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Yavlinskiy on Formation of New Government

AU0109160591 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German
30 Aug 91 pp 23-24

[Interview with Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, leading economic reformer and member of a four-man commission that is to work out an economic emergency program and a new union government at the order of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, by Maria Huber; place and date not given: "From the Putsch to Privatization"]

[Text] [Huber] You once said that in politics there can be compromises, but not in the economy. Because Gorbachev made compromises with the conservatives you decided before the international economic summit in London not to be available any longer for the Soviet president. Now you are working with him again. Have you regained trust in him?

[Yavlinskiy] In the past I thought—and I think so again now—that there is a chance. If the chance cannot be used, I will leave again. I will cooperate only in line with my principles.

[Huber] What principles are these?

[Yavlinskiy] We can have the task to form a new federative government, which is legitimated by the remaining republics. However, we can also have the task to push ahead reforms from Russia and to get the agreement of the other republics for that. And, finally, we can have a completely different task, namely to make sure that all the republics separate from each other sensibly and peacefully. The decisive issue now is the form of the state: federation, confederation, or Russia. I have been appointed to prepare a government to the best of my knowledge. I am free in my decisions. I will think about the compromises that are possible and I will work out a corresponding position. In the political discussion I want to state clearly what has to be done now. Here under my arm I have the folder with the draft on the tasks, functions, and possible versions of a new government.

[Huber] When did you prepare these versions?

[Yavlinskiy] During the past two nights.

[Huber] How will the decision among the versions be made?

[Yavlinskiy] This depends on Gorbachev, on Yeltsin, on the parliaments, and on public opinion.

[Huber] Can the decision be made quickly enough?

[Yavlinskiy] It must be made quickly. The versions that we decide to follow must be submitted to the congress, which has been called for 2 September.

[Huber] The four members of the commission are all economists?

[Yavlinskiy] Of course, they are all economists: Russia's Prime Minister Ivan Silayev as well as Arkadiy Volskiy of the Industrialists' Association and Moscow's Deputy mayor Yuriy Lyushkov. Which one of them adopts what position is not yet clear.

[Huber] You have come out in favor of the republics acting in a unified economic area. However, since the end of the attempted coup, the trends all seem to be centrifugal.

[Yavlinskiy] This need not remain so. Russia is now getting the necessary instruments to implement decisive reforms; it has already started to do so. I do not think that the Ukraine, for instance, will put up barriers, draw borders, and levy customs duties—and will turn away from the reforms in this way. Of course, the Ukrainian leaders can act more slowly, but this is their business.

[Huber] Thus, Russia wants decisive reforms. What are the next steps toward that?

[Yavlinskiy] Liberalization of prices; privatization—at least a small one. The problem is the union budget. It is one gigantic hole.

[Huber] Has your concept of cooperation with the West changed in the meantime? Before the international economic summit in London you, in close cooperation with a group surrounding U.S. Harvard professor Graham Allison, drew up a step-by-step plan for radical economic reforms and relief measures by the Western states. Does your concept of the grand bargain—the big barter deal with the West—now have to be improved or supplemented?

[Yavlinskiy] If the concept is now approved, a specific program to implement it must naturally be drawn up. Cooperation with the West must take place within a unified framework, and our country has to move toward a private economy.

[Huber] In your protest on the first day of the putsch you predicted a short life for the junta—for economic reasons. What reasons?

[Yavlinskiy] Very simple. One cannot force the people to work in this way.

[Huber] The putsch failed. Had market structures already developed before—over the past months—which you can now use to advance the reforms?

[Yavlinskiy] A great number of changes have taken place. The most important one took place during the putsch: The fear disappeared, increasingly so day after day. In order to drive it away completely I personally participated in the action to arrest Interior Minister Boris Pugo.

[Huber] How did this work?

[Yavlinskiy] Very simple. I was in the group in which it was discussed how one could arrest the putschists. It was

known where most of them were. Yanayev was in the Kremlin, Gorbachev ordered his arrest. The Kremlin is a fortress; experts had to be used. But where was Pugo? He was known to be the most cynical and toughest of the gang, of whom one could expect anything. "Why are we sitting here?" I told the people....

[Huber] Which people?

[Yavlinskiy] ...the experts of the KGB, the Interior Ministry, and the public prosecutor's office. I had not known them before. I only said that we had to look for Pugo.

[Huber] You found him during the night of 21 August....

[Yavlinskiy] ...not I myself. But I was with those who professionally discovered him with a telephone trick, prepared the arrest in his dacha, and went there.

[Huber] Your group then found Pugo, who had shot himself minutes before. What were you able to do before this dramatic night?

[Yavlinskiy] I heard the statement of the junta in Lvov. I knew nothing else. I immediately got on the train. On the way back to Moscow I drew up my protest statement. Of course, I did not know that Yeltsin had immediately called for resistance against the coup. I kept copying my statement to the people by hand and left copies at every stop along the journey. When I came to Moscow my statement had already become known here. Then I declared that I would leave the party. On this day—the second day of the putsch—this was very important. One week before such a step would have been completely insignificant.

[Huber] Immediately after the putsch there were many communists who chose a different path: They paid their backlogs in membership fees to worm themselves into the party's favor. Under these conditions, each protest was indeed important. However, the decisive thing was that, as Yeltsin had meanwhile announced, the KGB antiterrorist unit Alpha refused to obey the putschists. Is there an explanation for that?

[Yavlinskiy] The most important reason is that this KGB unit had a different attitude. The past five years did not pass without a trace. These people realized that Yeltsin is a president who was elected by the people—therefore, they no longer obeyed unconditionally. In addition, all sensible people understood that the fairy tales about Gorbachev's health could not be correct. One really has to be completely pig-headed to believe such blatant lies. There were many educated people among the KGB members. Some of them kept their own minds in this hour.

[Huber] Can one now free the economy immediately from the organizations of the Communist Party and the KGB? Will both give up control over the flow of communication?

[Yavlinskiy] Yes, this is simple. If Vadim Bakatin, the new KGB chairman, issues a decree tomorrow, everything is over. Then there are no clients and no demand anymore.

[Huber] What is your relationship with Gorbachev like after the attempted coup?

[Yavlinskiy] We had a talk on 25 August that lasted several hours. He now understands better what happened and what remains to be done. In the past he did not believe me when I repeatedly warned him that his prime minister, Pavlov, is a villain....

Yakovlev Assesses Potential for Coup

914B0357A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 34, 28 Aug 91 p 2

[Interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev on 16 August by Oleg Moroz: "Aleksandr Yakovlev: They Want To Take Us Back Half a Century"]

[Text]

Interview on the Eve of the Coup

Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev and I conversed on Friday morning. And on Monday morning... As has now been ascertained, the junta had, for that matter, sent its first "appeal to the people" to TASS (this subdivision of the KGB dealing with disinformation) in the night of the 17th, Saturday.

It was anticipated publishing the interview with A.N. Yakovlev in the issue of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA of 21 August. But this issue was canceled: among other democratic publications the junta also banned LITERATURNAYA GAZETA.

The canceled issue of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA appeared subsequently, nonetheless. But it was produced under emergency conditions and it did not carry this interview.

The events of recent days have, of course, eclipsed the event which served as the pretext for this interview—A.N. Yakovlev's expulsion from the CPSU. But we have decided to publish it, nonetheless: It seems to us that it will be of interest to the reader to compare the forebodings being experienced on the eve of the coup by a shrewd politician and an initiator of perestroika with the actual events which occurred a matter of hours after our conversation and in which respects he proved right, and in which, not entirely so.

We need to learn to foresee the course of events. Tbilisi, Baku, Vilnius, Moscow.... Is our Romania over for us?

[Moroz] What can you say in connection with yesterday's proposal of the CPSU Central Committee Central Control Commission Presidium Bureau that you be expelled from the party?

[Yakovlev] I wanted to tender my resignation. It is good that they preempted me.

[Moroz] Why good?

[Yakovlev] This shows the level of their morals and ethics. And, if you wish, fear and hopelessness. I was curious as to the article of the rules into which they would fit me and what arguments they would give for my expulsion. I had committed no wrongdoing. Had there been anything, they would have expelled me long since. They were greatly on the lookout for compromising conduct, this I know. But they simply could not find any. This is what they have now thought up—I advocate a split...

[Moroz] You were an initiator of perestroika. There is to be seen in the fact that the CPSU is now getting rid of you a certain symbolism: This party no longer needs perestroika, it sticks in its throat. What do you think, is this symbolism being drawn consciously or are your expellers not thinking of this?

[Yakovlev] Of course it is being done consciously. I believe so. That such a step has undoubtedly been dictated by thoughtlessness is another matter. Of course, had policy been devised more intelligently, they would not have acted in this way. There is here, evidently, both a fear for their future and, I repeat, a sense of hopelessness...

But in principle, of course, they are against perestroika. The apparatus has always been against and has rejected it. This rejection was merely of a different strength. Prior to the January 1987 plenum, say—until its interests were affected—it voted for it, albeit reluctantly and with a fair bit of grumbling... But when its interests were directly affected, the law of executive-chairology immediately came into play—just as long as you manage to hold on. The apparatus entered into open struggle, primarily against those who, indeed, began perestroika and upheld it. It was not the party which began perestroika. This was all just a serviceable phrase said for effect.

A good comrade of mine once told me a very typical story. A small group had gathered prior to the 28th Party Congress in a hotel in which delegates were staying—about 15 influential oblast and kray party committee secretaries and to drinks...

[Moroz] ...“on a party basis”...

[Yakovlev] ...yes, “on a party basis,” were speaking about the fact that the main thing for them was detaching Yakovlev and Shevardnadze from Gorbachev, and they would somehow be able to handle Gorbachev himself.

[Moroz] That is, they are already half-way there.

[Yakovlev] They are, although they are somewhat late.

[Moroz] Could they have agreed on the question of your expulsion with Gorbachev?

[Yakovlev] It is this which is a question for me also. A very big question. The most important question, if you will. On the one hand, it is hard to really believe that they did not: I am not, apparently, that inconspicuous a person... And, on the other, who knows them... If, however, he knew about this and this was done with his blessing, this would be the biggest disappointment in my life. But there is in me still a glimmer of hope that this was done behind his back (returning from the Crimea, Gorbachev confirmed this—O.M.). These are immoral, irresponsible, uneducated people... They have raised the question of his own dismissal also. They have been persecuting him for I don't know how many plenums running. Only at the last plenum they took fright. They were frightened not of him but of the fact that he might, indeed, suddenly quit, and they would be left naked.

[Moroz] What are they hoping for generally? What kind of strategic mission do they have?

[Yakovlev] They are, of course, entertaining themselves, in my view, with illusions, but they are preparing a party of revanche. They are hoping that they can accomplish a party and state coup. Such thoughts are harbored only in a feverish, sick condition.

[Moroz] But you think they lack the potential for such a coup?

[Yakovlev] Potential there is, but it will mean fighting with the people, resorting to violence, spilling blood. And I am convinced that this will not end in their victory. It is this of which they also are afraid. They are not, I believe, confident of their victory, for all that. Although they might attempt to start some fight. Taking advantage of some provocation, some discontent. Speculating on this, inflaming emotions. After all, every revolution—in the 20th century, say—has begun with empty saucepans.

[Moroz] If we compare the present situation with that of a year ago, what do you think, is the danger of a right-wing, fascist coup greater or lesser?

[Yakovlev] Outwardly, you know, it seems lesser. Because the elections in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, Moscow and Leningrad, for all that, frightened some of these people, who were hoping for entirely different results. I know people at the top were impressed with the thought: now, then, Yeltsin, will not get elected, of course; Sobchak, it stands to reason, will not get elected—the whole of the Leningrad City Soviet is against him; Popov will undoubtedly not get elected—nothing has changed in Moscow... But it all turned out the opposite. This could not have failed to have exerted an influence on the subsequent course of events. But there is now this incomprehensible lull... Connected with the August vacations, possibly. Such lulls put me on my guard. On the whole, however, the nearer he is to his end, the more dangerous the wounded animal becomes.

[Moroz] What can you say about the situation in the country? Is Gorbachev in control of the situation? Specifically, are the army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB still manageable? Recent events in the Baltic and the Transcaucasus compel doubts here.

[Yakovlev] You know, I do not have the least information on this issue specifically but I personally have the impression that there is some force which is apparently commanding all this. Everyone is saying that this is fortuitous... The Special Militia Department declares that it will take to the woods if pressure is brought to bear on it. It will organize guerrilla warfare and fight to the end... This would seem to indicate their anarchist mentality and refusal to subordinate themselves to anyone, only themselves. But, on the other hand, if this is so, any state authority should immediately take them into custody. But everyone views this with composure for some reason or other. It is this which puts me on my guard.

[Moroz] Is it possible that you, as the president's senior adviser, have not spoken with him about this?

[Yakovlev] Why? Why have I not spoken? Why this assumption?

[Moroz] And what is his opinion?

[Yakovlev] Well, remember that 10 days after the Vilnius events he said that he did not have the slightest thing to do with this. But this was a tragedy. I said this same day that this was a tragedy not only for Lithuania but for our entire people also.

[Moroz] The Lithuanians declare that they have information that this had been in preparation for several months, had been prepared very carefully. The preparations were led by Generals Achalov, Varennikov, Ovcharov, and Demidov. How could this have been a surprise to the president?

[Yakovlev] Yes, the Lithuanians are, indeed, saying this...

[Moroz] And does it not seem to you that there is a conspiracy against Gorbachev? An element of this conspiracy was the killing at the Lithuanian customs post timed to coincide with the meeting of Gorbachev and Bush. Moreover, with their joint news conference. After all, following this outrage both felt extremely awkward when they were asked about this killing and feebly mumbled something or other...

[Yakovlev] I have no facts in this connection, of course, but I have the sense that there is a powerful grouping—organized or unorganized, I don't know—whose mission is the ouster of the president. Nor are they making any particular secret of this.

[Moroz] SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA recently carried the latest shrill "Word to the People". It contains, essentially, a call for the ouster of Gorbachev...

[Yakovlev] Yes, of course...

[Moroz] This "Word" was undoubtedly cooked up by well-known fascistizing men of letters, the fire brand literators Prokhanov and Bondarev. But, aside from their signatures, aside from the signature of one further man of letters, Rasputin, aside from the signature of the singer Zvykina and Starodubtsev, "chief kolkhoz member" of the Soviet Union (who was later to become, as is known, a "natural" member of the junta—O.M.), there were the signatures of people "in office"—General of the Army Varennikov, deputy defense minister of the USSR and commander of the army, and Colonel General Gromov, first deputy minister of internal affairs. Inasmuch as the "Word" calls for rebellion and disobedience to the authorities, these generals should have resigned immediately. Or they should have been retired by the president. Yet they remain at their posts...

[Yakovlev] This is, indeed, what happens in any democratic state. But real democracy has not arrived with us as yet. We do not have it yet. In a democratic state, of course, the letter of resignation should be written first, only then should such "words" be signed.

[Moroz] Nonetheless, how is it that people responsible for defense and internal affairs are calling for the ouster of the legitimate authorities?

[Yakovlev] They most likely believe that power is already in their hands. This is my impression. I am fully in sympathy here with the courageous and brilliant response of Astafyev. He has once again shown his moral integrity. I would reprint this statement throughout the democratic press. I am amazed that this has not been done.

[Moroz] You were a part of the country's political leadership for quite some time. Did you not get the feeling that false, inflammatory information was frequently being supplied "upward" along the so-called special channels?

[Yakovlev] Information which is false to the highest extent is, in fact, sometimes provided. Take, say, the Moscow opposition of 28 March. After all, good heavens, there was information to the effect that somewhere ropes with hooks were being made ready—for throwing over the Kremlin wall. The absurdity was obvious. I said at that time: Let them show us just one such hook... Thousands would have been needed, after all. Nor does the country have any rope. Nonetheless, emergency measures were adopted, as you know. And what was the result? No one did any climbing anywhere, no one grabbed hold of anything. There was a peaceful demonstration. But what I feared most: What if some provocateur had gone and fired and killed someone? How would we have concealed it? For we would have had to have concealed it from Moscow's 8 million! And what, then, would have remained of the person adopting such idiotic decisions! It is hard even to imagine. It is a good thing that they broke up peacefully. Heavens be praised! I was very much afraid at that time. Of bloodshed and the start of something... That is when a civil

war could have started! Just so. I greatly fear such situations. Greatly. I spoke about this at that time to both democratic people and leaders...

[Moroz] It seems to me that Gorbachev will shortly relinquish the office of general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Things are moving in this direction. As all the more or less decent people are leaving the party, it is becoming increasingly reactionary. The general secretary is having to be such also. But the president of a country such as ours, in its present situation, cannot be a reactionary. Gorbachev tried to take this path and went a certain distance along it—from last fall through this spring. But nothing came of it. Nor could it have. The two ice-floes on which Gorbachev is standing are moving apart in different directions. He has to jump off one of them.

[Yakovlev] I believe that they will deal with him at the congress. And will deal with him painfully and ruthlessly, what is more. Unless he forestalls them.

[Moroz] From the viewpoint of preservation of his prestige it would be better, most likely, for him to tender his resignation himself—not half-pretendingly, as at the April plenum, but in earnest?

[Yakovlev] I altogether do not understand why he tolerates the endless insults, attacks and persecution. After all, the whole point is that it is not he who needs them but they who need him.

[Moroz] But are they entirely unnecessary for him? They still have power, after all, particularly in the provinces.

[Yakovlev] No, what kind of power is that! Were he not the leader, they would have no power. That's the whole point. They are speculating on this: The general secretary of the apparatus is president of the country.

[Moroz] So you believe that Gorbachev should have quit as general secretary long since?

[Yakovlev] I believe so. An excellent moment to leave was the 28th congress. A plenum like this year's April plenum could be anticipated even then. Had it not been for his second speech—very strong and extempore—there's no knowing how everything would have turned out. People were at that time, remember, starting to give all members of the Politburo marks. I said that I would leave the congress because this was altogether a reprisal—reprisal for perestroika, for the departure from Stalinism... I know all about this. This was how everything began at the 1929 April Plenum, when a new cohort of politicians which subsequently grouped around Stalin surfaced.

[Moroz] If Gorbachev quits as general secretary, on which political force will he rely? Might he rely on your Democratic Reform Movement?

[Yakovlev] This would depend on him. We reject no one.

[Moroz] Have you left his team conclusively or do you believe that you might yet meet with him on some paths?

[Yakovlev] Much will depend on him. If the policy of a rapprochement with the democrats for which he has now opted continues, I see no obstacles to joint continuation of the cause in which I really sincerely believe. Ultimately we have to pull the country onto the tracks of democratic development! Ultimately our people have a right to this!

[Moroz] How do you evaluate the shakeup in the leadership of the Communist Party of Russia? Will anything change following the replacement of Polozkov with Kuptsov?

[Yakovlev] I have always been very skeptical of this form of organization of the Russian Communist Party. If it is to be formed, let it be legitimately, starting with elections in the primary organizations. Otherwise you have formed some "appendix" of the "big" congress. I sat through this Russian congress for half a day and then simply left. Hearing all this was for me—how best to put it—uncomfortable. Uncomfortable for the party and for the Communists, who concertedly advocated the expulsion of five or six persons and concertedly opposed perestroika and engaged in demagoguery. Generally, I understand them: other than command, while being responsible for nothing, they do not know how to do anything. This is their tragedy, misfortune. But it is necessary to find within oneself the courage to quit. And take up the work of which they are capable (such can still be found, perhaps). But, you know, this is the question which arises here: the wages will be lower, there will be no privileges, there will be no power... It is a dreadful business—power. It is a cancerous tumor, metastasis.

As far as the first secretary is concerned, his entourage is such that he will hardly succeed in shifting it.

[Moroz] But the fact that they voted, for all that, for Kuptsov—a more moderate person than Polozkov, evidently—apparently means something?

[Yakovlev] They voted not [begin bold]for[end bold] Kuptsov, but [begin bold]against[end bold] Polozkov. And not because they do not like him—they are wholly on his side. It is simply that they saw that the party masses could no longer agree with Polozkov continuing in this office. And they removed him. This is the customary cynicism. Kuptsov is a more moderate person, perhaps, but it is hardly within his powers to handle this grouping, a Stalinist grouping.

[Moroz] Polozkov was dismissed with the traditional fraudulent wording—"in connection with his transfer to other work." As if a person was not being removed on account of general unanimous rejection even on the part of his own "hawk" friends but because, you see, our unhappy, fouled-up and looted agriculture, having only just been relieved of one Kuzmich, simply cannot manage without another. Do you know this outstanding specialist in the sphere of agriculture by the name of

Polozkov? What do you think, why is it this sector which is used as a gutter for the discharge of talentless party functionaries?

[Yakovlev] I do not understand this. I absolutely do not understand. And this also increases my suspicions that some revanche grouping is being created. What will he handle as first deputy minister? The development of tenant farming? Land reform? I do not understand.

[Moroz] What do you think, are there among the people holding the key positions in the Union leadership—I refer to the president, vice president, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, prime minister, ministers—sincere supporters of reforms?

[Yakovlev] I have not probed their hearts but I believe that the president is really a supporter of reforms. A couple of his aides are truly supporters of reforms. Bakatin, member of the Security Council, is truly a supporter of reforms... But I would put it this way: the list is very short.

[Moroz] You are the favorite target of persecution for the right. And it is not only you, what is more, who are being persecuted in your name—Gorbachev also was persecuted in cowardly manner until recently (you were named, but he was meant). Now, when criticizing him out in the open is permissible, you are receiving mainly only your own share of attacks...

[Yakovlev] ...They have not become any the fewer, however...

[Moroz] For which of the currents of the right which are participating in this persecution do you feel the most revulsion—neo-Bolsheviks, initiators, Polozkovites, "Soyuzniki," national patriots, United Workers Front people? Which seems to you objectively to be the most dangerous?

[Yakovlev] I have an identical attitude toward them. I do not separate them in terms of the extent of my derision. My derision is evoked not so much by what they write but by what they do. And they are doing dreadful things for our people. Dreadful. First, the aspiration to take the people back, to cast them once again into this darkness, dirt and poverty, this in itself is shameful. The main danger is the link up of all these forces around neo-Stalinism. After all, the "Word to the People" is also a yearning for Stalinism... And "Yedintsvo" and the initiators and the right wing in the CPSU and Zhirinovskiy... This is all a yearning for a military-bureaucratic dictatorship. They are all infected with the virus of Bolshevism. They are infected with it in their whole being. Their entire mentality. After all, Stalinism is a creation of Bolshevism. It is the logical continuation of Bolshevism, a part thereof. And Bolshevism has as its sources certain propositions of Marxism: dictatorship of the proletariat, class struggle, revolutionary violence, violence as a midwife, scorn for the civil society, scorn for

the middle stratum—craftsmanship, the peasantry... Whence all our intolerance, endless struggle, mutual destruction...

[Moroz] Throughout the world a right wing, conservative political persuasion by no means presupposes some amorality and ethical and intellectual deficiency. There are among the right by no means fewer decent, intelligent and cultured people than in other political schools. Take those same Tories. With us, however, the right consists, as a rule, of dregs and fools. What do you think, what is the reason for this?

[Yakovlev] The right with them and the right with us are totally different concepts. It is frequently more interesting even to converse and have dealings in the West with the right. These are cultured and educated people, as a rule. Their conservatism is manifested in respect to the family, elementary moral principles, Christian values... Not rushing their actions, not spurring events, proceeding from common sense... But no conservative in America or Britain would say: Listen, we need to take this country back 50 years! They all believe that it is necessary to move forward, but they adhere firmly here to positions of nonviolence and constitutionality. But our right is calling us back.

[Moroz] This is not the only difference, most likely. All means are serviceable for our right: lies, deception, falsification, slander.

[Yakovlev] Yes, any means, whatever you wish. How is it possible, say, to take a quotation and attribute it to an entirely different person? I have had personal experience of this: They take a quote from an entirely different Yakovlev and start to repeat it over and over. What kind of morals are these! What kind of ethics are these! Or they simply lie. Outright. And all this is done with the expectation of impunity, what is more. Were this to happen in any democratic society, it would be necessary to fork out a \$5 million, \$10 million fine. We do not have this. But we should have. I believe that we would institute proceedings against Prokhanov, who declared in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA that our Democratic Reform Movement is being subsidized by foreign capital...

[Moroz] As Bulgakov would say, I congratulate you, citizen, on having lied! Is it worth getting mixed up with these little yapping dogs who are out of their minds?

[Yakovlev] Well, look, we cannot be continually letting them off!

[Moroz] Do you on the human level experience some pain, some suffering, when you are needled in so boorish and underhanded a way? Are you a sensitive person?

[Yakovlev] Yes, unfortunately, I sometimes fail to take the punch. Nonetheless, I shall not go down. You will have noticed, possibly, that throughout these six years, despite all the attacks, I have mentioned only one name—Makashov. Just once. He trod on what is to me

sacrosanct. I have been, after all, a war invalid since the age of 19, and he dares to toy with another's wounds! This seemed to me so blasphemous! I wanted to call the public's attention to the fact that this kind of general would agree to anything—executions, killings, suppression. Any Tambov, Kronshtadt, Yaroslavl uprising is for him a joy. So that he can crush everyone and drown them in blood. This was the only time that I responded to slander. Otherwise I do not respond. I do not know, perhaps I am doing wrong. My comrades reproach me for not responding: You will look like a delicate girl, they say. But how disgusting all this is. I am reluctant to get involved in it. You feel, having picked up the pen and having written the first word, that you need to run and wash your hands.

[Moroz] Nonetheless, you should be grateful to the right: It was thanks to them that the world learned for the first time that you were one of the initiators of perestroika, thanks to their furious attacks on you.

[Yakovlev] (distrustfully) Do you mean to say that it might not have learned without them?

[Moroz] Have you in your life made mistakes of which you would like to repent?

[Yakovlev] Such for which repentance is necessary, no. I hope you are not referring to instances where, as a child, I had fights with little boys, and we broke one another's noses. You are probably not talking about this... Here is something, evidently, of which to repent—but this is not just for me alone, most likely—we were all, come to that, cowards! Cowards. If we had had the courage to speak and act in time... Of course, people were executed for this earlier. Then a system of moral execution was created. Under Andropov. The system of moral persecution continues now. But we are now speaking openly, for all that. Even so, you know, I am very much afraid that, really shut people up now and post a soldier outside the doors, and very many people will once again have their tail between their legs.

[begin bold]IN PLACE OF A POSTSCRIPT: As we have already said, these words were spoken a few hours prior to the putsch. After it had begun, soldiers were posted near many doors. And not only soldiers—armored combat vehicles and tanks. Many people did, indeed, have their tail between their legs. But the people as a whole did not and did not submit to the gang of adventurers. A return to the times of Stalin's fascism did not ensue.

[begin bold]The ringleaders of the putsch and some of their exposed accomplices have been arrested. The Russian Communist Party, whose leadership had from the very moment it was founded engaged vigorously in incitement to rebellion, has been suspended. Another branch of instigators is the literary branch, and men of letters of the Prokhanov, Bondarenko, Bondarev, Doroshenko, Rash and Bushin type feel pretty good, apparently. As also the inflammatory sheets of the MOSKOVSKIY LITERATOR and DEN type published by

these people. General Varennikov, who selflessly organized bloody cataclysms now in one part of the country, now in another, has been arrested. But Gromov and other generals who called for the putsch and who participated therein directly or indirectly remain in office.

[begin bold]The most dangerous, most mortally dangerous thing today is leaving unpunished those who are really guilty and letting everyone off lightly, as we did in Tbilisi and Vilnius. If we do, Tbilisi, Vilnius, and Moscow will inevitably come around once more.

Yakovlev Interviewed on Recent Events in USSR

LD0409031191 London BBC Television Network
in English 2130 GMT 2 Sep 91

[Interview with Aleksander Yakovlev, former adviser to USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, by reporter Mark Urban in Moscow on 2 September; from the "Newsnight" program—recorded]

[Text] [Urban] Do you believe obstruction of the president's policies will remain solely on the bureaucratic level, or do you think there is a real danger now of another coup?

[Yakovlev] Yes. I am not a man who is absolute optimist. I estimate the events without euphoria. Yes, the democratic movement got new possibilities. It is a fact. It is a fact. But the conservative reactionary forces now are under pressure—moral pressure, political pressure—but they exist, especially on the level of regions, republics. That should a party happen to be the main stopping mechanism of perestroika and reforms, and the base of totalitarian regime, it's a problem. Now we can say that the totalitarian regime is finished, but not the totalitarian conscience.

[Urban] Do you think, in any sense, that as a result of these events, there is now too much power in the hands of Mr. Yeltsin?

[Yakovlev] He is responsible for the republic, for the real situation in the republic. He cannot put this responsibility on everybody else, or somebody else. Only he, and he understands that. In a week, two weeks—I don't know—months, people would begin to say in the way of: What are you doing in the way of the commissions? That totally opposes.

[Urban] When do you think we're going to see concrete action, then—particularly on the economy?

[Yakovlev] Yes. Yes. It is necessary to go as quickly as possible to the market economy. It is necessary to have the free enterprise, free trade, and free movement of capitals—foreign, internal—and so on. Free enterprise of the real fabrics of plants, and so on and so on. Especially, I think, that during this winter we should improve the situation in agrarian sphere. It is really key to all economic reforms. It was a mistake of perestroika

and of all of us. We began with politics, industry, and so on. We had to begin from peasants, from agrarian sphere of our life.

Union Government's Prospects Viewed

PM0209092391 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 30 Aug 91 p 1

[Article by Leonid Skoptsov and Konstantin Skobeyev under the "Commentary" rubric: "Future Union Cabinet: Its Fate Is Just as Vague as the Future of the Union Itself"]

[Text] That it is so is obvious: Even the leaders of the Committee for the Operational Administration of the National Economy created by Gorbachev (I. Silayev, A. Volskiy, Yu. Luzhkov, and G. Yavlinskiy) are not burning with the desire to head the new USSR Cabinet of Ministers. They obviously see no future in it.

And our renowned economist Vasily Selyunin believes that neither the USSR nor the union Cabinet of Ministers has any chance of surviving. Especially now that the republics, having taken advantage of the putschists's "services," following the proclamation of sovereignties have rapidly nationalized union property. So that all the problems which Ryzhkov and Pavlov were unable to resolve directly, administratively, will have to be resolved now at the level of interstate relations. The vestiges of the union government will to all appearances play the role of the liquidation commission of "USSR incorporated."

Of the serious politicians perhaps now only the USSR president is confident that there is more or less solid ground under the Union and consequently under the union government. But if we discard his references to 1,000 years' experience of joint existence and state building (that argument could be cited with no less justification by, for instance, the apologists of the Austro-Hungarian empire) and also the more than contentious results of the all-union referendum, then the president's confidence is based on one irrefutable fact. A single economic space on one eighth of the world's dry land is not an invention of the Bolshevik but a harsh and even fierce reality.

And let us agree that interrepublican trade exchange is no fiction. And the numerous cooperation ties and the length of production and manufacturing chains are such that by their very logic they dictate the need for coordination and regulating centers—those selfsame notorious sector headquarters.

These two realities—of a common economic organism and a disintegrating unitary state—are establishing the viewpoints which now reign in society with regard to what the future union Cabinet should be like.

One view (it has been most vividly represented by Valentin Pavlov) imposes on the government, come what may, the duty of ruling the Union as a unitary state.

And that means implementing in full and throughout the country's territory the basic functions of state administration—political, administrative, and economic leadership. Then the entire situation in the country willy-nilly is interpreted as the collapse of society and all new problems are assessed as deviations from the "good, controllable" situation irrevocably left behind in the past.

Yet for two years now there has been no single state and in its place before our eyes an interstate formation is arising which includes simultaneously:

- an economic community of economically active subjects, including those operating on territories which have lost political unity with the Union (in fact that is the CEMA space), where the union government can enter only into interstate relations;
- a political community of these states in the face of the outside world—a confederation in which republics like the Ukraine, Armenia, Belorussia, and Azerbaijan acquire or have acquired state independence;
- a state community of sovereign states—a federation of states which have agreed—at their own wish or under pressure of circumstances—to renounce part of their sovereignty: To all appearances that is a union of Russia with Kazakhstan and Central Asia.

But the dust from the collapsed edifice of the unitary union statehood is still getting in everyone's eyes. Pavlov, like the other rulers, did not want to breathe that dust and went over to the putschists.

Others not so encumbered by great-power complexes came to terms with it. This coming to terms was at the basis of the second viewpoint: A president fulfilling representative functions more than anything and with a small apparatus remains at the head of the Union. Thus Yeltsin's long-standing idea of Gorbachev in the role of the Queen of England will be fully embodied. And the real union government under these conditions will be the government of the most powerful republic—Russia—although it too will be doomed to constant rivalry and economic wars with its allies.

Of course the liquidation period will require some union executive and administrative organ. But such a union cabinet will have no real powers of authority. And it could become a miniparliament in which representatives of the republics will, given good will, coordinate their interests.

The fate of such a weak government is a sorry one. Either no one will listen to it and it will discredit itself, having played the part of the latest scapegoat for the inevitable economic difficulties. Or else it will try to strengthen itself with the powers of authority now usurped by the republics and then it will inevitably enter into conflict with the republics, primarily with Russia, and will be removed by it.

Yet in the inevitable competition between centers of power, the union cabinet will have two, as yet unnoticed, but determining advantages. First, the republican governments, including the Russian government, will spend a few more years putting together an apparatus capable of working while the union government still has such an apparatus and it can be preserved to a considerable extent for the fulfillment of new functions. Second, in the chase after sovereignties and independence, the republics have swallowed a big hook on which they can be kept by the union leadership. Having taken on state property they have also assumed responsibility for the decline of production, the lowering of the living standard, and inevitable mass unemployment.

If the new union cabinet succeeds in avoiding responsibility for the fate of property which does not belong to the Union then in the next few months the enterprise directors, faced with mass layoffs, will demand from the republican governments the right to work with enterprises "abroad" in the Union. The process will begin of the return of unprofitable (primarily high-technology defense) industry. To whom? To the Union, naturally, no one else will take it.

That is the union government has every chance not simply of surviving but also of substantially strengthening its position. It is true that these chances will not appear now, but in two or three months, when the euphoria of independence has passed and the burden of real problems and the approaching winter force the republics to snuggle together as closely as possible. And these chances will be used only by a government whose members remember that the main advantage of the new cabinet is that it is a union body first and only second a government.

Russia Reaffirms Inviolability of Soviet Borders

OW0209002391 Moscow INTERFAX in English
0001 GMT 2 Sep 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy and President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan speaking after talks in Alma-Ata on Friday had both reaffirmed commitment to last year's bilateral agreement stating the inviolability of borders within the framework of the Union.

They suggested that the republics wanting to stay in the Union must set up provisional interstate structures to keep the economy afloat over a transitional period.

On Russia's recent statement on the border issue, Mr Rutskoy said the question was just one of border demarcation in the event of any republic deciding to secede from the Union.

Earlier, Russia and the Ukraine, as well as the Baltic republics also pledged commitment to bilateral agreements.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on Gorbachev's Future

PM3008135291 Paris LE FIGARO in French
28 Aug 91 p 2

[Article by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Editor Vitaliy Tretyakov: "Yeltsin Should Moderate the Enthusiasm of His Supporters and Gorbachev Should Resign"]

[Text] Mikhail Gorbachev dreamed of signing the new Union Treaty in order to maintain the USSR as a united state on the world political map. The preservation of the USSR would, of course be the means of responding to the need for stability in Europe and in the world and the ideal solution to all the problems. The question is whether ideal solutions are possible, especially in politics. And whether, in a country torn by contradictions, it is necessary to draw up a political strategy and tactics which take a single course and do not recognize any alternative. In my view, that would be a crude and unforgivable mistake for the president of such a powerful country.

The desire to sign the Union Treaty by any means, notably by military pressure against the "rebel" republics, complicated the problem of signing the Union Treaty. The treaty was attacked both by the reactionaries (who dreamed of maintaining a centralized empire without compromising with the republics), and the democrats (who did not believe in a center capable of compromise, because the center was embodied by outmoded men and policies). The putsch has greatly exacerbated this dilemma. It was primarily the signing of a treaty on 20 August involving a compromise with the republics, which prompted the reactionaries to launch a coup d'etat. Second, the collapse of the center and of Gorbachev himself showed that the center was envisaging the treaty is an imperialist rather than a democratic way.

Third, the crushing of the putsch and the resulting events led to the rapid strengthening of the new Russian leadership. This is natural because the opponents of the uprising were primarily Russia, Moscow, and Yeltsin. They should therefore enjoy the fruits of it. Like the other republics which do not trust the center, the Russian leadership decided to safeguard itself from any attempt to repeat the attempted coup d'etat. That is why Russia seized as many state structures and mechanisms formerly controlled by the center as possible. This seizure of power, far from being fully realized, frightened the other republics and was, it must be said, potentially excessive. Yeltsin immediately recognized the full independence of the Baltic republics, but did not do likewise for the others. Notably for the Ukraine.

Aggravation of Tensions

Yeltsin aides of less political caliber even accused the Ukraine of treason, or complicity with the putschists. The result of this rigid Russian stance was that the Ukraine declared full independence and sovereignty, not

only in the economic sphere but also over the Soviet army units and the navy ships on its territory.

Russia immediately declared that the territorial issue has only been settled with the Baltic republics and not with other republics aspiring to independence.

These objective risks of aggravating inter-republican tensions are the fault of the bad policy pursued before the putsch in connection with the signing of the Union Treaty.

How does the future look? It is obvious that the republics which have not bowed to the center's dictatorship will be even more mistrustful of the danger of a dictatorship, even a potential dictatorship, by Russia. And yet Russia is forced to push ahead, to encroach on the center's positions, because it fears a new putsch.

Instead of deciding its position on the basis of the main question, that of the coup d'etat and those responsible for it, the Union parliament is trying to refuse all blame. Indeed, there is chaos in parliament which does not want to relinquish its full powers. Seeing that, the republics are losing confidence in everything but themselves.

President Gorbachev, who previously seemed to be the supreme arbiter of these discussions, still aspires to that role, but few people believe in him. Russia itself has no confidence in him.

So far, I can see only one possibility of solving all problems in a democratic way—to replace Gorbachev by constitutional means by a more progressive figure whose candidacy should satisfy all the republics remaining in the Union. But Gorbachev refuses and this is a mistake. Unfortunately, he seems to intend to play the republican card against Russia, which will merely complicate the situation.

Everybody is now right, aside from the center and Gorbachev, which will probably bring about the collapse of the Union into a series of independent republics and of "blocs." The Russian leadership could improve the situation if it accepted compromise, not with Gorbachev but with the republics. It is not easy to know whether the Russian democrats, currently vacillating between the euphoria of victory and the fear of a new putsch, are capable of it. It is fairly unlikely.

Moments of crisis will become more intense and the disintegration will speed up. It is frightening. But it is also frightening to think that the reactionaries can exploit these circumstances.

The responsibility for our future rests primarily with two people: Yeltsin, who must moderate the enthusiasm of his subordinates, and Gorbachev, who must finally resign to solve at least one of the problems. If they do nothing, the situation could become more complicated and reach catastrophic proportions.

Gorbachev Compared to King Lear

914B0361B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 27 Aug 91 p 1

[Article by Igor Korolkov, political commentator of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA: "Personal Drama of the President"]

[Text] The fate of Gorbachev is no less dramatic than the fate of Shakespeare's deceived King Lear. Welcoming the flatterers and the corrupt while repudiating the honest and dedicated ones—this is a conflict which is as old as the world, and which has now been replicated in another country, in another cycle of time. Cordelia, who was rejected for her honesty, saved Lear, just like the excommunicated leadership of Russia saved Gorbachev. A tragedy had to occur in order for the USSR president, like the king, to be enlightened and see who was who.

Gorbachev is now going through an inner drama. His principle of selecting cadres from among dyed-in-the-wool party apparatchiks has failed. Meanwhile, nobody betrayed Yeltsin in those tragic days, despite the fact that their lives were in danger.

Gorbachev quit the post of CPSU Central Committee general secretary. He frequently referred to the party as the only force in society which could stabilize the situation. Even after returning from captivity in Foros, he still tried to justify the party. However, its role in the putsch is too obvious. He no longer even tries to oppose the nationalization of CPSU assets.

Gorbachev now recognizes what he rejected quite recently. In part, these were his convictions, and in part, the need to accommodate the mighty reactionary force. He is now free from pressure from the likes of Boldin and Kryuchkov, but he is not free of himself. Some of the steps he takes are those which a determined Yeltsin prompts him to take, rather than those the need for which he has come to appreciate himself. He came back to a different country in which three days made the array different from what it used to be.

While wholeheartedly feeling for captive Gorbachev and wishing the president good health, the defenders of the White House who waited for it to be stormed on the night of 20-21 August still could not forgive him this putsch. After all, all plotters were hand-picked by him.

Each of us has his own measure of responsibility. It is the greatest for the president of the country. His mistakes cost the most. Gorbachev, whom people respect greatly for the courage and fortitude he displayed, nonetheless can hardly count on support from the entire people in presidential elections after unwittingly putting the country on the brink of disaster. He will have to see the Novo-Ogarevo process through to the end and retire from the political arena, conceding it to those who turned out to be more perspicacious.

For several days now, I have been watching Gorbachev on TV. It appears to me that he has become kinder, more accessible, and more humane. Gorbachev's air of majesty is no longer there.

King Lear lost a daughter who loved him but had at one time been rejected by him. The president lost three handsome young people who rose to his defense. Yesterday, he called them extremists; now, he bows his head to their courage.

Alas, neither fiction nor history teach us anything. Each new generation goes through virtually everything on its own, with little regard for the experience of the past. Only the experience gained through one's own suffering and personal dramas creates an atmosphere in which different relationships, a different morality, and different people emerge slowly but surely.

Moves To Prevent 'Authoritarianism' Urged

PM3008120891 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 Aug 91 Union Edition p 3

[Otto Latsis article: "Collapse of the Authoritarian Model. Thoughts on Hearing Parliamentary Speeches on the Lessons of the Putsch"]

[Text] General Kornilov carried out the last attempted military coup in our country 74 years ago. It has not happened under Soviet power. After entering on the credit side the legitimate satisfaction at the strength of democracy, it would be sensible to have a good think about the debit side. The most terrible thing is that people died. Plus the blow to the new Union Treaty, which also marks a grave blow to the Union itself—only people like Alksnis with their muddled thinking could have failed to realize that. The convulsive leap in centrifugal emotions and the nervy train of declarations of independence have made the question of the republics' real borders loom on the horizon—this is not far off the Serbo-Croatian syndrome. Add to that the economic losses on the threshold of a hard winter.

The consequences of what has happened for the country's political system are contradictory. The state party apparatus has collapsed—at last, thank God. But so too has the hope of democratically transforming the party itself, an organization comprising millions of people with left-wing convictions. A gaping hole has formed on this flank of the political spectrum, the representation of a vast proportion of social interests has been cut short. The power vacuum—harboring the threat of unpredictable disequilibrium—has intensified in the country with its devastated mechanisms of totalitarianism and as yet undeveloped mechanisms of democracy.

That is the price of this attempt—an attempt that lasted just three days and seemed absurd (in terms of its chances of success). There are grounds for thinking seriously not only about why yesterday's men were unable to win, but also about why they were able to act.

The first answer fell from millions of lips at the moment that we learned the names of the members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency: cadre slipups on Gorbachev's part. Look who he trusted! But political scientists know that this explanation explains nothing. While being true enough in practice, it is logically inadequate and we cannot leave it at that. There must be a "fail-safe" in a well-designed mechanism, a system that rules out serious consequences when the government makes a mistake. Thus, a modern tape recorder will not switch on if you have forgotten to insert a cassette. Cadre mistakes happen in any country, but a perfect political system will not give in to a plotter, even one who has made his way to a top post. This is important: in order to ensure that the political system puts up resistance, at all echelons, without allowing the battle to be switched to the street, where a people's victory may be ensured, but the price is excessively high. Many safety devices did not work or worked poorly in our political system: in state security and army organs, at the Supreme Soviet and other soviets, the government, parties and trade unions, and in the mass media. Each of these systems must be reassembled piece by piece. But first we must find out the fundamental flaw in the political system as a whole.

The striking fact is that the putsch was prepared impudently, almost overtly.

Premier Pavlov blatantly sabotaged economic stabilization and enraged the people due to his financial and credit and pricing intrigues. The press wrote about this every day, all the facts were known, but neither the Supreme Soviet nor the president was able to react properly. The apparatus coup accomplished within the Russian Communist Party when it was set up created a crack detachment of anti-Gorbachev reaction within the heart of the president's party, but attempts to respond to this democratically through the will of party members and criticism in the press failed to produce any results.

As of December a state of emergency was insistently advocated, and January saw it tried out in Lithuania and Latvia with the creation of the public salvation committees—prototypes for the State Committee for the State of Emergency. As of late last year the call for all problems to be resolved by a state of emergency was heard more and more loudly at all CPSU Central Committee plenums. Someone's firm hand prevented people from the democratic wing from gaining access to the rostrum. (However, this was not just "someone"—we are well aware who it was: It was Boldin who first got his hands on notes asking to be given the floor). Toward summer Prokofyev organized special groups to formulate the "scientific" ideology for the state of emergency—the fruits of its labor were published in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, preparing people mentally for a state of emergency. There is no need to mention the propaganda in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and Prokhanov's bragging [reference unknown]. I would remind you: The signatories to the July call for a putsch in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA included two future members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency (Tizyakov and

Starodubtsev) and one of the most active plotters—General Varennikov. Democracy saw everything, it yelled about everything, and did nothing.

It could do nothing. Admittedly, tremendous progress has been made compared with the decades of silence when society was unable to come to terms with itself: A mechanism for democratic speech has now been set up. But there are no mechanisms for democratic action. The state party's pyramid of power was terrible with officials dealing with all questions, watching to see which way every cog would move and what every citizen was interested in. This Leviathan could not govern social development in the interests of the people—it governed solely in its own interests. But it governed somehow. Once we had destroyed this mechanism with its hundreds of thousands of links—from the Central Committee to the rayon party committee, to the plant and the kolkhoz—what did we put in its place?

Gorbachev. More and more functions were reserved for the president; more and more insistently we tried to pester the president on every issue. First loving him passionately for being so unlike Stalin and then increasingly taking umbrage because he did not act as resolutely as Stalin. We told him that he should act very resolutely everywhere—but he did not act resolutely. We put the kind of sound documents on his desk that said everything—what should be done to ensure speedy universal happiness, and how—but he failed to do it.

I will tell you a story to illustrate more graphically how the mechanisms of authority were faltering—simply because I know this for a fact. Many will remember USSR Finance Minister Gostev first suggesting in fall 1988 that a state budget with a deficit be approved for the coming year. This came as a sensation to the whole world—it was only the then USSR Supreme Soviet, which voted in favor of the budget with a deficit unanimously, as always, without asking a single question, that failed to notice this. But a host of questions inevitably arose. For instance: Why did the minister not announce the deficit earlier, why was he now admitting that this had long been the case? Why did he speak of 36 billion, although it was obvious even from his report that the true figure was 99 billion? And—this is the main thing—how would the country survive with that kind of deficit?

The press soon asked all these questions, but Pavlov, Gostev's replacement, paid no heed. In December Ye. Gaydar and I, with the blessing of the chief editor of *KOMMUNIST*, N. Bikkenin, wrote a brief memorandum to Gorbachev about the problem of the deficit, enclosing articles from the journal on this topic. Incidentally, in one article at the time Ye. Gaydar wrote that similar budget deficits in Argentina and Brazil in the past had given rise to such inflation that there ended up being a military coup.

The general secretary's assistant (it was I. Frolov at the time) immediately put the memorandum on Gorbachev's desk. We soon learned that the memorandum

had been read out and discussed at length at a Politburo session and the Council of Ministers had been instructed to urgently rectify things with the budget. I was puzzled by this news which would have heralded unprecedented success in the recent past. In the past the government never told the people about the real state of finances, the press was never able to write about the deficit, our former bosses did not approve of these kind of memos, assistants in those days did not hand them to the leadership, and the Politburo never inquired about finances. But, on the other hand, the attention paid to an appeal from a couple of journalists was discouraging. Were none of them keeping abreast of financial matters? What was the finance minister doing? What about the premier?

But I was most struck by the end result of this chain of democratic processes and apparatus successes. It was zero. The government calmly and openly "wrapped up" the matter, making do with a highly vacuous resolution. The 1989 deficit was no less than the previous year's. Then came Ryzhkov's war against the "500 Days" program—a program that envisaged, as a first step, making a draconian cut in the deficit. We then got to know Premier Pavlov and under him the kind of deficit that we could not have even imagined yesterday in a bad dream. Finally, we learned of the State Committee for the State of Emergency, which includes the same Pavlov, promising to eliminate economic difficulties with tanks.

What did we find striking in this story at the time? The terrible helplessness of the system notwithstanding the tremendous progress made by democracy. The finance minister failed to do his direct duty and the premier failed to notice. The question was discussed for some reason by the Politburo, the general secretary raised it, but at the time the premier spoke about economic difficulties in his public speeches in a kind of detached way, in the third person as if he was not accountable for the economy. Instead of taking the minister and premier by the scruff of the neck, setting a strict level for the deficit, and rigorously observing it, the Supreme Soviet (the new, democratically elected Supreme Soviet) itself planned more and more expenditure on social purposes, with no concern for the source of the revenue. There was fantastic unprofessionalism among cadres and a total absence of a well-thought-out system in all echelons.

It turned out that the countless malfunctions could only be rectified by the person at the top of the pyramid of power. But he too was unable to cope with supervising implementation of previously adopted decisions. It is not every day that journalists have a chance to put a letter on the desk of the country's leader and it is not every day that they can guess the kind of letter required. The wrecking of budget decisions was now being discussed not in memos, but in many authors' articles. In response there were aggrieved speeches by leaders: Journalists do not like anything, whatever the government does, they abuse everything. But what could you do when everything was being done wrong?

With the appearance of the post of president—who did not give up the job of general secretary—so many functions rested with him that he was clearly physically incapable of responding to all the incoming information. A situation developed whereby his assistants could regulate at will the flow of information—and misinformation, if they wanted—which was what Boldin did. In that case the main problem was not merely that the president was relying on the wrong person, but that he was forced to rely on anyone: He did not have time to grasp things for himself.

This was the time that he openly lost control of the party. Against his will the RSFSR Communist Party was cobbled together by apparatus intrigue (Gorbachev proposed a CPSU Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR). Against his will the apparatus put Prokofyev at the head of the Moscow organization (Gorbachev suggested Volskiy). Against his will Polozkov became head of the Russian Communist Party (Gorbachev suggested Kuptsov from the outset). During the second phase of the Russian Communist Party Constituent Congress, which developed into an unseemly apparatus orgy, Gorbachev apathetically kept quiet next to the chairman—in three days he made no speech or rejoinder.

Why then did he not abandon the party matters with which the president was clearly unable to cope? I do not know, I had no chance to ask. But, judging from the logic of events, he could not bring himself to give up his responsibility as a good czar governing all the people's affairs. I do not know whether he had heard of the fashionable theory that you cannot switch straight from a totalitarian system to a democratic system—you supposedly have to have an enlightened authoritarian regime in the interim. But we have survived that interim period. The fact that an amazing six years ended in a sickening putsch is not only a personal failure for Gorbachev. It also represents the collapse of our dream of a cozy authoritarian model of power where the good czar takes care of everything and everyone. There is no road to democracy via autocracy. The road to democracy lies via democracy, that is to say—the power of the people.

You cannot have one person keeping an eye on everything—it is too easy to lock one person up in Foros. I would feel at ease in a country where every lieutenant is personally well aware that you cannot drive into a city in a tank—even if a marshal gives the order. A country where every plant director and every worker at that plant knows that losses cannot be permitted—the State Bank and the Finance Ministry will not cover them, bankruptcy will ensue. A country where every editor knows that he will be unable to hide any socially significant information from his readers—no bosses will come to the rescue. All social systems have to be organized so that they can operate correctly in a highly autonomous manner.

I, a voter, ask the USSR Supreme Soviet, pondering the lessons of the putsch, not to arrange the social system to suit a "good czar." Do it for a bad one, to ensure that

even he is not terrifying if anything happens. We have reduced the concepts of a rule-of-law state and a civil society to empty words by our blather—they sound hollow, like "developed socialism." Yet these are highly necessary concepts with very definite substance. Things look bleak without them.

Presidential Spokesman on Coup Response

914B0367B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 34, Aug 91 p 2

[Interview with V. Ignatenko, press secretary of the USSR president, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent A. Binev; place and date not given: "The Putsch Began... With Seizing a 'Member Carrier'"]

[Text] V. Ignatenko, press secretary of the USSR president, is one of the most conspicuous figures (literally and figuratively) on the "team" of the president. Naturally, our readers are interested to know where he was at "H-Hour," what preceded all of these events, and what happened in the Kremlin...

Our correspondent A. Binev met with V. Ignatenko and asked him all of these questions.

[Ignatenko] It is the custom in our office to take leave at the same time as the USSR president because he needs our service when he is in Moscow. On 12 August I went to Sochi, where my mother lives.

On 20 August I was in Moscow. At first, I went to my friends at NOVOYE VREMYA. Yuriy Rost from LITERATURNAYA GAZETA was at A. Pumpyanskiy's place; he also rushed there from far away. That night I set out for my house. I live in the same house as B. Pugo. There were soldiers nearby.

I determined that the president was alive when I listened to the press conference of the coupists the day before. I could feel this from how they responded.

[Binev] Why did you go home? After all, there was a danger of your arrest.

[Ignatenko] The point is that I had some personal papers associated with the president at home. They did not contain any secrets, but nonetheless I did not want them to fall into the hands of strangers.

[Binev] Perhaps you analyzed all the prior events this night, and since. Have you drawn any conclusions?

[Ignatenko] On the morning of 21 August I came to the Kremlin in order to figure out the existing situation. There were many people in the corridors, bustle. I knew the faces of many of them, but I had not communicated with them before. I gathered my staff, who also came there, and said that I could no longer work there without Gorbachev. The employees of the department also came to this decision.

We got in touch with Bakatin, Primakov, Volskiy, and Shakhnazarov and resolved to hold a press conference, which was later broadcast from the Science and Industry Union.

As far as analyzing prior events. In principle there were some symptoms. Had we been more attentive we could have noticed them and sounded the alarm. For example, before there was an instruction of the USSR president, on 2 or 3 August, all the telephone and government communications of A.N. Yakovlev, down the corridor from me, were switched off. That is, this was done to a man who has done so much for democratic perestroika in the country! I was altogether shaken by this. Meanwhile, government communications exist to this day, for example, in the apartment of Ye.K. Ligachev.

Another symptom. On the eve of my leave V. Boldin, then chief of staff of the USSR president, held a meeting with the heads of subunits. We had mutual dislike for each other. However, this had to do with all memoranda, papers, and documents going through him. This was extremely unpleasant. A fellow employee of mine went to the meeting and later told me that, in response to a question on the date that should be written on the Union treaty file, someone said that Ignatenko named 20 August at a press conference. Boldin explained: "How come 20 August!" Later, he paused and went on to say: "Do not deliver information to Ignatenko anymore." By then, the president was no longer in Moscow. I attributed this to our mutual dislike, and did not make a fuss.

One more thing. In Sochi, I learned a detail which astounded me. Shenin, who was also involved in the coup, came to Sochi to vacation the day before and occupied Dacha No. 4—a separate mansion. He was vacationing "out of his league"—at a colossal dacha which had not been visited for more than six years. I was told that Romanov was the last one to live there. Only the president could vacation at a separate dacha. Well, perhaps the prime minister too.

Also, there was this detail, perhaps not the most important one, but also quite instructive. G. Shakhnazarov told me about this. Pugo and his wife vacationed together with them. They had always been sociable people, but one day B. Pugo up and went to Moscow right away without saying goodbye to anyone. He came there in a Volga but left in a huge car which the people call "a member carrier." At the time, this amused me.

As I recall all of this now, I become more convinced that apparently these people had proceeded in this direction for a while. For example, Yu. Plekhanov (chief of the security service) allowed himself to make tactless remarks to ranking employees of the presidential staff. On one occasion, when I was sick (the only day in a year), he called me at home and began to dress me down for some answer of mine at a press conference which "was not what it should have been." I had never heard such rebukes from the president, and here was this General

Plekhanov! The menacing general threatened: "You are risking loss of my support."

I did not communicate with these people. We had our own circle—Chernyayev, Bakatin, Yakovlev, Shakhnazarov, Primakov.

[Binev] What would you say about Baklanov?

[Ignatenko] Virtually nothing. He "moved into" the Kremlin about two weeks before my leave began. He seemed to me to be a quiet man. He was friendly with Boldin, and I believe that the latter was precisely the one to foist Baklanov on the president. Boldin was on unfriendly terms with all others. For example, he could not stand O. Lanina, secretary of the USSR president, who was with M.S. Gorbachev in Foros. Perhaps everybody has seen her on the "Vzglyad" program.

[Binev] Who has taken Boldin's position now?

[Ignatenko] Grigoriy Ivanovich Revenko. I count this man in the ranks of the most principled people on the president's staff. He worked on preparing the Union treaty. He is very democratic, and treats the press with great respect.

EDITORIAL NOTE. The conversation with our journalist was interrupted when V. Ignatenko was summoned to the apparatus of the USSR president. He received a new appointment as general director of TASS.

Burlatskiy Interviews Shevardnadze on Coup

914B0360A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*
in Russian No 34, 28 Aug 91 p 7

[Interview with Eduard Shevardnadze, by F. Burlatskiy:
"A Revolution From Below Is Beginning"]

[Text] [Burlatskiy] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, we all recall your historic speech, I would say, at the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, when you expressed a most serious warning about the possibility of the establishment of a dictatorship of reactionary forces in our country. How do you evaluate the junta's attempted coup d'état and what lessons, from your viewpoint, are the most important?

[Shevardnadze] First, a few words about the feelings I entertain. I was very upset that no conclusions were drawn following my speech and my resignation. Events were developing rapidly, and there was much evidence that a real threat existed. The events in the Baltic, for example, showed how force is used, then the besieged Kremlin, when the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia and the USSR Supreme Soviet were in session, then the speeches of the three ministers and Pavlov's demand for a broadening of his authority. This list could be continued. So the president of the USSR had considerable evidence and important facts, which should have shown him that our warnings were well-founded, that

they were not empty words and that a real threat existed. But the conclusion was not drawn, and then the attempted coup.

What now? Let us not speak about the entire dramatic tension of the situation. I believe that the junta is more numerous, with more extensive connections than it would seem. It is not just eight to 10 persons, history is not like this.... The people are now rejoicing, despite the casualties. They have a right to rejoice, to celebrate. I am, nonetheless, troubled by the mood of equability, complacency and euphoria. This also can be explained, this also is natural, most likely. But neither today nor tomorrow nor in a month's or five months' time will anything have changed from the standpoint of people's social situation, material provision and supplies. On the contrary, the situation is deteriorating, the production slump continues and the harvest is a poor one.

I forecast that we will experience big social upheavals in the fall. Winter will be very difficult. I fear most a weary, disenchanted people really taking to the streets. We would then in addition need to think about who might emerge in the political arena—from the left or the right, the radical left or some adventurers. Quite unknown people could come to hold high office. This could be the start of total anarchy and total political and economic chaos. This is what everyone, literally everyone, needs to be thinking about now.

[Burlatskiy] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, do you not think that, following the Fourth Congress, we let slip some moment for organizing forces within the congress, within the Supreme Soviet, within the democratic movements in order to oppose the offensive of dictatorship, including such organizations as Soyuz, which was making its position known perfectly distinctly even then?

[Shevardnadze] You deputies made the right choice, in my opinion. But I still do not understand why the president remained obstinate and was unwilling to believe that such a real danger really existed.

[Burlatskiy] You believe that he was even then under pressure from reactionaries or that he simply did not understand what was happening?

[Shevardnadze] That's most likely it, he did not understand, did not want, probably, to understand. Here lies the entire tragedy, the whole trouble. This trait is characteristic of many leaders, evidently. There has been a multitude of examples in history of a person not wanting to believe that terrible things are being done. In my opinion, this is precisely what was happening with Mikhail Sergeyevich. And this distresses me greatly. This has cost the country dear...

The situation in the Supreme Soviet was difficult. I still believe, however, that any group has a right to exist. But the Soyuz group, many members of this group, in any

event, are of a reactionary frame of mind, it is Lukyanov's creation. They did not advertise their involvement in the putsch but backed the junta and supplied it with material and conclusions and helped the reactionaries to act.

At a recent meeting of our democratic movement, of which you are a member, the writer Shatrov said that the ideologist of the putsch was Lukyanov. And almost all participants in the discussion agreed. He was not only the ideologist, he was the organizer also.

[Burlatskiy] What lessons are now particularly important for the USSR Supreme Soviet and Congress of People's Deputies?

[Shevardnadze] The first thing, it seems to me, is that we need to clarify the situation concerning the Congress of People's Deputies inasmuch as the situation in the Supreme Soviet is quite shaky. The Supreme Soviet will at the present meetings, naturally, decide a number of questions, but the cardinal decisions need to be adopted at the congress. It is necessary to form a government and the executive authorities quickly. This could be done in an hour, of course, but who takes the positions here, what kind of people—this is what is of immense importance. Who will head the Supreme Soviet if the office of chairman is preserved at all? Laptev is being named, for example. He is a worthy person in all respects, with an expansive outlook and culture, he is popular among the deputies and in the country and he knows how to work with people. This is a big advantage.

The central issue is formation of the government. The situation is now very complex, and there are particular interests of the republics, and account needs to be taken of these interests. But, for all that, I would now, bearing in mind the catastrophic state of the economy and the entire social sphere, invite into the government professionals because dilettantism has cost us very dear. This applies to Ryzhkov and Pavlov and certain other leaders. There are important economic specialists who have emerged on the scene of late. They have offered bold programs. It is immaterial how old they are—50, 47 or younger. I saw Yavlinskiy at work at Harvard. We spent several hours with American professors. I have to say that in terms of their training and thinking our scientists are not inferior to their American colleagues and are making more revolutionary proposals, perhaps. We need to make bold decisions, and bold, very bold people, but professionals, are now needed.

[Burlatskiy] What do you think, should the USSR Supreme Soviet and Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR continue for some further period or, as some people are proposing, should we now wholly abandon central structures and immediately form some new structures based on representation of the republics?

[Shevardnadze] On the one hand the situation dictates very radical solutions—dissolution of the government and the Supreme Soviet because the Supreme Soviet also had certain shortcomings, mainly through the fault of the

leadership. Nor was the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR always on top of the situation. On the other, it is now necessary to act, it is necessary to enact new laws. We therefore need to move toward general elections of a legislature representing all strata of the population and all the republics. We need to give very serious thought to the president. I have voiced my rebukes of Mikhail Sergeyevich, but this is a very serious matter, and it cannot be postponed. Elections could be prepared in parallel with work on the constitution. But for all this to come about a Union treaty is needed.

[Burlatskiy] You support the conclusion of this treaty as quickly as possible?

[Shevardnadze] As quickly as possible.

[Burlatskiy] Despite the fact that the position of certain republics, the Ukraine, for example, has begun to change?

[Shevardnadze] It is possible to join the Union under conditions of independence also. Why must this entry be considered an infringement of sovereignty? Look at what is happening in Europe and throughout the world, where considerable rights are being delegated—political, economic, military... if this is in the interest of a nation and peoples. I believe that the Ukrainian leaders and the people of the Ukraine will join the Union in principle.

[Burlatskiy] Then in some cases this could be a political union, in others, an economic union of the Common Market type, which neither the Baltic republics nor others which are not a part of the nine reject.

[Shevardnadze] I believe that the Baltic republics, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, all republics need a common economic space. No state, not even the United States, can live in isolation. If the economic space is destroyed, famine will ensue in the country. We in our democratic movement, for example, are paying great attention to questions of a common economic space, a democratic and law-based space on the territory of the USSR and then of the whole of Europe. There is one further prospect—bilateral treaties, this is even more serious than a symbolic Union treaty, perhaps. Then relations may be built on a more stable bilateral basis.

[Burlatskiy] Now about the democratic movement. I refer to the well-known statement signed by nine most important figures. This movement has now acquired powerful stimuli to rapid development. What do you think about the various currents which could join this movement and the possibilities of its becoming a party?

[Shevardnadze] There are no problems for participation in this movement. Representatives of many parties are cooperating with us and are a part of the leadership. I believe that the present lessons, particularly when the CPSU is being demolished and is disintegrating, suggest that the democratic movement cannot exist without a strong, serious force, without a political umbrella. A very crucial decision will have to be made at our constituent

congress, therefore, concerning the formation of a party. It will be a democratic party, and I, for example, advocate such a name or social democratic party, it will be necessary to consult all the delegates, regions and republics here. Now, when the CPSU, with its immense structure, is breaking up at such a pace, we need to act swiftly and dynamically.

[Burlatskiy] But this will not, of course, be a "new type" of party in the old sense but a party with extensive opportunities for internal democracy and for various currents reminiscent of parliamentary parties of the West.

[Shevardnadze] It will be a parliamentary party. You are right, we should not ignore the experience which has been accumulated by civilized countries. Inasmuch as we will have a union of states, I believe that we could take the positions of Socialist International as a basis.

[Burlatskiy] And the final question, it was heard at the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia and in Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev's remarks on television. When he was asked about the main potential threat, he said that it was necessary to watch to ensure that democracy not become dictatorship. Many people are saying that we must not succumb to the temptation to indulge in a "witch hunt."

[Shevardnadze] I share this approach of Aleksandr Nikolayevich's. This is our common position. We have discussed this often. A document was prepared yesterday containing the following words: Hitherto the revolution has been from above, now, in connection with the defeat of the junta, the revolution from below is beginning. People regard the result of the struggle of these three days as a revolution of the masses. This being the case, this is a new stage of the renewal of society, and some new dangers and threats, including a "witch hunt," emerge at new stages. I am very much afraid lest this become widespread.

[Burlatskiy] The main safeguard, most likely, is adherence to legality and constitutional order.

[Shevardnadze] A sound new constitution is needed, as are guarantees that it will work and will be fulfilled.

Lukyanov Details His Role During Coup

*PM3008104091 Paris LE MONDE in French
30 Aug 91 p 6*

[Interview with USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Editor Andrey Karaulov on the night of 27-28 Aug—place not given, first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] Accused by President Gorbachev of having "betrayed" him during the attempted coup, Anatoliy Lukyanov, who was one of his oldest friends, resigned on Monday 26 August from his post as USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman. The latter gave its approval to the

arrest of Mr. Lukyanov which had been demanded by USSR General Prosecutor Nikolay Trubin. Shortly afterward Mr. Trubin announced his own resignation.

Since then, this former conservative leader has been protesting his innocence. In an interview granted on the night of 27 to 28 August to Soviet journalist Andrey Karaulov of independent newspaper NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA (published in France by COURRIER INTERNATIONAL) and of which we are publishing extensive excerpts here, Mr. Lukyanov gives his own account of these three days of the putsch.

[Lukyanov] Do you realise that you are in the office of a future prisoner?

[Karaulov] There should have been no putsch.... When and how did it all start?

[Lukyanov] I was on vacation near Novgorod in the Valday when on 18 August at around 1800 hours the telephone rang. It was Pavlov (Footnote 1) (Then USSR prime minister) who demanded my immediate return to Moscow. He had already sent a helicopter to pick me up. I did not want to go, I even told my wife I was leaving with a heavy heart. But since I was called, I had to go.

[Karaulov] You were expected?

[Lukyanov] I was due to return on 19 August according to what we had agreed with Mikhail Gorbachev, to sign the Union Treaty. But I was told that I must return immediately, that circumstances demanded it, and in particular that a plane had already taken off.

[Karaulov] To go to fetch Gorbachev?

[Lukyanov] I was told "for the Crimea," and I thought that Mikhail Sergeyevich was going to arrive. Thus, at 2100 hours I was here in the Kremlin. I called in at my office before going up to see Pavlov, and it was there that I found the putschists....

[Karaulov] All of them?

[Lukyanov] No, but almost. There was Pavlov, Yanayev, Kryuchkov, and Yazov (Footnote 2) (Four of the eight members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency, perpetrators of the putsch). I was very surprised and I told them that I did not know what was going on, I asked them to explain to me what they wanted. On Pavlov's desk, there were two papers: the decree transferring power and the declaration on the establishment of the state of emergency. I told them immediately that they were launching into an irresponsible adventure. I even called that "the plot of the doomed": "If a coup d'etat is launched, it will spark off civil war, an unprecedented wave of anticommunism, and will greatly damage our foreign policy." Moreover, I thought I had convinced them to some extent. But the group which returned from the south shortly afterward thought that if they suspended their action at that point, they were risking their lives. I said that it was illegal, that power could not be transferred without the president's written

agreement and that I did not believe he was ill, because we had spoken on the telephone several times over the previous days. He was complaining of his sciatica, but that was nothing. I asked them to allow me to telephone him. I kept asking that but was not allowed to do so. I was told that there was no line. They had obviously blocked it. I warned them that their committee did not have the right to proclaim a state of emergency over the whole Union territory, that that was the exclusive prerogative of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The only thing I could give them was my declaration on the Union Treaty. I had drafted it on 16 August. And, after this lively and fairly short discussion, I left Pavlov's office.

I admit that I did not go home, I stayed at the Kremlin, because I did not know what decisions were going to be made. I lay down in the rest room but I could not sleep. I thought that they would change their minds, that the putsch adventure would not happen. It was only in the morning, when I heard the sound of tracked vehicles that I switched on the radio which was broadcasting the communique issued by the State Committee for the State of Emergency. I was outraged that it was my statement which was broadcast first. I then managed to persuade TASS to cite the exact date—the 16th—and then not to start with it.

[Karaulov] And yet, it would have been simple to leave Pavlov's office for central television to appear on the Vremya news program (Footnote 3) (The main television evening news)....

[Lukyanov] You have many illusions if you think that I could have made a telephone call or left like that.

[Karaulov] Were you being watched?

[Lukyanov] Yes, and I knew it. When I tried to make phone calls, I was told that the line was engaged or that there was no such number....

[Karaulov] So, it was a hopeless situation?

[Lukyanov] There were solutions. As always. But I am telling you what happened. Then at 0700 hours I was inundated with questions. I constantly had to give answers, reassure people, and so forth. I started by asking to telephone President Gorbachev again. I had called in the night of 19 August.... No, before, on 18th, because on 19th I was repeatedly told that there was no line. I thought that the navy ships off Foros (Footnote 4) (The place in the Crimea where Mr. Gorbachev was on vacation) could contact him through their channels, but no. Then, late on 21 and again on 22 August, I made every effort to obtain a plane to fly to the Crimea. I told them that otherwise I would get there by my own means... and that I would bring back Gorbachev whatever his condition, because the session could not be held without the president.

[Karaulov] Did you want to know what was the matter with him?

[Lukyanov] I did not know what his state of health was. I had been told that he was sick and could not leave his bed.

[Karaulov] Did you believe that?

[Lukyanov] I wanted to see for myself.

[Karaulov] OK. Gorbachev was sick which made it impossible to call him. But what about Raisa Maksimovna? What about their daughter and their son-in-law? Did you think there was a "family epidemic?"

[Lukyanov] But they could not telephone. Everything was guarded. I saw that with my own eyes when I went to Foros. In addition I had been told that Gorbachev already knew the composition of the committee in which they wanted to include me. But I categorically refused everything.

[Karaulov] In the 19 August press conference, Yanayev hinted that you would join the committee. Were you not in it simply because they needed to be separate from the executive?

[Lukyanov] Yes, that's it! Of course they wanted above all to have the chairman of the Supreme Soviet on their side. And I understand them. But they could not do that. I made every effort to prevent bloodshed, and to ensure that the law was respected. That is why I immediately asked that some of the arrested deputies, including Gdlyan, should not be touched. It must be said that he was subsequently released. But not immediately.

[Karaulov] In fact there was virtually no violation of the law between 19 and 21 August. Aside from a few exceptions....

[Lukyanov] But that is not all. I had warning of the preparation of an attack on the White House (Footnote 5) (Name given to the Russian Parliament). I called the military and I said very firmly that it would be on their heads if any action was taken against the White House or in the surrounding area. Given the number of people there, there was a risk of bloodshed.

[Karaulov] Did you talk to Yazov?

[Lukyanov] I spoke to the military, including Yazov. And in this connection, whatever anyone says, there was no attack on the parliament. None! There was a great deal of noise. And barricades. Khasbulatov telephoned me, then Stolyarov, then Silayev (Footnote 6) (Russian leaders close to Mr. Yeltsin), and there was no attack. We managed to call a meeting at the Defense Ministry on the morning of 21 August, and that night the armed divisions started to leave the capital.

On the morning of 20 August, when Rutskoy, Silayev, and Khasbulatov came to see me, we had discussions lasting 90 minutes (or even more), and we agreed on many points. I felt that we had a basis for joint action.

[Karaulov] You shared the same opinions?

[Lukyanov] People forget it now, but after their visit President Yeltsin issued a decree. It began like this: "The preliminary talks, which the leaders of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic had with USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Lukyanov, who essentially does not support the positions of the group which has called itself State Committee for the State of Emergency, confirm the unconstitutional nature of that committee's organization and action...."

I am convinced that every effort will henceforth be made to portray me as one of the organizers of the plot. I probably made a mistake. I could have refrained from going to Foros, but I would then have felt really guilty.

[Karaulov] Nonetheless, why did Kryuchkov and Yazov go there? What do you think they hoped to achieve?

[Lukyanov] It is difficult to say. I think they wanted to explain to Mikhail Sergeyevich....

[Karaulov] Were they really so naive?

[Lukyanov] That is one explanation. Moreover, it was not really a serious plot. Frankly, in my view, they behaved like amateurs.

Moreover, the committee members kept telling me that they were going to declare a state of emergency and that Mikhail Sergeyevich would then return and could reap the fruits of the restoration of order. But I had to meet with the president. On the morning of 21 August, I arrived at the Defense Ministry and I said: Let me go to Mikhail Sergeyevich by any means, on any plane! It was then that a plane was made available for the Crimea. Ivachko (Footnote 7) (Deputy secretary general of the CPSU) and four representatives of the Committee for the State of Emergency went with me on the plane. It was the commander of the Black Sea Fleet who met me and enabled us to reach Foros quickly. Mikhail Sergeyevich's first request, conveyed by his bodyguards and his aides, was to restore communications. Kryuchkov then asked me what to do.

[Karaulov] He asked you that?

[Lukyanov] Yes. I told him to comply immediately, but they were only reestablished after 30 minutes because the damage was considerable. Mikhail Sergeyevich was able to contact the republics, Bush, and the main military forces. And two and a half hours later Rutskoy arrived with his team....

[Karaulov] If it was you who ordered the plane, how was it that Yazov and Kryuchkov came too?

[Lukyanov] I was at the Defense Ministry talking with Yazov. They had clearly already considered whether to go or not. They knew that I would go at any cost.

[Karaulov] Are you saying that you thwarted their plans?

[Lukyanov] Not just their plans... but also those of the other camp which wanted to look like the president's

liberator. Two and a half hours later they hurried to Foros with officers and soldiers. If they had tried to storm Gorbachev's dacha it would have been ridiculous....

[Karaulov] Do you think the CPSU Politburo and Central Committee Secretariat played a key role in the plot?

[Lukyanov] I do not think that the party was the main organizer of this...action. An action which, moreover, greatly discredited it.

[Karaulov] So who was it? The army?

[Lukyanov] I cannot say.

[Karaulov] If the junta had won, what position would you hold?

[Lukyanov] Me? If they had won, I do not think I would be here.

[Karaulov] Do you mean alive?

[Lukyanov] Yes. They only needed me at a certain stage.

[Karaulov] Do you have good reason for thinking that?

[Lukyanov] First, it seems to me that there could be no question of democracy with the junta. Second, "the Moor has done his duty, the Moor can die."

[Karaulov] Who was the leader of this plot?

[Lukyanov] I do not know....

[Karaulov] Were there large forces behind Yazov, Kryuchkov, and Baklanov?

[Lukyanov] I do not know. I can only talk about what I know....

[Karaulov] Will you have the strength not to act like Pugo, Akhromeyev, Kruchina (who committed suicide)?

[Lukyanov] Yes, because I do not want this dirty plot...to make my country lose the values which have been its life for 70 years. The Soviet Union has not known only black days. It has also won victories.

[Karaulov] Do you think that a putsch is still possible?

[Lukyanov] (Silence) I do not even want to think about it. (Pensive) Is it possible that we have learned nothing...?

[Karaulov] Although he was on vacation, could Gorbachev have doubted that something was being plotted in the Kremlin?

[Lukyanov] I do not know. But we frequently discussed many possible developments, notably attacks on the president and the Supreme Soviet. I do not think he knew what was going to happen. But he probably received reports from time to time, because he said more than once that he felt a certain atmosphere of hostility.

Arkhangelsk Official Says Army Chiefs Met Before Coup

PM3008145491 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 30 Aug 91 p 1

[V. Karkavtsev report: "Why the Generals Assembled a Month Before the Putsch"]

[Text] Arkhangelsk—The oblast soviet session in Arkhangelsk went on for two days, during which the deputies carried out a "debriefing"—they ascertained how the local administration had conducted itself in the days of the coup d'etat. Aleksandr Ivanov, chairman of Arkhangelsk City Soviet, unexpectedly spoiled the agreeable picture that was being painted at the session.

He informed the meeting that in July, approximately a month before the putsch, senior military officers and civilian officials assembled in Novaya Zemlya and among other problems discussed actions in a state of emergency regime. During those days the nuclear archipelago was visited by Baklanov, Moiseyev, Chernavin, the writer Prokhanov, and also Gromoglasov, first secretary of Arkhangelsk RSFSR Communist Party Oblast Committee, and Shiryayev, deputy chairman of the oblast soviet. Referring to information received in a private conversation with one of the meeting participants, Ivanov stated that there, in Novaya Zemlya, there was energetic lobbying of General Moiseyev—his colleagues wanted to see him as an active figure in the future putsch.

RSFSR Deputy Prosecutor on Coup Arrests, Investigation

PM3008105391 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 29 Aug 91 p 4

[Interview with RSFSR Deputy General Prosecutor Ye. Lisov by Sergey Nagayev under "We Report the Details" rubric; date, place not stated; first paragraph is editorial introduction: "No Political Bias"]

[Text] Ye. Lisov, RSFSR deputy general prosecutor, spoke about the work of the investigation group which is examining the antistate conspiracy.

[Lisov] We will not allow any political bias during the investigation; we will be guided only by the law. At the present time there are about 50 investigators in the group; there are also operations officers. We are selecting people from all over Russia so as "not to denude" work in the localities—after all, the most qualified cadres are joining our team.

[Nagayev] How many people are under arrest as of today on suspicion of involvement in the conspiracy?

[Lisov] Twelve people have been arrested; one more was detained the day before yesterday—Generalov, deputy chief of the USSR KGB Security Service.

[Nagayev] Is their health O.K.?

[Lisov] Yes, no complaints have been forthcoming. They all have attorneys who have assumed their statutory obligations and are participating in the investigation process.

[Nagayev] How are the arrestees behaving themselves under interrogation?

[Lisov] It varies, but no one is having hysterics. They are giving their evidence fairly calmly.

[Nagayev] It is being said that they are blaming one another.

[Lisov] The explanations of the arrestees do not coincide in details; however, I cannot state absolutely that these contradictions are dictated by a desire to whitewash themselves at their comrades' expense.

[Nagayev] Are the reasons for the suicides of Akhromyev, Kruchina, Pugo, and his wife known?

[Lisov] I can speak definitely only of the former minister of internal affairs and his wife. They left suicide notes. In his last message Pugo deeply regrets having participated in the putsch—who if not he would have known how many interrogations and explanations, and how much shame lay ahead. His wife killed herself, if one can put it like this, in a sign of solidarity.

[Nagayev] How long will the investigation take, in your opinion?

[Lisov] I cannot give an exact time: A huge amount of work lies ahead. In addition, it is already clear now that the cases will fill many volumes. Therefore it is not known how long the men in custody will take to familiarize themselves with them—maybe one or two months, maybe longer.

[Nagayev] Under what article will the charges be brought?

[Lisov] Under article 64 of the RSFSR Criminal Code—Betrayal of the Motherland in the form of a conspiracy to seize power. This article provides for a sentence of between 10 and 15 years' imprisonment, or the death penalty.

'Investigation Head' on Interrogations, Leaked 'Documents'

*PM3008102991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 Aug 91 Union Edition p 6*

[V. Rudnev article incorporating interview with Yevgeniy Lisov, "head of investigation group": "The Three Days of the Putsch. IZVESTIYA Investigation. The Case of the State Committee for the State of Emergency: Lists of Internees Are a Fabrication"]

[Text] Vyacheslav Generalov, former deputy chief of the USSR KGB guard service, has been detained. He is being interrogated. We did not manage to get any more

information out of Yevgeniy Lisov, head of the investigation group [not further specified].

[Lisov] The ordinary investigation work has begun: interrogations, confrontations, searches... I promise you sensations later once the investigation is complete.

[Rudnev] Newspapers have published a copy of a top-secret document on measures to promptly intern members of the RSFSR leadership. These lists include 22 top officials. Orders have been given for their offices and living accommodation—including those located out of town—to be searched and official documentation confiscated... There has even been the suggestion that the aforementioned officials not be allowed to go to other parts of the country or abroad. What can you say about that?

[Lisov] First, what NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA published cannot be called a document. Anyone with a typewriter can draft this kind of paper and then photocopy it. What is more, top-secret documents are drawn up differently.

That is not the only reason that the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA article raises doubts. The means by which the editorial office obtained a copy is also unreliable. V. Tretyakov, chief editor of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, explained that late at night a stranger handed the janitor an envelope containing "top secret" instructions. We're checking up to see whether that really happened. I would like to take this opportunity to appeal to editors: Be vigilant! Many rumors and fabrications are flying about over the case of the State Committee for the State of Emergency. If you have doubts as to the reliability of information you have received, it is best to turn to us first. We'll help you investigate. You can then decide for yourselves whether or not to publish the "sensation."

Charges Dropped Against Gdlyan, Ivanov

*LD0209123191 Moscow TASS in English 1219 GMT
2 Sep 91*

[Article by TASS correspondent Aleksandr Borisov]

[Text] Moscow September 2 TASS—Nikolay Trubin, procurator general of the USSR, has decided on the dismissal of a case of former investigating officers of the USSR public prosecutor's office Telman Gdlyan and Nikolay Ivanov. TASS learned from the USSR Public Prosecutor's Office today the cases had been discontinued because of the absence of crime in their actions.

Criminal proceedings against German Karakozov, former chief of the Investigating Department of the USSR Public Prosecutor's Office, and a number of other staffers of the USSR Public Prosecutor's Office were discontinued for the same reason.

All of them had earlier been charged with violating the law of criminal procedure when investigating facts of corruption and bribe-taking in Uzbekistan.

RSFSR Prosecutor Hits Local Investigations Into Coup

*PM3008110591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 Aug 91 Union Edition p 8*

[V. Rudnev report: "Case of State Committee for State of Emergency: Independent Investigation Not Needed"]

[Text] On 28 August Vyacheslav Generalov, former deputy chief of the USSR KGB Guard Service, was arrested as a suspect following interrogation with the sanction of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic General Prosecutor Valentin Stepankov.

At the suggestion of Yevgeniy Lisov, leader of the group investigating the case of the State Committee for the State of Emergency, USSR General Prosecutor Nikolay Trubin asked the USSR Supreme Soviet to consent to the institution of criminal proceedings against, and the arrest of, Anatoliy Lukyanov, who, addressing the country's parliament the previous day, denied his involvement in the antistate conspiracy.

After this the general prosecutor resigned.

Yuriy Prokofyev, first secretary of Moscow City CPSU Committee, is still involved in the case as a witness. The Moscow City Prosecutor's Office is tackling this.

Russian General Prosecutor Valentin Stepankov has expressed profound concern at the fact that groups are being set up in a number of oblasts to conduct a private investigation into the case of the State Committee for the State of Emergency. Local soviet deputies and representatives of various public organizations are joining them. They are conducting independent investigations and removing documents. "Although these people might be motivated by a sincere desire to get to the bottom of the situation that took shape and to 'enumerate' those who aided the putschists, I would like to warn them against attempts to exercise mob law," Stepankov declared. The danger of a private investigation is obvious: The removal of documents that have not been submitted in accordance with procedural law deprives the competent organs of the possibility of using them as evidence in the investigation of a criminal case. [Quotation marks as published]

The Russian general prosecutor remarked in reply to the IZVESTIYA correspondent's question about the circle of persons being arraigned: "We cannot institute criminal proceedings for dissidence. A citizen may share the views of the members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency. But those whose actions contain a specific element of a crime under the existing law must be punished."

Stepankov gave this reply to a question about the behavior of the arrestees: "In his testimony each of them is trying to speak frankly about the actions of his comrades and to 'smooth' in every possible way his own role in the putsch."

The final question: about suicides. The answer: "We have no reason to link the suicides of Marshal S. Akhromeyev, adviser to the USSR president, and N. Kruchina, administrator of the CPSU Central Committee, with the putsch."

Minister Khadzhiyev Denies Reports That He Supported Coup

*PM0309113091 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Sep 91 Union Edition p 2*

[V. Yakovlev report on interview with S. Khadzhiyev, minister of the chemical and petroleum refining industry—date, place not stated: "S. Khadzhiyev Claims That He Opposed the Plotters From the Outset"]

[Text] On 23 August, at the USSR president's meeting with Russian parliamentarians, the notes of one of the participants in the 19 August 1991 session of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers were read out; in the notes it was asserted that S. Khadzhiyev, leader of the Ministry of the Chemical and Petroleum Refining Industry, supported the SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency]. The minister immediately denied it. Unfortunately, at that time the issue of IZVESTIYA which published these notes had already come out. Today we can report that S. Khadzhiyev is one of three ministers (the others were N. Vorontsov and N. Gubenko) who have retained their posts after the resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers.

"A. Volskiy, member of the committee for operational management of the country's national economy, called me and said that I should continue to fulfill my functions," Salambek Naibovich Khadzhiyev said. "There are plenty of problems. As a result of the attempted coup the sector has suffered enormous damage. We were receiving imported materials worth 1.5 billion rubles a year, and now all deliveries have been suspended. And consumers are waiting for tires, plastics, fuel."

[Yakovlev] And so, Salambek Naibovich, how did it all happen during those three days?

[Khadzhiyev] On 19 August, when that Cabinet of Ministers session was held, I was on leave, in the city of Grozny. I immediately sent a telegram to my deputies, telling them to find out the positions of the leaders of the major enterprises. In the night of 19-20 August I flew to Moscow, and at 0400 hours I was on Manege Square, where there were tanks. At 1000 hours on 20 August I held a meeting of the ministry collegium. Three options were examined: announce a strike; not submit to the SCSE, but wait for the decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet session; or submit. We chose the second option. In telegrams sent to the enterprises, we demanded that they act in accordance with the laws of the Union and republics, and define their attitude to the SCSE after its powers had been confirmed by the USSR Supreme Soviet. On my own account, I decided that I would not work with the SCSE, and that if the coup could not be stopped on 26 August, I would resign. Minister N.

Vorontsov and I set forth our rejection of the junta in an appeal which we sent to V. Pavlov and B. Yeltsin and to the press.

[Yakovlev] Why did so many senior officials submit to the SCSE's will?

[Khadzhiyev] The many years of influence by an authoritarian system played a part. Many directors were simply convinced that their job is to produce fuel, plastics, and tires, and let others concern themselves with politics. Probably I would have thought the same, if I had not passed through a school of parliamentary activity as a deputy...

Dzasokhov on CPSU Response to Coup

PM3008145091 Milan L'UNITA in Italian
28 Aug 91 p 4

[Interview with CPSU Politburo member Aleksandr Dzasokhov by Sergio Sergi in Moscow; date not given]

[Excerpt] Moscow—[introductory passage omitted]

[Sergi] Where were you at the time of the coup?

[Dzasokhov] I had been at Donbass for four days and I returned to my dacha near Moscow Sunday evening. On the morning of 19 August, at 0630, my aide knocked loudly on my door. "Turn the television on, quick." I did so and saw the emergency committee's first communications being read out. As soon as I had summoned my driver I left for the Central Committee.

[Sergi] What did you find there?

[Dzasokhov] It was a complete surprise, absolutely no information. At 0930 the Secretariat met. If I remember correctly, there was Stroyev, Kuptsov, Kalashnikov, Melnikov, Manayenkov, and Shenin too.

[Sergi] Shenin, the conspirator...

[Dzasokhov] He was the captain. Gorbachev had left him in Moscow to take charge of the party (deputy secretary Ivashko was in a convalescent home—L'UNITA editor's note). He was in charge at the time. He told us: "Gorbachev is sick." They gave us no other explanation except that Gorbachev's job was being done by Yanayev and that a state of emergency was being introduced.

[Sergi] Did you not say anything to him?

[Dzasokhov] We asked him: What does this mean? He replied that in some regions the ethnic conflicts and economic problems had to be eliminated. An hour later came the call to "orient" the party committee.

[Sergi] What about you?

[Dzasokhov] This was our biggest mistake. We sent a telegram saying that a state of emergency had been introduced, that it was necessary to act within the

context of the constitution, and that as far as the plenum was concerned we would make arrangements later. Our reasoning proceeded from the fact that we really did not know what to tell the Central Committee.

[Sergi] What did you deduce at that stage?

[Dzasokhov] The fact is that Sunday evening I received information from someone who is very important at the moment. I cannot name him, but I guarantee that he is a sincere democrat. Gorbachev is not very well, he told me; his radiculitis has flared up again. After speaking with Shenin I remembered this. So, I thought... he really is sick!

[Sergi] Pardon me, did you not see the tanks in the streets?

[Dzasokhov] Actually I wanted to talk about that. I did see the tanks, and I was terrified. Politically terrified.

[Sergi] But what time did you notice the tanks?

[Dzasokhov] I saw them from my office window; they were passing here below and I started having very serious doubts about what was happening and I told our staff who were drafting a Politburo statement to sharpen the assessments expressed in it.

[Sergi] What did it say?

[Dzasokhov] It was an appeal to Communists and Soviets saying that the Committee's methods were unacceptable and calling for bloodshed to be averted. I called Politburo members Galina Semenova and Petr Luchinskiy to my office. They came and we realized at once that the statement could be made even sharper. Then on Tuesday I went to deputy secretary Ivashko, who had recently undergone an operation, and advised him not to publish that weak document.

[Sergi] Sharper and sharper, but meanwhile hours and days were going by...

[Dzasokhov] Yes, that is true, but that is easy to say now, with hindsight. So we drafted another version which we published Wednesday morning (it was published Thursday by PRAVDA and it mentioned not a coup d'état but an "unacceptable use" of the committee's powers—L'UNITA editor's note). The same day we asked to meet with the secretary and formed a delegation, but there was no aircraft. Ivashko telephoned Yanayev (who was arrested within the hours—L'UNITA editor's note).

[Sergi] Did you telephone Yanayev?

[Dzasokhov] Who could we ask for an aircraft? Who else?

[Sergi] But did you also ask him what had happened to the president?

[Dzasokhov] I believe that this question was put to him before, and he had always answered us that he was in a safe place. But that he was ill.

[Sergi] Did you see Shenin again?

[Dzasokhov] Never again. He disappeared.

[Sergi] Who is Shenin?

[Dzasokhov] He was promoted by Gorbachev. He had him brought to Moscow from Siberia. I did not know him well.

[Sergi] What about Boldin, the head of the apparatus, the Brutus?

[Dzasokhov] I never saw him. None of us saw him.

[Sergi] Did you try to contact the military commands or the KGB?

[Dzasokhov] No. I deal with humanitarian matters, that is not my field. That is the deputy secretary's job. I should add that I still have copies of the draft statements in which I proposed an immediate dissociation from the coup.

[Sergi] Did it not occur to you to rush to the Russian parliament building, where the resistance was?

[Dzasokhov] I spoke with Yeltsin's apparatus chief by telephone and, from home at 0100 hours, expressed our congratulations over the failure of the assault.

[Sergi] But why did you not go there?

[Dzasokhov] If I could live my life again I would go. Look, I have never had a quiet life. I have often been involved in emergency situations. And now so many people want to portray themselves as heroes.

[Sergi] Tell me honestly: Do you believe there is anything left of the CPSU?

[Dzasokhov] The era of the state CPSU is over. Even before the coup the party leadership counted for very little.

[Sergi] Do you mean it?

[Dzasokhov] It is the absolute truth. Could I give a minister orders? What could I do? Did anyone agree the Union Treaty with me? The program to combat the crisis?

[Sergi] You talk as though the CPSU had never governed...

[Dzasokhov] Not at all! But the difference between yesterday and today is like that between night and day. I would take the plane and be relegated to row 35. I have a two-room apartment. I earned 1,200 rubles a month, and now I am unemployed. But I feel that I have been loyal to myself, my friends, and history. And I have nothing to repent of.

Procracy Says Deputy Falin's Apartment Searched
*LD3008162791 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1500 GMT 30 Aug 91*

[Text] A correspondent of the RUSSIAN INFORMATION AGENCY was informed at the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Procurator's Office that it is true that the apartment and dacha of Valentin Falin, a USSR people's deputy who occupied the post of Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, were searched.

According to the words of the Procuracy's representatives, Article 34 of the USSR legislation on the status of USSR people's deputies does not preclude the search of the premises of a people's deputy if the interests of the investigation demand it.

**CPSU Funds Switched From Bank to Bank
'Under False Names'**

*PM0209140391 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 27 Aug 91 p 4*

[Report by Sergey Nikitin: "'Bormann' Rescues the Funds"]

[Text] While angry crowds besiege the building on Staraya Square and break rayon committees' windows, the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs is taking frantic steps to save the money that was plundered during the long years of "serving the people." The mechanism is simple: The many billions that were deposited in various banks in the past are being swiftly withdrawn and transferred to other organizations under false names.

For example, we have learned from reliable sources of events that have been taking place in the USSR Automotive Industry Commercial Bank. Around a year ago the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs opened two deposit accounts, making immediate deposits: No. 713138 and No. 2713138, paying 0.5 billion rubles into each. Immediately after the communist plot was routed the registration cards for the accounts were removed from the accounts department. According to our information, some party funds have already been transferred to account No. 700906 at the central branch of the USSR State Bank, which is on Neglinka. Within the next couple of days the entire 1 billion will be transferred, only to disappear somewhere unknown. What the party money could be used for is something any schoolboy knows today.

R500 Million Belonging to CPSU Found in Bank
*LD0109132191 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 0900 GMT 1 Sep 91*

[Text] Five hundred million rubles belonging to the CPSU and invested in one of the commercial banks at four percent annual interest were discovered by a commission of the Moscow government for taking inventory of CPSU property. The information was provided to the

authorities not by some officials from the central committee and its directorate of affairs but by a director of the bank, which was remained unnamed. At a meeting with the media Aleksandr Muzykantskiy, prefect of the central administrative okrug, stressed that such an impressive sum is only a small part of the party money which is in commercial circulation. As the experience of the East European countries shows, it would not be easy to discover it. It is possible that the party origin of the money was erased long ago with the help of joint and other new ventures which are not very interested today in freezing profitable deals and in being deprived of the means of comfortable existence. However, the Moscow authorities hope for the help of honest bankers and businessmen in this country as well as abroad.

Gorbachev Line in Draft CPSU Program Scored

PM0209123191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 14 Aug 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Yu. Belov, secretary of the Leningrad Oblast CPSU Committee, by unidentified SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent; date and place unspecified: "In What Direction Will Perestroika Turn Us?"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Yuriy Pavlovich, work on the draft CPSU Program lasted a year. Was this work noticeably influenced by the difficult situation in the party and society?

[Belov] Changes which go some way to setting troubled party minds at rest have appeared in the published draft of the new CPSU Program. It apparently declares the socialist choice, sort of underlines the special role played by public ownership, and regards communism as a historical prospect and social ideal. All this is gratifying but, I repeat, only goes some way to setting minds at rest. You get the impression that the main authors of the draft did not propose Marxism-Leninism as the philosophical basis of the program in the initial versions but then, under pressure from party criticism, were forced to disguise this basis with Marxist terminology. I suspect there is no longer unity among the authors of the draft. That is my optimistic hypothesis. Whoever insisted on returning to Marxist-Leninist theory is regaining the springboard for returning the party to the principles of scientific socialism. You could say that the fight for the new CPSU Program has only just beginning.

[Correspondent] One trick is to speak of Social Democracy as a more modern, justified direction for CPSU reform to take. It is even presented as a return to the party's Social Democratic roots, reflected in its original name: the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party.

[Belov] There is no need to try to persuade Marxists of something of which they have already been persuaded by theory and history. I cannot understand why our general secretary is forcing an open door, as they say. It is axiomatic that the CPSU is related to the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party—every schoolchild knows

that. No one familiar with our party's history intends to oppose Social Democratic traditions or classical elements of Social Democracy in the new CPSU Program.

The whole question is: What kind of Social Democratic traditions and ideas do we intend to adopt and develop—radical or reformist? I get the impression from M.S. Gorbachev's statements that he takes a very general, very liberal view of Social Democracy.

Whoever believes that West European Social Democracy was developed solely by Bernshteyn is wrong. No, it has also been very strongly influenced by the communist movement. It is not even uniform in nature. In the postwar Social Democratic movement (the Socialist International) we find features relating it to Russian Social Democracy. Anyone who studies the documents of the 1951 Socialist International Congress cannot fail to notice its tough assessment of capitalism at that time. Although a social-class approach is not stated as such, it is present in this assessment nevertheless.

Gambling on the fact that many CPSU members are uninitiated in the history of Social Democracy, our latter-day Social Democrats mask their closet liberalism with Social Democratic terminology. There is a hint of this in the draft CPSU Program. Although there is only a hint of it now, this aspiration was quite blatant and unconcealed in the original versions of the draft.

There is still a danger of bourgeois liberalism being worked into the program.

[Correspondent] But the new "disguise" for developed state socialism will not suit Communists....

[Belov] Yes, there is a very real danger of bureaucratized state socialism being revived. But there is an even greater danger of barbarian capitalization. Why? Because the second danger is disguised as "civilization" and concealed by indignation regarding Stalin's socialism.

A great deal of effort has been made to conceal the threat of barbarian capitalization and distract public attention from it. Social-class analysis of past and modern history has been supplanted by political populism in its assessment or, to put it more simply, primitivism in explaining the essence of social phenomena. The concept of "baracks socialism" has been skilfully instilled in the mass consciousness with the intention of cancelling out all Soviet history. While destroying the image of an enemy in the West, efforts have also been made to create the image of an enemy in our own society. The CPSU has been chosen to play that role. There is no denying the professionalism of those who have thought out the methods of conditioning people in order to change their outlook.

[Correspondent] If you go to the Left it is bad, if you go to the Right it is even worse. Is there a third way?

[Belov] Yes, there is a third way, and it found scientific expression in Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) methodology. Our general secretary too makes frequent

reference to NEP, but zealous efforts are made to conceal the methodology of Lenin's NEP from the public. He is counting on a commonplace perception: If something is mentioned, it must have been taken into account. In actual fact, however, Lenin's NEP theory is being supplanted by his own understanding of it, or failure to understand it.

Judge for yourself. The very first element of Lenin's NEP methodology is social-class analysis of the state of society. In recent years, however, Soviet citizens have been schooled to believe that if a class approach is taken, everything is reduced to the class struggle. This is a lie which the gullible and naive accept as the truth. It was thanks to social-class analysis that Lenin reached his conclusion on the unavoidable conflict between the policy of war communism and the fundamental (economic) interests of the peasantry, which then comprised the bulk of the country's population.

There is not even any mention of social-class analysis of the state of society in the draft of the new CPSU Program. This leaves us with an unanswered question: In the interests of which classes are the USSR president's policies being implemented? I stress: The policies of the USSR president and not the CPSU, because our party—by which I mean the party masses—has long been estranged from politics.

Another extremely important methodological foundation of NEP is to guarantee the Soviet form of democracy and the leading role of public ownership. With this kind of guarantee provided, private ownership and private enterprise were permitted within certain limits: in retail trade, consumer services, and agriculture. But the doors were closed to private ownership as far as the basic means of production were concerned. Why? Because only with public ownership of means of production could this sector of the economy serve as a guarantee of social protection for working people.

But what is happening in our country now? The Soviet form of democracy is being replaced by a system of personal presidential power, and the leading role of public ownership is proclaimed but has absolutely no legal guarantees.

Equal rights for all forms of ownership is a myth. We can speak of legal equality: That is necessary. But, in practice, either public ownership or private ownership will gain the upper hand and dominate, depending on who holds power: the people or private enterprise. The draft program skirts around this issue.

[Correspondent] By taking Lenin's NEP methodology as a starting point, we can draw up a complete concept of the program for the CPSU and society. But it will obviously have little in common with the proposed draft. Are there any other efforts?

[Belov] Our oblast party committee has drawn up some theses on the new CPSU Program, entitled: "Difficult Road to the 21st Century." They are based on Lenin's NEP methodology.

I shall give you the main sections: "State Socialism and the Historical Responsibility of the CPSU"; "The Inevitability of Perestroika and its Transformation Into its Own Opposite"; "Which Valuable Aspects of Soviet History Are Defended by Communists of the Soviet Union"; "What Communists Fight For and What They Oppose"; and "What the Communist Party Should Be."

In the theses we maintain that state socialism was an objective historical necessity but that this particular model of socialism offered many different possibilities of development. In his later works, Lenin outlined the possibility of democratic state socialism, of which NEP was the basis. After Lenin's death, however, owing to objective and subjective factors (the effects of the devastation, constant danger from outside, low level of the masses' political and general awareness, and prevalence of petty bourgeois revolutionary feeling in the party) the model of democratic state socialism gave way to the model of bureaucratic state socialism. The practice of Stalinism arose. We maintain in the theses, however, that socialism should not be equated with this practice and that Stalinism is a deformation of socialism.

We also maintain that the history of Soviet society's socialist development is not confined to the history of Stalin's totalitarianism. Soviet society is also the result of the masses' social creativity, thanks to which the country has developed into a great power. The social creativity of honest party members has joined the stream of their creativity. The party oligarchy has parasitized on this, thereby making the party a hostage of circumstance.

The old form of socialism is now exhausted. In fact, there was a strong need to renew it as far back as the fifties. The process known as perestroika was inevitable.

The crisis of Soviet society in the form in which it is currently manifesting itself is not a uniform phenomenon. In the theses we highlight two trends in this phenomenon: The trend of renewing socialism and making rational, critical use of everything good that has accumulated in the culture of modern-day bourgeois society (we could provisionally call it the neo-NEP trend); and the trend of restoring capitalism at the stage of primitive accumulation of capital (we could provisionally call it the barbarian capitalization trend).

In our opinion, the uniqueness of the present situation being experienced by Soviet society lies in the struggle between these two trends. Perestroika has changed its objective—the renewal of socialism—and developed into its own opposite—the restoration of capitalism. There is clear confrontation between the two choices of social development: socialist and capitalist. It has weakened the foundations of the state system to the extreme and caused a paralysis of power.

We believe (and maintain in the theses) that the CPSU Program must be based on the kind of socialist development of society where the capitalist relations now forming are taken under control by the Soviet state and satisfy the logic of this development, i.e. work with it rather than against it.

To this end, we must implement structural reforms in the economic, political, social, and spiritual life of society, while at the same time preserving everything of value in our Soviet history. These reforms must be implemented in such a way as to ensure stable material, moral, and psychological conditions of life for all Soviet citizens.

With regard to the valuable aspects of Soviet history I just mentioned, I shall name just one of them: the most important. It is the Soviet state, which played a historic role in preserving world civilization from the destructive force of international fascism. A state which, during the Great Patriotic War, preserved the history and historical community of the peoples and nations which populate our country. A state which has protected them and the whole of mankind against the danger of a third world war.

[Correspondent] Today's newspaper carries Leningrad Communists' theses, "Difficult Road to the 21st Century," alongside your interview with us. Do you regard these theses as an alternative to the draft program?

[Belov] No, we do not intend to present our theses as an alternative to the draft program prepared by the program commission approved by the 28th CPSU Congress. Our theses represent our constructive, critical view of the draft. Using them as guidance, we will hold a critical discussion of the draft program in the Leningrad party organization. That is if the theses are adopted by Leningrad Communists.

We have sent our theses to every party organization in the country and will be grateful if we receive a critical response.

I will say this in conclusion: Most ordinary Communists and the overwhelming majority of Soviet people are experiencing a colossal political, moral, and psychological weariness. We will be honest: They are not in the mood for programs, when they have nothing else. Nevertheless, it is up to us, professional party workers, to induce as many ordinary Communists as possible to hold an exacting discussion on the draft of the new CPSU Program.

It is not even a question of saving the party. It is a question of saving the country.

Theses on the New CPSU Program: Difficult Road to the 21st Century

In the socioeconomic sphere, we are in favor of:

A multistructural [mnogoukladnaya] economy and equality before the law for all forms of ownership,

including private ownership, but with the leading role played by public ownership in its various forms. We feel it is necessary to give priority to state enterprises, and also to enterprises owned by the working people themselves.

We are in favor of gradual denationalization and partial privatization. We are against a general division of public property in any form: without payment or on a buy-out basis. We are against compulsory, unlimited privatization affecting the sphere of output of basic means of production. We are against nomenklatura privatization implemented in the interests of the administrative elite.

We are in favor of developing Soviet private enterprise and individual entrepreneurial initiative, but only if it ensures a broader market of goods and services as well as personal prosperity. We are in favor of protecting Soviet private enterprise against domination by foreign capital.

We are in favor of attracting foreign capital but against giving foreign entrepreneurs the right to own land.

We are in favor of a mixed economy and the development of market forms of economic management, provided a dominant role is played by the state sector and collective sector and recognition is given to a regulated, socially oriented market.

We are in favor of establishing a new system of distributing material wealth generated by labor and ownership of property and creating a system of progressive taxation of income from property.

The basic slogan of CPSU economic policy must be: "From social protection to the creation of a system of social guarantees."

In the political sphere, we believe Communists must be in favor of:

Preserving the Soviet Union on a federative basis, with the Soviet form of democracy in an unshakable position; and reviving friendship and cooperation between our peoples in a renewed, federative Union state.

They must be in favor of sovereignty for the soviets and against their being turned into an appendage of presidential power in the center and at local level. They must be in favor of supremacy for the soviets in relation to presidential power.

They must be in favor of rule-of-law democracy, which includes: a rule-of-law state; political pluralism and political rights of the individual; equal rights for nations and ethnic groups; priority of individual rights over the rights of the nation; solidarity and cooperation between nations; freedom of conscience; and the separation of the church from the state.

They must be against any ideology being elevated to the rank of a state ideology.

They must be in favor of equal cooperation with social movements and parties across a broad political spectrum, providing the following conditions are observed: There must be no avenging of history in political polemics; no mutual ideological grievances; no substituting of theoretical argument with political accusations; and no actions insulting the political honor and dignity of organizations or individuals.

They must be in favor of implementing the idea of a union of patriotic forces seeking a democratic solution to the crisis.

MDR Political Council Issues Statements

LD0209080591 Moscow TASS in English 0720 GMT 2 Sep 91

[Text] Moscow September 2 TASS—The Political Council of the Movement for Democratic Reforms (MDR) on Sunday circulated two statements on the eve of the opening of an extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

"Democracy has triumphed and demands with regard to the congress are particularly great under present conditions. However, the recent parliament session has shown that apprehensions about a possible conversion of the congress into an arena of revenge by reactionary forces are far from being unfounded," the MDR Political Council emphasised.

In this connection the MDR Political Council believes that the congress in its present composition should not make strategic decisions determining the life of the country's peoples in the long term.

The task of the congress is to lay legal groundwork for the functioning of state power structures in the transitional period, during which a new system of relationships between sovereign states on the territory of the USSR should take shape, the council maintains.

In the other statement, the MDR Political Council pointed out that the triumph of democratic forces creates conditions for a transition to a genuinely law-governed state set-up. This implies the guarantees of the rights and freedoms of all those who, acting within the framework of law, create any political and social associations.

Pilots' Strike Cancelled, but Strike State Extended

OW0309053491 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1030 GMT 2 Sep 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] There will be no general pilots' strike on September 2. This was disclosed by deputy minister of civil aviation Zamotin.

He said that last Friday the chairman of the fliers' trade union Alfred Maljnovskiy informed all labor staffs that

talks with the government are not over, the strike state continues, but work does not stop.

Talks are to continue on Monday between the union leadership and the head of the USSR Committee for the Economy Ivan Silayev.

Silayev Comments on Russian Spirit

LD3008215891 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 30 Aug 91

[From the "TV inform" newscast]

[Excerpts] People left our country for various reasons. Each of them has his own attitude toward his homeland. [passage omitted] [video shows participants at Congress of Compatriots on the Russian Spirit; Ivan Silayev seen speaking to Aleksiy II, patriarch of Moscow and all-Russia; Silayev addressing participants; interview with Silayev]

[Begin Silayev recording] In a moment of great trials and difficulties, there is an upsurge of unity and support. It seems to me that this is a great quality of the Russian spirit. I am proud that it is that quality that forms the Russian man, no matter where he lives. Of course, the Russian people do have a weakness of forgetting bad things quickly. In some cases they even forgive evil. But that is also a great Russian quality. Please, God, let the Russians be as they have been up until now! [end recording]

Center-Republic Consultations on Shape of Union Viewed

PM0309113791 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 31 Aug 91 p 1

["Commentary" by Yelena Tokareva and Vladimir Sluzhakov: "I. Silayev: You Cannot Break Through on Your Own"]

[Text] Instead of the grand and seemingly powerful Union Cabinet of Ministers, today we now have only the symbol of a collapsing Union—the committee of four or, as it is still called, the "salvation committee." Its term is limited by harsh reality, which demands that immediate measures be taken to create a new economic union of republics based on a single economic space.

According to the assessment of experts, the situation in the country is approaching catastrophe. Inflation is growing. Customs posts are being hastily erected between republics, stemming the already meager flow of goods.

Meanwhile the committee of four has started carrying out a series of consultations with the leaders of the economic departments of the republics and industrialists, including those of the military-industrial complex. At one of them on 30 August Ivan Silayev tried for a good hour to persuade the senior economic officials of

the republics to offer their independent opinion regarding further coexistence in the fragments of the empire.

And the invitees should have realized this. But the role of "kid brother," which they played so splendidly throughout the years, did not allow them to behave appropriately in their capacity as actual representatives of sovereign states. Moreover, some of them manifestly failed to match up in terms of status to the importance of the problem under discussion. The representatives of the Ukraine and Lithuania, for example, came without any powers at all as observers and refrained in every way from comment on economic cooperation. And one representative from the Central Asian republics clearly confused the session hall of the cabinet of four with the cabinet of Comrades Pavlov and Ryzhkov, constantly enquiring about what is to be done with particular instructions from the center, which still continue to be received at local level.

What actually was the head of the "provisional government" after, then? He was seeking a fully defined attitude to the proposed program of stabilizing the economy and creating favorable conditions for the implementation of reforms. By all appearances, it is to be built on the coordinated action of all the republics in introducing free prices, commercializing economic ties, reducing the deficit of republic budgets, restricting the issuing of credit on the territory of the states, and privatization. We stress—in accordance with agreed principles.

Nor is it ruled out, and it most likely will be so, that the sovereign states will introduce their own currency. And there is nothing dreadful in that, specialists assure, since the role of interstate commerce will be performed by a single monetary unit.

According to Ivan Silayev, there is no point in being restricted by the bounds of the former unitary state. The countries which also belong to the "camp" of socialist choice in East Europe are not without need of such an economic agreement. And they are faced with the same problems.

The first round of talks did not bring the expected results. And yet it does seem that it was possible to melt a little the ice of mistrust and suspicion that Russia intends to trample all beneath it. After all, it is going to be very difficult to get your head above water on your own. No one seemed to deny this. Suspending the conference so that delegates could consider the proposed document, Ivan Silayev reminded them once again that only an economy which finally rises above politics can form the basis of the future community. An agreement or statement on the principles of economic coexistence should be ready by Monday and be submitted to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies as the basis of the Union Treaty.

Opinion Poll Sounds Gorbachev Survivability

PM0309125591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
31 Aug 91 Union Edition p 3

[Unattributed report under the "Rating" rubric: "Sociologists: Who Is Who"]

[Text] On 27 August 1991, the Center for socioeconomic research "TINNI-Sotsio" (director Pavel Korotin) conducted a public opinion poll commissioned by the weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY and IZVESTIYA.

The poll was conducted among a sample of 1,185 people representing the adult urban population of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Belorussia.

The poll results are expressed as a percentage of those questioned.

1. In your opinion, will Gorbachev manage to retain his position as a result of current events?

a) probably yes—27 percent (on 20 August the figure was 27 percent).

b) probably no—61 percent (20 August—51 percent).

c) undecided—12 percent (20 August—22 percent).

2. Who, apart from Gorbachev, could be a contender for such a post?

B. Yeltsin—49 percent, A. Sobchak—8 percent, E. Shevardnadze—5 percent, A. Yakovlev—4 percent.

3. Who is the most popular politician at present?

B. Yeltsin—74 percent, A. Sobchak—8 percent, A. Rutskoy—5 percent, M. Gorbachev—4 percent, G. Popov—4 percent.

In the opinion of those questioned during and in the first few days after the putsch, the activity of the following publications earned the most sympathy and respect:

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA—20 percent, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY—12.5 percent, TRUD—10 percent, IZVESTIYA—7.5 percent, PRAVDA—5 percent.

Poll Reveals Opinions on Congress, Coup, CPSU Banning

OW0409070091 Moscow INTERFAX in English
0626 GMT 4 Sep 91

["Viewpoint"; Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] What Will Be the Fate of the Congress of People's Deputies?

The "Data" news agency reports an opinion poll by the National Public Opinion Studies Center on September 1 among 1071 persons from 12 cities of the Russian Federation shows that 41 percent consider the congress of USSR people's deputies should be dissolved and all powers be given to the republics.

36 percent have an opposite opinion.

The rest did not answer.

Margin of error—three percent.

Is Another Coup D'Etat Possible?

37 percent of the respondents in the same poll believe another coup attempt is possible in the future.

40 percent rule out such a possibility.

23 percent have no definite opinion.

Half of Those Polled Want the CPSU Banned

And the last question of the poll was: "What do you think about the CPSU?"

51 percent said it should be banned.

30 percent do not think so.

19 percent found it difficult to answer.

Polls Indicate Support for Armed Forces

PM0409091791 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Sep 91 p 1

[Report by Vladimir Kuznechevskiy: "Army: With the Reaction or With the People?"]

[Text] Since the fall of last year the idea of a state coup has been in the air. And all this time the democratic press has been asking with whom the army would be in the event of a coup—with the reaction or with the people.

In March 1991 we drew our readers' attention to the fact that to judge by the February public opinion poll in the RSFSR the republic's population expresses great trust in the armed forces (see ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA No. 51). Let us recall the results of that study.

Question: Which of the organizations and institutions of our society listed below do you trust?

Answer: 63 percent—the armed forces

57 percent—the church

55 percent—the RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman

51 percent—the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies

51 percent—the RSFSR Supreme Soviet

36 percent—the USSR Supreme Soviet

35 percent—the USSR president.

And now nearly six months have elapsed and the state coup has come and gone. And during it it was reaffirmed once again that the old Russian saying is right: The voice of the people is the voice of god. A 25-27 August telephone poll commissioned by the U.S. newspaper

USA TODAY in Moscow and Leningrad showed confirmation of the ratings of all the above-mentioned structures only with an even greater reduction of these ratings for the union power structures. The army has not betrayed the people's expectations and the people have assessed at its worth the Armed Forces' contribution to the suppression of the putsch.

A negligible minority, only two percent of those polled, are inclined to put the blame for the putsch on the army. Some 31 percent of the population of the Russian capitals believe that the army has once more shown that it is part of the people and will not act against them and to the question, do you believe that the army subunits' refusal to obey orders during the putsch attests to the complete demoralization of the army only three percent answered in the affirmative. The overwhelming majority of those polled treated the Armed Forces with trust.

Arbatov Urges Drastic Reduction of Military

PM3008135691 Milan L'UNITA in Italian
28 Aug 91 p 4

[Interview with Georgiy Arbatov, director of the United States of America and Canada Institute, by Jolanda Bufalini; date, place not given]

[Excerpt] [Moscow—[passage omitted] [Bufalini] So, Mr. Arbatov, despite the significant dissociation from the putschists by several army divisions, does your mistrust of the armed forces remain intact?

[Arbatov] I do not deny that both officers and ordinary soldiers behaved well, obeying their conscience. But on the whole the generals are reactionaries. Yazarov, Varennikov, and—we must not speak ill of the dead, but we must tell the truth, after all—Akhromeyev were one of the driving forces behind the coup. When the new defense minister, General Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, picked up the telephone he found only one general loyal to the constitution—Pavel Grachev, now appointed deputy minister.

[Bufalini] Are you afraid that these forces could raise their head again?

[Arbatov] They have received a very heavy blow, and the danger is not immediate. But as long as there is an army of 5 million men, as long as half of the industrial system works for the defense sector, and if we add to this the economic disaster and crime, then the risk of our finding ourselves in a critical situation in which the militaristic forces could seek revenge does exist.

[Bufalini] What do you believe should be done to avert a repetition of a crisis such as that currently being experienced?

[Arbatov] The West can help us to dismantle militarism. One partial but very concrete form of help concerns demobilized soldiers, in connection with home construction and so forth. It could help us to convert the defense

industry. But the trouble must be removed at the root. You must remember that Hitler's first coup was farcical, but the second time he was very successful. We must be strict in punishing the guilty parties. Furthermore, I believe that we must move fast with the reforms, appointing a civilian to head the Defense Ministry.

[Bufalini] But the international community is worried about the threat of the USSR's complete disintegration. Do you consider this a real danger?

[Arbatov] The putschists claimed to want to restore order, to want to conserve the Union. Instead they dealt a terrible blow both to order and to the Union, and this all happened against the background of a frightening economic crisis. People lost their confidence, and the risk of anarchy is very great. The most urgent need is to bring all this back under control. The Union leadership needs to be purified; it is, so to speak, demoralized. My hope and my trust lie with the Russian government structures. They are the linchpin on which to depend at present: The Russian government and parliament; the democratic trade unions of Moscow, Leningrad, and Sverdlovsk; and the wonderful capacity to organize themselves that people have displayed recently. What can be done now at the Union level? What can Bakatin—who has all my sympathy and has just come to the KGB—do, not to mention this General Lobov, appointed chief of staff? I know him well, and he really does not seem to me to be exactly a champion of democratic ideas.

[Bufalini] But do you not see the danger—indicated by the mayor of Leningrad—that the reactionary forces could operate in the field of nationalism with the aim of causing the USSR to disintegrate?

[Arbatov] This too could happen. However, I believe that the unrest in the republics is a reaction to the coup. There is a loss of confidence in the center that permitted all this to happen. Confidence in the center must be restored, and they too must realize that they need it.

[Bufalini] Nevertheless, some speeches in the Supreme Soviet—such as that by Kazhkhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev—seemed characterized by suspicion toward Russia.

[Arbatov] Nazarbayev's was a bad speech. I did not like his talk about redefining borders, his virtual appeal to Russia's autonomous republics to separate. He did this knowing the stances held by Tatarstan (which obstructed the nine-plus-one process) at the very time when Russia is the only force that can counter the worst. It is an attempt to strike at it from below—at a time like this.

[Bufalini] You have long argued the need for drastic arms cuts. Do you believe that the USSR should relinquish its role as a nuclear power?

[Arbatov] I do not believe that world powers can play a major role by relying on the military approach any more. This belongs to the past, as the Gulf war confirmed. On

its own, the United States could have neither paid for this operation, nor sent out the army, nor won the war. Any idea of unilateral actions must be abandoned. The time has come for multilateral solutions, for a very serious initiative by the United Nations and the other supranational structures. NATO too is now a dinosaur. I realize that it is impossible for it to be simply abolished or for something different to be created under the same name. Especially following the attempted coup here, we must analyze the situation and understand it properly. But what has happened here is actually an encouragement for everyone.

'Politics of Compromise' Advocated

914B0340A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Aug 91
Union Edition p 3

[Article by Aleksey Kiva, doctor of historical sciences: "Victory Calls for Responsibility"]

[Text] We, Russians, have become different. "We are not slaves, slaves we are not"—this now, really, is about us. First of all, about Muscovites, Leningraders, and people from Sverdlovsk, but also about the residents of hundreds and thousands of Russian cities and villages. We have seen not only a new people, but also a new generation of leaders. Leaders not from the partocracy, but leaders who came to the apex of authority not up the nomenklatura ladder, but by the will of the people. Such severe tests show precisely "who is who."

And, my God, what a chasm has opened up between the leaders of the old nomenklatura, the leaders of the putschists, and the leaders of the democrats. Some betrayed their leader and others remained loyal to their leader and to the law in the most difficult hours of the ordeal. This unerringly symbolizes two worlds: A world that is departing, and a world that is arriving.

During these three days, a lot fell into place. Including what the system of barracks socialism is really like. Its supporters turned out to be only the fascists and semi-fascists of the regime. Like the regime of Saddam Husayn. And this is not accidental. The socialism created by Stalin according to the old Marxist patterns is a variety of fascism. Communofascism. And the issue here is in the very principles of the theory. The idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the principles of the class approach, the repudiation of the right of an individual to a free choice of various forms of existence, the idea of forcing people to be happy in one way, the idea of doing away with private property in the means of production and a number of other provisions of the doctrine lead inevitably in their implementation to one and the same sad result, to massive terror up to and including genocide, and they deform society, and, in the final analysis, doom it to degradation.

However, what kind of conclusions should we draw from this? Ban the Communist Party? Make Marxism-Leninism illegal? In no way! The matter must be allowed to move at its own natural pace. Otherwise, there is no

escaping misfortune. The idea of communism has supporters, and no one has a right to prohibit them from believing in it and striving to put it into practice. But only in a democratic way. Only within the framework of the Constitution and within the framework of the values of modern civilization. All prohibitions give rise to counteraction right up to terrorism. Outside of totalitarian structures, the idea of communism, but not of socialism, will by itself come to nothing. Of course, those supporters of communism who have not rejected inciting social enmity in society, establishing "national salvation committees" and the idea of dictatorship, automatically place themselves outside the law. However, this does not relate to the vast number of CPSU members who long ago rejected the ideology of Bolshevik extremism and who profess fully civilized values. CPSU members must be given an opportunity to make a choice themselves. A "witch hunt" would be a disgrace for our young democracy and, in the final analysis, it could lead to grave consequences.

So much spite and hatred has built up in us over the years of totalitarianism that we, not noticing it ourselves, can cross a fatal line. We will mention our history once again. The Bolsheviks started with revenge against the old regime, and they ended with the fact that they were killing each other, and they cleared the way for genocide. I will mention another case also. Soon after the antimonarchist and antifeudal revolution in Iraq in 1958, the Communists started a bloodletting of the Ba'athists who blocked their way to power. The incident was soon succeeded by the fact that now the Ba'athists began a bloodletting of the Communists. And where did they get to?..

If we take the path of Bolshevik intolerance, depart from morality in politics, begin to take revenge on different defenders of communofascism, then we will come inevitably to some new type of totalitarianism, but not to democracy.

But on the other hand, does not the idea come to mind that this idiotically organized putsch was a gift from God

himself? Occurring objectively, it enables us to deliver the kind of blow to totalitarianism after which it will not be able to recover.

Victors must be wise. Well, where does this maximalism come from here? However, I know: It is the same bolshevism with which we are all infected as a whole. Look at the kind of increased demands we are requiring of each other. "Were you for the junta? No? Then why were you silent?" If a person did not participate in the preparation of the conspiracy, did not approve of it, but also did not come out against it, we, nevertheless, will be lenient.

We now say this in one voice: conspiracy, fascist coup. But, after all, an emergency situation regime was introduced by people from the higher echelons of power: the vice president and the premier. Along with them, maintaining Olympian calm, was the president of the Supreme Soviet. And also alongside was the CPSU leadership keeping mum. I do not call for the forgiveness of those who participated directly in the conspiracy. And, nonetheless, we should not revive the old Bolshevik slogan: Who is not with us is against us.

The victors must distinguish themselves by political sobriety. Very difficult times await us that are associated with the transition from one economic and, perhaps, social system, to another. And it is necessary to consolidate society, uniting all democratic, reformist, patriotic, and even national-patriotic forces in the struggle for reforms. I am convinced that a thorough and dynamic reformation of society objectively responds to the interests of an overwhelming majority of the population. Thus, it is necessary to try to give everyone a chance. I am convinced that now on the wave of the August victory, while not dallying, it will be possible to establish strong support for our movement forward and that there is a need for a broad bloc of forces on the basis of compromise. No matter what, we cannot do without a policy of compromise. Of course, compromises in favor of revolutionary changes. Let not victory cloud the eyes, but make us smarter, more insightful, and better.

More on Commission To Investigate KGB Organs

PM0309152991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Sep 91 Union Edition p 6

[V. Rudnev report: "Three Days of the Putsch. IZVESTIYA's Investigation. Presidential Commission Will Analyze Security Officials' Activity"]

[Text] A State Commission on the Investigation of KGB Organs' Activity was formed 28 August by a USSR presidential decree. It includes USSR and RSFSR people's deputies and representatives of the USSR and Russian KGB. The chairman is RSFSR People's Deputy Sergey Stepashin, chief of a Russian parliamentary committee.

By decision of the USSR president, all organs of state power and management, enterprises, institutions, organizations, and officials on the whole country's territory have been instructed to provide members of the commission with access to all materials without exception and to assist in the work. By 26 October 1991 the commission must be presented with findings on the role of the state security organs in the anticonstitutional coup; proposals for reorganizing the structure of state security organs; and findings on changes in legislation regulating the activity of the state security organs.

It was said at a press conference that analogous local commissions may be formed in rayons, cities, and oblast and republic centers on the proposal of the State Commission and by the decision of soviets. The findings of such commissions will be taken into consideration when the work of the State Commission is summed up.

Journalists were given the commission's telephone numbers to publish, so that anyone who wants to can call and report their opinion on the KGB organs. However, USSR People's Deputy Academician Yuriy Ryzhov, a member of the commission, was opposed to this. He believes that such "ties with the population" would actually turn them into an organ investigating specific cases and will stir up cases of people informing against each other.

Total Dismantling of KGB Urged

PM3008140691 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 27 Aug 91 p 1

["Commentary" by ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA political observer Vladimir Kuznechevskiy: "The KGB Must Be Liquidated"]

[Text] During questioning, former KGB Chairman Kryuchkov uttered the following phrase: "I do not regret anything I have done. And if I could start over, I would be more vigorous about it, in order to swiftly deprive the Russian leadership of its head."

I don't know about anyone else, but this utterance shook me. It scared me. It means that if a new Kryuchkov were

to take over the leadership of this monster, this independent empire within our state, a new putsch would be unavoidable. And the next putsch, instead of costing three lives, might unleash a civil war.

As I see it, the USSR and Russian presidents have appointed Vadim Bakatin USSR KGB chairman primarily in order to reorganize this party and state structure, so that it will never again be able to dictate to us all. In this connection, I would like to express some ideas which have occurred to me, and not only me, several times during the years of perestroyka.

First of all, I am convinced that the USSR KGB cannot and must not exist any longer as a single, monolithic, union-level organization, no matter what form of future Union Treaty the leaders of the union republics sign and no matter what form the future Union's powers take in the treaty. The president of the new Union should never again have charge of a suprarepublican organ combining in a single structure counterintelligence, intelligence, protection, security at very important facilities, border troops, and so on. Indeed, the union republics would not allow it any more.

As it is, the USSR KGB has to be liquidated rather than reorganized, and an entirely new organization has to be set up in its place with some of the facilities it has at the moment; it will serve the interests of the people and the republican states and it must be under the control of the republics' legislators, beginning with the budget and ending with its specific actions.

First and foremost, in my view, in the RSFSR the security service and external intelligence should be made separate. The contradictions which have always beset these services, together under the same roof, have given rise to enmity, and often sheer hatred of one another. What we need in Russia is a normal, professional external intelligence service that is independent and subject only to the government or the president, and a separate security service, amalgamated with the RSFSR Internal Affairs Ministry and also subject only to the government or president of the RSFSR.

The massive buildings on Lubyanka, of course, must be taken away from the KGB, and the Russian parliament must decide their future.

The KGB must lose all its military subunits. All of them! The border troops, drastically cut, must be independent and under no circumstances subordinate to the security service. The RSFSR State Council, Russian Defense Ministry, RSFSR president—anyone but the security service. As for the airborne divisions, for example the Vitebskaya or the Dzerzhinskiy division, they must all be removed from KGB control as soon as possible and reassigned to the Russian Defense Ministry.

All construction detachments must be taken away from the KGB. The KGB construction directorate must be transferred lock, stock, and barrel to the Russian government. The facilities required by external intelligence or

the security service must be constructed on the basis of normal orders by civil construction firms.

And, of course, there must be a drastic cut in the number of employees in the current KGB—staff and nonstaff, including informers.

The lists of the latter need not be made public. In the first place, because the security services always have had and always will have secret informers (the same goes for internal affairs organs, incidentally). But, without any doubt, these lists must be known to the authorized committee of Russian legislators. A purge of the KGB is inevitable. But it must be carried out as meticulously and as scrupulously as possible. With the maximum attention to each individual KGB employee and nonstaff informer. In my view, this requires the creation of commissions of professionals drawn from actual employees of the present KGB in both the First and Second main directorates. I am sure that these commissions, in conjunction with representatives of Russian

legislative organs, will be able to investigate both the professional and moral qualities of the KGB employees and decide who should remain in external intelligence and the security service of the RSFSR and who should be found a "civilian" job. However, there must be an RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee above these commissions, monitoring their work.

Finally, despite the grim organization's bad reputation, there are many honest officers and employees in the present KGB who have a passionate desire to honorably serve Russia and its people. Moreover, the training of a skilled intelligence agent or counterintelligence agent costs us, the taxpayers, a great deal of money and requires of the professionals many years of training and skill enhancement and enormous psychological, physical, and intellectual effort. We cannot afford not to recognize this fact. We are not so rich that we can ignore it. So the utmost caution, care, meticulousness, and scrupulousness are needed when we transform the KGB and liquidate it in its present form.

Media Minister Poltoranin Interviewed

*LD3108032891 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1643 GMT 26 Aug 91*

[Interview with Mikhail Poltoranin, chairman of the All-Union State Radio and Television Company, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] Hello! Today we are in the bastion of the democratic press, so to speak, in the Russian Federation Ministry of the Press and Mass Media. We are meeting the minister, who is also the acting chairman of the All-Union State Radio and Television Company, formerly Gosteleradio. He is Mikhail Poltoranin. [Video shows Poltoranin in office]

[Poltoranin] [Passage omitted] Our entire press can no longer remain in the hands of a group of people, a small group of people, under the control of this group, because as soon as they feel it necessary, they immediately block all channels and the press which does not want to work for them gets suspended or even banned, while the press, television, radio and other mass media are imposing disinformation onto the people. I think that today the main objective is to quickly mend the structure of our press and to demonopolize it. After all, the steps that are known to us are being taken to this end. I will speak about them a little later, but right now I would like to speak about the position of our journalists. [Passage omitted]

If a journalist sides with the putschists, if he sides with a group of people, or the junta grouping which lifted up its hand against the people and democracy, than this journalist has no moral right to work. But a large number of people of this kind does exist. I think that the journalists themselves should find their positions today, to try to understand each other and to draw their lessons from this.

And now about the structures. A decree on the suspension of a number of newspapers and on nationalization of party's assets of the Russian President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin was published. I understand that those working in PRAVDA, or say in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA and others, there is a shock today. We are receiving many telephone calls saying that the actions we took were against the law, that we are following in the tracks of those people who virtually several days ago, or so, were closing democratic institutions. Nothing of this kind has happened. All this has been done within the framework of the law on press, which says that monopolization of mass media is impermissible. At present the CPSU holds around 70 percent of mass media, which means that it has a full monopoly. And this, too, helped them to bring about the coup, because for several months, perhaps even for a year before the coup they have been waging an intensive campaign of rumors and of exerting pressure on people that the democrats and the very authority, which was

elected by people, does not correspond to interests and that it must be fought by all available means. This is how the people were addressed. The last such address was carried by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. [passage omitted]

People and collectives should organize meetings. They should discuss and think about how they could change the form in which they function. Tomorrow or even today they might turn up and say: We have decided to turn PRAVDA or SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA into a new publication, we are journalists and founders and we are asking you for support and the ministry and government for help. Give us financial backing and we shall be an independent publication. We would be pleased to register them, for it will constitute an addition to the democratic independent publications, as it were.

The second question concerning the decree is that we allegedly banned the publication of PRAVDA. No, the only thing we have done was that we suspended its publication on Russian territory. [passage omitted] No, it is possible to publish it even today, because its editorial office can move to the town of Baku, say, where the president of the Republic supported the (?actions) of the putschists. It is possible to print it there and to distribute it around Russia, because nobody is banning its distribution.

No one is banning its distribution. But the best thing, the best possible variant is, of course, to urgently set up an organization group, an initiative group, as they say, and to establish the newspapers which would work for the good of journalists and the people. [passage omitted]

There is yet another small thing, another topic concerning the press—the regional newspapers. Much is being said about it now. The whole thing began with a letter sent by our ministry to regional newspapers and to our printing plants, that we no longer intend to publish joint newspapers. The point here is that regional newspapers were almost all published jointly by the soviets and the CPSU. Why? First, the CPSU has deceived us, The CPSU Central Committee Administration Department and the CPSU Central Committee itself has failed to provide us this year with about 130 million rubles to sustain these newspapers. So, we took 360 million rubles from the budget and invested it in this matter. It is essential that the CPSU Central Committee makes investment on a proportionate basis so that journalists would be able to lead a normal life. They did not invest the money and a number of newspapers were simply reduced to a miserable existence. A number of newspapers were simply closed down in our country.

We realized that we can no longer do business with the treacherous organization of the CPSU Central Committee. But because the cost of newsprint and of various services is growing, it is difficult for all these newspapers to adhere to their budget, because, strictly speaking, the price of these newspapers will spiral up to almost a billion rubles.

We also said that it will be necessary to make a transfer to interregional newspapers. Interregional newspapers should be set up in the places where it is specifically possible, while where this is not possible regional newspapers should be retained. However, the main thing we would like to do in this respect, is to free journalists from under the control of local bureaucrats, from their command and their influence, to put it in a more precise way. This means that if the newspaper does what they want, they provide the money, but if it does not they block it and erect various obstacles and so on and so forth. This is why we want to free both the interregional and regional newspapers. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Can we say that the nationalization of Party-owned printing enterprises has been carried out in order to subsequently denationalize them?

[Poltoranin] Yes, the main task is to nationalize them so that we carry out their denationalization. We think that some kind of public enterprises and associations should be created on the basis of the pool of printing facilities which we acquired. As for me, I have an idea that we should have an association jointly with many other small associations called free press so that these printing enterprises would not move into politics and that they would print, on contractual basis, publications of any orientation, of the CPSU, democratic parties, and so on and so forth, of every orientation that may exist in our country. The same applies to denationalization. The handing over to us of the NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY, the APN as it was called in the past and the IAN as it is called now, was also at issue, because the entire information structure of TASS and IAN was in the center of Pavlov's group, or the junta. This is why IAN is being handed over to us and we must let it go free. The lads can set up various editorial offices there which would exist without control and without political censorship.

I know that censorship was introduced there virtually on the morning on that day. There are, of course, many excellent people there, who wanted to break the alarming news to the outside world, but they simply could not do it. If only were they independent, like our RUSSIAN INFORMATION AGENCY. This agency and INTERFAX were functioning and played an extremely important role. This has shown that we must quickly denationalize and in this way quickly deal with tasks and draw lessons from this putsch, too.

[Correspondent] Yet another question springs to mind with regard to the putsch. Should we not think then about communication lines which should be taken out of control of these state bodies?

[Poltoranin] The issue of internal communication lines is rather more complex. Nevertheless, we are thinking about it. It appears that there was much discussion that the jamming had been stopped and that jamming devices were destroyed. But as soon as we put on the air two of our underground Russian radio stations, which we got ready in case of putsch, all 1,600 jamming devices were

activated and started jamming us. We were simply cheated that they were destroyed. But even these jamming devices can be used and privatized, so that independent stations could be created. They would start working en masse, in case of another attempt at coup. The putschists will not have enough power to suppress everything instantly. Individual communications branches will, naturally, be gradually handed over to private owners.

Poltoranin Backs Plan for Reforms in TASS Structure

PM3008150891 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 27 Aug 91 p 4

[Report by unidentified TASS correspondent: "TASS Needs Independence"]

[Text] Mikhail Poltoranin, RSFSR press and mass information minister, has backed the plan for a fundamental reform of TASS proposed by the action group of the TASS journalists' organization board and representatives of a number of TASS components. The gist of the plan is to turn TASS from a state organization into an independent news agency and make TASS the property of the labor collective. The plan envisages creating at a general meeting of the TASS labor collective a temporary elected organ—founding council—to which all the powers of the TASS collegium will be transferred.

At a meeting with representatives of the action group, M. Poltoranin stressed that this concept coincides in the main with the aims of RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin's instructions to the RSFSR Council of Ministers to reorganize TASS. We fully support the idea of replacing the old TASS management structure with a new, democratically elected one, with all powers being transferred to it. We know, he said, that not all journalists have managed yet to overcome their fear, but "on acquiring independence and freedom they will reveal their potential and no one will dare try to break them in the future."

According to your plan, TASS is to be an independent structure guided only by the law, in particular the Law on the Press, and nothing else, he stressed. TASS will no longer be pressurized by any parties, groupings, or governments. TASS must not be destroyed, and the Russian government is prepared to join you in boosting this sagging structure. Let us get together and create a "fourth estate." Along with an effective third—legal—it would be a guarantor of freedom that would prevent any putsch.

The minister stressed that TASS people need not worry—for the duration of the elaboration and implementation of the TASS reform the agency's collective can count on the RSFSR government's giving every assistance and support, including the preservation of the present system and volume of state finance. "Never again will you have to beg," he promised.

At the same time, Poltoranin noted that the Russian government did not expect TASS people to take a long breather, hoping that TASS might become a joint-stock company pretty soon. Relations with governments, including republican governments, and other state structures, must be built entirely on a treaty basis. He noted that no one would be able to control TASS, because it is undesirable for anyone to have more than 15 percent of its shares.

TASS must have its own declaration and statutes, designed to ensure its independence and protect it from outside pressure. As for the agency's internal affairs, they must be decided by the collective itself, in particular problems caused by the inflated managerial apparatus.

Poltoranin promised expert help and any other support the Russian authorities can give, while warning that the RSFSR has much the same plans for the NOVOSTI news agency (IAN)—“to provide you with a competitor.”

Touching on another topic—the RSFSR president's decrees relating to the mass media—he said that were all geared “not to switching from one monopoly to another, but to finally demonopolizing them and commencing the implementation of the task envisaged by the Law on the Press.”

TASS Director Plans Official, Independent Departments

*OW3008214291 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1707 GMT 30 Aug 91*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The new chief of the Soviet news agency TASS Vitaly Ignatenko, who formerly headed the press service of the USSR President, has said his latest appointment came as a surprise to him, although Mr. Gorbachev and he had discussed ways of improving the performance of telegraph agencies.

He was speaking to IF's [INTERFAX] reporter on Friday, the second day of his work as the TASS director, and said there are plans to divide the agency into two departments: one official, the other independent which will be “entirely truthful.” Mr. Ignatenko explained that TASS will continue distributing official information, since “no country can do without it,” but that the “independent” department will be responsible for 90 percent of the agency's work.

TASS, he went on to say, is regarding other news agencies in the USSR, including INTERFAX, not as opponents but as colleagues “with whom we should compete in terms of promptness, objectiveness, quality, and talent.”

Mr. Ignatenko praised INTERFAX for high efficiency and said he had regularly received IF's news bulletins during his service as president Gorbachev's press spokesman.

Ignatenko Interviewed on TASS Appointment

*PM3008120591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 Aug 91 Union Edition p 8*

[Interview 29 August with TASS General Director V.N. Ignatenko by S. Livshin; place not given; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction: “TASS Is Authorized To State...”]

[Text] As already reported, Vitaliy Ignatenko has been appointed general director of TASS by a USSR presidential decree. We contacted Vitaliy Nikitich 29 August, before A.N. Yakovlev introduced the new leader to the collective.

[Livshin] Did this appointment come as a surprise to you?

[Ignatenko] I had discussed the agency's reorganization with Mikhail Sergeyevich beforehand. But I learned only at 1205 hours Wednesday that this would be entrusted to me.

[Livshin] Is it easy to come back inside the old walls?

[Ignatenko] During the time that I was not working for TASS, its work style, alas, changed little for the better. The same readiness to salute and present the information that people up above expect. This habit of disciplinary journalism, which so let down the agency at the time of the putsch, strikes me as enemy no. 1. The second problem: It is necessary to change not only the structure of TASS but also the actual news presentation techniques and news analysis. The competition from independent news agencies requires a sharp increase in the operational efficiency and competence of TASS. I believe that there are people in its large collective (probably too large) who will help me to resolve these tasks.

[Livshin] You were in charge of the president's press service for exactly one year, to the day. What is the chief result of this year?

[Ignatenko] Priceless experience of contacts with Gorbachev and with representatives of the press from all countries and areas at our frequent news conferences. Incidentally, when I saw that notorious meeting of the putschists with the press, I was struck by the total lack of contact between the presidium and the floor. People who gamble only on “bought” journalists and brazenly lie in the faces of the rest cannot govern the country. The second conclusion: The press now is no less powerful a force than, let us say, the Army or the KGB. But the danger to those who provide truthful information under any conditions has also increased correspondingly. There are two new episodes of the movie “We Are Journalists, Don't Shoot!” about this. I wrote the script with the playwright, K. Slavin, and the director, I. Gusman.

[Livshin] Who will replace you in your former post?

[Ignatenko] I don't know yet. But for the time being I will assist Mikhail Sergeyevich in his contacts with journalists. I believe that the USSR president's next major news conference will be held right after the Congress of People's Deputies.

New TASS Director V. Ignatenko Interviewed
*PM0209140591 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 30 Aug 91 p 3*

[Unattributed interview with V. Ignatenko on his appointment as TASS director general; date and place not given: "Evening Call to V. Ignatenko"]

[Text] [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Congratulations on your new appointment, Vitaliy Nikitich...

[Ignatenko] Thank you. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's congratulations are especially pleasant, because it was this newspaper that I left to go to TASS fifteen years ago...

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] But the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union is not the same now. Its monopoly of information has ended, tough competition has arrived...

[Ignatenko] I hope and believe that TASS will acquire a new identity. But a great deal needs to be done for this, a reorganization of the agency is needed. The TASS collective has demanded the dismissal of the editorial collegium...

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Does this mean that from now on we will receive not the tendentious, propagandistic articles of observer Petrunya, but objective and unbiased information like, for instance, that of REUTER?

[Ignatenko] Undoubtedly. Every journalist, in my view, should first of all determine his own civic and professional position. But TASS needs a small "revolution"... TASS will be an independent news agency, professing only honest journalism. Directives "from dizzy heights" and top-level instructions will no longer be of any use. There are two principles—the Law and the Truth.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] How were you received in the collective?

[Ignatenko] I am very pleased that A.N. Yakovlev, whom I respect, came to introduce me. That freed me from making a "king's" speech, and we decided to break Yakovlev's speech down into themes and put it out through our channels today—I think it will be of great interest not only to journalists and politicians...

USSR Writers' Union Paper DEN Tacitly Encouraged Coup

*914B0353A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 34, 28 Aug 91 p 3*

[Article by Sergey Boguslavskiy: "A Conspiracy of Academicians.' A Prologue for the Putsch Which Could Have Become Its Epilogue"]

[Text] At the very peak of the coup, if memory serves, on the second day, a funny joke was born which perhaps conveys the atmosphere of these days accurately. "A girl is sitting down, overcome with grief, holding her head in her hands. A colleague addresses her: What are you so upset about? If you are going to fall apart over just any coup like this you will simply shatter your nerves..."

Indeed, this time around the first attempt was made to seize power through the force of arms. However, let us recall how many attempts of a palace variety were made in the years of perestroika. The last attempt, when they tried to remove Gorbachev through the Union parliament, was made by Pavlov and the same "generals"—Kryuchkov, Yazov, and Pugo, with Lukyanov's tacit approval. The prime minister demanded to be given additional, emergency powers, with him no longer reporting to the president, and "the support group" went all out intimidating the members of parliament with threats from within and without. It did not work. Apparently, this was when they went for broke...

However, removing Gorbachev from power was a trifle. What is to be done, how is this to be justified? Understandably, physical death is the simplest. May I be forgiven for this blasphemy, but this is the optimal scenario. For example, let us recall Kirov's assassination by Nikolayev. Did they lack the nerve or the time?... This is where we enter a sphere of conjecture and hypotheses, though perhaps the coupists did not think that far ahead: "The main point is to engage in a battle, and then we will see." Still...

They say that virtually during the first hours of the coup some functionaries of the CPSU Central Committee staff saw the galleys of a lead article which was supposed to appear in all "loyal" newspapers: about uncovering a supposedly Zionist-Masonic conspiracy which had already occurred, or perhaps was being prepared by a group of persons close to M.S. Gorbachev. And why not? We know for sure that NASH SOVREMENNIK, MOLODAYA GVARDIYA, and LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA have long been working on this topic. However, as I see it, Valeriy Legostayev, widely known in the circles of the party elite, and "the favorite newspaper of writers," DEN, made the most valuable contribution.

The publication of "pages from a future book" by V. Legostayev in four issues of Prokhanov's tabloid became a peculiar artillery preparation for the coup, and later on it could have also become a script, a skeleton of the affair with that particular conspiracy which, in the opinion of

V. Legostayev, occurred as early as 1987, and which he interprets as "a conspiracy of academicians."

Incidentally, this is the Legostayev who was the closest aide of Ye.K. Ligachev (which he for some reason forgot to mention on his "pages") and who is better known not as an author of several notorious publications in PRAVDA but as a coauthor of the truly historical article by Nina Andreyeva in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA which became the very first attempt at a palace coup. Functionaries of the Central Committee referred to Legostayev's work on this manifesto as the rightist forces almost openly. Subsequently, the article was placed in the newspaper, apparently after being approved by the then omnipotent Ligachev; it was reprinted by many oblast publications and recommended for study in the system of party instruction.

However, Gorbachev and A.N. Yakovlev, academician, Central Committee secretary, and according to Legostayev, the main conspirator, who were away from Moscow, returned in time, and the effect of the publication was successfully neutralized (later, attempts to take advantage of Gorbachev's absence were repeated many times!)

Actually, there would not have been anything bad about it because a plurality of opinions should exist in the party as well. The point was, however, that they acted in a conspiratorial manner, secretly, and ordered the compulsory "approval" by the entire party. When it did not work they wrote it off as the personal opinion of a common chemistry teacher who until then was a complete unknown.

Now let us see what kind of threads Legostayev sews the "case" of academicians with. Let us open the newspaper DEN, Nos. 13, 14, 15, and 16.

"In a string of years since M.S. Gorbachev assumed leadership of the party, the year 1987 is special primarily because in this year a change in principle occurred in the very logic of our social movement. Having failed to hold on, we lapsed from a logic of evolutionary changes and strenuous current work into a logic of global, harsh political struggle in the course of which everything was gradually put at stake—the party, the people, and the future of the country."

He believes that there was no need at all to switch to radical reforms, but sort of without calling the need for April 1985 into doubt. It turns out that a certain array of forces, the positions of two opposing groups in the CPSU Central Committee, is the whole point.

"The supporters of one, adhering in the main to the ideas of Yu.V. Andropov outlined by him at the June 1983 plenum, argued that this was not the time for new extensive experiments in the economy..." "Others, their opponents, responded that the difficulties in our economy are of a fundamental, genetic nature, and for this reason expectations of a qualitative improvement in

its operation in the absence of a resolute, revolutionary restructuring of the national economy are unfounded."

Indeed, the positions were defined precisely. Naturally, he passed over in silence the fact that major infusions into the heavy and defense industries in the first two years of perestroika became the very mine which subsequently blew apart our budget, starved the light industry which was feeble to begin with, and brought about the highest rates of inflation and the unparalleled emission of currency. According to Legostayev, this is beside the point; he did not dwell on economic analysis. It turns out that everything is much simpler. Some, the successors of Andropov, or "practitioners": Ligachev, Ryzhkov, most secretaries of the Central Committee and party oblast committees came out in favor of reinforcing the leading role of the CPSU, recalling what Legostayev calls the prophetic words of the former KGB chairman: "When the leading role of the Communist Party is weakened, the danger of lapsing into a bourgeois-reformist path of development arises." He went on to say: "Life has shown that this has indeed been the case." Others, "academicians," A.N. Yakovlev, V.A. Medvedev, A.F. Dobrynin, G.A. Arbatov, and Ye.M. Primakov wanted "to get the CPSU out of their way."

This is it, as simple as can be. It turns out that there were no attempts to reform the party or calls for all Communist leaders to begin with themselves, and that right away destroying "the main engine of social development" was on the agenda.

According to Legostayev, this is when the struggle for the general secretary began. While praising his ex-boss every which way, he confirms what we now know for sure: In these initial years, Gorbachev, in essence, lacked adequate support not only in the territorial organs of the party, where for the most part the generally old Brezhnevite and Andropovian cadres remained, and where in places "the second echelon" was promoted to the positions of first, but also in the apparatus of the Central Committee itself and its Secretariat. People selected by Ligachev when he was chief of the department of party organizational and cadre work worked there for the most part. In turn, the "academicians" drew on support from the Moscow academic circles, "behind which stood several powerful politicized scientific organizations with pro-Western orientation."

(Incidentally, at approximately the same time that DEN published the thoughts of Legostayev, Kryuchkov spelled out which organizations these were at the infamous closed session of the USSR Supreme Soviet—organizations on the payroll of the CIA and Zionists—which he confidentially "voiced," with A. Nevzorov's help, for the entire country to hear.)

We are getting close to the main point: Given the existing correlation of forces in the party, the "academic" group had no chance... However, the situation changed abruptly when the CPSU general secretary

definitively took the side of the radicals for political reasons. At this point, the "academicians" got a realistic chance "for a coup."

Why did Gorbachev take the side of the "academicians?" The answer is as plain as can be: Reorientation "occurred to a decisive degree under the pressure of the need to restrict the growth of the political influence of Ye.K. Ligachev and members of the party leadership whose views were close to his." Allegedly, this was why Gorbachev nominated Yakovlev as candidate for Politburo member, despite "Aleksandr Nikolayevich being precisely the one criticized at the plenum, without mentioning his name, for serious shortcomings... in managing the press..."

Indeed, entrusting this significant ideological sector, in essence, taking it away from the ideologist Ligachev, was a great victory. The results were "horrible": independent positions of democratic publications and "mounting involvement of the mass media in political confrontations."

However, Legostayev himself revealed the hidden significance of the real struggle among the party leadership, perhaps unwillingly. Of course, radical differences were at issue: proceeding toward a democratic free society or standing in place, or more precisely, rolling back.

Some, the "academicians," "referred to the need to release the dormant, in their opinion, forces and the initiative of the people, liberating the economy to this end from the shackles of managerial bureaucracy," and they believed that a catastrophe "is drawing closer fast all by itself anyway, and this is why a way out is found in still more emergency reforms, the postponing of which will be pernicious for the country." Others, headed by Ligachev, were afraid that reforms would bring about both the party and themselves losing "control over the situation," and that everything would "end in a catastrophe" without "the leading and guiding one" (a familiar vocabulary, is it not?)

As you can see, Legostayev himself understood full well where the real watershed ran. You and I, the democrats, had no desire to understand this and accused Gorbachev of all mortal sins. Had it not been for his tactical flexibility and art, the emergence of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] would not have drawn closer as early as then, at the time of Ligachev, which would have undoubtedly ended in a tragedy for our country setting it decades back. (The reverse of this deftness by our president is represented by the same GKChP.) After all, no major democratic movement was yet in evidence; the struggle was over whether it is to be or not to be. Of course, only the press could play the main role in this matter. A real battle which was generally concealed from the eyes of the uninitiated, unfolded over the press and freedom from CPSU control.

Legostayev complains: "The nature of publications which from the start aligned themselves politically with

A.N. Yakovlev became expressly antiparty and anti-Soviet very soon. The subsequent expansion of the freedom they secured entailed their confiscation from the hands of the state and a transformation of what used to be state publications into 'independent' ones..." (These are the same wordings which bring up the ghost of the GKChP. For appropriate actions which the "essayist" suggests—to outlaw, reregister, and turn them again into party-state, servile publications, see Resolution No. 2 of the junta.)

Legostayev goes on to mention the article by Nina Andreyeva, of course, failing to mention his modest role. Well, as they say, we were not there to witness it... However, an entire huge page of DEN is devoted to proving what in general cannot be proven: The "academicians," this time headed by Gorbachev, took advantage of the article to discredit Ligachev politically. Oh, the perfidy of these "academicians!" I for one used to think that he compromised himself by supporting the article; Legostayev also acknowledges this.

In this case, what "truth which will stand on its own" does the author of the memoirs refer to? He goes on to state immediately below: "I will say for myself that in the situation of those days the article...evoked a feeling of complete rejection in me," and subsequently goes on to agree with all of its main passages when analyzing the article in detail.

He acknowledges that, essentially, the struggle was for power as he describes a serious struggle on account of the article, the results of which were closely followed by all party functionaries who came out on top. I think that we can put it plainly: It was a challenge to Gorbachev, the first overt attempt to reverse the reforms.

The coupists would have won had they set out to do this in 1988. At the time, it would have sufficed to remove Gorbachev from power to this end. By 1991, this has become insufficient. It appears to me that, luckily for us, they did not understand this which goes to show yet again that our "leaders," including, alas, "the architect of perestroika" himself, continue to be divorced from real life and the people. However, let us not delude ourselves; there are still many blank spots in this episode, in these three days. One thing is beyond doubt: The role of personality in our history remains decisive. Actually, Yeltsin's popularity became a guarantee for the victory of democracy.

So, Legostayev brings into the plot and weaves into the fabric of "the conspiracy" a new character, Yeltsin, then secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the party. He concludes: "By mid-1987, a powerful 'academic' alternative was ultimately formed... What remained was to decisively defeat Ye.K. Ligachev and like-minded supporters of the Andropov line in the Central Committee Secretariat without spreading the fire of the struggle from the Politburo to the entire party in the

process," meaning a speech by the future president of Russia at the October plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

In principle, the outline has been drawn, the "conspirators" have been determined, emphasis has been laid, and a case has been slapped together. What next? Unfortunately, all we can do is guess. The newspaper DEN is no longer able to publish a sequel to Legostayev's book. To be sure, this sequel came close to being carried out in reality.

Certainly, it is pointless to discuss the possible role of Legostayev himself in the coup, as some people may be inclined to do. He is too small a fry in the party backwaters. Let us not guess. All we may refer to is ideological influence, molding public opinion, creating the image of conspirators, and "the betrayal of the interests of our country by Gorbachev and the 'academicians.'" Who knows what names he would have added to the list? Bakatin, Shevardnadze, Volskiy? Who would a new hero defending the purity of the party be—Polozkov, Zyuganov? Besides, is it really the point?!

As I see it, the top brass of the party simply gave themselves away. Statements by Rutskoy, and previously by the Democratic Platform, to the effect that reforms in the party were needed met with immediate tough responses, up to expulsion from the ranks of the CPSU. This time around, a coup occurred, and all the numerous Central Committees of ours kept mum. Hush-hush! As if nothing had ever happened! However, silence is an eloquent sign of agreement.

Party publications, PRAVDA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, and others controlled by the CPSU, customarily took orders. They printed everything they were told to. Here it is, the notorious party discipline! After all, Yanayev himself was proud to be a member of the Central Committee.

Meanwhile, our main character, the newspaper DEN, urgently slapped together an appeal to those who seized power with a request to allow DEN to publish in order to engage in a struggle against "democratic Judases" together with other—let us put it plainly—Black Hundreds-type, reactionary publications.

Well, let us recall the well-known friendly conversation over a cup of tea, on two newspaper pages, between DEN Editor in Chief Prokhanov and future leader of the coupists O. Baklanov, chief of the military-industrial complex. All the petty ideas were mentioned there—"restoring order," "reinforcing discipline," and so on (see a GKChP appeal, ukases, and resolutions).

Also, there was a "round table" of writers in the aforementioned DEN under the extremely clear-cut and definitive headline "Our Cause Is Right!"

Comrade patriots, you awaited this! You also provoked this!

I am not calling for yet another witch hunt, this time on the part of the democrats. God forbid! This would signify the end of all reforms. Let the law reign. The law, and only the law, can determine the degree of participation and the role of certain individuals, publications, and organizations in antistate activities.

It would be terrible if lists of persons involved in the putsch were to be published now, before the court rules. This would mean that we have lost.

However, let us be aware that the putsch was not random, it was prepared! Who knows what other plans may now be nurtured in the minds of those who clearly lost this time?

PRAVDA Wants To Be First Paper Closed by Any Future Junta

*PM0309101991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
31 Aug 91 Single Edition p 3*

[S. Oganyan report under general heading "Tragic Days Through PRAVDA Journalists' Eyes": "Have We Learned This Lesson?"]

[Text] The editorial office received the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat statement 25 August 1991. It was relayed via the PRAVDA stenographic bureau by P. Luchinskiy, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. It was a workday but, in accordance with the decree of the Russian president, PRAVDA was not working at the time.

We took a quite natural step in any normal society. We called a radio station and dictated a statement and within the hour—or maybe sooner—it was aired. It was later repeated several times...

There would have been nothing unusual or worth mentioning in this were it not for one thing. We did not merely turn to the radio. We turned to Radio Rossii. When I say that this decision was natural and normal, it is only because Russian radio journalists guaranteed this as being natural. From their very first broadcast they said that they were open to all viewpoints and willing to give airtime to any party's representatives. They were true to their avowed principles on the day that we turned to them.

Had they declined, I would not have blamed them. Since I know for sure that PRAVDA would hardly have published a statement by, say, the leadership of "Democratic Russia" during the peaceful days. Just imagine if the junta had won and driven underground all parties, apart from the Communist Party. Would anyone have risked making such a request to us? I think that there are no doubts as to the answer. Or PRAVDA's reaction.

This is a lesson that must be learned.

I repeat in the wake of my colleagues from IZVESTIYA, we were not awarded the honor of being shut down by the junta. The new authorities did that. They did not

shut us down, but merely suspended our publication so that PRAVDA journalists could have a rethink and shake off the ideological dandruff. Today we are publishing again, and God grant that we can prove to people that the changes which they have found in the newspaper's appearance are not mere window dressing.

We will strive to work in such a way that PRAVDA will be the first paper shut down by the next junta, if there is one.

You cannot surprise or stun anyone with the photographs that you see on this page today [the rest of page 3 is occupied by photographs taken by PRAVDA journalists of events in Moscow during the coup]. The chronicle of those three days has been inscribed on photographic, movie, and video film today. But I do not think that the PRAVDA journalists' photographs will be superfluous.

It is just a pity that these photographs are being published only today.

I must say that PRAVDA's photographers suffered chronic bad luck. They visited the hottest spots in the country, taking equally hot photographs. But our editorial office, through fear either of burning their fingers or of getting their knuckles rapped, "took no notice" of these photographs.

That was the case with the Karabakh, Fergana, and Lithuanian series taken by M. Skurikhina, for instance. The most that she was allowed was to set up informal photographic exhibitions for internal consumption. That was also the initial fate of the photographs taken during the putsch—on the streets of Moscow and particularly outside the Russian "White House." She and her PRAVDA colleagues spent two days among its defenders and did not forget their professional duty as journalists for a minute. They took photographs though they were more than confident that PRAVDA, authorized by the junta, would not authorize these photographs.

But is that important for a journalist?

Should a journalist not reflect the mood in society verbally and through photos? Regrettably, we often used to reflect not life in all its diversity, but party life, in strict accordance with the absurd notions of the prophets on Staraya Square. For we were merely journalists.

We were party journalists.

That is why real life was such a source of irritation for PRAVDA journalists. It did not fit in with the all-purpose schemes of progressive theory. So much the worse for it—for life. If you do not fit it, we will make you!

As a result we did not fit in with a very important twist of fate for our country and people.

Today we have a chance not to remain on the sidelines. A chance to be part of a society that is undergoing, has undergone renewal.

There are no second chances.

Look at these photographs, they are now part of our history. The history of a newspaper that wants people to need it.

PRAVDA Apologizes for Having To Raise Price

*PM0309092991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
31 Aug 91 Single Edition p 6*

[Editorial announcement: "Please, Excuse Us"]

[Text] The newspaper's editorial office apologizes to its readers for the fact that this issue of the newspaper has a retail price of 15 kopeks. This is an enforced measure. Our accounts are regrettably still frozen [blokirovany]. We also sustained great losses during our period of enforced idleness. We will try to reduce the price as soon as financial and organizational matters are settled.

PRAVDA Denies It Was Subsidized by CPSU Central Committee

*PM0309143591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
31 Aug 91 Single Edition p 1*

[Unattributed announcement under "We Give Information" rubric: "Who 'Kept' PRAVDA?"]

[Text] A number of reports have appeared in the mass media to the effect that in the past the CPSU Central Committee subsidized the publication of PRAVDA. This is untrue. The publishing house's records on this score testify that the paper's annual profits in the early postwar period amounted to 7-10 million rubles [R], and from 1954, to R15-24 million.

And in all from 1945 through 1990 the paper gave R815,742,000 to the party coffers.

Thus the property which the editorial offices possesses has been paid for many times over by the labor of several generations of PRAVDA staff, and so the editorial collective has not only a moral, but also a juridical right to this property.

PRAVDA Urges Readers To Contribute News, Ideas

*PM0309094391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
31 Aug 91 Single Edition p 6*

[News Desk announcement: "We Will Buy News"]

[Text] The newspaper's new status also gives rise to its novel news concept. We intend to provide you with all the news that the majority may find interesting. Any events will be subjects for PRAVDA's reporters ranging, from pure sensation to "insoluble" problems at the everyday level: from encounters with "flying saucers" to impromptu interviews with politicians. In short, PRAVDA will reflect all interesting events in the country.

Our correspondents have been and are working on these problems, but we need your help, esteemed readers. We will be delighted with any practical suggestions, we are ready to gratefully listen to your advice and comments, and, needless to say, we are waiting for all kinds of news and original ideas from you.

The most reputable newspaper is the best informed newspaper. PRAVDA hopes to be just that with your help, readers.

Incidentally, despite PRAVDA's difficult financial position, we are now concerned as to what incentive to give to those who provide the newspaper with the most interesting and "freshest" news.

Be bold!

Our news hotline number is 257-32-18.

[Signed] News Desk

IZVESTIYA Staff on Paper's Future Identity

*PM0209150391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 Aug 91 Union Edition p 1*

[Article by "IZVESTIYA staff": "To Our Readers"]

[Text] Let us begin with two of the many telegrams the editorial office has received recently.

The first is an anonymous one from Vinnitsa: "Give the paper back its old masthead and all the orders. Otherwise you will lose millions of subscribers." The second is from a reader called Smorgonskiy in Novocherkassk: "I welcome your decision to become an independent newspaper. We have always believed in you, supported you, and struggled together for the triumph of democracy."

These extreme viewpoints make our job easier—to explain, in the first place, what has happened at IZVESTIYA, and, second, to say what kind of IZVESTIYA we envisage in the future.

Most of you are no doubt aware of the conflict in our editorial office, which has gone on for around a year. It has been reported in the press and on radio and television. It was a matter of confrontation between the paper's former chief editor N. Yefimov and most of the members of the editorial collegium and editorial collective. It was no ordinary industrial conflict, no difference of opinion regarding organizational or technological issues, but a clash of political positions, opposition to an attempt to make the paper serve the interests of ruling party and state structures. At one extreme you have the idea of perestroika as a "cosmetic" repair of the administrative edict system (that was the position of the then chief editor); at the other you have the belief in the need for radical democratic reforms in all spheres of our life that was and is the position of most of the IZVESTIYA staff).

The current changes at IZVESTIYA are consonant with the processes that have been taking place in the country

since the failure of the unconstitutional coup. Although far smaller in scale, they have the same logic. And if one objectively analyzes IZVESTIYA, what kind of paper it has been during the years of perestroika, one may conclude that our paper also made a contribution to the long-awaited victory for democratic forces, a victory that has now occurred, one hopes. Even when you consider the difficult situation IZVESTIYA was in during the coup, which was frankly described in the decision taken on 22 August by the editorial collegium and editorial collective: "We missed out on the honor of the ban that the junta imposed on the country's best publications." If it expected to bring us to heel, the junta was mistaken.

We say this not as an excuse and certainly not out of a desire to point out our merits, but to stress that the decision to establish an independent IZVESTIYA newspaper and renounce the old founder was dictated not by immediate considerations, but by our beliefs and the objective demands of social development and transition from glasnost to freedom of expression.

By demanding that the paper be given back its orders, the anonymous writer from Vinnitsa is touching on a very significant question. It is not a matter of orders. It is something else: Is IZVESTIYA a new paper? No. It is the rightful heir to the papers IZVESTIYA of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, IZVESTIYA of Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the USSR, and IZVESTIYA of Soviets of People's Deputies of the USSR. The formal evidence of this is the preservation of the key word by which our paper has always been known in the country and throughout the world, and also the brief phrase alongside it: "The paper has been published since March 1917."

But there is an informal argument too. We do not want to and we will not abandon IZVESTIYA's traditions. Moreover, it is they that form the foundation of independent IZVESTIYA. Not just today, the revolutionary situation, the atmosphere of new-found freedom, but our past experience dictates to us the future paper's program.

So IZVESTIYA will be an independent, social-political, union daily newspaper.

On the basis of the generally accepted, civilized norm of freedom of the press, it will inform people about all that is happening in the country and in the world. We deem it our professional duty to use the pages of IZVESTIYA for the expression of various views of events: Our paper is open to dialogue. We also confirm our adherence to the principles of democracy, respect for the law and human rights, and interethnic accord. We are convinced that freedom of choice is the only possible basis for a normal economy.

We are well aware that by becoming an independent publication we will face difficult organizational and financial problems. But we are sure that they can be resolved. It is our belief that this is guaranteed by the

IZVESTIYA journalists' indestructible harmony with the print workers and the collective of the IZVESTIYA publishing house. Only by working together can we cope with the difficulties and make maximum use of the potential of a free economy.

Finally, concerning the loss of millions of subscribers, predicted by the writer of the telegram from Vinnitsa. In this case, much, if not everything, depends on us. The reader forms his opinion of a newspaper not from declarations or appeals to workers of the world, but from the newspaper. And from the newspaper alone.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Journalists Address Readership

PM0309004791 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 3 Sep 91 Single Edition p 1

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA journalists' address: "To Readers of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA"]

[Text] The long days of silence imposed on SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA by the RSFSR presidential decree are behind us. In this time we suffered a great deal: public insults, telephone terror by anonymous ill-wishers, and threats of physical reprisals. That was particularly hard to take because the editorial collective gave no cause for the groundless accusations. On the first day of the extraordinary session of the USSR Supreme Soviet the editorial collective sent an appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet, to USSR President M.S. Gorbachev, and to RSFSR President B.N. Yeltsin resolutely condemning the attempted anticonstitutional coup by the group of adventurists. The newspaper effectively fell hostage to irresponsible political intriguers.

Dear Readers! At a difficult hour for the newspaper we heard your resolute voice, your demand for us to stand our ground, not to crack, and not to allow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA to perish. Here, for instance, is what Muscovite worker Yu.I. Morozov suggested when he brought his letter to the editorial official "Give SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA to us, the people. Give us the right to a people's monopoly over it." We received a host of similar appeals. They helped us stand our ground and make our choice. Last Friday the newspaper was reregistered and the requisite documents for its publication procured. Only technical difficulties and failures of production coordination prevented the publication of a Saturday edition.

What is the purpose of this reregistration? Does this not herald the regeneration of the newspaper, a change of course? These alarming questions have been voiced down editorial telephones and in a flood of cables. They are simultaneously both easy and difficult to answer. First, the reregistration was necessary due to the change in the newspaper's founder. The editorial labor collective voiced no-confidence in its former founder—the CPSU Central Committee—and decided to undertake the complex functions of founder. But publishing a newspaper

requires plenty of funds. We are grateful to the "Zavid-ya" firm, which expressed a desire to be the newspaper's cofounder and gave us the initial necessary guarantees.

During its existence SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA has indeed been a people's publication. Its current 2-million circulation and vast readers' mailbag are the best confirmation of that. The editorial office's creative collective has throughout this period tried to be a truly independent platform for the expression of the people's opinion. And it is utterly natural that on reregistering the newspaper acquired the official status of an independent people's publication.

But this by no means signifies that SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA has given up the humane noble aims avowed by the honest Communists of the Russian Federation. It is Russia's rank-and-file Communists who are now suffering the greatest humiliations and insults. We will still insist on defending their personal human dignity and will uphold everyone's right to their own political views and convictions. But today as never before the broadest people's masses need our firm and consistent protection. Millions of Soviet working people, workers, specialists in various fields and sectors, veterans, and young people. Day after day the number of refugees of various nationalities is growing and the number of unemployed, homeless, and disadvantaged people is increasing. We journalists and readers of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA must talk about their troubles. SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA will be your newspaper because you will be its permanent authors. Together we will strive to secure social justice, a worthy existence, and the true revival of Russia.

Our power itself—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—and its historical, cultural, and spiritual values need protection.

The rising generation has found itself threatened with corruption and bitterness. Young hearts and minds must be freed from the prison of banality, nihilism, callousness, and the collapse and destruction of moral and panhuman values and the ideals of patriotism and integrity must be halted.

A vast amount of intense work lies ahead. We can only do it together, united by the awareness of this important historic task, united by the pages of the independent people's SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

KOMMUNIST Collective Creates New Journal

PM3008102191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Aug 91 Union Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "Journalists Cast Off Fetters"]

[Text] The leading journals and newspapers of the country, republics, and oblasts are becoming fully independent.

The editorial collective which has until now published the journal KOMMUNIST, well known in recent years

for its reformist orientation, has created the theoretical and political journal SVOBODNAYA MYSL, which has proclaimed itself an open rostrum for democratic left-wing forces.

N. Bikenin has been elected chief editor of the new journal.

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Sets Up Publishing Business

914B0353C Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 34, 28 Aug 91 p 9

["Resolutions of the Labor Collectives of the Editorial Office and the Publishing and Production Association LITERATURNAYA GAZETA"—LITERATURNAYA GAZETA headline]

[Text] The working secretariat of the USSR Union of Writers Board supported antidemocratic tendencies in the Union of Writers for a long time, and in the days of the coup engaged in negotiations with a representative of the conspirators and did not state its condemnation for their activities at this decisive moment.

The true underpinnings of the repressive decision by the working secretariat of the Union of Writers to separate the editorial office of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA from the publishing house and the printing plant, and to transform the latter into the Publishing and Production Association [IPO] of the USSR Union of Writers became clear during the coup. This was not only a way to strangle the editorial office economically, despite the fact that this was becoming an increasingly realistic prospect with every passing month. It is now obvious that this was a way to deprive the editorial office of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA of its traditional influence on the publishing policy of the Publishing and Production Association and to provide material, technical, and production facilities for reactionary forces in the Union of Writers—the editorial offices of DEN, LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, NASH SOVREMENNİK, and MOSKOVSKIY LITERATOR.

The labor collectives made the following decisions:

1. To consider the "Resolution of the USSR Union of Writers Board Secretariat on Changing the Functions of the Publishing and Production Association LITERATURNAYA GAZETA," dated 17 September 1990, void and subject to cancellation. The charter of the USSR Union of Writers IPO is likewise subject to cancellation.

2. To form an independent association consisting of the following under RSFSR laws:

1) editorial office of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA;

2) publishing house of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA together with its component printing plant, motor vehicle pool, and other organizations reporting to it.

To establish the name of the association: the Editorial and Publishing Production Association LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (RIPO LG).

3. To establish that the editor in chief of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA simultaneously heads the RIPO LG and engages in the general management of its operations.

4. To prepare a charter of the RIPO LG which takes into account the interests of the labor collectives belonging to the association, and register it accordingly through established procedures.

5. Taking into account that assets (fixed assets and working capital) of the publishing house, and subsequently the IPO, have been accumulated over decades mainly from the proceeds from publishing LITERATURNAYA GAZETA:

1) to consider the existing publishing, production, social, and service facilities of the IPO LITERATURNAYA GAZETA the property of RIPO LG;

2) to acknowledge that the RIPO LG is the legal successor of the IPO LITERATURNAYA GAZETA.

To request that the RSFSR Ministry of the Press and Mass Media certify this by an appropriate act.

6. To request that the RSFSR Ministry of the Press and Mass Media allocate material and technical supply quotas for the RIPO LG, including newsprint, within the limits envisaged for the IPO LITERATURNAYA GAZETA and its publications in the USSR national economic plan.

7. To consider it necessary to provide financial support for writers in the future, and to continue transferring an agreed-upon percentage of the RIPO LG profits to the organizations of writers to this end.

Literary Paper Linked to Defense Ministry

914B0353B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 34, 28 Aug 91 p 3

[Article by Sergey Kiselev: "DEN Is Closed. Everybody Is Out to Putsch"]

[Text] "Newspaper of the USSR Union of Writers"—this was the caption on the first page of the newspaper DEN which was, as a matter of fact, closed last week by the Secretariat of the USSR Union of Writers Board as a publication which engaged in ideological preparations for the coup d'état. The address of the editorial office was indicated among publication particulars on the last page: "103662, Moscow Center, 30 Tsvetnoy Boulevard."

We may now say with complete confidence that both the above attributions are forgeries which camouflaged the genuine masters, curators, and protectors of DEN, and

those who financed this newspaper (it would be interesting to know what the item of expenditure is). At issue is the USSR Ministry of Defense.

This has to do with the fact that only the office of DEN Editor in Chief A. Prokhanov was located at 30 Tsvetnoy Boulevard, in the former publishing house of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA which was taken away from us when LITERATURNAYA GAZETA proclaimed its independence of officials from the writers' ministry. As far as the whereabouts of his coworkers and comrades-in-arms was concerned, this was shrouded in official secrecy. Where and at what desks do they compile their anti-perestroika articles, on whose typewriters do they retype them, and whose machinery do they use for computer typesetting? All of our attempts to find out were in vain. The secret associated with the true address of the DEN editorial office was so closely guarded, as if, at the very least, a super-secret military installation of strategic significance were at issue.

Last Friday, our search produced results after all. We succeeded in locating a semi-underground editorial office of the DEN newspaper which was indeed situated at... a military installation, the Krutitsy Yard, next to the Moscow Garrison Guardhouse.

An employee of the Investigations Department of the Moscow Garrison, a lawyer lieutenant colonel, told us how DEN infiltrated a military installation:

"Several months ago, Marshal Yazov's deputy, Commander of Ground Forces, General of the Army Valentin Varennikov (one of the "signatories" of the ideological and theoretical program for a coup d'etat entitled "A Word to the People" which was published on 23 July of this year in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA; an active organizer and participant in the coup; arrested together with former Minister of Defense Yazov—note by Sergey Kiselev) appeared here. He ordered that the district construction directorate be moved out of a huge building, and the editorial office of the newspaper DEN be moved onto the premises released. The order was carried out within one day. Repairs done by soldiers free of charge, of course, took one week. The Ministry of Defense allocated the best and newest furniture and office equipment for the newspaper of marshals and generals. They say that the military-industrial complex furnished a powerful computer for the editorial office. Since then, construction officers have huddled on poorly adapted premises with four to five people sharing one desk whereas I have never seen more than two to three staffers in the editorial office of DEN where they have uncouncted excellently appointed and spacious offices. On the day of the military coup, they locked the editorial office and left, and they have not shown up since..."

Therefore, the editorial office of the newspaper DEN is locked, both literally and figuratively. However, I would like to believe that the investigation which is now reconstructing the entire picture of preparing and accomplishing the coup d'etat in the country will succeed

in clarifying the role of DEN and the role of its former Editor in Chief A. Prokhanov in the organization of the coup, and will also respond to the following question: Why did the USSR Ministry of Defense need to secretly incorporate into its structure this "literary" publication? Really, were the highly patriotic KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL not enough?

...For now, the soldiers are looking over the premises usurped by the newspaper DEN. It looks like they will have to once again carry furniture out of there. Or perhaps use the furniture?..

Kazakh, Sverdlovsk Papers Change Status

PM3008103191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Aug 91 Union Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "Meanwhile, in the Provinces..."]

[Text] The journalists of the newspaper KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA have decided to renounce the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee's status as founder of the newspaper. They have proclaimed their press organ a republican sociopolitical newspaper. The labor collective is becoming one of its founders.

"Some of the newspaper's staffers have applied to leave the party," said Sergey Stepanov, the deputy chief editor. "But the majority believe that there is nothing to leave—there is no party as such."

And the labor collective of the oblast sociopolitical newspaper URALSKIY RABOCHIY published in Sverdlovsk has renounced cofounder status with the CPSU oblast committee in connection with the Russian president's decree "on the suspension of the activity of the RSFSR Communist Party" and has become the newspaper's sole founder.

The journalists have decided to register their newspaper at the RSFSR Ministry of the Press and Mass Media and have stated their right to a share of the property in the oblast committee publishing house and suggested creating a joint-stock company at its production base.

Future of Soviet Central Television Under Discussion

PM3008132091 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 Aug 91 Union Edition p 6

[Article by VI. Arsenyev under the general heading: "Television and Us. Yegor Yakovlev Talks and Demonstrates"]

[Text] The All-Union Television and Radio Company heard the news of Yegor Yakovlev's appointment during the general meeting of representatives of television and radio editorial boards and services. It was held on 27 August. By an irony of fate, it was announced by

Vladimir Molchanov, who left Central Television recently on a matter of principle.

Many experts I talked to the day before agreed that the global, multichannel octopus by the name of Central Television exists no more. It is a matter of time, they thought, before the death certificate is drawn up. They were expecting reorganization and staff cuts. At Ostankino, Shabalovka, and Pyatnitskaya, where All-Union State Television and Radio Company editorial offices and services are situated, they were all but in funereal mood. Those whom Kravchenko had smiled on just did not know what to do, what their job was now. Russian Television, which is visibly blossoming, is closed to them. All that remained for them to do was to establish, if they could, on the present foundation, a number of independent studios operating on a joint-stock basis and specializing in particular topics.

This was discussed, of course, at the meeting. There were moments of repentance (general repentance, as it were, for the whole of Central Television). People talked about how audaciously the leaders and staffers of, for example, the Moscow television channel had behaved during the coup. But, really, the main question was not who would now head the company, but what would happen to the company, what kind of company it would be in the future.

There was no clear, precise answer to this question. But then, the problem can scarcely be resolved in a matter of hours. It is an enormous television and radio company, the biggest in the world—there are 20,000 and more people working there, it is a department, a body, a state institution, which costs money, a very great deal of money to run. In 1991, for instance, 2.8 billion rubles [R] were allocated from the state budget for the needs of the All-Union State Television and Radio Company. Nearly R2 billion are needed to pay for Ministry of Communications technical services. That is food for thought.

Whatever happens, it will obviously be necessary to switch to economic accountability and develop advertising. Introduce subscriptions perhaps. This scenario is not ruled out by Viktor Zharkov, head of the company's legal service. Other speakers at the meeting even said that instead of the present company one might establish a corporation, uniting the independent studios.

I would point out that aside from the All-Union Television and Radio Company, we still have Russian Television as state television. I talked with Russian Television head Anatoliy Lysenko. A decree by the RSFSR president gave the entire second all-union channel to Russian Television. Is it possible to start negotiations on sharing, for example, technical facilities with the All-Union State Television and Radio Company? Anatoliy Grigoryevich thinks it is possible, and not that difficult. Kravchenko was exaggerating, he said, when he said that reallocation or sharing was impossible. Moreover, in Lysenko's opinion, the very television broadcasting system needs reorganizing. Moscow television should be independent,

separate from central. And what we call the Central Television first program also needs restructuring. Lysenko thinks that it would be better if it were a channel for interethnic communication, bringing together programs made at different studios in the country. There has to be a presidential hour or some other program for the country's president, of course. But it would be better, more expedient if the "Community" ["Sodruzhestvo"] channel were to be Central Television's first channel.

Vladimir Tsvetov was rather more cautious in his view of the future of the All-Union State Television and Radio Company. The country's president, he reckons, will try not to relinquish control of the power structures. Television is also an instrument of power, and a very considerable one at that. There will not be a return to the old days. But one should not expect swift changes either, he said.

At the time of the conversations they did not know of the appointment of Yakovlev. But one thing was clear even then: We can expect a television the like of which we have not seen before.

First Deputy Head of State TV Company Tenders Resignation

*PM0209105991 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 28 Aug 91 p 2*

[K. Belyaninov report: "Yegor Yakovlev. New Appointment"]

[Excerpts] Yesterday Yegor Yakovlev, chief editor of MOSKOVSKIY NOVOSTI, was appointed chairman of the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, by decree of the USSR president. [passage omitted]

Meanwhile at Central Television: A general meeting took place at Central Television yesterday during which Valentin Lazutkin, first deputy chairman of the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, asked to resign. "I am unsullied in the face of God and the president," he said, "but this is my choice. I feel morally responsible for everything that has happened and do not think it possible to continue my work."

Despite the fact that the assembly did not accept his resignation, Valentin Lazutkin did not withdraw his application.

Television commentators Sergey Lomakin and Vladimir Stefanov, who presented news programs during the putsch, have not appeared on television since.

TV Operations During Coup Examined

*PM0309155791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 Aug 91 Second Edition p 4*

[Captain Third Rank V. Yermolin report: "Even the Television Screen Is Going Red. Press Conference in Ostankino"]

[Text] Strictly speaking, this was a press conference with elements of an internal editorial meeting. Its main "defendant" (and initiator), V. Lazutkin, first deputy chairman of the All-Union Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, told us and his colleagues about what happened on the premises of Central Television between 19 and 21 August, who organized the work in the face of the state of emergency, and how. And for their part, the Central Television employees who were at the press conference started developing the theme too. For some reason things centered on the article in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI where V. Lazutkin is accused of sympathizing with the State Committee on the State of Emergency.

It must be said straight away that all those present, who evidently know their first deputy chairman well, confirmed his alibi: He did not say the words that MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI attributes to him, and he occupied a dignified position during the days of the putsch insofar as this was possible in his post.

It can be assumed that the fact that V. Lazutkin, who was already resolutely intending to resign, was made equally resolutely to stay in his post by the editorial collective at a general meeting, and by the new chairman Ye. Yakovlev, says a great deal. The latter, incidentally, condemned the article in his former newspaper. I think that we can consider the matter closed. How MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI will behave, what form of satisfaction V. Lazutkin will insist on—all that is the sphere of interest of reporters from the gutter press.

As I understand it, the general intention was to deal with the way the Central Television workers, and mainly those of the "Vremya," TSN, and "Utro" news programs, managed to "push" the truth about the situation in the country during the days of the coup onto the airwaves in the face of totalitarian control (as of 19 August practically all the workers of the Central Television network were supervised, as Lazutkin said, "by unknown people in civilian clothes"). And the fact that the truth was in fact "pushed through" can most probably be confirmed by any one of us who switched on their television sets from time to time during those days. For example, what about Medvedev's report on the "Vremya" program on the first day of the rule of the State Committee on the State of Emergency? Remember, we were then shown Moscow making a stand—B. Yeltsin, the tanks, the barricades, and the people who intended to defend these barricades to the last. V. Lazutkin explained that immediately after this report was shown, Pugo rang him up and threatened him with every earthly punishment. Then Prokofyev expressed his indignation at the subjective depiction of the mood of the people's masses... And, curiously enough, only one putschist... Yanayev, praised the report. But these are just details, features for future chroniclers.

Today it is high time to think about how we are to live in the future. A. Tikhomirov, a Russian parliamentary representative at Central Television, raised the issue

authoritatively, like a commissar: "Why did these people not defend 'Seven Days,' 'Vzglyad,' or 'Before and After Midnight'?" I instantaneously imagined what mammoth efforts all of these former and present colleagues, those who survived disgrace and those who avoided it, will have to now make, what moral obstacles they have to overcome so that they can get used to each other, return to work properly, and get involved in "their old business." Is it possible for them to be reunited either today or even tomorrow?

Alas, the formula for post-putsch life wittily invented by the USSR president—"who's who"—can be applied to the Central Television premises as well. Otherwise why would the employees of the "Kravchenko times" try, one after another, to scrupulously present proof of their rebel position during the days of the coup? However, half of the country is now involved in this. And "commissars in dusty helmets" strictly make sure that an "unclean" person does not leap into the company of "clean" people.

I am not going to judge the political traits of Kravchenko's Central Television. There is only one thing I know for sure—it made quite boring television. What kind of television will Ye. Yakovlev show us? We will wait and see. But I convinced that we will not see anything good if behind the curtains of the television screen there are inquisitions and a careful elucidation of who was who before August 1991.

In conclusion, I will take the liberty of expressing a "seditious" —by today's standards—thought that if the State Committee on the State of Emergency really had as many supporters as there are people suspected of sympathizing with it today, then why did it not stay sitting in its eight chairs even for three days?

Reporting on Coup 'Accomplices' Disputed

914B0361A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 28 Aug 91 p 1

[Article by Oleg Tekhmenev and Natalya Kozlova:
"Report, and They Will Respond?.."]

[Text] The telephone had been busy for half an hour. However, we continued to dial. Deep inside, a vein of fear and horror pulsed—could "the accomplices of the junta" be really that many? Our fear was understandable. On 26 August, the information program of Russian TV informed millions of TV viewers, through the lips of anchor Yuriy Rostov, that they were allowed to "report" now. Those wishing to do so were given contact phones. They could report at these numbers whoever, in the opinion of TV viewers, helped the coupists by word, deed, or even a stare. Yes, indeed, precisely a stare because tacit approval of the coup was also considered criminal.

There was a whiff of the seemingly forgotten cellars of Lubyanka...

It was not easy to get through. Finally, a pleasant male voice notified us that he was listening to us attentively. It turns out that the phones are located in the "White House" and belong to the information group of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense Issues. Of course, they do not accept any denunciations there.

Everything turned out to be a regular "canard," to be sure, at a clearly inappropriate time and under inappropriate circumstances. As it turns out, the committee indeed accepts complaints, but only from servicemen who have been discharged unjustifiably. The committee has always engaged in this. Under the current circumstances, the committee has only one additional function—organizing the national guard of Russia. As Aleksandr Sychev, an employee of the committee, told us, he and his colleagues were outraged by this TV announcement on "Vesti." They have lodged an official protest with television on this account.

It should by no means be forgotten that freedom has two facets—the right to say whatever you see fit, and the duty to be responsible for all you say. We need the old motto of Hippocrates—do no harm!—more than anything else at present. Of course, this does not apply to criminals who should be punished UNDER THE LAW.

State Television To Hold 'Competition' for News Team

LD0109213391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 1 Sep 91

[Studio interview with Eduard Mikhaylovich Sagalayev, first deputy chairman of the USSR State Television and

Radio Company, by announcer Tatyana Kovarova; from the "TV Inform" newscast—live]

[Excerpts] [Tatyana Komarova] As changes are taking place at the USSR State Television and Radio Company—evidently we will be changing both the style and form of work—I think this directly concerns not only us, but also you. For this reason we have in the studio the company's first deputy chairman, Eduard Mikhaylovich Sagalayev. We await your information.

[Sagalayev] Good evening. All these past few days we, television employees, have been debating what television should be like, what it should be like in your interests, as Tatyana rightly said. Because now we would like it to be television not for a narrow group of persons, but television for the people. It is a most difficult task. A most difficult problem. Passions are raging over this problem both among viewers, and to be honest, among our own editorial collectives—and above all in the collective of the main news desk of the "Vremya" program, in which the most diverse creative concepts and the most diverse ideas are emerging.

Upon the instructions of the chairman of the Gosteleradio Company, it has been decided to hold a competition: Air time is the prize. Various creative groups will take part in this competition, and from Monday [2 September] at 2100 Moscow time, a new model of a news program will come out. Then a week later another creative group will join in this competition and will offer you its model. [passage omitted]

The only thing I can say is that I am committed to the result, to the success of this work. So I will put all my effort and all my experience behind the teams, whichever ones they are. [passage omitted]

Resistance Revealed New Generation

914B0340B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Aug 91
Union Edition p 3

[Article by I. Ovchinnikova: "Unfrightened Children"]

[Text] You know, reader, I winced when Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov said what I was thinking all of these days: During six years, not only, of course, in the capital, but throughout the whole country, absolutely new people grew up, with a different cast of mind and a different method of behavior. They were 10, 12, and 15 in 1985, and the clay from which they were molded did not harden yet. Therefore, they, as became clear in the tragic days and nights from 19 to 22 August, do not know the fear that soaked itself in the flesh and blood of the older generation, and they did not have to transform themselves in order to respond to the call of civic conscience. And, for heaven's sake, forgive me for using a hackneyed but innocent term—these fellows are really ready for a heroic deed, although, I think, they will never define what they are doing in this way. Simply everything that was unnatural and unthinkable for our generation remained the property of individuals, and for them it goes without saying.

A year and a half ago, I replied from the pages of IZVESTIYA to Moscow teacher N. Shurkova, who sent a letter to the editorial office that was full of alarm about the fact that our children were being shaped in a situation of scoffing at the highest values, such as, work, history, the revolution, citizen, and comrade. I took exception: It is not true, our children are growing up to be discerning, and this means that in a little while it will become forever impossible to entice us to "the wrong place," to ensnare us in a lie, and to poison us with fear.

At that time, of course, I could not even have thought that time will decide our argument so soon and that our boys and girls will pass the strictest exam that life can offer. It was only yesterday that I thought with anguish what the teachers will say to the students after crossing the thresholds of their classrooms on the first day of the new academic year, what they will summon them to, and to what kinds of models of human behavior they will refer. Today, I am not worried about them. They will tell the children about the 19-year-old soldiers and the youthful officers, who dared not to execute criminal orders. About the young TV journalist Sergey Medvedev who put his brilliant and fast-rising career on the altar of professional duty and who was very quickly demoted from a political columnist to a rank and file correspondent. Of the unbroken "Vzglyad" members who supported with their word of honor their contemporaries who were standing in lines around the White House. Of the young newspaper boys from NEZAVISIMAYA, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, and KOMSOMOLKA, which put out their publications contrary to all prohibitions and pasted the still fresh pages on the walls of neighborhood buildings and in metro entrance ways. About the militia of the same age who pretended that

they did not notice either those who were doing the pasting, or those who stood on tiptoes reading above heads every word of truth.

Thus, they, our children, understand the highest values, and this is the kind of sense that they put into the concept of Motherland, and honor. They have already written their own page in the country's history, and they have already left for descendants the example that citizen is not a pretty word, but a deed, a heavy burden under which one can fall, but which cannot be shunned.

However, yesterday, no matter how grand and beautiful it was, has passed. Today has come. But today our children will need a different courage, but courage all the same. For the reason that it is required in our difficult life not only to build barricades, but ordinary houses as well. The courage to teach, to heal, to bake bread, to give birth to and rear children, and to get out of the quagmire that has engulfed us deeper and deeper for more than seven decades. To stand, finally, on solid ground, on a path which was blazed by the rest of humanity and which, on a level with it, fell to our sons and daughters.

And it will come more bitterly for them than for us, because it is they, no matter what happens, who will have to overcome a habit sown in the genes to receive everything from the hands of a good uncle: an apartment and a pass to a rest home, a bonus and "registration" at a good polyclinic, a car with a personal driver, and an official trip abroad. But a good uncle operates (one wants to think, operated) exactly like a magpie: She gave to one, but she did not give to the other. But where did the magpie get the pot of porridge? She herself did not go for water, nor did she cook the porridge—and she took from everyone of us the fruits of our labor without exception, but she served a full plate only to the most obedient for exemplary behavior.

It will never be this way again. In these three days of August, the end came for the clever magpie. And different names will arise. I do not know about others, but I am inspired by the very young farmers; however, it is better to say it in Russian—free tillers of the soil, who one after the other are pulling the spokes out of the wheels placed there by all and every kind of Starodubtsev. It is not possible that they will not clear the road from which their grandfathers were chased a half century ago. I like the young entrepreneurs who so importantly and bravely pronounce the forgotten words: market, stock, and firm. I know that I will not be able to earn enough for the kind of cars that they drive, nor the kind of summer homes that they are building for themselves. And most likely my children also will not earn enough. But, looking at them not with envy, but with jealousy, I want my granddaughter to learn one thing: A person must pay for everything on earth himself, not receive something from the hands of a stranger, not take what is

not earned, and not ever beg anyone for anything. If, of course, he is physically and mentally healthy.

Yes, 10 days after the first lessons, the teacher finally will not have to go far for so-called positive examples. The three days that we lived through have revealed them in such numbers that it makes it possible to destroy the moral obstructions that were formed over the decades and that consisted mostly of distorted ideas. There is an opportunity today to suffuse each of them with genuine meaning. As if under a magnifying glass, we saw loyalty and betrayal, cowardice and chivalry, and truth and

treason. One does not have to act against one's conscience, nor dig into dusty books to tell the children who is who and what is what.

We, the older ones, spoke about what we thought in whispers, in kitchens. Our children spoke out loud in the streets. But words did not amount to much as long as they were not reinforced by actions. They, our unfrightened children, showed that they are capable of operating by confronting brute force with the force of an indomitable spirit. And this is the main guarantee that tomorrow indeed will be another day.

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