AL-MUSTAQBAL interviewed Father 'Ayyad who, through his long tour in West Europe, Latin America and the United States, has wanted to demonstrate the dimensions of the change at times and the development of others in the international community and world public opinion in the wake of the Israeli war against Lebanon and the Palestinian resistance, especially in the wake of the Sabra and Shatila massacre.

Father 'Ayyad has said: "I left Beirut for Rome, via Damascus, on 12 June 1982. Until then, the Vatican had not displayed any reaction compatible with the dimensions of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and with the brutality of the massacres against the civilians. Immediately upon my arrival, I held a press conference in which I expressed my astonishment at the Vatican's position. Fortunately, most of the international wire services and Italian papers carried reports on the conference. In one of his Sunday sermons, the Pope said: 'An end must be put to the Palestinian people's suffering and a homeland must be found for them.' In the wake of this venerable position by the Pope, the Italian papers started to condemn the invasion and the accompanying barbarity. From Rome, I went to the Netherlands where I participated in all the marches, and I did the same in France.

"From Paris, I headed for Latin America where a large Palestinian community lives. My first stop was in Chile which, after the Arab countries, harbors the biggest Palestinian community in the world, a community numbering 200,000 people. This community owns the biggest club in Latin America. I found the

community's morale to be very 'low' especially since the Chilean media are controlled by Zionist Jews. I engaged in broad activity which covered the entire community there. I also held a press conference in which a number of prominent clergymen participated.

"During my tour, brother Abu 'Ammar, the revolution leader, asked me to return to Rome to complete the preparations for his visit to the Vatican and his meeting with His Holiness the Pope. Mr. Andriotti, the Italian Chamber of Deputies speaker, took part in arranging the meeting. During my meeting with the Vatican minister of foreign affairs, I said to him: The Pope has met numerous Israeli figures, including Dayan and Shamir, so why shouldn't he meet Abu 'Ammar? For the sake of honesty, when Abu 'Ammar emerged from the meeting with the Pope which lasted 10 minutes longer than scheduled, he told me that it had been a warm and touching meeting and the Pope had reiterated to him his support for 'the Palestinian people's right to self-determination' and that this is considered a sacred right.

"In the wake of this meeting, I noticed that the Catholic clergymen and Catholic establishments began to understand the Palestinian people's cause and started to receive us with warm welcome to discuss our people's cause. I was invited by the city of Milan where I addressed a large Catholic crowd. I also took part with the deputy cardinal of Milan in conducting mass for the souls of the Sabra and Shatila martyrs. I also delivered on the occasion a sermon to the congregation in which I said: 'As the Lord Christ walked on the Via Rosa to Golgotha, so are the Palestinian people walking on the path of pain.'

"From there I went to New York where I accompanied brother Abu al-Lutf at the U.N. proceedings. At the conclusion of the proceedings, I made an extensive tour of a number of U.S. cities, including New York, Washington, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago and others. I noticed during my tour a change, though slow, in the U.S. public opinion. I also encountered a response which I had not encountered before and felt that the Americans have begun to become aware of the weight of the Israeli burden on their shoulders."

8494

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SYRIAN VIEWS ON LEBANESE CRISIS DISCUSSED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 293, 13-19 Dec 82 pp 22-23

[Article by Wadi' al-Hilu: "It Is Foggy in Damascus; the Temperature Is Below Zero; Habib's Mission Floundered, but not Syria's Choices; Israel Will Move Its Battle with Syria to the Interior; Strategic Alliance between Damascus and Moscow Imminent"]

[Text] If one may describe the road to Damascus in these terms, [one would say that] it is enveloped in a rare and curious kind of frost. The road to Damascus is fraught with danger these days because of the al-Jabal clashes on the one hand and, on the other hand, because of the cold wave that is coming from Turkey and bringing with it snow and rain. Even in Damascus itself there is fog, and temperatures fall below zero at night. In the context of this cold wave, comments about "diplomatic frost" and "military frost" that are enveloping the Middle East have proliferated. There have also been comments about a cold, peaceful solution which is still deriving its heat from the fire that is blazing in Lebanon.

With the return of ambassadors Habib and Draper to Washington it seems evident that their missions had somewhat floundered, particularly since the speed-up of Habib's return to the Arab area through Lebanon implied that the United States was interested in strengthening U.S. diplomatic efforts emanating from Lebanon. It is known that Ambassador Draper was shuttling back and forth between Lebanon and Israel.

Habib in Damascus

Habib came at a time when Israel was setting conditions that could not be met: the Lebanese government had rejected them, and the U.S. government had not been convinced by them. This is at least a summary of what Philip Habib had conveyed about his government's position during the negotiations he conducted with Mr 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, Syria's minister of foreign affairs. While in Damascus Habib delineated the Israeli position which the Lebanese government had rejected and which the U.S. government had declined to adopt. Habib left Damascus without meeting President Hafiz al-Asad and after agreeing with Minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam that he would return to Syria with the new ideas that are required to get action on the subject of military withdrawals from Lebanon. According to a speech delivered by the Syrian president, Syria reaffirmed its conditions on that matter. The Syrian president said that Syria would not withdraw before Israel.

What is new about Syria's hardening position on this matter is the statement that Syria would withdraw after Israel withdraws.

Syria and President Gemayel

In this regard a Syrian official said, "This position is a Syrian card that has been given to the president of the Republic of Lebanon, al-Shaykh Amin Gemayel. It would help him bring about Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon. Syria," said the official, "has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon. Syria thinks that the achievement of legitimate Lebanese sovereignty over the territory of Lebanon is a matter that concerns the security of Syria. Therefore," added the official, "Syria is prepared to do everything to help Lebanon execute the government's objective of establishing its sovereignty over all the territory of Lebanon. Syria is primarily interested in the withdrawal of Israel. [Israel's military invasion of Lebanon] is posing a major threat to the Syrian heartland." According to the official, if the Lebanese government succeeds in pushing Israel and its threat outside the borders of Lebanon, then Syria would consider that a success for the Lebanese government. He said, "Syria is prepared to make sacrifices acceptable to Lebanese nationalists so that the state can impose its sovereignty. [Syria is prepared to make those sacrifices to enable the president to realize the interests of Lebanon."

More than one official in Damascus admits, however, that the mission of the president, al-Shaykh Amin Gemayel is one that is extremely difficult and arduous. Israel's withdrawal will not come about easily, and Syria will not leave the matter of its security at the mercy of the Israelis. This means that the present situation in Lebanon has reached a dead end. Does this then mean that U.S. diplomatic efforts which are based on the principle that the United States is the "only legitimate representative" of Arab interests have failed? Does this mean that a Syrian-Israeli war has become inevitable?

The Weakness in the Arab Situation

It seems evident in Damascus that not much hope is being placed on current U.S. diplomatic efforts. The reason lies not only in the inherent weakness of those U.S. efforts, but it also lies in the weakness of the current Arab situation. The Arab countries that approved a peace plan at the Arab Summit in Fes explored the requirements and conditions for an Arab peace, but did not approve an alternative plan in case the Arab peace plan should fail. This is not the only predicament. "At the present stage," says a Syrian official, "each Arab party concerned in the Arab-Israeli dispute believes that it can realize gains unilaterally and that, accordingly, it can save itself or its regime simply by agreeing with what is being proposed. Thus," the official says, "Israel would devote its attention to each and every Arab country separately. Arab countries would thus lose any possibility of applying pressure on the United States to compel it to insist on Arab conditions that ensure the Arabs' interests in peace. Therefore," says the Syrian official, "the Arab world seems to have lost its clout. On the one hand the interim results of an expansionist Israeli military attack on Lebanon are evident and, on the other hand, there is a U.S. diplomatic offensive that considers the opportunity suitable for achieving an Arab-Israeli peace. In both cases--that is, caught in the middle between the two offensives--the Arab world seems totally incapacitated: the Arabs cannot ensure their own peace; they cannot

confront Israel; and they are not in a position to turn down American conditions for peace. Amidst these climates," says the Syrian official, "the results that may be produced by the Arab seven-member committee which was charged with the task of explaining the Arab peace plan in Fes are in doubt. In view of Arab impotence," says the Syrian official, "Arab options collapse. The question is this: Do Syrian options collapse as well?"

"Syria's options have not and will not collapse. Syria can face [this] stage. At any rate it will not relinquish its right to defend its destiny. Accordingly, it will not abandon its options, and that includes the military option."

This is what the Syrian official said. He added that Syria was well aware of the fact that it would pay a very high price for this, but the price that others will pay will be no less. This will not necessarily be in the context of an open military confrontation with Israel, although that possibility does exist. Evidence for this lies in the military preparations Syria is making in the face of Israel's military mobilization. However, some informed Syrian circles are expecting the occurrence of domestic incidents like those which Syria had faced previously in the past few years. Reference was made in the editorial of the Syrian newspaper, AL-BA'TH, last Friday that gory events may take place in Syria as a logical consequence of its rejection of Israel's conditions. This means that Israel will deliberately shift its confrontation with the Syrian regime to Syria in an open military confrontation with that country. Continued internal tensions in Lebanon are helping this, and the climates of sectarian fighting that are prevailing in the Arab region are being exploited [for this purpose]. Perhaps what is more important than all this is the difference between Syrians and Palestinians over U.S. efforts for peace. This difference had become evident before the Palestinian Central Council was convened in Damascus; it was also evident while that council was in session. It is this difference that prevented a meeting between Mr Yasir 'Arafat and President Hafiz al-Asad.

But if Syria is capable of confronting the wave of terrorism that is expected [to rise] inside the country--and it has proved that in the past--how will it unilaterally face the consequences and conditions of the struggle with Israel?

The Soviet Union

The Syrian official says that Syria is not alone in confronting the strategic alliance between the United States and Israel. He adds that if the Syrian army had to face Israel's army, vital Soviet interests in the Arab region may compel the Soviet Union to abandon the conservatism that has characterized Soviet policy in the past. In clearer terms the official says that if Israel's military occupation of Lebanon is endangering Syria's security, replacing the American army with the Israeli army may endanger Soviet security. And here amidst the total absence of the Arabs, Syrian interests may coincide with Soviet interests in the Arab region in more than one central point.

The question is this: Will Damascus form a strategic alliance with Moscow to confront the strategic alliance between the United States and Israel? More than one Syrian official replies that Syria will do what has to be done at the appropriate time to preserve its interests. This may be the first time one hears a prominent Syrian official in Damascus say that Syria is satisfied with its relations with Moscow and that the direction in which these relations are proceeding is a sound one that ensures the interests of both countries.

ARAB CONSENSUS ON LEBANON URGED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 303, 11 Dec 82 p 12

[Article by Marawan al-Mahayini: "Syria Calls for Arab Agreement To Solve the Crisis in Lebanon"]

[Text] Syrian circles followed ongoing developments in Lebanon. These are the result of the continued presence of Israel's invasion troops on Lebanese territory which has caused negative effects and reactions to set in into the total situation in Lebanon. Syria had anticipated these effects and reactions and had warned fellow Arabs in Lebanon against them. Syria had asked the Lebanese brothers to come to an agreement and to thwart Israel's ambitions and plans. The Syrian media were highly sympathetic with the efforts that were being made to contain the dissension that Israeli invaders and their clients had staged in al-Shuf and in other areas of Mount Lebanon. The Syrian media affirmed Syria's continued unlimited support to the steps, measures and efforts of the Lebanese government to achieve advanced steps towards stability and peace and to ensure the withdrawal of Israel's invading forces. Meanwhile, Damascus continued its conservative watch over all communications, actions and proposals that were made in the region, and the Syrian media continued to emphasize the constant and ideological position of the necessity of ensuring the utmost effective Arab solidarity that can be ensured. Such solidarity would be based on confronting hostile plans and [engaging in] joint Arab action in accordance with the course recently proclaimed by President al-Asad.

This course may be summarized [as follows]: Syria's and the Arabs' principal preoccupation should be that of furthering joint Arab action in accordance with the resolutions of the Fes Summit; foiling attempts to make Arabs despair; and maintaining a vigilant opposition to attempts to draw the Arabs into positions of despair and surrender.

Syrian circles expect conditions in the area to remain unsettled and tense in the light of the Israeli leaders' continued intransigence, their thoughtless practices and their illegitimate insistence on the brazen conditions they set for withdrawing [their forces] from Lebanon. Israel's leaders are completely ignoring all attempts that are being made to search for peace or to approach the roads that would lead to it. These Syrian circles have expressed their satisfaction with declarations made by some fraternal Arab capitals about their attitudes toward the situation in Lebanon and the need to make a complete distinction

between the withdrawal of Israel's invading forces--a matter that is necessary and takes priority over any other matter--and the legitimate presence of the Arab deterrent forces, which can be dealt with in an Arab and bilateral framework. These circles indicated that these positions will reinforce the efforts of Lebanon's legitimate government to bring about the withdrawal of Israel's invading forces and to stand fast against attempts to impose any conditions as a price for this withdrawal, particularly conditions that would affect the vital national interests of Lebanon and the security interests of Syria.

8592

CSO: 4404/145

PROGRESS, OUTPUT OF HUMS FERTILIZER COMPLEX DESCRIBED

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 8 Dec 82 p 5

[Article by 'Ali Jammul: "The Greatest Fertilizer Manufacturing Complex in the Country, Belonging to the General Fertilizer Company"]

[Text] The Province of Hums is playing an important role in the economic field, on the industrial and agricultural levels. The fertilizer industry is considered one of the basic ones in this province, where the biggest fertilizer manufacturing complex in the country has been established with 3 billion Syrian pounds in capital. The General Fertilizer Company was established by virtue of a republican decree issued in 1975, after three fertilizer production plants were put under its jurisdiction -- the old fertilizer plant which started production in 1972, the triple superphosphate plant, and the ammonia urea plant.

A Tour in the Field

Before the field reconnaissance we took through the fertilizer company and its plants, we met with Eng Ahmad al-Turk, the general manager of the company, who said "The fertilizer company, for the first time in 10 years, is carrying out the entire stipulated production plan in the old 26 percent calentro fertilizer plant, whose production, up to the end of last November, came to 105,000 tons. It is expected that the output, by the end of this month, will reach 120,000 tons, thanks to the unremitting efforts the management, the party and union organizations and the workers have made, and that it will also produce additional quantities of phosphatic and ammonia fertilizer. This year we have managed to provide all requirements for various types of fertilizer for the agricultural season in the country, since the quantities delivered to Agricultural Cooperative Bank branches so far come to 250,000 tons and this, by the end of this month, will increase by 5 percent." The general manager pointed out that up to this year, from the time the programs for the productive plan were set out, various problems concerned with operation, shutdowns and the preparation of qualified technical staffs for this industry, especially in the old plant, which is to be considered the pioneer in fertilizer production, have been overcome. The general plan to produce various types of fertilizer to meet the needs of the agricultural season and start the first stage of the export program, especially as regards liquid ammonia and sulphuric acid, was an ambitious one; the plan programs may be summarized as the production of 300,000 tons of triple superphosphate fertilizer, 200,000 tons of urea, and 105,000 tons of 26 percent calentro fertilizer, which

have been achieved, and 30,000 tons of liquid ammonia, 30,000 tons of sulphuric acid and 2,000 tons of aluminum fluoride. These volumes account for about 70 percent of the total major productive capacity which will be present when the operation of the new plants is completed.

In spite of the force majeure circumstances which occurred this this year, especially in the case of the new plants, including the one producing phosphatic fertilizer, and the failure to procure the production ingredients at the right time, various quantities of different types of fertilizer were produced and a portion of them were exported.

Local and Substitute Production Ingredients

The General Fertilizer Company depends on locally produced oil products, 300 tons of naphtha, and 200,000 tons of fuel a year to manufacture its products. In the past, it suffered from problems in transporting these materials by tank truck, and therefore projects to construct for pipelines for these products, which would bring them from production sources have been carried out. In view of the fluctuations in naphtha prices on the world market, the expeditious exploitation of gases to substitute for the naphtha is an urgent, economic matter, since it is possible to base the operation of the new ammonia unit on gas instead of naphtha. The government is now intending to establish a project to bring gas from the oil fields to the fertilizer company.

The plant is pioneering in fertilizer production which has been constantly taking off and achieving quantum leaps this year.

It is important to describe the first calentro fertilizer plant in the company, and its early production, which started in 1972. It can provide an introduction to the complex problems of the chemical fertilizer industry. The second half of this year, all the plant's mechanical and operating problems were overcome, as a result of consolidated efforts and vigilance on the part of workers in keeping the production line going in this factory, which, before the end of this year, realized the entire stipulated production plan. It consists of three main units:

1. The nitric acid production unit, with a capacity of 250 tons a day.
2. The unit producing ammonia using naphtha, with a capacity of 150 tons a day.
3. The fertilizer production unit, with a capacity of 400 tons a day; 550 workers are working in this plant.

The First Fruits of an Advanced Fertilizer Industry and Development Projects

In view of the importance of the fertilizer industry and its direct effect on the agricultural sector, due to the compelling reasons we have discussed concerning this industry, as a consequence of the local availability of necessary raw materials, along with production ingredients, attention has been directed to the establishment of new development projects, and two big fertilizer plants, among the most important of their kind, have been erected.

These are:

The Urea Ammonia Plant

This is considered to be one of the most important modern fertilizer plants in the world. It started producing in the first quarter of this year, after technical tests were run on it and it reached contract capacities and specifications. This plant consists of three main units:

1. The ammonia unit, with a capacity of 1,000 tons a day.
2. The urea unit, with a capacity of 1,050 tons a day.
3. The water and steam productive services unit. There are 700 workers working in this plant, and, as Mr Ahmad al-Turk, the general manager of the company, points out, it is, from the standpoint of productive capacity, to be considered on a par with the biggest plants in the world. The process of operating the plant is now being carried out by Syrian Arab technical experts, without recourse to any foreign experts, especially now that the French firm Creuse Loire, which erected the plant, has finished satisfying the observations of the Syrian party regarding production and production specifications. The plant is totally ready to operate.

The Triple Superphosphate Plant

This plant is to be considered one of the important General Fertilizer Company projects. It specializes in the production of phosphatic fertilizers and has an annual productive capacity of 450,000 tons. There are 1,200 workers in it. Its technical commissions and production have been delayed because the Rumanian company performing the construction satisfied the observations that had made on not going beyond the producer's contract specifications and providing necessary replacement parts. The contract observations are being satisfied in accordance with a program that has been set forth, along with the performance of operating tests. The preliminary operating tests that were made last month achieved a significant balance in the gradual startup process and the fertilizer company is now waiting for the plant to be completed so that full operating tests can be carried out on the production units, preparatory to its technical commission, once the contract guarantees are met. This project consists of four main units:

1. The sulphuric acid unit, with an annual productive capacity of 560,000 tons.
2. The phosphoric acid unit, with an annual productive capacity of 165,000 tons.
3. The triple phosphate fertilizer production unit, with a capacity of 450,000 a year.
4. The aluminum fluoride production unit, with a capacity of 3,000 tons a year.

Other Projects Related to the Company

Eng Ahmad al-Turk, the director general, points out that there are a number of other projects related to the fertilizer company, among them ones bearing signi-

ficancy on the productive situation and ones contributing to the elimination of problems arising from fertilizer manufacture, especially mechanical problems, in addition to the project of removing the waste produced from residential conglomerations. These projects are:

A. The Transportation of Phosphogessum

A certain amount of industrial wastes known as "phosphogessum" are produced by the phosphatic fertilizer plant, one of the company's factories. This is estimated at about 1.2 million tons a year in volume. A realistic scientific study is now being carried out by the ministry and the company to find a suitable place in which to put it.

The al-Wa'r area, and another area to the east of the company, were chosen; then people's views changed, and efforts are now being made to arrive at a consensus on the site to be selected.

B. The Water Pollution Treatment Unit

In view of the large amount of water the fertilizer company's plants need in order to operate, which is estimated at about 4,000 cubic meters an hour, and in order to put this water back into al-Qatinah Lake in clean form, free of pollution, a unit has been constructed to treat the polluted water produced by the company's plants, with a capacity of 360 cubic meters an hour, which is the total volume of polluted water that is produced. This unit is about to be completed and will be put in operation next year.

C. The Steam Generating Complex

The fertilizer company, following earlier difficulties regarding a shortage of the steam needed for the plants, proceeded to procure and erect the steam generating complex. This went into operation a while ago, and it provides all this material to the fertilizer complex. The productive capacity of this complex is 210 tons of steam per hour. In this regard, the open cooling water system in the calentro fertilizer plant was transformed into a closed system once construction of the cooling towers was completed.

D. The Electric Generating Plant

It has also been decided to erect a special plant in the company to generate 230-66 kilovolts of electricity to supply the complex and help put an end to the problem of drops in voltage, which have an effect on the functioning of the fertilizer production units. This plant will also end the problem of fluctuating current, which shuts down the production lines.

The Tartus Bulk Plant Project

Technical studies and designs are now being made for the fertilizer bulk plant project in Tartus by a Danish international firm. It will finish the study and provide plans in a period of 9 months. The value of the contract to study the project is about 4 million Syrian pounds. This bulk plant will be set aside to store the company's output of various forms of fertilizer which is set aside for

export, and other facilities, cranes for loading ships and for packaging and facilities allocated for the export of liquid ammonia, will be attached to the bulk plant. The costs of this integrated project are estimated at about 150 million Syrian pounds.

What about the Project to Provide Substitute and Spare Parts?

Provision of the company's requirements for the necessary substitute parts stands as one of the priorities in operation and sustained production, since it is the backbone of activity in all the production and service departments. The company has managed to set out a future plan for 1983 in this regard which consists of an arrangement for parts and sets out lists of the company's requirements for substitute parts, introducing them into the computer so that the supply process can be met in advance by the main sources manufacturing the mechanical equipment. In addition to that, a large number of parts are being manufactured in the company's own workshop, saving large amounts of foreign currency.

The Labor Staff

There are 3,500 workers working in the General Fertilizer Company. This is a large staff when compared with those in other companies. It is being upgraded gradually, owing to the nature of the fertilizer industry, which is modern and complex at the same time. The company is now in the course of eliminating shortages in trained technical experts through a process of constant training and upgrading, and workers in the company benefit from production bonuses, along with nature of work compensation, free medical care and supplies of clothing, milk and eggs. The management, the party and union organization and other bodies are also making significant efforts to provide workers' housing close to worksites, in the form of a workers' housing complex in al-Wa'r, as well as studying earlier recommendations on the use of the model village, which will be the basis of future workers' housing projects.

In Conclusion

We can state that the fertilizer industry, with the reliance now being placed on it in order to develop the agricultural sector and support the domestic economy, must -- because the value of our products in the future will be in the range of 1 billion Syrian pounds a year, and the value of the products exported will be estimated at about 300 million Syrian pounds -- be constantly given the necessary support so that one may raise the rate of production and reduce the various problems, the most important of which are related to primary raw materials, the need to supply those at the right time, saving us many of the burdens of importing these products, as well as hard currency, and efforts to provide additional accessories which are supplementary to production.

11887

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PLANS FOR ORGANIZING 20-MILLION-MAN ARMY OUTLINED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 1 Dec 82 p 5

[Interview with Hojjat ol-Eslam Salek, chief of the Mobilization of the Oppressed; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] The week of the Mobilization of the Oppressed, the week of the struggle and combat against the world oppressor, the week of solidarity and intercession of the oppressed masses against the aggressive enemy have been observed.

During the mobilization work the heroid members of the Mobilization Organization once again manifested their valiant presence in campaign scenes and visited the cemetery of the martyrs. They vociferously clamored for unity against world oppression and its lackeys. The 20-million-man army of the oppressed, being the eternal friends and companions of the Islamic revolution, raised the banners of unity and demonstrated the steady will of the oppressed toward the total and final elimination of world oppression and the neutralization of the conspiracies of the great satan.

Conditions for Organizing the 20-Million-Man Army

Regarding the conditions for organizing the 20-million-man army in 1979, Hojjat ol-Eslam Salek, chief of the Mobilization of the Oppressed, explained in an interview with KEYHAN's correspondent: "The decree for organizing the 20-million-man army was issued by the imam under the dire prevailing circumstances. It was when the ringleaders of subversion were threatening the Islamic revolution by various intrigues and conspiracies. At that time the nest of espionage was occupied, and we were faced with severe economic sanctions. The blocking of our currency reserves plus the treachery of the United States and the CIA were some of the prevailing problems. The futile activities of small groups inside the country further threatened our Islamic revolution. It was under such conditions that the imam issued the decree to organize the 20-million-man army because it was urgent for the revolution to use the forces of the oppressed for the revolution."

Regarding the role of the 20-million-man army, the chief of the Mobilization of the oppressed added: "The more the 20-million-man army expands, the more its depth and existence become known to everyone. Yet one should bear in mind

"that the biggest army of the world may possibly comprise 3 million men, but this army of 20 million, which was a great innovation initiated by the imam, will remain active in times of war and peace. The fundamentals of mobilization and establishment of the 20-million-man army have been ratified by the Majlis, and the duties assigned for the mobilization is applicable both in times of war and peace. With the presence of all our nation in the arena, with the help of God, we should proceed in the direction pointed out by the founders of Islam. Our houses should be our trenches, and our drawers should be the armory of our organization. We should constantly undertake military training and learn through military organizations how to use arms and how to defend Islam."

According to Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani (the speaker of the Majlis), if the enemy intends to occupy the country and if it enters one of our streets having 20 houses, we should be so prepared that we are aiming guns at the enemy from every window.

The Role of Mobilization During War

The Mobilization of the Oppressed has broken all the norms of classical warfare. This organization takes its strength from the most devout and valiant offspring of this land, who, in defending Islam and the revolution, fight without heavy armament or the tactics of classical warfare. This is why we see that a youth 13 years old ties a grenade to his waist, gallantly attacks deep into the enemy lines and destroys a tank of the lackeys of Saddam. This extreme devotion and gallantry cannot be weighed by any standards of the world. Hojjat ol-Eslam Salek spoke about the function of the mobilization in attaining victories in an imposed war: "With meager possibilities and little training our mobilization brothers have accomplished unprecedented epic feats at the front. These brothers have upset the present norms of warfare in such a way that today the world should revise its system of warfare. Our mobilization and corps brothers and the militia, along with their military brothers, have introduced new norms, techniques and tactics in warfare that have abolished the classical and conventional war. It is due to this new spirit that an 18-year-old son of the nation combats a tank with light arms, and when the enemy artillery shells our forces from long distance, our forces manage to encircle them and easily force them to surrender. We should bear in mind that these standards are new and the role of mobilization in war is quite obvious. Recent victories are the result of the guidance from the guard corps, the armed forces and the action from our mobilization brothers, the militia, the tribes and our villagers. In other words, victories became ours because of two concurrent events: first, the fundamental change in warfare; second, the popularization of the war. During the reign of liberalism in our country, the war retained the classical form and war operations were supported by the cursed Bani-Sadr, which not only did not result in victory but also brought treason and defeat. Since the popular forces and the hezbollahis have taken charge of the war, we have achieved great victories.

Since the establishment of the Mobilization of the Oppressed, a large number of people have received military training and have been sent to the front. In this regard Hojjat ol-Eslam said: "From the establishment of the Mobilization

"of the Oppressed until now, more than 2.5 million people have acquired military training, which is a real feat." He reiterated that everyone should receive military training. It is precisely in this regard that the imam has also remarked: "If we have 20 million youth, it means that we should have 20 million riflemen." In the past year noteworthy measures have been taken in training mobilization members despite the shortage of instructors. Twenty-eight courses for the training of instructors in the ideological, military and political fields were trained, who trained more than 200,000 persons in various classes during the first phase. In the second phase more than 50,000 persons have undergone training. Cultural programs have also been conducted during the past year, and ideological contests have been staged in six phases in which more than 10,000 persons have participated. In this connection, extensive propaganda activities have been conducted by publishing posters, pamphlets and literature. A commemorative book of the martyrs with a circulation of 27,000 has been published, and a lot of training books, over 89,500 volumes, have been supplied to our mobilization brothers.

12283

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MASS TERRORISM SEEN BACKFIRING ON MULLAH RULE

Torture in Prisons Described

Vienna PROFIL in German 17 Jan 83 pp 38-39

[Unattributed article: "Khomeyni's Hell"]

[Text] These are bad times for the old man from Qum. In Duesseldorf, Sadegh Tabatabai, Khomeyni's top arms buyer and brother-in-law of his son Ahmed, was caught smuggling opium. Mojahedin leader Masoud Radjavi, in exile in Paris, addressed a letter to the UN secretary-general calling on him to take action against the "major criminals and human rights violators" in Tehran. "Since 20 June 1981, the Khomeyni regime has executed more than 25,000 persons," Radjavi, the leader of the "National Resistance Council," wrote. "There are more than 60,000 political prisoners."

In London, "Amnesty International" made public a report on Iran which offered documentary evidence on the sufferings of these prisoners in the form of eyewitness testimony. "Those held in Iranian jails frequently do not know why they were arrested," the report states. "They might have been seized as bystanders at the site of some bombing attack or because they were found reading a political leaflet; because they criticized the regime in a telephone conversation that was overheard; because their neighbor denounced them to the police or because they really were active in an opposition group."

The overcrowded prisons are being enlarged; the erstwhile SAVAK torture chambers are continuing to operate; it is even said that prisoners are now being held in the former U.S. embassy.

Some very few of them who were released and managed to flee the country are telling of weeks of captivity with their eyes blindfolded, of beatings even of women and children and of sham executions designed to make the victims more cooperative. All of it is being supervised by religious judges who play the part of dedicated protectors of the revolution and make those released after their wrongful detention vow to keep silent—or else they will be shot.

Salehabad prison, located on an abandoned dairy farm between Tehran and Qum, is considered one of the worst of the torture centers. It is said that 2,000 prisoners are being held there at present most of whom are suspected of belonging to the mojahedin. In the cow barns of Salehabad—which is officially called a rehabilitation center for drug addicts—preference is given to beating the "truth" out of the prisoners.

More sophisticated methods of torture are being applied in the former SAVAK Komiteh prison in Tehran. The circular structure of the prison forces all the prisoners constantly to listen to the cries of anguish of those undergoing torture.

In the main prison of Evin in Tehran, gunfire can be heard day and night. Long-time prisoners spend their time counting the "coups de grace" fired singly. In this manner, they count 30 to 60 executions in the space of a single day. Sometimes—in the aftermath of a bombing, for example—there will be one hundred or more. The only warning prior to the imminent execution is an order to attend to the last purification rites. Many of those condemned to death then desperately try to get messages to their relatives out of the washrooms.

It is said that 40 children between the ages of one and twelve are presently being held in the women's section of Evin prison. When their mothers are whipped the children have to watch.

Of the approximately 15,000 prisoners at Evin, those being held in block 325 are probably best off. These are primarily intellectuals—physicians, professors, merchants—who in some cases can buy their way to freedom by paying huge sums of money. Nobody knows whether the guards account or turn over these cash payments.

The Qasr prison in Tehran—originally designed to hold 1,500 petty criminals—now holds 6,000 prisoners. In most blocks, there is only one toilet for every 300 prisoners. The inmates call Qasr "Khomeyni's hell." Rather than be taken there a second time, one escaped eyewitness said, he would have committed suicide.

"The rights of which people are being defended?" is the question asked by Khomeyni's emissaries who flood the Western media with testimony designed to make their case. In Iran, they say, "the human rights only of those persons are in danger who attack an entire people with machine pistols, hand grenades and explosives; who set fire to crowded buses; who fire machinegun salvos into crowds; who shoot revolutionary guards in the back; who blow up elected officials..."

The mojahedin, they say, are no more justified in saying that only 5 percent of the population stand behind the government than the RAF in the FRG or the Red Brigades in Italy could.

The truth, they say, is that the revolutionary government enjoys "the unconditional support of the entire population." The army and the bulk of the revolutionary guards are fighting on the front against Iraq. The remainder of the guards is not even equal to one-tenth of the strength of the Shah's army and police contingents. "Who then," they inquire, "is keeping the 95 percent from chasing out those supposedly hated 5 percent? After all, they also chased out the Shah, his army and a world power like the United States."

Countering reports by Iranian refugees who tell of the desolate state of the economy, of factories standing idle and of the oil production which can only be sold at dumping prices, Khomeyni's diplomats like to speak of a veritable economic miracle. "In spite of the boycott and the war and in spite of terrorist saboteurs, Iran has been able to increase both oil and industrial production. Currency reserves are greater than they were at the start of the war. They are increasing at the rate of about \$ 1 billion in hard currency each month."

But even the supreme ayatollah apparently no longer lends credence to such exuberant statements. According to the French magazine L'EXPRESS, Khomeyni called on Iranian refugees to return home in a sermon in late December—even promising to return their property to such emigrants who had been on good terms with the old regime.

A few days earlier, he is reported to have announced an 8-point program which his prime minister, Hossein Musavi, termed an "historic turning point." The program promised that there would be no more indiscriminate arrests and seizures. Torture, unjustified immunity and wiretapping would be outlawed. By announcing these changes, L'EXPRESS believes, Khomeyni is trying to regain the favor of the bazaar merchants and the middle class

LE FIGARO, another Paris journal, gave room to entirely different expectations voiced by the most prominent Iranian exile. Reza Pahlevi, the 22 year-old son of the former Shah, predicted the early collapse of the "mullah-crazy." Then he himself would take care of the "Islamic deviationists" and return to Tehran at the head of a constitutional monarchy.

Refugees Report to Amnesty International

Vienna PROFIL in German 17 Jan 83 p 39

[Text] Salehabad—the Dairy Farm

"When I arrived there blindfolded, I was pushed into a stall with concrete walls. The floor was covered with straw. There were five of us in a stall designed to hold one cow. There was no toilet; and we had to urinate on the floor. Sometimes, we were led—or rather chased—to the toilet outside. We slept almost on top of one another, without any sort of bedding. There were no windows and the only light we had came through a grille near the ceiling. ...During many days and every night, we could hear noise and screaming out-

side. Twice, we could hear shots. After a week, the guards led me into the yard for interrogation. 'Go on, talk!' one of them said to me. I asked where the court was and why I was being held. They hit me in the face and on my head for that. The guard said it would be wiser to admit to my left-wing activities. When I said I had not committed any, I was beaten once again. In the next night, they forced me to strip from the hips down and then ordered me to run around the yard. One of the guards said: 'Maybe this will loosen your tongue.' They hit me on the buttocks and genitals with a whip. Other men came and hit me in the same way with a rubber hose. I was beaten like this for about an hour. I screamed that I knew nothing and that I had been arrested by mistake."

Komiteh--the Torture Chamber

"The Komiteh building has four stories--each of them ringed by a circular balcony. The guards call the prison 'the chicken coop'--perhaps because many of us had to crouch on the balcony for days. There are 1,000 to 1,500 prisoners at Komiteh and it is terribly overcrowded. The prison was designed to hold about 500. When they bring you in, they leave you blindfolded on one of the balconies. There is hardly any room to sit; much less to lie down. The cells behind us were also all full. You stay blindfolded for days and no one tells you what will happen. If you ask the guards a question, they answer by beating and kicking you. During the night, the guards drag prisoners out of their cells through the crowds on the balconies. Those in the cells are said to be as good as dead and that they are being tortured to death. Sometimes they did not come back. Maybe they were taken somewhere else or maybe they died. Every night, people were tortured until early morning--either in the yard or in adjacent rooms. Their screams were horrible to hear. We who were on the balconies talked to those inside the cells in a whisper. Some of them gave us messages to their families hoping we might be able to pass them on. Some of these prisoners were branded with irons and others said they were given electroshocks. Most often, we heard of naked men who were used as 'footballs' down on some other level. Six or seven guards had stripped them and then pushed them around and kicked and beat them. Then they sat them down on a chair, held their head back and interrogated them."

Evin--Block 4

"The worst section at Evin is known as Block 4. It consists of two 3-story buildings and 80 percent of the inmates are thought to be high-ranking members of the mojahedin. The other 20 percent are so-called difficult cases. In Block 4, there is a special religious prosecutor who has any prisoner who does not cooperate whipped...During the whippings, the prisoners are held or tied down. Most of those in Block 4 have also been beaten in the area of the genitals. Older prisoners have said they believe that three of ten men beaten in this manner have died."

9478

CSO: 4620/13

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORTS ON 'HORRORS OF IRAN'S PRISONS'

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 104, 13 Jan 83 pp 7-10

[Text] Amnesty International shortly before Christmas published a spine-chilling report on the treatment of prisoners in jails in Iran. It was based on testimony taken from released prisoners and prisoners' relatives belonging to various political groups and including some people who have not been involved in political activity.

The report was not written by Amnesty but the organisation said the information in it was consistent with its knowledge of the situation in Iran today. It published the extracts, it said, because it believes they provide an accurate account of the torture and ill-treatment of prisoners in Iran at the present time. The worst cases of torture it said are now practiced at the Salehabad dairy farm near Qom, and a former Savak jail in Tehran. Both sites are well away from the public eye, Amnesty says, and, in the case of Salehabad, guards had let it be known in the area that the farm was a centre for treatment of drug addicts to offset any curiosity on the part of people in the area.

We print these extracts from the Amnesty-sponsored report so that the details, to which the ordinary press has little space to allocate, can be read by westerners and especially by non-Iranian Muslims whose shameful silence in the face of the Khomeini regime's inhumanity in the name of Islam has been as much a discredit to the name of their religion as the crimes themselves.

First Prisoner at Salehabad

"I was taken first to Evin Jail and from there to Salehabad without any explanation. When I arrived, blindfolded, I was pushed into a cow-pen with concrete walls and a mud floor covered with straw. There were five of us in a pen that would fit one cow. There was no toilet and we had to urinate on the floor. Sometimes we were led - or herded would be better - outside where there was a toilet. We slept almost on top of one another, without any bedding. There were no windows and the only light was from an open grid up near the ceiling. I was kept like this for a week. The others were also new arrivals. During some of the days, and every night, we would hear noises outside and screaming and crying.

"It was difficult to tell what was happening. On two occasions we heard shooting. After a week, the guards ordered me out for questioning. I was taken out into the yard. One of the guards said "O.K. start talking." I asked where the court was and what I was being held for. I was punched in the face and hit over the head. The same guard said it would be more sensible for me to admit my leftist activity. I was hit around the face and head again when I said I had none. I was thrown back into the cow pen. The next night, about midnight, I was ordered out into the yard. I was made to strip from the waist down. Then they ordered me to run around the yard. One of the guards said, "Maybe this will loosen your tongue."

"He said, "You don't look like much of a man to me, maybe we should give you something else". Others inside had told me such things really did happen there. I had no doubt that this guard would have engaged in sexual activity if other guards with him had not opposed it. Two of them, one of whom was holding the hosepipe, told him to shut up and "observe Islamic principles." When I think of it now, such advice from a man engaged in torture was hilarious. After such sessions I was left alone for six weeks. I was taken several times to answer questions before a clergyman in a court outside. He told me to confess and thus avoid more suffering. He said that they had tape recordings and photos of my Mojahedin activity. The clergyman warned, "My brothers here can make you talk." He was very annoyed when I told him he should be ashamed before God to call such men brothers.

"Three of my cell mates said they had received electric shocks to make them talk. One said he had received repeated shocks from an open wire placed on his teeth. After two months at Salehabad, I was suddenly taken back to Evin. I have suffered internal damage from the treatment I received. I don't think it's right to talk of it, others have suffered much worse. Evin authorities finally let me go when a religious judge said there was insufficient evidence to hold me. I personally think they let me go because they had no room for others being brought in. Evin is a palace compared to Salehabad. Most of those I talked to at Salehabad said it was specially created to allow torture which could not be undertaken at Evin. They also said the guards were specially chosen. I can believe that. Evin guards may be bastards but some of them are human. I was told that Salehabad had been opened as a jail four months ago with the idea of extracting more speedy confessions. Those who had been there for longer than me, said the floor previously had been mud covered with straw. They said the smell of human excrement was so great that guards had refused to work inside and that was why it had been cemented and two toilets had been provided."

"There is no treatment. Occasionally, if they feel someone is cooperating, a guard will bring in some drugs. That's all..."

And in Evin Jail

"Night and day you can hear the sound of gunfire in Evin. If it's continuous firing then you know it could be mock executions. But if you hear lone shotgun fire at the end you know it is a real execution. Those inside sit and count lone shots. From them you can estimate how many have been killed.

Generally, between 30-60 shots can be counted in a day. But there is no regular pattern. For example, after the September bomb blast you could count 100 or more such shots in 24 hours. The guards take people off for execution at any time of the day or night. The only warning to many of those due for execution is a curt order from a guard to observe the final washing rights. Many about to be executed give last, frantic messages to their loved ones to other inmates in the washroom. It's awful facing such people. What can you say? And how do you know the same won't happen to you? You feel totally helpless.

"The second most inhuman block in Evin is the Zendan-e Zanan (Women's Prison). Many of the younger women held there were arrested with their children. There are around 40 children, aged from one to 12. The children are kept because they are an asset to the prison authority for gaining confessions. When the mother is lashed, the child is made to watch. One such mother screamed that she was ready to confess when she could no longer stand the agony of her three year old daughter being made to watch in the grip of two guards. Often the guards slap the children about at the same time as the lashing, probably to let the mother know they could also be lashed. Anyone who has seen the terror of such children cannot easily forget it. A mother who could stand it, would herself be described as inhuman.

"Many new arrivals are thrown into the so-called 'isolation' cells. They were made for one man but today, due to lack of space, sometimes there are 20 people inside. You are just shoved in and the door is bolted. There is no window and the door is only opened once a day to allow use of an outside toilet. Food is thrown in through a hatch in the door. If you complain, the door remains shut for days and you have no toilet. A group who voted to voice a joint complaint in one cell found themselves locked in for two weeks...

"There are three main sections in Evin. The worst is known as Band-e Chahar (Block Four). It has two, three storey buildings and some 80 per cent of its inmates are believed to be high ranking members of the Mojahedin. The other 20 per cent are so-called difficult cases. In Block Four there is a special religious judge who deals out "Islamic" thrashing sentences to most who won't cooperate at interrogation sessions. Technically, no one can argue against the Islamic right to lash sinners. The clergyman and those working in his section, appear to really believe that what they are doing is Islamically correct. Yet Islam has never outlined thrashings like this, covering all parts of the body, with the greatest of force and, often repeated day after day. The prisoners are held or tied down while the thrashing with a whip takes place. Most of those in Block Four are hit repeatedly across the testicle area. Old inmates in Block Four, say that they estimate three out of ten men, repeatedly beaten in this manner, have died. They find they are unable to urinate and after days of trying unsuccessfully, their urea count rises. If they are not treated, they die. Some of the cell mates of Block Four have learned how to "induce urine" and have hidden medical instruments to help their fellow prisoners."

At the Komiteh Prison in Tehran

"There are four storeys in the Komiteh building, each ringed by a circular balcony. The guards call the prison the "Hen House", probably because many of

us have to squat for days on end on the balconies. There are around 1,000-1,500 people in the Komiteh and it is horribly overcrowded. The building was originally intended for 500 or so. When you are taken there, you are left blindfolded for days. No one will tell you what your fate is. Questions from the guards on this subject are answered with kicks and blows.

"At night, the guards drag people in and out of the cells through the midst of the balcony people. It is said that those inside such cells are "dead men" and that their fate is to be tortured to death. Sometimes those they took out did not come back. They could have been taken elsewhere, or they could have died. No one can say. Every night until the early morning hours, people were tortured, either in the open courtyard or in rooms off of it. The screams were terrible. On the balconies we whispered to those inside the cells. Some gave us messages for their families in the hope word would be got out. Some of the cell captives had been burned with irons, others said they had received electric shocks.

"Most frequently we picked up information of naked men being "played football with" in a lower room. They said six or seven guards stripped them and then shoved the victim from one to the other kicking and hitting him. Then they would sit the victim on a chair, hold his head back and ask questions. Those who underwent this treatment said they didn't know any longer what they had answered as they had been totally confused at that time. Many worried that they might have revealed useful information. Many times balcony people taken into the courtyard for whippings with wire cable kept on shouting obscenities against the regime. They often kept on shouting until they were beaten silent.

"They didn't return for hours. Some said they had been taken into a room and "knee punched" in the testicles by a guard who jeered, "Why don't you shout any more?" as he increased the blows. Many of the people in the cells had difficulty walking and were literally dragged past us. There is a court room off the yard with a man known as "Haji Agha" in charge. There is no trial as such, he just looks at your file, asks a few questions and then orders the guards to commence their work. That means, start the torture process. Usually this means having you run around wth yard while they beat the lower half of your body with pipe or cables. There is a small pool in the yard where they also dunk your head under and hold it there by force until your lungs swell and you feel you are drowning. Then they pull you out and tell you to run again. Most of the Komieith inmates have some kinds of wounds."

In Qasr Prison in Tehran

"Qasr cannot be described as a prison but as something less than a stable. There are 6,000 people packed into space originally planned for 1,500. There are many people inside who have been waiting months for some official to tell them when they might be tried. There were several who had been waiting two years. It seems to be a practice to throw people into Qasr and leave them there to await a later trial. The courts are so busy, or so Qasr authorities claim, that you could wait months. Health conditions are not observed at all in Qasr. There were 28 people in an eight meter room. Most blocks have 300

people, or more, using one toilet. One someone asked a guard to send someone in, or the cleaning utensils, to clean a crowded cell in which a sick inhabitant had vomited all over the floor. The guard replied: "This is a prison, not a hotel."

"There is a rule in Qasr that for 24 hours no new arrival be given food or water. The second day, the food comes, full of grease and often with cockroaches floating in it. I am told the guards throw dead beetles in for fun. Those inside call Qasr "Khomeini's Hell". Few outside can believe what it is like. It's enough to say that if you found you were to be sent back a second time you would, quite seriously, think of committing suicide.

"Some of the people inside have been held without any trial on the most ridiculous charges. One was fined 500,000 Rials for selling 10 packets of washing powder on the black market. He had no money to pay the fine. He said that if he had been well off, he would not have sold ten packets of washing powder in the first place. Another sandwich shop owner was fined for selling sausage sandwiches for 10 Rials more than the normal price. He was fined two million Rials and is still inside because he doesn't have such money.

"Those who have been in Qasr for four years or so remember when Ayatollah Khalkhali had control of the jail. They related that he used to stage group executions late at night. Once he gave a list with twelve names but only eleven of the people could be found. He told the guards with him to go inside and "choose" another man to make up the number."

CSO: 4600/227

IRAN

BAKHTIAR'S APPEAL TO EUROPEAN SOCIALISTS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 104, 13 Jan 83 p 10

[Text] Shahpour Bakhtiar, leader of the National Movement of Iranian Resistance, has called on socialist governments of Europe to condemn the Khomeini regime for its inhuman behaviour.

In an interview with Grafia, the organ of the labour unions of Sweden's ruling Social Democratic Party, Bakhtiar has condemned the mercenary attitude of some countries with socialist governments towards their relations with Iran.

"I witness the fact that countries like Sweden, Austria and France maintain their relations with the regime in Tehran because for them trading advantages come first," Bakhtiar said of countries where his fellow socialists are in power.

"I would like to see governments all over the world expressing their views on what goes on in Tehran."

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HOPES INSIDE IRAN, CONFUSION AMONG EXILES AS 'LIBERALIZATION' CONTINUES

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 104, 13 Jan 83 pp 1-3

[Text] Three weeks after Ayatollah Khomeyni gave notice that the Islamic revolution had reached the stage for some liberalisation there was still widespread optimism over the future among much of the middle and upper class sections of the population in Tehran this week.

There had indeed been many further announcements and even actions which had given some justification to the new hope that has been sweeping the capital and other large cities in Iran, where the harassed business and professional classes have been waiting pessimistically for some turn of the tide of revolutionary disruption. One important step was the appointment of Seyed Jaafar Karimi, a close associate of Khomeini, to control Islamic courts, related organisations and the prosecutors who run them. By the beginning of this week eight prosecutors had been changed, three of them significant. These were in crucial places like Tabriz, where resistance to the regime has been strongest in recent months, Qom and Bandar Abbas.

A number of other officials were reported to have been arrested or dismissed and many rumours were flying around of more changes. A deputy minister of labour and a deputy mayor of Tehran were among heads to roll.

In his short letter appointing Karimi, Khomeini wrote: "I expect from you a total integrity towards Islamic principles. Nobody responsible for committing any degree of injustice towards others, whoever he may be or whatever the level of the crime he may have committed, even if it be your own brother or best friend, must be punished according to the law (of Islam); and whoever has suffered any degree of injustice, even your own enemy, must be given fair recompense. I am sure you are that kind of man."

Further evidence of Khomeini's intention to try to implement his new measures was the appointment early this week of Hojjatoleslam Yusef Sane'i, a member of the Council of Guardians and, like Karimi, who studied under Khomeini at both Qom and Najaf, a really trusted supporter of the ayatollah, to be state prosecutor in succession to Ayatollah Rabbani-Amlashi. The latter had been too soft in trying to exercise the control Khomeini demanded over the courts and prosecutors up and down the country and resigned because of "fatigue." Sanei is said to be one of the toughest and most effective of the administrating

mullahs. He has also been associated with resistance on the Council of Guardians to some of the more extreme measures proposed by Majlis members.

Among the numerous orders given to back up the new liberalisation was the disbandment of the purging committees which decided on the suitability and Islamic qualifications of employees of the various offices and institutions. Khomeini later, however, said he had not intended the committees should be done away with, but that only those members who were doing really constructive work should be retained and unIslamic practices or unimportant work should be dispensed with. The confiscation of questionnaires and many books which have been produced by mullahs and sold to those wanting guidance on how to qualify as "Islamic" has also been ordered. Many of these latter had been sold to students wanting to enrol in universities due to start up again next month.

But there were signs during the past two weeks that Khomeini's new edicts were causing grave disquiet among rank and file supporters of the regime, and among the revolutionary institutions. Khomeini, who is said to have been working long days, has been kept busy receiving delegations. On one occasion he lectured a group of revolutionary guards of the need to appreciate the efforts of the active mullahs engaged in practical work and the courage and perspicacity they showed in facing many "troubles". It also became clear that there was some disaffection among the clergy and that mullahs to lead Friday prayers are now becoming harder to find. Khomeini even went so far one day to state that he did not understand why he was receiving reports that some people were creating an "atmosphere" which could influence the carrying out of the eight points he had announced in his initial liberalisation speech. He could only have been referring to officials. "My order is an order that should be carried out", he said sternly.

Exiles around the world took some comfort from the new optimism among their relatives or friends in Tehran who told them they should prepare to return home. The fact that Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani was actually quoted on radio as saying that the Americans should begin to behave like human beings and should supply Iran with goods it needed (possibly a request for arms) and then Iran could sell to them in return (possibly a reference to oil) was seen as a positive sign that more conservative, pro-western elements might be gaining the advantage over the radicals. Growing and more open criticism of the Soviet Union by officials and in the press added to this impression. The fact that the Soviet Union had begun to supply big quantities of arms to Iraq again was yet another sign that Tehran and Moscow were becoming more distant and were finding they had less and less in common. Although the Soviets had been aware of growing irritation with them on various issues, particularly Afghanistan, it had not been expected that the mullahs would allow recent Afghan refugee demonstrators in Tehran to march to the Soviet embassy and burn the flag. The incident came as a shock and produced a vehemently-worded protest from Moscow.

The influence of Khomeini's son Ahmad--Shahpoor (Prince) Ahmad as he's referred to by many Iranians--is seen as important in recent moves. Former premier Mahdavi Kani and Rafsanjani are said to have convinced him that the new effort should be made at the present time. Observers have seen significance in the

fact that Khomeini's first speech could also have been seen as an admission that so many abuses of civil rights had been going on since the revolution. This, it was felt, could be used as a weapon to arrest many of the more unpopular figures like Evin prosecutor Lajevardi, even Ayatollah Khalkhali, and restore confidence in the regime as well as get rid of some of the enemies of the predominating clique of the moment.

Confiscation Paradox

While Khomeini had railed against illegal confiscations his regime introduced the threat of legal ones against the property of exiles who do not return to claim it and present themselves at the office of the public prosecutor. This was seen as not only an attempt to pressure many people to return, backing up the blandishments of recent weeks directed particularly to physicians and other professional groups, but also a move to try to exclude some of the emigres from returning at all.

The sequence of events has posed a real dilemma for the exiles. While they were tempted by the opportunity to return there was a yet no clear evidence that the government has any better chance to control the komitehs, hezbollahis or revolutionary guards than on previous occasions when it has attempted the task. The fact that by the regime's own figures 49 people have been executed since the first Khomeini speech on liberalisation can hardly be seen as an encouragement to return.

Officials have also warned that nobody must misunderstand that the liberalisation is undertaken from a position of anything but strength. It should be imagined that it was the result of the same kind of weakness as that of the Shah. Enemies of Islam would continue to meet with exemplary justice and the fight against the Mojahedin and its allies would be conducted with even more vigour. Spokesmen announced the discovery of another 40 "safe houses" of counter-revolutionaries in different parts of the country and of deaths and arrests resulting from raids on them.

Iranian observers seemed divided on whether Khomeini and his henchmen actually feel strong enough to make the announced concessions without jeopardising the regime, hoping through this to obtain more cooperation and collaboration from the public; or whether they are acting from fear that the public may be nearing explosion point. "We have heard these things before and nothing has happened so we must just wait and see if this time it is different", was a typical comment.

Continuation of the war seemed in no doubt, judging from the announcements of Khomeini and officials telling military and medical personnel to prepare themselves for the final battle. Arms were said to be coming into Iran in a steady stream, though the presence of so many dealers and agents in the Iranian capital suggests they feel there is a still bigger market to be exploited yet.

RAJAVI-TARIQ AZIZ MEETING CAUSES A STIR AMONG IRANIANS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 104, 13 Jan 83 pp 3-4

[Text] Has Mojahedin-e-Khalq leader Massoud Rajavi taken a fatal gamble in publicising his meeting with Iraqi deputy premier Tariq Aziz in Paris last Sunday--or will his decision come to be seen by Iranians as a courageous bid to make his compatriots appreciate the absurdity of continuing the suicidal war between the two countries?

These were the questions being asked this week after the announcement about the meeting between the two men "to discuss ways and means of ending the Irano-Iraq war". The answer most Iranians came up with was that the meeting would be the "kiss of death" for the young leftist leader.

As at the time of the Iraqi invasion, the first even since the revolution to provide some hope of Khomeini being toppled, Iranians driven out of their homes by the mullahs still appeared to opt for patriotism rather than a hard-headed approach to their predicament. They preferred to ignore a possibly more positive side to the meeting between the two men which could be to see if the Mojahedin could help do anything to try to bring the disastrous war to an end, and began to whip up a fierce campaign to destroy any remaining credibility of Rajavi as a leader.

Within hours of the news of the meeting being released several people calling themselves student supporters of the Mojahedin telephoned a Paris radio station which broadcasts some programmes in Persian to denounce the meeting. They announced their resignations from the organisation, saying the meeting "confirmed rumours that Saddam Hussain was giving large sums to Rajavi." Leftist sources in Paris suggested that these students were, in fact, supporters of other groupswishing to embarrass Rajavi. But there was no doubt that rank and file Mojahedin supporters were concerned at the idea that their leader was willing to talk to the Iraqis, and was willing to publicise the fact and expose himself to the inevitable rumours that the Iraqis were financing him.

The situation was not helped by an interview in Le Monde in which Tariq Aziz claimed his country maintained close links with practically all the opposition groups, including the Mojahedin, and helped them in different financial and military ways. In a joint Rajavi-Aziz statement after their meeting this

reference in Le Monde was denied. Later Rajavi told the leftist Paris daily Liberation that there had been a "misunderstanding" about what had been said to Le Monde.

According to Liberation, which has close ties with the Mojahedin, Tariq Aziz had described Rajavi as a "dear friend, whom I would be delighted to see as Iran's future prime minister or even president." The last reference would not please his National Council of Resistance colleague Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, who is rumoured to have been against the meeting, or at least against publicly announcing it.

Western observers were less surprised by the Rajavi-Aziz announcement than Iranians were. It was pointed out that the two men had a mutual interest in the downfall of Khomeini and his regime, an interest shared by many other Iranians but which the latter were too politically naive to recognise.

"The Iranian exiles' attitude towards the Iraqis is inexplicable to westerners, who respect those Germans who fought against Hitler rather than those who remained passive while he slaughtered their liberal and Jewish compatriots," one analyst commented. "Bakhtiar and Oveissi made that fatal mistake in 1980 when Iraq invaded Iran. Had they had the courage and political foresight to accompany the Iraqis into Iran and set up their flag in the mountains of the south they could have gathered the resistance around them. The Islamic republic might well have crumbled and the slaughter that has ensued may never have taken place. After all, it is Khomeini and the mullahs who have been the enemies of the exiles, not the Iraqis. Liberal Germans had no qualms about siding with the allies; they did not say we are Germans first so must fight for Hitler no matter what he does. The Iranians who have suffered from Khomeini seem prepared to argue for Khomeini even if they know he might chop off their heads if they go home again."

The only support heard for Rajavi this week has come from the Association for the Defence of Iranian Women's Rights, an organisation based in Paris. They merely hailed Rajavi's discussions with Aziz as "a courageous attempt to seek an end to the bloody war between Iran and Iraq". The association has appealed for world support to try to bring an end to the war.

Iranian observers point out that though westerners may think the Iranian attitude to Iraq's invasion of their country in a bid to destroy their enemy (Khomeini) is strange "it is nevertheless the attitude which will be taken by nearly every Iranian." He added: "Rajavi's mistake may be that he has developed an attack of the disease of 'Bani-Sadritis'--an advanced state of egosim that makes a man feel he is the greatest thing that hit Iran, or perhaps even the universe. As a result he may have lost sight of how his compatriots think."

An Iranian journalist in Paris backed up the view that Rajavi may have developed an exaggerated sense of his own importance. He pointed out that Rajavi had claimed that his meeting with Aziz was "a turning point on the regional and the world level."

The newsman added: "This comes from a man whose support inside Iran, from accounts given even by his former supporters, has faded drastically. Mojahedin student sympathisers are trying to extract more money in payment for their newspapers, claiming that the organisation no longer has money and that it is needed to send into Iran. If that is the case it demonstrates clearly that it enjoys no more support inside the country or people would give it funds. It may well be that the organisation is looking for backing wherever it can find it."

The fact that Tariq Aziz came to Paris fresh from a trip to Moscow has also been seen as significant by some observers. Iraq has been forced to treat with the Soviets to obtain new arms, it is said, in the light of the failure of Saudi Arabia and its other Arab backers to continue their financial support. One of the propositions put to the Iraqis in return for Soviet help may have been a bid to draw the Mojahedin closer to the pro-Soviet left in a bid to build up a counterweight against the tendency to closer links between Tehran and the West, some people feel.

"If Rajavi sees the odds piling up against him in Iran he may well be driven into the arms of the Soviets as a last resort", another analyst suggests. "At the moment he and his organisation look finished in Iran. What alternative will be left to him if his European leftist friends find they can no longer help him? The Russians may in any case be looking for a more popular leader for the left in Iran while they continue their efforts to get into the Persian Gulf through an Iraq forced to become its surrogate because of abandonment by its fellow Arabs."

CSO: 4600/228

YOUNG SHAH LOOKS FORWARD TO GOING HOME AS MONARCH

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 104, 13 Jan 83 pp 5-6

[Text] The young Shah Reza has broken his long silence in an interview with the weekly "Le Figaro Magazine" in Paris in which he says he looks forward to a popular uprising in conjunction with a military one to bring about a change of regime in Iran.

He excluded "a military putsch, a classical coup d'etat" as a solution to the present situation, but looked for an uprising in the bazaar, among each tribe, in every home, at the army garrisons--at every social level.

"What is needed...is a coincidental action of the people's aspirations and a move by the army, but such a thing cannot become reality without the 'umbrella' which I represent (as the monarch)", he declared. His theme in the interview was that without the monarchy, one of two pillars of Iran through the ages--religion is the other--the country would be vulnerable to a communist take-over.

The Soviets had trained between 15,000 and 20,000 Iranians hostile to monarchy in its specialised institutes and most of them had come to Iran with Khomeini's revolution, the young Shah said. He believed that the Tudeh strategists were behind the incompetent mullahs today.

"According to Mr Kianouri (the Tudeh party leader) Iran needs a marxist revolution and to prepare this the Tudeh must ally itself with the bourgeoisie hostile to monarchy, regardless of this bourgeoisie being of the left or the right", he continued. "To achieve this goal Kianouri's aims are (a) destruction of the base of private property and ownership; (b) to set Iranians against whatever came from the West in general and from the United States in particular; and (c) to prepare the ground for a secret takeover of power."

According to his information Tudeh was now bracing itself to start the second phase of its strategy--that of getting out of the "coalition" with the mullahs and reducing the latter's power. To this end it had to push the mullahs into taking more and more unpopular measures.

"The Soviet Union has many institutes specialising in every kind of sub-culture, something which unfortunately is lacking in the West", the young monarch

went on. "Some of these institutes are specialised in studying Iranian sub-cultures and thus, with the help of thousands of Russians who speak the same languages as their Iranian cousins, the Soviets have an immense reservoir of knowledge and of trump cards."

It was because of this he felt the monarchy could save Iran. When one of the pillars of monarchy and religion which had always upheld Iran was removed the whole building collapsed, as one could see from the present situation in the country.

The 22-years-old king voiced his conviction that the monarchy would be restored in Iran, but not restored to its former pattern. "A new page in the history of modern Iran will open with me: I believe this sincerely", he said.

Asked about how he perceived his role as a future monarch "in these republican days" he pointed out that 70 per cent of people living today under monarchical regimes enjoyed democratic rights and freedoms, as against only 20 per cent of those living under republican regimes. As against eight existing authoritarian monarchies there were 130 "arbitrary, authoritarian republics."

On the collapse of his father's regime he believes that it could have been due to the fact that the pace of modernisation was too fast for a society still steeped in tradition. "We should probably have gone more slowly, and offered the people institutional means to better express themselves", he said. "In short, I think we gambled on the Iranian people's capacity for adaptation, but it is a gamble we have lost for the time being."

The young Shah said he thought that in trying to please the western intellectuals and the liberal elites one had lost touch with the realities in his own country. There were paradoxes in the criticisms of his father's rapid modernisation and their attitudes to traditions, he contended.

And democracy, he felt, was something which took time to build--it's not a Lipton's tea bag to put in hot water to get the desired taste and colour." He pointed out that it took today's democratic countries, "in particular your France," much tears and blood before getting a really democratic regime. "Why should a country like Iran, which belongs to the Third World, reach democracy instantaneously without shedding its own share of tears and blood?" he asked.

Khomeini's success came because of a vacant place for a "pedagogue" in Iran. "Every time you have that kind of voice, a charlatan jumps in, promising the moon", the Shah said. "This is what Khomeini did".

He went on to criticise the western cliché opposing the monarchy "systematically" against Islam. "Islam is our religion," he said, "while monarchy is the expression of our convictions, including all religious ones, Islam and others. Meantime, Khomeini's brand of Islam is an aberration, a deviation from (true) Islam. In other words, it is to Islam what the Inquisition was to Catholicism."

Khomeini's regime was fighting hopelessly in an impasse, because it was the prisoner of contradictions of many kinds, from the war with Iraq, which was responsible for starting the war, to attempts to normalise the situation.

In his view, monarchy in Iran represented everybody, every ideology, all religious or ethnic minorities. "Those who are engaged in the process of toppling Khomeini must of necessity help each other. Sooner or later, these forces will realize that there are only two umbrellas to give them shelter and protection. One is marxism, the other monarchy. But while Iranians can perceive the limits of a monarchy, those of an obscure republic are not known to them, and no one knows what kind of FRankenstein monster can come out of the shadow of a republic".

His vision of monarchy and of a monarch for Iran is, according to him, "something on the lines" of Don Juan Carlos of Spain. "A king does not have to take sides politically", he said. "He is not there to help eliminate this or that political trend. He is a symbol, he is there to supervise the harmony between the government and the people and if he has to take sides, this must be with the people".

He pledged that it would be the people in the final resort who would choose its regime. "I will fight to my last reserves to fulfill the people's desire", he said, adding that "of course, if they chose a republic, I would feel shame and misery but, nevertheless, I would do everything in my power to implement it. But I have high hopes for a monarchy".

Frankly, he said he did not think that democracy could be established in Iran as soon as Khomeini fell. "One needs a short period of transition. One should remember that more than one million light weapons are in the hands of individuals. As one does not learn swimming in shallow waters, one cannot learn the rule of democracy amid anarchy and disorder. Therefore, we will not have democracy in 1983, nor in 1984, even if I come to power within a few months."

Finally, on foreign affairs issues, the young Shah believes that notwithstanding the USSR's designs on Iran, his country must have good neighbourly relations with Moscow.

With Washington, "sincere relations will suffice and there is no need to stir anti-imperialist sentiments by establishing US bases or bringing a physical American presence to the Persian Gulf."

"The Government of Her Majesty in Britain does not have permanent friends, nor permanent foes, but permanent interests," he continued. This will be our policy in the future. Nevertheless, Iran after Khomeini will have close links with the free world".

He finished the interview with a phrase of General de Gaulle: "As conditions are not favourable, so, let's change conditions: (Puisque les circonstances ne sont pas favorables, changeons donc les circonstances). It is exactly to this end that I'm going to do my best".

GUERRILLAS IN NORTHERN FORESTS STILL THORN IN REGIME'S SIDE

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 104, 13 Jan 83 pp 10-12

[Text] Judicial authorities in Tehran on Sunday announced that the trial of 40 counterrevolutionaries responsible for "Amol massacres" had begun.

The regime's spokesmen have given no other details as to who the 40 arrested people are or when they carried out their attack on Amol, a town near the Caspian Sea coast. Amol was briefly taken over by anti-Khomeini gunmen on January 26, 1982, but the ringleaders of that action were reported by the Tehran press to have been executed soon afterwards.

The regime's refusal to give details on the arrest, trial and sentencing of its opponents is in line with a policy adopted some time ago. It is now difficult to learn when dependents were arrested. Sometimes individuals arrested three years ago are put on trial with people arrested only recently.

Israel radio has conjectured the 40 "counter-revolutionaries" might belong to the group known as Sarbedaran which claimed responsibility for the attack on Amol a year ago. Sarbedaran is the name of a nationalist organisation which was traditionally anti-Islamic.

Informants in Iran, however, quoting official sources, said the 40 arrested people were members of the Union of Iranian Communists who were taken prisoner in a recent gun battle in the forests near Sari, also on the Caspian littoral close to Amol. The Union of Iranian Communists is an umbrella organisation for a motley group of communists opposed to the Tudeh party and to Khomeini.

The same informants add that soon after the attack on Amol a year ago the revolutionary guards rounded up some 30 locals, labelled them as ring leaders of the attack, and then found them guilty at a sham trial. They were then executed.

Since the new defendants are also being tried on charges of armed activity in Amol, then it is suspected that some new incident has taken place there which the official media have not been allowed to report.

This view seems to be confirmed by a statement made by Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani at the opening of his Friday prayer sermon last week that he would

be paying tribute to "martyrs" of Amol on the 40th day of their martyrdom. In the course of his sermon, however, he failed to pick up the item for further elaboration.

The fact is that the anti-Khomeini gunmen, generally known as the forest fighters, have been giving the regime a real headache for some time. Their attack on Amol a year ago so unnerved officials that Khomeini was forced to make a major speech to shore up morale among the revolutionary guards.

Since then the forest fighters have emerged as the folk heroes of the resistance to the Islamic theocracy.

The fullest account of their activities to be given so far was written recently for Iran-va-Jahan, a Persian language weekly which is printed in Paris and reflects a moderate political stand close to the Ali Amini-led Front for Liberation of Iran.

In this article the origins of the movement are said to go back to early 1981. The writer, who has lived with the fighters, says that they are a group of dedicated, self-sacrificing young Iranians who come from all walks of life and many parts of Iran. But the local Mazandarani predominate.

Their attitude, according to pamphlets distributed in the Caspian Sea area, is: "We have only one aspiration, which is to save Iran. This objective is placed above any ideology or political creed. We welcome anybody and any group. Our hearts are open to all. But we do stress that proliferation of political ideologies has had a divisive effect on the totality of resistance in Iran. That is why we make a point of putting ideology away.

"We believe that the overwhelming majority of Iranians has rejected the mullahs' rule and that every single Iranian is in danger of losing his or her national identity under it. Therefore, we say that first and foremost there must be a country and a sense of national identity."

According to the Iran-Va-Jahan report, a number of the members of the union joined the forest fighters last year. But recently they decided to break away again.

A recent statement by the forest fighters puts the matter in the following words:

"We are sorry to announce the tactical defeat of the Union of Iranian Communists. They asked to join us a short while ago. We welcomed them but soon we discovered that their ideological pack is heavier than their guns. We had no objection provided they kept their ideology to themselves.

"We told them the forest fighter has no particular ideology except the liberation of Iran. That is why we have among our ranks royalists, former officers of the army, theological students, mojahedin, fedayeen and, above all, independent people.

"The Union of Iranian Communists did not honour our convention. So in September 1982 they left our ranks. We were sorry to see them leave. Unfortunately they decided to go it alone and in an ill-conceived attack they were beaten by Khomeini's killers. As many as 40 of them were killed or arrested." This attack could not have been the one in Amol referred to by Rafsanjani, as it apparently took place in September.

The regime's spokesmen claim that all opposition forces in the Mazandaran forest are members of the Union of Iranian Communists who have adopted the name of Sarbedaran.

Tehran Radio has claimed that the Union was funded by the United States Central Intelligence Agency. Tehran revolutionary judge Asadollah Lajevareh last week said any member of the Union who gave himself up would be pardoned, provided he gave information to the authorities.

To disprove the regime's allegations that they have been broken up the forest fighters have mounted several spectacular operations since the defeat of the Union of Iranian Communists. In one operation they held the small town of Shirgah for six hours. They have also made surprise attacks in Shahi, Behshahr and other northern towns.

They usually arrest Islamic revolutionary guards and judges. As a rule a summary trial is held; but in most cases those mullah officials who are arrested have already been identified by sympathisers and their fate sealed. So trials end with one verdict - execution.

Forest fighters are highly critical of the opposition groups abroad, especially those afflicted by ideological bias. They often say that the real coalition of opposition groups has taken place there. Ironically, publications belonging to the opposition groups abroad often ignore communiques put out by the fighters inside the country.

CSO: 4600/226

IRAN

BIG BOYS STILL ESCAPE JUSTICE OVER CORRUPTION, JUDGE COMPLAINS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 104, 13 Jan 83 p 12

[Text] Hojatoleslam Mahmud Azizian, Islamic judge of the Trades Offences Court, told reporters last week that his court had investigated numerous cases of graft, misappropriation of funds, bribery and misuse of trust.

"Some cases involve very high officials," Azizian told reporters. "We have given our verdict and the verdicts have been officially advised to enforcement authorities, but nothing seems to have been done about them."

He said he had to hold a press conference to reveal the facts, "otherwise people will go on believing that we are doing nothin", he said.

He named Sadegh Memarian as a top ranking official at the Ministry of Commerce who on one occasion had collaborated with a company director to increase the company's quota in exchange for 2.4 million rials (32,000 dollars) in bribes.

"Memarian said he had a Dutch wife and her upkeep cost money," Azizian said. "If I send him to prison his wife will be left alone with nobody to look after her. We have our problems."

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AFGHANISTAN LABELLED AS 'DEATH-BED OF COMMUNIST CZARS'

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 13 Jan 83 p 1

[Commentary by Hatif Etesami]

[Text]

THE Soviet brutalities in Afghanistan, like the Zionists' in Palestine and Lebanon and the Americans in Vietnam and Latin America, have kept alive the memories of Nazis; Hitler and his aides have found as atrocious successors in Moscow, Washington and Tel Aviv. The aborted Russian adventure in Afghanistan is the latest episode in the history of Russian colonialism and expansionism. The Communist leaders in Kremlin have proved that the dreams of Czars are as alive today as they were three hundred years ago when the Russians launched their expansionist offensive into Asia and Europe, moving east and west, north and south.

The Russian colonialism has been different from that of the U.S., British, French and the Dutch in the sense that whereas all of them have confined themselves to drinking the blood of nations, the Russians have adopted the policy of swallowing them alive. Moreover, their historical expansionist experience has proved to the socialist Czars that this kind of imperialism, though accompanied by painful fits of indigestion, is the safest method.

If the times had not changed the Kremlin might have realized its ancient dreams in a new 'Afghan Soviet Socialist Republic.' However, sadly for the socialist imperialists and fortunately for the Moslems of the world and Afghanistan, the times have changed and the tides have reversed. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan is not yet another fit of expansionist indigestion, but, luckily, the first

agonies of an approaching death. The slumber of Moslems before 1914 is also a part of history.

It would be a deceptive mirage for the Kremlin to find an inspiring example in the temporary triumphs of the neo-Nazi Zionists; for the challenge the socialist imperialists have thrown to Islam shall prove disastrous for them in the ensuing conflict: it will not be long before the Uzbek, Turkeman, Kirgis, Azarbaidjani, and Tadzik Moslems realize too that their conditions are not much different from that of their Afghan brethren. Today, the Moslem world has awakened to the challenge of the wretched devotees of Adam Smith and Karl Marx.

Just as the propagation of corrupt values of Western culture and domestic capitalist vassals form the media of capitalist penetration, ideological slaves and intellectual vassals form the agency of Russian expansionism in the bordering countries.

Unfortunately, the diabolical theory of balance of power has forced alignment, no matter how much ill-concealed, on the smaller countries of the Third World by offering the wretched choice between the two contemporary evils: the U.S. and Soviet imperialism. But the example of Iran has brilliantly demonstrated the absurdity of the conventional 'solutions'; for a lasting solution lies only in evolution of viable political systems based on Islam. The greatest discovery of the twentieth century is that Islam is the key to true independence and self-determination. This is borne out by the example of Iran in contrast to the situation in most Islamic countries: their dependence on the Eastern and Western imperialists is in direct proportion to their deviation from true Islam.

In the present condition, it is the duty of the global Moslem community to realize the urgency of their problems and to come to the assistance of their brothers in Iran and Afghanistan who are pitched in their battle against the two imperialist poles. We urge the Afghan brothers to further consolidate their ranks and unite their forces against the bloody Red Army and to abstain totally from internal squabbles. They should not give way to despair in face of their protracted struggle, for, today and tomorrow the Time is on their side, and what is more than time, God the Almighty, is their Helper.

If God helps you, none can overcome you; but if He forsakes you, who then can help you after Him? Therefore in God let the believers put all their trust. (Qoran; III; 160.)

BRIEFS

VISIT TO PAKISTAN CRITICISED--The National Voice of Iran, a Soviet-backed Persian language station broadcasting from Baku, has bitterly attacked the visit of Iran's Interior Minister Nateq-Nouri to Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. It criticised the Tehran regime for sending a minister to Pakistan, a "faithful stooge" of the United States. The visit, the radio said, did not go well with Tehran's anti-American campaign for Islamabad was a lackey for imperialism and its plans for the region. And it was astonished that Nateq-Nouri should include in his programme a visit to "brigands and bandits" (the Soviet designation for the refugees). [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 104, 13 Jan 83 p 4]

TABATABAI WARRANT REPORTED--Reports from Germany on Wednesday claimed that a warrant had been issued for the arrest of Sadegh Tabatabai, son-in-law of Ayatollah Khomeini, on drug-smuggling and possible illegal arms dealing charges. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 104, 13 Jan 83 p 4]

CSO: 4600/228

PROBLEMS OF SIND, BALUCHISTAN DESCRIBED, ANALYZED

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 14 Dec 82 p 12

[Article by Mohammad Musta Bhutto: "What Is the Basic Problem of Sind and Baluchistan?"]

[Text] Some time ago, during a tour of Baluchistan, I met with Baluchistan's veteran politician, Nawab Akbar Bugti, who was also the governor of Baluchistan during the Bhutto era. Numerous issues were discussed during this meeting and I learned aspects of the current situation. Besides Baluchistan, however, this politician also gave a detailed analysis of the situation in Sind. His viewpoint was that the wounds of the destruction that occurred in the political and social fields in Sind and Baluchistan in the past have now deepened. The leadership and the majority of the youth in these two provinces would not be led astray by slogans of Islam and Pakistan. Not only are they no longer attracted to these slogans, but they look in other directions in order to guard their rights.

As for the situation in Sind, he said that whenever he visited Karachi and the interior of Sind, hundreds of thousands of Sindhi youths came to meet with him. The majority of those youths is individuals who have no confidence in Pakistan and whose ambition is now to take forceful and final steps, no matter how, to gain their political and social rights.

Responding to one of my questions about Baluchistan, this politician said that although the Soviet Union is also an imperialist regime, and a very big one, he had visited the Soviet Union and knows how people there are made to work like slaves. Nevertheless, what better treatment have we received in Pakistan? What has this country done except to install military rule and destroy people's rights. Anyway, now Baluchistan will not fight for Pakistan and its rulers. We now ask to be left alone. Do not interfere in our affairs. Who do we live with and whose slaves are we? These are our internal problems and we ourselves will deal with them.

On Islam and Pakistan, this politician from Baluchistan expressed great enmity. My pen does not allow me to write further about his views expressed in this regard. Actually, this politician from Baluchistan has proven to be a hard liner in temperament, nature and mental attitude. Whenever he comes into power, Baluchistan's rights and equality appear secure to him, but soon

after he steps down from power, Baluchistan's rights face threats. Many years ago, Baluchistan's wise elder, the late Maulana Abdul Aziz, said about this leader that he was dangerous by nature, that he would create personal crises and problems for Pakistan in Baluchistan; other leaders can switch to the right path, but it is difficult for this person to change his mentality.

The mention made by Akbar Bugti of the apathy of Sind's and Baluchistan's people towards the country and their extreme sense of deprivation is a reality that cannot be denied. Rather, for the past 10 to 12 years, waves of agitation have been rising from these two provinces, which at times have been experienced at the national level as well. The question is: why do these people feel scared and dissatisfied even though from the Islamic viewpoint the people of both provinces possess qualities that are not found among any other provinces of Pakistan or India, such as fraternity, love, hospitality, friendship, candidness, simplicity, contentment and belief in God. Let us examine these questions.

One answer is that this sense of deprivation is not real, but is artificial, and all this disruption is caused by elements who seek their own interest. They are inciting the people to achieve their own goals. They become silent once they get what they want. However, when they are given no importance and are ignored, they raise their heads again. The second answer is that the foreign powers are behind these waves of commotion and agitation in Sind and Baluchistan. These powers have appointed a few individuals as their instruments. Whenever they want to create a commotion, they give a signal, and whenever they think it appropriate, they retreat into silence.

A third answer could also be that the Provinces of Sind and Baluchistan are victims of extreme poverty. People depend on their chiefs and leaders even for their food and bodily necessities. This poverty and indigence, too, are a source of hopelessness.

All these three factors are worth pondering and all of them have been active in whatever has happened in Baluchistan at various times.

There is no shortage of selfish leaders in these two provinces. At the time of Pakistan's establishment, too, these leaders were hesitant to join with Pakistan and some were against it. Those who favored it did so for personal gain. Islam, the Muslim nation and the interest of the people was not their concern. The greatest danger they felt was that their influence and superiority over the people of this region should not be weakened. Even now these people are unhappy about the steps being taken to instill a sense of awakening among the ordinary people. Why are roads being built? Why is there development and other reformation work? All these things will awaken the people and they will become a source of weakened influence of the ringleaders and chiefs. This is what annoys the selfish leaders.

It is also true that for a long time the Soviet Union has focused its attention on Sind and Baluchistan. This region is important to it from the standpoint of controlling a greater part of the Islamic world. That is why, for a long time, the Soviet Union has been trying to disseminate communist

ideology and lead astray the younger generation of this area, and by propagating disunity, and in the guise of economic aid, it is enhancing its influence.

The issue of poverty and unemployment is a major problem in these two provinces. It is sad that Baluchistan, a region with unlimited resources and whose population is not more than 2.5 to 3 million, has been unable for the past 34 years to provide employment for its people so that their problem of hunger has yet to be resolved. Similarly, industrial institutions, which could be established with local raw materials and which could have absorbed hundreds of thousands of youths, have not been established in the interior of Sind. Due to lack of planning, thousands of youths in the interior of Sind are passing their days in the misery of unemployment.

This analysis shows us that the self-interested political leadership in Sind and Baluchistan, the interest of a world power and the issue of poverty are the three factors that make the situation there worrisome. Another question also arises here. After all, what were the circumstances whereby these three factors played their part while no policy was developed to stop them? Why were the practical interests of world powers not barred? Why were no arrangements made to unveil the selfish leader and bring forward sincere leaders instead?

There are many countries in the world that were faced with more serious problems than we, but due to appropriate action, sincerity and the planning of the leadership, they made progress and, despite many linguistic nationalities and dozens of provinces, they were so successful in resolving their internal problems that it was obvious that there was only one nation living there. Regional and linguistic prejudice does not exist there as it does in our country.

We present below an outline of a few countries' population and provinces.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Provinces</u>
West Germany	61,600,000	11
U.S.A.	216,800,000	50
Japan	118,000,000	47
Australia	12,000,000	5
Canada	20,000,000	10
Iran	32,000,000	30
Malaysia	10,400,000	13
Sri Lanka	12,500,000	22
France	51,900,000	15
Turkey	40,000,000	76
Sweden	8,700,000	24
Norway	4,000,000	19
Switzerland	6,800,000	22

These countries are victims of several internal conflicts and are comprised of numerous religions and nationalities. Despite this, however, conflicts among nationalities and accusations of domination by provinces have never created a situation in those countries such as exists here in our country.

In our opinion the basic reason is that conspiracies have existed here right from the start and honest leadership never had an opportunity to develop. After the establishment of Pakistan, opportunities for progress should have been granted to leaders in various provinces who truly represented their respective regions, who had close contact with the people and who possessed the ability to satisfy the people. Certainly, such leaders could not have been found at the outset. For this, we had to be patient until after four elections. We would certainly have acquired such leaders if the democratic process had continued uninterrupted. Unfortunately, however, we inherited a strong bureaucracy from the British. Soon after the establishment of Pakistan, due to Quaid-e-Azam's death and disunity among the Muslim League members, the bureaucracy had plenty of opportunities for disruption and they themselves gained power. Obviously, no region would be content with a government established without representative leadership of provinces and regions, no matter how much abundance there is of everything in the province, since a leadership has direct contact with the people. The meaning of the leadership participating in the government is that the entire province perceives itself as a part of the authority and power.

To deprive leaders of power is to inflict a feeling of deprivation on the entire province. Unfortunately, in 1970, the democratic process in our country began at a time when the feeling of deprivation among the provinces had reached its extreme and feelings of hatred had reached their climax. Obviously, the consequences of elections held in such an atmosphere would be totally different from the results of elections held under normal conditions. Regrettably, the fundamental factor overlooked was that the country's different linguistic nationalities could not be granted satisfaction as long as a feeling of participation in the government was not aroused in them. The feeling of provincial participation in the government alone is a factor that eradicates sentiments of a linguistic nationality and promotes a feeling of one nationwide nationality. The leaders of various provinces are nothing in themselves, but to a certain extent, they do have contacts with intellectuals, journalists, workers and the public. To include these leaders in the government is not only to satisfy all these sectors but to instill a feeling in them that Pakistan's interest is their interest and its enemy is their enemy, and that they themselves are responsible for its security. This method alone can infuse continuous passionate love for Pakistan. Good leadership that combat the problem of poverty and the conspiracies of foreign powers.

If such passionate love for Pakistan has not been instilled among our people, in my opinion, the responsibility to a great extent must be borne by the sector that, after Liaqat Ali Khan's martyrdom, itself took power through various conspiracies.

This is the basic factor regarding the situation of Sind and Baluchistan that is often overlooked. Aside from the army and the bureaucracy, no sector

of the country is satisfied with the current political system. The present rulers will have to devise methods through which a new patriotic leadership, on the people's level, can emerge from the smaller provinces. Such leadership can perform its role against those selfish leaders who collaborate with foreign powers.

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CSO: 4656/60

DEFICIT IN FOREIGN TRADE LINKED TO IMPORT PRACTICES

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 12 Dec 82 p 10

[Editorial: "How Long Will Deficit in Foreign Trade Continue?"]

[Text] The federal minister of commerce has refuted the impression that the cause of the growing deficit in foreign trade is the increase in the imports of consumer goods and luxury items. Instead, the real and basic cause is the higher costs of imported oil, which have now reached \$1.8 billion annually. He clarified this while addressing members of the Multan Chamber of Commerce and Industry. He said that the new import policy provides only 15 percent for importing consumer items, primarily edible oil, petroleum products, tea, medicines, etc. Only Pakistanis residing in foreign countries have been granted permission to import cars.

These statistics and facts and figures are a fundamental part of that argument, which, for a long time, has been repeated by official spokesmen about the growing deficit in foreign trade. Nevertheless, despite frequent use of this argument, the basic question as to why all efforts fail and problems remain the same still needs an answer. The official solution to this problem is that there should be an increase in the country's productivity. The minister of commerce also emphasized this fact in Multan.

There is no disagreement with this proposed solution being true or hitting directly on target, and no one of sound mind will doubt it. But when there is a great abundance of all kinds of consumer and luxury items both in homes and shopping centers, to allow even 15 percent for consumer items appears to totally contradict the facts. The situation now is that the use of foreign consumer items is no longer limited to a few individuals as being fashionable; rather it has become a part of everyday life. Pakistanis residing overseas also play a part in the abundance of these consumer items, which they bring into the country in large quantities as personal baggage or are allowed to send as "gifts." The remaining need is met from the vast and perpetual chain of smuggling that, to a great extent, has now acquired the form of an unauthorized but parallel trade structure. It is so vast that now the buying and selling of smuggled items is not limited to markets in tribal areas like Landi Kotal, Bara, Chaman and Quetta, but "Bara markets" have been established in all of the big cities, including the provincial capitals. In addition, foreign items are sold openly in streets and lanes.

This situation has continued for years and has become a daily routine. When will the officials who implore the common folk "be Pakistanis, buy Pakistani" end their inattentiveness and silence about this matter? Granting some facilities to the Pakistanis residing abroad is understandable, but why are the people in authority who regard an increase in local productivity as the solution to growing deficits in foreign trade unable to see and comprehend that there is no reason to grant open permission for bringing in consumer items that are produced in the country itself? On one hand the burden of gratitude that the Pakistanis residing abroad put information by sending in foreign exchange keeps increasing. On the other hand, due to their bringing and sending in foreign items, the worthless quality of articles produced within Pakistan and smuggling are on the rise. How can the antidote of increasing the production of such items within the country be feasible under these circumstances.

The issue of importing cars, too, has become a puzzle and an agony. In this regard, the baseless argument that no foreign exchange is spent from government resources for importing cars is repeated. Instead, the entire burden is said to be borne by the Pakistanis residing abroad. But this argument amounts to an empty satisfaction because the country's foreign exchange is utilized for the import of spare parts, oil, etc., for cars sent by Pakistanis residing overseas. The estimated increase in expenditures in this category can be determined from the fact that the prices of imported oil have remained stable for the last 1-1/2 to 2 years; rather, they are getting a bit lower. Nevertheless, due to a rapid increase in the number of cars and other vehicles, the bill for oil imported during this period increased from \$50 million to \$1.8 billion (according to the minister of commerce). The situation now is that parking space for cars on every big city's roads is not only limited, it is simply becoming unavailable. Nevertheless, the importation of cars continues to increase.

Doubtedly the administration has an opportunity to obtain heavy duty on the importation of cars and other consumer and luxury items, but it is not sensible that in an effort to fill up the treasury for ordinary expenditures the nation should become accustomed and attracted to foreign consumer and luxury items to such an extent that their own country's articles are looked down on, and further, to reform the situation the proposed solution--increasing the country's productivity--should be turned into an impractical task and, instead of making better, correct and profitable use of the country's resources, the system of dependability on foreign loans should continue to increase. The magicians of the treasury who obtain foreign loans in the name of aid, like their predecessors, will depart when their time expires, but this "beneficence" of theirs will become a torture for the next two or three generations.

The correct solution to this situation, undoubtedly, is the one proposed by the official spokesman: that the country's productivity should be increased. But, along with that, it is also essential that besides avoiding, as far as possible, the use of foreign consumer items, the needless import of such items should also be discouraged. In other words, the list of items brought or sent in as personal baggage and gifts should be limited, and the system of

importing cars should be totally abolished for the next 2 to 3 years. The privilege of bringing in foreign items should also be fixed on the basis of foreign exchange sent from legal sources instead of the duration of the stay abroad. The condition of the duration of the stay was somewhat justified when the majority of the Pakistanis in foreign countries consisted of members of the embassy staff on official duty and students traveling overseas. Now, however, their number compared to those going overseas for work and jobs is equal to nothing. These people can benefit themselves, the nation and the country by not wasting a greater portion of their hard-earned money away from home on bringing along with them piles of foreign consumer and luxury items. Instead, by sending money through legal sources, they should serve their country, and also prepare for their future security. To create such an awareness is the duty of those in authority who frame the trade and commerce policies of the country and who prescribe increase in productivity as the treatment for various social ailments.

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BRIEFS

NO NEW MUSLIM LEAGUE--Islamabad, 8 Dec (Special Correspondent)--Informed circles here described the news that certain Advisory Council members are forming a new Muslim League as misleading. It was stated that the Advisory Council is a nominated institution whose members have been selected on non-political bases. They have no connection at all with any group, and there is no room in it to form any party unless the political parties are restored. In the beginning there was a proposal to appoint a parliamentary secretary, but in view of a fear of division into groups, this proposal was not acted on. Similarly, no need was felt to appoint a chief whip, etc. The Advisory Council members enjoy complete freedom of expression and they keep on informing the administration of their viewpoints on various issues. According to the informed circles, the formation of groups within the Advisory Council can harm the objectives of its establishment. [Text] [Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 9 Dec 82 p 10] 9779

CRITICISM OF ADVISORY COUNCIL--Rawalpindi, 8 Dec (Special Correspondent)--The leader of Tanzeem-e Islami and former member of the Federal Advisory Council, Dr Israr Ahmad, has said that the only way to remedy the current situation is unbiased elections on a nonparty basis to elect a true advisory council to whom the president should forward his views and program for the welfare of the country. This advisory council would make decisions about the country's problems, especially constitutional issues and the constitutional role of the army. Dr Israr Ahmad emphasized that this advisory council should not be elected to form a government and share power. Last night, during a conversation with NAWA-I-WAQT at Councillor Ishtiaq Ahmad's residence, Dr Israr Ahmad said that the current nominated Advisory Council serves no purpose. If its purpose was to seek advice, I would not have resigned from it. Actually, a parliamentary system wastes time, that is why the Council has become a debating society. He said that under present circumstances nothing can be achieved without elections. However, it is essential to set a standard for the voters and conditions for the candidates. In response to a question, Dr Israr Ahmad said that an Islamic system will be enforced through a revolutionary procedure. There will be a president who will run the government through mutual consultations. For a revolutionary campaign, he said, the sample of Iran's struggle for Islamic revolution is before us. "It is for this revolutionary campaign that I established Tanzeem-e Islami, but its sphere of action so far is limited." The establishment of Jamaat-e Islami

was based on this ideology, too, but later on it became entangled in the mess of politics. Replying to a question on the restoration of the 1973 constitution, Dr Israr Ahmad said that this constitution was accepted by the Islamic parties through a political bargain under the sword of martial law. This is not a sacred manuscript. He said it is still not certain what the number of political parties is, 87 or what? He said that the Shariat Court's authority should not be limited; no matter should be above the Shariat Court. Dr Ahmed said that the current administration cannot enforce an Islamic system. President Zia did get an opportunity to do so with the enthusiasm and zeal generated by the [1977] Nizam-e Mustafa campaign, but he wasted it. [Text] [Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 9 Dec 82 p 10] 9779

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